A Sociological Study of Aligarh City

THE EMERGING PATTERNS OF MARRIAGE AMONG MUSLIMS: A SOCIOLOGICAL STUDY OF ALIGARH CITY

ABSTRACT OF THE THESIS

SUBMITTED FOR THE AWARD OF THE DEGREE OF

Doctor of Philosophy

SOCIOLOGY

By BUSHRA ASAD

Under the Supervision of Prof. NIKHAT FIROZ

DEPARTMENT OF SOCIOLOGY ALIGARH MUSLIM UNIVERSITY ALIGARH, U.P. (INDIA) 2015 In Indian society marriage is considered to be an institution through which men and women are initiated into the culture of society. Therefore, they are socialized to identify a set of goals in life which largely revolves around marriage and family.

Marriage is the beginning of a new family unit with all the complicated roles and statuses which the members of this unit are expected to play. Socio-cultural and religious practices regarding marriage can have a significant effect on the status of women within family and society.

In a traditional society, like India which is known for its cultural diversity the Muslims form a unique group by themselves due to their religious faith and values .Among Muslims, like all other aspects of life, the man-woman relationship and the authority structure in the family too are rooted in traditional sanctions as written in sacred texts.

However, scientific developments, impact of education, socio-economic changes in the modern industrial society are having their impact on the structure and functioning of marriage patterns. It is proposed to study the emerging patterns of marriage among Muslims in Aligarh as such no study has been made so far.

Objectives of the Study

1. To assess the attitudinal changes among three generations of Muslim men and women towards family life.

2. To examine the attitudinal changes among three generations of Muslim men and women regarding matters related to marriage.

3. To examine the impact of education in bringing about change in the attitudes of Muslim men and women.

4. To examine the impact of residence on the attitude of Muslim men and women.

Hypothesis:

1. The pattern of marriage has undergone changes among three generations of Muslims.

2. Age at marriage is increasing.

1 3. The custom of dowry is increasing.

4. Socio-economic background plays an important part in determining attitudinal change among the Muslims.

5. Rural/urban locale is an important factor in determining the rate of change among the Muslims.

6. Religious orthodox is not an important cause of Muslim women‟s lack of access to developmental facilities.

The present study was conducted in Aligarh city which is situated in western U.P. Aligarh is basically a university town has its own Municipal Corporation. It has always been distinguished for its lock industries which have now, over the years has expanded tremendously. Of late, agro industries, rubber, iron and food canning industries have also developed. The city has progressed industrially.

As “The Emerging patterns of marriage among Muslims in India: a sociological study of Aligarh city” was the focus of the present study, a stratified random sampling technique was used for the selection of the sample.

The sample consists of 630 respondents comprising 350 married Muslim women and 280 married Muslim men. The population has been classified into three generations namely first, second and third. First generation consists of 100 women and 80 men in the age group of „above 60‟. Second generation comprises of 125 women and 100 men in the age group of „between 31-60‟ and the third generation comprise of 125 women and 100 men in the age group of „below 31‟.

It was very difficult for the researcher to find out those families in which all the three generations were present. Out of 150 families 100 women of first generation, 125 women of second generation, 125 women of third generation were available and 80 men of first generation, 100 men of second generation, and 100 men of third generation were available.

2 For the purpose of study researcher has selected those areas where Muslim population was in majority which include both literate and illiterate, rich and poor which can represent the whole universe. These areas were Jeevangarh, Jamalpur, Dhorra, Muzammil Manzil, Sir Syed Nagar, Friends colony, Shahjamal, upper kot, Nai Basti, Awasvikas. The sample is representative of various variables like education, religiosity, income level, and residential location of the respondents. The data was analysed on the basis of these four variables.

The technique used for collecting information for the present study was „Interview Schedule‟. The reason for choosing schedule is obvious. It ensures reliability of data unlike questionnaire. Beside many respondents being illiterate schedule is the right choice. Separate schedules were constructed for males and females.

In examining the patterns of marriage among Muslims four independent variables have been used. These are education, religious observance, income and residence. All these variables have their independent influence on marriage patterns.

The findings of the study revealed that in the first generation majority of the respondents were married below 18 years of age whereas in the second and third generation the marriage age has risen above 25 years. Education and age at marriage are closely associated with each other. The attitude of Muslims towards the early marriage has changed and a greater proportion of them were in favour of late marriage. The nature of the responses suggests that early marriage were prevalent in the first generation whereas third generation prefer marrying late. Thus, the hypothesis that marriage age is rising is prove true. As far as the impact of residential status is concerned, the study indicates that early marriages were more prevalent among rural born respondents whereas urban born respondents married late. Similarly, it is observed that in the present study that income level of the respondents affects age at marriage, there are three categories lower income group (below Rs.10,000), middle income group (Rs.10,000-50,000) and high income group (above Rs.50,000), early marriages were found more common among lower income group and majority of high income group married late. Thus, we can say that socioeconomic background determines attitudinal change among Muslims and the hypothesis proves to be correct.

3 The present study indicates that dowry is becoming an important aspect of Muslim marriages. Rao and Rao (1982) concluded in their study that though majority of students expressed negative attitude towards the present dowry system but in reality one third of the male respondents and their parents expected a dowry when they got marry. Similarly in the present study, majority of females and males expressed negative attitude towards the dowry but they practice dowry in reality. The study concludes that as education increased, the practice of dowry was also increasing. Among the educated respondents the practice of giving and taking dowry was more as compared to uneducated respondents. It is also concluded from the present study that dowry was given and taken among the urban born residents more in comparison to rural born residents. As far as religious observance is concerned, it is found that respondents who were religiously moderate and indifferent practiced dowry more as compared to strictly religious. As far as Income level is concerned, the practice of dowry was prevalent even among the lower income groups also. Thus, the hypothesis that dowry has increased has also proved correct. It can be concluded that as education increases among the respondents dowry demand is decreasing. Dowry is more demanded by the illiterate people. The present study also indicates that religiously moderate respondents demand dowry more in comparison to religious respondents. Also, majority of urban born respondents did not demand dowry in the third generation but in the first generation urban born demanded more as compared to rural born and in the second generation rural born respondents demanded dowry more as compared to urban born. As far as the impact of Income is concerned, it is found from the present study that dowry is demanded more among lower income group of respondents as compared to higher income group.

Mehr is considered as the fundamental right of a Muslim woman at the time of marriage. Mehr is a form of marriage transaction which is a characteristic of Muslim marriage. The present study indicates that as the education rises among the respondents, the percentage of respondents who received and paid mehr has also increased. As far as the impact of religiosity is concerned, majority of respondents who were strictly religious have received and paid mehr to their wives. It is found that majority of urban born respondents have paid mehr. It is also found that high income group of respondents paid mehr to their wives more in comparison to low income

4 group. It can be concluded that in the first generation, mostly the amount of mehr was not given to the wives. Mostly the wives were easily tricked by their husband because they were innocent and not aware of their rights. But now women are aware of their rights and they don‟t compromise on it.

It can be said that polygyny was not favoured by most of the female respondents with the passage of time. It can be concluded that with the rise of education among the respondents, they start opposing it.

The present study concludes that the percentage of respondents who stated that there is possibility of giving equal treatment to two wives has increased from first generation to third generation. But majority of the respondents cannot give equal treatment to two wives.

Divorce is more common in the third generation. In the first generation, it was not much favoured by the respondents. It is found that divorce was more favoured by educated female respondents. Higher educational level of the respondents is responsible for the rise of divorce rate. As far as religious observance is concerned, respondents who were not religious favoured it. It is also found that it is favoured by females who belong to high income groups and males belonging to low income group.

The present study also indicates that the major cause of divorce in the third generation was husband‟s extra marital relations. In the first generation, the major cause was male child issue.

Family planning methods were more adopted by Muslims in the third generation. Respondents have become aware of the advantages of small family norms. In the first generation, only a small percentage of women were using any method of family planning. Religion appear to be one of the factor for non use of family planning methods. But in the third generation, religiosity does not restrict respondents to use it. The popular perception that religious conservatism among Muslims is a major factor for not accessing developmental facilities was found incorrect. The acceptance of family planning among educated, higher income group and urban born respondents is high whereas its acceptance is low among illiterates, lower income groups and rural born respondents in the first and second generation. In the third generation there is a

5 change, illiterate respondents and lower income group of respondents have also began to favour family planning methods. Majority of female respondents believe in having a small family norm in the third generation.

It was also found that majority of the Muslim respondents favoured arrange marriage. Very few Muslim favoured love marriage. In the third generation, however love marriages were few but love marriages are increasing as compared with the first generation but the majority of the Muslims favoured arrange marriage. Love marriages were more common among educated Muslims. Education is an important factor in bringing about change in the attitude of people.

The present study indicates that the women have started to work outside. In the first generation, the husband did not allow them to work outside but now they allowed them to work outside. It is also found that women can go for shopping alone as their husband allowed them to go and women can also take decisions on financial matters, any family matters.

Thus, a gradual and steady change in their attitude is observed. The Patterns of marriage has undergone changes in the three generation has proved correct. We can conclude that in some aspect there is a change while in some aspects of marriage there is no change. Rural /urban locale as an important factor in bringing about change among Muslims has also proved true from the present study as marriage age is high among urban born, dowry demand is less and domestic violence is less found among them, willingness of small family is also more among them.

Suggestions:

1. Similar studies can be undertaken on a larger sample in different parts of the country for more valid results and broader generalization.

2. Similar studies should be conducted on other religious groups also.

3. There is a great need for creating awareness regarding legal aspects of marriage among people in India and particularly among Muslim women.

4. Education for women is very essential. Special attention should be given to legal education in order to teach them about their legal rights.

6 5. The media can play a very important role in educating the masses, creating awareness among them so that they can change and become rational in their attitude and are expected to cross cultural values and norms.

Limitations of the study:

1. The study is limited only to Aligarh city U.P

2. The present study concerns only Muslim population of Aligarh city. Hence the findings are limited to Muslims only.

3. The sample is limited because the present study is undertaken by a single researcher and it had to be done within specified time.

4. The study does not cover all the aspects of marriage. Aspects like intercaste marriages, and widow remarriage, divorce remarriage, inheritance of property, maintenance have not taken in the study.

THE EMERGING PATTERNS OF MARRIAGE AMONG MUSLIMS: A SOCIOLOGICAL STUDY OF ALIGARH CITY

THESIS

SUBMITTED FOR THE AWARD OF THE DEGREE OF

Doctor of Philosophy

SOCIOLOGY

By BUSHRA ASAD

Under the Supervision of Prof. NIKHAT FIROZ

DEPARTMENT OF SOCIOLOGY ALIGARH MUSLIM UNIVERSITY ALIGARH, U.P. (INDIA) 2015 Prof. Nikhat Firoz DEPARTMENT OF SOCIOLOGY ALIGARH MUSLIM UNIVERSITY ALIGARH – 202 002 (U.P.) INDIA

Date:……………….

CCeerrttiiffiiccaattee

Certified that the thesis entitled “The Emerging Patterns of Marriage Among Muslims: A Sociological Study of Aligarh City” being submitted to Aligarh Muslim University, Aligarh, for the award of Ph.D. degree in Sociology embodies the original research work of Bushra Asad and is a record of bonafide research carried out by her under my guidance and supervision.

(Prof. Nikhat Firoz) Supervisor

CANDIDATE’S DECLARATION

I, Ms. Bushra Asad, Department of Sociology certify that the work embodied in this Ph.D. thesis is my own bonafide work carried out by me under the kind supervision of Prof. Nikhat Firoz at Department of Sociology, Aligarh Muslim University, Aligarh. The matter embodied in this Ph.D. thesis has not been submitted for the award of any other degree.

I declare that I have faithfully acknowledged, given credit to and referred to the research workers wherever their works have been cited in the text and body of the thesis. I further certify that I have not willfully lifted up some other's work, para, text, data, result, etc. reported in the journals, books, magazines, reports, dissertations, theses, etc., or available at websites and included them in this Ph.D. thesis and cited as my own work.

Dated:…………….. (Signature of the Candidate)

Certificate from Supervisor

This is to certify that the above statement made by the candidate is correct to the best of my knowledge.

Prof. Nikhat Firoz Department of Sociology Aligarh Muslim University, Aligarh, INDIA (Signature of the Chairman of the department with Seal)

ANNEXURE – II

COURSE/COMPREHENSIVE EXAMINATION/PRE-SUBMISSION SEMINAR COMPLETION CERTIFICATE

This is to certify that Ms. Bushra Asad, Research Scholar, Department of Sociology has satisfactorily completed the course work/comprehensive examination and pre- submission seminar requirement which is part of her Ph.D. Programme.

Date……………..

Signature of Chairman Department of Sociology AMU, Aligarh

Certificate

Title of the Thesis: THE EMERGING PATTERNS OF MARRIAGE AMONG MUSLIMS: A SOCIOLOGICAL STUDY OF ALIGARH CITY

Candidate‟s Name: BUSHRA ASAD

The undersigned hereby assigns to the Aligarh Muslim University, Aligarh copyright that may exist in and for the above thesis submitted for the award of the Ph.D Degree.

Signature of Candidate

Note: However, the author may reproduce or authorize others to reproduce material extracted verbatim from the thesis or derivative of the thesis for author's personal use provide that the source and the University's copyright notice are indicated.

Acknowledgement

First and foremost I wish to express my endless thanks to Almighty God, The most benevolent and merciful, who blessed me for the timely completion of this thesis.

Words are too less to express my deep sense of gratitude to my supervisor Dr. Mrs. Nikhat Firoz ( Professor) Department of Sociology , Aligarh Muslim University Aligarh, for being exceptionally nice to me throughout my research. This study would have never been accomplished without her painstaking, humble and excellent guidance through all the stages of my research.

I am extremely grateful to Prof.Abdul Matin Chairman, Department of Sociology, Aligarh Muslim University for his intellectual support and encouragement.

I take this opportunity to express my sincere gratitude to all the teachers of my department for this support and for developing healthy academic environment in the department. I am also thankful to my colleagues in the Department for this kind assistance at various stages of my research.

Moreover, I wish to give thanks to the staff of Maulana Azad Library, Aligarh Muslim University, Seminar library, Department of Sociology Aligarh Muslim University. I am also grateful to the University Grants Commission for providing me with the fellowship during the period of my study.

I also wish to thanks my friends (Iqra and Aqsa) for their moral support and cooperation and for making Aligarh a memorable place for me.

Finally, with a profound sense of gratitude and love I must express the kind and generous support that I have been receiving from my beloved father Asad Wahab Khan and my mother (late) Anjum Asad . Whatever I am today, it is because of their prayers, loving care and sincere endeavours. I cannot give them anything in return except a heartful of love, affection and deep reverence. My special thanks are also due to my husband Danish Khan who cooperated and supported me at every stage of my research.

I am grateful to all the respondents for their cooperation and overwhelming response to the interviews without which the present work would not have been accomplished.

Finally I am very much indebted to all those who have directly and indirectly been associated towards the completion of the present work.

Date:______BUSHRA ASAD

CONTENTS

Certificates Acknowledgement List of Tables List of Graphs List of Map

Chapter 1: INTRODUCTION 1-18 1.1 Objectives of the study 1.2 Hypothesis of the study 1.3 Marriage 1.4 Characteristics of marriage 1.5 Forms of Marriage a) Group marriage b) Polyandry c) Polygamy d) Monogamy e) Endogamy f) Hypergamy g) Hypogamy h) Exogamy 1.6 Marriage in Islam

Chapter 2: REVIEW OF LITERATURE 19-32

Chapter 3: RESEARCH METHODOLOGY 33-38

Chapter 4: DATA ANALYSES AND INTERPRETATION 39-160

Chapter 5: CONCLUSION AND SUGGESTIONS 161-168

TABLES AND FIGURES 169-459

BIBLIOGRAPHY 460-464

Appendix – I: INTERVIEW SCHEDULE a) Female b) Male

Appendix – II: PUBLISHED PAPER

LIST OF TABLES

In table 1.1 to 1.25 data on the respondents belonging to the first generation is presented

Table Page Title of Tables No. No. A Profile of the respondents in the first generation 36 B Profile of the respondents in the second generation 36 C Profile of the respondents in the third generation 37 1.1 Age at marriage of the respondents 169 1.2 Preferred age of marriage of the respondents 174 1.3 Respondents who favoured dowry 179 1.4 Respondents who have given and taken dowry 184 1.5 Female respondents who considered social status as the main 189 reason of dowry 1.6 Female respondents who experienced domestic violence 192 1.7 Male respondents who demanded dowry 195 1.8 Respondents who have received and paid mehr 198 1.9 Respondents attitude towards polygyny 203 1.10 Female respondents who experienced polygyny 208 1.11 Under what conditions the female respondents would allow second 211 wife 1.12 Male respondents view on equal treatment to wives 214 1.13 Respondents who favoured divorce 217 1.14 Female respondents who experienced divorce 222 1.15 Major cause of divorce among respondents 225 1.16 Respondents who favoured family planning 228 1.17 Respondents who used contraceptives methods 233 1.18 Respondents view on type of successful marriage 238 1.19 Type of marriage of the respondents 243 1.20 Male respondents who helped their wives in household chores 248 1.21 Male respondents who allowed their wives to work outside 251 1.22 Male respondents who allowed their wives to go for shopping 254 alone 1.23 Female respondents who took decision on financial matters 257 1.24 Actual number of children in the family of the respondent. 260 1.25 Female respondents view on ideal number of children 263

In table 2.1 to 2.25 data on the respondents belonging to the second generation is presented

Table Page Title of Table No. No. 2.1 Age at marriage of the respondents 266 2.2 Preferred age of marriage of the respondents 271 2.3 Respondents who favoured dowry 276 2.4 Respondents who have given and taken dowry 281 2.5 Female respondents who considered social status as the main 286 reason of dowry 2.6 Female respondents who experienced domestic violence 289 2.7 Male respondents who demanded dowry 292 2.8 Respondents who have received and paid mehr 295 2.9 Respondents attitude towards polygyny 300 2.10 Female respondents who experienced polygyny 305 2.11 Under what conditions female respondents would allow second 308 wife 2.12 Male respondents view on equal treatment to wives 311 2.13 Respondents who favoured divorce 314 2.14 Female respondents who experienced divorce 319 2.15 Major cause of divorce among respondents 322 2.16 Respondents who favoured family planning 325 2.17 Respondents who used contraceptives methods 330 2.18 Respondents view on type of successful marriage 335 2.19 Type of marriage of the respondents 340 2.20 Male respondents who helped their wives in household chores 345 2.21 Male respondents who allowed their wives to work outside 348 2.22 Male respondents who allowed their wives to go for shopping 351 alone 2.23 Female respondents who took decision on financial matters 354 2.24 Actual number of children in the family of the respondents 357 2.25 Female respondents view on ideal number of children 360

In table 3.1 to 3.25 data on the respondents belonging to the third generation is presented

Table Page Title of Table No. No. 3.1 Age at marriage of the respondents 363 3.2 Preferred age of marriage of the respondents 368 3.3 Respondents who favoured dowry 373 3.4 Respondents who have given and taken dowry 378 3.5 Female respondents who considered social status as the main 383 reason of dowry 3.6 Female respondents who experienced domestic violence 386 3.7 Male respondents who demanded dowry 389 3.8 Respondents who have received and paid mehr 392 3.9 Respondents attitude towards polygyny 397 3.10 Female respondents who experienced polygyny 402 3.11 Under what conditions the female respondents would allow second 405 wife 3.12 Male respondents view on equal treatment to wives 408 3.13 Respondents who favoured divorce 411 3.14 Female respondents who experienced divorce 416 3.15 Major cause of divorce among the respondents 419 3.16 Respondents who favoured family planning 422 3.17 Respondents who used contraceptives methods 427 3.18 Respondents view on type of successful marriage 432 3.19 Type of marriage of the respondent 437 3.20 Male respondents who helped their wives in household chores 442 3.21 Male respondents who allowed their wives to work outside 445 3.22 Male respondents who allowed their wives to go for shopping 448 alone 3.23 Female respondents who took decision on financial matters 451 3.24 Actual number of children in the family of the respondents 454 3.25 Female respondents view on ideal number of children 457

LIST OF GRAPHS IN THE FIRST GENERATION

Graph Page Title of Graphs No. No. 1.1 a) Graph showing educational level and age at marriage (female) 170 b) Graph showing educational level and age at marriage (male) 170 c) Graph showing religiosity and age at marriage (female) 171 d) Graph showing religiosity and age at marriage (male) 171 e) Graph showing residential background and age at marriage 172 (female) f) Graph showing residential background and age at marriage 172 (male) g) Graph showing monthly income and age at marriage (female) 173 h) Graph showing monthly income and age at marriage (male) 173 1.2 a) Graph showing educational level and preferred age of marriage 175 (female) b) Graph showing educational level and preferred age of marriage 175 (male) c) Graph showing religiosity and preferred age of marriage 176 (female) d) Graph showing religiosity and preferred age of marriage (male) 176 e) Graph showing residential background and preferred age of 177 marriage (female) f) Graph showing residential background and preferred age of 177 marriage (male) g) Graph showing monthly income and preferred age of marriage 178 (female) h) Graph showing monthly income and preferred age of marriage 178 (male) 1.3 a) Graph showing educational level and respondents who favoured 180 dowry (female) b) Graph showing educational level and respondents who favoured 180 dowry (male) c) Graph showing religiosity and respondents who favoured dowry 181 (female) d) Graph showing religiosity and respondents who favoured dowry 181 (male) e) Graph showing residential background and respondents who 182 favoured dowry (female) f) Graph showing residential background and respondents who 182 favoured dowry (male) g) Graph showing monthly income and respondents who favoured 183 dowry (female) h) Graph showing monthly income and respondents who favoured 183 dowry (male) 1.4 a) Graph showing educational level and respondents who have 185 given dowry (female) b) Graph showing educational level and respondents who have 185 taken dowry (male) c) Graph showing religiosity and respondents who have given 186 dowry (female) d) Graph showing religiosity and respondents who have taken 186 dowry (male) e) Graph showing residential background and respondents who 187 have given dowry (female) f) Graph showing residential background and respondents who 187 have taken dowry (male) g) Graph showing monthly income and respondents who have 188 given dowry (female) h) Graph showing monthly income and respondents who have 188 taken dowry (male) 1.5 a) Graph showing educational level and social status as the main 190 reason of dowry (female) b) Graph showing religiosity and social status as the main reason 190 of dowry (female) c) Graph showing residential background and social status as the 191 main reason of dowry (female) d) Graph showing monthly income and social status as the main 191 reason of dowry (female) 1.6 a) Graph showing educational level and female who experienced 193 domestic violence b) Graph showing religiosity and female who experienced 193 domestic violence c) Graph showing residential background and female who 194 experienced domestic violence d) Graph showing monthly income and female who experienced 194 domestic violence

1.7 a) Graph showing educational level and male who demanded 196 dowry b) Graph showing religiosity and male who demanded dowry 196 c) Graph showing residential background and male who demanded 197 dowry d) Graph showing monthly income and male who demanded 197 dowry 1.8 a) Graph showing educational level and mehr received (female) 199 b) Graph showing educational level and mehr paid (male) 199 c) Graph showing religiosity and mehr received (female) 200 d) Graph showing religiosity and mehr paid (male) 200 e) Graph showing residential background and mehr received 201 (female) f) Graph showing residential background and mehr paid (male) 201 g) Graph showing monthly income and mehr received (female) 202 h) Graph showing monthly income and paid mehr (male) 202 1.9 a) Graph showing educational level and attitude towards polygyny 204 (female) b) Graph showing educational level and attitude towards polygyny 204 (male) c) Graph showing religiosity and attitude towards polygyny 205 (female) d) Graph showing religiosity and attitude towards polygyny (male) 205 e) Graph showing residential background and attitude towards 206 polygyny (female) f) Graph showing residential background and attitude towards 206 polygyny (male) g) Graph showing monthly income and attitude towards polygyny 207 (female) h) Graph showing monthly income and attitude towards polygyny 207 (male) 1.10 a) Graph showing educational level and female who experienced 209 polygyny b) Graph showing religiosity and female who experienced 209 polygyny c) Graph showing residential background and female who 210 experienced polygyny d) Graph showing monthly income and female who experienced 210 polygyny 1.11 a) Graph showing educational level and conditions in which 212 female respondents would allow second wife. b) Graph showing religiosity and conditions in which female 212 respondents would allow second wife. c) Graph showing residential background and conditions in which 213 female respondents would allow second wife. d) Graph showing monthly income and conditions in which female 213 respondents would allow second wife. 1.12 a) Graph showing educational level and view on equal treatment to 215 wives b) Graph showing religiosity and view on equal treatment to wives 215 c) Graph showing residential background and view on equal 216 treatment to wives d) Graph showing monthly income and view on equal treatment to 216 wives 1.13 a) Graph showing educational level and respondents who favoured 218 divorce (female) b) Graph showing educational level and respondents who favoured 218 divorce (male) c) Graph showing religiosity and respondents who favoured 219 divorce (female) d) Graph showing religiosity and respondents who favoured 219 divorce (male) e) Graph showing residential background and respondents who 220 favoured divorce (female) f) Graph showing residential background and respondents who 220 favoured divorce (male) g) Graph showing monthly income and respondents who favoured 221 divorce (female) h) Graph showing monthly income and respondents who favoured 221 divorce (male) 1.14 a) Graph showing educational level and female who experienced 223 divorce b) Graph showing religiosity and female who experienced divorce 223 c) Graph showing residential background and female who 224 experienced divorce d) Graph showing monthly income and female who experienced 224 divorce 1.15 a) Graph showing educational level and major cause of divorce 226 b) Graph showing religiosity and major cause of divorce 226 c) Graph showing residential background and major cause of 227 divorce d) Graph showing monthly income and major cause of divorce 227 1.16 a) Graph showing educational level and respondents who favoured 229 family planning (female) b) Graph showing educational level and respondents who 229 favoured family planning (male) c) Graph showing religiosity and respondents who favoured family 230 planning (female) d) Graph showing religiosity and respondents who favoured family 230 planning (male) e) Graph showing residential background and respondents who 231 favoured family planning (female) f) Graph showing residential background and respondents who 231 favoured family planning (male) g) Graph showing monthly income and respondents who favoured 232 family planning (female) h) Graph showing monthly income and respondents who favoured 232 family planning (male) 1.17 a) Graph showing educational level and respondents who used 234 contraceptive methods (female) b) Graph showing educational level and respondents who used 234 contraceptive methods (male) c) Graph showing religiosity and respondents who used 235 contraceptive methods (female) d) Graph showing religiosity and respondents who used 235 contraceptive methods (male) e) Graph showing residential background and respondents who 236 used contraceptive methods (female) f) Graph showing residential background and respondents who 236 used contraceptive methods (male) g) Graph showing monthly income and respondents who used 237 contraceptive methods (female) h ) Graph showing monthly income and respondents who used 237 contraceptive methods (male)

1.18 a) Graph showing educational level and view on type of successful 239 marriage (female) b) Graph showing educational level and view on type of successful 239 marriage (male) c) Graph showing religiosity and view on type of successful 240 marriage (female) d) Graph showing religiosity and view on type of successful 240 marriage (male) e) Graph showing residential background and view on type of 241 successful marriage (female) f) Graph showing residential background and view on type of 241 successful marriage (male) g) Graph showing monthly income and view on type of successful 242 marriage (female) h) Graph showing monthly income and view on type of successful 242 marriage (male) 1.19 a) Graph showing educational level and type of marriage of the 244 respondents (female) b) Graph showing educational level and type of marriage of the 244 respondents (male) c) Graph showing religiosity and type of marriage of the 245 respondents (female) d) Graph showing religiosity and type of marriage of the 245 respondents (male) e) Graph showing residential background and type of marriage of 246 the respondents (female) f) Graph showing residential background and type of marriage of 246 the respondents (male) g) Graph showing monthly income and type of marriage of the 247 respondents (female) h) Graph showing monthly income and type of marriage of the 247 respondents (male) 1.20 a) Graph showing educational level and male respondents who 249 helped wives in household chores b) Graph showing religiosity and male respondents who helped 249 wives in household chores c) Graph showing residential background and male respondents 250 who helped wives in household chores d) Graph showing monthly income and male respondents who 250 helped wives in household chores 1.21 a) Graph showing educational level and male respondents who 252 allowed their wives to work outside b) Graph showing religiosity and male respondents who allowed 252 their wives to work outside c) Graph showing residential background and male respondents 253 who allowed their wives to work outside d) Graph showing monthly income and male respondents who 253 allowed their wives to work outside 1.22 a) Graph showing educational level and male respondents who 255 allowed their wives to go for shopping alone b) Graph showing religiosity and male respondents who allowed 255 their wives to go for shopping alone c) Graph showing residential background and male respondents 256 who allowed their wives to go for shopping alone d) Graph showing monthly income and male respondents who 256 allowed their wives to go for shopping alone 1.23 a) Graph showing educational level and females who took decision 258 on financial matters b) Graph showing religiosity and females who took decision on 258 financial matters c) Graph showing residential background and females who took 259 decision on financial matters d) Graph showing monthly income and females who took decision 259 on financial matters 1.24 a) Graph showing educational level and actual number of children 261 in respondent‟s family b) Graph showing religiosity and actual number of children in 261 respondent‟s family c) Graph showing residential background and actual number of 262 children in respondent‟s family d) Graph showing monthly income and actual number of children 262 in respondent‟s family 1.25 a) Graph showing educational level and ideal number of children 264 b) Graph showing religiosity and ideal number of children 264 c) Graph showing residential background and ideal number of 265 children d) Graph showing monthly income and ideal number of children 265

LIST OF GRAPHS IN THE SECOND GENERATION

Graph Page Title of Graphs No. No. 2.1 a) Graph showing educational level and age at marriage (female) 267 b) Graph showing educational level and age at marriage (male) 267 c) Graph showing religiosity and age at marriage (female) 268 d) Graph showing religiosity and age at marriage (male) 268 e) Graph showing residential background and age at marriage 269 (female) f) Graph showing residential background and age at marriage 269 (male) g) Graph showing monthly income and age at marriage (female) 270 h) Graph showing monthly income and age at marriage (male) 270 2.2 a) Graph showing educational level and preferred age of marriage 272 (female) b) Graph showing educational level and preferred age of marriage 272 (male) c) Graph showing religiosity and preferred age of marriage 273 (female) d) Graph showing religiosity and preferred age of marriage (male) 273 e) Graph showing residential background and preferred age of 274 marriage (female) f) Graph showing residential background and preferred age of 274 marriage (male) g) Graph showing monthly income and preferred age of marriage 275 (female) h) Graph showing monthly income and preferred age of marriage 275 (male) 2.3 a) Graph showing educational level and respondents who favoured 277 dowry (female) b) Graph showing educational level and respondents who favoured 277 dowry (male) c) Graph showing religiosity and respondents who favoured dowry 278 (female) d) Graph showing religiosity and respondents who favoured dowry 278 (male) e) Graph showing residential background and respondents who 279 favoured dowry (female) f) Graph showing residential background and respondents who 279 favoured dowry (male) g) Graph showing monthly income and respondents who favoured 280 dowry (female) h) Graph showing monthly income and respondents who favoured 280 dowry (male) 2.4 a) Graph showing educational level and respondents who have 282 given dowry (female) b) Graph showing educational level and respondents who have 282 taken dowry (male) c) Graph showing religiosity and respondents who have given 283 dowry (female) d) Graph showing religiosity and respondents who have taken 283 dowry (male) e) Graph showing residential background and respondents who 284 have given dowry (female) f) Graph showing residential background and respondents who 284 have taken dowry (male) g) Graph showing monthly income and respondents who have 285 given dowry (female) h) Graph showing monthly income and respondents who have 285 taken dowry (male) 2.5 a) Graph showing educational level and social status as the main 287 reason of dowry (female) b) Graph showing religiosity and social status as the main reason 287 of dowry (female) c) Graph showing residential background and social status as the 288 main reason of dowry (female) d) Graph showing monthly income and social status as the main 288 reason of dowry (female) 2.6 a) Graph showing educational level and female who experienced 290 domestic violence b) Graph showing religiosity and female who experienced 290 domestic violence c) Graph showing residential background and female who 291 experienced domestic violence d) Graph showing monthly income and female who experienced 291 domestic violence 2.7 a) Graph showing educational level and male who demanded 293 dowry b) Graph showing religiosity and male who demanded dowry 293 c) Graph showing residential background and male who demanded 294 dowry d) Graph showing monthly income and male who demanded 294 dowry 2.8 a) Graph showing educational level and mehr received (female) 296 b) Graph showing educational level and mehr paid (male) 296 c) Graph showing religiosity and mehr received (female) 297 d) Graph showing religiosity and mehr paid (male) 297 e) Graph showing residential background and mehr received 298 (female) f) Graph showing residential background and mehr paid (male) 298 g) Graph showing monthly income and mehr received (female) 299 h) Graph showing monthly income and paid mehr (male) 299 2.9 a) Graph showing educational level and attitude towards polygyny 301 (female) b) Graph showing educational level and attitude towards polygyny 301 (male) c) Graph showing religiosity and attitude towards polygyny 302 (female) d) Graph showing religiosity and attitude towards polygyny (male) 302 e) Graph showing residential background and attitude towards 303 polygyny (female) f) Graph showing residential background and attitude towards 303 polygyny (male) g) Graph showing monthly income and attitude towards polygyny 304 (female) h) Graph showing monthly income and attitude towards polygyny 304 (male) 2.10 a) Graph showing educational level and female who experienced 306 polygyny b) Graph showing religiosity and female who experienced 306 polygyny c) Graph showing residential background and female who 307 experienced polygyny d) Graph showing monthly income and female who experienced 307 polygyny 2.11 a) Graph showing educational level and conditions in which 309 female respondents would allow second wife. b) Graph showing religiosity and conditions in which female 309 respondents would allow second wife. c) Graph showing residential background and conditions in which 310 female respondents would allow second wife. d) Graph showing monthly income and conditions in which female 310 respondents would allow second wife. 2.12 a) Graph showing educational level and view on equal treatment to 312 wives b) Graph showing religiosity and view on equal treatment to wives 312 c) Graph showing residential background and view on equal 313 treatment to wives d) Graph showing monthly income and view on equal treatment to 313 wives 2.13 a) Graph showing educational level and respondents who favoured 315 divorce (female) b) Graph showing educational level and respondents who favoured 315 divorce (male) c) Graph showing religiosity and respondents who favoured 316 divorce (female) d) Graph showing religiosity and respondents who favoured 316 divorce (male) e) Graph showing residential background and respondents who 317 favoured divorce (female) f) Graph showing residential background and respondents who 317 favoured divorce (male) g) Graph showing monthly income and respondents who favoured 318 divorce (female) h) Graph showing monthly income and respondents who favoured 318 divorce (male) 2.14 a) Graph showing educational level and female who experienced 320 divorce b) Graph showing religiosity and female who experienced divorce 320 c) Graph showing residential background and female who 321 experienced divorce d) Graph showing monthly income and female who experienced 321 divorce 2.15 a) Graph showing educational level and major cause of divorce 323 b) Graph showing religiosity and major cause of divorce 323 c) Graph showing residential background and major cause of 324 divorce d) Graph showing monthly income and major cause of divorce 324 2.16 a) Graph showing educational level and respondents who favoured 326 family planning (female) b) Graph showing educational level and respondents who 226 favoured family planning (male) c) Graph showing religiosity and respondents who favoured family 327 planning (female) d) Graph showing religiosity and respondents who favoured family 327 planning (male) e) Graph showing residential background and respondents who 328 favoured family planning (female) f) Graph showing residential background and respondents who 328 favoured family planning (male) g) Graph showing monthly income and respondents who favoured 329 family planning (female) h) Graph showing monthly income and respondents who favoured 329 family planning (male) 2.17 a) Graph showing educational level and respondents who used 331 contraceptive methods (female) b) Graph showing educational level and respondents who used 331 contraceptive methods (male) c) Graph showing religiosity and respondents who used 332 contraceptive methods (female) d) Graph showing religiosity and respondents who used 332 contraceptive methods (male) e) Graph showing residential background and respondents who 333 used contraceptive methods (female) f) Graph showing residential background and respondents who 333 used contraceptive methods (male) g) Graph showing monthly income and respondents who used 334 contraceptive methods (female) h ) Graph showing monthly income and respondents who used 334 contraceptive methods (male)

2.18 a) Graph showing educational level and view on type of successful 336 marriage (female) b) Graph showing educational level and view on type of successful 336 marriage (male) c) Graph showing religiosity and view on type of successful 337 marriage (female) d) Graph showing religiosity and view on type of successful 337 marriage (male) e) Graph showing residential background and view on type of 338 successful marriage (female) f) Graph showing residential background and view on type of 338 successful marriage (male) g) Graph showing monthly income and view on type of successful 339 marriage (female) h) Graph showing monthly income and view on type of successful 339 marriage (male) 2.19 a) Graph showing educational level and type of marriage of the 341 respondents (female) b) Graph showing educational level and type of marriage of the 341 respondents (male) c) Graph showing religiosity and type of marriage of the 342 respondents (female) d) Graph showing religiosity and type of marriage of the 342 respondents (male) e) Graph showing residential background and type of marriage of 343 the respondents (female) f) Graph showing residential background and type of marriage of 343 the respondents (male) g) Graph showing monthly income and type of marriage of the 344 respondents (female) h) Graph showing monthly income and type of marriage of the 344 respondents (male) 2.20 a) Graph showing educational level and male respondents who 346 helped wives in household chores b) Graph showing religiosity and male respondents who helped 346 wives in household chores c) Graph showing residential background and male respondents 347 who helped wives in household chores d) Graph showing monthly income and male respondents who 347 helped wives in household chores

