The Courts, Congress, and the Politics of Federal Jurisdiction
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THE COURTS, CONGRESS, AND THE POLITICS OF FEDERAL JURISDICTION DISSERTATION Presented in Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements for the Degree Doctor of Philosophy in the Graduate School of The Ohio State University By Brett W. Curry, B.A., M.A. ***** The Ohio State University 2005 Dissertation Committee: Approved By: Professor Lawrence Baum, Adviser Professor Elliot Slotnick _________________________________ Professor Herbert Weisberg Adviser Political Science Graduate Program Copyright by Brett William Curry 2005 ABSTRACT Although the institutional relationship between the federal courts and Congress has been the subject of substantial empirical research, scholars know relatively little about the specific role that jurisdiction plays in structuring that relationship. Most prior scholarship on the courts and Congress has focused on ways in which Congress has attempted to use its influence over court structure and judicial personnel to impact the federal courts. However, Congress’s ability to expand or limit the types of cases eligible for federal court review has received much less attention. By analyzing congressional efforts to limit federal jurisdiction in two major areas of law, this dissertation sheds new light on jurisdiction’s role in the relationship between these governmental branches and, more generally, the degree of autonomy from congressional oversight that the federal judiciary possesses. The dissertation’s assessment of this jurisdictional activity begins with a technical area of federal statutory jurisdiction known as diversity jurisdiction. There, in a combination of qualitative and quantitative analyses, I examine the ii impact that judicial outcomes, court caseloads, and group involvement have played in motivating congressional attempts to limit diversity jurisdiction’s scope. I conclude that, while administrative caseload factors have accounted for much of Congress’s jurisdictional activity in this area of statutory law, dissatisfaction with federal court outcomes has also contributed to Congress’s jurisdictional activity in a more limited way. The dissertation then moves to an analysis of congressional attempts to curtail federal jurisdiction over certain areas of constitutional law. Again, by combining quantitative approaches with systematic qualitative analyses, I assess the impact of judicial outcomes, public opinion, Congress’s ideological preferences, and several related factors on the intensity with which legislators have sought to excise certain constitutional claims from the purview of the federal courts since the 1950s. The results obtained from these analyses generally indicate that the tenor of federal judicial outcomes, the preferences of the general public, and the likelihood of judicial reversal all relate to the intensity with which members of Congress pursue this jurisdiction- or court-stripping legislation. Taken together, the dissertation’s results suggest that jurisdictional politics may be more critical to the relationship between the federal courts and Congress than most scholars have realized. At a minimum, they intimate that iii separation-of-powers models of the courts and Congress cannot be complete without an acknowledgement of jurisdiction’s potential importance to the relationship between these two institutions. iv Dedicated to my family, for their tireless love and support v ACKNOWLEDGMENTS I wish to thank my adviser, Larry Baum, for his steadfast support, encouragement, and guidance throughout the development of this project. Words cannot begin to express my appreciation for his dedication, his patience, and his professional example. I thank Elliot Slotnick for his thoughtful comments and suggestions on various stages of the dissertation—and for making me a star. Finally, Herb Weisberg’s judicious perspective was especially useful in grounding the dissertation in the realities of legislative politics. I am grateful to Jan Box-Steffensmeier for early methodological guidance on the dissertation, as well as later suggestions from Corwin Smidt and Brandon Bartels. I further wish to thank the Graduate School for awarding me a University Fellowship which, along with two PEGS Grants from the Department of Political Science, hastened the completion of this dissertation. Finally, I am grateful to my family and friends for the support they have provided throughout my graduate career. vi VITA February 13, 1978………………………..Born, St. Joseph, Missouri 2000………………………………………B.A., Summa Cum Laude, Political Science and History, University of Missouri-Columbia 2003………………………………………M.A., Political Science, The Ohio State University 2000-2001………………………………...University Fellow, The Ohio State University 2001-2004………………………………...Graduate Teaching and Research Associate, The Ohio State University 2004-2005………………………………...University Fellow, The Ohio State University PUBLICATIONS 1. Brett W. Curry. 