Explorations of the Cultural Heritage Value of Hominid, Pongid, and Robotid Artifacts Dirk H

A Line in the Sand? Explorations of the Cultural Heritage Value of Hominid, Pongid, and Robotid Artifacts Dirk H. R. Spennemann*

Abstract: Although cultural heritage management is an inherently retrospective discipline, there is a need for strategic forward thinking. Too many valuable heritage places have been lost because they are not recognized and assessed in time. As cultural heritage management begins to examine modern structures and sites, this paper takes strategic thinking in cultural heritage management one step further and addresses the management of artifactual material created by our closest relatives, the great apes. Given the increasing understanding that chimpanzees have cultures and traditions in tool use, there is a need to recognize their heritage value in reference to human evolution. Expanding the concept of nonhuman heritage into the future, it is now also time to explore how to deal with the artifacts that the first artificial intelligence (AI)-imbued, self-reflecting robots will create. By extension, which artifacts will be kept along the way? The contemplation of the role of nonhuman heritage will ultimately foster a reappraisal of human heritage. The article outlines some of the conceptual issues that must be addressed if our heritage is to have an ethical future.

INTRODUCTION

Heritage is a human construct. In a broad conceptual framing, cultural heritage is the result of humankind’s interactions with their environment and one another. The outcome of these processes is reflected in a number of forms and is generally divided within two typologies of tangible (built environment, sites, landscapes, objects, and artifacts) and intangible cultural heritage (language, folklore, skills and customs, folklore, skills, and customs).1 This paper is only be concerned with

*Institute of Land, Water and Society. Email: e-mail [email protected]

241 242 DIRK H. R. SPENNEMANN the tangible aspects. Heritage managers assess the values projected onto cultural heritage places (and artifacts) by the public against predetermined criteria to de- termine their significance. Preservation theory holds that this process enables important aspects of the past to be identified, protected, and managed for the benefit of present and future generations.2 Subjective valuation, revaluation, and ultimately prioritization occur consciously and subconsciously on a continual basis. As with all values, cultural heritage values are variable between communities as well as between socioeconomic layers within a community. Moreover, values are mutable qualities that change both in intensity of conviction and in general over time, and thereby create a semifluid state in heritage valuations.3

HERITAGE AND STRATEGIC FORESIGHT

The field of futures studies researches the medium- to long-term future of soci- eties and their setting, the physical world, encompassing the mechanisms as well as the driving forces of change. Because the future is neither predictable nor predetermined, but will be influenced by the choices we make in the present, a subset of future studies is concerned with foresight. The research direction of strategic foresight, defined as “the ability to create and maintain high-quality forward views and to use the insights arising in organizationally useful ways”4 is particularly apposite when considering the management of cultural heritage. The aim is to expand the present-day conceptual horizon by forward-projecting present observations and trends and interpreting their potential future significance. Given that by its nature, cultural heritage management is an intensely retrospective discipline, it is not very surprising that future studies have been rare in the discipline. Even front-end technologies such as space exploration received (and in many cases still receive) mainly retrospective assessments only once it was (almost) too late.5 True future studies are limited to discussion of the management of space technology such as orbiting satellites6 as well as the future heritage management of sites currently in existence on other celestial bodies and out of reach of human interference.7 All these issues, however, are still confined to the human sphere of heritage. By starting a discussion on the future of robotic heritage and by looking at the question of how we might manage heritage sites created by future AI-imbued robots, the anthropocentric paradigm of heritage management that has recently been challenged.8 This article is an extension of the previous assessment and concerns itself with the current and future management of heritages other than human: in particular the moveable cultural heritage of the great apes and that of robots. This article first summarizes the nature of hominid artifacts and then expands the discussion to explore the status of pongid-generated artifacts. Conceptually, this is just a logical extension of the anthropocentric concept of heritage, as we A LINE IN THE SAND 243 are, after all, assessing the heritage potential of artifacts and sites created by our closest physical ancestors. The second part of the paper will consider the future heritage management of artifacts created by AI-imbued robots—whom we could, and should, consider to be our intellectual children. Hominid archaeology is seen by most practitioners as a means of understanding who we are and how we came to be the humans we are at present. Despite often-conflicting interpretation and robust debate, archaeological excavations are considered a means to research aspects ranging from an investigation of tool pro- duction and manipulative skills9 as well as human diet10 to understanding cognitive evolution11 and the development of social behavior.12 Thus, a study of the technological development of our direct ancestral lineage is of great importance. Yet, no archaeologist would argue that the study of Neanderthal tool use should be abandoned; even though it is very persuasive from a monophyletic point of view that Neanderthals were not in our direct ancestral lineage,13 but actually another species of Homo (neanderthalensis), moreover a species that our own species, Homo sapiens, extinguished some 30,000 years ago. The study of pongid sites and artifacts is merely an extension of the concept, looking at a genus (Pan species) that split off at the tribal level (see Figure 1). Just as the study of the cultural heritage of our direct ancestral lineage provides insight into who we are, and just as the study of Neanderthal sites provides a means to compare ourselves with con- temporaries at that time, so the study of the (cultural) heritage of chimpanzees and other great apes will provide reference points to our own self. Furthermore, with technological innovation running at an ever-faster rate, advances in robotic development, on the technological (consider RoboCup14 or Hon- da’s ASIMO), the conceptual,15 and the commercial front (NEC’s PaReRo200316) are poised to revolutionize our lives. Migrating from pure mechano-logical programing to fuzzy logic, AI is trying to replicate the actions of animal brains. The Darwin robot series is a case in point.17 Unbeknownst to most users, AI has already become quite pervasive in modern society; and robotic appliances are en- tering the consumer market in a series of guises.18 Thus, AI-aided applications are already all-pervasive in modern life. As these AI-imbued robots become ever more powerful (in terms of intellectual computing

FIGURE 1. Monophyletic relationship between humans and the great apes. 244 DIRK H. R. SPENNEMANN power), in the near to medium-term future they could very well generate a set of artifacts that are derived from human-independent reasoning. Applying the precautionary principle,19 as well as meeting the obligations of responsible steward- ship20 heritage, practitioners must curate such items in an ethical fashion so future generations can retrospectively evaluate and make a final decision what to retain and what to discard.

DEFINITIONS

It is understood that a recent reclassification of the human and pongid family tree based on genetics has seen a reclassification of the interrelationship (see Figure 1), with the family Hominidae now including all great apes. Orangutans belong to the subfamily Ponginae, and all others belong to Homininae. At the tribe level, gorillas split out into Gorillini, whereas chimpanzees and humans are combined into Hominini,21 which in turn split at the genus level. For the purposes of this article, the traditional anthropological, and effectively anthropocentric, definition model is used that places all great apes into one group, irrespective of actual monophyletic genetic closeness to humans (as shown in Figure 1). For the purposes of this article, three terms need to be defined and clarified:

Pongid includes all species deemed to belong to the (former) pongid lineages as traditionally understood by anthropologists. This includes the modern species of gorilla (Gorilla gorilla; Gorilla beringei), orangutan (Pongo abelii; Pongo pygmaeus), and chimpanzee (Pan troglodytes; Pan paniscus). Hominid includes all species deemed to belong to the hominid lineages as traditionally understood by anthropologists. This includes Homo sapiens— us—as all other species of the genus Homo (i.e., Homo erectus, H. neanderthalensis, etc.). Robotid is a term specifically coined for this paper, to sit alongside the previously mentioned terms. It extends to all variants of robots where the machines have some degree of ability for independent decision-making based on AI algorithms.

Although the evolutionary processes for all lineages are of course continuing, all available evidence for the processes for the pongid and hominid lineages rest in the past. Conversely, most evolutionary processes for robotid lineages will take place in the immediate and medium-term future.

