THE SUPERORGANIC IN AMERICAN CULTURAL GEOGRAPHY*

JAMES S. DUNCAN

ABSTRACT. The superorganic mode of explanation in cultural geography rei- fies the notion of culture assigning it ontological status and causative power. This theory of culture was outlined by anthropologists Alfred Kroeber and Robert Lowie during the first quarter of the twentieth century, later elaborated by Leslie White, and passed on to Carl Sauer and a number of his students at Berkeley. In this theory culture is viewed as an entity above man, not reducible to the actions of individuals, mysteriously responding to laws of its own. Explanation, it is claimed must be phrased in terms of the cultural level not in terms of individuals. After demonstrating that a number of influential cultural geographers support this theory the central assumptions of the theory are subjected to a critical analysis. These assumptions include the separation of the individual from culture, the reification of culture, the assumption of internal homogeneity within a culture, the characterization of culture as a configuration of modal personality types and idealized values, and the implicit use of Pavlovian conditioning theory.

N 1963 Harold Brookfield noted that cultur- ical status renders the above questions of so- I al geographers “scarcely ever seek expla- cial psychology and social organization un- nations in matters such as human behavior, problematic. It should be added that rescation attitudes and beliefs, social organization and is a fallacy by which mental constructions or the characteristics and interrelationships of abstractions are seen as having substance, i.e. human groups.”’ The situation has changed independent existence and causal efficacy.2 remarkably little in the past fifteen years. This This is a widespread problem throughout ge- paper examines the mode of explanation in ography and social science generall~.~There- cultural geography which reifies the notion of fore the arguments presented have implica- culture assigning it ontological status and tions beyond the immediate subject matter of causative power. In the process, that ontolog- the essay. Almost all major theories of man and soci- Dr. Duncan is Assistant Professor of Geography at the ety can be classified as either holistic or indi- University of British Columbia in Vancouver, B.C., V6T vidualistic depending upon the nature of their IW5, Canada.

* I am indebted to Warren Bourgeois, Department of P. Berger and S. Pullberg, “Reification and the So- Philosophy, University of British Columbia, Clifford ciological Critique of Consciousness,” History and The- Geertz, Institute of Advanced Studies, Princeton, Elihu ory, Vol. 4 (1964-65), pp. 196-211. Gerson, Pragmatica Systems, San Francisco, John Rob- For a discussion of the problem in cultural geography ertson, Department of Philosophy, Syracuse University, see M. B. Newton, Jr., and L. Pulliam-Di Napoli, “Log Anselm Straws, Department of Sociology, University of Houses as Public Occasions: A Historical Theory,” An- California, San Francisco, and to the following geogra- nals, Association of American Geographers, Vol. 67 phers: John Agnew, Nancy Duncan, Cole Harris, David (1977), pp. 360-83. For a discussion of the problem in Ley, Donald Meinig, Milton Newton, David Robinson, other areas of geography see R. D. Sack, “Geography, Marwyn Samuels, David Sopher, and Philip Wagner for Geometry and Explanation,” Annals, Association of their helpful comments on earlier drafts of this paper. I American Geographers, Vol. 62 (1972), pp. 61-78; R. D. am also grateful to the Canada Council for providing a Sack, “A Concept of Physical Space in Geography,” doctoral fellowship to allow me to complete this study. Geographical Analysis, Vol. 5 (1973), pp. 16-34; and R. D. Sack, “The Spatial Separatist Theme in Geography,” Economic Geography, Vol. 50 (1974), pp. 1-19. On rei- H. C.Brookfield, “Questions on the Human Frontiers fication in social science see D. C. Phillips, Holistic of Geography,” Economic Geography, Vol. 40 (1964), Thought in Social Science (Stanford: Stanford University pp. 283-303; reference on p. 283. Press, 1976).

ANNALS OF THE ASSOCIATION OF AMERICAN GEOGRAPHERS Vol. 70, No. 2, June 1980 @ 1980 by the Association of American Geographers. Printed in U.S.A. 181 182 JAMESS. DUNCAN June solution to the “problem of order” in society. c~lture.”~Wagner has since reversed himself Holist versus individualist explanation re- on this position, as has Mikesell, who recently mains the subject of an important ongoing wrote? controversy in social ~cience.~Although they Most geographers have adopted a laissez-faire attitude often do not make the issue explicit in their toward the meanings of culture, perhaps in a mistaken work, most social scientists are very much belief that agreement on this issue has already been engaged in this controversy. In cultural ge- achieved by anthropologists. ography and anthropology the form of holism Geographers have not only frequently ig- around which the controversy centers is nored the variety of alternative definitions of known as the superorganic. culture that could have been drawn from an- The theory of culture as a superorganic en- thropology, but in accepting the superorganic tity was outlined by anthropologists Alfred concept of culture have also inadvertently Kroeber and Robert Lowie during the first chosen a theory which has come under dev- quarter of the twentieth century and later elab- astating attack and has long since been reject- orated by Leslie White. Culture was viewed ed by the vast majority of anthropologists. as an entity above man, not reducible to ac- While this in itself is no reason for geogra- tions by the individuals who are associated phers to follow their lead in rejecting the the- with it, mysteriously responding to laws of its ory, it is surprising that there has been no at- own. It was, moreover, this view of culture tempt to defend the position against such that came to dominate cultural geography. criticisms. A lack of concern over theoretical Specifically, this perspective was adopted by debates outside geography may result from Carl Sauer as a result of his association with “regard[ing] the discipline as an autonomous Kroeber and Lowie at Berkeley in the twen- enterprise set apart from the social or natural ties and thirties and was subsequently passed science^."^ In any case, Mikesell has recently on to his students. urged that geographers rectify the situation by Although many students of Sauer’s “Berke- giving “more serious thought to how they ley School” frequently cite Kroeber’s defini- wish to use the concept of culture.”8 This pa- tion of culture and have neither rejected nor per attempts to make a modest contribution to replaced it one cannot be entirely sure to what this endeavor by examining the concept of cul- extent they embrace that definition. Wilbur ture employed by a number of important cul- Zelinsky, however, is exceptionally explicit in tural geographers in light of ongoing debates his use of the theory. If other cultural geog- over the notion outside the field. raphers do not support this thesis, they can nevertheless be faulted for citing and appear- THE SEPARATION OF INDIVIDUAL ing to support it without qualification. Indeed, AND SOCIETY the ambiguity with which many cultural geog- raphers address the question of the superor- Today in popular, nonacademic modes of ganic nature of culture reveals a failure to un- thought the distinction between the individual derstand the implications of the position. This and society is virtually taken for granted. This may have been exacerbated by Wagner and has not always been SO.^ As Erich Fromm and Mikesell’s influential introduction to cultural others have suggested in medieval Europe “a geography in which they wrote “the cultural person was identical with his role in society; geographer is not [i.e. should not be] con- he was a peasant, artisan, or knight, not an cerned with explaining the inner workings of individual who happened to have this or that

P. L. Wagner and M. W. Mikesell, eds., Readings in For a general discussion of holism and individualism, Cultural Geography (Chicago: University of Chicago see J. O’Neill, ed., Modes of Individualism and Collec- Press, 1962), p. 5. tivism (London: Heinemann, 1973). One of the best fi M. W. Mikesell, “Tradition and Innovation in Cul- known critiques of holism is Karl Popper’s, The Poverty tural Geography,” Annals, Association of American of Historicism (London: Routledge, 1946). For a more Geographers, Vol. 68 (1978), pp. 1-16; reference on p. recent discussion of holism in social science see Phillips, 12. op. cit., footnote 3, and for a discussion of holism in ge- ‘ Mikesell, op. cit., footnote 6, p. 10. ography see J. S. Duncan, “Holistic Explanation in Hu- * Mikesell, op. cit., footnote 6, p. 13. man Geography: The Case of the Culture Concept,” un- C. Moms, The Discovery oj’the lndividuul1050-1200 published manuscript, 1979. (New York: Harper & Row, 1972), p. 2. 1980 Su PE RO RG A N I c 183 occupation.”lo Raymond Williams comments uals include God, culture, laws, social con- that the distinction between the individual and tracts, absolute monarchs, norms, values, and society (or culture) is embedded in the English the invisible hand in the marketplace. Individ- language. This distinction, he claims gained ualists such as Hobbes viewed individuals as currency at a particular point in history and self-interested and predatory, incapable of co- has now established itself in our minds as ab- operating without handing over their individ- solute.’l ual power to an absolute sovereign. Locke’s Most theories in social science today are solution is similar but more palatable. His ex- based on the assumption that individuals are ternal forces are institutions, laws, and prin- atomistic and thus independent of one ciples. another. This leaves unresolved the problem The holists believe that large-scale events of accounting for the order one finds in society such as the decline of nations are autonomous unless it is imposed by an external force from and largely independent of the individuals who without. As mentioned above, there are two participate in them. Order, therefore, is major solutions to this problem, one individ- achieved as these large-scale configurations ualist, the other holist. The disagreement be- “work themselves out,” or “seek their equi- tween adherents of the two positions is this: librium.” One of the most important modern should we consider the large-scale social statements of the position of holism was made events to be the mere aggregate of the actions, by Hegel. His concept of Geist (spirit) is per- attitudes, and circumstances of the individuals haps the quintessential transcendental