Royal Historical Society of Queensland Journal

1 ROYAL HISTORICAL SOCIETY OF QUEENSLAND JOURNAL Volume XIV, No.1 February 1990 Queensland v. The Commonwealth: The State's Objection to the Australian Standard Garratt Programme by Alan Whiting Presented at a meeting of the Society, 22 June, 1989 The entry of Japan into the Second World War brought massive traffic demands to the government railway system of Queensland (QGR). As a partial resolution to those demands the Commonwealth resolved to construct a number of locomotives for use on some of the narrow (3'6") gauge rail systems, including the QGR. That locomotive type became known as the Australian Standard Garratt (ASG), a name that even now, almost fifty years later evokes acrimonious memories in some circles. The ASG project ultimately cost Australia dearly, not only in the direct losses of millions of pounds of public funds but more importantly in the waste of thousands of tons of fabricated metal, and countless hours of added congestion to valuable workshop resources and, worse still, to overcrowded lines, which became so vital to the defence of Australia. The ASG's most outstanding feature was controversy and what this paper examines is not the public controversy that resulted after the locomotive had proved itself as an horrendous and indeed dangerous mechanical failure, but the bitter, relatively private dispute that raged between the Commonwealth and Queensland primarily before and during the construction of the machine. Essentially, that contest was over who, as between the Commonwealth and the State, had the right to determine how the QGR as the State's largest enterprise was to be managed, as it was Alan Whiting, BA, LLB, is a solicitor who has extensively researched the role of Queensland Railways during World War II and pubUshed Engine of Destruction. suddenly and forcibly transformed into one of the most vital defence items which the Commonwealth possessed. The issue of engine power and roUingstock use was therefore only one issue, although an important one which was fundamental to the operation of the system. The ASG programme is relevant because it was an example, inextricably bound up with others, of the joint decisions that had to be made by both the Commonwealth and the State. The struggle for practicEil as opposed to the legal control of the QGR and the issues related to the operation of the QGR was largely fought out by two people, and it is the relationship of those two people, Harold Winthrop Clapp for the Commonwealth and Percy Robert Turner Wills, for the State, that is so fascinating. Clapp is undoubtedly the most well known railway administrator of this country. Prior to the war he had been Chairman of the Victorian Railway Commissioners for some nineteen years during which he had displayed enthusiasm for that which was modern, efficient and big. The Spirit of Progress was but one manifestation of his thoughts. He had been heavily involved in electric traction. More importantly, he had spent a number of years working in engineering and managerial capacities in railways in the United States. His enthusiasm for innovative ideas resulting in large, fast, powerful locomotives and improved standards of service were not the only factors that made Clapp a legend in his own time — he was a man of grand vision as well as a semi eccentric. Clapp had been selected by the Commonwealth to be the Director-General of the Commonwealth Land Transport Board (CLTB), a statutory wartime creature of the Commonwealth that had the power to control all road and rail transport in Australia. Clapp's power was enormous. Indeed by law, any order or direction by Clapp was deemed to be that of the full Board, which incidentally did not comprise one Queensland representative.' Clapp was no supporter of the States. He is recorded as saying "Australians are just selfish and miserable people. They are not Australians primarily but State-ites."^ In contrast. Wills was a Queenslander by birth and had been employed in various administrative positions in the QGR throughout his working life. Wills had been appointed as Commissioner only a matter of months before the attack on Pearl Harbour. His choice as Commissioner was not popular. Many of his own employees saw him as anti-union and a handicap to the Government.^ Given that the war brought the QGR unions, especially those unions comprised of running crew, into unprecedented hardship and strong demands upon their employer, that opinion of Wills might appear at first glance to be justified. One of the issues of greatest friction between Wills and his unions was that of the ASG and yet a close perusal of Wills' memoranda on this issue reveals an interesting perspective of how he saw his loyalties. At times, he seems genuinely sympathetic to the appalling hours, over 140 per fortnight, worked by many of his running crews. His files do not show him to be critical of his political masters yet, curiously they reveal a prime loyalty not to those political masters but to the public of Queensland. What also emerges is that Wills was a permanent head who was deeply alive to politics and, on the ASG issue as he trod his own path between two governments of the same political philosophy in conflict with each other he was careful to protect himself before using what appears to be a considerable degree of influence amongst persons occupying various public positions during the war. Wills had as his Minister for much of the ASG issue, James Larcombe, from whom he repeatedly sought and obtained support. One word summarises Wills — controversial. He appears as never afraid to speak his mind. This and his obvious belief that he was right (notwithstanding that on some points he wasn't) resulted in bitter, hostile, abusive encounters with his Commonwealth political and military colleagues throughout the war. Even though a public official, his belief that he should speak his mind flowed over to conflict with the media and public of Queensland. Published history has not been kind to Wills but it is clear that Queensland owes much to him for his tireless actions during the war. It is difficult to conceive a greater personal contrast that that which existed between these two public officials whose positions required an urgent and unprecedented degree of co-operation in order to utilise the QGR as an efficient instrument of warfare. THE WAR SITUATION When the Pacific war broke out, two immensely disturbing facts immediately emerged. The first was that by its position, Queensland was to be the battlefront State. An almost total absence of coastal shipping combiiied with Australia's manufacturing base being in the southern States lead to one inescapable conclusion — that almost all of the military loading would have to be railed to North Queensland ports and military establishments with all of the attendant delay and dislocation of trans-shipping at the Queensland change of gauge locations. The second and more concerning fact was that even before the Japanese entered the war, the Brisbane-Cairns route or North Coast Line (NCL) was already saturated.'* Inquiries by the Commonwealth revealed that the QGR was attempting to meet a task for which it was never designed and with a fleet of ancient, small and largely obsolete locomotives the average age of which in mid 1942 was 24.55 years.' The figure takes on significance when it is compared with the fact that even by QGR admission, the economic life of a locomotive was about 30 to 35 years.* Analysed further, of 688 serviceable machines, some 387 were in classes that had an average age of 28 years or more. The demand for loading was resulting in a dramatic increase in average train loads and average mileage worked per day of the locomotives in service, the latter figure increasing from 83 miles in 1931 to 119 in March 1942.^ As a consequence, the usual mileage of 75,000 between overhauls was being forced for the larger engines to over 188,000. Any organised programme of maintenance had obviously been abandoned. The pressure on locomotives was increased by the shortages of manpower and materials at workshops, where delays of up to three months in servicing were occurring with a resultant figure to March 1942 of almost one fifth of locomotives out of service. As the military traffic demands were unable to be fulfilled it became apparent that Australia was paying the price for decades of mismanagement in the QGR. A LIGHT-DUTY RAILWAY The system in which Wills had worked was almost unique in the world. At a length of some 6,500 miles, the QGR was the second longest 3 '6" gauge system in the world. But what made it particularly different was the lightness of construction of the railway itself. Even the NCL which accounted for almost one sixth of the entire system was a line of exceptionally light construction for much of its length, again because of the extremely low density of traffic. To work the comparatively small, low speed, light trains on the QGR, a fleet of light and low powered locomotives was developed largely after the turn of the century to designs prepared by the QGR itself. The central theme of the system, its low density of usage, was reflected in the locomotive policy which was conservative to say the least. "Inventive" is certainly not the word. Once four basic designs had evolved through the first quarter century the QGR, when the need for more locomotives became pressing, simply produced more of the same, largely oblivious to modern advances in locomotive practice. One aspect of this becomes relevant to our story.

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