Ethnopolitical Confl ict in Turkey: From the Denial of Kurds 10 to Peaceful Co-existence?
A y şe Betül Çelik
Kurdish Chapter Summary In this chapter the author describes the Kurds as a heterogeneous minority group with shared cultural identity, yet differing religions and languages. This group is estimated to comprise 15–20% of the current population of Turkey. Confl ict traces back to the Ottoman Empire, but takes a more ethnic character after the formation of the Turkish state, reaching a peak after 1984. The continuing confl icts, resolution attempts, and suggestions for a peaceful future are outlined. Signifi cant acts of rebellion over the last hundred years of confl ict are delineated along with the underlying causal factors including nationalism, attempts to homogenize, and resettlement activities. The evolution of vari- ous legal and illegal groups which helped mobilize the Kurds in the strug- gle for equality and recognition are discussed. The author recognizes that while some progress was made through these efforts, there were also many negative outcomes such as human rights abuses, banning of Kurdish lan- guage in public, and forced migration. The author notes that signifi cant positive changes began to occur as Turkey prepared to harmonize with the EU.Emphasis is given to a continu- ing cycle of increased hope for the Kurds through state treaties and initia- tives followed by lack of implementation which resulted in a persistent sense of mistrust. Discussion of a current state initiative granting specifi c rights to Kurds refl ects many positive aspects, but the author points out the important issues that are notably absent.
A. B. Çelik () Faculty of Arts and Social Sciences , Sabanci University , Orhanli Tuzla, Istanbul , Turkey e-mail: [email protected]
D. Landis and R.D. Albert (eds.), Handbook of Ethnic Confl ict: International Perspectives, 241 International and Cultural Psychology, DOI 10.1007/978-1-4614-0448-4_10, © Springer Science+Business Media, LLC 2012 242 A.B. Çelik
Suggestions which the authors believe will assist in resolving this con- fl ict are offered, including but not limited to the need to recognize and address the social tension between the Turks and Kurds. Studies are cited which reveal the existent misperceptions between these two groups. The authors call for each group to address the other in open dialogue, recogniz- ing the pain, social polarization, and mistrust. Cheryl Jorgensen
The Kurdish Question is perhaps one of the most damaged infrastructure, confl icts over land important issues with which Turkey has had to ownership between villagers and village guards,1 deal since the mid-1980s. Even though the roots and a legitimacy problem due to improper human of this problem can be traced back to the Ottoman rights practices during the Ola ğanüstü Hal regime Empire, the devastating consequences of the war between the PKK (Partiya Karkerên Kurdistan – Kurdistan Workers’ Party) and the Turkish secu- 1 Village Guards are locally recruited civilians armed and rity forces that has taken place since 1984 in the paid by the state to oppose the PKK. There are around 59,000 southeast of Turkey and the fact that the demands village guards on regular salaries, and 23,274 village guards of the ethnic Kurds have still not been effectively are working on a voluntary basis (Today’s Zaman, 2009 ) . addressed by the Turkish state, places this issue The national media have carried various stories in recent years about the criminal activities of village guards, such as at the core of Turkish politics. The war between the abduction of women, aggravated assault, and the forma- the PKK and the Turkish army has resulted in tion of armed gangs (see Kurban, Çelik, & Yükseker, 2006 ) . 10 Ethnopolitical Confl ict in Turkey: From the Denial of Kurds to Peaceful Co-existence? 243
(system of emergency rule). 2 It also created of Kurds in Turkey. However, studies estimate mistrust between the local state administrators that they make up 15–20% of the population of and the local inhabitants, and produced internally the country (Andrews, 1992 ; Gunter, 1997 ; displaced people (IDPs), who are still encounter- McDowall, 1997 ) . ing problems returning to the confl ict region. The Kurds do not constitute a homogenous Confl ict in the western cities of Turkey, on the group; they follow various religions (Sunni, Alevi, other hand, has led to a degree of polarization and Yezidi) and speak a variety of languages among different groups and occasional discrimi- (Zaza,3 Kırmanji). That is why it is often hard to nation against Kurds. Besides these bitter conse- describe them. Kurds in Turkey can distinguish quences, however, the last decade has also themselves from other groups by their language witnessed some improvements in the ways in and culture. They speak two (Zaza and Kırmanji) which the governments have handled the confl ict. of the many dialects of the Kurdish language, From denial of the problem, they have moved to a which belongs to the northwestern group of the position of seeking alternative solutions that can Iranian branch of the Indo-European family. It is a bring long-lasting peace to the country. This close relative of Persian, which is in the south- chapter will discuss the history of the confl ict western group. Differentiating themselves on the along various dimensions and analyze the recent basis of language sometimes can be problematic in peace-building efforts of the actors involved in the case of Kurds who never learned to speak the process. Kurdish, either because their parents were afraid to teach them the language or because they were simply assimilated into Turkish culture. Most 1 Kurds: Stateless Nation Kurds, therefore, defi ne themselves on the basis of the Middle East of their parentage, place of origin, and/or self- identifi cation. Geographically, there is no specifi c Many scholars and organizations refer to the region where the population is exclusively made Kurds as being one of the largest ethnic groups up of Kurds, although they constitute the majority without a nation-state (Council of Europe, 2006 ; in most parts of Eastern and Southeastern Anatolia Izady 1992 ; MacDonald, 1993 ; McKeirnan, (see blue and red areas on Map 1). 1999 ) . They make up an important percentage Another diffi culty in talking about Kurds as a of the minority population in the countries homogeneous group is their spatial diversity and where they live in the Middle East – namely, dispersion in Iran, Iraq, Syria, and Azerbaijan. Turkey, Iran, Iraq, Syria, and Azerbaijan, and a Although there is a Kurdish consciousness that considerable percentage in some Western coun- binds them together, Kurds in these countries tries such as Germany, Holland, and Sweden. speak different dialects (the northern version, There are no offi cial statistics on the percentage commonly called Kırmanji, is spoken in Turkey, Syria, and the northern part of the Kurdish- speaking areas of Iraq and Iran. The central ver- 2 The OHAL regime was imposed in several cities of eastern sion, commonly called Sorani, is spoken in western and southeastern Anatolia in 1987. The governors of the Iran and much of Iraqi Kurdistan. The Southern cities under the OHAL regime acquired the right to pass Kurdish dialects, and Hewrami or Auramani regulations functioning like laws. Among several rights the governors enjoyed one can list the right to expel citi- (Gorani) are spoken by few, especially in Iran. zens from the region, restrict ownership and limit rights and liberties, and freedom of the press and of expression. 3 There are debates among scholars that Zaza is not a Even though the regime had been lifted in the region by Kurdish dialect and that the Zazas are a different ethnic the end of 2002, albeit gradually, not only its legacy and group. However, this debate is not supported by many tradition but also the mistrust it created between the locals research studies; therefore, most scholars still consider and the public offi cers remain to a certain extent there. Zazas as part of Kurdish culture. 244 A.B. Çelik
These are furthered divided into sub-dialects). Empire to a nationalistic Turkish Republic in the Moreover, there are also differences in lifestyles fi rst quarter of the twentieth century. among these groups because of being assimilated The fi rst international recognition of the into or having lived together with different national Kurds came with the Treaty of Sevres in 1920, groups in these countries. which led to the partition of Ottoman lands by Kurds have never existed as an independent the Allied Powers after the First World War. The political community,4 and thus, have been under Treaty of Sevres recognized Kurds as an ethni- different rulers throughout their history, including cally distinct people and a plan was drafted that the Sassanian Empire, the Safavid Empire, the included autonomy for Kurdish-populated areas. Ottoman Empire, and the Turkish Republic, The treaty provided an independent, but non- among others. In the early sixteenth century, unifi ed, Kurdistan. However, the basic docu- Kurdish tribes fell under Ottoman rule as a result ments and international treaties (such as the of the Safavid–Ottoman struggle (van Bruinessen, Treaty of Lausanne in 1923), which shaped the 1992 ; Entessar, 1992 ; McDowall, 1997 ) . With legal foundations of the new Turkish state after respect to its relations with its subjects, the the War of Independence, left no room for the Ottoman Empire was different from nation-states: offi cial recognition of Kurds and other Muslim subjects were not classifi ed according to their groups as distinct peoples. The Treaty of Lausanne ethnic identities/origins but rather to their reli- recognized only non-Muslim groups (Greeks, gions (Muslim vs. non-Muslim). Accordingly, Armenians, and Jews) as minorities. Even though Kurds, who had lived in the Ottoman domains it replaced the Sevres Treaty and formed a unifi ed since the sixteenth century, were recognized as Turkey, the fears that the Allied Powers would part of the Muslim community, along with Arabs, divide the country continued and is still one of Turks, Albanians, etc. The hostility between the the major barriers for the resolution of the con- religious and ethnic communities was aggravated fl ict. What is commonly known as Sevres in the late nineteenth century5 ; consequently, the Paranoia , fears that there are external powers roots of the “Kurdish question” should be contex- who are trying to challenge the territorial integ- tualized within the transition from a multi-ethnic rity of the Turkish state and implement the provi- sions of the Sevres Treaty by establishing local autonomy for the predominantly Kurdish areas, 4 The only exception is the short-lived Mahabad Republic still affects many Turkish citizens and policy- in today’s Iran in December 1945. The Republic ceased to makers’ perceptions on any ground-breaking exist when the Soviet forces and support, which helped policy on the issue. the foundation of the Republic, were withdrawn in December 1946. 5 Although Kurds lived under Ottoman rule without much challenge to its existence, there are several historical 2 Kurds in the Early Years events that signify the emergence of Kurdish nationalist of the Republic sentiments and of challenges to the Ottoman rule in the nineteenth century. The fi rst signifi cant sign of indepen- During the fi rst years of the Republic, there were dence vis-à-vis Ottoman rule came from Bedr Khan, who established his authority over all Kurdish tribes, and several Kurdish uprisings. Of the 18 rebellions refused to send tribal contingents when these were req- that broke out between 1924 and 1938, 17 were uisitioned in the Ottoman–Russian war of 1828–1829. in Eastern Anatolia and 16 involved Kurds The second Kurdish insurgency towards the Ottoman rule (Kirişçi & Winrow, 1997 ) . Three of these deserve was a rebellion led by Şeyh Ubeydullah of Nehri, who sought to establish an independent state with the help of mention because the narratives of these rebel- the British in 1880. Lastly, the Hamidiye Cavalries created lions have been passed from generation to gen- by Abdulhamid II in 1891 strengthened the formation of eration through oral accounts, which were Kurdish community as a distinct unit, by giving consider- separate from, and opposed to, Turkish national able power to Kurdish Hamidiye commanders, which posed a potential threat to the state (van Bruinessen, 1992 ; identity, and were pivotal in constructing a sepa- McDowall, 1997 ; Olson, 1989 ) . rate Kurdish identity ( Neyzi, 1999 ). 10 Ethnopolitical Confl ict in Turkey: From the Denial of Kurds to Peaceful Co-existence? 245
The fi rst important Kurdish rebellion was among the Kurds (Olson, 1989). The rebellion led by Sheikh Said in 1925. This was the earli- followed systematic deportations and martial est large-scale Kurdish rebellion in the Republic. law in the East. It also led to the establishment Although it was largely led by religious ş eyhs of the Restoration of Order Law in 1926, which (sheiks),6 the Kurdish organization Azadi created Independence Tribunals to arrest the (Freedom),7 which had the aim of establishing leaders of all opposing forces. The law was in an independent Kurdistan (van Bruinessen, effect for 2 years, and the two Independence 1992 ) , was instrumental in the unfolding of the Tribunals, one established in the east and one in rebellion. What is signifi cant about the rebellion Ankara, were successful in stifl ing all reaction is that it “was a turning point in the history of the and rebellion, and restoring “social harmony” Kurds in that nationalism was the prime factor (McDowall, 1997 , p. 195). With the Law on the in its organization and development” (Olson, Transfer of Certain People from the Eastern 1989, p. 154). Olson argues that although the Regions to the Western Provinces (Law No. rebellion was signifi cant because of the nation- 1907), which was passed by parliament on June alist elements it carried, it proved the weak- 10, 1927, many Kurds were transferred to west- nesses of the Kurdish mobilization. First of all, ern provinces without an indication of where it lacked tribal connection with urban dwellers. they were to be sent, and their land and other Secondly, the rebellion failed because of existing real estate were taken over by the treasury tribal rivalries and Sunni–Alevi8 differences (Tekeli, 1994) . The law was passed after the Ankara government realized that Kurdish recal-
6 citrance had continued despite the suppression According to Turkish offi cial history, the Şeyh Said rebel- lion had a religious character, mainly because of the sym- of the Sheikh Said Rebellion. The number of bols used in the rebellion. It is argued that it was against people transferred is unknown, but some argue the secular nature of the new republic, and the rebellion that it was no fewer than 200,000 (Clerk as erupted because Atatürk, the president of the new republic, had abolished the Caliphate on March 3, 1924. There is cited in McDowall, 1997 ) . still no agreement among the scholars working on Kurdish From 1925 to 1927, Kurdish mobilization history whether the rebellion was a nationalist rebellion in was largely suppressed. The second important essence. Van Bruinessen ( 1992 ) argues that prohibition of Kurdish rebellion of the Turkish Republic came the use of Kurdish language in public places (populism ), the exile of Kurdish landlords (aghas) and the expropria- as an insurrection led by a former Ottoman army tion of their land by the state (abolition of feudalism), and offi cer, Ihsan Nuri Pasha in the area of Ağrı abolition of the Caliphate gave rise to grievances among (Ararat) in 1930. Frustrated by the Turkish state’s Kurds, leading to the rebellion. Thus, the rebellion carries homogenization project, whose foundation was both national and religious elements. On the other hand, some argue that Kurdish intellectuals and military offi cers based on the belief that all citizens are Turkish, were at the heart of this movement, making it a nationalist combined with the government’s emergency rebellion. And, “the fact that the rebellion had a religious powers to administer the area, some Kurdish character was the result of Azadi’s assessment of the strategy nationalist elites formed the Khoybun and tactics necessary for carrying out a successful revolu- tion” (Olson, 1989 ) . (Independence) group in 1927. The operational 7 Azadi was a Kurdish nationalist party founded by leader of the Bayt al Shabab mutiny, İhsan Nuri, Kurdish nationalists and offi cers from the Ottoman army assembled a small group of men trained in in May 1923. Azadi was largely supported by Zaza- modern weapons, and moved his men to the speaking tribes. It opposed the new government’s policies Ararat region, where there were local tribes of secularization (abolishment of the Caliphate) and the introduction of a modern education system based on already in revolt. This time some Alevi tribes in Turkish (Kirişçi & Winrow, 1997 ) . Turkey and Kurdish tribes in Iran also joined the 8 Alevism is a sect in Islam. There are signifi cant differ- revolt. However, the Turkish army’s superior ences in the beliefs and worshipping practiced by Sunnis weaponry, communications and logistics, and and Alevis in Turkey, which has created a long-lasting the lack of coordinated mobilization of Kurdish animosity between the two. It is estimated that around 70% of the Kurds in Turkey are Sunni, and the remaining tribes led to the Turkish state’s success in suppress- 30% consists of Alevis and Yezidis (Andrews, 1992 ) . ing the rebellion (McDowall, 1997 ) . 246 A.B. Çelik