object who participate in these events or suffer their from which are derived later holistic “solu- results, as the case may be, or are the events tions” such as Durkheim’s “collective con- to be explained in terms of “their own auton- sciousness,” Parsons’ “society” or Kroeber’s omous, macroscopic level of analysis?” Is it, “superorganic.”15 Durkheim’s sociology is a to quote Dray, “social wholes . . . not their classic example of transcendental holism. He human elements [that] are the true historical viewed society sui generis as irreducible to individuals?”12 Individualists such as J. W. N. individuals. He provides a critical logical link Watkins claim that it is individuals who are between Hegelian idealism and cultural an- the active forces, whereas holists such as thropology because his work represents an in- Maurice Mandelbaum claim that it is social direct transmutation of Hegelian notions into wholes that must be studied.13 Both positions a social science framework.16 assume that it is reasonable to argue that ex- Whenever I use the term holism below I will planations must ultimately be framed either in refer to the rather strong philosophical claim terms of social wholes but not individual hu- of “transcendental” holism in which the man agents or conversely that “rock bottom” whole, not the individual parts, is the active, explanations must be framed in terms of in- determining force .I7 Individuals are the pas- dividuals but never social wholes. The as- sive agents of this force; their apparent activ- sumption is that either individuals are logically ity is attributed to their role as the “efficient” prior to larger social wholes or vice-versa. l4 as opposed to the “formal” cause. This Ar- Those external forces that have been in- istotelian distinction is crucial to an under- voked to mediate between atomistic individ- standing of any form of transcendental holism because lying behind every description of the lo R. Williams, The Long Revolution (New York: Har- per & Row, 1966), p. 75. Transcendental is used here in the Hegelian sense to *l Williams, op. cit., footnote 10, pp. 72-100. refer to an entity such as Ceist which transcends, in the I* W. Dray, “Holism and Individualism in History and sense of being greater than and determinant of, the indi- Social Science,” in P. Edwards, ed., Encyclopedia of vidual parts which are held to be mere manifestations of Philosophy (New York: Macmillan, 1967), Vols. 3-4, pp. it. 53-58; reference on p. 53. l6 I do not mean to imply that Durkheim consciously l3 J. W. N. Watkins, “Ideal Types and Historical Ex- attempted to apply Hegel’s ideas to the study of society, planations,” in H. Feigl and M. Brodbeck, eds., Readings only that his notion of society as a thing sui generis had in the Philosophy of Science (New York: Appleton Cen- pronounced Hegelian overtones and had the effect of tury Crofts, 1953), pp. 723-43; and M. Mandelbaum, casting a good deal of American social science in a par- “Societal Facts,” British Journal of Sociology, Vol. 6 ticular Hegelian mold. (1955), pp. 305-17. I’ For a discussion of active versus passive conceptions l4 E. M. Gerson, “On Quality of Life,” American So- of man, see M. Hollis, Models of Man (Cambridge: Cam- ciological Review, Vol. 41 (1976), pp. 793-806. bridge University Press, 1977). 184 JAMES S. DUNCAN June actions of individuals is the assumption that an attempt to distinguish anthropology from these individuals are merely the agents who psychology and later from sociology by focus- carry out the tasks determined by a transcen- ing on culture as an independent level of real- dental formal cause, e.g. society, culture, and ity. By raising culture to a suprahuman level, God. Unwary readers as well as the authors the anthropologist had no need for individuals of relevant works may not always remember and therefore no need for psychological pro- the logical implications of such a view, espe- cesses. Kroeber’s view of culture as a thing cially when placed in the context of empirical sui generis was shared by Lowie, according description. to culture is a thing sui generis which can only be ex- THE SUPERORGANIC IN AMERICAN plained in terms of itself. . . . The ethnologist . . . will ANTHROPOLOGY: KROEBER AND WHITE account for a given cultural fact by merging it in a Alfred Kroeber developed his thesis of the group of cultural facts or by demonstrating some other autonomy of culture in a seminal paper enti- cultural fact out of which it has been developed. tled “The Superorganic.” This signaled the In ‘‘The Superorganic” Kroeber first address- beginning of cultural determinism in American es himself to the question of the relation of anthropology, a perspective that only began the individual to the socio-cultural level. “A to lose its vigor in the 1950~.’~For Kroeber, thousand individuals do not make a society. the move from the individual to the social and They are the potential basis of a society; but cultural does not constitute a “link in a chain, they do not themselves cause it.”24 Rather it not a step in a path, but a leap to another is the socio-cultural level which causes men plane.”1gHe conceived of reality as composed to behave as they “When a tide sets one of a number of levels beginning with the in- way for fifty years, men float with it, or thread organic at the bottom, followed by the organ- their course across it; those who breast the ic, which in turn is topped by a psychological vast stream condemn themselves in advance or biopsychic level, and finally crowned by to futility of accomplishment.”26 He contin- the social or cultural Although each of ues: “The concrete effect of each individual these levels is connected to the levels imme- upon civilization is determined by civilization diately above and below, it “constituted a sep- itself.”27 One need not be concerned with the arate and distinct area of investigation with its individual, Kroeber felt, because the individ- own special facts and causal explanation.”21 ual is the mere agent of cultural forces. He is One could not reduce explanation at one level a messenger carrying information across the to that at another. generations and from place to place. Kroeber and Lowie were very much con- The value code was central to Kroeber’s cerned with the relationship of the individual notion of the superorganic and similarly for to the superorganic milieu.22This was in part Durkheim and Talcott Parsons in sociology. Values allowed the superorganic to work, to iH A. L. Kroeber, “The Superorganic,” in The Nature grip men’s minds and force them to conform of Culture (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1952), to its will. The value code is seen as the su- pp. 22-51. Kroeber borrowed the term “superorganic” from the nineteenth century social determinist Herbert perorganic equivalent of the genetic code. Spencer. See H. Spencer, The Principles of Sociology Whereas lower organisms are controlled ge- (Chicago: Chicago University Press, 1967); and F. W. netically from within, man is controlled from Voget, A History of Ethnology (New York: Holt, Rine- without by values.28 hart and Winston, 1975), p. 365. l9 Kroeber, op. cit., footnote 18, p. 49. hannon and M. Glazer, eds., High Points in Anthropology 2n At a later date, Kroeber did distinguish between the (New York: Knopf, 1973), pp. 102-06; Kroeber, op. cit., social and the cultural level, although he considered both footnote 18; and R. H. Lowie, Culture and Ethnology of them to be superorganic; see A. L. Kroeber and T. (New York: Boni and Liveright, 1917). Parsons, “The Concepts of Culture and of Social Sys- 23 Lowie, op. cit., footnote 22, pp. 17, 66. tem,” American Sociological Review, Vol. 23 (1958), pp. 24 Kroeber, op. cit., footnote 18, p. 41. 582-83. 25 A. L. Kroeber, “On the Principle of Order in Civi- 2L Voget, op. cit., footnote 18, p. 364. lization as Exemplified by Changes in Fashion,” Ameri- aa F. W. Voget, “Man and Culture: An Essay in Chang- can Anthropologist, Vol. 21 (1919), pp. 235-63. ing Anthropological Interpretation,” in R. Darnell, ed., 2fi Kroeber, op. cit., footnote 25, p. 261. Readings in the History of Anthropology (New York: 27 Kroeber, op. cit., footnote 18, p. 48. Harper and Row, 1974), pp. 343-63; reference on p. 350; 28 E. R. Wolf, Anthropology (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: A. L. Kroeber, “The Eighteen Professions,” in P. Bo- Prentice Hall, 1964), p. 43. 1980 s UPERORGANIC 185

Kroeber and White were in basic agreement symbol or symbolate, he believes, can be used over the concept of the superorganic although to refer to human behavior and psychological they disagreed over other issues such as processes; however, this is the province of White’s materialist conception of the world in psychology. Symbols can also be regarded in which technology was a determining force.29 an extrasomatic context in direct relation to White believed that man must be taken into other symbols without the mediation of indi- consideration when examining the origin of viduals; this he claims is a cultural process. A culture, after which culture can be explained number of geographers, as we shall see, refer without reference to man, individually or col- to this latter usage of the term symbol. lectively. “Man is necessary to the existence White is perhaps even more forceful than and functioning of the culture process, but he Kroeber in asserting the superorganic nature is not necessary to an explanation of its vari- of culture:33 ations. ”30 According to White, culture origi- If the behavior of a people is determined by its culture, nated and is undergoing a continuous process what determines the culture? The answer is that it de- of improvement because of man’s “neurolog- termines itself. Culture may be regarded as a process ical ability to symbolize.” Once culture had sui generis. developed, it became extrasomatic, obeying Culture, White tells us, is made possible laws of its new development quite indepen- through human carriers, but “we must consid- dent of the laws governing its human carriers. er it apart from its human carriers when we Culture generates its own forms, independent study its structure and proce~ses.”~~He, like of men, and those which are not useful to its Durkheim, Kroeber, Lowie and other tran- purposes are di~carded.~~This gradual evolu- scendental holists believes that culture cannot tion of culture is based upon flows of energy be reduced to the individual. Through these that are captured and put to work by a society men this point of view has exerted a vast al- through technology. though decreasing influence on American cul- The concept of symbol plays an important tural anthropology and, by extension, on role in White’s theory of culture.32The terms American cultural geography.

