Nationalism and Democracy in Tanzania

A thesis presented to

the faculty of the College of Arts and Science of Ohio University

In partial fulfillment

of the requirements for the degree

Master of Arts

Eun kyung Kim

June 2008 2 This thesis titled

Nationalism and Democracy in Tanzania

by

EUN KYUNG KIM

has been approved for

the Political Science

and the College of Arts and Science by

Dauda Abubakar

Visiting Assistant Professor of Political Science

Benjamin M. Ogles

Dean, College of Arts and Sciences 3 ABSTRACT

KIM, EUN KYUNG, M.A., June 2008, Political Science

Nationalism and Democracy in Tanzania (104 pp.)

Director of Thesis: Dauda Abubakar

Julius Nyerere’s one-party democracy, prolonged over three decades in independent Tanzania, succeeded in unifying an ethnically diverse population and making Tanzania a relatively stable African state by emphasizing nationalist ideals.

Affected by the one-partyism and Nyerere’s respected rule, Tanzania has maintained a single-party dominated state without plural representation and has generally enjoyed social and political unity even after the transition to the multi-party system. This unity is due in large measure to the success of Nyerere’s original nationalist ideals, in which the people find no need to differentiate their political and economic interests but appreciate egalitarian value. Based on my qualitative research and textual analysis – relying on secondary sources, public opinion polls, and profiles provided by election monitoring institutions on democratization in post-Nyerere Tanzania – it appears that this one-party dominated democracy will continue to promote Nyerere’s nationalism and will keep gaining legitimacy at least in the short term. However, to advance the cause of democracy, Tanzania needs to gradually open its political system to be responsive to various demands.

Approved:

Dauda Abubakar

Visiting Assistant Professor of Political Science 4 ACKNOWLEDGEMENT

I am very grateful to my advisor Dauda Abubakar for guiding me through the completion of this thesis and granting the intellectual support and academic advice.

With a grateful heart, I would like to acknowledge great teachers who have inspired

and encouraged me: Dr. James Mosher from whom I have learned to love political

science and took confidence in the study; Dr. Myra Waterburry who inspired me to

explore the facts and realities critically; Dr. Takaaki Suzuki for the generous support

for scholarship and the intellectual stimulation; and Dr. Lisa Aubrey who has encouraged and trusted me even in her physical distress and in her absence at OU.

I give special thanks to my cohorts for their compassion, encouragement, and everlasting friendship: Ayumi, Ping Quei, Moayad, Unie, Jullie, Erica, Drew, and the brilliant others. I also owe warm thanks to Shawn Selby and Andrew Carlson for much time spent on continuous revising of my thesis.

Much thanks to my father Sung-sub, my mother Chun-hwa, and my brother

Woo-hyun for all times they are concerned about me with the love, patience, support, and assistance. I am also grateful to my church members who have been praying for me to be nurtured and to grow in joy.

Finally, along the way the Lord sent many who were just the help needed at the moment. Much thanks for his grace. 5 TABLE OF CONTENTS

Page

Abstract……………………………………………………………………………….3

Acknowledgement…………………………………………………………………….4

List of Tables………………………………………………………………………….6

List of Figures………………………………………………………………………...7

Chapter 1: Introduction………………………………………………………………8 I. An Overview of Colonialism in Africa…………………………………...13 II. Post-colonial History…………………………………………………….16 i. Nationalism in Africa……………………………………………….17 ii. Authoritarianism in Africa…………………………………………..22 iii. Cultural Pluralism & Democratization in Africa……………………24 III. Theories…………………………………………………………………27 i. Nation-building Strategy…………………………………………...27 ii. Personal Rule……………………………………………………….30 IV. Summary of Chapters……………………………………………………32 Chapter 2: Nationalism & National Integration in Tanzania…………………………35 I. Colonial Legacy in Tanzania……………………………………………...36 II. TANU & Nationalism……………………………………………………38 III. Julius Nyerere…………………………………………………………...49 Chapter 3: Democratization in Tanzania……………………………………………..52 I. Quality of Democracy…………………………………………………….54 II. One-party Domination……………………………………………………57 III. Civil Society……………………………………………………………..69 Chapter 4: Analysis & Conclusion…………………………………………………...76 I. Analysis…………………………………………………………………..76 II. Concluding Remarks……………………………………………………..91

References……………………………………………………………………………94

Appendix A………………………………...……………………………………….104 6 LIST OF TABLES

Page

Table 1: Major ethnic groups’ population, language, and region……………………36

Table 2: No. of Votes (%) in 1995, 2000, 2005 Presidential Elections……………...60

Table 3: National Assembly Elections in 1995, 2000, 2005………………………..60

7 LIST OF FIGURES

Page

Figure 1: Map of Tanzania…………………………………………………………...63

Fiture2: Map of the Regions of Tanzania…………………………………………….63

8 CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION

Most African countries gained their independence in the 1960s. Following this

period, many Africa’s post-colonial states embarked on the process of nation-building.

However, rather than political stability many of them experienced military

intervention, violent ethnic and religious conflicts, civil wars as well as state collapse.

One country, however, seems to be a comparatively exceptional narrative in Africa’s

post-colonial nation-building project. That country, which is the subject of this case

study, is Tanzania. Tanzania possesses many of the factors that arguably impede social

stability such as ethnic, religious, and racial diversity, general economic deprivation,

and a history of indirect rule as a British colony. Yet, Tanzania has enjoyed rather

peaceful political transitions both to the post-colonial regime and to multi-party democracy while in many other African states, political and economic development

was retarded by protracted civil conflicts around the issue of defining identity,

citizenship, and indigeneity required for democratization.

For example, in the aftermath of Kenya’s 2007 election, the violent dispute

between the ethnic groups of the Kikuyu and the Maasai resulted in a death toll of

1000. Similar ethnic hostility has repeatedly occurred in Kenya around election times

in 1992, 1997, 2002, and 2007. It originated from the clash on land ownership in the

Rift Valley, which the Maasai was deprived of by the Kikuyu after Kenya’s

independence. Precipitating the schism among ethnic groups, President Daniel arap

Moi, who had ruled Kenya for 24 years, practiced a strategy of ethnic discrimination, 9 repression, and marginalization of opposition forces (Steeves, 2006:211). Nigerian civil war (1967-1970), in which over one million people lost their lives, shows how ethnic identity could easily erupt into violent conflict; Sudan experienced a 20 year civil war with the South, and the conflict in Darfur continues to escalate. So far approximately 250 thousands innocent civilians have been killed and over 2 million people have been turned into refugees. Similarly in 1994, Rwandan genocide led to the massacre of over 800,000 Tutsi and moderate Hutu.

In contrast, Tanzania has been relatively peaceful, despite the recently increasing conflicts between indigenous Tanzanians and the Asian population in

Tanzania as well as between the Mainlanders and Zanzibaris. It seems to suggest a different comparative experience with cultural pluralism. Although it has over 120 different ethnic groups, the country has been relatively stable. The key question in the research, therefore, is “Why has Tanzania been relatively peaceful during its experience with nation-building and democratization?”

To interpret the social stability throughout the post-colonial regimes, this study first explores explanations for political integration led by Julius Nyerere’s authoritarian rule during the nation-building period in post-colonial Tanzania (1961-

1985) based on colonial legacy, political regime, and personal rule. Building upon the existing colonization and liberation literature, I examine the social patterns emerging in the decolonized African states: authoritarianism, ethnic division, and insurgent proclivity. These elements of colonial legacy hinder national integration while having 10 not undermined Tanzania’s. Nevertheless, the colonial legacy, either of Anglophone

or Francophone, lies dormant, whether potentially provocative or active and insurgent.

In other words, because ethnic identity, erected during the colonial era, does not easily

disappeared, even if successful nation-building created a new national identity,

ethnicity can be used for political purposes whenever the motive is provided.

In terms of the political regime, nation-building strategy offers one possible explanation for this variation in the process of constructing a political structure in a

country. Particularly in dealing with ethnic cleavages after independence, there are

largely two ways to manage conflict over a transitionary period. According to

Mamdani Mahmood in Citizen and Subject (1996), two different types of political

reform emerged after independence. One, which Mahmood calls the traditional

strategy, involves a political system allowing key ethnic leaders to compete for power.

In the other system, known as the radical strategy, a hegemonic leader takes control of balancing the competing demands of ethnic interests and minimizes the factionalism of ethnicity. However, Mahmood argues that both cases eventually result in social divisions – both among ethnic groups and between rural-urban regions respectively – which allow corruption or coercion as interests vie for power rather than establish sensible civil society.

Keeping his sense of bifurcation of the nationalist strategy, I specify the effect of the strategies onto two stages of post-colonial African history. For the incipient

regimes after independence, the radical and ethnically exclusive strategy was more 11 effective to manage social stability and create national identity than the traditional strategy of ethnic power-sharing. For the era of democratization which began in the early 1990s, I agree with Mamdani’s argument that the two strategies, which are the outcomes of colonialism, prevent African states from constructing a sound democracy and with Rothchild that democracy’s failure resulted from the excessive expansion of centralized government. However, I conceive a procedural interpretation of the strategies’ impacts, in which the traditional strategy yields multi-party politics earlier than the radical strategy despite suffering from severe ethnic conflicts. On the other hand, the totalitarian regime which is an outgrowth of the radical strategy retards the diversification of civic demands while solidifying national integration and delaying or placating ethnic conflicts.

As the conservative states, Nigeria, Zaire, and Uganda (1962-1966) launched a multi-party system was implemented in the 1960s and in Kenya, Cote d’Ivoire,

Camerron, and Ethiopia, authoritarian leaders constituted the government with the eminent elites of the major ethnoregional groups, explicitly distinguishing the ethnic lines as a new political organization. However, in Ghana, Guinea, Zambia, and

Tanzania took the radical method. Ultimately, the government’s tactic in coping with ethnicity is used to identify factors of national integration for the study of the post- colonial regime in this chapter below and chapter 2 to test the Tanzanian case and also is considered as a determinant of the formation of civil society, based on the system’s inclusiveness or exclusiveness, during the democratization that is examined in chapter

3. 12 Despite its inherent uncertainty, ambivalence, and the inconsistency of people’s behavior, personal rule is a type of political system which constructs political associations, conditions, and quandaries. In the same sense, the elites’ political resolve and behavior may not be affected by a social structure or the society, but rather be totally independent. The significance of personal rule in the context of sub-Saharan

Africa relies on the characteristics of politicians revealed as numerous forms of autocracy – “coups, plots, factionalism, purges, rehabilitations, clientelism, corruption, succession, maneuvers, and similar activities” – used in order to protect their power

(Jackson et al., 1998:17-19). Thus, I discuss the importance of Julius Nyerere’s rule during the two decades after Tanzania was decolonized in light of the country’s national integration.

These theories are the common characteristics that emerged in independent

African states and affected their national integration. In comparing Tanzania with other African countries, I apply the colonial legacy as a controlled variation which in general hampers national integration, without measuring the differentiated colonial impacts. Because Tanzania, the object of this study, accomplishes national integration despite the experience of the typical colonization it is not meaningful to evaluate the difference. But I document the legacy to apprise of its attributes which commonly appear in the former African colonies. However, political regimes and leadership have varied degrees of influence on national integration. Tanzania’s nation-building strategy, which is described as a non-collaborative hegemonic regime, and 13 authoritarian nationalist Julius Nyerere’s rule played a crucial role in managing the country’s order. I discuss how effective they were and which was the most significant factor in Tanzania’s social and political integration.

Centered on the period after the transition to a multi-party system (1992- present), the second aim of this research is to identify the post-colonial legacy, which bequeathed to Tanzania social stability and to discuss its influences on democratization in the country. I present the available explanations for the peaceful transition to the multi-party system: one-party domination, weak civil society, and national identity. As a consequence of the successful establishment of national integration in the Nyerere regime, these inheritances remain with the country while helping to sustain social stability. However, they by and large contradict quality of democracy and may hinder the development of democracy. I elucidate quality of democracy and discuss the Nyerere legacy’s influence on the democracy that has emerged in Tanzania.

This chapter proceeds in three steps: First, I offer a succinct overview of colonialism in Africa. Second, I identify key concepts utilized in this study. Then, I outline two theories for national integration in the post-colonial states. In the third section, I summarize the chapters that follow.

I. An Overview of Colonialism in Africa

The rule of the African colonial states is characterized as authoritarianism in its means of control and establishment and as bifurcated in its form. A colonial 14 authority system replaced traditional political bodies in rural areas and exercised power over local opposition to improve administrative efficiency and to reduce operation costs. Thus, the institutionalization of colonial rule facilitated the growth of hegemonic centralized organizations in the bureaucracy, military, education, economy, communications, and other modern sectors while marginalizing local involvement

(Rothchild, 1997:6-7). On the other hand, colonial officials encouraged the construction of ethnic self-consciousness based on regional, cultural, and institutional similarities. Under this constructed identity, diverse ethnic groups came to be the solid units for missionary acclimatization, colonial education, and effective administration of the colonial rule, including the Karamojong of Uganda, the Sukuma of Tanzania, the Yoruba and Igbo of Nigeria, and the Kikuyu and Luhya of Kenya (Illiffe,

1979:334-341). As a result, these groups competed with one another for state benefits

– in employment for public service positions and the military, district and regional distribution for development, and location of industry. This competition for national resources deepened the cleavages between ethnic groups and created a pattern of anxiety, which has lasted even until now (Rothchild, 1998:214-215).

In Nigeria, the colonial policies had been negligent in benefiting the relatively underprivileged and culturally distinct northern region while economic, political, and social development yielded more progress in the southern region. The ethnic groups became estranged from civic national integration by such policies and came to insist upon separatism. Chief Obafemi Awolowo, the ex-leader of the Unity party of Nigeria, 15 remarked that British colonial policies – the insulation of the North to Christian

missionary influence, the ossification of northern political institutions under the

protection of indirect rule, and the preservation of the distinct political and official

entities in the North and the South – transformed the ethnic polities into a seedbed of severe problems for following regimes (1968:62,72).