The last important Kurdish rebellion dates to wait for 1946 to be able to be free from the back to the late 1930s. There were two important emergency powers and to return their homes. factors that laid the ground for the rebellion. The fi rst came on June 21, 1934, when the Turkish parliament passed the Law on Resettlement (Law No. 2510), which regulated the settlement of 3 Kurds in the Transition immigrants and resettlement within the country. to the Multiparty Era The law divided Turkey into three zones in accor- dance to adherence to “Turkishness”: (1) localities The suppression of the Dersim rebellion was so where the population possessed non-Turkish powerful that it left a bitter memory among the elements and a concentration of population Kurds so great that it pushed back any possible having Turkish culture was desired (as a result, Kurdish mobilization until the 1950s, when the immigrants from the former Ottoman provinces single-party era came to an end. The strict state who had Turkish origins were settled in these control following the rebellion in the Kurdish- localities); (2) regions reserved for people who populated regions made it almost impossible for were expected to assimilate into Turkish culture; the Kurds to mobilize against the Turkish state. and (3) regions to be totally evacuated (the From the late 1930s to the late 1950s, there was inhabitants of these regions were to be settled in no signifi cant Kurdish opposition to the Turkish the fi rst two zones) (McDowall, 1997 ; Tekeli, regime. 1994 ) . The law also aimed to break down the It is the political environment of the 1960s structure of potentially powerful tribes, and which provided fertile ground for political abrogated tribal property rights. Tekeli reports mobilization. The immediate cause was the 1961 that 25,831 people from 5,074 households were Constitution, considered to be the constitution transferred from 15 cities in the eastern and providing the most explicit protection of freedom southeastern Anatolia to western Anatolia. of association (Bianchi, 1984 ) . The rights granted However, many households which were trans- by the Constitution promoted the foundation of ferred to other provinces in the 1930s returned to trade unions and student organizations, which their homes in the 1940s when the obligation of would play an important role in the Turkish the transferred people to stay where they were politics of the 1970s. However, it should be kept settled was lifted, as Turkey moved to a multi- in mind that although the 1961 Constitution party regime in 1947 (Tekeli, 1994 ) . encouraged some freedoms in terms of organiza- The other factor which prepared the ground tion and mobilization of the Kurds, and the pub- for the Dersim rebellion was the passing in lication of the fi rst Kurdish journals at the December 1935 of a law by parliament that beginning of the 1960s, the government imposed placed Dersim (renamed Tunceli after the rebel- strict measures to control the Kurdish-populated lion) under military rule. In fact, Dersim was regions. By Law No.1587, the National Unity commonly known as the main problem area. The Committee, which for a while took over the law also enabled the government to detain and administration after the 1960 coup d’état , started deport the “potential threats” of the “notoriously to replace Kurdish place names with Turkish defi ant region.” The inhabitants of Dersim resisted ones, claiming that names which hurt public the imposition of direct government control, opinion are not suitable for national culture, which initiated the Dersim rebellion led by Şeyh moral values, traditions, and customs (McDowall, Seyyid Rıza in 1936. At the end of 1938, the 1997 ) . Thus, the 1960s both created some liberties rebellion was bloodily suppressed by the govern- and led to greater restrictions on Kurdish rights. ment. Seyyid Rıza was hanged and thousands Within this rather “democratic” environment, were executed. Again the rebellion preceded Kurds initiated legal mobilization in both associ- deportations and population control. And the ations and political parties. The establishment of inhabitants and deported families of Tunceli had the Türkiye İşçi Partisi (the Workers’ Party of 10 Ethnopolitical Confl ict in Turkey: From the Denial of Kurds to Peaceful Co-existence? 247
Turkey – hereafter the WPT) in 1961 is a milestone ‘class interest’ to ‘human freedom’ in an attempt to in the legal Kurdish mobilization. The party broaden its appeal-especially to Kurds and Alevis” gained support from the middle-class “progres- (Samim, 1987 , p. 158). In 1966, at its Second sives” in Istanbul, and overwhelmingly from Congress, the party experienced a break between Kurds and Alevis in the countryside (Samim, those who supported the National Democratic 1987) . Even though the party was a pro-Soviet Revolution (NDR) and the Socialist Revolution. In socialist party aiming to “transform the Turkish its monthly publication Aydõnlõk, the NDR, led by society through the creation of a mass workers’ Mihri Belli, published an article in November 1968, party” (Samim, 1987 , p. 155), it also supported entitled “The National Reality,” where it talked organizational activity in the late 1960s. about the “Kurdish question ” ( Sosyalizm ve The perspective of the WPT in the western Toplumsal Mücadeleler Ansiklo pedisi Ð STMA , cities of Turkey such as Istanbul, Ankara, and 1988) . Whereas the WPT continued its program Izmir was mainly based on class struggle against along the lines of the Socialist Revolution, which capitalist exploitation. On the other hand, in the argued that the revolution should take place under cities of Eastern and Southeastern Anatolia, the the leadership of the workers, the NDR criticized WPT argued that in order to liberate people, the the party for being “pacifi st and parliamentarist,” institutions of şeyhlik, 9 ağalõk, 10 and feudalism and argued that a new struggle should take place. should be abolished, land reform introduced, and However, neither the NDR movement nor the WPT human rights respected. These two different were able to get Kurdish youth, who realized the perspectives stemmed from institutional and “Turkish” left organizations did not respond to their structural differences between the east and the needs, to follow them. These young people later west of the country. However, the argument was founded the fi rst legal Kurdish organization of the about structurally changing the society by replacing Turkish Republic: Devrimci Doğu Kültür Ocakları the “exploitative” institutions. In this sense, party (Eastern Revolutionary Cultural Hearths, hereafter politicians did not pronounce “Kurdishness” as the ERCH). an ethnic right until the mid-1960s. What is signifi cant about the WPT in terms of It was only in 1965 that the WPT’s chairman, Kurdish mobilization is that it was the fi rst legal Mehmet Ali Aybar, “shifted his emphasis from political party recognizing the existence of Kurds in Turkey. In its fourth Grand Assembly, on 9 Şeyhlik is a religious institution, and şeyh (sheikh) is a October 29, 1970, the WPT announced that religious title given to the head of the Naksbandi order in There is a Kurdish people in the East of Turkey… Islam. Among the Kurds, şeyh was a very infl uential reli- The fascist authorities representing the ruling gious fi gure (Olson, 1989 , p. 3). Although one can come classes have subjected the Kurdish people to a across with infl uential Kurdish şeyhs who could “infuse policy of assimilation and intimidation, which has religious phraseology full of millenarian and messianic often become bloody repression (Chailand, 1993 , symbols into … nationalist objectives” such as in the case p. 87; STMA, 1988 , p. 2132). of the uprising led by Şeyh Ubaydullah of Nehri who sought to establish an independent state with the help of One should note that although the party openly the British in 1880 (van Bruinessen, 1992 ; McDowall, suggested an ethnic problem in Turkey, this 1997 ; Olson, 1989) , in the 1970s many Kurds argued that the existence of şeyhs, who mostly used their ties with the analysis “was heavily laden with class and leftist state to strengthen their own power, prevented the rise of terminology” (Barkey & Fuller, 1998 , p. 15). The Kurdish nationalism. party argued that the most fundamental reason 10 Ağalõk is an institution similar to landlordship. Agas for the underdevelopment of the region and the (Aghas), in Kurdish-populated regions, were the leaders suppression of the Kurds was the “economic and of Kurdish tribes, and they had a great amount of social, economic, and political power over the tribe members. In social policies of the dominant classes who were most cases ağas used their clientelistic ties with the state very much aware that the region was inhabited by to exert their power over the population, which overshad- Kurds” (Chailand, 1993 , p. 87). Thus, the leftists owed the growth of Kurdish consciousness for decades. of the era related the Kurdish question to the Also, the confl ict between the tribal groupings led by ağas formed shifting patterns of alliance, preventing the rise of “colonization” of the region by the Turkish- a united Kurdish mobilization (Barkey & Fuller, 1998). dominant classes. 248 A.B. Çelik
According to the perspective presented by for us, villas for them,” “The Easterner has most of the members of the WPT, the “Eastern awakened. Now, he will look after his rights,” problem,” as they put it, stemmed from the “Rights are not given, but taken,” and so on. What combined effects of colonization of the Eastern was important about the Eastern Meetings is that Anatolia, and its relative deprivation based on for the fi rst time in the history of the Turkish ethnic differences. Along with this argument Republic, a legal party was able to mobilize so came the belief that when the capitalist and impe- many Kurds and ask for egalitarian income distri- rialist forces are overthrown, Kurds will also be bution between the regions. Although the word liberated. This ideology gained support, particu- “Kurd” was not mentioned at the meetings, the larly among the Kurdish youth and intellectuals problems of Easterners’ were emphasized. of the early 1960s. The formation of the Eastern Revolutionary The most signifi cant event of the 1960s in Cultural Hearths in May 1969 stands as the fi rst terms of Kurdish consciousness is the Do ğu important legal step of the Kurdish mobilization Mitingleri (The Eastern Meetings). From August in the history of Turkish Republic. However, note 1967 to August 1969, 12 meetings were held in that even the title of the organization indicates several Eastern and Southeastern Anatolian that it brings together the people of the “East,” cities, and in Ankara (Devrimci Doğu Kültür and does not necessarily refer to the Kurds. “The Ocaklarõ: Dava Dosyasi 1 , 1975 ) . Although