VICKSBURG CAMPAIGN Driving Tour Guide

Prepared by: Friends of the Vicksburg Campaign and Historic Trail, Inc. 2008

TABLE OF CONTENTS Page Part 1: Introduction ...... 2

Glossary: Abbreviations and Conventions...... 6

Part 2: Synopsis of the Campaign for Control of the Mississippi River ...... 8

Part 3: Driving Tour of the Final Offensive of the Vicksburg Campaign . . . . 31

Generalized Orders of Battle of Union and Confederate Forces...... 159

Map (located in pocket in back) Obverse: The Final Offensive of the Vicksburg Campaign; Significant Sites, 24 Dec 1862 - 6 Jul 1863 Reverse: The Final Offensive of the Vicksburg Campaign; Movements of Major Units of the Union and Confederate Forces, 24 Dec 1862 B 6 Jul 1863

NOTE: Any user suggestions or errors noted may be submitted to: [email protected]

This material is based upon work assisted by a grant from the Department of the Interior, National Park Service. Any opinions, findings, and conclusions or recommendations expressed in this material are those of the author(s) and do not necessarily reflect the views of the Department of the Interior.

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Part 1 Introduction

This Vicksburg Campaign Driving Tour Guide has been prepared by The Friends of the Vicksburg Campaign and Historic Trail, Inc., and funded by a grant from the American Battlefield Protection Program of the National Park Service, U.S. Department of the Interior, and the Lower Mississippi Delta Initiatives.

How to use this tour guide.

Confusion about names. Almost from the beginning of the Civil War, a major Union strategic objective was to gain control of the Lower Mississippi River—that portion of the River from the confluence of the Ohio and Mississippi Rivers to the Gulf of Mexico. That campaign properly began with the Union attacks on Fort Henry on the Tennessee River on 6 February 1862 and Forts Jackson and St. Philip near the mouth of the Mississippi on 24 April 1862, and concluded with the Confederate surrenders of Vicksburg on 4 July and of Port Hudson on 9 July 1863. The National Park Service has chosen to describe the actions within that period (6 February 1862-9 July 1863) as AThe Vicksburg Campaign.@ Viewed in that perspective, this driving guide is designed to interpret only that portion of The Vicksburg Campaign extending from 24 December 1862 to 6 July 1863. This period covers only the final months in the campaign, a period termed The Final Offensive of the Vicksburg Campaign, because during that period the Confederate fortress of Vicksburg was indeed the immediate tactical objective of the Union forces.

Since the area covered for the entire AVicksburg Campaign@ ranges from Cairo, IL, to the Gulf of Mexico, it is far too great for one driving guide. Consequently, a synopsis of the entire AVicksburg Campaign@ (e.g., the campaign for control of the Lower Mississippi River) is included in Part 2 to provide a historical context for the events covered in this driving guide.

Part 3, with map, provides a comprehensive account of the last months of the Vicksburg Campaign (e.g., the Final Offensive of the Vicksburg Campaign), interpreted at 178 sites through vignettes which describe the Union and Confederate activities at that site. Most of these sites can be reached on public roads with a conventional automobile, although a few of them are located along roads that still look very much as they did in 1863 and may require a 4-wheel drive vehicle.

The map is enclosed in the back pocket of this guide. The front of the map, entitled AThe Final Offensive of the Vicksburg Campaign, Significant Sites, 24 December 1862—6 July 1863@ includes the 178 sites on a large-scale modern road map which includes every road mentioned in the text, the Civil War-era road 2 net, and the location of every site mentioned in Part 3. The map on the reverse is entitled AThe Final Offensive of the Vicksburg Campaign; Movements of Major Union and Confederate Forces, 24 December 1862—6 July 1863.@ It is printed on the same base map as the "Sites" map, and shows the routes traveled by all units of brigade size or greater during these months of the Vicksburg Campaign. The routes traveled by smaller units are shown when the actions were of significance to the campaign. Using the two maps in conjunction will make it easier to follow as closely as possible the actual movements of the armies.

The Glossary shows lists of abbreviations and terms.

Understanding the Vicksburg Campaign Driving Tour Guide

The events encompassed in this guide are categorized into seven phases:

Phase A: The Chickasaw Bayou Expedition (24 Dec 1862 - 4 Jan 1863) Phase B: The Winter of Great Hardships (24 Jan - 30 Apr 1863) Phase C: The Campaign into the Interior of Mississippi (1 - 18 May 1863) Phase D: Assaults and Siege: (19 May - 3 Jul) Phase E: Surrender of Vicksburg and Port Hudson (4 - 9 Jul 63) Note: Phase D concerns the two Union assaults on the Vicksburg fortifications and the 47 days of the siege. Phase E concerns the period to include the surrender of Vicksburg on 4 July and the surrender of Port Hudson on 9 July 1863. These two phases are interpreted in the Vicksburg National Military Park and the Port Hudson State Historic Site. Phases D and E are not interpreted in this campaign driving guide. Phase F: The Confederate Army of Relief (19 May - 6 Jul 1863) Phase G: The Confederate Counteroffensives in Louisiana (30 May - 6 Jul 1863)

The geographic sites selected to represent the action during the five phases included in this driving guide have been arranged and numbered as closely as chronology and driving times allow. Since Union and Confederate armies were active at the same time, but often in widely separated geographic locations, some Askips in time@ will be necessary to follow the action. Also, the area covered by core events is about 5,250 square miles, so the site number- sequences are arranged to minimize driving distances, while still retaining the approximate temporal sequence. However, some Aback-tracking@ will be required to follow the correct chronology, and the driving distances are significant, just as the marching distances were significant to the soldiers in blue and gray who fought in the campaign.

The sites in Part 3 have been arranged in "clusters" of sites, each focusing on a particular part of the campaign, so that this vast campaign may be viewed in sections. For example, the Chickasaw Bayou Expedition is included in Sites 1- 10, the Steele=s Bayou Expedition in Sites 11-25, etc.

3 Phase coding in the text.

Each paragraph within a site narrative is coded with a Phase symbol in brackets - - [A], [B], [C], [F], or [G] (Phases D and E are interpreted in the Vicksburg National Military Park and Port Hudson State Historic Site) to make it easier to follow the action. For example, a paragraph starting with [A] deals with action associated with Phase A, the Chickasaw Bayou Expedition, which occurred primarily within the period 24 Dec 1862 - 4 Jan 1863. There will be occasional exceptions when action not specific to that phase occurred at the same site.

The critical role of the Navy is emphasized by identifying each paragraph devoted to naval activities with a code of its own -- [NavOp] B located at the beginning of the relevant paragraph (see sub-section Naval Operations, below). For example: Site 39. Young's Point, played an important role during Phases [A], [B], [C], and [G], as well as playing a role in naval operations.

Finding the historical sites listed in Part 3.

As aids in finding the site on the ground, most of which are not marked, each site description has been provided with two methods for on-the-ground navigation:

1. A Geographic Positioning System (GPS) coordinate. For example, Site 39. Young's Point, is GPS N32° 21.306', W91° 00.982. 2. The conventional “road names and distances” method. Explicit driving instructions and approximate mileages are provided. However, since many of the minor roads can be confusing and are sometimes unmarked, or the road name has changed, Reference Points are provided, usually at a road intersection in a town or village, or in some cases at a major highway junction which can be easily identified on the Significant Sites map. The Reference Point is identified in the driving directions by a name in Italics. Each such site will be found in the Table of Navigational References at the top of the lists of sites in Part 3.

Example: The driving directions for Site 39. Young's Point, are: From Mound, proceed north on Duckport Road for 1.1 mi. Mound is listed in the Louisiana Navigation Reference Points and is at the junction of US-80 and LA- 602 (0.5 mi. north of I-20 Exit 182).

All of the sites are located beside public roads accessible with conventional automobiles. Some of the roads are not surfaced and may be unsuitable for use in wet weather. It is important to note that limitations of scale made it impossible to put the names of Parish and County roads on the road map used as a base for the enclosed map. The "road and distance" directions and descriptions are sufficiently detailed for navigational purposes.

4 Roads and access.

Much of the modern road network is actually superimposed on the Civil War network. However, most of the modern roads have been straightened, widened, and paved. In a few places the original roads still remain essentially unchanged. In such instances, the navigation data for the relevant sites will include a note to advise what type of vehicles should drive the road. In addition, a few sites are in locations that can no longer be reached by vehicles, either because they no longer exist (for example Site 66. Disharoon=s Plantation was eroded away by the Mississippi River many years ago), or because they are in locations not accessible by road (Site 77. Bruinsburg Plantation). In either case, the surrogate roadside site is indicated on the map by a solid red dot, and the unreachable "true" site is indicated by a hollow red dot (o). The legend of the map gives examples.

Naval Operations.

The role of the Union Navy was crucial to the success of the Union effort, but naval exploits are difficult to describe in terms of sites ashore. Still, seven naval operations throughout the Vicksburg Campaign rise to a level demanding individual notice. These operations were in the Yazoo River [24 Dec 1862 - 4 Jan 1863], Yazoo Pass Expedition [3 Feb – 10 Apr 1863], Steele’s Bayou Expedition [12-27 Mar 1863], Running the Vicksburg Batteries [6 - 22 Apr 1863], The Battle of Grand Gulf [29 Apr 1863], The Bruinsburg Landing [30 Apr - 1 May 1863], and Sherman's feint at Snyder's Bluff [30 Apr - 1 May 1863]). The entire Union campaign for control of the Mississippi River was one of the most remarkable examples of the effective use of combined arms in American military history.

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GLOSSARY: ABBREVIATIONS AND CONVENTIONS

Abbreviations, Conventions, and interpretive notes

The following conventions have been used in the interests of clarity and brevity in all textual material in the booklet.

Dates and Times: Dates are given in modern military notation, and refer to 1863 unless otherwise noted. Example: June 3, 1863 is written as 3 Jun, but June 3, 1862 is written as 3 Jun 1862.

Times are given in the 24-hour clock called “military time” for the purpose of reducing ambiguity. In military time, any time from midnight to noon is read at face value. For time after noon, subtract 12 from the military time and use the remainder for the face value time. Examples:

0030 = 12:30 AM 0300 = 3:00 AM 1200 = 12:00 noon 1300 = 1:00 PM 2300 = 11:00 PM

Abbreviations: The following abbreviations and conventions apply.

Army and Navy ranks: LT = Lieutenant (Army and navy) CPT = Captain (Army and navy) MAJ = Major (Army) LTC = Lieutenant Colonel (Army) COL = Colonel (Army) BG = Brigadier General (Army) MG = Major General (Army) LTG = Lieutenant General (Army) GEN = General (Army) LCDR = Lieutenant Commander (Navy) CDR = Commander (Navy) FO = Flag Officer (Navy) RADM = Rear Admiral (Navy)

Army and Navy units: CORPS = Corps (Army) DIV = Division (Army) 6 BDE = Brigade (Army) RGT = Regiment (Army) CO = Company (Army) SQDN = Squadron (Navy)

Miscellaneous military terms: HQ = Headquarters (Army and Navy) MTD = Mounted (Army) ARTY = Artillery (Army) CAV = Cavalry (Army) INF = Infantry (Army)

Conventions Many geographic names have changed since 1863. The modern name is used in the narrative with the 1863 name in parentheses, thus Reganton (Crossroads).

The names of naval vessels are always given without the customary definite article, and are printed in italics, thus: “RADM Porter, in his flagship Black Hawk, steamed ...”

The names of plantations and farms can be confusing because in this region, at that time in history, many of them were identified by a formal name rather than by the name of the owner. The distinction has been made between a named plantation or farm, such as Joan Plantation, and a similar feature is identified only by the owner’s name being capitalized, such as Stanbrough’s plantation.

Military Organizations. The names of military units are followed by the name of the parent unit in parentheses. For example: DeCourcy’s BDE (Morgan’s DIV) = DeCourcy’s BDE is a component of Morgan’s DIV. In addition, Orders of Battle are provided for both Union and Confederate armies after the Glossary.

7 PART 2

SYNOPSIS OF THE VICKSBURG CAMPAIGN (The Campaign for Control of the Lower Mississippi River)

Prologue

The overall Union strategy for defeating the South in the Civil War was the 1861 brainchild of aging warrior LTG Winfield Scott Widely lampooned in the press as the Anaconda Plan, it was deceptively simple but purposeful. It called for a blockade of the South from the Chesapeake Bay to the tip of Florida, and then westward along the Gulf Coast to the Rio Grande River. The naval blockade would prevent the manufacturing-poor South from selling its cotton to foreign powers in exchange for war supplies and weaponry. The plan's second goal was to seize and control the Mississippi River to keep open that vital line of communication with the Northwest. Union control of the Mississippi would also cut the South geographically in half by isolating the states of Texas, Arkansas, and most of Louisiana, as well as the border state of Missouri. Any commerce or military supplies and reinforcements from those states would be cut off from the Confederate states east of the Mississippi. Thus, the South would be constricted economically and militarily, much as an anaconda kills its prey.

In 1861, the major routes of inland transportation in America were railroads and rivers, and the Mississippi River was the greatest of the American water highways. It immediately became evident to Northern strategists that Union military operations must gain control of the Mississippi. Then, once away from the navigable streams the railroads offered the only solution to the increasingly difficult problem of supplying armies maneuvering far inland. Thus, the initial strategy was to use waterborne transport wherever possible, and to follow the railroads whenever operations far from the streams were required.

The hard-fought Union victory at Shiloh, TN, on 6-7 April 1862, followed by the Federal occupation of Corinth, MS, on 30 April, gave the Federal military forces control of the vital rail-crossing of the east-west Memphis & Charleston Railroad and the north-south Mobile & Ohio Railroad. Control at the railroad hub of Corinth, coupled with the Union occupation of the Mississippi River town of Memphis, on 6 June 1862, gave the North solid control of the Memphis & Charleston Railroad from the Tennessee River northeast of Iuka, MS, west to the river at Memphis. Control of this railroad and Memphis gave the North a firm hold on Tennessee west of the Tennessee River, as well as commercial navigation of the Mississippi River from the Northern states all the way to Memphis. From Memphis, marine convoys could go south to Vicksburg, but they had to be accompanied by warships.

8 Shortly thereafter, the Union Western Gulf Blockading Squadron under RADM David D. Farragut penetrated up the Mississippi River from the Gulf of Mexico; captured New Orleans, Baton Rouge, and Natchez; and attempted to take Vicksburg. In a standoff at strategically important Vicksburg, 18 June-24 July 1862, Farragut failed to capture the "Gibraltar of the Confederacy." Vicksburg's stubborn defense demonstrated that opening the Mississippi River to Union shipping, the primary strategic objective of the Union west of the Appalachian Mountains, would require the occupation of the city by the Federal land forces, which at that time were under the overall command of MG Henry W. Halleck.

Farragut's expedition upriver to seize Vicksburg had been accompanied by less than 5,000 soldiers commanded by BG Thomas Williams -- far too few men to attempt a land assault on the fortified city. And, in the summer climate of the South, many of these men, who were largely New Englanders, became ill and unfit for duty.

Because Farragut's ships had received a pounding in passing the Vicksburg batteries, Williams was inspired to propose the construction of a canal across the neck of DeSoto Peninsula, directly across the river from Vicksburg. This canal, if completed, would divert the Mississippi River south of the city, thus permitting vessels to bypass the citadel unscathed. The project was started on 28 June 1862, with the backbreaking labor being done by some of Williams' men and about 1,200 slaves impressed from nearby plantations. Had the canal scheme succeeded, it might eventually have changed the course of the Mississippi, leaving Vicksburg and its batteries on the quiet shore of an isolated ox-bow lake. But during the summer months, the water level in the river dropped far faster than the men could dig, and the project was abandoned on 24 July 1862.

When Halleck was called to Washington to become the General-in-Chief of Union forces, MG Ulysses S. Grant was left in command of the military forces in western Tennessee. Confederate forces commanded by MG Earl Van Dorn and MG Sterling Price opposed Grant. The initial Union strategic plan involved the establishment of major depots at Memphis, TN, and Holly Springs, MS. From these bases the army would advance southward into Mississippi toward Vicksburg, using the railroads as main lines of supply. Confederate attempts to disrupt this plan and regain control of western Tennessee were frustrated by Union victories at Iuka, MS, on 19 September 1862, and at Corinth, MS, on 3 - 4 October 1862. These defeats caused the relief of Van Dom, who was replaced by LTG John C. Pemberton on 14 October 1862 in a newly created command, the Department of Mississippi and East Louisiana.

Phase A: The Chickasaw Bayou Expedition (24 Dec 1862 - 4 Jan 1863)

By December 1862, the Union Army of the Tennessee had moved slowly southward into Mississippi, reaching the line of the Yocona River, 6.5 miles south of Oxford, MS. Grant had anticipated that the drive down the railroads of western 9 Mississippi would result in the Confederate concentration of virtually all major Confederate forces in the region into a single force to oppose the advance. He had, therefore, sent MG William T. Sherman's Expeditionary Force in an amphibious operation from Memphis down the Mississippi to the Yazoo River, then up the Yazoo to land just above Vicksburg. Sherman's orders were to attack the Confederate defense complex at Snyder's and Drumgould's Bluffs, with the hope that the defensive garrison there had been sent north toward the Yocona River to counter Grant's thrust. If the ploy worked, Vicksburg would fall quickly to Sherman's forces, and the great strategic objective would be achieved quickly and cheaply.

Suddenly, three Confederate cavalry brigades under Van Dorn moved northeast from Grenada, and, at Ripley, turned west toward the rear echelons of Grant's army. Van Dorn had been relegated to a command that better suited his skills – Pemberton's cavalry division commander. On 20 December 1862, Van Dorn's men achieved complete surprise over the Holly Springs garrison and turned the depot into an inferno. An astonished and discomfited Grant decided to withdraw to Grand Junction, TN, where his troops could at least be fed.

Upon Grant's withdrawal from the Yocona, Pemberton shifted troops to the fortifications north of Vicksburg to oppose Sherman's forces. The Confederates, though outnumbered, fought from well-situated defenses on the dry ground at the base of Walnut Hills, while Sherman's men attacked across the swamplands of the Yazoo. The result was the bloody Union defeat at Chickasaw Bayou on 29 December 1862.

Instead of withdrawing to Memphis upon his defeat at Chickasaw Bayou, as the Confederates confidently anticipated, Sherman embarked his men on the fleet of transports and steamed down the Yazoo into the Mississippi to land on the west bank of the Mississippi River at Milliken's Bend, LA. Here, on 2 January 1863, he was joined by MG John A McClernand, who had just arrived from Memphis. McClernand, as the senior officer, formally assumed command of Sherman's troops on 4 January. The next day the army transport fleet, three ironclad gunboats, and numerous light-draft gunboats of RADM David Dixon Porter's Mississippi River Squadron steamed back up the Mississippi to the Arkansas River. On 10 - 11 January 1863, the Union expedition captured the Confederate fortress of Arkansas Post, thus opening the Arkansas River to Union naval incursions as far upstream as Little Rock. When the expedition returned to the posts opposite Vicksburg, the troops were gradually reinforced over the succeeding weeks by additional units of the Union Army of the Tennessee.

10 Phase B: The Winter of Great Hardships (24 Jan - 30 Apr 1863)

Grant's Canal (24 Jan - 17 Mar 1863) On 19 January 1863, Secretary of the Navy Gideon Welles advised RADM Porter that President Abraham Lincoln was "exceedingly anxious" that the ill-fated Williams canal be reopened. The next day Grant advised MG Halleck, who had become General-in Chief in Washington, D.C., that the canal would be "surveyed and cut." Work on what would be called Grant's Canal was resumed on 24 January 1863, mostly with Sherman's troops and impressed slaves. This time matters worked in reverse. As the Mississippi rose toward the spring crest, the waters spread widely across the floodplain, inundating the camps of the workmen and the channel of the canal itself. Work on the canal ceased while the men sought to save themselves. Eventually, steam dredges were brought in, but the Confederates moved guns to the point on the east bank of the Mississippi River opposite where the canal would debouch on the west bank. These guns could enfilade the canal for about one-half its length. On 17 March 1863, the effort was at last abandoned.

Lake Providence Expedition (3 Feb - 31 Mar 1863) Grant's engineers at Young's Point suggested that a channel navigable for small boats and shallow-draft transports could be created by cutting a canal from the Mississippi River to Lake Providence, and from the Lake to Bayou Macon, a large stream only ten miles west of Lake Providence. Bayou Macon eventually discharged via the Tensas, Black, and Red Rivers, into the Mississippi about 80 river miles above Baton Rouge, LA. While such a channel would have little immediate tactical value, it would yield immense strategic advantages. A water route that circumvented the batteries at Vicksburg would provide a safer and more direct avenue of communication. It could be used for transport of supplies and troops to MG Nathaniel Banks at New Orleans and to Farragut's fleet in the deeper waters of the Gulf of Mexico. Farragut's Western Gulf Blockading Squadron, far from the mines of the North, was chronically short of coal to feed its steam engines. Work on the project began in early February of 1863, but it proved far more difficult than expected, and the project was finally abandoned at the end of March.

Yazoo Pass Expedition (3 Feb -10 Apr 1863) The Federal repulse at Chickasaw Bayou made it clear that the defenses of Vicksburg were very strong, and the reports of both Farragut and Porter verified this fact. The Holly Springs episode had also suggested that supplying a large army over the Mississippi railroads would be very difficult, if not impossible. The obvious alternative was to depend upon river transport for supply, and to seek a somewhat weakly defended place on the eastern edge of the Mississippi River floodplain, or Mississippi Delta, where troops could be put ashore close to Vicksburg. Such a place was Yazoo City, MS, which sat astride the line of bluffs that bordered the floodplain. Yazoo City could be reached through the Yazoo Pass, a former break in the east bank of the Mississippi River a few miles below 11 Helena, AR. The Pass had been sealed in 1856 when the Mississippi River levee was built, but the levee could be blown up and the Pass reopened. Once in the Yazoo Pass, the route led to the Coldwater River, then south on the Coldwater to the Tallahatchie River, then south to Greenwood, MS, where the Tallahatchie and Yalobusha Rivers joined to form the Yazoo River. From Greenwood, a flotilla could then steam down the Yazoo River to Yazoo City. Also the Yalobusha River flowed from Grenada, MS (where the strategic railroad bridges of the Mississippi Central Railroad and the Mississippi & Tennessee Railroad were located) northeastward to the Yazoo at Greenwood, MS. Grant, in his December thrust toward Vicksburg, had tried in vain to destroy these bridges, which were essential to the Confederates. Greenwood, therefore, offered two very important options to a Union amphibious operation -- Yazoo City and Grenada.

A transport fleet loaded with troops and supported by light-draft gunboats and two ironclads from Porter's squadron entered the Yazoo Pass beginning on 7 February 1862. By 11 March 1862, the fleet had almost reached Greenwood via waterways so narrow and difficult that the smokestacks of the steamers were swept away by the limbs of swamp trees lining the channel. But again, Pemberton had anticipated the effort. He had ordered the construction of an earthwork fort, dubbed Fort Pemberton, at a constricted bend of the Tallahatchie River just above Greenwood. When the Confederate guns opened up on the two Union ironclads, the channel was so narrow that the Union gunboats could not be used effectively, and the Yazoo Pass Expedition ground to a halt. The withdrawal began the night of 4 April 1863.

Steele's Bayou Expedition (12-27 Mar 1863) When Grant learned of the problems his troops faced at Greenwood, he became concerned that the Confederates might cut the extended Union line of communication and destroy the Yazoo Pass Expedition. At the same time, Porter was investigating another route into the Yazoo River. While Porter was at Chickasaw Bayou with Sherman the previous December, he had learned that there was yet another navigable route to the Yazoo River above the Confederate defenses located at Snyder's and Drumgould's bluffs. This route led northward up Steele's Bayou from its mouth at Johnson's plantation on the Yazoo River, to Black Bayou, which connected eastward to Deer Creek, which in turn connected northward to Rolling Fork Creek, which ran eastward into the Big Sunflower River. The Big Sunflower then flowed generally south into the Yazoo River at a point 10.5 water miles below Satartia, and good roads led from Satartia into the rear of Vicksburg.

Porter's Steele's Bayou idea was not only a possible route into the Yazoo River above the Confederate fortifications, but it was also a way to send relief up the Yazoo to Greenwood if it was needed, so Grant approved the plan. On 15 March 1863, Porter entered Steele Bayou with five of his ironclads, four mortar scows,

12 and a number of supporting vessels, but the expedition was brought to a stop in Deer Creek about 800 yards south of the mouth of the Rolling Fork on 20 March when Confederates felled trees to block the channel and then opened fire with field artillery. Fearing that his gunboats might be boarded by Confederate infantry, Porter sent for help, and on 21 March Sherman's advance element of two regiments arrived, with Sherman and another six regiments showing up the next day. The federal infantry then kept the Rebels at bay while Porter backed his precious warships out of the deadly trap. The federal flotilla was safely home at Young's Point by 27 March 1863.

Union March South (29 Mar - 30 Apr 1863) Grant and Porter had proved that putting an army ashore in Mississippi on solid ground north of Vicksburg by a route through the floodplain bayous was impractical. Now at Young's Point in Louisiana, Grant was reduced to three possible courses of action.

Grant's first course of action could be a withdrawal of the army to Memphis to organize a new offensive, using the railroad from Memphis as his primary supply line. Sherman, Grant's subordinate as well as friend, strongly advocated this course of action. But, in the previous December, Grant had tried and failed at a variant of that scheme. More importantly to Grant, there were compelling political reasons why such a plan was unacceptable. In times of political turmoil and antiwar sentiment in the North, a retrograde to Memphis would be viewed as a defeat and retreat, and would most probably cost Grant, and possibly President Abraham Lincoln, their jobs.

As his second course of action, Grant could launch the army across the river in a direct amphibious assault against Vicksburg and its defenses. Unknown to Grant, Pemberton and his senior commanders greatly feared just such an action. The Confederates were aware that their defenses were not as strong as they looked. In any case, Grant rejected such a plan because he feared the casualties would be too great.

Grant's last course of action would be to march the army southward through Louisiana and to find an undefended, or at least lightly defended, landing site on the Mississippi shore somewhere south of Vicksburg. Such a course was fraught with difficulties, since the Louisiana road network was skeletal, at best, and the countryside would be largely under water from the spring floods. Supplying a large army under such conditions certainly would be extraordinarily taxing, if not impossible. The Mississippi was rising toward the spring crest, and the soldiers were encamped on a landscape consisting of not much land but a very great deal of water. The few roads were not surfaced and ran along the crests of natural levees. These levees were narrow strips of dry ground bordering the larger bayous, and this ground had flowing streams on one side and endless stagnant swamps on the other. Rain would turn the roads on the levees into quagmires,

13 making the movement of wheeled vehicles – cannon and supply wagons – impossible. Even the movement of infantry was exhausting beyond measure. Furthermore, landing on the Mississippi shore would be impossible without naval support. That meant that Porter would have to cooperate by running a major portion of his ironclad fleet past Vicksburg's powerful river defense batteries.

Despite Grant's problems, one of the three courses of action would have to be chosen, and soon. Sickness had already reached dangerous proportions due to continued camp life under unsanitary and waterlogged conditions. As long as the Union army was confined to the floodplain of the Mississippi, an epidemic of malaria or yellow fever might well destroy the army without the Confederates firing a shot. This dilemma was well understood by the Confederate high command. They believed that it was unnecessary to assume the offensive, because nature would give them victory if the Union army simply could be pinned in place for a sufficient period of time.

Faced with such an imperative, and after close consultation with his naval colleague Porter, Grant decided, on 29 March 1863, to take the third of the three possible courses of action. He marched McClernand's XIII and MG James B. McPherson's XVII Corps of his army south through Louisiana in search of an unguarded landing spot on the Mississippi shore, and left Sherman's XV Corps behind to guard his line of communications and create the illusion that the army was still opposite Vicksburg.

The march south took a month, but by 18 April 1863 the army had concentrated around the plantation town of Hard Times, LA, nearly 60 road miles south of Milliken's Bend, LA. Hard Times was almost across the Mississippi from the Confederate stronghold of Grand Gulf, which was 27 airline miles south- southwest of Vicksburg. On that day, Grant and Porter agreed that Grand Gulf would be the landing point, contingent upon Porter's ability to silence the Confederate fortifications with his seven ironclads. Porter had fulfilled his part of the plan by running seven of his ironclads, an armed ram, three transport steamboats, a little tug, and many barges, past the Vicksburg batteries on the night of 16 April 1863. To nearly everyone's surprise, the damage from Confederate fire was minimal. The ironclads were scarcely damaged, and only one of the transports was sunk. On the night of 22 April 1863, six more transports, this time unsupported by ironclads, ran past the batteries, with five surviving the gauntlet of cannon fire. This gave the Federals seven transports, a ram, and a tug for an amphibious landing on the Mississippi shore.

Across from Hard Times on the east bank of the River, Confederate BG John Bowen, the commander of the garrison of Grand Gulf, had long been aware of the Union thrust southward. Bowen had both strengthened the artillery defenses of Grand Gulf, and persuaded Pemberton to forward reinforcements to assist in fending off the impending danger.

14

Meanwhile, on 27 April 1863, Grant suggested to Sherman that he conduct a feint against the Confederate fortifications north of Vicksburg at Snyder's Bluff with his XV Corps, which had been left behind at Young's Point. Such a feint might so alarm the Confederate commanders that they would hold large forces in Vicksburg, rather than send them south to Grand Gulf as reinforcements for Bowen. Sherman, with the cooperation of LCDR K. Randolph Breese, who had been left by Porter in command of the Union naval forces above Vicksburg, assembled a force of ten regiments. On 29 April 1863, Sherman steamed up the Yazoo River with a large transport fleet guarded by ironclads. In a convincing diversion, he landed the troops and feigned an attack on the Confederate positions.

To further mask Grant's movements, in mid-April MG Stephen Hurlbut, who commanded the Union forces in West Tennessee and northern Mississippi, launched a series of cavalry raids southward. The objective of these raids was to hold the large Confederate cavalry forces defending the line of the Tallahatchie River in place, thus preventing them from being sent south to reinforce Pemberton, whose forces at Jackson and Vicksburg were known to be very deficient in cavalry.

Hurlbut’s cavalry raids succeeded admirably in their strategic goal of locking Pemberton’s cavalry in north Mississippi, and one of them succeeded beyond all expectation. COL Benjamin Grierson, left LaGrange, TN, on 17 April 1863, with a force of about 1,200 Illinois and Iowa cavalrymen. On 24 April Grierson captured Newton Station, MS, and destroyed several miles of the track of the Southern Railroad of Mississippi, Vicksburg's lifeline to the east. Grierson then led his men southwest toward Natchez, and on 27 April some of his troopers, disguised as Confederates, boldly rode into Hazlehurst on the New Orleans, Jackson, and Great Northern Railroad, and sent a fake telegram to Pemberton's headquarters, then in Jackson, saying that Grierson was turning toward Jackson. Swallowing the bait, Pemberton ordered Bowen's cavalry, commanded by COL Wirt Adams, to the east and away from the Mississippi River, to intercept Grierson. Grierson then rode towards Grand Gulf to unite with Grant's army only to be temporarily thwarted at Union Church, less than 30 miles southeast of Grand Gulf, on 28 April by Adams' cavalry, which had ridden east under Pemberton's orders and had left the east bank of the Mississippi River near Grand Gulf unguarded.

Undaunted, the following day Grierson broke contact with Adams's horsemen, and on 2 May 1863, his exhausted troopers rode triumphantly into the Union garrison at Baton Rouge, LA This concluded one of the most brilliant and successful cavalry raids of American history.

15 Phase C: The Campaign into the Interior of Mississippi (1 - 18 May 1863)

Port Gibson to Hankinson's Ferry (1- 6 May 1863) On the morning of 29 April 1863, while Grierson was helping to divert attention from Grant in Louisiana, Grant loaded many of his troops on boats and barges in preparation for a landing at Grand Gulf. The landing was to take place as soon as the Confederate guns were silenced. During a bombardment of more than six hours, Porter's ironclads managed to suppress the fire from Grand Gulf’s Fort Wade, but could not completely silence Fort Cobun. Grant and Porter's plan had gone awry.

Unwilling to attempt a landing in the face of heavy artillery fire, Grant unloaded his men and marched southward across the base of Coffee Point, LA, to Disharoon's plantation, five miles south of Hard Times and opposite the mouth of Bayou Pierre. Shepherding the transports, Porter's squadron of ironclads easily ran the partially crippled Confederate batteries at Grand Gulf during the night and joined the army at Disharoon's plantation. Grant then abruptly changed his improvised plan of landing his forces at the small town of Rodney, 14 water miles to the south. Grant had learned that the plantation town of Bruinsburg, only five miles downriver from Disharoon's, was unguarded and had an excellent steamboat landing with a good road that led to the interior. On the strength of that report, Grant immediately decided to land at Bruinsburg, which was a far more convenient location than Rodney.

Early the following morning, 30 April 1863, the advance elements of Grant's Army of the Tennessee landed unopposed and unobserved at Bruinsburg. By nightfall, the advance guard was well inland, marching westward along the Rodney Road toward Port Gibson.

From an observation point on Point of Rocks, high above the Confederate fortifications at Grand Gulf, Bowen was able to see the Union columns marching southward from Hard Times toward Disharoon's. When the Union fleet ran by Bowen's crippled batteries on the night of 29 April, Bowen was certain that the Union army would land on the Mississippi shore somewhere below the mouth of Bayou Pierre. However, he was unable to determine where the Union landing might be because Adams' Mississippi Cavalry, which had been patrolling the shoreline, had been withdrawn on 27 April to pursue Grierson.

In an effort to contain the probable Union bridgehead to the area south of Bayou Pierre, Bowen night-marched the two brigades comprising the Grand Gulf garrison to a point about four miles west of Port Gibson. Here they assumed positions blocking both the Bruinsburg and Rodney roads. The Confederates were scarcely in position when, at about midnight, the Union advance guard struck their picket line on the Rodney Road near the Shaifer farmhouse. Grant was unexpectedly marching at night. 16

The Confederate force resisted bitterly through the early morning hours and most of the following day, 1 May 1863, although outnumbered about three to one. Their defense was aided by an almost surreal landscape of narrow ridges running in all directions, deep ravines with almost sheer sides, and canebrakes and scrub timber so dense as to be virtually impassable. Still, the sheer weight of Union numbers at last forced the Confederates back across Bayou Pierre, leaving the Union in possession of the battlefield and the town of Port Gibson, MS.

As the Confederates retreated through Port Gibson, Bowen assumed that the Union army would continue its offensive by taking the direct road between Grand Gulf and Port Gibson. Having been belatedly augmented by troops from Vicksburg, Bowen concentrated his forces on the north bank of Bayou Pierre in a position blocking the main road. Unfortunately for Bowen, at this point Grant decided to maneuver to a crossing of the Little Bayou Pierre far to the Confederate left at Askamalla Ford, about three miles southeast of the town.

Grant opted for an encircling movement that avoided confrontation, but nevertheless forced the hasty evacuation of Grand Gulf. The offensive was directed first at Grindstone Ford, where a suspension bridge across Big Bayou Pierre was captured on the night of 2 May before it could be completely burned by the Confederates. On 3 May Grant's men fought their way toward the Big Black River and Hankinson's Ferry, the only practical crossing of that river, located on the direct road to Vicksburg. A desperate delaying action by Confederate forces at Kennison Creek, just south of Hankinson's Ferry, barely allowed the escape of the Grand Gulf forces, now under the command of MG William W. Loring. Loring's men retreated across a temporary floating bridge across the Big Black River at Hankinson's Ferry, but the Union advance captured the bridge before it could be chopped loose. One Union column promptly took possession of the bridge, while another marched a few miles eastward from Willow Springs and occupied Rocky Springs.

In the meantime, hearing the explosions of the powder magazines at Grand Gulf when the Confederates evacuated, Porter steamed up the Mississippi and occupied the town and fortress with his sailors. A few hours later on 3 May, Grant, accompanied only by a tiny cavalry detachment, rode into Grand Gulf from Willow Springs. At Grand Gulf he gathered his messages and thoughts, and converted the former Confederate bastion into a forward Union supply depot. This depot would greatly simplify the problem of supplying the Union army advancing into Mississippi.

As Grant made his plans at Grand Gulf, the Confederate forces began to regroup to the north of the Big Black River, the only water barrier remaining between the Union army and the Confederate defenders of Vicksburg. The Confederates now moved to occupy the Big Black Railroad Bridge, which anchored the eastern end 17 of a planned defensive system that ran from Warrenton, on the western flank, through Redbone Church on the Vicksburg-Hankinson’s Ferry road, Lanier's plantation on the Baldwin Ferry Road, and on to Big Black Bridge. While Loring moved to the northeast and the Big Black Bridge, MG Carter Stevenson's division, a major component of the Vicksburg garrison, moved south to occupy the western end of the defense line at Warrenton.

While the Confederates redeployed, Grant, located at Hankinson's Ferry on 5 April, considered his best course of action. To help him decide, he sent MG McPherson with a strong combat team up the main road toward Vicksburg. McPherson soon reported that the Confederates had dug in at Redbone Church, with indications of a prepared defensive position all the way to the Big Black Bridge, 15 miles to the northeast. McPherson also was careful to note that the same terrain that had been so troublesome at Port Gibson extended all the way to Vicksburg. At the same time, reports arrived from McClernand whose XIII Corps occupied Rocky Springs, MS, to the northeast of Hankinson’s Ferry. These reports clearly stated that “Port Gibson terrain” ended just east of Rocky Springs, giving way to open, rolling countryside suitable for the effective deployment of artillery, the Union’s strongest arm.

Indirect Approach (7 -11 May 1863) By 7 May 1863, Grant's decision had been made. He would change his axis of advance by moving northeast, instead of north, using the Big Black River to protect his left flank against interference from the Confederate army in Vicksburg. He would then move to the north towards Edwards, Midway Station, and Bolton to destroy the tracks of the Southern Railroad of Mississippi connecting Vicksburg to Jackson. By destroying the railroad, Grant would sever the railroad line that supplied the Vicksburg garrison. With the railroad destroyed, the Confederates might possibly abandon Vicksburg without a fight.

However, it was far more likely that Pemberton would choose to defend his vital railroad by fighting a battle somewhere south of Edwards. If Pemberton ventured across the Big Black River toward Edwards to counter Grant's movement, he could not possibly know the size of Union forces still in the Louisiana posts. Thus, he would be forced to leave substantial forces in Vicksburg to guard against a direct amphibious assault from Union forces possibly still in Louisiana. By forcing Pemberton to consider multiple threats, Grant was realizing the dream of every military commander, that is, to force the enemy to divide his forces on the eve of a major battle.

There was, however, one major complication that affected Grant's plan. The long and tenuous supply line connected the army with Milliken's Bend, the Union depot on the Louisiana shore of the Mississippi River above Vicksburg, to the new depot at Grand Gulf. This line was incapable of supplying all of the food required by the troops and horses. As a result, Grant was forced to divide his

18 army into three parallel columns of one corps each, with the men supplementing their rations with food foraged from the countryside along the route of march. Wagons loaded with basics and ammunition would follow the army from Grant's forward supply depot at Grand Gulf

As Grant had figured, Pemberton split his forces. Pemberton looked to the east from Vicksburg, and to counter Grant's strike toward the railroad, he shifted two of his five infantry divisions to the vicinity of Big Black Bridge, while leaving his two smallest divisions in Vicksburg to guard against the possibility of a Union amphibious assault from across the Mississippi. Under Pemberton's orders his remaining division, Bowen's newly designated division of trans-Mississippi troops, was moved east from Bovina and crossed the Big Black River to encamp about three miles south of Smith's farm on the road to Montgomery Bridge. Per the plan, Bowen then sent a strong Missouri regiment and a section of artillery to deploy along a ridge about two miles south of Edwards Station on the railroad, sealing off the Telegraph Road leading from Cayuga and Auburn to Edwards. Pemberton was planning on Grant's moving to the railroad on one single axis of advance; however, Grant had other ideas.

McPherson's two divisions of the XVII Corps marched via Reganton on the Port Gibson Raymond road, and then turned southeast on a road that led to Utica. From Utica McPherson was to march northeast to Raymond, MS. When McPherson arrived at Raymond, he was to turn northwest to Bolton, a stop on the Southern Railroad six miles east of Edwards.

McClernand's four divisions of the XIII Corps, half of the total available combat strength of the Federal army, were ordered to march directly for Edwards. Grant was positioning his army to conduct a coordinated, three-pronged attack on Pemberton's vital lifeline, the Southern Railroad of Mississippi.

Sherman's two divisions of the XV Corps marched via Auburn to Dillon's farm, where it was to turn north to the Southern Railroad between Edwards and Bolton at a point known as Midway Station. This movement would place Sherman's men in the center of the army, with McPherson three miles to the east at Bolton and McClernand three miles to the west at Edwards.

Raymond to Jackson (12 -14 May 1863) By midmorning of 12 May 1863, McClernand had forced a crossing at Whitaker's Ford on Fourteenmile Creek, five miles south of Edwards, and had encountered a Confederate skirmish line in advance of a battle line deployed on a ridge just over two miles south of Edwards near Mt. Moriah.

Sherman's corps, accompanied by Grant, reached Fourteenmile Creek late in the morning of 12 May at a point 6.5 miles southeast of McClernand while en route to Dillon's farm on the Port Gibson-Raymond Road. Here the advance elements of

19 Sherman's corps engaged in sharp skirmishing with Confederate cavalry, and by 1100 hours were across the creek en route to nearby Dillon's farm.

At 1000 hours on the morning of May 12 McPherson reached Fourteenmile Creek where it crossed the Raymond-Utica Road two miles southwest of Raymond. His advance was quickly brought to a halt by a Confederate skirmish line positioned in a belt of woods along the creek. The advancing Union soldiers also received fire from three pieces of Southern artillery located on a hilltop .5 mile north of the creek.

The Confederates were from BG John Gregg's brigade, which had traveled by Pemberton's order to Raymond from Port Hudson, LA, through Jackson, MS. Gregg's orders were to disrupt the movement of what Pemberton believed to be a force of no more than a brigade of Union troops guarding the right flank of the Grant's army. However, due to confusing orders from Pemberton, the cavalry that was to support Gregg rode from Jackson to Edwards, instead of to Raymond. With no cavalry to serve as his "eyes," Gregg misjudged the enemy strength and launched a vigorous attack on the Union force. This force consisted of two Federal infantry divisions-nearly three times Gregg's brigade strength.

As McPherson, posted on a ridge overlooking FourteenmiIe Creek, watched Gregg's attack, he was confused by the aggressive Confederate tactics, and reacted cautiously. He reasoned that a Confederate attack implied the presence of an enemy force at least as large as his own. To complicate matters, both commanders were nearly blinded by dense woodlands and extremely poor visibility due to heavy, almost motionless, dust and smoke. However, the vastly superior Union numbers eventually won the day, and late that afternoon the Confederates were driven from their position, withdrawing through Raymond toward Jackson.

McPherson immediately reported the engagement to Grant, who was encamped with Sherman and two divisions of the XV Corps at Dillon's farm, a little over 6.5 miles west of the Raymond battlefield. Grant's intelligence sources alerted him to the pending arrival of Confederate GEN Joseph E. Johnston in Jackson, 18.5 miles to the northeast, and the presence of enemy troops in Jackson seemed to be confirmed by the retreat of Gregg's forces toward that city. Grant was also well aware of Pemberton's build-up of troops near Mt. Moriah, 6 .5 miles to the northwest. He dared not continue his planned northward offensive against the railroad with Pemberton on his left flank and Johnston on his right.

Displaying remarkable flexibility, Grant immediately dispatched orders to McClernand, who had moved to contact with the Confederate defensive line at Mt. Moriah. McClernand was ordered to feign an attack north toward Edwards, then disengage and move three of his divisions to the southeast to Dillon's while sending his fourth division to Auburn to await the arrival of MG Frank Blair's

20 division of Sherman's XV Corps which was protecting the supply train arriving from Grand Gulf. McClernand was then to move east to Raymond to protect the rear of the army as it moved toward Jackson.

At the same time Grant ordered McPherson to march northeast from Raymond to Clinton, a town located on the railroad that connected Jackson and Vicksburg, and then due east to Jackson. While in Clinton, McPherson was to destroy the railroad and sever Pemberton's line of communications. Sherman was ordered to march from Dillon's through Raymond to Mississippi Springs, and to approach Jackson via the Raymond-Jackson road. His approach would coincide with McPherson's march to the capital city from Clinton. Orders were issued on the night of 12 May for movements early on 13 May, with an attack on Jackson on the 14th.

The Confederate forces in Jackson consisted of the equivalent of about two brigades, now commanded by GEN Joseph E. Johnston, the commander of the Department of the West. Johnston had been directed by President Jefferson Davis to assume personal command of the forces defending Vicksburg, and he arrived in Jackson on the afternoon of 13 May.

The complex Union movements were achieved with flawless precision on 13 May 1863. McPherson's XVII Corps arrived in Clinton, 7.5 miles northwest of Jackson, that afternoon, and late that night began destruction of the railroad there. Thus, Grant achieved his objective of cutting Pemberton's line of communication at Clinton, rather than at Edwards, Midway Station, and Bolton. Sherman arrived in Mississippi Springs, 6.5 miles west of Jackson, the same day. Both McPherson and Sherman were now poised for an attack on Jackson on 14 May, while McClernand, in and around Raymond, covered the rear of the army and guarded the critical trains arriving from the Federal supply base at Grand Gulf.

On the following day, 14 May, both McPherson's and Sherman's forces faced relatively feeble resistance as Johnston fought a delaying action while his men pulled out of the city. The Federals penetrated the defensive line and occupied Jackson, while Johnston's force withdrew in good order toward Canton, a substantial town on the railroad 23 miles to the northeast. Union forces systematically destroyed all of the railroad tracks and facilities in the vicinity of Jackson, as well as all of the Pearl River bridges, and burned all of the war- related manufacturing plants.

Jackson to Champion Hill (15 -16 May 1863) In the meantime, Pemberton had realized that the Federal army had turned toward Jackson, and that there was literally nothing he could do to save the city. He did, however, bring his divisions at Big Black Bridge eastward to Edwards, and there he and his officers made plans at a council of war on 14 May. The

21 scheme, which was put to a vote, was to seize the initiative by moving southeast to Dillon's farm, where scouts had reported a large Union supply train. Thus, Pemberton believed, he would be astride Grant's supply line to Grand Gulf, severing the Union line of communication. However, while Pemberton's council met, the vital supply trains were en route from Grand Gulf to Auburn, and during Pemberton's march the next day the vital Union trains moved into Raymond.

Pemberton began the movement on 15 May, anticipating an easy march of about 10 road miles. However, failure to ensure that the troops were supplied with rations for the march resulted in a five-hour delay on 15 May. When the troops finally marched out of Edwards at 1300 hours, the column was halted due to a washed-out bridge across flooded and un-fordable Baker's Creek, only 1.5 miles southeast of Edwards. This bridge had somehow escaped detection by Pemberton's scouts. Confusion at the washed-out bridge resulted in another delay and then a considerable detour, so that by nightfall the advance guard of the army had only reached Mrs. Ellison's house, 4.5 miles southeast of Edwards. The tail of the Confederate column was two miles north of Mrs. Ellison's, a few hundred yards west of a crossroads formed by the junction of the Jackson, Middle, and Ratliff roads, just under 0.5 mile south of the crest of Champion Hill.

During the same day, 13 May, the Union army had moved westward from Jackson and Raymond, while Sherman and two divisions remained in Jackson to complete the destruction of war industries in the town. By nightfall, two Union divisions under McClernand were camped just west of Raymond along the Raymond-Edwards Road. Two of McClernand’s other divisions camped along the Middle Road just west of the junction with the Raymond-Bolton Road. Three divisions, under the command of McPherson, were camped in the vicinity of Bolton along the Jackson Road, while Grant made his headquarters in Clinton.

Grant now had seven infantry divisions, on three axes of advance within easy supporting distance of one another, in position to move westward on 16 May. All three Union columns moved westward at first light on 16 May 1863. Less than two hours later the columns on the Raymond-Edwards and the Middle roads struck Confederate roadblocks, and halted. Further to the north on the Jackson Road, the column led by McPherson encountered the Confederate forces frantically deploying along the crest of Champion Hill. Grant, at McPherson's request, had ridden at first light from Clinton to join the young general's column.

Taken by surprise, the Confederates were unable to complete their deployment before the Union assault struck and enveloped both flanks. The Southern forces were driven, in near-rout, almost 0.5 mile south, back to the Jackson Road Ridge, where they lost the vital Crossroad on the Jackson and Middle roads to Union forces. Pemberton then withdrew Bowen's Trans-Mississippi division from its place in the center of the line, where it had thus far been idle, and launched it in a determined counterattack at the Union forces holding the vital Crossroad.

22 The Confederate counterattack quickly reoccupied the Crossroad, and swept northward along the Jackson Road, over the crest of Champion Hill, and down the north face almost to the Champion House near the base of the hill. Here the arrival of a fresh Union infantry division and a large concentration of artillery halted Bowen's determined counterattack.

The battered Union troops, which had been routed by Bowen's counter-offensive, rallied on the reinforcing Federal division, and rejoined the fight. Superior Union numbers quickly overcame the exhausted Confederates, who by this time were nearly out of ammunition. The attacking Federals rolled back over the crest of Champion Hill, and this time they occupied the entire length of the Jackson Road Ridge west of the Crossroad, to include the Crossroad. Pemberton, having no more effective reserves, withdrew the remnants of his army along a farm road that led to the site of the washed-out bridge across Baker's Creek on the Raymond-Edwards road. Pemberton's engineers had frantically prepared a replacement bridge during the battle, and the retreating troops raced over it as they crossed Baker's Creek.

They continued on through the early night hours through Edwards, and then westward to the fortified bridgehead that defended the railroad bridge over the Big Black River. Loring's division, serving as rear guard, began to receive long- range artillery fire from the north shortly after crossing Baker’s Creek. It came from a small Federal force that had crossed Baker’s Creek on the Jackson Road bridge, to the north. Due to this fire, Loring withdrew his advanced elements to the east bank of Baker’s Creek and moved his entire division southward and east of the creek, ostensibly in search of another crossing. The terrain where Jackson Creek joined Baker's Creek along the east bank of Baker's Creek south of the new bridge was so difficult that all wheeled vehicles of Loring's division, including twelve pieces of artillery, were abandoned. Rather than cross Baker's Creek and march west to rejoin Pemberton's army, Loring and the remnants of his division trudged south to Crystal Springs, a miserable 35 mile march. None of this activity was reported to Pemberton, who was impatiently awaiting his arrival in the bridgehead at Big Black Bridge. Loring and the remnants of his division (he lost more than half his men to straggling) eventually joined Johnston's forces, which had by that time reoccupied Jackson, 21 miles north of Crystal Springs.. There was no effective Union pursuit.

Big Black River Bridge to Vicksburg (17 -18 May 1863) After the defeat at Champion Hill, Pemberton and the bulk of the Confederate army passed through the defenses of Big Black Bridge in the night hours of 16 May. Pemberton mistakenly believed that Loring's rear guard division was following the rest of the army. To provide Loring time to reach the bridgehead, Pemberton ordered Bowen to man the works just to the east of the Big Black Bridge with his two brigades. Bowen was reinforced with a fresh brigade of East Tennessee troops that had arrived a few hours earlier.

23

Bowen's mission was to hold the eastern Big Black line until Loring's division passed through, after which Bowen was to withdraw to the high ground to the west of the Big Black River and prepare to temporarily hold the crossings. Bowen's 1,800 yard-long-line on the swampy eastern side consisted of breastworks, approximately 1,600 yards east of Big Black Bridge, extending from the Big Black River on the north to Gin Lake on the south.

Bowen's men remained alert through the night, anxiously awaited the arrival of Loring's missing division. Meanwhile the Union pursuit left Edwards during the predawn hours of 17 May, and reached the Confederate defense line before first light. The dense forest that fronted the Confederate breastworks less than 400 yards north of the Jackson Road caused the Federals to lose much time deploying for the attack. When they did attack in column formation from the woods and across an open stretch of field, the powerful thrust broke through the Confederate line north of the Jackson Road at the vulnerable seam where Bowen's Trans-Mississippi troops joined the East Tennessee brigade. Almost immediately, the entire line dissolved in a desperate race to escape across the river to the rear. Two avenues of escape across the river were in place for the Confederates: the railroad bridge, which was planked over so that it could be used by both infantry and wheeled vehicles, and a temporary floating bridge. This floating bridge was a little steamboat that was fortuitously exactly as long as the river was wide, and was turned sideways to replace the normal ferry at the highway crossing. In the race for safety on the western side of the Big Black River, eighteen pieces of Confederate artillery were abandoned, and 1,751 men were taken prisoner.

Before the battle, MAJ Samuel Lockett, the Confederate chief engineer officer, had soaked both bridges in turpentine for burning after they were no longer needed. Both were fired as the last of the Confederates passed to the west of the river. The burning bridges, complemented by a pair of Confederate 24-pounder siege guns emplaced on the bluff above the railroad bridge, as well as intense small-arms fire, persuaded the pursuing Federal forces not to attempt an immediate crossing of the Big Black River at that point.

Pemberton thought briefly of attempting to hold the line of the Big Black River, because it was the last remaining natural obstacle between the Union army and the defenses of Vicksburg. He abandoned the thought when he reflected that there were five readily available crossing points within a few miles both north and south of Big Black Bridge, but due to the fighting of the last two days, he had only three brigades fit for immediate action. Therefore, Pemberton and hi& staff rode immediately for Vicksburg to begin the work of organizing the city for defense against an assault that was certainly to come within hours.

24

Even before leaving Edwards early on the morning of 17 May, Grant had ordered bridges to be constructed on the Big Black River at three of the crossings upriver from Big Black Bridge. The crossing at Bridgeport Plantation, four miles northwest of Edwards, was facilitated by the arrival of the army's pontoon bridge train. The crossing at Bridgeport was completed by sunset on 17 May. By full dark, a division of Sherman's XV Corps had already crossed the pontoons and was in camp along the Bridgeport Road, three miles northwest of the river crossing. By dawn on 18 May, floating bridges were completed by McPherson's XVII Corps at Coaker's and Hooker's ferries, in the neighborhood of Amsterdam. Within the hour, his troops were pouring across to the west side. Even McClernand's XIII Corps completed a floating bridge just upstream of Big Black Bridge after Confederate small-arms fire ended about midnight. By dawn, the advance elements of his corps were on the Jackson Road marching for Vicksburg.

Inside Vicksburg, Pemberton set about the task of manning the formidable defenses of the city with MG Martin L. Smith's and MG John H. Forney's divisions. These two divisions, left behind in Vicksburg to protect the city from a possible amphibious attack, had not been touched by the disasters of the last few days. Pemberton also worked hard to restore the morale and organization of Stevenson's and Bowen's divisions, both of which had been shattered by the fights at Champion Hill and Big Black Bridge. The ensuing recovery was so rapid and effective that both divisions had occupied substantial portions of the line by dawn on 19 May.

As Pemberton worked to defend Vicksburg, Sherman's troops marched to Vicksburg on the Bridgeport Road, and closed around the Stockade Redan early on the afternoon of 18 May. McPherson's troops marched behind Sherman's on the Bridgeport Road, and formed on Sherman's left to extend the line to the south as far as the Great Redoubt, a Confederate fortification guarding the Jackson Road. McClernand's troops, which had marched more slowly due to fear of a Confederate ambush, stopped for the night near Beechwood, still about four miles east of the defense line.

Phase D: Assaults and Siege (19 May - 4 July 1863) (Sites not in this Guide)

As his army moved to surround the Vicksburg defenses, Grant believed that the morale of the Confederate defenders had been so shattered by their recent defeats that they would be unable to offer effective resistance. Partially influenced by his senior commanders, Grant decided to order an assault on the Vicksburg defenses to begin at 1400 hours on 19 May. If the attack were successful, an early conclusion to the campaign would have important military and political advantages. However, only Sherman's corps was actually in

25 position to launch an effective attack, so the assault on 19 May was confined largely to a determined assault on the Stockade Redan complex on the Graveyard Road in front of Sherman's corps sector. To the considerable surprise of the Union commanders, Confederate resistance to the converging attack was determined and effective. The assault failed, resulting in many hundreds of Union casualties.