In light of its structure, Mamdani argues that the colonial state divided countries into two political spheres: a civic domain of modernized citizens, mainly

excluding Africans and a “customary” sphere, mostly embodying “tribal” Africans,

who were the subjects of the repressive local colonial authorities. This bifurcation is

the characteristic of the colonial rule that came to stratify the society into the superior and the inferior and disadvantaged. These divisions largely manifested themselves between relatively urban and rural, White and non-Whites, and citizens of modern rights and law and indigenous subjects (1996:19).The despotic rule by local leaders in rural areas resembled the imperialist nature of this bifurcation, in which the chief took all traditional power in executive, administrative, legislative, and judicial decisions while not being responsive to the subjects (ibid, 23-24). Correspondingly, Tanzania during the British Mandate between 1919 and 1961 had experienced the indirect rule which consolidated ethnic solidarity and invigorated ethnic and regional competition for economic matters. Thus, the post-colonial regime in Tanzania took the nationalist policy to resist the delinquency and inadequacy of the colonial rule.

II. Post-colonial History 16 With this colonial experience as background, independent Africa, ruled by

indigenous elites, was expected to dismantle the colonial hegemonic systems and

create constitutions to promote effective governance, political participation, checks

and balances, and economic prosperity. In accomplishing these goals, the independent states encountered two contradictory challenges: establishing stability and managing conflicts. Considering these goals in post-independence Africa, the existing literature provides ample knowledge, focusing on nationalism, which helps establish national identity and stability, and democracy, which realizes the representation of diversity, as the apparatus of the new rule.

i. Nationalism in Africa

African nationalism that began in the 1950s and engendered state-building is construed as the internal attempt to stabilize the society after independence, or as the colonial heritage or fallacy. As the European states scrambled to colonize Africa, new states were created, and at the same time historical unities of tribes, nations, states1 and federations were destroyed. In dividing up Africa, the European powers only considered their advantages and power balance among themselves. Hence, the

Western boundaries of the new African states are not congruent with the African tribes and nations as tribes were split into different territories and diverse political entities were combined into one country. Useful examples are the Alur tribe divided into

1 Ali Mazrui believes that there was a viable African state which was able to secure itself from others and to extend its power, in his book, Power, Politics, and the African Condition (2004) 17 Uganda and the Congo, the Acholis at the Sudan-Uganda boundary and the

Banyankole at the Tanzania-Uganda boundary whilst hundreds of ethnic groups

consist of an African nation-state. Such an arrangement makes it easy to claim the

post-colonial territories and attest to where populations “rightly belong” (Mazrui,

2004:33). In truth, however, it has been destructive rather than constructive, and has not just resulted in reorganization but also disorganization. Nonetheless, in 1963, the

Organization of African Unity (OAU) admitted the state boundaries in Africa as mapped out by the European colonies.

Consequently, some problems in national integration have hindered stability from time to time by causing rampaging competition and conflicts among ethnic groups where a new nation needs to equip itself with only one major authority.

According to Ali Mazrui (2004), there are four explanations of why the national integration is a challenge in most African states. First, while the central colonial government directly controlled each tribe within the state, the tribes had hardly had contact with one another before independence. Not only was there little contact, but there was no motivation to coordinate or unite the ethnic groups. In the same sense,

Anthony Smith finds the difficulty of nation-building in most of Africa from “the lack of any shared historical mythodology [sic] and memory on which state elites can set about ‘building’ the nation” (1986:258). Thus, there had not been a great deal of communication to build up intimate rapport among the ethnic groups. Second, for the few ethnic groups which have traditionally adversarial relationships, it is certainly a 18 huge challenge to be bound in the same nation and jointly decide how to share

national resources. The Luo and Kikuyu in Kenya and the northern and southern

tribes in Uganda have gone through this kind of temperament through history. Even

now, the rivalry is provoked when they vie for central political power and when the hegemony of a certain tribe is assaulted in national issues.

The last two related problems of civic national integration are tribal nationalism and separatism. Tribal nationalism itself likely becomes hostile. For instance, the Ibos who originally have resided in Eastern Nigeria struggled to obtain better employment and business opportunities for themselves in other parts of the country where better treatment was not approving than in their home-ground, resulting in nearly 30,000 deaths of the Ibos in the Northern area from the conflict happened in the 1970s. If the attempt to settle conflicts among the Ibos and the other

Nigerian ethnic groups apparently failed, this aggressive tribal nationalism could transform into isolationism or separatism that also makes national integration difficult

(Mazrui, 2004:42-44).

These impediments of national integration are fundamentally caused by the incompatibility of ethnic nationalism and civic nationalism. Ethnic nationalism, more frequently occurring in non-Western countries, calls for the associates’ loyalty to the nation which is distinguished by similar characteristics or qualities of lineage or vernacular culture such as religion, customs, language, or race (Smith, 1981:66). That is, ethnic nationalism often possesses primordial qualities, by which “[ethnicity] exists 19 in nature, outside time. It is one of the ‘givens’ of human existence,” which was

recently explained in socio-biology as “an extension of processes of genetic

selection.” Also, ethnic nationalism is a sense of solidarity shared among group

members who have a mythic ancestry or historical memories, either genuine or

constructed (Smith, 1983:21). Nevertheless, as ethnicity was used as the unit of the

Native Authority during the colonial era it fortified its political meaning and modified its identity in comparison with other ethnic groups.

On the other hand, ethnic nationalism accuses civic nationalism of using its dogmatic strategies to maintain status quo of the central government but to ignore ethnic peculiarities. Civic nationalism in the Western societies that came along with

Modernization and Liberalization proclaims that citizens must be treated equal

“before the law, irrespective of their social and economic status, ethnic origin, and religious beliefs” (Alter, 1989:15) and nationalism is regarded as an effective mechanism for strengthening a nation-state. Emphasizing the newly conferred equality to the citizens in the new nation and the bounded cultural similarities constructed on behalf of nationality, civic nationalism is treated as a product of social relations rather than genetic inheritance. Also, symbols, such as flags, anthems, military, emblems, and the Royal House, are used to promote nationalism by stimulating popular emotion that inspires to dedicate themselves to the nation’s well- being.

Following the constructive perspective of nationalism, African elites, who 20 recognized the hardships of African nations’ attempts at cohesion, intentionally

used nationalism as a means of turning the citizens’ anxiety about ethnicity to the

issue of struggle for self-governance and development both during the colonial period

and after.

However, African nationalist agitation for self-rule, which brought

independence from the colonial rule in the 1960s, demonstrated three main

characteristics of African nationalism: territorialism, democracy, and pan-Africanism

(Smith 1983:49-50).

Contrary to the absurdity of the scrambled continent by the Europeans, territorialism is the base of nationalism in which a single political community within a territorial boundary pursues “extraction, centralized authority, autonomous institutions,

and monopolistic coercion (ibid. 50).” This centralized bureaucracy exhibits a low

level of tolerance for locally rooted polities and regional or ethnic parties and movements. Although African states intended to amend reactionary reform that was to oppose not only the foreign rule but tribalism which could divide the country, a centralized hegemonial actor or party often dissociated the rural and urban communities and deepened the rift among ethnic groups for the sake of development and income promotion (Mamdani, 1996:25-27). The coercive authority, though anti- colonial, resembled the centralized, colonial administration which segmented the country to maneuver for rapid acquisition and effective control.

In the search for the channel of liberation and enlightenment, African 21 nationalists examined the elements of Europe’s nation-liberating struggles (Davison,

1992:116). They adopted the morals of liberal democracy such as popular sovereignty and the democratic suffrage in legitimizing the foundation of the nation. The

Westernized elites – the nationalists – cried for restoring the national property, citizenship of the majority, and human rights in an effort to achieve independence.

Pursuing Immanuel Kant’s argument that respect for morality as a universal law and

admiration for liberty of the civil constitution endow a nation with a right and an

obligation to maintain global freedom and peace, African nationalists took on the

liberalist approach about a nation-state in order to emphasize the meaning of

autonomy that made possible legitimately resist the rule by foreigners, and fulfill self-

determination (Taras & Ganguly, 2008:50-52).

Finally, the relationship between African nationalism and pan-Africanism is

useful in demonstrating the distinctiveness of nationalism in Africa. What pan-

Africanism shares with nationalism in their basis of the movements is the

determination to differentiate Africans from Europeans, to defy the foreign rule and

liberate Africans from the colonial rule, and to promote economic and political

development in their own way. While pan-Africanism is more conscious about shared

‘blackness’ – the Africans’ common distress under the pressure of colonial rule, it

should be noted that both movements take a stand against ethnic separatism.

Consistent with the disagreement of splitting ethnic groups, Ali Mazrui has argued

that tribal institutions and sentiments are the colonial creations that still exist and 22 cause difficulties in nation-building and African integration (Mazrui, 2004:35).

Immanuel Wallerstein concurs that pan-Africanism, the idea that ties Africa together,

is also highly effective to accomplish unity of a nation by keeping it from ethnic

partitioning (1993:32-33).

Therefore, we found nationalism in Africa as a complex mixture of conflicting values “with a strong traditional bias on the part of the westernized leaders,

and nativism, manipulated by the leaders, on the part of the masses” (Coleman,

1994:24). However, it was an ideational cornerstone of the transition.

In Tanzania, Julius Nyerere was a crucial figure of the nationalist movement

in the post-war period. In 1952 when he returned to Tanganyika from Britain, he

started to found a nationalist organization, Tanganyika Africa Association (TAA),

which was reformed to Tanganyika African National Union (TANU). To gain support

from the populace, he toured in the country and addressed speeches, propagating

nationalism and national unity while opposing tribalism and foreign rule (Nyerere,

1961:21). Eventually, he became a president of Tanzania who had reigned for 25 years

and stepped down by his own choice.

ii. Authoritarianism in Africa

The period between 1966 and 1989 was marked by the inefficient rule of independent government. Inherited from the centralized colonial rule, the independent government was unable to establish an efficient system to summon active political participation of the people and societal groups and to reflect local needs and 23 aspirations (Mbaku, 1997:40-42). As the authority waned, the post-colonial

governments used the forceful strategies to manage the politicized ethnic groups.

Nevertheless, not only because of the inability of the state to meet the people’s

expectations but because of the extensive insufficiency of national resources, the

competition between ethnic groups for additional advantages from the state became

intensified (Ayoade, 1988:115; Rothchild, 1999:216-217). Eventually, this antipathy toward the government was resolved by a “hegemonic exchange” regime which meant elite (or party) representation in the hegemonic state without allowing broad public participation in decision-making process (ibid, 217).

During this period, when authoritarian regimes dominated Africa, the elites used nationalism to establish social and political stability. One nationalist strategy was to repress cultural pluralism, including ethnic diversity that could be a source of ethno-territorial disputes. The other was that the authoritarian president controlled ethnic leaders in the political realm whereby ethnicity appeared to be the most tolerable unit for fulfilling the members’ will. By crushing cultural pluralities through

“homogenizing diverse peoples” or “detribalization,”2 or by bargaining power among

ethnic groups under the control of the authoritarian leader, nationalist elites were taking steps to keep them “included” in power (Horowitz; 1994:51-52). Maintaining this authoritarian rule for decades was achieved by the elites’ exclusive decision- making power on whether to use violence.

2 These terms are used by Immanuel Wallerstein in the chapter of “Ethnicity and National Integration in West Africa,” in African Nationalism and Revolution, edited by Gregory Maddox (1993). 24 However, the perpetual power of the authoritarian regimes was not only obtained by brutal governance. It was also supported by the people. Michael

Hechter explains how this might take place as he argues when the elites first face structural constraints under which they act, such as unsuccessful administration of the fledgling post-colonial regimes, a rational choice for them is a collective action of a nationalist movement from which they think they can receive individual benefits

(Hechter, 1986:271). To sustain the elites’ interests, public communication via free media is restrained in the initial step of democratization (Snyder, 2000:36-39). The people’s acceptance of hegemony induced by the government’s control, however, conversely validates the constructivist claim on how nationalism is formed. As nationalism for the constructivists is established by social interactions that create a limitedly imagined political entity, authoritarian regimes were able to last by using the nationalist morale for which popular support was willingly given.

iii. Cultural Pluralism & Democratization in Africa

By the 1990s, there was a new transition that discredited the past of widespread authoritarianism, and embarked on regime alteration. According to

Bratton, there were 30 free and fair elections3, 12 cases of leadership change, and also the losers accepted the outcome from 32 election cases (Bratton, 1999:20). Another feature of the effort for change is that national conferences had been held in Africa

3 The “free and fair” determination is based on the preponderance of judgments reported by international election observers and domestic election monitors. 25 supported by the increasing internal demands for political liberalization.

International donors also put pressure on them for human rights and democracy.

Although a more open society arrived after the failure of the authoritarian regime, the grave sufferings from the ceaseless conflict between ethnic and religious groups raise the question about the feasibility of democratization in culturally plural societies. Whereas ethnic groups become separated, seeking autonomy, a civic nation requires the implementation of an effective central government to control the nation under the apt laws and regulations. Regarding the risk to democratization in conflicts,

Robert Dahl argues, “[a]cute and persistent conflicts that polarize or fragment the people of a country are likely to prevent democratic institutions from fully developing and to destroy democratic rights and liberties should they be introduced” (1999,127).

However, not only to cope with conflicts as a barrier to democracy but to fulfill equality and participation as qualifications of democracy, ethnicity is crucial to the democratization process and even more important in African states where ethnic and other cleavages politically divide the society.

Eghosa E. Osaghae posed two fundamental inquiries about the relation between ethnicity and democracy: first, why does democracy exceedingly provoke ethnicity; and second, why and how is ethnic mobilization more desired than other forms of mobilization? (2003:282) The answer to the first question relates to the nature of democracy itself. Historically, democracy has usually been formed via revolutionary events that claimed rights such as individual liberty and equality, while 26 prompting significant uncertainty and unease. It is also a process to

(re)institutionalize the state as well as a system to represent the demands and interests of different ethnic groups, to compete for power, and to protect the suppressed and the marginalized. Under the democratic system, which tends to be open, it is legitimate to deliver on ethnic needs and claims that used to be stifled by authoritarian regimes.