the founding objectives of the ERCHs were: (a) to meetings of the WPT in western cities of Turkey encourage Kurdish university students to engage were rather unpopular, the Eastern Meetings in cultural activities, and generate material gathered thousands of people. These meetings solidarity among them, (b) to destroy all the rac- focused mostly on economic and social problems ist-chauvinist ideologies of Turkey, and mobilize with an emphasis on the institutions of a ğalõk and Kurds within the democratic and revolutionary şeyhlik (as sources of inequality) in the society, institutions that struggle for the brotherhood and inequality between the regions, unequal income equality of nations” (STMA, 1988 , p. 2119). distribution and poverty. Although the meetings What is important to note about the ERCH is were largely organized by the WPT, the support- that it mobilized a signifi cant number of Kurds, ers of another pro-Kurdish party also joined and especially the youth. Barkey and Fuller (1998 ) gave their support: the Kurdistan Demokratik argue that this young generation replaced the old Partisi (Democratic Party of Kurdistan – hereaf- one, “whose traditional ties limited its rebellious ter the DKP). This political organization, led by temptations,” with “one raised with all the sym- Sait Elçi, was an illegal party that had connec- bols of nation and state” (p. 15). The perspectives tions with the Iraqi Democratic Party of Kurdistan, of the ERCH were refl ected in the WPT so suc- led by Molla Mustafa Barzani. It was mostly sup- cessfully that it led to the resolution regarding the ported by rich Kurdish peasants. Although the existence of the Kurds in the eastern part of the party provided support to the meetings, it could country in the party’s Fourth Grand Assembly in not mobilize many Kurds. 1970. However, this resolution also paved the way The discourse at the meetings combined the for the banning of both the WPT and the ERCHs socialist rhetoric of relative deprivation with the by the military memorandum of March 12, 1971. demands for identity recognition. They emphasized The memorandum brought very strict restric- the relative deprivation of “the East,” and raised the tions on Kurdish rights. The court decision issue that Easterners should get as great a share in concerning the ban of the ERCHs argued that national capital and resources as “Westerners.” they were closed down because of high treason. Some of the banners at the meetings emphasized The attorneys also claimed that this inequality between the regions: “If the West is the homeland, what is the East?” “The fate of the Kurdish, rather than being a language, is a bunch of East is famine, unemployment, and degradation,” words (…) The Kurdish language does not actually belong to an existing or historical entity because “Where is democracy?” “We want protection of it has been proven that Kurds come from Turkish life,” “Oil was our blood, you took that, too,” “Inn descent (STMA, 1988 , p. 2304). 10 Ethnopolitical Confl ict in Turkey: From the Denial of Kurds to Peaceful Co-existence? 249
With the establishment of the ERCHs, the were explicated, and Kurdish appeared in the Kurds learned to engage in political issues and to names of these groups (e.g., Yekitiya Proleterya voice their demands through legal channels. Kurdistan Ð Kawa (Kurdistan Proletarian However, because of the short-lived history of Union), Rõzgari (Kurdistan Independence the ERCHs, and the banning of most of the leftist Movement), etc.), after it was fi rst used by an political parties and institutions in 1971, Kurdish illegal political party Türkiye Kürdistan mobilization found different paths in many illegal Demokrat Partisi Ð TKDP (Kurdistan Democrat leftist organizations during the 1970s. Party of Turkey) in 1965. With the 1971 memorandum, most political Devrimci Demokratik Kültür Dernekleri parties as well as syndicates, associations, and (Revolutionary Democratic Cultural Associations – trade unions were banned from the political scene hereafter the RDCAs), which were founded in and their leaders were put in prison. The members 1974 in Ankara and Istanbul, are worth mention- of the ERCHs were charged with training “militants ing in this regard. The RDCAs, in their monthly who believed in Kurdism, to spread the argument magazines, argued that they were following the that there is an independent Kurdish race, and to paths of the ERCHs, which were banned by the help establish an independent Kurdistan” “anti-democratic regime of the March 12th ( Devrimci Doğu Kültür Ocakları: Dava Dosyası [1971],” and emerged when “there was a reawak- 1 , 1975 , p. 25). The memorandum also restricted ening among the students after the relaxation of the rights of many associations granted by the the regime’s strict measures” (Devrimci Demokrat 1961 Constitution. From 1971 to 1974 Kurdish Gençlik-DDG , 1978 , p. 8). These associations mobilization was once again silenced. Many have largely been dominated by students, who leaders were captured, and the state controlled a were devoted to the defeat of “imperialism, colo- large segment of political life. The 1974 general nialism, neo-colonialism and racism” (DDG, amnesty granted by the coalition government 1978, p. 9). They were successful in leading a formed after the transition period following the great number of Kurds into the streets, and getting 1971 memorandum brought these leaders back them involved in political life, through either con- into the political arena; however, this time, they ventional or unconventional participation. This mostly became part of illegal political groups. resulted in the most successful Kurdish illegal During the mid-1970s, a highly politicized mobilization ever: the PKK. Because of their political system developed between extreme right active role in Kurdish mobilization, the functions and left groups. Within this environment, different of the RDCAs were under strict state control in the illegal Kurdish groups emerged; while all were in late-1970s, and they were eventually closed down the leftist camp, they had different political per- by the 1980 military coup d’état. The September spectives. McDowall ( 1997 ) argues that Kurdish 12, 1980 coup d’état was a result of extreme ideo- nationalism was revived by “economic depriva- logical polarization of the society, coupled with tion, social injustice and physical displacement the election laws, which prevented any single party as well as ideas of ethnic identity, all of which from attaining a majority in the parliament, combined in the 1970s to create the conditions resulting in the inability of rapidly changing gov- for revolt” (p. 402). ernments to respond to the increasing violence. It The 1970s are important for Kurdish mobili- led to the arrest of hundreds of thousands and fi ve zation since those years include the emergence hundred people receiving the death penalty. The of illegal Kurdish organizations, which are sep- military junta also imposed martial law and arate from similarly banned Turkish leftist stripped many people of their political rights. Even groups, and more importantly, the emergence of though it returned the government to civilian hands the PKK as a political entity. Even though the within two years, the 1982 Constitution it prepared discourse of these organizations was highly rev- is still in effect and remains one of the important olutionary, for the fi rst time in Turkish political barriers for the recognition of Kurds as a Republican history, Kurdish nationalist demands culturally distinct group. 250 A.B. Çelik
in the 1980s, it was perceived by many state 4 Partiya Karkerên Kurdistan offi cials as “terrorism,” fi rst, and an “underdevel- (PKK) and the “Kurdish opment,” problem later on. It was common prac- Question” tice to refer to the Kurds as “Mountain Turks” in the 1980s. It took almost two decades for state offi - Among all the Kurdish illegal organizations, cials to come to terms with the fact that Kurds do perhaps the most important was the PKK, which exist and this problem is also one that demands was founded by Abdullah Öcalan and his friends recognition of Kurds as a distinct group in Turkey. in Ankara, during his university years at Ankara The armed confl ict peaked in the mid-1990s, Üniversitesi Siyasal Bilimler Fakültesi (the when human rights abuses, torture, and disap- Faculty of Political Science at Ankara University). pearances were reported by NGOs in the region Before the organization came into being in 1977, and state offi ces,11 and the public use of Kurdish this group had prepared a document entitled “The language was banned. Furthermore, around a Path of Kurdish Revolution,” which argued that million Kurd were forced to migrate (HÜNEE, the Kurdish-populated regions of Turkey were 2006) to other cities either as a result of the evac- colonies. They also argued that the colonization uation of villages by the military, allowed by the was enforced by Kurdish feudalists and bour- 1987 emergency rule; or because of the PKK’s geoisie, who chose to collaborate with the Turkish pressure on villagers who did not support the ruling classes. According to Öcalan and his PKK to abandon their villages; or due to the inse- friends, this was why Kurds should lead a curity resulting from being caught between the Marxist-Leninist revolution to create an indepen- PKK and Turkish security forces (Kirişçi, 1998 ) . dent Kurdistan. The document later became the The armed confl ict started to de-escalate when program of the PKK (Kirişçi, 1998 ) . the PKK leader Öcalan was captured by the Turkish The emergence of the PKK as an armed force National Intelligence Organization in Nairobi, occurred in a period just after the military coup of Kenya, in February 1999. That year was also sig- September 12, 1980, which had silenced Kurdish nifi cant because of EU’s acceptance of Turkey as a mobilization, along with all sorts of non-Kurdish candidate to the Union. The negative peace that political mobilization. The 1980 coup d’état pre- came with Öcalan’s imprisonment and the PKK’s ceded a martial law regime and strict restrictions decision of “inaction,” which lasted until mid-2004, on the right to form associations. Within this envi- laid the fertile foundation for democratic reforms. ronment, the regime paradoxically paved the way for the PKK’s greater mobilization in the follow- ing years ( Kutschera, 1994 ). The PKK launched 5 Post-1999: A New Era? its fi rst open attack on the Turkish authorities with an armed assault on gendarme garrisons in 1984. Between 1999 and 2004, the PKK declared a Since then the confl ict has taken many lives. There one-sided ceasefi re, which it broke on June 1, are no exact statistics on the number of causalities 2004. However, this negative peace period was that the confl ict has caused. However, most schol- ars and journalists estimate the number to be 11 According to a report prepared by the Ministry of Justice around 30,000–40,000. on July 29, 2003, for example, the number of people taken From 1984 to the early 1990s, Turkey’s “Kurdish into custody by the Diyarbakir State Security Courts and question” started to attract increasing attention State Attorney in Diyarbakir, the biggest Kurdish city, during the OHAL regime was 48,697. According to the President of from both Turkish and international media and the Diyarbakir Bar Association, around 800 state offi cers political circles. Yet, it is in the early 1990s that the have been expelled from the region and none of them have issue acquired high priority as a consequence of been able to fi le complaints against the state on the issue escalating PKK attacks, on the one hand, and (interview, Diyarbakir, February 11th 2004). OHAL has also restricted many public activities. According to Tanrıkulu harsher state responses, on the other. When the and Yavuz (2005), many art activities such as festivals, con- confl ict re-emerged with the PKK’s separatist goals certs, and public screening of movies have been restricted. 10 Ethnopolitical Confl ict in Turkey: From the Denial of Kurds to Peaceful Co-existence? 251 the signal that a new era was opening in Turkey’s also became internationalized again12 in late 2007 Kurdish Question. As part of harmonizing its with the Turkish army’s bombings of PKK camps laws with European norms in the process of within the territory of Northern Iraq. With the adopting European Union (EU) Common Law, intensifi cation of violence in the post-2004 period, the Grand National Assembly of Turkey has the State’s emphasis has been on the security and accepted broadcasting in other mother tongues the territorial integrity of the country, whereas the besides Turkish and has eased restrictions on main dissatisfaction of the different Kurdish languages other than Turkish, has abolished the groups has been with what can be summarized as death penalty, and has signed international the slow unwilling moves of the State in the EU treaties protecting the economic, social, cultural, integration process to grant more rights to the and political rights of its citizens (see Çelik, 2005 Kurds as a group. for a detailed analysis of legal changes). Even though such changes were not made to deal with the issues underlying the Kurdish Question, they 6 Towards Resolving indirectly affected it. Such constitutional guaran- the Confl ict? tees were provided reluctantly and slowly; yet they were crucial for leaving behind a period that Year 2009 marks another important turning point had to a certain extent neglected the problems of in the state’s position towards the confl ict. TRT- the Kurds. Interviews conducted by the author 6, a TV channel owned by the Turkish state initi- with Kurds and Kurdish NGOs revealed that ated broadcasting in Kurdish on January 1, 2009. these steps were perceived by many Kurds as While this was not the fi rst case of Kurdish broad- insincere attempts by the Turkish state that did casting, it was more signifi cant than the earlier not address the demands of Kurdish citizens. attempt in 2004. Following the signing of the They were seen instead as an effort to prove to National Program for the Adoption of the EU the EU that Turkey could democratize (Çelik & Common Law on March 8, 2001, the government Rumelili, 2006 ) . initiated several reform packages. One of govern- In a speech delivered in Diyarbakır, the most ment’s reform packages in 2004 included allow- important city for Kurds in Southeast Anatolia, on ing the teaching of Kurdish (and other mother August 12, 2005, Prime Minister Erdoğan stated tongues and accents) in private courses and that “the Kurdish Question is everyone’s problem, broadcasting in Kurdish; however, the state still especially mine. Disregarding the mistakes made retained the right to exercise strict control in such in the past is not an attribute of big states. The areas. For example, Kurdish TV programs could solution lies in providing more democracy, citizen only be broadcasted on state television and were rights and welfare” ( Radikal 12/08/2005). limited in content. The fi rst private Kurdish Erdogan’s speech, which stressed the existence of courses opened their doors to students in April the Kurdish question and offered citizenship rather 2004 in the two Kurdish-populated cities in the than “Turkish identity” as a supra-identity for both regions affected by the confl ict. In June 2004, the the Kurds and Turks, raised the hopes of Kurds for fi rst Kurdish broadcast appeared on Turkish state the democratic resolution of the issue for a short while. However, his emphases on the security of the state in his later speeches and the resort to mili- 12 The mass infl ux of Iraqi Kurds into Turkey in the early tary means since 2007 have diminished this hope. 1990s can be considered the initial internationalization of the Kurdish Question. World attention focused on the Such dissatisfaction and loss of hope on the side of Kurds at the end of the Persian Gulf War in 1991 and contin- the Kurds led to an escalation of violence. From ued throughout the 1990s as there were increasing levels mid-2004 to mid-2009, sporadic hostilities in the of forced migration from the Kurdish-populated regions confl ict-affected areas, as well as the spread of of eastern and southeastern Anatolia. Although this event was a spillover effect of what has happened in Iraq, the violence to the cities of western Turkey, hampered “Kurds” as a group subsequently became recognized in any attempt at bringing about peace. The confl ict the international arena. 252 A.B. Çelik television. Even though this fi rst attempt was After discussing the “initiative” in the National seen as insincere and inadequate by many Kurds, Assembly on November 13, 2009, the AKP pub- it was the fi rst step in overcoming the problems in lished a report on what this new policy means. In making Kurdish language more public. Yet, it is its publication about the National Unity and the changes in 2009 that made the Kurdish broad- Brotherhood Project (AKP, 2010 ) and in the casting a reality in Turkey. prime minister’s public speeches, the government The positive developments continued through- claimed to address the following issues: out 2009, and for the fi rst time in the history of the • Allowing the use of Kurdish in prisons. This Republic, a government claimed to be initiating an was legalized by the government in the fi rst extensive peace process to address the confl ict. week of November 2009. However, even though the project was commenced • Reintegrating PKK members. The government as the “Kurdish Initiative,” meaning designed to aims to reintegrate PKK members who have not address solely the Kurdish Question, it came to be participated in any armed confrontation with the referred to as the “Democratic Initiative,” and, Turkish military. However, this objective does lastly, the “National Union and Brotherhood not have any concrete plan, and was not pro- Project.” These changes in names signify the gov- nounced by the government in clear terms. ernment’s confusion, and some desperation, in • Reintegrating the people in the Makhmour dealing with a complex and deep-rooted problem. Refugee Camp, in cooperation with the Announced as the Kurdish Initiative by the Kurdish autonomous region administration in Ministry of Interior in July 29, 2009, these attempts Northern Iraq: During the armed confl ict in to resolve the confl ict aimed at addressing several the 1990s, approximately 12,000 Kurds core problems. The proposal was believed to crossed the Turkish border into Iraq. include greater cultural rights for Kurds (exclud- Approximately 9,000 of these settled in the ing teaching in Kurdish), some form of local Makhmour Refugee Camp; 2,600 of them autonomy, and incentives to demobilize and rein- returned to Turkey in the following years tegrate the PKK fi ghters into the society. Such (UNHCR, 2004 ) . The return of the rest of the changes require fi rst and foremost the changing of refugees was discussed extensively at the the 1982 Constitution, a byproduct of the 1980 