THE SUPERORGANIC IN AMERICAN 29 I am indebted to Clifford Geertz (personal commu- CULTURAL GEOGRAPHY nications) for pointing out that Kroeber unlike White was aware of some of the difficulties involved in the superor- Many well-known cultural geographers re- ganic position. In certain of his writings he shows uncer- fer to Kroeber and White for their concept of tainty as to the strength of cultural determinism. It must culture. Since both of these anthropologists be stated that even late in his career Kroeber held the were known as the leading exponents of a su- view that culture was sui generis. See: Kroeber and Par- sons, op. cit., footnote 20; A. L. Kroeber, “The Person- perorganic theory of culture, one can only as- ality of Anthropology,” in E. A. Hammel and W. s. Sim- sume that the geographers in question sub- mons, eds., Man Makes Sense (Boston: Little Brown, scribe to this theory. Not all such geographers 1970), pp. 41-45. For the links between Kroeber and may be aware of the full implications of Kroe- White see: J. H. Steward, Alfred Kroeher (New York: ber’s extreme position. However, their work Columbia University Press, 1973), p. 48; A. L. Kroeber and C. Kluckhohn, Culture: A Crificnl Review of Con- incorporates the form of the superorganic ar- cepts and Definitions (Cambridge, Mass.: Peabody Mu- gument which rules out many critical social seum, 1952), Vol. 47, p. 28; L. A. White, The Science of psychological and social organizational vari- Culture: A Study of Man and Civilization (New York: ables because of active, causal properties at- Grove Press, 1944), p. 90; D. Hymes, Reinventing An- tributed to culture by the theory.35 thropology (New York: Random House, 1969), pp. 186, 189; R. L. Bee, Patterns and Processes: An Introduction Carl Sauer was the leading figure in Amer- to Anthropological Strategies for the Study of Socio-Cul- turn1 Change (New York: Free Press, 1974), p. 122; and M. Harris, The Rise of Anthropological Theory (New York: Columbia University Press, 1975), pp. 3-4; and York: Crowell, 1968), p. 332. White, op. cit., footnote 30, p. 548. 30 L. A. White, “Culturology,” in D. L. Sills, ed., Zn- 33 White, op. cit., footnote 30, p. 548. ternational Encyclopedia of the Social Sciences (New 34 White, op. cit., footnote 32, p. 5. York: Macmillan, 1968), Vol. 3, pp. 547-51; reference on 35 Some human geographers appear to have a holistic p. 549. concept of culture which may not have its origins in Kroe- 31 L. A. White, “The Concept of Culture,” American ber’s superorganic theory. Many do single out Kroeber Anthropologist, Vol. 61 (1959), pp. 227-51. and White referring to their theory in particular. Attention 32 L. A. White, The Concept of Cultural System (New is devoted here only to these latter geographers. 186 JAMESS. DUNCAN June ican cultural geography. The principal themes him of the Berkeley anthropologists in “The of this field, cultural ecology, the diffusion of Morphology of Landscape” in which he refers artifacts and ideas, and the cultural perception approvingly to Kroeber’s of landscape were all present in his work. Additional evidence of the influence of Kroe- Sauer acknowledged his intellectual debt to berian anthropology on Sauer lies in the fact the German cultural geographers of the late that the themes of historical reconstruction, nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, es- culture area, and diffusion, which Sauer intro- pecially Ratzel, Schluter, and Hahr~.~~Sauer duced into American geography in the 1920s considered Ratzel above all others to be the were those that Boas and his students Kroe- father of cultural ge~graphy.~~Ratzel in turn ber, Wissler, Lowie, Goldenweiser, Herso- was greatly influenced by Herbert Spencer, an kovits, and Spier had been working on since exponent of the superorganic theory of culture Boas first became interested in such topics in who, in fact, coined the term “superorganic.”38 the late 1890~.~~Although the dominant influ- Sauer was also highly influenced by ideas cur- ence on Sauer’s conception of culture un- rent in American anthropology. During his doubtedly was Kroeber it is of interest to note first years at Berkeley he established close ties that he also refers favorably to Spengler, with the Department of Anthropology and in another superorganicist, in “The Morphology particular with A. L. Kroeber and R. H. LOW- of Landscape. ”44 ie.3s In fact it was Lowie who introduced him It is difficult to ascertain to what extent to the work of RatzeL40 From this association Sauer communicated his notion of culture to Sauer assimilated the theory of culture that his students. Spencer suggests that in the was to pervade all his subsequent teaching and 1930s Sauer encouraged his students to famil- re~earch.~’Sauer mentions the importance to iarize themselves with the concept of culture. ___- Parsons states that “everyone took courses 3ti C. 0. Sauer, “Recent Developments in Cultural Ge- with Kroeber and with Robert Lowie,” and ography,” in E. C. Hayes, ed., Recent Developments in Kniffen writes “I got an awful lot from Kroe- the Social Sciences (Philadelphia: Lippincott, 1927), pp. ber. I had more courses in anthropology than 154-212; C. 0. Sauer, “Friedrich Ratzel (1844-1904),” Encyclopedia ofthe Social Sciences, Vol. 13 (1931), pp. I did in ge~graphy.”~~However Sopher has 120-21; C. 0. Sauer, “Cultural Geography,” Encyclo- suggested that during the late 1940s and early pedia ofthe Social Sciences, Vol. 6 (1931), pp. 621-24; 1950s, graduate students in geography at C. 0. Sauer, “The Fourth Dimension of Geography,” Berkeley were not necessarily expected to Annals, Association of American Geographers, Vol. 64 (1974), pp. 189-92; and C. 0. Sauer, Sixteenth Century read Kroeber or other culture theorists for it North America: The Land and the People as Seen by the was assumed that they simply “knew what Europearis (Berkeley: University of California Press, culture was.”46 Possibly this suggests that 1971). Sauer drew on the anthropologists’ concept of 37 Sauer, op. cit., footnote 36, “Ratzel”; C. 0. Sauer, culture during his first years at Berkeley and “The Formative Years of Ratzel in the United States,” Annals, Association of American Geographers, Vol. 61 urged his students to do likewise, but that sub- (1971), pp. 245-54, reference on p. 253; and Sauer. op. cit., footnote 36, “Fourth Dimension,” p. 190. 4E Sauer, op. cit., footnote 36, “Fourth Dimension,’’ p. P. E. James, All Possible Worlds: A History qf Geo- 192; C. 0. Sauer, “The Morphology of Landscape,” in graphical Ideas (Indianapolis: Odyssey Press, 1972), p. J. Leighly, ed., Land and L$e: A Selection frotn the Writ- 223. ings of Carl Ortwin Sauer (Berkeley: University of Cali- 3y J. E. Spencer, “The Evolution of the Discipline of fornia Press, 1963), pp. 315-50; reference on p. 349. Geography in the Twentieth Century,” in Geographical 43 Bee, op. cit., footnote 29, pp. 67-93. Perspectii~rs,Vol. 33 (l974), pp. 20-36: reference on p. 44 Sauer, op. cit., footnote 42, pp. 327-28. 26; J. E. Spencer, “What’s in a Name?-The Berkeley 45 J. E. Spencer, “Carl Sauer: Memories about a School,” Historical Geography Newsletter, Vol. 5 (1976), Teacher,” The California Geographer, Vol. I5 (1975), pp. pp. 7-11; reference on p. 9: J. Leighly, “Carl Ortwin 83-86; reference on p. 85; Parsons, op. cit., footnote 39, Sauer, 1889-1975,” Annals, Association of American “Later Years,” p. 13; F. B. Kniffen, “The Geographer’s Geographers, Vol. 66 (1976), pp. 337-48; reference on p. Craft-I: Why Folk Housing?,” Annuls, Association of 341; J. Parsons, “Carl Ortwin Sauer,” The Geographical American Geographers, Vol. 69 (1979), pp. 59-63; refer- Revien,, Vol. 66 (1976). pp. 83-89; and J. Parsons, “The ence on p. 62; Trindell writes that “. . . the second gen- Later Sauer Years,” Annuls, Association of American eration of American cultural geographers was trained in Geographers. Vol. 69 (l979), pp. 9-15: references on pp. the schools of Sauer and Kroeber at Berkeley.” R. T. 11, 13. Trindell, “Franz Boas and American Geography,” The 4o Sauer, op. cit., footnote 36, “Fourth Dimension,” p. Professional Geographer, Vol. 21 (1969), pp. 328-32; ref- 192. erence on p. 331. 41 Leighly, op. cit., footnote 39, pp. 339-40. 46 D. Sopher, personal communications. 1980 SUPERORGANIC 187 sequently an acceptable definition of culture ber as does Spencer who refers not only to had been arrived at and therefore further ex- Kroeber and White but also to Bagby’s Cul- ploration of the concept was no longer be- ture and History: Prolegomena to the Com- lieved necessary.47 Although not all cultural parative Study of Civilizations. 53 Bagby it geographers refer directly to the work of an- should be noted is a superorganicist who thropologists, a number do. Zelinsky for ex- draws heavily on Kroeber and dedicates his ample, refers to Kroeber’s The Nature of Cul- book to him. It should also be added that these ture, White’s The Science of Culture, and geographers do not discuss competing theo- Quigley’s The Evolution of Civilization. 4R Ze- ries of culture. linsky says that he assumes:49 ASSUMPTIONS OF THE SUPERORGANIC following in the footsteps of Alfred Kroeber and with some mental reservations, those of Leslie White, . . . Culture as External to Individuals that culture is to a large extent an autonomous, vir- Kroeber and White distinguished between tually “super-organic” system that functions and evolves according to its own internal logic and pre- the province of biology (of which psychology sumed set of laws . . . and does so wit!) a large degree was held to be a part) and the superorganic of freedom from individual or commucity control. which consists of the cultural or social facts In their introduction to cultural geography, that transcend the individual and at the same Wagner and Mikesell suggest that those read- time mold his actions. A number of cultural ers interested in pursuing the notion of culture geographers have made similar assertions. According to Sauer, human geography is only turn to White’s The Science of Culture, Kroe- ber and Kluckhohn’s Culture: A Critical Re- concerned with the superorganic level of in- tyiew of Concepts and Definitions, and Kroe- quiry: “Human geography, then, unlike psy- her’s The Nature of Culture.50 Wagner and chology and history, is a science that has noth- ing to do with individuals but only with human Mikesell also cite White’s The Science of Cul- ture for the notion of the symbol which as was institutions, or cultures.”54 mentioned above played a key role in his cul- Similarly Zelinsky states:55 tural determini~rn.~~Others such as Broek and we are describing a culture, not the individuals who Webb refer their readers to Kroeber’s Anthro- participate in it. Obviously, a culture cannot exist with- out bodies and minds to flesh it out; but culture is also pology and White’s Science of Culture for a something both of and beyond the participating mem- definition of Carter refers to Kroe- bers. Its totality is palpably greater than the sum of its parts, for it is superorganic and supraindividual in na- ture, an entity with a structure, set of processes, and 47 This uncritical attitude toward the culture concept momentum of its own, though clearly not untouched has been noted by Mikesell, op. cit., footnote 6, pp. 12- by historical events and socio-economic conditions. 