HUMAN-CREATED ARTIFACTS

One early scientific definition for the dichotomy between animals and humans was the axiom that humans used tools, whereas animals did not. Benjamin Franklin A LINE IN THE SAND 245 most prominently expressed it when he commented, “man is a tool-making animal.”22 Franklin’s view held much import for the interpretation of human development and influenced, inter alia Karl Marx; and through Marx’s monumental work Das Kapital,23 generations of socialists. That definition, which soon became more generalized to encompass mere tool use, could be sustained for almost 200 years24 until studies of primate behavior by Jane Goodall25 showed that primates, too, were able to use tools. Indeed, it was soon found that tool use was not confined to primates but can be demonstrated for birds26 and sea otters.27 If the use of tools did not suffice as a discriminant feature, it was necessary to return to the initial dichotomy of the manufacture of tools. However, as is dis- cussed in the following section in more detail, studies of primate behavior showed that primates, too, were able to make tools. This occurred not only in laboratory settings but also in their natural environments. Thus, the level of separation had to be raised a further notch. The manufacture of tools that defined humankind was the manufacture of tool not for simple task, but tocreateatooltomakeatool to carry out a task. It was this major cognitive step that defined the new boundary. The ancestry of human tool use and manufacture has long been debated. Early hominid use of unmodified flake tools (flakes struck by percussion flaking of a pebble core), labeled the Oldowan Industrial Complex, goes back 2.5 million years ago (Ma).28 Based on the unmodified and accidentally modified tool use observed among chimpanzees (see the following text), it has been speculated that evidence of even earlier use may have not been recognized in the archaeological record.29 Much of the speculation depends on the correlation of the morphological characteristics of the chimpanzees and early hominid ancestors based on brain capacity and hand anatomy. To meet the raised cognitive test previously outlined, however, we have to wait 1.5 million years with the advent of large core tool technologies of the Acheulean Industrial Complex, where humans reduced a pebble to shape it into a tool.30

ANIMAL-CREATED ARTIFACTS

There is little need to comment in any detail on the curating of human-created artifacts. There is a plethora of publications and manuals written for museums and archives dealing with the curating of archaeological materials, artworks, tex- tiles, photographs, paper-based items, and so forth. Although tool use among animals has long been observed, such as the Woodpecker Finch using twigs to extract larvae from decaying wood31 or, more recently, the use of sponges by bottle-nosed dolphins,32 most such use is limited to objects of preexisting shape. The New Caledonian crow appears to be the only nonprimate able to select appropriate tools and if need be shape them to size.33 However, primates have demonstrated the capability to shape a range objects to suit the task at hand: in short, to make tools. 246 DIRK H. R. SPENNEMANN

Primate-Created Tools in Natural Environments

Tool use among great apes has been documented in captivity for gorillas,34 common chimpanzees,35 Bonobos,36 and orangutans,37 as well as other species of plat- yrrhine and catarrhine monkeys.38 However, only the great apes show the ability to comprehend causal relations and thus modify tools (in experimental situa- tions).39 In the natural environments, these observations are confined to chim- panzees40 and orangutans.41 Most primate tool use has been related to gathering food. In addition, we have recent observations where a female gorilla was observed using a stick to test the depth of a pond before proceeding, while another female gorilla used a tree trunk as a makeshift bridge.42 This shows a level of reflective thought, neither of which is associated with food procurement. In addition, research has attributed some level of culture at least to chimpanzees inasmuch as they exhibit traditions of grooming, calling, and tool use that suggest intergenerational learning and differentiation by one group from another.43 Chimpanzees in the Taï Forest in the Ivory Coast collect stones and use them as nutcracking implements. A scatter of stone flakes is gradually formed around specified sites where unmovable anvils exist. The hammer stones were of varied raw materials, some of which were transported to the nutcracking site from source locations of up to 2 km away. Some assemblages have been excavated by archae- ologists and studied for their similarities with early hominid sites.44 The authors claim that the artifacts from the Taï Forest site “resemble some Early Stone Age industries from East Africa.”45 That has been criticized by others who claim that any modification of the stone hammers and anvils is accidental.46 At the present state of study and observation of chimpanzee populations living in their natural environments, stone use is limited to unmodified stones. Stone flaking, a skill that could be taught to chimpanzees in captivity (see the following text), does not seem to occur in the natural world.47

Primate-Created Tools in Human-Controlled Environments

The debate on human consciousness and learning has also created a debate that has looked at the ability of great apes to learn and perform cognitive tasks under controlled laboratory conditions. A number of pongids in captivity have been taught how to use and flake stone tools. The pioneering study was carried out in 1971 by Richard Wright who demon- 1_ stratedtoa52 -year-old captive male orangutan, Abang, how to use a stone tool to cut a string that kept shut a box with food. The orangutan could copy the action after 9 demonstrations and 12 trial event exposures. Subsequent trial events all resulted in success. In the continuation of the experiment, Wright demonstrated to the orangutan how to strike a stone flake off a core. After six demonstrations and seven trial events the orangutan succeeded in striking a chip off the core, which he repeated in the following attempt. After another demonstration, the orang- A LINE IN THE SAND 247 utan managed to copy that skill and strike off flakes in the following three trial events. After the last attempt Abang proceeded to use the flake to open the box. Filming of the orangutan 10 days after the last event showed that he was able to strike flakes and cut the string of his own accord.48 The study carried was pioneering in its scope, but in the final summation it only demonstrated that a orangutan had the imitative capacity to learn to make tools and put them to a (predefined) use. The study, as Wright himself counselled, was not designed to test intuitive problem solving. The experimental setup was repeated by Nick Toth and Kathy Schick starting in 1991; they carried out a series of experiments with a 9-year-old Bonobo (Pan paniscus), Kanzi. Striking flakes off a core and using them to cut string and keep shut a food reward box was briefly demonstrated. Kanzi soon acquired the skill to carry out the task, continually improving his abilities to flake. In view of the long-term experiment, Toth and Schick demonstrated that the Bonobo carried out an innovation. Kanzi found that throwing the hammer stone at the core provided better results, possibly because of the larger force exerted in that way. The longitudinal study, to which another Bonobo has been added, has yielded a large number of tools that could be analyzed in a fashion akin to human stone tools.49 The important observation made by the researchers was that Kanzi was able, over 3 years of observation, to improve his skill at producing flakes,50 indicating that Bonobos are capable of improving of skills through practice.

Curating Animal-Created Artifacts

Commencing with the curiosity cabinets of the sixteenth century, there is a long tradition in collecting human artifacts with a range of institutions worldwide. Common to all major museums and archives is that they have a collections policy grounded in the ethical management and curating items long term to ensure that they do not deteriorate.51 These museums tend to divide along traditional lines of scientific enquiry into the human and the natural animate and inanimate world. The artifacts of human endeavor are collected in museums of archaeology, ethnography, art, and folklore, as well as in archives and libraries. The animal world is collected in live form in zoos as well as in natural history museums. Do the items derived from the studies of great ape tool use belong into the realm of natural history museums, or should they be part of an archaeological/ anthropological collection? And what about the material culture created by animals in captivity? Who collects that? And what kind of collections policy should be applied? The excavation at the Tai Forest sites by Mercader and coworkers52 has created congruence between primatological behavioral research on one hand and pale- oanthropological and archaeological research on the other. The traditionally anthropocentric discipline of archaeology has been widened to consider pongid sites. 248 DIRK H. R. SPENNEMANN

The findings of the research are significant and the excavated material culture of the chimpanzee population must be curated in an ethically acceptable way so future generations have the opportunity to compare. This is even more imperative considering that the chimpanzee group is capable of learning and that, at some point in time, technological change may in fact occur. At present the research into chimpanzee generated sites is limited; the full variation within the tool manufacturing process is unknown, neither is there a full understanding of how common such sites are. Both are of requirements for the assessment of these within the concept of cultural heritage management. This then raises the question of how the material, both from the excavations and experiments previously mentioned, is being curated. The artifacts derived from these excavations at the Tai Forest sites are curated at the researcher’s academic institu- tion. The artifacts created by the orangutan Abang in Wright’s pioneering study of 1971 are still in the researcher’s possession53 and thus subject to the vagaries of domestic house fires and the like. There are no formal plans for where these artifacts will be curated in the long term, but a future holding in public hand can be anticipated. The artifacts created by the Bonobo Kanzi as part the Toth and Schick study are held at the Centre for Research into the Anthropological Foundations of Technology, at Indiana University. The underlying questions about how these artifacts should be valued, and how these values should be assessed, are addressed later in the article.

ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE-CREATED ARTIFACTS

New developments in AI have seen the gradual development of computing algorithms that can out-think grandmasters at the game of chess,54 analyze and create music,55 art,56 develop and self-learn construction rules,57 develop new car body shapes, influence transportation systems,58 or design aircraft parts.59 It can be used to equip machines with independent decision-making capabilities based on predefined grammatical (rather than fixed rule) sets, obviating the need for the pres- ence of humans. Not surprisingly, military applications have been at the forefront: Uncrewed combat vehicles60 and surveillance planes have been developed and de- ployed61 and are continually being given increased capabilities.62 At the same time, new research is looking at the concept of genetic algorithms63 and how they can be successfully employed to improve the performance of robots.64 Parallel research considers the ability of (at present simple) robots to ob- serve the behavior of other robots and imitate it based on a stored set of possible outcomes.65 As these developments continue with ever-increasing pace, there can be little doubt that before long a robot will create the first artifact. That artifact will have been derived purely from the evolutionary thought processes of the robot rather than from human-designed preconditions to which the robot/genetic algo- rithm developed a solution. A LINE IN THE SAND 249

If we ignore the emergence of robot-generated sites from the consideration of this paper,66 at present the only artifacts generated by robots are confined to digital constructs in the realm of genetic algorithms and artificial (digital) life forms.