beginning of the initiative, but it was not men- coup d’état. Since it is regarded as undemocratic tioned in the AKP’s 2010 publication. It might and opposed by many civil society groups and be due to the fact that people in the Makhmour there is a need to comply with the EU’s Camp stated that they will not return to Turkey Copenhagen Standards,13 several modifi cations unless they believe that Turkey has fully been have been made to it since 2001. The initiative of democratized and a general amnesty is granted the ruling party, Adalet ve Kalkõnma Partisi to members of the PKK. (Justice and Development Party, hereafter the • Bringing prisons up to EU standards and clos- AKP), aimed at “ending terrorism,” and “advanc- ing the Diyarbakır Prison.14 ing democracy”; however, while it has the will to • Rehabilitating minors involved in “terrorist address the confl ict, it is still unclear as to what acts.” Especially following the violent upris- steps need to be taken. However, after mid-2010, ings in the funerals of several PKK members with the increasing violence from both sides, even in Diyarbakır (April 2006) and increased this will is being questioned by many Kurds. clashes between the PKK and the Turkish army (since summer 2006), several minors in the big cities of the southeast Anatolia participated in 13 According to the Copenhagen Criteria, all EU candidate states must meet several standards and criteria. Among them were political criteria indirectly affecting the issues 14 Diyarbakir is the most populous Kurdish city. Diyarbakir related to the Kurdish Question. Of the political standards, prison became a symbol of anti-1980 coup d’état because respect for the principle of the rule of law and for minority of human rights abuses that took place during the coup rights serves as a crucial part of the basis of compliance. d’état and the military rule following it. 10 Ethnopolitical Confl ict in Turkey: From the Denial of Kurds to Peaceful Co-existence? 253
throwing stones at the Turkish security forces. • Strengthening the right of freedom of These minors were sent to adult prisons after expression. This mostly aims at removing receiving long sentences in anti-terrorist courts. Article 216 of the Turkish Criminal Code, A bill on these minors passed by parliament on which penalizes those “instigating a group of July 21, 2010. According to the new law, people having different social class, race, reli- minors will no longer be tried at high criminal gion, sect or region to hatred or hostility courts; those charged with violating the Law against another group of people in a way that on Meeting and Demonstrations will not face is dangerous for public security.” prison terms if they do not use a weapon, a • Allowing the teaching of Kurdish language as an knife, or explosives against the security forces, elective course in schools and teaching different and they will serve their sentence at institutes languages and dialects in private institutions. of education or doing community service. • Allowing the formation of Kurdish institutes • Allowing other channels besides the state- and/or Kurdish Literature departments in owned TRT to have continuous Kurdish universities. broadcasting. • Allowing the use of the Kurdish language dur- • Empowering the local administrations (decen- ing election campaigns, which requires chang- tralization). Such proposals have been dis- ing the election law. Another factor limiting cussed in public since the time of the eighth representation of the Kurds in the Turkish President Turgut Özal. However, up to now, National Assembly is the requirement that a there has been no concrete plan for carrying political party receive 10% of the national vote this out in a country with an historically strong to be eligible to enter parliament. Even though unitary character. Moreover, the government pro-Kurdish parties can obtain up to 65% of has not pronounced plans for decentralization the local votes in the small cities of eastern plans even though in June 2010, 99 pro-Kurdish Anatolia, they are not represented in parlia- Barõş ve Demokrasi Partisi (Peace and ment because they cannot reach this national Democracy Party, hereafter the BDP)15 bar. The government initiative does not address mayors in the southeast Anatolia declared that this problem, however. they would work toward establishing some • Easing the strict road and plateau controls in sort of autonomy in their regions. eastern and southeastern Anatolia to make life easier for the inhabitants. Put in effect, this can 15 Another important issue concerning Kurdish political also increase the return of the Kurdish IDPs. representation is the formation of Kurdish political parties. • Forming “Fight Against Discrimination According to the Articles 12 and 83 of the Law on Political Commissions,” which would inspect the public Parties, put in effect in 2005, forming a political party based and private sectors for possible discrimination on ethnic, racial, and religious lines is unconstitutional (TBMM, 2005 ) . Based on these articles, several pro-Kurd- cases. There will also be an independent civic ish political parties were banned. The BDP is the sixth party Human Rights Commission to control human whose political ideology can be considered as pro-Kurdish. rights abuses throughout the country, including The fi rst pro-Kurdish party, HEP (Halkın Emek Partisi- but not limited to human rights abuses of the vil- People’s Labor Party), was founded in June 1990 by the Kurdish MPs who were expelled from the Social Democratic lage guards and security forces in the southeast. Party (SHP) after their participation in an International • Renaming the places of former “locally- Conference held on the Kurdish Question in Paris. After named” places. These include not only the vil- HEP’s closure by the Constitutional Court, the three con- lages that formerly had Kurdish names, but secutive pro-Kurdish parties, namely DEP (Demokrasi Partisi-Democracy Party), ÖZDEP (Özgürlük ve Demokrasi also those with other languages, such as Partisi-Freedom and Democracy Party), and DEHAP Armenian, Arabic, and Circassian all around (Demokratik Halk Partisi- Democractic Society Party) Turkey. According to a recent study (Mynet, shared the same fate. After the inception of the Kurdish ini- 2009 ) , the names of around 28,000 places tiative the DTP was closed down by the Constitutional Court and its members, except for its two leaders, formed have been changed since 1940 ( Hurriyet the new party, the BDP, at the end of 2009. November 13–14, 2009; AKP, 2010 ) . 254 A.B. Çelik
As seen by these issues and argued by Kemal also released its requests. The “Peace Group,” Kirişçi (2008 ) , it is easier to discuss the state’s after its arrival in Turkey, made the letters from “redlines,” refl ecting its understanding of what the PKK available to the journalists. These not to include in this initiative: “transformation requests were: disclosing Öcalan’s road map16 to from a unitary state to a federal one,” “territorial the people and along with possible negotiators, autonomy,” or acceptance of Kurdish as an halting military operations, allowing freedom of offi cial language (p. 7). In its publication on the the Kurdish language, developing democratic initiative, the government also claimed that social organizations and political representation amnesty for Öcalan or his re-trial is out of associated with Kurdish identity, abolishing the question (AKP, 2010 ) . village guards system and bringing an end to the The government’s will to address the issues Turkish military’s “special operations” in the around the confl ict was welcomed by the pro- region, and preparing a new democratic constitu- Kurdish party of that time, the Demokratik Toplum tion. They requested that these be contingent Partisi (Democratic Society Party, hereafter the upon a real democratization of Turkey and the DTP) and the PKK even before the specifi c issues Kurdish people’s free will. They should be of the initiative were known. To show that they reached by dialogue and discussion and allowing also support peace initiatives, the PKK sent to Kurds to lead a free and equal life within the Turkey a “Peace Group” composed of some PKK society on the basis of their Kurdish identity – members who had not joined in any armed con- under constitutional guarantees, as a part of the frontation with the Turkish army and some ref- democratic nation of Turkey (Radikal 10/20/2009). ugees from the Makhmour Camp in Northern However, some of these demands (e.g., taking Iraq. Even though this was an attempt on the part Öcalan as the addressee) can possibly lead to of the radical Kurds to “welcome peace,” enthusi- confl ict escalation. Recent polls show that the astic celebrations on the border between Iraq and “Kurdish initiative,” even when it was not clear Turkey by Kurds and the release of these return- exactly what it meant, was supported by 48.1% ees, despite Article 220 of the Turkish Criminal of the population (36.4% did not support it and Code, which would have otherwise penalized 15.5% had no opinion). However, a majority of them, elicited harsh reactions by the non-Kurds in the population is also afraid that the Kurds want the Turkish society. Since this welcoming by the a separate state (64.4%), and that Öcalan and the state offi cers led to severe opposition to the AKP PKK do not represent the Kurds (50.1%) (SETA, government, state offi cials later brought up 2009) . Another study surveying only Kurds and cases against