Another significance that helps promote ethnic identity is the advent of ethnic nationalisms and the international notions of the rights of minority, self-determination, and development. The successful ethnic nationalisms in the countries of the former

USSR had a demonstration effect to African states, and the Western interventionists after the Cold War attempted to legitimize and empower the ethnic petitioners while toppling authoritarian rulers.

For the second question about why and how ethnic mobilization is more likely to be realized, ethnicity offers a more secure and cost-effective approach to political competition. By appealing to ethnic sentiments, political elites can easily mobilize poor and illiterate people towards their reelection. Also, political objectives are clearer and political executives can be more responsive if the demands and the interests are mainly based on ethnicity. The differentiated, ethnic group-order in turn shapes privileged and communal identity by which the rights of citizens are defined

(Herbst, 1999). Thus, the function of ethnicity to arbitrate the relationship between individuals and the state has become significant, albeit dangerous where ethnic claims are inequitably heeded (Osaghae, 2003:282-285). 27 And yet, Tanzania is an exceptional case. Despite the existence of ethnic groups in Tanzania, ethnicity is not utilized for political alliances in the democratic system. Instead, the one-party dominated government, which dismisses ethnicity in the political arena, controls a great deal of resources as well as social sectors. Thus, nationalism and democracy conflict with each other as the centralized, nationalist government deters the burgeoning of a civil society. They do so because diversity, manifested in pluralistic democracy, has a vital part in democratization but is incompatible with the national integration which renders social stability. Subsequently, two essential questions should follow: What were the circumstances that allowed for democracy in Tanzania even when the civil society was weak? Then, why was civil society weak?

III. Theories

Colonial legacy, nation-building strategies, and personal rule may be possible explanations for the variation in national integration in post-colonial African states.

While I assume the colonial experience was uniform in creating ethnic divides in the independent African states, policies in nation-building and the peculiarity of personal rule vary among states and therefore determine their respective level of national integration or conflict.

i. Nation-Building Strategy

The priority for newly independent African states was the creation of a common identity and the promotion of democratic politics that could replace 28 exploitative colonial rule. Although different regimes looked for various types of stability to diminish the appalling consequences of severe ethnic conflicts (Rothchild,

1997:5), a broad and useful distinction among regimes is whether they used conservative or radical methods in conducting political and economic reforms, which could lead to national unity and stability, as Mahmood Mamdani posits (1996:25-27).

In conservative African states, the hierarchical local authorities were maintained as a revival of traditional institutions headed by chiefs or headmen. This system remains in some African nations. More radical African states reinstated the tribal apparatus and

instead developed homogeneous, nation-wide institutions, regardless of ethnic origins,

while addressing the interests of urban residents over those of the rural residents.

The former method generates a decentralized political system that resists the authoritarian form of the earlier colonial state but exacerbates ethnic separations

through a clientelism linking the urban-rural boundary. It eliminates racism but continues the form of the Native Authority of the colonial rule, which precipitates ethnic partitioning. The main argument of the modern tribalism strategy is to build alliances in the struggle for power that would likely emerge in a multiparty system, regardless of social class, but with regard to the tribe as a base of African social structure. However, the hazard of this strategy is obvious: it can be a guideline for disruptive tribal movements and the root of specific ideologies that harm social integration. Moreover, the multi-party regime tends to be “a superficial and explosive democratization of civil society” because the ethnic-based political factions are 29 inflexible and are created by external force rather than by cultural diversity (ibid,

25-26, 187-188).

For example, in the Democratic Republic of Congo, political groups continue to identify themselves based on ethnicity, which were often first formed in the colonial era. However, the post-colonial and current conflicts have occurred alongside the ethnic differentiation. When Mobutu grabbed power after the assassination of

Lumumba, the Mulelist militia group triggered a reaction in eastern Zaire to overthrow Mobutu. But the Mulelist movement drew local support from traditional chiefs and this backing was encouraged by regional identity, mainly containing the

Mbunda (Mulele’s ethnic group) and the Penda (Gizenga’s group). This militia, named Mayi Mayi, reappeared in 1993 in North Kivu condemning the cruelty of

Mobutu’s army and the incursion of soldiers of the Forces armees Rwandaise.

Centered on a strong ethno-national identity, the militia group was created to defend the ethnic alliance from the brutal central government (“DRC: From protection to insurgency – history of the Mayi Mayi,” 2006). This shows the limits of perceptions that emphasize geographical scope as a base to understanding political issues

(Mamdani, 1996:188-189).

However, the innovative reform of the modern state reorganizes the decentralized local governments in pursuance of national integration. The restructured system, essentially a revolution from above, detribalizes civil society and strengthens central administrative power. With the abolition of the tribe, which is considered a 30 form of "customary" and traditional law, the modernization of political and

economic institutions widens the disparity and rift between town and country. On account of development and wage increase, the authoritarian regime exercises

coercive means and puts excessive pressure on the peasantry. Thus, despite the de-

racialization and detribalization of civil society resulting from this unifying strategy, it

bears a powerful central government, characterized as a single party and militant anti-

colonial nationalism and signifies the rural and urban gap, manifested as urban and

rural militants and clientelism. The single party tends to depoliticize civil society, but

interethnic strains subsist within civil society (ibid, 290-291).

ii. Personal Rule

Personal rule is a type of political system, which is maneuvered by few privileged and authoritative elites. The character of personal rule is suitably delineated

by the model of mastery in Machiavelli’s Prince. For Machiavelli, the ruler, Prince, is

a self-seeking and rational actor, who desires to seize perpetual power of principality.

Prince is not concerned about society or social groups within the national boundary, nor in the promotion of the wellbeing of the people, nor in resolving conflicts among the populace. Rather, the rule by Prince relies occasionally on authoritarian action, in order not to be exploited and not to be subverted by external threats, while the regime lasts “as long as he does not rob the great majority of their property or their honor. He then has to contend only with the restlessness of a few, and that can be dealt with easily and in a variety of ways” (1961:102). 31 However, the modern state becomes legitimate when its government continuously interacts with a national society and citizen groups and reflects their demands or interests to the laws and policies. Moreover, the state’s institutions and policies determine the power and privilege of classes and groups in society (Jackson et al., 1998:19-20).

The elitist rule, in which the masses are usually restricted from mobilization and organization of civil associations, is inconsistent with the nature of the modern state, where the masses have the ability to influence government action. Instead, the system is likely to conduct performances in appealing for a personal regime’s patronage or in deposing traitors. Thus, the government administration is personal, but not public, and is unsympathetic to the interests, needs, and problems of the civic level outside of the political class. Importantly, personal rule is bereft of effective institutions that define offices and positions and regulate appropriate actions of the officials. Also, there is no sense that the functions of the institutions ought to be acknowledged by the rulers and the citizens.

In most independent African states, there are conceptual political institutions, but the constitutional rules and orders do not effectively control officials’ behavior.

Rather, political action is determined by kinship, ethnic lines, and political factions, for the ruling individuals’ convenience and necessity. The action can be implemented depending on resources at hand. As mentioned above, the rule is autocratic, authoritarian, or oligarchic rather than pluralistic, and only a few involved as 32 associates, clients, or supporters share the power or struggle for the monopolistic power without the consideration of public opinion or participation. Hence, “political stability in all regimes depends ultimately on the ability and willingness of powerful men to regulate their conflicts and forebear from using violence, but…leaders in personal regimes do not have legitimate and effective institutions to assist them in this endeavor” (ibid, 22).

IV. Summary of Chapters

The main theme of this research, the exploration of the Tanzanian government’s performance and its effect on national stability since the country’s independence, consists of two premises, within two timeframes. On one hand, it is important to discuss the factors of national integration that yielded the society’s stability during the post-independence regime in Tanzania (1961-1985). Simply put,

“What caused Tanzania to establish its national integration while many other African countries failed?” On the other hand, the countries on the Third Wave of democracy needed a radical change of their political systems and expansion of the opportunity to interact with the population in pursuance of keeping their authority. In this global context, Tanzania peacefully moved to a multi-party democracy. While retaining the former regime’s legacy, which concentrated its policies primarily on nation-building designed and implemented by the government alone, the current government faces a new goal of participatory democracy. Therefore, another question that is to be asked to understand Tanzania’s political situation is, “How does Nyerere’s legacy adhere to 33 the democratization in Tanzania after the transition to the multi-party system in

1992?”

Taking these two considerations into account, and based upon the overview of colonial legacy and literature review entailing key concepts and theories demonstrated in this chapter, Chapter 2 discusses the factors of the accomplishment of Tanzania’s national integration. How the colonial legacy, which created ethnic division, was reflected in independent Tanzania is briefly described. Then, with regard to the theory on nation-building strategy, I scrutinize the importance of Nyerere and his party’s civic nationalism on national integration, in which ethnicity was disregarded as an issue of politics. In addition, an analysis of Julius Nyerere’s personal rule identifies his impact on Tanzania’s nation-building and examines the co-relationship between the nationalist policy as an institution and his personal rule as an unsystematic political system.

In Chapter 3, after quality of democracy is elucidated, Tanzania’s democratization is assessed based on the presented quality of liberal democracy.

Particularly, this democratic framework accuses the current regime, shown as one- party domination, of being irresponsive to cultural plurality. Most likely to be a reason for the preservation of the domination, as well as a result of the obstructive regime, the weak civil society in Tanzania is explained, along with its necessity for democratic development.

Chapter 4 deals with a comprehensive analysis of Tanzania’s history of nation- 34 building and its effects on the country’s democratization. Eventually, that

contributes to a discussion of the future of Tanzania’s democracy with a suggestion

that the country requires a more open and accountable government to address the diversified demands of the society. 35 CHAPTER 2: NATIONALISM & NATIONAL INTEGRATION IN

TANZANIA (1961-1985)

This chapter discusses the contributors to Tanzania’s peaceful transition to the post-colonial state and the reasons for its stability during the Nyerere regime. There are three factors which have influenced Tanzania’s political development since its independence in 1961. One is the colonial legacy, which counteracts national harmony by separating the nation-state into diverse factions of tribes or ethnicities. As a former British colony, Tanzania had experienced the indirect rule of the Native

Authority and had engaged in World War II, sending troops and providing mercenary and financial assistance. This section describes how the experience affected

Tanzania’s social and political structure and helped outline its post-colonial policy.

The second explanation for Tanzania’s national evolution grows out of its experiences during its colonial period. Reacting to its colonial background, the independent Tanzanian government developed a one party system which was best suited to its goals of developing nationalist policy. As a radical nation-building strategy, the single-party rule offers an explanation for Tanzania’s national unity in

Tanzania.

The last explanation focuses on Julius Nyerere, a prominent figure of the country’s nation-building during the more than twenty years he was in power. His strong character, convincing speeches, and his nationalist philosophy involved

Tanzania in relative harmony and national cohesion. He was an authoritarian leader 36 but at the same time was a populist and a propagandist who was devoted to the

country.

I. Colonial Legacy in Tanzania

According to the last census before independence in 1957, Tanzania consisted

of 120 ethnic groups, including the Sukuma (13%), Chaga (5%), Nyamwezi (4%),

Haya (3%), Nyakyusa (2%), Hehe (2%), and Bena (1%), each with its own language

and boundaries. These groups are lumped into five ethnic groups with the largest

being the Bantu, comprising 95% of Tanganyika’s population. (Kaula, 1963). The

ethnic groups were the centers of the colonial administration, known as the

Ethnicity Population (%) Language Region Sukuma 3.2 million (13) Sukuma (subset of Bantu) Mwanza Chaga 2 million (5) Chaga (subset of Bantu) Kilimanjaro, Meru, Mosi Nyamwezi 1.5 million (4) Nyamwezi Mwanza, Kagera Haya 1.2 million (3) Bakoba, Muleba, Karagwe Kagera Nyakyusa 750,000 (2) Nyakyusa (subset of Bantu) Southern Tanzania Hehe 750,000 (2) Bantu Iringa Bena 670,000 (1.7) Bena Iringa Table 1: Major ethnic groups’ population, language, and region

“native authority,” and were utilized to implement Britain’s indirect rule. Although the ostensible purpose of the native authority was to build up tribal institutions which could be more suitable to establish stability in the country and development for themselves, the reality was far different.

Traditional institutions have never been fully developed but rather have been 37 limited in their power to serve as an effective political mechanism. The district

officers simply appointed their own choices apart from the council of tribal elders favored by chiefs and the traditional community. Even worse, the native authorities undertook the economic exploitation and political repression of the villagers in

collusion with the colonial government. While the purport of colonial policy was not

understandable and acceptable to the local officials, their political skill was lacking to

operate their own interests and to maintain their customs (Yeager, 1989:14-15).

Colonial economic policy also had a profound impact on racial and regional

stratification in Tanzania. Europeans and Asians appropriated the control of trade and

retail business while Africans came to be limited to small-scale farming. In addition,

British colonial officials encouraged Tanzanian peasants to grow cash crops rather

than staples in order to yield more profits from export. Likewise, the Chagga of

Kilimanjaro and the Haya on the western coast of Lake Victoria mainly produced

coffee, and cotton was cultivated near the eastern region of the lake. Due to the

economic importance given to the cash-crop growing areas, education and other social

services were inequitably provided in different regions.

In England after World War II, where the economy had stagnated during the

war, the Colonial Office in London demanded more intensive agricultural production

from Tanganyika. At the same time, realizing that the unpopular and biased

administration was not helping economic growth, the colonial government initiated

reforms on agricultural development and effective representation of local authorities 38 and multi-races. Nevertheless, the absurd regulations on crop and livestock production and the improper agricultural and rural education programs for Africans resulted in nationalist campaigns against the colonial regime (ibid, 15-25).

II. TANU & Nationalism

In 1965, Tanzania adopted an interim constitution that declared it as a one- party state led by Tanzania African National Union (TANU) for the mainland (while the Afro-Shirazi party was the unitary party for the islands). Since TANU has endeavored to obtain national integration and African unity regardless of ethnic, religious, and regional backgrounds and feared the creation of social factions that could harm domestic security, the one-party democracy was justified and consolidated by universal suffrage. Also, the National Assembly believed it could function more properly within the single-party system in fulfilling the ordinary people’s participation and advancing responsiveness of political leadership, by improving technical capacity of institutions (Kjekshus, 1975:19).