Issues Of Curating

At present, no robots are included in national lists of cultural heritage items protected from export or destruction. Some museums (Smithsonian, Massachusetts Institute of Technology [MIT]) are collecting items of the information age, but none of this has been particularly systematic. Most research relating to robotics and AI is carried out by academics in a wide range of universities as well as by scientists in commercial settings (such as Sony, NEC, or Honda). The commercial realities of the modern world, with the development of intellectual property in inventions, mean that many of the intermediate stages will be held in-house without formal collection and curating processes, apart from standard academic or laboratory diligence. Even where universities have set up museums of technology (such as MIT), there is no guarantee that the significant items created by university staff will eventually be handed to the museum for curating.67 Some scholarly research on the matter has commenced, at least in the realm of computers, as is evidenced by the journals IEEE Annals of the History of Comput- ing as well as Iterations: A journal of Software History and the work carried out by the Charles Babbage Institute at the University of Minnesota.68 Science and technology museums have been collecting examples of such equipment as part of their mission.69 There are also some web archives that focus on historic software.70

CULTURE: A WORKABLE DICHOTOMY?

Having considered aspects of material culture of hominid, pongid, and robotid design and some issues related to curating, it is now time to tie the discussion back to the question of cultural heritage management. Before considering the question of how the cultural heritage values of these three sets of artifacts are assessed (see the following text) it is necessary to establish whether there is a fundamental difference between these three typologies of artifacts, and if so, where the dichot- omous line can be placed. Since heritage management and evaluation, as well as the whole concept of ethics per se is a human construct, it is inevitable that the considerations presented later in the article will be rooted in human constructs themselves. One of the major concepts that influences the discussion is that of culture. As tool use, and later tool manufacture became untenable as a dichotomy between humans and the great apes (and other animals), anthropologists have tended to position the key dichotomy at the concept of ‘culture.’ Culture has been re- 250 DIRK H. R. SPENNEMANN garded as an eminently human trait based on the “cognitive and learning mechanisms by means of which such information is transmitted.”71 Definitions of human culture vary, subjectively based on the ideological standpoint of the interpreter. UNESCO72 holds that “culture should be regarded as the set of distinctive spiritual, material, intellectual and emotional features of society or a social group, and that it encompasses, in addition to art and literature, lifestyles, ways of living together, value systems, traditions and beliefs,” which according to Bates and Plog73 “are transmitted from generation to generation through learning.” The definition of culture among ecologists is based on the assumption that any animal behavior that is not uniform across all members of the species but varies in circumscribed geographic areas and that cannot be explained either environ- mentally or genetically, must be learned behavior transmitted within a subpopu- lation.74 “Culture is information or behavior acquired from conspecifics through some form of social learning.”75 In that view, humans are merely other animals, where the intergenerational learning is more complex. Thus, the matrilineal transmission of the use of sponges to protect the vulnerable nose of bottlenose dolphins has been described as cultural transmission76 and Rendell and Whitehead77 in their review of cultural transmission among cetaceans analyzed a wide range of definitions of culture as used in the ecological literature.

Culture Among the Great Apes

Setting aside the literature on culture and dialect among song birds, as well as the growing number of studies on cetaceans, the main body of work on animal ‘culture’ looked at the great apes—mainly because of their evolutionary proximity to humans. The key difference between the great apes and other animals also rests in the fact that primates are the only animals other than humans where multiple behavioral elements have been observed. Several studies have been carried out to investigate the nature of culture among chimpanzees78 and orangutan.79 Studies of behavior and tool use among chimpanzees have shown that tool-use behavior is organized in traditions or cultures.80 A good example is nutcracking that is practiced among some groups but not among others, even though the latter are only 30 km away.81 The study of the captive Bonobo Kanzi showed that an individual Bonobo could learn experientially, innovate on techniques, and improve his skills to create useful flakes.82 The key question is whether such skills would be passed on, intra- and intergenerationally and if so, how. Observations among chimpanzee populations have shown that intergenerational transmission of skills and cultural practices occurs but also that some tool use is invented yet dies out again without being adopted by most of the group. For this, group dynamics and the social standing of the inventor were held responsible. The key difference rests in the fact that among human innovators the role of (formalized) teachers able to vocalize instructions must be considered. This is ab- A LINE IN THE SAND 251 sent in the chimpanzee world where imitators may exist but where the imitation may take on its own expressions.83 Human culture provides ample evidence of the ratchet effect, whereby the plane of knowledge and thus learning complexity is raised from generation to generation and where the next generation can critically interpret the cumulative results of the previous generations. This is largely absent among the chimpanzee populations. But as Boesch and Tomasello84 rightfully point out, the line of evidence for the culture of chimpanzees is only very short because behavioral studies among the chimpanzee populations are only comparatively recent. Moreover, as Whiten85 pointed out, the evidence from the early hominid sites demonstrates that the ratchet effect occurred in small increments that can only be identified in a time scale of hundreds of thousands of years. If we accept that culture is, essentially, a process where “information or behavior is acquired from conspecifics through some form of social learning,”and where this learning is reinforced through intergenerational emulation (among the great apes) and emulation and organized instruction (among humans), culture is no longer a valid measure and the dichotomy between animal and human must be placed at a different level.86

Culture Among Robots

The current discussion of culture among robots falls into three spheres: literary imagination; technological innovation; and technologically-informed conceptual- ization. All are relevant as they inform and influence each other. Created in 1920 by the Czech playwright Karel Cˇ apek for his play R.U.R.(Ro- sumovi Umeˇlí Roboti [Rossum’s Universal Robots]), the term robot87 soon re- placed automaton in most languages of the world. The concept was explored in a range of plays, novels, and films. Both academic and popular (science fiction) works quickly took to the term robotics, coined by Isaac Asimov in 1941 in the short story “Liar!”88 To create some order in his imaginary world, Asimov created a series of behavioral rules.89 Asimov’s laws of robotics assume the supremacy of humans, even though in earlier films (such as Metropolis) and plays (such R.U.R.) that is not given and the view is much darker. As Bartneck90 has shown, much of the contemporary popular perception of robots as perpetuated by the media and entertainment industry is that people assume there are two types of robots: those would want to be like humans (e.g. Bicentennial Man) and those who are evil and wish to destroy the world (e.g., the Cylons in Battlestar Galactica). There is little conceptual work in the media that future robots may in fact have their own, different priorities and, eventually, their own value sets. That robot life forms will use humans as reference points for their value constructs may well be a fallible assumption: Ro- bots might merely regard humans as at the same level of abstraction they might 252 DIRK H. R. SPENNEMANN regard other mammals, or in fact as they might regard any other carbon-based life form. Substantial work has been carried out on the design requirements and concepts of socially interactive robots91 with attitudinal research on how people would respond to social robots.92 Yet, many commercial applications still mimic human behavior as the following text from the NEC product information illustrates:

[NEC created a] Behavior model [that] designs the robot character through the design of consistent behavior patterns based on the given character. For example, a robot can be designed by specifying his “likes” and “dislikes” such as “he loves dancing but astrology” [sic] “selfish and independent,” or “passive and obedient.” Based on the specified inter- ests, tastes, and characters of the robot, he evaluates each human-robot interaction, such as ‘fun’ or ‘boring.’ The collected evaluation results are used to define the next action, spontaneous behavior, and reaction to a questions by the user.93

Although there is much talk about a robot culture, exercise care to avoid con- fusing the concepts. The Japanese electronics companies are proponents of a robot culture conceptualized in the same way as we would talk about a good food and dining culture (i.e., still focused on the human element).94 The construct of robot culture as posited in this article relates to the cultural construct originated by robots. Although the current commercial work imitates selected subsets of human behavior, based on human concepts and values, little consideration has been given to the values robots themselves may hold and, ultimately, the concept of robot culture. The prerequisites for robots to develop culture in human terms would be for them to develop independent, critical, and self-reflective thought—in essence that a robot would gain consciousness and, ideally, self-awareness. The traditional key test for AI to have come of age, has always been the Turing Test.95 To answer the question whether machines can think, he proposed a variation of the imitation game96 where a machine takes the place of one of the humans in the closed-room scenario. A machine is deemed capable of thought if the human interrogator is unable to correctly identify the target individual (in this case as a machine) as often as the human fails to do in the entirely human setting.97 Often criticized as impossible and unrealistic, it is argued that the Turing Test would not measure the consciousness of a machine.98 At present there is no acceptable test to assess whether an AI design has consciousness. Many of the chatbots, starting with ELIZA,99 appear to mimic real conversations; but in fact they have been carefully programed to respond to human-provided cue words in such a way that humans ignore the occasional non sequitur and generally interpret the responses as they wish; and thus they continue the conversation unaware that the machine answers but does not understand. The chatbots are, by their design, incapable of cognitive learning and development. A LINE IN THE SAND 253

From the perspective of cultural heritage management, it is crucial to define what the term culture should encompass. If the human concept of consciousness, is used, the development of a robot culture is a very long way off.100 Conversely, as in the case for the great apes, to propose an acceptance that culture is essentially a process where “information or behavior is acquired from conspecifics through some form of social learning,” and where this learning is reinforced through intergenerational emulation, deems the matter somewhat different. There are already examples where robots learn from each other and optimize strategies of collaboration based on their situation.101 The definition of culture among the great apes also assumes that these traits and skills are spatially confined to one or more groups, while at the same time some neighboring groups do not share these traits. As a corollary among the robots, a set of identically designed machines is interpreted; they carry out a series of experimental simula- tions as populations, where each population executes the same experiment, but where the outcomes and thus the optimization strategies differ. It is worth exper- imenting to see whether these strategies, without human intervention and guid- ance (through programing), would become habitual; and in the next level, to add new but identical machines to the mix to see whether the learning process is intergenerational. Such models have already been run successfully in the fields of genetic algorithms.102 At present there is no tangible manifestation of robot culture in the form of artifacts along those produced by the great apes either in captivity or in their natural setting. The closest such developments are the improved technological designs in the car and aircraft industry (see above).