the members of the Peace Group, Zazas17 found that while the Kurds who had voted which resulted in the return of 20 out of 34 PKK for DTP in the 2007 national elections were less members to Northern Iraq in July 2010. For many, willing to live together with Turks (62.9%) this was a sign that the new positive era in Kurdish compared to those who voted for other parties Question has ended once again. Even though most Kurdish politicians, intel- 16 The imprisoned PKK leader put forth his road map, that lectuals, and ordinary Kurds appear to have been is, his understanding of how Kurdish Question should be supporting these possible reforms, the PKK and addressed by the Turkish state, to the prison prosecutor on some Kurdish members of parliament, in fact, August 20, 2009. State representatives did not disclose the had a different understanding of how peace content of the letter. Öcalan also asked his lawyers to send the text to the European Court of Justice, which takes should be achieved. According to an interview some time (Bianet 08/27/2009). with higher-ranking PKK offi cers, they wanted 17 Zazas are differentiated from Kırmanji-speaking Kurds the government to take Öcalan as the “addressee” based on the language they use. Whereas most Kurds of this negotiation process and Kurdish to be an speak Kırmanji, Zazas use Zazaki. There are debates offi cial language along with Turkish ( Çongar, among scholars as to whether Zazas are an ethnic group by themselves or a sub-group of Kurds. This study did not 2008 ). After the contours of the initiative started engage in these discussions, and regarded Zazas as part of to be discussed by the Turkish public, the PKK the Kurdish culture. 10 Ethnopolitical Confl ict in Turkey: From the Denial of Kurds to Peaceful Co-existence? 255
(84.8%), overall, Kurds do not want a separate increasing stone-throwing incidents by Kurdish state. The same study also revealed that only children and PKK attacks on Turkish military around 19.77% of the population believes that bases. An indictment completed in June 2010 Öcalan should be released (BILGESAM, charged 150 people, including 11 BDP mayors 2009 ) .18 from Southeast Anatolia, with membership in However, as violence started to spiral once the illegal Kurdish Communities Union (KCK), the again in 2010 and the government was unable to allegedly underground urban organization of the come up with concrete plans for peace, the PKK (Hürriyet , 2010 ) . support for the initiative started to decrease. Besides all these shortcomings, however, the According to a study done by the A&G Research most important consequence of this recent initia- Institute, the support in June 2009 for resolving tive has been the positive atmosphere it created the Kurdish Question through non-violent means and the hope for a common future in the society. dropped drastically over the months to follow Yet, at the same time, many fear that if this chance (from 69% in June to 46% in August and to 31% of resolving the confl ict is missed, social polar- in November) (A&G as cited in Taraf 26/01/2010). ization of Kurds and Turks might result. Contrary Another study reached interesting conclusions to what many scholars and Turks argue, the concerning the performance of the government Kurdish Question is not only a confl ict between and how society sees the solution to the Kurdish the state and the Kurdish separatists. As asserted Question. According to this study, compared to by Çelik and Blum ( 2007 ) , “it is possible to identify 2009, there was growing hope among Turkish three fault lines along which the Kurdish confl ict citizens that the issue of “terrorism” could be in Turkey plays out. At one level, the confl ict is resolved through peaceful means (increase from between the Turkish state and an ethnic minority. 52.3% in 2009 to 64.5% in 2010). However, in At another level, the confl ict is between the contrast, only 30.9% labeled government perfor- Turkish state and an insurgent group, the PKK. mance in “terrorism” as “good” and 30.1% saw At a third level, the conflict exists in the form government policies as the biggest reason for of social tension between Turks and Kurds “terrorism” (Baybars Hawks, 2010 ) . Besides throughout Turkey, especially in the bigger cities these contradictions, it is also important to note in western Turkey” (p. 65). If not recognized by how social science rhetoric on the issue is still the policymakers, this last level is the least confused in terminology: “”the initiative,” addressed and hardest to deal with. In fact, there “terrorism,” “support for non-violent means,” have been studies addressing this possible social “support for peace” are all used to refer to the polarization. A KONDA study in June 2010 same phenomenon, which is in fact, complex, shows that even though many Turkish citizens multi-layered, and deep-rooted. support the legal reforms safeguarding Kurdish Even though, the so-called Kurdish initiative culture, they are not as liberal when it comes to was welcomed by the Kurds and most Turks welcoming different ethnicities into their close [except for some ardent supporters of the opposi- circles. Another striking fi nding is the dominance tion parties Cumhuriyet Halk Partisi (CHP) and of Sevres Paranoia in the ordinary Turkish citi- Milliyetçi Hareket Partisi (MHP)], its popularity zens’ understanding of the issue. Almost three decreased as the government did not clarify its quarters of the people surveyed believed that contents, all the while silencing the legal Kurdish Kurdish Question is the result of foreign coun- voices. The recent operation against the elected tries’ provocation and more than half (around Kurds in the southeast, in particular, led to 54.7%) believed that Kurds want a separate state (KONDA, 2010 ) , even though other studies show the contrary (BİLGESAM, 2009 ) . 18 However, these fi ndings should be taken with a grain of With the government’s new initiative, the tension salt since answering questions about demands for separa- tion and Öcalan is still not easy especially in survey studies that had been rising between the Kurds and Turks where the interviewer is not known to the respondent. since the mid-2007 has started to give way to a 256 A.B. Çelik possible peaceful coexistence. As pointed out by vis-à-vis the Turkish state’s political and a renowned Turkish journalist, Cengiz Çandar, at economic dominance. These reactions later took a meeting bringing together Kurds and Turks of the form of asking for cultural rights and consti- different political ideologies for the fi rst time, tutional guarantees in the late 1990s and 2000s some 10 years ago, it was very diffi cult to see commensurate with the increasing globalization together an imprisoned Kurdish parliamentarian of human rights all around the world (Çelik, (Hatip Dicle), an ex-PKK member who had 2005) . Turkish nationalism, on the other hand, returned Turkey from abroad as a gesture of perceived the Kurdish Question “mostly in terms showing PKK’s commitment to peace in 1999 of a fatal rivalry between the backward, pre- and imprisoned afterwards (Seydi Fırat) and an modern and tribal past and the prosperous ex-deputy secretary of the Turkish National present in the fi rst half of the century,” and Intelligence Organization (Cevat Öneş). However, “in terms of a tension between the peripheral econ- it is hard to see such positive developments at the omy and national market in the fi fties and sixties. In societal level since such long-lasting confl icts the 1970s, the Kurdish unrest was believed to be a leave a legacy of mistrust and pain, which need product of communist incitement. Despite this im- purity in perception, one thing has remained nearly time to heal. That is also why the initiative also unchanged for Turkish nationalism: Kurds could attracted the reactions of the nationalists on each become Turkish. In other words, Turkish national- side, which assumed the form of violent urban ism of the republican era has principally perceived unrest in several cities of Turkey in late 2009 and Kurds as future-Turks. (Yeğen, 2007 , p. 119). mid-2010. Today, for the fi rst time in the history of the Turkish Republic, the Kurdish Question is being discussed along all of its dimensions, even though 7 Conclusion possible solutions might not necessarily address all issues. Yet, at the same time, this issue is also From the foundation of the Turkish Republic to regarded as a “democratization problem,” which the mid-1980s, offi cial Turkish discourse did not can be tackled through legal reforms and consti- recognize the Kurds as an ethnic group in Turkey. tutional changes by the government. Even though When the “Kurdish Question” became publicized the confl ict has historically pitted the state against on Turkish political scenes through the PKK’s an ethnic group, the long-lived war in the south- activities, many state offi cials perceived the con- east and its spillover effects in the big cities have fl ict as a “terrorist act,” the aim of which was to also led to a societal polarization in almost all carve out an independent Kurdistan within the cities in Turkey. The social polarization dimension territories of the Turkish state. The Turkish state of the confl ict is the most neglected side of the refused to consider the PKK as the legitimate issue. Presenting cases like the Kurdish Question “other” in the confl ict and treated its Kurdish as a problem of “terrorism” mostly legitimizes population as part of its whole Turkish citizen the acts of governments in other countries as population. That is why the “Kurdish Question” well. However, long-lived violent confl icts leave was mostly considered in terms of “terrorism” or, a legacy of mistrust between the citizens and at best,” a “southeast underdevelopment prob- states but most importantly among different strata lem” by state offi cials and most of the rest of in the society. Whereas most Kurds feel a lack of Turkish society. justice, humiliation, and silencing, many Turks The Kurdish Question, even though having feel afraid (that “their land” will be taken away), unique historical reasons, shares some common- angry (that “terrorism” took away their sons), alities with other confl icts around the world. Most and proud (to be a “Turk” for centuries). These importantly, Kurdish and Turkish nationalisms feelings need to address “each other” and be have followed similar dominant ideologies and opened up to dialogue. It is only when such con- political movements. Kurdish nationalism in the fl icting claims as justice, recognition of and 1960s and 1970s adopted a socialist discourse respect to identity, some sort of self-governance, 10 Ethnopolitical Confl ict in Turkey: From the Denial of Kurds to Peaceful Co-existence? 