2.21 a) Graph showing educational level and male respondents who 349 allowed their wives to work outside b) Graph showing religiosity and male respondents who allowed 349 their wives to work outside c) Graph showing residential background and male respondents 350 who allowed their wives to work outside d) Graph showing monthly income and male respondents who 350 allowed their wives to work outside 2.22 a) Graph showing educational level and male respondents who 352 allowed their wives to go for shopping alone b) Graph showing religiosity and male respondents who allowed 352 their wives to go for shopping alone c) Graph showing residential background and male respondents 353 who allowed their wives to go for shopping alone d) Graph showing monthly income and male respondents who 353 allowed their wives to go for shopping alone 2.23 a) Graph showing educational level and females who took decision 355 on financial matters b) Graph showing religiosity and females who took decision on 355 financial matters c) Graph showing residential background and females who took 356 decision on financial matters d) Graph showing monthly income and females who took decision 356 on financial matters 2.24 a) Graph showing educational level and actual number of children 358 in respondent‟s family b) Graph showing religiosity and actual number of children in 358 respondent‟s family c) Graph showing residential background and actual number of 359 children in respondent‟s family d) Graph showing monthly income and actual number of children 359 in respondent‟s family 2.25 a) Graph showing educational level and ideal number of children 361 b) Graph showing religiosity and ideal number of children 361 c) Graph showing residential background and ideal number of 362 children d) Graph showing monthly income and ideal number of children 362

LIST OF GRAPHS IN THE THIRD GENERATION

Graph Page Title of Graphs No. No. 3.1 a) Graph showing educational level and age at marriage (female) 364 b) Graph showing educational level and age at marriage (male) 364 c) Graph showing religiosity and age at marriage (female) 365 d) Graph showing religiosity and age at marriage (male) 365 e) Graph showing residential background and age at marriage 366 (female) f) Graph showing residential background and age at marriage 366 (male) g) Graph showing monthly income and age at marriage (female) 367 h) Graph showing monthly income and age at marriage (male) 367 3.2 a) Graph showing educational level and preferred age of marriage 369 (female) b) Graph showing educational level and preferred age of marriage 369 (male) c) Graph showing religiosity and preferred age of marriage 370 (female) d) Graph showing religiosity and preferred age of marriage (male) 370 e) Graph showing residential background and preferred age of 371 marriage (female) f) Graph showing residential background and preferred age of 371 marriage (male) g) Graph showing monthly income and preferred age of marriage 372 (female) h) Graph showing monthly income and preferred age of marriage 372 (male) 3.3 a) Graph showing educational level and respondents who favoured 374 dowry (female) b) Graph showing educational level and respondents who favoured 374 dowry (male) c) Graph showing religiosity and respondents who favoured dowry 375 (female) d) Graph showing religiosity and respondents who favoured dowry 375 (male) e) Graph showing residential background and respondents who 376 favoured dowry (female) f) Graph showing residential background and respondents who 376 favoured dowry (male) g) Graph showing monthly income and respondents who favoured 377 dowry (female) h) Graph showing monthly income and respondents who favoured 377 dowry (male) 3.4 a) Graph showing educational level and respondents who have 379 given dowry (female) b) Graph showing educational level and respondents who have 379 taken dowry (male) c) Graph showing religiosity and respondents who have given 380 dowry (female) d) Graph showing religiosity and respondents who have taken 380 dowry (male) e) Graph showing residential background and respondents who 381 have given dowry (female) f) Graph showing residential background and respondents who 381 have taken dowry (male) g) Graph showing monthly income and respondents who have 382 given dowry (female) h) Graph showing monthly income and respondents who have 382 taken dowry (male) 3.5 a) Graph showing educational level and social status as the main 384 reason of dowry (female) b) Graph showing religiosity and social status as the main reason 384 of dowry (female) c) Graph showing residential background and social status as the 385 main reason of dowry (female) d) Graph showing monthly income and social status as the main 385 reason of dowry (female) 3.6 a) Graph showing educational level and female who experienced 387 domestic violence b) Graph showing religiosity and female who experienced 387 domestic violence c) Graph showing residential background and female who 388 experienced domestic violence d) Graph showing monthly income and female who experienced 388 domestic violence 3.7 a) Graph showing educational level and male who demanded 390 dowry b) Graph showing religiosity and male who demanded dowry 390 c) Graph showing residential background and male who demanded 391 dowry d) Graph showing monthly income and male who demanded 391 dowry 3.8 a) Graph showing educational level and mehr received (female) 393 b) Graph showing educational level and mehr paid (male) 393 c) Graph showing religiosity and mehr received (female) 394 d) Graph showing religiosity and mehr paid (male) 394 e) Graph showing residential background and mehr received 395 (female) f) Graph showing residential background and mehr paid (male) 395 g) Graph showing monthly income and mehr received (female) 396 h) Graph showing monthly income and paid mehr (male) 396 3.9 a) Graph showing educational level and attitude towards polygyny 398 (female) b) Graph showing educational level and attitude towards polygyny 398 (male) c) Graph showing religiosity and attitude towards polygyny 399 (female) d) Graph showing religiosity and attitude towards polygyny (male) 399 e) Graph showing residential background and attitude towards 400 polygyny (female) f) Graph showing residential background and attitude towards 400 polygyny (male) g) Graph showing monthly income and attitude towards polygyny 401 (female) h) Graph showing monthly income and attitude towards polygyny 401 (male) 3.10 a) Graph showing educational level and female who experienced 403 polygyny b) Graph showing religiosity and female who experienced 403 polygyny c) Graph showing residential background and female who 404 experienced polygyny d) Graph showing monthly income and female who experienced 404 polygyny 3.11 a) Graph showing educational level and conditions in which 406 female respondents would allow second wife. b) Graph showing religiosity and conditions in which female 406 respondents would allow second wife. c) Graph showing residential background and conditions in which 407 female respondents would allow second wife. d) Graph showing monthly income and conditions in which female 407 respondents would allow second wife. 3.12 a) Graph showing educational level and view on equal treatment to 409 wives b) Graph showing religiosity and view on equal treatment to wives 409 c) Graph showing residential background and view on equal 410 treatment to wives d) Graph showing monthly income and view on equal treatment to 410 wives 3.13 a) Graph showing educational level and respondents who favoured 412 divorce (female) b) Graph showing educational level and respondents who favoured 412 divorce (male) c) Graph showing religiosity and respondents who favoured 413 divorce (female) d) Graph showing religiosity and respondents who favoured 413 divorce (male) e) Graph showing residential background and respondents who 414 favoured divorce (female) f) Graph showing residential background and respondents who 414 favoured divorce (male) g) Graph showing monthly income and respondents who favoured 415 divorce (female) h) Graph showing monthly income and respondents who favoured 415 divorce (male) 3.14 a) Graph showing educational level and female who experienced 417 divorce b) Graph showing religiosity and female who experienced divorce 417 c) Graph showing residential background and female who 418 experienced divorce d) Graph showing monthly income and female who experienced 418 divorce 3.15 a) Graph showing educational level and major cause of divorce 420 b) Graph showing religiosity and major cause of divorce 420 c) Graph showing residential background and major cause of 421 divorce d) Graph showing monthly income and major cause of divorce 421 3.16 a) Graph showing educational level and respondents who favoured 423 family planning (female) b) Graph showing educational level and respondents who 423 favoured family planning (male) c) Graph showing religiosity and respondents who favoured family 424 planning (female) d) Graph showing religiosity and respondents who favoured family 424 planning (male) e) Graph showing residential background and respondents who 425 favoured family planning (female) f) Graph showing residential background and respondents who 425 favoured family planning (male) g) Graph showing monthly income and respondents who favoured 426 family planning (female) h) Graph showing monthly income and respondents who favoured 426 family planning (male) 3.17 a) Graph showing educational level and respondents who used 428 contraceptive methods (female) b) Graph showing educational level and respondents who used 428 contraceptive methods (male) c) Graph showing religiosity and respondents who used 429 contraceptive methods (female) d) Graph showing religiosity and respondents who used 429 contraceptive methods (male) e) Graph showing residential background and respondents who 430 used contraceptive methods (female) f) Graph showing residential background and respondents who 430 used contraceptive methods (male) g) Graph showing monthly income and respondents who used 431 contraceptive methods (female) h ) Graph showing monthly income and respondents who used 431 contraceptive methods (male)

3.18 a) Graph showing educational level and view on type of successful 433 marriage (female) b) Graph showing educational level and view on type of successful 433 marriage (male) c) Graph showing religiosity and view on type of successful 434 marriage (female) d) Graph showing religiosity and view on type of successful 434 marriage (male) e) Graph showing residential background and view on type of 435 successful marriage (female) f) Graph showing residential background and view on type of 435 successful marriage (male) g) Graph showing monthly income and view on type of successful 436 marriage (female) h) Graph showing monthly income and view on type of successful 436 marriage (male) 3.19 a) Graph showing educational level and type of marriage of the 438 respondents (female) b) Graph showing educational level and type of marriage of the 438 respondents (male) c) Graph showing religiosity and type of marriage of the 439 respondents (female) d) Graph showing religiosity and type of marriage of the 439 respondents (male) e) Graph showing residential background and type of marriage of 440 the respondents (female) f) Graph showing residential background and type of marriage of 440 the respondents (male) g) Graph showing monthly income and type of marriage of the 441 respondents (female) h) Graph showing monthly income and type of marriage of the 441 respondents (male) 3.20 a) Graph showing educational level and male respondents who 443 helped wives in household chores b) Graph showing religiosity and male respondents who helped 443 wives in household chores c) Graph showing residential background and male respondents 444 who helped wives in household chores d) Graph showing monthly income and male respondents who 444 helped wives in household chores 3.21 a) Graph showing educational level and male respondents who 446 allowed their wives to work outside b) Graph showing religiosity and male respondents who allowed 446 their wives to work outside c) Graph showing residential background and male respondents 447 who allowed their wives to work outside d) Graph showing monthly income and male respondents who 447 allowed their wives to work outside 3.22 a) Graph showing educational level and male respondents who 449 allowed their wives to go for shopping alone b) Graph showing religiosity and male respondents who allowed 449 their wives to go for shopping alone c) Graph showing residential background and male respondents 450 who allowed their wives to go for shopping alone d) Graph showing monthly income and male respondents who 450 allowed their wives to go for shopping alone 3.23 a) Graph showing educational level and females who took decision 452 on financial matters b) Graph showing religiosity and females who took decision on 452 financial matters c) Graph showing residential background and females who took 453 decision on financial matters d) Graph showing monthly income and females who took decision 453 on financial matters 3.24 a) Graph showing educational level and actual number of children 455 in respondent‟s family b) Graph showing religiosity and actual number of children in 455 respondent‟s family c) Graph showing residential background and actual number of 456 children in respondent‟s family d) Graph showing monthly income and actual number of children 456 in respondent‟s family 3.25 a) Graph showing educational level and ideal number of children 458 b) Graph showing religiosity and ideal number of children 458 c) Graph showing residential background and ideal number of 459 children d) Graph showing monthly income and ideal number of children 459

LIST OF MAP

Map Page Title of Map No. No.

1.1 Map of Aligarh City 33

CChhaapptteerr 11 IInnttrroodduuccttiioonn

The role and status of men and women in any society are defined by cultural ideology the normative system of beliefs and values which the society has developed over a period of time. The very perception of men and women their relative role and status are ideologically defined and sanctioned.

Socio-cultural norms and values promoted by social institutions guide man-woman relationship and their roles in the society. The cultural diversity of Indian society is manifested in different institutions, customs and practices. Marriage is one such institution which needs to be understood in its diverse forms as the status of individual in traditional societies like India is largely determined by marriage and family relationships.

In Indian society marriage is considered to be an institution through which men and women are initiated into the culture of society. Therefore, they are socialized to identify a set of goals in life which largely revolves around marriage and family.

In a traditional society, like India which is known for its cultural diversity the Muslims form a unique group by themselves due to their religious faith and values (Sheikh, 1991: 146). Among Muslims, like all other aspects of life, the man-woman relationship and the authority structure in the family too are rooted in traditional sanctions as written in sacred texts (Sheikh, 1991: 147).

1.1 Objectives of the Study

1. To assess the attitudinal changes among three generations of Muslim men and women towards family life.

1 2. To examine the attitudinal changes among three generations of Muslim men and women regarding matters related to marriage.

3. To examine the impact of education in bringing about change in the attitudes of Muslim men and women.

4. To examine the impact of residence on the attitude of Muslim men and women.

1.2 Hypothesis

1. The pattern of marriage has undergone changes among three generations of Muslims.

2. Age at marriage is increasing.

3. The custom of dowry is increasing.

4. Socio-economic background plays an important part in determining attitudinal change among the Muslims.

5. Rural/urban locale is an important factor in determining the rate of change among the Muslims.

6. Religious orthodox is not an important cause of Muslim women‟s lack of access to developmental facilities.

1.3 Marriage

The origin to the institution of marriage is traced back to the beginning of the human existence, though it has taken so many different shapes in different societies according to the times and conditions.

Marriage is a universal social institution. It is established by the human society to control and regulate the sex life of individuals. It is closely connected with the institutions of family. Marriage and family are two social institutions, complementary to each other. They are permanent element of our social system. Marriage is an institution which admits men and women to family life. It is a stable relationship in

2 which men and women are socially permitted to have children implying the right to sexual relations (Rao 2004: 334).

A happy marriage demands that there must be a sense of equality and social interdependence between the contracting parties. Moreover, the mutual freedom be respected. Physical and mental intimacy and certain degree of similarity along with some standards of values should also exist. These pre-requisites are fulfilled only in marriage.

Marriage is defined as sexual access between males and females, regulated and legitimized by society. The marriage ceremony is an important cultural institution in every society that signifies the union and grants them socially approved status as husband and wife. Every society has norms about who may have sexual relationship with persons believed to be closely related. It is a universal cultural standard (Abraham 2006: 157).

Anthropologists have proposed several definitions of marriage so as to encompass the wide variety of marital practices observed across cultures (Bell 1997: 237). Edward Westermarck in his book, „The History of Human Marriage‟ (1921) defined “marriage as a more or less durable connection between male and female lasting beyond the mere act of propagation till after the birth of the offspring” (Westermarck, 1927: 71). Later on, in (1936), he rejected his definition and proposed a new definition „marriage as a relation of one or more men to one or more women that is recognized by custom or law‟ (Westermarck, 1936:3). Edmund Leach defined that „marriage is a relationship established between a woman and one or more other persons, which provides that a child born to the woman under circumstances not prohibited by the rules of the relationship is accorded full birth statues rights common to normal member of his society or societal or social stratum‟(Gudoman,1976). While Hurton and Hunt (1968) considers marriage as social pattern to establish family.

1.4 Characteristics of Marriage:

1. Universality: Marriage is more or less a universal institution. It is found among illiterate as well as literate people. It is enforced as social rule in some of the societies.

3 2. Relationship between Man and Woman: Marriage is a union of man and woman. It indicates relationship between one or more men to one or more women. Who could marry whom? Such questions represent social rules regarding marriage, which differ significantly.

3. Marriage bond is enduring: Marriage indicates a long lasting bond between the husband and wife. Hence it is not coextensive with sex life. Marital relationship between man and woman lasts even after that sexual satisfaction is obtained. The Hindu believes that marriage is a sacred bond between husband and wife which even the death cannot break.

4. Marriage is associated with some civil or religious ceremony. Marriage gets its social recognition through some ceremony. This ceremony may have its own rites, rituals, customs, formalities etc.

5. Marriage requires social approval: A union of man and woman becomes a martial bond only when the society gives its approval. When marriage is given the hallmark of social approval, it becomes a legal contract.

6. Marriage creates mutual obligations: Marriage imposes certain rights and duties on both the husband and wife. Both are required to support each other and their children.

1.5 Forms of Marriage

Different forms of marriage with reference to the number of persons contracting are as follows: a) Group marriage:

Group marriage means the union between certain male and female. Till now it has been supposed to be a peculiarity of ancient and outdated units of civilization. It was in existence in some primitive tribes of India but it is again emerging as an ultra modern institution chiefly in American society where it is being adopted by the proportionally younger generation. It reflects a social revolution in sexual relationships. b) Polyandry:

4 It means union between one woman and several men whether the latter are related or unrelated with one another. c) Polygamy:

Polygamy or more correctly polygyny means union between one man and several women. Till recently, the general western trend in this regard has been to adopt formal legal monogamy though giving legal license to a male to have as many as informal and illegal sexual relations he likes thus legalizing illicit polygamy. Legal polygamy is prevalent among the Muslims as non-legal among the Hindus. d) Monogamy:

It is a union of one man and one woman, though Christianity has not placed any restriction upon the number of wives a man can take, yet celibacy has been since the inception of Christianity the exemplary form of life. As a result the Christian fathers have allowed not more than one wife and it is viewed as the ideal form of marriage. Legal monogamy has been enforced among the Hindus since 1956, after the enactment of the Hindu marriage Act, though according to Hindu shastra, the number of wives has not been restricted. On the contrary, we find in the mythology and traditions of Hindustan that a Hindu could take any number of wives as he liked. Of all the religions of the world, Islam has been the first and the only religion which reflects the number of wives a man could take at one time. (Stone and A. 1939:21)

Different forms of marriage with reference to the groups into which a person can and cannot marry: e) Endogamy:

Endogamy defines the group in which socially approved marital unions can take place. They are generally the tribe or the jati. f) Hypergamy:

Hypergamy marriage allows alliance of a lower jati woman to a higher jati man. But culture defines how low in the caste hierarchy one can go in this type of marriage. This type of marriage is Anuloma . g) Hypogamy:

5 In this type of marriage, an upper jati woman can enter into an alliance with a man of lower jati. This is also called pratiloma. h) Exogamy:

It determines the categories among whom marriage alliances cannot take place. Hindu cannot marry within their Gotra because it is believed to have a common ancestor. Alliance between Sapinda is also prohibited. Sapinda constitutes seven generations in the father‟s line and five generations in the mother‟s line. (Dube:1990: 72-73)

1.6 Marriage in Islam

In a traditional society like India, which is known for its cultural diversity the Muslims form a unique group by themselves due to their religious faith and values (Sheikh, 1991:146). Among Muslims like all other aspects of life, the man- woman relationship and the authority structure in the family too are rooted in traditional sanctions as written in the sacred texts. As regards the status and role of woman specific rules are laid down in the religious texts. There is a close link between the authority structures in the family and in religion and this affects decision-making and overall behaviour pattern of the members (Sheikh, 1991:147).

Islam has also its own values of marital relationship and the ways of marriage bondage and its declaration before the community. Marriage is performed only when the couples have expressed their willingness according to the preachings of the holy prophet (Siddiqui, 1996:1).

During the course of history women have long been oppressed section of the society. In most civilization of the world, a woman enjoyed hardly any role outside the household. She was contemptible and despised in their estimate. She had no social and political rights. She could not exercise her own free will in any financial deal. She was sold and purchased in market places and fairs and was treated worse than animals. The Arabs regarded her very existence as a disgrace and some cruel persons used to bury their daughters alive at or soon after birth (Hussain, 2004:1). In pre- Islamic Arabia, women held no better status than that accorded to the slaves. Islam as a religion, gave them equality with men in some respect and taught the Arabs that they were as much of human beings as members of the male sex with a distinct

6 individuality of their own which should be respected and given due weightage in the apportionment of their rights and functions. But in one respect, Islam had to take drastic steps for controlling women‟s freedom. Despite their low status and virtual rightlessness, women in pre-Islamic Arabia enjoyed a measure of sexual freedom amounting to license which led to widespread illicit unions and promiscuity in sex relations. The sexual morality of the Arabs had sunk so low that women were viewed only as a means of sexual gratification or at best a vehicle of procreation. Marriage ties were very loose and there was not much stability in family life. The Quran put some restrictions in women‟s behaviour in the following verses:

“O wives of the prophet, ye are not as other women. If ye fear God, be not too complaisant in speech lest he should covet in whose heart is a disease of in continence, but speak the speech which is convenient: and stay at home and do not go out with the display and ostentation of the former time of ignorance” (xxxiii.32-33) (Siddiqi, 1980:142).

As these verses show, women in pre-Islamic Arabia did not observe any rules of decency while going out and dressed themselves with great ostentation with the intention of looking attractive to the male sex.

During the Jahiliyyah (pre-Islamic era) there were four kinds of marriages. One of them was like our own form of marriage in which one person asked another for the hand of his daughter or ward, fixed the dowry and then took her in marriage. In another form of marriage, a woman after her period of menstruation was sent by her husband to another person who had sexual intercourse with her, until she became pregnant by the other person. When this happened the husband again had normal sexual relations with her and he did all this so that he may have a child of superior blood. This form of marriage was called Nikha-i- Istibza. A third form of marriage was also under practice, in which about ten or less than ten persons gathered and had sexual intercourse with a woman, turn by turn. When she became pregnant and gave birth to a child, she sent for all of them and none could refuse her invitation. When all her lovers gathered together she would say: You all know what has happened. Here is the child and it is the son of such and such a person, she named whatever person she liked and then the person could not refuse and took the child for his son and the

7 woman for his wife. There was also a fourth form of marriage. A number of men came to visit a woman and she could not refuse. These women were prostitutes and had a flag planted before their doors. So, many persons entered her house and had intercourse with her. When one of them conceived and delivered a child, she called them before her and pointing towards the features of the child, named one of them as its father. Then he had to take the child, while she became his regular wife thereafter. (Abu Dawud) (Siddiqi, 1980:143).

This tradition gives a clear picture of the standards of sexual morality prevalent in Arabia before the advent of Islam. In these conditions, Islam found it necessary to impose certain restrictions on the dress and movement of women with a view to preventing the formation of illicit sexual relations and ensure a healthy and stable family life. These restrictions were not intended for all time and for every stage of historical and social development. They could be relaxed or tightened in accordance with changes in social and cultural conditions and the moral level of the people (ibid, 1980:144).

Thus, before the advent of Islam and the arrival of Prophet Mohammad and his proclamation of prophet hood, the history of woman was no doubt the history of subjugation and oppression. She was underestimated and condemned as a low and mean creature and did not enjoy any absolute or independent position in the society and was made subservient to man. In such a dark period of the history of women, Islam was the first to raise its voice against the oppression and exploitation of women (Ahmad, 2003:27) by granting her due rights elevating her position in honour and dignity and teaching the society to respect her. Women enjoy a special status and protected rights in Islam. Islamic law provides with an iron cover around them from being instrumental in the hands of men. Men and women are equal before Allah and their actions are to be judged by the same yardstick (Ahmad, 2003: v, vii).

It was Islam and the teaching of holy prophet which dispelled the idea that women are inferior to men or that female child deserved any treatment different from that meted out to male issues. The Quran asserted the dignity of women by declaring:

“They are apparel for u and you are apparel for them”. (ii 188)

8 Here the Quran lent support to the basic equality of women and men by declaring that each sex compliments the other and neither is inferior in status and dignity. The word “apparel” may be interpreted to mean either protection or dignity and beauty. The verse would mean, therefore, the men and women protect each other from sin and dishonor or it may mean that women lends dignity and beauty to the existence of man as man does to that of woman. Prior to Islam, daughters were looked upon with disfavor and as a kind of economic and social burden. The result was that male members of the family enjoyed a respect which was upbringing of sons and daughters. All this was discouraged by holy prophet who upheld the rights of female children and insisted on their being treated on a footing of equality (Siddiqi, 1980:14-15).

There were many nations of the world that had denied a right of ownership to their women. She had no share in the family property. Rather even her own earnings were not left to her. Whatever she got through her own efforts was regarded the property of the father, husband, sons or other members of the family. Islam recognized the right of woman to ownership of the property and any meddling with it was declared wrongful and unlawful. According to it as a man has a right to honestly earned wealth so has a woman right to own and use her lawful earnings (Ahmad, 2003:348).

Islam restored to women the right of inheritance, after she herself was an object of inheritance in some cultures. Her share is completely hers and no one can make any claim on it, including her father and her husband. Her share in most cases is one half the man‟s share with no implication that she is worth half a man. It would seem grossly inconsistent after the overwhelming evidence of woman‟s equitable treatment in Islam. This variation in inheritance rights is only consistent with the variations in financial duties and responsibilities of man and woman. Man in Islam is fully responsible for the maintenance of his wife, his children, and in some cases of his needy relatives, especially the females. This responsibility is neither vowed nor reduced because of her access to any personal income gained from work, rent, profit and other legal means (Sharma, 2007: 24).

Women on the other hand, are more secure financially and are far less burdened with any claims on her possessions. Her possession before marriage does not transfer to her

9 husband and she may keep her maiden name. She has no obligation to spend on her family out of such properties or out of her income after marriage (Sharma, 2007: 45).

Under Islam, there is no discrimination for woman in any area be it household matters, social affairs, academic disciplines or even inheritance of property and the marital affairs (Bano, 2003: ix) as right to marry is lawfully decreed the same way like the right of man. Woman has the right to choose her own spouse. She has the right to consent or disagree, when someone proposes to her through her guardian. The marriage contract will not be concluded unless she consents with her own free will (Al Minavi Kawther M., 1993).

Marriage as an institution serves the purpose of bringing forward the fact that Islam gives full freedom to both spouses to know each other they have conjugal affinity and form a family (Siddiqui, 1996:2). Marriage is the union of two souls for love and two bodies for procreation and legalizing of children. It is a „solemn covenant‟ based on mutual consent of the bride and bridegroom. The real, natural and first unit of human civilization is family, and there can be no family if there is no marriage. In Islam, marriage has been very much emphasized. The jurists who have firm faith in Islamic matrimonial philosophy are of the view that when the sexual passion is so strong that there is a chance of a man falling into sin, marriage then becomes binding. When the sexual passion is very strong, the marriage is wajeb (obligatory). When the sexual passion remains in normal degree, it is Sunnat-e-Mukkadah. Marriage becomes makruh, when there are no means for maintenance and when no suitable match is found (Ephroz, 2003:41).

The Muslim woman has the freedom of marital choice. She is at liberty to choose her prospective husband, look at him and get to know him without coercion on the part of the father or other relatives. If force or pressure takes place, she has the right to appeal to the court to redress the wrong. Her consent is essential for the validity of the marriage contract. According to Islam, a divorced or widowed woman has the right to remarry without any shame or denunciation. In fact, the Quran allows the betrothal of a divorced or widowed woman even during her period of transition (iddat) (Ahmad, 2003:523).

10 In order to ensure a happy home and really stable family life. Islam has assigned to marriage the status of a contract dissoluble if either party develops grievances against the other leading to a final and irrevocable break in their mutual relations. There is really no virtue in keeping appearances, when their relations have deteriorated beyond all hope of reconciliation. An unhappy marriage resulting in interminable quarrels fails to realize the primary object of the union which brought the partners together. It is therefore better both socially and morally that the husband and wife should be allowed to part with each other if the breaking point has been reached in their mutual relations. Therefore, marriage in Islam is not un-dissoluble but a kind of contract in which specific rights and obligations may be undertaken besides those already implied in marriage. These rights are justifiable in a court of law. It is open both to the husband and the wife to enter into agreement prior to marriage on matters which they consider important for the regulation of their future relations. Such agreements shall be part of the marriage contract and adjudicable in law courts, provided they are not repugnant to the basic rights and obligations of husband and wife as stated by Islam.

The author of Nail al-Autar says: The wife can lay down conditions prior to marriage relating to her way of living, her food, house and dress according to the social status of the husband and that her just rights shall not be compromised. Similarly, the husband can lay down these conditions: that the wife shall not go out from home without his permission, that she shall not refuse sexual intercourse with him and shall not use his property and possessions except by his permission. Just as a man can stipulate that his wife shall not go out except by his permission, it is open to the woman to insist that she shall not be prevented from going out of her home on suitable occasions or for her economic or social needs: so long as this action does not disturb the work of her husband or the proper upbringing of the children. All these matters come within the scope of the marriage agreement, but since some of them are not easily justifiable, much depends on the actual relations of the husband and the wife after marriage and their mutual understanding. All these things show that the wife does not lose under Islam, her separate legal personality, but retains full possession of it. She can sue her husband in a court of law if the implied or express terms of the marriage contract are violated by the husband (Siddiqi, 1980:44-45).

11 Islam has certainly attached importance to the guardian of the girl in marriage but it has also stressed the point that her permission is essential in a marriage tie. If the ward happens to be a widow or divorced woman her explicit consent is necessary. In case of a virgin, however her silence is to be deemed her consent and concurrence. If a guardian of a woman gives her away in marriage and she disapproves of it, it would stand null and void (Bano, 2003: 224-225).

Thus according to Islamic Law, Woman cannot be forced to marry anyone without her consent. Besides all other provisions for her protection at the time of marriage, it was specifically decreed that woman has the full right to her mehr, a marriage gift, which is presented to her by the husband and is included in the nuptial contract; it is a gift symbolizing love and affection. Islam has ordained man that the woman he marries must be paid her dower, without which nikah is not valid (Ahmad, 2003:343).

The male spouse has to pay mehr to the female spouse according to the Islamic Shariah which is defined by different schools of Shariah in different ways (Siddique, 1996:2). Dower has no other purpose apart from being an offer, a gift to wife directly and not to her father. This is clear from the quranic provision:

“And give the women

(On marriage) their dower

As a free gift ;…”( Quran IV:4 Nisa)

The Husband should pay dower according to his financial status, dignity and fortune .The amount must be according to the paying capacity of the husband. It should be noted that it is not a ritual but a legal obligation or a duty on the part of the husband (Ephroz 2003: 150-151).

According to Islamic law, marriage is a part of human nature that has a broad significance incorporating all its aspects. It transcends the sexual impulse and the natural disposition to have children. Marriage functions as a shield against committing adultery and fornication, both of which are forbidden in Islam. Marriage ensures social stability and a dignified form of living for both partners, probably even more

12 for women since it guarantees their rights both as wives as well as mothers (Ahmad, 2000: 521). Islam ensures that the marriage bond stays relatively stable and durable.

Islam regards it as a most sacred institution and makes it incumbent on every Muslim man and woman unless prevented by valid physical or economic incapacity to lead a married life. The following traditions of the Holy Prophet stress the importance of marriage: “It is necessary for you to marry, because marriage is the most powerful shield against the allurements of sight and the protection of your private parts; if one of them cannot afford it, let him fast because fasting weakens the sexual impulse”. The prophet declared that marriage was one of his most sacred practices and added: „Whoever dislikes my way of life is not of me‟ (Bukhari) (Siddiqui, 1980:32).

The Quran also exhorts the followers of Islam to enter into marriage with chaste women:

Then marry such women as seem good to you (iv.3) And lawful for you are all women, Besides those mentioned above, provided that you seek them with your property taking them in marriage, not committing fornication (iv.24).

The Quran has constantly used the word muhsin for chaste men and Muhsinat for chaste women both of which came from the Arabic root „Hisn‟ meaning„fort‟. The underlying idea is that marriage safeguards and protects chastity in the same manner as a fort protects the garrison. (Ibid. 33).

From the above quotations it appears that Islam recommends marriage because first it helps men and women to lead a life of chastity that is it secures them against promiscuous sexual indulgence; secondly because it prevents the formation of secret sex relation. These two values are the cornerstone on which the institution of marriage rests and Islam‟s conception of women‟s right in marriage flows logically from them (Ibid.,33).

Islam is against divorce and is strongly in support of the family unit. Hence both spouses have to do their utmost to build up a strong and harmonious marital

13 relationship. If, however, tension arises between them, they should not rush into a hasty divorce. First, they should try and make some serious efforts to save their marriage (Ahmad, 2003:533).

Islam recognizes the necessity for divorce in cases when marital relations have been poisoned to a degree which makes a peaceful home life impossible. While permission has been given both to man and woman to obtain a release from the bond of marriage in cases of absolute necessity, the prophet has made it clear that Islam does not regard it as desirable. A tradition of the Prophet states: „the most repugnant of things made lawful in the sight of God is divorce‟. Another tradition says: „Marry but do not divorce, because God does not like men and women who relish variety in sexual pleasure‟ (Siddiqui, 1980: 63).

Islam is the first religion in the world to have conferred on the wife a right to divorce her husband. Marriage is a contract according to Islamic law and under this contract both enjoys certain rights and have to shoulder certain responsibilities. The following conditions must be fulfilled before and after the divorce. First, Divorce cannot be given without a valid reason. Another condition is that divorce will take effect not immediately on pronouncement but after the expiry of the prescribed period of time. Third condition is that the wife after the divorce will not leave the house of her husband but would remain there till expiry of the period of iddat. Fourth, for the husband, it is mandatory to think over the grave consequence which is likely to follow as a consequence of divorce (Shamim, 2002: 30).

The Quran clearly protects the right of the woman in this matter. By insisting here that two arbitrators one from the side of each party have to be called to investigate the matter between them peacefully and objectively, it has in fact put the interests of the wife on an equal footing with those of her husband by giving her the opportunity to present her case and viewpoint before the arbitrators. This is surely a fair and just way to deal with divorce matters because it takes into consideration the interest of both sides. More importantly, it protects the weak from being abused by the strong (husband). (Ahmad, 2003: 533).

Further, woman is allowed to seek separation from her husband: First, through mutual agreement between the husband and the wife which is called „Khula‟. The wife is

14 however not at liberty, like the husband, to get herself realized by an outright declaration of divorce.

It is commonly held by most of the scholars that the distinctive feature of Islamic marriage that permits to have four wives is the major cause of degradation of Muslim woman. But this is to be pointed out here that there were some historical necessities that permitted the continuance of polygamy under certain regulations (Chaturvedi, 2004:161).

Quran permits men to have more than one wife the permission are conditional: “every one of the wives has to be treated justly not only materially but also in love and all other respects”. The verses “But if ye fear that ye shall not be able to deal justly with them, then only one – you shall never be able to do justice among wives , no matter how desirous you may be” is more an admonition to practice monogamy than polygamy (Beevi,1993:9).

Thus great importance has been given to husband-wife relationship in Islam. The holy Quran and the prophet have shown the highest respect and regard for women. „Paradise lay at the feet of the mother‟ said the prophet. He stopped female infanticide, restricted polygamy, frowned upon divorce and gave women a status they had never enjoyed anywhere in the world. Though Islam makes clear pronouncement in favour of equal status of both sexes but it does not find practical implementation due to various factors in a male-dominated society like India and elsewhere which need to be explored in terms of socio-cultural context.

In the view of above Islamic prescriptions one may expect the Muslim women as enlightened, dignified personalities. But the reality is different. In reality, however marriage appears to be largely an unequal arrangement concerning the roles of men and women within the family. The cultural conditioning of Muslim women is such that in spite of having a number of sanctions in their favour they do not actually profit by them. For example, though divorce is allowed in the Quran, in actual practice a social stigma is attached to it and it is looked down by others. The mehr money which is actually meant as a security for the married women is in practice rarely given to her, except in a few cases. The main reason for this may be the attitude of Muslim men in safeguarding their own interest at the cost of women. This is further facilitated

15 by the lack of understanding of the legal aspect of Islam by women. However, nowadays, with increased education, urbanization, differential economic growth women have begun to change. (Raj, 1991: 163-165).

Education is considered as an important and powerful instrument of economic development, social transformation and mobilization of human resources. Education plays a significant role in the dissemination of modern attitudes, values, approach and outlook. (Ahmad 1987:201)

The development of education among women is the main instrument through which we can narrow down the prevailing social inequalities and accelerate the process of change in their status. The better a women‟s education the greater the availability of social opportunities. Education is directly related to occupational mobility and improvement in economic status and it also forms an element in social prestige. According to Srivastava, a key factor in improving the status of women and as an agent for developing modern attitude and rational outlook. (Srivastava 2005:7)

Education helps women “in lightening the burden of tradition of ignorance and strict seclusion within the home, in equipping them with the expertise and knowledge required to play modern roles, in widening their horizons and in raising their general status in society” (Akhtar1992:75).

The modern society also gives importance to the legislative measures for bringing about change in order to save people from inequalities and exploitations. Each community in India has its own personal law. After independence a series of codification and reforms followed in several fields of the hindu law . „Marriage and Divorce‟ is one such field codified in the „Hindu Marriage Act‟. The ceremonies and validity of marriage amongst Hindus are now governed by the „Hindu Marriage Act‟. It includes Buddhists, Jain, Sikhs and all persons now governed by Hindu Law or customs. It permits marriages between any two Hindus as defined by the Act. The concept of divorce was not recognized by the ancient Hindu Law. The provision of dissolution of marriage is one of the revolutionary changes brought about by the Hindu Marriage Act.

16 Muslim Law administered in India has also undergone some changes .These are few yet not insignificant. The Muslim matrimonial law has been statutorily modified by the “Muslim Dissolution of Marriage Act 1939” so as to permit the wife to have judicial divorce. The rest of Muslim laws are still traditional (Diwan,1991:2).