Unable to accept the seemingly miraculous recovery of the Confederate forces from their five devastating defeats in a 17 -day span of time, the Union commanders concluded that the assault had failed because of inadequate preparations and the failure to attack on a broad front. Hoping to end the campaign before the heat of summer arrived, and to avoid the necessity for large-scale reinforcements which would be needed for a siege, Grant agreed to a second assault on 22 May.

The assault of 22 May was launched at 1000 hours with the entire Army of the Tennessee, supported by its artillery component, striking on a three-mile front extending from Square Fort in the south to the 26th Louisiana Redoubt in the north. This attack failed due to determined Confederate resistance and the failure of the Union commanders to achieve simultaneity in their attacks. The result was 3,199 Union casualties compared to an estimated 500 Confederate.

The Union high command now accepted the necessity of a siege, and for the next 41 days the Union siege lines grew tighter and tighter around the beleaguered city. Such total artillery domination was achieved by the Union that the Confederates could scarcely fire a gun in defense. Mines were constructed under major Confederate strong points, and were made ready for detonation on demand. Saps and parallels were driven so close to the Confederate lines that it was possible to lob a hand grenade from one entrenchment to the other. In addition, the Union brought large reinforcements down the Mississippi River to Vicksburg, so that by early July the Union force had grown to nearly 77,000 men.

Phase E: Surrender of Vicksburg and Port Hudson (4 - 9 July 1863) (Sites not in this Guide)

Within the city, Confederate food stocks were running very low, although by 3 July they were still adequate for at least another ten days. Casualty rates were very high; the men were exhausted from endless days in the trenches without relief; and perhaps most important of all, the defenders had given up hope that the Confederate government in Richmond would actually be able to mount an effective relief attempt. Thus, on 3 July, Pemberton offered to surrender the city if suitable terms could be arranged. After a brief round of negotiations, the city was surrendered on 4 July 1863.

26 Far down the Mississippi River, Confederate MG Franklin Gardner was still holding Port Hudson, the last Confederate bastion on the Mississippi River, against the besieging army of MG Nathaniel Banks. Unlike the Confederate situation at Vicksburg, Gardner's troops were actually on the verge of starvation. On 7 July, a letter from Grant arrived at Banks' headquarters announcing the surrender of Vicksburg. Banks promptly communicated it to Gardner, who immediately proposed surrender. On 9 July 1863, the Confederate garrison laid down its arms.

Phase F: The Confederate Army of Relief (19 Jun - 6 July 1863)

Gen. Joseph E. Johnston had been directed by President Jefferson Davis to proceed from his headquarters in Tullahoma, TN, to Mississippi to assume direct command of the forces defending Vicksburg. He arrived in Jackson on 13 May, just in time to be ejected by the Union offensive that resulted in the occupation of the city on 14 May. Johnston withdrew his little army to Canton, MS, and set about the assembly of an Army of Relief

The mission of the Army of Relief was to prevent Union capture of Vicksburg and the control of the Mississippi River. Unfortunately for Pemberton and the defenders of Vicksburg, Confederate manpower resources were very limited. As a result, Johnston at no time commanded a force of more than 31,000 men, far too few, in his view, to attempt the relief of the city. Furthermore, there were many distractions. Early on, the Union high command had realized that the bulk of the commissary supplies which supported Johnston's army at Canton came primarily from the Mississippi Delta, the vast and fertile region between the Mississippi and Yazoo rivers north of Vicksburg. Those supplies were brought in via a route that focused on the long railroad trestle at Ways Bluff, where the railroad crossed the Big Black River about 14 miles north of Canton. Low water in the Delta made it impractical to disrupt the supply system by penetrating the minor waterways with warships. It was, perhaps, inevitable that the Union would attempt to disrupt the vital Confederate supply line that ran from Yazoo City to Vaughan and Ways Bluff to Canton by launching expeditions up the Mechanicsburg Corridor. This corridor is the region that runs northeast of Vicksburg between the Yazoo River and the Big Black River, and then turns eastward toward the Mississippi Central Railroad Bridge at Ways Bluff. The Union thrusts all failed, but the efforts to counter them diverted Johnston from his primary mission of relieving Vicksburg.

About mid-June, the Union high command gave up all hope of interfering with Johnston's supply system, and concentrated, instead, on the fabrication of an impenetrable defense against a Confederate attempt to raise the siege. An enormous line of earthwork fortifications, similar to those the Confederates had erected around Vicksburg, was raised running eastward from Snyder's Bluff to the Benton Road, and then southward to below Tiffentown. Those fortifications

27 blocked every road that led from the north to Vicksburg down the Mechanicsburg Corridor, as well as the crossings of the Big Black River to Vicksburg. Sherman believed that they were stronger than Vicksburg itself. Grant then directed Sherman to assemble an Army of Maneuver at least as strong is Johnston's Army of Relief. Sherman, sheltered behind his formidable line of defenses, vigorously set about his task. By the time of the surrender, Sherman's force consisted of about 34,000 veteran troops. Furthermore, Sherman had been granted the authority to draw additional divisions from the siege army if appropriate.

While Sherman was preparing his defenses against a possible Confederate attack, the Confederate government in Richmond was urging Johnston to make some effort – any effort – to relieve Vicksburg. On the morning of 1 July 1863, the Army of Relief began moving from Canton and Jackson toward the Big Black River. Johnston held a council of war on 3 July at his Carney Creek command post not far from Brownsville, MS, with the council concluding that knowledge of the terrain to the west of the Big Black River was inadequate to formulate a plan for an offensive. The next day the troops noted that the roar of artillery from the direction of Vicksburg had ceased. The ominous silence told all of the soldiers that Vicksburg had surrendered. Johnston immediately began formulating plans for withdrawing to Jackson.

At about the same time, Grant sent a two-word message over the field telegraph that linked all of the Union corps headquarters: "Go in." Sherman immediately began pulling all of his scattered divisions out of their defensive positions, and began assembling them into an army of maneuver. On the afternoon of 4 July they moved toward the Big Black River and on 5 July secured the crossings. Early on 6 July, three powerful columns struck across the Big Black River. One crossed at Birdsong's Ferry, another at Messenger's Ferry, and a third at Big Black Bridge. There was no opposition. Within days Sherman's army was investing the western approaches to Jackson, and on 16 July, Johnston evacuated the city and moved east toward Meridian. The next day, 17 July, Sherman's Army of Maneuver again occupied the city, and this time the destruction was total. Everything that could be of any possible value to the Confederacy was destroyed.

On 16 July, the packet Imperial out of St. Louis tied up at New Orleans. She had not been fired upon by Confederate guns during the two thousand mile trek down the Mississippi. In Washington, Abraham Lincoln, in near exaltation, wrote to a friend: "The Father of Waters goes again unvexed to the sea."

28 Phase G: The Confederate Counteroffensives in Louisiana (20 May - 5 July 1863)

During the spring of 1863, Pemberton, as well as the Confederate government in Richmond, had on several occasions urged LTG Edmund K. Smith, commander of the Department of the Trans-Mississippi, to intercede on behalf of the defending Confederate forces at Vicksburg. While sympathetic to Pemberton's plight, Smith felt unable to comply because his very limited force was completely occupied in an effort to defend southern Louisiana against MG Banks' much larger force. Banks' men had occupied Alexandria, LA, on 6 May 1863. Although Banks withdrew his forces in Alexandria on 17 May, in order to renew his efforts to reduce Port Hudson, Smith was unable to reoccupy the town until 27 May. With the threat to southern Louisiana removed, Smith at last felt free to attempt an offensive in aid of Vicksburg. However, the only troops Smith had available were MG John D. Walker’s division of about 5,000 men, which had recently arrived from Arkansas.

On 20 May, Smith directed his senior field commander, MG Richard Taylor, to take Walker's division by steamboat up the Tensas River and seize the Union post at Mrs. Perkins' Louisiana plantation on the Mississippi River about 11 miles northwest of Grand Gulf. Smith's intelligence sources insisted that this plantation was a major supply base for the Union army operating across the river in Mississippi. The expedition reached Mrs. Perkins's plantation on 31 May, only to discover that the Union camp was empty except for a single regiment. This regiment luckily managed to be rescued in the nick of time by a Union transport and ironclad. The only useful thing the Confederates obtained was information that Vicksburg was already under siege, and that the Union depots at Young's Point, Milliken's Bend, and Lake Providence were bursting with supplies and were guarded by token garrisons.

Taylor moved Walker's division first to Delhi, and then to Richmond, LA. From Richmond he proposed to attack the three Union supply depots along the Mississippi River. Late on the afternoon of 6 June, Taylor sent BG James Hawes' brigade to attack Young's Point; BG Henry McCulloch's brigade to attack Milliken's Bend; and kept one brigade in reserve. Hawes found Young's Point heavily defended by veteran infantry, and returned to Richmond without firing a shot. McCulloch found Milliken's Bend defended by newly enlisted and poorly trained black troops. He attacked and briefly occupied the camp on 7 June, but was eventually driven off by continued resistance from rallying black troops and a single veteran regiment, supported by the fire of the heavy guns of ironclad Choctaw and later by the timberclad Lexington. The troops at Lake Providence easily beat off an attack by Confederate cavalry.

Walker's TX division, much weakened by malaria and dysentery, remained at Richmond until 15 June. On that day they were evicted after a sharp skirmish

29 with Union BG Joseph A. Mower's "Eagle Brigade," supported by the cavalry of BG Alfred Ellet's Mississippi Marine Brigade. Walker withdrew to Delhi, LA. Several attempts by Walker's division to install a battery of light field artillery on the Mississippi River below Lake Providence were easily frustrated by Union forces.

While events opposite Vicksburg were unfolding, Kirby Smith also agreed to attempt the occupation of Helena, AR, a strongly defended Union fortress on the west bank of the Mississippi River, 60 water miles southwest of Memphis. Smith hoped to interdict the Union supply line with heavy artillery. LTG Theophilus Holmes began to move his forces of about 8,000 men from bases in central Arkansas toward Helena on 16 June. However, the flooded and nearly impassable roads across the Grand Prairie hampered Holmes' advance. Consequently, Holmes did not reach the vicinity of Helena until 3 July. Holmes' attack on 4 July encountered an unfamiliar defensive arrangement consisting of very broad belts of almost impenetrable abatis, or obstacles, made of felled timber. These obstacles were defended by mutually supporting artillery positions, which were further supported by heavy naval artillery from timberclad Tyler lying off the town. The poorly coordinated attack failed, with heavy Confederate casualties, and the last Confederate effort to come to the aid of beleaguered Vicksburg was over.

30 PART 3

Driving Tour of the Final Offensive of the Vicksburg Campaign 24 December 1862 - 6 July 1863

Campaign Phase Sites on this Driving Tour A. The Chickasaw Bayou Expedition (24 Dec 62 - 4 Jan 63) B. The Winter of Great Hardships (24 Jan – 30 Apr 1863) C. The Campaign into the Interior of Mississippi (1 May - 18 May 63) F. The Confederate Army of Relief (19 May - 6 Jul 63) G. The Confederate Counteroffensives in Louisiana (30 May - 6 Jul 63)

Navigation References to be used as orientation aids (All road names are modern) Mississippi Navigation References Bolton: Junction of W. Madison Street (Old US-80) and Bolton-Brownsville Rd. GPS: N32° 20.943', W90° 27.546' Bovina: At intersection of Warrior’s Trail and Bovina Dr. GPS: N32° 20.967', W90° 44.102' Brownsville: At junction of MS-22 and Bolton-Brownsville Road. GPS: N32° 26.956', W90° 26.237' Canton: Junction of MS-22 and US-51 at Courthouse Square. GPS: N32° 36.777', W90° 02.078' Culkin Road overpass over US-61N, 1.5 mi. north of I-20 Exit 5. GPS: N32° 22.188', W90° 42.661 Edwards Station: At the railroad crossing on Mt. Moriah Road 0.2 mi. west of the Old Edwards Water Tower (GPS: N32° 19.582', W90° 420.364') at the junction of US-80 and MS-467. Flora: GPS: N32° 32.558', W90° 18.775'. Junction of Old US-49 and MS-22. Grand Gulf: From Claiborne County Courthouse in Port Gibson, proceed northwest on Anthony Street and across Bayou Pierre (river) for 3.1 mi.; turn left on MS-462 (Main Grand Gulf Road) for 4.1 mi., past entrance to Grand Gulf Park to junction with Back Grand Gulf Road in old Grand Gulf square. GPS: N32° 2.00', W91° 3.18' MS-27 Bridge: Across Big Black River, 10 mi. southeast of I-20 Exit 5. GPS: N32° 90.31', W90° 46.19' Port Gibson: In front of Claiborne County Courthouse. GPS: N32° 56.440', W91° 07.789' Raymond: Junction of MS-487 and Port Gibson St. in Town Square: GPS: N32° 15.550', W90° 250.384' Redbone Road: Junction of US-61S and Redbone Road 60.2 mi. south of junction of I-20 and US-61S. GPS: N32° 14.10', W90° 55.46'

31 Reganton (historic “Crossroads”): Junction of Fisher Ferry Road and Old Port Gibson Road, 16 airline mi. southwest of Vicksburg City Center. GPS: N32° 8.53', W90° 44.91' Satartia: Near east end of Yazoo River Bridge. GPS: N32° 400.306', W90° 32.862' Signal: Junction of US-61 BUS and Chickasaw Road (2.4 mi. north of junction of Washington and Clay Streets, Vicksburg). GPS: N32° 24.405', W90° 50.787' Vicksburg: Downtown Vicksburg, MS, at intersection of Clay St. and Washington St. (US-61 BUS). GPS: N32° 21.01', W90° 52.93' Willows: On MS-462 4.5 mi. west of US-61S. GPS: N32° 02.189', W90° 53.761'

Louisiana Navigation References Delhi: Junction of LA-17 and US-80. GPS: N32° 27.43', W91° 29.55' I-20 Exit 186: Two mi. west of Delta, LA. GPS: N32° 190.23', W90° 57.70' Lake Providence: Junction of US-65 and LA-596. GPS: N32° 480.334', W 91° 100.310' Mound: Junction of US-80 and LA-602 (0.5 mi. north of I-20 Exit 182). GPS: N32° 21.000', W91° 00.982' Mrs. Perkins’: 0.2 mi. north of junction of Levee Road and Gatewood Road. GPS: N32° 9.19', W91° 10.76' Newellton: Junction of LA-605 and LA-4. GPS: N32° 4.46', W91° 14.08' Oak Grove: Junction of LA-17 and LA 2. GPS: N32° 51.65', W91° 23.40' Pointe Clear Junction: Junction of LA-603 and Levee Road. GPS: N32° 140.387', W91° 070.310' Quimby junction: Junction of LA-603 and US-65 (6 mi. west of Pointe Clear Junction). GPS: N32° 14.13', W91° 12.98' Tallulah: Junction of US-80 and US-65, GPS: N32° 24.509', W91° 11.186'

Phase A: The Chickasaw Bayou Expedition

Site 1: Black’s plantation (Black’s Sawmill): GPS: N32° 26.562', W90° 54.905' From Vicksburg, proceed north on Washington St. (US-61 BUS) for 4.8 mi. to Signal (intersection US-61 BUS and Chickasaw Rd.). From Signal, turn left (northwest) and proceed on Chickasaw Rd. (historic Mrs. Lake’s Road) for 5.8 mi. [A] 26 Dec 1862. MG William T. Sherman, leading a convoy of transports carrying about 30,000 Union troops escorted by a squadron of gunboats commanded by RADM David D. Porter reached this point and began landing the troops along a three-mile stretch of the south bank of the Yazoo River, starting at the mouth of Old River. Large camps and supply depots were quickly established as troops began to push inland in preparation for an assault on Confederate positions along the base of Drumgould’s Bluff, nearly 5 miles to the southeast.

32 [A] 30 Dec 1862. Union troops re-board the transports following the defeat at Chickasaw Bayou on 29 Dec 1862 and withdraw to the Mississippi River. [B] [NavOp] 29 Apr 63. MG Sherman, accompanied by a fleet of 10 transports loaded with 10 INF regiments from MG Frank Blair’s DIV (Sherman’s XV Corps) and LCDR K. Randolph Breese’s SQDN (giant new ironclad Choctaw, newly arrived from Memphis, ironclad De Kalb, timberclad Tyler, tinclads Black Hawk, Signal, Romeo, Linden, and Petrel, and three tugs each towing a XIII-inch mortar scow), arrived in the Yazoo River. The mission of the expedition, which was made at Grant’s suggestion, was to feign an attack (a demonstration) from the Yazoo River on the Snyder’s Bluff and/or the Chickasaw Bayou areas, thus diverting Confederate attention away from the main army, which was preparing to land at Grand Gulf (Site 47). [B] [NavOp] 29 Apr 63. Tinclad Petrel was anchored in the mouth of Old River, just west of Black’s plantation, to prevent the Confederates from mining the Yazoo behind the fleet. After losing ironclad Cairo to a “torpedo” the previous year (Site 5), the Navy was understandably nervous about the “infernal machines.”

Site 2. Johnson’s plantation. GPS: N32° 26.723', W90° 53.582' From Site 1 turn around and proceed back (east) on Chickasaw Road (historic Mrs. Lake’s Road) for 1.3 mi. [A] [NavOp] 23 Dec 62. The plantation buildings were burned during Union naval operations in preparation for the impending landing of Sherman’s Chickasaw Bayou Expeditionary Force. [A] 26 Dec 62. 1000. Sherman’s Expeditionary Force (about 30,000 men) began landing the four divisions (Morgan’s, Steele’s, M. L. Smith’s, and A. J. Smith’s) along the Yazoo River bank between the mouth of Boat Slough (1.4 mi. upstream) and Black’s sawmill. By nightfall supply depots and camps had been established, and Union skirmish lines had encountered Confederate resistance about 2 miles southward toward the base of Drumgould’s Bluff (visible to the southeast). However, scouts reported the presence of deep and steep-banked Chickasaw Bayou between the Union and main Confederate forces. [A] 27-28 Dec 62. Union BG George Morgan’s DIV pushed southward against spirited Confederate resistance, and by nightfall of 28 Dec 62 the Confederates had withdrawn across Chickasaw Bayou. At the same time BG M.L. Smith’s DIV, followed by BG A. J. Smith’s DIV, advanced in parallel along the Long Lake Road (Vicksburg Road), but were stopped by fire from Confederate fortifications east of Chickasaw Bayou, which at this point was easily fordable but with very steep and high banks. Now able to examine the whole length of Chickasaw Bayou firsthand, Sherman realized that the only crossing was on Chickasaw Road (historic Mrs. Lake’s Road), and it was a corduroyed ford.

33 [B] 13 Mar 63. Morning. Union RADM Porter arrived here to perform reconnaissance of Steele’s Bayou to see if it provided a practicable route to the Yazoo River above the Hayne’s Bluff fortifications. Porter then ascended Steele’s Bayou in a tug (Steele’s Bayou Sites are 11-25). [B] 29 Apr 63. Sherman’s entire flotilla (8 gunboats, 10 troop-laden transports, and miscellaneous smaller vessels) passed the ruins of Johnson’s plantation en route to the mouth of Chickasaw Bayou (2.6 mi. upstream). [C] [NavOp] 18 May 63. Union RADM Porter, in his flagship Black Hawk anchored off the mouth of the Yazoo River, learned (apparently from agents in Mississippi) that Pemberton’s Confederate army had been defeated, and that MG Grant’s Union army was pursuing the Confederates into Vicksburg. Anticipating that the Union forces would be in great need of supplies, he immediately ordered that a supply depot be established at Johnson’s plantation on the Yazoo River, and secured the site with sailors from his fleet. [C] 19 May 63. A cavalry patrol from Sherman’s XV Corps, sent out from a point near the Stockade Redan to locate a suitable site for a supply depot on the Yazoo River, arrived at Johnson’s plantation, only to find a depot already established by RADM Porter. Grant’s army had abandoned its Grand Gulf supply line on 15 May and had marched west from Jackson and Raymond toward Vicksburg, and reached Vicksburg on 18 May. Thus, the army was in need of supplies and the Johnson’s plantation depot became the primary depot for the supply of the army besieging Vicksburg. [C] 21-22 May 63. Grant’s engineers constructed two roads inland from Johnson’s plantation. On 21 May one went from here and crossed Chickasaw Bayou on a pontoon bridge to the Thompson Lake Road, then inland. On 22 May a second road was opened that went from here to Chickasaw Bayou, then followed the Chickasaw Bayou Road inland.

Site 3. Mouth of Chickasaw Bayou. GPS: N32° 25.707', W90° 51.536' From Site 2 proceed straight (east) on Chickasaw Road (historic Mrs. Lake’s Road) for 2.6 mi. The actual site (N32°E 26.562', N 90°E 51.481') is 1 mi. airline north; on private property. [A] 27 Dec 62. Morning. To open an option other than that of forcing a crossing of Chickasaw Bayou, Sherman sent two brigades of Steele’s DIV (Thayer’s and Hovey’s) by steamboat to the mouth of a stream which the available maps identified as Chickasaw Bayou, but which was actually the mouth of Thompson Lake, roughly parallel to, but about a mile east of, Chickasaw Bayou. Steele’s advance southward found itself confined to a single track atop narrow Blake’s Levee, with Thompson’s Lake on the west and a swamp on the east, and Confederate fortifications preventing access to the Valley Road at the base of the bluffs. Unable to deploy to make use of their superior numbers, Steele’s two brigades could not launch an effective attack, and were withdrawn and transferred the following morning to a position behind A. J. Smith’s DIV, which was advancing toward Chickasaw Bayou.

34 [B] 29 Apr 63. Sherman’s convoy arrived in the afternoon, and 57 OH INF immediately landed to provide security for the fleet during the night. The next morning at 0900, 30 April, the entire fleet cast off and moved farther upstream to very near Blake’s lower plantation. After making a demonstration toward Drumgould’s Bluff, the Union force was withdrawn from the Yazoo River on 1 May and returned to Young’s Point. [C] 21 May 63. CPT William Jenney, chief engineer of Sherman’s XV Corps, was tasked to build a road to transport supplies from Johnson’s plantation (Site 2) to the rear of the army. CPT Herman Klosterman, with the 83 IN INF, built a pontoon bridge across Chickasaw Bayou to the Blake’s Levee Road (modern Thompson Lake Road), and the road was open by 1100. That afternoon, as Grant rode along his lines, the cry of “Hardtack!” was heard. Grant assured his men that rations were on the way, and that night the men were issued coffee and hardtack. [C] 22 May 63. MAJ William Tweeddale, with three COs of Bissell’s EN RGT of the West, constructed and opened a second supply road from Johnson’s to the Chickasaw Bayou Road, then to the rear of the army.

Site 4. Anthony’s Ferry. GPS: N32° 29.194', W90° 48.414' From Site 3 continue straight (east) for 1.9 mi. to Signal, turn left (north) and proceed on US-61 BUS for 2 mi. to US-61. Turn left (north) on US-61 for 4.1 mi. Actual site was on the Yazoo River 0.6 mi. downstream from modern US-61 bridge (GPS: N32° 290.246', W90° 49.003'.) [A] Early 1862. The Confederates had constructed a raft barrier across the Yazoo River about 2 miles upstream from this point, to prevent Union naval incursions up the Yazoo River. The raft was covered by heavy guns mounted in batteries near the base of Snyder’s Bluff, immediately to the east (Site 7). [A] 30 Dec 62. Following the defeat at Chickasaw Bayou on 29 Dec 62 (Sites 7, 8, 9) Sherman sought for another way to seize the Valley Road and decided upon a night attack on the Snyder’s Bluff batteries with a force of about 6,000 infantrymen from Steele’s and M. L. Smith’s DIVs landing along the Yazoo River just below Anthony’s Ferry. Assault forces were withdrawn from the Chickasaw Bayou line after nightfall on 30 Dec and loaded on transports near the mouth of Chickasaw Bayou. At midnight a dense fog preventing the ships from moving upriver, and the attack was reluctantly cancelled. [B] [NavOp] 1 May 63. After Sherman’s demonstration (while Grant crossed the Mississippi River at Bruinsburg) was completed, CDR Breese, in Black Hawk, covered the withdrawal of the INF from the Yazoo River. With Sherman aboard, Black Hawk left the mouth of Chickasaw Bayou and moved upstream with the heavy boats of the squadron, leaving tinclads Romeo and Signal at the mouth of Chickasaw Bayou. The transports tied up near Blake’s lower plantation, about 2 miles upstream from the mouth of Chickasaw Bayou. The big gunboats Choctaw and Baron de Kalb continued upstream to near Anthony’s Ferry and opened fire on Drumgould’s Bluff, only a mile to the east. Tyler and Black Hawk joined from slightly downstream, and three 13-in. mortar boats joined in the bombardment.

35 The mortars were covered by tinclad Linden, anchored 1.5 mi. downstream from Anthony’s Ferry. The Confederate guns in the face of Snyder’s Bluff immediately replied, concentrating on Choctaw and Baron de Kalb. Even though the Confederate barrier raft, which had once blocked the stream, had been carried away by the spring flood, Breese made no effort to pass the batteries. The Confederate guns were silenced by early afternoon, after which the Union gunboats slowly withdrew to Blake’s lower plantation. They had sustained only minor damage, and no casualties.

Site 5. Sinking of ironclad Cairo. GPS: N32° 26.785', W90° 51.191' From Site 4 turn around and proceed back (south) for 4.1 mi. on US-61 to US-61 BUS. Turn right (southwest) onto US-61 BUS and proceed 1.1 to Thompson Lake Road. Turn right (northwest) onto Thompson Lake Road and proceed for 3.5 mi. The road is unpaved and should be avoided in wet weather. Actual site is on private property 1.4 mi. airline northeast at GPS: N32° 21.616', W90° 58.596'. [NavOp] Jul-Dec 62. A detachment of the Union Mississippi SQDN commanded by CPT Walke had been operating from an anchorage off the mouth of the Yazoo River since 1 Jul 1862. One of its missions was to maintain free navigation of the Yazoo River as far upstream as the Confederate fortifications at Snyder’s Bluff, where the Confederates had obstructed the channel with a barrier raft. In early December 1862, Walke learned that the Confederates were placing “torpedoes” (which are now called mines) in the Yazoo River to prevent Union use of that river. RADM Porter, who was at Cairo, IL, and who had just assumed command of the Mississippi SQDN from FO Davis, ordered Walke to remove the “infernal devices” from the Yazoo. [NavOp] 12 Dec 62. Walke sent LCDR Thomas Selfridge up the Yazoo with ironclads Cairo and Pittsburg, tinclads Signal and Marmora, and armed ram Queen of the West, to remove the mines as far upstream as the limit of effective range of the Confederate heavy guns in the fortifications at Snyder’s Bluff. The mines could be removed by finding the wooden floats from which they were suspended; then a crew in a small boat would pull them from the water. About 1.8 miles above the mouth of Chickasaw Bayou, the deactivation crews were fired upon by Confederates hidden in the scrub along the banks. Selfridge took Cairo into the lead to suppress the fire, but in doing so exposed his vessel to two Confederate “torpedoes.” One exploded under her port bow, and another near her starboard bow. Cairo’s pilot steered her bow into a steep bank, enabling the crew to jump ashore, then the vessel slowly slid backwards into deep water and sank. The entire episode lasted only 12 minutes, and without loss of life. The Union sailors removed Cairo’s tall stacks and masts to conceal her position from the Confederates, and there she remained hidden in the muddy Yazoo River waters until she was found by a team of three men: Edwin C. Bearss, Warren E. Grabau, and Don Jacks, in 1956. Much of her structure and many of the artifacts aboard were recovered and are on exhibit at the Cairo Museum, Vicksburg

36 National Military Park. Note: Site 6. Blake’s Lower Plantation is also at this location.

Site 6. Blake’s Lower Plantation. GPS: N32° 26.785', W90° 51.191' View from Site 5. Actual location of Blake’s Lower Plantation is 1.7 mi. airline northeast, at GPS: N32° 27.995', W90° 50.064. [B] 30 Apr 63. Sherman’s INF landed at Blake’s lower plantation and began to push inland along the road on top of the artificial levee which ran across the flooded fields from near Blake’s lower plantation house to Blakely Plantation, at the base of the bluffs, about 1 mile to the east. However, light resistance from 3 LA INF plus artillery fire from the Confederate fortifications at Snyder’s Bluff halted the advance well before the Union INF reached the bluffs. [B] 30 Apr 63. Ironclad Baron de Kalb steamed up-river and quickly silenced the troublesome Confederate battery, whereupon the Union INF withdrew to the Yazoo and re-boarded the transports. [B] 1 May 63. Sherman landed 6 MO INF on the west bank to explore the riverbank as far as the site of the barrier raft, but they were turned back before reaching Anthony’s Ferry by a break in the natural levee, as well as by fire from the Snyder’s Bluff batteries. Two Union regiments were also put ashore at Blake’s lower plantation to investigate all possible routes to the bluffs, but flood waters had closed all the roads and tracks. [B] 1 May 63. Sherman received an order from Grant, at Disharoon plantation (Site 42), to move two of his three DIVs southward toward Hard Times, thus signaling that the demonstration at Drumgould’s Bluff was no longer necessary. Sherman immediately re-embarked his men for a return to Young’s Point. Primarily to cover the withdrawal, Sherman asked CDR Breese to move upstream with his ironclads and shell the Confederate batteries at Drumgould’s Bluff (Site 4).

Site 7. Corduroy Bridge. GPS: N32° 24.484', W90° 50.852' From Sites 5, 6 turn around proceed back (southeast) for 3.5 mi. to US-61 BUS, turn right (south) for 0.6 mi. and return to Signal at intersection of US-61 BUS and Chickasaw Rd. From Signal, turn right (west) and proceed 0.1 mi. on Chickasaw Road (historic Mrs Lake’s Road). The Corduroy Bridge, which was no more than an improved ford across a reach of Chickasaw Bayou otherwise too deep to ford, was located about 75 yards north of the modern culvert where Chickasaw Road crosses the former bed of the bayou (GPS: N32° 24.520', W90° 50.676') [A] 29 Dec 62. The Union assault across the Corduroy Bridge on Chickasaw Road (historic Mrs. Lake’s Road) was the northern-most of a coordinated three- prong attack (Sites 8, 9). Scheduled for early morning, many problems delayed the attack until about noon. It was led by COL John DeCourcy’s BDE (BG George Morgan’s DIV). The men were forced to break ranks, wade across Chickasaw Bayou on the Corduroy Bridge at a place where the banks were 10 to 15 ft high and very steep. Once across, they then had to reform their battle line

37 on the east bank, all in the face of withering rifle and artillery fire from Confederate rifle pits manned by COL William Withers’ BDE (BG Stephen D. Lee’s DIV). Unable to reach the Confederate positions, the Union forces soon broke and fell back, and by mid-afternoon the entire force had withdrawn to the west bank of Chickasaw Bayou.

Site 8. Patterson’s Bridge. GPS: N32° 24.280', W90° 51.100'. From Site 7 turn around and return (east) to Signal at intersection of US-61 BUS and Chickasaw Rd. From Signal, turn right (south) onto US-61 BUS and proceed for 0.4 mi. The actual site (N32°E 24.429', W90°E 51.025') is about 250 yds. west. It is on private property and is not accessible. [A] 27 Dec 62. Sherman, now aware that the maps available to him were wildly misleading, realized that they had led him to march his forces into a cul-de- sac formed by Chickasaw Bayou and McNutt Lake, neither of which was crossed by a bridge. Only one other road, the Vicksburg Road, actually crossed Chickasaw Bayou, and the crossing consisted only of an unimproved ford. The road then climbed the eastern bank, which was 15 feet high and nearly vertical, by a track too narrow to permit passage of artillery or military wagons. To provide an attack on a broader front, the Union commanders decided to have CPT W. Patterson’s KY CO of Pioneers and Mechanics secretly build a third crossing during the night, about midway between Mrs. Lake’s Road and the Vicksburg Road. Patterson’s Bridge was to cross an unfordable reach of Chickasaw Bayou, 80 ft. across and about 700 yds. south of the Corduroy Bridge. [A] 29 Dec 62. Deep mud and flooded fields, plus bitter Confederate resistance, had delayed the arrival of the pontoon train until late on the night of 28 Dec 62, making it impossible to complete the bridge by dawn of 29 Dec. The stringers of the pontoon bridge were left behind during the hasty embarkation at Memphis and had to be fabricated from trees. First light revealed the new bridge to Confederate COL William Withers’ BDE (BG Stephen D. Lee’s provisional DIV), thus ending all hope of a surprise assault. [A] 29 Dec 62. The middle column of the three-prong Union assault (Sites 7, 9) began at about noon, led by BG John Thayer’s BDE (BG Frederick Steele’s DIV). The troops crossed Patterson’s Bridge in column of fours, deployed quickly into battle line, and assaulted the Confederate rifle pits in front of the Valley Road. Withering Confederate fire from 42 GA INF and 29 LA INF quickly forced them back to the bank of the bayou. A mistake in the transmission of orders had moved Thayer’s supporting troops to a different part of the battlefield, so Thayer’s line was forced back across Chickasaw Bayou, with many casualties. Confederate BG Lee followed the Union withdrawal with 17 LA INF and 26 LA INF, capturing 311 men, 21 officers, and 500 rifles.

Site 9. The Indian Mound. GPS: N32° 24.092', W90° 51.115'. From Site 8 proceed straight (south) on US-61 BUS for 0.9 mi. The actual site (N32°E 240.198', W90°E 51.197') is about 300 yards to the northwest, but is

38 on private property. The Vicksburg Road was often called the Indian Mound Road because it crossed Chickasaw Bayou just north of a small Indian mound on the southeast bank. The road no longer exists, but in 1862 it joined the US-61 BUS (historic Valley Road) at about this point. [A] 29 Dec 1862. The Union assault at the Indian Mound was the southernmost column of a coordinated three-pronged assault (Sites 7, 8). At this point Chickasaw Bayou was readily fordable, but the banks were very steep and high. The assault was led by BG Frank Blair’s BDE (Steele’s DIV). The soldiers managed to scale the near-vertical banks of the bayou, and a very few of them actually penetrated the Confederate works and reach the Valley Road, but not in sufficient numbers to hold it against Confederate counterattacks. Blair was eventually forced to withdraw to the west bank of the bayou.

Total Confederate casualties for the Battle of Chickasaw Bayou were 57 killed, 120 wounded, 10 missing. Union casualties were 208 killed, 1,005 wounded, 563 missing.

Site 10. Snyder’s Bluff Battery. GPS: N32° 29.503', W90° 48.035'. From Site 9 turn around and return (north) for 1.3 mi. to Signal at intersection of US-61 BUS and Chickasaw Rd. From Signal, continue straight (northeast) on US-61 BUS for 2 mi. to junction of US-61 BUS and US-61N; turn left (north) on US-61N for 3.8 mi. to junction of US-61 and MS-3; continue on MS-3 (historic Valley Road) for 0.1 mi. Actual location (N32E 29.544', W90E 48.035') is at base of bluff 0.5 mi. north. It is on private property and not accessible to vehicles. [A] The Confederates had constructed an earthwork fortification mounting two heavy guns at this site. The fort was built into the base of the bluff in such position as to cover a heavy raft constructed of large timbers bound together and held in place by heavy chains, to prevent Union vessels from penetrating up the Yazoo River. [B] [NavOp] 30 Apr - 1 May 63. 1000. Union Commander Breese, with the ironclads Choctaw and Baron de Kalb, tinclad Black Hawk, and wooden gunboat Tyler anchored just downstream from Anthony’s Ferry (Site 4) and opened fire. The bombardment continued until 1400, after which the Union vessels withdrew down river. Damage from the bombardment was slight. About an hour later Union infantry began advancing along a small levee leading from the Yazoo River to the bluffs, and the Confederate guns at Snyder’s Bluff opened fire on them at long range, bringing the advance to a stop. However, almost immediately the Union ironclad Baron de Kalb steamed back upstream and again opened fire, whereupon the Confederate guns ceased firing. Baron de Kalb remained in position until the following morning. [B] [NavOp] 1 May 63. Baron de Kalb was joined by ironclad Choctaw, and gunboats Tyler and Black Hawk. The combined squadron opened an intense bombardment that silenced the Confederate batteries by about 1700. The Union fleet then withdrew from the Yazoo River and returned to Young’s Point.

39 Note: This concludes the tour of Phase A—The Chickasaw Bayou Expedition. Turn around and proceed south for 0.1 mi. to junction of US-61 and MS-3; turn onto US-61S; continue south on US-61 for 3.8 mi. to US-61 BUS; turn right (southwest) onto US-61 BUS. Proceed 6.8 mi. to Vicksburg at intersection of Washington and Clay Sts.

Phase B: The Winter of Great Hardships

Steele’s Bayou Expedition

Note: Prior to proceeding on this tour, a visit to the U.S.S. Cairo and museum in Vicksburg National Military Park would be beneficial to understand the size and nature of the Union ironclads built by James Buchanan Eads and used during this expedition.

Site 11. Steele’s Bayou. GPS: N32° 27.109', W90° 53.275' From Vicksburg, proceed north on Washington St. (US-61 BUS) for 4.8 mi. to Signal (intersection US-61 BUS and Chickasaw Rd.). From Signal, proceed north on US-61 BUS to US-61, turn left (north) on US-61 for 7.1 mi. to MS-465, turn left (west) and proceed 6.1 mi. [B] [NavOp] 13 Mar 63. RADM Porter steamed up Steele’s Bayou in a tug to determine if the Steele’s Bayou route was feasible. Porter reported to MG Grant that the route could be used either to help rescue the Yazoo Pass Expedition, which was stalled at Greenwood, or to flank the Confederate fortifications on the Yazoo River. [B] [NavOp] 15 Mar 63. Grant and Porter steamed up the Yazoo River and into Steele’s Bayou with a flotilla consisting of ironclads Louisville, Cincinnati, Carondelet, Mound City, and Pittsburg, as well as four tugs, each one towing a mortar scow with a 13-inch mortar. Grant returned to Young’s Point on 15 Mar while Porter proceeded up Steele’s Bayou.

Site 12. Muddy Bayou at Eagle Lake. GPS: N32° 30.800', W90° 59.681' From Site 11 proceed straight (northwest) on MS-465 for 9.6 mi., crossing over Muddy Bayou, then turn left (west) onto Lo-Sto Road at Eagle Lake and stop where the road ends at Eagle Lake and Muddy Bayou. [B] 17 Mar 63. BG David Stuart’s division of MG Sherman’s XIII Corps arrived here from Young’s Point. The soldiers built two bridges on the Muddy Bayou Road leading to Steele’s Bayou. On 18 Mar Grant arrived here and approved Stuart’s route, and the BDEs of COLs Giles Smith and T. K. Smith marched east to Steele’s Bayou on 19 Mar, while BG Hugh Ewing’s BDE remained here.

40 Site 13. Junction of Muddy and Steele’s Bayous. GPS: N32° 30.871', W90° 58.862' From Site 12 turn around and turn right (south) onto MS-465, then immediately left (east) onto Muddy Bayou Road. Muddy Bayou Road is unpaved and should be avoided in wet weather. Drive for 0.5 mi. to dam, then walk the remaining 0.3 mi. down the road to the boat ramp, because here is no safe turn- around at boat ramp, and the Corps of Engineers flood control dam is the best turn-around point. [B] 19 Mar 63. The 116th IL and 6th MO IN RGTs of COL Giles Smith’s BDE embarked on the transport Silver Wave and the tug Fern, with MG W. T. Sherman aboard, to steam to Hill’s Plantation to support RADM Porter’s flotilla in the Steele’s Bayou Expedition. They arrived at Hill’s on 20 Mar. [B] 21 Mar 63. The remaining RGTs of Giles Smith’s and T. K. Smith’s BDEs, which were encamped here, boarded transports Silver Wave, Diligent, and Eagle. They arrive at Hill’s on 23 Mar.

Site 14. Black Bayou. GPS: N32° 42.756', W90° 58.239' From Site 13 turn around and proceed back to MS-465. Note: From MS-465 here you may either go left (south), which is a longer route back to US-61 and retracing the way you came, or the shorter route to the right (north). Large vehicles, such as RVs, should take the south route. If you go north you will drive along the top of the modern Mississippi River levee, and, while the road is good, it is narrow and there are several cattle guards on the levee where only one vehicle can pass at a time. South route: Turn left (south) onto MS-465 and proceed 15.7 mi. to the junction with US-61. Turn left (north) onto US-61 and proceed 19.1 mi. to MS-1 at Onward, MS. Turn left (west) onto MS-1 and proceed 2.4 mi. to Black Bayou Road. Turn left (south) onto Black Bayou Road and proceed 0.5 mi. to Black Bayou culvert. North route: Turn right (north) and proceed on MS-465 for 25.4 mi. to junction with MS-1. Turn right (east) and proceed on MS-1 for 2.6 mi., turn right (south) on Black Bayou Road, proceed for 0.5 mi. to Black Bayou culvert. [B] [NavOp] 16 Mar 63. Union work details cleared huge trees and overhanging branches from this bayou to allow navigation for RADM Porter’s flotilla of ironclads Cincinnati, Carondelet, Mound City, and Pittsburg, and ram General Price, which Porter has added to the flotilla as his flagship, as well as four tugs, and four 13-inch mortar scows. Ironclad Louisville was left at the junction of Black and Steele’s Bayou for security. [B] 20 Mar 63. The first two regiments of BG David Stuart’s division, accompanied by MG Sherman, arrived here on transport Silver Wave and disembarked for the 1.5 mile march to Hill’s. [B] 21 Mar 63. Night. The remainder of COL Giles Smith’s BDE, 13 U.S. IN and 116 IL IN, and all of COL T. K. Smith’s BDE, 127 IL, 83 IN, 54 OH, and 57 OH IN RGTs arrived here aboard transports Diligent and Eagle. Sherman had candles issued to the men and they marched to Hill’s plantation in the dark, arriving in the early hours of 22 Mar.

41

Site 15. Hill’s plantation. GPS: N32° 43.404', W90° 57.010' From Site 14 turn around and proceed back (north) 0.5 mi. to MS-1, turn right (east); proceed for 1.8 mi. to Hill’s plantation historical marker.

[B] [NavOp] 16 Mar 63. RADM Porter’s flotilla arrived here. MG Sherman arrived in tug Fern later in the day. Sherman and Porter steamed up Deer Creek in Fern for a three-mile reconnaissance to the Fore Plantation, and returned. Sherman was skeptical about the route and reported this to Grant, but Porter believed the route possible. [B] [NavOp] 17 Mar 63. Morning. Porter steamed north toward Rolling Fork. [B] 21 Mar 63. 0300. At Hill’s Sherman received a distress message from Porter wrapped in a tobacco leaf and delivered by a black man. At daybreak he sent COL Giles Smith with about 800 men of the 6 MO, 8 MO, and 116 IL on a march up the east bank of Deer Creek to Porter’s aid. [B] 22 Mar 63. 0800. Sherman led the remaining two regiments of Giles Smith’s First brigade, followed by the four regiments of Kilby Smith’s brigade, to Porter’s support. BG Ewing’s BDE arrived here the morning of 23 Mar to assist the 200 men Sherman left at Hill’s in securing the area. [B] 24 Mar 63. Sherman’s men and Porter’s flotilla returned here after the unsuccessful Steele’s Bayou Expedition.

Site 16. Cary Indian Mound. GPS: N32° 48.215', W90° 58.896' Note: There are two routes to this location: the direct route on US-61 and the scenic route along Deer Creek Road. Direct Route: From Site 15 proceed straight (east) on MS-1 for 0.6 mi. to US-61. Turn left (north); proceed on US-61 for 5.4 mi. to Redbud St. at Cary, MS. Turn left (west) onto Redbud; then immediately right (northwest) onto Willow Lane. Proceed 0.3 mi. to Indian mound on right (east) of Willow Lane. Scenic Route: From Site 15 proceed straight (east) on MS-1 for 0.6 mi. to US-61. Turn left (north); proceed on US-61 for 2 mi. to Creek Road on the left. Turn left (west) onto Creek Road and drive 6.9 mi. to US-61 at Cary. Turn right (south) onto US-61 and proceed 0.3 mi. to Redbud St. on the right. Turn right (west) onto Redbud and then right (northwest) onto Willow Lane. Proceed 0.3 mi. to Indian mound on right (east) of Willow Lane. [B] 21 Mar 63. Night. COL Giles Smith with three regiments marched north to support RADM Porter’s flotilla, which was threatened by Confederates at Rolling Fork and was attempting to withdraw. At 1600 Smith rendezvoused with Porter’s fleet at Moore’s Plantation 2 ¾ miles south of Rolling Fork, and then sent three companies of the 6th and 8th Missouri for almost a five mile march south to this Indian Mound to establish an observation post so that they could guard the southern flank of the federal forces. [B] 22 Mar 63. 1215. Sherman arrived here with the rest of COL Giles Smith’s BDE and all of COL T. K. Smith’s BDE. Learning from the outpost that the Confederates had established a roadblock between the mound and the fleet,

42 Sherman pushed ahead another 2 miles, where his men were fired upon by Confederate forces.

Site 17. Rolling Fork Indian Mounds. GPS: N32° 53.763', W90° 52.831' From Site 16 proceed back (south) 0.3 mi. on Willow Lane to Redbud, turn left (north), then immediately right (east) to US-61. Turn left (north) onto US-61, and proceed 6.7 mi. to South Rolling Fork Rd. (Parkway Street); turn left (northwest) onto South Rolling Fork Rd. and proceed north for 0.3 mi. to Indian mounds on right. [B] [NavOp] 19 Mar 63. Afternoon. RADM Porter’s flotilla reached a point three miles south of the confluence of Rolling Fork and Deer Creeks after combating willow shoots (that clogged the paddle wheels of the boats) and felled trees placed by the Confederates to obstruct his boats. Porter sent LT John Murphy with 300 volunteers and two 12-lb. boat howitzers to secure the confluence of the two creeks. Murphy posted his men and guns on the largest of the three Indian mounds, about ½ mi. south of the creek junction. Porter moved his fleet up to the bend in Deer Creek, about 0.3 mile southwest of the Indian mound, and sent ironclad Carondelet north to a point just under 0.5 mile from the creek junction (approx. where Martin Avenue crosses Deer Creek today). Note: To view the location of Porter’s mortars, turn around and proceed 0.2 mi. back (south) on South Rolling Fork Road (Parkway Street) to the junction of Ending Bar Road. Turn right (west) onto Ending Bar Road; proceed across Deer Creek (less than 0.1 mi.), and turn left (south) into cemetery. Follow the road to its farthest point at the right angle turn to the right (west). Deer Creek is in the tree line to the front, where it turns to the west, and Porter’s mortars were in the bend of the creek to your front.

Site 18. Junction of Rolling Fork and Deer Creeks. GPS: N32° 54.360', W90° 52.757' From Site 17 proceed straight (north) on S. Rolling Fork (Parkway St.) for 0.6 mi. to junction of Parkway and Race Sts. Note: To get a good view of the junction of the two creeks, turn left (west) onto Race St., cross over bridge and turn right (north) onto N. 1st St. and park in front of Rolling Fork Methodist Church. Deer Creek is now practically dry at this location, with limited water in Rolling Fork Creek. [B] [NavOp] 19 Mar 63. RADM Porter hoped for his flotilla to turn right (east) into Rolling Fork Creek at this point, and ironclad Carondelet steamed to about ½ mile south of here (approx. to Martin Street) before Confederates of LTC Sam Ferguson’s combat team arrived. [B] 20 Mar 63. Approx. 1200. Ferguson’s men opened fire with three 10-lb. Parrott rifles from the Widow Watson’s, about 1 mi. east of here, while the 12 AR IN RGT occupied Dr. Chaney’s here at 1300. The Confederate infantry attacked and the Federals on the Indian mound ¾ mi. south of here retreated to the safety of the boats. Porter returned fire with his 13-inch mortars and bow guns when possible, but the steep creek banks prevented him from using his broadside

43 guns. At 1700 the Confederates placed two 10-lb. Parrott rifles 0.5 mi. north of the creek junction on the east side, and at 1800 these guns and the guns at Widow Watson’s fired on Porter’s flotilla until dark.

Site 19. Widow Watson’s plantation. GPS: N32° 54.387', W90° 52.019' From Site 18 turn around and turn left (east) onto Race St. Cross bridge over Deer Creek and at junction of Parkway and Race Sts., proceed straight (east) on Race St. for .4 mi. to US-61. Cross US-61 onto E. Race St., proceed 0.2 mi. to corner of E. Race and Academy Dr. [B] 20 Mar 63. Widow Watson’s plantation was located 0.38 mi. southeast of here (GPS: N32° 54.18', W90° 51.71') on the south bank of Rolling Fork Creek. At 1200, Confederate LTC Sam Ferguson’s combat team placed three 10-lb. Parrott rifles at Widow Watson’s plantation and opened fire on RADM Porter’s men on the Indian mound about 1 mi. southwest of here, while the 12 AR IN RGT moved to Dr. Chaney’s at the junction of Rolling Fork and Deer Creeks. Around 1700, BG W. S. Featherston arrived to reinforce Ferguson with the 22 MS and 33 MS RGTs and two more guns (a 24-lb. howitzer and a 3-inch rifle) for eight guns total. Two 10-lb. Parrott rifles were placed 0.5 mi. north of the creek junction on the east side, with six cannon at Widow Watson’s. Featherston’s two regiments were placed to the left of Ferguson’s men at the creek junction. At 1800 the Confederate cannon opened fire, but Featherston’s men did not attack. Darkness ended the fight, and Featherston decided to block the flotilla by felling trees south of it.

Site 20. Mouth of Rolling Fork Creek. GPS: N32° 52.556', W90° 49.098' From Site 19 turn around go back to US-61, turn right (north) and proceed for 0.1 mi. to MS-16 (Rolling Fork), turn right (east) onto MS-16 and proceed for 4.1 mi. The site is not accessible today, and was located 0.3 mi. east of here in 1863 (GPS: N32° 52.287', W90° 48.612') [B] 19 Mar 63. 1600. The Confederate combat team of LTC Sam Ferguson traveled south from Fall’s plantation, 7 miles north of Hollandale on Deer Creek, via the Bogue Phalia, and Big Sunflower River to the mouth of Rolling Fork Creek. Struggling to get to dry ground due to high water, early the next day Ferguson’s men marched 4.5 miles from here to Widow Watson’s. [B] 20 Mar. 1500. BG W. S. Featherston arrived here with the 22 MS IN and 33 MS IN and two guns of CO C, 1 MS LT ARTY after steaming over 52 miles up the Yazoo and Big Sunflower Rivers from Snyder’s Bluff. The troops then marched to Widow Watson’s to support Ferguson’s men, arriving at 1630.

Site 21. Dr. Moore’s plantation. GPS: N32° 54.387', W90° 52.019' From Site 20 turn around and go back on MS-16 to Rolling Fork at junction of MS-16 and US-61. From Rolling Fork, turn left (south) onto US-61 and proceed 3 mi. south on US-61 to Dr. Moore’s plantation. Dr. Moore’s plantation was to your left (east) along the tree line of Deer Creek.

44 Note: For safety due to highway traffic and lack of pullover space, do not attempt to stop here, instead moving to next stop at Egremont, MS. [B] [NavOp] 20 Mar 63. Night. RADM Porter’s flotilla retreated down Deer Creek from Rolling Fork, to Dr. Moore’s. Ironclad Louisville accidentally rammed and sunk a coal barge here, blocking the exodus. That night Porter sent a distress message, wrapped in a tobacco leaf, to Sherman, and then made plans to scuttle his fleet if necessary. [B] [NavOp] 21 Mar. 0600. Confederate artillery opened fire on the northernmost ironclads, Carondelet and Cincinnati. Porter returned fire with his mortars, but his men could not clear the obstacles due to Confederate rifle fire. At 1600, COL Giles Smith’s 800 infantrymen approached from the south. That night the coal barge blocking the retreat was cleared. [B] [NavOp] 22 Mar. Daylight. The fleet backed downstream for two water miles to Egremont plantation.

Site 22. Egremont Plantation. GPS: N32° 51.622', W90° 54.158' From Site 21 proceed south on US-61 an additional 0.7 mi. (3.7 mi. total from Rolling Fork) to Egremont Rd., turn left (east) onto Egremont Rd. and pause at Deer Creek crossing. [B] [NavOp] 22 Mar 63. At Egremont, Porter’s fleet, which attempted to withdraw down Deer Creek after being confronted by obstacles and Confederate forces, ran into a massive log blockade constructed to block the flotilla’s withdrawal. At 1300, as the federals worked to clear the blockade, Confederates appeared to the south, forming a line in front of the leading ironclad, Louisville. On the west side of Deer Creek was LTC Sam Ferguson’s combat team, and on the east side were BG W. S. Featherston’s 22 MS and 33 MS IN RGTs. To the north and behind Porter’s flotilla were the 40 AL and eight Confederate cannon. At 1425 the Confederates opened fire with their artillery, but the big boat guns and 13-inch mortars drove the small Southern field pieces away. Gunfire was soon heard to the south, and COL Giles Smith feared for the safety of his outpost on the Indian mound at Carey. Ironclad Louisville attempted to ram its way through the log blockade to go to the aid of the outpost, but was unsuccessful, so COL Smith had four companies of the 6 MO begin to south to cut their way through to the Indian mound. As these men moved south, MG Sherman’s men arrived after their 13 mile march from Hill’s plantation, and the Confederates retreated to the east. Porter’s sailors then used steam power to move the logs. Note: Straight ahead (east) at the end of Egremont Rd. and to the right (south) is an “Egremont 1855” marker.

Site 23. Sherman Makes Contact. GPS: N32° 50.573', W90° 54.349' From Site 22 proceed south on US-61 for 10.2 mi. to St. Michael Rd., turn left (east), proceed 0.2 mi. to Deer Creek at Lyndel Rd. [B] 22 Mar 63. 1500. MG Sherman, after pushing his troops hard to come to the aid of RADM Porter, stopped near here to rest on the porch of a plantation building. He heard small-arms fire to the north as his vanguard, the 13 U.S. IN,

45 was fired upon. COL Americus Rice, in temporary command of COL T. K. Smith’s BDE, heard the big guns of Porter’s boats a mile to the north. The federals drove the Confederate skirmishers away and pushed north, where they ran into the rear of Confederate BG W. S. Featherston’s men, who were facing north to Porter’s fleet, now supported by COL Giles Smith’s infantry. With federals to their front and rear, the Confederates quickly withdrew to the east.

Site 24. Good Intent Plantation. GPS: N32° 41.717', W90° 55.696' From Site 23 turn around and proceed back to US-61. Turn left (south) onto US-61and proceed for 10.5 mi. to Good Intent Plantation, which was located to the left (east) along Deer Creek. Note: For safety due to highway traffic and lack of pullover space, do not attempt to stop here, instead moving to the next stop at Victor F. Wilson plantation. [B] 23 Mar 63. BG H. Ewing’s BDE arrived at Hill’s plantation and BG Stuart, the DIV CO, sent out combat patrols north and south along Deer Creek to secure Hill’s. At Good Intent plantation, COs E, F, and I of 30 OH IN RGT were posted, and three miles south at Kelsaw plantation (near modern Kelso) LTC T. Jones established his 30 OH regimental HQ. At 1900 a Union patrol ventured as far south as Omega plantation, 6 mi. south of here, and found no Confederates.

Site 25. Victor F. Wilson plantation. GPS: N32° 32.544', W90° 51.041' From Site 24 continue on US-61 straight (south) for another 11.1 mi. (21.6 mi. total from Site 23) to Floweree Rd. Turn right onto Floweree and proceed 2.1 mi. to Raines Pl. drive on the right (west) at Deer Creek. [B] 24 Mar 63. In an attempt to launch a two-pronged attack on RADM Porter’s flotilla on Deer Creek, BG S. D. Lee ascended Deer Creek from Snyder’s bluff on the Yazoo River, and encamped here with 1 MS BN, and 3 LA IN RGT.