JUDGED BY WHOSE VALUES?

Because cultural heritage and values in general are both human constructs, the values that underpin and circumscribe what people define as heritage are subjective, individual, or communal but purely human projections onto an essentially value-free animate or inanimate world. The central figure in the valuations is the individual, and the central generation is the present one.103 So then, how should these items be valued? As de Waal104 pointed out, animal culture cannot be compared with human culture if the standards of human art, cuisine, science, and politics are applied. But what, he posited, if we “change perspective, and don’t measure them by our standards?” If we take the ecological definition of culture as the basis of our considerations, and thus regard human culture with its psychological complexities merely as an extremely well-developed set of cultural traits, the artifacts generated by the great apes are regarded as material culture. As such then they must be researched and evaluated to address regional and subregional variation, all of which can give 254 DIRK H. R. SPENNEMANN evidence on the development of tool traditions among the early hominids105 and can illuminate human evolution. When considering the values projected onto pongid, hominid and robotid artifacts we have to consider the capabilities of the creators to exert value judge- ments, as well as our own contemporary human values that we are projecting on the moveable cultural heritage resources.

Hominid Values

Most modern humans value the past in one form or another. We are, of course, un- informed about how the early hominids valued their artifacts once they were no longer used. Thus, the concept of hominid values must be constructed based on how we value(d) the artifacts of our more distant past. Bandi106 explored the perceptions of the past held by European and Mediterranean cultures. He demonstrated that until the beginning of positivist thinking in the Age of Enlightenment, the past was regarded as better than the (then) present. The fall, the expulsion from para- dise as expressed in Judeo-Christian religion, as well as Golden Age of Greek and Roman thought are examples. Only with Rousseau, Schiller, and Kant did the present, and by implication the future, become more positive than the past. Although the discovery of Herculaneum and Pompeii was of significance for Renaissance art, it was only with the positivist frame of mind that humans began to seriously value the objects of their ancient past—and to collect them.107 thus there results an established a range of institutions, administrative processes, and rules of behavior to manage these expressions of the past.108

Pongid Values

The excavation at the Tai Forest sites has broadened the perception of archaeology from an anthropocentric discipline. It now also encompasses the behavior and tool use of chimpanzees. Although Mercader and colleagues109 and their com- mentators110 comment on the expansion of archaeology, they consider archaeology at present as a mere method to study the site and its contents. Yet, the excavation of chimpanzee sites forms an expansion of the concept that might entail a paradigm shift in opinion. What needs to be considered, however, is the extent of the conundrum of having to manage pongid heritage. Certainly, pongid heritage is in museum collections. Although some humans may value this heritage, it is self-evident that the pongid creators of this heritage do not value the items once they are removed from their sites to museums. Moreover, as far as can be ascertained, no studies have been carried out that consider the extent of pongid reuse of an artifact in the natural setting, or on the reuse, or habitual use, of successful flakes created by Kanzi and the second Bonobo Panbanisha. A LINE IN THE SAND 255

Robotid Values

As humanity’s values change in response to the new intellectual challenges posed by the increased capabilities of AI-derived robots, it is necessary to adjust the perceptions of heritage. Ultimately, consider that the present definition of cultural heritage must be flexible enough to include the actions of human-designed, but AI thinking robots in the not-so-distant future. Until such time that self-aware robots make their own decisions on the products of their own making, custodial decisions must be made for them. Heritage managers must consider whether to stand accused by future generations that the opportunity to collect robotid artifacts and intermediate milestone artifacts slipped by.

OUTLOOK

As the article has shown, the issue of managing nonhuman cultural heritage of our close relatives among the great apes, and well as among our intellectual and technological children among the robots is quite real. By focusing on the biolog- ical concept, regarding culture as a behavior acquired from conspecifics through some from of social learning, the concept of cultural heritage management can expand from the hominid sphere to include aspects of pongid and robotid culture. Al- though pongids do not seem to value the cultural artifacts they have created, hominids should value them as they provide an insight into possible manifestations of their past. Although the tangible manifestation of robotid culture does not exist at present, the development of genetic algorithms with group learning ability, as well as the development of robotid technologies, suggest that this is not too far off. The difference between pongid and robotid cultural heritage rests in the fact that robots, once self-awareness has been reached, can to develop their own value sets and thus make their own decisions regarding the management of cultural heritage. Until such time, however, hominids, as intellectual parents, must act as cus- todians and protect the manifestations of emergent robotic heritage. The article has raised some serious issues relating to our construction of heritage and how that may apply to artifacts created by robots capable of (semi)independent thought through improved AI algorithms. Although some issues appear quite futuristic in concept, always remember that the technological developments are pro- gressing at an ever-accelerating pace. The fact remains that it is only a matter of time before the question arises: What is the nature and future of the earth’s robotic heritage? The implications of the matter must be seriously considered, lest by future generations accuse preceding generations of not protecting the emerging heritage when there was an opportunity. The precautionary principle should apply in this case. Cultural heritage managers have traditionally drawn a line in the sand and confined their activities, as well as their conceptual thinking to the human-derived world. With the winds of change blowing, both in terms of behavioral research 256 DIRK H. R. SPENNEMANN into our closest relatives among the great apes, and in terms of the increasing developments in AI and its robotic applications, that line in the sand is becoming increasingly blurred. The day will dawn when it is obliterated altogether. Will we be ready for it?

ENDNOTES

1. See Pearson and Sullivan, 1995; Tunbridge and Ashworth, Dissonant Heritage; Spennemann “‘Preserving the Past for the Future.’” 2. Pearson and Sullivan, 1995; Murtagh, Keeping Time. 3. Lockwood and Spennemann, 2001. 4. Slaughter, Futures for the Third Millennium, p. 281. 5. Butowsky, Man in Space; Campbell, Assessing and Managing Human Space Heritage; Spen- nemann, “The Naval Heritage of Project Apollo”; Spennemann and Kosmer, “Heritage Sites of the US Space Program.” 6. Barclay and Brooks, “In Situ Preservation”; Gorman “The Cultural Landscape”; and Gorman, “The Archaeology of Orbital Space.” 7. Fewer, “Towards an LSMR and MSMR”; Rogers, “Safeguarding Tranquility Base”; Spenne- mann, “The Ethics of Treading on Neil Armstrong’s Footsteps”; Spennemann, “Out of This World”; Spennemann and Murphy, “Technological Heritage on Mars.” 8. Spennemann, “On the Cultural Heritage of Robots”; Spennemann, “Of Great Apes and Robots.” 9. For example, Young, “Evolution of the Human Hand.” 10. For example, Haynes, “Archeological Methods.” 11. For example, Wyn, “Archaeology and Cognitive Evolution.” 12. See Lebel et al., “Comparative Morphology and Paleobiology” and critique by deGusta, “Com- parative Skeletal Pathology.” 13. Ovchinnikov et al., “Molecular Analysis of Neanderthal DNA.” 14. For example, Kitano et al., RoboCup. 15. Fox, Sitompul, and van Schaik, “Intelligent Tool Use in Wild.” 16. NEC, Child Care Robot; NEC, PaReRo 2005; and NEC, PaReRo 2003. 17. Krichmar et al., “Characterizing Functional Hippocampal Pathways.” 18. See the 2004 World Robotics survey by the United Nations Economic Commission for Eu- rope (UNECE) (http://www.unece.org/press/pr2004/04robots_index.htm). 19. See Sandin et al., “Five Charges Against the Precautionary Principle” for concept. 20. But see Spennemann, “Preserving the Past for the Future” for a critique of the underlying notion of stewardship in cultural heritage management. 21. Goodman et al., “Primate Evolution at the DNA Level.” 22. Boswell, Life of Samuel Johnson, entry, April 7, 1778. 23. Marx, Das Kapital, p. 194. 24. For example, Oakley, Man the Toolmaker; Reed, “New Light on the Origins of Man.” 25. Goodall, “Chimpanzees of the Gombe Stream Reserve.” 26. Riedman et al., The transmission of individually distinctive foraging strategies. 27. See salient work by Jenkins “Cultural Transmission of Song Patterns.” 28. Ambrose, “Paleolithic Technology and Human Evolution”; Panger et al., “Older than the Oldowan.” 29. Panger et al., 2002. 30. Ambrose, “Paleolithic Technology and Human Evolution.” 31. For example, Tebbich and Bshary, “Cognitive Abilities Related to Tool Use.” 32. Krützen et al., “Cultural Transmission of Tool Use in Bottlenose Dolphins.” 33. For example, Chappell and Kacelnik, “Tool Selectivity in a Non-Primate.” A LINE IN THE SAND 257