There are different Schools which interpret Muslim Law differently. The Hanafi School (one of the four schools of the sunni sect) covers a vast majority of Muslims all over India. Most of the Shias are governed by the „Ithana Ashari‟ school. Muslims belonging to the Shafei school are mostly found in South India (Mathew, 1990:78).

In Muslim Law, marriage is a civil contract and procreation of children is the main objective. Muslim marriage consist of a proposal on one side and its acceptance by the other side. The proposal and acceptance must be done at one meeting.

Though hindu women have raised legal status, Muslim have lag behind because of lack of enlightenment among them. Hence, in theory it is easy for a woman to stipulate in her marriage contract that she will be entitled to divorce her husband under specific conditions. However, in practice, majority of the marriage contracts do not contain any such stipulation. As against this, a husband can divorce his wife at will just by uttering the words “ I divorce u” three times, anywhere anytime. He is also not required by law to give maintenance to the wife beyond iddat period which is three months. He is only obliged to pay mehr to his divorced wife. This provision is also taken as a security for Muslim women against early divorce. If he has four wives, he need not to divorce his wife if he does not wish to pay mehr. He may ill-treat her while marrying another wife, although the „Quran‟ while permitting polygamy lays down the strict condition that a man may marry another wife only if he can treat all his wives equally. Polygamy is based on justice but justice is not always practiced.

The custom of dowry started with the giving of presents to the girl entering into marriage by her family as an expression of love and affection. But in course of time, it became a evil, which involved the question of family prestige and social status. The end result was anxiety for many parents with marriageable daughters that their daughters would not be married off because of lack of means to provide dowry.

17 The government tried to control this evil through periodic legislation. The Dowry prohibition Act 1961 was found to be ineffective in reducing the number of dowry deaths. The criminal procedure Code was amended in 1983. Accordingly, cruelty to and harassment of woman by her dowry seeking husband is punishable. The Dowry Prohibition Act was amended in 1984 to make giving or receiving dowry as a cognizable offence. A social evil like dowry cannot be removed by legislation alone. The legislation will need to be backed by community.

The social reality of the benefits of legal provisions presents a totally different picture. Non-implementation of these laws was found to some extent due to some legal and administrative factors. Lack of proper supervision system and to a large extent due to psychological and sociological factors. They are the traditional and conservative behavior of people. The reason of ineffectiveness of many of the laws, is that the people in general are not interested in actually practicing them (Mishra, 1993).

The success of social legislation does not depend only on the enactment of the laws but also on their practice in day to day life. It is necessary that people should be well acquainted with various laws to know their status, rights and responsibilities.

CChhaapptteerr 22 RReevviieeww ooff LLiitteerraattuurree

A number of scholars have made attempts to understand social life of Muslims and to analyze the status of Muslim women with regard to marriage on the basis of empirical studies conducted by them in different parts of India and Muslim countries. In this chapter a critical review of few of these studies is presented. Furthermore, the legal framework governing Muslim personal law in different countries and changes made therein from time to time has also been included.

Chekki (1968) examined the age at marriage of 303 cases. It was found that 80.53% of the females were married at 15 years or below and the rest at 16 years of age or older than that and 81.52% of the males were married at the age of 18 years or more.

Gupta (1972) found the mean age of 158 boys and 163 girls at the time of marriage as 19 years. He however examined that the age at marriage was high for upper and economically better off castes while it was relatively low for agriculturists and artisans.

Husain (1976) in his sociological study of „Marriage customs among Muslims in India‟ reported that 36% of the total respondents preferred the desirable age for marriage of boys 24-26 years, 26% and 24% were of the view that boy should be married between the age 21-23 years and 18-20 years respectively. In case of girls, 38% of the respondents preferred desirable age for marriage between 18-20 years respectively. 30% and 22% were of the opinion that girls should be married between the ages 15-17 and 12-14 years respectively. Only 3% people were in favour of 9-11 years for marriage of girls which is comparatively early.

According to Islam, divorce is a necessary evil but is inevitable in the interest of both the parties who cannot mutually adjust. Husain in his study about the practice of divorce among Shia Muslims reported that only 7% of the respondents stated that divorce had taken place in their families during last ten years, and the rate of divorce was higher among the younger people than among the aged.

Doranne (1976) had carried out extensive fieldwork on Mehr and dowry system in Muslim community in Nimkhera village of Bhopal region of Madhya Pradesh. It was found that all Muslim brides were expected to bring dowries to their home. Detailed

19 list of dowry items has to be kept and in case marriages end in divorce, a woman is entitled to take away dowry things.

Roy (1979) analyzed the status of Muslim women in north India. In total 300 families of Sayyad, Sheikh, Mughal and pathans were investigated belong to middle income group. The study reveals that every educated woman though not employed achieve certain degree of economic Independence. Education among women led to a great degree of self assurance. In view of the fact that Muslim educated males tend to prefer educated females as their spouse, it was found that there has been a spontaneous increase in literacy among north Indian Muslim families. This phenomenon in turn has led to an increase in the age of marriage of Muslim girls. After studying the facts gathered the author concludes that education has played very significant role in raising the status of Muslim women.

Brijbhushan (1980) undertook study to present realistic picture of Muslim women around Delhi. The study reveals changes in all aspects of Muslim women like marriage, polygamy, adoption of family planning measures.

Menon (1981) study on Muslim Women in Kerala pointed out that there were several traditional customs and practices centering around marriage give Muslim women an inferior status in society. Thus, early marriage, absence of a voice in the selection of husband, ritualisation of the mehr, polygamy and arbitrary divorce by men, attitude towards widows including widow remarriage, exist even today, though in a diminished form. A new custom, viz., payment of dowry, has an important place in the Islamic society but it has no basis in the Quran or tradition of the prophet.

The study pointed out that early marriage is on the decline but in the present decade there were several cases where girls were married below 15 years. As Muslim girls go to school only at a late age, the effect of late entry into school and early marriage is to deprives her from education. This results in denying her the advantages of education. However, education enabled Muslim women to come out of traditional ways of life. Thus, more educated women prefer late marriage, a voice in decision relating to choice of husband, equal opportunity with men for divorce and remarriage of widows. Educated women are against polygamy and dowry.

20 Menon pointed out that polygamy or plurality of wives has been a common practice among Muslims. Among the Indian Muslims, it became popular during the period of Muslim rule when the royal families used to have harems and enjoyed plurality of wives from both Muslim and Hindu communities. In India, it is steadily decreasing among the Muslims in the urban and educated section of the population. The study found that 3.33% of Muslim Women, had husbands with a plurality of wives and nobody had more than two wives. The majority came from the rural population. None of them was educated above primary level. In Menon‟s study polygamy was found to be decreasing among the Muslims and those who adopt this practice belong to the upper age group and also lower income group. The practice of polygamy still exists as a legacy of the past and contributes to lower the status of woman.

Menon also observed that in Muslim community, one major factor which affects the status of women is the practice of divorce. Under Muslim personal law, divorce is an easy matter for the husband as he enjoys an unlimited freedom to divorce his wife at his own will. The prophet also gave to the woman the „right of obtaining a separation on reasonable grounds‟. But in practice this was not so easy. In India after the passage of the dissolution of Muslim Marriage Act 1939.Woman also got the right to divorce her husband. Inspite of this, Muslim men still enjoy much freedom compared to women as far as divorce is concerned which has lowered women‟s position.

Siddiqui study (1987) analyzed the changes in the status of Muslim women and indicated a close association between socio-economic status and educational achievements in the case of both males and females. The higher educational achievements were almost entirely to be found among the higher socio-economic strata. Similarly, urban Muslims both males and females had done much better in respect of educational achievements than their rural counterparts, a trend which was consistent with the general pattern in respect of other communities in India.

The study reflected the greater participation level of urban Muslim women in decision making or taking independent decision both at home and outside home, whereas rural women were comparatively less active. Changes were also found in marriage patterns and purdah practices among Muslims .The concept of Purdah as total seclusion of women has undergone change though it was found widely prevalent in both urban and

21 rural areas. But the low observance of purdah by younger generation signified a change. There were gradual changes in respect to ideal age at marriage and consulting girls while taking decisions regarding their marriage but these changes in attitude and practices were found more pronounced in some cases in urban areas and among the women with high school or above educational attainments. Thus, educated women with urban and sound economic background attained greater changes.

Ashrafi (1992) in her study of Urban Muslim women of Patna examines the important aspects of determining the status of Muslim women i.e. marriage, family, education, purdah, Family planning. The author concludes that it is a mistake to assume that Muslim society is conservative in nature and argues that changes are taking place in the life style, role, status and position of Muslim women in their families as well as in society.

Merchant (1993) interviewed a group of 100 divorced Muslim women from Bombay and Pune, in order to study the impact of the provisions of law, about marriage and divorce. The trend appeared that more Muslim women were asking for divorce in second marriages, especially in case of their husband‟s second marriage. However, polygamy did not appear to be widely prevalent. The reasons could be the living pattern in the urban areas, women‟s awareness of their roles and status. Generally, there was no tradition of demand by the husband, but the trend is changing, with more and more families insisting that the families of the bride gave large sum of money, luxury items, furniture. All the women under study were aware of the custom of mehr which is supposed to be protection for the wife and a deterrent to a hasty divorce was rarely given to her.

The effects of urbanization on the practice of giving dowry in a study done by Batra and Dak (1993) in Haryana, examined that more urban than rural respondents brought dowry with them. Majority of urban respondents (62%) agreed strongly that if dowry was not given, the girl‟s status in the family would be effected, while only 44% of rural women felt so.

Government efforts are not enough to root out the problem of dowry but people‟s participation is also more important. More urban respondents favoured education of

22 boys and girls and social awakening as appropriate methods for checking the practice of dowry.

Malika B. Mistry (1993) made an attempt to study the status of women in Islam and the contemporary Muslim societies by examining the status of women in pre-Islamic Arabia, in different religion and cultures before the advent of Islam, and the revolutionary changes Islam brought about in the status of women.

She pointed out that in spite of the high status given to women in Islam and the present status of Muslim women not only in India but almost all over the world is low. However, among Indian Muslim women divorce is not so common, as it is disapproved socially among most groups and it results in loss of social prestige for the parties involved, the families as well. Like Hindu Women the concept of endurance is the highest virtue of a woman which has so completely overtaken the minds of the Muslim Women that they would rather die than suffer a divorce. So, if the husband is not compatible or is going for a second marriage and the wife has the right to seek divorce, she will not do so.

Mistry highlighted that claiming Mehr (dower) from the husband by an Indian Muslim Woman, is an act of disgrace. Women do not know the actual amount of mehr decided in their marriages.

Zarina Bhatty (1993) has also pointed the provisions of Muslim personal law relating to man-woman relationships are most repressive to women. Woman‟s unequal position in marriage is reflected in the practice of polygamy, whereby a Muslim man can keep up to four wives at a time and monogamy is the rule for women. A man can also divorce without giving reason and without any witness just pronouncing divorce verbally. He is also not required to pay maintenance beyond the period of iddat, which is four months ten days.

Azim (1997) in her study of Muslim women in Manglore city, (Karnataka) observes changes that have taken place in the role and status of Muslim women. The study focuses on the role of education, employment, modernization and overseas migration in bringing about change in the position of Muslim Women.

23 Abdul Waheed (2003) studied divorce and remarriage among Indian Muslims highlighted that Muslims are heterogeneous and stratified. They display variety of customs and beliefs and which vary from region to region and within a region from one social group to another. Socio-cultural diversity among Indian Muslims also has a deep imprint on the practice of divorce and remarriage. Indeed, these practices are neither uniform nor absolutely in accordance with the Shariat.

Contrary to Islamic Principles, Indian Muslims display different attitudes towards divorce, remarriage after divorce and the marriage of widows. Traditionally, Muslims of the higher social strata encouraged neither divorce nor remarriage. Among Muslims of the lower social strata divorce is widely practised and remarriage is encouraged.

He pointed out that divorce and remarriage practices seem to be similar to those practices prevailing among non-muslims. Muslims are represented as „unique‟ in respect of marriage and divorce practices. They are thought to be more prone to divorce. This is assumed to be the case simply because Muslim law as followed in India allows a man to divorce his wife unilaterally. Laws relating to divorce, that is „triple talaq‟ and a Muslim man‟s right to marry four women at a time seem to be examples of the ill treatment meted out to Muslim women. This gives the impression that divorce among Muslims is frequent and that a Muslim man is a malevolent patriarch who does not only divorce his wife but also marries another woman. A Muslim woman seems to be helpless person who always lives under the fear of being unilaterally abandoned by her husband.

I.A. Khan (2004) studied Gavandi community of Maharashtra as a marginal Muslim community in India. Gavandi are a community with an occupational background of masonry work. He observed that the Gavandis practice endogamy and the marriage is arranged by the parents or the guardian. The age of marriage for the girls varies from 16 to 18 years and for the boys it varies from 19 to 21 years. Monogamy is present and the incidence of polygamy is unknown to the community. However, there are a few cases of second marriage after the death or divorce of the first wife. Mehr is fixed during shadi or nikah and paid to the bride at the time of marriage in cash. In certain cases payment of mehr is paid afterwards. The causes of divorce are maladjustment,

24 adultery and incompatibility of temper. Divorce is done according to Shariat i.e. the husband has to pay the mehr and post divorce maintenance according to Shariat which is determined by the religious specialists. The right of divorce rests on husband and the children are the responsibility of the father in case of divorce.

So far as the status of the women is concerned, the dominant role of a man as a bread winner is evident. The women have, however, the right of inheritance in the properties of their parents. The women are mainly confined to the kitchen and in household activities almost throughout the day. The women look after the children and have to entertain her husband after the day‟s hard work. Though at times, she has to face even physical torture and abuse by the husband if he is unhappy. Elderly woman have some role in family management but it is also under male instruction.

S.R. Mondal (2004) in his study on the Tibetan Muslims of Indian Himalayas reveals that marriages by negotiation are a common form of marriage among Tibetan Muslims and love marriage is accepted if it is within the community. In marriage, Tibetan Muslims observed rites and rituals exclusively of their own. Weddings are performed according to Islamic law. Marriages are preceded by a religio-cultural ceremony to which Islamic great tradition and Tibetan little tradition are blended in a harmonious way. As a tradition of Tibet the Tibetan Muslims do not take dowry in marriage as a mark of social honour and status of women in their community.

Imam Hasnain (2004) studied marriage patterns among Nut of Champaran, an Islamized section of a larger nomadic nut community spread throughout Northern India. They are emphatic about their Islamic identity which is conclusively proved not only by their nomenclature pattern but also life cycle rituals but quite interestingly their religio-cultural identity is not taken seriously by their neighbours including Muslims perhaps due to their extreme poverty and isolation.

It was observed by him that the usual age of marriage for nut boys and girls were reported to be 20 and 16 respectively though marriage at an earlier age is not rare. But the usual practice of marriage is only when a boy becomes an adult and is ready to carry the burden of a family and the girl old enough to look after the offspring‟s. The Nut women are generally treated well in the nut society because she fetches bride price in the form of cash for her parents during their marriage. News of the birth of a

25 daughter generally evokes happiness and satisfaction. Though still remaining a patriarchal society at large the woman appeared to have a better say within the nut community. The cases of divorce were low; cases of desertion were reported to be higher than divorce. However the frequency of divorce and desertion was reported to be insignificant among the nuts and this was attributed to the costly nature of remarriage.

Sachar committee report (2006) on social, economic and educational status of the Muslim community of India, pointed out that since Independence India has been successful in reducing poverty and improving crucial human development indicators such as levels of literacy, education and health. But the Muslims, the largest minority community in the country, constituting 13.4 percent of the population, are seriously lagging behind in terms of most of the human development indicators and the perception of deprivation is widespread among Muslims.

The report indicates that gender issues in the community are usually given a religious slant. To the exclusion of a Muslim woman (income, jobs, education, security and even caloric intake), such as the rules of marriage, right to divorce and maintenance have become the benchmarks of a gender unjust existence. The obsessive focus on select cases of Muslim women passionately discussed in the media results in identifying the Muslim religion as the sole locus of gender - injustice in the community. Consequently, the civil society and the State locate Muslim women‟s deprivation not in terms of the „objective‟ reality of societal discrimination and faulty development policies, but in the religious community space.

It has also been pointed out that gender- based fear of the „public‟, experienced to some degree by all women, is magnified manifold in the case of Muslim women. The lines between „safe‟ and „unsafe spaces‟ become rigid. The community and its women withdraw into the safety of familiar orthodoxies, reluctant to participate in the project of modernity, which threatens to blur community boundaries. It was said that for large number of Muslim women in India today, the only safe space (in terms of Physical protection and identity) is within the boundaries of home and community. Everything beyond the walls of the ghetto is seen as unsafe and hostile- markets , roads, lanes, and public transport, schools and hospitals, police stations and government offices.

26 Interestingly though, in many meetings women participants emphasized that given appropriate opportunities to work and get educated, they would „manage‟ all these issues.

The popular perception that religious conservatism among Muslims is a major factor for not accessing education was found incorrect as the recognition of their educational backwardness was found to be quite acute amongst a large section of Indian Muslims and they wish to rectify it urgently.

While the education system appears to have given up on Muslim girls, the girls themselves have not given up on education. There is a strong desire and enthusiasm for education among Muslim women and girls across the board. This was one of the striking pieces of information the committee gathered in its interactions in the different states. Thus, it was argued that , contrary to popular perception that religious conservatism among Muslim somehow militates against educating girls, current research indicates that poverty and financial constraints are the major causes that prevent Muslim girls from accessing „modern‟/„secular‟ education.

The report revealed that Muslims do not have a lower age at marriage than average. A point made on the higher fertility of Muslims was that the proportion of women married in reproductive ages was relatively high, because widow remarriage is well accepted in the Muslim community unlike the Hindus. However, data from the 2001 census show that the marital status distribution of Muslim women is not notably different from that of the general population in the reproductive age groups, the ages that matter for fertility.

The Sachar committee observed while there is considerable variation in the conditions of Muslims across states (and among the Muslims, those who identified themselves as OBC‟s and others), the community exhibits deficits and deprivation in practically all dimensions of development. In fact, by and large, Muslims rank somewhat above Scs/Sts but below Hindu -OBCs, other Minorities and Hindu General (mostly upper castes) in almost all indicators considered. Among the states that have large Muslim populations, the situation is particularly grave in the states of West Bengal, U.P and Assam. Interestingly, despite such deficits, the community has lower infant mortality rates and sex- ratios.

27 The studies on Islamic countries such as Pakistan shows that in spite of being an Islamic state Hindu culture has influenced the various processes of marital union. These are undergoing radical changes with the influence of modernization.

Masood, Rehman and Abbasi observed in their study of Marriage Patterns in Pakistan that marriage is mostly arranged by the parents. While in some parts of the country the husband has to buy his partner by paying a handsome amount to the parents of the girl. Marriage through courts is not encouraged even among urban families in Pakistan. Marriage takes place with certain rituals which are more or less formal ceremonies through which the male and female enter into new bonds. Mostly the people in Pakistan are endogamous i.e., marriage of an individual takes place within one‟s caste ethnic group-(bradari). It was also observed that there are certain deviations in this respect, which can be attributed to social changes in the society.

Qadeer (2006) observed in his study that almost every family is joint family in Pakistan. This social unit functions as one family with a single kitchen, living in the same house. He has noted that the family size is shrinking because of fewer births and the erosion of joint families. Modern societies tend to have nuclear families, consisting of a couple and their dependent children. Elder member of the family arranged marriages for the young. 50% of marriages have been between cousins. Studies related to children‟s health and mortality indicates higher rates of mortality and disease among children of married cousin. Dowry is given to a girl in her marriage in Sindh. Father and brother of the girl seek work in the oil countries so that they can bear the expense of the marriage of their daughter or sister.

Qadeer reported that traditionally parents select partners in marriage. Education and professional occupation opened new expectations of marriage. Gradually boys are being consulted in the choice of their partners. The norms of arranged marriage have changed. Now, the young couple has the permission to go out before marriage, this practice was shameful and dishonourable in the past.

It was observed that the norms of extended living have also changed .There is more freedom in extended family. Mother-in-law does not have the same authority over daughter-in-law.

28 Prior to the partition of India and Pakistan matters relating to marriage were governed by customary laws as well as by the religious laws. Muslim Family Law Ordinance which was passed in 1961.This Ordinance advanced women‟s legal rights to some extent. Khula and the delegated right of divorce for women were recognized. Secondly, polygamy was restricted, if a man wanted to marry second time then he has to submit an application for permission to the Chairman Arbitration Council, besides seeking the permission of his existing wife. The Muslim Family law Ordinance amended the Child Marriage Restraint Act by rising the legal age of marriage for females from 14 to 16 years.

In Iran, the average marriage age for women is twenty one years. A study showed that in 1968 in Iran 25% of urban marriages, 31% of rural marriages and 51% of tribal marriages were reported as endogamous. Traditionally, marriages involve a formal contract. In the contract a series of payments are specified. The bride brings a dowry consisting of clothing and household things. A specified amount is written into the contract as payment for the woman in the event of divorce. Polygyny is allowed though it is not widely practiced. Divorce is not common in Iran. Husband and wife prefer to stay together instead of taking divorce (www.everyculture.com/Ge- It/Iran.html) taken on 9 Jan 2012

In Arab countries, traditionally marriage was seen as a family, communal or societal affair. It is seen as a mechanism for reproduction, human survival, and the reinforcement of family ties, socialization and the achievement of other goals that transcend the happiness of the individual to guarantee communal interests. This principle is seen in all aspect of marriage. In the past, there were arranged marriages. Gradually, it has declined as a result of the mixing of the sexes in school and public places. Today, marriage is seen as an individual choice. Love marriages take place increasingly.

Traditionally, polygyny is practiced in Arabs. But now Polygyny is rare. A Study on family in Baghdad showed that only 8 percent of men had more than one wife in the 1940s and in 1970s it was reduced to only 2%.

Morocco has implemented family law reform that gave women more rights in family life. Morocco adopted a socially conservative policy towards family law by

29 promulgating the muddawana or code of personal status of 1957-1958.Under the Muddawana the marriage age of a girl is 15 and 18 for boys. But 2004 muddawana reforms brought changes which give women more rights in respect of marriage, divorce, polygamy and custody. Marriage age was raised to 18 years for women. Women can enter into marriage on their own.

In many Arab countries under prevailing personal status laws women do not have the right to ask for divorce or to oppose polygamy. Divorce is normally considered a male right and is not a solution to specific marital problems. Inspite of that, there have been some advancement in the laws in Arab countries. There is adoption of „khula‟(divorce intended by wife) polygamy is restricted and it grants woman the right to register objection to polygamy before the marriage in agreements and can obtain divorce through the courts or by mutual consent.

Bangladesh is another Muslim country with 88% Muslims. (Nemat, 2006:11)The legal status of Muslim women in Bangladesh is defined by the principles of Shariah through Muslim Personal law. It covers the field of marriage, divorce, maintenance, guardianship of children and inheritance whereas the constitution deals with penal codes, the civil and criminal procedures etc. (Amin and Cain1997)

Earlier the age of marriage for girls was 14 and 16 for boys and later it became 16 for girls and 18 for boys and now it has been raised to 18 and 21 for girls and boys respectively. (Nemat, 2006:12) In Bangladesh, dowry is very common though Islamic law does not support it. Dowry is developed as a custom in male dominated society. Dowry demands has lead to crimes such as murder or assaults on women whose parents could not meet increasing dowry costs. Bangladesh Penal Code includes many sanctions against harmful marriage practices.

The Child marriage restraint Act 1921, Dowry Payments were banned in 1980 and sanctions were strengthened in 1985.

One study has found that 59% of marriages that took place between 1980 and 1991 involved dowry. Some studies shows that better educated women pay higher dowry amount compared to families of less educated women, their higher economic status allows them to pay more. A survey conducted in 2001 showed that girls who are

30 educated are likely to marry without paying dowry. So education has a positive impact. (Huq and Amin, 2001)

However, some progressive developments have been introduced throughout the decades including the Muslim Family Ordinance of 1961. It brought some changes such as registration of marriages has been made compulsory. Polygamy had also been prohibited. It also abolished triple talaq in one sitting. It introduced the Islamic concept of arbitration which is quite fair to women as they have the right to appoint an arbitrator to take care of their interests in matter of divorce.

Indonesia which is predominantly a Muslim country has varied cultural customs and traditions each depending upon the area. Between 1900 and the outbreak of world war II Girls used to marry at an age of 12 or 13, it was relatively rare for a girl to reach 20 without being married.

Sutarsih (1976) using data from the 1973 fertility Mortality Survey observed that the median age at marriage had risen from 15.9 to 16.5 in West Java, 17 to 18 in central Java and 18.3 to 19.3 in Sulawesi.

From early 1900‟s, government and social organizations have tried to change these systems. Women‟s group fought to increase the minimum legal age at marriage and to abolish polygamy. It was found that the majority of couples who prefer love marriage arranged their marriage on the basis of love and mutual attraction and tends to marry late. In particular, the method of arranging the marriage through parents has shifted to the children who themselves seek their own partners. (Sutarsih: 1976)

Historically, it was difficult for an Indonesian wife to get dissolution of marriage. However the marriage act of 1974 provides provisions under which a wife may seek judicial divorce. Divorce being equally accessible for males and females in some communities, but still difficult for females in other communities. Women whose husband divorce them receive the whole amount of their mehr. Communal property acquired by the couple during their marriage is divided equally between the husband and wife or at a ratio of 2:1.

In Malaysia (2001) there have been some amendment in the constitution and any discrimination based on gender was prohibited. Malaysia‟s Child Act 2001, in which

31 persons under the age of 18 are considered as a child. In 2006 law for minimum age of marriage for girl is 16 and for male is 18 years.

Othman (2010) study showed the result that polygamous marriages are increasing and generally women are unhappy with such marriages. First wife is most dissatisfied with the polygamous relationship. The first wife had suffered a loss of social status after their husband‟s second marriage.

A review of the existing literature reveals that the academic search acquire knowledge concerning patterns of marriage among Muslims in India and other Muslim countries has raised many issues as these studies differ in their emphasis and perspective. The unique aspect of diversity of Indian culture makes it difficult to identify specific variables affecting social lives of women particularly Muslim women in India.

CChhaapptteerr 33 RReesseeaarrcchh MMeetthhooddoollooggyy

The research has been designed according to the aims and objectives of the proposed hypothesis. The present study is an attempt to assess the change in marriage patterns and family issues in three generations amongst Muslim males and females. It is a descriptive research. It may also be called statistical research as it involves gathering data that describes events and then organises, tabulates, depicts and describe the data collection(Glass and Hopkins 1984).The present study includes the elements of descriptive research as it makes statements about some specific class of people or objects. A sample of the population about which inferences are to be drawn, affords an adequate basis for making such statements (Wilkinson and bhandarkar 2000:112). Deductive logic of inquiry has been used in the study.

Map 1.1: Map of Aligarh City

33 Universe of the Study:

The Aligarh population is an amalgamation of Hindus, Muslims, Sikhs and Christian as is evident from the flourishing temples, mosques, gurudwaras and churches. The government officials, university and college teachers, doctors and a large number of well established business dealing with import/ export business constitute the elite of Aligarh.

Sample:

The method of selecting a portion of the universe under study with a view to draw conclusion about the universe or population is known as sampling. (Wilkinson and bhandarkar 2000: 265).

The sample consists of 630 respondents comprising 350 married Muslim women and 280 married Muslim men. The population has been classified into three generations namely first, second and third. First generation consists of 100 women and 80 men in the age group of „above 60‟. Second generation comprises of 125 women and 100 men in the age group of „between 31-60‟ and the third generation comprises of 125 women and 100 men in the age group of „below 31‟.

It was very difficult for the researcher to find out those families in which all the three generations were present. Out of 150 families 100 women of the first generation, 125 women of the second generation, 125 women of the third generation were available and 80 men of the first generation, 100 men of the second generation and 100 men of the third generation were available.

34 For the purpose of study researcher has selected those areas where Muslim population was in majority which include both literate and illiterate, rich and poor which can represent the whole universe. These areas were Jeevangarh, Jamalpur, Dhorra, Muzammil Manzil, Sir Syed Nagar, Friends colony, Shahjamal, upper kot, Nai Basti, Awasvikas. The sample is representative of various variables like education, religiosity, income level, and residential location of the respondents. The data was analysed on the basis of these four variables.

Techniques for data collection:

The technique used for collecting information for the present study was „Interview Schedule‟. The reason for choosing schedule is obvious. It ensures reliability of data unlike questionnaire. Beside, many respondents being illiterate schedule is the right choice. Separate schedules were constructed for males and females.

Problems faced by the researcher during the study:

The data was collected by the researcher personally during 2012 -2013. In spite of the efforts to avoid pitfalls, many stumbling blocks created problems. The initial problem was to launch a search for those Muslim families in which all three generations were present and the main problem was the unwillingness of most of the married women to answer the questions and they did not want to share their personal experiences. Sometimes, the researcher had to make several visits to the homes of the respondents as the respondents were not available at the home. It needed extra time and additional expenditure. Some respondents were dropped from the sample test because they did not give complete information. Most respondents however, extended their help and cooperation whole heartedly.

35 Table a) PROFILE OF THE RESPONDENTS IN THE FIRST GENERATION

Number Percentage Variable Category Female Male Female Male Illiterate 52 31 52% 38% Below high school 39 27 39% 33% Education Higher secondary 9 14 9% 17.5% Graduate & above 00 8 00 10% Total 100 80 Less than 10,000 48 44 48% 55% Monthly 10,000-50,000 46 29 46% 36.2% Income level Above 50,000 6 7 6% 8.7% Total 100 80 Urban 43 48 43% 60% Residence Rural 57 32 57% 40% Total 100 80 Strictly religious 80 45 83% 56% Religious Moderate 10 20 16% 25% observance Indifferent 10 15 1% 18% Total 100 80

Table b) PROFILE OF THE RESPONDENTS IN THE SECOND GENERATION

Number Percentage Variable Category Female Male Female Male Illiterate 24 15 19.2% 15% Below high school 59 34 47.2% 34% Education Higher secondary 40 32 32% 32% Graduate & above 2 19 1.6% 19% Total 125 100 Less than 10,000 18 34 14.4% 34% Monthly 10,000-50,000 85 36 68% 36% Income level Above 50,000 22 30 17.6% 30% Total 125 100 Urban 105 90 84% 90% Residence Rural 20 10 16% 10% Total 125 100 Strictly religious 87 35 69.6% 35% Religious Moderate 35 60 28% 60% observance Indifferent 3 5 2.4% 5% Total 125 100

36 Table c) PROFILE OF THE RESPONDENTS IN THE THIRD GENERATION

Number Percentage Variable Category Female Male Female Male Illiterate 4 6 3.2% 6% Less than high school 10 10 8% 10% Education Higher secondary 44 34 35.2% 34% Graduate & above 67 50 53.6% 50% Total 125 100 Below 10,000 6 13 4.8% 13% Monthly 10,000-50,000 61 25 48.8% 25% Income level Above 50,000 58 62 46.4% 62% Total 125 100 Urban 125 100 100% 100% Residence Rural 00 00 Total 125 100 Strictly religious 42 10 33.6% 10% Religious Moderate 79 75 63.2% 75% observance Indifferent 4 15 3.2% 15% Total 125 100

Profile of the respondents:

Educational level:

a) Illiterate: Those who do not know how to read and write.

b) Below high school: Those who have studied below 10.

c) Higher secondary: Those who have studied standards 10 to 12.

d) Graduate and above: Those who have completed graduation or above.

Religious Observance:

a) Strictly Religious: Those who are very religious and strictly follows Islam. Regular in namaz, roza, zakat and other religious activities.

b) Moderate: Those who do not follow Islam strictly. They are not regular in namaz, roza, zakat and other religious activities.

37 c) Indifferent: Those who never offer prayers and other religious activities.

Residence:

a) Urban: Those who belongs to urban background.

b) Rural: Those who belongs to rural background, they were born in rural area but shifted to urban area.

Monthly Income level:

a) Below Rs.10,000: Whose monthly income is below Rs.10,000 includes tailor, rikshaw puller, maid, peon, carpenter etc. They are lower income groups.

b) Rs.10,000-50,000: They include shopkeepers, primary school teachers, librarian, and clerks etc. They belong to middle income groups.

c) Above Rs.50,000: They are high income groups which include doctors, professors, engineers, Businessmen etc.

CChhaapptteerr 44 DDaattaa AAnnaallyysseess aanndd IInntteerrpprreettaattiioonn

Age at marriage:

In the present study, it is clear from the table 1.1 that in the first generation majority of the female respondents (88%) were married below 18 years and 12% of female respondents were married between 18-25 years and no one married above 25 years. In case of males, 62.5% of respondents were married below 18 years and 37.5% were married between 18- 25 years and no one married above 25 years.

When analysed on the basis of educational level, it is clear from the table 1.1 that 96.1% of illiterate female respondents were married below 18 years as compared to 66% of higher secondary educated respondents who were married below 18 years. On the contrary, 87% of illiterate males were married below 18 years as compared to 21.4% of higher secondary educated respondents. In the age group between 18-25 years, only 3.8% of illiterate females were married as compared to 33.3% of higher secondary educated. In case of males, only 12.9% of illiterate respondents were married between 18-25 years as compared to 100% of graduates and above. The data clearly reveals that education has a strong delaying effect on marriage. As education increases, age at marriage also increases.

When analysed on the basis of religiosity, it was found that 87.9% of strictly religious female respondents, 80% of respondents who were religiously moderate, and 70% of females who were religiously indifferent were married below 18 years. In case of males, 77.7% of strictly religious respondents, 50% of respondents who were religiously moderate and 33.3% of respondents who were religiously indifferent were married below 18 years. On the other hand, 12.5% of strictly religious respondents, 20% of respondents who were religiously moderate and 30% of respondents who were religiously indifferent were married between 18-25 years. In case of males, however 22.2% of strictly religious respondents and 66.6% of respondents who were religiously indifferent married between 18-25 years. The data reveals that those with greater religiosity married at a lower age.

When analysed on the basis of respondent‟s residence, it is evident from the table 1.1 that most of the rural born respondents 92.9% were married below the age of 18 years as compared to 81.3% of those who were urban born. In case of males, 75% of rural born were married below 18 years of age as compared to 54% of urban born. In the

39 age group between 18-25 years, it is opposite. 18.6% of urban born females were married between 18-25 years as compared to 7% of rural born females. In case of males, 45.8% of urban born males were married between 18-25 years as compared to 25% of rural born respondents. The data shows that residence is a significant factor in the rising of marriage age. As majority of the rural respondents were married at lower age as compared with urban born respondents.

Analysing the data on an Income basis, it is evident from the table 1.1 that 95.8% of female respondents whose monthly income was below Rs. 10,000 were married below 18 years of age as compared to 66.6% of female respondents whose monthly income was above Rs. 50,000. On the contrary, 88.6% of male respondents whose monthly income was below Rs.10,000 were married below 18 years as compared to 14.2% of respondents whose income was above Rs.50,000. The data reveals that respondents with a lower income group were married below 18 years whereas higher income respondents were married above 25 years of age. Hence, income level is greatly significant to the age at which people married.

In the second generation, it can be observed from the table 2.1 that 59.2% of female respondents were married below 18 years and 39.2% of female respondents were married at the age group of 18-25 years and only 1.6% of respondents were married above 25 years. In case of males, 17% of respondents were married below 18 years, 67% of respondents were married between 18-25 years and 16% of respondents were married above 25 years.

On the basis of educational level, it is evident from the table 2.1 that 95.8% of illiterate females were married below 18 years whereas only 40% of higher secondary educated were married below 18 years of age. 1.69% of females below high school were married between 18-25 years and 2.5 % of higher secondary females were married above 25 years. Among the males, 40% of illiterate respondents were married below 18 years as compared to 10.5% of graduate and above and 5.8% of respondents below high school were married above 25 years as compared to 36.8% of graduate and above.

The study reveals that as education increases, the percentage of respondents who were married below 18 years decreases. More educated respondents were married

40 between 18-25 years and illiterate respondents married below 18 years. Hence, education and age of marriage are significantly related to each other.

When the data was analysed on the basis of religiosity, it is found that 60.9% of strictly religious female respondents, 54.2% of respondents who were religiously moderate and 66.6% of respondents who were indifferent towards religion were married below 18 years. Among the males, 28.5% of respondents who were strictly religious, 8.33% of respondents who were religiously moderate and 40% of respondents who were religiously indifferent were married below 18 years. Whereas 37.9% of female respondents who were strictly religious, 42.8% of respondents who were religiously moderate and 33.3% of respondents who were religiously indifferent married between 18-25 years of age. Among the male respondents, 42.8% of respondents who were strictly religious, 81.6% of respondents who were religiously moderate and 60% of respondents who were religiously indifferent were married between 18-25 years. At the marriage age of above 25 years, it was found that 1.1% of female respondents who were strictly religious, 2.8% of respondents who were religiously moderate and no one among those who were religiously indifferent were married above 25 years. In case of male respondents, it was found that 28.5% of those who were strictly religious and 10% of those who were religiously moderate were married above 25 years of age. It can be concluded from religious point of view that strictly religious respondents married at an early age as compared with religiously moderate and religiously indifferent respondents. Thus, religion can be a relevant factor in delaying marriage age.