This ends the tour of the Steele’s Bayou Expedition. From Site 25 continue straight (south) on Floweree Rd. for 3.3 mi. to US-61. Turn right (south) onto US- 61 and proceed 6.6 mi. to US-61 BUS. Turn right (southwest) onto US-61 BUS and proceed 6.4 mi. to Vicksburg at intersection of Washington and Clay Streets.

Yazoo Pass Expedition

Note: Due to distances involved in driving the Yazoo Pass Expedition, mileages are approximate.

Site 26. Yazoo Pass at Mississippi River Levee. GPS: N32° 32.544', W90° 51.041' From Vicksburg, proceed north on Washington St. (US-61 BUS) for 6.4 mi. to junction of US-61 BUS and US-61N; turn left (north) on US-61N and proceed for 156.5 mi. to junction of US-49 to Helena, AR. Turn left (west) onto US-49 and proceed 5 mi. to junction with MS-1. Turn left (south) onto MS-1 and proceed 1.9 mi. to Yazoo Pass and historical marker. The Yazoo Pass, which is located six

46 miles south of Helena, ran from the Mississippi River through nearby Moon Lake all the way to the Coldwater River, which is about 10 miles east of the Mississippi as the crow flies. The Coldwater flows southeast for about 19 air miles to the

Tallahatchie River, which flows south for about 45 air miles to Greenwood, Mississippi. There the Tallahatchie and Yalobusha meet to form the Yazoo River. From Greenwood the Yazoo flows southwest for about 85 air miles to the high ground just north of Vicksburg. The Yazoo Pass was used by small boats as the shortest and safest route to travel from Yazoo City to Memphis, and was closed when the Mississippi River levee was built in 1856. So just about everyone who knew the Mississippi during the Civil War was familiar with this route, and Grant decided to try to reopen it to gain the coveted dry ground above Vicksburg. [B] 3 Feb 63. 1900 hours. Grant’s chief topographical engineer, LTC James H. “Harry” Wilson, placed 50 lbs. of black powder in the levee built to block the Yazoo Pass and blew it open. Wilson reported to Grant that the water rushed through “like Niagara Falls.” [B] 6 Feb 63. Grant liked Wilson’s report and asked RADM Porter to send boats to the Yazoo Pass. [B] [NavOp] 7 Feb 63. Tinclad Forest Rose rushed over the falls at the levee and steamed into Moon Lake.

Site 27. Yazoo Pass at Moon Lake. GPS: N32° 32.544', W90° 51.041' From Site 26 turn around and proceed 1.9 mi. north on MS-1 to US-49. Turn right (east) and proceed 3.3 mi. to Moon Lake Road. Turn right (south) and proceed 0.6 mi. to bridge over Yazoo Pass at Moon Lake. [B] [NavOp] 7 Feb 63. LCDR George Brown, skipper of Forest Rose, took a landing party ashore and learned from locals that Confederates had blocked the Yazoo Pass below Moon Lake with felled trees. Brown took a cutter and 22 men and LTC Wilson into the Pass at this point to investigate. They only went about 0.5 mile before turning back. [B] [NavOp] 8 Feb 63. Brown’s party re-entered the Pass in the cutter and traveled 6 miles. They saw about 40 felled trees, but Brown and Wilson thought they would not pose a problem. When Brown’s party returned to Moon Lake they found the 33 IA and 34 IN INF, led by BG Cadwallader Washburn, clearing the Pass. Many of these men were lumberjacks, and by 12 Feb they had cleared the Pass for six miles. [B] [NavOp] 12-13 Feb 63. The federal fleet, under the command of LCDR Watson Smith, arrived at Helena and prepared to enter the Pass. Aside from numerous tinclads, the fleet had two ironclads, Chillicothe and Baron de Kalb. Smith was in poor health, and reported to Porter that he felt “of very small worth,” but that he would go “as far as possible.” [B] 15 Feb 63. MG Grant ordered BG Leonard Ross to take a brigade of 4,000 men to the Yazoo Pass. If they reached the Yazoo River, they had orders

47 to ascend the Yalobusha River at Greenwood and destroy the vital Confederate railroad bridges at Grenada, MS. [B] [NavOp] 20 Feb 63. LCDR Smith moved his flotilla into Moon Lake when he learned that the Yazoo Pass was almost clear to the Coldwater River. [B] [NavOp] 25 Feb 63. Morning. LCDR Smith’s flotilla entered the Yazoo Pass from Moon Lake at this point with ironclad Chillicothe in the lead, followed by ironclad Baron de Kalb. The tinclads, transports, and coal barges were spaced single-file along the convoy. The boats move only by daylight, and do not reach the Coldwater River until 28 Feb.

Site 28. Yazoo Pass at Moon Road. GPS: N32° 32.544', W90° 51.041' From Site 27 proceed straight (south) for 1 mi. to Moon Road. Turn left (east) onto Moon Road and proceed 1.1 mi. to bridge over Yazoo Pass. [B] 8 Feb 63. While LCDR Brown, LTC Wilson and the party explored the Pass, Confederate CPT Aaron Forrest, younger brother of Nathan B. Forrest, planned to ambush the cutter in this vicinity. However, young Forrest, fooled by the silver wheels on a Naval officer’s shoulder straps, held his fire and moved closer to Moon Lake in order to capture what he thought was a brigadier general. Not far from here Forrest heard sounds from the brush and thought federal infantry was moving along the Pass bank, so he withdrew. The sounds came from some wild pigs and Aaron Forrest missed an opportunity.

Site 29. Yazoo Pass at Hwy 61. GPS: N32° 32.544', W90° 51.041' From Site 28 proceed straight (east) for 0.6 mi. to US-61. Turn right (south) onto US-61 and proceed 2.2 mi. to historical marker at highway bridge over Yazoo Pass. [B] 16 Feb 63. In this vicinity a Confederate patrol fired on the federal workers as they were clearing trees out of the Pass. Three federals were wounded and several members of 33 IA INF were captured, so BG Washburn sent back to Helena, AR, for 200 cavalrymen to support the infantry.

Site 30. Yazoo Pass at Hunt’s Mill. GPS: N32° 32.544', W90° 51.041' From Site 29 proceed straight (south) for 0.5 mi. to Coahoma-Rich Road. Turn left (northeast) onto Coahoma-Rich Road and proceed for 2.9 mi. to Rich, MS. The bridge is now closed, but the Yazoo Pass and the site of Hunt’s Mill on the north bank of the Pass may be seen from this location. [B] 17 Feb 63. Night. The federal infantry camp of 33 IA and 34 IN INF RGTs was at Hunt’s Mill, on the far (north) side of Yazoo Pass from this point. The 200 troopers requested by BG Washburn arrived at Hunt’s Mill the night of 17 Feb, and are from the 1 IN CAV.

Site 31. Yazoo Pass at Coldwater. GPS: N32° 32.544', W90° 51.041' From Site 30 while facing the closed bridge, turn right (east) onto Birdie Road and proceed 3.6 mi., crossing the Coldwater River bridge to unimproved Turner Road on the left (north) immediately after crossing the bridge; turn left (north)

48 onto unpaved Turner and proceed 1.1 mi. Note: The Yazoo Pass enters the Coldwater River at this point, and the junction may be seen through the trees on the left (west).

[B] 19 Feb 63. Troopers from 1 IN CAV skirmish with Confederate troopers of Aaron Forrest near here, and Forrest suffers 6 dead, 3 wounded, and 15 captured, compared to 5 federal wounded. [B] 22 Feb 63. LTC Wilson and an INF RGT steamed into the Coldwater River from the Yazoo Pass here and ventured 2.5 miles down the Coldwater to Cole’s plantation. The next day they explored another 12 miles and then returned to the Hunt’s Mill camp on the Yazoo Pass. Wilson reported to MG Grant on 24 Feb that boats could be sent from the Mississippi to the Tallahatchie River in 4 days. [B] [NavOp] 28 Feb 63. Ironclad Chillicothe entered the Coldwater River from the Yazoo Pass at this point, but LCDR Smith ordered the flotilla to halt and wait for all boats to clear the Yazoo Pass, much to the chagrin of BG Ross and LTC Wilson, who wanted to move as fast as possible before the Confederates could react. [B] [NavOp] 2 Mar 63. The last of the boats entered the Coldwater River from the Yazoo Pass.

Site 32. Coldwater at Little Tallahatchie. GPS: N32° 32.544', W90° 51.041' From Site 31 turn around and proceed back (south) for 1.1 mi. to Birdie Road. Turn left (east) onto Birdie Road and proceed 0.8 mi. to “Y” intersection Darling- Birdie Roads. Turn right (southeast) onto Darling-Birdie Road and proceed 5.5 mi. through Birdie, MS to MS-3. Turn right (south) onto MS-3 and proceed 9 mi. to MS-322 at Lambert, MS. Turn left (east) and proceed 4 mi. to bridge over Tallahatchie River. Note: The junction of the Coldwater and Little Tallahatchie Rivers to form the Tallahatchie River is 0.1 mi. left (north) of the bridge. [B] [NavOp] 5 Mar 63. The flotilla entered the Tallahatchie River, which is formed at the junction of the Coldwater and Little Tallahatchie Rivers 0.1 mi. north. The flotilla is now 18 air mi. from the junction of the Yazoo Pass and Coldwater River, and 45 air mi. from the Yazoo River. [B] 5 Mar 63. MG Grant, optimistic that the expedition will succeed, ordered BG Isaac Quinby to bring his XVII Corps DIV from Grand Lake, AR, up the Mississippi River to the Yazoo Pass. [B] 7 Mar 63. Grant reported to MG Halleck in Washington that the expedition was successful so far.

Site 33. Federal Fleet at Minter City. GPS: N32° 32.544', W90° 51.041' From Site 32 turn around and proceed back (west) on MS-322 for 4 mi. to MS-3. Turn left (south) and proceed 15.6 mi. to junction of US-49. Turn left (southeast) on US-49 and after 0.3 mi. stay left at fork of US-49E and US-49W, taking US-49E. Proceed 21.2 mi. to MS-8. Turn left (east) onto MS-8 and proceed 0.2 mi. to bridge over Tallahatchie River.

49 [B] [NavOp] 10 Mar 63. Night. The federal fleet tied up here and received detailed information from local blacks of a Confederate fortification 20 miles downstream. The federals are told that the fort has a battery of three guns, one a rifle, a parapet of cotton and sand, and a ditch around the whole works, enough to whip 7,000 Yankees. They are also told there is a raft of gum logs ready to swing into place, and the steamer Star of the West is just below the raft, ready for scuttling to block the Tallahatchie if needed. [B] [NavOp] 11 Mar 63. Dawn. BG Ross, LCDR Smith, and LTC Wilson board Chillicothe and steam downriver to investigate the Confederate fortification, reported to be at Greenwood.

Site 34. Fort Pemberton. GPS: N32° 32.544', W90° 51.041' From Site 33 turn around and proceed back (west) on MS-8 to US-49. Turn left (south) onto US-49 and proceed 13 mi. to junction with US-82. Turn left (east) onto US-82, proceed for 0.3 mi. across bridge and turn left (north) into Fort Pemberton. [B] 23 Feb 63. MG William Loring visited Greenwood and approved this site for the construction of a fort to opposed the federal expedition. This site had been recommended by CDR Isaac Brown on 9 Feb, and seconded by CPT Powhatan Robinson on 17 Feb. COL Thomas Waul’s TX Legion and impressed slaves constructed the fort, made of earth and cotton bales and named Fort Pemberton. [B] 24 Feb 63. MG Loring requested two big guns, a powerful rifled and banded 32-lb. gun and a 20-lb. Parrott, be sent to Fort Pemberton from Yazoo City. The 32-lb. gun (which due to the rifling and reinforced band fired a 68-lb. shell) was placed on the left of the fort near the Yazoo River (near the modern flood control dam) so that it could enfilade the 800-yard stretch of the Tallahatchie, and the 20-lb. Parrott (the “Lady Richardson” captured at the Battle of Corinth on 3 Oct 62 from BTRY D, 1 MO Light ARTY) was placed on the right of the earthworks at the Tallahatchie River so that it could control the sharp bend in front of the fort. Five more guns were placed between these two flank guns. Near the “Lady Richardson” the steamer Star of the West (the U.S. steamer fired upon at Fort Sumter on 9 Jan 61 and captured by Confederates on 18 Apr 61) was sunk in the Tallahatchie to block the river channel. These guns were barely in position when the federal armada arrived, with some guns still en route. [B] [NavOp] 11 Mar 63. 1015. After steaming down the Tallahatchie River from the vicinity of Minter City, federal ironclad Chillicothe, a side-wheeler boat with two 11-inch Dahlgren bow guns protected by 3 inches of armor, rounded the bend 800 yards in front of Fort Pemberton. Behind Chillicothe were 9 more gunboats and 27 transports loaded to the gunwales with troops. The Confederates fired first and scored two hits, wounding one sailor, when a round from the 32-lb. gun fractured the forward casemate armor and embedded in the wood behind. Chillicothe fired three rounds and withdrew. Meanwhile, the transports are at Shellmound, 5.7 air miles north of here, and 46 IN and 47 IN

50 INF disembark and move to within 0.75 mile of Fort Pemberton before being fired upon by Waul’s TX Legion. [B] [NavOp] 11 Mar 63. 1615. Chillicothe returned and opened fire on Fort Pemberton. She was hit 4 times, once from the rifled 32-lb. gun. That shell penetrated a firing port slide and hit an 11-inch Dahlgren on the muzzle as it was being loaded, exploded both shells and blew away both firing port slides. Four sailors were killed with 15 wounded, and Chillicothe withdrew. [B] [NavOp] 13 Mar 63. 1100. After the unsuccessful 11 Mar attack, the federals built a land battery 700 yards from Fort Pemberton and installed two 30- lb. Parrott rifles and a 12-lb. howitzer to suppress the dangerous Confederate 32- lb. gun. Chillicothe and Baron de Kalb, backed by a 13-inch mortar scow, attacked with tow lines attached to trailing tinclads in case the ironclads were disabled. Chillicothe fired 54 shells and was hit 38 times with 6 wounded, and withdrew at 1303. The Confederates ran out of ammunition for the 32-lb. gun and Baron de Kalb was able to stay on station and continued to fire with her three bow guns until dark. She was hit only 6 times, with 3 dead and 3 wounded. In the fight the Confederates suffered 1 killed and 2 wounded. MG Loring, while pacing atop the fort parapets and yelling, “Give ‘em blizzards, boys!” is given the nickname of “Old Bilzzards.” [B] 14 Mar 63. 1500. The federal land battery fired on Fort Pemberton for 30 min. [B] 15 Mar 63. An 8-inch gun arrived from Yazoo City and was placed to the left of the 32-lb. rifled gun, making the 800-yard stretch of the Tallahatchie in front of the fort an even deadlier kill zone. The Confederates also placed two field guns in a detached work to the left of the big guns to provide enfilade fire on any attacking infantry. The federals mounted an 8-inch Dahlgren in the land battery next to the two 30-lb. Parrotts and 12-lb. howitzer. [B] [NavOp] 16 Mar 63. 1130. The federal land battery opened fire on Fort Pemberton, followed by Chillicothe and Baron de Kalb. Chillicothe’s gun port slides were hit by the 32-lb. and 8-inch shells and were bent shut, so she withdrew. Baron de Kalb followed. [B] [NavOp] 19-20 Mar 63. Night. Following LCDR Smith’s personal withdrawal due to illness (he was replaced by LCDR James Foster), BG Ross and LCDR Foster withdrew the armada. [B] 21-23 Mar 63. One BDE of BG Quinby’s DIV met the flotilla as it returned upriver at noon on 21 Mar, and Quinby ordered the expedition back to Fort Pemberton. The troops disembarked at Shellmound the afternoon of 23 Mar. [B] [NavOp] 22 Mar 63. 1500. At BG Quinby’s request, LCDR Foster had Chillicothe and Baron de Kalb steam toward Fort Pemberton in a driving rain. After Chillicothe fired 3 rounds, a geyser of water arose near her bow, convincing Foster that the river had been mined. Remembering the sinking of Cairo on 12 Dec 62 to a torpedo (mine), Foster ordered the gunboats to retire. [B] 1 Apr 63. Fort Pemberton is reinforced with MG W. S. Featherston’s BDE, fresh from its adventure on Steele’s Bayou. BG John Moore’s BDE had moved from Yazoo City to Fort Pemberton on 17 Mar; thus, MG Loring now had over

51 7,000 men to oppose MG Quinby’s 5,500 and an opportunity to smash Quinby. Loring did not attack. [B] 3 Apr 63. COL George Boomer arrived with the remaining 2 BDEs of Quinby’s DIV, and Loring’s opportunity was lost. [B] 4-5 Apr 63. Night. BG Quinby received an order to withdraw from MG Grant, dated 28 Mar (Grant was preparing to march southward through Louisiana). Quinby’s men embarked and by dawn had steamed up the Tallahatchie. Loring did not pursue and Quinby was at Helena by the night of 10 Apr.

This ends the tour of the Yazoo Pass Expedition. From Site 34 turn around and proceed back to US-82, turn right (west), then proceed 38.8 mi. to US-61. Turn left (south) onto US-61S and proceed 750.1 mi. to US-61 BUS. Turn right (southwest) onto US-61 BUS and proceed 6.4 mi. to Vicksburg at intersection of Washington and Clay Streets.

Actions in Louisiana

Site 35. Lake Providence Canal. GPS: N32° 48.371', W91° 10.301' From Vicksburg at intersection of Washington and Clay Streets, proceed south on Washington St. (US-61 BUS or US-80) for 2.9 mi. to I-20. Turn left onto I-20W access ramp at Mississippi Welcome Center before crossing over I-20 Bridge. Proceed 18 mi. on 1-20W to Exit 171 (US-65N). Turn right (north) onto US-65N and proceed for 30.1 mi. to stop sign at US-65 in downtown Lake Providence. Turn left (west) and proceed 0.1 mi. to Lake Providence. From Lake Providence, turn right (north) and proceed on LA-596 for 0.05 mi. [B] 3 Feb 63. At the direction of MG Ulysses S. Grant, elements of BG John McArthur’s DIV began construction of a canal connecting Lake Providence with the Mississippi. It was to be a link in a proposed canal connecting the Mississippi River with Bayou Macon (pronounced Mason) (Site 171), which connected to navigable waterways and ultimately the Mississippi River at the mouth of the Red River. If successful, it would provide a route for transport vessels to supply and communicate with RADM David Farragut’s West Gulf Blockading Squadron and MG Nathaniel Banks’ Army of the Gulf without the necessity of passing the Confederate batteries at Vicksburg. Much of the deserted town was destroyed by the canal construction because the route lay through the center of the town. [B] 23 Feb 63. MG John Logan’s DIV, newly arrived from Memphis, landed at Lake Providence to speed construction of the canal. [B] 17 Mar 63. The levee was cut, joining Lake Providence and the Mississippi. [B] 31 Mar 63. Effort abandoned; Grant turned his attention to the Yazoo Pass Expedition.

52 Site 36. Lake Providence. GPS: N32° 48.334', W91° 10.310 From Site 35 turn around and return for 0.1 mi. to junction of US-65 and LA- 596, Lake Providence. Junction of US-65 and LA-596 [A] Early Jan 63. Town occupied by small elements of the MG William Sherman’s Chickasaw Bayou Expeditionary Force. [B] 1 Feb 63. Afternoon. Occupied by COL George W. Deitzler’s BDE (McArthur’s DIV, McPherson’s XVII Corps). [B] 23 Feb 63. MG Ulysses S. Grant began shifting the bulk of his Army of the Tennessee from Memphis to Louisiana. All of BG John McArthur’s DIV and MG John Logan’s DIV (MG James McPherson’s XVII Corps) arrive. [B] 21 - 25 Apr 63. With the vanguard of his army approaching Hard Times Plantation, Grant ordered McPherson to move his XVII Corps southward from its camps around Lake Providence to Milliken’s Bend by steamboat. They are to occupy vacant camps of McClernand’s XIII Corps. Only BG Hugh Reid’s BDE (of BG John McArthur’s DIV), was left behind as a garrison. [D] 30 May - 6 Jun 63. The broad, dry natural levee along the south shore of Lake Providence was used as a training area for the newly-created black regiments which were being raised at this time. As training progressed, the new black regiments were added to Reid’s garrison. The area was also used as an “R and R” (rest and relaxation) area for Union soldiers who could not afford to make the long journey home, even if granted leave.

Site 37. Tensas Bayou outlet. GPS: N32° 48.745', W91° 11.554' From Lake Providence, proceed west on US-65 for 1.3 mi. to bridge over Tensas Bayou outlet. [G] 9 Jun 63. Warned by his cavalry picket at Baxter Bayou (Site 177), BG Hugh T. Reid marched his half-trained black INF regiments out to the Tensas Bayou exit of Lake Providence, burned the bridge, and awaited the approach of Confederate Col Frank Bartlett’s force. Even Bartlett’s light artillery failed to shake the Union defense, and after several hours of mostly harmless small-arms fire, Bartlett withdrew, marching southwest along Tensas Bayou to Floyd via a newly-constructed bridge across Joe’s Bayou. This ended all further threats to the Union posts in Louisiana. (see Site 38. Milliken’s Bend and Site 39. Young’s Point) Note: Site 177. Baxter Bayou may be viewed at this time by proceeding west on US-65 for 3.2 mi. to the Baxter Bayou bridge.

Site 38. Milliken’s Bend. GPS: N32° 27.361', W91° 06.228' From Site 37 (and Site 177 if viewed at this time) turn around and return (1.3 mi. from Site 37 or 4.5 mi. from Site 177) to Lake Providence at US-65 and LA- 596 and continue .05 mi. to US-65S; turn right (south) onto US-65S and proceed 30.1 mi. to I-20E. Take I-20E, proceed 11.1 mi. to Exit 182, Mound, LA-602. Turn right (north) onto LA-602, proceed for 0.8 mi. to Mound, junction of US-80 and LA-602. From Mound, proceed west on US-80 for 2.9 mi. to Thomastown;

53 turn north on Thomastown Road for 9.1 mi. to (Ashley Plantation Rd.); continue north on Milliken Bend Road for 1.9 mi. to end of road at levee. The final 1.9 mi. is unsuitable for conventional vehicles in wet weather. The actual site is about 500 yds. east of the Milliken’s Bend historical markers (markers are at GPS: N32° 26.312', W91° 07.374'). The site of Milliken’s Bend no longer exists, having been destroyed by the Mississippi River shortly after the Civil War. The river has since rebuilt new land on the site of the old town. [A] 25 Dec 62. MG William T. Sherman’s Chickasaw Bayou Expeditionary Force arrived off-shore aboard a large convoy escorted by RADM David D. Porter’s Mississippi River Squadron. Porter shelled the hamlet from his flagship Black Hawk with 20-lb. Parrott rifles, after which BG Stephen Burbridge’s BDE (of BG A. J. Smith’s DIV) landed at dawn to cut the Vicksburg, Shreveport & Texas Railroad (VS&TRR), 6.5 mi. to the southwest. [A] 3 - 4 Jan 63. MG John McClernand arrived at Milliken’s Bend from Memphis, and assumed command of the Chickasaw Bayou Expeditionary Force (Grant was still in Memphis, TN). McClernand reconstituted the four infantry divisions plus artillery into the Army of the Mississippi, which had been decommissioned shortly after the Battle of Shiloh (6 -7 April 62), and departed upriver to capture the Confederate fort of Arkansas Post, on the Arkansas River, leaving only a small security detachment in Milliken’s Bend. [B] 21 Jan 62. McClernand’s Army of the Mississippi, fresh from its victory at Arkansas Post, re-occupied Milliken’s Bend and Young’s Point. (Site 39) [B] 28 Mar - 15 May 63. Milliken’s Bend during this period was the major supply depot in the Vicksburg area for the Union army; later that function was assumed by Young’s Point (Site 39). [B] 31 Mar 63. McClernand’s four divisions led the way southward toward Richmond to begin Grant’s plan to find an undefended place on the Mississippi shore where the army could be landed unopposed, leaving Milliken’s Bend with only a caretaker force. [B] 21 - 22 Apr 63. Milliken’s Bend was re-occupied by Logan’s and Crocker’s DIVs (McPherson’s XVII Corps) which were brought from Lake Providence by steamboat, in preparation for the march southward to join McClernand’s XIII Corps at Hard Times Plantation (Site 65). [B] 23 Apr 63. Logan’s and Crocker’s DIVs marched for Richmond and points south. [B] 3 - 4 May 63. MG Sherman, with Tuttle’s and Steele’s DIVs, arrived by steamboat from Young’s Point, then marched for Mrs. Perkins’ plantation, leaving only Blair’s DIV at Milliken’s Bend to build and maintain the roads. With Sherman’s departure, Milliken’s Bend was re-designated as the HQ, Military District of Northeast Louisiana, BG Jeremiah Sullivan in command. Tactical command of the Post of Milliken’s Bend was given to COL Hermann Lieb, whose troops consisted almost entirely of newly-recruited and poorly trained black regiments.

54 [E) 7 Jun. 0300. [Battle of Milliken’s Bend] As a part of an offensive to interrupt the Union attack on Vicksburg, MG Richard Taylor, with McCullough’s BDE of Walker’s Texas DIV, attacked the post of Milliken’s Bend (Site 38). The garrison, which consisted only of four poorly-trained black LA regiments and the veteran 23 IN INF, had been warned of the impending attack. However, the Texans overwhelmed the garrison and drove it back to the shelter of the river levee. Here the Union troops rallied, and all attempts by the Confederates to cross the levee were driven back by the combined fire of the infantry defenders and cannon fire from ironclad Choctaw, one of RADM David Porter’s largest ironclads. Unable to avoid Choctaw’s fire, which was reinforced when timberclad Lexington arrived 0900, the Confederate attack was called off, and McCullough’s BDE withdrew to Richmond, LA. Note: From levee, turn around and return 11 mi. south on Thomastown Rd. to US-80. Turn left (east) on US-80, proceed 2.9 mi. to Mound, junction of US-80 and LA-602.

Site 39: Young’s Point. GPS: N32° 21.306', W91° 00.982'. From Mound, proceed north on Duckport Road for 1.1 mi. The actual site of Young’s Point has been destroyed by the Mississippi River, but it is a few yards beyond the main-line levee, visible just to the north. One of three major posts on the Mississippi River in Louisiana opposite Vicksburg, it is only 8 air miles west of Vicksburg. [NavOp] 28 Jun 62. Union forces first appeared in the Vicksburg area when RADM David Farragut, with a detachment of the West Gulf Blockading Squadron, ran the Vicksburg batteries. Unable to force the surrender of the Confederate garrison of Vicksburg, Farragut anchored off the mouth of the Yazoo River, about 3 mi. east of Young’s Point. [NavOp] 1 Jul 62. FO Charles Davis, commanding the Western Flotilla, arrived with the bulk of his gunboat fleet and joined Farragut off the mouth of the Yazoo River. Farragut departed for New Orleans on 16 Jul 1862, but Davis remained in place. From this time on, there was a Union naval presence in the Mississippi above Vicksburg. [A] 25 Dec 62. After leaving Burbridge’s BDE behind at Milliken’s Bend (Site 38) Sherman’s convoy proceeded to Young’s Point, where COL Giles Smith’s BDE (Morgan Smith’s DIV) was dropped off to occupy the area and break the VS&TRR at Hecla Place Plantation (barely 10.3 mi to the south). From this time on, Young’s Point was continually occupied by Union forces until the end of the Civil War. [A] 26 Dec 1862. Sherman’s convoy of transport steamboats, escorted by a squadron of ironclads commanded by RADM David Porter, left Young’s Point and entered the mouth of the Yazoo River, about 3 mi. east. (Sites 1-9) [A] 30 Dec 62. After withdrawing to the Mississippi River following the defeat at Chickasaw Bayou, the bulk of Sherman’s Expeditionary force remained aboard boats anchored off the mouth of the Yazoo River, 3 mi. to the east. [A] 4 Jan 63. MG McClernand took command of Sherman’s Expeditionary force and departed for Arkansas Post.

55 [B] 21 Jan 63. Following the Union victory at Arkansas Post, Porter’s boats and McClernand’s troops reached Young’s Point on 21 Jan. A CAV detachment was landed, but the bulk of the troops remained aboard the steamships. [B] 28 Jan 63. Night. MG Ulysses S. Grant, commander of the Department of the Tennessee, arrived at Young’s Point aboard steamer Magnolia after his trip from Memphis. A conflict over exactly who was in command of the entire expeditionary force in the Vicksburg area, Grant or McClernand, remained unresolved. [B] 30 Jan 63. Grant assumed command of all troops in the Department of the Tennessee, which included all of the troops in the Vicksburg area. At this time he also re-organized the Army of the Tennessee into a four-corps structure which was to persist throughout the remainder of the struggle for control of the Mississippi River: XIII Corps, MG John McClernand; XV Corps, MG William T. Sherman; XVI Corps, MG Stephen Hurlbut (at Memphis); and XVII Corps, MG James McPherson. This ended the brief existence of the Army of the Mississippi, which McClernand had created on 4 Jan 63. [B] 11 Feb 63. Grant, in his HQ boat Magnolia, lost his false teeth when they were accidentally tossed, along with the water in his wash basin, through a porthole by a porter. [B] 2 Apr 63. Convoy carrying Steele’s DIV (of Sherman’s XV Corps) steamed north at dusk en route to Greenville, about 100 river mi. above Vicksburg, with orders to destroy the commissary supplies of the Deer Creek area, thus diverting Confederate attention away from Grant’s army opposite Vicksburg. [B] 23 Apr 63. Tuttle’s DIV and McArthur’s DIV (McPherson’s XVII Corps) from Lake Providence encamped here, in preparation for marching southward to join McClernand’s XIII Corps at Pointe Clear. Grant, now entirely committed to a planned amphibious landing south of Vicksburg, moved his HQ from Young’s Point to Pointe Clear (Site 51). [B] 25 Apr 63. 0700. After completing the expedition to Greenville and Deer Creek, Steele’s DIV returned to Young’s point and re-occupied their old campground, joining Tuttle’s and McArthur’s DIVs (McPherson’s XVII Corps). On this same day Grant ordered Sherman to prepare Steele’s and Blair’s DIVs to move southward to join the main army, leaving Tuttle’s DIV behind to improve and maintain the roads from the Mississippi River to Richmond. Tuttle’s DIV was carried to Duckport by steamboat, where it began work building a new road parallel to the Duckport Canal (Site 40), thus giving the Union forces an alternate route from the Mississippi River to Walnut Bayou. A new bridge across Walnut Bayou was also built at Oak Grove Plantation, thus relieving stress on the difficult stretch of road from Milliken’s Bend to Lum’s. [B] 26 Apr 63. McArthur’s DIV (of McPherson’s XVII Corps) was carried by steamboat to Milliken’s Bend, in position to begin the long trek southward. At this time, Young’s Point was held only by Steele’s and Blair’s DIVs of Sherman’s Corps.

56 [B] 27 Apr 63. Sherman received a letter from MG Grant suggesting that he make a demonstration toward Snyder’s Bluff, hoping thus to confuse the Confederates as to the true intentions of the Union army. The next day Sherman moved up the Yazoo River with 15 infantry regiments aboard a fleet of transports supported by a powerful squadron of gunboats commanded by LCDR K. Randolph Breese (Sites 1-3) [B] 1 May 63. Sherman, still in the Yazoo River in the Snyder’s Bluff area, was ordered by Grant to immediately bring two divisions south to join the main army, which was poised to cross the Mississippi River south of Grand Gulf. Sherman’s convoy from the Yazoo River returned to Young’s Point. (This same day Grant, with McClernand’s XIII Corps and Logan’s DIV of McPherson’s XVII Corps, fought the Battle of Port Gibson). [B] 3 - 4 May 63. Sherman moved Tuttle’s and Steele’s DIVs by steamboat to Milliken’s Bend, in preparation for the long march to Mrs. Perkins’ plantation, thus avoiding the long and difficult road from Young’s Point along Walnut Bayou to Lum’s. [B] 15 May 63. After the completion of the Bowers’ Landing road (Site 43), Young’s Point became a major Union supply depot in the Vicksburg area, and remained so until the Union investment of Vicksburg on 19 May. On 30 May a road was completed leading from Warrenton to the southern portion of the Union siege lines, and supplies again flowed from Young’s Point to Bowers’ Landing, then across the Mississippi River to Warrenton, then north by road to the siege lines. [B] [NavOp] Young’s Point was also used as the on-shore headquarters of RADM David D. Porter, commander of the US Navy’s Mississippi Squadron. Porter also had a floating headquarters, the big and lightly-armored “tinclad” gunboat Black Hawk, formerly the steamer New Uncle Sam. The presence of Grant, Sherman, and Porter at Young’s Point greatly facilitated cooperation and coordination among the three men, who constituted a command triumvirate for the Union forces in the area. When not in active operations, the boats of Porter’s squadron were anchored in the Naval Anchorage, a quiet reach of the Mississippi River just off the mouth of the Yazoo River, about 1.5 river miles below Young’s Point and close to the Mississippi shore. [B] [NavOp] 6 Apr 63. Having agreed to Grant’s request for naval support for a landing on the Mississippi, Porter moved those vessels of the Mississippi Squadron selected for the enterprise to the Naval Anchorage and began preparations for the adventure. [B] [NavOp] 11 Apr 63. Running the Vicksburg Batteries. Because Grant would require transports to ferry his troops across the Mississippi River, Porter included three Army transports (Silver Wave, Henry Clay, Forest Queen) and a tug (Ivy) to the fleet of seven ironclad gunboats (Benton, Lafayette, Mound City, Pittsburg, Louisville, Carondelet, and Tuscumbia), the armed ram General Price, and a number of barges filled with supplies for the army and coal for the vessels. Porter left CDR K. Randolph Breese behind with two ironclads (Choctaw, Baron

57 de Kalb), a timberclad (Tyler), and five tinclads (Black Hawk, Signal, Romeo, Linden, Petrel), and several tugs. [B] [NavOp] 16 Apr 63. 2215. Porter’s boats started downstream with all lights extinguished, hoping to slip past the batteries in the darkness. However, the boats were detected by Confederate patrols as the fleet made the turn around De Soto Point. The Confederates immediately lit up the waterfront by igniting tar barrels and bonfires which had been prepared for just such a contingency. The Confederate gunners in the river batteries opened fire with the 22 heavy guns mounted along the river front, and the Union naval gunners returned fire with their own heavy artillery. Despite the artificial light, smoke and darkness made aiming so uncertain that of the fleet of 11 vessels, only the transport Henry Clay was lost. [B] [NavOp] 22 Apr 63. Grant, realizing the need for more transport vessels below Vicksburg, requested that six additional army transports run the gauntlet of the Vicksburg batteries. Tigress was sunk outright, while Moderator, Empire City, J. W. Cheeseman, Anglo-Saxon, and Horizon were battered but survived. That gave Grant seven operational transports plus the ram General Price and the tug Ivy, for use as troop transports. [C] 11 Apr 63. With the opening of the Bowers’ Landing Road (Site 43), Young’s Point became the main Union supply base in Louisiana. It continued to function as such until the surrender of the city on 4 Jul 63. [G] 7 Jun 63. Confederate BG James Hawes’ brigade (of MG John Walker’s TX DIV), accompanied by MG Richard Taylor, attempted a surprise attack on Young’s Point as a part of a general offensive against Young’s Point and Milliken’s Bend (Site 38). Hawes arrived in attack position at 1030 rather than the planned 0500 because of difficulty in finding bridges across Walnut Bayou, only to discover that the Union garrison had been warned and was fully prepared. Hawes realized the futility of attacking a prepared position, and withdrew his troops to Richmond without firing a shot. Note: Turn around and return 1.1 mi. to Mound at intersection of US-80 and LA-602.

Site 40. Duckport Canal. GPS: N32° 23.461', W91° 00.982' From Mound, proceed west on US-80 for 2.9 mi. to Thomastown; turn right (north) on Thomastown Road for 3.2 mi. to Duckport Road; turn right (east) and proceed 0.5 mi. to Sparta Road; turn north and proceed 200 yds. to faint trace of the Duckport Canal. Duckport and Sparta Roads are unsuitable for conventional vehicles in wet weather. [B] The difficulties of moving large bodies of troops, including ARTY and heavily-loaded supply wagons, over the un-surfaced roads of Louisiana were well understood by MG Grant and his commanders, and every possible means of mitigating the situation was explored. One possibility was to use shallow-draft steamboats on Walnut and Roundaway Bayous between Milliken’s Bend and New Carthage. However, Walnut Bayou was so shallow and obstructed by bald cypress and tupelo trees that it would have to be deepened and cleared to create a navigable channel, and it would be necessary to construct a canal connecting

58 the Mississippi with Walnut Bayou. Because the march to the south was being made during the early spring months, traditionally the “high water period” of the Mississippi, Grant’s engineers believed that water flowing into Walnut Bayou, through a canal from the Mississippi near the little steamboat landing of Duckport, would provide the needed depth for the steamboats to pass. [B] 31 Mar - 23 Apr 63. Work on the Duckport Canal began, under the direction of Col. George Pride, on the same day that lead elements of Grant’s army began the march to the south. Work on the project continued until all of the trees in Walnut Bayou had been cleared (earlier in the war, at Island No. 10, the Union engineers had learned how to efficiently remove trees from bayous), and the canal was deep enough so that a small tugboat could be taken through. [B] 20 Apr 63. The water level in the Mississippi River began to fall. Floating dredges brought in to deepen the canal grounded as the water drained out of Walnut Bayou and into the Mississippi. Twenty barges and a tiny tug were left behind in the bayou, with barely enough water to stay afloat. [B] 4 May 63. Col. Pride abandoned work on the canal, but built a dam across Roundaway Bayou below Richmond to maintain enough water in Walnut Bayou so that the tug and barges could be used as far as Richmond. They were of inestimable help in maintaining the flow of supplies to the army far to the south. Note: Turn around and return to Mound by proceeding 200 yds. back to Duckport Rd.; turn right (west) and proceed for 0.5 mi. to Thomastown Rd. Turn left (south) and proceed 30.2 mi. to US-80. Turn left (east) onto US-80 and proceed for 2.9 mi. to Mound at junction of US-80 and LA-602. Turn right onto LA-602 and proceed 0.8 mi. to I-20E. Turn onto I-20E and proceed 3.4 mi. to I- 20 Exit 186, Delta.

Site 41. Grant’s Canal. GPS: N32° 19.255', W90° 55.828' From I-20 Exit 186, turn left (north) and proceed 0.2 mi. to Old US-80; turn right (east) and proceed for 1.8 mi. to unnamed Parish road, turn right (south) over railroad; turn right (west) and proceed under I-20 for 0.2 mi. to Grant’s Canal park. In the spring of 1862 President Lincoln and Secretary of the Navy Gideon Welles had instructed RADM David Farragut to enter the mouth of the Mississippi River from the Gulf of Mexico; occupy New Orleans; and continue up the Mississippi River, occupying strategic towns along the way; thus, completing the naval blockade of the major portion of the Confederacy. A detachment of Farragut’s squadron arrived at Vicksburg on 18 May 62 and demanded the surrender of the city, but the Confederates refused. Farragut and most of the heavy ships of the squadron arrived below the city on 26 May, but Farragut realized he needed infantry to take the city. He went downriver to New Orleans and returned on 25 Jun with an army brigade of less than 3,000 men commanded by BG Thomas Williams. Unable to attempt occupation of the city with such a small number of men, Farragut ran past the newly-emplaced Confederate batteries and anchored off the mouth of the Yazoo River on 28 June

59 62, where he was joined on 1 July by FO Charles H. Davis with the ironclads of the Western Flotilla. With contingents of Farragut’s fleet both above and below Vicksburg, Williams proposed that he and his men occupy the shore opposite Vicksburg, and dig a canal across the neck of De Soto Peninsula, thus making it possible to supply the lower squadron from the north, which would be infinitely easier than supplying it by ship from New York. Williams’ men, supplemented by about 1,200 slaves from neighboring plantations, immediately set to work on the canal on 27 Jun. However, by 24 Jul, before much progress had been made, the water level in the Mississippi River dropped so low that Farragut was forced to return to New Orleans, taking Williams and his men with him. [B] 24 Jan 63. MG Grant, in Memphis, ordered work on the old Williams canal resumed, and Sherman’s men, who arrived at Young’s Point on 23 Jan, started digging the next day. Aside from the fact that Grant needed to keep his idle men busy, there were sound strategic reasons for completing the Williams canal. RADM Porter suggested that the supply line which carried much critical foreign war material to the Confederacy, and which ran from neutral Matamoros, Mexico, to southern Louisiana and the Red River, and thence up the Mississippi to Vicksburg and the Southern Railroad of Mississippi, could be interdicted by running a few gunboats past the Vicksburg batteries. Supplying those vessels with coal, ammunition, and food could be achieved by using shallow-draft transports if a canal could be cut across the base of De Soto Peninsula. [B] 27 Mar 63. The usual spring high water flooded the Union camps and began to fill the canal with sediment, and the Confederates emplaced a battery of heavy guns on the eastern shore that could drop shells into the mouth of the canal. Grant ordered all work on the canal stopped. [B] [NavOp] 14 Mar 63. Long before the canal could be completed, RADM Farragut pre-empted Porter by running two boats of his West Gulf Blockading Squadron past the Confederate batteries at Port Hudson to block the mouth of the Red River at the Mississippi. They arrived below Vicksburg a few days later, which meant that boats from Porter’s squadron above the city were no longer needed to interdict the Confederate supply line. But now it was Farragut’s vessels that needed to be supplied. Within a few days Farragut returned to his anchorage at the mouth of the Red River, while work on the canal continued. Note: Turn around and return to Old US-80 by proceeding 0.2 mi. to unnamed Parish road and turning left (north) over railroad tracks. Turn left (west) onto Old US-80 and proceed 5.7 mi. to Mound at junction of US-80 and LA-602.

Site 42. Hecla Place Plantation. GPS: N32° 20.032', W91° 00.982'. From Mound, proceed south on LA-602 for 0.4 mi. The actual site of the plantation house (which no longer exists) is 0.1 mi. west, on the west side of Walnut Bayou. The plantation property extended about 2 miles to the south along both banks of Walnut Bayou.

60 [A] 25 Dec 62. Occupied by Union forces from Sherman’s Chickasaw Bayou Expeditionary Force, with the mission of breaking the Vicksburg, Shreveport & Texas Railroad (VS&TRR). [C] 3 May 63. Grant ordered BG Jeremiah Sullivan, at Young’s Point, to construct a wagon road from Walnut Bayou to Bowers’ Landing on the Mississippi River as soon as practical. The Walnut Bayou terminus of the road was about 2.0 mi. south of Hecla Place house.

Site 43. Bowers’ Landing Road. GPS: N32° 18.669', W91° 03.444' From Site 42 proceed south on LA-602 for 2.1 mi. to site of Bowers’ Landing Road. [C] 3 May 63. With the Union army in possession of Grand Gulf (Site 71), Grant wrote to BG Jeremiah Sullivan, who commanded the few troops still remaining in Milliken’s Bend and Young’s Point, ordering that a road be constructed across the swamps from Walnut Bayou to Bowers’ Landing on the Mississippi River as quickly as possible. This would provide a good road from Young’s Point to Bowers’ Landing, which would make it possible for the transports below Vicksburg to pick up the army’s supplies directly from Bowers’ Landing and land them at Grand Gulf. Grand Gulf would then become the forward depot supplying the army in Mississippi. This would make it practical to abandon the long and difficult wagon hauls from Milliken’s Bend via Richmond to Mrs. Perkins’ plantation on the Mississippi, as well as free the division of combat troops being used as road guards for use in Mississippi. [C] 10 May 63. Noon. The swamps having drained sufficiently for work to begin, all 6 mi. from Walnut Bayou to Bowers’ Landing were corduroyed and completed by 15 May. Ironclad Mound City attacked the Confederate battery of 30-lb. guns at Warrenton, which could fire upon Bowers’ Landing, and silenced the battery. [C] 30 May 63. The wagon supply route from Young’s Point south to Bowers’ Landing Road, down the corduroyed road to Bowers’ Landing, across the Mississippi by steamer to Warrenton, and finally by wagon to the southern siege lines was opened.

Site 44. Crescent Plantation. GPS: N32° 22.190', W91° 09.933' From Site 43 proceed south on LA-602 for 8.9 mi. to Crescent Plantation. Built in 1832, this house was the home of Dr. D. M. Dancy and is one of only two ante-bellum (pre-Civil War) houses still standing near the Union army’s route of march in Louisiana. [G] 6 Jun 63. After leaving Lum’s Station at about 2230, Hawes’ brigade of Walker’s TX DIV marched south and east along the Walnut Bayou road, intending a dawn attack on Young’s Point. However, they found that the bridge across Walnut Bayou at Crescent Plantation had been burned. A bridge was eventually found intact at the Hoggett plantation, 6 miles to the east, but the long delay made a dawn attack impossible.

61 [G] 7 Jun 63. Hawes’ brigade arrived near Young’s Point at about 1030, only to find that the garrison consisted of veteran combat troops who were in prepared defenses, with gunboats in the river and crews alert. Hawes immediately called off the attack and returned to Richmond, but in the process burned every plantation along Walnut Bayou except Crescent, presumably because there was a sick lady in the house.

Site 45. Lum’s Junction. GPS: N32° 23.848', W91° 09.297' From Site 44 proceed north on LA-602 for 1.6 mi. to Lum’s Junction at Old US-80. In 1863 the road from Richmond (Site 46.) divided at this junction, with the Milliken’s Bend Road (Meryl Gustafson or Airport Road) going across the swamps to Milliken’s Bend, and the Walnut Bayou Road (LA-602) going south and east along Walnut Bayou to Young’s Point. [B] 29 Mar - 11 May 63. Nearly the entire strength of the Army of the Tennessee passed this point en route from Milliken’s Bend to Hard Times Plantation or Mrs. Perkins’ plantation. [G] 6 Jun 63. Having left Richmond at 1900, Walker’s TX DIV reached this point on its approach march to attack the Union posts in Louisiana at about 2230. McCullough’s brigade, accompanied by LTG Richard Taylor, deputy commander of the Department of Trans-Mississippi, marched immediately for Milliken’s Bend, planning to attack at dawn the next day, [G] 7 Jun 63. Hawes’ brigade started south on the Walnut Bayou road, intending to attack Young’s Point at dawn. MG Walker, the nominal commander of the TX DIV, was left near this road junction with Randall’s brigade and the divisional artillery, presumably to act as a reserve. [G] 8 Jun 63. Afternoon. The entire TX DIV reassembled at this point following the failed attacks on Milliken’s Bend and Young’ Point, and returned to Richmond the same afternoon. [G] 15 Jun 63. While the loss of one or all of the Union posts in Louisiana would not have had a significant impact on the conduct of the siege of Vicksburg, even a minor defeat in Louisiana would have resulted in a furor in the Northern press, and an embarrassment to both Grant and the Lincoln administration. Grant’s solution to the problem was to push the Confederate force known to be at Richmond (Walker’s TX DIV plus two small detached brigades) out of the region. To this end, he organized an offensive consisting of BG Joseph A. Mower’s veteran “Eagle Brigade,” marching from Young’s Point, and BG Alfred W. Ellett’s Marine Brigade marching from Milliken’s Bend. The two forces met at this point at 0600, ejected a Confederate picket guarding the road junction, and marched immediately toward Richmond. Note: Turn left (west) onto US-80 and proceed 1.9 mi. to Tallulah, junction of US-80 and US-65 at courthouse.

Site 46. Richmond. GPS: N32° 23.131', W91° 12.506' From Site 43 turn left (west) onto Old US-80 and proceed 2 mi. to Tallulah at junction of US-65 (Chestnut Street) and Old US-80. Turn left (south) and

62 proceed on US-65 for 2.0 mi. to road fork just before the bridge at Bayou Drive; proceed south on Bayou Drive for 1 mi. to Roundaway Bayou Bridge. While no trace of the Civil War-era town now exists, in 1863 Richmond was the largest town in Madison Parish, and boasted several newspapers, as well as a number of banks, commercial enterprises, cotton warehouses, etc. The bulk of the 1863 town was concentrated south and west of Roundaway Bayou at its junction with Walnut Bayou. The only Confederate presence in the immediate area consisted of LTC Isaac F. Harrison’s 12 LA CAV battalion (HQ at Richmond), with a strength of about 250 men. [B] 31 Mar 63. Harrison’s pickets, watching the Union camps at Milliken’s Bend and Young’s Point, warned of an approaching Union force (COL Thomas Bennett’s 69 IN INF, a small detachment of 6 MO CAV, a pair mountain howitzers, and Patterson’s KY CO of Engineers and Mechanics. Harrison burned the bridge across Roundaway Bayou and tried to hold the crossing, but was forced to retire southward along the Roundaway Bayou Road (modern LA- 603). Once in possession of the town, Patterson’s engineers quickly constructed a sturdy bridge across the bayou to support the advance of MG John McClernand’s XIII Corps. [B] 3 Apr 63. BG Peter J. Osterhaus and the bulk of his DIV, accompanied by MG John McClernand, arrived at Richmond, only to find Bennett’s advance guard returned from Stanbrough’s plantation (Site 47). [B] 4 Apr 63. McClernand and Osterhaus, with Garrard’s brigade, march southward toward New Carthage. During the following month, virtually the entire maneuver force of the Army of the Tennessee, consisting of McClernand’s XIII Corps (4 divisions), McPherson’s XVII Corps (3 divisions), and Sherman’s XV Corps (3 divisions), plus literally thousands of supply wagons, crossed the new bridge on their way southward. [G] 4 Jun 63. MG Richard Taylor, accompanied by LTC Isaac Harrison, arrived from Delhi at about 2000. Finding no Union forces in the vicinity, a courier was sent to Walker, at Delhi, to bring his whole division forward. Taylor was told that Young’s Point was garrisoned by about 600 convalescents and quartermaster troops, that the Milliken’s Bend garrison consisted of a brigade of half-trained black troops, and that Lake Providence contained only a few companies of cavalry. Judging that Walker’s numbers (about 5,000 men) were adequate to take all three posts simultaneously, he planned an immediate offensive. [G] 6 Jun 63. Walker’s TX DIV arrived from Delhi. Planning a night approach march and a dawn attack on Milliken’s Bend and Young’s Point, Taylor’s force left Richmond at 1900. [G] 8 Jun 63. Walker’s troops reached Richmond during the afternoon, much depleted in numbers because of casualties suffered during their defeats at Milliken’s Bend and Young’s Point, and from stragglers left behind due to fatigue and heat exhaustion from the long march.

63 [G] 14 Jun 63. A Union counter-offensive conducted by BG Joseph A. Mower’s “Eagle Brigade” and BG Alfred W. Ellett’s Marine Brigade evicted Walker’s TX DIV from Richmond and forced them back to Delhi. LA, after a mini- engagement north of Roundaway Bayou.

Site 47. Stanbrough’s plantation, “Joan.” GPS: N32° 20.820', W91° 11.760' From Site 46 proceed straight (south) on Bayou Drive for 2.2 mi. to junction of US-65 and LA-603; cross US-65 and proceed straight (southeast) on LA-603 for 0.8 mi. to Stanbrough’s plantation. [B] 2 Apr 63. COL Bennett’s task force, leading the Union advance south from Richmond, had orders to go all the way to New Carthage. However, Bennett stopped upon reaching Stanbrough‘s plantation even though he had encountered no resistance other than an occasional small-arms shot from the heavy timber in the back swamp a few hundred yards to the west. At this point the Alligator Bayou Road (PR-D49 or Old US-65) ran westward and vanished into the swamp. No one knew where it went. Bennet feared to go farther down the Roundaway Bayou Road (LA-603) until he was certain that no large Confederate force lurked down the Alligator Bayou Road which could fall on the rear of his column if he marched farther south. Bennett sent CAV patrols south along the Roundaway Bayou Road, and west along the Alligator Bayou Road. The patrol to the south reported strong Confederate forces just beyond Holmes’ “Trinidad” plantation. The patrol to the west did not return in the appointed time, and fearing a trap, Bennett returned to Richmond. [B] 2 Apr 63. Bennett’s Alligator Bayou Road patrol pushed westward and discovered a cluster of plantations along the south shore of Alligator Lake. The troopers seized a small boat and followed Alligator Bayou all the way to its junction with Tensas Bayou, where they captured a small party of unsuspecting Confederate commissary officers, but saw no Confederate soldiers. Returning to Stanbrough’s plantation, they found Bennet had returned to Richmond, so they followed suit. [B] 3 Apr. - 5 May 1863. All three corps of Grant’s Army of the Tennessee marched past this point en route to the south. BG Thomas Ransom’s brigade (BG McArthur’s DIV) remained behind to guard and maintain the critical wagon road which carried the bulk of the supplies required by the army.

Site 48. Holmes plantation, “Trinidad.” GPS: N32° 18.18', W91° 7.46' From Site 47 proceed south on LA-603 for 5.6 mi. to Holmes plantation. No trace of the antebellum house exists. [B] 23 – 29 Apr 63. As soon as MG John McClernand’s XIII Corps was well on the way southward toward Hard Times Plantation, MG James B. McPherson’s XVII Corps followed from Milliken’s Bend. [B] 25 Apr 63. McArthur’s DIV (of McPherson’s XVII Corps) was ordered to stay behind to guard, improve, and maintain the long wagon road to Mrs. Perkins’ plantation (Site 58). COL William Hall’s BDE was assigned the section of road

64 from Richmond to Pointe Clear Plantation, with headquarters at Holmes’ plantation, but every major plantation along the way had a regiment as garrison. [B] 11 May 63. Hall’s brigade (of McArthur’s DIV) was ordered to march southward to Mrs. Perkins’ plantation in expectation of the completion of the Bowers’ Landing Road (Site 43) after which the road from Milliken’s Bend to Mrs. Perkins’ plantation was to be abandoned. [B] 3 Apr – 15 May 63. The wagon road from Milliken’s Bend to Mrs. Perkins’ plantation, which was both ungraded and unsurfaced, was the Main Supply Line of the Army of the Tennessee from 3 Apr until 15 May, the date that the Bowers’ Landing Road was completed. It is estimated that about 4,000 wagons, pulled by 16,000 horses and/or mules, were used to maintain the flow of supplies (food, forage, munitions, camp equipage, and all of the other matériel required by an army in the field) during the period from about 15 April to 13 May 63.

Site 49. Dawson’s plantation. GPS: N32° 16.363', W91° 6.614' From Site 48 proceed south on LA-603 for 3.5 mi. to Dawson’s plantation. No trace of the antebellum house exists. [B] 6 Apr 63. BG Osterhaus’ DIV, leading the Union advance southward, passed this point and dropped off BG Theophilus Garrard’s BDE to improve and maintain the road along Roundaway Bayou. Osterhaus, with BG Sheldon’s BDE, continued south to occupy Montgomery’s plantation, on Bayou Vidal Road (modern LA-603) 2 miles west of Pointe Clear Junction. [B] 20 Apr 63. BG Alvin Hovey’s DIV (McClernand’s XIII Corps) reached this point, and the following day moved on to Dunbar’s plantation and Mill Bayou.

Site 50. Surget’s plantation. GPS: N32° 15.05', W91° 5.56' From Site 49 proceed south on LA-603 for 2.2 mi. to Surget’s plantation. No trace of the antebellum house exists. [B] Early May 63. One RGT of COL William Hall’s BDE (BG McArthur’s DIV) garrisoned this plantation during the period when the BDE was assigned the duty of maintaining and guarding the Main Supply Line of the Army of the Tennessee. It was relieved of duty and joined the BDE on its march south on 11 May.

Site 51. Pointe Clear Plantation. GPS: N32° 14.387', W91° 07.310' From Site 50 proceed south on LA-603 for 2.3 mi. to Pointe Clear Junction. Pointe Clear was owned by “Pliney” Smith in 1863, and was one of the most pretentious homes in the region. The house was located on the south bank of Roundaway Bayou and is no longer accessible to conventional vehicles. [B] 4 Apr 63. Noon. McClernand established the HQ, XIII Corps in the house. The plan to continue 2 mi. southward to the river-bank village of New Carthage had proved impossible because the two-mile-long road to the village ran along the top of an artificial levee (there was no natural levee along this section of Roundaway Bayou), and the road and levee were interrupted by three wide crevasses through which raced deep and swift currents. Bridges would have to be constructed if the march were to be continued.

