• Abstract and Figures
• Public Full-text

,­ ,_. J . HISTORICAL SOCIETY OF AFGHANISTAN Apri_l- May- June No.2 1962 'April-June, 1962 VOL, XVII- No.2 Revue trimestrielle P u b li e e p a r I a Societe des etudes historiques d' Afghanistan \ ABONNEMENT ANNUEL Kaboul ....................... 60 Afghanis Province .................... 62 Afghanis Etranger .................... 4 Dollars DIRECTEUR: MOHAMMAD NABI KOHZAD ADRESSE: Societe d'Histoire d' Afghanistan KABOUL, Ghyasuddin Wat, Tel. 20:{74 C'ONTENTS Page 1-BRITISH DIPLOMACY IN AFGHANISTAN D.P. Singhal 1 \ 2-MOVEMENT OF PEOPLE AND IDEAS IN AND FROM AFGHANISTAN 18 3-LES GHORIDES UNE GRANDE DYNASTIE NATIONALE Charles Kieffer 40 Couverture: Mundigak: Tete de calcaire blanc (Periode IV, 3). BRITISH DIPLOMACY IN AFGHANISTAN: An Example History has often neglected to record episodes which are later discovered to be of importance. One such omitted event is the Turkish Mission to Kabul (1) of 1877, despatched in the name of the Sultan of Turkey Abdul Hamid II, but really en­ gineered by the local representatives of the British government in Calcutta and Constantinpole, against the expressed wishes of their superiors. Except a very casual ~eference in one or two contemporary works no mention seems to have been made of the mission in the works of history. The mission provided a necessary link in a chain of events and had serious repurcus­ sions on the future of Afghanistan. Furthe~more it unfolds the helplessness of British 9abinet against their designing pro-consuls in the East. The documents concerning the episode are preserved in a separately bound volume in the European Manuscripts Section of the British, Museum, London. Until 1950, these were not to be inspected without the previous permission of the Secretary of State for India. In the European Manuscripts Section Indian materials, with some known exceptions, are generally not located. Perhaps for this reason they have managed to remain in disuse; a scholar of European history has little use for them as the story they reveal has much bearing on Indo-Afghan relations and none on the course of the Russo-Turkish war. It is possible that these documents which constitute the only correspondence between Lytton an.d Salisbury who were at the time Viceroy and the Secretary of State for India respectively, could be deposited in that section. But what is surprising is that these papers are not duplicated either in the Lytton Papers or in the Salisbury Papers which are available for public inspection in the Com- -2-- monweal th Relations Office, London and Christ Church College, Oxford respectively. Nor are they found, which is most puzzling of all, in the Political and Secret Correspondence between the governments of India and Britain. Why should these documents be detached from their habitual residence almost in toto? In private and official correspondences, casual references to the mission are found, but actual documents upon which the episode and the scene behind can be reconstructed are obtained elsewhere.· Let me here warn against attempts to read too much into this somewhat unexpected arrangement. There may well be a very simple explanation of this, but the non-availability of these documents in places and archives o~dinarily expected to possess them together with the almost complete detach­ ment from official .correspondence and the stipulation of secrecy. do raise some eyebrows. This indeed is curious, and perhaps needs further investigation. But the net outcome of this so far. has been the near anonymity of this mission in his-· tori cal writings. The time when this miSSIOn was despatched was one of brisk international activity, both military and diplomatic. New patterns of power politics were being formed in Europe and Britain was assuming a new Iook in politics. After the Napo­ leonic Wars the British power remained supreme and with minor exceptions, outside any major involvements. But with the rise of Germany as a potential challenger in 1870, British conce~n for their vast colonial empire grew and they began to erect protective walls around their possessions, through strategic fortifications, and, particularly through diplomatic devices (2). Of all the colonies, India was the one most valued and the most menaced. From the side of North Asia there was pr,essing a giant power, Russia, towards India, constituting grave danger to British interests. In 1873, Russia after an accelerated pace, had occupied Khiva and reduced the original gap of the two expand- -3- ing empires in Asia from about 6,000 to only 600 miles. The in­ tervening country was rugged and unsuryeyed. Unsure of Russian professions of non-interference in British Asian sphere of influence and also of the attitude of the inhabitants of the area the British became excessively apprehensive of their colo­ nial safety. Afghanistan was the only organised major power which effectively interposed between