13; M. Mikesell, “Cultural Geography,” in Progress in Human Geography, Vol. 1 (1977), pp. 460-64; reference Although as Zelinsky sees it, a culture is on p. 460; and by P. Wagner, personal communications. something apart from individuals, it needs in- 48 W. Zelinsky, The Cultural Geography of the United dividuals to do its This, as mentioned States (Englewood Cliffs, N. J.: Prentice Hall, 1973), pp. 3, 68; White, op. cit., footnote 29; C. Quigley, The Evo- above, follows Kroeber and White’s usage of lution of Civilizations (New York: Macmillan, 1961); and the Aristotelian distinction between formal A. L. Kroeber, The Nature ofculture (Chicago: Univer- and efficient causes of an event. Men acting sity of Chicago Press, 1952). as efficient causes are usually referred to as 49 W. Zelinsky, “The Use of Cultural Concepts in Geo- graphical Teaching: Some Conspiratorial Notes for a Quiet Insurrection,” in Introductory Geography: View- 53 G. Carter, Man and the Land, 2nd ed., (New York: points and Themes, Commission on College Geography, Holt, Rinehart, and Winston, 1968), p. 562; J. E. Spencer, Publication No. 5 (Washington: Association of American Shifting Cultivation in South East Asia (Berkeley: Uni- Geographers, 1967), pp. 75-96: reference on pp. 75-76. versity of California Publications in Geography), Vol. 19 Wagner and Mikesell, op. cit., footnote 5, p. 2; (1966), p. 54; Kroeber, op. cit., footnote 52: White, op. White, op. cit., footnote 29; Kroeber and Kluckhohn, op. cit., footnote 29; and P. Bagby, Culture and History: cit., footnote 29; and Kroeber, op. cit., footnote 48, pp. Prologomena to the Comparative Study of Civilizations 118-35. (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1959). 51 Wagner and Mikesell, op. cit., footnote 5, p. 2; and 54 C. 0. Sauer, “Foreword to Historical Geography,” White, op. cit., footnote 29. in J. Leighly, ed., Land and Life: A Selection from the 52 J. 0. M. Broek and J. W. Webb, A Geography oj Writings of Carl Orfwin Sauer (Berkeley: University of Mankind (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1973), p. 48; A. L. California Press, 1963), pp. 351-79; reference on p. 358. Kroeber, Anthropology (New York: Harcourt, Brace and 55 Zelinsky, op. cit., footnote 48, pp. 40-41. World, 1948); and White, op. cit., footnote 29. 56 Zelinsky, op. cit., footnote 48, p. 71. 188 JAMESS. DUNCAN June the “mere,” “agents,” “bearers,” or “car- physical and biological in shaping the char- riers” of The formal cause, culture, acter of places.”‘j5 Clearly, Zelinsky believes therefore becomes reified. It has power to do that his fellow cultural geographers accept im- things.58 Zelinsky states:jg plicitly, if not explicitly, that culture is a su- cultural process is one of the few great first-causes that perorganic entity. shape those place-to-place differences, of phenomena Spencer and Thomas add an evolutionary on or near the earth’s surface that we geographers aspect to this argument when they state that study, and . . . this powerful nearly sovereign primal culture has grown powerful over the millenia force should share star billing in our research and pe- and has now become a controlling force:‘j6 dagogy, along with geomorphological agents, climatic process, biological process, and the operation of eco- The individual progressive body of culture . . . [has] nomic laws. increased . . . in total strength. As we come toward the modern era it can be seen that ranking cultures In The Cultural Geography of the United have a strength and a context almost apart from the States he writes that “The power wielded persons of the society possessing a given culture . . . . over the minds of its participants by a cultural It sometimes appears that evolving American culture controls Americans, as in the mechanistic trend toward system is difficult to exaggerate.”‘jOHe stress- greater automation, whether we like it or not. es the autonomy of culture claiming that it evolves out of the “reaction among newly jux- George Carter seems to adopt a cultural de- taposed cultural elements.”‘jl He also states? terminist stance when he writes:‘j7 cultural forces we cannot yet identify have been at we have studied many examples of culture at work. work sorting out potential church members in terms of Thus in California, Indians, Mexicans, Spanish and social and economic characteristics and preferences Americans, in sequence, played their role in the iden- for particular areas and environments. tical environment, each making their choice of way of life from the numerous possibilities that existed in Sauer also refers to the power of culture to do terms of their culturally determined perceptions. things, writing in “The Morphology of Land- scape,” “Culture is the agent, the natural area Carter does leave a ray of hope for the indi- is the medium, the cultural landscape is the vidual however. Speaking of a particularly powerful and effective royal inspector in Co- result. ”63 Zelinsky asserts that there are six principles lombia in the eighteenth century he states in cultural geography that “are at least tacitly “Here we meet the role of the unusual indi- accepted by our confreres” (other cultural vidual and see that within a culture there is geographer^).^^ The first of these six is that still room for the exercise of the individual “culture is a prime genetic factor, along with Clearly in Carter’s opinion it is only the most powerful and “unusual” individual

57 J. E. Spencer and W. L. Thomas, Cultural Geog- who is able to exert his individual will. Pre- raphy (New York: Wiley, 1969), p. 3. sumably the rest of us are, to use Kroeber’s j8 Price discusses the notion of formal and efficient phrase, swept along by the cultural tide. cause in E. T. Price, “Aspects of Cause in Human Ge- Mikesell, in his recent presidential address, ography,” Yearbook, Association of Pacific Coast Geog- raphers, Vol. 25 (1963), pp. 7-19. He appears to accept stated that Brookfield’s critique of cultural ge- Kroeber’s notion that culture is the formal cause while ography must be heeded and that “cultural man is the efficient cause (p. 17) although, unlike Kroe- geographers must try to deal not only with ber he appears to be willing to grant man the ability to “material culture and livelihood” but also affect change upon the formal cause. This distinction is held in disdain by most philosophers today but retained with “the workings of society and the reasons by many social scientists who favor holistic forms of ex- for human behavior.”‘j9 However, Brookfield planation. See R. Taylor, “Causation,” in P. Edwards, in this particular case adopting an individualist ed., The Encyclopedia of Philosophy, Vol. 1 (New York: stance, claims that if geographers are to study MacMillan, 1967), pp. 56-66; reference on pp. 56-57. process and not simply describe patterns they 59 Zelinsky, op. cit., footnote 49, p. 75. Zelinsky, op. cit., footnote 48, p. 70. must study the behavior of small groups of 6* Zelinsky, op. cit., footnote 48, p. 78. individuals at the microscale. The view that 62 Zelinqky, op. cit., footnote 48, p. 99. 63 Sauer, op. cit., footnote 42, p. 343. In later years 65 Zelinsky, op. cit., footnote 49, p. 91. Sauer had misgivings about this article. His misgivings titi Spencer and Thomas, op. cit., footnote 57, pp. 559- concerned, however, the possibility of reconstructing the 60. cultural and natural landscape and not the superorganic Carter, op. cit., footnote 53, p. 532. overtones of his culture theory. Carter, op. cit., footnote 53, p. 458. 64 Zelinsky, op. cit., footnote 49, p. 78. Mikesell, op. cit., footnote 6, pp. 10-11. 1980 SUPERORGANIC 189 fundamental explanation must be in terms of is that no human being is a mere organism individuals is incompatible with the superor- unless he is a foetus or an imbecile.”74In short ganic approach to explanation. Thus Mike- the view that reality is divided into autono- sell’s suggestion may be more radical than it mous levels not only appears to be methodo- appears at first, for it may entail the abandon- logically undemonstrable but entails an unnec- ment of the s~perorganic.~~ essarily unflattering model of man. It therefore has largely been abandoned by anthropolo- Critique of the Assumptions gists. 75 The reification of culture has been criticized The notion that there are distinct levels of as mystical, a remnant of nineteenth century reality, the organic (or psychological) and the German romantic idealism.76 Franz Boas, superorganic (or cultural) has been attacked Kroeber’s own teacher, who firmly believed on the grounds that it presents methodological in empiricism, criticized the superorganic, difficulties. In 1917, the same year Kroeber stating that “it hardly seems necessary to con- put forward his notion of the superorganic, sider culture a mystic entity that exists outside Edward Sapir wrote a response entitled “Do the society of its individual carriers and moves We Need a Superorganic?” He challenged the by its own force.”77 Edward Sapir echoed notion of levels claiming that the method by Boas’ criticism claiming that “it is not the con- which the psychological and cultural levels are cept of culture which is subtly misleading but distinguished “is essentially arbitrary.” It is the metaphysical locus to which culture is gen- unclear how one decides which behaviors are erally assigned. ’ ‘78 explained at the individual level and which at Bidney and others have also attacked it as the superorganic Also related is the “metaphysical” and “as a kind of Fate which problem of how, once one has divided reality in the name of Social Science has superceded into “separate scientific ‘levels’ complete and metaphysical Providence.” More recent com- autonomous in themselves,” does one put mentators refer to it as “animism,” “mythol- them back together again.72 Others have at- ogy,” as something that “can now be sus- tacked the notion of autonomous levels on the tained by ideology and faith but not by sober grounds that there is no such thing as an in- science.”79Geertz says that “the favorite im- dividual apart from culture and that therefore age of the romantic ethnographers [is] a seam- the whole concept of levels is flawed.73Opler less superorganic unit within whose collective sums up this objection stating that “the truth embrace the individual simply disappears into