65 [B] 4 Apr 63. Afternoon. Small-arms fire all around the perimeter of the Union encampment had grown to be a serious nuisance. Country people told McClernand that the sharpshooters belonged to Confederate LTC Harrison’s 12 CAV BN, whose camp was westward along Bayou Vidal, so he sent his most trusted subordinate, BG Peter Osterhaus, to clean them out. At Dunbar’s plantation (Site 31) the sharpshooters vanished. Osterhaus left an outpost at Dunbar’s and returned to Pointe Clear. [B] 3-16 Apr 63. A first attempt at building a bridge across the crevasses between Pointe Clear and New Carthage failed. This made it impossible to follow the plan to use New Carthage and the high and dry natural levee along the Mississippi River at Ione Plantation, another 2 miles southwest of New Carthage, as a staging area for a landing at Warrenton. This news, plus other considerations, forced Grant, who was still at Young’s Point, to abandon Warrenton as a landing point, and secure a landing at Grand Gulf, about 27 river miles south of New Carthage. However, the new plan required that the army march overland to Hard Times Plantation, which had an excellent steamboat landing and abundant dry ground around it to use as a staging area. [B] 16 Apr 63. McClernand’s entire XIII Corps (Osterhaus,’ Carr’s, A. J. Smith’s, and Hovey’s DIVs) had arrived from Milliken’s Bend and was encamped around Pointe Clear and Dunbar’s plantation. [B] 17-19 Apr 63. Grant rode to Pointe Clear from Richmond and established his HQ on 18 Apr. On 19 Apr he returned to Milliken’s Bend. [B] 19 Apr 63. To everyone’s surprise, the steamboat Forest Queen, accompanied by tugboat Ivy, arrived at Pointe Clear, demonstrating that there was a navigable channel along Roundaway Bayou connecting Pointe Clear with the Mississippi River near New Carthage, thus making it possible to move troops by water to Ione Plantation (Site 53). The next day Osterhaus’ entire division was carried to Ione Plantation by Forest Queen, Ivy, and a rag-tag collection of barges. It quickly became evident that the seven steamboats available below Vicksburg were inadequate to move the entire army by water, making it even more critical that a road along Bayou Vidal to Mrs. Perkins’ plantation (on the Mississippi River about 3 miles south of Ione) be completed. [B] 20 Apr 63. Grant, after returning to Milliken’s Bend from his trip to Pointe Clear, decided to land at Grand Gulf (Site 71), and issued Special Orders No. 110 directing the three corps commanders to march to New Carthage. [B] 21 Apr 63. McClernand was assigned the task of constructing the Bayou Vidal road to BG Thomas Ransom’s BDE (BG John McArthur’s division of MG James McPherson’s XVII Corps), newly arrived at Pointe Clear. [B] 23 Apr 63. Grant, now fully committed to forcing a landing at Grand Gulf, moved his HQ from Young’s Point to Pointe Clear. Before leaving Young’s Point he had ordered McPherson’s XVII Corps to march southward behind McClernand’s troops, but to leave McArthur’s division behind to guard and maintain the road from Richmond to Mrs. Perkins’ plantation. Thus only two of DIVs McPherson’s XVII Corps (MG John Logan’s and BG Marcellus Crocker’s) actually accompanied the Army of the Tennessee on its campaign in the interior

66 of Mississippi. Ransom’s BDE (McArthur’s DIV) guarded the road along Bayou Vidal from its headquarters at Pointe Clear, from which it had managed to construct bridges across the crevasses between Pointe Clear and New Carthage. [B] 11 May 63. Ransom left Pointe Clear and marched via the newly- constructed bridges to New Carthage and Mrs. Perkins’. [B] 12 May 63. Ransom was ferried across to Grand Gulf (Site 71), thus re- uniting McArthur’s DIV (less BG Hugh Reid’s BDE, which was still at Lake Providence) at Grand Gulf prior to marching inland for Rocky Springs. Union occupation of the Pointe Clear area ended on this date because of the completion of the Bowers’ Landing Road (Site 43).

Site 52. New Carthage. GPS: N32° 13.413', W91° 07.053' From Point Clear Junction, proceed south on Levee Road for 1.7 mi. to site of New Carthage, which is off the levee to the left on Palmyra Road. This road may be unsuitable for conventional vehicles in wet weather. New Carthage in 1863 was a village on the Mississippi River, but the site is now occupied by Palmyra Landing, a “fishing camp” on Palmyra Lake, which is abandoned Palmyra Bend of the 1863 Mississippi River. Visits should not be attempted by conventional vehicles in wet weather. [B] 3 April 63. Grant had planned to use the river-bank village of New Carthage, only 1.7 mi. to the south of Pointe Clear, as a staging area for an amphibious landing at Warrenton, about 18 river miles upstream. However, when McClernand arrived at Pointe Clear on 3 Apr, the spring floods had inundated the area so deeply that only the roofs of the village were above water, and the only road leading to it, the road from Pointe Clear along the west bank of Roundaway Bayou, was impassable because of crevasses. [B] 6 Apr 63. Despite the vigorous opposition of Confederate sharpshooters, skirmishers from Osterhaus’ DIV managed to cross the crevasses with small boats and, with the support of Opossum, an improvised gunboat made out of a large barge, the soldiers occupied the flooded town. Osterhaus immediately sent a patrol southward along the narrow natural levee toward Ione Plantation.

Site 53. Ione Plantation. GPS: N32° 12.79'N, W91° 9.43'W From Site 52 (Palmyra Road junction on levee), proceed south on Levee Road for 1.6 mi. to site of Ione Plantation. No trace of the antebellum house exists. Ione Plantation was owned by Joshua James and was located on the bank of the Mississippi River about 2 miles southwest of New Carthage, on the high natural levee which extended along the river from a mile north of Ione to a few miles below Mrs. Perkins’ plantation, three river miles below Ione. [B] 3 Apr 63. Having been forced to evacuate New Carthage, Confederate LTC Isaac Harrison’s 15 LA CAV BN fell back to Ione Plantation and converted the gin house into an improvised fort. He commanded fewer than 250 men.

67 [B] 6 Apr 63. Union BG Peter Osterhaus arrived with a strong patrol, but Harrison’s horse soldiers put up a stiff defense which was only overcome when the Union troops brought up their improvised gunboat, Opossum. Osterhaus learned at this time that two regiments of Confederate COL Francis Cockrell’s MO INF (part of BG John Bowen’s garrison at Grand Gulf) were dug in at Mrs. Perkins’ plantation, another 4 miles to the south. As a precaution, Osterhaus fortified a line across the narrow natural levee a few hundred yards south of the Ione Plantation buildings. [B] 8 Apr 63. Confederate COL Cockrell’s force at Mrs. Perkins’ plantation moved forward to within 800 yards of Osterhaus’ line south of Ione; shelled the Union line harmlessly for a short time with a 12-pdr. howitzer; then withdrew to its own lines just north of Mrs. Perkins’ plantation. Cockrell repeated the threat on 15 Apr, but again withdrew without launching an attack. [B] 17 Apr 63. In the early morning hours, the soldiers of Osterhaus’ DIV at Ione Plantation awakened to the rumble of guns from upriver, and realized that the Navy was trying to run past the mighty Confederate River Batteries at Vicksburg. Just after daybreak McClernand’s outpost on the New Carthage levee sighted flaming wreckage. Then at 1220, LTC Henry Warmoth of McClernand’s staff, posted on the roof of Ione plantation house, sighted boats through his field-glasses, and yelled out, “Gunboat in sight!” Amid the yelling, dancing, and drinking of the soldiers, RADM Porter’s ironclads tied up at the Ione Plantation steamboat landing shortly thereafter. [B] 19 Apr 63. Patrols from Osterhaus’ DIV now began to probe cautiously southward toward Mrs. Perkins’ plantation. Note: Proceed 0.2 mi. further on levee road to junction with farm road, carefully turn around, and return to Pointe Clear Junction.

Site 54. Montgomery’s plantation. GPS: N32° 15.02', W91° 8.48' From Pointe Clear Junction, proceed west on LA-603 for 1.4 mi. west to site of Montgomery’s plantation. No trace of the antebellum house exists. [B] 7 Apr 63. The 49 IN INF and 120 OH INF RGTs of BG Theophilus Garrard’s BDE (Osterhaus’ DIV) occupied Montgomery’s plantation in preparation for opening a road along Bayou Vidal to Mrs. Perkins’ plantation on the Mississippi River. By nightfall they arrived near Fisk’s plantation on the Bayou Vidal road 3.4 mi. west of Pointe Clear Junction, where they camped for the night. Note: From Pointe Clear Junction proceed west for 3 mi. to “T” at Afton, turn left, and proceed 1.6 mi. to US-65, Quimby Junction.

Site 55. Dunbar’s plantation. GPS: N32° 12.470', W91° 14.012' From Quimby junction, proceed south on US-65 for 1.9 mi. to Dunbar’s plantation. The house site was actually on the west bank of Bayou Vidal, 100 yds. west of US-65. [B] 4 Apr 63. Patrols from Osterhaus’ DIV (McClernand’s XIII Corps) left a cavalry vedette at Dunbar’s plantation and withdrew to Pointe Clear.

68 [B] 15 Apr 63. Morning. A RGT of Confederate COL Francis Cockrell’s MO INF (BG John Bowen’s Grand Gulf garrison) crossed Mill Bayou, 2.1 mi. south of Quimby, and forced the withdrawal of the Union cavalry vedette. However, Union COL Garrard’s INF force at Montgomery’s plantation moved forward in support, and after a short period of brisk fire, Cockrell’s INF withdrew to below Mill Bayou. [B] 19 Apr 63. Union patrols, which cautiously followed the Confederate withdrawal, reported that Cockrell’s INF had completely withdrawn, and that construction of a road along Bayou Vidal between Dawson’s plantation and Mrs. Perkins’ plantation on the Mississippi River was feasible. However, the road would require the building of a number of long bridges as well as the corduroying of long stretches. [B] 21 Apr 63. McClernand moved Hovey’s division from its camp at Dawson’s plantation to Dunbar’s and Mill Bayou, with the mission of constructing a road along Bayou Vidal to Mrs. Perkins’ plantation on the Mississippi River (Site 58).

Site 56. Mill Bayou. GPS: N32° 12.456', W91° 14.019' From Site 55 continue south on US-65 for 0.2 mi. (total of 2.1 from Quimby junction) to the mouth of Mill Bayou. Mill Bayou drains westward out of Bayou Vidal into the Tensas River. [B] 4 – 9 Apr 63. Mill Bayou was the effective frontier between Confederate and Union forces from 4 Apr, when Confederate LTC Isaac Harrison’s 15 LA CAV BN withdrew before the advance of Union BG Peter Osterhaus’ DIV west of Pointe Clear, until 19 Apr, when Cockrell’s INF withdrew to Grand Gulf (Site 71). [B] 15 Apr 63. After the withdrawal of Cockrell’s INF, which had attacked the Union position at Dunbar’s plantation, Union patrols followed the Confederate withdrawal across Mill Bayou. By 19 Apr Union patrols reported that the road for several miles just south of Mill Bayou was flooded and impassable for wagons and artillery, and that there were several wide but relatively shallow bayous draining westward out of Bayou Vidal. The route south was temporarily blocked by flooded ground, but they reported that, with difficulty, a road could be built.

Site 57. Hovey’s By-pass Road. GPS: N32° 12.776', W91° 14.011' From Site 56 proceed south on US-65 for 0.1 mi. (total of 2.2 mi. from Quimby junction) to site of northern end of Hovey’s bypass road. The southern end of Hovey’s bypass is at Somerset Cemetery and the Hovey’s road historical marker at Bear Den Road on US-65 1.8 mi. south of here (4 mi. south of Quimby junction). Bear Den Road crosses the old channel of Bayou Vidal near the southern bridge site and then returns to US-65. [B] 22 - 26 Apr 63. Union BG Hovey’s division arrived at Mill Bayou on 22 Apr and began the construction of a by-pass road around the flooded section of road south of Mill Bayou. The route involved crossing to the east bank of Bayou Vidal above Mill Bayou, proceeding down that bank for almost 2 mi., and then re- crossing Bayou Vidal to the dry road on the west bank, just below Negro Bayou.

69 South of Negro Bayou the road on the west bank could be made serviceable, although much corduroying would be required. Two long bridges were required (the northern bridge to the east bank of Bayou Vidal was 362 ft., and the southern bridge to the west bank was 550 ft.), with a smaller 150 ft. bridge on the east bank over a slough between Mill and Negro Bayou. The entire road had to be corduroyed. It was declared completed by nightfall on 26 April, and wagon trains began to use it the next day. On 21 Apr, 33 IL INF reached Perkin’s plantation (Site 58) about 3.8 mi. southeast of this cemetery, and COL Isaac Elliott recalled the “large square block of marble . . . in memory of a son who had been lost at sea.” This grave stone, which honors William Perkins who was lost at sea in 1854, is in the Somerset Cemetery near the junction of Bear Den Road and US-65. The cemetery was moved west from its original position at Perkins’ plantation 3.5 mi. southeast. [B] 26 Apr 63. Hovey sent a patrol south and east toward Mrs. Perkins’ plantation, and after only about two miles they met another Union patrol coming from the direction of Mrs. Perkins.’

Site 58. Mrs. Perkins’ plantation. GPS: N32° 9.28', W91° 10.77' From Site 57 proceed south for 3 mi. (total of 5.2 mi. from Quimby junction or 1.2 mi. from Hovey’s road historical marker at Bear Den Road) to LA-605, proceed south on LA-605 for 0.5 mi. to Gatewood Road, proceed northeast on Gatewood Road, turn north at road fork (1.8 mi.), go over levee, travel total of 3.2 mi. to Levee Road; turn north on Levee Road for 0.2 to site of Mrs. Perkins’ plantation. Gateway Road is not paved, is used by farm equipment, and caution should be used in conventional vehicles, then only in dry weather. Access to Levee Road may be blocked. Often called Somerset Plantation, this was one of at least six plantations in the vicinity owned by the Perkins clan, all of which were named Somerset. The “primary” plantation of that name was the home of John Perkins, one of the wealthiest planters in the area and the father-in-law of Mrs. Perkins. His plantation consisted of 17,500 acres and 250 slaves and was valued at $600,000. It was located about a mile to the north on the natural levee along the west bank of Palmyra Lake (historical Palmyra Bend, which was the main channel of the River in 1863). [B] 4 Apr 63. Confederate BG John Bowen, commander of the garrison of Grand Gulf, was convinced that the Union movement south through Louisiana was aimed directly at him (Site 71). In an effort to interdict the Union advance, Bowen sent COL Cockrell and two of his regiments of MO INF plus a pair of 12- pounder guns across the river to Hard Times Plantation in two tiny steamboats, Charm and Hine. Once ashore, Cockrell marched along the Lake St. Joseph Road; then occupied and began to fortify Mrs. Perkins’s plantation with a line of rifle pits across the natural levee from the river bank to the swamps to the west. [B] 6 Apr 63. Bowen sent a third regiment to Cockrell at Mrs. Perkins’ plantation. Two days later Cockrell tried to goad the Union forces at Ione into

70 attacking his position by moving his two guns forward and shelling the Union line, but the Union soldiers made no reply, even with their own more powerful artillery. [B] 9 Apr 63. Cockrell sent one of his three regiments in Louisiana westward along the Bayou Vidal Road to Mill Bayou, which it reached after much difficulty due to the flooded road. The Confederates soon made contact with the Union vedette south of Dunbar’s plantation. Cockrell probed the Union lines with scouts and patrols, and by 12 April he believed that the Union positions were vulnerable. Bowen then ordered Cockrell to attack the Union cavalry at Dunbar’s plantation (Site 31), drive it back to Pointe Clear, and in the confusion, attack and drive the Federal forces at Ione Plantation back to Pointe Clear. [B] 15 Apr 63. Cockrell launched his attack on Dunbar’s plantation, but was halted by strong Union resistance. The attack on Ione Plantation was then cancelled, and the regiment at Mill Bayou was withdrawn to Mrs. Perkins’ plantation. [B] 17 Apr 63. Bowen learned that a powerful Union ironclad fleet had run the Vicksburg batteries, and hastily withdrew Cockrell’s troops to Grand Gulf, lest they be captured or marooned in Louisiana. [B] 19 Apr 63. Union patrols from BG Osterhaus’ DIV at Ione Plantation found Mrs. Perkins’ plantation evacuated by Confederates. Osterhaus occupied the plantation grounds immediately, reporting to Grant (at Pointe Clear) that there was enough dry ground for only two divisions, and that contact with a patrol from BG Hovey’s division revealed that the Bayou Vidal road was complete and usable. Because of Perkin’s excellent steamboat landing and large area of dry ground, it immediately became a major forward supply base and concentration point for the Federal forces. [B] [NavOp] 19 - 22 Apr 63. With damage repaired, Porter moved his ironclad squadron down to Mrs. Perkins’ plantation, and on 20 Apr, he took ironclad Tuscumbia and ram General Price downriver for a look at the Confederate fortifications at Grand Gulf. On 22 Apr he made a second visit, this time with mighty Lafayette, which exchanged a few shots with the Confederate guns. Back at Mrs. Perkins’ plantation, Porter sent messages to both Grant and McClernand, telling them that the place could be taken if the army moved promptly. The message reached McClernand, at Pointe Clear, at 2300, 22 Apr, and he immediately ordered Osterhaus to put every man he had in the Mrs. Perkins’ plantation area aboard transports and barges, in preparation for a landing at Grand Gulf. [B] [NavOp] 24 Apr 63. The five transports that survived running the Vicksburg batteries on 22 Apr had been repaired, with the exception of Anglo- Saxon, which had a broken wheel but could be towed. Along with the two transports that survived the 17 April run, this gave McClernand six operational transports, one that could be towed, the ram General Price, the tug Ivy, and a large number of barges that could be used to transport his forces across the River to Grand Gulf. [B] 24 Apr 63. Grant and Porter, aboard General Price, steamed down to inspect Grand Gulf more closely, and decided that the Navy could silence the

71 Confederate guns in preparation for a landing. However, Grant calculated that he would need at least a full corps of three or four divisions ashore as quickly as possible in order to secure the landing place, and the space at Mrs. Perkins’ plantation was inadequate to concentrate such a force. The obvious option was to move to Hard Times Plantation, because it was only 3 miles from Grand Gulf, had a large area of dry ground, an excellent steamboat landing, and a gentle offshore current for the anchorage of the transports and barges. [B] 25 Apr 63. McClernand moved his headquarters from Pointe Clear to Mrs. Perkins’ plantation and ordered Osterhaus to reconnoiter the Lake St. Joseph Road (modern MS-605 and MS-608), which was reported to be a good road that paralleled the western and southern shore of Lake St. Joseph all the way to Hard Times. Osterhaus immediately sent a strong combat team, under COL James Keigwin, to investigate the route. [B] 26 Apr 63. McPherson’s XVII Corps was on the road south from Young’s Point and Milliken’s Bend. Only Sherman’s XV Corps still remained in the posts opposite Vicksburg. [B] 27 Apr 63. Grant visited McClernand at Mrs. Perkins’ and together they oversaw the embarkation of Carr’s and Osterhaus’ DIVs, the only two XIII Corps DIVs actually on site, in preparation for the move to Hard Times. Despite heavy rain, Hovey’s and A. J. Smith’s DIVS were fast approaching on the newly- completed Bayou Vidal Road. The convoy steamed down-river as soon as the troops were loaded, and anchored off Hard Times that afternoon. Grant expected to land at Grand Gulf the next day. [B] 28 Apr 63. Keigwin reported that the Lake St. Joseph Road went all the way to Hard Times, and that it was open for traffic (Sites 59-65). [B] 5 May 63. Tuttle’s and Steele’s DIVs (Sherman’s XV Corps) arrived at Mrs. Perkins’ plantation, having marched from Milliken’s Bend via Richmond and the Bayou Vidal road over the previous two days. [B] 6 May 63. An acute shortage of steamboats in the river below Vicksburg made it impractical for Sherman’s troops to complete their journey to Grand Gulf, which fell into Union hands on 3 May, by steamboat, so they continued on their way on foot along the Lake St. Joseph Road to Hard Times Plantation. [B] 15 May 63. Following the Federal occupation of Grand Gulf on 3 May, and the opening of the Bowers’ Landing Road on 15 May, the long wagon route from Milliken’s Bend through Richmond, and Pointe Clear to Mrs. Perkins’ plantation was abandoned, leaving only COL Richard Owen’s 60 IN INF at Mrs. Perkins’. [G] 31 May 63. Confederate MG John Walker’s TX DIV arrived at Mrs. Perkins’ plantation via the Bayou Vidal Road (modern Gatewood Road), only to find the supposed supply depot completely empty, except for 60 IN INF, which was rescued in the nick of time by the arrival of transport Forest Queen, covered by the guns of ironclad Carondelet. Following the abortive attack, the Confederates withdrew toward Bucks plantation on the Tensas River (Site 170).

72 Site 59. Wyoming Plantation. GPS: N32° 70.150', W91° 12.687' From Site 58 turn around and proceed back to LA-605. Turn left (south) on LA-605; proceed for 2.7 mi. to “T” with LA-608. Turn left (northeast) onto LA-608 and proceed for 0.5 mi. The house was occupied by Mrs. John Ogden and was located on private property approx. 300 yds. to the left (north), just to the right (east) of the present farm road. [B] 25 Apr 63. A patrol from Osterhaus’ DIV, commanded by COL James Keigwin and comprised of 49 IN INF, 114 OH INF, a large detachment of 2 IL CAV, a section of 7 MI BTRY with two 20-lb. Parrott rifles, and LT Tunica’s ENG, left Mrs. Perkin’s plantation to explore the Lake St. Joseph Road (modern LA-608 and LA 605). Four miles from Mrs. Perkins’s plantation, near George Douglas’ Plantation, Keigwin found the Holt’s Bayou bridge burned. A new bridge was quickly constructed. Another 0.5 mi. brought them to Bayou du Rossett and a second burned bridge. The stream was deep and 120 ft wide. It was eventually bridged with a raft made of neighboring buildings. Keigwin camped here for the night, and the next morning continued his probe southward along the Lake St, Joseph Road. Note: Turn around and proceed back (west) to the junction of LA-608 with LA-605. [B] 9 May 63. An artilleryman in Sherman’s XV Corps recalled; “We crossed Douglas’ bridge and encamped for the night at Mrs. John Ogden's plantation [Wyoming], then being used for Gen. Blair's Head Quarters.”

Site 60. Franklin Plantation. GPS: N32° 6.311', W91° 14.117' From Site 59 turn around and proceed 0.5 mi. back to junction of LA-608 with LA-605 and proceed straight (south) on LA-605 for another 2.1 mi. (total of 2.6 mi. from Wyoming to Franklin Plantation). [B] 26 Apr 63. Morning. Keigwin’s task force passed Franklin Plantation en route toward Hard Times Plantation. Their mission was to open a road from Mrs. Perkins’ plantation, on the Mississippi River 7 miles northeast of this point, to Hard Times Plantation, on the Mississippi River 3 miles west of Grand Gulf. An acute shortage of transport vessels made it necessary to move some units of the Union Army of the Tennessee by land to Hard Times, rather than transport them by the faster and more convenient water route. [B] 6 May 63. Sherman’s XV Corps passed Franklin Plantation, and Sherman wrote to his wife, “We have found some magnificent plantations most horribly plundered. Dr. Allen T. Bowie’s plantation is the finest I ever saw . . . I fear the house and contents will be burned by the stragglers from my corps.” While waiting to cross the bridges across the bayous to their front, soldiers from Tuttle’s DIV, 8 IA and 12 IA INF, who had been captured at the Battle of Shiloh on 6 Apr 62 and had spent six months in Confederate prison camps prior to their parole, burned a number of the plantation homes, including Franklin. [B] 10 May 63. An artilleryman in Sherman’s XV Corps wrote in his diary: “A few miles from camp we passed the ruins of Dr. Allen Bowie’s mansion and cotton house . . . All that remained of the furniture was a piano in the front yard,

73 of which the top had been taken off. From appearances and report at least $500,000 dollars worth of property must have been destroyed.

Site 61. Ann E. Routh’s plantation. GPS: N32° 3.43', W91° 13.63' From Site 60 proceed 1.4 mi. straight (south) to Newellton at junction of LA- 605 and LA-4. From Newellton at junction of LA-605 and LA-4, proceed straight (south) on LA-605 for 0.9 mi. to Ann E. Routh’s plantation, which was located on a narrow peninsula between Phelps Bayou (now dry) on the north, and Clark Bayou on the south. [B] 26 Apr 63. Both bayous were deep, swift, and unfordable when Union COL James Keigwin’s task force arrived on its march to Hard Times Plantation, on the Mississippi River 8 miles to the east. Confederate LTC Isaac Harrison’s 15 LA CAV BN had burned both bridges and deployed skirmishers around the buildings of Routhwood Plantation to dispute the advance of the Federal task force. However, heavy Union rifle fire forced the Confederates to fall back across Clark Bayou. (Site 62) [B] 10 May 1863. An artilleryman in Sherman’s XV Corps recalled: “I went ahead of the battery, and stopped at Routh's plantation, across the bayou . . . The 8th MO wagon tipped over in the Phelps' bayou and the same wagon and Gen. Blair's wagon tipped over in Clark’s Bayou. From the latter, liquor in bottles and several barrels of beer were readily rescued by the soldiers for the sake of the articles.”

Site 62. Clark Bayou. GPS: N32° 3.29', W91° 13.54' From Site 61 proceed south on LA-605 for 0.3 mi. to Clark Bayou. [B] 31 Mar - 25 Apr 63. Confederate LTC Isaac Harrison, with only about 250 men and four 12-pounder guns, had been forced to withdraw in the face of the overwhelming numbers of Union forces advancing southward from Richmond. [B] 26 Apr 63. Harrison finally made a determined stand behind deep and swift Clark Bayou. COL Keigwin brought up his two 20-lb. Parrott rifles, which were far heavier than Harrison’s artillery. Harrison’s cavalrymen quickly fell back under the fire of the big guns, and Keigwin was able to cross Clark Bayou unopposed. LT Tunica’s ENGs immediately began construction of bridges across both Phelps Bayou and Clark Bayou, using boards and timbers recycled from the buildings of Routhwood. Construction was difficult, and the bridges were not completed until late afternoon on 27 April. [B] 27 Apr 63. Well before the bridges were completed, Keigwin sent MAJ Arthur Hawhe with four companies of INF to track down Harrison’s Confederate force. (Site 63) [B] 6 May 63. MG Sherman with Tuttle’s and Steele’s DIVs reached here late in the evening, having marched all the way from Mrs. Perkins’ plantation in a single day. Tuttle’s DIV was forced to stop for the night, but Steele’s DIV marched on through the night toward Hard Times, 7 miles away. [B] 7 May 63. Dawn. Tuttle’s DIV left Clark Bayou en route to Hard Times.

74 [B] 10 May 63. Blair’s DIV, which had encamped at Wyoming Plantation on 9 May, marched over Clark Bayou en route to Haller Nutt’s Winter Quarters Plantation.

Site 63. Choctaw Bayou. GPS: N31° 59.27', W91° 15.37' From Site 62 proceed south for 1.2 mi. to junction with LA-608; turn right (southwest) onto LA-605 and proceed southwest for 4.5 mi. on LA-605 (stay on LA-605 by turning left at intersection 3.4 mi. from LA-608) to Choctaw Bayou. [B] 27 Apr 63. Union MAJ Arthur Hawhe, commanding a force of four companies of infantry, marched southeast from Routhwood Plantation along the Lake St. Joseph Road (modern LA-605) with the mission of locating Confederate LTC Isaac Harrison and his 15 LA CAV BN. A little over a mile southeast of Clark Bayou the road branched, and tracks in the dirt road clearly indicated that Harrison’s Confederates had withdrawn down the southeast fork toward St. Joseph. Hawhe followed cautiously, and after traveling just over four miles encountered the Confederates deployed on the south bank of unfordable Choctaw Bayou. The Confederates had burned the bridge over the bayou. Hawhe had orders only to find the Confederates, not attack them, so he returned to Clark Bayou, arriving just as the bridge over that bayou was completed. [B] 27 Apr 63. Keigwin immediately set out with his entire force (less a detachment of 20 men left behind to guard the newly-constructed bridges across Clark’s and Phelp’s Bayous) to eliminate the threat of Harrison’s Confederates. He sent his cavalry forward to hold the Confederates in place until his infantry and artillery could arrive. When he arrived at Choctaw Bayou, he found Harrison’s four 12-pounder howitzers emplaced on a point of land jutting into Lake Bruin, protected on one side by the lake and on two sides by Choctaw Bayou. Undaunted, Keigwin placed one of his big 20-lb. Parrott rifles near the lake and the other in an open field to provide a deadly cross-fire on the Confederate position. The Confederates withstood the cannon fire only for a few minutes before they withdrew rapidly southward toward St. Joseph. [B] 27 Apr 63. Keigwin believed that the skirmish ended any possible threat to his road and bridges. Returning to the Lake St. Joseph Road, he turned eastward toward Hard Times Plantation. (Site 65). Turn around; proceed north on LA-605 for 4.5 mi. to the junction with LA-608. Turn right onto LA-608.

Site 64. Winter Quarters Plantation. GPS: N32° 1.108', W91° 9.982' From Site 63 turn around; proceed north on LA-605 for 4.5 mi. to the junction with LA-608. Turn right onto LA-608. From junction of LA-605 and LA-608, proceed southeast on LA-608 for 2.3 mi. to Winter Quarters, which belonged to the Haller Nutts, and was the only home left standing of the 15 mansions that lined Lake St. Joseph. [B] 28 Apr 63. Nightfall. COL James Keigwin’s combat team from Osterhaus’ division (McClernand’s XIII Corps), fresh from its skirmish with Confederate LTC Isaac Harrison’s force at Choctaw Bayou, arrived at about nightfall and camped around the buildings of Winter Quarters. Early the next

75 morning the team continued westward for the final 3 miles to Hard Times Plantation. [B] 30 Apr 63. Noon. A. J. Smith’s DIV of McClernand’s XIII Corps marched wearily past on their way to Hard Times, having been on the march from Pointe Clear via the Bayou Vidal road and the Lake St. Joseph road for four days. [B] 6 May 63. Sherman, with Steele’s DIV, marched past late at night, but did not stop. Tuttle’s DIV passed shortly after dawn the next morning. [B] 10 May 63. An artilleryman in Blair’s DIV of Sherman’s XV Corps recalled: “We encamped at about 4 P. M. on Haller Nutt's plantation about 2 or 3 miles from Hard Times landing, and the boats are visible from camp.”

Site 65. Hard Times Plantation. GPS: N32° 2.52', W91° 8.15' From Site 64 proceed east on LA-608 for 4.9 mi. to the gate on the right, the road leads over the levee to Lake Yucatan (Hard Times Plantation). The actual site of Hard Times Plantation is now in the middle of Yucatan Lake, which is an abandoned meander of the Mississippi River. The site designated is on the shore of Yucatan Lake 10.1 mi. west of the actual site, but it has closely similar geographic characteristics, and has been chosen as a surrogate for the 1863 site. This road is closed during high water, usually in the winter. [B] 28 Apr 63. 0600. Carr’s DIV and Osterhaus’ DIV (McClernand’s XIII Corps) arrived at Hard Times as planned. Osterhaus’ DIV remained aboard the boat anchored off the landing, but Carr’s DIV debarked and camped on shore. The steamboats that had carried Carr’s DIV immediately returned to Mrs. Perkins’ plantation to pick up Hovey’s DIV, which by this time would have arrived at that point. [B] Later that morning Keigwin’s task force arrived at Hard Times, where Keigwin reported to Osterhaus, who was still aboard ships anchored off-shore. To Keigwin’s surprise, his little task force was immediately ordered to board the boats as well. [B] 29 Apr 63. 0600. The transports carrying Hovey’s DIV arrived from Mrs. Perkins’ plantation, giving McClernand three of his four divisions concentrated at Hard Times by 0630 of 29 April, while his fourth division, A. J. Smith’s, was approaching along the Lake St. Joseph road. [B] [NavOp] 29 Apr 63. 0700. The soldiers packed aboard transports and barges, as well as the men ashore, all watched breathlessly as four of RADM Porter’s fleet, the “City Series” gunboats Pittsburg, Louisville, Carondelet, and Mound City, slid out into the stream and headed for Grand Gulf, to be followed shortly by the remaining three vessels of Porter’s fleet, Benton, Tuscumbia, and Lafayette. Everyone knew that the mission of the gunboats was to silence the Confederate guns at Grand Gulf, in preparation for a landing at that point (Sites 71-73). Shortly after the departure of the ironclads, the transport and barge fleet also cast off, but the boats moved only about a mile downstream to a position just out of range of the Confederate guns in Fort Cobun, northernmost of the two Confederate batteries comprising the fortress of Grand Gulf. (Site 71)

76 [B] [NavOp] 29 Apr 63. Beginning at about 0800, the Union soldiers ashore, as well as in the crowded transports and barges on the Mississippi, were able to hear the thunder of guns and see the smoke rising from the direction of Grand Gulf. The fight continued until about 1250, when it finally ceased. The gunboats had been unable to silence the Confederate guns, and Porter and Grant (who had watched the fight from the deck of the tug Ivy) agreed that it was impractical to attempt a landing at that point, and both the transport fleet and the naval vessels returned to Hard Times. The men were unloaded with all possible speed and marched southward across the base of Coffee Point, heading toward Disharoon’s plantation, on the Louisiana shore of the Mississippi River about 3 miles downstream. [B] 29 Apr. 63. A. J. Smith’s men plodded into camp about mid-afternoon, and fell in at the rear of the column marching southward across the base of Coffee Point. [B] 6 May 63. Sherman, with Steele’s DIV, arrived at about midnight via the Lake St. Joseph Road. Tuttle’s DIV arrived the next day about 0700. [B] 7 May 63. Dawn. MG Sherman, with BG Steele’s DIV of his XV Corps, arrived at Hard Times via the Lake St. Joseph Road, and the men were immediately loaded aboard transports for the trip across the Mississippi to Grand Gulf, which by this time was in Union possession. Tuttle’s men arrived at Hard Times about 0700, and by nightfall they had also been ferried across the River to Grand Gulf. [B] 10-11 May 63. BG Blair’s DIV arrived at Hard Times with 200 wagons filled with supplies for Grant’s army. I took until the evening of 11 May before the last of the DIV disembarked at Grand Gulf.

Site 66. Disharoon’s plantation. GPS: N31° 59.17', W91° 11.08' From Site 65 return to LA-608 and turn left (east); proceed for 70.2 mi. to junction of LA-608 and LA 605; proceed southwest on LA-605 for 2.7 mi. to LA- 604; proceed east on LA-604 for 4.5 mi. to site of Disharoon’s plantation. The site of Disharoon’s plantation no longer exists, it having been eroded away by the river shortly after the Civil War. The actual site is about 1 mi. to the east in the middle of the modern Mississippi River. [B] 29 Apr 63. Afternoon. Disharoon’s plantation was fronted by an excellent steamboat landing and was surrounded by a considerable area of dry ground. McClernand’s XIII Corps began arriving late in the afternoon, and immediately began preparations for loading once more on the transports and barges. Grant and McClernand arrived about sundown. During the night of 29/30 ADM Porter and his ironclad fleet escorted the empty transports and barges past the almost- crippled Confederate batteries at Grand Gulf and arrived safely at Disharoon’s plantation. [B] 29 Apr 63. Night. Knowing very little about the nature of the countryside and the road network on the Mississippi side of the river, Grant at this point intended to land at Rodney (Site 79), a small river-bank town about 12 river miles south of Disharoon’s plantation. However, late that night a black man described

77 as an “intelligent contraband” (i.e., an escaped slave) informed Grant that Bruinsburg, a plantation town on the Mississippi shore only about 5 river miles below Disharoon’s, had an excellent steamboat landing as well as a network of roads connecting it to Port Gibson, a large town on the main road connecting Vicksburg and Natchez. Grant immediately changed his plans and directed that his forces be landed at Bruinsburg. [B] 29 Apr 63. Night. While at Disharoon’s, Grant somehow found time to write to Sherman, back at Young’s Point, asking him to bring two of his XV Corps DIVs to Perkins’ plantation with all possible speed. The message was delivered to Sherman on 1 May, while he was still engaged in the demonstration against Drumgould’s Bluff. (We can guess that the message was taken by little tug Ivy to Bowers’ Landing, then carried by horseback across the swampy base of De Soto Peninsula to Young’s Point, and finally by steamboat up the Yazoo to Sherman’s headquarters.) [B] 30 Apr 63. McClernand’s XIII Corps, camped around Disharoon’s plantation on the west bank of the Mississippi, boarded the available transports and barges shortly after dawn. Space was so sparse that only artillery horses were allowed aboard, and even Grant’s horse was left behind. Even mighty Benton, Porter’s flagship, had a contingent of troops aboard (companies A, B, and C, 46 IN INF, led by LT Thomas Howes). The motley fleet of warships, transports, and barges, all loaded to the gunwales with men, pulled away from the bank at Disharoon’s at 0800. The Union transport fleet consisted of Moderator, Empire City, J. W. Cheeseman, Anglo-Saxon, Horizon, Silver Wave, and Forest Queen. Assisting in transporting troops was tug Ivy, ram General Price, and many barges. Even the ironclads had troops aboard. En route downstream, Grant, who was in the pilothouse of Benton with Porter, noticed the tension aboard and directed the band to play “The Red, White and Blue,” thus, indicating to everyone in the fleet that the landing would be unopposed, and that there was no need for stealth.

Note: This concludes the tour of Phase B—The Winter of Great Hardships. From Site 66. Disharoon’s plantation turn around and proceed west on LA-604 for 4.5 mi. to LA-605. Turn left (south) onto LA-605; proceed 0.8 mi. to US-65. Turn right (north) onto US-65; proceed 28.4 mi. to I-20E; turn right (east) onto I- 20E; proceed 18.5 mi. across the Mississippi River Bridge to Exit 1A (Washington St.), turn right (north) onto Washington St.; proceed 2.9 mi. to Vicksburg at intersection of Washington and Clay Sts.

Phase C: The Campaign into the Interior of Mississippi

Site 67. Warrenton Battery: GPS: N32° 14.89', W90° 55.84' From Vicksburg, proceed south on Washington St. (US-61 BUS or US-80) for 3 mi. to I-20E. Pass over I-20 bridge at Mississippi Welcome Center and turn left (east) onto I-20E. Proceed 0.5 mi. and turn right (south) onto US-61S. Proceed 5.6 mi. south on US-61; turn right onto Warrenton Rd. Proceed 0.5 mi. on

78 Warrenton Rd. Actual location of the battery is 0.5 mi. northwest. It is not accessible to conventional vehicles. [C] Apr – May 1863. The Confederates constructed an armored battery for two 20-lb. Parrott rifles on a low ridge of ground that remained above all but the highest flood levels extended from the base of the bluffs to the east all the way to the Mississippi River. [C] On about 30 Apr 63. LTG John Pemberton ordered MG Carter Stevenson’s DIV to move from Vicksburg to the vicinity of the Warrenton Battery, from which the troops could readily man the Warrenton-Lanier defense line which was intended to protect Vicksburg from attack from the south (Sites 68, 106).

[NavOp] 9 May 63. Anticipating interference from the Confederate guns against the free use of the steamboat landing at Bowers’ Landing after the completion of the Bowers’ Landing Road (Site 43), BG Jeremiah Sullivan, who was responsible for the construction of the road, requested that the Navy reduce the Confederate battery. The next day ironclad Mound City arrived, anchored in midstream, and completely destroyed the Confederate battery. There was no Confederate response.

Site 68. Redbone Church: GPS: N32° 13.070', W90° 53.450'. From Site 67 turn around and proceed 0.5 mi. back (east) to US-61; turn right (south) and proceed 0.8 mi. to Redbone Rd. Turn left (east) on Redbone Road and proceed 2.4 mi. to Redbone Church. [C] Late Apr 63. In addition to the primary defenses of Vicksburg, LTG John Pemberton ordered that an outer line of positions be selected to protect the city from an attack from the south. Earthworks were actually constructed only at two places, Redbone Church, which straddled the main highway between Port Gibson, Hankinson’s Ferry, and Vicksburg, and Lanier’s plantation (Site 106). The rest of the line consisted only of positions previously selected for defensive potential. [C] 1 May 63. A detachment of Carter Stevenson’s DIV occupied the Redbone Church position immediately following the battle of Port Gibson. [C] 5 May 63. Following the Union capture of Hankinson’s Ferry (Site 70), Grant’s first intention was to attack Vicksburg by advancing directly northward up the Vicksburg Road. In preparation, he ordered MG McPherson, commander of the XVII Corps, to lead a combat patrol consisting of a detachment of 6 MO CAV (Col. Francis Wright), two RGTs of infantry from COL George Boomer’s BDE (BG Marcellus Crocker’s DIV), and a section (2 guns) of artillery, up the Vicksburg Road toward Vicksburg to scout the approaches to the city. Late in the morning McPherson’s patrol encountered Carter Stevenson’s INF manning the defense line at Redbone Church, and withdrew to report to Grant at Hankinson’s Ferry.

Site 69. Vicksburg-Port Gibson Highway. GPS: N32° 10.503', W90° 54.631' At “Y” intersection in front (south) of Site 68 (Redbone Church) turn right and continue south on Redbone Road for 1.3 mi. to junction with Jeff Davis Road;

79 turn right and continue southwest on Jeff Davis Road for 3.1 mi. to junction with Hankinson Road. The road between Hankinson’s Ferry and Redbone Church was the Vicksburg Road and was unsurfaced in 1863. [C] 29 Apr 63. As soon as Confederate LTG Pemberton realized that the Federal army in Louisiana opposite Grand Gulf constituted a major threat, he ordered MG Carter Stevenson, commander of the Vicksburg forces, to send two INF BDEs to reinforce BG John Bowen at Grand Gulf. Stevenson dispatched Tracy’s AL (unattached) BDE and Baldwin’s BDE (of MG Martin Smith’s DIV) from Vicksburg. Tracy left Vicksburg at 1900, Baldwin at 2100, and both marched rapidly south along this road toward Hankinson’s Ferry during the very early morning hours of 30 Apr.

Site 70. Hankinson’s Ferry (Vicksburg Approach). GPS: N32° 08.359', W90° 54.056' From Site 69 at intersection of Jeff Davis and Hankinson Roads, turn left (south) at intersection and proceed 3.3 mi. to locked gate. Actual site of the Ferry is 2.1 mi. southeast. GPS: N32° 06.926', W90° 57.704'. It is privately owned. PLEASE RESPECT PRIVATE PROPERTY. [C] Early spring 63. The main highway between Port Gibson and Vicksburg crossed the Big Black River on a ferry at this point. After the Union threat to Grand Gulf became apparent, Pemberton ordered the barrier raft below Big Black Bridge, which had been constructed to prevent Union warships from attacking the vital railroad bridge, to be cut free and floated down to Hankinson’s Ferry to be used as a floating bridge to facilitate the movement of troops and supplies from Vicksburg to the Confederate garrison at Grand Gulf. [C] 30 Apr 63. Tracy’s AL BDE, which had marched south from Vicksburg late on 29 Apr, crossed the Big Black River on the floating bridge at about noon, en route to join Bowen’s Grand Gulf garrison. Baldwin’s BDE, which had left Vicksburg later than Tracy’s BDE, arrived at Hankinson’s Ferry about 1300, and camped on the south bank. A courier from Bowen arrived at about 2030, with orders to proceed with all possible speed to join Green’s BDE at Port Gibson.

Site 71. Grand Gulf Military Monument. GPS: N32° 01.99', W91° 03.182' From Site 70 turn around and proceed 3.3 mi. north to intersection with Jeff Davis Rd. Turn left (west) onto Jeff Davis road and proceed 2 mi. to US-61. Turn left (south) onto US-61 and proceed south for 12 mi. to Main Grand Gulf Road and sign for Grand Gulf Park. Turn right (west) onto Main Grand Gulf Road and proceed 7.8 mi. to Grand Gulf at Grand Gulf Military Monument Park entrance. Turn right (east) at entrance. Note: The Grand Gulf Military Monument is a fee area. Grand Gulf had been a flourishing river port prior to Civil War, even though much of the town had been eroded away by the Mississippi River by 1862. It is now a ghost town, marked only by the remnants of the street pattern and a few residences and the Grand Gulf Military Monument Park.

80 [C] 17 Apr. Confederate BG John Bowen, in command at Grand Gulf since mid-March 1863, learned that the Union navy had passed the Vicksburg batteries with a fleet of gunboats. Fearing that COL Francis Cockrell’s three INF regiments in Louisiana, (which by this time had withdrawn to Hard Times), were in imminent danger of being trapped, Bowen immediately ordered his two little steamboats, Hine and Charm, to pick up Cockrell’s men and bring them home to Grand Gulf. With Cockrell’s 3 regiments, Bowen’s Grand Gulf Force consisted of COL Cockrell’s MO BDE, BG Martin Green’s AR BDE, 6 field artillery batteries, an independent INF RGT and two independent battalions of INF, plus a detachment of artillerymen who manned the heavy guns in the fortifications. [C] Grand Gulf was one of the few places below Warrenton which offered both a good steamboat landing and a good road into the interior of Mississippi. Shortly after his decision on about 5 Apr not to attempt a landing at Warrenton, Grant had selected Grand Gulf for his amphibious landing. Because he dared not attempt such a landing in the face of artillery, Grant requested that the fortifications be silenced prior to the actual landing of troops. [C] [NavOp] 29 Apr. Morning. Having concentrated an adequate force at Hard Times by 28 April, Grant loaded all available men aboard boats and barges, and waited for RADM Porter’s ironclad gunboats to silence the Confederate batteries at Grand Gulf (Sites 72, 73). While their fire was greatly reduced, it was never silenced, and by about 1250 Porter, running short of ammunition, called off the effort and fell back to Hard Times. The defeat forced Grant to select a landing point still farther downstream, and that night Porter ran both his gunboats and the seven transport vessels without damage past the Grand Gulf batteries to rendezvous with the army at Disharoon’s plantation (Site 66). [C] 2 May. Evening. The Confederate garrison of Grand Gulf had been reduced to the crews of the heavy guns in Forts Wade and Cobun, and a few caretaker troops. All of the others had been drawn southward to defend Port Gibson and the line of Bayou Pierre. [C] 3 May. An order from Bowen to evacuate the town and blow up the three magazines (Fort Wade, Fort Cobun, and the post magazine which had supplied the infantry and field artillery) reached Grand Gulf at about 0300. At dawn the magazines were detonated, the troops already being on the way up the Back Grand Gulf Road toward Hankinson’s Ferry. [C] [NavOp] Union RADM Porter arrived at the waterfront with his ironclads about mid-morning from Bruinsburg, having heard the explosions of the magazines when the Confederate garrison had evacuated the area. Porter immediately sent blue-jackets ashore to secure the town. Then, leaving LCDR Elias Owen at Grand Gulf with ironclads Louisville, Mound City, and Carondelet, he sailed for the mouth of the Red River with Benton, Lafayette, Pittsburg, Ivy, and General Price to meet with RADM David Farragut. Porter’s light draft gunboats were needed to support MG Nathaniel Banks’ offensive up the Bayou Teche to Alexandria, as Farragut’s unarmored, blue-water ships could not venture into the Red River.

81 [C] To LCDR Owen’s surprise, that same afternoon MG Grant, accompanied by only 20 cavalrymen, rode into town on the Back Grand Gulf Road. Owen fed the army commander a good dinner, gave him a suit of fresh underwear, a table on which to write letters, and left him to his own devices. Among the letters was one to BG Jeremiah Sullivan, who commanded the forces left behind at Young’s Point, instructing him to construct a road across the swamps from Hecla Place on Walnut Bayou to Bowers’ Landing on the Mississippi. When completed, supply wagons would no longer need to follow the long and difficult road from Milliken’s Bend to Mrs. Perkins’ plantation. [C] 4 May. Just after midnight. Grant left Grand Gulf en route to Hankinson’s Ferry, which by this time was firmly in Union control. Grand Gulf was immediately converted into a huge forward supply depot. Starting about 7 May a 200-wagon supply train left Grand Gulf each day in support of the army in the interior of Mississippi. This situation was maintained until the investment of Vicksburg, after which the depot was discontinued and the site was occupied only by a small caretaker force.

Site 72. Fort Wade. GPS: N32° 01.890', W91° 03.141' In Grand Gulf Military Monument Park, uphill to the left (north), behind the museum. The Grand Gulf fortifications consisted of two powerful batteries; Fort Wade, on a terrace about 20 feet above the old town, contained one 100-pdr Blakely rifle, two 32-pdr rifles (the projectiles actually weighted 58 pounds), and one 8-in Dahlgren smoothbore. [C] [NavOp] 29 Apr 63. The Confederate defenders watched as four Union ironclads (Pittsburg, Louisville, Carondelet, and Mound City) ran past Fort Cobun, rounded-to in front of Fort Wade, and opened a deliberate fire in the earthwork. The Confederate gunners replied in kind, but most of the shells glanced off the boats’ armor. In contrast, the naval shells penetrated deep into the fresh earth of the Confederate parapet, exploded, and threw masses of earth over the men and guns. Soon the guns could no longer be brought into firing position, and their firing mechanisms and even the bores of the guns became clogged with earth. Even worse, by late morning both 32-pdrs had been dismounted. About 1030 huge Lafayette, which had been shelling Fort Cobun, disengaged and slid downstream to add her fire to the four “City Series” boats. By noon, Fort Wade could no longer return fire, and her commander, COL Wade had been killed.

Site 73. Fort Cobun. GPS: N32° 02.590', W91° 03.101' From Site 71 museum proceed out the front gate and turn right (north) at Grand Gulf. Proceed 0.1 mi. to Grand Gulf Town Square, bear left, pass old general store, and make right 90Eturn in road. Note: At this right-angle turn the old bed of the 1863 Mississippi River may be seen about 100 yds. straight ahead. After right-angle turn proceed straight 0.1 mi. to fork in road. At fork turn left (north) and proceed 0.5 mi. to Fort Cobun.

82 Fort Cobun, the second of the two batteries comprising the fortifications of Grand Gulf, was located at the foot of Point-of-Rock ( a very steep bluff) about 1,500 yards north of Fort Wade. The fort had two 32-pdr rifles, one 8-in Dahlgren smoothbore, and one 30-pdr Parrot rifle. [C] [NavOp] 29 Apr. About 0800. The Confederate gun crews watched as four Union “City Series” ironclads steamed past, firing quick salvos at the parapet of Fort Cobun as they moved downstream. Just behind them two gunboats (Benton and Tuscumbia) of a group of three ironclads rounded-to and opened fire on the fort. The third vessel (Lafayette) took a position well out in the Grand Gulf (a wide embayment north of the fort) from which her 100-lb. Parrott rifle shells enfiladed the Confederate earthwork. The Confederate response was limited by the narrow embrasures, which gave the guns only a small field of view. Shortly after 1000 a Confederate shell struck and penetrated the pilothouse of Benton. Out of control, Benton grounded right under the parapet of the fort. However, the bank was so high and steep that the guns could not be depressed enough to hit her, and the Confederate garrison listened in total frustration while the Union sailors repaired the damage and eventually moved the ironclad back into the channel, where she resumed firing. [C] [NavOp] It was known to the Confederates that Tuscumbia was less strongly built than the other two Union vessels, and they concentrated on her in the hope of sinking her. By late morning she dropped out of the battle and drifted downstream to an anchorage well out-of-range. While the rate of fire of the guns in Fort Cobun was greatly reduced, they were not entirely silenced. Shortly after 1245, the gunboats, short of ammunition, withdrew to Hard Times. The Confederates were euphoric at the thought of defeating the much-feared ironclads.

Site 74. Bayou Pierre Railroad Bridge. GPS: N31° 59.065', W91° 00.364' From Site 73 proceed south for 0.8 mi. to Grand Gulf at Grand Gulf Military Monument gate. Continue straight (south) for another 4 mi. to fork in road. Turn right (south) on Port Gibson Rd. (Old Mill Rd.), proceed 1 mi. to bridge. [C] 1 May 63 Following the defeat of the Grand Gulf force at the Battle of Port Gibson (Sites 81 - 84), the bulk of Bowen’s force withdrew toward Grand Gulf along this road. Assuming that the Union army would immediately pursue, and hoping to hold them south of Bayou Pierre, Bowen halted his withdrawal; deployed his force on the north bank to defend the crossing; and burned both the railroad and highway bridges. [C] 1 May 63. However, Grant had no intention of making a direct attack on Grand Gulf. Instead, his plan was to strike directly for Hankinson’s Ferry. If successful, this move would trap Bowen and his force in Grand Gulf, where he would be forced to surrender without a fight. To ensure that Bowen had withdrawn to the north of the Bayou Pierre, Grant ordered that BG Dennis’ BDE (of MG John Logan’s DIV) pursue as far as the railroad and highway bridges across Bayou Pierre on the Grand Gulf Road. Stevenson’s BDE arrived at the railroad bridge at about 1030, where it immediately received fire from

83 Confederate skirmishers on the north bank. Stevenson, realizing that it was the bulk of the Confederate Grand Gulf force, deployed and traded shots with the Confederates, hoping to persuade them to remain in place until it was too late to interfere with the Federal bridge-building at Port Gibson, only 2 miles to the southeast. [C] 1 May 63. The Union presence at the Bayou Pierre convinced Bowen that the Union army was marching toward Grand Gulf. At about 1515 a courier from MG William Loring arrived at Bowen’s position at the bridge, informing him that he and BG Lloyd Tilghman, with Tilghman’s two-regiment BDE had arrived at Rocky Springs. Bowen had hoped for two brigades, not two regiments. He immediately sent a message to Tilghman ordering him to march for Grindstone Ford and to hold the crossing at all costs (Site 86), hoping that additional reinforcements would arrive from Vicksburg in time to keep the Federals south of Little Bayou Pierre. [C] 1 May 63. Stevenson’s men quietly disengaged at about 1630 and marched off toward Port Gibson. Nevertheless, Bowen remained in position at the bridge until the next morning. [C] 2 May 63. At dawn Bowen realized that the Union forces were marching directly for Grindstone Ford and Hankinson’s Ferry, and that his whole army was in danger of being trapped. He immediately ordered the bulk of his force to march for Ingleside and Hankinson’s Ferry, keeping only Cockrell’s BDE at the bridge with him. Here, at about 2300, MG Loring and BG Tilghman found him (Tilghman had left COL Arthur Reynolds in command of his two-regiment BDE at Willows). Because Loring was Bowen’s senior, Bowen immediately attempted to turn over command to Loring, but Loring refused to accept it. In the meantime Bowen had learned that a TN BDE, BG Alexander Reynolds’, was en route from Vicksburg. [C] 3 May. 0200. At last realizing that even the addition of another BDE could not retrieve the situation, Bowen ordered the garrison of Grand Gulf to spike the guns and blow up the magazines. Alexander Reynolds’ TN BDE arrived from Vicksburg at about 0300, completely exhausted. Giving Alexander Reynold’s men only an hour of rest, Bowen sent them off to reinforce Arthur Reynolds at Grindstone Ford, hoping that it was still in Confederate control. It was not. The partially-burned bridge was already held by Crocker’s DIV of the Union army (Site 86). About 0500 Bowen, with Cockrell’s BDE, left the railroad bridge and marched for Hankinson’s Ferry.