34. Fontain, Moisson, and Wickings, “Observations of Spontaneous Tool Making”; Boysen et al., “Tool Use in Captive Gorillas.” 35. Celli, Hirata, and Tomonaga, “Socioecological Influences on Tool Use in Captive Chimpan- zees”; Herzfeld and Lestel, “Knot Tying in Great Apes.” 36. Gold, “Ladder Use and Clubbing by a Bonobo”; Herzfeld and Lestel, “Knot Tying in Great Apes.” 37. O’Malley and McGrew, “Oral Tool Use by Captive Orangutans (Pongo pygmaeus)”; Herzfeld and Lestel, “Knot Tying in Great Apes.” 38. Beck, Animal Tool Behavior; van Schaik, Deaner, and Merrill, “The Conditions for Tool Use in Primates.” 39. Visalberghi, Fragaszy, and Savage-Rumbaugh, “Performance in a Tool-Using Task.” 40. Whiten et al., “Cultures in Chimpanzees”; Miller, “Tool Study Supports Chimp Culture.” 41. Fox et al., “Intelligent Tool Use in Wild Sumatran Orangutans”; van Schaik, Fox and Fechtman, “Individual Variation”; van Schaik et al., “Orangutan Cultures and the Evolution of Material Culture.” 42. Breuer, Ndoundou-Hockemba, and Fishloc, “First Observation of Tool Use in Wild Gorillas.” 43. Whiten et al., “Cultures in Chimpanzees”; Vogel, “Chimps in the Wild.” 44. Mercader, Panger, and Boesch, “Excavation of a Chimpanzee Stone Tool Site.” 45. Mercader, Panger, and Boesch, Chimpanzee-Produced Stone Assemblages. 46. Vogel, “Can Chimps Ape Ancient Hominid Toolmakers?” 47. Schick et al., “Continuing Investigations into Stone Tool-Making.” 48. Wright, “Imitative Learning of a Flaked Stone Technology.” 49. Toth, Schick, and Sema. “A Technological Comparison”; Schick and Toth, Making Silent Stones Speak; Schick et al., “Continuing Investigations into Stone Tool-Making.” 50. Schick et al., “Continuing Investigations into Stone Tool-Making.” 51. Although environmental decay is less a problem for stone tools, they too can be affected by natural disasters affecting the storage facility. The case of the artifact storage of the Australian Na- tional University, destroyed in January 2003 as part of the Canberra bush fires is a case in point. 52. Mercader, Panger, and Boesch, “Excavation of a Chimpanzee Stone Tool Site.” 53. Wright, E-mail to the author. 54. Called “Deep Blue”; Pollack et al., “Three Generations.” 55. Jacob, Composing With Genetic Algorithms; Widmer, “Machine Discoveries.” 56. Cohen, “The Further Exploits of AARON, Painter.” 57. Called Legobots. Pollack et al., “Three Generations.” 58. For example, Chou, “The Growing Role of IT in Transportation.” 59. For example, Keane and Nair, “Problem Solving Environments in Aerospace Design.” 60. Gage, “UGV HISTORY 101.” 61. Cf. Thornberg and Cycon, “Sikorsky Aircraft’s Unmanned Aerial Vehicle.” 62. Cf. Granlund et al., The WITAS Unmanned Aerial Vehicle Project. 63. Genetic algorithms are a class of evolutionary algorithms that use techniques inspired by evolutionary biology (e.g., inheritance, mutation, natural selection, and recombination). 64. See Watson, Ficici, and Pollack, “Embodied Evolution” for an example of evolutionary robotics. 65. Elshaw, Lewis, and Wermter, Incorporating Reactive Learning Behaviour. 66. See Spennemann, “‘Preserving the Past for the Future.’” 67. See Spennemann, “‘Preserving the Past for the Future.’” 68. Charles Babbage Institute, University of Minnesota, available at http://www.cbi.umn.edu. 69. Cf. Spicer, “The IBM 1620 Restoration Project.” 70. Cf. Burba and Frana, “Researching the History of Software”; Schlombs, “Digital Archives for the History of Software.” 71. Cf. Boesch and Tomasello, “Chimpanzee and Human Cultures.” 72. UNESCO, UNESCO Universal Declaration on Cultural Diversity. 73. Bates and Plog, Cultural Anthropology, p. 7. 74. Boesch and Tomasello, “Chimpanzee and Human Cultures.” 75. Boyd and Richerson, “Why Culture Is Common but Cultural Evolution Is Rare.” 258 DIRK H. R. SPENNEMANN

76. See Krützen et al., “Cultural Transmission of Tool Use in Bottlenose Dolphins.” 77. Rendell and Whitehead, “Culture in Whales and Dolphins.” 78. Boesch and Tomasello, “Chimpanzee and Human Cultures”; Whiten et al., “Cultures in Chimpanzees.” 79. van Schaik, Fox, and Fechtman, “Individual Variation”; van Schaik et al., “Orangutan Cultures and the Evolution of Material Culture”; van Schaik and Pradhan, “A Model for Tool-Use Traditions in Primates.” 80. Boesch and Boesch, “Optimisation of Nut-Cracking”; Boesch and Boesch, “Mental Map in Wild Chimpanzees”; Boesch and Boesch, “Tool Use and Tool Making in Wild Chimpanzees”; Boesch and Tomasello, “Chimpanzee and Human Cultures”; Sugiyama and Koman, “Tool-Using and Tool- Making Behaviour.” 81. Boesch and Tomasello, “Chimpanzee and Human Cultures.” 82. van Schick, Deaner, and Merrill, “The Conditions for Tool Use in Primates.” 83. Boesch and Tomasello, “Chimpanzee and Human Cultures.” 84. Boesch and Tomasello, “Chimpanzee and Human Cultures.” 85. Whiten,“Commentary to Christophe Boesch and Michael Tomasello’s ‘Chimpanzee and Human Cultures.’” 86. The ability of humans to transcend their own physical needs and to express themselves in a self-reflective and self-aware way appears a logical dichotomy. Placing the dichotomy of human, and by implication, of prehuman, at a level of psychological development, determines the psychological thresholds that must be recognizable in the archaeological and paleontological record. Three main incisions that separate us from the great apes come to mind: 1) Overcoming the fear of fire, demonstrable certainly because approximately 800 ka (Goren- Inbar, “Evidence of Hominin Control”), but possibly as much as 1.6 Ma (Bellomo, “Methods of Determining Early Hominid Behavioral Activities; Wrangham, “The Raw and the Stolen”). 2) Overcoming the fear of open water, demonstrable because approximately Ͼ800 ka by the col- onisation of a Homo erectus to Flores, which was always cut off from the Sunda Shelf (cf. Bednarik, “Seafaring in the Pleistocene.”). 3) An understanding of the concept of mortality and of afterlife, because approximately 90 ka as evidenced by Neanderthal burials (cf Pettitt, “The Neanderthal Dead” for review). There are some indications that caching of the dead may have occurred from 200–300 ka onwards (see Pettitt, “The Neanderthal Dead” for discussion). 87. Robot is a contraction from the Czech robota meaning drudgery or servitude; and robotnik meaning peasant or serf. Karel Cˇ apek credited his brother, the painter Josef Cˇ apek, with the actual creation of the word. 88. Asimov, “Liar!” 89. In his 1942 short story Runaround Asimov first explicitly introduced his three laws of robotics (Asimov, “Runaround”), to which in 1985 he added a fourth which underpins the previous three (and hence is referred to as the zeroeth law of robotics) (Asimov, Robots and Empire). 0) A robot may not injure humanity or, through inaction, allow humanity to come to harm. 1) A robot may not injure a human being or, through inaction, allow a human being to come to harm. 2) A robot must obey orders given it by human beings except where such orders would conflict with the First Law. 3) A robot must protect its own existence as long as such protection does not conflict with the First or Second Law. 90. Bartneck, “From Fiction to Science.” 91. See Fong, Nourbakhsh, and Dautenhahn, “A Survey of Socially Interactive Robots.” 92. Cf Dautenhahn et al., What is a Robot Companion. 93. NEC, PaReRo 2003. 94. Cf. Japan Times, “New Osaka Shop to Promote ‘Robot Culture.’” 95. Turing, “Computing Machinery and Intelligence.” A LINE IN THE SAND 259