~ 7u Brookfield, op. cit., footnote 1, p. 300. For a further discussion of the relationship between scale and expla- 74 Opler, op. cit., footnote 73, p. 521. nation see L. Grossman, “Man-Environment Relation- 75 Geertz, op. cit., footnote 72, pp. 56-57; Voget, op. ships in Anthropology and Geography,” Annals, Asso- cit., footnote 22, p. 362; Keesing, op. cit., footnote 73, p. ciation of American Geographers, Vol. 67 (1977), pp. 126- 74; and Voget, op. cit., footnote 18, pp. 545, 557, 797- 44; reference on p. 129. For an example of cultural geog- 800, 803. raphers who appear to have abandoned the superorganic 7fi F. W. Voget, “The History of Cultural Anthropolo- concept of culture and who have studied human behavior gy,” in J. J. Honigmann, ed., Handbook of Social and at the microscale, see Newton and Pulliam-Di Napoli, op. Cultural Anthropology (Chicago: Rand McNally, 1973), cit., footnote 3. pp. 1-88; reference on p. 3. E. Sapir, “Sapir’s Views of the Superorganic,” in 77 F. Boas, Anthropology and Modern Life (New York: M. Freilich, ed., The Meaning of Culture (Lexington, Norton, 1928), p. 235. Mass.: Xerox, 1972); reference on p. 82. 78 E. Sapir, Cultural Anthropology and Psychiatry 72 C. Geertz, “The Impact of the Concept of Culture (1932), quoted in F. Eggan, “Among the Anthropolo- on the Concept of Man,” in E. A. Hammel and W. S. gists,’’ Annual Review of Anthropology, Vol. 3 (1974), Simmons, eds., Man Makes Sense (Boston: Little Brown, pp. 1-19; reference on p. 4. 1970), pp. 46-65: reference on p. 54. 79 D. Bidney, “On the Concept of Culture and Some 73 Geertz, op. cit., footnote 72, p. 51; M. E. Opler, Cultural Fallacies,” American Anthropologist, Vol. 46 “The Human Being in Culture Theory,” American An- (19441, pp. 30-44; reference on p. 41; D. Bidney, “Human thropologist, Vol. 66 (1964), pp. 507-28; refernce on pp. Nature and the Cultural Process,” American Anthropol- 512, 521; R. M. Keesing, “Theories of Culture,” Annual ogist, Vol. 49 (1947), pp. 375-99; reference on p. 384; Review of Anthropology, Vol. 3 (1974), pp. 73-97; refer- Opler, op. cit., footnote 73, p. 524; G. P. Murdock, “An- ence on p. 74: J. D. Freeman, “Human Nature and Cul- thropology’s Mythology,” The Huxley Memorial Lec- ture,” in R. G. Slatyer et al., eds., Man and the New ture, 1971, Proceedings of the Royal Anthropological In- Biology (Contena: Australian National University Press, stitute of Great Britain and Ireland for 1971, pp. 17-24; 1970), pp. 50-75. and Keesing, op. cit., footnote 73, p. 74. 190 JAMESS. DUNCAN June a cloud of mystic harmony.”8o Given that the with a series of empirical studies failed.83 existence of the superorganic cannot be either Whereas, he found recurrent trends in wom- proven or disproven then it simply becomes en’s fashions over a three hundred year period a matter of faith. Moreover it involves the re- he was unable to demonstrate that this pattern jection of the common sense belief in the im- could be explained by the s~perorganic.~~In portance of the actions of real, flesh and blood his study, The Conjigurations of Culture individuals. Growth he drew together data from such var- Perhaps today in light of the admitted failure ied societies as Mesapotamia, India, Japan, of positivist philosophers of science to sustain China, Greece, Rome, and Europe, showing their goal of ridding science of all “metaphys- that they had certain “common features in ics,” defined somewhat inaccurately by them growth” of such cultural elements as sculp- as that which is unobservable or untestable, ture, painting, drama, literature, philosophy, one should not dismiss too casually the claim and science.85 He tried to demonstrate that that culture may be a legitimate “theoretical societies develop cultural configurations spas- entity” whose existence must be inferred be- modically and that such things as geniuses cause it cannot be observed.81 Although the cluster during certain periods of culture anthropologists referred to above may not growth. However Kroeber failed to demon- have been sufficiently careful in formulating strate a uniformity in the patterns which their criticisms, they are essentially correct. would have added weight to his notion of the There are many scientific theories whose links superorganic. He was forced to admit that? with empirical data are so loosely specified in reviewing the ground covered, I wish to say at the that they must be abandoned. In physical sci- outset that I see no evidence of any true law in the ence, luminiferous ether is an example: in so- phenomena dealt with: nothing cyclical, regularly re- cial science Durkheim’s “collective consci- petitive or necessary. ence,” Talcott Parsons’ “pattern variables,” Another prominent exponent of the super- and Kroeber’s “culture” are examples of con- organic, Leslie White, was also unable to ap- cepts that are impossible to link to empirical ply the theory in his empirical work. As Wolf data either directly or indirectly in such a way points out he used his notion of culture as su- as to demonstrate their existence as autono- perorganic only in his programmatic state- mous causal agents.*’ ments. His substantive research consisted of Based on the principle of parsimony, or careful descriptions of Indian tribes of the Ockham’s razor, a distinction that adds su- South~est.~~His theory was never brought to perfluous baggage to our body of concepts bear upon his empirical work because his no- should be eliminated. The concept of auton- tion of culture is nonoperational. This serious omous levels appears to be an example of such shortcoming might be overlooked if the cul- an unnecessary concept. The reification of ture concept were shown to have sufficient culture can be criticized, therefore, on the analytic power to justify the otherwise unwar- grounds that there is little empirical evidence ranted assumptions contained in the theory. to support even the inference of a transcen- The superorganic implies a view of man as dent, autonomous level. Positing such a level, relatively passive and impotent. If the individ- while not providing any gain in analytic pow- ual is considered atomistic and isolated then er, produces severe methodological problems. the binding forces between men must be ex- Kroeber’s attempt to substantiate his theory ternal to them, The superorganicists fail to re-

_____ 83 R. Bohannan and M. Glazer, eds., Highpoints in “ C. Geertz, The Social History of an Indonesian Town Anthropology (New York: Knopf, 1973), p. 106. (Cambridge, Mass.: M.I.T. Press, 1965), p. 145. R4 Kroeber, op. cit., footnote 25, pp. 262-63; A. L. G. Maxwell, “The Ontological Status of Theoretical Kroeber and J. Richardson, “Three Centuries of Wom- Entities,” in Minnesotu Studies in the Philosophy of Sci- en’s Dress Fashions: A Quantitative Analysis,” Univer- ence, Vol. 3 (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, sity of Culifornia Anthropological Records, Berkeley, 1956), pp. 3-27; M. Hesse, “Laws and Theories,” in P. Vol. 5 (1940), pp. 111-54; and Opler, op. cit., footnote Edwards, ed., The Encyclopedin of Philosophy, Vol. 3 73, pp. 513-16. (New York: MacMillan Publishing Co., 1967), pp. 404- R5 A. L. Kroeber, The Conjigurntions of Culture 10. Growth (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1944). RP A. Ryan, The Philosophy of the Social Sciences 8fi Kroeber, op. cit., footnote 85, p. 761. (London: MacMillan Press, 1970), p. 87. 87 Wolf, op. cit., footnote 28, pp. 61-62. 1980 SUPERORGANIC 191 alize that “culture is the work of humanity; effects of business organizations and financial we have the impression that it is autonomous institutions on the landscape. Many of these only because it is anonymous.”*8 things are seen as “given,” as cultural char- To be sure, it is very common to find un- acteristics of a people that are not analyzed in foreseen effects of action, consequences that any detail or used in explanation. Culture, are at times in direct contradiction to the in- which presumably includes the factors men- tentions of any given individual who may have tioned above, is seen to produce such effects been instrumental in bringing them about. on landscape. Thus the interactions of men or However as Joachim Israel has said? institutions often are not given careful atten- the existence of such autonomous effects does not im- tion. It should be noted however that Wagner ply the existence of “objective,” in the sense of thing- points to this lack and suggests that cultural like, non-human factors operating independently of hu- geographers in the future direct their studies man action. They imply only a lack of human foresight, to the institutions within which behavior takes intelligence and motivation. place.91 In short the world described by the To the extent that cultural geographers take cultural geographers is a world in which the culture to be a determining force, other types individual is largely absent, consensus pre- of explanation do not appear necessary. vails, deviance is ignored; it is a world un- Hence many important questions are preclud- touched by intracultural conflict. Thus the un- ed. We find little or no attempt to find empir- intended consequence of the superorganic ical evidence of the processes by which cul- theory has been to discourage inquiry into im- tural patterns are generated. As Freilich has portant questions of social interaction by root- argued “by focusing on culture as a superor- ing explanation in a transcendental realm. ganic process it is not necessary to deal with the complexities of human decision-making. The Internalizution of Culture The human animal received a culture, saw Under the rule of the superorganic typical reality through his culture’s ‘eyes’ and acted values or norms are posited as the mechanism acc~rdingly.”~~Individuals making choices, by which a transcendental object becomes interacting, negotiating, imposing constraints translated into a form that can be internalized on one another are, then, largely ignored. by individuals. These values reveal what When institutions are seen as the products of Kroeber and Benedict have referred to as the culture, the fact that they are the outcome of “patterns of a given culture.” For Kroeber social interaction and often represent the in- culture became anchored in unconscious pat- terests of certain groups as opposed to others terning.9‘ A number of geographers have is often forgotten. adopted this “patterning” assumption. Spen- The most serious consequence of attributing cer writes that “the patternings of culture causal power to culture is the fact that it ob- . . . create group norms, styles, or configura- scures many important issues as to the origin, tion~.”$~Thomas uses a variety of terms for transmittal, and differentiation within a pop- such patterns; these are “configuration,” ulation of various “cultural characteristics.” “dominant drives,” “destiny idea,” “genius There is a surprising lack of many kinds of of a culture,” and “cultural theme.”94 The explanatory variables that are employed in term “configuration” is preferred by Zelinsky other subfields of geography and in other so- who cial sciences; for example there is little or no discussion of social stratification, the political Most of the norms, limits, or possibilities of human interests of particular groups, and the conflicts action thus are set as much or more by the configura- which arise from their opposing interests. Similarly there is little discussion of govern- y1 P. L. Wagner, “The Themes of Cultural Geography ment and other institutional policies, or the Rethought,” Yearbook of the Association of Pacific Coast Geographers, Vol. 37 (1975), pp. 7-14; reference on pp. 12-13. RB Opler, op. cit., footnote 73, p. 525. y2 Voget, op. cit., footnote 76, p. 32. R9 J. Israel, Alienation from Marx to Modern Sociology: y3 Spencer, op. cit., footnote 53, p. 63. A Macro-Sociological Analysis (Boston: Allyn and Ba- 94 W. L. Thomas, Land, Man and Culture in Mainland con, 1971), p. 331. South Easr Asia (Glen Rock, New Jersey: privately pub- yo M. Freilich, The Meaning of Culture (Lexington, lished, 1957), p. 56. Mass.: Xerox College Publishing, 1972), pp. 81-82. y5 Zelinsky, op. cit., footnote 48, p. 71. 192 JAMES S. DUNCAN June

tion of the culture as by biological endowment or the ing tkii this value pattern turns people into nature of the physical habitat. machine-like entities that need to be main- Although a number of cultural geographers tained as real machines:100 have stressed the role of cultural values or The pressures within the cultural milieu tend to mold configurations in shaping behavior, the geog- people into flexible, adjustable, cheerful, conformable rapher who has devoted the most attention to units for operation in the social as well as the economic sphere. If a machine is to work well, its parts must be these is Zelin~ky.