Site 75. Junction of Rodney and Bessie Weather Roads. GPS: N32° 52.360', W91° 00.364' From Site 74 continue straight (south) on Port Gibson (Old Mill) Road for 2.6 mi. to Claiborne County Courthouse, Port Gibson. Turn right (south) onto Main St. and proceed 0.2 mi. to Rodney Road (historic Bruinsburg Road). Turn right (west) onto Rodney Road and proceed 1 mi. on Rodney Road to the intersection of Rodney and Bessie Weather Road. Note: The modern road names are very confusing. The modern Rodney Road is the historic Bruinsburg Road, and the

84 modern Bessie Weather Road and the modern Shaifer Road together form the historic Rodney Road. [C] 30 Apr 63. Aware that the Union army had occupied Disharoon’s plantation late on the night of 29 Apr 63 but ignorant of the place on the Mississippi shore chosen for the landing, Bowen, at Grand Gulf, realized that he would be unable to interfere with the actual landing, but he assumed that the first Union objective would be the road junctions and bridge at Port Gibson. At about 0100 he ordered BG Martin Green’s AR BDE to march immediately for Port Gibson and block the road leading to it from the west. Green was delayed in leaving Grand Gulf, but by 1030 he arrived at the junction west of Port Gibson where the Rodney (modern Bessie Weather) and Bruinsburg (modern Rodney) Roads join. Local residents told him that the Union army was actually advancing on both roads. Green’s force numbered only about 900 men, inadequate to cover both roads, so he gambled that the Rodney (modern Bessie Weather) Road was the most likely route for the Union advance, and selected a position for a road block on a commanding ridge near Magnolia Church, 800 yards east of the Shaifer house (Site 81). However, he kept his BDE concentrated at the road junction. [C] 30 Apr 63. About an hour later, 6 MS INF and the Pettus Flying ARTY arrived, raising Green’s force to about 1,200 men. Bowen arrived at the road junction at about 1900 with news that Tracy’s AL BDE of about 1,500 men, from Vicksburg, would arrive within hours. [C] 1 May 63. Tracy arrived at the road junction at about 0030, which gave Green the manpower required to block both roads. Green sent Tracy’s BDE forward to block the Bruinsburg Road (modern Rodney Road), while he took his own BDE forward to his pre-selected position across the Rodney Road (modern Bessie Weather Road) near Magnolia Church.

Site 76. Shaifer Road Junction. GPS: N31° 57.782', W90° 02.490' From Site 75 take the right (west) fork and proceed on the Rodney Road (historic Bruinsburg Road) for 3.6 mi. to the junction with McAmis Road (historic Shaifer Road). Note: McAmis Road is not usable for conventional vehicles. [C] 1 May 63. Tracy’s AL BDE arrived at this road junction before dawn and deployed to form a road block facing west on the Bruinsburg Road (modern Rodney Road) about 200 yards from the junction, and a second road block across the Shaifer Road (modern McAmis Road) and facing south. Not long after sunrise a Union force (Garrard’s BDE, of Osterhaus’ DIV) approached from the south along the Shaifer Road (McAmis Road), but Tracy’s skirmish line quickly stopped its advance. Rough terrain made it nearly impossible to maintain a formal battle line, so Osterhaus fed his men into a reinforced skirmish line. About 1000 Sheldon’s BDE (Osterhaus’ DIV) arrived with about 1,000 men, and with them Osterhaus was able to force Tracy’s badly outnumbered Confederates back to the northeast, leaving the road junction in Union hands. BG Tracy was killed in the first hour of the battle, and his place was taken by COL Isham Garrott.

85

Site 77. Bruinsburg Plantation. GPS: N31° 56.241', W91° 07.903' From Site 76 continue straight (west) on Rodney Road (historic Bruinsburg Road) 40.3 mi. to Bruinsburg Road. The inconspicuous gravel road on the right leading west is the historic road leading to Bruinsburg Plantation, 3.3 mi. west. The actual location is: GPS: N31° 56.533', W91° 09.461'. Note: This road is not accessible by conventional vehicles. The site of Bruinsburg is also on private property. [C] 30 Apr 63. 0930. Benton grounded first and LT Howe and his detachment from 46 IN INF landed, followed within seconds by 24 IN INF. Skirmish lines formed and raced inland, securing the whole flat to the base of the bluffs, almost a mile away to the east. By noon the bulk of McClernand’s XIII Corps was ashore. Grant was about to give the order to start inland when it was discovered that McClernand’s staff had forgotten to issue the three days rations which were customary at the start of a long march. There was no option but to wait until the necessary supplies were ferried across the river from the depot at Disharoon’s plantation, so the march inland did not actually begin until about 1600, four hours later than intended. [C] [NavOp] 3 May 63. RADM Porter’s mission of protecting the landing of Grant’s army on the Mississippi had now been accomplished, but he remained anchored at Bruinsburg until he was certain that Grant’s bridgehead was secure. Then, at 0415, 0425, and 0435 he heard the huge explosions from the direction of Grand Gulf. Correctly assuming that the Confederates had blown up the magazines to the two forts and the main magazine and evacuated the town and forts, he steamed up with all of his ironclads (except poor Tuscumbia) to investigate (Site 71).

Site 78. Windsor Plantation. GPS: N31° 56.440', W91° 07.789' From Site 77 turn around and proceed back (north) for 0.1 mi. on Rodney Road (historic Bruinsburg Road). Turn right (east) at Windsor Ruins sign and proceed 0.1 mi. to ruins. Windsor Plantation house was an imposing four-story mansion built by Smith Coffee Daniell, II from 1859-1861. It boasted galleries on the second and third levels supported by 29 brick Corinthian columns which were covered with mortar and plaster. The iron stairs (one set still survives and is at the chapel on the Alcorn A&M College campus), column capitals, and balustrades were manufactured in St. Louis. The total cost of the mansion was $175,000 and the mansion survived the Civil War only to be destroyed by an accidental fire in 1890. [C] 30 Apr 63. The Union advance reached the Rodney Road (Bruinsburg Road) at the top of the bluff near Windsor at about 1300, with Carr’s DIV leading, followed in order by Osterhaus’, Hovey’s, and A. J. Smith’s DIVs (about 17,000 men). Grant had remained behind in the bridgehead for some time, but at about 1630 he met McClernand at Windsor Plantation. Earlier, Grant had decided to advance on Port Gibson via the Rodney Road ( modern Shaifer and Bessie

86 Weather Road) rather than the Bruinsburg Road (modern Rodney Road). Thus, when the head of the column turned south toward Rodney and Natchez instead of north toward Port Gibson and Vicksburg, the soldiers believed that they were heading south to join MG Nathaniel Banks in his offensive to capture Port Hudson (the southernmost of the two Confederate fortresses that blocked Union use of the Mississippi River), and their morale sank. Because nearly all of them were from the Old Northwest (which are now called the Lake States), and many had volunteered only to regain possession of the Mississippi River, they regarded the capture of Vicksburg as the primary objective.

Site 79. Rodney. GPS: N31° 51.699', W91° 11.981'. Ghost town on Shuster Road, 3.6 mi. southwest of Alcorn College. Note: Rodney is not on the tour, but is shown for reference only. Rodney was a flourishing river town at the time of the Civil War, with good roads leading into the interior. Its combination of good steamboat landing, roads into the interior, and enough flat ground to provide space for a large forward supply depot, had made Rodney Grant’s first choice as a landing site, but Grant’s decision, made at Disharoon plantation, to land at Bruinsburg instead, took Rodney out of the picture. After the Civil War the river moved out into the floodplain, leaving Rodney without access to the river, and, as a result, it quickly declined in importance.

Site 80. Bethel Presbyterian Church. GPS: N31° 54.353', W91° 07.763' From Site 78 (Windsor) proceed 0.1 mi. to Rodney Road and turn left (south) on Rodney Road (MS-552). Proceed 2.9 mi. to Bethel Church on the left (east) side of the road. Bethel Church (circa 1843) was badly damaged by a tornado on 6 Nov 1943, but was repaired in 1945 and the bulk of the building is original. In 1863 the historic Rodney Road met the road leading from Bruinsburg at a “Y” junction north of the church near the modern road (the old roadbed and “Y” junction may still be seen). [C] 30 Apr 63. When the head of the Union column reached the Bethel road junction near dusk, an officer standing in the middle of the Rodney Road silently directed the column to take the road to the east. Knowing that eastward led to Port Gibson and Vicksburg, while southward led to Natchez and Port Hudson, a wave of cheering ran down the column. As night fell many in the ranks wondered when they were going to bivouac, but none were going to sleep that night as the march continued through the night. [C] 30 Apr 63. Oddly enough, a Confederate scout saw the column turn into the Rodney Road and reported to BG Green, who at that time was a mile west of Port Gibson at the junction of the Rodney and Bruinsburg Roads, that there were 3,000 men in the Union column. It was a slight underestimate.

Site 81. Shaifer house. GPS: N31° 54.353', W91° 07.763' Note: There are two routes (for this guide they will be called “Union” and “Confederate”) to the Shaifer house, both of which have unpaved sections. The

87 Union route from Bethel Church (which was the route of the Union army inland) requires a 4-wheel drive vehicle at all times, as well as a driver with experience driving difficult terrain. The Confederate route (the route of BG Green’s troops to the battle) is unsuitable for conventional vehicles in wet weather. Union route: From Site 80 turn left (east) on Russum-Westside Road, which is immediately south of the church, and proceed for 4.8 mi. to junction with Shaifer Road. Note: The next 3.2 mi. is unpaved and unsuitable for conventional vehicles. Turn left (north) onto Shaifer Road and proceed for 3.2 mi. to Shaifer house.

Confederate route: From Site 80 turn around and proceed back (north) on Rodney Road for 10.7 mi. to junction of Rodney and Bessie Weather Roads. At junction turn right (west) onto Bessie Weather Road (historic Rodney Road) and proceed for 1.1 mi. to road fork with unimproved Shaifer Road on the right. Note: The next 1.1 mi. is unpaved and unsuitable for conventional vehicles in wet weather. Turn right (west) on Shaifer Road (historic Rodney Road) and proceed 1.1 mi. to Shaifer house. [C] 1 May 63. Union BG Carr’s advance guard, marching eastward on the Rodney Road, ran into Green’s pickets west of the Shaifer house at about 0030. The exchange of fire was brief and harmless, though it badly frightened the women of the Shaifer household, who were loading furniture on a wagon in expectation of fleeing to safety in Port Gibson. Green’s pickets immediately fell back to the Confederate skirmish line on Magnolia Church ridge. Carr pursued cautiously, but after a brief exchange of fire the Union troops withdrew to the Shaifer house to await daylight, after which the terrain and Confederate dispositions could be assessed. Grant and McClernand arrived at dawn. [C] Standing on the knoll in front of the Shaifer house, the two generals could see a Confederate battle line on a ridge to the north (Tracy’s road-block on the historic Bruinsburg Road), and were told by an “intelligent contraband” that the Bruinsburg Road ran along that ridge. They could also see the Magnolia Church ridge, only about 600 yards to the southeast, which they assumed was occupied by the Confederate force ahead of them on the Rodney Road. As Carr’s men came up, he deployed Benton’s brigade to the right of the road, and Stone’s brigade to the left, with orders to drive straight ahead and overrun the Magnolia Church positions. The terrain was so broken and difficult that the brigades could not be deployed normally, but eventually enough manpower was assembled in strong skirmish lines to risk moving forward, when it was discovered that the Confederates had only a skirmish line on the Magnolia Church ridge, and by 0700 the Confederate line was forced back to the Foster house ridge (Site 82). [C] In the meantime Grant, worried about the force to the north, intercepted Osterhaus’ DIV, which had arrived on the field immediately behind Carr’s and ahead of Hovey’s divisions, and sent it north to confront Tracy’s Confederate force on the historic Bruinsburg Road. (Site 76).

88 Site 82. Foster Ridge and plantation. GPS: N31° 56.665', W 91° 01.726' Note: If the “Confederate” route was taken to Site 81, turn around; if the “Union” route was taken, continue straight. From the Shaifer house, proceed 0.5 mi. straight (east) on Shaifer Road. The dirt road trace to your left (north) led to the Foster house about 50 yards from Shaifer Road. [C] 30 Apr 63. Nightfall. Confederate BG Green had deployed his BDE in the pre-selected position on Foster Ridge, about 0.5 mi. west of the Shaifer house (Site 81). Late that night he sent a picket forward to a position astride the Shaifer Road (historic Rodney Road) about a hundred yards west-southwest of the Shaifer house, and established a skirmish line along Magnolia Church ridge, about half way between the Shaifer house and Foster Ridge. In the meantime Tracy’s brigade had arrived at the road junction (Site 51), and had been directed to move out on the Rodney Road (historic Bruinsburg Road) and take a position controlling the junction of the Bruinsburg and McAmis (historic Shaifer) Roads (Site 76). The bulk of Tracy’s and Green’s brigades were separated by only about 2,000 yards, but the deep and virtually impassable ravine of Centers Creek prevented direct communication. [C] 1 May 63. Just after midnight, alerted by firing from the direction of the Shaifer house (Site 81), Green’s men fired at the sound of men on the road. Firing flared, with both sides shooting at muzzle flashes. Green’s pre-positioned artillery swept the road, and the Union guns replied in kind. After a short time, the Union troops withdrew until dawn. [C] 1 May 63. About 0700. Carr’s DIV (McClernand’s XIII Corps) attacked and quickly overran the Confederate skirmish line on Magnolia Church Ridge. However, the terrain was so difficult that it proved impossible to maintain formal battle lines, and the attack was easily halted by Green’s main line on Foster Ridge. However, BG Alvin Hovey’s DIV (McClernand’s XIII Corps), marching behind Osterhaus’ DIV, arrived at the Shaifer house (Site 81) about 0900, and McClernand added his force to Carr’s DIV. The attack resumed with Hovey’s DIV on the right of the road and Carr’s DIV on the left. The terrain was so difficult for the attacking force that despite being outnumbered almost nine to one, Green’s BDE managed to hold the Foster ridge until nearly 1000. At that time, Hovey’s men had pushed to within 80 yards of the center of the Confederate line, which was near the Shaifer Road (historic Rodney Road). Losing patience, Hovey ordered an all-out attack. The center of the Confederate line, near the Shaifer Road, was overwhelmed and their defense collapsed, with the troops fleeing east along the Shaifer Road toward Port Gibson. No pursuit was possible because of the disorganization caused by the frightful terrain, but eventually McClernand sorted the situation out and marched cautiously eastward in pursuit. [C] During the morning, Confederate BG Bowen had arrived from Grand Gulf and realized that he would need every man he could bring forward. He sent immediately to COL Francis Cockrell, at Grand Gulf, and to BG William Baldwin, who was camped near Grindstone Ford, to bring their BDEs immediately to Port Gibson. Baldwin arrived at the Bruinsburg and Rodney Road junction (Site 75) about 1000, and Cockrell and his three RGTs arrived a few moments later. Both

89 BDEs were ordered to reinforce Green’s position on Foster Ridge, but before they could arrive, the Union troops broke Green’s line, and Green’s men withdrew to the Irwin Branch position (Site 83). Cockrell’s and Baldwin’s BDEs were ordered up to the Irwin Branch position (Site 83). To give Green’s men time to recover before putting them back into the fight, Bowen ordered Green to withdraw from Irwin Branch and go back to the Bruinsburg and Rodney Road junction (Site 75), then proceed west on modern Rodney Road (historic Bruinsburg Road) to reinforce Garrott’s BDE (formerly Tracy’s), which was defending the Rodney Road (historic Bruinsburg Road) at the junction with McAmis Road (historic Shaifer) (Site 76).

Site 83. White and Irwin Branches. GPS: N31° 56.665', W 91° 01.726' From Site 82 proceed straight (east) on Shaifer Road (historic Rodney Road) for 0.8 mi. to improved Bessie Weather Road (historic Rodney Road); turn left (north) and proceed for 1.4 mi. to the small creek running under the road, which divides into two branches to the right (south) of the road. White Branch is the westernmost branch. [C] 1 May 63. During the early afternoon Logan’s DIV (McPherson’s XVII Corps), and A. J. Smith’s DIV (McClernand’s XIII Corps) arrived on the field with four BDEs. J. E. Smith’s BDE (Logan’s DIV) was sent to reinforce Osterhaus’ DIV on the Rodney Road (historic Bruinsburg Road), but the remaining three BDEs were added to McClernand’s force on the Shaifer Road (historic Rodney), giving the Union forces a numerical advantage of about 7 to 1. [C] 1 May 63. About a mile east of the Foster house, the advancing Federals advanced cautiously along the Shaifer Road(historic Rodney Road), which ran along the crest of a steep and narrow ridge with deep ravines on both sides. Here the Union advance came under fire from a Confederate skirmish line in the bottom of White Branch of Centers Creek, to their right, as well as from an artillery battery on a hilltop about 1,000 yards to the north, which commanded the whole ridge occupied by the Union column. McClernand deployed his men parallel to the Bessie Weather Road (historic Rodney Road) and advanced eastward against the skirmish line in the creek bottom. The Confederate skirmishers put up a brisk fight and then withdrew up and over the ridge that separated White Branch from Irwin Branch. But as the Union battle line topped the ridge, a blast of rifle fire from a Confederate battle line concealed in the brushy woods along Irwin Branch brought them to a stop. This is one of the first recorded instances of the defense of a reverse slope, a tactical innovation brought to perfection by German General Erwin Rommel in North Africa in 1944. [C] 1 May 63. McClernand brought forward every man he had available—21 regiments—and concentrated them on a front of only 800 yards. While the INF was getting set, Hovey noticed, through a gap in the hills, a Confederate column moving to his right in the next ravine to the southeast with the obvious intent of attacking his right flank. Hovey was a master artilleryman. He assembled the 22 guns in his DIV on the nose of ridge overlooking White Branch on the right of his flank (which was occupied by Slack’s BDE). Just as expected, the Confederate

90 attack struck Slack’s right flank and rolled it up, but the attacking force was mauled by Hovey’s 22 guns, and was forced to withdraw without causing serious problems. [C] 1 May 63. The Confederate attacking force consisted of two regiments of Cockrell’s MO INF, which had arrived on the field shortly after the collapse of Green’s Confederate position on Foster Ridge. The Confederate battle line defending White and Irwin branch consisted of Baldwin’s BDE, which had also arrived just in time to meet the men of Green’s BDE as they fled from the Union breakthrough on Foster’s Ridge (Site 82). [C] 1 May 63. With Cockrell’s counterattack broken, McClernand reverted to his previous tactics by feeding men into a powerful skirmish line that began forcing Baldwin’s and Cockrell’s men backward, trying at the same time to encircle both flanks. By about 1830 Baldwin and Cockrell had been forced back to a position defending the road junction, with both flanks in danger of encirclement.

Site 84. Andrews House Ridge. GPS: N31° 57.916', W91° 02.075' From Site 83 proceed east on Bessie Weather Road (historic Rodney Road) for 0.7 mi. to road fork; turn left (northwest) on Rodney Road (historic Bruinsburg Road) and proceed 6.9 mi. to Andrews House Ridge. The unimproved road cut to the right (north) is the historic Andrews Road and is now a private drive. [C] 1 May 63. After losing control of the junction of the McAmis Road (historic Shaifer Road) and Rodney Road (historic Bruinsburg Road) (Site 76, which is 0.5 mi. to the front) to BG Osterhaus’ DIV during the morning, Confederate COL Isham Garrott’s AL BDE (formerly Tracy’s BDE) continued to fall back under heavy pressure, pivoting as a hinge on a point south of the Andrews house, until by about noon it occupied the crest of the Andrews Ridge, with both flanks in imminent danger of being flanked by the Union advance up the McAmis Road (historic Shaifer Road). Green’s BDE, tired and badly beaten-up by its defeat during the morning on the Shaifer Road (historic Rodney Road) arrived from the Rodney and Bessie Weather (historic Bruinsburg and Rodney) Road junction (Site 75) in the nick of time. Garrott deployed Green’s men on his left flank, extending his line to the southeastward along the Rodney Road (historic Bruinsburg Road). [C] 1 May 63. However, Union pressure continued unabated, and by 1600 Garrott, nearly out of ammunition and in serious danger of encirclement, broke off the engagement and withdrew his entire force to the east along the Centers Creek Road (0.2 mi. to the rear [east]) toward the bridges across Bayou Pierre (Site 74), where his men joined Bowen’s main body retreating from its defeat at White and Irwin Branch. There was no Union pursuit. Total Confederate casualties for the Battle of Port Gibson were 60 killed, 340 wounded, 387 missing. Union casualties were 131 killed, 719 wounded, 25 missing.

91 Site 85. Little Bayou Pierre Bridge at Port Gibson. GPS: N31° 57.893', W90° 58.953' From Site 84 turn around and proceed back (east) on Rodney Road toward Port Gibson. Proceed 7.9 mi. to Main Street in Port Gibson, turn left (north) onto Main Street and proceed 0.2 mi. to Port Gibson at the Claiborne County Courthouse. From Port Gibson, continue straight (north) on Main St. for 0.2 mi. to “T” intersection and end of Main St. [C] 1 May 63. By 1800 Grant had won the Battle of Port Gibson and his beachhead in Mississippi was secure. His next objective was to seize Grand Gulf and convert it into a major forward supply depot, thus greatly simplifying his logistical system. However, rather than confront Confederate BG Bowen’s army once again in terrain like that at Port Gibson, he planned to strike directly for Hankinson’s Ferry, where the Vicksburg - Port Gibson highway crossed the Big Black River. With the raft bridge at Hankinson’s Ferry secure, the Confederates would be trapped in a cul-de-sac at Grand Gulf, with the Mississippi River to the west, the Big Black River to the north, and the Bayou Pierre to the south. With Grant’s forces closing the cul-de-sac to the east, Bowen would be forced to surrender. However, such a strategy required quick action before the Confederates could escape across the Hankinson’s Ferry Bridge. [C] 2 May 63. After the Battle of Port Gibson, McClernand’s men were so tired after their all-night march and all-day battle that the van of the Union army did not reach Port Gibson until 1000 the next morning. The men found the bridge on the Little Bayou Pierre near this point in flames and beyond repair. By this time both of MG McPherson’s DIVs, Logan’s and Crocker’s, were on the scene. Grant sent BG John Stevenson’s BDE (Logan’s DIV) to the northwest to secure the bridges across Big Bayou Pierre on the Port Gibson-Grand Gulf road (Anthony Street), and the rest of MG Logan’s DIV (J. E. Smith’s and Dennis’s BDEs) up Little Bayou Pierre to locate a suitable ford by which a force could be sent in advance toward the Grindstone Ford suspension bridge on Big Bayou Pierre (Site 86). Meanwhile, near here, the Union engineers were able construct a floating bridge to replace the burned suspension bridge across Little Bayou Pierre by 1600, and two divisions of the Army of the Tennessee immediately marched with all possible speed for Grindstone Ford.

Site 86. Grindstone Ford. GPS: N32° 00.306', W90° 53.747' From Site 85 turn around and proceed south for 0.2 mi. to the Claiborne County Courthouse at Port Gibson. At the courthouse, turn left (east) onto Orange St. and proceed 0.1 mi. to US-61; turn left (north) on US-61 and proceed for 0.2 mi. to MS-18; turn right (east) on MS-18 (MS-18 roughly parallels the Vicksburg Road for the first 1.1 mi.) and proceed for 1.1 mi. to the Natchez Trace Parkway entrance; turn left (north) onto the entrance loop. At the Natchez Trace Parkway, turn left (north) and proceed 4.8 mi. to Mile 46, Grindstone Ford- Mangum Mound turn-off. (Note: Immediately after turning onto the Trace Parkway, after about 400 feet, the historic Vicksburg Road crosses the Natchez Trace and the deep road cut may be seen to the left [west] and may be visited at

92 “Sunken Trace” turnoff just past this to the left. The soldiers of both sides used this road.) After turning into the Grindstone Ford turnoff, bear right (north) at the “Y” intersection and proceed 0.5 mi. to the circular parking area for Grindstone Ford. You may walk the gravel path to the left (south) of the large interpretive sign and go to the historic Natchez Trace (Vicksburg Road) and the Burnet family cemetery. COL Daniel Burnet (1763-1827) was a Mississippi pioneer and veteran of the War of 1812. From the cemetery you may walk 0.2 mi. to the site of the Grindstone Ford suspension bridge, the foundation stones of which may still be seen embedded in the bank. The Bayou Pierre has changed course since the Civil War and now flows about 200 yds. away (north), [C] 1 May 63. Only Baldwin’s BDE had withdrawn eastward on the Vicksburg-Port Gibson road after the defeat of Bowen’s Confederate army at Port Gibson. Reaching the Grindstone Ford suspension bridge across the Bayou Pierre, Baldwin had paused only long enough to set fire to the north end of the bridge, and then continued on to the Willows road junction, and then westward to join Bowen’s force at the railroad bridge (Site 74). They arrived at about noon on 2 May in a state of near-exhaustion. [C] 2 May 63. COL Arthur E. Reynolds and two RGTs and a BTRY of BG Lloyd Tilghman’s BDE, newly-arrived in the area from Big Black Bridge, reached the hills overlooking the bridge from the north late on the night of 2 May, only to find a sea of Union campfires in the fields south of the bridge, and working parties repairing the bridge. Reynolds had little choice but to withdraw to Willows. [C] 2 May 63. Following the completion of a floating bridge across Little Bayou Pierre at Port Gibson, two of McPherson’s DIVs (Logan and Crocker) marched as rapidly as possible for Grindstone Ford. The advance guard arrived at about sunset to find the north end of the bridge in flames. However, CPT Stewart Tresilian, an engineer officer, was marching with Logan’s DIV (McPherson’s XVII Corps), which led the column. He quickly organized a fire brigade, extinguished the flames, inspected the bridge, and assured Grant that it could be quickly repaired. True to his word, the engineer and his men labored through the night and by dawn, 3 May the bridge was repaired. Grant and his staff slept at a roadside cabin nearby, probably Burnet’s Stand. [C] 3 May 63. Logan’s DIV (McPherson’s XVII Corps), began crossing the repaired bridge, followed at about 0630, by Crocker’s DIV (McPherson’s XVII Corps). The remainder of the Army of the Tennessee was strung out in a long column extending almost as far as Port Gibson.

Site 87. Willows. GPS: N32° 02.189', W90° 53.761' From Site 86 turn return to the Natchez Trace Parkway and turn right (west). Proceed 4.8 mi. to the Port Gibson exit, turn right (west) onto the exit loop to MS- 18. Turn right (west) onto MS-18, proceed west for 1.1 mi. to US-61; turn right (north) and proceed for 3.4 mi. to MS-462; turn right (east) on MS-462 and proceed for 4.5 mi. to Willows, an intersection of 4 roads. Willows is often called Willow Springs in Civil War literature. Note: MS-462 is a post-Civil War road.

93 The 1863 is the road to the northwest, Willows Rd. (historic Ingleside Road), which led to Grand Gulf. The road to the south soon forks, and the right (west) fork, McCaa Road, is the original Natchez Trace (Vicksburg Road) which led to Grindstone Ford. Today it dead-ends at the Big Bayou Pierre north of Grindstone Ford. Willows was a modest village on the Natchez Trace. MS-462, as it goes east of Willows, is today called the Old Port Gibson Road, and is a still- used portion of the historic Natchez Trace. [C] 1 May 63. LTG Pemberton, in Jackson, detached BG Lloyd Tilghman and his demi-brigade (two RGTs and an ARTY BTRY) from Big Black Bridge to reinforce Bowen at Grand Gulf. Tilghman was accompanied by MG William Loring, who was to assume command of the Grand Gulf force. [C] 2 May 63. Loring and Tilghman reached Rocky Springs late in the afternoon, where they learned that the Federals were approaching the Grindstone Ford Bridge in great force. Loring ordered Tilghman to turn over his demi-BDE to COL Arthur Reynolds, and ordered Reynolds to move immediately to the Grindstone Ford Bridge and hold it against the approaching Federal force. Meanwhile Loring and Tilghman rode to see Bowen and late that night reached Bowen’s headquarters near the Bayou Pierre railroad bridge (Site 74). [C] 3 May 63. After crossing the Big Bayou Pierre on the repaired Grindstone Ford Bridge, Union MG Logan’s DIV (McPherson’s XVII Corps) reached Willows at about 0830 and found the hamlet held only by Confederate skirmishers, who were easily driven out. Combat patrols were sent immediately northward on the Vicksburg Road (modern Hankinson’s Road or Old Hwy 61, .3 mi. straight ahead [east] to the left (north) off Old Port Gibson Road) toward Hankinson’s Ferry, as well as westward on Willows Road (historic Ingleside Road), and within minutes they found strong Confederate forces deployed across both roads. McPherson sent Logan’s DIV westward on the Ingleside Road, and Crocker’s DIV northward on the Vicksburg Road to break through the roadblocks. [C] 3 May 63. The Confederate force on the Ingleside Road (modern Willows Road) consisted of COL Arthur Reynolds’ demi-BDE, now back under the command of Tilghman, and the roadblock on the Vicksburg Road (modern Old Hwy 61) was held by BG Stephen D. Lee’s AL BDE, which had fought so well at Port Gibson under command of BG Tracy and COL Garrott (Site 84). BG Lee had recently arrived and been sent by MG Loring to assist Arthur Reynolds in stopping the federals at Willows. Logan’s men struck hard, and after only a few minutes of skirmishing, Arthur Reynolds’ roadblock collapsed and the Confederate troops fled westward toward Ingleside with Logan in hot pursuit. [C] 3 May 63. While Logan’s men swept ahead toward Ingleside and Grand Gulf, Crocker’s DIV encountered BG Lee’s skirmish line only 1,000 yds. north of Willows. The Confederates gave ground grudgingly, but eventually withdrew across Kennison Creek, 1.5 miles north of Willows. With the Willows road junction firmly in Union control, three of the four DIVs of McClernand’s XIII Corps crossed the Grindstone Ford Bridge and marched to Willows, where they encamped. McClernand made his HQ at the Ingraham house.

94 Site 88. Ingleside Road Junction. GPS: N32° 02.410', W90° 57.835' From Willows, turn left (west) onto Willows Road (historic Ingleside Road) for 3.3 mi.; cross median and turn left (south) on US-61; proceed 0.4 mi. and turn right (west) onto Ingleside-Karnac Ferry Road (historic Ingleside Road) for 1.2 mi. to road junction with Shiloh Road. The road leading right (north) from this junction is Shiloh Road (historic Hankinson’s Ferry Road), and the road continuing straight (west) is the historic road from Vicksburg to Grand Gulf (historic Ingleside Road). [C] 3 May 63. Bowen’s force had left the Bayou Pierre railroad bridge and was marching to Ingleside, with Loring now in command. En route they had been joined by the Grand Gulf garrison (which had blown up the three magazines at Grand Gulf at about dawn), and the combined force reached this road junction in early morning. Here Loring found COL Alexander Reynolds’ TN BDE, which was footsore and lost from the long march from Vicksburg to the Bayou Pierre railroad bridge (Site 74) and the countermarch toward Willows to reinforce Arthur Reynolds’ demi-BDE. BG Stephen D. Lee, sent by Pemberton to assume command of the AL BDE, is with them. Worried that Arthur Reynolds’ demi-BDE would be overwhelmed, Loring ordered Tilghman to take BG Stephen D. Lee and the AL BDE to Willows to assist Arthur Reynolds’ demi-BDE. The remainder of the tired Confederates turned right onto Shiloh Road (historic Hankinson’s Ferry Road) en route to Hankinson’s Ferry. [C] 3 May 63. About an hour after the tail of Loring’s and Bowen’s column had disappeared up the Shiloh Road (historic Hankinson’s Ferry Road) en route to Hankinson’s Ferry, Arthur Reynolds’ demi-BDE arrived here from Willows, closely pursued by Logan’s men. The van of Union MG Logan’s DIV came in view, marching in full pursuit of Reynolds’ men. Logan’s men immediately turned up the Shiloh Road, picking up occasional Confederate stragglers as they marched, but were unable to catch up to the main body. [C] 3 May 63. After crossing the Big Bayou Pierre at Grindstone Ford and moving through Willows, MG Grant was marching with Logan. As soon as the road junction here was cleared, Grant continued straight (west) on to Grand Gulf on the Ingleside-Karnac Ferry Road (historic Ingleside Road) with an escort of only 20 cavalrymen.

Site 89. Kennison Creek. GPS: N32° 03.361', W90° 53.478'. From Site 88 turn right (north) onto Shiloh Road (historic Hankinson’s Ferry Road), proceed 3.5 mi. to US-61; cross median and turn left (north); proceed 0.6 mi. to Floyd Road; turn right (east) onto Floyd Road (historic Hankinson’s Ferry Road) and proceed 2.4 mi. to junction with Old Hwy 61 (historic Vicksburg Road). Note: This junction used to be a 4-way crossroads, and was known as Hardscrabble Crossroads. Turn right (south) onto Old Hwy 61 (historic Vicksburg Road) and proceed 1.4 mi. to creek running under the road. [C] 3 May 63. Skirmishers from Confederate BG Lee’s AL BDE (Site 88) formed at the creek about mid-morning, just in time to meet a similar line of Union skirmishers from BG Crocker’s DIV (McPherson’s XVII Corps) pushing

95 north toward Hankinson’s Ferry. Heavily outnumbered, Lee’s men were forced northward, but Lee’s main body deployed in line of battle on the hills north of the Creek, bringing the Union advance to a pause, until Cockrell’s men came to his support. This insured that the critical road junction (Site 90) only 1.5 mi. north remained open for Loring’s Grand Gulf force, which was retreating toward the floating bridge at Hankinson’s Ferry (Site 91). [C] Skirmishers from Union BG Crocker’s DIV (McPherson’s XVII Corps) identified the battle flags floating above the Confederate line north of Kennison Creek as those of the AL BDE that had fought so hard at Port Gibson. Crocker’s battle line outflanked the Confederates on both flanks, but before the opposing lines became fully engaged, the flags of Cockrell’s MO BDE, always to be taken seriously, also appeared on the ridge. Crocker paused to rearrange his line, but before he could resume the attack, the Confederate battle line suddenly vanished. Crocker’s skirmishers proceeded cautiously, suspecting a trap, but there was none. Realizing that the Confederates had disengaged, Crocker formed Dennis’s BDE and 8 MI BTRY on the road and headed for Hankinson’s Ferry as fast as the men could march.

Site 90. Hardscrabble Crossroads. GPS: N32° 04.531', W90° 53.318' From Site 89 turn around and proceed back (north) for 1.4 mi. to the junction of Old Hwy 61 (historic Vicksburg Road) and Floyd Road (historic Hankinson’s Ferry Road). [C] 3 May 63. This road junction was critical to the escape of the Confederate Grand Gulf force after the evacuation of Grand Gulf at dawn. Because all of the crossings of Big Bayou Pierre to the south were already under Union control, and there were no ferries or bridges other than the floating bridge at Hankinson’s Ferry across the Big Black River capable of supporting an army, the Grand Gulf force would have been trapped and would eventually have had to surrender had the Union been able to occupy this junction before the arrival of the Confederates.

Site 91. Hankinson’s Ferry. GPS: N32° 06.388', W90° 48.835' From Site 90 proceed straight (north) on Old Hwy 61 (historic Vicksburg Road) for 2.6 mi. to Hankinson Road on the right (east). Turn onto Hankinson Road and proceed 0.3 mi east. Note: The actual location of Hankinson’s Ferry on the Big Black River is about 0.6 mi north of this point. The site is privately owned and is not accessible to the public. [C] 3 May 63. The head of the retreating Confederate column reached Hankinson’s Ferry about 1600, and it took about an hour for all of the troops to cross. As soon as the last soldier was across, Loring ordered a work party to destroy the floating bridge. However, the Union pursuit arrived just as work was started, and a salvo from the six guns of 8 MI BTRY, which had marched with the advance guard of Dennis’s BDE (Logan’s DIV, McPherson’s XVII Corps) and reached the ridge 800 yards to the south of the bridge (near this location), drove them to shelter before any damage was done.

96 [C] 4 May 63. MG Grant arrived at McPherson’s HQ near the Ferry at about 0400, having ridden from Grand Gulf with an escort of only 20 cavalrymen (Site 88). He had a hot meal and change of underwear aboard Louisville at Grand Gulf, and had written a message to advise MG Halleck in Washington that, “I shall not bring my troops into this place [Grand Gulf, which was the original plan], but immediately follow the enemy.” (Site 71) [C] 5 May 63. Early morning. Grant, still at Hankinson’s Ferry, directed McClernand, who was at Rocky Springs, to reconnoiter the roads north and northeast of Rocky Springs. He also sent McPherson with a combat patrol to investigate the Vicksburg Road (historic Hankinson Road) north of the Big Black River. Late that afternoon McPherson reported three important items: first, the Confederates had a strong defensive position at Redbone Church (Site 68); second, the terrain all the way to Vicksburg was very difficult, like that in the Port Gibson battlefield; and third, all of the Confederate Grand Gulf force had withdrawn toward Big Black Bridge (Sites 105, 108), instead of into Vicksburg. With this intelligence, Grant abandoned his plan to launch an attack directly at Vicksburg. Instead, he decided to march up the east side of Big Black River and cut the Southern Railroad of Mississippi (SRRM) at Edwards Station, thus isolating Pemberton’s Vicksburg army which, without the railroad supply line, would be forced to evacuate Vicksburg without a fight. Grant did not expect that to happen. Instead, he was certain that Pemberton would fight to retain the railroad, and so the climactic battle of the campaign would be fought somewhere near the vicinity of Edwards Station. Grant hoped that Pemberton, still seemingly threatened by a direct attack on Vicksburg from the Mississippi River, would leave a large force to defend the city and fight this climactic battle with only a part of his army. Even so, Grant would need all of his available manpower. Sherman was already en route with two of his three divisions, so the army would mark time until they arrived. [C] 7 May 63. In anticipation of the arrival of Sherman with two divisions of his XV Corps, Grant moved his HQ from here to Rocky Springs, joining McClernand, who was already there. Sherman, with Steele’s DIV, arrived at Hankinson’s Ferry the next day, and Tuttle’s DIV arrived on the following day. Sherman wrote to Grant from Hankinson’s Ferry on 9 May, recommending that COL William Hillyer be appointed a “transportation czar” with power to organize and operate the long and complex supply line that connected the army with Milliken’s Bend. In Sherman’s view, it was the only way in which the supply system would be able to sustain the demands upon it. Grant concurred, and under Hillyer’s able hand the system supplied the troops with hardtack, coffee, and ammunition throughout the campaign in the interior. Only fresh food had to be gleaned from the countryside. [C] 9 May 63. Crocker’s DIV (XVII Corps) left Tuttle’s DIV (Sherman’s XV Corp) to guard the raft bridge across the Big Black River, and marched toward Rocky Springs to join in a general advance toward the Southern Railroad of Mississippi.

97 Site 92. Rocky Springs. GPS: N32° 06.388', W90° 52.792' From Site 91 proceed straight (southeast) on Hankinson Road for 30.2 mi. to Regan Road, turn left (east) on Regan Road and proceed 1.9 mi. to Old Port Gibson Road. Turn left (north) and proceed 0.1 mi. to Rocky Springs Methodist Church on right (east) of road. The church was built in 1837. Rocky Springs is now a ghost town. [C] 3 May 63. Advance elements of Osterhaus’ DIV (McClernand’s XIII Corps) occupied Rocky Springs without opposition. Having as yet no cavalry, Osterhaus sent infantry patrols out on the Old Port Gibson Road (historic Cayuga Road or Natchez Trace) as far as Big Sand Creek, as well as for some distance out on the Midway Road toward Utica, but found no trace of Confederate forces. Grant was puzzled, unwilling to assume that the Confederates had lost contact and were unaware of the location of the Federal army. [C] 5 May 63. Following the arrival on 4 May of COL Clark Wright’s 6 MO CAV, McClernand sent three companies of cavalry commanded by LT Isaiah Stickel, supported by infantry, farther up the Old Port Gibson Road toward Edwards Station. On the same day Osterhaus’ DIV moved forward and encamped in the bottoms of Big Sand Creek. 2 IL CAV arrived, giving Grant two full CAV regiments. Confederate CAV coming up the roads from the south were trying to interfere with the wagon trains bringing supplies forward from the depot at Grand Gulf, but the Union CAV drove them below Big Bayou Pierre, ending the problem. [C] 6 May 63. Evening. Grant formed reconnaissance detachments from his Signal Corps personnel. They were divided into four detachments, one of which was kept at General Grant's headquarters and one at each of the three corps headquarters. These detachments reported major concentrations of Confederate troops at both Warrenton and the Big Black Bridge area, suggesting that Pemberton had divided his forces, just as Grant had hoped. Grant also knew that Sherman, with Steele’s and Tuttle’s DIVs of his XV Corps, was at Hard Times, ready to cross the River to Grand Gulf. Hovey’s DIV (XIII Corps) had moved forward to Rocky Springs, and A. J. Smith’s DIV (XIII Corps) had moved into Willows, poised to move up in support. McPherson’s two DIVs, Logan’s and Crocker’s, were still at Hankinson’s Ferry. With nearly all of his combat DIVs concentrated or in close support, Grant was ready to move forward toward the expected confrontation over the railroad. [C] 7 May 63. Grant planned to split his army into three columns. The plan was to move McClernand’s four DIVs straight up the roads to the railroad at Edwards Station; McPherson’s two DIVs would diverge at Crossroads (modern Reganton) and march through Utica and Raymond before turning northwest toward Bolton, 6 miles east of Edwards on the Southern Railroad of Mississippi; and Sherman’s two DIVs would march northeast on the Old Port Gibson Road to Dillon’s farm, then north to the railroad at Midway Station, midway between Edwards and Bolton. This would place all 3 of his columns within easy supporting distance of one another.

98 [C] 7 May 63. McPherson, with Logan’s DIV, moved from Hankinson’s Ferry to Rocky Springs, leaving Crocker’s DIV behind to await the arrival of Sherman. That same afternoon a 200-wagon supply train from Grand Gulf arrived, demonstrating that COL Hillyer’s new supply system was functioning. As soon as Grant arrived in Rocky Springs from Hankinson’s Ferry (Site 91) on the afternoon of 7 May 63, he ordered McClernand to move his XIII Corps forward, placing one division at Auburn, and the other three along the line of Fivemile Creek, 11.5 mi. northeast of Rocky Springs. Problems in McClernand’s XIII Corps forced delays, but on 9 May both Sherman’s XV Corps and McPherson’s XVII Corps began moving forward. Crocker’s DIV (XVII Corps) left Tuttle’s DIV (Sherman’s XV Corp) to guard the raft bridge across the Big Black River, and marched through Rocky Springs en route to the Meyer farm on the Fisher Ferry Road (historic Utica Road), southeast of Crossroads. Logan’s DIV (XVII Corps), which was camped at Rocky Springs, fell in on the rear of Tuttle’s column, and accompanied it to the Meyer farm (Site 113).

Site 93. Little Sand Creek. GPS: N32° 05.959', W90° 47.92' From Site 92 proceed straight (north) on Old Port Gibson Road for 1.5 mi. to bridge over Little Sand Creek. [C] 7 May 63. A. J. Smith’s DIV (McClernand’s XIII Corps) moved to Little Sand Creek from Willows on 7 May 1863, and sent patrols to explore the Midway Road (historic Utica Road) 0.5 mi. ahead. [C] 7 - 10 May 63. Seven DIVs of Grant’s entire maneuver force of 8 DIVs, either camped at, or marched past, Little Sand Creek en route to the Southern Railroad of Mississippi, LTG Pemberton’s line of communication.

Site 94. Big Sand Creek. GPS: N32° 07.087', W90° 46.399' From Site 93 proceed straight (northeast) on Old Port Gibson Road (historic Auburn Road or Natchez Trace) for 2.8 mi. to bridge over Big Sand Creek. [C] 4 May 63. Three companies of 6 MO CAV, commanded by LT Isaiah Stickel, and supported by infantry, were fired on by Confederate horsemen. Lt Stickel led a saber-swinging CAV charge that captured the entire Confederate patrol except for its commander. Though this was a daring escapade for LT Stickel, to Grant it meant that Pemberton now knew his location. He was correct. [C] 5 - 6 May 63. Osterhaus moved his division forward, camped in the bottoms of Big Sand Creek, and probed toward Utica, Auburn, and the crossings of Big Black River with cavalry and infantry patrols. They encountered no Confederate soldiers. [C] 7 May 63. Carr’s DIV (McClernand’s XIII Corps) moved forward from Willows and camped beside Osterhaus’ troops in the bottoms of Big Sand Creek. Carr sent 1 US INF and their big 30-lb. Parrott rifles (siege guns) forward to guard the strategic road junction at Crossroads (modern Reganton). [C] 8 - 9 May 63. Grant ordered a general advance of the army to begin, but McClernand objected on the grounds that supplies were insufficient to issue each man the mandatory three days rations, so the march was deferred for a day.

99 That afternoon a 200-wagon supply train arrived from Grand Gulf. However, in the meantime McClernand had scheduled a grand review of the three DIVs of XIII Corps camped in the vicinity (Osterhaus,’ A. J. Smith’s, and Carr’s DIVs) in honor of Governor Yates of Illinois, who was visiting the front. Grant remained in the background, watching stoically.

Site 95. Reganton. GPS: N32° 08.519', W90° 44.914' From Site 94 proceed straight (northeast) for 2.6 mi. to Reganton (known as Crossroads until 1888) at the intersection of Fisher Ferry and Old Port Gibson Roads. [C] 9 May 63. Crocker’s DIV (McPherson’s XVII Corps), having marched from Hankinson’s Ferry via Rocky Springs, turned right on the Fisher Ferry Road (historic Utica Road) at Crossroads and camped around the Meyer farm (Site 113), 2.5 miles southeast of Crossroads (modern Reganton). Logan’s DIV (XVII Corps) fell in at the rear of Crocker’s column as it passed through Rocky Springs. Thus, by midnight, McPherson had his XVII Corps well on the way to Utica, as Grant had ordered.

Site 96. Cayuga. GPS: N32° 09.580', W90° 41.643' From Site 95 proceed straight (east) on Old Port Gibson Road for 4.3 mi. to Cayuga at intersection of Cayuga and Old Port Gibson Roads. There are no ante-bellum buildings in Cayuga but the old town cemetery is on Old Port Gibson Road 0.3 mi. east of the hamlet. [C] 10 May 63. Three DIVs of McClernand’s XIII Corps (Osterhaus, Carr, and Hovey) passed through the hamlet of Cayuga, continuing straight (east) on Old Port Gibson Road (historic Cayuga-Auburn Road or Natchez Trace) for 2.3 mi. to encamp on Fivemile Creek, while his fourth DIV, A. J Smith’s, turned north on Charlie Brown Road (historic Montgomery Bridge Road, 0.1 mi. to the rear [west]) to encamp on Maxie Creek. Grant transferred his HQ from Rocky Springs to Cayuga on 10 May and advised McClernand to keep his troops in camp on Fivemile Creek on 11 May and keep off the road so that Sherman’s XV Corps could pass.

Site 97. Fivemile Creek. GPS: N32° 10.503', W90° 39.838'. From Site 96 proceed straight (east) on Old Port Gibson Road for 2.3 mi. to bridge over Fivemile Creek. [C] 10 May 63. Nightfall. Osterhaus’, Carr’s, and Hovey’s divisions (McClernand’s XIII Corps) reached Fivemile Creek on the Old Port Gibson Road (historic Auburn Road). A. J. Smith’s DIV was at Maxie Creek on the Charlie Brown Road (historic Montgomery Bridge Road). [C] 11 May 63. Because Grant wanted to approach simultaneously with all three columns (McPherson’s on the right at Raymond, Sherman’s in the center at Dillon’s farm, and McClernand’s on the left at Montgomery Bridge and Whittaker’s Ford), McClernand’s XIII Corps rested in its camps on the Fivemile Creek bottoms to allow Sherman’s XV Corps to pass through the XIII Corps lines

100 to occupy the center position. Sherman’s men passed here and encamped at Auburn, which has vanished but was at the intersection of modern Old Port Gibson Road and MS-27, just 1.6 mi. ahead. A Union patrol probing north on Middle Road (historic Telegraph Road) encountered stiff Confederate resistance 0.5 mi. south of Fourteenmile Creek, and Grant realized that he would most probably have to fight for the crossings of Fourteenmile Creek, the last east-west water barrier between his army and the Southern Railroad of Mississippi. [C] 12 May 63. Dawn. McClernand’s three DIVs here on Fivemile Creek marched straight (east) on Old Port Gibson Road and then turned north toward Fourteenmile Creek.

Site 98. A. J. Smith’s Campsite on Maxie Creek. GPS: N31° 13.547', W90° 41.197' From Site 97 proceed straight (east) for 1.6 mi. to stop sign at MS-27. Turn left (north) onto MS-27 and proceed 4 mi. to MS-27 bridge over Maxie Creek. [C] 10 - 12 May 63. About 2200. A. J. Smith’s DIV (McClernand’s XIII Corps) marched north on Charlie Brown Road (historic Montgomery Bridge Road) from Cayuga and camped at the Maxie Creek bottoms on the night of 10 May. The DIV mission was to march northward up the Montgomery Bridge Road and seize Montgomery Bridge across Fourteenmile Creek, as the left flank of a general Union attack on the Southern Railroad of Mississippi. However, delays elsewhere caused the DIV to remain here until 12 May, when the march toward Montgomery Bridge resumed at dawn. Note: The historic Montgomery Bridge Road from Cayuga to Montgomery Bridge is no longer an important route. However, the route is closely followed by modern country roads. To follow this road as a side trip, start at the intersection of Charlie Brown Road and Old Port Gibson Road 0.1 mi. west of Cayuga; follow the Charlie Brown Road generally north for 5 mi. to MS-27; turn left (west) on MS-27 for 0.1 mi., then turn right (northwest) on Charlie Brown Road and continue 0.9 mi. to the junction with Newman Road. Continue on Newman Road for 3.1 mi. to Montgomery Bridge across Fourteenmile Creek.

Site 99. Baldwin’s Ferry. GPS: N32° 14.183', W90° 43.549' From Site 98 continue straight (west) 2.4 mi. to MS-27 Bridge over the Big Black River. MS-27 (historic Baldwin’s Ferry Road) is close to that of the historic road, but the modern road has been straightened, widened, and paved. Actual ferry site is N32E 14.233', W90E 43.549'. [C] 11 May 63. As Sherman’s XV Corps (Tuttle’s and Steele’s divisions) passed through Auburn, COL William McMillen with his 95 OH INF was sent to check on possible Confederate activity at Hall’s Ferry. However, McMillen took the wrong road and found himself at Baldwin’s Ferry. As 95 OH INF neared the river, it was fired on by a very belligerent Confederate force on the east bank. After a brisk skirmish the Union regiment drove the Confederates to the west bank. McMillen and his RGT remained at the ferry to prevent the Confederates

101 from re-crossing and making trouble among the marching Union columns heading for the Southern Railroad of Mississippi.

Site 100. Telegraph Road. GPS: N32° 12.376', W90° 37.191' From Site 99 turn around at the first opportunity and return (east) to MS-27 Bridge. From the bridge continue 6.4 mi. (southeast) to the junction of Old Port Gibson Road and MS-27. Turn left (northeast) onto Old Port Gibson Road (historic Auburn Road or Natchez Trace) and proceed 1.8 mi. to junction of Old Port Gibson and Middle (historic Telegraph Road) roads. [C] 12 May 63. Hovey’s DIV, followed by Carr’s and Osterhaus’ DIVs, marching northeast on Old Port Gibson Road (historic Auburn Road), turned north at this road junction onto Middle Road (historic Telegraph Road) about midmorning. The immediate objective was to seize Whittaker’s Ford across Fourteenmile Creek as a part of a general Union attack on the Southern Railroad of Mississippi, with McClernand cutting the railroad at Edwards Station (Site 109). An hour later Steele’s and Tuttle’s DIVs of Sherman’s XV Corps reached this intersection, but continued straight (east) on the Old Port Gibson Road (historic Auburn Road or Natchez Trace) toward Dillon’s farm, on the Old Port Gibson Road 5.4 mi. to the east.

Site 101. Montgomery Bridge. GPS: N32° 15.651', W90° 39.979' From Site 100 turn left (north) onto Middle Road (historic Telegraph Road), proceed north 1.7 mi. to crossroads; turn left (west) onto Canada Crossing Road and proceed straight (west) for 3.6 mi. to junction with Newman Road (historic Montgomery Bridge Road). Turn right (north) and proceed 0.8 mi. to Montgomery Bridge over Fourteenmile Creek. Note: At 0.3 mi. west of Middle Road on Canada Crossing Road is the Bethesda Presbyterian Church and cemetery to the right (north) of the road. Confederate MG John Bowen, who contracted dysentery during the Siege of Vicksburg and died approx. 3 ½ mi. northeast of the church on the Walton Farm on Mt. Moriah Road on 13 Jul 63, was buried in the Bethesda Cemetery. His body was exhumed in 1887 and re- buried in the Cedar Hill Confederate Cemetery in Vicksburg. [C] 12 May 63. A. J. Smith’s, marching from Maxey’s Creek (Site 98) seized Montgomery Bridge across Fourteenmile Creek without opposition. Skirmishers fanned out on the north bank to control a bridgehead, but the DIV camped south of the creek. This position comprised the left flank of McClernand’s projected attack on the Southern Railroad of Mississippi (SRRM) at Edwards Station, 5.5 mi. to the northeast. [C] 13 May 63. Early morning. After the Battle of Raymond on May 12, Grant ordered McClernand to have A. J. Smith’s DIV leave Montgomery Bridge and march back to Auburn to await the arrival of two supply trains from Grand Gulf, escorted by Blair’s DIV of Sherman’s XV Corps. On 13 May Smith burned Montgomery’s Bridge and marched back to New Auburn via Newman Road, Canada Crossing Road, and Bill Strong Road, encamping on China Grove plantation that night. At mid-afternoon 14 May Blair’s DIV arrived with the wagon

102 trains, and Blair’s men camped on the G. B. Hall property, 1 mi. east of Old Auburn and 2.8 mi. west of New Auburn. On 15 May the two DIVs and supply trains moved past Dillon’s, through Raymond, and camped just west of Raymond on the Raymond-Edwards Road that night.

Site 102. Whittaker’s Ford. GPS: N32° 15.800', W90° 370.370' From Site 101 continue straight (north) for 0.9 mi. to Smith’s Station Road. Turn right (east) onto Smith’s Station Road and proceed 2.9 mi. to Mt. Moriah intersection. Turn right (south) onto Middle Road (historic Telegraph Road) and proceed 1.3 mi. to the bridge over Fourteenmile Creek.

[C] 11 May 63. Confederate BG Bowen was fully aware that a powerful Union column was approaching Edwards Station from the south via the Middle Road (historic Telegraph Road), and placed a strong picket line, supported with a battery of artillery, 0.5 mi. south of Whittaker’s Ford to provide adequate warning of the Union approach. Sure enough, that afternoon a strong Union patrol moving northward was stopped and turned back. [C] 12 May 63. Three of McClernand’s divisions (Hovey’s DIV in the lead, followed by Carr’s and Osterhaus’ divisions) advanced northward along Middle Road (historic Telegraph Road) and about 0.5 mi. south of Whittaker’s Ford they encountered Bowen’s roadblock, which bitterly resisted the Union advance. After fierce fighting, Hovey forced the Confederates back across Whittaker’s Ford. Once in possession of the ford, McClernand pushed cautiously northward toward Mt. Moriah with Hovey’s DIV, leaving Carr’s and Osterhaus’ DIV south of Fourteenmile Creek.

Site 103. Mt. Moriah. GPS: N32° 16.986', W90° 37,003' From Site 102 turn around and proceed back (north) for 1.3 mi. the road junction at Mt. Moriah. [C] 12 May 63. Afternoon. A strong detachment of Confederate troops from BG John Bowen’s DIV (Pemberton’s Army of Vicksburg) withdrew through Mt. Moriah under heavy pressure from Union BG Hovey’s DIV (McClernand’s XIII Corps), and continued northward to a ridge about 0.6 mi. north of the hamlet. Hovey’s DIV stopped at Mt. Moriah, sending only a skirmish line northward to make contact with Bowen’s defense line on the ridge to the north. At nightfall, following Grant’s orders to avoid bringing on a major engagement until notified to do so, McClernand left a strong skirmish line from Hovey’s DIV at Mt. Moriah, but withdrew the bulk of his three divisions to camps south of Fourteenmile Creek. [C] 13 May 63. Very early in the morning, McClernand received an order from MG Grant ordering him to disengage from the Confederate force to his front and march with all possible speed with Hovey’s, Osterhaus’, and Carr’s DIVs east to Raymond and have Smith’s DIV (which was at Montgomery Bridge [Site 101]) march south to Auburn to await the arrival of the two wagon trains and Blair’s DIV from Grand Gulf. Until that moment, McClernand had been expecting an order directing him to attack the Confederate line north of Mt. Moriah, thus

103 bringing about the decisive battle of the campaign for Vicksburg. At dawn McClernand pushed Hovey’s skirmish line out aggressively toward the Confederate defense position on the ridge north of Mt. Moriah while he brought Osterhaus’ and Carr’s DIVs forward to the Mt. Moriah road junction (which was invisible from the Confederate position) and turned eastward toward Raymond on the Mt. Moriah Road (historic Mt. Moriah Road). As soon as the Mt. Moriah junction was cleared, McClernand feigned an attack with a few regiments of Hovey’s DIV, disengaged neatly, and was well on the way to Raymond before the Confederates realized what had happened. Thus, Pemberton’s plan to fight Grant on very good defensive ground south of Edwards Station was thwarted. Pemberton, who had moved his HQ from Vicksburg to Bovina on 12 May, learned of the Confederate defeat at Raymond late the same day. He realized that Grant was marching on Jackson, and that there was absolutely nothing he could do to stop him. Note: This concludes McClernand’s XIII Corps approach route up to and including the morning of 13 May 63. Stops 104-109 will take you to the Confederate positions for the same time frame.