96. The imitation game sees a male and a female in one room and an interrogator (whose sex is irrelevant) trying to ascertain the gender of either person A or B. This is effected through a series of questions to which the respondents provide typed answers (to avoid identification via voice or hand writing). The object for the target person is to answer correctly but confuse the interrogator, while the second person in the room will try to provide helpful answers to the interrogator. 97. Turing, “Computing Machinery and Intelligence.” 98. See Saygin “Turing Test: 50 Years Later” for a discussion of the literature on the Turing Test. 99. See Saygin “Turing Test: 50 Years Later.” 100. For example, Manuel, “Creating a Robot Culture.” 101. For example Alonso, “Learning in Multi-Agent Systems.” 102. Cervone et al., Combining Machine Learning With Evolutionary Computation. 103. Spennemann, “Your Solution, Their Problem.” 104. de Waal, “Cultural Primatology Comes of Age.” 105. Boesch and Tomasello, “Chimpanzee and Human Cultures.” 106. Bandi, “Der Topfknick.” 107. Cf. Taylor, The Taste of Angels, for survey of collecting. 108. Pearson and Sullivan, “Looking After Heritage Places”; Murtagh, Keeping Time, Spenne- mann, “Your Solution, Their Problem”; World Heritage Center, The World Heritage List. 109. Mercader, Panger, and Boesch, “Excavation of a Chimpanzee Stone Tool Site”; Mercader, Panger, and Boesch, Chimpanzee-Produced Stone Assemblages. 110. Cf. Bower, “Wild Chimps Rocked On.”

BIBLIOGRAPHY

Alonso, E., M. d’Inverno, D. Kudenko, et al. “Learning in Multi-Agent Systems.” Knowledge Engineer- ing Review 16 no. 3 (2001): 277–84.

Ambrose, Stanley H. “Paleolithic Technology and Human Evolution.” Science 291, no. 5509 (2001): 1748–54.

Asimov, Isaac. “Liar!” In Astounding Science Fiction, May 1941, 43–55.

———. “Runaround.” In Astounding Science Fiction, March 1942, 94–103.

———. Robots and Empire. New York: Doubleday, 1985.

Bandi, H.-G. “Der Topfknick oder die unterschiedliche Wertung der Domestikation des Menschen.” In Festschrift für Günter Smolla. Materialien zur Vor-und Frühgeschichte von Hessen Band 8, vol. 1, 17–24. Wiesbaden: Landesamt für Denkmalpflege Hessen Abteilung archäologische und paläontol- ogische Denkmalpflege, 1999.

Barclay, R.L., and R. Brooks. “In situ preservation of historic spacecraft.” JBIS-Journal of the British Interplanetary Society 55, no. 5–6 (2002): 173–81.

Bartneck, C. “From Fiction to Science: A Cultural Reflection of Social Robots.” In CHI2004 Work- shop on Shaping Human-Robot Interaction: Understanding the Social Aspects of Intelligent Robotic Prod- ucts, edited by J. Forlizzi and C. Bartneck. Vienna, 2004. http://www.bartneck.de/workshop/chi2004 (accessed April 25, 2004).

Bates, D.G., and F.Y. Plog. Cultural Anthropology. New York: McGraw-Hill, 1990.

Beck B.B. Animal Tool Behavior: The Use and Manufacture of Tools By Animals. New York: Garland Press, 1980. 260 DIRK H. R. SPENNEMANN

Bednarik, R.G. “Seafaring in the Pleistocene.” Cambridge Archaeological Journal 13 (2003): 41–66.

Bellomo, R.V. “Methods of Determining Early Hominid Behavioral Activities Associated with the Controlled Use of Fire at FxJj 20 Main, Koobi Fora, Kenya.” Journal of Human Evolution 27, no. 1–3 (1994): 173–95.

Boesch, C., and M. Tomasello. “Chimpanzee and Human Cultures.” Current Anthropology 39 no. 5 (1998): 591–614.

Boesch, C., and H. Boesch. “Optimisation of Nut-Cracking with Natural Hammers by Wild Chim- panzees.” Behaviour 83 (1983): 265–86.

———. “Mental Map in Wild Chimpanzees: An Analysis of Hammer Transports for Nut Cracking.” Primates 25 (1984): 160–70.

———. “Tool Use and Tool Making in Wild Chimpanzees.” Folia Primatologica 54 (1990): 86–99.

Boswell, J. Life of Samuel Johnson. London: JM Dent, 1901.

Bower, Bruce. “Wild Chimps Rocked On: Apes Left Unique Record of Stone Tool.” Science News 161, no. 13 (2002): 195.

Boyd, R., and P.J. Richerson. “Why Culture Is Common but Cultural Evolution Is Rare.” In Evolution of Social Behaviour Patterns in Primates and Man Proceedings of the British Academy, edited by W.G. Runciman, John Maynard Smith, and R.I.M. Dunbar, 77–93, London: British Academy, 1996.

Boysen S.T., V.A. Kuhlmeier, P.O. Halliday, et al. “Tool Use in Captive Gorillas.” In The Mentalities of Gorillas and Orangutans: Comparative Perspectives, edited by S.T. Parker, R.W. Mitchell, and H.L. Miles, 79–187, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999.

Breuer, T., M. Ndoundou-Hockemba, and V. Fishloc. “First Observation of Tool Use in Wild Goril- las.” PLoS Biology 3, no. 11, e380 (2005): 2042–44.

Burba, J., and P.L. Frana. “Researching the History of Software: Mining Internet Resources in the ‘Old World,’‘New World,’ and the ‘Wild West’.” Iterations: A Journal of Software History, 2002. http:// www.cbi.umn.edu/iterations/burbafrana.pdf (accessed April 23, 2007).

Butowsky, H.A. Man in Space: A National Historic Landmark Theme Study. N.P.S., U.S. Department of the Interior, 1984.

Campbell, John B. Assessing and Managing Human Space Heritage In the Solar System: The Current State of Play and Some Proposals. World Archaeological Congress 5. Themes The Heavens Above: Archaeoastronomy, Space Heritage And SETI, 2003. http://godot.unisa.edu.au/wac/paper.php?paperϭ 1049 (accessed April 23, 2007).

Cˇ apek, K. R.U.R.—Rosumovi Umeˇlí Roboti [Rossum’s Universal Robots], 1920. Digital version of Czech original available at http://www.gutenberg.org/etext/13083 (accessed April 23, 2007).

Celli, M.L., S. Hirata, and M. Tomonaga. “Socioecological Influences on Tool Use in Captive Chim- panzees.” International Journal of Primatology 25, no. 6 (2004): 1267–81.

Cervone, Guido, Ryszard S. Michalski, Kenneth K, et al. Combining Machine Learning With Evolu- tionary Computation: Recent Results on LEM. Proceedings of the Fifth International Workshop on Multistrategy Learning (MSL-2000), Guimarães, Portugal, June 11–14, 2000. Pp. 41–58.

Chappell, J., and A. Kacelnik. “Tool Selectivity in a Non-Primate, the New Caledonian Crow (Corvus moneduloides).” Animal Cognition 5 (2002): 71–78. A LINE IN THE SAND 261

Chou, W. “The Growing Role of IT in Transportation.” IT Professional 5, no. 6 (2003): 5–6.

Cohen, H. “The Further Exploits of AARON, Painter.” Stanford Humanities Review SEHR 4no.2 (1995): 141–158.

Dautenhahn, K., S. Woods, C. Kaouri, et al. What is a Robot Companion: Friend, Assistant or Butler? Proceedings of the IROS 2005, IEEE IRS/RSJ International Conference on Intelligent Robots and Systems, August 2–6, 2005, Edmonton, Alberta, Canada, 1488–1493. de Waal, F.B.M. “Cultural Primatology Comes of Age.” Nature 399, no. 6737 (1999): 635–36. deGusta, D. “Comparative Skeletal Pathology and the Case for Conspecific Care in Middle Pleisto- cene Hominids.” Journal of Archaeological Science 29 (2002): 1435–38.

Dick, Steven J. “Cultural Evolution, the Postbiological Universe and SETI. International Journal of Astrobiology 2, no. 1 (2003): 65–74.

Elshaw, M., D. Lewis, and S. Wermter. Incorporating Reactive Learning Behaviour into a Mini-robot Platform. Proceedings of AI-2003, the 23rd SGAI International Conference on Innovative Tech- niques and Applications of Artificial Intelligence. Edited by Frans Coenen, Alun Preece, and Ann Macintosh. London; New York: Springer, 2003: 255–266.

Fewer, Greg. “Towards an LSMR and MSMR (Lunar and Martian Sites and Monuments Records): Recording Planetary Spacecraft Landing Sites as Archaeological Monuments of The Future.” In Dig- ging Holes in Popular Culture, edited by Miles Russell, 112–20. Oxford: Oxbow, 2002.