the two empires, and it became Britain's paramount policy to obtain a commanding influence in that country. The Conservative Cabinet under Disraeli, the~efore, sent out Lytton as Viceroy of India in 1876 specifically charged to establish British ascendancy at Kabul. He was at best permitted to ask the Amir for a share in so­ vereignty, but the new Viceroy, who had ideas of his own, be­ gan with such arrogance and impatience that it became im­ possible for. the Amir SherAli to come to any terms with him without crippling his sovereignty and honour permanently. Even his entreaties denoting fear of incurring his peoples' wrath if he accepted the proposed terms failed to move Lytton. For he was convinced that the Colonial expansion of both the British and the Russians was a destined 'march of civilization' in the east against the receding barbarism, and sooner or. latter the frontiers of British and Russian Asia were certain to be­ come coterminus. It was therefore, for Britain through him to reach Merv first, if possible, or Kabul certainly. Possession of Kabul, in addition, would place Britain in a striking position against Russia. He tried coercive tactics in his attempt to frighten the Amir into submission, but London would not give him freedom to force rupture as, afraid for their world-wide colonies, their policy at the time was to avoid disr,uption through non-aggression. The diffused state of their empire stood to lose in an indiscriminate adventure. Eventually they did sanction war with Afghanistan, but under duress of Lytton's skilful combination of manipulation and defiance. His disobedience threw even Disraeli into a temper, who himself was locking the ''keys of India" in. search of a "scientific frontier". Forced by London to explore avenues of compromise acr.oss conference tables, Lytton carried on the negotiations with such show of -4-- strength, impatience and contempt for the "earthen pipkin bet­ ween the two iron pots" (3) that unless his dictated terms were accepted, no talks could succeed. The last of these was the abor­ tive Peshawar conference in early 1877, between Sir Lewis Felly and Syed Nur Mohammad. The breakdown under Lytton's instructions, though excuses wer.e found for public consump­ tion, ensured rupture with the Amir who was, it appears, un­ aware of or incapable of comprehending the mounting pressure. He made fresh overtures, but Lytton was determined not to "reopen negotiations till the Amir had apologised for his breach of faith and ~ecent bad conduct". (4) What was the Amir's bad conduct or breach of faith is not known. Lytton's own letters, on the contrary, reveal that it was he who should have merited this epithet. Reading his correspondence, however, one is soon conditioned to disregard his powerful expressions of condem­ nation of his Asian opponents. Having failed to dictate his terms to the Amir, Lytton turned to strengthening the frontier: by other methods. Pie had organised a very complete system of secret inteligence through­ out the Amir's territories. He had already occupied Quetta, which opened for him an opportunity to extend his influence along the western border of Afghanistan. He was also end­ eavouring to strengthen Kashmi~ by authorising the Maharaja to accept the suzerainty over Chitral and Yassin. He planned to work round gradually the more turbulent tribes on the nor­ thern frontier and gain their support. While Lytton was thus engaged in encircling Afghanistan and prepar,ing to pounce, hostilities between Russia and Turkey commenced in Europe. Britain was expected to join the Turkish side. Lytton kne'Y well that London would not sanction war with Afghanistan without a very definite provocation from the Amir, while they were at war with Russia. One war was bad enough, too won't be disastrous. Frustrated in his enthusiasm he had to look for some other ways. -5- The Russo-Tu~kish war commenced in April 1877 and lasted until the San Stefano treaty was signed in January 1878. For more than 200 years Russia and Turkey had been engaged in a succession of wars. Turkey, weak at the time, was dependent on the British for help. The Sultan of Turkey, once a powerful monarch, was still the Khalifa of the Islamic world, commanding allegience of all the Muslims. Lytton saw in this situation tremendous possibilities as this was the per­ iod of Pan-Islamic ascendancy. Having failed in diplomacy and restrained in armed in­ te~vention, he could cause religious pressure to be applied in the name of the Khalifa on the Amir to accept British terms. Turkey was a "poor relative" and willing to oblige by lending the little authority she was left with to her potential bene­ factor. Seldom political alliance has been used to borrow re­ ligious power to achieve political ends. Layard, another disciple of the Forward School and a friend of Lytton, was the British Ambassador, in Constanti­ nople.

Load more

  60

Copy Link