Site 104. Bowen’s Ridge. GPS: N32° 17.920', W90° 37.136' From Site 103 proceed straight (north) for 1 mi. on Mt. Moriah Road (historic Telegraph Road). Note: Middle Road (historic Telegraph Road) from Old Port Gibson Road thru Whittaker’s Ford (Site 102) becomes Mt. Moriah Road at Mt. Moriah, and continues north to Edwards. At Mt. Moriah the Mt. Moriah Road also turns southeast to Dillon’s, but continue straight and take the Mt. Moriah Road north toward Edwards. [C] 4 May 63. Alerted by the cavalry patrol skirmish at Big Sand Creek on 4 May (Site 94), Pemberton had divined Grant’s plan to move up the east bank of Big Black River and attack the railroad at Edwards Station. He immediately countered by ordering Bowen’s DIV, which had just arrived in the vicinity of Big Black Bridge following its retreat across Hankinson’s Ferry on 3 May (Site 91), to move toward Edwards Station and select a position which could be defended against the Federal army, which he expected to approach from the south via the Telegraph Road (Mt. Moriah Road). This was the intent of Grant; however, Pemberton did not plan on Grant’s army advancing in three columns. [C] 14 May 63. Following the realization that the Union army was marching on Jackson and the receipt of a message (sent by courier, CPT William Yerger, at 2040, 13 May from Jackson and received by Pemberton at 0910, 14 May in Bovina because the telegraph line and railroad had been severed by McPherson’s XVII Corps at Clinton in the early hours of 14 May) from GEN Joseph Johnston suggesting that Pemberton attack eastward toward Grant, Pemberton rode to Bowen’s HQ and called a council of war with his general officers around noon on 14 May. This several-hour, contentious council was probably held in the brick Redfield plantation house (GPS: N32° 17.987', W 90° 37.136'), on the Telegraph Road about 2.1 miles south of Edwards Station. The decision of the council was not to attack the federals at Clinton as Johnston

104 wanted, but to march north on 15 May on the Mt. Moriah Road (historic Telegraph Road) to Edwards, then turn southeast from Edwards on MS-467 (historic Upper Raymond Road) to the Bill Downing Road (historic Turkey Creek Road) and turn south to Dillon’s farm to destroy the Union supply trains moving from Grand Gulf. After the council adjourned Pemberton sent a dispatch to Johnston at 1740, advising Johnston that he would march to Dillon’s farm to “cut the enemy’s communications,” not to Clinton as Johnston had wanted. However, the next day the two trains, escorted by Smith’s and Blair’s DIVs, moved from near New Auburn to Raymond, and passed through Dillon’s long before Pemberton’s army, which did not begin its movement until 0800, 15 May, could have arrived. Note: There is no documentary evidence to support the Redfield house as the location for the conference, but the circumstantial evidence is compelling. The ante-bellum house is just north of, and sheltered by, the crest of the ridge Bowen had selected for the Confederate position from which to defend the railroad and was almost certainly used as Bowen’s HQ.

Site 105. Clear Creek. GPS: N32° 21.734', W90° 43.671' From Site 104 proceed 2.3 mi. straight (north) on Mt. Moriah Road to Edwards Station (Site 109). After crossing the historic tracks of the Southern Railroad of Mississippi (which was Grant’s objective when he wheeled his army to the northeast on 7 May), turn left (west) at the stop sign onto Old US-80 and proceed 7.7 mi. to Bovina Road (0.1 mi. after the underpass). Turn left onto Bovina Road and proceed 0.1 mi. to Tiffentown Road on left (east) just before the historic railroad tracks. Turn left onto Tiffentown Road, and proceed 1 mi. (passing over I-20) to Clear Creek northeast of Bovina. The Clear Creek bottoms offered an ideal camp ground with abundant water close to Big Black Bridge, which carried the vital Southern Railroad of Mississippi across the Big Black River. [C] 4 May 1863. After escaping across the floating bridge at Hankinson’s Ferry on 3 May 1863, Bowen’s two BDEs (Green’s and Cockrell’s) marched through Bovina and encamped in the Clear Creek bottoms, arriving late in the day. Here Pemberton formally constituted the two BDEs as Bowen’s DIV (Pemberton had recommended Bowen for promotion to MG, which was accomplished on 25 May). The newly-created DIV remained here until the following day, when it was ordered to move to Edwards Station (Site 104).

Site 106. Lanier’s Plantation. GPS: N32° 18.251', W90° 48.195' From Site 105 turn around and proceed back (south) 1 mi. on Tiffentown Road to Bovina Road. Turn right (north) on Bovina Road for 0.1 mi. to Old US- 80. Turn left (west) onto Old US-80 and proceed 50.3 mi. to junction of Old US- 80 and MS-27 (historic Baldwin’s Ferry Road). Turn left (south) onto MS-27 and proceed 3.9 mi. to the junction of Gibson Road with MS-27. Lanier’s plantation was located at this intersection. Note: The alignment of MS-27 approximates that of historic Baldwin’s Ferry Road, but at this point the Civil War roadbed is about 200 yards west of the modern road. Much of the historic road is still used,

105 such as China Grove Road that turns left (south) off Gibson Road 0.4 mi. from MS-27. The old road to Mt. Alban to the northeast from Lanier’s plantation is extant in the woods east of MS-27, and may be seen through the woods a short distance north of Lanier’s plantation. McClernand’s XIII Corps used the historic Mt. Alban Road and the historic Baldwin’s Ferry Road as it marched to Vicksburg on 18 May. [C] 2 May 63. Immediately following the Battle of Port Gibson on 1 May, Pemberton directed the selection of an outer defensive line south of Vicksburg in anticipation of a Union attack up the Vicksburg-Port Gibson highway. The line ran from Warrenton (Site 67) on the Mississippi River past Redbone Church (Site 68) and Lanier’s plantation to Big Black Bridge (Site 108). The line was not a continuous earthwork, like the primary Vicksburg defenses, but was instead only a series of selected but unfortified positions blocking all of the roads from the south and southwest, with prepared earthwork battery positions only at Redbone Church and Lanier’s plantation. [C] 3 May 63. Following his withdrawal to the north side of the Big Black River at Hankinson’s Ferry (Site 91), Loring led all of the Port Gibson troops, other than Bowen’s two BDEs at Clear Creek (Site 105), to positions in the vicinity of Lanier’s plantation. [C] 4 May 63. Pemberton organized all of the troops at Lanier’s into Loring’s DIV, which remained in this area until Pemberton ordered it to move forward to Edwards Station (Site 109) in anticipation of the great battle he expected to be fought on Bowen’s Ridge (Site 104).

Site 107. Bovina. GPS: N32° 20.967', W90° 44.102 From Site 106 turn around and proceed back (north) for 3.9 mi. to Old US-80. Turn right (east) onto Old US-80 and proceed 50.3 mi. to Bovina Road. Turn right (south) onto Bovina Road and proceed 0.2 mi. across the historic railroad to the stop sign, Bovina, at Bovina Road and Warriors Trail. [C] 30 Apr - 5 May 63. Now convinced that the primary threat to Vicksburg was from Grant’s Union army across the Mississippi River from Grand Gulf, Pemberton moved his HQ from Jackson to Vicksburg. At the time that Loring broke contact with the Union army following his withdrawal across the Big Black River at Hankinson’s Ferry on 3 May (Site 91), Pemberton had been convinced that Grant would attack Vicksburg from the south, up the Hankinson Road (historic Vicksburg Road). However, Loring lost all contact with the Union army following his withdrawal across the Big Black River, leaving Pemberton to guess at the location of the Federal army. Having no CAV available (COL Wirt Adams’ CAV was in pursuit of COL Benjamin Grierson, who was en route to Baton Rouge, LA), Pemberton in desperation organized an ad hoc CAV force and sent it from Edwards Station (Site 109) toward Rocky Springs to confirm the presumed location of the Union army at Hankinson’s Ferry. The patrol was overwhelmed by a Union CAV force at Big Sand Creek on 4 May (Site 94), but the information revealed to Pemberton Grant’s new plan to strike the railroad at Edwards Station (Site 109). Pemberton immediately began to assemble a force

106 to counter the Federal offensive. [C] 12 May 63. Evening. Pemberton moved his HQ from Vicksburg to Bovina in anticipation of fighting the climactic battle of the defense of Vicksburg on a site selected by Bowen 2.3 mi. south of Edwards. Pemberton also moved MG Carter Stevenson’s DIV from Warrenton, and MG William Loring’s DIV from Lanier’s farm, to the vicinity of Big Black Bridge. However, still threatened by the possibility of a Union amphibious assault on the Vicksburg waterfront, Pemberton left Forney’s and M. L. Smith’s DIVs, plus several minor commands, behind in Vicksburg. By doing so, Pemberton had effectively divided the Army of Vicksburg into an “Army of Maneuver,” located in the Edwards-Big Black Bridge area, and an “Army of Defense,” located in the Vicksburg defenses. This was precisely what Grant hoped he would do. [C] 13 May 63. Following the Battle of Raymond (Sites 118 - 120) on 12 May, early on 13 May Pemberton moved Bowen’s DIV (less one regiment previously ordered to Edwards Station (Site 109) on 5 May) and two BDEs of Stevenson’s DIVs, as well as two BDEs of Loring’s DIV (Featherston’s and Buford’s) from the Bovina area to Edwards Station (Site 109). [C] 16-17 May. Following the defeat at Champion Hill (Sites 132-136) on 16 May, Pemberton withdrew to Bovina during the night of 16-17 May, and briefly contemplated trying to hold the line of the Big Black River against the victorious Union army, but decided it was impractical, and after the Battle of Big Black Bridge on 17 May he retreated to Vicksburg. [C] 18 May. McClernand’s Corps of the Union army occupied Bovina during the morning, and it remained in Union hands until well after the surrender of Vicksburg on 4 Jul 63.

Site 108. Campground above Big Black Bridge. GPS: N32° 20.865', W90° 42.364' From Site 107 turn left (east) onto Warriors Trail and proceed 1.7 mi. Note: At intersection of Warriors Trail and Bovina Cutoff (0.3 mi. from Bovina) turn left (east) onto Warriors Trail. Warrior’s Trail (historic Jackson Road) was the southernmost main highway from Vicksburg to Jackson, sometimes historically called the Lower Jackson Road. Historic Bridgeport Road was the northern route, and was sometimes historically called the Upper Jackson Road. Near the Big Black Bridge (the railroad bridge across the Big Black River) to the west is a small plateau about 40 feet above the normal level of the Big Black River. Two 24-pdr siege howitzers were emplaced on this plateau in a position that commanded the bridge and the highway approach from the east. [C] 14 May 63. 0910-0930. Pemberton received a message from a courier, CPT William Yerger, here from GEN Johnston, dated 2040, 13 May from Jackson, suggesting that Pemberton attack the Union forces in Clinton. Pemberton reluctantly wrote back that he would do so, remarking to Johnston that he felt that Johnston did not “fully comprehend the position that Vicksburg would be left in.” Pemberton then rode to Bowen’s Ridge (Site 104) south of Edwards Station (Site 109) and, apparently having second thoughts, held a council of war to determine what course of action should be taken. Rather than

107 attack eastward to Clinton, the council decided to march south to Dillon’s farm to try and intercept Grant’s supply trains. [C] 17 May. Following the defeat in the bridgehead east of Big Black Bridge (Battle of Big Black Bridge, Site 117), the Confederate Army of Vicksburg retreated across two bridges: Big Black Railroad Bridge and a temporary boat floating bridge a few hundred yards south of the railroad bridge. Both bridges were covered by the fire of the two siege howitzers. Both the railroad bridge and the floating bridge were burned to prevent the victorious Union troops from crossing. A regiment was detached from the retreating army with orders to prevent the federals from building a floating bridge until midnight.

Site 109. Edwards Station. GPS: N32° 19.799', W90° 36.662' From Site 108 proceed straight (east) on the unimproved portion of Warriors Trail, passing under the railroad bridge, for 0.4 mi. to Old US-80. Turn right (east) and proceed 5.7 mi. to Mt. Moriah Road (historic Telegraph Road). Turn right (south) onto Mt. Moriah Road and proceed 0.1 mi. to the railroad crossing, the probably site of the 1863 depot. The modern railroad follows exactly the alignment of the historic Southern Railroad of Mississippi. The Civil War community was only a small cluster of houses and stores around the railroad depot, water tank, and loading dock. [C] 6 May. When Pemberton learned of the cavalry clash near Big Sand Creek (Site 94) on 5 May he surmised that Grant might be positioning for a strike on the railroad bridge at Big Black River, and he immediately ordered Bowen to send one regiment of his bone-tired DIV from its camp along Clear Creek to Edwards Station (Site 109). Bowen moved COL Elijah Gates’ 1 MO CAV and a section (2 guns) of artillery to Edwards Station on 6 May. Gates set up a roadblock at Whittaker’s Ford with his main line on Bowen’s Ridge (Site 104). [C] 12 May 63. Following Grant’s decision at Hankinson’s Ferry (Site 91) to strike at the Southern Railroad of Mississippi east of Big Black Bridge rather than directly attack Vicksburg, McClernand’s XIII Corps was selected by Grant to move north on this road (historic Telegraph Road) to Edwards Station. On 12 May Hovey’s DIV moved north and met Gates’ roadblock at Whittaker’s Ford (Site 102). [C] 13 May 63. After BG Bowen received a telegraph from COL Gates on the fight at Whittaker’s Ford on 12 May, he ordered the rest of his DIV (the BDES of BG Green and COL Cockrell) to Edwards Station (Site 109). They left very early and arrived at Bowen’s Ridge (Site 104) at dawn on 13 May. Shortly afterward two BDEs of Loring’s DIV, Featherston’s and Buford’s, arrived from Big Black Bridge. Featherston was posted on Bowen’s left, and Buford on Bowen’s right. At mid-morning two BDEs of Stevenson’s DIV arrived. MG Loring and MAJ Samuel Lockett, Pemberton’s chief engineer, approved Bowen’s position. Trenches were dug and rail fence barricades were built with the expectation that Grant would attack. Since Pemberton still had his HQ in Bovina, Loring was in command of the 22,000 men.

108 [C] 14 May 63. Around Noon. After receiving GEN Johnston’s dispatch of 13 May from Jackson, suggesting that Pemberton attack the federals at Clinton, Pemberton moved his HQ from Bovina to Bowen’s Ridge (Site 104) and called a council of war. [C] 15 May 1863. 0900-1300. Having decided at the 14 May council of war to attack the Union supply line at Dillon’s farm (Site 111), Pemberton led his “Army of Maneuver” out of Bowen’s Ridge at 0800 at marched north to Edwards Station (Site 109) on the Mt. Moriah Road, but when the troops arrived here around 0900 it was discovered that someone had forgotten to order rations from Vicksburg. A train was sent back to Vicksburg and when it returned loaded with rations, they were issued, and the march eastward from Edwards Station (Site 109) for Dillon’s farm was resumed at about 1300. [C] 16 May 1863. Night. Following the defeat at Champion Hill (Sites 132- 136) the Confederate army fled past Edwards Station en route to Big Black Bridge and safety. Fires from supplies set alight by the retreating troops spread to homes and stores and almost completely destroyed the hamlet. Union MG McClernand, with Osterhaus’ DIV, occupied the town shortly before midnight, and during the remainder of the night Carr’s and Osterhaus’ DIVs (XIII Corps) marched through the hamlet in pursuit. Note: This concludes the tour of the Confederate positions through 16 May 63. Stops 110-112 will continue the route of Sherman’s XV Corps through 13 May 63.

Site 110. Sherman’s Skirmish. GPS: N32° 12.535', W90° 330.199' From Site 109 proceed straight (south) on Mt. Moriah Road for 30.3 mi. to the Mt. Moriah-Smith’s Station-Middle Road intersection. Continue straight (south) on Middle Road (historic Telegraph Road) for 5.8 mi. to Old Port Gibson Road (historic Auburn Road or Natchez Trace). Turn left (east) onto Old Port Gibson Road and proceed 40.3 mi. to bridge at Fourteenmile Creek. [C] 12 May 63. While McClernand’s XIII Corps turned north toward Edwards Station (Site 109) on Charlie Brown Road (historic Montgomery Bridge Road) on 10 May and Middle Road (historic Telegraph Road) on 12 May, Sherman’s XV Corps continued straight (east) on Old Port Gibson Road toward Dillon’s farm. Moving toward Dillon’s farm, LTC Simon Swan’s 4 IA CAV, protecting the advance of Sherman’s XV Corps, met such stiff resistance from Confederate COL Wirt Adams’ MS CAV at the bridge across Fourteenmile Creek that MG Steele had to deploy two of his INF BDEs to disperse the Confederates force. The Confederates had burned the bridge, and the high and steep banks delayed the Union advance for some time.

Site 111. Dillon’s farm. GPS: N32° 14.004', W90° 320.365' From Site 110 proceed straight (east) on Old Port Gibson Road (Auburn Road) for 0.7 mi. to Dillon’s farm. The Dillon house location and cemetery is 0.16 mi. northeast in the woods north of the road, but is accessible only from the Natchez Trace Parkway, mile 73, Dean’s Stand (GPS N32°E 14.022', W90°E 32.403').

109 [C] 12 May 63. Late afternoon. After their skirmish at Fourteenmile Creek (Site 110) Steele’s DIV (XV Corps) continued 0.9 mi. eastward to Dillon’s farm and occupied the area around it. Tuttle’s DIV (XV Corps) passed through and occupied the junction of the Turkey Creek Road (Bill Downing Road) and the Auburn Road (Old Port Gibson Road). Grant and Sherman spent the night of 12- 13 May at Dillon’s farm. Late on 12 May a courier from McPherson (XVII Corps) brought the news of the battle of Raymond (Sites 118-120). The existence of a Confederate force large enough to risk an attack on McPherson’s two DIVs implied that a large Confederate force occupied Jackson. Grant’s intelligence system had reported earlier that GEN Joseph E. Johnston, reputed to be the one of the finest generals in the Confederacy, was due to arrive in Jackson at any moment. Grant dared not leave a powerful Confederate force led by such a general on his right flank during an attack on the Southern Railroad of Mississippi, so he immediately aborted his planned attack north to the railroad and instead redirected his entire army toward Jackson. Orders went to McPherson to evacuate Raymond, move to Clinton (where the railroad could be cut) and approach Jackson via Clinton Boulevard and Capitol Street (historic Clinton Road), while Sherman was directed to move through Mississippi Springs and approach Jackson via the Jackson-Raymond Road (historic Raymond Road). McClernand’s XIII Corps was to disengage south of Edwards Station and concentrate at Raymond. Grant’s remarkably decision may be the most decisive of the campaign, because it completely dislocated all Confederate plans for countering (on very good defensive ground at Bowen’s Ridge [Site 104]) the planned Union attack. It also led to the cutting of Pemberton’s line of communication (the railroad) at Clinton; led to the capture of only the third Confederate capital city (Jackson); and drove Johnston out of Jackson, separating his forces from Pemberton’s; thus, leading directly to the victory at Champion Hill and the siege and surrender of Vicksburg. [C] 13 May 63. Grant, with Sherman’s XV Corps, left Dillon’s farm early. Sherman’s men marched through Raymond to camp at Mississippi Springs while Grant spent the night in Raymond. Hovey’s DIV of McClernand’s XIII Corps arrived at Dillon’s late that night after breaking contact with Confederate forces at Bowen’s Ridge (Site 104). McClernand spent the night at Dillon’s with Hovey’s DIV.

Site 112. Turkey Creek Road. GPS: N32° 13.987', W90° 32.403'. From Site 111 proceed straight (east) on Old Port Gibson Road for 1 mi. to junction with Bill Downing Road (historic Turkey Creek Road). Note: En route to Site 112 the Mt. Moriah Road enters Port Gibson Road on the left (north) 0.2 mi. from Site 111. McClernand’s XIII Corps, after breaking contact with the Confederates on Bowen’s Ridge (Site 104) on 13 May, marched down this road to Dillon’s farm. The historic Mt. Moriah Road ran directly to Dillon’s farm (this section is today the driveway to the Dean’s Stand site on the Natchez Trace Parkway at Mile 73), and this modern junction is due to the re-routing of this portion of the road due to the construction of the Natchez Trace Parkway.

110 [C] 12 May 63. Tuttle’s DIV (XV Corps) occupied this junction late on the afternoon, and immediately threw out picket lines to secure the area in anticipation of using the Bill Downing Road (historic Turkey Creek Road) the following day to begin the approach march toward Midway Station on the Mississippi Central Railroad. If all three corps moved promptly on 13 May, as Grant had planned before the change of situation after the Battle of Raymond, this move would place McClernand’s XIII Corps on the railroad at Edwards Station (Site 109), 3 mi. to Sherman’s left, and McPherson’s XVII Corps on the railroad at Bolton (Site 128), 3 mi. to Sherman’s right. [C] 13 May 63. Tuttle’s DIV broke camp at dawn and led the way for Steele’s DIV toward Raymond and Jackson. Grant and Sherman marched with Tuttle’s DIV. Grant stopped at Raymond while Sherman marched on to Mississippi Springs, about 5 air mi. east of Raymond. Note: This concludes Sherman’s XV Corps approach route up to and including the morning of 13 May 63. Stops 113- 121 will take you to the route of McPherson’s XVII Corps for the same time frame, including the Battle of Raymond.

Site 113. Meyer farm. GPS: N32° 06.667', W90° 420.305' From Site 112 turn around and proceed back (west) on Old Port Gibson Road for 15.3 mi. to Reganton (historic Crossroads, Site 95) and intersection of Fisher Ferry Road (historic Vicksburg-Utica Road). Turn left (southeast) onto Fisher Ferry Road and proceed 3.7 mi. A church will be 0.1 mi. to the front right (south) of the road. Meyer farm was on left (north) of road. [C] 9 May 63. McPherson’s XVII Corps (Logan’s and Crocker’s DIVs) after turning right (east) off Old Port Gibson Road (historic Auburn Road or Natchez Trace) at Reganton (historic Crossroads) camped here. The weather had been very dry and only the major creeks still had running water. Springs at the headwaters of Mud Creek provided water for the men and horses. The next camp would be near Tallahala Creek, 4.5 mi. northeast of Utica.

Site 114. Utica. GPS: N32° 06.555', W90° 37.347' From Site 113 proceed straight (east) for 5.9 mi. to junction of Southview and E. Main Streets at cemetery. In 1863 Utica was a thriving agricultural town. [C] 10 May 63. Late morning. McPherson’s XVII Corps (Logan’s and Crocker’s divisions), now protected by COL Clark Wright’s 6 MO Cavalry, marched through Utica, pausing only to obtain water from the town’s wells and cisterns. The town and adjacent farms were also stripped of food and forage by Union foragers.

Site 115. Weeks farm. GPS: N32° 08.200', W90° 34.045' From Site 114 proceed straight for 1.5 mi. on Main Street to MS-18 (historic Utica Road). Turn left (north) onto MS-18 and proceed 30.3 mi. to junction of Tom Collins Road with MS-18. MS-18 (historic Utica Road) has been widened and straightened, but the trend of the roadbed approximates that of the historic Road.

111 [C] 10 May 63. Logan’s and Crocker’s DIVs (XVII Corps) camped here after a dusty march of only 10 miles from the Meyer farm (Site 113). The choice of campsite was dictated by the need for water, which in this area was obtainable only from Tallahalla Creek, 1.1 mi. to the southeast. Grant sent McPherson a message from Cayuga, 7 mi. northwest of here, on 10 May advising him that McClernand’s men had reached Fivemile Creek and that Sherman would advance to Auburn on 11 May. Grant ordered McPherson to “move your command forward also, so as to occupy something near the same east and west line with the other army corps.”

Site 116. Roach farm. GPS: N32° 08.347', W90° 32.853' From Site 115 proceed straight (north) for 0.7 mi. on MS-18 (historic Utica Road) just past the intersection of Berry Road on the right (south) of MS-18. The historic Roach house is on the right. [C] 11 May 63. McPherson’s XVII Corps moved its campground only about a mile on 11 May, from the Weeks farm to the Roach farm, primarily because of a shortage of water along the road. Tallahala Creek, 0.5 mi. southeast of the Roach farm, would be the last available water until the troops reached Raymond, 11 miles northeast. It was a relatively short distance, but the weather was very hot and dry, and McPherson realized the march would be difficult for the infantry. However, Grant’s plan for an attack on the Southern Railroad of Mississippi required that the three Union Corps jump off at the same time after crossing the last east-west water barrier between his army and the railroad, which was Fourteenmile Creek. McClernand’s XIII Corps was nearing Montgomery’s Bridge and Whittaker’s Ford at Fourteenmile Creek, and Sherman’s XV Corps was nearing Fourteenmile Creek near Dillon’s farm. McPherson’s XVII Corps should have been nearing Fourteenmile Creek 2 miles south of Raymond, but was still almost 11 miles away. McPherson’s rate of advance was so slow that it endangered the whole plan, and Grant, then in Cayuga, wrote a fatherly letter to McPherson asking for greater speed. An attentive McPherson had his men on the road en route to Raymond at 0330 on 12 May.

Site 117. Tallahala Creek. GPS: N32° 08.015', W90° 32.647'. From Site 116 proceed straight (northeast) for 0.6 mi. to intersection of Chapel Hill Road (historic Crystal Springs Road); turn right (southeast) and proceed 0.5 mi. to bridge across Tallahala Creek. The Crystal Springs Road led to the village of Crystal Springs on the strategic New Orleans, Jackson & Great Northern Railroad (NOJ&GNRR). [C] 10-12 May 63. McPherson’s CAV probed down the Chapel Hill Road (historic Crystal Springs Road) to investigate reports of a Confederate force holding the bridge across Tallhala Creek. The few Confederates actually present were quickly dispersed, but a Confederate prisoner told of a large Southern force at Crystal Springs. Concerned by the possibility of an attack on his rear while marching toward Raymond, McPherson sent COL Clark Wright and most of his 6 MO CAV to investigate, leaving only a CAV detachment under CPT John Foster

112 to accompany the INF on its march toward Raymond. That evening Wright reached the railroad at Crystal Springs and discovered that a large body of troops (Gregg’s BDE from Port Hudson) had recently passed en route to Jackson. Wright’s men tore up the railroad in the vicinity of the town, and returned to McPherson’s column early on the morning of 12 May.

Site 118. McPherson’s Ridge. GPS: N32° 13.978', W90° 27.098' From Site 117 turn around and proceed straight (northwest) 0.5 mi. to MS-18 Raymond; turn right (east) onto MS-18 and proceed 8.7 mi. to hilltop with gravel drive to left (west) overlooking Raymond battlefield. Turn left (west) onto gravel drive and stop at top of hill (historical marker is nearby). This site affords the best view of the battlefield, and it belongs to Friends of Raymond (a non-profit historical preservation group). The roadbed of the historic Utica Road ran about 250 yards to the east of this site. [C] 12 May 63. 1000. As the Union advance approached Raymond, resistance from Confederate sharpshooters and cavalry forced MG Logan’s DIV, which led the advance of McPherson’s XVII Corps, to use the CAV to protect the flanks, and deploy an INF skirmish line as an advance guard. The marching column was abnormally long because the day had been very hot, dry, and windless, and the dust had forced the marching men to open large gaps between the units. It was almost exactly 1000 when the skirmish line topped the low ridge (now known as Artillery Ridge) about 0.5 mi. to the north, where it was stopped by rifle fire from a Confederate skirmish line hidden in the edge of the belt of scrub trees that concealed the bed of Fourteenmile Creek. [C] 12 May 63. 1115. Logan immediately deployed Dennis’s BDE across the road near the crest of Artillery Ridge, as well as the 6 guns of 8 MI ARTY, which CPT Samuel DeGolyer raced forward to within 200 yards of Fourteenmile Creek (Site 119). The muzzle blasts of the ARTY and INF small arms, raised clouds of dust from the freshly-tilled field. The dust and smoke failed to dissipate in the still air, and almost immediately the view to the front was obscured, and remained so for nearly the entire day, making it impossible for either side to estimate the size of the opposing force. [C] 12 May 63. 1130. As the Confederates move forward, DeGolyer withdrew his guns from near the creek and moved back to Artillery Ridge to the left of the road. Logan deployed his second BDE, J. E. Smith’s, in an extension to the right of Dennis’s BDE, and had DeGolyer move his guns further to the west along Artillery Ridge. Logan’s second artillery battery, Battery D, 2 IL light artillery (four 24-lb. howitzers), arrived and was deployed on the crest of Artillery Ridge just west of the road. The dust was so thick that the gunners were unable to see a target. About 1115 Logan ordered his two-BDE line to advance into the scrub woods along Fourteenmile Creek, and cross the creek.

Site 119. Fourteenmile Creek bridge. GPS: N32° 14.459', W90° 26.651' From Site 118 turn around and proceed back down the gravel drive to MS-18. Turn left (north) onto MS-18 and proceed 0.7 mi. to modern bridge over

113 Fourteenmile Creek and continue past bridge for another 0.1 mi. (total of 0.8 mi. from Site 118); turn left (west) onto Port Gibson Street, proceed 0.1 mi. (past the bus parking area and Raymond Military Park granite marker) and turn left (west) into automobile parking area for Raymond Interpretive Trail (owned by Friends of Raymond). After parking, enter the 0.75 mi. walking trail, turning to the left (east) onto the trail and follow the trail to the old concrete bridge (circa 1910) on the site of the wooden Civil War bridge. [C] 12 May 63. 1115. Dennis’ BDE (Logan’s DIV, XVII Corps) advanced to the edge of the line of trees bordering Fourteenmile Creek, paused until J. E. Smith’s BDE (Logan’s DIV) arrived, and extended Dennis’ right flank to the eastward. Both BDEs then attempted to advance to the north edge of the belt of scrub timber, but only Dennis’ BDE and 23 IN INF (J. E. Smith’ BDE were able to cross the very high and steep banks of Fourteenmile Creek. [C] 12 May 63. 1130. A Confederate battle line (7 TX INF) attacked across the open field north of the belt of scrub trees. Taken by surprise, the entire Union line fell back into the open fields south of the belt of timber, except for 20 OH INF (Dennis’ BDE), which took shelter in the bed of Fourteenmile Creek east of the bridge. That portion of the TX battle line east of the 20 OH INF swept through the belt of timber, but was stopped by Union fire as they emerged into the open field. Here the situation stabilized for a time. [C] 12 May 63. 1145. The 3 TN INF (Confederate) charged the into the woods at the left flank of the Texans, sweeping J. E. Smith’s BDE out of the belt of woods along Fourteenmile Creek and into the open fields to the south, where they also were brought to a stop by Union resistance. McPherson was deeply puzzled by the Confederate attack. He had every reason to believe that the Confederates knew how large his force was, but the obscuring dust and smoke made it impossible to estimate the actual size of the Confederate force. Because it was a military axiom that a smaller force attacked a larger one only under extraordinary circumstances, the Confederate attack suggested that the Confederate force was superior in numbet. This made McPherson extremely cautious. [C] 12 May 63. 1145. In the meantime, Stevenson’s BDE (Logan’s DIV) had arrived on the scene and been deployed in the open field in an extension of J. E. Smith’s right flank, but with the two right-flank regiments turned to face northeast (refused, in military parlance). [C] 12 May 63. Noon. At about 1200 still another Confederate regiment (50 TN INF) emerged from the edge of the woods east of the scene of action, but did not attack Stevenson’s BDE. Instead, deterred by the sight of Stevenson’s battle line, the Confederates fell back into the woods and eventually withdrew to then Dry Grove Road (historic Gallatin Road), about 1,100 yards to the east. [C] 12 May 63. 1245. By this time Sanborn’s BDE (Crocker’s DIV), plus all of Crocker’s ARTY had arrived on the scene. McPherson broke up Sanborn’s BDE, sending individual RGTs to reinforce various parts of Logan’s battle line, and all of the Corps ARTY (4 BTRYs, totaling 22 guns), had been deployed along the crest of Artillery Ridge.

114 [C] 12 May 63. 1545-1700. As the day wore on, McPherson was able to reorganize his battle line, and the Union troops were able to force their way across Fourteenmile Creek and into the open fields north of it. Finally, at about 1545 the Confederate 7 TX INF gave way and withdrew from the field. By about 1700 the last Confederate resistance had been overcome and BG Gregg assembled his defeated troops and began to withdraw eastward along the Raymond Road (MS-18 and the Jackson-Raymond Road) toward Jackson.

Site 120. Gregg’s Artillery. GPS: N32° 14.84', W90° 26.52'. From Site 119 in the Raymond Interpretive Trail parking area and return to Port Gibson Street (historic Utica Road). Turn left (north) and proceed 0.2 mi. to junction of Port Gibson Street and Old Port Gibson Road (historic Auburn Road). Note: En route 0.8 mi. from Site 119 is the Raymond Confederate Cemetery on the right (east) of the road. The Confederate dead from the Battle of Raymond are interred here, while the Union dead were re-interred at Vicksburg National Cemetery. [C] 11 May 63. BG John Gregg’s BDE arrived in Raymond from Jackson (it had been sent to Jackson from Port Hudson, LA) in the afternoon. Intelligence sources had informed the Confederates that a small Union force, probably no larger than a BDE in size, was approaching Raymond from the direction of Utica, and that another similar force was camped at Dillon’s farm, 7 mi. west of Raymond on the Old Port Gibson Road (historic Auburn Road). The previous day LTG Pemberton had ordered Gregg to proceed to Raymond, destroy or drive away the Union force, and then turn westward toward Edwards Station (Site 109) to destroy the Union force at Dillon’s farm. Gregg reconnoitered the area southwest of Raymond, and selected a battlefield that was suitable for a tactical trap where MS-18 (historic Utica Road) crossed Fourteenmile Creek, 1.7 miles southwest of Raymond. [C] 12 May 63. Gregg deployed his large BDE (about 3,000 men, in comparison to a Union BDE of about 1,500) in the positions selected the previous day, intending to hold the Union force in check with two of his five RGTs, and use the other three to encircle the right flank of the Union troops, capturing them if possible. He placed a skirmish line in the southern edge of the band of scrub timber along Fourteenmile Creek to force the Federals to deploy and emplaced the three field guns of Bledsoe’s BTRY on a hilltop about 800 yards north-northeast of the bridge across Fourteenmile Creek. [C] 12 May 63. The 3 Confederate guns fired a salvo a few minutes after 1000 over the heads of their skirmish line in the woods along the creek at the Federal skirmish line in the field beyond, and were dismayed that their field of view was masked almost immediately by clouds of dust and smoke which did not dissipate. The guns continued to fire more or less blindly and sporadically in the direction of the Union force. Soon one of the guns, a Whitworth rifle, burst, leaving Gregg with only two light field guns to support his efforts. [C] 12 May 63. The battlefield was so obscured that Gregg no longer knew where his RGTs were located, or the situation facing them. About 1600 a lull in

115 the battle occurred at the same time that a faint breeze began to dissipate the smoke and dust, making it possible for Gregg to see an array of 22 Union guns on the ridge beyond the creek. His own regiments were fighting desperately to hold a position on a line of low hills north of Fourteenmile Creek against a greatly superior force. He immediately gave the order to disengage and retire toward Raymond.

Total Confederate casualties for the Battle of Raymond were 73 killed, 252 wounded, 190 missing. Union casualties were 68 killed, 341 wounded, 37 missing.

Site 121. Raymond Court House. GPS: N32° 15.61', W90° 25.41'. From Site 120 proceed straight (north) on Port Gibson Street 1.4 mi. to stop sign at Main Street (MS-467); turn left (west) for 200 yards to Raymond Courthouse (Hinds County Courthouse) on right (north). This building was constructed 1857-1859 by the Weldon brothers who designed the Old Court House at Vicksburg. It has not been significantly modified, and retains its 1863 appearance. [C] 12 May 63. The courthouse was used as a hospital by the Confederates during and following the Battle of Raymond. Many Confederate wounded were left behind following the retreat toward Jackson of Gregg’s brigade late on the afternoon. Later, many Union soldiers wounded in the battle were brought to St. Mark’s Episcopal Church (still standing) next door, as well as the Methodist Church and private homes in town, and were left behind when the army moved on. The night of 12 May McPherson’s troops camped in town, and McPherson is said to have made his HQ in Waverly, a home 0.15 mi. northeast of here. Much later, in the period when Vicksburg was under siege, the left-behind wounded Union troops were “captured” by Confederate CAV as they re-occupied the town in early June 1863. [C] 13 May 63. On 13 May, after Grant’s change of plans the night of 12 May, McPherson’s XVII Corps marched from Raymond to Clinton, 8 mi. to the northeast, and Sherman’s XV Corps marched from Dillon’s farm through Raymond to Mississippi Springs, 5 mi. to the east. Grant left Dillon’s farm with Sherman, but spent the night in Raymond, reportedly at McPherson’s former HQ in Waverly.

Site 122. Gregg’s Camp. GPS: N32° 15.304', W90° 22.524' From Site 121 turn around and proceed straight (east) on Main Street (MS- 467) for 10.3 mi. to MS-18. Turn left (east) onto MS-18 and proceed 1.5 mi. and pull off on shoulder. Gregg’s camp was 0.4 mi. to the right (south) of here on the road to Jackson (this portion no longer exists) and along Snake Creek (actual GPS: N32° 14.95', W90° 22.63'). [C] 12 May.63 Here, just before nightfall, Confederate BG John Gregg, retreating with his BDE after being defeated at the Battle of Raymond (Sites 118-

116 120) earlier in the day, met BG W. H. T. Walker’s BDE (about 1,000 men), hastening to reinforce him. Both brigades encamped here for the night. [C] 13 May 63. A message from LTG Pemberton reached Gregg before he broke camp, ordering him to withdraw both his own and Walker’s BDEs into the Jackson defenses. Gregg reluctantly obeyed, and scouts were sent back toward Raymond before the march toward Jackson began. The scouts returned to Gregg’s marching column about noon near Mississippi Springs, and reported that that there were no signs of a direct pursuit. However, they also reported that two Union DIVs (Tuttle’s and Steele’s DIVs of Sherman’s XV Corps) had moved through Raymond from the west very early that morning and that Clinton had been occupied by a strong Union force (Logan’s and Crocker’s DIVs of McPherson’s XVII Corps). Gregg, whose column arrived in Jackson that afternoon, interpreted this information to mean that the Union force that had defeated him south of Raymond consisted of two DIVs and that they had ignored him and moved to, and occupied, Clinton late on 12 May. Gregg incorrectly surmised that there were two Union DIVs, not four, and that these two DIVs were in Clinton. This estimate ignored the two DIVs in Raymond, and was to cost the Confederates heavily the very next day.

Site 123. Mississippi Springs. GPS: N32° 16.004', W90° 20.108'. From Site 122 proceed straight (east) for 0.3 mi. past the junction of Midway Road to the intersection of Jackson-Raymond Road. Turn right (south), turn the bend and proceed straight (east) on Jackson-Raymond Road for 2.1 mi. to junction of Springridge Road. Mississippi Springs was a health spa on Raymond Road 5 mi. east of Raymond, and near the junction of the Raymond-Jackson Road (historic Raymond Road) and Springridge Road. No trace remains of the 1863 community of Mississippi Springs. [C] 13 May 63. Sherman’s XV Corps camped in this vicinity (Steele’s DIV one mi. west of here and Tuttle’s DIV ½ mi. east of here), en route to Jackson from Dillon’s farm, in response to the orders Grant had issued while at Dillon’s farm (Site 111). Sherman had camped here in part because Springridge Road provided an easy way to coordinate the movements of his own corps with McPherson’s XVII Corps, which was camped a mile east of Clinton. Grant’s orders had been to launch a coordinated attack on Jackson the following day, 14 May. It rained heavily during the night of 13-14 May 1863, making movement difficult on the unsurfaced roads.

Site 124. Sherman’s Approach to Jackson. GPS: N32° 16.68', W90° 12.86'. From Site 123 proceed straight on Raymond Road (east) for 7.9 mi. to intersection of Alta Woods Blvd. on the right (south, 0.1 mi. past 4-way intersection of Belvedere Dr. with Raymond Road). Turn right (south) onto Alta Woods Blvd. and proceed 0.7 mi. to junction of Oakhurst Dr. Turn left (north) onto Oakhurst Dr. and proceed 0.1 mi. to junction of Carmel Ave. Turn right (east) onto Carmel Ave. and proceed 0.2 mi. to driveway in front of Carmelite Monastery. Turn left (north) onto driveway; proceed about 100 yds. and face

117 straight ahead (north). Urbanization, to include construction of I-20, has destroyed nearly all traces of the 1863 terrain and road pattern. [C] 14 May 63. With Tuttle’s DIV in the lead, Sherman’s corps left their campground near Mississippi Springs at 0500. Movement was hampered by deep mud caused by the rain of the previous night. The CAV guarding the advance failed to find a single Confederate. Tuttle interpreted this as a sign of a potential ambush, and moved slowly and cautiously. Tuttle’s advance reached this ridge overlooking a narrow bridge across Lynch Creek (0.5 mi. north on the other side of I-20) at about 0900. The creek was in flood from the overnight rain, and a small Confederate force was deployed on the north bank, covering a working party which was trying to burn the rain-sodden wooden bridge. Sherman brought Tuttle’s ARTY (2 IA BTRY and Co. E, 1 IL ARTY) forward, and the guns not only drove away the Confederate working parties but after a few minutes forced the Confederate INF to withdraw into the Jackson fortifications, allowing Sherman’s men to cross the bridge without interference. Sherman moved forward, deployed in front of the earthworks, and sent patrols to the flanks looking for weak spots. One of the patrols discovered that there were no Confederates defending the place where the New Orleans, Jackson & Great Northern Railroad entered the works. A Union regiment sneaked through the gap, and in a rapid bayonet charge captured a few civilians who were manning artillery while the soldiers retreated. By nightfall the city was in firm Union control.

Site 125. Clinton. GPS: N32° 20.23', W90° 19.76'. From Site 124 turn around and proceed back (south) for 100 yds. Turn left (east) onto Carmel Ave., then turn left (north) onto Terry Road. Proceed 0.7 mi. straight (north, under I-20 overpass) to major intersection with US-80. Note: En route, at 0.5 mi., you will cross over Lynch Creek. The historic bridge was about 100 ft. to the left (west) of Terry Road on the frontage road. At junction of US-80 and Terry Road, turn left (west) and proceed 8 mi. on US-80 to intersection of Springridge Road and US-80 in Clinton. Note: Sherman’s Mississippi Springs camp (Site 123) on the night of 13-14 May was 2.3 mi. left (south) of Springridge Road at US-80. Turn right (north) onto Springridge Road and proceed 0.3 mi. to intersection with College Street. Turn left (west) onto College Street and proceed 0.1 mi. to junction with Monroe Street. Note: To the left (south) on the Mississippi College campus is ante- bellum Provine Chapel (“Old Chapel”), built in 1860, which would later be used as a Union hospital and stable. [C] 13 May 63. McPherson’s XVII Corps (Logan’s and Crocker’s DIVs) camped about a mile east of this site after marching 8 mi. from Raymond. [C] 14 May 63. 0500. With Crocker’s DIV in the lead, XVII Corps left its camps in Clinton, and marched east to Jackson on this road (historic Clinton Road) made muddy by the downpour during the night. By 0900 the head of the column reached the railroad bridge over Clinton Boulevard (historic Clinton Road). It had taken 4 hours to cover 4 miles. (NOTE: This bridge no longer

118 exists. It was about 0.4 mi. east of the modern junction of Clinton Boulevard and I-220.) [C] 15 May 63. Following the Battle of Jackson (Sites 124, 126), Grant marched westward from Jackson with Logan’s and Crocker’s DIVs (McPherson’s XVII Corps) during the afternoon, stopping for the night at Clinton. COL Samuel Holmes’ BDE remained in Clinton with Grant and camped on the north side of town. However, while in Jackson on the night of 14 May Grant had received from a spy a copy of the message in which Johnston had suggested to Pemberton that Pemberton attack the Union forces in Clinton (see Sites 104, 108). Grant immediately directed his scattered army to coalesce into three columns and march west for a concentration near Bolton. The two DIVs which had escorted the supply wagons from Grand Gulf (Blair’s and A. J. Smith’s [Blair’s XV Corps DIV was temporarily attached to McClernand’s XIII Corps]) were to march from the vicinity of Auburn eastward through Raymond, then westward towards Bolton. They marched to the junction of the Bolton-Raymond Road (historic Bolton Road) and MS-467 (historic Raymond Road), 1.5 mi. northwest of Raymond. McClernand’s two DIVs (Osterhaus’ and Carr’s) which had been en route to Jackson on the Jackson-Raymond Road were to turn around and march through Raymond toward Bolton. They did so and concentrated at the junction of the Bolton-Raymond Road and Houston Road (historic Middle Road), 3 mi. south of Bolton. McPherson’s two DIVs in Jackson (Logan’s and Crocker’s) were to march through Clinton to Bolton. They encamped 1 mi. southeast of Bolton along Bakers Creek on St. Thomas Road (historic Clinton-Edwards Road). Hovey’s XIII Corps DIV had marched to Clinton on 14 May to support McPherson if needed, and it preceeded McPherson’s Corps on St. Thomas Road and encamped 1 mi. south of Bolton All three columns were to start westward early on 16 May 63. Sherman’s XV Corps (Steele’s and Tuttle’s DIVs), however, was to remain in Jackson and complete the destruction of transportation and industrial facilities. [C] 16 May 63. At 0500 Grant, in Clinton, was awakened to talk to two railroad men who had just passed through the Confederate lines around Edwards Station (Site 109). The two men gave Grant an almost-perfect estimate of the size and composition of Pemberton’s army. At 0530 Grant sent orders to Sherman in Jackson to send Steele’s DIV and an ammunition train to Bolton with “the greatest celerity,” with Tuttle’s DIV to follow as soon as possible. At 0545 he sent orders to McPherson, who was south of Bolton, to “move forward to join McClernand.” Around 0700, Grant received a message from McPherson, written at 0600, advising him “to come forward to the front as soon as you can.”

Site 126. Wright Farm. GPS: N32° 19.292', W90° 13.562'. From Site 125, turn around and proceed back (east) on College Street for 6.3 mi. Note: At 0.8 mi., just past Clinton Cemetery at the three-way intersection, veer left (east) where College Street becomes Clinton Blvd. Proceed on Clinton Blvd. under I-220 overpass to major intersection with Ellis Ave. The O. P. Wright

119 farm was about 150 ft. straight ahead to the right (south) of Clinton Blvd., but the terrain has been greatly changed by urbanization. [C] 14 May 63. At about 0930 Crocker’s DIV, leading the advance of McPherson’s XVII Corps toward Jackson along the Clinton Road, began receiving long-range but very accurate ARTY fire from a Confederate BTRY nearly 1,700 yards to the east (about 0.5 mi. east on a slight rise at the southeast corner of Delaware Ave. and Clinton Blvd). Despite the ARTY fire, Crocker deployed and began to move forward. Crocker estimated the Confederate force at no more than 1,000 men, while he commanded about 5,500, and Logan’s DIV, with another 5,500, was close behind in support. However, the rain made it hard to see and difficult to move, so Crocker moved cautiously. At about 1000 it began to rain so heavily that the men dared not try to load their rifles. Logan’s men arrived while Crocker waited for the rain to stop, so Crocker (who was in tactical command) deployed Logan’s men in extension of his left flank. Logan could see a large Confederate force deployed beyond Town Creek about 0.8 mi. to the Union left front, but ignored it because the creek was in flood and so deep that neither side could interfere with the other. [C] Finally, at about 1100 the rain stopped. Crocker immediately attacked, quickly broke the Confederate line, and pursued the withdrawing Confederates toward Jackson. Muddy fields and roads, plus persistent Confederate resistance, made a mockery of the pursuit, so it was not until about 1500 that the Union troops actually made contact with the earthworks defending Jackson. However, the absence of Confederate fire made Crocker suspicious. Patrols quickly discovered the works empty. Crocker’s patrols met Sherman’s in the center of the city. The Confederate defenders, including GEN Joseph E. Johnston, who had arrived the previous day, had withdrawn to the northeast toward Canton. [C] 14 May 63. While conferring with his corps commanders during the late afternoon at the Bowman House, Jackson’s most elegant hotel (at the corner of E. Amite and N. State Streets in Jackson where the Standard Oil Bldg. is today, immediately north of the Old Capitol), McPherson handed Grant a copy of a dispatch (see Site 125) which GEN Johnston had sent to Pemberton at 2040 on the previous evening. One of Johnston’s couriers was a Union agent. It suggested, not ordered, that Pemberton attack the Union troops in Clinton. This was a duplicate copy of the message that was delivered to Pemberton in Bovina at 0910 on 14 May (see Sites 104, 108). Grant immediately decided that Bolton was the place to interpose his army between the two Confederate forces before they could unite, and ordered McPherson and McClernand to march their corps to Bolton early on 15 May, while Sherman remained in Jackson to destroy the railroads and factories. Total Confederate casualties for the Battle of Jackson were 17 killed, 64 wounded, 118 missing. Union casualties were 42 killed, 252 wounded, 7 missing. Note: This concludes the Union approaches to Jackson 13-15 May. For GEN Johnston’s evacuation route from Jackson, proceed to Site 127.

120

Site 127. Tougaloo. GPS: N32° 23.890', W90° 09.02'. From Site 126 proceed straight (east) 3.2 mi. on Clinton Blvd. (which becomes W. Capitol Street) to its termination at the Old Capitol on N. State Street. Note: The Old Capitol was the 1863 Capitol building, and the Bowman House (see Site 126) was one block to the left (north). Turn left (north) onto North State Street (US-51) and proceed north for 7.6 mi. to junction of County Line Road and N. State Street at Tougaloo, MS. In 1863Tougaloo was a small community around a Section Station on the Mississippi Central Railroad (MCRR). [C] 14 May 63. GEN Joseph E. Johnston, withdrawing with Gregg’s men from Jackson in advance of the Union occupation of the town, stopped for the night at this community. [C] 15 May 63. 0830. As Gregg’s troops broke camp and began to march toward Canton, CPT Yerger, who delivered Johnston’s message of 13 May to Pemberton near Bovina on 14 May (Site 108), returned with Pemberton’s reply that Pemberton was marching to Dillon’s farm, not Clinton as Johnston had suggested. Furious at Pemberton’s disregard of his suggestion, Johnston wrote a dispatch to Pemberton, who had at 0800 begun the march towards Edwards Station (Site 109) on the first leg of the march to “cut the enemy’s communications” at Dillon’s farm. Johnston instructed Pemberton that Jackson had fallen and that “the only mode by which we can unite is by moving directly to Clinton.” Strangely, Johnston then continued the march toward Canton, 23 mi. to the northeast, which placed his forces further away from Clinton as well as Pemberton’s forces. The exhausted courier reached Pemberton around 0715 on 16 May, by which time Grant’s forces, moving west, had already made contact, opening the Battle of Champion Hill.

Site 128. Bolton. GPS: N32° 20.987', W90° 27.508' From Site 127 proceed straight (north) on US-51 for 20.2 mi. to Natchez Trace Parkway entrance (Rice Road) on right (east). Turn right (east) onto Rice Road and proceed 0.1 mi., then turn left (north) to Natchez Trace Parkway entrance and proceed 0.2 mi. to Natchez Trace Parkway. Turn left (west) onto Natchez Trace Parkway and proceed 12.7 mi. to Clinton Visitor Center turn-off near mile marker 90. Turn left (south) onto turn-off and proceed 0.1 mi. to Pinehaven Road. Turn right (south) onto Pinehaven Road and proceed 0.3 mi. to major intersection with W. Northside Drive. Turn right (west) and proceed 8.3 mi. (go under I-20) to Old US-80. Turn right (west) onto Old US-80 and proceed 1.2 mi. to intersection with Bolton-Brownsville Road (on right, Bolton-Raymond Road on left). Note: After passing under the Natchez Trace Parkway overpass, the old roadway to the left (south) at 0.5 mi. is a remnant of the road that Grant used when he left Clinton on the morning of 16 May. At 0.8 mi. at the “Y” intersection bear left (west) on W. Northside Dr. (historic Bridgeport, or Upper Jackson, Road). This road was used by Grant and Holmes’ BDE of Crocker’s DIV, XVII Corps, to get to Bolton on 16 May. At 6.8 mi. near Mt. Olive Church the historic

121 road continued straight (west) to Joe Davis’ (brother of Pres. Jefferson Davis) Fleetwood Plantation. East of Fleetwood the Bolton-Brownsville Road turned south from the Bridgeport Road to Bolton. Grant and Holmes’ BDE used that route to Bolton. [C] 15 May. During the afternoon McPherson and three Union DIVs marched to Bolton on the St. Thomas Road (historic Clinton-Edwards Road [Jackson Road]) 1 mi. to the left (south). Hovey’s DIV marched from Clinton, and Logan’s and Crocker’s from Jackson. Their orders were to start westward on the Jackson Road toward Edwards Station (Site 109) the next morning with Hovey’s DIV (XIII Corps) leading the way, followed by Logan’s and Crocker’s divisions (XVII Corps). Three mi. south of here the DIVs of Osterhaus and Carr were to move, and 4.5 mi. south of here the DIVs of Smith and Blair were to move. Grant had seven DIVs poised to attack Pemberton on three parallel axes of advance. The cavalry of Osterhaus’ DIV of McClernand’s XIII Corps, to prevent any approach of GEN Johnston’s force from northeast of Jackson near Tougaloo (Site 127), destroyed the bridge over Baker’s Creek 0.3 mi. to the left (south) on Bolton- Raymond Road. [C] 16 May 63. Grant, who left Clinton at 0700 16 May arrived in Bolton via Bolton-Brownsville Road to the right (north) and had to wait while pioneers rebuilt the bridge over Bakers Creek 0.3 mi. south of here. [C] 16 May 63. Sherman, in the process of destroying the railroads and manufacturing facilities in and around Jackson with Tuttle’s and Steele’s DIVs of his XV Corps, received a message from Grant to move west to join the rest of the army as soon as possible. Sherman marched west on W. Northside Dr. (historic Bridgeport Road) and encamped in and around Bolton that night. During the night he received a message from Grant to march north on 17 May to the Bridgeport Road and then to Bridgeport to force a crossing of the Big Black River in order to flank Pemberton, now on the Big Black River (Site 140). [C] 17 May 63. Sherman and his men left early in the morning for Bridgeport.

Site 129. McPherson’s Approach to Champion Hill. GPS: N32° 200.14', W90° 27.54'. From Site 128 turn left (south) onto Bolton Road-Raymond Road (historic Bolton Road) and proceed 1 mi. to tree line in field to your left (east). Note: At 0.6 mi. bear right (southwest) at “Y” intersection of Raymond-Bolton and Airport Roads, staying on Raymond-Bolton Road. In 1863 the St. Thomas Road (historic Clinton-Edwards Road, Jackson Road), which is 0.3 mi. to the left (east) and ends at Airport Road, continued straight and crossed the Raymond-Bolton Road at this point. Grant’s troops passed this point as they marched right (west) toward Champion Hill on what at this point was called the historic Jackson Road (modern Champion Hill Road). This portion of that road no longer exists, as the Champion Hill Road has been re-routed, and now turns westward off the Bolton-Raymond Road only 00.1 mi. south of Bolton town center, and north of the Bakers Creek bridge.