On the other hand, all the associations identified by ethnicity were banned even if many of them had been conducive to accomplishing independence by espousing TANU’s operation, and also debates on ethnicity were prohibited in the

Parliament. The Native Authority system – a colonial tribal institution which performed legislative and executive functions, and included native courts, and a native treasury – was abolished, and the local government structure was integrated into the new government and the ruling party (Mbonile, 2003:21). As local leaders in 39 the former colonial indirect rule were replaced by directly elected administrators, ethnic-based authorities were destroyed (Tripp, 1991:227-229). Although the issue of assimilating social differences is related to pan-Africanism or African-ness to the extent that it opposes the dominance by non-Africans both in government and in trade and thus unifies various ethnicities as Africans, the nationalist policy made it difficult to reinstate the traditional ruling systems.

For the sake of nation-building, the elected parliament leadership and

President Nyerere conveyed their socialist beliefs to political performance, which was represented as the Arusha Declaration in 1967, the exemplar of the socialist economic project. It resisted economic dependence on foreign states, while adhering to the discipline of self-reliance on resources, land, and people and pursued nationalization of banks, foreign-possessed farms of export products, and important industrial sectors.

Also, attempting to prevent a class-divided society and elite self-gratification, the government introduced a strict leadership code that regulated corruption and blocked the emergence of private economic accumulation (Mwansasu et al., 1979:148).

Ujamaa Vijijini (collective village) was a part of the socialist guidelines for development, which aimed at constructing a cooperative community where peasant producers were working and living together and assisted with state institutions that intended to provide technical instruction and agricultural infrastructure. The policy aimed for critical evolution from sluggish progress in production and on-going poverty to extensive output and affluence through the investment of enormous 40 resources. This campaign had eagerly raised the number of Ujamaa villagers from

531,200 to 2.5 million between 1970 and 1974 (Hyden, 1980:104).

Nonetheless, the outcome was more disappointing than promising – the

Ujamaa project took up only a small proportion of the rural economy and its interest became unsteady and declining among the Ujamaa officials as well as the peasants.

The possible reasons which explain the disappointment can be the peasants’ negligence on the communal exertion, the officials’ extraction of material goods from the communal hoard, and unreasonably low prices at the marketing board (Townsend,

1998:60-61). In addition, Goran Hyden argues that the failure of this policy revealed the citizens’ unpreparedness (particularly the peasants’) for accepting the revolutionary socialist discipline of development attempted by the party and the government’s endeavor (1980:32-33). Hence, the more ineffective the Ujamaa policy

had become, the less willing the peasants were to be involved in the project between

1968 and 1973 (Townsend, 1998:57-62).

The peasants’ latent response and the unsatisfactory outcome facilitated the

government’s use of force to achieve the national goal. Thus, in 1973-1976 as the

second stage of Ujamaa villagization, all peasants’ villagization or resettlement was

required through a national decree which confirmed the government’s resolve on

advancement. It was illustrated in Nyerere’s declaration in 1973 that commanded

living in villages. By 1979, 8,299 villages with a population of 14.9 million were

completed and this comprised 87% of the country’s population. But the unsuccessful 41 settlement that deprived peasants of economic security incurred animosity among

the rural population. Their opposition was restrained by government intimidation that

increased operation costs and reduced the budget for rural production. Consequently,

the Ujamaa villagization turned out to be ineffective in fulfilling either socialist or

self-reliant development as President Nyerere admitted on the tenth anniversary of the

Arusha Declaration on Febrary 5, 1977 (Nyerere, 1977). Rather, it was rule by a few

party elites and the president without a great deal of participation of civil service bureaucrats, technocrats, or ordinary people (Yeager, 1989:76-77; Pinkney, 1997:105-

106; Townsend, 1998:62-66).

Another salient factor in TANU’s nationalist policy was modern education through Kiswahili as a national language. Its basic aim was to educate the masses to understand the concept of Tanzanian citizenship and furthermore integrate more than

120 peoples distinguished by five major ethnic groups into the party to attain agricultural self-reliance. The ‘Education for Self-reliance’ policy set in 1967 sought fundamental changes in the educational program to establish national identity, professional training particularly in agriculture, and reform in educational institutions as a way to increase party control over access to higher education. TANU also adopted Kiswahili soon after the party was shaped in order to communicate with its ethnically diverse membership and in 1962 Nyerere used Kiswahili in the Bunge

(parliament), making a political and symbolic remark on the significance of African culture (Khamis, 1974). In addition, there were cultural programs, political education, 42 and military training, conducted to promulgate and inculcate socialist values and

stance through Kiswahili (Campbell, 1999:106-108).

Therefore, this educational policy played a part in ‘nation-building’ (or construction of a modern nation) rather than successfully creating a homogenous

national culture. Indeed, in institutionalizing the government offices and

strengthening Ujamaa, the policy was confronted with internal contradictions –

“authoritarian and hierarchic educational practices and a lack of correspondence

between educational qualifications and opportunities in the labor market” (ibid, 108) –

and the growing doubts about the practicality of public participation and the accountability of the government. Nevertheless, they contributed to nation-building in which Tanzanians could take steps towards a common goal of development and

possessed a shared identity based on the socialist idea of egalitarianism.

Indeed, the party feared that popular participation of a high degree, such as

national conflict when the participants try to take as much advantage as possible,

would destroy the function of the system. However, for the matter of the balance

between active participation and tolerance of sacrifice to maintain a stable, democratic

society, the discussion about political participation and the party control will center

around the following three questions: (1) How were the people involved in politics?

(2) What were the roles of local officials in decentralization? (3) How were the people involved in the non-party associations?

Traditionally, the people in Tanzania feel obliged to attend a required village 43 meeting and, in practice, most attend voluntarily. Along with this strong political

tradition, 2,469,840 people, or 11 percent of the population, were affiliated with

TANU by 1987, and the village meetings convened by the Village Development

Committees (VDC) – the local TANU body – were usually well-attended. According

to the survey conducted by Hyden on attendance at campaign meetings in the 1965

general election, among five villages the average attendance of the four highest was

25% of villagers while only Kitendagulo recorded less than 10% (1969:219-220).

Whereas many of Kitendagulo, because they were employed elsewhere, alleged that they could not be present at the meeting because of their work, those who were conscious of conformity in rural communities largely showed up, guilted by personal

persuasion.

Interestingly, facilitated by the nationalist policy that encouraged people’s

participation in development, a belief that the citizenry could have a strong influence

on governmental policies prevailed in the 1960s. Although rather unrealistic, this

belief contributed to the growth of political consciousness, and TANU should be

credited with listening to the people’s needs on policies.

However, there were no other significant channels than the party

organizations to practice political affairs, since tribal chiefs were overturned and little

tradition of independent political activity existed (Pinkney, 1997:112-113). That was

also seen in the survey, manifesting as low attendance at the non-VDC meetings and

the tendency that National Union of Tanganyika Workers (NUTA) and other voluntary 44 associations were less likely to be considered political. It was because the people

feared that these activities could be recognized as a threat to TANU’s autonomy, because many already accepted that TANU was the single political institution within

the country, and more importantly because other organizations were not as effective as

the TANU politically (Hyden, 1969:220-222).

By the 1970s, the monopoly of the government and the party increased and

other formal ways of political participation were more strictly contained. In 1975, the

party dominance was strengthened by the Constitution, which allowed the party to

place the National Assembly (Parliament) under its control. What is more, the party

Constitution in 1977 reinforced it, and stated that “all activity of the organs of the

state of the United Republic shall be conducted under the auspices of the party.” Since

the party was supposed to serve as the main agency for political participation, no

other political organizations were able to survive. Nevertheless, a local cell

representative under the party system, in which about ten houses engaged to present

their demands to the upper echelons, was more or less effective in that they actively

participated in dispute settlement, arranging development projects, operating various

welfare activities, and enforcing law and order. However, the party structure was so

hierarchical that local input was rarely transmitted to the upper authorities (Miller

1970:551; Samoff 1973:69).

What this illustrates is the distorted consequences of the decentralization

initiated in 1972 by President Nyerere. Decentralization was a structural modification 45 in the districts and in the regions whose administrative officials were all employed

by the central government. While securing TANU’s control over the civil service, the target was to “challenge the historically dominant government bureaucracy at the

regional and district level and to ensure popular participation there” (Finucane,

1974:27). It meant the process of abolishing separate ethnic bases of power, while

regional and district development directors in district development councils (DDCs)

replaced the former district council executive officers of the old district councils.

Development directors were the main officials of the DDCs and they were assisted by

three officers – a personnel officer, a planning officer, and a financial officer – who

managed a number of administrative officers. The development directors who would

be completely aware of all regional information and directives, mainly supervised

eight functioning areas: health, education, agriculture and natural resources, water,

land development, public works, and village and cooperative development. Although

the DDCs were to be the public administration working at the district level, the

directions of their performance was provided by the central government in Dar es

Salaam (Picard, 1980:50-51). In effect, district party officials that intended to

represent the local demands had no power over the district administration, but instead

mobilized the local people to take part in district development projects, which

functioned as a resource on which the administrators could proceed with extra

bureaucratic goals (ibid, 59,63-64).

On the other hand, non-party, political and economic organizations were 46 systemically undercut throughout the 1970s – e.g. in urban areas, the trade union movement was gravely curbed and the cooperatives in rural areas were replaced by crop authorities in 1976 – and they were brought under direct central governmental control. Traditional grassroots schemes in the countryside were also undermined by a national project, the Ruvuma Development Association that coordinated collective production and supplied social services. The local initiatives perceived as a threat to the party’s autonomy and prominence of democracy and self-reliance were dissolved

(Tripp, 1991:231).

However, there were rather invisible local organizations which were more effective in answerability, reliability of leaders, financial involvements and active participation than the party-affiliated organizations. The participants felt they could enjoy more autonomy and control in these organizations. For instance, upato was one of the most popular organizations among city women to make profits by saving money. The small upato groups were formed in workplaces, in marketplaces, and in localities where people with diverse ethnicities and religious background engaged. To ensure accountability of the organization, they employed a secretary or kijumbe who took charge in collecting and redistributing the savings. People were more inclined to put their trust in these organizations than local party-affiliated ones such as Women’s

Union (UWT) because of its lack of management skills, its inability to voluntarily supply finance, and unreliability of its local leaders. In addition, to cope with social needs that were not met by the party organizations, people’s informal organizations 47 for their security and religious matters often emerged as an indication of the

malfunction of the state operations (ibid, 232-234).

Another important but exceptional issue in Nyerere’s nationalist policy entailed the upcoming role of Zanzibar in Tanzania’s political and economic concerns.

Despite the one-sided consolidation of party supremacy of TANU, the merger with the

Afro-Shirazi party in Zanzibar was not achieved until 1977, five years after the

Zanzibari President Abeid Karume was assassinated. Karume was a repressive

Zanzibari nationalist who desired to form “a new identity, neither wholly Arab nor

wholly African” (“Third Five Year Plan,” 1977:16). The new joint party of Tanzania

was called the Chama Cha Mapinduzi (CCM) endorsed by the poll of TANU and ASP

members, as resulting in all the members’ consent except for 6 oppositions from

TANU branches out of 6,389. Also, a permanent Tanzanian constitution that

proclaimed single-party dominance over the whole country was passed by the

National Assembly, replacing the interim constitution of 1965. Still, it conceded that

Zanzibar was a distinctive governmental authority, which operated a separate cabinet

and ministerial system. When it comes to the legislative elections, ten seats for

Zanzibar were appended to the mainland constituencies in the merged National

Assembly. The executive representation consists of a president and two appointed

vice presidents, one of whom is to be Zanzibaris (ibid, 81-83).

However, the problem in this nationalization process was that the socialist

elements of development and authoritarian governance were ineffectively combined. 48 Non-party organizations were not allowed to exercise political debates and political movements, but the party-affiliated organizations were the only means to represent the people’s demands, albeit limitedly under the supervision of coercive administrators appointed by the central government. Because the party officials usually lacked management skills and were corrupt, they had lost trust from the citizens.

In conclusion, TANU’s radical reform had political success in establishing national integration and political and social stability in independent Tanzania by practicing ujamaa villagization and enforcing civic education. Contradicting

Mamdani’s claim that the radical nationalist strategy aggravated urban-rural divisions and reinforced centralized power, Tanzania at least made an intentional endeavor to

resist these side effects under the aegis of TANU’s special policies that favored

agricultural development and citizen participation. Although ujamaa failed because it

did not grasp peasants’ preference and genuine demands, this development project

attempted to elevate prosperity in rural areas.

On the other hand, TANU’s “decentralization” was actually the re-

institutionalization of authoritarian power, in which traditional local authorities were replaced by centralized local agencies. However, it is interesting that TANU tried to facilitate the decentralized form of rule by pursuing active popular participation. In sum, Tanzania also seemed to generate the common outcomes of the radical strategy, which were described as national cohesion and excessively centralized administration. 49 These features notwithstanding, its ventures on appeasing peasants and promoting

participation were not completely abortive in that they had an educational or propagandist effect on the people by showing the government’s nationalist enthusiasm.

III. Julius Nyerere

Julius Nyerere is a key actor in gaining Tanzania’s independence and structuring the post-colonial state. Although his role as a nationalist ruler is closely

related with TANU’s policy and performances, his background, principles, and

morality vis-à-vis unregulated personal rule would have a particular function that led

Tanzania successfully to achieving national integration.

Julius Nyerere was born in Butiama Village near Lake Victoria in 1922. In

1952, he returned to Tanganyika after obtaining a Master’s degree in History and

Economics in Britain and founded a nationalist organization, Tanganyika African

National Union (TANU). To gain national support for independence, he toured in the country and delivered powerful speeches on national unity (Nyerere, 1961:21). He became the independent country’s first Prime Minister in 1961 and its first President in 1962.