When analysed on the basis of residential status, it can be observed from the table 2.1 that among the female respondents who were urban born 60% of them were married below the age of 18 years, 38% of them were married between 18-25 years and 1.9% of them were married above 25 years of age. Among the rural born respondents 55% of them were married below 18 years, 45% of them were married between 18-25 years and no one married above 25 years. In case of males, 16.6% of respondents who were urban born were married below 18 years, 70% of respondents were married between 18-25 years and 13.3% of respondents were married above 25 years of age. Only 20% of male respondent who were rural born married below 18 years, 40% of them were married between 18-25 years and 40% of them were married above 25

41 years. It can be concluded from residence point of view that urban born males married late as compared with rural born males. But among the females, this is not the case.

When analysed on the basis of family Income, it was found that 83.3% of female respondents whose family income was below Rs.10,000 were married below 18 years as compared to 31.8% of those whose income was above Rs.50,000. 16.6% of respondents whose income was below Rs.10,000 were married between 18-25 years as compared to 63.6% of respondents whose income was above Rs.50,000. In case of males, 32.3% of respondents belonging to family income less than Rs.10,000 were married below 18 years as compared to 6.6% of those whose income was above Rs.50,000. 80.5% of male respondents with family income between Rs.10,000-50,000 were married between 18-25 years as compared to 11% of respondents who were married below 18 years. Hence, it can be said that as income level rises, the marriage age also rises.

The data in Table 3.1 shows that in the third generation only 10.4% of female respondents were married below 18 years, 52.8% of females were married between 18-25 years and 36.8% of respondents were married above 25 years. The data reveals that majority of female respondents were married between 18-25 years. In case of males, no one married below 18 years and 83% of male respondents were married above 25 years.

On the basis of educational level, it was found that majority of the female respondents, 58.2% graduate and above were married above 25 years and only 2% of respondents were married below 18 years who were graduate and above. In case of males, 96% of graduate and above respondents were married above 25 years and no one married below 18 years. Hence, education is a relevant variable in delaying the marriage age.

The data was also analysed on the basis of religiosity. It is evident from the Table 3.1 that 4.7% of strictly religious female respondents belonging to the third generation were married below 18 years, and 47.6% of them were married between18-25 and above 25 years. Only 13.9% of respondents who were religiously moderate were married below 18 years and 30.3% of respondents were married above 25 years while 50% of respondents who were indifferent towards religion were married between 18-

42 25 years and above 25 years. In case of males, 40% of those who were strictly religious married between 18-25 years and 60% of them were married above 25 years. In case of males, 40% of respondents who were strictly religious married between 18- 25 years and 60% of respondents were married above 25 years. Only 12% of respondents who were moderate towards religion married between 18-25 years and 88% married above 25 years. The data reveals that there is no consistency on the basis of religion in this case.

When analysed on the basis of residential background, the table 3.1 shows that no data could be collected from the third generation belonging to rural residents. All the respondents in the third generation belongs to urban background. The data indicated that the highest percentage of male respondents married above 25 years and among females the most favoured age of marriage lie between 18-25 years.

When the data was analysed on the basis of Income level, it is clear from the table 3.1 that majority 66.6% of female respondents whose monthly income was less than Rs.10,000 were married below 18 years and only 3% of respondents whose monthly income was above Rs.50,000 married below 18 years. No one married above 25 years. It indicates that mostly low income group were married below 18 years and mostly high income group were married above 25 years. Thus, income is relevant in this case.

Findings:

The analysis of the data for the three generations concludes that age of marriage is rising. In the first and second generation, marriages took place at a very early age. The majority of the marriages in the first generation occurred between illiterate respondents under the age of 18 years. In terms of religiosity, it was found that majority of strictly religious respondents were married at an earlier age as compared to religiously moderate respondents. On the basis of residential status, majority of the rural born respondents were married at an early age as compared to urban born respondents. In addition, respondents with a lower income were married at an early age than their counterparts. In the second generation, the impact of education shows that higher educated respondents prefer delaying marriage. In case of religiosity, it was found that the respondents who were strictly religious married early in

43 comparison to religiously moderate and religiously indifferent. As far as residential background is concerned, it was found that urban born married late in comparison to rural born. On the basis of income level, it was found that respondents who belong to lower income group married at an early age as compared to higher income group. In the third generation, it was found that as education increases among the respondents their attitude towards early marriage changes and they prefer marrying late. In addition, urban born respondents married late. Respondents with higher income level married late in comparison to lower income level. Hence, it can be concluded that there is a change in the attitude of Muslims towards the marriage age.

44 Preferred age at marriage:

The respondents were also asked about their opinion towards the desirable age at marriage. It is shown in the table 1.2 that among first generation of female respondents only 13% said that most suitable age for the marriage of girls was below 18 years, 84% preferred between 18-25 years and only 3% said above 25 years. In case of males, 55% favoured marriage age below 18 years and 45% favoured between 18- 25 years. No one favoured above 25 years.

When the data was analysed on the basis of educational level, it is clear from the table 1.2 that 13.4% of illiterate females and 11.1% of females among higher secondary educated said suitable age of marriage of girls was below 18 years. In case of males, 87.09% of illiterate respondents and only 21.4% of higher secondary educated respondents preferred marriage age below 18 years. It also indicated a change in the opinion of respondents. The percentage of illiterate female respondents 13.4% who preferred marriage age below 18 years was high as compared to 11.1% of those who were higher secondary educated. The percentage of illiterate males 87% preferring marriage age below 18 years were high as compared to 21.4% of higher secondary educated respondents. 82.6% of illiterate females said suitable age of marriage was between 18-25 years whereas 87.1% respondents who were below high school and 77.7% of respondents who were higher secondary educated preferred 18-25 years. In case of males, 38% of illiterates said suitable age of marriage was between 18-25 years. Hence, education seems to be a relevant factor in bringing about change in the opinion of respondents regarding marriage age.

When the data was analysed on the basis of religiosity, it is evident from the table 1.2 that only 12.5% of female respondents who were strictly religious and 30% of female respondents who were indifferent towards religion preferred marriage age below 18 years. It was also observed that 87.5% of female respondents who were strictly religious and 70% of respondents who were religiously moderate and 70% of respondents who were religiously indifferent preferred marriage age to be between 18-25 years. 30% of respondents who were religiously moderate preferred marriage age above 25 years. In case of males, 42.2% of respondents and 57.7 % of respondents who were strictly religious preferred marriage age below 18 years whereas 75% of respondents who were religiously moderate preferred marriage age

45 below 18 years and 25% of them preferred marriage age between 18-25 years and 30% of them preferred marriage age above 25 years. 30% of female respondents who were indifferent towards religion preferred marriage age below 18 years and 70% of them preferred marriage age between 18-25 years. In case of males, 66.6% of respondents who were indifferent towards religion preferred marriage age below 18 years and 33.3% of respondents who were religiously indifferent preferred marriage age between 18-25 years and no one preferred marriage age above 25 years. The data indicates that religion is not a significant factor in changing the opinion of respondents regarding marriage age.

When analysed on the basis of residential background, the table 1.2 shows that 15.7 % of female respondents who were rural born preferred marriage age below 18 years as compared to 9.3% urban born respondents. 83.7% of female respondents who were urban born and 84.2% of rural born females preferred marriage age between 18-25 years. 6.9% of urban born female respondents preferred marriage age above 25 years. In case of males, 43.7% of respondents who were urban born preferred marriage age below 18 years as compared to 71.8% of rural born respondents. 56.2% of urban born male preferred marriage age between 18-25 years and 28.1% of rural born preferred marriage age between 18-25 years. The data indicated that the number of rural born respondents who preferred marriage age below 18 years is higher than the urban born respondents. The percentage of rural and urban female respondents was similar in case of marriage age between 18-25 years. Only 6.9% of respondents who are urban born preferred marriage age above 25 years and no one from rural born preferred marriage age above 25 years. The percentage of urban born respondents preferring marriage age between 18-25 years was higher than the rural born male respondents. Thus, residence is a significant factor in bringing about change in the minds of the people regarding marriage age.

When the data was analysed on the basis of Income level, it can be observed from the table1.2 that 10.4% of female respondents whose monthly income was below Rs.10,000 preferred marriage age below 18 years and 17.3% of respondents whose monthly income level was between Rs.10,000-50,000 also preferred below 18 years of marriage age. None of the respondents whose monthly income level was above Rs.50,000 preferred below 18 years of marriage age. 89.5% of respondents whose

46 monthly income was less than Rs.10,000 preferred marriage age between 18-25 years .76% of respondents whose income was between Rs.10,000-50,000 preferred marriage age between 18-25 years and 100% of respondents whose monthly income was above Rs.50,000 also preferred marriage age between 18-25 years. In case of males, 77.2% of respondents whose monthly income was below Rs.10,000 preferred marriage age below 18 years. The percentage of respondents who preferred marriage age below 18 years declined to 31% as the income level increased between Rs.10,000-50,000. As the income level rises above Rs.50,000 the percentage of respondents 14.2% decreased who preferred below 18 years of marriage age. In the age between 18-25 years it was evident from the table 1.2 that 22.7% of male respondents favoured marriage age between 18-25 years whose monthly income was less than Rs.10,000. The percentage of respondents who preferred marriage age between 18-25 years increased to 68.9% as the income increased to Rs.10,000- 50,000.85.7% of respondents belonging to income level above Rs.50,000 preferred marriage age between 18-25 years. No one preferred above 25 years of marriage age. The data reveals that as the income level increases, the percentage of respondents preferring marriage age between 18-25 years also increases. It means that the income is significant factor in bringing about change in marriage age.

Further, in case of the second generation, it is indicated from the data in the table 2.2 that only 4.8% of females and 12% of males preferred marriage age below 18 years and 92% of females and 68% of males preferred marriage age between 18-25 years and 3.2% of females and 20% of male respondents favoured marriage age above 25 years.

When analysed on the basis of educational level, it is found that only 4.1% of illiterate female respondents preferred marriage age below 18 years as compared to 5% of higher secondary educated respondents. 83.3% of illiterate female preferred marriage age between 18-25 years as compared to 100% of graduate and above respondents. In the age above 25 years, 12.5% of illiterate and 2.5% of graduate and above preferred marriage age above 25 years. In case of males, 26.6% of illiterate male respondents preferred marriage age below 18 years and 23.5% of respondents below high school preferred below 18 years of marriage age. It was also evident from the table that 73.3% of illiterate males, 61.7% of higher secondary educated and 68.4% of graduate

47 and above respondents preferred 18-25 years of marriage age. 14.7% of respondents below high school and 28% of higher secondary respondents preferred marriage age above 25 years. It is clear that majority of females and males in the second generation preferred 18-25 years of marriage age.

When the data was analysed on the basis of religiosity, it is evident from the table 2.2 that only 2.2% of strictly religious females preferred below 18 years as compared to 11.4% of respondents who were religiously moderate. 93.1% of respondents who were strictly religious preferred marriage age between 18-25 years as compared to 88.5% of respondents who were religiously moderate but 100% of respondents who were religiously indifferent preferred marriage age between 18-25 years. Only 4.5% of respondents who were strictly religious preferred above 25 years of marriage age. In case of males, 5.7% of strictly religious respondents and 16.6% of respondents who were religiously moderate preferred marriage age below 18 years and 65.7% strictly religious respondents, 100% of respondents who were religiously indifferent preferred marriage age between 18-25 years. Only 28.5% of strictly religious respondents, 16.6% of respondents who were religiously moderate preferred above 25 years of marriage age. Hence, religiosity is not significant in this case.

When analysed on the basis of residential background, it is evident from the table 2.2 that 4.7% of urban born female respondents preferred below 18 years of marriage age as compared to 5% of rural born female respondents. 92.3% of urban born preferred marriage age between 18-25 years as compared to 90% of rural born respondents. Only 2.8% of urban born respondents preferred marriage age above 25 years as compared to 5% of rural born respondents. In case of males, it was evident that 11.1% of urban born respondents preferred below 18 years of marriage age as compared to 20% of rural born respondents. 70% of urban born respondents preferred 18-25 years of marriage age as compared to 50% of rural born.16.1% of urban born respondents preferred marriage age above 25 years as compared to 30% of rural born respondents. The data reveals that residential background is significant in this case as it brings about change regarding marriage age. It is found that number of urban born respondents who preferred marriage age between 18-25 years is high as compared to rural born respondents.

48 When the data was analysed on the basis of Income level, it is shown in the table 2.2 that only 5.5% of female respondents whose monthly income level was less than Rs.10,000 preferred marriage age below 18 years as compared to 5.8% of respondents whose monthly income was Rs.10,000-50000. 94.4% of respondents whose monthly income is less than Rs.10,000 preferred marriage age 18-25 years as compared to 95.4% of respondents whose monthly income was above Rs.50,000. Only 3.5% of respondents preferred marriage age above 25 years whose monthly income was between Rs.10,000-50,000. In case of males, 23.5% of respondents whose monthly income level was less than Rs.10,000 preferred marriage age below 18 years as compared to 33.3% of respondents whose monthly income level was above Rs.50,000. 70.5% of respondents whose monthly income was below Rs.10,000 preferred 18-25 years of marriage as compared to 60% of respondents whose monthly income level was above Rs.50,000. 5.8% of respondents with monthly income below Rs.10,000 preferred above 25 years of marriage age as compared to 36.6% of the respondents whose monthly income was above Rs.50,000. There is no consistency on the basis of income level, and so income is not significant factor in bringing about change in the mind of the people.

Further in the third generation, it is evident from the table3.2 that there was no one found who preferred below 18 years of marriage age, 20% of females and 20% of males preferred marriage age 18-25 years. 80% of females and 80% of males preferred marriage age above 25 years.

When the data was analysed on the basis of educational level, it is evident from the table3.2 that only 30% of female respondents below high school preferred marriage age between 18-25 years as compared to 47.7% of respondents who were higher secondary educated. 75% of illiterate female respondents preferred above 25 years of marriage age. 70% of those who were below high school, 52.2% of respondents among higher secondary educated and 100% of respondents who were graduate and above preferred above 25 years of marriage age. In case of males, 33.3% of respondents who were illiterate, 40% of those who were below high school, 23.5% of respondents who were higher secondary, 12% of respondents who were graduate and above preferred marriage age between 18-25 years. On the contrary, 66.6% of respondents who were illiterate, 60% of respondents who were below high

49 school,76% of respondents who were higher secondary and 88% of respondents who were educated graduation and above preferred above 25 years of marriage age. The data reveals that as educational level is increasing, mind of the respondents is also changing regarding marriage age. Respondents became aware of the problems posed by early marriage. Education is a significant factor in bringing about change in the attitudes of respondents.

When the data was analysed on the basis of religiosity, it is evident from the table3.2 that 21.4% of respondents who were strictly religious, 17.7% of respondents who were moderate towards religion and 50 % of respondents who were indifferent towards religion preferred marriage age between 18-25 years. On the contrary, 78.5% of strictly religious respondents, 82.2% of respondents who were moderate towards religion and 50% of respondents who were indifferent towards religion preferred marriage age above 25 years. In case of males, 40% of respondents who were strictly religious, 21.3% of respondents who were moderate towards religion preferred marriage age between 18-25 years. On the contrary, 60% of respondents who were strictly religious, 78.6% of respondents who were moderate towards religion, and 100% of respondents who were indifferent towards religion preferred marriage age above 25 years. The data reveals that 100% of males who were indifferent towards religion preferred above 25 years of marriage age.

When the data was analysed on the basis of residential background, it is clear from the table3.2 that in the present sample of the third generation no one belongs to rural background. All the respondents in the third generation were from urban background. Therefore, 20% of female and 20% of male respondents preferred marriage age between 18-25 years and 80% of female and 80% of male respondents preferred marriage age above 25 years. The data reveals that majority of the urban born respondents preferred marriage age above 25 years.

When the data was analysed on the basis of income level, it is evident from the table3.2 that 16.6% of respondents whose monthly income was below Rs.10,000 preferred marriage age between 18-25 years as compared to 24.5% of respondents whose monthly income was between Rs.10,000-50,000. On the contrary, 83.3% of respondents whose monthly income was below Rs.10,000, 75.4% of respondents whose monthly income was between Rs.10,000-50,000 and 84.4% of respondents

50 whose monthly income was above Rs.50,000 preferred to marry above 25 years. In case of males, 61.5% of respondents whose monthly income was below Rs.10,000 and 28% of respondents whose monthly income was between Rs.10,000-50,000, 8.06% of respondents whose monthly income was above Rs.50,000 preferred marriage age between 18-25 years. On the contrary, 38.4% of respondents whose monthly income was below Rs.10,000, 72% of those with monthly income between Rs.10,000 -50,000 and 91.9% of respondents with monthly income above Rs.50,000 preferred marriage age above 25 years of age. The data reveals that there is no consistency in the response pattern but there is rise in the percentage of males who preferred above 25 years of marriage age as the income level rises.

Findings: The analysis of the data of the three generations indicates that in the first generation, 84% of females and 45% of males preferred marriage age between 18-25 years as compared to the second generation where 92% of females and 68% of males preferred that age. 80% of both females and males preferred marriage age after 25 years of age. There is a visible change as not many prefer to marry at an early age. Education has changed the attitudes of many and more people are becoming aware of the problems of marriage at an early age. In terms of religiosity, it was found that in the third generation majority of the female respondents who were indifferent towards religion preferred to marry between 18-25 years as compared to strictly religious and religiously moderate respondents who preferred to marry above 25 years of age. Male respondents who were strictly religious and religiously indifferent preferred to marry above 25 years. The results for both were the same in this case. As far as the impact of residential background is concerned, no one belongs to rural background in the data for this study. Therefore, it can be concluded that in the third generation, urban born respondents preferred to marry above 25 years. The impact of income level shows that majority of the female respondents belonging to high income group preferred a marriage age above 25 years. But it cannot be concluded that change occurred due to rise in income level of the respondents because there is no consistency in the response pattern. While among males, there is rise in the percentage of respondents who preferred marriage age above 25 years with the rise in income level.

51 Respondents view on dowry:

Dowry means any property or valuable security given or agreed to be given either directly or indirectly by the bride‟s family to the bride, bridegroom or his kin in consideration of marriage. Srinivas observes that dowry is the product of various socio-economic factors like the monetization of economy, growth of education, hypergamy, lesser female work participation etc. He has constructed two well accepted modes of dowry: Traditional Dowry and Modern Dowry. Traditional Dowry was a natural gift, a small sum of capital and goods, given out of affection to the girl who was parting from her parents and the basic intention of the gifts so given was to help the young couple in running a household. The modern dowry on the other hand is characterized by large sums of cash frequently amounting to a few lakhs of rupees which is transferred along with furniture, gadgetry, costly clothing and jewellery from the bride‟s kin to the groom‟s kin. (chetty,2006)

In spite of the fact that dowry is prohibited in Islam, it has become important part of marriages in Muslim society. The following section examines respondent‟s attitudes towards dowry system.

In the first generation, it is clear from the table 1.3 that 56% of female respondents and 61.2% of male favoured dowry whereas 44% of female and 38.7% of male did not favour it.

When the data was analysed on the basis of educational level, it is evident from the table 1.3 that 69.2% of illiterate females, 41% of respondents below high school, 44.4% of respondents who were higher secondary educated favoured dowry. On the contrary, 30.7% of illiterate females, 58.9% of respondents below high school, and 55.5% of respondents who were higher secondary educated opposed it. In case of males, 64.5% of illiterate respondents, 66.6% of respondents below high school, 57.1% of higher secondary respondents and 37.5% of respondents who were graduate and above favoured dowry while 35.4% of respondents who were illiterate, 33.3% of respondents below high school, 42.8% of respondents who were graduate and above opposed it. The data reveals that as education increases among the respondents, they start opposing dowry system.

52 When analysed on the basis of religiosity, it is evident from the table 1.3 that 56.2% of respondents who were strictly religious, 60% of respondents who were religiously moderate, and 50% of respondents who were religiously indifferent favoured dowry. On the contrary, 43.7% of respondents who were strictly religious, 40% of religiously moderate, 50% of religiously indifferent opposed it. In case of males, 53.3% of strictly religious respondents, 60% of religiously moderate respondents, and 86.6% of religiously indifferent favoured the practice of dowry. The data reveals that majority of the female respondents who were religiously moderate, and majority of the male respondents who were religiously indifferent favoured the practice of dowry more as compared to strictly religious respondents.

When the data was analysed on the basis of residential background, it is clear from the table 1.3 that 46.5% of urban-born female respondents favoured dowry as compared to 63% of rural born respondents. On the contrary, 53.4% of urban born respondents opposed it as compared to 36.8% of rural born respondents. In case of males, 66.6% of respondents who were urban born favoured dowry as compared to 53.1% of rural- born respondents. Whereas 33.3% of urban born respondents opposed it as compared to 46.8% of rural born respondents. The data reveals that rural born female respondents favoured dowry more as compared to urban born female respondents whereas among males urban born favoured dowry more as compared to rural born.

On the basis of Income level, it can be observed from the table 1.3 that 62.5% of female respondents whose monthly income level was below Rs.10,000 favoured dowry as compared to 66.6% of respondents whose monthly income level was above Rs.50,000. On the contrary, 37.5% of respondents whose monthly income level was below Rs.10,000 opposed it as compared to 33.3% of respondents whose monthly income level was above Rs.50,000. In case of males, 56.8% of respondents whose monthly income level was below Rs.10,000 favoured dowry as compared to 42.8% of respondents whose monthly income level was above Rs.50,000. On the contrary, 43.1% of male respondents with monthly income level below Rs.10,000 opposed it as compared to 57.1% of respondents with monthly income level above Rs.50,000. The data reveals that females belonging to high income group favoured dowry more as compared to low income group. Whereas among males, middle income group favoured more as compared to high and low income group of respondents. High

53 income group of female respondents favoured it because they give it to their daughter as gift in their marriage.

Further, in the second generation the data clearly indicates that 34.4% of females and 53% of males favoured dowry and 65.6% of females and 47% of males opposed it.

When the data was analysed on educational basis, it is clear from the table 2.3 that only 25% of respondents who were illiterate favoured dowry as compared to 50% of above graduate respondents. On the contrary, 75% of illiterate female respondents opposed it as compared to 50% of graduate and above. In case of males, 73.3% of illiterate males favoured dowry as compared to 26.3% of graduate and above respondents. On the contrary, 26.6% of respondents who were illiterate opposed it as compared to 73.6% graduate and above respondents who opposed it. The data reveals that educated females favoured dowry more as compared to uneducated because Muslim women in the area under study were comparatively better off since though the dowry was given, it did not give rise to tensions and miseries as it does among the hindus. This is because it is voluntarily given by the parents and is not demanded by the boys parents. Among males, it was found that educated males did not favour it as compared to uneducated. Education appears to have made impact on the attitude of male respondents.

When analysed on the religious basis, it is found that 39% of female respondents who were strictly religious, 25.7% of respondents who were religiously moderate favoured dowry more as compared to respondents who were indifferent towards religion. In case of males, 71.4% of strictly religious and 60% of religiously indifferent respondents favoured dowry more as compared to religiously moderate respondents.

When analysed on the basis of residential background, it is found that 32.3% of urban born female respondents and 45% of rural born respondents favoured dowry. In case of male respondents, 51.1% of urban born and 70 % of rural born respondents favoured dowry. The data reveals that respondents belonging to rural background favoured dowry more as compared to urban born respondents.

When the data was analysed on the basis of income level, it is evident from the table 2.3 that 33.3% of female respondents with monthly income level below Rs.10,000 and 32.9% of respondents with monthly income between Rs.10,000-50,000 and 40.9% of

54 respondents with monthly income level above Rs.50,000 favoured dowry. On the contrary, 66.6% of respondents with monthly income level below Rs.10,000, 67% of respondents with monthly income level between Rs.10,000-50,000 and 59.09% of respondents whose monthly income was above Rs.50,000 opposed dowry. In case of males, 64.7% of respondents whose monthly income was below Rs.10,000, 47.2% of respondents with monthly income between Rs.10,000-50,000, 46.6% of respondents whose monthly income was above Rs.50,000 favoured dowry. On the contrary, 35.2% of respondents whose monthly income was below Rs.10,000, 52.7% of respondents whose monthly income was between Rs.10,000-50,000 and 53.3% of respondents with income level above Rs.50,000 opposed dowry. The data reveals that high income groups favoured dowry strongly as compared to low income and middle income groups. High income groups favoured dowry as they wanted to give dowry as gifts to their daughter. Hence, it can be concluded that dowry is more common among high income groups.

In the third generation, it is evident from the table3.3 that 32% of female and 50% of male favoured dowry and 68% of female and 50% of male did not favour dowry.

On the basis of educational level, it is evident from the table3.3 that 40% of female respondents below high school favoured dowry as compared to 25.3% of female respondents who were graduate and above. On the contrary, 60% of respondents below high school did not favour it as compared to 74.6% of respondents who were graduate and above. In case of males, 83% of illiterate respondents favoured dowry as compared to 32% of graduate and above respondents. On the other hand, 16.6% of illiterate respondents opposed dowry as compared to 68% of graduate and above respondents. The data reveals that as education increases among the respondents and their attitude towards dowry changes.

When analysed on the basis of religiosity, it is clear from the table3.3 that 28.5% of female respondents who were strictly religious respondents, 35.4% of religiously moderate respondents favoured dowry. On the other hand, 71.4% of strictly religious respondents, 64.5% of those who were religiously moderate, and 100% of those who were religiously indifferent did not favour it. In case of males, 53.3% of respondents who were religiously moderate, and 66.6% of respondents who were religiously indifferent favoured dowry. On the other hand, 100% of respondents who were

55 strictly religious, 46.6% of respondents who were religiously moderate and 33.3% of respondents who were religiously indifferent opposed dowry. The data reveals that majority of strictly religious respondents opposed it and only few strictly religious females favoured it. As far as religiously moderate and religiously indifferent was concerned, majority of females and males favoured dowry.

On the basis of residential background, Table3.3 indicates that there was no one in the sample who belongs to rural background in the third generation. 32% of female who were urban born, 50% of male who were urban born favoured dowry whereas 68% of female urban born and 50% of male who were urban born opposed it. The data reveals that in the third generation majority of females and males opposed dowry.

When the data was analysed on an income basis, it is evident from the table3.3 that 33.3% of respondents whose monthly income was below Rs.10,000, 32.7% of respondents with monthly income between Rs.10,000-50,000, 31% of respondents having monthly income above Rs.50,000 favoured dowry. On the contrary, 66.6% of respondents with monthly income below Rs.10,000, 67.2% of respondents having monthly income between Rs.10,000-50,000 and 68.9% of respondents with monthly income above Rs.50,000 did not favour dowry. In case of males, 53% of respondents whose monthly income was below Rs.10,000, 64% of respondents whose monthly income was between Rs.10,000-50,000 and 43% of respondents whose monthly income was above Rs.50,000 favoured dowry. On the contrary, 46% of respondents whose monthly income was less than Rs.10,000, 36% of respondents having monthly income between Rs.10,000-50,000 and 56% of respondents with monthly income above Rs.50,000 did not favour it. The data reveals that as the income level rises, the percentage of the respondents who are favouring dowry decreases and the percentage of respondents who are opposing dowry increases.

Findings: After analysing the data of the three generations, the study indicates that change has occurred across the generations. The study indicates that the number of the respondents favouring dowry in the first generation was higher than the respondents in the second and the third generation. It is indicated by the study that in the first generation, illiteracy was found to be the most important cause of favouring dowry among respondents. The number of illiterate females and males who favoured dowry was more as compared to literates. It can be said that educated respondents do not

56 favour dowry . But, with the passage of time, in the second generation educated respondents also began to favour dowry because they belong to better family background and their parents wanted to give dowry as a gift to them. Whereas in the third generation, it was found that educated respondents do not favour dowry more in comparison to uneducated. Therefore, we can say that education brings about change in the attitudes of respondents as they start opposing it. As far as religiosity is concerned, it was found that in the first generation respondents who were moderate and indifferent towards religion favoured the practice of dowry more in comparison to strictly religious respondents. In the second generation, it was found that strictly religious and religiously moderate respondents favoured dowry more in comparison to religiously indifferent. Male respondents who were moderate towards religion opposed dowry more in comparison to strictly religious and religiously indifferent. In the third generation, the study indicates that religiously moderate and religiously indifferent respondents favoured dowry more in comparison to strictly religious. As far as the impact of residential background is concerned, in the first and second generation rural born respondents favoured dowry more in comparison to urban born respondents. But in the third generation, unfortunately there was no one who belongs to rural background, therefore there were only urban background respondents who opposed dowry more than favoured it. On the basis of income level, it was found that in the first generation, high income group and low income group favoured dowry more as compared to middle income group and in the second generation, high income group favoured more as compared to low income group. But in the third generation, high income group opposed dowry more as compared to low income group of respondents.

57 Respondents who have given and taken dowry

In the first generation, it is evident from the table 1.4 that 59% of females and 58.7% of males have given and taken dowry respectively.

On the basis of educational level, it is evident from the table1.4 that 57.6% of illiterate females had given dowry as compared to 66.6% of higher secondary educated. In case of males, 64.5% of illiterate males had taken dowry as compared to 37.5% of graduates and above. The data reveals that dowry was prevalent but as education increases, the percentage of respondents who took dowry decreases gradually in case of males. Therefore, it can be said that the impact of education is more on male respondents.

When analysed on the basis of religiosity, the table 1.4 indicates that 58.7% of strictly religious females, 60% of those who were religiously moderate and 60% of those who were religiously indifferent have given dowry in their marriage. In case of males, 66.6% of strictly religious respondents, 30% of respondents who were religiously moderate and 73.3% of respondents who were religiously indifferent have taken dowry in their marriages. The data reveals that the number of respondents who were moderate and indifferent towards religion who had given dowry was high as compared to strictly religious respondents.

When the data was analysed on the basis of residential status, it is clear that 72% of urban born females had given dowry as compared to 49.1% of rural born females. The data reveals that urban born respondents practice dowry more as compared to rural born respondents.

On the basis of an income level, it is indicated from the table1.4 that 47.9% of female respondents with monthly income level less than Rs.10,000, 69.5% of female respondents with monthly income level between Rs.10,000-50,000 and 66.6% of female respondents with monthly income level above Rs.50,000 had given dowry in their marriage. Among males, 56.8% of respondents with monthly income level below Rs.10,000, 65.5% of respondents with monthly income level between Rs.10,000- 50,000 and 42.8% of respondents with monthly income level above Rs.50,000 had taken dowry in marriage. On the contrary, 52% of female respondents whose monthly income was below Rs.10,000, 30.4% of respondents whose monthly income was

58 between Rs.10,000-50,000 and 33.3% of respondents whose monthly income was above Rs.50,000 had not given dowry in marriage. In case of males, 43.1% of respondents whose monthly income was below Rs.10, 000, 34.4% of respondents whose monthly income was between Rs.10,000-50,000 and 57.1% of those whose monthly income was above Rs.50,000 had not taken dowry in their marriage. The data reveals that the practice of dowry was more among high income group of respondents as compared to low-income group.

In the second generation, it is evident from the table2.4 that 76.8% of females and 58% of males practiced dowry and 23.2% of females and 42% of males did not practice dowry.

On the basis of educational level, it is clear from the table2.4 that 75% of illiterate females, 88.1% of respondents below high school, 62.5% of respondents who were higher secondary, and 50% of respondents who were graduate and above had given dowry in their marriage. On the contrary, 25% of respondents who were illiterate, 11.8% of respondents below high school, 37.5% of respondents who were higher secondary and 50% of respondents who were graduate and above had not given any dowry in marriage. In case of males, 80% of respondents who were illiterate, 67.6% of respondents who were below high school, 50% of respondents who were higher secondary, 36.8% of respondents who were graduate and above had taken dowry in marriage.While 20% of respondents who were illiterate, 32.3% of respondents who were below high school, 50% of respondents who were higher secondary educated, and 63.1% of respondents who were graduate and above had not taken dowry in marriage. The data reveals that as educational level increases among females and males, the practice of dowry declines, they oppose dowry when they get educated.

When analysed on the basis of religiosity, it is shown in the table2.4 that 86.2% of respondents who were strictly religious, 57.1% of respondents who were religiously moderate, and 33.3% of respondents who were religiously indifferent have given dowry in marriage whereas 13.7% of respondents who were strictly religious, 25% of respondents who were religiously moderate, 66.6% of respondents who were religiously indifferent had not given dowry in marriage. On the other hand, in case of males, 71.4% of respondents who were strictly religious, 50% of respondents who

59 were religiously moderate, 60% of respondents who were religiously indifferent had taken dowry in marriage whereas 28.5% of respondents who were strictly religious, 50% of respondents who were religiously moderate, 40% of respondents who were religiously indifferent have not taken dowry in marriage. The data reveals that in the second generation strictly religious respondents practice dowry more as compared to religiously indifferent. It appears that they have very little knowledge about Islam and they are influenced by the cultural practices.

When the data was analysed on the basis of an income level, it is shown from the table2.4 that 33.3% of female respondents whose monthly income level was below Rs.10,000, 82.3% of female respondents whose monthly income level was between Rs.10,000-50,000 and 90.9% of female respondents whose monthly income was above Rs.50,000 had given dowry in their marriage. On the other hand, it was shown from the table2.4 that 66.6% of respondents whose monthly income level below Rs.10,000, 17.6% of female respondents with monthly income level between Rs.10,000-50,000 and only 9.09% of female respondents whose monthly income level was above Rs.50,000 had not given dowries. In case of males, it was shown from the table2.4 that 64.7% of respondents whose monthly income was below Rs.10,000, 52.7% of respondents whose monthly income level was between Rs.10,000-50,000, 56.6% of respondents whose monthly income was above Rs.50,000 had taken dowry in their marriage whereas 35.2% of respondents whose monthly income was below Rs.10,000, 47.2% of respondents whose monthly income was between Rs.10,000- 50,000 and 43.3% of respondents whose monthly income was above Rs.50,000 had not given dowry in their marriage. The data reveals that majority of females of high income group practice dowry more as compared to low income group. In case of males, the number of low income group who took dowry was high as compared to high income group.

On the basis of residential status, it is evident from the table2.4 that 80.9% of urban born female respondents practiced dowry more as compared to 55% of rural born whereas 19% of urban born female respondents did not practice it as compared to 45% of rural born respondents. In case of males, 60% of rural born respondents had taken dowry more as compared to 57.7% of urban born respondents whereas 42.2% of urban born respondents had not taken dowry as compared to 40% of rural born

60 respondents. The data reveals that among females the practice of giving dowry was high among urban-born respondents whereas it was low among rural born respondents. Among males, those who were rural born took dowry more as compared to urban born.

In the third generation, it is clear from the table3.4 that 82.4% of female respondents and 56% of male respondents practiced dowry whereas 17.6% of females and 44% of male respondents did not practice dowry.

When analysed on the basis of educational level, it is shown in the table3.4 that 75% of respondents who were illiterate, 70% of respondents below high school, 84% of respondents who were higher secondary and 83.5% of graduate and above practiced dowry. In case of males, 100% of illiterate, 70% of respondents below high school, 67.6% of respondents who were higher secondary and 40% of those who were graduate and above practice dowry. The data reveals that as education increases, the practice of dowry is also increasing. But among males, it was observed that the practice of dowry is more among illiterates as compared to educated respondents.

On the basis of religiosity, it is shown in the table3.4 that 78.5% of respondents who were strictly religious, 83.5% of respondents who were religiously moderate, and 100% of respondents who were religiously indifferent practice dowry. On the other hand, only 21.4% of respondents who were strictly religious and 16.4% of respondents who were religiously moderate did not practice dowry. In case of males, 100% of respondents who were strictly religious, 33.3% of respondents who were religiously moderate and 60% of respondents who were religiously indifferent did not practice dowry. On the other hand, 66.6% of respondents who were religiously moderate, 40% of respondents who were religiously indifferent took dowry. The data reveals that majority of female respondents who were religiously indifferent practice dowry. In case of males, religiously moderate respondents practice dowry more. So it indicates that in the third generation, those who were religiously indifferent and religiously moderate practice dowry more.

When the data was analysed on the basis of residential background, it is shown in the table3.4 that there was no one in the sample who belongs to rural background. It was clear that 82.5% of female respondents and 56% of male respondents had taken dowry

61 whereas 17.6% of female and 44% of male respondents had not taken dowry. The data reveals that majority of the respondents had given and taken dowry.

When analysed on the basis of income level, it is evident from the table3.4 that 66.6% of female respondents whose monthly income was below Rs.10,000, 95% of female respondents whose monthly income was between Rs.10,000-50,000 and 70.6% of respondents whose monthly income was above Rs.50,000 practice dowry. In case of males, 69% of respondents whose monthly income was below Rs.10,000, 64% of respondents whose monthly income were between Rs.10,000-50,000, and 50% of respondents whose monthly income was above Rs.50000 practice dowry. The data reveals that female respondents of high income groups practice dowry more as compared to low income groups. Whereas among males, respondents of low income group took dowry more as compared to high income group.

Findings: After analysing the data of the three generations, the study indicated that there is a change among the three generations .The study indicates that the practice of dowry is increasing day by day as it is evident from the figures. The practice of dowry was more prevalent in the third generation as compared to first and second generation. In the first generation, it was 59% among females and 58.7% among males which increased to 76.8% and 58% in the second generation and increased to 82.4% among females and decreased to 56% among males in the third generation.