257 re-constitution of trust towards the state and the Kurds, Turks, and the state. Track II workshops recognition of past mistakes on the part of the consisting of intergroup dialogues, joint projects, Kurds meet the demands of the Turks who ask for and other strategies can be designed to target guarantees that Kurds will not partition the country specifi c problematic neighborhoods in the larger and will use “Turkish citizenship” as an umbrella cities. The history of violence also creates the identity for peaceful co-existence. Undertaking needs for programs, such as trauma healing, and this task, fi rst and foremost, requires “communal- individual skill-building that can be designed to ization” of the pains that the war caused and support victims and perpetrators of violence, to producing a common language.19 encourage healing, to foster individual reconcili- It is essential to note that in the last 80 years, ation and bridge between the state and the Kurdish the Turkish state has moved from denial of the citizens (Çelik and Blum, 2007 ) . Social change existence of Kurds to the recognition of cultural towards peaceful co-existence is a long and a differences and a commitment to respect their rough road, and there will always be spoilers and culture. However, peaceful coexistence of people loss of hope on the journey to peace. requires addressing social polarization and mis- trust. There is a need for Turks, Kurds, and other groups in Turkey to come together and discuss Appendix: Ethnopolitical Confl ict what brings them under the same roof and in Turkey Timeline whether their projection of future is commensu- rate. Even though, for the fi rst time, Turkey’s 1984 – Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK) launches membership acceptance to the EU increased the separatist guerrilla war in southeast Turkey. hopes of many for peaceful existence in a demo- 1987 – Turkey applies for full European cratic Turkey, the problems of mistrust, social Economic Community (EEC) membership. polarization between Kurds and Turks, and non- 1990 – Turkey allows US-led coalition against recognition of past mistakes still stand as barriers Iraq to launch air strikes from Turkish bases. to such a shared future. Violent events between 1992 – 20,000 Turkish troops enter Kurdish Kurds and Turks in the big cities of western safe havens in Iraq in anti-PKK operation. Turkey following the discussions of the Kurdish 1995 – Major military offensive launched Initiative can be presented as evidence of such against the Kurds in northern Iraq, involving problems. The violent events between the Turks some 35,000 Turkish troops. and Kurds in the two towns in the north and south 1995 – Turkey enters European Union (EU) of the country in July 2010 worried all those who customs union. believed in the positive atmosphere that the October 1998 – Abdullah Öcalan, leader of Kurdish initiative has set. To address the multi- the PKK, leaves his base in Syria after Turkey dimensional nature of the confl ict, various strate- threatens to invade Syria. gies are needed. Whereas macro changes such as February 1999 – PKK leader Abdullah Öcalan constitutional and legal reforms can guarantee captured in Kenya. the political, social, and legal rights of the Kurds July 1999 – Öcalan receives death sentence, and their culture, there is also a need for micro later commuted to life imprisonment. changes to address the long animosity between August 2002 – Turkish Parliament approves reforms aimed at securing EU membership. 19 One of the barriers of dialogue between the Kurds and Death sentence to be abolished except in times of the Turks is the confl icting language they use in describ- war and bans on Kurdish education, broadcasting ing their pains and referring to their history. The simplest to be lifted. example is that many Kurds call the deceased PKK militants “martyrs,” whereas for Turks martyrs are the January 2004 – Turkey signs protocol banning soldiers and security forces who die during the “fi ght death penalty in all circumstances, a move against terrorism.” welcomed in EU circles 258 A.B. Çelik
May 2004 – PKK says it plans to end a ceasefi re is being held and Öcalan criticizes the AKP for its because of what it calls annihilation operations lack of sincerity. against its forces. October 19, 2009 – A 34-person “peace June 2004 – State TV broadcasts fi rst group,” comprising eight PKK members and 26 Kurdish-language programme. Four Kurdish residents of the Makhmour refugee camp in MPs, including former MP Leyla Zana, freed northern Iraq, heeds a call by Öcalan and surren- from jail. ders at the Habur border gate between Turkey December 2004 – EU leaders agree to open and Iraq. The welcoming ceremony held for the talks in 2005 on Turkey’s EU accession. group and the members’ release by judges at the April 2006 – At least a dozen people are killed border spark a huge public outcry. in clashes between Kurdish protesters and December 7, 2009 – Seven Turkish soldiers security forces in the south-east. Several people die in a terrorist attack in the Reşadiye district of are killed in related unrest in Istanbul. the central province of Tokat. September 30, 2006 – PKK declares a unilat- December 11, 2009 – The Constitutional eral ceasefi re in operations against the military. Court closes the pro-Kurdish Demokratik Toplum December 2007 – Turkey launches a series of Partisi (DTP). air strikes on fi ghters from the Kurdish PKK May 31, 2010 – Six soldiers are killed in a movement inside Iraq. PKK attack on a Turkish naval base in İskenderun, October 2008 – Trial starts of 86 suspected a district of the southern province of Hatay. members of a shadowy ultra-nationalist June 19–20, 2010 – Twelve soldiers are killed Ergenekon group, which is accused of plotting a in PKK attacks in the southeastern province of series of attacks and provoking a military coup Hakkari. against the government. Terrorist activities peak June 22, 2010 – Four soldiers and one teenage with the PKK’s, killing of 17 soldiers at the civilian are killed in a bomb attack on a military Aktütün military outpost. bus in Istanbul’s Halkalı district. A PKK-affi liated January 2009 – The state-run Turkish Radio group claims responsibility. and Television Corporation (TRT) launches a Adapted from BBC News Online (http://news. Kurdish-language broadcast. bbc.co.uk/2/hi/europe/1023189.stm ), and Hurri yet February 2009 – Protesters marking the 10th Daily News ( http://www.hurriyetdailynews.com/n. anniversary of the arrest of Abdullah Öcalan, php?n=from-hope-to-misery-kurdish-move8217s- the leader of the banned Kurdish PKK move- journey-2010-06-22 ) visited on 7 July, 2010. ment, clash with police in south-east Turkey. Prominent Kurdish politician Ahmet Turk defi es Turkish law by giving speech to parliament References in his native Kurdish. State TV cuts live broadcast, as the language is banned in parliament. AKP. (2010). Sorularõ ve Cevaplarõyla Demokratik Açılım July 29, 2009 – Interior Minister Beşir Atalay Süreci. Ankara: Ak Parti Tanıtım ve Medya announces the government’s Kurdish move, Başkanlığı. Andrews, P. A. (1992). Türkiye’de Etnik Gruplar (Ethnic vowing to solve the problem through “more free- Groups in Turkey) . Istanbul: Ant Yayınları. dom and more democracy.” Barkey, H., & Fuller, G. E. (1998). Turkey’s Kurdish ques- August 1, 2009 – The government holds its tion . New York: Rowman & Littlefi eld Publishers. fi rst workshop to hear suggestions on the move Bayrbars Hawks, B. (2010). Türkiye’nin Gündemini Belirleme Araştõrmasõ . Istanbul: Kadir Has Üniversitesi. from important intellectuals, including colum- Bianchi, R. (1984). Interest groups and political develop- nists and academics. ment in Turkey . Princeton, NJ: Princeton University August 20, 2009 – Öcalan delivers his own Press. 160-page handwritten road map to resolve the Bianet. (2009, 20 October). Requests of the peace groups . Available at http://bianet.org/english/ Kurdish issue through his attorneys. It is confi s- english/117731-requests-of-the-peace-groups . cated by prison offi cials at İmralı Island where he Accessed 25 Nov 2009. 10 Ethnopolitical Confl ict in Turkey: From the Denial of Kurds to Peaceful Co-existence? 259
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