Fong, T., I. Nourbakhsh, and K. Dautenhahn. “A Survey of Socially Interactive Robots.” Robotics and Autonomous Systems 42 (2003): 143–66.

Fontain, B., P.Y. Moisson, E. J Wickings. “Observations of Spontaneous Tool Making and Tool Use in a Captive Group of Western Lowland Gorillas (Gorilla Gorilla Gorilla).” Folia Primatologica 65 (1995) 219–23.

Fox E.A., A.F. Sitompul, C.P. van Schaik. “Intelligent Tool Use in Wild Sumatran Orangutans.”In The Mentalities of Gorillas and Orangutans: Comparative Perspectives, edited by S.T. Parker, R.W. Mitch- ell, H.L, 99–116. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999.

Fox, D. “Brainbox.” New Scientist 188, no. 2524 (2005): 28–32.

Gage, Douglas W. “UGV HISTORY 101: A Brief History of Unmanned Ground Vehicle (UGV) De- velopment Efforts.” Unmanned Systems Magazine 13, no. 3 (1995): 9–16, 32.

Gold, K.C. “Ladder Use and Clubbing by a Bonobo (Pan paniscus) in Apenheul Primate Park.” Zoo Biology 21, no. 6 (2002): 607–11.

Goodall, J. “Chimpanzees of the Gombe Stream Reserve.” In Primate Behaviour, edited by I. DeVore. New York: Holt, Rinehart & Winston, 1965.

Goodman, M., D.A. Tagle, D.H, Fitch, et al. “Primate Evolution at the DNA Level and a Classifica- tion of Hominoids.” Journal of Molecular Evolution 30 (1990): 260–66.

Goren-Inbar, Naama, Nira Alperson, Mordechai E. Kislev, et al. “Evidence of Hominin Control of Fire at Gesher Benot Ya’aqov, Israel.” Science 304, no. 5671 (2004): 725–27.

Gorman, Alice C. “The Cultural Landscape of Interplanetary Space.” Journal of Social Archaeology 5, no. 1 (2005): 85–107. 262 DIRK H. R. SPENNEMANN

———. The Archaeology of Orbital Space. Presented at the Australian Space Science Conference, 14 to 16 September, 2005, Melbourne, Australia: RMIT University. 338–57.

Granlund, G. K. Kuchcinski, E. Sandewall, et al. The WITAS Unmanned Aerial Vehicle Project. In W. Horn (ed.): ECAI 2000. Proceedings of the 14th European Conference on Artificial Intelligence, Berlin, August 20–25, 2000. IOS Press, Amsterdam.

Haynes, G. “Archeological Methods for Reconstructing Human Predation on Terrestrial Vertebrates.” In The Fossil Record of Predation, edited by M. Kowaleswski and P. Kelly. The Paleontological Society Papers 8 (2002): 51–67.

Herzfeld, C., and D. Lestel. “Knot Tying in Great Apes: Etho-Ethnology of an Unusual Tool Behav- ior.” Social Science Information 44, no. 4 (2005): 621–53

Jacob, B.L. Composing With Genetic Algorithms. Proceedings of the International Computer Music Conference, Banff, Alberta, Canada, September 1995.

Japan Times. “New Osaka Shop to Promote ‘Robot Culture.’” Japan Times, December 18, 2004. http:// search.japantimes.co.jp/print/business/nb12–2004/nb20041218a5.htm (accessed April 23, 2007).

Jenkins, P.F.“Cultural Transmission of Song Patterns and Dialect Development in a Free-Living Bird Population.” Animal Behaviour 26 (1978): 50–78.

Keane A.J., and P.B. Nair. “Problem Solving Environments in Aerospace Design.” Advances in Engi- neering Software 32, no. 6 (2001): 477–87.

Kitano, H., M. Asada, Y. Kuniyoshi, et al. RoboCup: The Robot World Cup Initiative. International Conference on Autonomous Agents. Proceedings of the First International Conference on Autono- mous agents. Marina del Rey, California. February 5–8, 1997, 340–47, 1997.

Krichmar, J. L., D.A. Nitz, J.A. Gally, et al. “Characterizing Functional Hippocampal Pathways in a Brain-Based Device as It Solves a Spatial Memory Task.” Proceedings of the National Academy of Sci- ences 102 (2005): 2111–16.

Krützen, M., J. Mann, M.R. Heithaus, et al. “Cultural Transmission of Tool Use in Bottlenose Dol- phins.” Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences 102, no. 25 (2005): 8939–43.

Kuman K. “The Oldowan Industry from Sterkfontein: Raw Materials and Core Forms.” In Aspects of African Archaeology: Papers from the 10th Congress of the PanAfrican Association for Prehistory and Related Studies, edited by G. Pwiti and R. Soper R., 139–46. Harare: University of Zimbabwe Publi- cations, 1996.

Lebel, S., E. Trinkaus, M. Faure, et al. “Comparative Morphology and Paleobiology of Middle Pleis- tocene Human Remains from the Bau de l’Aubesier, Vaucluse, France.” Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences USA 98 (2001): 11097–102.

Manuel, Tyrus L. “Creating a Robot Culture: An Interview with Luc Steels.” IEEE Intelligent Systems 18, no. 3 (2003): 59–61.

Marx, K. Das Kapital. Kritik der politischen Oekonomie. Erster Band. Buch I: Der Produktionsprocess des Kapitals. Vierte Auflage. Marx-Engels-Werke Bd 23. Berlin: Dietz Verlag, 1867 (1952).

Mercader, J., M. Panger, and C. Boesch. “Excavation of a Chimpanzee Stone Tool Site in the African Rainforest.” Science 296 (2002): 1452–55. A LINE IN THE SAND 263

———. Chimpanzee-Produced Stone Assemblages from the Tropical Forests of Taï, Côte d’Ivoire. Paleoanthropology Society Meetings. Denver, CO, March 19, 2002. Abstract http://www.paleoanthro. org/abst2002.htm#mercader (accessed April 23, 2007).

Miller, G. “Tool Study Supports Chimp Culture.” Science 309, no. 5739 (2005): 1311.

Mundinger, P.C. “Animal Cultures and a General Theory of Cultural Evolution.” Ethology and So- ciobiology 1 (1980): 183–223.

Murtagh, W.J. Keeping Time: The History and Theory of Preservation in America. New York: John Wiley and Sons, 1997.

NEC. Child Care Robot. PaReRo 2003. Product Information Page. NEC Personal Robot Research Center, 2005. http://www.incx.nec.co.jp/robot/english/childcare/how.html (accessed April 23, 2007).

———. PaReRo 2005. Product Information Page. NEC Personal Robot Research Center, 2005. http:// www.incx.nec.co.jp/robot/english/papero2005/index.html (accessed April 23, 2007).

———. PaReRo 2003. “He has a character like a human being.” Product Information Page. NEC Personal Robot Research Center, 2005. http://www.incx.nec.co.jp/robot/english/2003papero/english/ gijyutu3.html (accessed April 23, 2007).

——— PaReRo 2003. “Creating a Robot Culture.” Product Information Page. NEC Personal Robot Research Center, 2005. http://www.incx.nec.co.jp/robot/english/2003papero/english/index.html (accessed April 23, 2007).

O’Malley, R.C., and W.C. McGrew. “Oral Tool Use by Captive Orangutans (Pongo pygmaeus).” Folia Primatologica 71 (2000): 334–41.

Oakley, K.P. Man the Toolmaker, 3rd ed. London: British Museum, 1956.

Ovchinnikov, I.V., A. Gotherstrom, G.P. Romanova, et al. “Molecular Analysis of Neanderthal DNA from the Northern Caucasus.” Nature 404, no. 6777 (2000): 453–54

Panger, M.A., A.S. Brooks, B.G. Richmond, et al. “Older than the Oldowan? Rethinking the Emer- gence of Hominin Tool Use.” Evolutionary Anthropology 11, no. 6, 235–45.

Pettitt, P.B. “The Neanderthal Dead: Exploring Mortuary Variability in Middle Palaeolithic Eurasia.” Before Farming: The Anthropology of Hunters-Gatherers 1, no. 4 (2002): 1–19

Pollack, J.B., H. Lipson, G. Hornby, et al. “Three Generations of Automatically Designed Robots.” Artificial Life 7, no. 3 (2001): 215–23.

Reed, E. “New Light on the Origins of Man.” International Socialist Review 24, no. 3 (1963): 81–83.

Rendell, L., and H. Whitehead. “Culture in Whales and Dolphins.” Behavioral and Brain Sciences 24, no. 2 (2001): 309–82

Riedman, M.L., M.M. Staedier, J.A. Estes, et al. The transmission of individually distinctive foraging strategies from mother to offspring in sea otters (Enhydra lutris). From the Eighth Biennial Confer- ence on the Biology of Marine Mammals. Pacific Grove, CA, 7–11 December, 1989.