As far as the impact of educational level is concerned, it was found that in the first and second generation the practice of dowry declines as the education level increases, but in the third generation, as the education level increases, the practice of giving dowry also increases but decreases in males. In case of religiosity, it is indicated by the data that in the first generation, religiously moderate and religiously indifferent respondents had given dowry more in comparison to strictly religious respondents. In the second generation, it was found that dowry was more practiced among strictly religious as compared to religiously moderate and religiously indifferent. In the third generation, respondents who were religiously indifferent practiced dowry more. As far as the impact of income level is concerned, in the first generation the practice of dowry was more among high income group as compared to low income group. In the second generation and third generation, it was found that majority of females of high

62 income group practiced dowry more as compared to low income group whereas among males dowry was more common among the lower income groups.

63 Female respondents who considered social status as the main reason of dowry.

In the first generation, it is evident from the table1.5 that 29% of female respondents agreed that social status is the main reason of dowry, 49% of female respondents disagreed and 22% of respondents agreed to some extent.

When analysed on the basis of education, it is indicated from the table1.5 that 28.8% of illiterate agreed, 30.7% of respondents below high school, 22.2% of respondents who were higher secondary agreed that social status is the main reason of dowry whereas 53.8% of illiterate respondents, 41% of respondents below high school and 55.5% of respondents who were higher secondary educated disagreed to it and 17.3% of illiterate respondents, 28.2% of respondents below high school, 22.2% of respondents who were higher secondary educated agreed to some extent. The data reveals that in the first generation dowry was given among the educated people not because of social status as majority of the respondents disagreed that social status is the main reason of dowry.

On the basis of religiosity, it is indicated from the table1.5 that 31.2% of strictly religious respondents, 20% of those who were religiously moderate and 20% of those who were religiously indifferent agreed that social status is the main reason of dowry whereas 50% of respondents who were strictly religious, 50% of respondents who were religiously moderate and 40% of respondents who were religiously indifferent disagreed that social status is the main reason of dowry. The data reveals that majority of strictly religious and religiously moderate respondents did not consider social status as the main reason of dowry.

On the basis of residential status, it is indicated from the table1.5 that 34% of urban born respondents agreed that social status is the main reason of dowry as compared to 24.5% of rural born respondents. While 46.5% of urban born respondents disagreed as compared to 50.8% of rural born. 18.6% of urban born respondents and 24.5% of rural born respondents said that they agreed to some extent that social status is the main reason of dowry. The data reveals that urban born respondents agreed more as compared to rural born respondents.

When analysed on the basis of income level, it is evident that only 18.7% of respondents whose monthly income was below Rs.10,000, 39.1% of respondents

64 whose monthly income was between Rs.10,000-50,000 and 33.3% of respondents whose monthly income was above Rs.50,000 agreed that social status is the main reason of dowry whereas 58.3% of respondents with monthly income below Rs.10,000, 39.1% of respondents whose monthly income lies between Rs.10,000- 50,000 and 50% of respondents having monthly income above Rs.50,000 disagreed that social status is the main reason of dowry. It was also evident from the table1.05 that 22.9% of respondents with monthly income below Rs.10,000, 21.7% of respondents with monthly income between Rs.10,000-50,000 and 16.6% of those with monthly income above Rs.50,000 agreed to some extent that social status is the main reason of dowry. The data reveals that middle income group of respondents agreed highly as compared to high income group and low income group. As far as low income group is concerned, they disagreed highly that social status is the main reason of dowry.

In the second generation, it is evident from the table2.5 that 33.6% of respondents considered that social status is the main reason of dowry, while 45.6% of respondents did not consider and only 20.8% of respondents said that they consider it to some extent.

On the basis of educational level, it is indicated from the table2.5 that 33.3% of illiterate respondents, 37.2% of respondents below high school, 27.5% of respondents who were higher secondary and 50% of respondents who were graduate and above agreed that social status is the main reason of dowry. While 54.1% of illiterate respondents, 44% of respondents below high school, 42.5% of respondents who were higher secondary and 50% of respondents who were graduate and above disagreed that social status is the main reason of dowry and 12.5% of illiterate respondents, 18.6% of respondents below high school, 30% of respondents who were higher secondary agreed to some extent that social status is the main reason of dowry. The data reveals that those who were more educated consider social status as the main reason of dowry. Those who were illiterates did not consider social status as the main reason of dowry. Therefore, education is a relevant factor.

When analysed on the basis of religiosity, it is indicated that 26.4% of strictly religious respondents and 54.2% of religiously moderate respondents agreed that social status is the main reason of dowry. Whereas 49% of strictly religious

65 respondents, 34.2% of religiously moderate, 66.6% of religiously indifferent did not agree that social status is the main reason of dowry and 24.1% of strictly religious respondents, 11.4% of religiously moderate and 33.3% of religiously indifferent agreed to some extent. The data reveals that majority of religiously moderate respondents agreed that social status is the main reason of dowry. It means that most of the respondents who were not regular in namaz, roza, and other religious practices practice dowry more as they show their status by giving dowry. Respondents who were religiously indifferent disagreed that social status is the main reason of dowry.

When analysed on the basis of residential background, it is indicated from the table2.5 that majority of respondents (urban born as well as rural born) disagreed that social status is the main reason of dowry. 40% of urban born disagreed whereas 75% of rural born disagreed. It was clear from the data that rural-born respondents were highly disagreed that social status is the main reason of dowry.

When the data was analysed on the basis of Income level, it is indicated from the table2.5 that 44.4% of respondents belonging to monthly income below Rs.10,000 agreed as well as disagreed whereas only 11.1% of respondents agreed to some extent that social status is the main reason of dowry. Respondents with monthly income between Rs.10,000-50,000, 48.2% of them disagreed whereas 25.8% of them agreed . Respondents whose monthly income level was above Rs.50,000, 54.5% of them agreed that they consider social status as the main reason of dowry and only 36.3% of them did not consider social status as the main reason of dowry. The data reveals that respondents whose monthly income level was high considered social status as the main reason of dowry. They showed their status by giving dowry.

In the third generation, it is indicated from the table3.5 that 52% of respondents agreed that they consider social status as the main reason of dowry, whereas 31.2% of respondents disagreed and 16.8% of respondents agreed to some extent that they consider social status as the main reason of dowry.

When analysed on the basis of educational level, it is indicated from the table3.5 that 50% of illiterates, 100% of those below high school, 68% of higher secondary educated respondents and 34% of graduate and above agreed that social status is the main reason of dowry. The data reveals that those who were educated did not consider

66 social status as the main reason of dowry. It means that majority of above graduate respondents disagreed on it.

When analysed on the basis of religiosity, it is indicated from the table3.5 that 57.1% of strictly religious respondents, 49.3% of respondents who were religiously moderate, and 50% of respondents who were religiously indifferent consider social status as the main reason of dowry. On the contrary, 30.9% of strictly religious, 30.3% of respondents who were religiously moderate, and 50% of respondents who were religiously indifferent did not consider social status as the main reason of dowry whereas 11.9% of respondents who were strictly religious, 20.2% of respondents who were religiously moderate agreed to some extent on it. The data reveals that most of the strictly religious respondents agreed that they consider social status as the main reason of dowry. However, they were religious but still they said that dowry should be given. Hence, it cannot be said that strictly religious respondents did not give dowry for social status. In reality, it is true that they give dowry for social status.

On the basis of residential background, it is indicated from the table3.5 that there was no one in the sample who belongs to rural born. It was evident from the table3.5 that 52% of respondents agreed, 31.2% of respondents disagreed, and 16.8% of respondents agreed to some extent that social status as the main reason of dowry. The data reveals that majority of the respondents belonging to urban born agreed that social status as the main reason of dowry.

On the basis of an Income level, it is indicated from the table3.5 that 50% of respondents whose monthly income was below Rs.10,000, 57.3% of respondents whose monthly income was between Rs.10,000-50,000 and 46.5% of respondents whose monthly income was above Rs.50,000 considered social status as the main reason of dowry. On the contrary, 50% of respondents below Rs.10,000 income level did not consider social status as the main reason of dowry, 34.4% of respondents whose monthly income was between Rs.10,000-50,000 and 25.8% of respondents with monthly income above Rs.50,000 disagreed that social status was the main reason of dowry and 81% of the respondents with monthly income level between Rs.10,000-50,000 and 27.5% of respondents whose income level was above Rs.50,000 said that they agreed to some extent. The data reveals that majority of respondents whose monthly income level was between Rs.10,000-50,000 and above

67 Rs.50,000 considered social status as the main reason of dowry and majority of low- income group of respondents did not consider social status as the main reason of dowry.

Findings: The analysis of the data of the three generations indicates that in the first generation, very few respondents (29%) considered social status as the main reason of dowry. In the second generation, the percentage of respondents increased to 33.6% and reached to 52% in the third generation who agreed that social status as the main reason of dowry. As far as the impact of educational level is concerned, in the first generation dowry was given among the educated respondents not because of social status. As the impact of religiosity is concerned, it was found that majority of strictly religious and religiously moderate respondents disagreed that social status is the main reason of dowry. Also, urban born respondents considered social status as the main reason of dowry more in comparison to rural born respondents. As far as the impact of income level is concerned, it was found that middle income group considered social status as the main reason of dowry whereas low income group of respondents did not consider social status as the main reason of dowry. In the second generation, as far as the impact of education is concerned, educated respondents considered social status as the main reason of dowry more than the uneducated respondents. As far as the impact of religiosity is concerned, religiously moderate respondents considered social status as the main reason of dowry as compared to strictly religious. On the basis of residential background, it was found that rural born respondents did not consider social status as the main reason of dowry as compared to urban born respondents. The impact of income level is that high income group of respondents considered social status as the main reason of dowry more as compared to low income group. In the third generation, the impact of education is that majority of educated respondents did not consider social status as the main reason of dowry. Education is found to be relevant in bringing about change in the views of respondents. On the basis of religiosity, strictly religious respondents were more agreed that social status is the main reason of dowry as compared to religiously moderate and religiously indifferent. As far as the impact of residential background is concerned, it was found that majority of the urban born respondents agreed that social status is the main reason of dowry.

68 Female respondents who experienced domestic violence:

Domestic Violence is a sensitive issue and it occurs in all societies, among people of all ages. It affects all levels of income and education. Domestic violence often goes unreported as women are reluctant to disclose experiences of violence because of feelings of shame or fear; this is because they are socialized to accept, tolerate and even rationalize domestic violence and to remain silent about such experiences. It is hard to know exactly how common domestic violence is because people often don‟t report it. In the present study an attempt has been made to explore the occurrence of domestic violence among muslim women in Aligarh. Domestic violence includes violence perpetrated by intimate partners and other family members.

a) Physical violence such as slapping, beating, arm twisting, kicking etc.

b) Psychological abuse which includes behaviour that is intended to intimate and persecute and takes the form of threats of abandonment or abuse, confinement to the home, surveillance, threats to take away custody of the children and constant humiliation.

In the first generation, it is evident from the table1.6 that 26% of female respondents faced domestic violence in the family whereas 74% of female respondents did not face any violence.

On the basis of educational level in the first generation, it is indicated from the table1.6 that 26.9% of illiterate respondents (only females), 28.2% of respondents below high school, 11.1% of respondents who were higher secondary faced domestic violence and no one was graduate and above in the first generation. On the other hand, 73% of illiterates, 71.1% of respondents below high school, 88.8% of respondents who were higher secondary did not face domestic violence. The data reveals that violence occurred mostly in less educated families and not in educated families. Very few cases were found among educated families.

When the data was analysed on the basis of religiosity, it is indicated from the table1.6 that only 25% of respondents faced domestic violence who were strictly religious, 30% of respondents who were religiously moderate and 30% of respondents who were religiously indifferent faced domestic violence. On the other hand, 75% of

69 respondents who were strictly religious, 70% of religiously moderate respondents and 70% of respondents who were religiously indifferent did not face domestic violence. The data reveals that respondents who were strictly religious faced less domestic violence as compared to those who were religiously moderate and Indifferent.

On the basis of residential status, the table1.6 shows that 23% of urban born respondents faced domestic violence as compared to 28% of rural born respondents whereas 76.7% of urban born did not face domestic violence as compared to 71.9% of rural born respondents. The data reveals that domestic violence was more prevalent among rural born as compared to urban born respondents.

On the basis of an Income level, it is indicated from the table1.6 that 29.1% of respondents with monthly income level below Rs.10,000, 26% of respondents with monthly income between Rs.10,000-50,000 faced domestic violence whereas 70.8% of respondents belonging to monthly income level less than Rs.10,000, 73.9% of respondents whose monthly income was between Rs.10,000-50,000 and 100% of respondents whose monthly income was above Rs.50,000 did not face domestic violence. The data reveals that violence was more found among low income group of respondents as compared to high income group.

In the second generation, it is evident from the table2.6 that 22.4% of respondents faced domestic violence as compared to 77.6% of respondents who did not face.

When analysed on the basis of educational level, it is indicated from the table2.6 that 66.6% of illiterate respondents, 18.6% of respondents below high school and 2.5% of respondents who were higher secondary educated faced domestic violence whereas 33.3% of illiterate respondents, 81.3% of respondents below high school, 97.5% of respondents who were higher secondary educated and 100% of respondents who were graduate and above did not face domestic violence in second generation. The data reveals that domestic violence was more among illiterates and less educated respondents as compared to educated respondents.

On the basis of religiosity, it is shown in the table2.6 that 19.5% of strictly religious respondents faced domestic violence whereas 80.4% of respondents who were strictly religious and 68.5% of respondents who were religiously moderate and 100% of

70 respondents who were religiously indifferent did not face domestic violence. The data reveals that those who were indifferent towards religion did not face any domestic violence. Very few strictly religious respondents faced domestic violence as compared to those who were moderate towards religion.

When analysed on the basis of residential background, it is shown in the table2.6 that only 20.9% of respondents who were urban born faced domestic violence as compared to 30% of rural born respondents. On the contrary, 79% of urban born respondents and 70% of rural born respondents did not face domestic violence. The data reveals that domestic violence was more prevalent among rural born respondents. It means that however, they had shifted to urban areas but their thinking and attitude had not changed. They were still narrow-minded, conservative type of people.

When analysed on the basis of income level, it is evident from the table2.6 that 61.1% of respondents with monthly income level below Rs.10,000, 11.7% of respondents with monthly income between Rs.10,000-50,000 and 31.8% of respondents whose monthly income was above Rs.50,000 faced domestic violence in the family . On the other hand, 38.8% of respondents whose monthly income was below Rs.10,000, 88.2% of respondents whose monthly income was between Rs.10,000-50,000 and 68.1% of respondents whose monthly income was above Rs.50,000 did not face domestic violence. The data reveals that violence was found more among low income group as compared to middle income group and high income group.

In the third generation, the number of respondents who faced domestic violence declines to 14.4% and those who did not face domestic violence their percentage rises to 85.6%.

When analysed on the basis of educational level, it is evident from the table3.6 that 75% of illiterate respondents, 30% of respondents below high school, 15.9% of respondents who were higher secondary educated and 7.46% of respondents who were graduate and above faced domestic violence whereas 25% of illiterate respondents, 70% of respondents who were below high school, 84% of respondents who were higher secondary educated and 92.5% of respondents who were graduate and above did not face domestic violence. The data clearly reveals that domestic

71 violence was prevalent more among illiterates and less educated respondents as compared to more educated respondents.

On the basis of religiosity, the table3.6 depicts that only 9.5% of strictly religious and 17.7% of respondents who were religiously moderate faced domestic violence whereas 90.4% of respondents who were strictly religious, 82.2% of those who were religiously moderate and 100% of those who were religiously indifferent did not face domestic violence. The data clearly reveals that domestic violence was found among religiously moderate respondents.

When the data was analysed on the basis of residential background, it is evident from the table3.6 that 14.4% of respondents who were urban born faced domestic violence. No one belongs to rural background in the third generation in the sample.

When the data was analysed on the basis of Income level, it is evident from the table3.6 that 83.3% of respondents whose monthly income was below Rs.10,000 14.7% of those whose monthly income was between Rs.10,000-50,000 and 6.8% of those whose monthly income was above Rs.50,000 faced domestic violence whereas 16.6% of respondents whose monthly income was below Rs.10,000, 85.2% of respondents whose monthly income was between Rs.10,000-50,000 and 93.1% of respondents whose monthly income was above Rs.50,000 did not face domestic violence. The data clearly reveals that domestic violence was found more among low income group of respondents as compared to high income group of respondents.

Findings:

The analysis of the data of the three generations on domestic violence concludes that the rate of domestic violence had decreased from first generation to the third generation. It was more prevalent in the first generation but in the third generation it was very less found. In the first generation, as far as the impact of education is concerned, domestic violence was more reported by illiterates as compared to literates. On the basis of religiosity, it was found that domestic violence was more found among those who were moderate and indifferent towards religion as compared to strictly religious respondents. The impact of income level on domestic violence shows that domestic violence was more reported by low income groups as compared

72 to high income groups. In the second generation, it was found that as far as the impact of education is concerned, domestic violence was more reported by uneducated respondents in comparison to educated respondents. As far as the impact of religiosity is concerned, very few strictly religious respondents reported domestic violence as compared to religiously moderate whereas those who were indifferent towards religion did not report domestic violence. In case of residential background, majority of urban born respondents did not face domestic violence and no rural respondent found in third generation in the sample. On the basis of monthly income, it was more reported by low income group of respondents as compared to high income and middle income groups.

73 Male Respondents who demanded dowry:

In the first generation, it is evident from the table1.7 that 35% of male respondents demanded dowry and 65% of male respondents did not demand anything.

When analysed on the basis of educational level, it is evident from the table1.7 that 51.6% of illiterate respondents, 33.3% of respondents below high school, 14.2% of respondents who were higher secondary educated and 12.5% of respondents who were graduate and above demanded dowry. On the contrary, 48.3% of illiterate respondents, 66.6% of respondents below high school, 85.7% of higher secondary educated and 87.5% of respondents who were graduate and above did not demand anything. The data reveals that dowry was more demanded among illiterates as compared to literates.

On the basis of religiosity, it is indicated from the table1.7 that 33.3% of strictly religious respondents, 40% of religiously moderate respondents, and 33.3% of respondents who were indifferent towards religion demanded dowry whereas 66.6% of strictly religious respondents, 60% of religiously moderate respondents, and 66.6% of respondents who were indifferent towards religion did not demand dowry. The data shows that the respondents who were religiously moderate demanded dowry more as compared to strictly religious and those who were indifferent towards religion.

When analysed on the basis of residential background, it is evident from the table1.7 that 37.5% of urban born respondents demanded dowry as compared to 31.2% of rural born respondents. On the other hand, 62.5% of urban born did not demand as compared to 68.7% of rural born respondents. The data reveals that the percentage of urban born respondents was higher who demanded dowry as compared to rural born respondents.

When analysed on the basis of an Income level, it is evident from the table1.7 that 38.6% of respondents whose monthly income was below Rs.10,000, 31.03% of respondents whose monthly income lies between Rs.10,000-50,000 and 28.5% of respondents whose monthly income was above Rs.50,000 demanded dowry. On the contrary, 61.3% of respondents whose monthly income was below Rs.10,000, 68.9% of respondents whose monthly income lies between Rs.10,000-50,000, 71.4% of

74 respondents whose income was above Rs.50,000 did not demand dowry. The data reveals that respondents belonging to low income group have demanded more dowry as compared to high income group.

In the second generation, it is evident from the table2.7 that 29% of respondents demanded dowry as compared to 71% of respondents who did not demand dowry.

When analysed on the basis of educational level, it is evident from the table2.7 that 53.3% of illiterate respondents, 38.2% of respondents below high school, 18.7% of respondents who were higher secondary educated, 10.5% of respondents who were above graduate demanded dowry whereas 46.6% of illiterate respondents, 61.7% of respondents below high school, 81.2% of respondents who were higher secondary and 89.4% of respondents who were graduate and above did not demand dowry. It means uneducated respondents demanded more than the educated respondents.

On the basis of religiosity, it is evident from the table2.7 that only 5.7% of respondents who were strictly religious demand dowry whereas 94.2% of them did not demand dowry, 45% of respondents who were religiously moderate demand dowry whereas 55% of them did not demand dowry and 100% of respondents who were religiously indifferent did not demand dowry. The data reveals that the percentage of religiously moderate respondents was higher as compared to strictly religious respondents. Majority of strictly religious respondents did not demand dowry.

When analysed on the basis of residential background, it is evident from the table that 2.7 that only 27.7% of urban born respondents demanded dowry and 72.2% of them did not demand it. On the other hand, 40% of respondents who were rural born demanded dowry and 60% of them did not demand it. The data reveals that percentage of rural born respondents who demanded dowry was higher as compared to urban born respondents.

On the basis of Income level, it is evident from the table 2.7 that 44.1% of respondents whose monthly income was below Rs.10,000, 11.1% of respondents whose monthly income was between Rs.10,000-50,000 and 33.3% of respondents whose monthly income level was above Rs.50,000 demanded dowry whereas 55.8%

75 of respondents whose monthly income level was below Rs.10,000, 88.8% of respondents whose monthly income level was between Rs.10,000-50,000 and 66.6% of respondents whose monthly income level was above Rs.50,000 did not demand dowry. The data reveals that the percentage of higher income group who demanded dowry was low as compared to lower income group.

In the third generation, it is evident from the table3.7 that 31% of respondents demanded dowry as compared to 69% of respondents who did not demand dowry.

When the data was analysed on the basis of education, it is evident from the table3.7 that 100% of illiterate respondents, 70% of respondents below high school, 41% of respondents who were higher secondary, 8% of respondents who were graduate and above demanded dowry whereas 30% of respondents below high school, 58% of respondents who were higher secondary, 92% of graduate and above respondents did not demand dowry. The data reveals that as education increased among the respondents dowry demand decreased.

When the data was analysed on the basis of religiosity, it is evident from the table3.7 that 100% of respondents who were strictly religious did not demand dowry as compared to 66.6% of religiously moderate and 60% of indifferent respondents. On the other hand, 33.3% of religiously moderate and 40% of religiously indifferent respondents demanded dowry. The data reveals that respondents who were religiously moderate and religiously indifferent demanded dowry more as compared to strictly religious.

When the data was analysed on residential background, it is clear from the table3.7 that there is no one found in the third generation who belongs to rural background. It was shown in the table 3.7 that 31% of the urban born respondents demanded dowry and 69% of them did not demand dowry. The data reveals that majority of the urban born respondents did not demand dowry in the third generation.

When analysed on the basis of income level, it is evident from the table3.7 that 61% of respondents whose monthly income was below Rs.10,000, 40% of respondents whose monthly income lies between Rs.10,000-50,000 and 20.9% of respondents whose monthly income was above Rs.50,000 demanded dowry. On the other hand,

76 38% of respondents whose monthly income was below Rs.10,000, 60% of respondents whose monthly income lies between Rs.10,000-50,000 and 79% of respondents whose monthly income was above Rs.50,000 did not demand dowry. The data reveals that the number of respondents belonging to low income group was high. It means low income group of respondents demanded dowry more as compared to high income groups.

Findings:

After analysing the data of the three generations, it was found that demand of dowry is highest (35%) in the first generation, then it decreased to 29% in the second generation, then it increased to 31% in the third generation. In the first generation, as far as the impact of education is concerned, it was found that illiterates demanded more as compared to literates. So, education is an important factor in changing the views and attitudes towards dowry. As far as the impact of religiosity is concerned, the data shows that religiously moderate respondents demanded dowry more as compared to strictly religious respondents. In case of residential background, respondents who belong to urban background demanded more as compared to rural background. On the basis of income level, it is found that respondents belonging to low income group demanded more as compared to high income group. In the second generation, illiterates demanded dowry more as compared to literates. In case of religiosity, religiously moderate respondents demanded dowry more as compared to strictly religious. On the basis of income level, higher income group demanded dowry more as compared to low income group. In the third generation, it was found that as far as education is concerned, illiterates demanded dowry more as compared to literates. The impact of religiosity shows that religiously moderate and indifferent respondents demanded more dowry as compared to strictly religious respondents. In case of residential background, it was found that majority of urban born respondents did not demand dowry. There were no rural born respondents in this generation in the sample. As far as the impact of income level is concerned, respondents belonging to low income group demanded dowry more as compared to high income group.

77 Respondents who have received and paid mehr:

Mehr is paid to the bride for conjugal rights. It is a characteristic of Muslim marriage. Mehr is supposed to be a good security for the women in case of any difficulty in her marital life. It should be paid to the bride on the first night but may be deferred by mutual consent. However, if she is divorced mehr has to be given to her. In order to study the views of the respondents they were asked some questions on this issue.

In the first generation, it is indicated from the table1.8 that 30% of female respondents received mehr and 70% of female respondents did not receive mehr. In case of males, 66% of respondents paid mehr and 33.7% of them did not pay.

When the data was analysed on the basis of educational level, it is clear that 28.8% of female respondents who were illiterate, 30.7% of female respondents below high school, 33.3% of female respondents who were higher secondary educated had taken mehr from the husband. In case of male respondents, 51.6% of respondents who were illiterate, 66.6% of respondents below high school, 78.5% of higher secondary educated and 100% of graduate and above respondents had given mehr to their wives. The above data reveals that majority of the female respondents (70%) had not taken mehr. Only those females had received mehr who were educated. As the education increases among women, they have started taking mehr from the husband because they became aware that mehr is an economic security for them. Mehr is her right. It is found that as the education increased among males, they paid mehr to their wives.

When the data was analysed on the basis of religiosity, it is found that 32.5% of strictly religious female respondents, 20% of religiously moderate and 20% of religiously indifferent had taken mehr from the husband whereas 67.5% of respondents who were strictly religious, 80% of respondents who were religiously moderate and 80% of respondents who were religiously indifferent had not taken mehr. In case of males, 88.8% of respondents who were strictly religious, 40% of religiously moderate respondents and 33.3% of religiously indifferent respondents had paid mehr to their wives and 11.1% of respondents who were strictly religious, 60% of religiously moderate respondents and 66.6% of respondents who were indifferent towards religion had not paid mehr. The data reveals that the number of strictly religious female respondents who had taken mehr is high as compared to respondents

78 who were moderate and indifferent towards religion. In case of males, the number of strictly religious was high who had paid mehr as compared to respondents who were moderate and indifferent towards religion. Therefore, religion is an important factor in determining respondent‟s attitude towards mehr.

When the data was analysed on the basis of residential background, it is evident from the table1.8 that 32.5% of urban born female respondents had taken mehr as compared to 28% of rural born respondents who had taken mehr. On the contrary, 67.4% of female respondents who were urban born had not taken mehr as compared to 71.9% of rural born female respondents who had not taken mehr. In case of males, it is indicated in the table1.8 that 66.6% of respondents who were urban born had given mehr to their wives as compared to 65.6% of rural born respondents. On the other hand, 33.3% of urban born respondents had not given mehr as compared to 34.3% of rural born male respondents. The data indicates that the number of urban born respondents were high who had given and taken mehr as compared to rural born respondents because urban born respondents were more aware of the religious values.

When the data was analysed on the basis of Income level, it is indicated from the table1.8 that 27% of female respondents whose monthly income was below Rs.10,000, 34.7% of female respondents whose monthly income lies between Rs.10,000-50,000 and 16.6% of female respondents whose monthly income was above Rs.50,000 had taken mehr in marriage whereas 72.9% of female respondents whose monthly income was below Rs.10,000, 65.2% of female respondents whose monthly income lies between Rs.10,000-50,000 and 83.3% of female respondents whose monthly income was above Rs.50,000 had not taken mehr by their husband. In case of males, 52.2% of respondents whose monthly income was below Rs.10,000, 86.2% of respondents whose monthly income level was between Rs.10,000-50,000 and 71.4% of respondents whose monthly income level was above Rs.50,000 had given mehr to their wives whereas 47.7% of respondents whose monthly income was below Rs.10,000, 13.7% of respondents whose monthly income level was between Rs.10,000-50,000, 28.5% of respondents whose monthly income level was above Rs.50,000 had not given mehr to their wives. The data indicates that majority of males who belong to higher income group had given mehr to their wives. In case of females,

79 it was found that majority of females (83.3%) who belong to higher income group have not taken mahr.

In the second generation, it is evident from the table2.8 that 45.6% of female respondents and 67% of male respondents had received and paid mehr respectively. On the other hand, 54.4% of female respondents and 33% of male respondents had not received and paid mehr respectively.

When the data was analysed on the basis of educational level, it is indicated from the table2.8 that 29.1% of female respondents who were illiterate, 49.1% of female respondents below high school, 50% of female respondents who were higher secondary educated and 50% of graduate and above female respondents had received mehr from the husband. In case of males, 46.6% illiterate respondents, 55.8% of respondents below high school, 75% of respondents who were higher secondary educated and 89% of graduate and above respondents had paid mehr to their wives. The data indicates that as the education increased among female respondents, the percentage of female respondents who had received mehr and the percentage of males who had paid mehr increased as the education increases among them.

When the data was analysed on the basis of religiosity, it is indicated from the table2.8 that 43.6% of female respondents who were strictly religious, 48.5% of female respondents religiously moderate, 66.6% of female respondents who were religiously indifferent have received mehr from the husband. Whereas in case of males, 57.1% of respondents who were strictly religious, 70% of those who were religiously moderate and 100% of those who were religiously indifferent had paid mehr to their wives. The data indicates that majority of the respondents who were indifferent towards religion have paid and received mahr.

When the data was analysed on the basis of residential background, it is evident from the table2.8 that 50.4% of urban born female respondents had received mehr as compared to 20% of rural born female respondents. On the other hand, 67.7% of male respondents who were urban born had given mehr to their wives as compared to 60% of rural born respondents. The data indicates that majority of urban born respondents had paid and received mehr as compared to rural born respondents.

80 When the data was analysed on the basis of income level, it is evident from the table2.8 that 27.7% of female respondents whose monthly income was below Rs.10,000, 58.8% of respondents whose monthly income was between Rs.10,000- 50,000 and 9.09% of female respondents whose monthly income was above Rs.50,000 had received mehr. In case of males, 50% of respondents whose monthly income was below Rs.10,000, 75% of respondents whose monthly income was between Rs.10,000-50,000 and 76.6% of respondents whose monthly income was above Rs.50,000 had given mehr to their wives. The data indicates that as the income level rises, the percentage of male respondents who had paid mehr also increased. In case of females, income level is not important.

In the third generation, it was indicated from the table3.8 that 57.6% of female respondents and 55% of male respondents had received and paid mehr.

When the data was analysed on the basis of educational level, it is evident from the table3.8 that 25% of female respondents who were illiterate, 30% of respondents below high school, 56.8% of female respondents who were higher secondary and 64% of respondents who were graduate and above had received mehr from the husband. In case of male respondents, 40% of respondents below high school, 47% of respondents who were higher secondary educated, 70% of respondents who were graduate and above had paid mehr to their wives. The data reveals that as the education increased, the number of male and female respondents also increased who have paid and received mehr.

When the data was analysed on the basis of religiosity, it is evident from the table3.8 that 61.9% of female respondents who were strictly religious, 56.9% of female respondents who were religiously moderate and 25% of female respondents who were indifferent towards religion had received mehr. In case of male respondents, 80% of strictly religious respondents, 46.6% of religiously moderate respondents and 80% of respondents who were religiously indifferent had paid mehr to their wives. The data reveals that majority of strictly religious female respondents had received mehr and majority of strictly religious respondents and religiously indifferent had given mehr to their wives.

81 When the data was analysed on residential background, it is evident from the table3.8 that 57.6% of urban born female respondents had received mehr and 42.4% of respondents had not received mehr. On the other hand, 55% of male respondents paid mehr and 45% did not paid mehr. The data reveals that majority of the females had received mehr and majority of males had paid mehr.

When the data was analysed on the basis of Income level, it is clear from the table3.8 that 16.6% of female respondents whose monthly income was below Rs.10,000, 50.8% of female respondents whose monthly income was between Rs.10,000-50,000 and 68.9% of female respondents whose monthly income was above Rs.50,000 had taken mehr. In case of males, 30.7% of respondents whose monthly income was below Rs.10,000 36% of respondents whose monthly income was above Rs.50,000. The data reveals that the number of respondents who belongs to high income groups was highest as compared to middle and lower income groups who had taken and paid mehr.

Findings :

After analysing the data of the three generations, it is found that in the first generation only 30% of female respondents received mehr whereas in the second generation 45.6% of female respondents took mehr and in third generation 57.6% of female respondents took mehr from the husband. In case of males, in the first generation, 66% of respondents paid mehr whereas 67% of respondents in the second generation and 55% of respondents in the third generation paid mehr . So, it is clear, that the number of male respondents in the third generation who paid mehr is low as compared to the first and second generation. In the first generation, as far as the impact of education is concerned, majority of illiterate females did not take mehr as compared to educated. On the basis of religiosity, strictly religious respondents had paid and taken mehr more than religiously moderate and religiously indifferent respondents. In case of residential background, it is clear that the urban born respondents had paid and taken mehr more than the rural born respondents. The impact of income level indicates that females who belong to higher income groups had not taken mehr but males who belong to high income group had taken mehr to their wives in comparison to lower income groups. In the second generation, as far as

82 the impact of education is concerned, it was found that educated respondents had paid and received mehr more than uneducated respondents. In case of religiosity, it was found that respondents who were indifferent towards religion had paid mehr more than strictly religious. As far as the impact of residential background is concerned, it was found that respondents who belong to urban background had paid and received mehr more as compared to rural born respondents. On the basis of income level, it was found that higher income group of respondents had paid mehr more than lower income groups. In the third generation also, educated respondents had paid and received mehr more than uneducated. In case of religiosity, it was found that majority of strictly religious respondents had received mehr and majority of religiously indifferent respondents had paid mehr. In case of residence, it was found that majority of the urban born respondents had paid and received mehr. On the basis of income level, respondents of high income groups had paid and received mehr more than the middle and lower income groups.

83 Respondent’s attitude towards polygyny:

In the first generation, it is evident from the table1.9 that only 18% of female respondents favoured polygyny as against 52% of female respondents who opposed it. In case of males, 58.7% favoured polygyny and 41.2% were not in favour of it and 30% of female favoured under some conditions.

When analysed on the basis of educational level, it is evident from the table1.9 that 15.3% of illiterate females, 23% of female respondents below high school, 11.1% of female respondents higher secondary educated were in favour of polygyny. In case of male respondents, 67.7% of illiterate respondents, 66.6% of respondents below high school, 35.7% of respondents higher secondary educated, 37.5% of respondents who were graduate and above were in favour of polygyny. On the other hand, 51.9% of female respondents who were illiterate, 51.2% of respondents below high school, 55.5% of respondents higher secondary educated were not in favour of polygyny. In case of males, 32.2% of illiterate males, 33.3% of respondents below high school, 64.2% of respondents higher secondary educated and 62.5% of respondents who were graduate and above were not in favour of polygyny. There were some females who favoured polygyny to some extent. 32.6% of illiterates, 25.6% of respondents below high school, 33.3% of respondents who were higher secondary favoured polygyny to some extent. The data indicates that respondents who were less educated favoured polygyny the most. But majority of the female respondents were not in favour of polygyny. In case of male respondents, illiterates favoured the most and those who were higher secondary educated favoured the least.

When analysed on the basis of religiosity, it is evident that 20% of female respondents who were illiterate, 10% of female respondents who were religiously moderate, 10% of those who were religiously indifferent favoured polygyny. In case of males, 71.1% of respondents who were strictly religious, 25% of respondents who were religiously moderate and 66.6% of respondents who were religiously indifferent favoured polygyny whereas 51.2% of female respondents who were strictly religious, 90% of respondents who were religiously moderate and 20% of respondents who were religiously indifferent were not in favour of polygyny and 28.7% of female respondents who were strictly religious and 70% of female respondents who were religiously indifferent favoured polygyny. The data reveals that strictly religious

84 female respondents favoured polygyny more as compared to religiously moderate and indifferent respondents.

When the data was analysed on the basis of residential background, it is clear from the table1.9 that 25.5% of urban born female respondents favoured polygyny as compared to 12.2% of rural born female respondents whereas 46.5% of urban born female respondents were not in favour of polygyny as compared to 56.1% of rural born female respondents. In case of males, 54.1% of urban born respondents favoured polygyny as compared to 65.6% of rural born respondents. On the other hand, 45.8% of male respondents who were urban born were not in favour of polygyny as compared to 34.3% of rural born respondents. Some of the urban born respondents 27.9% favoured it under some conditions as compared to 31.5% of rural born respondents. The data reveals that urban born respondents were more in favour of polygyny as compared to rural born respondents. But in case of males, rural born respondents were more in favour of polygyny as compared to urban born respondents.