Nyerere’s nationalist principles, as manifested in TANU’s policy, contain four mission statements: social integration of ethnic, religious, and racial diversities, realization of equality as a traditional value (egalitarianism), self-reliant development using socialist guidelines, and democratic decision-making by the general population.

Among these nationalist goals, the way Nyerere identified egalitarianism was 50 remarkable and distinctive. His expression of equality was attached to socialism

which he felt was compatible with African traditional ethic because of “the same

socialist attitude of mind which in the tribal days gave to every individual the security that comes of belonging to a widely extended family” (Nyerere, 1962). That is, the concept of equality to him was intimately cooperative and humane societies, as appreciative fraternity (Pratt, 2000:366-367). His economic policy was also socialist whose guiding principle of state or collective ownership was better at equal distribution (Saul, 2002:18). While the well-being of the people was the primary goal of Nyerere’s governance, his strategy for development was not to be devoted to industrialization but to mere agricultural development. For this ideal of development, equality must be heralded before economic advancement because higher labor productivity could be born when people’s needs are satisfied (Hyden, 1994:83). His egalitarianism was also a respect for human dignity.

Besides his political principles, his leadership and personality involved the success of nation-building. He was a “leader-intellectual” and a “state leader” with a great political popularity as titled, Mwalimu, a respected teacher (Shivji, 2007:58). As a leader-intellectual, he was able to encourage, persuade, and motivate people to redeem their right to live in the better world by defending humanity, justice, and equality and thus inspired to emotional loyalty of nationalism.

Also, he was a skillful state commander who was able to draw the people’s agreement about the need for development and national integration. He was a 51 coercive dictator who used the armed force to carry out his nationalist policies, but he was convincing and attractive as the people disapproved his dictatorship.

Practicing frugality, he refused to live in the Government House and cautioned political elites against corruption. Even though the forced villagization did not bring a successful outcome, and the country came to face a political and economic crisis, he still remained his fame of the benevolent and brilliant founding father of Tanzania. In

1985, he decided to step down as President.

Julius Nyerere’s regime was obviously an authoritarian rule in its method which was not regulated by state institutions. Although Nyerere was solicitous for the nation’s well-being, his ruling style was of unilateral top-down commands rather than collecting public opinion. In fact, his policy contained democratic values such as equal human dignity, political participation, and self-determination, while the practice of the values was controlled by the government. Thus, what matters for social stability may be effective control of opponents and powerful persuasion of the populace by a well-loved and respected leader. Despite Nyerere’s authoritarianism and economic breakdown in the last years of his reign, Tanzania maintained national integration and relative social stability by virtue of his devotion and efforts to nation-building. 52 CHAPTER 3: DEMOCRATIZATION IN TANZANIA

Tanzania faced a serious economic crisis by the end of the 1970s caused by stagnant domestic production and a rising trade deficit. These were due primarily to external factors including an increase in oil prices, the crumbling of the East African

Community, and the Ugandan war (Shivji, 1992:48-49). In 1979, the trade deficit reached more than 100 percent of Tanzania’s export earnings for the year and contributed to the emergence of a vicious economic cycle in which the scarce primary substances for living and industry deteriorated production. This economic devastation dropped the living standard by 40-50 percent between 1975 and 1983, despite

Nyerere’s pride in reducing income inequality from 20:1 to 9:1 during the ten-year

Ujamaa plan (Baregu, 1994:165).

In the economic crisis, however, the government and the Party (Chama Cha

Mapinduzi [CCM], the united unitary party of Tanzania since 1977) failed to maintain their legitimacy because they were not able to solve the actual problems. Realizing the real limits of the socialist development strategies, the government informally

launched a World Bank structural adjustment program for 1982-1985. Then, it

officially endorsed an agreement with the IMF in 1985, accepting an economic

recovery program for 1986-1989. On the other hand, politically, the liberalistic

adjustment programs supported by the Western countries and organizations compel a

shift to a multiparty government. Not only the expression of economic needs mattered, but culture and religion were at issue when a multi-party state was called for. The 53 emergence of multiparty politics dwelled on the need for new ways in which workers, peasants, and independent craftsmen expressed themselves.

Between 1990 and 1993, more than half of the fifty-two African governments turned to exercising competitive presidential and legislative elections in response to the domestic and international pressures for change. This was a radical transition from authoritarian or/and one-party rules that had been prolonged for dozens of years since independence. Likewise, under the pressure of the liberalist international organizations and the timeliness of a change, Tanzania eventually opened a new era of multi-party politics in 1992. Although Tanzanians feared that the multi-party system might harm the national identity and integration that had been assiduously developed during Nyerere regime, the transition was unexpectedly smooth (Msekwa, 2006:34-

35). While retaining the former regime’s legacy, which concentrated its policies primarily designed and implemented within a single-party dominated system, the current government faces a new goal of participatory democracy or development of civil society.

In this chapter, Tanzania’s democratization is assessed based on quality of liberal democracy. Particularly, the government’s responsiveness to cultural plurality and the formation of civil society in Tanzania are examined in terms of its phase of democratic development. Finally, in connecting Nyerere regime’s legacy and the democratization of the current government, the role of national identity is explored.

54 I. Quality of Democracy

To analyze the quality of democracy, and to assess democratizations of

different regimes, we must elucidate what is “good” democracy. As we defined above,

democracy at least requires: 1) universal adult suffrage; 2) free, fair, and competitive

elections; 3) freedom of organization and opposition; and 4) freedom of expression.

But obviously, the existence of a sovereign state – that is, the state institutions should

not be restrained by individuals or foreign powers that are not directly accountable to

the people – is a prerequisite for democracy (Diamond et al. 2005:xi). Consistent with

the essence of democracy and meeting the precondition, the eight dimensions of

democratic quality as defined by Larry Diamond will be useful for empirical research.

The Rule of Law. The rule of law means that all citizens are equal under the law, and

the laws are clear, specific, predictable, non-retroactive, and fairly applied to all

citizens and government by an independent judiciary. Citizens have equal and

unrestrained right to use the courts to defend their rights and to challenge court cases

between private citizens or between private citizens and public institutions. Judges at

all levels are impartial and independent from any political pressure. To a greater

extent, the legal system protects democratic practices, sustains citizens’ civil and

political rights, and supports the authority of other agencies (O’Donnell, 2005:3-16).

Participation. The basis of democracy is individual liberty and the opportunity for

political participation is an essential element of a good democracy. All citizens have rights to vote, organize, convene, protest, lobby for their interests, or influence the 55 decision-making process. To encourage progressive participation, the diffusion of basic education and literacy and political knowledge are fundamental. It is important that a political culture that acknowledges dignity of all citizens and tolerates different ideas and ways of life exists in the society. However, participation can manifest itself in violence or lawlessness which would impede efficient governance and limit the quality of democracy (Diamond, 2005:xvi-xvii).

Competition A democratic system must include regular, free, and fair electoral competition between different political parties. Competition is constrained not only through inequitable and unfair electoral administration but also by repression of the freedom of parties to contest for limited positions (ibid,xvii-xix).

Vertical Accountability In terms of the quality of democracy, accountability is the duty of elected officials to take responsibility for their political decisions as asked for by citizen voters and other constitutional organizations. Citizens as voters can demand vertical accountability from elected representatives in the course of campaigns and elections and they can apply this at occasions of political controversy. But if incumbents manipulate elections to benefit themselves over opposition parties or extend control over media and civil society actors, vertical accountability is threatened (Schmitter, 2005:19-31).

Horizontal Accountability. Elected officials are also required to answer to other institutional actors who are legally charged with checking and regulating their conduct. Unlike vertical accountability, by horizontal accountability the actors of 56 independent government agencies have equal political influence in their activities of monitoring, investigating, and implementing. On the other hand, an inappropriate appointment for the head of the counter-corruption commission by and large dilutes horizontal accountability by neglecting duties to investigate, inquire, challenge, and punish (Diamond, 2005:xxi-xxv).

Freedom. Freedom grants three kinds of rights: political, civil, and socioeconomic.

Political rights, such as the rights to vote, to campaign, to support for office, and to organize political party, facilitate dynamic political participation and competition, and thus vertical accountability. Civil rights are composed of freedom of expression, religion, organization and the right to legal and suitable process. There are also socioeconomic rights, including the rights to private property, entrepreneurship, and collective bargaining. But these rights could be subverted by executives who propagate false conceptions of national security to extend their powers, repress criticism, and stifle opposition. Also, incompetent or partial judicial structures as well as police, military, and intelligence agencies that abuse these rights and suppress political opposition put freedom in peril (Beetham, 2005:32-44).

Equality Equality is a principle that confers upon every citizen and group the same rights and legal defense, as well as access to judicial proceedings and power. This consists of the disallowance of discrimination on the basis of gender, race, ethnicity, religion, or political orientation. The achievement of equality requires the reduction of absolute poverty in order to create an environment where citizens are able to seek political equality (Rueschemeyer; 2005:47-59). 57 Responsiveness The last dimension of a quality democracy is government

responsiveness to the demands, needs, anticipations, and concerns of citizens.

Citizens’ policy and electoral preferences are transformed into real policy outcomes.

This is closely connected to vertical accountability, and thus to participation and competition. But this is restrained by limited resources and budget, by the autonomous leaders’ own interpretation of the citizens’ demands, and by beforehand priorities. In addition, ethnically based parties could marginalize minorities and avoid the decent distribution of preferences of others (Powell, 2005:62-75).

Eight different dimensions of democracy have been presented, and how the dimensions could be constrained is also explained. But not a single dimension can be translated and accomplished individually unless the elucidation and development of other dimensions are included. That is, the various dimensions are so intensely interactive and overlapping that it is difficult to test the level of democracy based on one dimension, and hence a quality democracy requires the simultaneous or successive advances of several dimensions. Therefore, in assessing Tanzania’s democracy, although all the dimensions are not measured individually, we will examine how one influences the others when it comes to the progress or digress of its

democracy.

II. One-party Domination

After nearly three decades of dictatorship and one-party politics, Tanzania finally made a transition to multiparty democracy, announced by President Ali 58 Mwinyi in June 1992. It was an outcome of the national conference that the ruling

CCM held on 18-19 February 1992, where the issue of an introduction of a multiparty system was discussed as recommended by the National Executive Committee (NEC).

The CCM posited several reasons why it could be positive to this radical transition that could be seen as a threat to the autonomy of the party. First, the CCM recognized that the social and political circumstances in Tanzania had changed from the 1960s when the party took overall responsibility on nation-building which was the most urgent task above any other problems. A national consensus on the one-party system and its role would no longer be present while a large number of Tanzanians wished for a multiparty government. Especially in Zanzibar, there had been revolutionary calls for pluralism in the political system. Also, the party was not able to overlook the inspiring current mood of pluralistic political change in Africa and in the world.

Second, the CCM argued that the acceptance of multipartyism was not opposed to its principle of democracy. According to the ruling party, Tanzania had enjoyed peace, stability, and national harmony by virtue of the party and its government, which created an environment to maintain these virtues, and the transition to a plural-party system would be a continuation of the party’s historical respect for democracy and human rights. By claiming so, it hoped to maintain its authority as an influential and central party.

Last, the CCM asserted that there was no ideological dispute to multi- partyism. The Arusha Declaration, the government’s ideological guideline stated that 59 the one-party system was an instrument to build up socialism and self-reliance in the country, and the party acknowledged socialism could not be achieved without democratic participation. Along with this principle, the CCM agreed that when the one-party government appeared to be not the most appropriate system to deliver divergent views of the people, those members who dissented on multipartyism should forgo their opinion (Ngasongwa, 1992:114-115). Consequently, the radical systematic change turned out not very dramatic in the CCM’s interpretation of the transformation, which gave justification of the party’s rule in which democratic values seemed already having been performed.

However, even after the transition to the multi-party system, the CCM’s domination continues both in the executive and legislative bodies of the government.

In presidential elections, a candidate of the CCM, Benjamin Mkapa won two terms of office by over 60% in 1995 and 2000, and another candidate of the CCM, Jakaya

Kikwete was elected at the high rate of the poll, over 80% in 2005. (See Table 2.)

60

Candidate (Party) 1995 2000 2005 Benjamin Mkapa 4,026,422 5,863,201 (CCM) (61.82) (71.74) - Jakaya Kikwete 9,123,952 (CCM) - - (80.28) Augustine Mrema 1,808,616 (NCCR-Mageuzi) (27.77) - - Sengondo Myungi 55,819 (NCCR-Mageuzi)* - - (0.49) Augustine Mrema 637,115 84,901 (TLP) - (7.80) (0.75) Ibrahim Lipumba 418,973 1,329,077 1,327,125 (CUF) (6.43) (16.26) (11.68) 258,734 342,891 John Cheyo (UDP) (3.97) (4.20) - Freeman Mbowe 668,756 (CHADEMA) - - (5.88) Christopher Mtikila 31,083 (DP) - - (0.27) Emmanuel Makaidi 21,574 (NLD) - - (0.19) Anna Senkoro 18,783 (PPT-Maendeleo) - - (0.17) Leonard Shayo 17,070 (MAKINI) - - (0.15) Paul Kyara 16,414 (SAU) - - (0.14) Table 2: No. of Votes (%) in 1995, 2000, 2005 Presidential Elections *Sengondo Mvungi was also supported by the Forum for Restoration of Democracy (FORD), National Reconstruction Alliance (NRA), Union for Multiparty Democracy (UMD), and United People’s Democratic Party (UPDP).