122 [C] 16 May 63. 0600. Three Union DIVs led by Hovey’s DIV (XIII Corps), followed closely by Logan’s and Crocker’s DIVs (XVII Corps), began passing this point on the historic Jackson Road, en route to Edwards. Most of the army’s wagon train was positioned between Logan’s and Crocker’s divisions. The head of the INF column was guarded by 1 IL CAV.

Site 130. McClernand’s Approach to Champion Hill. GPS: N32° 180.383', W90° 27.797'. From Site 129 continue straight (south) on Raymond-Bolton Road (historic Bolton Road) for 20.1 mi. (total of 30.1 mi. south of Bolton) to junction of Houston (historic Middle Road) and Raymond-Bolton roads. Note: As you proceed straight (south) for 10.2 mi. (total of 20.2 mi. south of Bolton) to the left (east) is the W. S. Jones plantation house (GPS: N32° 19.03', W90° 27.62', private property), which McPherson used as his HQ the night of 15- 16 May. [C] 16 May. 0600. McClernand rode to McPherson’s HQ at the W. S. Jones house to tell the junior officer how the battle was to be conducted. As soon as McClernand departed and returned here, McPherson send a message to Grant in Clinton advising him to “come to the front.” Osterhaus’ and Carr’s DIVs of the XIII Corps, began marching westward along the Houston Road (historic Middle Road) toward Edwards Station (Site 109), with Osterhaus’ men heading the column, preceded by a DET of 3d IL CAV. Grant expected McClernand to encounter elements of Confederate LTG Pemberton’s army, and had directed McClernand to avoid a major engagement “unless certain of success.” Grant had hoped thereby to avoid a piece-meal battle.

Site 131. A. J. Smith’s Approach to Champion Hill. GPS: N32° 160.361', W90° 26.400'. From Site 130 continue straight (south) on Raymond-Bolton Road for 2.8 mi. to junction of MS-467 (historic Raymond Road). [C] 16 May 63. 0500. BG A. J. Smith’s DIV (XIII Corps), followed by Blair’s DIV (XV Corps) and the pontoon train of the army, having further to travel to Edwards Station than the other four DIVs, left this road junction at daybreak and marched eastward along MS-467 (historic Raymond Road) toward Edwards Station (Site 109). A. J. Smith was in tactical command of the column, under the overall command of MG McClernand, who was marching with two other DIVs of his XIII Corps on the Houston Road (historic Middle Road), 2.8 mi. to the northwest.

Site 132. Champion House. GPS: N32° 20.662', W90° 310.216' From Site 131 turn right onto MS-467 (historic Raymond Road) and proceed 3 mi. to intersection of Chapel Hill Road. Turn right (north) onto N. Chapel Hill Road and proceed 4 mi. to junction with Champion Hill Road (historic Jackson Road). Turn left (west) onto Champion Hill Road and proceed 1.9 mi. to church drive on left (south) on crest of ridge (just past Farr Road on the right [north]).

123 The actual site of the Champion house is 0.2 mi. south, on the south grounds of modern Champion Hill Church. No trace of the Civil War house remains. [C] 16 May 63. 0900. A detachment of 12 Confederate infantrymen from BG S. D. Lee’s AL BDE arrived on a small knoll about 200 yds. south of the Champion house about 0800, sent there by Lee as a precaution against the possibility of a Union approach along the Champion Hill Road (historic Jackson Road) which turned sharply to the left (south) and went over the ridge known as Champion Hill. Lee’s precaution paid large dividends, because at about 0900 the Confederate pickets saw 1 IL CAV approaching from the east along the Champion Hill Road (historic Jackson Road). The pickets opened fire as soon as the Union horsemen came within range. [C] 16 May 63. 0930. BG McGinnis, commanding the lead BDE of the Union column, could see a Confederate force hastily deploying on the crest of a commanding ridge (Champion Hill) 1,500 yds. to the south. Without referring to Hovey (his DIV commander), McGinnis began deploying and pushing southward toward the Confederate line forming on the hilltop. The rest of Hovey’s DIV arrived within minutes, and extended McGinnis’ line to the left. Logan’s DIV arrived and extended McGinnis’ line to the right into a large area of open fields, and continued the push toward the Confederate line on the hilltop to the south. Grant, McPherson, and Logan arrived on the scene a few minutes later, and immediately realized that they had surprised the Confederate defenders before they had finished their defensive deployment. McPherson sent word to Crocker to bring his DIV forward with all possible speed. [C] 16 May 63. 1200. The Union deployment was completed by about noon, and the assault broke through the Confederate line, which by this time consisted of Lee’s, Barton’s, and Cumming’s BDEs of MG Carter Stevenson’s DIV. The Confederate defenders were driven back for about a mile, finally coming to a stand roughly along Austin Ridge, along which ran the Billy Fields Road (historic Jackson Road). However, the Union forces occupied both the critical Crossroad (Site 133) and the western end of Austin Ridge, thus closing the only known retreat route across Bakers Creek for the Confederate army. [C] 16 May 63. 1400. A Confederate counterattack by Bowen’s DIV recaptured the Crossroad and advanced northward along the Jackson Road almost to the Champion house, where determined Union INF plus a concentration of ARTY brought the Confederate attack to a stop. After nearly an hour of vicious fighting, Bowen’s men, short of ammunition, were forced by a renewed Union offensive to a position south of the Crossroad.

Site 133. The Crossroad. GPS: N32° 19.733', W90° 31.782'. From Site 132 continue straight for 1.7 mi. to junction with Billy Fields Road (historic Jackson Road). Note: This section of Champion Hill Road (from Champion house to Billy Fields Road) did not exist in 1863. At 1.1 mi. Logan’s DIV attacked across the fields to the left (south) of the road toward S. D. Lee’s BDE on the distant ridge.

124 At Billy Fields Road turn left (south) and proceed 1.4 mi. to junction with D. J. Johnson Road (historic Ratliff Road) on right (south) and historic Jackson Road trace on right (north). In 1863 the D. J. Johnson Road (historic Ratliff Road) followed the crest of the ridge southwestward 1.3 mi. to a junction with MS-467 (historic Raymond Road) at the Coker house. Today this road dead-ends 0.7 mi. to the south. The historic Jackson Road (old road trace to left [north]) ran west from Bolton, then made a right angle turn north of the Champion house (Site 132), crossed over Champion Hill, then made a right angle turn right (west) at this point (modern Billy Fields Road) and ran toward Edwards Station. Billy Fields Road (historic Middle Road) is straight ahead (east). [C] 15 May 63. After the delayed issue of rations at Edwards Station, Pemberton’s Army of Vicksburg departed southeastward from the hamlet on the MS-467 (historic Raymond Road) at 1300. At Bakers Creek a detour had to be taken north from MS-467 (historic Raymond Road) to the Champion Hill Road (historic Jackson Road) due to a washed-out bridge. MG Loring’s DIV, followed by BG John Bowen’s DIV, reached the Crossroad via the Champion Hill and Billy Fields Roads (historic Jackson Road), and missed the turn to the right (south) at this location due to this road (according to Loring) being “wrongly laid down upon the map furnished.” MAJ Lockett then guided the column south on the D. J. Johnson Road (historic Ratliff Road) late in the day. Bowen’s DIV finally went into camp at 2200 on Ratliff Road north of the Ratliff house 0.8 mi. southwest of the Crossroad. MG Carter Stevenson’s DIV could not leave Edwards Station until 1700 due to the congested roads and it was 0200 on 16 May before it reached the tail of Bowen’s encamped DIV 0.4 mi. south of here. It was daybreak before the army’s 200-wagon train, escorted by COL A. W. Reynold’s BDE, reached the Crossroad. [C] 16 May 63. Approx. 0630. Orders were received from Pemberton directing the army to reverse its direction of march, and move west, then north, to Brownsville, a small village 14 mi. northeast of Edwards Station (Site 109), via the Billy Fields, Champion Hill, and Cemetery Roads (historic Jackson Road) and MS-22(historic Brownsville Road). [C] 16 May 63. As a precaution against the possibility of a Union approach from the northeast along the Champion Hill Road (historic Jackson Road), BG S. D. Lee, whose BDE had camped around the Crossroad, sent a picket to the top of Champion Hill, a commanding crest on a ridge 800 yds. north here. The lieutenant in command of the picket, realizing that he could not see very far down the Champion Hill Road (historic Jackson Road), sent a 12-man patrol forward to the top of a small knoll just south of the Champion house. [C] 16 May 63. 0910. The advanced picket informed Lee that a powerful Union INF force was approaching rapidly toward them along the Champion Hill Road (historic Jackson Road). Lee instantly realized that the Confederate army had been caught by surprise while in marching order, and without asking for orders marched his BDE northward to the crest of Champion Hill and began to deploy along the summit, thus defending the vital Crossroad from the north, while leaving Waddell’s ARTY BTRY at the Crossroad facing east down the Billy Fields

125 Road (historic Middle Road). BG Alfred Cumming divided his BDE, leaving two RGTs with Waddell’s BTRY facing east to protect the Crossroad, and followed Lee to the crest of Champion Hill. Lee filed off to the northwest, and Cumming’s men followed, continuing the Confederate line from Lee’s right flank to the crest of Champion Hill and then turning south along the Jackson Road to face east. The two guns of the Botetourt ARTY BTRY (this BTRY lost 4 guns at Port Gibson) were placed on the crest of Champion Hill, and were soon joined by two of the 6 guns of Waddell’s BTRY. MG Stevenson, on Champion Hill, saw Logan’s Union DIV extending beyond Lee’s left flank, and ordered BG Seth Barton’s BDE to double-time cross-country to extend Lee’s left flank from the ridge toward Bakers Creek, bolstered by 4 guns of Cherokee GA ARTY and 4 guns of 1st MS Light ARTY. Even so, the Confederate line was so heavily outnumbered by the Union force that the Union line extended beyond both flanks of the Confederate position. [C] 16 May 63. 1130. The Union assault began, and by 1330 Barton’s and Cumming’s BDEs had been shattered and dispersed, and Lee’s BDE had been forced back to Austin Ridge and the Billy Fields Road (historic Jackson Road) west of the Crossroad. Union BG John Stevenson’s BDE had seized a section of the historic Jackson Road about 1,500 yards west of the Crossroad, and Hovey’s DIV had seized the Crossroad itself, thus cutting off any possible Confederate withdrawal via the Upper Baker Creek bridge, 3,500 yds. west of the Crossroad. [C] 16 May 63. 1430. A Confederate counterattack by Bowen’s DIV quickly recovered the Crossroad and continued over the crest of Champion Hill, 800 yds. north of the Crossroad, and was finally brought to a stop only a few hundred yards south of the Champion house by Union reinforcements from Crocker’s DIV and an ARTY concentration. After nearly an hour of bitter fighting, Bowen’s men were forced back, and by 1630 the federals controlled the entire reach of the historic Jackson Road east of the Upper Bakers Creek bridge. [C] 16 May 63. 1430-1730. McClernand’s two DIVs (Osterhaus’ and Carr’s) on the Billy Fields Road (historic Middle Road) broke through a Confederate roadblock across the road, about 800 yards east of the Crossroad, and joined the Union forces at the Crossroad. Fortuituously, a courier arrived at Pemberton’s HQ at the Roberts house (only the cistern survives, 0.3 mi. south of the Crossroads on D. J. Johnson Road) with the news that there was a farm road connecting the D. J. Johnson Road (historic Ratliff Road) with MS-467 (historic Raymond Road) and the Lower Bakers Creek Bridge, and that the washed-out bridge had been rebuilt by MAJ Lockett’s engineers (Site 136). Having no option but to withdraw as best he could, Pemberton immediately ordered his army to march for the newly-constructed bridge. The three Union DIVs that had arrived on the field via the Jackson Road (Hovey’s, Logan’s, and Crocker’s) and had won the battle for the Crossroad were exhausted, so Grant placed McClernand in charge of the pursuit, using the DIVs of Osterhaus and Carr, which had arrived on the scene via the Billy Fields Road (historic Middle Road) and were relatively fresh.

126 [C] 16 May 63. 2000. With the end of the fighting, the exhausted men of Hovey’s DIV (XIII Corps) camped between the crest of Champion Hill and the Crossroad which they had won at such cost. Total Confederate casualties for the Battle of Champion Hill were 381 killed, 1,018 wounded, 2,441 missing. Union casualties were 396 killed, 1,838 wounded, 187 missing.

Site 134. Upper Bakers Creek Bridge. GPS: N32° 20.097', W90° 33.392'. From Site 133, turn around and proceed back (west) on Billy Fields Road for 1.4 mi. to junction with Champion Hill Road. Turn left (west) onto Champion Hill Road and proceed 0.4 mi. to bridge over Bakers Creek. [C] 15 May 63. Pemberton, on Bowen’s Ridge (Site 104), fully aware that the main supply line for the Union army ran along the Old Port Gibson Road (historic Natchez Trace), and that his forces were between Grant and the Southern Railroad of Mississippi, planned to use Bowen’s Ridge as a defensive position, thus forcing Union MG Grant’s Army of the Tennessee to attack him. After long delays at Edwards Station and at the Lower Bakers Creek Bridge (Site 136), Pemberton’s army began crossing the Upper Bakers Creek Bridge late in the afternoon, en route to Dillon’s farm on the Old Port Gibson Road (historic Natchez Trace). The Confederate army’s wagon train was not able to leave Edwards Station until late in the afternoon, and began crossing the Upper Bakers Creek Bridge about dusk, well behind the infantry column. [C] 16 May 63. Approx. 1700. Following the defeat of the Confederate Army of Vicksburg, Union BG J. Stevenson’s BDE marched westward along the Champion Hill Road (historic Jackson Road) and occupied the Upper Baker’s Creek Bridge intact. The Confederates were unable to mount any serious attempt to retake the bridge, and later that evening a portion of the Union army crossed the bridge in pursuit of Pemberton’s retreating army.

Site 135. Jackson Creek bridge. GPS: N32° 18.049', W90° 32.808'. From Site 134 turn around and proceed back (east) on Champion Hill Road for 4.8 mi. to junction of N. Chapel Hill Road. Turn right (south) onto N. Chapel Hill Road and proceed 4.2 mi. to intersection of MS-467 (historic Raymond Road). Note: At “Y” intersection after 0.4 mi. on N. Chapel Hill Road bear right (southwest) and remain on N. Chapel Hill Road. At MS-467 intersection turn right (west) onto MS-467 and proceed 4.1 mi. to bridge over Jackson Creek. Note: At 3.3 mi. the gravel drive to the left (south) led to Mrs. Sarah Ellison’s house, the HQ of LTG Pemberton the night of 15-16 May. [C] 16 May 63. Approx. 0630. Union BG A. J. Smith’s DIV (XIII Corps), guarded by CAV, and followed by Blair’s DIV (Sherman’s XV Corps. Blair’s DIV had escorted a supply wagon train from Grand Gulf to Raymond) approached the Confederate outpost near the junction of the Bill Downing Road (historic Turkey Creek Road) and MS-467 (historic Raymond-Edwards Road), forcing the Confederates back. By 1330 the Confederates (Loring’s DIV) had burned the

127 Jackson Creek bridge and withdrawn to a low ridge 300 yards west of the creek. While the creek was only ankle-deep, it had steep banks, and the federals stopped to build a new bridge. Construction proceeded very slowly because the bridge site was under fire from Loring’s ARTY. At about the same time that the bridge was completed (about 1400), two of Loring’s three BDEs were detached and sent to the aid of the main Confederate army at the Crossroad, leaving BG Lloyd Tighman’s BDE to oppose the two-DIV Union force on MS-467 (historic Raymond-Edwards Road). Tilghman slowly withdrew to a position near the Coker house, 0.8 mi. east of the Lower Bakers Creek Bridge (which was washed- out but was being rebuilt by Confederate engineers), and the Union troops slowly and cautiously followed. Thus, two of Grant’s seven DIVS failed to play any significant part in the climactic Battle of Champion Hill.

Site 136. Lower Bakers Creek Bridge. GPS: N32° 18.895', W90° 34.895'. From Site 135 proceed straight (west) on MS-467 for 2.2 mi. to the bridge over Bakers Creek. Note: At 0.8 mi. the Coker house is to the left (south) of the road at the crest of Coker Ridge. The Coker Ridge served as Loring’s second artillery position after he withdrew from the ridge overlooking Jackson Creek. The Coker Ridge was occupied early in the afternoon by federal artillery (6 guns of Chicago Mercantile BTRY and 4 guns of 17 OH BTRY) when the Confederates fell back to the Cotton Ridge, 0.3 mi. west of the Coker Ridge (1.1 mi. from Site 136). Confederate BG Lloyd Tilghman was killed by a federal artillery shell on Cotton Ridge, and a small monument marks the spot of his death. [C] 15 May 63. The wooden bridge that carried the Raymond Road across Bakers Creek had been washed out by a flash flood a few days prior to 15 May 1863, but the event had not been noted by Pemberton’s only available scouting force, COL Wirt Adams’ MS CAV RGT. [C] 15 May 63. 1400. After long delays at Edwards Station, Confederate LTG Pemberton’s Army of Vicksburg approached the Lower Bakers Creek Bridge . Unable to cross the flooded and unfordable creek, at 1600 Pemberton was forced to divert his march to cross the creek on the Upper Bakers Creek Bridge (Site 134), 2.1 mi. to the northeast. The long delay forced Pemberton’s Army of Vicksburg to camp for the night in marching order along the D. J. Johnson Road (historic Ratliff Road) from the Crossroad (Site 133) to MS-467 (historic Raymond Road), well short of the planned objective of Dillon’s farm. Pemberton, near the head of the column, spent the night of 15-16 May 63 at Mrs. Ellison’s house, on MS-467 (historic Raymond Road) 4.5 mi. east of Edwards. [C] 16 May 63. While the battle of Champion Hill raged 4 mi. to the northeast, Pemberton’s engineers began rebuilding the bridge, and by 1630 not only was the bridge completed, but the flood had subsided so that the creek was fordable, albeit with difficulty. Furthermore, scouts (from Wirt Adams’ MS CAV) had discovered a farm road (non-extant Lower Bridge Road) leading from near the Lower Bakers Creek Bridge to the D. J. Johnson Road (historic Ratliff Road) about 1 mi. southwest of the Roberts house, where Pemberton had moved his

128 HQ from Mrs. Ellison’s. This development opened an easy escape route for the defeated Army of Vicksburg at the last possible moment, and Pemberton wasted not a moment in ordering his army to leave the field and march via Edwards Station for Big Black Bridge, 7.2 mi. westward. [C] 16 May 63. While the bulk of the army escaped across the Lower Baker’s Creek Bridge, Tilghman’s BDE withdrew slowly westward from the Coker Ridge to a position about 1 mi. east of the Lower Baker’s Creek Bridge, from which he could defend the bridge. At 1720 he was fatally wounded at the site by a Union artillery shell, and carried to Hiawatha Plantation house, where he died. Hiawatha house was located 0.4 mi. east of this bridge on the south side of MS- 467, but was moved to Cooper’s Wells Street in Raymond in 2005 and restored. [C] 16 May 63. Dusk. MG Loring brought up the rear of the retreat with his DIV, and believing that the road to Big Black Bridge was already occupied by Union forces, turned southward along a farm track which joined the Raymond Road near Hiawatha. The road vanished in the swampy bottoms of Jackson Creek, 3 mi. south of the Raymond Road, forcing Loring to abandon all of his wagons and 12 cannon. The DIV, much depleted by desertions and straggling, at last reached the railroad at Crystal Springs, 26 mi. to the southeast, and eventually marched to Jackson and reported GEN Johnston his arrival there. Loring had made no effort to communicate his situation to Pemberton. [C] 16 May 63. Well after the battle of Champion Hill was over, two BDEs of MG Blair’s DIV (XV Corps) arrived near the Coker house, having escorted a large train of supply wagons from Grand Gulf via Raymond. With them were the wagons carrying the army’s pontoon bridge. During the night orders from Grant directed Blair to escort the wagons carrying the pontoon bridge directly to Bridgeport, where he was to construct a bridge across the Big Black River (Site 139).

Site 137. Brownsville Road. GPS: N32° 20.211', W90° 35.867'. From Site 136 proceed straight (west) across Lower Bakers Creek Bridge for 100 yds. and turn right (north) onto Buck Reed Road. Proceed north on Buck Reed Road for 1.7 mi., crossing the historic railroad tracks of the Southern Railroad of Mississippi. Turn left (west) immediately after railroad tracks onto Cemetery Road. Note: Buck Reed Road is the approximate route of the detour of Pemberton’s Army of Vicksburg on 15 May after it marched from Edwards to the washed-out Lower Bakers Creek Bridge. Champion Hill Road (to the right [east] 100 yds. south of the railroad track) is the historic Jackson Road leading to the Crossroads and over the crest of Champion Hill. Cemetery Road is also the historic Jackson Road. After turning onto Cemetery Road proceed straight for 1.6 mi. to junction of Wallace Drive (may be unmarked, and is the historic Brownsville Road) on the right (north). [C] 15 May 63. 1300-2400. At 1300 the Army of Vicksburg, after drawing rations, marched east from Edwards Station on MS-467 (historic Raymond Road)

129 0.8 mi. south of here. It was followed at midnight by a wagon train of about 200 wagons, escorted by COL A. W. Reynolds’ BDE (Carter Stevenson’s DIV). [C] 16 May 63. Near dawn the wagon train caught up with the tail of the army near the Crossroad (Site 133). Almost before the horses could be unhitched, an order from Pemberton arrived, directing the train to turn around, move toward Edwards Station on Billy Fields, Champion Hill, and Cemetery Roads (historic Jackson Road) to Wallace Drive and MS-22 (historic Brownsville Road) toward Canton. The wagons were turned around in the sunken road with great difficulty, but by about 0900 they were on the Jackson Road heading west toward Edwards Station. The train, accompanied by A. W. Reynolds’ BDE, turned north here onto the Brownsville Road at about noon, and by about 1330 it had passed the junction of Anderson Road (historic Bridgeport Road or Upper Jackson Road), 2.5 mi. northeast of Edwards Station. Here Reynolds halted to await further orders.

Site 138. Escape of Confederate Wagon Train. GPS: N32° 21.71', W90° 34.52'. From Site 137 turn right (north) onto Wallace Drive (possibly no street sign); proceed (northeast) to Stop sign on Old US-80. Continue straight and continue for a total of 1.7 mi. to junction with Good Hope Road. Note: Wallace Drive becomes MS-22 after crossing over I-20. [C] 16 May. With the wagons A. W. Reynolds was shepherding parked along MS-22 (historic Brownsville Road), he could hear the sounds and see the smoke of the battle raging on Champion Hill, only 4 mi. away to the southeast. At about 1515 a courier arrived from MG Stevenson, Reynold’s DIV commander, with an order for Reynolds to get the wagons across the raft bridge which crossed the Big Black River at Bridgeport as soon as possible. Once again the teamsters got their wagons turned around, and by 1730 the train was well started down Anderson Road and Goat Hill Road (historic Bridgeport Road) and headed for Vicksburg.

Site 139. Bridgeport. GPS: N32° 21.658', W90° 37.847'. From Site 138 turn around and proceed back (southwest) for 0.4 mi. to the junction of Anderson Road, and turn turn right (west) on Anderson Road for 0.1 mi; turn south on Goat Hill Road (historic Bridgeport Road) and proceed 2.3 mi. to Askew Ferry Road. Note: At “Y” intersection of Goat Hill and Hill Road at 1.7 mi., veer left (southwest) and stay on Goat Hill Road. After passing the “Y” intersection for 0.1 mi. the historic Bridgeport Road continued straight (west) to Bridgeport Plantation, while the modern road turns south. At junction of Goat Hill Road and Askew Ferry Road, turn right (west) and proceed 0.2 mi. to entrance at Askew Landing Campground. Historic Bridgeport Road joined this modern road at this point by descending the ridgeline to the right (northeast) and continued straight (west) for 0.3 mi. to the Big Black River. [C] 16 May 63. The Bridgeport Road east of the Big Black River was bordered by deep ravines covered with scrub timber. About 1800, shortly after

130 the wagon train guarded by COL A. W. Reynolds’ BDE and a portion of COL Wirt Adams’ MS CAV turned onto the Goat Hill Road (historic Bridgeport Road), it was attacked by COL Clark Wright’s 6 MO CAV. Aided by the terrain, which was very unsuitable for CAV, Reynolds’ INF was able to beat off the Union attacks, and by about 2000, the train was able to escape across the Big Black River on the raft bridge at Bridgeport. The Confederates were able to hold off the Union horsemen long enough to burn the bridge behind them. While the wagons rumbled safely toward Vicksburg on the Freetown Road (historic Bridgeport Road west of the Big Black River), Reynolds left a detachment of riflemen behind to prevent the federals from constructing a bridge across the river, thus preventing pursuit by the Union cavalry. [C] 17 May 63. 1400. Sherman, arrived with Tuttle’s and Steele’s DIVs (XV Corps) to find Blair’s DIV (the third of Sherman’s three DIVs) already engaged in constructing a pontoon bridge across the Big Black River. Blair had been forced to fire artillery at the west bank to drive away a Confederate outpost that tried to prevent the bridge construction. The bridge was completed by late afternoon, and Blair’s DIV crossed and camped for the night at Brooks’ farm on the Freetown Road (historic Bridgeport Road), 2 mi. northwest of Bridgeport (modern Askew Landing). [C] 17 May 63. Grant arrived just before dark, having ridden from Big Black Bridge after the Battle of Big Black Bridge (Site 140). He and his friend Sherman sat companionably on a log watching Steele’s DIV cross by torchlight, with Tuttle’s DIV lined up and waiting its turn. Sherman wrote, “We sat on a log, looking at the passage of troops by the light of the fires; the bridge swayed to and fro under the passing feet, and made a fine war picture.” The last water barrier between the Army of the Tennessee and Vicksburg had been crossed. [C] 18 May 63. Tuttle’s DIV (XV Corps) crossed the Big Black at dawn and fell in on the rear of Sherman’s XV Corps marching westward on the Freetown Road (historic Bridgeport Road).

Site 140. Battle of Big Black Bridge. GPS: N32° 20.709', W90° 41.366'. From Site 139 turn around and proceed back (east) on Askew Ferry Road for 2.4 mi. to intersection with MS-22. Turn right (south) on MS-22 and proceed 0.2 mi. across I-20 to intersection with Old US-80. Turn right (west) onto Old US-80 and proceed 1 mi. to Edwards Station at intersection of Mt. Moriah Road with Old US-80. Note: At large white “Edwards” letters at 0.7 mi. follow Old US-80 as it turns left (south) for 0.1 mi. then turn right (west) and continue straight (west) to Edwards Station. From Edwards Station proceed east on Old US-80 (Jackson Road) for 5 mi. to battle site. Note: At 5 mi., just before the bridge over the shallow bayou at the Confederate battle line, is a dirt pull-off area leading to a farm road on the right (north) of Old US-80. The Confederate defense line was behind (west) of a shallow bayou (marked by the tree and brush line), 1,700 yds. east of the Old US-80 bridge across Big Black River. The historic Jackson Road actually ran

131 parallel to, and then crossed under, the railroad about 900 yards south of Old US-80. [C] 6-15 May 63. After Pemberton had realized that Edwards Station and Big Black Bridge were the immediate objectives of the Union army, he ordered a fortified bridgehead constructed to defend the Big Black Bridge. It primarily consisted of a line of breastworks constructed of cotton bales and logs, part of which was fronted by a shallow bayou serving as a moat, extending from the Big Black River on the north to Gin Lake on the south. The ties of the railroad on Big Black Bridge had been planked over to facilitate the movement of men and horses, and Dot, a small steamboat, had been anchored across the stream at the ferry crossing to serve as a floating bridge. [C] 16-17 May 63. Night. The Confederate Army of Vicksburg retreated westward from the defeat at Champion Hill (Sites 132-136) along Old US-80 (historic Jackson Road) and across the Big Black River on the railroad bridge and a boat bridge. Assuming that Loring’s DIV, which was acting as the rear guard of the army, was following closely, Pemberton ordered BG Bowen’s DIV, plus BG John Vaughn’s BDE (which had newly arrived from Vicksburg), to defend the fortifications until Loring’s DIV had crossed the Big Black River. Pemberton did not know that Loring had abandoned the army east of the Lower Bakers Creek Bridge and had marched southward away from the Champion Hill battlefield. [C] 17 May 63. The Union pursuit, led by Carr’s DIV, followed by Osterhaus’ DIV, both of McClernand’s XIII Corps, arrived at the Confederate line before dawn. Lawler’s and Garrard’s BDEs (Carr’s DIV) deployed in a dense wood north of the road. Lawler found a partially-concealed approach in the form of a meandering depression leading to a point within 75 yards of the Confederate line; launched a sudden attack; and broke through at the junction of the Green’s and Vaughn’s BDEs. The rest of the Confederate line collapsed, and the men fled in a rout across the Big Black Bridge and the boat bridge. Many men and all 18 guns of the Confederate ARTY were captured. As the Confederates retreated, both the railroad bridge and the floating bridge were burned to prevent a Union pursuit. The routed army fled westward through Bovina to Vicksburg via Warrior’s Trail (historic Jackson Road). Total Confederate casualties (incomplete) for the Battle of Big Black Bridge were 4 killed, 10 wounded, 849 missing. Union casualties were 39 killed, 237 wounded, 3 missing.

Site 141. Big Black Bridge. GPS: N32° 20.826', W90° 42.272'. From Site 140 continue straight (west) for 0.8 mi. (across the steel Big Black River Bridge and bridge over Clear Creek) to junction of Warriors Trail on left (south) of Old US-80. Turn left (southwest) onto Warriors Trail and proceed 0.2 mi. under the railroad viaduct and pull over to left (east) of gravel road. Note: During high water, usually in winter, this portion of Warriors Trail is closed. The limestone foundations of the historic and strategic wooden trestle bridge which carried the Southern Railroad of Mississippi (SRRM) across the Big Black

132 River may be seen just south of the modern viaduct close to the west river bank. The SRRM was the only rail link remaining to the Confederacy which connected the East Coast with the Mississippi River. Recognizing its importance early in the war, The Confederates had defended it against the threat of Union CAV raids with several wooden blockhouses on the eastern approaches. The historic Jackson Road crossed the river about 250 yards downstream on a ferry. However, Pemberton’s chief engineer, MAJ Samuel Lockett, had found a small steamboat, Dot, and anchored her across the stream so that she could be used as a permanent floating bridge. On the west bank the railroad crosses a small plateau about 40 ft above normal water level, which served as a convenient camp-ground for Confederate troops concentrating at the bridge. The flat bottom-land of Clear Creek, 1.5 mi. northwest, also afforded an excellent camp area with abundant water for men and horses. [C] 4 - 12 May 63. During this period, Pemberton assembled an “Army of Maneuver” in this vicinity to deal with the threat posed by Grant’s Union army moving northward from Rocky Springs and Hankinson’s Ferry on the roads east of the Big Black River. The concentration consisted of Carter Stevenson’s, Bowen’s, and Loring’s DIVs, a total of about 26,000 men . [C] 17 May 63. Following the Confederate defeats at Champion Hill (16 May) and Big Black Bridge (17 May), the routed Army of Vicksburg retreated across both the railroad and floating bridges and into Vicksburg. Pemberton emplaced two 24-lb. siege howitzers on the plateau to discourage Union troops from attempting to cross the bridge before it was fully consumed by fire. Pemberton, after briefly considering trying to hold the line of the Big Black River, realized that his shattered army would not be able to guard all of the possible crossings, and reluctantly ordered the entire army back into the Vicksburg defenses. However, three regiments of Baldwin’s brigade (they had not yet been engaged), plus 23 AL INF (of Lee’s BDE) were ordered to remain behind to impede Union efforts to cross the river for as long as possible. Lee’s men did not get the order to withdraw, and continued to give McClernand’s bridge-builders trouble until midnight. [C] 17 - 18 May. After the battle of Big Black Bridge, Grant, now in full control of the east bank of the Big Black River, ordered McClernand to construct a floating bridge a few yards upstream of the railroad bridge. Sniping from Lee’s BDE made progress slow until midnight, after which construction proceeded rapidly. A. J. Smith’s DIV was able to cross at 0715 on 18 May, followed quickly by Osterhaus’ and Carr’s DIVs. [D] 25 May 63. Following the envelopment of Vicksburg by the Union army on 18-19 May (Site 148), Grant moved Osterhaus’ DIV (McClernand’s XIII Corps) to Big Black Bridge in order to more closely monitor the movements of the Confederate Army of Relief under GEN Joseph Johnston. Osterhaus’ patrols reached as far eastward as Edwards Station, with rare visits as far as Raymond to visit the Union wounded left behind following the Battle of Raymond on 12 May.

133 Site 142. Hooker’s Ferry. GPS: N32° 20.56', W90° 39.28'. From Site 141 turn around and proceed 0.2 mi. back to Old US-80. Turn right (east) onto Old US-80 and proceed 2.8 mi. to point where highway angles to right (south). The actual ferry site is on the Big Black River, 0.1 mi. to the left (north). It is on private property, and not accessible. [C] 17 May 63. At Big Black Bridge, Grant assumed that the Confederates would try to prevent a Union crossing of the Big Black River as long as possible. As soon as the battle (Site 140) was over, Grant sent a message to McPherson (two of his DIVs were in the vicinity of Amsterdam, on the Big Black River 4.5 mi. east of Big Black Bridge), ordering him to locate the ferry sites known to be in the area and build floating bridges if at all possible. Late that afternoon Grant left McClernand’s men as they worked to build a bridge near the site of the burned railroad bridge (Site 141) and rode east toward Amsterdam to check on McPherson’s progress. At Hooker’s Ferry, he found Ransom’s BDE (BG John McArthur’s DIV) busily at work on a bridge, with the west bank already under control of Union forces. The Hooker’s Ferry Bridge was a first--it used cotton bales as floats. [C] 18 May. 0900. McPherson, with McArthur’s DIV [XVII Corps], crossed the Big Black River on the “Cotton-bale Bridge” and marched along a country road which eventually joined the Bridgeport Road about 5 mi. northwest of Bridgeport.

Site 143. Amsterdam and Coaker’s Ferry. GPS: N32° 20.237', W90° 37.686'. From Site 142 proceed straight (east) for 1.4 mi. to junction of Jones Road on the right (south) of Old US-80. The actual location is on a bend of the Big Black River about 0.6 mi. to the left (north). It is on private property. The hamlet of Amsterdam was the effective head of navigation on the Big Black River. No trace of the town remains. [C] 17 May 63. As Grant rode past Amsterdam en route to Bridgeport Plantation (Site 139) late in the afternoon, he found Sanborn’s BDE (Crocker’s DIV) hard at work on a floating bridge constructed primarily from timbers and planks recycled from dismantled gin houses. Union patrols were already in control of the west bank of the Big Black River, and McPherson confidently expected that Crocker would be able to cross early the following day. [C] 18 May 1863. 0900. Crocker’s DIV crossed the Big Black River and fell in behind McArthur’s DIV on a farm road that led to a junction with the Bridgeport Road 5 mi. northwest of Bridgeport. Thus, by mid-morning, Grant had six of his DIVs across the last major water barrier on the way to Vicksburg.

Site 144. Hatcher Bayou. GPS: N32° 19.426', W90° 49.587'. From Site 143 turn around and proceed back (west) for 4.2 mi. to junction of Warriors Trail. Turn left (southwest) onto Warriors Trail and proceed 2.1 mi. to Bovina at intersection of Warriors Trail and Bovina Drive. Note: At 1.8 mi. at junction with Bovina Cutoff Road, turn right (north) to Bovina (0.3 mi.).

134 At Bovina (junction of Warriors Trail and Bovina Drive) bear left (west) onto Warriors Trail and proceed west for 5.4 mi. to MS-27. Note: Modern St. Alban Episcopal Church 0.4 mi. west of Bovina was destroyed by federal forces in 1863, and later rebuilt. At 2.3 mi. is the junction of Silver Creek Drive with Warriors Trail; bear right (northwest), go under railroad trestle, and turn left (west) to continue on Warriors Trail. At 3.6 mi. is the site of Mt. Alban, which is at the intersection of Mt. Alban Road with Warriors Trail. The Confederates destroyed the railroad bridge at Mt. Alban, forcing McClernand’s XIII Corps to detour left (south) at this point. They marched south on Mt. Alban Road to Lanier’s plantation on MS-27 (historic Baldwin’s Ferry Road, then turned northwest at Lanier’s on the Baldwin’s Ferry Road to Hatcher Bayou. At MS-27 proceed straight (west) across MS-27 on Warrior’s Trail for 0.4 mi. to junction of Warrior’s Trail and Old Hwy 27 (historic Baldwin’s Ferry Road). Bear right (northwest) and continue west on Old Hwy 27 for 0.6 mi. to bridge across Hatcher Bayou. [C] 18 May. After completing a floating bridge across the Big Black River near Big Black Bridge (Site 141), McClernand’s XIII Corps marched westward through Bovina on Warrior’s Trail (historic Jackson Road) to Mt. Alban. Here the column turned off Warriors Trail (historic Jackson Road) and continued southwest on Mt. Alban Road for 3.4 mi. to the Baldwin’s Ferry Road at Lanier’s Plantation, then northwest on the Baldwin’s Ferry Road to encamp at Hatcher Bayou. McClernand was still 1.7 mi. from the Confederate lines defending Vicksburg. Note: This concludes McClernand’s XIII Corps approach route to Vicksburg. To follow Sherman’s XV Corps and McPherson’s XVII Corps route, proceed to Site 145.

Site 145. Brooks plantation. GPS: N32° 22.847', W90° 39.486'. From Site 144 continue straight (west) for 2.2. mi., going under I-20, to intersection with Old US-80 at the entrance to Vicksburg National Military Park. Turn right (east) onto Old US-80 (Clay Street) and proceed 0.8 mi. to I-20 East. Note: At 0.5 mi., after going under I-20, at the “Y” on Clay, bear left (northeast) to merge onto I-20 East. Proceed east on I-20 for 11.5 mi. to Flowers Exit (Exit 15), and bear right (southeast) on exit ramp. At top of ramp turn left (north) on Camille Avenue and proceed over I-20 for .4 mi. to “Y” intersection. Turn left (west) onto Henry Lake Road and proceed 2 mi. to junction with Freetown Road. Note: At 0.1 mi. Henry Lake Road makes a right angle turn to north. At about 1 mi. the modern Henry Lake Road becomes the historic farm road that McPherson’s XVII Corps took from the Hooker’s and Coaker’s Ferry bridges on the morning of 18 May. When McPherson’s men (COL John Sanborn’s BDE) reached the Freetown Road junction around noon, 18 May, the road was filled with Sherman’s passing troops. McPherson’s men took a break while the XV Corps passed; they then fell in behind Sherman’s men.

135 At Freetown Road turn right (east) and proceed 1.2 mi. to a point 100 yds. past (east of) the intersection at Youngtown Road. No trace of the 1863 plantation exists. [C] 17 May 63. Following the completion of a pontoon bridge across the Big Black River at Bridgeport (modern Askew Landing) during the afternoon (Site 139), Blair’s DIV (Sherman’s XV Corps) marched westward on the Freetown Road (historic Bridgeport, or Upper Jackson Road) for about 3.0 mi., and camped for the night around Brook’s plantation house. [C] 18 May 63. Early in the morning Steele’s DIV (Sherman’s XV Corps) arrived from its campground on the west bank of the Big Black River at Bridgeport (modern Askew Landing), fell in at the rear of Blair’s DIV, and the two DIVs, accompanied by Grant and Sherman, continued westward on the Freetown Road (historic Bridgeport, or Upper Jackson Road) to Vicksburg. Tuttle’s DIV (Sherman’s XV Corps) arrived at Brooks’ farm after a two-hour delay, and followed Blair and Steele westward.

Site 146. Junction of Bridgeport and Benton Roads. GPS: N32° 22.63', W90° 48.450'. From Site 145 turn around and proceed straight (west) on Freetown Road for 11 mi. to the “Y” intersection of Freetown Road (historic Bridgeport, or Upper Jackson Road) and Oak Ridge Road (historic Benton Road). Note: At 2.8 mi. at the “Y” intersection of Tiffentown and Freetown Roads bear right (west) to stay on Freetown Road, and at 2.9 mi. at the “Y” intersection of Freetown and Flowers Hill Roads bear left (west) to remain on Freetown Road. The Freetown Road (historic Bridgeport, or Upper Jackson Road) is the oldest state-built road in Mississippi, constructed from 1822-1825, and used as a federal Post Road in the 1840s, served by daily stagecoach service between Jackson and Vicksburg. [C] 18 May 63. 0930. Sherman, riding with Blair near the head of Blair’s DIV, reached this road junction, which they knew to be only about 5 mi. from Vicksburg. Steele’s DIV was close behind Blair’s, but Tuttle’s DIV was about two hours away. Knowing that the Oak Ridge Road (historic Benton Road) had connections with Snyder’s Bluff (Site 10), and fearing that there might still be a large force of Confederates in the Snyder’s Bluff fortifications, Sherman stopped his advance until Tuttle’s DIV had arrived. Sherman sent a strong patrol northward on the Oak Ridge Road (historic Benton Road). As soon as Tuttle had closed up, Blair cautiously continued southwest on the Freetown Road, which at this point is called the Culkin Road (historic Bridgeport, or Upper Jackson Road). McPherson’s XVII Corps, which was marching westward behind Tuttle’s DIV of Sherman’s XV Corps on the Freetown Road (historic Bridgeport Road), was also forced to stop until Sherman moved forward.

136 Site 147. Junction of Benton and Jackson roads. GPS: N32° 22.112', W90° 49.081'. From Site 146 proceed straight (west) on Culkin Road for 0.9 mi. the junction of Mt. Alban Road (historic Jackson Road) on the left (south) of Culkin Road. At this point the road to the front (west) became known as the Jackson Road. Note: Mt. Alban Road (historic Jackson Road) has been re-routed in modern times due to the construction of I-20, 1.4 mi. south. The historic road is 0.2 mi. straight ahead (west) and is a dead-end road (Douglas Road). [C] 18 May 63. To the left (2.9 mi. southeast) of here around noon BG Stephen Burbridge’s BDE (BG A. J. Smith’s DIV, of McClernand’s XIII Corps) led the way along Warriors Trail (historic Jackson Road), having crossed the Big Black Bridge (Site 141) at 0715. His lead elements discovered that the bridge over the deep railroad cut of the Southern Railroad of Mississippi (2.6 mi. southeast) had been burned by retreating Confederates. Also, McClernand knew that the Culkin Road (historic Bridgeport Road) would be jammed with Sherman’s and McPherson’s troops, and that he needed to locate Old Hwy 27 (historic Baldwin’s Ferry Road) and approach on that route. Thus, Burbridge turned southwest toward Lanier’s plantation (Site 106) at Mt. Alban, rather than northwest to this location. [C] 18 May 63. Blair’s advance guard reached this road junction at about 1300. No Confederate soldier had yet been seen. Blair and Sherman, confident that McClernand’s XIII Corps was advancing toward Vicksburg in parallel along Old Hwy 27 (historic Baldwin’s Ferry Road), continued slowly westward along Culkin Road (historic Bridgeport, which at this point became the Jackson Road). [E] 11 Jul 63. 0400. After the surrender of Vicksburg on 4 Jul, Pemberton’s paroled army mustered at 0400 and marched eastward out of Vicksburg on the Culkin Road (historic Jackson Road) and Old Hwy 27 (historic Baldwin’s Ferry Road) toward parole camps in Alabama. The Culkin Road column turned south onto Mt. Alban Road (historic Jackson Road) and the two columns merged at Mt. Alban and continued on Warriors Trail (historic Jackson Road) toward the Big Black Bridge that McClernand’s XIII Corps had built.

Site 148. First view of The River. GPS: N32° 23.041', W90° 51.278'. From Site 147 proceed straight (west) on Culkin Road (historic Jackson Road) for 0.7 mi. to the “Y” intersection (immediately after crossing the Hwy 61 overpass) of Culkin Road (historic Jackson Road) and Sherman Avenue (historic Graveyard Road). Turn right (north) onto Sherman Avenue and proceed 2 mi. west to “Y” intersection of Sherman Avenue and Union Avenue. Bear left (southwest) at intersection onto Union Avenue and pull over to right (north) after 100 yds. Note: The “Y” intersection is a “blind turn” to the left, as traffic coming uphill from the opposite direction is obscured—exercise extreme caution in turning left onto Union Avenue. Note: On the way from Site 147 to Site 148 are several significant points, but at which it might be unsafe to stop because of traffic.

137 At 0.7 mi. at the “Y” intersection just past the Hwy 61 overpass: The right (northwest) fork is Sherman Avenue (historic Graveyard Road), which Sherman knew led into Vicksburg, while the left fork is the Culkin Road (historic Jackson Road), which led directly into the city. Following Grant’s orders, Sherman and Blair took the Graveyard Road route toward the city. As soon as the tail of Sherman’s column passed this junction, McPherson’s Corps continued left (west) toward Vicksburg on the left fork, the Jackson Road. After 1.3 mi. the Culkin Road (historic Jackson Road) is interrupted by the Vicksburg National Military Park. To visit the Military Park, procure a map of the park from the Visitor Center, 3201 Clay Street, Vicksburg. At 1.1 mi. there is a short, dead-end, road to the left (west) which is interrupted by the Vicksburg National Military Park. This is the historic Graveyard Road. MG Frank Blair’s DIV, preceded by the Regulars of 13 U.S. INF, turned left (west) onto the Graveyard Road and after a mile came face-to-face with a powerful line of earthwork fortifications manned by very alert Confederates. The U.S. Regulars had found the Stockade Redan, one of the strongest works in the Vicksburg defenses, and manned by 26 LA INF, 36 MS INF, and Cockrell’s MO INF BDE. And while Blair’s men took the Graveyard Road, Grant’s highest priority was to reestablish contact with the RADM Porter, so that his army could be re-supplied directly from transport ships. With this in mind, Steele’s DIV was directed to continue straight (northwest) on Sherman Avenue (historic Countryman Road), which seemed to lead in the direction of the Yazoo River where Porter’s gunboats presumably awaited. After advancing a few hundred yards on Sherman Avenue (historic Countryman Road), Steele’s advance was fired on by Confederates of BG Baldwin’ BDE in a line of rifle pits across the road. In the ensuing fight, a Union soldier was killed near Grant and Sherman as they were chatting by the side of the road at dusk. Steele deployed his infantry, but decided to wait for morning before attempting to attack. At dawn on 19 May, Steele’s skirmishers discovered that the earthworks in front of them had been evacuated by the Confederates during the night. [C] 19 May 1863. 0830. Grant and Sherman, with a small cavalry escort at the head of a column of infantry, rode westward along Sherman Avenue (historic Countryman Road), through dense second-growth forest, until suddenly the road turned south at the top of a tall bluff, and the floodplain of the Mississippi opened before them. Sherman, in a voice rough with emotion, turned to Grant: “Until this moment I never thought your expedition a success; I never could see the end clearly till now. But this is a campaign; this is a success if we never take the town.” Badly in need of supplies, that same day Grant sent a patrol northwestward into the floodplain to find a feasible supply road to the Yazoo River, and to make contact with RADM Porter, if possible. To Grant’s undisguised satisfaction, the patrol not only found a good road, but a supply depot already established at Johnson’s plantation by RADM Porter in anticipation of the army’s arrival (Site 2).

138 Note: This concludes the tour of Phase C--The Campaign into the Interior of Mississippi. From Site 148 turn around and proceed 100 yds. back (east) to “Y” intersection of Sherman Avenue and Union Avenue. Turn left (west) onto Sherman Avenue and proceed downhill for 0.1 mi. to US-61 BUS (Washington Street). Turn left (south) onto US-61 BUS and proceed 3.1 mi. to Vicksburg at intersection of Clay and Washington Streets.

For Phases D & E—Assaults and Siege of Vicksburg and Surrender of Vicksburg, please proceed to the Vicksburg National Military Park Visitor Center, 3201 Clay Street.

Phase F: Confederate Army of Relief

Site 149. Snyder’s Bluff in Union Control. GPS: N32° 28.670', W90° 48.360'. From Vicksburg proceed north on US-61 BUS (Washington Street) for 6.8 mi. to US-61. Turn left (north) onto US-61 and proceed 4 mi. to junction of Mildale Road (Redwood Road). Turn right (east) onto Mildale Road and proceed 25 yards. [C] 17 May 63. Following the defeats of Champion Hill (Sites 132-136) and Big Black Bridge (Sites 140-141), Pemberton ordered the immediate evacuation of the Confederate garrisons of the various forts and batteries at Haynes’ Bluff, Snyder’s Bluff (Site 10), and Drumgould’s Bluff, with all men, commissary supplies, and materials that could be moved brought into the Vicksburg perimeter. The heavy ARTY, which could not be moved in time, was spiked and rendered useless without extensive repair. [F] 19 May 63. The Confederate fortifications and batteries guarding the Yazoo River from Haynes’ Bluff and Snyder’s Bluff to Drumgould’s Bluff were occupied by Sherman’s XV Corps. Work was almost immediately begun to convert the area into positions defending the Union supply depots along the Yazoo River (Site 2). [F] 24 May.63 Following the failure of the 22 May 1863 assault on Vicksburg, Grant assembled a Provisional CAV BDE of about 1,000 Union cavalrymen at Snyder’s Bluff under COL Amory Johnson, who was given orders to destroy all food and forage in the Mechanicsburg Corridor (the area between the Big Black and Yazoo rivers between Vicksburg and Mechanicsburg), after which Johnson was to continue on to destroy the wooden Mississippi Central Railroad (MCENRR) bridge across the Big Black River at Way’s Bluff (Site 156), 11 mi. north of Canton. The destruction of the bridge would be a serious handicap to the Confederate forces under GEN Johnston at Canton and Jackson because a majority of their commissary supplies were obtained over the MCENRR. Johnson and his cavalrymen left Snyder’s Bluff at dawn, en route to Mechanicsburg (Site 153) and Way’s Bluff (Site 156) via the Mildale Road (historic Mildale Road) and the Oak Ridge Road (historic Benton Road).

139 [F] 25 May 63. Johnson and his CAV returned to Snyder’s Bluff at about daybreak, to report that the Confederates had a force of 6,000 to 8,000 men in the Mechanicsburg area. [F] 26 May 63. Grant decided to send MG Frank Blair with a powerful INF force to push the Confederates out of the area, thus giving the Union CAV freedom to continue to Way’s Bluff. Blair’s expeditionary force (BG Mower’s provisional INF DIV, MG McArthur’s INF DIV, plus Johnson’s CAV command and an ARTY battery) left Snyder’s Bluff after dark headed for Mechanicsburg via the Mildale, Oak Ridge, and Russellville Roads (historic Mildale, Benton and Russellville roads). Note: The historic Benton Road now has multiple names: Culkin Road from US-61 overpass to the Freetown Road; Oak Ridge Road from the Freetown Road to Oak Ridge; Russellville Road from Oak Ridge to Mechanicsburg.) [F] 31 May 63. Blair’s expeditionary force returned from Mechanicsburg (Sites 152, 153) on the MS-3 (historic Valley Road) late in the afternoon. He brought with him large amounts of food and many draft animals that had been stripped from the Mechanicsburg Corridor and the Satartia area, increasing the difficulties of any Confederate force that might try to use the region. [F] 3 Jun 63. Grant, growing increasingly concerned about the possibility of a major Confederate offensive by Johnston’s Army of Relief in Canton, decided on one more attempt to destroy the Way’s Bluff railroad bridge. This time he would take advantage of RADM Porter’s warships. About 2200 BG Nathan Kimball left Snyder’s Bluff with three INF BDEs aboard a fleet of steamboats up the Yazoo River to Satartia (Site 152), protected by several of Porter’s tinclads (commanded by LCDR John Walker). The next day COL Johnson’s provisional CAV BDE left Snyder’s Bluff and marched up the Oak Ridge Road (historic Benton Road), planning to meet Kimball at Mechanicsburg. [F] 7 Jun 63. After Kimball took counsel of his fears after hearing rumors of a large Confederate force nearby, and after receiving LCDR Walker’s report that falling waters in the Yazoo River would require the withdrawal of the tinclad gunboats from Satartia, Kimball withdrew. The last of Kimball’s task force reached Snyder’s Bluff by steamboat from Satartia after evacuating the Mechanicsburg area. Offensive operations in the Mechanicsburg Corridor having proved to be a costly failure, Grant decided to conserve manpower by fortifying the area against an expected attack by Confederate GEN Johnston’s Army of Relief. He directed MG Cadwallader Washburn, newly arrived from Memphis, to take command of Snyder’s Bluff and fortify it against all contingencies.

Site 150. Cook’s farm. GPS: N32° 27.138', W90° 44.448'. From Site 149 proceed straight (east) on Mildale Road for 5 mi. to junction with Oak Ridge Road (historic Benton Road). Cook’s farmhouse no longer exists. [F] 22 Jun 63. Union MG Grant divided his Army of the Tennessee at Vicksburg into two armies, a “Siege Army” to continue the siege and reduction of Vicksburg, and an “Army of Maneuver” under MG William Sherman. The Maneuver Army mission was to protect the Siege Army from interference by the

140 Confederate Army of Relief under GEN Joseph Johnston. Sherman’s Army of Maneuver consisted of about 34,000 men drawn from XIII, XV, XVI, and XVII Corps. A heavily fortified line had been constructed that ran roughly parallel to the Mildale Road from the Yazoo River about a mile north of the old Confederate batteries (Site 10) to a point about a mile northwest of Cook’s farm, thus blocking all approaches from the north via the MS-3 (historic Valley Road). A second line, equally strongly fortified, ran from Oak Ridge (Site 151) southeastward to the vicinity of Parson Fox’s farm (Site 168), on the Birdsong Road, effectively blocking the Oak Ridge Road (historic Benton Road) from Mechanicsburg and all of the roads leading westward from the several crossings of the Big Black River.

Site 151. Oak Ridge. GPS: N32° 28.876', W90° 42.416'. From Site 150 turn left (northeast) onto Oak Ridge Road (historic Benton Road) and proceed 3.4 mi. to Oak Ridge at junction of Oak Ridge and Rawhide Roads. Virtually no trace of the Civil War community now exists. [F] 24 May 63. COL Amory Johnson’s Provisional CAV BDE (See Site 149) with 1,000 Union cavalry rode through Oak Ridge about mid-morning, en route to Mechanicsburg and Way’s Bluff, and returned the next day. [F] 26 May 63. Blair’s expeditionary force (Site 149) passed through Oak Ridge, moving slowly, seizing all livestock and destroying all crops so that even Confederate CAV patrols would have difficulty operating in the area. [F] 29 Jun 63. Sherman began the construction of a defense line extending from just north of Oak Ridge to the vicinity of Fox’s farm (Site 168), nearly 7 mi. to the southeast. When completed a few days later, Sherman believed the line of earthworks to be stronger than the Confederate defenses of Vicksburg. These works effectively blocked both the Russellville Road (historic Benton Road) from Mechanicsburg, and all of the roads leading westward from the several crossings of the Big Black River. Unfortunately, few traces of the earthworks remain.