When the data was analysed on the basis of income level, it is evident from the table1.9 that only 14.5% of female respondents whose monthly income level was below Rs.10,000 favoured polygyny while 21.7% of female respondents having salary between Rs.10,000-50,000 p.m. and 16.6% of female respondents earning above Rs.50,000 p.m. also favoured polygyny. On the other hand, 58.3% of respondents whose monthly income was below Rs.10,000 did not favour polygyny while 43.4% of respondents receiving salary Rs.10,000-50000 p.m and 66.6% of respondents with salary package above Rs.50,000 were against it. In case of males, 68% of respondents with monthly income below Rs.10,000, 48.2% of respondents with salary between Rs.10,000-50,000 p.m. and 42.8% with monthly income above Rs.50,000 were in favour of polygyny whereas 31.8% with monthly income below Rs.10,000, 51.7% having monthly income between Rs.10,000-50,000 and 57.1% with monthly income above Rs.50,000 were not in favour of polygyny. 27% of respondents whose monthly income was below Rs.10,000, 34.7% of respondents whose monthly income lies between Rs.10,000-50,000, 16.6% of respondents having salary above Rs.50,000 p.m.favoured polygyny to some extent. The data reveals that on income basis, there is no consistency in the response pattern. Hence, income does not appear to be relevant in this case.

85 In the second generation, it is indicated from the table2.9 that 11.2% of female respondents favoured polygyny while 54.4% did not favour it and 34.4% of respondents favoured it under some conditions.

When analysed on the basis of educational level, it was found that only 16.6% of illiterate female respondents, 10.1% below high school, 10% of respondents who were higher secondary educated favoured polygyny whereas 50% of illiterate female respondents, 54.2% of female respondents below high school, 57.5% among higher secondary educated and 50% of those who were graduate and above were not in favour of polygyny and 33.3% of respondents who were illiterate, 35.5% of respondents below high school and 32.5% of respondents among higher secondary educated, 50% of those graduate and above favoured polygyny under some conditions. The data indicates that majority of educated female and male respondents were not in favour of polygyny and uneducated females and males were more in favour of polygyny.

When the data was analysed on the basis of religiosity, it is evident from the table2.9 that 12.6% of strictly religious female respondents favoured polygyny as compared to 8.5% of respondents who were religiously moderate whereas 59.7% of respondents who were strictly religious, 37% of respondents who were religiously moderate, and 100% of religiously indifferent were not in favour of polygyny. In case of males, only 28.5% of strictly religious, 66.6% of respondents who were religiously moderate, 80% of religiously indifferent towards religion were in favour of polygyny as compared to 71.4% of respondents who were strictly religious, 33.3% of respondents who were religiously moderate, 20% of respondents who were religiously indifferent were not in favour of polygyny. 27.5% of female respondents who were strictly religious, 54.2% of respondents who were religiously moderate favoured polygyny to some extent. The data indicates that strictly religious female respondents favoured polygyny more as compared to those who were moderate. In case of males who were religiously indifferent and religiously moderate favoured polygyny more as compared to strictly religious. Religiosity is significant here.

When the data was analysed on the basis of residential background, it is evident from the table2.9 that 11.4% of urban born female respondents favoured polygyny and 10% of rural born female respondents favoured polygyny. In case of males, 52.2% of urban

86 born male respondents and 70% of rural born male respondents favoured polygyny. The data reveals that majority of rural born male respondents were in favour of polygyny but there is very little difference of percent between urban and rural female respondents who favoured polygyny. Hence, in the case of females residence has no significance.

When analysed on the basis of income level, it is evident from the table2.9 that 44.4% of female respondents whose monthly income was below Rs.10,000, 3.5% of female respondents with monthly income between Rs.10,000-50,000, 13.6% of respondents whose salary was above Rs.50,000p.m. favoured polygyny. On the other hand, 67.6% of male respondents having monthly income below Rs.10,000, 44.4% of male respondents whose monthly income lies between Rs.10,000-50,000 and 50% of male respondents with monthly income was above Rs.50,000. The data reveals that on the basis of income, there is no consistency in the response pattern. Hence, income is not significant variable in this case.

In the third generation, only 8.8% of female respondents favoured polygyny as compared to 73.6% who were not in favour of polygyny. In case of male respondents, 56% of them were in favour of polygyny as compared to 44% who were not in favour of it. 17.6% of female respondents who favoured it under some conditions.

When analysed on the basis of educational level, it is clear from the table3.9 that 10% of female respondents below high school, 11.3% of female among higher secondary, 7.4% of those graduate and above favoured polygyny. In case of males, 100% of respondents who were illiterate, 60% of those below high school, 67.6% of those who were higher secondary educated, and 42% of graduates and above favoured polygyny. On the other hand, 100% of female who were illiterate, 70% of female respondents below high school, 75% of female respondents who were higher secondary educated, and 71.6% of female respondents who were graduate and above were not in favour of polygyny. In case of males, 40% of respondents below high school, 32.3% of higher secondary educated respondents and 58% of graduate and above respondents were not in favour of polygyny. The data reveals that there is no consistency in the response pattern. Hence, education is not significant in this case.

When the data was analysed on the basis of religiosity, it is clear from the table3.9 that 19.4% of strictly religious female respondents favoured polygyny as compared to

87 3.79% of respondents who were religiously moderate whereas 64.2% of female respondents who were strictly religious, 77.2% of religiously moderate female and 100% of respondents who were indifferent towards religion were not in favour of polygyny. In case of males, 50% of strictly religious, 48% of religiously moderate, 100% of religiously indifferent favoured polygyny whereas 50% of strictly religious respondents, 52% of religiously moderate were against polygyny. The data reveals that strictly religious females were more in favour of polygyny as compared to religiously moderate . But in case of males who were indifferent towards religion were more in favour of polygyny.

When analysed on the basis of residential background, it is evident from the table3.9 that 8.8% of urban born female respondents and 56% of urban born male respondents were in favour of polygyny. There were no rural born respondents in the third generation. The data reveals that majority of urban born females were not in favour of polygyny whereas majority of males were in favour of polygyny.

When analysed on the basis of income level, it is evident from the table3.9 that 11.4% of female respondents whose monthly income lies between Rs.10,000-50,000 and 6.8% with monthly income above Rs.50,000 favoured polygyny whereas 100% of female respondents whose monthly income was below Rs.10,000 and 75.4% of respondents with monthly income between Rs.10,000-50,000 and 68.9% of those whose monthly income was above Rs.50,000 were not in favour of polygyny. In case of males, it is evident from the table3.9 that 69.2% of respondents with monthly income below Rs.10,000, 64% of respondents whose monthly income was between Rs.10,000-50,000 and 50% of respondents whose monthly income was above Rs.50,000 were in favour of polygyny whereas 30.7% of male respondents whose monthly income level was below Rs.10,000, 36% of male respondents whose monthly income level lies between Rs.10,000-50,000 and 50% with salary above Rs.50,000 were not in favour of polygyny. The data reveals that among males lower income group favoured more as compared to higher income group. Among females, majority of lower income group were not in favour of polygyny as compared to middle and higher income group.

88 Findings:

After analysing the data of the three generations, the number of female respondents favouring polygyny was high in the first generation as compared to the second generation and third generation. In the third generation, only 8.8% of female respondents favoured polygyny. In case of males, the percentage of respondents who favoured polygyny was high in the first generation as compared to the second and third generation. In the first generation, on the basis of education it was found that those who were less educated favoured polygyny. However, majority of the females were not in favour of it. In case of religiosity, it was found that strictly religious respondents favoured polygyny more as compared to religiously moderate and religiously indifferent. As far as the impact of residential background is concerned, it was found that majority of rural born male respondents were in favour of polygyny and majority of urban born female respondents were not in favour of polygyny. In case of income level, there is no consistency in the response pattern. In the second generation, on the basis of educational level, educated respondents were not in favour of polygyny. Education is not significant here. In case of religiosity, strictly religious female respondents were more in favour of polygyny as compared to religiously moderate and religiously indifferent and in case of males, religiously moderate and indifferent were found to be more in favour of polygyny. As far as the impact of residence is concerned, it was found that urban born females were more in favour of polygyny as compared to rural born respondents and in case of males, rural born respondents were more in favour of polygyny. As far as the impact of income level is concerned, there is no consistency in the response pattern. In the third generation, as regards education is concerned there is no consistency in the response pattern. Therefore, education is not important here. In case of religiosity, strictly religious females were more in favour of polygyny, whereas males who were indifferent towards religion were more in favour of polygyny. On the basis of residence, majority of urban born female respondents were not in favour of polygyny whereas majority of male respondents favoured it. There were no rural born respondent found in the third generation. In case of income level, females who belong to middle income group were more in favour of polygyny. Whereas males of low income group were more in favour of polygyny.

89 Female respondents who experienced polygyny:

The religious texts allow a Muslim to have four wives, on the condition that all four are equally treated, financially and emotionally. Polygamy has been permitted by the Quran in a concrete social context and in order to do justice to the weak (orphans) and subject to the condition that equality of treatment is almost an impossible condition to be considered.

In the first generation, it is clear from the table 1.10 that only 18% of the respondents experienced polygyny and 82% of the respondents did not experience polygyny.

On the basis of educational level of the respondents, it is clear from the table 1.10 that 7.6% of illiterates female respondents, 33.3% of respondents below high school, 11.1% among higher secondary educated experienced polygyny. On the contrary, 92.3% of illiterate female respondents, 66.6% of respondents below high school, 88.8% of higher secondary educated respondents did not experience polygyny. The data reveals that there is no consistency in the response pattern. Hence, education is not significant here.

When the data was analysed on the basis of religiosity, it is clear from the table 1.10 that 20% of the respondents who were strictly religious experienced polygyny as compared to 10% of respondents who were moderate and indifferent towards religion. The data reveals that the polygyny was more experienced among strictly religious respondents as compared to moderate and indifferent respondents.

When analysed on the basis of residential background of the respondents, it is clear from the table 1.10 that 25.5% of respondents who were urban born experienced second marriage of their husband (polygyny). On the contrary, 74.4% of urban born respondents did not experience polygyny whereas 12.2% of rural born respondents experienced and 87.7% of rural born respondents did not experience polygyny. The data reveals that the polygyny is more found among urban born respondents than rural born respondents.

When the data was analysed on income level, it is clear from the table 1.10 that 16.6% of respondents with monthly income below Rs.10,000, 21.7% of respondents having salary between Rs.10,000-50,000 experienced polygyny whereas 83.3% of

90 respondents with monthly income below Rs.10,000, 78.2% of respondents whose salary was between Rs.10,000-50,000p.m. and 100% of respondents whose monthly income was above Rs.50,000 did not experience polygyny. The data reveals that on the basis of income, there is no consistency in the response pattern. Hence, Income is not relevant factor in this case.

In the second generation, it is indicated from the table 2.10 that only 18.4% of respondents experienced polygyny and 81.6% of respondents did not experience. Here, there is a little rise in polygyny.

When the data was analysed on the basis of educational level, it is clear from the table 2.10 that 20.8% of illiterate respondents, 22% of respondents below high school, 10% of those higher secondary educated, 50% graduate and above respondents experienced polygyny. On the other hand, 79.1% of illiterate respondents, 77.9% below high school, 90% of those higher secondary educated and 50% graduate and above respondents did not experience polygyny. The data reveals that polygyny was more experienced by those who were graduate and above educated respondents.

When the data was analysed on the basis of religiosity, it is clear from the table 2.10 that 19.5% of strictly religious respondents, 14.2% of respondents who were religiously moderate, 14.2% of respondents who were religiously indifferent experienced polygyny. On the other hand, 80.4% of respondents who were strictly religious, 85.7% of respondents who were religiously moderate, 66.6% of respondents who were religiously indifferent did not experience polygyny. The data reveals that polygyny was more prevalent among those who were indifferent towards religion.

When the data was analysed on residential background, it is evident from the table 2.10 that 15.2% of urban born respondents experienced polygyny as compared to 35% of rural born respondents. The data reveals that polygyny was more found among rural born respondents.

When the data was analysed on the basis of Income, it is evident from the table 2.10 that 16.6% of respondents having monthly income below Rs.10,000, 17.6% whose monthly income lies between Rs.10,000-50,000 and 22.7% of respondents with

91 monthly income above Rs.50,000 experienced polygyny. The data reveals that polygyny was more found among higher income groups in the second generation.

In the third generation, it is evident from the table 3.10 that only 15.2% of respondents experienced polygyny and 84.8% of respondents did not experience polygyny.

On the basis of educational level, it is clear from the table 3.10 that 25% of respondents who were illiterate, 11.36% among higher secondary educated and 19.4% of respondents who were graduate and above experienced polygyny. The data reveals that in the third generation, education is not significant in this case. It is also found among illiterates.

When the data was analysed on the basis of religiosity, the table 3.10 shows that 14.2% of respondents who were strictly religious, 13.9% of religiously moderate and 50% of religiously indifferent respondents experienced polygyny whereas 85.7% strictly religious respondents, 86.07% religiously moderate respondents and 50% of religiously indifferent respondents did not experience polygyny. The data reveals that polygyny was more found among religiously indifferent respondents.

On the basis of residential background, the table 3.10 depicts that 15.2% of respondents who were urban born experienced polygyny whereas 84.8% of respondents who were urban born did not experience polygyny. There were no rural born respondents in the third generation. The data reveals that majority of the urban born respondents did not experience polygyny.

When the data was analysed on Income basis, it is evident from the table 3.10 that 14.7% of respondents having salary between Rs.10,000-50,000 p.m., 17.2% of respondents with monthly income above Rs.50,000 experienced polygyny and on the contrary 100% of respondents with income below Rs.10,000 p.m.(per month), 85.2% of those whose monthly income lies between Rs.10,000-50,000 and 82.7% of respondents whose monthly income is above Rs.50,000 did not experience polygyny. The data indicates that higher income groups have higher incidence of polygyny as compared to lower income groups.

92 Findings: The above data indicates that in the first generation there was more incidence of polygyny as compared to the second and third generation. In the third generation, the incidence of polygyny has declined. In the first generation, education has no significance whereas religion is important here as majority of strictly religious experienced polygyny and the incidence of polygyny is high among the urban born residence. So, residential background is relevant. As far as income is concerned, respondents belonging to higher income have high incidence of polygyny. In the second generation, the incidence of polygyny was high among educated respondents. Education is relevant in the second generation. When it comes to religiosity, polygyny was more found among religiously indifferent respondents. As far as the impact of residence is concerned, it was more found among rural born respondents as compared to urban born respondents. On the basis of income level, polygyny was more found among higher income groups whereas in the third generation, polygyny was also found among illiterates. It cannot be said that only educated respondents experienced polygyny. As far as religiosity is concerned, polygyny was found more among religiously indifferent respondents.

93 Under what conditions the female respondents would allow second wife.

In the first generation, 8% of the female respondents said that they may allow their husband second marriage on the condition that if equal treatment is guaranteed. 6% of the respondents agreed on the condition to prevent divorce, 29% agreed on the condition that if there is no issue and majority 57% of the respondents said that they would never allow their husband to marry second time.

When the data was analysed on the basis of educational level, it is evident from the table 1.11 that 5.7% of the illiterate female agreed on the condition if equal treatment is guaranteed , 3.8% of the illiterate respondents agreed to prevent divorce. 30.7% of the illiterate respondents agreed on the condition that if there is no issue and 59.6% of the illiterate respondents said that they would never allow their husband to take a second wife. Respondents below high school 12.8% of them however accepted polygyny if equal treatment is guaranteed, 7.6% of respondents said to prevent divorce, 25.6% of respondents said that if there is no issue, 53.8% said they would never allow husband to take a second wife. Respondents who were higher secondary educated 11.1% of them said to prevent divorce, 33.3% of them said if there is no issue, 55.5% of them said never they would allow husband to marry second time. The data reveals that majority of the respondents whether they were educated or not said that they would never allow husband to marry second time.

When the data was analysed on the basis of religiosity, it is evident from the table1.11 that 6.25% of the strictly religious respondents said that they would allow second marriage of the husband if equal treatment is given, 6.25% of the respondents said to prevent divorce, 30% of the respondents accepted if there is no issue and 57.5% of the respondents said they would never allow their husband to marry again. Respondents who were religiously moderate 10% of them agreed if equal treatment is guaranteed, 40% of them said if there is no issue, 50% of them said never they would allow second marriage of their husband. Respondents who are religiously Indifferent, 20% of them said if equal treatment is guaranteed, 10% of them said to prevent divorce, 10% of them said if there is no issue, 60% of them said they would never allow second marriage of the husband. The data reveals that very few strictly religious

94 respondents would allow husbands to marry as compared to religiously moderate and indifferent. Majority said they would never allow husband to marry again.

When the data was analysed on the basis of residential background, it is evident from the table 1.11 that 6.9% of urban born respondents agreed if equal treatment is guaranteed,4.6% of the respondents said to prevent from divorce, 30.2% of the respondents said if there is no issue, 58.1% of the respondents said they would never allow second marriage of the husband. While respondents who were rural born 8.7% of them agreed to prevent divorce, 28.07% of respondents agreed if there is no issue, 56.1% said they would never allow. The data reveals that majority of the urban born respondents would never allow their husband to marry second time as compared to rural born respondents.

When the data was analysed on the basis of income level, it is clear from the table1.11 that 8.3% of the respondents whose income is below Rs.10,000 p.m. agreed if equal treatment is guaranteed, 8.3% allowed to prevent divorce, 29.1% said if there is no issue, 54.1% said they would never allow second marriage of the husband. Respondents with monthly income between Rs.10,000-50,000, 8.6% of them said if equal treatment is guaranteed, 4.3% of the respondents said to prevent divorce, 28.2% of the respondents said if there is no issue, 58.6% of the respondents said they would never allow second marriage of their husband. The data reveals that majority of high income group of respondents said they will never allow their husband to marry second time as compared to lower income group.

In the second generation, it is evident from the table 2.11 that 3.2% of the respondents said if equal treatment is guaranteed, 1.6% of the respondents said to prevent divorce, 27.2% of the respondents said if there is no issue, 68% of the respondents said never they will allow husband to marry second time.

When the data was analysed on educational basis, it is evident from the table 2.11 that 4.1% of the illiterate respondents said if equal treatment is guaranteed, 4.1% of them said to prevent divorce, 25% of them said if there is no issue and 66.6% of the respondents said they would never allow their husband to marry. Respondents below high school 3.3% of them said if equal treatment is guaranteed, 28.8% of them said if there is no issue, 67.7% of them said they would never allow their husband to marry

95 again. Respondents who were higher secondary educated 2.5% of them said if equal treatment is guaranteed, 2.5% of them said to prevent divorce, 25% of them said if there is no issue, 70% of them said that they would never allow their husband to marry again. Respondents who were graduate and above 50% of them said if there is no issue and 50% of them said never. The data reveals that inspite of education 50% of the respondents allow their husband to marry second time if there is no issue and 50% of them never allow second marriage of the husband.

When analysed on the basis of religiosity, it is evident from the table 2.11 that respondents who were strictly religious 1.1% of them said if equal treatment is guaranteed, 1.1% of them said to prevent divorce, 22.9% of them said if there is no issue, 74.7% of them said they will never allow second marriage of the husband. Respondents who were religiously moderate 5.7% of them said if equal treatment is guaranteed, 40% of them said if there is no issue, 54.2% of them said never. Respondents who were religiously indifferent 33.3% of them said if equal treatment is guaranteed, 33.3% of the respondents said to prevent divorce, 33.3% of them said never. The data reveals that majority of strictly religious respondents would never allow second marriage of the husband as compared to religiously moderate and indifferent.

When analysed on the basis of residential background, it is evident from the table 2.11 that 1.9% of the urban born respondents said if equal treatment is guaranteed , 18% of them said if there is no issue, 80% of them said never. On the other hand 10% of the rural born respondents said if equal treatment is guaranteed, 10% of them respondents said to prevent divorce, 75% of them said if there is no issue, 5% of them said never. The data reveals that majority of the urban born respondents would never allow their husband to marry again.

When the data was analysed on income basis, it is evident from the table 2.11 that 22.2% of the respondents whose monthly income was below 10,000 said if there is no issue, and 77.7% of them said they would never allow second marriage of their husband. Respondents whose income lies between 10,000-50000p.m., 2.3% of them allowed if equal treatment is guaranteed, 2.3% of them said to prevent divorce, 30.5% of them allowed if there is no issue. 64.7% of them said they would never allow their

96 husband to marry second time. Respondents whose monthly income is above 50,000, 9% of them said if equal treatment is guaranteed, 18.1% of them said if there is no issue, 72.7% of them would never allow their husband to marry second time. The data reveals that in the second generation, majority of lower income group of respondents never allow second marriage of the husband.

In the third generation, it is evident from the table 3.11 that only 1.6% of the respondents agreed on the condition if equal treatment is guaranteed, 2.4% of the respondents said to prevent divorce, 8.8% of the respondents said if there is no issue and 87.2% of the respondents said they would never allow husband to marry again.

When the data was analysed on the basis of educational level, it is evident from the table 3.11 that among illiterates 25% of respondents agreed on the condition if there is no issue and 75% of them never allow their husband to marry again. Respondents below high school 10% of them agree on the condition if there is no issue and 90% said that they will never allow their husband to marry again. 2.27% of higher secondary educated said to prevent divorce, 6.8% of them said no issue, and 90.9% of them said they will never allow husband to marry second time. Respondents who were graduate and above 2.98% of them said if equal treatment is guaranteed, 2.98% of respondents said to prevent divorce, 8.95% of respondents said if there is no issue, 85% of them said they will never allow their husband to marry again. The data reveals that majority of educated respondents would never allow second marriage of the husband.

When analysed on the basis of religiosity, it is evident from the table 3.11 that 4.7% of strictly religious agreed if equal treatment is guaranteed, 4.7% of them said to prevent divorce, 7.1% of them said if there is no issue, and 83.3% of them said never. Respondents who were religiously moderate 1.2% of them said to prevent divorce, 7.5% said if there is no issue, 91.1% of respondents said never. Respondents who were religiously indifferent 50% of them said if there is no issue, 50% of them said never they will allow their husband to marry. The data reveals that majority of religiously moderate respondents would never allow second marriage of the husband.

When the data was analysed on the basis of residential background, it is clear from the table 3.11 that 1.6% of urban born respondents agreed if equal treatment is

97 guaranteed, 2.4% said to prevent divorce, 8.8% of respondents said if there is no issue, 87.2% of respondents said never .The data reveals that majority of the urban born respondents would never allow husband to marry second time.

When analysed on an income basis, it is evident from the table 3.11 that 16.6% of the respondents with monthly income below Rs.10,000 agreed if there is no issue, 83.3% of the respondents said they will never allow. Respondents whose income was between Rs.10,000-50,000p.m., 1.6% of them accepted if equal treatment is guaranteed, 3.2% of them said to prevent divorce, 6.5% said no issue, and 88.5% of the respondents said never they will allow second marriage of the husband. Respondents whose monthly income was above Rs.50,000, 1.7% of them allowed if equal treatment is guaranteed, 1.7% of respondents allowed to prevent divorce, 10.3% of respondents allowed if there is no issue, 86.2% of respondents said never they will allow husband to marry .The data reveals that majority of the respondents with middle income group (Rs.10,000-50,000) would never allow second marriage of the husband.

Findings: It is clear from the analyses that in all the three generations majority of the respondents assert that they could never allow their husband to marry second time. However, there are some respondents in the first generation who said if there is no issue they will allow their husband to marry. Similarly in the second generation also, there are some respondents who accepted polygyny if there will be no issue. But the number of respondents who agreed when there is no issue is declined in the third generation and the number of respondents who opposed polygyny has increased.

98 Male respondents view on equal treatment to wives:

In the first generation, it is evident from the table 1.12 that 27.5% of the male respondents viewed that there is possiblity to give equal treatment to two wives and 72.5% of the respondents said no it is not possible to give equal treatment to two wives. Therefore, in the first generation majority of the respondents said no, not possible to give equal treatment.

When the data was analysed on educational basis, it is evident from the table 1.12 that 12.9% of the illiterate respondents, 40.7% of respondents below high school, 21.4% higher secondary and 50% of graduate and above stated that it is possible to give equal treatment whereas 87% of illiterate, 59.2% below high school, 78.5% higher secondary and 50% graduate and above stated no, it is not possible to give equal treatment to two wives. The data reveals that there is no consistency in the response pattern and hence education is not significant here.

On the basis of religiosity, the table 1.12 stated that 24.4% of the strictly religious respondents, 55% of religiously moderate stated that there is possibility to give equal treatment to two wives whereas 75.5% of strictly religious, 45% of religiously moderate and100% of religiously indifferent stated it is not possible. The data reveals that religiosity is not important here.

When the data was analysed on the basis of residential background, it is evident from the table1.12 that 29.1% of the urban born respondents stated it is possible to give equal treatment to two wives, whereas 70.8% of respondents said no, it is not possible . Respondents who were rural born 25% of them said yes it is possible and 75% of them said no it is not possible to give equal treatment to two wives. The data reveals that urban born respondents viewed more possibility to give equal treatment as compared to rural born respondents.

When the data was analysed on Income basis, it is evident from the table 1.12 that 22.7% of respondents whose income was below Rs.10,000, 31% of respondents whose income was between Rs.10,000-50,000 and 42.8% of those whose income was above Rs.50,000 stated that it is possible to give equal treatment to two wives. The

99 data reveals that majority of respondents whose monthly income was above Rs.50,000 stated that it is possible to give equal treatment to two wives.

In the second generation, 30% of respondents stated that it is possible to give equal treatment to two wives and 70% of the respondents said no it is not possible.

When the data was analysed on educational basis, it is presented in the table 2.12 that 6.6% of the illiterate respondents, 26.4% of those below high school, 37.5% respondents higher secondary and 42% graduate and above stated it is possible to give equal treatment to two wives, whereas 93% of illiterate, 73.5% below high school, 62.5% higher secondary and 57.8% of graduate and above stated it is not possible to give equal treatment to two wives. The data reveals that as the education increases the percentage of respondents who stated that it is possible to give equal treatment also increases. Thus education is relevant factor here.

When the data was analysed on the basis of religiosity basis, it is evident from the table 2.12 that 57.1% of the strictly religious, 16.6% of the religiously moderate stated that it is possible to give equal treatment to two wives whereas 42.8% of the strictly religious and 83.3% of the religiously moderate and 100% of the religiously indifferent said it is not possible. The data reveals that religion is relevant in this case. The percentage of strictly religious respondents is high as compared to moderate who stated that it is possible to give equal treatment to two wives.

When the data was analysed on residential status, it is evident from the table 2.12 that 32.2% of the urban born respondents stated that it is possible to give equal treatment to two wives while 67.7% of the respondents stated that it is not possible to give equal treatment to two wives. On the other hand 10% of the rural respondents stated that it is possible to give equal treatment to two wives while 90% of the rural respondents stated that it is not possible to give equal treatment to two wives. The data reveals that percentage of urban born respondents is high as compared to rural born respondents who stated that it is possible to give equal treatment to two wives.

When the data was analysed on income basis, the table 2.12 shows that 20.5% of the respondents whose income was below Rs.10,000 stated that it is possible to give equal treatment to two wives whereas 79.4% of them stated it is not possible . 36.1% of

100 respondents whose income lies between Rs.10,000-50,000 said it is possible to give equal treatment to two wives whereas 63.8% of the respondents said no, 33.3% of respondents whose income was above Rs.50,000 said it is possible to give equal treatment and 66.6% of them said it is not possible to give equal treatment to two wives. The data reveals that there is no consistency in the response pattern. Therefore, income is not relevant variable.

In the third generation, it is evident from the table 3.12 that 29% of respondents stated that it is possible to give equal treatment to wives whereas 71% of respondents said there is no possiblity to give equal treatment to wives.

When the data was analysed on educational level, it is evident from the table 3.12 that 100% of illiterate respondents said it is not possible to give equal treatment to two wives. 20%of respondents below high school, 20.5% higher secondary educated,40% graduate and above said it is possible to give equal treatment to two wives whereas 100% of illiterate, 80% below high school, 79.4% higher secondary, 60% graduate and above stated that there is no possibility to give equal treatment to two wives. The data reveals that education has changed the views of the respondents and more respondents stated that it is possible to give equal treatment to two wives.

When analysed on the basis of religiosity, the table 3.12 shows that 60% of the strictly religious respondents, 26.6% of religiously moderate, 20% of religiously indifferent stated that it is possible whereas 40% strictly religious, 73.3% religiously moderate, 80% religiously indifferent stated it is not possible to give equal treatment to two wives. The data reveals that majority of strictly religious respondents agreed it is possible to give equal treatment to wives. Hence religion is relevant here.

When analysed on residential basis, it is evident from the table 3.12 that 29% of the respondents who were urban born agreed it is possible to give equal treatment and 71% of them stated no it is not possible to give equal treatment to two wives. The data reveals that majority of the respondents who were urban born said no it is not possible to give equal treatment.

When analysed on Income basis, it is evident from the table 3.12 that 15.3% of respondents whose income level was below Rs.10,000 per month, 20% of those

101 whose monthly income was between 10,000-50,000 and 35.4% of those whose monthly income was above Rs.50,000 stated that it is possible to give equal treatment to two wives while 84.6% of respondents whose monthly income was below 10,000, 80% of respondents whose monthly income was between Rs.10,000-50,000 and 64.5% of those with monthly income above Rs.50,000 said it is not possible to give equal treatment. The data reveals that higher income group of respondents agreed more that it is possible to give equal treatment to wives.

Findings :

After analysing the data of the three generations, it is clear from the data that in the first generation few respondents agreed that it is possible to give equal treatment to two wives and whereas in the second and third generation the percentage of respondents has increased. Hence, we can say that the respondents who stated the possibility of giving equal treatment has increased from first generation to third generation. On the basis of education, in the first generation there is no consistency, but in the second and third generation as the education increases among respondents percentage of respondents who stated that it is possible to give equal treatment to two wives has also increased. In case of religiosity, religiously moderate respondents stated possibility of giving equal treatment to two wives more than strictly religious in the first generation, whereas in the second and third generation, strictly religious respondents were more found who stated the possibility of equal treatment to two wives. In case of residential status, in all the three generations, the percentage of urban born respondents was high who stated the possibility of giving equal treatment to two wives. It is also found that higher income group of respondents agreed more that there is possibility of giving equal treatment to two wives in all the three generations.

102 Respondents opinion whether divorce be allowed:

Islam has made provisions for the dissolution of marriage. A man has greater rights than a woman in the matter of divorce in Islam. According to Muslims, a divorce or dissolution of the marriage contract is meant for the purpose of avoiding the evil consequences of an unhappy marriage.

In the first generation, it is evident from the table 1.13 that 11% of the female respondents were in favour of divorce and 89% of the respondents were against it. In case of males, 38.7% of the respondents favoured it and 61% of the respondents were not in favour of it.

When the data was analysed on the basis of educational level, it is evident from the table 1.13 that 9.6% of illiterate females, 12.8% of respondents below high school, 11.1% of the respondents who were higher secondary educated were in favour of divorce. In case of males, 58.06% of illiterate respondents, 40.7% of respondents below high school, and 25% of respondents who were graduate and above were in favour of divorce. The data reveals that in the first generation illiterate male respondents favoured divorce more as compared to literates. In case of females, literate favoured more as compared to illiterate.

When the data was analysed on the basis of religiosity, it is evident from the table 1.13 that only 8.7% of the strictly religious female respondents, 20% of the respondents who were religiously moderate, 20% of the respondents who were indifferent towards religion favoured divorce. In case of males, 22.5% of strictly religious, 30% of religiously moderate, 100% of respondents who were indifferent towards religion favoured divorce. The data reveals that respondents who were religiously moderate and indifferent were more in favour of divorce as compared to strictly religious.

When the data was analysed on the basis of residential background, it is evident from the table 1.13 that 11.6% of the urban born female respondents were in favour of divorce as compared to 10.5% of rural born respondents. In case of male respondents, 35.4% of urban born respondents were in favour of divorce as compared to 43.7% of rural born respondents. The data reveals that urban born female respondents were

103 more in favour of divorce but among males, rural born respondents were more in favour of divorce as compared to urban born respondents.

When the data was analysed on the basis of Income level, it is evident from the table1.13 that 10.4% of female respondents with monthly income below Rs.10,000, 13% of respondents with monthly income between Rs.10,000-50,000 were in favour of divorce. In case of males, 50% of respondents whose monthly income lies below Rs.10,000 and only 12.06% of respondents whose monthly income was between Rs.10,000-50,000 and 42.8% of respondents whose monthly income was above Rs.50,000 favoured divorce. The data reveals that divorce was more favoured by higher income group in the case of males. Very few females favoured it.

In the second generation, the table 2.13 suggests that 24.8% of the female respondents and 38% of the male respondents favoured divorce whereas 75.2% of the female respondents and 62% of the male respondents were against it.

When analysing the data on the basis of educational level, the table 2.13 shows that 25% of the illiterate female respondents, 23.7% of the respondents below high school, 22.5% of the respondents who were higher secondary educated and 100% of the graduate and above favoured divorce. In case of males, 66.6% of the illiterate respondents, 47% below high school, 18.7% of those higher secondary educated respondents and 31.5% graduate and above favoured divorce. The data reveals that females who were highly educated favoured divorce more as compared to uneducated. Among males, uneducated respondents favoured divorce more as compared to educated.

The data when analysed on the basis of religiosity, it is evident from the table 2.13 that 26.4% of the strictly religious female respondents and 22.8% of the respondent who were religiously moderate favoured divorce. In case of males, 28.5% of the strictly religious respondents, 41.6% of the religiously moderate respondents and 60% of the religiously indifferent respondents favoured divorce. The data reveals that males who were indifferent towards religion favoured divorce more as compared to strictly religious and females who were strictly religious favoured more as compared to religiously moderate.

104 Further, the data was analysed on the basis of residential background, it is evident from the table 2.13 that 22.8% of the urban born female respondents and 70% of the rural born respondent favoured divorce. Among the males, 36.6% of the urban born and 50% of rural born respondents favoured divorce. The data reveals that rural born respondents favoured divorce more than the urban born respondent in the second generation.

When the data was analysed on the basis of income level, it is evident from the table 2.13 that 33.3% of female respondents with monthly income below Rs.10,000, 23.5% of female respondents with monthly income between Rs.10,000-50,000 and 22.7% of female respondents with monthly income above Rs.50,000 favoured divorce. In case of males, 55.8% of the respondents whose monthly income was below Rs.10,000, 22.2% of respondents whose income lies between Rs.10,000-50,000 p.m., 36.6% of respondents whose income was above Rs.50,000 p.m. favoured divorce. The data reveals that divorce was more favoured by lower income group.

In the third generation, it is evident from the table 3.13 that 54.4% of female respondents and 58% of male respondents favoured divorce whereas 45.6% of female respondents and 42% of male respondents were against it.

The data was analysed on the basis of educational level, the table 3.12 shows that 50% of female respondents, 40% of respondents below high school, 52.2% of those who were higher secondary, 58.2% of those who were graduate and above favoured divorce and in case of males, 100% of illiterate, 80% of those below high school, 61.7% of those higher secondary and 46% of graduate and above respondents favoured divorce. The data reveals that among females, divorce was more favoured by the educated respondents and among the males divorce was more favoured by the uneducated.

Further the data was analysed on the basis of religiosity, it is evident from the table 3.12 that among females 52.3% of strictly religious respondents, 54.4% of religiously moderate respondents, and 75% of religiously indifferent respondents favoured divorce and among males, 10% of strictly religious, 60% of respondents who were religiously moderate and 80% of respondents who were religiously indifferent

105 favoured divorce. The data reveals that divorce was more favoured by religiously indifferent respondents.

On the basis of residential background, it is evident from the table 3.13 that 54.4% of female respondents who were urban born favoured divorce, and 45.6% of female respondents were against it. In case of males, 58% of respondents who were urban born favoured divorce and 42% of them were against it. There were no rural born respondents in the third generation. The data reveals that in the third generation majority of males and females favoured divorce.

When the data was analysed on Income basis, it is evident from the table 3.13 that 16.6% of female respondents whose monthly income was below Rs.10,000, 45.9% of those with monthly income between Rs.10,000-50,000 and 67.2% having monthly income above Rs.50,000 favoured dowry. In case of males, 76.9% of respondents with monthly income below Rs.10,000, 68% of the respondents with monthly income lies Rs.10,000-50,000 favoured divorce. The data reveals that in the third generation, divorce was more favoured by the high income group among females and among males, it was more favoured by the lower income group.

Findings:

It is clear from the analyses that in the first generation, divorce was less favoured by the respondents. In the second and third generation, the opinion towards divorce has changed among the respondents. It has increased from 11% to 24.8% and reached to 54.4% among females and from 38.7% to 38% and gone up to 58% among males. In the first generation, on the basis of educational level, divorce was more favoured by illiterate males as compared to literates and literate females as compared to illiterates. It can be said that divorce was found both among literates and illiterates. It is also found that divorce was less favoured by strictly religious respondents and more favoured by religiously moderate and religiously indifferent. In case of residence, it is found that rural born males and urban born females favoured divorce more. It can be said that very few incidence of divorce was found among both urban born and rural born in the first generation, majority of them were against it. As far as income is concerned, divorce was not favoured by most of the respondents. Only 13% of female respondents belonging to middle income group favoured it and 50% of male

106 respondents belonging to low income group favoured it. In the second generation, divorce is highly favoured by educated females and uneducated males. On the basis of religiosity, divorce was more favoured by strictly religious females and religiously indifferent males. In case of residential background, it is found that rural born respondents favoured more as compared to urban born respondents. As far as the impact of income level is concerned, divorce was more favoured by low income groups. In the third generation, on the basis of educational level, educated females and uneducated males favoured divorce. As far as the impact of religiosity is concerned, respondents who are religiously indifferent favoured more divorce as compared to strictly religious and moderate. As far as residential background is concerned, there was only urban born respondents and majority of them were in favour of divorce. In case of income, whose family income is high among females favoured more as compared to low income group and males belonging to low income group favoured more.