~~The American configura- washed, dusted and carefully cleaned and polished; tion in which Zelinsky is interested comprises and for this reason, among others, we find an obses- four principal “themes” or “values” that he sional interest in personal cleanliness. has identified. These themes are: “(1) an in- tense, almost anarchistic individualism, (2) a Zelinsky’s book The Cultural Geogruphy of high valuation placed upon mobility and the United States contains many references to change, (3) a mechanistic vision of the world, “the cultural personality and behavior of and (4) a messianic perfecti~nism.”~’Zelinsky American man,” the “American cultural psy- che,” and “the American cultural In argues, following the usage of Kroeber, Kluckhohn, and Talcott Parsons, that these a similar vein, Sauer makes use of regional values become internalized and cause people character types in “The Personality of Mexi- to behave in certain distinct ways. It is in this co.” He identifies two modal character types manner that culture produces behavior. As an in Mexico. In the north, he claims, men are example he states that the theme of mobility “born to take risks”; whereas in the South the and change has produced jazz music.98 people’s character predisposes them to “pa- The internalization of the values creates, tient, steady Zelinsky claims, a modal personality type The use of such ideal-type norms, values, which can also be termed a “national char- or modal personality types may be ques- acter.” The mechanistic world vision, Zelin- tioned. There are two issues at stake. One sky believes, accounts for Americans favoring concerns the usefulness of extremely broad “efficiency,” “cleanliness,” and “bigness,” generalizations such as the “American cultur- as well as their “strongly extroverted person- al psyche” or the personality of Northern ality pattern.”99 He goes even further, claim- Mexico for descriptive purposes. This issue is not clear-cut since it involves matters of scale and it depends upon the purposes of the in- 96 H. H. Aschmann, “Can Cultural Geography be dividual using such descriptive generaliza- Taught?,” in Zntroductory Geography: Viewpoints and Themes, Commission on College Geography, Publication tions. No. 5. (Washington, D.C.: Association of American Sauer’s use of the modal personality type Geographers, 1967), pp. 65-74: reference on p. 73: E. T. should be questioned only because of its ex- Price, “Cultural Geography,” in D. L. Sills, ed., Znter- treme generality. One can rightly ask if there national Encyclopedia of the Social Sciences, Vol. 6 is any value in attempts to reduce the char- (New York: MacMillan, 1968), pp. 129-34; reference on p. 133: and Thomas, op. cit., footnote 94, pp. 147, 151. 9’ Zelinsky, op. cit., footnote 48, p. 40. In an article InnZelinsky, op. cit., footnote 48, p. 59. written in 1974, Zelinsky echoes the cultural determinist iol Zelinsky, op. cit., footnote 48, pp. 5, 53, 63. Durkheim worrying that perhaps the theme of anarchistic 102 C. 0. Sauer, “The Personality of Mexico,” in J. individualism is coming to dominate behavior in the Leighly, ed., Lund and L$e: A Selection From the Writ- United States. He therefore suggests that we add the ings of Carl Sauer (Berkeley: University of California “personality factor” to the “laws of economic behavior,” Press, 1963), pp. 104-17; reference on p. 117. The notion “constraints of . . . [the] physical environment,” and of modal personality type is also supported by Andrew “laws of socio-cultural behavior.” He retains the struc- Clark who writes “The things that one reasonably may ture of his superorganic argument by viewing this per- say about a country’s cultural identity or national char- sonality factor as “newly emergent social-psychological acter have been discussed by many scholars, and brilliant- forces,” (pp. 144-45) and by stating that “a hitherto un- ly so for the United States by Wilbur Zelinsky in . . . charted, multidimensional domain of geographic phenom- Cultural Geography of the United States.” A. Clark, ena can be detected hovering over the surface of the “The Whole is Greater than the Sum of its Parts: A Hu- United States: the world of virtually unconstrained per- manistic Element in Human Geography,” in D. R. De- sonal impulse” (p. 175). See W. Zelinsky, “Selfward skins, G. Kish, J. D. Nystuen, G. Olsson, eds., Geo- Bound? Personal Preference Patterns and the Changing graphic Humanism, Analysis, and Social Action, Map of American Society,” Economic Geography, Vol. Proceedings of Symposia Celebrating a Half Century of SO (1974), pp. 144-79. Geography at Michigan (Ann Arbor: Michigan Geograph- yB Zelinsky, op. cit., footnote 48, p. 53. ical Publications, No. 17, 1977), pp. 3-26; reference on 9y Zelinsky, op. cit., footnote 48, p. 59. p. 25. 1980 SUPERORGANIC 193 acter of millions of people to a few traits. Fur- is a model and as such may be suggestive of thermore, Sauer gives no evidence that any hypotheses or can aid in explanation by anal- significant proportion of the population of ogy. It must be judged, however, by its useful- northern Mexico are “born to take risks.” ness, as in an instrumentalist approach, and Some anthropologists have raised questions as not by its truthfulness in explanation as would to the “scientific precision of specific char- be the case in a realist argument.lo8 acterizations and the methods of attaining Zelinsky’s use of ideal-types and configu- them.” Charges have also been made that rations of culture in causal explanations is such an approach is characterized by unnec- clearly unacceptable because it involves treat- essary selectivity and neglect of inconsistent ing an instrumental concept in a realist fash- data in cases in which they are pertinent to ion. Zelinsky claims that ideal-typical traits the problem at hand.lo3 The learning environ- such as a “mechanistic world-vision’’ are ments of individuals in all but the smallest and things with causal efficacy, not simply useful most primitive societies often differ radically mental constructs. For example he suggests from one another.lo4 What proportion of that this mechanistic vision causes people to Americans is represented by Zelinsky’s four be efficient, clean, and extroverted. The fac- themes? Do they apply equally to the mem- ticity claimed for the ideal types and the role bers of all ethnic groups and income levels? these are said to play in translating the super- How have those who are not represented es- organic into behavior on the part of people caped the cultural press? Perhaps of greater who are essentially passive agents of culture importance is the fact that the question of how is far more objectionable than the mere use of values arise and are maintained is rendered a few ideal-type characteristics to describe a unproblematic by this deterministic mode of whole nation of people. The latter can only be explanation. Geertz characterizes it as “a criticized as being of questionable utility, mode, an archtype, a Platonic idea or an Ar- while the interpretation of ideal-typical pat- istotelian form with respect to which actual terns as transcendent, autonomous things men . . . are but reflections, distortions, ap- which cause people to behave in some speci- proximations.”lo5 Such an approach Geertz fied fashion is an obvious case of misusing claims, leads to a drowning of living detail in ideal-types. dead stereotypes and ultimately obscures Zelinsky shares with the cultural personal- more than it reveals.lnfi ity school of anthropology in making the mis- The second issue deals with the role of ideal take of taking ideal-typical values and norms types in explanation. Although controversial, presumably derived from casual observation this is a more clear-cut issue. Ideal types may of behavior of certain groups within the cul- be used in explanations as models or heuristic ture, and using these to explain behavior. By devices, in other words as instruments in ex- making an ideal-type out of empirical obser- planation. There is a tendency, however, and vations and then using these to explain similar Zelinsky’s writing illustrates this nicely, to observations one produces a tautology. It is forget that these are mental constructs of the both circular and a gross form of reification, social scientist, that they are abstractions certainly a misuse of ideal-types. from reality and as such should not be inter- preted realistically, i.e. as real things that exist The Homogeneity Assumption in the world and cause events or that can be Underlying much of the work of the cultural the subject of empirical laws.lo7An ideal type geographers is an assumption of homogeneity within a culture. Cultural geographers have

Io3 A. R. Lindesmith and A. L. Strauss, “A Critique of often chosen to do research in relatively prim- Culture-Personality Writing,” in M. Fried, ed., Read- itive rural areas in order to discern greater ho- irzgs in Cultural Anthropology (New York: Crowell, mogeneity. Most of Sauer’s work was in rural 1959), pp. 528-45; reference on p. 531. regions of Mexico, or back in the “farthest ln4A. F. C. Wallace, “Individual Differences and Cul- tural Uniformities,” American Sociological Review, Vol. 17 (1952), pp. 747-50; reference on pp. 748-49. John Agnew, personal communications. Also for the Io5 Geertz, op. cit., footnote 72, p. 62. distinction between instrumentalism and realism see R. lo6 Geertz, op. cit., footnote 72, p. 62-63. Keat and J. Urry, Social Theory as Science (London: lo‘ Dennis Wrong, Max Weber (Englewood Cliffs, N. Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1975); and M. Hesse, op. cit., J.: Prentice Hall, 1970), p. 154. footnote 81. 194 JAMES S. DUNCAN June reaches of human time” so that an assumption If vagueness and obscurity are faults in culture history, of homogeneity could reasonably be made, or I maintain that they can still plague contempory cul- tural studies, too. Our subjects most commonly are had to be made due to a paucity of data. Sim- either individuals presumed to think and behave vir- ilarly, Wagner’s study of Nicoya and Mike- tually the same, as in the blessed small community, or sell’s study of Northern Morocco were of ru- peoples or nations similarily seen as homogeneous. At ral areas.IogAschmann suggests that in order best, we get our per3onality and character, served up to teach students about cultural geography in by regions like the “South”. . . . Aggregating mightily, one can speak of national cultures. The chief attribute the field it is best to choose a primitive and of such a broad concept is it5 uselessne5s. isolated area to study.”” A few cultural geographers who have stud- He goes on to suggest that cultural geogra- ied complex societies such as the United phers abandon their homogeneity assumption States also assume homogeneity. Zelinsky and focus their attention on the scale of the claims that there exists a “unified national cul- institution, which, he claims is the critical ture” and that a “surprising degree of relative level in complex, modern societies. He ends uniformity among the various regions and so- his article by stating that “the time for crude cial segments of the country” exists.ll’ aggregation of data is past.” He suggests that In the past many cultural anthropologists geographers must move away from this “less have also assumed homogeneity and have sophisticated mechanistic and aggregative been criticized for doing so. Detractors of this thinking.”117 When culture is defined as the position claim that even in primitive societies active force and the individual the passive re- less homogeneity exists than many would cipient, homogeneity will be assumed, for in- have us believe.”’ Wallace asserts that the dividuals must be blank pages upon which the idea of uniform behavior is implicit in the con- culture pattern is imprinted. Therefore an at- cept of culture.l13 Bennett claims that this tack on the homogeneity assumption hits at view arose because culture was identified with the heart of the superorganic theory of cul- a “holistic, tribal unity which was then as- ture. sumed to be present among all human gro~ps.’’~~~During the 1930s it was this view Habituation: Mechanism for the of homogeneous behavior within an integrated Internalization of Culture culture that led anthropologists to conceive of The final major assumption associated with change as infrequent and consisting of forces the superorganic concept of culture is Pavlov- external to culture. During this time, there- ian conditioning. This was posited by early fore, diffusion enjoyed great popularity as an twentieth century anthropologists as the explanation of change, and internal conflicts mechanism by which cultural values become of interest were downplayed.115 internalized by individuals. This view was Wagner has recently raised the issue in re- adopted either consciously or, more likely, gard to the work of the cultural geographers: 116 unknowingly by cultural geographers who most often refer to it as habitual behavior. 109 P. L. Wagner, Nicoya: A Cultural Geography According to Wax, “the tragic flaw in (Berkeley: University of California Publications in Ge- [Boas’] approach to cultural anthropology was ography), Vol. 12 (1958), pp. 195-250; and M. W. Mike- sell, Northern Morocco: A Cultural Geogrciphy (Berke- that he operated with a simple-minded me- ley: University of California Publications in Geography), chanical psychology.””* In the chapter enti- Vol. 14 (1961). tled “Stability of Culture” in his Anthropol- l1‘) Aschmann, op. cit., footnote 96, p. 70. ogy and Modern Life Boas stressed that men’s Zelinsky, op. cit., footnote 48, pp. 7, 40. J. W. Bennett, “Interdisciplinary Research and the actions could be largely explained by habit Concept of Culture,” in M. Freilich, ed., The Meuning that stemmed from conditioning early in of Culture (Lexington, Mass.: Xerox College Publishing, life.11s He adopted the behaviorist claim that 1972), pp. 226-38: reference on p. 229; D. Mandelbaum, habit should be construed not as thought but “Cultural Anthropology,” in D. L. Sills, ed., The Inter- national Encyclopediri of the Social Sciences, Vol. I (New York: MacMillan, 1968), pp. 313-19; reference on 11’ Wagner, op. cit., footnote 91, p. 14. p. 316. 11* M. Wax, “The Anthropology of Boas,” in M. Freil- Wallace, op. cit., footnote 104, p. 747. ich, ed., The Meaning of Culture (Lexington, Mass.: Xe- Il4 Bennett, op. cit., footnote 112, p. 229. rox College Publishing, 1972), pp. 22-31; reference on p. I1,j Bennett, op. cit., footnote 112, p. 229. 28. Ilfi Wagner, op. cit., footnote 91, p. 11. 119 Boas, op. cit., footnote 77. 1980 SUPERORGANIC 195 as activity. Thought concerning habitual activ- us to Kroeber and Kluckhohn’s definition of ity was usually seen as after-the-fact ration- culture as the “conditioning elements” of ac- alization. Boas’ perspective was passed on to tion.lZ7He then goes on to tell us that “Each his students Lowie and Kroeber so that as cultural group has a certain common fund of Voget points out:120 traits . . . that is acquired, usually quite un- The new cultural-historical determinists relied on Be- consciously, during the early months and haviorism to supply the psychological under-pinning of years of childhood.“128 He continues with the man-in-culture processes. The evidences of condition- assertion that Americans are “conditioned to ing presented by Pavlov were accepted casually as accepting individualism,” that they are char- quite congruent with the cultural process, whereas Freudian interpretations that called attention to the re- acterized by “sheep-like conformity,” that actions of individuals to cultural processes generally they have “ideas, usually subconscious, as to were vigorously opposed or ignored. a proper way to construct a dwelling,” which “reflect the primordial notions of house mor- During the first half of the twentieth century ph~logy.”~~~We are further told that New then, a view of culture as based upon uncon- Englanders have a “cultural predisposition scious patterning which molded the motiva- against personal violence” and finally that cul- tions of individuals was widespread.lZ1Stress ture formation is largely:13” was placed upon the dominance of motor hab- its over intellectual processes and an individ- transacted at the unlit subterranean levels of con- sciousness, as a series of extremely gradual, subtle ual’s emotional attachment to tradition was shifts in modes of thinking, feeling, and impulse in re- asserted.lZ2Man was viewed not as a delib- sponse to basic alterations in socioeconomic structure erative actor but as a being moved by “affect and ecological patterns. states.”123Sauer’s presidential address to the As we have seen, Zelinsky’s use of cultural Association of American Geographers in 1941 conditioning parallels that of the superorgan- was a statement of his position on cultural ge- icists in anthropology with his stress upon ography. He referred to habit as synonymous learned habitual action on the one hand and with culture, stating “we may redefine the old the unconscious on the other. definition of man’s relation to this environ- As some cultural geographers have turned ment as the relation of habit to habitat.”lZ4 their attention to countries such as the United Many others have also adopted the notion of States, the assumption that there are uniform culture as habitual behavior stressing the fact habitual behavior patterns for all the inhabi- that this habitual behavior is learned. Sauer tants has become clearly untenable. Atten- states that “culture is the learned and conven- tion, therefore, is paid to roles. In his notes tionalized activity of a group that occupies an on a seminar offered by Sauer in 1963, New- area.”‘25 Elsewhere Sauer, Wagner and Mi- comb quotes Sauer as saying, “In a complex kesell, Wagner, and Zelinsky define culture as super-culture, we observe the different roles learned habitual behavior and state their def- and statuses.”131 The notion of role allows one inition in much the same terms.126 to conceive of action in terms of habitual be- Whereas the notion of cultural conditioning havior in a highly segmented society. One can is implicit in the work of those cultural geog- by this method transfer the homogeneity and raphers who accept the notion of the primacy habitual action presuppositions regarding a of habitual action, some geographers have simple society to a complex one. In role the- been quite explicit in their adoption of condi- ory, the notion that people behave according tioning theory. Zelinsky, for example, refers to the dictates of their culture is refined in such a way that their behavior, rather than la” Voget, op. cit., footnote 22, p. 351. being prescribed by a culture as a whole is i21 Voget, op. cit., footnote 76, pp. 32, 38-39. prescribed by their role within it. There is little ILL Wax, op. cit., footnote 118, p. 32. lz3 Voget, op. cit., footnote 22, p. 354. difference between these perspectives be- Sauer, op. cit., footnote 54, p. 359. lZ5 Sauer, op. cit., footnote 54, p. 359. lZ7 Zelinsky, op. cit., footnote 48, p. 70. 126 Wagner and Mikesell, op. cit., footnote 5, p. 2; C. lLH Zelmsky, op. cit., footnote 48, p. 72. 0. Sauer, Agricultural Origins and Dispersals (Berkeley: lz9 Zelinsky, op. cit., footnote 48, pp. 42, 44, 89. University of California Press, 1952); Zelinsky, op. cit., I3O Zelinsky, op. cit., footnote 48, pp. 103, 68. footnote 49, p. 75; and P. L. Wagner, Environment and 131 R. M. Newcomb, “Carl 0. Sauer, Teacher,” His- Peoples (Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey: Prentice Hall, torical Geography Newsletter, Vol. 6 (1976), pp 21-30; 1972), p. 5. reference on p. 25. 196 JAMESS. DUNCAN June

cause both draw upon culture as the over- TOWARDS A NONREIFIED CONCEPT arching transcendental object and on condi- OF CULTURE tioning theory. They are close, in this respect After about 1940 a growing consensus de- at least, to the structural-functional sociology veloped within American cultural anthropol- of Talcott Parsons. For the superorganicist ogy that individuals were not simply condi- man is normally an uninventive creature. tioned automaton^.'^^ Rather, as Keesing Commonly his creativity is seen as confined points out, attention was shifted to the ques- to the initial creation of culture, thereafter his tion of how individuals, interacting with other behavior can be largely explained by habitual individuals through institutions, create, main- conditioning. tain, and are in turn modified by their envi- The picture of man as an object acted upon r~nment.’~~Stress was increasingly placed and conditioned by an external force is based upon how individuals exercise choice, how upon what Wrong has termed an “oversocial- they are strategists who manipulate the con- ized conception of man.”132 Unselfconscious, texts in which they find them~elves.’~~This is habitual action is but one aspect of human be- a very different conception of man, emphasiz- havior another aspect of which is individual ing consciousness, self-interest, differential choice and creativity. This choice is not en- values and expectations, and the role of indi- tirely unconstrained, however. It is con- viduals in the process of change.139 strained not by mysterious suprahuman forces A number of anthropologists have recently but by specifiable economic and social con- called for an approach to understanding the ditions. These conditions are not autonomous relation between culture and the individual in but analyzable into individual and group activ- which culture constitutes a context for, rather ity. These constraints should be viewed as than a determinant of, choices. Attention is problematic, i.e. should be investigated in re- focused on both freedom and constraint, con- search. Cultural anthropologists and cultural scious as well as unconscious behavior, and geographers have tended to vastly overplay the conscious manipulation of some individu- conditioned behavior thus producing what has als’ unquestioned beliefs by others.140One been criticized as an impoverished view of could say that people allow cultural prescrip- man. Kroeber’s superorganic theory has been tions to dictate their behavior because they labeled by Bidney as antihumanist while Frei- see these as abstractions not because they lich implies the same when he states that Kroe- really are For example, in the ber considers culture as if man did not exist.133 R. Wagner argues that reified anthropological models such as these accomplish “the meta- 136 Voget, op. cit., footnote 22, p. 356. morphization of life into culture” thereby 137 Keesing, op. cit., footnote 73, p. 91. short-circuiting the creative potentiality of 13* Wallace, op. cit., footnote 104, p. 748; and Voget, op. cit., footnote 18, pp. 546, 799. meaning and impoverishing social experi- 139 Voget, op. cit., footnote 18, p. 561; Voget, op. cit., en~e.’