2005. “Nomination of Clarence Thomas to the Supreme Court.” In Encyclopedia of the United States Congress, ed. Robert Dewhirst. New York: Facts on File, Inc. FIELDS OF STUDY Major Field: Political Science vii TABLE OF CONTENTS Page Abstract…………………………………………………………….................ii Dedication…………………………………………………………………….v Acknowledgments…………………………………………………………...vi Vita…………………………………………………………………………. vii List of Tables………………………………………………………………. xii List of Figures……………………………………………………………… xiv Chapters: 1. Federal Jurisdiction in the American System……………………....….1 Introduction……………………………………………………............1 Federal Jurisdiction in the American System…………………............3 An Introduction to Federal Jurisdiction……………………….4 An Historical Overview of Federal Jurisdiction………………8 The Other Side of Federal Jurisdiction………………………16 Plan of the Dissertation………………………………………19 2. Congressional Oversight and the Federal Courts………………….... 22 Introduction………………………………………………………… 22 Congress and the Courts……………………………………………...26 Composition-Based Prospective Control…………………... ..27 Composition-Based Retrospective Control………………… ..37 Case-Based Prospective Control…………………………… ..38 Case-Based Retrospective Control………………………….. 39 Federal Jurisdiction and Case-Based Oversight of the Federal Courts……………………………………….. ..41 Summarizing Congressional Control of the Courts………………......47 viii 3. A Theoretical Model of Court-Congress Jurisdictional Interaction.....50 Introduction………………………………………………………… ..50 Legislator Goals and Jurisdictional Change……………………….....51 Jurisdictional Change and Electoral Politics……………….. ..53 Jurisdictional Change and Good Public Policy…………….. ..57 Institutional Dynamics and Jurisdictional Change…………………...61 External Groups and Interests……………………………… ..62 Institutional Maintenance………………………………….....64 Congress’s Attention to Judicial Outcomes………………... ..66 Applications to the Politics of Federal Jurisdiction…..…………….. 68 External Groups and Interests……………………………… ..69 Institutional Maintenance………………………………….....73 Congress’s Attention to Judicial Outcomes………………... 76 Conclusion…………………………………………………………... 81 4. The Case of Diversity Jurisdiction…………………………………. 85 Introduction………………………………………………………… . 85 Background to Diversity Jurisdiction……………………………….. 87 Rationales for Federal Diversity Jurisdiction……………… . 87 A Brief Historical Overview of Diversity Jurisdiction, 1789-1875………………………………………97 Potential Catalysts for Limiting Diversity Jurisdiction……..100 Narrative History of Federal Diversity Jurisdiction………………... 106 Postwar Politics of Diversity Jurisdiction: The Primacy of Judicial Outcomes………………………… 106 The Triumph of Judicial Administration…………………....118 Diversity Turns a Corner…………………………………....121 5. Analyzing the Politics of Federal Diversity Jurisdiction…………....124 Introduction………………………………………………………… 124 Three Case Studies of Diversity Jurisdiction………………………. 125 Echoes of the 1800s: Norris and the Progressives….126 Traditional Politics vs. Professional Judicial Administration: A New View Emerges……………………………………....138 The Triumph of Outside Interests and Administration Over Judicial Outcomes……………………………………. 146 Post-Mortem………………………………………………...154 ix Quantitative Analysis of Diversity Jurisdiction……………………. 155 Operationalization of Key Variables………………………..157 Remaining Issues…………………………………………....167 Models and Results………………………………………………… 171 Diversity Jurisdiction Pre- and Post- 1950s………………... 179 Conclusion…………………………………………………………..182 6. The Case of “Court-Stripping” Proposals………………………….. 184 Introduction………………………………………………………… 184 An Introduction to Jurisdiction-Stripping………………………….. 191 Jurisdiction-Stripping Defined……………………………... 194 The History of Jurisdiction-Stripping, 1789-1953…………. 198 An Overview of the Jurisdiction-Stripping Movement Since the Warren Court…………………………………….. 201 The Constitutionality of Jurisdiction-Stripping……………. 203 Toward a System-Level Understanding of Jurisdiction-Stripping….210 Potential Catalysts for Limiting the Supreme Court’s Appellate Jurisdiction……………………………………….213 Potential Catalysts for Limiting the Jurisdiction of Inferior Federal Courts……………………………………... 218 Variable Operationalizations and Hypotheses……………... 223 Capturing the Dependent Variable…………………………. 229 Data and Methods………………………………………….. 236 Results……………………………………………………………… 244 Limiting the Supreme Court’s Appellate Jurisdiction……....244 Limiting the Jurisdiction of Inferior Federal Courts……….. 249 Individual Members and the Pursuit of Jurisdiction-Stripping…….. 255 Data and Methods………………………………………….. 256 Variables and Hypotheses………………………………….. 257 Results……………………………………………………… 264 Conclusion…………………………………………………………. 267 7. A Comparative