107 Female respondents who experienced Divorce

In the first generation, the table 1.14 shows that only 14% of the female respondents experienced divorce and 86% did not experienced divorce.

The data was analysed on the basis of educational level of the respondents, it is clear from the table 1.14 that 3.8% of the illiterate respondents, 23% below high school, 33.3% of those higher secondary educated respondents experienced divorce. The data reveals that divorce was high among the educated respondents, therefore education is a relevant variable in this case.

Further, the data was analysed on the basis of religiosity, the table 1.14 shows that 13.7% of the strictly religious, 10% of the respondents who were religiously moderate, and 20% of the respondents who were religiously indifferent experienced divorce. The data reveals that divorce was highest among the religiously indifferent respondents as compared to strictly religious.

The data when analysed on the basis of residential background, it is indicated from the table 1.14 that 18.6% of the urban born respondents and 10.5% of the rural born respondents experienced divorce. The data reveals that divorce was more experienced by urban born respondents as compared to rural born respondents.

When the data was analysed on the basis of income level, it is clear from the table 1.14 that 10.4% of the respondents with monthly income below Rs.10,000, 15.2% of the respondents whose monthly income was between Rs.10,000-50,000 and 33.3% of those whose monthly income was above Rs.50,000 experienced divorce. The data reveals that the respondents belonging to higher income group experienced divorce more as compared to lower income group.

In the Second generation, the table 2.14 indicates that 19.2% of respondents experienced divorce and 80.8% of the respondents did not experience divorce.

On the basis of educational level of the respondents, it is evident from the table 2.14 that 12.5% of the illiterate respondents, 16.9% of respondents below high school, 25% of the respondents who were higher secondary educated and 50% of the respondents who were graduate and above experienced divorce. The data reveals that as the

108 education increases, the divorce is also increased. Hence, education is relevant factor in second generation also.

The data was analysed on the basis of religiosity, it is evident from the table 2.14 that 21.8% of the strictly religious respondents, 11.4% of the religiously moderate, and 33.3% of the respondents who were religiously indifferent experienced divorce. The data reveals that divorce was high among those who were religiously indifferent.

When the data was analysed on the basis of residential background, it is evident from the table 2.14 that 18% of the urban born and 25% of the rural born respondents experienced divorce. The data indicates that divorce is high among rural born respondents than urban born in the second generation.

When the data was analysed on the basis of income level, the table 2.14 indicates that 5.5% of respondents belonging to monthly income level below Rs.10,000, 18.8% of those belonging to monthly income between Rs.10,000-50,000 and 31.8% of those whose monthly income was above Rs.50,000 experienced divorce. The data reveals that divorce was high among higher income group.

In the third generation, it is indicated from the table 3.14 that 16.8% of the respondents experienced divorce and 83.2% of the respondents did not experience.

The data when analysed on the basis of educational level, it is evident from the table 3.14 that 10% of the respondents below high school, 11.36% of those who were higher secondary educated and 22.3% of those who were graduate and above experienced divorce. The data reveals that divorce is high among educated respondents. Hence, education is significant here.

Further the data was analysed on the basis of religiosity, it is shown in the table 3.14 that 2.3% of the strictly religious respondents and 25.3% of religiously moderate respondents experienced divorce. The data reveals that divorce was high among religiously moderate respondents.

On the basis of residential background, it is evident from the table 3.14 that there is no one found who belongs to rural born in the third generation. 16.8% of urban born

109 experienced divorce and 83.2% of respondents did not experience divorce. The data reveals that majority of urban born respondents did not experience divorce.

When the data was analysed on the basis of Income level, it is evident from the table 3.14 that 33.3% of respondents with monthly income below Rs.10,000, 11.4% of those with monthly income between Rs.10,000-50,000 and 20.6% of the respondents with monthly income above Rs.50,000 experienced divorce. The data reveals that divorce was high among lower income group.

Findings:

After analysing the data of the three generations, it can be said that divorce rate has increased from first generation to third generation. In the first generation, it was only 14% in the first generation and reaches to 19.2% in the second generation and declines to 16.8% in the third generation as compared to the second generation. In the first generation, on the basis of education, divorce was high among educated respondents as compared to uneducated respondents. On the basis of religiosity, divorce was more experienced by religiously indifferent respondents as compared to strictly religious. As a result of residential background, divorce rate was high among urban born respondents as compared to rural born respondents. As far as the impact of income is concerned, divorce was more experienced by high income groups in comparison to low income group.. In the second generation, divorce rate was high among educated respondents as compared to uneducated and divorce rate is high among religiously indifferent respondents as compared to religiously moderate respondents. In case of income level, divorce was more experienced by high income group. In the third generation, divorce was more experienced by educated respondents as compared to uneducated respondents. Education is significant in this case. On the basis of religiosity, moderate respondents experienced divorce more as compared to strictly religious respondents. As far as residential background is concerned, it is found that divorce rates were not high among urban born respondents majority of them oppose it. On the basis of income, divorce rates were high among lower income groups as compared to higher income groups.

110 Major cause of divorce among respondents

In the first generation, it is evident from the table 1.15 that 20% of respondents said major cause of divorce was lack of adjustment with in- laws, 13.3% of respondents said husband‟s extramarital relations, 13.3% of respondents said dowry dispute, 46.6% of respondents said male child issue and 6.6% said physical violence was the major cause of divorce.

When the data was analysed on the basis of educational level, it is evident from the table 1.15 that 50% of respondents who were illiterate said major cause of divorce was husband‟s extra-marital relations and 50% of respondents said male child issue. 30% of respondents below high school said lack of adjustment with in-laws and 10% of them said dowry dispute, 50% of them said male child issue, and 10% of them said physical violence was the major cause of divorce. 33.3% of the respondents who were higher secondary educated said husband‟s extramarital relations, 33.3% of them said dowry dispute and 33.3% of them said male child issue was the major cause of divorce. The data reveals that among illiterates major cause was found to be husband‟s extramarital relations and male child issue. Among educated respondents, three reasons were found husband‟s extramarital relations, dowry dispute, and male child issue.

When the data was analysed on the basis of religiosity, it is evident from the table 1.15 that 10% of the respondents who were strictly religious said lack of adjustment with in-laws, 10% of them said husband‟s extramarital relations, 20% of them said dowry dispute, 60% of them said male-child issue. Respondents who were religiously moderate 50% of them said lack of adjustment with in-laws, 50% of them said husband‟s extramarital relations. Respondents who were religiously indifferent 33.3% of them said male child issue, 33.3% of them said physical violence was the major cause of divorce. The data reveals that among strictly religious respondents male child issue was the major cause of divorce. Among religiously moderate respondents two reasons were found lack of adjustment with in laws and husband‟s extramarital relations. Among religiously indifferent respondents lack of adjustment, male child issue, and physical violence was the major cause of divorce.

111 When the data was analysed on the basis of residential background, it is evident from the table 1.15 that 20% of the urban born respondents said lack of adjustment with in- laws, 20% of them said husband‟s extramarital relations, 50% of them said male child issue and 10% of them said physical violence as the major cause of divorce whereas respondents who were rural born 20% of them said lack of adjustment with in-laws, 40% of them said dowry dispute, 40% of them said male child issue as the major cause of divorce. The data reveals that male child issue was the major cause of divorce among urban born respondents and among rural born respondents dowry dispute and male child issue was found to be major cause of divorce.

When the data was analysed on the basis of Income level, it is evident from the table 1.15 that 20% of the respondents whose monthly income was below Rs.10,000 said husband‟s extramarital relations, 20% of them said dowry dispute, 40% of them said male child issue and 20% of them said physical violence as the main cause of divorce. Respondents whose monthly income lies between Rs.10,000-50,000 28.5% of them said lack of adjustment with in-laws, 14.2% of them said husband‟s extramarital relations, 14.2% of them said dowry dispute, 42.8% of them said male child issue as the main cause of divorce. Respondents whose monthly income was above Rs.50,000 33.3% of them said lack of adjustment with in laws and 66.6% of respondents said male child issue as the major cause of divorce. The data reveals that male child issue was the major cause of divorce among the respondents whether they were high income groups or low income groups.

In the second generation, it is evident from the table 2.15 that 20.8% of the respondents said lack of adjustment with in-laws, 41.6% of the respondents said husband‟s extramarital relations, 4.16% of the respondents said wives extramarital relations, 8.3% of the respondents said dowry dispute, 4.16% of the respondents said male child issue as the major cause of divorce.

The data when analysed on the basis of educational level, the table 2.15 shows that respondents who were illiterate 66.6% of them said husband‟s extramarital relations and 33.3% said wives extramarital relations as the cause of divorce. Respondents who were below high school 30% of them said lack of adjustment with in-laws, 20% of them said husband‟s extra marital relations, 10% of them said dowry dispute, 10% of

112 them said male child issue, 30% of them said physical violence as the main cause of divorce. Respondents who were higher secondary educated 10% of them said lack of adjustment with in laws , 60% of them said husband‟s extramarital relations, 10% of them said dowry dispute and 20% of them said physical violence as the major cause of divorce. Respondents who were graduate and above 100% of them said lack of adjustment with in laws as the cause of divorce. The data reveals that husband‟s extramarital relations was the major cause of divorce among illiterates, lack of adjustment with in laws was found among educated respondents as the major cause of divorce.

On the basis of religiosity, it is evident from the table 2.15 that 37.5% of the respondents who were strictly religious said lack of adjustment with in-laws, 25% of them said husband‟s extra marital relations, 12.5% of the respondents said dowry dispute, 12.5% of them said male child issue, 12.5% of them said physical violence as the major cause of divorce. Respondents who were religiously moderate 16.6% of them said lack of adjustment with in-laws, 41.6% of them said husband‟s extra marital relations , 8.3% of them said dowry dispute and 33.3% of the respondents said physical violence as the main cause of divorce. Respondents who were religiously indifferent 75% of them said husband‟s extramarital relations, 25% of them said wives extramarital relations as the major cause of divorce. The data reveals that husband‟s extra marital relations are found to be major cause of divorce among respondents.

When the data was analysed on the basis of residential background, it is evident from the table 2.15 that 17.6% of the urban born respondents said lack of adjustment with in-laws , 35.2% of them said husband‟s extramarital relations, 5.8% of them said wives extra marital relations, 11.7% of them said dowry dispute, 5.8% of them said male child issue and 23.5% of them said physical violence as the main cause of divorce whereas respondents who were rural born 28.5% of them said lack of adjustment with in-laws, 57.1% of them said husband‟s extramarital relations, 14.2% of them said physical violence as the main cause of divorce. The data reveals that husband‟s extramarital relation was the major cause of divorce among urban born respondents and also among rural born respondents.

113 When the data was analysed on the basis of Income level, it is evident from the table 2.15 that respondents with monthly income below Rs.10,000, 100% of them said husband‟s extramarital relations, respondents whose monthly income lies between Rs.10,000-50,000 , 6.6% of them said lack of adjustment with in laws, 46.6% of them said husband‟s extramarital relations, 6.6% of them said wives extramarital relations, 6.6% of them said dowry dispute, 14.2% of them said male child issue and 20% of them said physical violence as the main cause of divorce. Respondents whose monthly income was above Rs.50,000 p.m., 50% of them said lack of adjustment with in-laws, 25% of them said husband‟s extra-marital relations and 25% of them said physical violence as the main cause of divorce. The data reveals that husband‟s extramarital relation was found to be major cause of divorce among lower income group.

In the third generation, it is evident from the table 3.15 that 23.8% of the respondents said lack of adjustment with in-laws, 52.3% of the respondents said husband‟s extra marital relations, 9.5% of the respondents said wives extramarital relations and 9.5% of the respondents said dowry dispute and 4.7% of the respondents said male child issue as the major cause of divorce.

When the data was analysed on the basis of educational level, it is evident from the table 3.15 that 50% of illiterate respondents said dowry dispute, and 50% of them said male child issue as the main cause of divorce. Respondents who were below high school 100% of them said dowry dispute. Respondents who were higher secondary educated 28.5% of them said lack of adjustment with in laws and 71.4% of them said husband‟s extramarital relations. Respondents who were graduate and above 27.2% said lack of adjustment with in-laws, 54.5% said husband‟s extramarital relations and 18.1% of them said wives extramarital relations as the main cause of divorce. The data reveals that dowry dispute was the major cause of divorce among respondents who were below high school.

When the data was analysed on the basis of religiosity, it is evident from the table 3.15 that 66.6% of strictly religious respondents said lack of adjustment with in laws, 33.3% of them said dowry dispute as the main cause of divorce. Respondents who were religiously moderate 30% of them said lack of adjustment with in-laws, 50% of

114 them said husband‟s extramarital relations, 10% of them said wives extramarital relations and 10% of them said dowry dispute as the major cause of divorce. Respondents who were religiously indifferent, 75% of them said husband‟s extramarital relations, 12.5% of them said wives extramarital relation, 12.5% of them said male child issue as the main cause of divorce. The data reveals that husband‟s extra marital relation was the major cause of divorce among religiously indifferent respondents.

When the data was analysed on residential background, it is found that 23.8% of urban born respondents said lack of adjustment with in-laws, 52.3% of respondents said husband‟s extramarital relations, 9.5% of the respondents said wives extramarital relations, 9.5% of the respondents said dowry dispute, 4.7% of the respondents said male child issue as the major cause of divorce. The data reveals that rural born respondents were not found in the third generation and among urban born respondents husband‟s extramarital relations was the major cause of divorce.

When the data was analysed on the basis of Income level, it is evident from the table 3.15 that 50% of the respondents whose monthly income was below Rs.10,000 said dowry dispute, and 50% of the respondents said male child issue as the major cause of divorce. Respondents whose income lies between Rs.10,000-50,000 p.m., 28.5% of them said wives extra marital relations as the main cause of divorce. Respondents whose income is above Rs.50,000 p.m. 25% of them said lack of adjustment with in- laws, 66.6% of them said husband‟s extra-marital relations, 8.3% of them said dowry dispute as the main cause of divorce. The data reveals that husband‟s extra marital relation was the major cause of divorce among higher income groups.

Findings:

After analysing the data of the three generations, in the first generation major cause of divorce was male child issue, and in the second and third generation the major cause was husband‟s extra marital relations. In the first generation, male child issue and husband‟s extramarital relations were found among illiterates. Among strictly religious respondents male child issue was the major cause of divorce. On the basis of residential background, male child issue was the major cause of divorce among urban born as well as rural respondents. Male child issue was the major cause of divorce

115 among high income as well as low income groups. In the second generation, lack of adjustment with in-laws was the major cause of divorce among educated respondents. When it comes to religiosity, husband‟s extramarital relation was the major cause among religiously indifferent respondent. In case of residential background, husband‟s extramarital relations was found major cause of divorce among rural born respondents. As far as income level is concerned, husband‟s extra marital relations was the major cause among lower income groups. In the third generation, it was found that dowry dispute was the major cause of divorce among respondents below high school. On the basis of religiosity, husband‟s extramarital relation was the major cause of divorce among religiously indifferent respondents. When it comes to residential background, it was found that husband‟s extramarital relation was the major cause of divorce among urban born respondents. As far as the impact of income is concerned, it was found that husband‟s extramarital relation was found to be major cause of divorce among high income groups.

116 Respondents who favoured family planning:

There is widely held notion that Muslims in India are growing at a much higher rate as they are reluctant to practice family planning. Some argue that Muslims are against family planning because of their religion.

In the first generation, it is evident from the table 1.16 that 15% of female respondents favoured family planning and 85% were against it. In case of males, 27.5% favoured family planning and 72.5% of them were against it.

On the basis of educational level of the respondents, it is indicated from the table 1.16 that 7.6% of illiterate female, 12.8% of female below high school and 66.6% of female respondents who were higher secondary educated favoured family planning. In case of males, 9.6% of illiterate respondents, 14.8% of respondents below high school, 64.2% of respondents who were higher secondary and 75% of respondents who were graduate and above favoured family planning. The data reveals that as the education increases, family planning among respondents also increases.

Further, the data was analysed on the basis of religiosity, it is clear from the table 1.16 that 10% of strictly religious respondents, 40% religiously moderate and 30% religiously indifferent respondents favoured it. In case of males, 8.8% of respondents who were strictly religious respondents, 40% of respondents who were religiously moderate, and 66.6% of respondents religiously indifferent favoured family planning. The data reveals that family planning is more favoured by religiously moderate and religiously indifferent respondents as compared to strictly religious respondents.

When the data was analysed on residential background, it is evident from the table 1.16 that 18.6% of urban born female respondents favoured family planning as compared to 12.2% of rural born respondents whereas 37.5% of urban born male favoured it as compared to 12.5% of rural born respondents. The data reveals that family planning was more favoured among urban born respondents because they were more aware of the advantages of having small family.

When the data was analysed on the basis of income level, it is evident from the table 1.16 that only 8.3% of female respondents whose monthly income was below Rs.10,000, 19.5% of respondents whose monthly income lies between Rs.10,000-

117 50,000 and 33.3% of respondents whose monthly income was above Rs.50,000 favoured family planning. In case of males, 13.6% of them whose monthly income was below Rs.10,000, 34.4% of them whose monthly income was between Rs.10,000- 50,000 p.m. and 85.7% of them whose monthly income was above Rs.50,000 favoured family planning. The data reveals that family planning was more favoured by higher income group of respondents as compared to lower income group.

In the second generation, 38.4% of female respondents favoured family planning and 41% of male respondents favoured family planning. On the contrary, 61.6% of female respondents and 59% of male respondents were against it.

When analysed on the basis of educational level, it is evident from the table 2.16 that 29.1% of illiterate female respondents, 32.2% of respondents below high school, 52.5% higher secondary educated and 50% graduate and above favoured family planning. In case of males, 33.3% of illiterate, 35.2% below high school, 43.7% of respondents who were higher secondary educated, 52.6% of graduate and above favoured family planning. The data reveals that higher the educational level, higher the percentage of respondents who favoured family planning.

When analysed on the basis of religiosity, it is evident from the table 2.16 that 39% of female respondents strictly religious, 37.1% of religiously moderate respondents, 33.3% of religiously indifferent respondents favoured family planning. In case of males, 22.8% of those who were strictly religious, 50% of those who were religiously moderate, 60% of those who were religiously indifferent favoured family planning. The data indicates that greater the religiosity, greater the female respondents who favoured family planning and among males lower the religiosity higher the percentage of respondents favouring family planning.

The data when analysed on residential background, it is indicated from the table 2.16 that 40.9% of urban born respondents favoured family planning as compared to 25% of rural born respondents. Among males, 40% of urban born respondents favoured family planning as compared to 50% of rural born respondents. The data reveals that among females, urban born respondents were more in favour of family planning and among males it is found that rural born respondents were more in favour of family planning.

118 When the data was analysed on the basis of income level, it is clear from the table 2.16 that 44.4% of respondents whose monthly income was below Rs.10,000 , 32.9% of respondents whose monthly income lies between Rs.10,000-50,000 and 54.5% of respondents whose monthly income was above Rs.50,000 favoured family planning. In case of males, 29.4% of respondents whose monthly income was below Rs.10,000 , 30.5% of respondents whose monthly income was between Rs.10,000-50,000 and 66.6% of respondents whose monthly income was above Rs.50,000 favoured family planning. The data indicates that higher the income level, higher the percentage of respondents favouring family planning in the second generation. It means that family planning is more favoured by higher income group.

In the third generation, it is evident from the table 3.16 that 88% of female respondents and 86% of male respondents favoured family planning. On the contrary, 12% of female respondents and 14% of male respondents were against it.

When the data was analysed on the basis of educational level, it is clear from the table 3.16 that 100% of illiterate female respondents, 60% of those below high school, 84% of those who were higher secondary and 94% of those who were graduate and above favoured family planning. Among the males, 66.6% of illiterates, 70% of those who were below high school, 88.2% of those who were higher secondary educated and 90% graduate and above educated respondents favoured family planning. The data reveals that higher the educational level, higher the percentage of respondents who favoured family planning.

When the data was analysed on the basis of religiosity, it is clear from the table 3.16 that 97.6% of strictly religious female respondents, 82.2% of respondents who were religiously moderate, 100% of respondents who were religiously indifferent favoured family planning. In case of males, 20% of strictly religious respondents, 92% of religiously moderate and 100% of those who were religiously indifferent favoured family planning. The data reveals that religiously indifferent males and females favoured family planning more.

On the basis of residential background, it is found that 88% of urban born female respondents and 86% of male respondents favoured family planning . There were no

119 rural born respondent in the third generation and therefore, it can be said that majority of urban born respondents favoured family planning.

The data when analysed on the basis of income, it is clear from the table 3.16 that 83.3% of female respondents whose monthly income was below Rs.10,000, 81.9% of those whose monthly income was between Rs.10,000-50,000 and 94.8% of respondents whose monthly income was above Rs.50,000 favoured family planning. In case of males, 46.1% of respondents with monthly income below Rs.10,000, 80% of those whose monthly income was between Rs.10,000-50,000 and 96.7% of those having monthly income above Rs.50,000 favoured family planning. The data reveals that higher the income level, higher the percentage of respondents who favoured family planning. It means that family planning was more favoured by high income groups.

Findings:

After analysing the three generations, it is found that in the first generation, respondents who favoured family planning were few as compared to the second and third generation. Among females, it was only 15% in the first generation that increased to 38.4% in the second whereas in the third generation it reaches to 88%. Among the males, it was 27.5% in the first generation and raised to 41% in the second generation while in the third generation it increased to 86%. In all the three generations, with increase in the level of education, an increment was found in the family planning favoured respondents. Therefore, education is a relevant factor in this case. On the basis of religiosity, family planning was more favoured by religiously moderate female and religiously indifferent male in the first generation. Although in the second and third generation, the family planning was more favoured by strictly religious female and religiously indifferent male. When it comes to residence, family planning was more favoured by urban born respondents in the first generation while in the second generation, urban born female and rural born male respondents favoured more family planning. In the third generation, there were only urban born respondents who favoured it. As far as income is concerned, family planning was more favoured by high income groups in all the three generations.

120 Respondents who used contraceptive methods

In the first generation, it is evident from the table 1.17 that only 3% of female respondents and 13.7% of male respondents used contraceptive methods.

When the data was analysed on the basis of educational level, only 1.9% of illiterate female and 6.4% of illiterate male used contraceptive methods. 2.5% of female respondents below high school and 7.4% of male respondents used contraceptives.11.1% of higher secondary educated female and 28.5% of male respondents used these methods. 37.5% of graduate and above male respondents used contraceptives method. The data indicates that as the education increases among the respondents, the percentage of the respondents who used contraceptives method has also increased.

On the basis of religiosity, it is clear from the table 1.17 that 10% of female who were strictly religious, 10% of those who were religiously moderate, 10% of religiously indifferent respondents used these methods. In case of males, 6.6% of strictly religious, 25% of religiously moderate, 20% of religiously indifferent used them. The data reveals that religion is of no importance among female respondents. Among the males, majority of moderate respondents used contraceptive methods.

The data when analysed on residential background, it is clear from the table 1.17 that 4.6% of urban born female respondents used contraceptive method as compared to 1.7% of rural born respondents.12.5% of urban born male respondents used them as compared to 15.6% of rural born respondents. The data indicates that contraceptive methods among females were more used by urban born respondents. Among males, these methods were more used by rural born respondents.

When the data was analysed on the basis of income level, it is evident from the table 1.17 that 4.3% of female respondents whose monthly income lies between Rs.10,000- 50,000, 16.6% of those whose monthly income is above Rs.50,000 used contraceptive methods. In case of males, 2.2% of respondents whose monthly income is below Rs.10,000, 13.7% of respondents whose monthly income is between Rs.10,000- 50,000, 85.7% of respondents whose monthly income is above Rs.50,000 used

121 contraceptive methods. The data reveals that contraceptive methods were more used by high income groups as compared to low income group.

In the second generation, it is evident from the table 2.17 that 20.8% of female respondents and 24% of male respondents used contraceptive methods. On the contrary, 79.2% of female and 76% of male respondents did not use contraceptive methods.

On the basis of educational level of the respondents, it is evident from the table 2.17 that 20.8% of illiterate female, 13.5% of respondents below high school, 30% of respondents who were higher secondary, 50% of those who were graduate and above used contraceptive methods. In case of males, 20% of illiterate, 11.7% of respondents below high school, 15.6% of respondents who were higher secondary educated, 63% of respondents who were graduate and above used these methods. The data reveals that education is significant here. Higher the educational level, higher the percentage of respondents who used contraceptive methods.

Further, the data was analysed on the basis of religiosity, the table 2.17 shows that 19.5% of female respondents who were strictly religious, 25.7% of female respondents who were religiously moderate used contraceptive methods. In case of males, 14.2% of respondents who were strictly religious, 25% of respondents who were religiously moderate, 80% of respondents who were religiously indifferent also used these methods. The data reveals that higher the religiosity, lower the respondents who used contraceptives. Therefore, contraceptives were more used by religiously moderate and religiously indifferent respondents.

When the data was analysed on residential background, it is evident from the table 2.17 that 20.9% of female and 22% of male who were urban born used contraceptive methods and 20% of female and 40% of male who were rural born used contraceptive methods. The data reveals that rural born male respondents have used contraceptive methods more as compared to urban born respondents whereas the percentage is same for urban as well as rural born females.

When the data was analysed on the basis of income level, the table 2.17 indicates that 27.7% of female respondents whose monthly income was below Rs.10,000, 3.5% of

122 respondents whose monthly income was between Rs.10,000-50,000 and 81.8% of female respondents whose monthly income was above Rs.50,000 used contraceptive methods. In case of male respondents, 20.5% of respondents whose monthly income was below Rs.10,000. 22.2% of respondents whose monthly income lies between Rs.10,000-50,000 and 30% of respondents whose monthly income was above Rs.50,000 used contraceptive methods. The data indicates that as the income level rises, the percentage of respondents who used contraceptives has also increased.

In the third generation, it is evident from the table 3.17 that 76.8% of female and 64% of male respondents used contraceptives.

When the data was analysed on the basis of educational level, it is evident from the table 3.17 that 100% of illiterate female, 50% of respondents below high school, 72.7% of respondents who were higher secondary educated, 82% of respondents who were graduate and above used contraceptive methods. In case of males, 33.3% illiterate, 40% of those who were below high school, 52.9% of those who were higher secondary educated and 80% of those who were graduate and above used these methods. The data indicates that as the educational level increases, contraceptive methods used by respondents has also increased.

On the basis of religiosity, the table 3.17 indicates that 78.5% of respondents who were strictly religious, 77.2% of respondents who were religiously moderate, and 50% of respondents who were religiously indifferent used contraceptive methods. In case of males, 40% of strictly religious, 66.6% of those who were religiously moderate and 73.3% of those who were religiously indifferent used contraceptive methods. The data indicates that higher the religiosity, higher the percentage of respondents who used contraceptives.

When analysed on residential background, it is evident from the table 3.17 that 76.8% of female respondents and 64% of male respondents who were urban born used contraceptive methods whereas 23.2% of female and 36% of male did not use contraceptive methods. There were no rural born respondents. The data reveals that majority of respondents used contraceptives in the third generation.

123 When the data was analysed on the basis of income level, it is evident from the table 3.17 that 33.3% of respondents whose monthly income was below Rs.10,000, 67.2% of respondents whose monthly income was between Rs.10,000-50,000 and 91.3% of those whose monthly income was above Rs.50,000 used contraceptive methods. In case of males, 66.6% of respondents whose monthly income was below Rs.10,000, 60% of respondents whose monthly income was between Rs.10,000-50,000 and 77.5% of respondents whose monthly income was above Rs.50,000 used contraceptive methods. The data indicates that higher the income level of respondents, higher the percentage of respondents who used contraceptive methods.

Findings:

The analysis of the data for the three generations concludes that the use of contraceptive methods was least in the first generation. Though, it increased in the second and third generation. In all the three generations, educated respondents used contraceptives more as compared to uneducated. As far as the impact of religiosity is concerned, the majority of religiously moderate males used contraceptive methods more as compared to strictly religious respondents. As far as residential background is concerned, these methods were more used by urban born female respondents while among males the results were same for rural born. On the basis of income level, higher income group used these methods more as compared to lower ones in all three generations. In the second generation, religiously moderate and indifferent used more of these methods in comparison to strictly religious. On the basis of residence, rural born males have used contraceptive methods more as compared to urban born. While in the third generation, majority of urban born respondents have used contraceptive methods.

124 Respondent’s view on type of successful marriage:

In the first generation, it is clear from the table 1.18 that 96% of female respondents said that arrange marriage is more successful whereas only 4% of female respondents said love marriage is successful type of marriage. In case of males, 95% favoured arrange marriage and 5% favoured love marriage.

When the data was analysed on the basis of educational level, it is indicated from the table 1.18 that 100% of female respondents who were illiterate, 92% of respondents below high school, 88.8% of higher secondary educated respondents viewed arrange marriage as successful. In case of males, 90.3% of illiterate, 96% of respondents below high school, 100% of higher secondary educated respondents and 100% graduate and above educated respondents viewed arrange marriage as more successful than love marriage. On the contrary, among females, 7.6% of respondents below high school, 11.1% of higher secondary educated respondents viewed love marriage as successful type of marriage. The data reveals that educated respondents favoured arrange marriage more as compared to love marriage.

The data when analysed on the basis of religiosity, the table 1.18 shows that 98.7% strictly religious female respondents, 80% religiously moderate and 90% religiously indifferent said arrange marriage is successful type of marriage. In case of males, 100% strictly religious respondents, 90% religiously moderate respondents, 86.6% religiously indifferent respondents viewed arrange marriage as more successful than love marriage. While 1.25% of female respondents who were strictly religious, 20% of female respondents who were religiously moderate and 10% of female respondents who were religiously indifferent viewed love marriage as more successful than arrange marriage. Among the males, 10% of respondents who were religiously moderate, 13.3% of respondents who were religiously indifferent said love marriage is more successful than arrange marriage. The data reveals that strictly religious respondents favoured arrange marriage as they think arrange marriage is more successful than love marriage and religiously moderate respondents favoured love marriage.

When the data was analysed on residential background, it is evident from the table 1.18 that 95.3% of female respondents and 95.8% of male respondents who were urban born favoured arrange marriage more than love marriage while only 4.6% of

125 female respondents and 4.1% of male respondent favoured love marriage more than arrange marriage. Respondents who were rural born 96.4% of females and 93.7% of males said arrange marriage is more successful type of marriage whereas only 3.5% of female and 6.25% of male respondents favoured love marriage more than arrange marriage. The data indicates that majority of the respondents considered arrange marriage as more successful than love marriage. Very few respondents favoured love marriage. Impact of residence in the first generation does not bring about change in the attitude of respondents towards type of marriage.

On the basis of income level, it is evident from the table 1.18 that 95.8% of female respondents and 93.1% of male respondents with monthly income below Rs.10,000 , 95.6% of female and 100% of male respondents whose monthly income was between Rs.10,000-50,000 and 100% of female and 85.7% of male respondents whose monthly income was above Rs.50,000 viewed arrange marriage as more successful than love marriage. Whereas only 4.1% of female and 6.8% of male with monthly income below Rs.10,000 and 4.3% of female whose monthly income was between Rs.10,000-50,000 and 14.2% of male with monthly income above Rs.50,000 viewed love marriage as more successful type of marriage. The data indicates that majority of the respondents whether higher income group or lower income group favoured arrange marriage.

In the second generation, 96.8% of female respondents and 96% of male respondents favoured arrange marriage more than love marriage whereas 3.2% of female and 4% of male favoured love marriage more as compared to arrange marriage.

When the data was analysed on the basis of educational level, it is clear from the table 2.18 that 100% of illiterate female and 93.3% of male, 96.6% of female below high school and 94.1% of male, 97.5% of higher secondary educated female and 96.8% of male, 50% of female who were graduate and above and 100% of male viewed arrange marriage as successful type of marriage. Whereas 6.6% of illiterate male, 3.3% of female below high school and 5.8% of male, 2.5% of female higher secondary and 3.1% of male, 50% of female who were graduate and above viewed love marriage as more successful type of marriage than arrange marriage. The data reveals that illiterate female respondents favoured arrange marriage more as compared to educated female respondents. It is also found that educated male respondents favoured arrange

126 marriage more as compared to uneducated. Love marriage is more favoured by educated females than educated males.

When the data was analysed on the basis of religiosity, it is evident from the table 2.18 that 97.7% of female and 100% of male respondents who were strictly religious, 94.2% of female and 96.6% of male respondents who were religiously moderate and 100% of female respondents and 60% of male respondents who were religiously indifferent favoured arrange marriage whereas 2.2% of female respondents who were strictly religious, 5.7% of female and 3.3% of male respondents who were religiously moderate and 40% of male respondents who were religiously indifferent viewed love marriage as successful type of marriage. The data reveals that among religiously indifferent females arrange marriage was favoured more as compared to love marriage whereas strictly religious male respondents favoured arrange marriage more as compared to love marriage.

When the data was analysed on residential background, it is evident from the table 2.18 that 98% of urban born female respondents and 97.7% of urban born male respondents said arrange marriage is more successful than love marriage. Whereas 1.9% of urban born females 2.2% of urban born males favoured love marriage and 90% of female and 80% of male who were rural born favoured arrange marriage and 10% of female and 20% of male who were rural born said love marriage is successful type of marriage. The data indicates that urban born respondents favoured arrange marriage more as compared to rural born.

When the data was analysed on the basis of income, it is evident from the table 2.18 that 100% of female and 94% of male respondents with monthly income below Rs.10,000, 97.6% of female and 97% of male respondents with monthly income between Rs.10,000-50,000 and 90.9% of female and 96.6% of male respondents viewed arrange marriage as more successful than love marriage. While 5.8% of male respondents having salary below Rs10,000 p.m., 2.3% of female and 2.7% of male with monthly income between Rs.10,000-50,000, 9% of female and 3.3% of male whose monthly income was above Rs.50,000 favoured love marriage. The data indicates that female respondents from lower income group favoured arrange marriage highly as compared to higher income groups. Among the male respondents,

127 higher income group favoured arrange marriage highly as compared to lower income groups.

In the third generation, it is indicated from the table 3.18 that 85.6% of female, 78% of male respondents viewed arrange marriage as successful type of marriage whereas 14.4% of female and 22% of male respondents considered love marriage as successful type of marriage.

When the data was analysed on the basis of educational level, it is evident from the table 3.18 that 100% of female and 83.3% of male who were illiterate, favoured arrange marriage and also 100% of female and 90% of male below high school, 86.3% of female and 85% of male who were higher secondary educated, 82% of female and 70% of male who were graduate and above also favoured arrange marriage. On the other hand, 16.6% of illiterate male respondents and 10% of male below high school, 13.6% of female and 14.7% of male higher secondary educated and 17.9% of female and 30% of male who were graduate and above considered love marriage as successful type of marriage. The data indicates that those who were less educated favoured arrange marriage highly as compared to educated respondents. The respondents who were more educated favoured love marriage highly as compared to uneducated.

When the data was analysed on the basis of religiosity, it is clear from the table 3.18 that 80.9% of female who were strictly religious, 87.3% of those who were religiously moderate and 100% of those who were religiously indifferent viewed arrange marriage as successful type of marriage in comparison to love marriage. In case of males, 100% of strictly religious, 70.6% of religiously moderate, 100% of those who were religiously indifferent viewed arrange marriage as more successful than love marriage. On the other hand, 19% of female who were strictly religious, 12.6% of religiously moderate female and 29.3% of religiously moderate male respondents said love marriage is more successful type of marriage. The data reveals that majority of strictly religious males and majority of religiously indifferent female respondents favoured arrange marriage more as compared to strictly religious respondent.

When the data was analysed on residential background, it is clear from the table 3.18 that 85.6% of female and 78% of male respondents who were urban born viewed arrange marriage as successful type of marriage whereas 14.4% of female and 22% of

128 male respondents said love marriage is more successful type of marriage. There were no one found rural born in the third generation. Majority of the respondents were in favour of arrange marriage.

When the data was analysed on the basis of Income level, it is evident from the table 3.18 that 100% of female and 84.6% of male with monthly income below Rs.10,000, 88.5% of female and 88% of male with monthly income between Rs.10,000-50,000, 81% of female and 72.5% of male whose monthly income was above Rs.50,000 favoured arrange marriage more than love marriage whereas 15.3% of male having monthly income below Rs.10,000, 11.4% of female and 12% of male with income between Rs.10,000-50,000 p.m. , 18.9% of female and 27.4% of male whose monthly income was above Rs.50,000 favoured love marriage more than arrange marriage. The data reveals that lower and middle income groups of respondents favoured arrange marriage highly as compared to higher income group.