~~Jacques Ellul condemns the antihum- footnote 22, p. 357; C. Erasmus, Man Takes Control; anism in such structural models which “nomi- Ciiltural Development and American Aid (Minneapolis: nally retain . . . [man] while reducing him to University of Minnesota Press, 1961), p. 309; and S. Dia- mond, “What History is,” in R. A. Manners, ed., Process a system and an interplay of forces.”135 and Pattern in Culture (Chicago: Aldine, 1964), pp. 29- 46: reference on p. 33. 152 D. H. Wrong, “The Oversocialized Conception of 140 Voget, op. cit., footnote 22, pp. 356-57: Voget, op. Man in Modern Sociology,” American Sociulogiccil Re- cit., footnote 18, pp. 562, 800, 802-04; Geertz, op. cit., view, Vol. 26 (1961), pp. 183-93. Wrong’s critique was of footnote 72, pp. 57, 63; Keesing, op. cit., footnote 73, p. the model of man employed by Talcott Parsons, but it can 91; Opler, op. cit., footnote 73, pp. 524-25: and F. Barth, equally serve for Kroeber, for as Parsons and Kroeber “On the Study of Culture Change,” American Anthro- themselves point out in a coauthored article, their model pologist, Vol. 69 (1967), pp. 661-69: reference on pp. 661- of man is identical: op. cit., footnote 20. Bidney levels 63. the same charges at Kroeber. See Bidney, op. cit., foot- 14’ Weber, warning against the dangers of reification, note 79, “Cultural Fallacies,” p. 35. insisted that it must not be forgotten that collectivities are 133 Bidney, op. cit., footnote 79, “Cultural Fallacies,” “solely the resultants and modes of organization of the p. 31; and Freilich, op. cit., footnote 90. specific acts of individual men.” However, he goes on to 134 R. Wagner, The Znt’ention of Culture (Englewood say that reification is important from the subjective stand- Cliffs, New Jersey: Rentice Hall, 1975), p. 28. point of individual actors in that it plays an important J. Ellul, “Problems of Sociological Method,” Social “causal” role in social behavior. See A. Giddens, Capi- Resecirch, Vol. 43 (1976), pp. 6-24; reference on p. 9. talism and Modern Social Theory (Cambridge: Cambridge 1980 SUPERORGANIC 197 case of one of Zelinsky’s “four themes,” in- their origins in the distant past, making them dividualism may have an impact on the be- seem remote to the people who now accept havior of Americans not because it is part of them, often unquestioningly, as guidelines for any mechanism by which a superorganic cul- action. This is not evidence for the autonomy ture determines behavior but because many of large scale processes, however; it merely Americans believe that individualism is an reflects the opaqueness of complicated inter- American characteristic and they therefore act actions and man’s alienation from his collec- in accordance with this belief.142 tive creations. As Clifford Geertz, perhaps the That which has been termed “culture” can best known spokesman for this new view of be reduced to the interaction between people. culture writes, culture is An individual’s interactions with others a power, something to which social events, behavior, shapes the nature of his self. The individual is institutions, or processes can be causally attributed; it thus in part a product of this context as well is a context, something within which they can be in- as a producer and sustainer of the context. telligently . . . described. This is simply to say that whereas children, It might be suggested that culture rather than for example, are socialized by their parents, being viewed as a powerful autonomous force school teachers, and friends into accepting a should be considered as a set of traditions and set of values, which they can in turn pass on beliefs that may guide action especially when to their children, many children as they grow they are defined by the actors themselves as up and are exposed to other ideas, can and “natural” or “correct” modes of behavior. often do reject the ideas that were conveyed Attention should be placed upon the complex to them as children. In other words individuals interactions, which may be more or less or- are more autonomous than the thoroughly so- ganized or formalized, between individuals cialized individual posited by the cultural and groups that produce these guidelines for geographers. Within the limits of social and behavior within a certain cultural context. institutional constraints the individual picks and chooses from the multitude of choices CONCLUSION provided by the many social worlds with In summary, one can categorize the various which he is familiar. mistakes associated with the use of the super- The term culture could be saved if it were organic theory of culture as either ontological not treated as an explanatory variable in itself or empirical in nature. I have claimed that the but used to signify contexts for action or sets separation of the’individualfrom culture is an of arrangements between people at various ontological mistake. It is a case of anthropo- levels of aggregation. These may in fact ap- morphism, of reifying a mental construct and pear as things-in-themselves and thus provide attributing to it self-direction and power over the “taken-for-granted’’ nature of the world. men that is purely ficticious. Furthermore it In any society there is not a single context but involves rejecting common sense modes of a series of contexts at a variety of scales. Dif- thinking without gaining analytic power. The ferent individuals and groups, depending upon assumption of homogeneity within a culture is how much access to power and other re- an empirical generalization which does not ap- sources they have, are differentially able to pear to be justifiable in terms of furthering the- arrange and modify these different contexts. oretical progress. The use of the generic man Some have an impact upon the immediate con- and modal personality types as causal mech- text of their neighborhood whereas the rich anisms again is a case of reification. A greater and the powerful may leave their mark at the problem lies in the fact that they preclude im- national scale.143These contexts often have portant research questions. Further, Pavlov- ian conditioning theory has been inadequate in explaining empirical research data. Perhaps University Press, 1971), pp. 150-51; and Berger and Pull- berg, op. cit., footnote 2. more telling than these specific criticisms is 14* This is a realist view of reification. See “Reification and Realism,” in Keat and Urry, op. cit., footnote 108, pp. 176-95. 144 C. Geertz “Thick Description: Toward an Interpre- 143 M. Samuels, “The Biography of Landscape,” in D. tive Theory of Culture,” in The Interpretation oJ’Culfures W. Meinia, ed., The Inierpreiaiion of Ordinary Land- (New York: Basic Books, 1973), pp. 3-30; reference on scapes (New York: Oxford-University-Press, 1979). p. 14. 198 JAMESS. DUNCAN June the fact that the general approach to culture Can the concept of culture be saved? Not has been adopted uncritically, which is to say all cultural geographers consistently treat cul- that with few exceptions cultural geographers ture as a superorganic entity. It is often used appear unconcerned by controversies in an- as a catch-all term to mean the way of life of thropology over this theory. It could be added a people. This in itself may not cause any that this failure to defend the use of outmoded problem. Any attempt to save culture as an theory is widespread and not confined to cul- explanatory concept by defining it in this way, tural geography. even if divested of an independent ontological A major question remains, what value, if status, fails. It is tautological to explain any- any, does the notion of culture have for ge- thing about a group of people by reference to ography? The present critique does not deny a notion which allegedly covers all the char- that there is value in the use of the term cul- acteristics of the group including, by defini- ture; it does however reject the attribution of tion, that which is to be explained. Such a autonomous ontological status to the concept. definition of culture can be of use only in cat- It suggests that culture defined as a superor- egorizing behavior at a very broad compara- ganic entity is not only unconvincing as an tive scale across “world cultures.” This, how- explanatory variable, but impedes explanation ever, may involve the problems mentioned by masking many problematic social, econom- above in connection with ideal national types. ic, and political relationships. The rejection of a reified notion of culture The criticisms of the superorganic apply to may imply a degree of convergence between substantive work in cultural geography as well cultural and social geography. If culture is no as the programmatic statements. Much of longer viewed as an autonomous object re- Sauer’s empirical research may deserve the quiring a self-contained level of inquiry but attention and praise it has received, however rather as the context for social interaction, as a school “Sauerian” or Berkeley cultural then the distinction between social and cul- geography is unnecessarily limited in the tural geography collapses. Rather than study- range of questions it can address and more ing a “thing” called culture, research would importantly in the range of explanatory vari- be focused on individuals and groups as they ables with which it can deal. By explicitly rul- interact with their physical environment in ing out discussion of individuals and by deal- various social and institutional contexts at a ing only with the material effect of man in variety of scales. The emphasis on social, psy- general, generic man, or the aggregation of all chological, and occasionally political expla- men in a region, one is left with but two nation found in social geography nicely com- choices. Either, one can deny explanation as pliments the landscape, artifactual, and a goal and settle for “description” which is aesthetic emphases of cultural geography. The somehow distinguished from explanation, or, man-land tradition although strong in cultural one must depend upon a larger whole such as geography is weak in social geography today culture as an explanatory variable. However because of the central concern with spatial the distinction between explanation and de- aspects of urban problems. A merging of these scription is by no means clear. On the one two subareas of geography would be mutually hand, as Sauer rightly claimed, historical de- beneficial if the cultural geographers’ tradi- scription can be explanation. On the other tional definition of geography as the study of hand, a mere sequence of events is not nec- the relation between “man” and the environ- essarily explanation especially when the most ment were to be given greater emphasis in so- important factors are omitted. By denying in- cial geography. “Man,” of course, in this case dividual action as a legitimate concern of is not the disembodied generic man of ortho- geographers, one must either reify man by dox cultural geography but individuals and making him into an ideal (i.e. generic man), groups of individuals in relation to particular reify culture, or deny explanation as a goal. socio-historical landscapes.