1995 2000 2005 Party % of No. of Seats No. of Seats % of No. of Seats Vo t e s 232 (269[%])* 231 (295) Vo t e s 232 (323[%]) Chama Cha Mapinduzi 186 206 (CCM) 59.22 (214[79.60]) 202 (258) 70.0 (275[85.1]) National Convention for Construction and Reform- 21.83 16 (19[7]) 01 (01) - - Mageuzi (NCCR-Mageuzi) Chama cha Demokrasia na Maendeleo (CHADEMA) 6.16 03 (04[1.5]) 04 (05) 8.2 05 (11[3.4]) Civic United Front (CUF) 5.02 24 (28[10.4]) 17 (22) 14.3 19 (31[9.6]) United Democratic Party (UDP) 3.32 03 (04[1.5]) 03 (04) 1.4 01 (01[0.3]) Tanzania Labor Party (TLP) - - 04 (05) 2.7 01 (01[0.3]) Vacant** - - - - - (04) Table 3: National Assembly Elections in 1995, 2000, 2005 *232 members are directly elected; The figures in parentheses reflect the distribution of seats when both the directly and indirectly elected seats are combined [excluding the 5 Zanzibar delegates and Attorney-General]. **Only 6 of 10 seats reserved for presidential appointees have been filled in 2005. Source: African Elections Database, http://africanelections.tripod.com/ In the legislative elections, CCM’s domination appears more eminent because of the “First-Past-the-Post” (FPTP) system. Each and every registered party – eighteen political parties are presently in the list of permanent registration – has the 61 right to support one candidate for Presidential, legislative, and councilor elections.

However, the FPTP system, which some ex-British colonies have adopted, widens the gap of parties’ parliamentary seats as a candidate who obtains plurality vote wins the election. In the 2005 Parliamentary election, the CCM received 70% of the national vote, with 14.3% for the Civic United Front (CUF) and 8.2% for the Chama cha

Demokrasia na Maendeleo (CHADEMA) gained. However, because of the FPTP system, shares of parliamentary seats were designated with greater difference than the popular vote, as CCM took almost 85.1% of the seats while CUF and CHADEMA won 9.6% and 3.4% respectively (National Electoral Commission [NEC], 2005).

Nevertheless, both the executive and legislative electoral systems also assign proportionally a huge portion of power to Zanzibar despite the small sizes of population and land of Zanzibar. The electoral system for presidency requires that if the candidate is from the mainland, his/her running mate, who is to be Vice-President, must be from Zanzibar or vice versa. In the parliamentary electoral system, the FPTP allows the CUF, which is the most competent party in Zanzibar, to take much more seats compared to the number of its votes. It seems deserving of dispensation when the Zanzibari secessionist movement appears to be one of the more delicate factors that could harm the unity of the people in Tanzania because Zanzibari ethnic identity has remained stronger than the other ethnic identities even throughout Nyerere’s nationalist regime. Still, it does not seem to represent diversity effectively that both the executive power and a large portion of the legislative control are rooted in one 62 party and that the power sharing accounts in no small measure for Zanzibar in the government.

Under the NEC’s direction, fair registration, impartial election campaigns, and free speech and the free press are constitutionally guaranteed. In order to prevent chicanery of parties and candidates, Tanzania started permanent registration in 2005, provided by an amendment in the Constitution endorsed in 2004. Also, publication and broadcasting related to elections are guided by the electoral law to be impartial and against discrimination in matters connected to candidates and in the amount and the weight of the media dedicated to them (NEC, 2005). Hence, despite several shortcomings of the ostensibly multi-party constitution, free and fair elections seem to be mounted in Tanzania where at least some party candidates can freely register to compete for elections and accept the results from the three successive multi-party elections immediately or sometime later (Lindberg, 2003:101).

This moderate assessment on the electoral institutions and process attributes the one-party domination in Tanzania to weak opposition parties and the historic impetus of the CCM. Not distinctive from the other ethnically diverse countries in

Africa, the new political parties in Tanzania, mostly registered in 1993, usually had apparent regional and ethnic support bases – except for the CCM, which obtained nation-wide support (See Figure 1 & 2). The CUF, the second largest party, retained strong support in Zanzibar, the Union for Multi-party Democracy (UMD) appealed for backing from the Sukuma and Nyamwezi ethnic groups and was influential in Dar es Salaam and Bukoba, the National Convention for Reconstruction and Reform (NCCR)-Mageuzi 63

Figure 2: Map of Tanzania

Fiture2: Map of the Regions of Tanzania 64 had strong following in the major cities, Chadema was potent in Arusha,

Kilimanjaro, and in coffee-growing areas in the South, and the United Democratic

Party (UDP) appealed to the Bariadi in Shinyanga. Most of the parties solicited a

revival of the pre-independence province system and the supremacy of parliament

(van Cranenburgh, 1996:540). Therefore, the party formation appeared closely

connected to ethnic divisions while its influence did not disturb the incumbent party

from maintaining it domination in the multi-party system. In spite of their liberal orientation, the importance of opposition parties was enervated under the shadow of the party’s overbearing power.

The most significant factor in enfeebling opposition parties was the fractions among the parties themselves. For instance, the National Convention for

Reconstruction and Reform (NCCR), presided over Chief Abdallah Fundikira, former

Speaker of House Representatives, was created, as a result of a multi-party seminar.

However, NCCR ended up splitting into various parties mainly because of quarrels about and among the leaders. Among those NCCR fractions, only NCCR-Mageuzi, which had a strong supporter base of lawyers, academics, professionals, and youth people disappointed with CCM survived. It came to retain strong popular support when former Deputy Prime Minister and Home Affairs Minister, Augustine Mrema, was given the position of party head (Mwase & Raphael, 2001:249). Nevertheless, there was not a great deal of migration of supporters from CCM to NCCR, while the leadership of NCCR was severely impaired: Nyerere remarked that NCCR-Mageuzi 65 did not have leaders capable of running a state and also, Mrema was suspect among

the Asian business community and Muslim fundamentalists (Mwase & Raphael,

2001:249). Accordingly, NCCR failed to establish a broad coalition for the party (van

Cranenburgh, 1996:539-541).

Another problem of the multi-party system is that most parties lacked clarity in

elucidating their views on campaign issues, especially on economic matters. Most

opposition parties, including NCCR, CUF, and UDP, advocated a liberal market

economy but at the same time adhered to government involvement in the social

services. Some of them argued for “indigenization” of industry, but lacked favored

treatment of indigenous entrepreneurs. These economic policies are not viewed much

differently from the CCM’s economic policy, which fundamentally follows

liberalization of the economy. As a matter of fact, elections in Africa are essentially

more attentive to a discussion of personae than issues or policies (Mwase & Raphael,

2001:260).

In the 2005 elections, candidates from 12 political parties were nominated for

the Presidential election and 1,222 candidates from 18 parties were nominated for the

Parliamentary election to contest in the 232 constituencies. Among these parties, the

three most influential parties are CCM, CUF, and CHADEMA, while NCCR-Mageuzi

won only 0.49% of votes in the Presidential election and obtained no seats in the parliament (NEC, 2006).

The Civic United Front (CUF) is the most forceful challenger to CCM having 66 won approximately 12% and 14% of the votes in the 2005 Presidential and legislative elections, respectively. It was formed in 1992 with a broad alliance of urban intellectuals and entrepreneurs, and maintained political superiority among rural peasantry on the island of Pemba, as well as partial rural support on the mainland of

Unguja. In every election since its foundation, CUF has been fighting against the skewed dominance of CCM in the Zanzibari Parliament. Generally, a sharper competition between CUF and CCM and more fierce violence between their supporters appear in the Zanzibar elections than in the Union elections. According to

the official result of the Zanzibar Presidential election in 2005 Amani Abeid Karume

(CCM) won by 53.18% against Seif Shariff Hamad (CUF) who received 46.07% of

votes (“Elections in Zanzibar,” 2006). However, CUF questioned the party’s illicit

predominance in Zanzibar by showing its own calculation that Hamad had won by

50.63% to Karume’s 49.37%. Even in the Union elections, CUF has won the second

most votes following CCM since the 2000 election though there has been a huge gap

between them. On the other hand, both parties accuse each other of prompting

violence embroiled in the election fervor (“Tanzania; Police, Opposition Clash As

Zanzibaris Await Poll Results,”2005).

Despite the zealous support on the isles towards CUF and the party’s

insistence for more autonomy of the islanders, its foundation was not solely based on

Zanzibari orientation, but formed from a joining of a Zanzibar political advocacy 67 group, Kamati ya Mwelekeo wa Vyama Huru (a Committee for the Enhancement of

Free Political Movement) and a mainland-based party, Chama cha Wananchi (The

People’s Party). Also, there is contradiction in its propensities of economic policies, seeking agricultural development and equal health system for the poor, while its coalition is based on not only peasants but a majority of businesspeople and intellectuals (“Tanzanian opposition party launches manifesto ahead of polls,” 2005).

With these contradictions, its policy interests seem constituted to be disparaging the

CCM’s policies seen as unsuccessful to CUF in keeping human rights, dealing with

constitutional reform of the Union, and ameliorating the state of the economy

(Cameron, 2002:314).

On the other hand, the CCM’s rhetorical principles still remain constant with

Nyerere’s basic doctrine of self-reliance and socialism based on the Arusha

Declaration. In respect to the economy, CCM mostly protects the rights and the

development of the peasants and workers and attempts to build an equal society by fighting against neo-colonialism, imperialism, and all sorts of discrimination. The

supreme issues of CCM’s service to the country and the people are based on eradicating poverty, ignorance, diseases and corruption, and pursuing justice and the development of self-reliant citizens. In terms of politics, the party maintains Nyerere’s philosophy of guarding human rights and people’s participation in decision-making on national affairs and civic concerns in its principles. Additionally, even after 68 independence, it attaches importance to African unity and fraternal relations with neighboring countries which share an ideological inclination with CCM (CCM, 2007).

Actually, it is surprising that it manifests the same doctrine as Nyerere’s socialism and self-reliance though considering its adoption of the neo-liberal economy in the late

80s and considerable dependence on foreign donors with an external debt of $7.5 billion, qualifying as one of the Highly Indebted Poor Countries (HIPC)

(“Background note: Tanzania,” 2008).

Ultimately, there are three major reasons why the one party has been able to maintain its power even in the multi-party system. First, CCM, the ruling party, often takes advantage of national resources and its control of power in the defense and security agencies and information sectors. Especially in elections, the officers of the

National Electoral Commission, appointed by the President, are likely to determine the dates of elections and campaigns favorable to the incumbent party. Second, the ruling party already has a stronger and more developed party organization. Because

CCM is inherited from TANU, which is the original party of independent Tanzania, its network is geographically broad and steadfast in most villages of the country in comparison to other parties that obtain a few strongly supportive regions and classes

(ibid, 234-235). Third, too many parties are fragmented and lack explicit views on political issues. According to Joel Barkan (2000), the opponents are divided into

“transition-seekers,” “patronage-seekers,” and “anti-regime hard-liners.” Most of 69 them are “patronage-seekers” who line up for the opportunity to enter the incumbent party. Thus, in Tanzania, establishing an intact political party to legitimately challenge the dominant party is largely unsuccessful, though numerous parties exist.

In conclusion, although Tanzania had changed to a multi-party system, in which utilizing ethnicity as a source of party support was legitimized, there has been a dominance of the one party, CCM that adheres to former President Nyerere’s political principles. The opposition parties like NCCR-Mageuzi and CUF have been challenging the ruling party by criticizing the current undemocratic constitutional system and long-lasting economic deprivation. Despite the opposition parties’ efforts to divide the source of power and condemn the contradiction within CCM’s political decree, the CCM’s historic rule has gained momentum in the present politics in

Tanzania. Therefore, though a democratic system for competitive elections is installed, the single-party dominated government is not an adequate configuration to operate good democracy, which includes responsiveness and accountability to cultural plurality.

III. Civil Society

Civil Society as a realm of associational life that is “open, voluntary, self- generating, at least partially self-supporting, [and] autonomous from the state…”

(Diamond, 1999:221) emerged to overcome the malfunction of the state and legal markets. Civil society includes an inherent tension between the individual’s concept 70 of his or her role within the community and the community’s understanding of the

individual’s place within it. While many norms are shared between the two, there is

occasionally stress when one part of the civil society or the other agitates for a

reinterpretation of this relationship (Williams, 2007:46-47). According to John

Harbeson’s functionalist perspective, civil society constructs acceptable constitutional

norms regarding the function and process of the polity “to the extent that [it] seek[s]

to define, generate support for, or promote change in the basic working rules of the

[political] game” (1994:4). Often times, ethnic and class considerations exacerbate the

existing tensions as individuals or groups begin to define their role in the civil society

based on their view of themselves as distinct from the state particularly when it comes

to public responsibility and individual liberty.

And yet, it is not appropriate to naively conclude that civil society would complete the ideals of democracy when civil groups equally represent their voices.

Due to the variation of the groups’ power holdings and contribution to the society, differential access to the state ought to be granted to the various civil groups of capitalists, socialists, intellectual associations, nongovernmental organizations, and trade groups. Especially in Africa, where the state affairs have been secretive and authoritarian, civil society may be easily romanticized as the ultimate for open and plural politics that could be an answer to an arbitrary government required to be more and more liberal. However, the state has played a positive role in protecting capitalism and in political mediation between diverse groups in society while civil society needs 71 continuous attention to adjust its concept and the roles suitable for political functions in a society (Nyang’oro, 1999:190-191). At this juncture, therefore, civil society is a good measure of democracy, particularly if it helps promote the government’s operations in accomplishing equality, accountability, and responsiveness. Similarly in Tanzania, to observe the people’s consciousness and practices in civil society is salient in searching for the grounds of Tanzania’s democracy.

As the failure of the socialist economic policy became apparent in the 1980s, skepticism of the ruling party’s capability constantly grew in Tanzania. Showing signs of abating its ability to deal with economic problems, CCM crushed oppositions to maintain the rule. In fact, the party retained legitimacy as the utmost power of the state, keeping “paternal authority,” even when the economy was in dire hardship and the political promises increasingly faltered. In this regard, Hyden shows the prominence of the party in that many Tanzanians were not able to envisage their country without it (1994:92-93). Because of the antecedent of the party’s political and economic monopoly in the post-independence period before the multiparty democracy began, civil society that serves a more direct and vigorous participation of people in the multi-party system does not thrive in Tanzania even now (ibid,94).