Robson Brown, Kate. “The Meaning of Hominid Species: Culture as Process and Product?” Behav- ioral and Brain Sciences 23, no. 1 (2002); 157.

Rogers, T.F. “Safeguarding Tranquility Base: Why the Earth’s Moon Base Should Become a World Heritage Site.” Space Policy 20, no. 1 (2004): 5–6. 264 DIRK H. R. SPENNEMANN

Sandin, Per, Martin Hansson Peterson, Christina Sven Ove Rudén, et al. “Five Charges Against the Precautionary Principle.” Journal of Risk Research 5, no. 4 (2002): 287–99.

Saygin, A.P., I. Cicekli, and V. Akman. “Turing Test: 50 Years Later.” Minds and Machines 10, no. 4 (2000): 463–518.

Schick, K., and N. Toth. Making Silent Stones Speak: Human Evolution and the Dawn of Technology. New York: Simon and Schuster, 1993.

Schick, K., N. Toth, G. Garufi, et al. “Continuing Investigations into Stone Tool-Making and Tool- Using Capabilities of a Bonobo (Pan paniscus).” Journal of Archeological Science 26, (1999): 821–32.

Schlombs, C. “Digital Archives for the History of Software: The Allen Newell Collection and the Herbert A. Simon Collection.” Iterations: A Journal of Software History 1 (2002). http://www.cbi.umn. edu/iterations/schlombs.pdf (accessed April 23, 2007).

Slaughter, R. Futures for the Third Millennium. Sydney: Prospect Media, 1997.

Smolla, G. Epochen menschlicher Frühzeit. Freiburg & München: Karl Aber, 1967.

Spennemann, D.H.R. “The Ethics of Treading on Neil Armstrong’s Footsteps.” Space Policy 20, no. 4 (2004): 279–90.

———. “The Naval Heritage of Project Apollo: A Case of Losses.” Journal of Maritime Research, October 2005, http://www.jmr.nmm.ac.uk/spennemann (accessed April 23, 2007).

———. “Out of this world: Issues of Managing Tourism and Humanity’s Heritage on the Moon.” International Journal of Heritage Studies 12, no. 4 (2006): 356–71.

———. “Gauging Community Values in Historic Preservation.” CRM: The Journal of Heritage Stew- ardship 3, no. 2 (2006): 6–20.

———. “Your Solution, Their Problem. Their Solution, Your Problem: The Gordian Knot of Cul- tural Heritage Planning and Management at the Local Government Level.” disP 42, no. 164 (2006): 30–40.

———. “On the Cultural Heritage of Robots.” International Journal of Heritage Studies 13, no. 1 (2007): 4–21

———. “Of Great Apes and Robots: Considering the Future(s) of Cultural Heritage.” Futures–The Journal of Policy, Planning and Futures Studies 39, no. 7 (2007): 861–77.

———. “‘Preserving the Past for the Future.’ Altruism, Egotism and the Future of Historic Preser- vation.” CRM: The Journal of Heritage Stewardship 5, no. 2, (2008), forthcoming.

Spennemann, D.H.R., and L. Kosmer. “Heritage Sites of the US Space Program in Australia: Are We Managing Them Adequately?” QUEST—The History of Spaceflight Quarterly 12, no. 2 (2005): 52–64.

Spennemann, Dirk H.R., and Guy Murphy. “Technological Heritage on Mars: Towards a Future of Terrestrial Artifacts on the Martian Surface.” Journal of the British Interplanetary Society 60, no. 2 (2007): 42–53.

Spicer, D. “The IBM 1620 Restoration Project.” IEEE Annals of the History of Computing 27 (2005): 33–43.

Sugiyama, Y., and J. Koman. “Tool-Using and Tool-Making Behaviour in Wild Chimpanzees at Bossou, Guinea.” Primates 20 (1979): 513–24. A LINE IN THE SAND 265

Taylor, F.H. The Taste of Angels. A History of Collecting from Ramases to Napoleon. Boston and Lon- don: Little Brown & Co., 1948.

Tebbich, S., and R. Bshary. “Cognitive Abilities Related to Tool Use in the Woodpecker Finch Cactospiza pallida.” Animal Behaviour 67, no. 4 (2004): 689–97.

Thornberg, Christopher A., and James P.Cycon. “Sikorsky Aircraft’s Unmanned Aerial Vehicle, Cypher: System Description and Program Accomplishments.” 51st AHS Annual Forum 9–11 May 1995,Fort Worth, TX. 804–11, 1995.

Toth, N., K. Schick, and S. Sema. A Technological Comparison of the Stone Tool-Making Capabili- ties of Australopithecus/Early Homo, Pan paniscus, and Homo sapiens, and Possible Evolutionary Implications. Paleoanthropology Society Meetings. Denver, CO, March 19, 2002. Abstract http:// www.paleoanthro.org/abst2002.htm#toth (accessed April 23, 2007).

Toth, N., K. Schick, E.S. Savage-Rumbaugh, et al. “Pan the Tool-Maker: Investigations into the Stone Toolmaking and Tool-Using Capabilities of Bonobo [Pigmy Chimp] (Pan paniscus).” Journal of Ar- chaeological Science 20 (1993): 81–91.

Tunbridge, J. E., and G.J. Ashworth. Dissonant Heritage: The Management of the Past as a Resource in Conflict. Chichester, England: John Wiley & Sons, 1996.

Turing, A.M. “Computing Machinery and Intelligence.” Mind 49 (1950): 433–60.

UNESCO. UNESCO Universal Declaration on Cultural Diversity 2 November 2001. In United Na- tions Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization. Records of the General Conference, 31st Session Paris, Volume 1 Resolutions. Paris, France, October 15–November 3, 2001, 62–64. van Schaik C.P., R.O. Deaner, and M.Y. Merrill. “The Conditions for Tool Use in Primates: Implica- tions for the Evolution of Material Culture.” Journal of Human Evolution 36, no. 6 (1999): 719–41. van Schaik, C.P., and Gauri R. Pradhana. “A Model for Tool-Use Traditions in Primates: Implications for the Coevolution of Culture and Cognition. Journal of Human Evolution 44 (2003): 645–64. van Schaik, C.P., M. Ancrenaz, G. Borgen, et al. “Orangutan Cultures and the Evolution of Material Culture.” Science 299, no. 5603 (2003): 102–05. van Schaik, C.P., E.A. Fox, and L.T. Fechtman. “Individual Variation in the Rate of Use of Tree-Hole Tools Among Wild Orang-Utans: Implications for Hominin Evolution.” Journal of Human Evolution 44, no. 1 (2003): 11–23.

Visalberghi, E., D.M. Fragaszy, and S. Savage-Rumbaugh. “Performance in a Tool-Using Task by Com- mon Chimpanzees (Pan troglodytes), Bonobos (Pan paniscus), an Orangutan (Pongo pygmaeus), and Capuchin Monkeys (Cebus apella).” Journal of Comparative Psychology. 109, no. 1 (1995): 52–60.

Vogel, G. “Chimps in the Wild Show Stirrings of Culture.” Science 284, no. 5423 (1999): 2070–74.

Vogel, G. “Can Chimps Ape Ancient Hominid Toolmakers?” Science 296, no. 5572 (2002): 1380.

Watson, R.A., S.G. Ficici, and J.B. Pollack. “Embodied Evolution: Distributing an Evolutionary Al- gorithm in a Population of Robots.” Robotics and Autonomous Systems 39 no. 1 (2002): 1–18.

World Heritage Center. The World Heritage List. Alphabetically by State Party, 2004. http://whc. unesco.org/heritage.htm (accessed April 19, 2007).

Whiten, A. “Commentary to Christophe Boesch and Michael Tomasello’s ‘Chimpanzee and Human Cultures.’” Current Anthropology 39, no. 5 (1998): 609–10. 266 DIRK H. R. SPENNEMANN

Whiten, A., J. Goodall, W.C. McGrew, et al. “Cultures in Chimpanzees.” Nature 399 (1999): 682–685.

Widmer, G. “Machine Discoveries: A Few Simple, Robust Local Expression Principles.” Journal of New Music Research 31, no. 1 (2002): 37–50.

Wrangham, R.W., J.H. Jones, G. Laden, et al. (1999) “The Raw and the Stolen: Cooking and the Ecology of Human Origins.” Current Anthropology 40, no. 5 (1999): 567–94.

Wright, R.V.S.“Imitative Learning of a Flaked Stone Technology: The Case of an Orangutan.” Man- kind 8 (1972): 296–306.

Wright, R.V.S. E-mail to the author, November 13, 2005.

Wyn, T. “Archaeology and Cognitive Evolution.” Behavioral and Brain Sciences 25, no. 3 (2002): 389–402.

Young, Richard W.“Evolution of the Human Hand: The Role of Throwing and Clubbing.” Journal of Anatomy 202, no. 1 (2003): 165–74.

Want to Comment on this Article? Go to www.culturalproperty.org/forum/