Site 152. Satartia. GPS: N32° 400.277', W90° 32.845'. From Site 151 continue straight (north) on Oak Ridge Road (historic Benton Road) for 0.7 mi. to “Y” intersection of Ballground Road and Oak Ridge Road (Russellville Road). Veer right (northeast) to stay on Oak Ridge Road. After another 2 mi. (total of 2.7 mi. from Oak Ridge) continue straight (north) past Possum Hollow Road for another 3 mi. (total of 5.7 mi. from Oak Ridge) to “Y” intersection with Bell Bottom Road. Veer right (east) to stay on Oak Ridge Road and continue 1.3 mi. (total of 7 mi. from Oak Ridge) to “Y” intersection. Turn left (north) and continue 1.2 mi. (total of 8.2 mi. from Oak Ridge) to “Y” intersection at Russellville. Turn left (north) at Russellville onto Russellville Road, and proceed 2.1 mi. (total of 10.3 from Oak Ridge) to “Y” intersection with County Line Road. Veer right (east) to stay on Russellville Road, and continue 5.8 mi. (total of 16.1 mi. from Oak Ridge) to Phoenix Road crossroad. Continue straight (east) across Phoenix Road for .3 mi. (total of 16.4 mi. from Oak Ridge) to “Y” intersection of Mechanicsburg Road and Hebron Church Road (Note: Hebron Church Road circles back to Mechanicsburg Road in another 2.1 mi.). Turn left (north) onto

141 Mechanicsburg Road and proceed another 2.1 mi. past Hebron Church Road (total of 18.5 mi. from Oak Ridge). Continue on Mechanicsburg Road for another 4.1 mi. (total of 22.6 mi. from Oak Ridge) to MS-433 at site of historic Mechanicsburg (Site 153). Turn left (west) onto MS-433 and proceed 3.4 mi. to MS-3. Cross over MS-3 and proceed 0.4 mi. on MS-433 to intersection with Old Hickory and Plum Street. Veer left (west) and cross Old Hickory Street to stay on Plum Street and continue .2 mi. (total of .6 mi. from MS-3) through Satartia to bridge over Yazoo River. (Note: The white Colonial Kling house, circa 1848, on the south side of Plum Street across from the Satartia country store, was occupied by the Federals while in Satartia.) [F] 30 May 63. Union MG Blair’s expeditionary force withdrew from Mechanicsburg (Site 153) to Satartia early in the morning, and continued southwest on MS-3 (historic Valley Road) toward Snyder’s Bluff. [F] 3 Jun 63. BG Kimball’s task force (COL Adolph Engelman’s and COL Milton Montgomery’s BDEs of Kimball’s DIV, plus Mower’s “Eagle BDE” of Tuttle’s DIV) debarked from their transports early in the afternoon, covered by LCDR Walker’s tinclads. At 0500 the next day Kimball’s task force, led by Mower’s BDE, left Satartia and marched up MS-433 (historic Mechanicsburg Road) for its planned rendezvous with Amory Johnson’s CAV BDE at Mechanicsburg. [F] 6 Jun 63. LCDR Walker, commanding the naval squadron at Satartia, reported to Kimball that the water level in the Yazoo River was falling over Satartia Bar (a submerged ledge of rock across the Yazoo River just below Satartia), and that he would have to leave within 24 hours. Kimball dared not remain without naval support and ordered the immediate withdrawal of his task force, which was near Mechanicsburg (Site 153). The entire force was safely at Snyder’s Bluff by nightfall the next day, 7 June 1863. [F] 6-7 Jun 63. Grant received BG Kimball’s pessimistic reports and decided to visit Satartia. He and a small party departed his HQ at 1900; rode to Hayne’s Bluff; and boarded the steamer Diligence for the trip up the Yazoo River to Satartia. Charles Dana, who accompanied Grant, recalled; “Grant was ill and went to bed soon after he started. We had gone up the river to within two miles of Satartia, when we met two gunboats coming down.” Dana was advised that Kimball had withdrawn and that it would not be safe for Grant to continue to Satartia. While Grant slept, Dana had the boat turn around. According to Dana, the next morning Diligence was back at Hayne’s Bluff and, “Grant came out to breakfast fresh as a rose, clean shirt and all, quite himself.” Dana told Grant why the boat had returned to Hayne’s Bluff and Grant was satisfied. On 23 Jan 1887, almost two years after Grant’s death (on 23 Jul 1885), a letter that LTC John Rawlins on Grant’s staff wrote to Grant at 0100, 6 Jun 63, appeared in an article in the New York Sun on the subject of Grant’s drinking. In the letter, Rawlins wrote; “The great solicitude I feel for the safety of this army leads me to mention what I had never again hoped to do—the subject of your drinking.” On 28 Jan 1887, the Sun printed an editorial (Dana was then the editor) that said Rawlins

142 delivered the letter to Grant “at some distance from his HQ near Vicksburg,” and that, “After putting Rawlins’ missive in his pocket he [Grant] wound up by going on board a steamer, which he had ordered for an excursion up the Yazoo River, and getting as stupidly drunk as the immortal nature of man would allow. But the next day he came out fresh as a rose, without any trace or indication of the spree he had passed through.” In the late 1880s reporter Sylvanus Cadwallader of the Chicago Times claimed that he was aboard Diligence with Grant and that the steamer reached Satartia. He wrote that the general was “stupid in speech and staggering in gait.” Cadwallader claimed that Grant was determined to dress and go ashore on horseback with only a handful of troopers as protection, but that he talked the general out of it, and the boat steamed downriver, arriving at Hayne’s Bluff the next morning.

Site 153. Mechanicsburg. GPS: N32° 38.191', W90° 30.785'. From Site 152, turn around and return for 0.6 mi. to junction of MS-433 and MS-3. Cross over MS-3 and proceed straight (southeast) on MS-433 (historic Mechanicsburg Road) for 3.4 mi. to junction of Mechanicsburg Road on the right (south). There is a gravel pullover to the left (north) of MS-433 just past the road junction. [F] 24 May 63. COL Wirt Adams’ MS CAV withdrew to Canton after the battle of Raymond (12 May), and with Vicksburg encircled by Grant’s Union army, Johnston moved Adams’ CAV (plus a detachment of 20 MS MTD INF) to the Mechanicsburg area to protect the Confederate supply line that ran from Yazoo City on the Yazoo River to Vaughan (Site 155) on the MCENRR. Adams’ scouts detected a large Union cavalry force approaching on Russellville Road (historic Benton Road), and set up an ambush about 1,000 yds. south of Mechanicsburg. The Union force of about 1,000 cavalrymen under COL Amory Johnson rode into the trap at about noon, panicked, and withdrew – all the way to Snyder’s Bluff. [F] 29 May 63. During the morning, BG John Adams’ CAV DIV, newly arrived from GEN Bragg’s Army of Tennessee, arrived at Pritchard’s Crossroad, and began moving west toward Mechanicsburg. Union MG Blair’s expeditionary force of two INF DIVs, ARTY, and a large CAV force moved unopposed through Mechanicsburg about 1300, and headed eastward toward Pritchard’s Crossroad (Site 154). The two forces met about 2 mi. east of Mechanicsburg, and John Adams fled back toward Pritchard’s Crossroad, while Blair withdrew slowly to Mechanicsburg, where he was handed an order from Grant, ordering him to withdraw to Snyder’s Bluff. Grant, at Vicksburg, feared that Johnston’s Confederate Army of Relief might cross the Big Black River at Cox’s Ferry (Site 157) and cut Blair’s force off from Snyder’s Bluff and destroy it. The next day Blair withdrew to Satartia. [F] 4 Jun 63. Confederate BG John Adams’ CAV DIV was at Mechanicsburg, and Adams learned that a large squadron of Union transports and gunboats was landing troops at Satartia. This was Union BG Kimball’s task force of three BDEs. Adams immediately deployed his force in an ambush on a commanding hill just west of Mechanicsburg to await the arrival of the Federal INF. The Union

143 troops (Mower’s “Eagle BDE” of Tuttle’s DIV) soon arrived and confidently attacked. At that moment John Adams learned that a strong Union CAV force (COL Amory Johnson’s PROV CAV BDE) was approaching Mechanicsburg from the south on the Russellville Road (historic Benton Road). Adams, fearing that he would be surrounded and captured, quickly withdrew eastward toward Pritchard’s Crossroad. [F] 5 Jun 63. Union BG Kimball sent a patrol from his task force at Mechanicsburg to Cox’s Ferry (Site 157), where it burned the ferryboat. Another probed toward Pritchard’s Crossroad (Site 154). Still another visited Yazoo City and found it defended by an estimated 20,000 Confederates and 25 guns in strong earthworks. Late that afternoon LCDR Walker told Kimball that the water in the Yazoo was falling so rapidly that he dared not keep his boats at Satartia for more than another 24 hours. [F] 6 Jun 63. Kimball withdrew his force from Satartia via MS-3 (historic Valley Road), heading for Snyder’s Bluff (Site 149). Mechanicsburg was immediately re-occupied by Confederate BG John Adams’ CAV. Six days later Confederate COL George Cosby’s CAV BDE (BG Jackson’s CAV DIV) moved from Benton to Mechanicsburg area, while the remainder of DIV moved to Vernon (Site 162). [F] 20 Jun 63. Cosby started a strong task force under LTC Robert Wood, consisting of Wirt Adams’ MS CAV and Stark’s 28 MS CAV, southward to investigate the ferries and fords across the Big Black River south of Cox’s Ferry.

Site 154. Bentonia. GPS: N32° 20.677', W90° 20.712'. From Site 153 proceed straight (east) on MS-433 (historic Mechanicsburg Road) for 10.2 mi. (crossing US-49 in 9.7 mi.) to Bentonia (known as Pritchard’s Crossroad until the railroad came through in 1884) at the junction of MS-433 and Pritchard Road. [F] 29 May 63. About 2 mi. southeast of Mechanicsburg the advance guard of Union MG Blair’s expeditionary force was ambushed by Confederate cavalry and artillery commanded by BG John Adams. Blair withdrew slowly to Mechanicsburg, but Adams was so unnerved by the appearance of a large Union INF force that he disengaged and fled back across the Big Black River at Kibbey’s Ferry(Site 158, 3.2 mi. southwest of Pritchard’s Crossroad). However, Wirt Adams’ MS CAV remained on the west side of the river. John Adams soon recovered his nerve, and returned to Pritchard’s Crossroad the next day and began to fortify the strategic junction with earthworks. [F] 4 Jun 63. Confederate BG John Adams, after retreating from Mechanicsburg before the advance of Union BG Kimball’s task force, began to improve the entrenchments previously begun on 30 May. He also sent a courier to MG Walker’s HQ at Yazoo City, who immediately reported to GEN Johnston (at Canton) by telegraph. Johnston moved instantly to protect the vital Way’s Bluff railroad bridge (Site 156) by starting Loring’s INF DIV and BG William Jackson’s CAV DIV from Canton toward Benton (Site 164).

144 [F] 5 Jun 63. A Union CAV patrol from Kimball’s task force at Mechanicsburg was turned back by Confederate BG John Adams’ entrenched men at Pritchard’s Crossroad. Early the next day John Adams probed cautiously toward Mechanicsburg, and found to his astonishment that the Union force had withdrawn to Satartia; had been picked up by a Union transport fleet; and was heading back toward Snyder’s Bluff.

Site 155. Vaughan. GPS: N32° 48.363', W90° 02.507'. From Site 154 continue straight (east) on MS-433 across the railroad for 16.8 mi. to Benton, MS. Continue straight (east) on MS-433 through Benton for 1.4 mi. to intersection with MS-432. Veer right (southeast) onto MS-432 and proceed for 9.1 mi. to Bennett Road. Turn right (south) onto Bennett Road and proceed 4.3 mi. to intersection with Vaughan Road (historic Benton Plank Road). Turn left (east) onto Vaughan Road and proceed 1.7 mi. to I-55 overpass. From I-55 overpass proceed straight (east) on Vaughan Road for another 1 mi. to railroad. Vaughan, known as the death site of Casey Jones in a 30 APR 1900 trainwreck, was a strategic railroad village at the eastern terminus of the historic Benton Plank Road in 1863.

Site 156. Way’s Bluff. GPS: N32° 20.674', W90° 20.716'. From Site 155 turn around and return (west) for 1 mi. to I-55. Turn left (south) and take I-55 south for 9 mi. to Exit 124 at MS-16. Take Exit 124 and turn left (east) onto MS-16 and proceed 6 mi. to Way Road. Turn left (north) onto Way Road and proceed 4 mi. to "Y" intersection on Way Road. Veer right (northeast) at "Y" intersection, cross railroad track and continue north another 1.7 mi. (total of 5.7 mi. from MS-16) to Way Circle. Turn left (west) onto Way Circle and drive toward railroad track. Stop at sharp curve while facing railroad. Way's Bluff railroad bridge is 1 mi. to the right (north) and is not accessible.

Site 157. Cox’s Ferry. GPS: N32° 31.312', W90° 29.201'. From Site 156 continue around Way Circle and return to Way Road. Turn right (south) onto Way Road and return 5.7 mi. to MS-16. Turn right (west) onto MS-16 and proceed 6 mi. to I-55. Turn left (south) onto I-55 and proceed south for 5.1 mi. to Exit 229 Canton/Flora. Turn right (west) toward Flora onto MS-22 and proceed 16 mi. to Flora at junction of Old US-49 and MS-22. From Flora proceed straight (west) on MS-22 (Note: At 0.3 mi. MS-22 makes a hard left [south] turn, then at 0.2 mi. it makes a hard right [west] turn). Continue on MS-22 for 4.5 mi. total; turn right (northwest) on Spring Creek Road and proceed for 2.4 mi. to junction with Cox Ferry Road; turn (right) north on Cox Ferry Road and proceed for 1.2 mi. to junction with Joe Hall Road; turn left (west) on Joe Hall Road and proceed for 1.8 mi. to E. Cox Ferry Road; turn right (northwest) and proceed 2.7 mi. to Cox’s Ferry. The actual ferry location is 0.7 mi. northward (GPS: N32° 31.831', W90° 29.500'), but the road is not suitable for conventional vehicles. Cox’s Ferry was a strategic crossing of the Big Black River on what

145 was, in 1863, a major highway connecting the steamboat landing on the Yazoo River at Satartia with the farms and plantations of the Brownsville area. [F] 29 May 63. Grant, concerned that GEN Joseph Johnston would cross the Big Black River at Cox’s Ferry and trap MG Blair’s expeditionary force at Mechanicsburg, ordered Blair to abandon his effort to reach Way’s Bluff, and return immediately to the safety of Snyder’s Bluff.. [F] 5 Jun 63. A patrol from Union BG Kimball’s task force at Mechanicsburg visited Cox’s Ferry and burned the ferryboat, thus making it more difficult for the Confederates to use it to support operations in the Mechanicsburg Corridor.

Site 158. Kibbey’s Ferry. GPS: N32° 36.023', W90° 21.718'. From Site 157 turn around and proceed back (east) on E. Cox Ferry Road for 2.7 mi. to Joe Hall Road; turn left (east) onto Joe Hall Road and proceed 1.8 mi. to Cox Ferry Road; turn right (south) onto Cox Ferry Road and proceed 1.2 mi. to Spring Creek Road; turn left (east) onto Spring Creek Road and proceed 2.4 mi. to MS-22. Turn left (east) onto MS-22 and proceed 4.5 mi. to Flora, at intersection of Old US-49 and MS-22. From Flora turn left (north) onto Old US- 49 and proceed for 4 mi. to bridge over Big Black River. Actual ferry site is on Big Black River (N32E 35.578', W90E 22.863') 1.6 mi. west of US-49. The ferry site is privately owned, and is no longer accessible to vehicles. In 1863 a strategic ferry crossed the Big Black River on an important road connecting Satartia on the Yazoo River with the important village of Vernon. 2.5 mi. southeast of here. [F] 30 May 63. Fleeing from an unexpected encounter with strong Union forces near Mechanicsburg, Confederate BG John Adams’ CAV BDE fled across Kibbey’s Ferry to safety in Vernon. However, Wirt Adams’ MS CAV RGT remained north of the river. The very next day John Adams’ CAV BDE re- crossed the Big Black at the ferry and re-occupied Pritchard’s Crossroad.

Site 159. Higginbotham’s Ferry. GPS: N32° 36.275', W90° 21.857'. From Site 158 proceed straight (north) on US-49 for 0.2 mi. to north end of Big Black River Bridge. The actual site of this ferry was 0.6 mi. east-northeast of the US-49 bridge across Big Black River (GPS: N32° 36.785', W90° 21.029'). It is not accessible to vehicles. In 1863 an important ferry across the Big Black River on a major highway connecting Yazoo City and Jackson. [F] 10 Jun - 3 Jul 63. This ferry was extensively used by Confederate GEN Johnston to move troops rapidly between Jackson, Canton, and the towns north of the Big Black River during this period.

Site 160. Canton. GPS: N32° 36.777', W90° 02.078'. From Site 159 turn around and proceed back (south) on US-49 for 3.7 mi. to the junction of US-149; veer left (southeast) onto US-149 (1st Street) and proceed 1.4 mi. to Flora, the intersection with MS-22. Turn left (east) onto MS-22 and proceed 18 mi. to intersection of Old US-51(Liberty Street) in downtown Canton, MS.

146 [F] 20 May 63. Having failed to achieve a junction of LTG Pemberton’s forces and his own following his ejection from Jackson by Union forces on 14 May 63 (Sites 124, 126, 127), GEN Joseph Johnston arrived at Canton from Vernon and established Canton as his HQ. Here he began to raise an Army of Relief with the “Army of Jackson” forming a nucleus. The mission was to save both Vicksburg and the Army of Vicksburg, which was now trapped within the defenses of Vicksburg by MG Grant’s besieging Army of the Tennessee. [F] 21 May - 3 Jul 63. During this period reinforcements arrived in the area from all over the Confederacy, until at last the Army of Relief numbered about 35,000 men. However, from 29 May until 6 Jun Johnston’s attention was focused on fending off Union attacks on the railroad bridge at Way’s Bluff (Site 156) by Union forces from the direction of Mechanicsburg (Site 153). [F] 30 May 63. GEN Johnston, in an effort to position forces for an attack on Union MG Blair’s task force presumed to be at Mechanicsburg (it had in fact had already withdrawn to Snyder’s Bluff), started MG Walker’s INF DIV from Canton to Yazoo City. [F] 3 Jun 63. BG William Jackson’s CAV DIV arrived from GEN Bragg’s Confederate army in middle Tennessee. [F] 4 Jun 63. Johnston ordered Loring’s INF DIV and Jackson’s CAV DIV to start at dawn for Benton. Extremely hot and dry weather forced the column to stop for the night 3 miles northwest of Moore’s Ferry (Site 139), 8.7 mi. northwest at the crossing of MS-16 on the Big Black River). There were many stragglers. However, both DIVs continued to Benton the next day. [F] 11 Jun 63. With the end of Union threats from Mechanicsburg, Johnston began to position the Army of Relief for an offensive to break the Union siege of Vicksburg. He ordered Jackson’s CAV DIV to leave one BDE in the Mechanicsburg Corridor, but to move the other to Vernon. Walker, at Yazoo City was also ordered to Vernon, as was Loring’s DIV at Canton. [F] 21 Jun 63. Johnston organized MG French’s DIV out of three newly- arrived BDEs (McNair’s, Maxey’s, and Evans’). [F] 23 Jun 63 (approx). Johnston held a council of war in Canton to discuss courses of action for relieving Vicksburg. All senior commanders attended; including a representative of GEN E. Kirby Smith, commander of the Department of the Trans-Mississippi. Johnston told the council that he regarded the case as “almost hopeless.” The council was unable to make any substantive suggestions. [F] 1 Jul 63. Johnston ordered the Army of Relief to begin moving toward Vicksburg. MG Breckenridge, who commanded the Right Wing of the army, moved from Jackson to Clinton. French’s DIV moved from Canton to Livingston, 12 mi. west of Canton. Loring and Walker moved from Vernon to a point on the Cox Ferry Road 6 mi. north of Brownsville.

Site 161. Cheatham’s plantation. GPS: N32° 30.250', N90° 20.773'. From Site 160 turn around and proceed back (west) on MS-22 for 18 mi. to Flora, the junction of Old US-49 (1st Street). Continue southwest on MS-22 for

147 3.9 mi. to Cheatham’s plantation (approx. 100 yds. before the Shady Grove Road turn to the left [east]). No trace of the antebellum house exists. [F] 14 - 16 May 63. Following the defeat of Johnston’s small “Army of Jackson” at Jackson on 14 May, Johnston withdrew slowly northward toward Canton. From Tougaloo (Site 127), 7 mi. north of Jackson city center, Johnston ordered Pemberton, who at that time was in the vicinity of Edwards Station, to meet him at Clinton. However, Johnston continued to move his “Army of Jackson” slowly toward Canton, and spent the night of 16 May 1863 (the day of Battle of Champion Hill) (Sites 132-136) at Calhoun, on the railroad 8 mi. south of Canton (Site 136). [C] 17 May. Johnston at last began to march from Calhoun toward Cheatham’s plantation at about 0700, and arrived at about 1600, where the men camped for the night, after a march of only 18 miles. The Cheatham’s were long- time personal friends of Johnston. That evening a courier from Pemberton, who was in Bovina, brought the news of the devastating Confederate defeat at Champion Hill (Sites 132-136) on 16 May. Later that same evening Johnston also learned of yet another Confederate disaster at Big Black Bridge (Site 140). Johnston immediately sent a dispatch ordering Pemberton to evacuate Vicksburg and march his Army of Vicksburg toward Mechanicsburg, northeast of Vicksburg. [C] 18 May 63. Early morning. Johnston ordered BG John Gregg, who was in tactical command of the “Army of Jackson,” to move the troops to Vernon, 8 mi. to the north of here, presumably in preparation for a march toward Mechanicsburg and a rendezvous with Pemberton. However, Johnston himself remained at Cheatham’s plantation, where, in the afternoon, he received another dispatch from Pemberton, this one written from inside the defense perimeter of Vicksburg. Pemberton advised Johnston that “it was impossible to withdraw the army” from Vicksburg. Johnston then joined Gregg at Vernon late in the afternoon.

Site 162. Vernon. GPS: N32° 35.371', W90° 19.774'. From Site 161 turn around and proceed back (northeast) for 3.9 mi. to Flora, at intersection of MS-22 and US-149. From Flora, continue east on MS-22 for 0.8 mi. to Kearney Park Road; turn left (north) and proceed for 3.2 mi. to Moore Vernon Avenue (Livingston-Vernon Road); turn left (west) and proceed for 0.3 mi. [C] 18 May 63. Confederate BG John Gregg, who was in tactical command of the “Army of Jackson,” arrived at Vernon from Cheatham’s plantation (Site 161), 8 mi. south of here. Johnston joined Gregg at Vernon late in the afternoon. [F] 19 May 63. Johnston received a dispatch from Pemberton, who reported that the Army of Vicksburg could no longer escape because the city had already been invested by the Union army. The following day Johnston moved his “Army of Jackson” from Vernon to Canton, where it was transformed into the “Army of Relief.” [F] 29 May 63. BG John Adams’ Provisional CAV BDE arrived at Vernon via Kibbey’s Ferry (Site 158) after encountering Union MG Blair’s task force at

148 Mechanicsburg (Site 153). The next day Adams’ Provisional CAV BDE returned via Kibbey’s Ferry (Site 158) to the Mechanicsburg area. [F] 13 Jun 63. Loring’s INF DIV from Canton arrived in Vernon, as well as a BDE of Jackson’s CAV DIV, as Johnston began to concentrate his Army of Relief for the relief of Vicksburg. Two days later Walker’s DIV arrived at Vernon from Yazoo City. Johnston ordered Jackson’s CAV DIV to aggressively patrol the Big Black River between Cox’s Ferry (Site 157) on the north to Baldwin’s Ferry (Site 99) on the south, hoping to prevent Grant and Sherman from discovering the Confederate strength and position. Jackson, known as the Red Fox, discovered that Bridgeport (Site 139) and Big Black Bridge (Site 141) were heavily defended, but the fords between Bridgeport and Cox’s Ferry were unguarded and low water made them fordable for ARTY and wagons.

Site 163. Moore’s Ferry. GPS: N32° 42.428', W90° 05.600'. From Site 162 turn around and proceed back (east) on Moore-Vernon Avenue for 0.3 mi. to Kearney Park Road; turn right (south) and proceed 3.2 mi. on Kearney Park Road to MS-22. Turn left (east) onto MS-22 and proceed 17.2 mi. to Canton, intersection of MS-22 and Old US-51 (Liberty Street). Turn left (north) onto Old US-51 and proceed north for 1.4 mi. to junction of MS-16. Turn left (northwest) on MS-16 and proceed for 6.6 mi. to the bridge across Big Black River. Actual ferry site is about 100 yds. downstream (N32E 42.428', W90E 05.652). The one-lane wooden trestle bridge at Moore’s Ferry carried MS-16 (historic Moore’s Ferry Road), which was a section of the main Canton to Yazoo City road across the Big Black River. [F] 31 May 63. Walker’s INF DIV crossed the rickety wooden bridge at Moore’s Ferry about noon en route from Canton to Yazoo City. To maintain a force in Canton, Johnston brought Loring’s INF DIV from Jackson to Canton.

Site 164. Benton. GPS: N32° 49.623', W90° 15.651'. From Site 163 continue straight (northwest) on MS-16 for 12.5 mi. to junction of Old Hwy 16 (Benton Boulevard); veer right (northwest) onto Old Hwy 16 for 1.3 mi. to Benton’s Court House square. [F] 30 May 63. BG Jackson’s CAV DIV arrived in Benton from Canton via Moore’s Ferry. Their mission was to protect the wagon road from Yazoo City to Vaughan, and the railroad from Vaughn to Canton and Jackson, with emphasis on the vital Way’s Bluff railroad bridge. Walker arrived at Benton at dawn, 31 May. The next day Walker continued his march to Yazoo City, arriving early in the afternoon. [F] 5 Jun 63. Loring’s INF DIV and Jackson’s CAV DIV arrived in Benton, nearly exhausted by the heat and lack of water.

Site 165. Carney Creek. GPS: N32° 26.988', W90° 25.996'. From Site 164 turn around and proceed back (east) for 0.1 mi. to junction of MS- 433. Turn right (south) onto MS-433 and proceed 16.8 mi. to intersection with US-49 in Bentonia. Turn left (south) onto US-49 and proceed 7.9 mi. to

149 junction with MS-22. Turn right (west) onto MS-22 and proceed 11.1 mi. to Brownsville, at junction of Bolton-Brownsville Road with MS-22. From Brownsville turn around and proceed back (east) on MS-22 for 0.2 mi. to Carney Creek. [F] 3 Jul 63. Johnston and the Army of Relief (about 35,000 men, consisting primarily of Breckinridge’s INF DIV, French’s INF DIV, Loring’s INF DIV, Walker’s INF DIV, and Jackson’s CAV DIV) were concentrated in the general vicinity of Brownsville, where the sound of the guns at Vicksburg could be clearly heard. Jackson’s CAV reported that all of the crossings of the Big Black River as far south as Big Black Bridge were being closely watched by Union forces. Johnston held a council of war to determine a course of action. MG French recorded in his diary that they could “learn relatively little . . . of the country on the other side of the Big Black,” and were unable to decide on a course of action.” [F] 4 Jul 63. The sounds of the guns at Vicksburg had ceased. Late in the afternoon Johnston issued orders for the army to move southwest toward Edwards Station (Site 109) at 0300 on 5 Jul, intending to probe for an unguarded crossing of the Big Black River south of the Big Black Bridge. That evening “intelligence of the surrender of Vicksburg was received.” [F] 5 Jul 63. Shortly after dawn a scout confirmed that Vicksburg had surrendered. The campaign was over. The Confederacy had lost Vicksburg, and Johnston immediately ordered the Army of Relief to begin withdrawing toward Jackson at daybreak on 6 Jul. When news of the surrender reached MG Franklin Gardner, the Confederate commander at Port Hudson, he surrendered the final fortress on the Mississippi River on 9 Jul. The North had wrested control of the Mississippi from source to mouth.

Site 166. Birdsong’s Ferry. GPS: N32° 25.518', W90° 34.387'. From Site 165 turn around and proceed back (southwest) on MS-22 for 7.2 mi. intersection with Farr Road; turn right (north) and proceed 2.8 mi. to Anderson Road; turn left (west) and proceed 1.5 mi. The actual ferry site (N32E 26.333', W90E 35.770) is on the Big Black River 1.5 mi. northwest. It is on private property and no longer accessible to conventional vehicles. [F] 18 Jun 63. Confederate BG Jackson sent a CAV patrol across the Big Black River at Birdsong’s Ferry, but it was driven back across the river after a vicious skirmish with 4 IA CAV (Bussey’s BDE, Sherman’s Army of Maneuver).

Site 167. Messenger’s Ferry (or Ford). GPS: N32° 22.756', W90° 38.193'. From Site 166 continue straight (south) on Anderson Road for 1.1 mi. to “Y” intersection with Askew Road; bear right (west) to continue on Anderson Road for 4.1 mi. to MS-22; turn right (south) onto MS-22 and proceed 1.2 mi. to I-20 W; turn right (west) onto I-20 W and proceed west for 4.3 mi. to Flowers (Exit 15). Veer right (north) on exit and turn right (north) on Camille Avenue and proceed for 0.3 mi. to “Y” intersection. Turn left (west) onto Henry Lake Road and proceed 2 mi. to junction with Freetown Road. Note: At 0.1 mi. Henry Lake Road makes a right angle turn to north. At Freetown Road turn right (east) and

150 proceed 1.2 mi. to the intersection at Youngton Road. Turn north (left) on Youngton Road and proceed 1.7 mi. to Messenger Road (Summer Seat Road); turn right (southeast) and proceed 1.1 mi. The actual ferry site (N32E 22.117', W90E 38.127') is 0.8 mi. south, but is not accessible to vehicles. [F] 30 Jun 63. As a part of his defense system to foil an attempt by Confederate GEN Johnston to break the siege of Vicksburg, Sherman had a strong lunette, fitted for ARTY, constructed to command Messenger’s Ford. Messenger’s Ford was, after Bridgeport, the most easily-fordable crossing of the Big Black River north of Big Black Bridge. [F] 30 Jun - 3 Jul 63. With his fortifications complete (Site 151), Sherman began to send aggressive cavalry patrols across the Big Black River in an attempt to establish the strength and location of Confederate GEN Johnston’s Army of Relief, but they were unable to penetrate the Confederate patrol screen.

Site 168. Fox’s plantation. GPS: N32° 24.054', W90° 40.471'. From Site 167 turn around and proceed back (north) to Youngton Road. Turn left (south) and proceed 1.7 mi. to Freetown Road. Turn right (west) onto Freetown Road; proceed 2.3 mi. to junction of Birdsong Road. Turn right (northeast) onto Birdsong Road and proceed for 1 mi. to site of Parson James A. Fox’s plantation, Woodburne. No trace of the Fox house now exists. Note: In his Memoirs, Sherman described Parson Fox as “a fine-looking, venerable old man,” and that, after the Siege of Jackson (10-17 Jul 63) following the surrender of Vicksburg, Sherman established his headquarters from 27 Jul – 25 Sep 63 “in tents in a fine grove of old oaks near Parson Fox’s house, and the battalion of the Thirteenth Regulars was the headquarters guard.” Sherman’s wife and their four oldest children visited and remained with him at Parson Fox’s, and it was during this time that Sherman’s nine-year-old son, Willie, who had a cot in a tent with the 13th U.S. Infantry, contracted typhoid fever, and died in the Gayoso Hotel in Memphis on 3 Oct. [F] 29 -31 Jun 63. During this period Union MG Sherman’s Army of Maneuver constructed a strongly-fortified line running from Oak Ridge (Site 151) southeastward to the vicinity of Parson Fox’s farm, on the Birdsong Road, thus effectively blocking both the Benton Road (Russellville Road) from Mechanicsburg and all of the roads leading westward from the several crossings of the Big Black River. Unfortunately few traces of the earthworks remain.

Site. 169. Hill plantation. GPS: N32° 27.13', W90° 37.28'. From Site 168 turn around and proceed back (west) for 1 mi. to Freetown Road; turn left (east) onto Freetown Road and proceed 2.3 mi. to junction of Youngton Road. Turn left (north) on Youngton Road for 3.2 mi. to “Y” intersection of Davis and Youngton Road, and veer right (northeast) to stay on Youngton Road. Continue for 2.4 mi. to junction with Henry Jones Road. Note: Hill plantation was located 0.4 mi. north of this intersection. No trace of the plantation buildings now exist. To go to roadblock position turn right (east onto Henry Jones Road and proceed 0.2 mi. to “Y” intersection with Hannah Road and

151 veer left to stay on Henry Jones Road. Proceed another 0.6 mi. (total of 0.8 mi. from Youngton Road) to crest of watershed overlooking Big Black River floodplain (GPS: N32° 26.654', W90° 36.555'). [F] 22 Jun 63. Union MAJ Alonzo Parkell, with 130 men of 4 IA CAV and a 2- pdr gun, started for Birdsong’s Ferry to fell trees along the road (Henry Jones Road) leading to the ferry (which low water had now made into a practical ford). Here they were attacked by a strong Confederate patrol consisting of troops from Wirt Adams’ MS CAV and 25 MS CAV (Cosby’s CAV BDE, Jackson’s CAV DIV). After a savage and protracted fight the Union troopers were forced back and dispersed. Grant and Sherman interpreted this engagement as an indication that the Confederate offensive to save Vicksburg was imminent; thus triggering Sherman’s deployment along the Big Black River. However, Johnston’s Army of Relief did not actually move toward Vicksburg until 1 Jul 63.

Note: This concludes the tour of Phase F—Confederate Army of Relief. From Site 168 turn around and proceed back (south) on Youngton Road for 2.4 mi. to “Y” intersection with Davis Road; veer left (southeast) to stay on Youngton Road and proceed another 3.2 mi. to Freetown Road. Turn right (west) onto Freetown Road and proceed 3.1 mi. to Tiffentown Road. Turn left (southwest) onto Tiffentown Road and proceed 3.9 mi. to I-20 W; turn right (west) onto I-20 and proceed 6.3 mi. to W. Clay St. Exit (Exit 4B). Veer right (west) onto exit to W. Clay St. and proceed 2.6 mi. to Vicksburg at intersection of Clay and Washington Streets.

Phase G: The Confederate Counteroffensive in Louisiana

NOTE: The following Sites in Louisiana (Sites 155 -163) concern only the Confederate Counteroffensive in Louisiana (the final Confederate effort to affect the outcome of the siege of Vicksburg by activities in the Trans-Mississippi). Other sites in Louisiana that include information relevant to that offensive are Sites 37, 38, 44-46.

Site 170. Buck’s plantation. GPS: N32° 11.28', W91° 18.99' From Vicksburg at intersection of Washington and Clay Streets, proceed south on Washington St. (US-61 BUS or US-80) for 2.9 mi. to I-20. Turn left onto I-20W access ramp at Mississippi Welcome Center before crossing over I-20 Bridge. Proceed 18 mi. on 1-20W to Exit 171 (US-65S). Turn left (south) onto U.S. 65 and proceed 16.3 mi. to Bear Den Road (LA 898) at “Hovey Cuts a Road” historical marker; turn right (southwest) onto Bear Den Road and proceed 0.3 mi. to LA 575. Turn right (west) on LA-575 (which becomes LA 888) and proceed 7.8 mi. to “T” junction with LA-1079. Turn right (north) on LA-1079 for 0.3 mi. to Buck’s plantation. [G] 30 May 63. MG Richard Taylor, with McCulloch’s and Randall’s brigades (Walker’s TX DIV) reached Bucks plantation on the Tensas River. This was the beginning of an effort by Confederate GEN E. Kirby Smith, at Alexandria, LA,

152 commander of the Department of the Trans-Mississippi, to launch an offensive intended to aid the defense of Vicksburg by interfering with the Union logistics system in Louisiana. On 20 May 63 Kirby Smith had directed MG Richard Taylor, commander of the Military District of Western Louisiana, to take MG John Walker’s TX DIV, which was at Campti, LA, and attack the Union supply line through Louisiana. On 26 May Walker’s troops boarded steamboats at Campti, steamed down the Red River to Alexandria, and went into camp at Pineville on 27 May. The following day the DIV marched overland to La Croix Ferry on the Little River, and on 29 May the troops boarded steamboats which carried them down the Little River to the Black River at Trinity. McCulloch’s and Randall’s BDEs (of Walker’s TX DIV) proceed up the Tensas River, leaving Hawes’ BDE at Trinity. Here Walker detached LTC A. F. Crawford’s 13 TX CAV (Dismounted) and sent it up the Ouachita to Monroe with orders to move by railroad to Delhi, and then march north to Floyd to reinforce COL F. A. Barrett’s 13 LA CAV BN for an attack on Lake Providence. [G] At Bucks plantation Taylor’s force was almost opposite Mrs. Perkins’ plantation on the Mississippi, which MG Taylor’s informants had described as a huge Union supply depot (Site 58). The road from Bucks plantation to Somerset Plantation (another of the Perkins clan’s holdings) on Bayou Vidal was still flooded, but the water was shallow enough to permit INF to pass, so Taylor marched across the swamps to the Union-built Bayou Vidal road, and then on to Mrs. Perkins’ plantation. [G] 31 May 63. Taylor’s expedition arrived at Mrs. Perkins’ plantation, only to find the Union camp empty. Local inhabitants informed Taylor that Vicksburg was already besieged, but that the three Union posts of Lake Providence, Milliken’s Bend, and Young’s Point were lightly garrisoned and bursting with military supplies of all kinds. Taylor immediately determined to attack the three posts, but a shortage of rations (Taylor had expected to replenish supplies with Union rations captured at Mrs. Perkins’ plantation) forced him to move Walker’s DIV to Delhi, where he would be able to obtain commissary supplies from the rich agricultural region along Bayou Macon. [G] 1 Jun 63. Taylor, with Walker’s two BDEs, returned to Bucks plantation, where they were reunited with Hawes’ BDE, which had moved up to Buck’s plantation from Trinity. The division then moved by steamboat from Bucks plantation on the Tensas River to the Indian Lake Landing, another 25 river miles up the Tensas, and then marched overland on the Indian Lake Road (LA-Spur 577) through the swamps for about 7 miles to Flowers Plantation on Bayou Macon. The troops probably crossed the Bayou Macon at Warsaw Ferry, 1.5 mi. downstream from Flowers Plantation.

Site 171. Flowers Plantation. GPS: N32° 17.54', W91° 30.32'. From Site 170 turn around and proceed back (south) on LA 1079 for 0.3 mi. to junction with LA-888. Turn left (east) on LA-888 and proceed 7.8 mi. to Bear Den Road. Turn left (north) onto Bear Den Road and proceed for 0.3 mi. to US- 65 at “Hovey Cuts a Road” historical marker. Turn left (north) onto US-65 and

153 proceed 16.3 mi. to I-20. Turn left (west) onto I-20W and proceed 13.5 mi. to LA- 577 (Exit 182) and take exit. From I-20 Exit 182, turn left (south) and proceed on LA-577 for 13 mi. to Flowers Plantation. [B] 3 Feb-31 Mar 63. This waterway, Bayou Macon, was part of the planned route of the Lake Providence Expedition (Site 35) in Feb-Mar 63. Grant hoped to open a waterway from Lake Providence into Bayou Baxter, 41 mi. north, to Bayou Macon, then south to the Tensas River, to the Black River, to the Red River, and into the Mississippi River just north of Natchez, MS. [G] 2 Jun 63. Confederate MG Richard Taylor, with MG John Walker’s TX DIV, arrived at Flowers Plantation on Bayou Macon. There the division obtained badly needed commissary supplies from the rich agricultural region west of Bayou Macon, an area which was subject to neither Mississippi floods nor Union raids. The march then continued northward up Bayou Macon toward Delhi.

Site 172. Bayou Macon Bridge. GPS: N32° 27.468', W91° 28.573' From Site 171 continue straight on LA-577 for 2.8 mi. to junction with LA-17 at Crowville. Turn right (north) onto LA-17 and proceed 12 mi. to Delhi, the junction of LA-17 and US-80 (1st Street). Note: At 11 mi. continue under I-20 overpass. From Delhi turn right (east) and proceed 0.8 mi. on US-80 (E. 1st Street) to east end of US-80 bridge across Bayou Macon. The 1863 railroad bridge was on almost exactly the same site as the modern railroad bridge, which is visible about 300 yards to the south. It cannot be reached by conventional vehicles. [G] 3 Jun 63. The Taylor/Walker expedition reached Delhi, which was the headquarters of BG Paul Hebert, commander of the Military District of North Louisiana, late on the afternoon. Here Taylor was joined by LTC Isaac Harrison’s 15 LA CAV BN, which had re-entered the region following the Union withdrawal after the completion of the Bower’s Landing road on 15 May (Site 43). Finding the railroad bridge across Bayou Macon burned (it had been burned on about 25 Dec 62 by the Confederates as a precaution against a Union raid westward along the railroad by troops associated with the Union Chickasaw Bayou Expedition), Taylor ordered his engineers to construct a new one so that his troops could easily reach Richmond, 18 miles to the east. [G] 4 Jun 63. The new railroad bridge was completed by 1600. In the meantime, Taylor and staff, escorted by Harrison’s troopers, rode to Richmond. [G] 5 Jun 63. Walker’s DIV marched for Richmond, using the new bridge.

Site 173. Monticello. GPS: N32° 36.019', W91° 23.682'. From Site 172, turn around and proceed back (west) for 0.8 mi. to Delhi, the junction of US-80 and LA-17. Turn right (north) and proceed on LA-17 for 9 mi. to junction of LA-877 at Mitchiner. Turn right (east) on LA-877 and proceed for 5.8 mi. to LA-577. Turn left (north) onto LA-577 and proceed 0.5 mi. to Monticello, at junction of LA-577 and LA-877. [G] June 63. Following the defeats at Milliken’s Bend and Young’s Point, Taylor decided to make one last effort to help the Confederate defenders of Vicksburg by scorching the earth in

154 the rich cotton-producing area south of Lake Providence, hoping thereby to draw Union forces away from Vicksburg. [G] 22 Jun 63. Walker’s TX DIV, much depleted by casualties incurred at the battle of Milliken’s Bend (Site 38) and sickness, but reinforced by Tappan’s INF brigade, newly arrived from Arkansas, as well as both 13 LA and 15 LA CAV BNs, arrived late in the afternoon at Monticello. The objective was to destroy the agricultural potential of the rich region between Bayou Macon and Tensas River, which was now growing cotton for the Federal government. [G] 25 Jun 63. Parson’s provisional CAV BDE arrived from LTG Theophilus Holmes’ command in Arkansas, and was added to Walker’s task force. [G] 22-27 Jun 63. During this period Walker’s men scorched the region more thoroughly than even the Shenandoah Valley. Not a building was left standing; the animals were driven off or slaughtered; the ex-slaves were rounded up and returned to their owners. [G] 29 Jun 63. Walker’s mini-army crossed the Tensas River on a new bridge built by his pioneers near Jackson’s Ferry, and moved on to Transylvania (Site 178)

Site 174. Floyd. GPS: N32° 40.643', W91° 24.313'. From Site 173 continue straight (north) on LA-577 for 6 mi. to Floyd. Note: To stay on LA-577, at 2 mi. past Monticello, turn left (west) onto LA-134 for 0.2 mi., then turn abruptly right (north) back on LA-577. Floyd is just over 4 mi. past this double turn. No trace of the 1863 town remains. [G] 5 Jun 63. LTC A. F. Crawford’s 13 TX CAV ((of Randall’s BDE, Walker’s TX DIV) arrived at Floyd to reinforce COL Frank Bartlett’s 13 LA CAV BN in preparation for a planned attack on the Union garrison at Lake Providence to coincide with the attacks on Milliken’s Bend and Young’s Point by the main body of Walker’s TX DIV. [G] 7 Jun 63. Bartlett began to construct a bridge across Bayou Macon at Floyd, planning to use a well-traveled road through the swamps that led directly to Lake Providence. However, when the bridge had been completed, Bartlett changed his mind in favor of a little-used road that led from Caledonia, 15 mi. north of Floyd, to the north end of Lake Providence. [G] 8 Jun 63. With the new bridge completed at Caledonia, Bartlett was ready to launch his offensive. The following morning he crossed Bayou Macon and started across the swamp toward the lake.

Site 175. Caledonia. GPS: N32° 52.28', W91° 18.89'. From Site 174 turn left (west) at Floyd to stay on LA-577 and proceed 2.7 mi. to intersection with LA-17. Turn right (north) onto LA-17 and proceed 12.9 mi. to Oak Grove, at the junction of LA-17 and LA 2 (Main Street). At Oak Grove turn right (east) and proceed on LA-2 for 2.8 mi. to Macon Front Road; turn left (north) on Macon Front Road (PR-149) and proceed for 0.7 mi., to Gunter Loop Road (PR-416); turn east on Gunter Loop Road and proceed for 1.5 mi. to the site of Caledonia. The settlement no longer exists.

155 [G] In early May 1863 the Union commander in Lake Providence, BG Hugh Reid, heard that the Confederates were concentrating cavalry at Caledonia with the intent of raiding and destroying the cotton plantations in the Lake Providence area. That would be a serious annoyance to the Union because those plantations were producing badly-needed crops for the cotton-starved mills of the North. [G] 9 May 63. Reid sent MAJ William Rogers with 9 companies of 1 KS MTD INF and a 100-man detachment of 16 WI INF to eradicate the Confederate concentration at Caledonia. Bayou Macon proved too deep to ford, so Rogers had to build a bridge. Pushing westward, he ran into an ambush a mile west of Caledonia, but broke through and pressed on in two columns toward Pin Hook in pursuit of the fleeing Confederates.

Site 176. Pin Hook. GPS: N32° 51.591', W91° 24.013'. From Site 175 turn around and proceed back (south) for 1.5 mi. to Macon Front Road. Turn left (south) onto Macon Front Road and proceed 0.7 mi. to LA- 2. Turn right (west) onto LA-2 and proceed 2.8 mi. to Oak Grove, at junction of LA-2 and LA-17. From Oak Grove continue straight (west) on LA-2 for 0.6 mi. to Old Kilborne Road. The 1863 hamlet of Pin Hook has been absorbed by the modern town of Oak Grove. [G] Both of Rogers’ columns were ambushed a mile east of Pin Hook and forced back across Bayou Macon, but not before Rogers was able to burn his new bridge. The mission to destroy the Confederate concentration was defeated, but Rogers did learn positively that Confederate MG John Walker’s TX DIV was at Monroe with his entire command. [G] 11 May 63. MG Grant received the news while he was at Cayuga, MS (Site 96). This was Grant’s first intimation that Confederate GEN E. Kirby Smith, commander of the Confederate Department of the Trans-Mississippi, was at last making an effort to interfere with the Union arrangements in Louisiana. Grant immediately ordered BG Jeremiah Sullivan, commander of the Military District of Northeast Louisiana at Young’s Point, to do his best to find out what the Confederates had in mind, and to put all of the posts in Louisiana in a state of preparedness for attack.

Site 177. Baxter Bayou. GPS: N32° 50.682', W91° 13.451' From Site 176 turn around and proceed back (east) to Oak Grove, the junction of LA-2 and LA-17. From Oak Grove continue straight (east) on LA-2 for 9.7 mi. to junction with US-65; turn right (south) and proceed for 0.3 mi. to the Baxter Bayou Bridge. [B] 2 Feb 63. LTC W. L. Duff, or Grant’s staff, and COL George W. Dietzler investigated Baxter Bayou as a proposed steamboat route connecting the Mississippi River with Bayou Macon. They explored the bayou for a mile west of Lake Providence, and reported to Grant that the route was feasible. The countryside was almost empty of people, the plantation people all having fled west of Bayou Macon.

156 [B] 24 Feb 63. Logan’s DIV, which had recently arrived from Memphis, began to clear trees and other obstructions from Baxter Bayou, and deepened and widened the channel. The first four miles of Baxter Bayou were wide and deep enough although much obstructed by cypress trees, but the next 5 miles passed through a dense cypress swamp in which the trees not only had to be cleared out, but the channel itself had to be deepened, [B] 5 Mar 63. The canal into Lake Providence was passable by small boats. [B] 17 Mar 63. Grant reported to MG Henry Halleck in Washington that “ordinary river boats can now pass from Lake Providence into Bayou Macon, and thence, by easy navigation, to the mouth of Red River.” This report was overly optimistic.

[B] 31 Mar 63. The effort was hampered by falling water levels in the Mississippi River, as well as in the backswamps, along with the need for a sawing machine to cut 12 to 15 cypress trees below the water line. By this time Grant had decided to march overland by moving southward from Milliken’s Bend, and the Lake Providence route was abandoned. [G] 9 Jun. Col. Frank Bartlett, CSA, led a strong cavalry force from Caledonia, LA toward Lake Providence as a part of the Taylor-Walker counteroffensive against the Union posts in Louisiana. Marching south along the western shore of Lake Providence, he encountered a Union CAV force at Baxter Bayou, but drove it back toward Lake Providence. However, the contact warned the Union commander at Lake Providence, giving him ample time to prepare counter-measures (Site 36).

Site 178. Walker’s Camp at Transylvania. GPS: N32° 41.201', W91° 12.101' From Site 177 continue straight (southeast) on US-65 for 4.5 mi. to Lake Providence, at the junction of US-65 and LA-596. Turn right (south) onto US-65 and proceed for 900.3 mi. to Transylvania; turn right (west) onto LA-581 and proceed for 100.3 mi. to Walker’s Camp site near the Transylvania Indian mounds (private property). [G] 28 Jun 63. A provisional Confederate cavalry BDE composed of 12 and 21 TX CAV and J. H. Pratt’s BTRY, commanded by COL W. H. Parsons, attacked two COs of blacks of 1 AR INF that had fortified the Indian mound. Outnumbered, the white Union officers surrendered their command. [G] 29 Jun 63. Walker’s reinforced DIV arrived from Monticello, and immediately began the work of scorching the area south of Lake Providence. Walker also sent an artillery battery to Transylvania Bend about 2 south of the hamlet of Transylvania to interdict Union shipping in the Mississippi River. That same afternoon the gunners fired at what they thought was an unarmed transport, but it turned out to be John Raine, an armed vessel belong to the Union’s Ellet’s Marine Brigade. Union counter fire killed three Confederates and forced the rest to withdraw. Despite this setback, Walker’s men continued their work of destruction.

157 [G] 29 Jun 63. BG Hugh Reid, commander of the Union post at Lake Providence, learned that a Confederate force (Walker’s reinforced DIV) was burning plantations in the region south of Lake Providence between the upper Tensas River and the Mississippi. The small Union outpost at Goodrich Landing, 6 miles below Transylvania, reported that the whole area was swarming with Confederates. [G] 30 Jun 63. Reid sent 1 KS MTD INF south from Lake Providence to investigate. Five miles south of town they were ambushed by a greatly superior force of Confederates and driven back for two miles. At about the same time Ellet’s Marine Brigade, plus the Union garrison of Goodrich Landing, moved toward Transylvania from the south. Arriving in Transylvania, the Union force found no trace of the Confederates. They had withdrawn eastward toward Monticello, MS, but not because of Union pressure. Instead, Confederate MG Walker had received an order from GEN Kirby Smith to return as rapidly as possible to southern Louisiana. Four days later, Vicksburg surrendered. MG Grant, in his 1885 Memoirs, recalled; “The fate of the Confederacy was sealed when Vicksburg fell.” Note: This concludes the tour of Phase G—The Confederate Counteroffensives in Louisiana. From Site 178 turn around and proceed back (east) on LA-581 for 10.3 mi. to US-65. Turn right (south) and proceed 2.8 mi. through Tallulah to I-20. Turn onto I-20E and proceed 18.5 mi. across the Mississippi River Bridge to Exit 1A (Washington St.). Take the exit to the right (south) which circles around to Washington Street. Turn right (north) onto Washington St., and proceed 2.9 mi. to Vicksburg at intersection of Washington and Clay streets.

158 GENERALIZED ORDERS OF BATTLE UNION FORCES Army of the Tennessee: MG Ulysses S. Grant Provisional CAV BDE: COL Amory Johnson XIII Corps: MG John A. McClernand 9 DIV: BG Peter J. Osterhaus 1 BDE: BG T. T. Garrard 2 BDE: COL L. Sheldon 10 DIV: BG Andrew J. Smith 1 BDE: BG S. G. Burbridge 2 BDE: COL W. J. Landram 12 DIV: BG Alvin P. Hovey 1 BDE: BG G. F. McGinnis 2 BDE: COL J. L. Slack 14 DIV: BG E. A. Carr 1 BDE: BG W. P. Benton 2 BDE: COL W. M. Stone (BG M. K. Lawler) XV Corps: MG William T. Sherman 1 DIV: MG Frederick Steele 1 BDE: COL F. H. Manter 2 BDE: BG C. E. Hovey (BG C. R. Woods) 3 BDE: BG J. M. Thayer 2 DIV: MG Frank Blair 1 BDE: COL G. A. Smith 2 BDE: COL T. K. Smith 3 BDE: BG H. Ewing 3 DIV: BG James Tuttle 1 BDE: BG R. P. Buckland 2 BDE: BG J. A. Mower 3 BDE: BG C. L. Matthies XVII Corps: MG James B. McPherson 3 DIV: MG John A. Logan 1 BDE: BG J. E. Smith 2 BDE: BG E. S. Dennis (BG M. D. Leggett) 3 BDE: BG J. D. Stevenson 6 DIV: BG John McArthur 1 BDE: BG H. Reid 2 BDE: BG T. E. Ransom 3 BDE: COL W. Hall 7 DIV: BG Marcellus M. Crocker (BG Isaac Quinby) 1 BDE: COL J. B. Sanborn 2 BDE: COL S. A. Holmes 3 BDE: COL G. B. Boomer

159 Mississippi River Squadron: RADM David Dixon Porter Ironclads (11 vessels, damaged Eastport at Cairo, IL) Tinclads (32 vessels) Rams (6 vessels) Timberclads (3 vessels) Mortar scows (12 barges w/13-in. mortars) Fleet Auxiliaries (7+ vessels) Transports (Number of vessels unknown, but large)

CONFEDERATE FORCES Department of the West: GEN Joseph E. Johnston Army of Vicksburg*: LTG John C. Pemberton Stevenson’s DIV: MG Carter L. Stevenson Barton’s BDE: BG Seth M. Barton Taylor’s BDE: COL Thomas Taylor (BG Alfred Cummings) Reynold’s BDE: COL Alexander W. Reynolds Forney’s DIV: MG John H. Forney Hebert’s BDE: BG Louis Hebert Moore’s BDE: BG John C. Moore M. L. Smith’s DIV: MG Martin L. Smith Vaughn’s BDE: BG J. C. Vaughn Baldwin’s BDE: BG W. E. Baldwin Shoup’s BDE: BG Francis A. Shoup Independent Units Tracy’s BDE: BG Edward D. Tracy (COL Isham Garrott) (BG Stephen D. Lee) Tilghman’s BDE: BG Lloyd Tilghman Waul’s TX Legion: COL Thomas N. Waul River Defense Forces: COL Edward Higgins Grand Gulf Forces: BG John S. Bowen Cockrell’s BDE: COL Francis Cockrell Green’s BDE: BG Martin E. Green Adams’ MS CAV: COL Wirt Adams Fort Pemberton Garrison: MG William W. Loring Featherston’s BDE: BG W. S. Featherston Jackson Force: GEN Joseph E. Johnston Gregg’s BDE: COL R. Farquharson Gist’s BDE: COL Peyton Colquitt Walker’s BDE: BG W. H. T. Walker Army of Relief: GEN Joseph E. Johnston Left Wing: MG William W. Loring Breckinridge’s DIV: MG John C. Breckinridge D. Adams’ BDE: BG Daniel Adams Helm’s BDE: BG Ben H. Helm Stovall’s BDE: BG Marcellus A. Stovall

160 Loring’s DIV: MG William W. Loring J. Adams’ BDE: BG John Adams Buford’s BDE: BG Abraham Buford Featherston’s BDE: BG Winfield S. Featherston Right Wing: MG Samuel G. French French’s DIV: MG Samuel G. French McNair’s BDE: BG Evander McNair Maxey’s BDE: BG Samuel B. Maxey Evans’ BDE: BG Nathan G. Evans Walker’s DIV: MG W. H. T. Walker Ector’s BDE: BG Matthew D. Ector Gregg’s BDE: BG John Gregg Gist’s BDE: BG States Rights Gist Wilson’s BDE: COL Claudius C. Wilson CAV DIV: BG William H. Jackson 1 CAV BDE: BG George B. Cosby Adams MS CAV RGT: COL Wirt Adams 2 CAV BDE: BG J. W. Whitfield Reserve ARTY: MAJ W. C. Preston

*Significant reorganizations of major units occurred during the course of the Final Offensive of the Vicksburg Campaign (e.g., the Grand Gulf Force was reorganized as Bowen’s Division on about 10 May 1863), but units of brigade size or less remained largely intact.

161