Regarding the effect of this monopoly of power, there are two different perspectives on the weakness of Tanzanian civil society. One is a political aspect contended by Nyang’oro that because Tanzania has tended to keep out ethnicity in 72 political mobilization and also because the government’s coercion used for the sake

of national stability was neither overt nor pervasive, people felt no need to create

stretching new civil society that opposed government intimidation. Rather, there is a

political culture that views people who challenge the party operations as opportunists

(1999:194). When it comes to African civil society, distinguished from the Western civil society in which various interests of citizens are represented and materialized through the state-society interaction, informal, independent organizations seek their

own individual and collective resources for health, education, and other social

services as well as personal security as shown in Tanzania (Tripp, 1998:249). This

informal space for associational life, unless ethnic-based, is given due to the

government’s unaccountability for people’s needs, undergoing economic deprivation.

Tripp’s interesting analysis about this formation of Tanzania’s civil society asserts that

“[the informal associations] are ultimately redefining politics by seeking tangible

solutions to problems caused by the vagaries of the market and the failure, negligence

or outright repression of the state” (ibid, 253). In conclusion of these two aspects,

politics in Tanzania is still an exclusive possession of few elites not because of the

government’s regulation of civic associations but rather because the people have

rarely had the experience of civil society, in the sense of appealing to the state for

their group demands unlike the “indigenous” groups in African civil society as

understood in the Western sense is comparatively weak.

Indeed, the number of non-governmental organizations (NGOs) has been 73 increasing – while only 17 new NGOs were registered with the government in

between 1961-78, at least 163 organizations were recorded in 1990, and the number

had risen to 1,800 or even 8,000 NGOs in 1997 (Kelsall, 2001).4 These figures

indicate that the government gradually began to accept initiatives by individuals and

by independent organizations (including ethnic and religious based groups) at the

grassroots level since the state outlay for social services had declined due to the

economic crisis beginning in the mid-1970s (Maghimbi, 1995:46-47). But there are

few NGOs performing the political role of engaging in Tanzania’s democratic breach

and the transition to the multiparty system, and most of these are guided by external

donors: Research and Education for Democracy in Tanzania (REDET), Eastern &

Southern African Universities Research Program (ESAURP), Political Risk Analysis

(PORIS), Tanzania Gender Networking Program (TGNP), and Baraza la Wanawake

Tanzania (BAWATA) tally with this description. Where donors are likely to support

NGOs in order to contribute to the creation of “democratic” civil society, many initiate NGOs to take advantage of donor funds. As long as donor money flows in to the organizations, there is little stimulus for them to become sensitive to grass-roots demands through devoted services or mobilization. In addition, due to the vast, sparsely inhabited land, Tanzanians are unfamiliar with the importance of local self-

4 The latter estimate was given in Parliament during the 1997 budget session. It probably includes District Development Trust Funds, which are registered under a separate Ministry, and possibly Community Based Organizations, which tend to be unregistered. 74 government and networking within civil society (“Tanzania: Community Workers

Debate New Funding Agreement,” 2007). Thus, in spite of the fact that the passion for a democratic society has been growing, vibrant and independent civil society including the NGO sector is still weak in Tanzania (Kelsall, 2001:136-147; Hyden,

1999:142-155).

This section’s ultimate concern about civil society is the connection between the people’s needs and the government’s accountability to them, and how civil society functions to increase appropriate representation of diversity in the government. To understand public opinions about the government’s accomplishment, Afrobarometer conducted a survey about people’s evaluations on the political and economic reforms implemented in Tanzania. The result revealed that Tanzanians are “uncritical citizens,” exhibiting “habits of accommodation” despite the high level of political interests. According to the survey, even though most Tanzanians (more than 60%) are aware of the seriousness of official corruption, they show a very high level of overall satisfaction with the performance of the government. Also, they mostly demonstrate the positive assessment in the area of social services; fighting corruption (55%), satisfying educational need (59%), combating crime (59%), and curing and caring for

HIV/AIDS infected persons (72%). But the respondents provide negative evaluation for the government’s macroeconomic management and low positive ratings for other economic matters such as reducing the gap between the poor and the rich (24%), creating jobs (27%), diminishing poverty (31%), and eliminating food shortage (39%). 75 The result demonstrates that the citizens have positive evaluation for the

administration’s performance though recognizing it inefficient for the economic sector.

In terms of a party system, two-thirds of the respondents showed a positive view

(rating above 6 on a scale of 1 to 10) of the present multi-party system and a

significant percentage of the population (84%) advocate democracy. However, it

should be noted that their view of the former one-party politics is also benevolent with

a 42% positive rating. This research posits that the low incidence of people’s rejection

of the one-partyism is attributed to the favorable remembrance of the old political

regime, in which national unity, social welfare, and economic equality were pursued

and a certain degree of competition was allowed within the one-party system

(Chaligha, 2002). It is also possible, as Lauren Ndumbaro and Audax Kweyamba argue, that citizens consider the implementation of political issues to be the sole responsibility of elected officials while the public is only concerned with political matters around the time of elections (2003:2-3).

In sum, as a salient part of the development of democracy, civil society plays a role in interacting with the state to lobby for their demands. Yet, in Tanzania, civil society, as a channel for the citizens to appeal to the government, is not fully developed though continuously growing. Instead, there are many different profit- seeking informal organizations that are usually multi-ethnic-based, and it is seen as a

way through which people diversify their demands, mostly economic, due to the

unaccountable administration in the economic sector. Interestingly, however, 76 Tanzanians’ avid interest in politics had been satisfied even in the previous one- party system, whereas they are inclined towards the present multi-party democracy.

Now, it needs a synthesized analysis to find why even in the current multi-party system, one-party dominance is the choice of the people and how the democratization in Tanzania has remained relatively peaceful. 77 CHAPTER 4: ANALYSIS & CONCLUSION

I. Analysis

This research sheds light on the accomplishment of Tanzania’s national

integration and social stability in the post-colonial authoritarian regime as well as the

previous regime’s influence on democratization in multi-party politics. Tanzania has

enjoyed social and political stability by successfully erecting national integration.

Despite the colonial legacy which conveys ethnic factionalism, TANU’s radical

nation-building strategy and Julius Nyerere’s leadership contributed to creating national cohesion and identity. After the transition to the multi-party system, though

Tanzania maintained the relative peace in the society, it faced a challenge to democratic development – sustaining CCM’s dominance in both executive and legislative institutions, Tanzania’s democracy is constrained without providing room for the maturation of civil society.

The political development of any state is dependent upon that state’s historical experiences. Correspondingly, Tanzania’s relative stability and its current democratic conditions may result from the reconciliation between the past and the present. As most decolonized African states have gone through, Tanzania passed from nation-building, authoritarianism, and economic crisis to democratization. Resisting colonial heritages, the African states attempted a political, economic, and social take- off to the new independent phase. In the process of nation-building, the central government became gigantic and monopolitistic while an authoritarian leader was in 78 full charge of decision-making. Economic crises aggravated the inefficiency of authoritarianism, and then it became inevitable to change the political system to a multi-party democracy. In addition, throughout this post-colonial history in Africa, many countries suffered from ethnic conflicts for power-sharing in the new order.

Meanwhile, it was idiosyncratic that Tanzania bypassed severe ethnic conflict, which often occurred if on the typical path to the post-colonial development in Africa.

But Tanzania’s national unity and social stability are closely linked with the country’s democratization in terms of the growth of civil society. Since nationalism has been shaped in a way to create a common identity but to restrain political consciousness of liberal democracy, the preparation for democracy is prolonged but hardened.

To elucidate the path of Tanzania’s political development, this research answers three essential questions: (1) What are the factors of Tanzania’s successful nation-building or national integration? (2) How democratic is Tanzania’s politics after the transition to the multi-party system? (3) What are the influences of the post- colonial regime to the current regime in terms of democratic development? To answer these questions, the particular frameworks for the set of circumstances in Tanzania – national integration and social stability – are used which entail the radical nation- building strategy and the political leadership of President Julius Nyerere.

Resisting indifferent and exploitative colonialism in the post-colonial

Tanzania, nationalist movements centered on the nationalist party, TANU, were conducive to developing a new stable state, and its power as a ruling party was 79 consolidated. The Party’s nationalist policy gained strong support from the populace and conferred legitimacy upon the independent government. Moreover, the

increased state ownership and economic control that results from this consolidated

power yielded stability and mastery over the country.

In particular, the declaration of a one-party state in 1965 and the inauguration

of the socialist development policy, Ujamaa, under the Arusha Declaration in 1967 are

the fundamental events that shaped the nature of Tanzania’s politics as called the radical nation-building strategy by Mahmood Mamdani. The radical strategy

reinstated the tribal apparatus and instead developed homogeneous, nation-wide

institutions, regardless of ethnic origins. As such, the single-party system was favored

because when national unity was acute, it would be more likely to prevent disruptive

ethnic, regional, and religious factionalism and the socialist policy was pursued to

improve the political and economic well-being of the people as well as to succeed in

equality in the area of human rights. Successful in giving utterance to the national

goals of national unity and self-help, the detribalizing nationalist strategy played an

important role in creating national integration and fending off the ethnic conflict

prevalent in other ethnically diverse countries.

Closely related to nationalist policy, the other critical factor which impacts

national stability and unity was historic – the political leadership of Julius Nyerere.

Throughout history the ethics and strategies of political leaders have had a prominent

role in the devastation or advancement of a country’s destiny. The corruption, 80 authoritarianism, and grandiosity of Kwame Nkrumah, for example, brought Ghana into a path of political and economic ebb from which it has yet to recover, three decades later (Diamond, 1988:18).

Julius Nyerere, the founding father of independent Tanzania, was a crucial figure in paving a path towards Tanzania’s political stability and in shaping the way subsequent political players will likely conduct themselves. He was a political theorist who set up his nation’s mission statements – social integration of diversity, realization of equality as a traditional value, development using socialist guidelines, and democratic decision-making by the general population – and has been wholly admired by the people. Indeed, Nyerere and his people believed Tanzania’s traditional ideals like fraternity and equality protected the unity of the people while his socialist development policy would help rescue the nation from poverty, deterring the emergence of a capitalist bourgeoisie.

However, his rule was enormously authoritarian not only in that his presidency lasted over 20 years but also because the party’s power in decision-making and administration was not negotiable. His reign was appreciative of restructuring the nation, promoting social stability and cohesion of the citizens and thus has been revered by his people.

In considering the second question about the situation of Tanzania’s democracy, there are two particular characteristics in its politics: the one-party dominated government and a weak civil society. Tanzania’s current president and the 81 CCM party’s head, Jakaya Kikwete won the election by a large margin, capturing over 80% of the vote. As a result of the legislative election in 2005, CCM took almost

85.1% of the seats in the Parliament. Although the system provides a competitive arena for democratic rule, CCM seems to have a paramount power so that diverse demands and cultural plurality are less likely to be reflected in policy.

CCM has been able to maintain its power even after the democratic institutional change because of its continuous popularity. As examined, fraudulence, coercion, and violence by the ruling party to control the elections and campaign exist but are not significant, and the opposition parties are rather obedient to the election results. The causes of the party’s sustained dominance are mostly found in the little opportunity for the opposition parties to be reinforced under the compelling influence of CCM. Thus, CCM may not frequently need a coercive method or prohibition of free speech and press to retain its supremacy.

However, the single-party dominance does not facilitate the growth of civil society. It becomes more understandable in Hyden’s observation that many

Tanzanians were not able to envisage their country without the Party. Because of the antecedent of the party’s political and economic monopoly before multi-party democracy began, civil society that permits a more direct and vigorous participation by the public does not thrive in Tanzania even now (1994, 92-94). Weak civil society in Tanzania stems from insufficient experience of civil society, in the sense of appealing to the sate for their group’s demands as understood in the Western sense. As 82 Nyerere emphasized the egalitarian worth of a group as demonstrated in his communal agricultural village project, Tanzanians may value fraternity or community rather than differentiated individual needs. When it comes to civil society, Tanzania’s democracy is still on a fledgling step though with a multi-party system.

Lastly, Tanzania’s post-colonial regime, characterized by Nyerere’s authoritarian rule and a one-party system as a means of the radical nation-building strategy, had a great influence on post-Nyerere politics. Due to the post-colonial legacy, Tanzania maintains relative stability even in the multi-party democracy and has strong national identity, while civil society remains premature.

A possible explanation for the peaceful transition to the multi-party democracy may adopt Robert Dahl’s theory about the paths to polyarchy. The normal path to polyarchy, and the one that Tanzania has followed, consists of three stages: hegemony, followed by competitive oligarchy, and finally ending in inclusiveness of the regime

(polyarchy) (1971:34). The normal procedure is more peaceful than the others including one wherein inclusiveness precedes systemic liberalization and another one characterized by a swift change to increasing inclusiveness from hegemony. This is because in the normal path, a small group of elites earn more time to learn to tolerate or adjust among themselves before expanding the room for authority to others, which are potentially more threatening groups and social classes with diverging interests, goals, and outlooks. In addition, incumbent leaders could more peacefully manage demands for political competition and participation when not confronted with the 83 abrupt breakdown or subversion of the regime.

According to this analysis, the two-decade long de jure one-party system in

Tanzania that resembles competitive oligarchy was a bulwark of peaceful democratization and a transitional stage practicing tolerance and competition with relatively little conflict. In other words, Tanzania’s was a transition minimizing the threat to the incumbent leadership by controlling the diversified popular interests or limiting the establishment of possible alternative institutions by political opponents and civic groups. It delineated "top-down" democracy and Goran Hyden (1999) claims that Tanzania’s gradual institutionalization of new values has been reinforced from the ruling elites rather than the local civil society or political opposition. That is, the previous authoritarian regime and the one-party system, endowed with sufficient time to make a stable political shift, have historical meaning because the relatively peaceful conditions of Tanzania’s contemporary politics exhibit how significantly the country’s past has determined its present.

However, the way to distinguish Tanzania from the other countries with single-party dominant democracies is its dominant party’s foundation that disregards ethnicity. Although there is no predominant ethnic group in Tanzania, ethnicity also does not incur severe competition in politics due to the successful nationalist effort to unify the country. To the extent that they both are purposefully non-ethnic based parties, South Africa’s dominant party, African National Congress (ANC) is comparable with CCM in Tanzania. The ANC, emerging as a politically enfranchised 84 black party to protest racial exclusion by the white elites in the late 1980s, has a

broad ethnic base except for the region of KwaZulu-Natal whose people mostly support Inkatha Freedom Party (IFP). Meanwhile, the CCM, established in support of nationalism, has been a nation-wide dominant party, prohibiting ethnic concentrations

(though this is less crucial in Zanzibar than in the mainland.)

Significantly, however, leaders in South Africa have embarked on making stable democracy especially through institutionalization, owing to the country’s vulnerability to recurrent ethnic tension (Lijphart, 1998; Friedman, 1999; Mattes,

2002; Pottie & Hassim, 2003; Lodge, 2003; Southall, 2003). ANC is the principle party committed to institutional democracy in which ethnic-based disputation is no longer an issue of political debate (Lane & Ersson, 2007:219). Different in the background of their foundation and in the degree of democratization, the significance of these non-ethnically based parties in Tanzania and South Africa relies on their respective contributions to their countries’ on-going peaceful democratizations.

On the other hand, South Africa’s first elections in which multi-racial parties could be involved, were held in 1994 soon after Nelson Mandela’s government was inaugurated in 1990 as the first black leadership. Accordingly, its transition to the multi-party system could be a revolutionary start at the bottom, unlike Tanzania’s top- down transition. Along with this, South Africa has a strong civil society, and conducting free and fair elections, ANC has a will to be open to minorities and transitional movements and to negotiate with other parties in the legislature (Barkan, 85 2000:239).

In the meantime, in Tanzania, the ruling party has neglected to institutionalize representative democracy. Actually, Tanzania’s party organizations largely follow ethnic or regional lines, whereas the CCM focuses on nationalism. Contrasting with the institutionalized, non-ethnic based democracy in South Africa, Tanzania’s democracy is rather disjoined without making provisions for potential ethnic frictions, which are veiled under the unremitting one-party domination. When it comes to the functions of political institutions in constructing or diverging interests and beliefs,

Tanzania falls short of extensive development of varied institutions to represent minority interests and ideas, where opposition parties, trade unions, and civil society are weak. Rather, there is a single dominant institution, the ruling party, (that also usually bears the executive power) which has been considered ‘fit’ for the community that would impede rapid change.

Along with the one-party politics, CCM’s smooth adjustment took advantage of Nyerere’s popularity. His positive influence makes Tanzania a very unique case in which the present ruling party maintains its power as well as a good reputation.

Although there have been and are several persistent nationalist presidents or prime ministers in Africa who have remained in office since their countries’ independence – e.g. Hastings Kamuzu Banda in Malawi (1966-1993), Kenneth Kaunda in Zambia

(1964-1991), Robert Mugabe in Zimbabwe (1980-present), and Gnassingbé Eyadéma in Togo (1967-2005) – authoritarian leaders who have a positive influence in their 86 nations or who have maintained authority in succeeding Cabinets are rare.

Similar to the nationalist policy that Nyerere used to unify the country, president Banda in Malawi created a national identity that contributed to national cohesion and attempted to make improvements in the living standards of the people.

Also, he and his Malawi Congress Party (MCP) gained authority from the masses during his reign. Nonetheless, in the first multi-party elections in 1994, Banda lost his presidency and MCP did not take the majority of seats in the national assembly

(Kaspin, 1995:612). Instead, the votes were fragmented along ethnic lines. A viable reason for this ethnic division emerging after Banda's nationalist authoritarianism is his short-sighted policy in which Chewa was selected to be developed as Malawian identity and the regional importance unequally determined resource distribution

(Forster, 1994:492).

Correspondingly, in 1991, in the first multi-party elections after Zambia's independence, Kenneth Kaunda, who as the "founding father" of Zambia had ruled 23 years, was defeated by Frederick Chiluba's Movement for Multi-party Democracy

(MMC). The reasons for his defeat included a high level of political corruption, maladroit governance, and economic breakdown (Mills, 1992:16-18). In addition,

Mugabe's dictatorship and his Zanu-PF party may lose power depending on the outcome of the hotly contested 2008 parliamentary elections (Edith, 2008).

A fundamental cause of the emergent disaffection with the despotic regimes indicated above was found in the misconducts of the former authoritarian elites and 87 party leaders. This popular criticism of government wrong-doing was provoked by

increased pressure from Western governments. While the nationalist presidents sought

national unity in their policies, they used state capital for political patronage and the

private accumulation of wealth. Moreover, centralized administration under the name

of national unity was obviously an unfair representation of individual or group

demands, especially where clear political boundaries distinguished by region and

ethnicity existed.5 Meanwhile, Nyerere maintained his fame and the respect of his people (even while his party leaders were corrupt) so that his party continued to gain

popular support. Also importantly, national integration in Tanzania seemed more

steadfast than in other African countries since Tanzanians better tolerated centralized

rule even though it did not alleviate the economic hardships of the country.

The one-party politics and Nyerere’s personal rule are devoted to establishing

and maintaining Tanzania’s national identity. While the nationalist movement

conspired with TANU to make a national identity in opposition to colonialism prior to

independence in 1961, Tanzania’s national identity was erected along with Nyerere’s

nationalist policy and the one-party-ism which protected the country from ethnic,

regional, and religious discord. All the associations grounded in ethnicity were

eliminated and co-opted into governmental organizations, and debates on ethnicity

5 Daniel Posner (1995) posits that the major causes of the growing demand for political reform in Malawi are the economic failure of the country, elite corruption and the inadequate appointment of leaders, as well as an independent media, and active international and civil organizations. This pattern of the accusation of undemocratic regimes is also manifested in other African countries and can result in the defamation and ouster of authoritarian leaders. 88 were prohibited in the political arena. In addition, adoption of Kiswahili as the national language and education on Nyerere’s nationalist ideology, which accentuates social justice, equality, and the respect for labor, played a critical part in constructing national cohesion. National integrity in turn came to be a main factor of Tanzania’s national stability that could then be the foundation of democracy.

Nevertheless, Tanzania’s nation-building did not mean to construct a homogenous national culture (Campbell, 1999:108). In effect, with Nyerere’s demise and the appearance of a multi-party system, the failure of Ujamaa, or socialism, revealed the contradictions between the purport of nationalism and the reality of economic devastation and “contradictions between civic/territorial and ethnic/cultural conceptions of the state” (ibid, 120), via the increasing conflicts based on race, ethnicity, and religion. Even with nationalist endeavors to unite cultural differences, there occurred destructive riots (mostly between the mainlanders and Zanzibaris,

Christians and Muslims, and Natives and Asians) along the ethnic, religious, and racial divisions that had been created during the colonial era (Tripp, 1999:37-41).

These incidents are the results of the failure of Tanzania’s social and political development which can be traced back to CCM’s emphasis on nationalist rather than ethnic identities. “[A] pragmatic concern with power on the part of CCM, played out in the context of economic decline, undermined institutional accountability and public trust in the stated objectives of national programs,” argued Campbell (1999:122). This 89 is part of an incipient test by culturally based political groups of the government’s

operation for “domination and distribution” in the sense of democracy.

Having benefited from Nyerere’s nationalist policy, however, Tanzania is not

at risk of losing national identity, but rather the commotions between different cultural groups are a means to express their discontent with the nation-state or government’s failure to meet their expectations. That is, Tanzania’s strong national identity, which has no specific bases of ethnicity and religion, diminishes the fear that the on-going uncertainties, caused by the frictions among solidarity groups, might threaten national integrity.

In contrast, nationalism in Ethiopia, Kenya, and Malawi was constructed on particular ethnic or religious bases and endorsed by their nationalist parties. The

Ethiopian People’s Revolutionary Democratic Front (EPRDF), founded by the

majority Tigrayan population overthrew the Mengistu regime and seized power in

1991. This party imposed a national program intended to meet the needs of

legitimizing the regime and of conciliating latent, influential nationalist opposition

units. But its base of ‘national’ identity is closely related to a specific ethnic group’s

interests, for which EPRDF continued political domination, neo-patrimonial rule, and

institutional instability with the use of force (Hagmann, 2005:515-517).

In addition, starting with fairly democratic power-sharing at independence in

1963, Kenya fell under the control of the Kikuyu six years after its independence.

Because of the continuing political dominance of the Kikiyu elites and their attempts 90 to purge opposition and dissent, democracy has recently been called into question in Kenya (Omolo, 2002:215).

In Malawi, where President Kazumu Banda emphasized the notion of cultural nationalism in his policy during his reign (1966-1993), the established national identity has helped the country enjoy a certain degree of national cohesion since independence in 1964. Despite Banda’s nationalist principles and strong desire to improve the people’s living standard, his nationalist policy was discriminatory not only in that Malawian national identity was invented solely based on the tradition of the Chewa, which is one of the larger ethnicity in the Central Region of Malawi and which Banda comes from, but also because of unequal allocation of resources (Forster,

1994:481-484). With the launch of multi-party elections in 1994, Banda was removed from office, and national unity was undermined due to the limit of inclusiveness of

Malawian nationalism in which northerners and southerners are denigrated or excluded altogether (Kaspin, 1995:608-609).

The key issue in all three cases concerns the stability and the role of national integration upon which such countries rely to develop a multi-party democracy.

National unity with a narrow base of ethnicity or just for an administrative purpose is more likely to be fragile and bring repeated disputes, permitted in a representative democratic system, than is secular (i.e. non-ethnic or non-religious based) national identity. In these countries, neo-patrimonial regimes are flourishing with the 91 recruitment of officials along ethnic lines, and otherwise political positions are

subjugated to a particular ethnicity.

Tanzania, however, is hopeful of further democratization with a strong

national integration that can be a solid foundation of democracy. Tanzania has an advantageous condition to begin democracy for the sake of stability, tolerance, and trust. In fact, however, identity or the extent of the identity changes conditionally while several identities coexist within a group or an individual. Especially where a majority lives in absolute poverty and the disparity between rich and poor remains wide, it is inevitable that culturally based identities are revitalized to trigger internal dissension with the government. As demands by ethnic groups become increasingly diverse, there is a growing need for a democratic means of decision-making and political competition.

II. Concluding Remarks

In this research, I have explored what seemed the crucial factors of the exceptional peace in post-colonial Tanzania and the most salient requirements for the development of democracy related to the question of cultural pluralism: national integration and the representation of cultural diversity. National integration paves the way for democracy by providing stability, tolerance, and trust. Representation of various demands of the people fulfills the primary goal of democracy, respect for individuals’ liberty. However, civic nationality conflicts with diverse cultural solidarities such as ethnicity, race, and religion. Especially in multi-ethnic countries, 92 like African states where the national territories are not congruent with ethnic boundaries, the coordination of nationality and ethnicity remains a daunting task for the development of democracy.

Unique and interesting, Tanzania, one of the many ethnically diverse countries in Africa, achieves relative stability having been forged by a strong national integration that has lasted since independence. In the post-colonial period, the country strived to attain nation-building for which the one-party system was adopted.

Tanzania’s one-party politics was part of Mamdani’s radical nation-building strategy in which ethnicity could not be an issue of politics. It was also conducive to making stability in the political arena, little contested among leaders. While this strategy was successful in establishing a common identity in the nation, it suppressed ethnic diversity which can be an element of political grouping as a way to secure one’s interest from the society’s fortune.

However, African states, which employed the radical strategy, many times experienced ethnic conflicts when they turned to the multi-party system. The uniqueness of Tanzania’s relative stability may result from Julius Nyerere’s influence.

He inscribed nationalism in his succeeding party policies and in the political culture of the country, which was revealed as the way toward peaceful democratization to a multi-party system and the sustained one-party domination even in the current regime.

Having been supported by the masses, nationalist policies have been utilized to legitimize the persistent rule of the incumbent party. Nyerere’s nationalist principles 93 of equality and self-help in political and economic development have drawn

positive responses from the people. Even now, Nyerere’s communal values may

be more convincing to Tanzanians than specified individual rights and profits.

Nevertheless, the one-party-dominated democracy is unable to rightly

function in serving diverse needs, which will inevitably come to be sought or to

emerge. The imbalanced structure of the constitution is neither sensible to the

dynamism of the diversity nor open to allow negotiation with opposition parties.

Moreover, a full-fledged civil society that could help put pressure on the

government’s responsiveness does not exist in Tanzania, while the sheer volume of literature argues that civil society is critical to democratization. Overall, democracy in

Tanzania seems unripe yet. With the political system unaccountable to the cultural plurality, riots due to group disparity and antagonism towards the government are likely to happen. Even worse, if the economy remains detrimental to the ordinary people, the legitimacy of the government will be challenged by numerous, culturally based factions seeking their stakes from the central government though threatening national unity.

Ultimately, the gradual opening of the political system is inevitable in

Tanzania’s ongoing democratization, while the national integration embedded by the historical commitment of Julius Nyerere and his people is an obvious benefit for

Tanzania to develop democracy. 94

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Tanzania’s Total Area and Population by Region

Rank Region miles² population

1 Tabora 29,402 127,880

2 Rukwa 29,050 1,141,743

3 Morogoro 27,336 206,868

4 Ruvuma 25,667 1,117,166

5 Lindi 25,501 41,549

6 Mbeya 24,100 280,000

7 Iringa 21,955 112,900

8 Shinyanga 19,607 92,918

9 Singida 19,051 1,090,758

10 Manyara 18,499 1,040,461

11 Kigoma 17,400 130,142

12 Dodoma 15,950 324,347

13 Kagera 15,300 2,003,888

14 Arusha 13,327 270,485

15 Pwani 12,512 889,154

16 Mwanza 11,795 378,327

17 Mara 11,641 1,368,602

18 Tanga 10,351 243,580

19 Mtwara 6,451 1,128,523

20 Kilimanjaro 5,139 1,381,149

21 Dar es Salaam 538 2,497,940

22 Zanzibar Central/South 330 *

23 Pemba North 222 26,450

24 Zanzibar North 181 2,572*

25 Pemba South 128 21,686

26 Zanzibar West 89 * *Zanzibar in total: 403,658