Findings:

After analysing the data of the three generations, it can be said that in the first generation the number of respondents who favoured love marriage was very low and who favoured arrange marriage was very high. In the third generation, number of respondents who favoured love marriage increased and the percentage of respondents who favoured arrange marriage decreased as compared to the first generation. On the basis of education, it can be said that in the first generation arrange marriages were more favoured by the illiterate respondents while some of the respondents favoured love marriage more as compared to arrange marriage in the second and third generation. As far as the impact of religiosity is concerned, strictly religious respondents viewed arrange marriage as more successful type of marriage in the first generation. In the second and third generation also, arrange marriage was more favoured by the respondents whether they are religiously indifferent or strictly religious. When it comes to residential background, urban born respondents favoured arrange marriage more as compared to rural born respondents in all the three generations. On the basis of income level, it can be said that in the first generation arrange marriage was more favoured by higher income group as well as middle income group. But arrange marriage was also favoured by lower income group in the second and third generation.

129 Type of marriage of the respondents:

In the first generation, it is suggested from the table 1.19 that 5% of female respondents and 1.25% of male respondents were interested in love marriage, 93% of female and 98.7% of male were interested in arrange marriage, 2% of female respondents choose love-cum-arrange marriage.

On the basis of educational level of the respondents, the table 1.19 shows that 5.7% of female and 3.2% of male with no education, 2.5% of female below high school, 11.1% of female who were higher secondary educated showed preference for love marriage whereas 94.2% of female and 96.7% of male who were illiterate, 94.8% of female and 100% of male below high school, 77.7% of female and 100% of male higher secondary educated and 100% of male who were graduate and above choose arrange marriage and 2.5% of female below high school, 11.1% of female higher secondary educated liked love-cum-arrange marriage. The data reveals that as the respondents get educated they preferred love marriage but majority of the respondents preferred arrange marriage.

When the data was analysed on the basis of religiosity, 3.75% of female and 2.2% of male who were strictly religious, 10% of those moderate towards religion and 10% of those who were indifferent towards religion liked love marriage whereas 95% of female and 97.7% of male who were strictly religious, 80% of female and 100% of male who were moderate, 90% of female and 100% of male who were indifferent towards religion choose arrange marriage. The data indicates that respondents who were moderate and indifferent towards religion preferred love marriage more in comparison to strictly religious respondents. But majority of the respondents have the preference for arrange marriage.

The data was analysed on the basis of residential background and the table 1.19 clearly shows that 4.6% and 2.08% of urban born female and male respondents respectively preferred love marriage whereas 93% of female and 97.9% of male urban born preferred arrange marriage. And only 2.3% of urban born female respondents preferred love-cum-arrange. 92.9% of female and 100% of male who were rural born liked arrange marriage whereas 1.7% of rural born female interested in love-cum- arrange marriage. The data reveals that among rural born female respondents love

130 marriage was more found as compared to urban born respondents while among rural born male respondents arrange marriage was more found as compared to urban born respondents and 92.9% of female respondents who were rural born preferred arrange marriage. Females who were urban born preferred arrange marriage more as compared to rural born respondents.

When the data was analysed on the basis of income level, the table 1.19 clearly shows that 6.2% of female and 2.2% of male with monthly income level below Rs.10,000, 2.1% of female whose monthly income level was between Rs.10,000-50,000, 16.6% of female respondents with monthly income level above Rs.50,000 choose love marriage. While 91.6% of female and 97.7% of male belonging to monthly income below Rs.10,000, 95.6% of female and 100% of male with monthly income between Rs.10,000-50,000, 83.3% of female and 100% of male whose monthly income was above Rs.50,000 liked arrange marriage and 2% of female whose monthly income was below Rs.10,000 and 2.1% of female whose monthly income was between Rs.10,000-50,000 preferred love-cum-arrange marriage. The data reveals that love marriage was more preferred by higher income group whereas arrange marriage was more liked by both higher and lower income group.

In the second generation, only 4% of female preferred love marriage whereas 96% of female and 100% of male preferred arrange marriage.

On the basis of education of the respondents, it is clear from the table 2.19 that 4.1% of illiterate female, 1.6% of female below high school, 7.5% higher secondary educated choose love marriage. Whereas 95.8% of female with no education, 98.3% below high school, 92% higher secondary educated and 100% graduates and above graduate choose arrange marriage. In case of male, 100% of illiterate and also educated liked arrange marriage. The data reveals that very few cases of love marriages were found among educated females whereas all male preferred arrange marriage.

Analysing data on the basis of religiosity, the table 2.19 depicts that only 3.4% of female who were strictly religious, 2.8% of female who were religiously moderate, and 33.3% of female who were religiously indifferent preferred love marriage whereas 96.5% of strictly religious female, 97% religiously moderate female and

131 66.6% of female who were religiously indifferent preferred arrange marriage and 100% of male who were strictly religious, 60% of male who were moderate and only 5% of male who were indifferent towards religion preferred arrange marriage. The data reveals that love marriages were more preferred by religiously indifferent female respondents as compared to strictly religious respondents. Arrange marriages were more found among strictly religious and religiously moderate respondents.

When the data was analysed on residential background, it is indicated from the table 2.19 that only 3.8% of urban born female liked love marriage whereas among rural born 5% of female interested in love marriage and there were no male found who preferred love marriage. Majority 96.1% of female and 90% of male who were urban born preferred arrange marriage. Whereas among rural born 95% of female and 100% of male preferred arrange marriage. The data reveals that love marriage was more found among rural born respondents as compared to urban born respondents whereas arrange marriage was more found among urban born respondents.

When the data was analysed on the basis of income, it is clear from the table 2.19 that only 2.3% of female respondents whose income was between Rs.10,000-50,000 and 13.6% of female respondents whose income was above Rs.50,000 preferred love marriage and 100% of female and male whose income was below Rs.10,000 and 97.6% of female and 100% of male with income level between Rs.10,000-50,000, 86.3% of female and 100% of male preferred arrange marriage. The data reveals that love marriages were more found among high income group of females as compared to low income group of respondents. Whereas arrange marriages were found mostly in all income groups.

In the third generation, it is evident from the table 3.19 that 7.2% of females and 16% of males preferred love marriage, 86.4% of females and 73% of males preferred arrange marriage, 6.4% and 11% of females and males respectively liked love-cum- arrange marriage.

When the data was analysed on the basis of level of education, the table 3.19 depicts that majority 90% of males below high school did love marriage. 4.5% of females and 2.9% of males who were higher secondary educated, 10.4% of females and 12% of males who were graduate and above liked love marriage. 100% of female and 100%

132 of male who were illiterate, 100% of female and 10% of male below high school, 93.1% of female and 91.1% of male higher secondary educated, 79.1% of female and 70% of male graduate and above choose arrange marriage . 2.2% of female and 5.8% of male higher secondary educated and 10.4% of female and 18% of male graduate and above preferred love-cum-arrange marriage. The data reveals that as the education level rises, the rate of love marriage and love-cum arrange marriage has risen gradually in the third generation.

When the data was analysed on the basis of religiosity, it is indicated from the table 3.19 that only 4.7% of strictly religious female, 7.5% of female and 20% of male who were religiously moderate, 25% of females and 6.6% of males who were religiously indifferent preferred love marriage while 88% and 100% of females and males respectively who were strictly religious, 86% and 69.3% of female and male respectively who were religiously moderate, 75% and 73.3% of females and males respectively who were religiously indifferent preferred arrange marriage and 7.1% of female who were strictly religious, 6.3% of female and 10.6% of male who were religiously moderate, 20% of male only who were religiously indifferent liked love- cum-arrange marriage. The data reveals that love marriage was high among female respondents who were religiously indifferent as compared to religiously moderate respondents. Among males, the rate of arrange marriage was high among strictly religious respondents. The rate of love-cum arrange marriage was high among males who were indifferent towards religion.

When the data was analysed on residential background, it is evident from the table 3.19 that there were only urban born respondents in the third generation.7.2% of females and 16% of males preferred love marriage. 86.4% of females and 73% of males liked arrange marriage. 6.4% of females and 11% of males liked love-cum- arrange marriage. The data reveals that majority of the urban born respondents preferred arrange marriage.

When the data was analysed on the basis of income level, it is evident from the table 3.19 that 16.6% of female respondents whose monthly income was below Rs.10,000, 8.1% of female and 32% of male respondent with monthly income between Rs.10,000-50,000, 5% of female and 12.9% of male with monthly income level above

133 Rs.50,000 preferred love marriage .83.3% of female and 100% of male with monthly income level below Rs.10,000, 83.6% of female and 25% of male whose monthly income is between Rs.10,000-50,000, 88% of female and 69.3% of male whose monthly income was above Rs.50,000 liked arrange marriage. 6.5% of females only with monthly income between Rs.10,000-50,000, 6.7% of female and 17.7% of male choose love-cum-arrange marriage. The data reveals that in the third generation love marriage were high among male respondents who belongs to middle-income group and arrange marriage were high among lower income group. Love-cum-arrange marriage was also high among high income groups.

Findings:

After analysing the data of the three generations, it is found that the rate of love marriage rises gradually. However, majority of respondents preferred arrange marriages more as they think arrange marriage is more successful. So, it can be said that there is slight change in the attitudes of people towards type of marriage. As far as the impact of education is concerned, love marriages and love cum arrange marriage were increasing gradually with the increment in education in all the three generations. Education was found to be relevant in this case. Education has changed the views of the respondents towards love marriage. On the basis of religiosity, it is found that love marriages were more found among religiously moderate and religiously indifferent respondents as compared to strictly religious respondents. When it comes to residential background, love marriages were more found among rural born respondents as compared to urban born respondents in the second generation whereas in the third generation, love marriage were found among urban born respondents. As far as the impact of income level is concerned, love marriage were more found among middle income groups as compared to high income groups.

134 Male respondents who helped their wives in household chores

In the first generation, it is evident from the table 1.20 that 20% of respondents helped their wives in household chores and 80% of respondents did not help their wives.

When the data was analysed on the basis of education, it is indicated from the table 1.20 that 9.67% of illiterate, 7.4% of respondent below high school, 50% of respondents who were higher secondary educated and 50% graduate and above helped their wives in household chores while 90.3% of respondents with no education, 92.5% of those below high school, 50% of higher secondary educated, 50% of those graduate and above did not help their wives in house hold chores. The data reveals that educated males helped their wives more as compared to uneducated males.

When the data was analysed on the basis of religiosity, it is evident from the table 1.20 that 13.3% strictly religious, 25% of respondents who were religiously moderate and 33.3% of those who were religiously indifferent helped their wives in household chores whereas 86.6% of strictly religious, 75% of those who were religiously moderate, 66.6% of those who were religiously indifferent did not help their wives in household chores. The data indicates that strictly religious respondents did not help their wives in household chores as compared to religiously moderate and indifferent respondents.

The data when analysed on the basis of residential background, it is indicated from the table 1.20 that 14.5% of urban born respondents and 28.1% of rural born respondents helped their wives in household chores whereas 85.4% of respondents who were urban born and 71.8% of respondents who were rural born did not help their wives in household chores. The data reveals that rural born respondents helped their wives more in comparison to urban born respondents. But majority of the males did not help their wives.

Further, the data was analysed on the basis of income, it is indicated from the table 1.20 that 18.1% of respondents with monthly income below Rs.10,000, 13.7% of those whose monthly income was between Rs.10,000-50,000 and 57% of respondents whose monthly income was above Rs.50,000 helped their wives in household chores. While 81.1% of respondents with monthly income below Rs.10,000, 86.2% of

135 respondents whose monthly income was between Rs.10,000-50,000 and 42.8% of respondents with monthly income above Rs.50,000 did not help their wives in household chores. The data reveals that respondents who belongs to higher income group helped their wives more in comparison to lower income groups.

In the second generation, it is suggested from the table 2.20 that 29% of respondents helped their wives while 71% of respondents did not help them.

When the data was analysed on the basis of education, it is evident from the table 2.20 that 13.3% of illiterate respondents, 14.7% of below high school, 37.5% of higher secondary educated respondents, 52.6% of graduate and above helped their wives in household chores whereas 86.6% of illiterate, 85.2% below high school, 65.2% of higher secondary, 47.3% graduate and above did not help their wives in household chores. The data reveals that educated males helped their wives more in comparison to uneducated respondents. Hence, education is important in this case.

The data when analysed on the basis of religiosity, it is evident from the table 2.20 that 40% of respondents religiously moderate, 100% of religiously indifferent respondents helped their wives in house work whereas 100% strictly religious, 60% religiously moderate did not help their wives in household chores .The data reveals that strictly religious respondents did not help their wives but those religiously indifferent helped their wives in household chores.

When the data was analysed on the basis of residential background, it is evident from the table 2.20 that 28.8% urban born and 30% rural born helped their wives in household work whereas 71% urban born and 70% rural born did not help their wives. The data indicates that rural born respondents helped their wives more in comparison to urban born respondents.

When the data was analysed on the basis of Income level, it is evident from the table 2.20 that 14.7% of respondents with monthly income below Rs.10,000, 33.3% of respondents with monthly income between Rs.10,000-50,000, 40% of those with monthly income above Rs.50,000 helped their wives in household work whereas 85.2% of respondents whose monthly income was below Rs.10,000, 66.6% of respondents with monthly income between Rs.10,000-50,000, 60% of respondents

136 whose monthly income was above Rs.50,000 did not help their wives in household chores. The data reveals that as the income level increases, the respondents who help their wives also increases.

In the third generation, 46% of respondents helped their wives in household chores and 54% of them did not help their wives in household chores.

When the data was analysed on the basis of level of education, it is clear from the table 3.20 that 16.6% of illiterate respondents, 10% below high school, 20.5% higher secondary educated and 74% graduate and above respondents helped in household chores whereas 83.3% of illiterate respondents, 90% of respondents below high school, 79.4% of respondents higher secondary educated, 26% graduate and above respondents did not help their wives in house work.

When the data was analysed on the basis of religiosity, it is evident from the table 3.20 that 60% strictly religious respondents, 33.3% religiously moderate, 100% religiously indifferent respondents helped in house hold. The data reveals that the respondents who were religiously indifferent helped their wives more as compared to strictly religious respondents.

When the data was analysed on residential basis, it is evident from the table 3.20 that 46% of urban born helped in house hold work and 54% of respondents did not help their wives. There are no rural born respondents in the third generation.

When the data was analysed on the basis of income level, it is evident from the table 3.20 that 23% of respondents with monthly income below Rs.10,000, 12% who belongs to monthly income between Rs.10,000-50000, 64.5% whose monthly income above Rs.50,000 helped their wives in household chores whereas 76.9% of respondents whose monthly income was below 10,000, 88% of respondents with monthly income level between Rs.10,000-50,000 and 35.4% of respondents belonging to monthly income level above Rs.50,000 did not help their wives in household chores. The data indicates that income level is not significant in this case.

137 Findings:

After analysing the data of the three generations, the percentage of respondents who helped their wives has increased in the third generation. As far as the impact of education was concerned, educated respondents help their wives more as compared to uneducated respondents in all the three generations. When it comes to religiosity, strictly religious did not help their wives whereas religiously indifferent help their wives in all the three generations. On the basis of residential background, it is found that in the first and second generation, rural born respondents helped their wives but in the third generation, there was no rural born respondent found and majority of urban born did not help in household. In case of income level, it is found that in the first and second generation, respondents who belong to higher income level helped their wives but in the third generation, there is no consistency.

138 Male respondents who allowed their wives to work outside :

In the first generation, it is clear from the table 1.21 that only 2.5% of respondents allowed their wives to work outside and 97.5% of respondents did not allow their wives to work outside.

When the data was analysed on the basis of education, it is evident from the table 1.21 that only 6.4% of illiterate respondents allowed wives to work outside whereas 100% of respondents below high school, 100% higher secondary educated respondents and 100% graduate and above respondents did not allow their wives to work outside. The data reveals that in the first generation only few illiterate respondents allowed their wives to work so that their income can increase. Due to low level of their income, they allow their wives to work.

Further, the data was analysed on the basis of religiosity, it is clear from the table 1.21 that only 5% of religiously moderate respondents, 6.66% religiously indifferent respondents allowed their wives to work outside whereas 100% strictly religious, 95% religiously moderate, 93.3% religiously indifferent did not allow their wives to work outside. The data reveals that strictly religious respondents did not want their wives to work outside and very few religiously moderate and indifferent want their wives to work.

When the data was analysed on the basis of residential status, it is shown in the table 1.21 that only 2.08% of respondents who were urban born and 3.1% of rural born respondents wanted their wives to work whereas 97.9% of urban born respondents and 96.8% of rural born respondents did not want their wives to work. The data reveals that rural born allow their wives to work outside more in comparison to urban born.

When the data was analysed on the basis of income level, it is indicated from the table 1.21 that only 4.5% of respondents with income level below Rs.10,000 permitted their wives to earn whereas 95.4% of respondents with monthly income below Rs.10,000, 100% of respondents whose income level was between Rs.10,000-50,000 and 100% of respondents whose income level was above Rs.50,000 did not permit them to earn

139 outside. The data reveals that respondents belonging to lower income groups wanted their wives to earn as they were poor, they didn‟t have any other source of income.

In the second generation, table 2.21 indicates that 23% of respondents gave them permission to work and 77% of respondents did not give.

On the basis of educational level of the respondents, it is clear from the table 2.21 that 33% of illiterate respondents, 14.7% below high school, 21.8% higher secondary respondents, 31.5% graduate and above allowed their wives to earn whereas 66.6% of illiterate respondents, 85.2% of respondents below high school, 78.1% higher secondary respondents, 68.4%graduate and above did not permit them to work outside. The data reveals that illiterate respondents wanted their wives to earn because they are poor, and they don‟t have many sources of income.

Further, the data was analysed on the basis of religiosity, it is evident from the table 2.21 that 11.4% of strictly religious respondents, 31.6% religiously moderate permitted their wives to work outside while 88.5% of respondents who were strictly religious, 68.3% of respondents religiously moderate and 100% of respondents who were religiously indifferent did not allow their wives to work outside. The data reveals that religiously moderate respondents permitted their wives to work more as compared to strictly religious respondents.

When the data was analysed on residential background, it is evident from the table 2.21 that 20% of urban born respondents and 50% of rural born respondents allowed their wives to work whereas 80% of urban born respondents and 50% of rural born respondents did not permit their wives to work outside. The data reveals that rural born respondents allowed their wives to work outside more as compared to urban born respondents.

The data was analysed on the basis of income level, and is evident from the table 2.21 that 17.6% belonging to monthly income below Rs.10,000, 22.2% whose monthly income is between Rs.10,000-50,000, 30% of respondents with monthly income above Rs.50,000 permitted their wives to earn whereas 82.3% of respondents with monthly income below Rs.10,000, 77.7% of respondents with monthly income between Rs.10,000-50,000, 70% of respondent whose income was above Rs.50,000

140 did not allow their wives to work. The data reveals that respondents belonging to higher income group allow their wives to work outside more as compared to lower income group in the second generation.

In the third generation, the percentage of respondents increased to 53% who allowed their wives to work outside and 47% of respondents did not allow them to work outside.

When the data was analysed on the basis of education, it is evident from the table 3.21 that 66.6% of illiterate respondents, 50% below high school, 47% higher secondary educated, 56% of graduate and above respondents permitted their wives to work whereas 33.3% of respondents who were illiterate, 50% below high school, 52.9% higher secondary and 44% of respondents who were graduate and above did not allow their wives to work. The data reveals that illiterate respondents permitted their wives to earn outside more as compared to educated respondent.

When the data was analysed on the basis of religiosity, it is clear from the table 3.21 that 50% of respondents who were strictly religious, 60% of respondents religiously moderate and 20% of religiously indifferent respondents permitted their wives to work whereas 50% of respondents who were strictly religious, 40% of respondents who were religiously moderate and 80% of respondents religiously indifferent did not allow their wives to work outside. The data reveals that respondents who were religiously indifferent did not allow their wives to work outside and religiously moderate allowed their wives to work more as compared to religiously indifferent.

When the data was analysed on the basis of residential background, it is evident from the table 3.21 that there were only urban born respondents and no rural born respondents found in the third generation. It is seen that 53% of respondents wanted their wives to work outside and 47% of respondents did not want their wives to work. The data indicates that majority of urban born respondents wanted their wives to work outside.

When the data was analysed on the basis of income level, it is evident from the table 3.21 that 53.8% of respondents with monthly income below Rs.10,000, 60% of respondents whose monthly income was between Rs.10,000-50,000, 50% of

141 respondents whose income was above Rs.50,000 permitted their wives to earn whereas 46.1% of respondents whose income was below Rs.10,000, 40% of respondents with monthly income between Rs.10,000-50,000 and 50% of respondents with monthly income above Rs.50,000 did not allow their wives to work outside. The data reveals that respondents who belong to middle income group permitted their wives to work is highest as compared to low income group.

Findings:

After analysing the data of the three generations, it is found that respondents who allowed their wives to earn were lowest in the first generation and highest in the third generation. Hence, it can be said that there is change in the thinking of people in the third generation. As far as the impact of education is concerned, in the first and second generation very few illiterate respondents allowed their wives to work whereas in the third generation, majority of illiterate respondents allowed their wives to work. They permit them to work as they were poor and their family income is low. On the basis of religiosity in the first and second generation, it is found that strictly religious respondents did not want their wives to work outside as they were still orthodox and have not change their thinking, whereas in the third generation, strictly religious and moderate respondents allowed wives to work so that they can earn and became self dependent. In the case of residential background, rural born respondents did not allow their wives to work outside in the first generation but in the second generation rural born respondents allowed more to work outside. On the basis of income level, in the first generation lower income group wanted their wives to work outside, whereas in the third generation middle income group allowed their wives to work outside.

142 Male respondents who allowed their wives to go for shopping alone:

In the first generation, it is evident from the table 1.22 that 33.7% of respondents allowed their wives to go for shopping alone and 66% of respondents did not permit their wives to go for shopping alone.

When the data was analysed on the basis of education of the respondents, it is indicated from the table 1.22 that 19.3% of illiterate respondents, 25.9% of respondents below high school, 50% of respondents who were higher secondary and 87.5% of those who were graduate and above allowed their wives to go for shopping alone whereas 80.6% of illiterate respondents, 74% of respondents below high school, 50% of respondents who were higher secondary, 12.5% of graduate and above did not allow their wives to go for shopping. The data indicates that as the education level rises, more respondents allowed their wives to go for shopping.

When the data was analysed on the basis of religiosity, it is clear from the table1.22 that 22.2% of strictly religious respondents, 60% of religiously moderate, 33.3% of those who were religiously indifferent permitted wives to go for shopping. The data reveals that respondents who were religiously moderate allowed their wives to go for shopping more as compared to strictly religious and religiously indifferent.

The data when analysed on the basis of residential background, it is clear from the table 1.22 that 39.5% of urban born respondents allowed their wives to go for shopping as compared to 25% of rural born respondents whereas 60.4% of urban born respondents did not allow wives to go for shopping as compared to 75% of rural born respondents. The data reveals that urban born respondents allowed more as compared to rural born respondents.

When the data was analysed on the basis of income, it is indicated from the table 1.22 that only 9% of respondents with monthly income below Rs.10,000, 58.6% of respondents with monthly income between Rs.10,000-50,000, 85.7% of respondents whose monthly income was above Rs.50,000 permitted their wives to go for shopping alone whereas 90.9% of respondents with monthly income below Rs.10,000, 41.3% of respondents with monthly income between Rs.10,000-50,000 and 14.2% of respondents with monthly income above Rs.50,000 did not allow wives to go for

143 shopping alone. The data reveals that respondents belonging to higher income group permitted more in comparison to lower income group.

In the second generation, table 2.22 shows that 56% of respondents permitted their wives to go whereas 44% of respondents did not allow wives to go for shopping alone.

On the basis of educational level, it is indicated from the table 2.22 that 46.6% of illiterate respondent, 38.2% of respondents below high school, 68.7% of graduate and above respondents allowed their wives to go whereas 53.3% of illiterate respondents, 61.7% of respondents below high school, 31.2% of respondents who were higher secondary, 26.3% of respondents who were graduate and above did not allow wives to go for shopping alone. The data reveals that there is no consistency in the response pattern in this case.

When the data was analysed on the basis of religiosity, it is evident from the table 2.22 that 57.1% of respondents who were strictly religious, 58.3% of respondents who were religiously moderate, 20% of religiously indifferent respondents allowed wives to go for shopping alone whereas 42.8% of respondents who were strictly religious, 41.6% of respondents who were religiously moderate and 80% religiously indifferent did not allow wives to go for shopping alone. The data reveals that strictly religious and religiously moderate respondents allowed their wives to go for shopping alone more as compared to religiously indifferent.

When the data was analysed on the basis of residential background, it is clear from the table 2.22 that 53.3% of urban born respondents and 80% of rural born respondents allowed wives to go for shopping alone whereas 46.6% of urban born and 20% of rural born respondents did not permit. The data reveals that rural born respondents allowed their wives more to go for shopping alone as compared to urban born respondents.

When the data was analysed on the basis of income, it is evident from the table 2.22 that 38.2% of respondents with monthly income below Rs.10,000, 55.5% of respondents whose monthly income was between Rs.10,000-50,000 and 76.6% of respondents whose monthly income was above Rs.50,000 allowed wives to go for

144 shopping alone whereas 61.7% of respondents whose income was below Rs.10,000, 44.4% of respondents with monthly income between Rs.10,000-50,000 and 23.3% of respondents with monthly income above Rs.50,000 did not allow their wives to go for shopping alone. The data reveals that higher the income level, higher the respondents who allowed their wives to go for shopping alone.

In the third generation, the table 3.22 shows that the percentage of respondents increased to 90% who allowed wives to go for shopping alone and 10% of respondents did not allow wives to go for shopping.

When the data was analysed on the basis of educational level, 100% of respondents who were illiterate, 80% of respondents below high school, 88% higher secondary, 92% of graduate and above respondents permitted wives to go for shopping alone whereas 20% of respondents below high school, 11.7% of respondents who were higher secondary, 8% of respondents who were graduate and above did not allow wives to go for shopping. The data indicates that not only highly educated respondents were allowing wives to go for shopping alone but uneducated respondents were also allowing wives to go for shopping alone.

Further, the data was analysed on the basis of religiosity, the table 3.22 indicates that 70% of strictly religious, 93.3% of religiously moderate, 86.6% religiously indifferent allowed wives to go for shopping alone whereas 30% of strictly religious, 6.6% religiously moderate, 13.3% religiously indifferent did not permit them to go alone. The data indicates that religiously moderate and indifferent respondents allowed more as compared to strictly religious and religiously indifferent.

When the data was analysed on the basis of residential status, it is indicated from the table 3.22 that 90% of urban born respondents permitted their wives whereas only 10% did not allow them. The data indicates clearly that urban born allowed their wives more.

When the data was analysed on income basis, it is evident from the table 3.22 that 84.6% of respondents whose monthly income was below Rs.10,000, 84% whose monthly income was between Rs.10,000-50,000, 93.5% of respondents with monthly income above Rs.50,000 allowed wives to go for shopping alone whereas 15.3% of

145 respondents whose monthly income was below Rs.10,000, 16% of those whose monthly income was between Rs.10,000-50,000, 6.4% of respondents whose monthly income was above Rs.50,000 did not allow wives to go for shopping .The data indicates that respondents belonging to higher income group allowed wives more to go for shopping alone.

Findings:

After analysing the data of the three generations, it is found that in the third generation more respondents allowed their wives to go for shopping. On the basis of education level, it is found that as the education level rises among the respondents, more respondents allowed their wives. As far as the impact of religiosity is concerned, it is found that religiously moderate respondents allowed more as compared to strictly religious respondents. In case of residential background, in the first generation urban born respondents allowed more while in the second generation, more rural born respondents also allowing their wives to go for shopping alone. On the basis of income level, higher income group of respondents allowed more their wives to go for shopping as compared to lower income level.

146 Female respondents who took decisions on financial matters:

In the first generation, it is evident from the table 1.23 that 24% of respondents took decision on financial matters, 57% of respondents did not take decision on financial matters and 19% of respondents took decision sometimes.

When the data was analysed on the basis of educational level, it is evident from the table 1.23 that 21.1% with no education, 28.2% below high school, 22.2% higher secondary educated took decisions in the first generation whereas 61.5% illiterate, 58.9% below high school, 22.2% higher secondary educated did not take decision and 17.3% illiterate, 12.8% below high school, 55.5% higher secondary educated respondents sometimes took decision on financial matters. The data reveals that on the basis of education there is no consistency. Hence, in this case education is not a relevant variable in the first generation.

When the data was analysed on the basis of religiosity, The table 1.23 depicts that 25% strictly religious, 20% religiously moderate, 20% religiously indifferent took decision on financial matters whereas 57.5% strictly religious, 50% religiously moderate, 60% religiously indifferent did not take decision on financial matters and 17.5% strictly religious, 30% religiously moderate, 20% religiously indifferent sometimes took decision on financial matters. The data reveals that respondents who are strictly religious took decision on financial matters more as compared to religiously moderate and indifferent respondents.

When the data was analysed on the basis of residential background, the table 1.23 shows that 23% of urban born and 24.5% of rural born respondents took decision on financial matters whereas 58% of urban born and 56% of rural born respondents did not take decision on financial matters while 18.6% of urban born and 19.2% of rural born respondents sometimes took decision on financial matters. The data reveals that rural born respondents took decisions on financial matters more than urban born respondents. It can be said not only rural born respondents but urban born also took decision.

When the data was analysed on income basis, it is evident from the table 1.23 that 22.9% of respondents with monthly income below 10,000, 23.9% of respondents

147 whose monthly income was between Rs.10,000-50,000, 33.3% of respondents with monthly income above Rs.50,000 took decisions on financial matters whereas 56.2% of respondents whose monthly income below Rs.10,000, 58.6% of respondents with monthly income between Rs.10,000-50,000, 50% of respondents with monthly income between Rs.10,000-50,000, 50% of respondents with monthly income above Rs.50,000 did not take decisions on financial matters and 20.8% of respondents whose monthly income was below 10,000, 17.3% of respondents whose monthly income was between Rs.10,000-50,000, 16.6% of respondents whose monthly income was above Rs.50,000 sometimes took decision on financial matters. The data reveals that respondents belonging to higher income group took decisions on financial matters more as compared to lower income group.

In the second generation, the table 2.23 depicts that respondents who took decisions on financial matters reached to 29.6%, whereas 48% of respondents did not take decisions on financial matters.

When the data was analysed on the basis of educational level, the table 2.23 shows that 29.1% of illiterate respondents, 18.6% of respondents below high school, 45% of respondents who were higher secondary, 50% of respondents who were graduate and above took decisions on financial matters whereas 70.8% of illiterate respondents, 50.8% of respondents below high school, 32.5% of respondents higher secondary educated did not take decisions on financial matters while 30.5% of respondents below high school, 22.5% higher secondary educated and 50% of respondents graduate and above sometimes took decision on financial matters. The data reveals that educated respondents took decisions on financial matters more as compared to uneducated respondents.

When the data was analysed on the basis of religiosity, it is clear from the table 2.23 that 16.09% of strictly religious respondents, 57.1% of religiously moderate, 100% of respondents who were indifferent towards religion took decision on financial matters whereas 57.4% strictly religious, 28.5% religiously moderate did not take decisions on financial matters while 26.4% strictly religious respondents, 14.2% of respondents who were religiously moderate sometimes took decision on financial matters. The

148 data reveals that religiously indifferent took decisions on financial matters more as compared to strictly religious respondents.

When the data was analysed on the basis of residential status, it is evident from the table 2.23 that 30.4% of urban born respondents and 25% of rural born respondents took decisions on financial matters while 46.6% urban born and 55% rural born did not take decision on financial matters. The data reveals that urban born respondents took decisions more as compared to rural born respondents.

When the data was analysed on income basis, it is evident from the table 2.23 that 38.8% of respondents with monthly income below 10,000, 17.6% of respondents whose monthly income was between Rs.10,000-50,000 and 68.1% of respondents whose monthly income was above Rs.50,000 took decisions on financial matters. While 27.7% of respondents with monthly income below Rs.10,000, 58.8% of respondents with monthly income between Rs.10,000-50,000 , 22.7% of respondents with monthly income above Rs.50,000 did not take decisions on financial matters and 33.3% of respondents whose monthly income was below 10,000 , 23.5% of respondents belonging to monthly income between Rs.10,000-50,000 took decisions on financial matters. The data reveals that respondents belonging to higher income group took decision on financial matters more as compared to lower income group.

In the third generation, the table 3.23 shows that the respondents who took decisions on financial matters has increased to 71.2%, whereas 11.2% of respondents did not take decision on financial matters and 17.6% of respondents sometimes took decision on financial matters.

When the data was analysed on the basis of educational level, it is evident from the table 3.23 that 50% of respondents with no education, 50% below high school, 72.7% of those who were higher secondary educated, 74.6% of those who were graduate and above took decision on financial matters, whereas 25% of illiterate respondents, 20% of respondents below high school, 13.6% of respondents who were higher secondary, 7.4% of respondents who were graduate and above did not take decision on financial matters and 25% of illiterate respondents, 30% below high school, 13.6% of respondents who were higher secondary educated, 17.9% of respondents who were

149 graduate and above sometimes took decision on financial matters. The data reveals that as the education rises among the respondents they take more and more decisions.

When the data was analysed on the basis of religiosity, the data of the table 3.23 shows that 71.4% of respondents who were strictly religious, 70.8% of respondents who were religiously moderate and 75% of respondents who were religiously indifferent took decision on financial matters whereas 9.5% strictly religious, 11.3% religiously moderate and 25% religiously indifferent did not take decisions on financial matters and 19% strictly religious, 17.7% religiously moderate sometimes took decisions on financial matters. The data reveals that religiously indifferent respondents took decision on financial matters more as compared to strictly religious.

When the data was analysed on residential background, it is indicated from the table 3.23 that 71.2% of urban born respondents took decision whereas 11.2% of urban born respondents did not take decision on financial matters and 17.6% of respondents sometimes took decision on financial matters. In the third generation, there were no rural born respondents. The data indicates that majority of urban born respondents took decision on financial matters.

When the data was analysed on the basis of income level, it is indicated from the table 3.23 that 66.6% of respondents whose monthly income was below Rs.10,000, 68.8% of respondents whose monthly income was between Rs.10,000-50,000 and 74.1% of respondents whose monthly income was above Rs.50,000 took decision on financial matters whereas 16.6% of respondents whose monthly income was below Rs.10,000, 16.3% of respondents whose monthly income was between Rs.10,000-50,000, 5.1% of respondents whose monthly income was above Rs.50,000 did not take decision on financial matters and 16.6% of respondents with monthly income below Rs.10,000, 14.7% of respondents with monthly income between Rs.10,000-50,000, 20.6% of respondents whose monthly income was above Rs.50,000 sometimes took decision on financial matters. The data reveals that respondents who belong to higher income groups took decisions more as compared to lower income groups.

150 Findings:

After analysing the data of the three generations, the percentage of respondents who took decisions has increased in the third generation. On the basis of education, the data suggests that as the educational level rises, more respondents took decision on financial matters in the third generation. In case of religiosity, in the first generation strictly religious respondents took decision on financial matters more as compared to religiously indifferent whereas in the third generation, religiously indifferent respondents took decision on financial matters more as compared to strictly religious. When it comes to residential background, it is found that in the first generation rural born female respondents took decision more in comparison to urban born respondents but in the third generation, more urban born respondents took decision on financial matters. As far as the impact of income level is concerned, it is found that respondents belonging to higher income groups took decision more as compared to lower income group in all the three generations.

151 Actual number of children in the family of the respondents :

In the first generation, the table 1.24 presents actual number of children of the respondents. 3% of the respondents have children between 1- 2, while 37% of the respondents have children between 3-5 and 60% of respondents have more than 5 children in the family.

When the data was analysed on the basis of level of education, it is indicated from the table 1.24 that 1.9% of illiterate respondents, 2.5% of respondents below high school, 11.1% of higher secondary educated respondents have children between 1- 2, whereas 32.6% of illiterate respondents, 38.4% of respondents below high school, 55.5% of respondents who were higher secondary have children between 3 to 5, whereas 65.3% of illiterate respondents, 58.9% of respondents below high school, 33.3% of respondents who were higher secondary said that their number of children is more than five. The data reveals that majority of illiterate respondents have more than five children and educated respondents have two children.

When the data was analysed on the basis of religiosity, data in the table 1.24 indicates that 2.5% of strictly religious respondents, 10% of respondents who were religiously moderate have 1 or 2 children whereas 36.2% of strictly religious respondents, 50% of religiously moderate and 30% of respondents who were religiously indifferent have three to five children while 61.2% of respondents who were strictly religious, 40% of respondents who were religiously moderate, 70% of respondents who were religiously indifferent have more than five children. The data indicates that respondents who were religiously moderate have lesser number of children than strictly religious whereas religiously indifferent respondents have more children.

When the data was analysed on the basis of residential background, it is presented in the table 1.24 that 2.3% of urban born respondents have 1-2 children, 41.8% of urban born respondents have three to five children and 55.8% of urban born have more than five children. In case of rural born respondents, 3.5% have one or two children, 33.3% of respondents have three to five children, 63% have more than five children. The data reveals that rural born respondents have higher number of children as compared to urban born respondents.

152 When the data was analysed on income basis, it is evident from the table 1.24 that 4.1% of respondents with monthly income level below Rs.10,000, 2.1% of respondents whose monthly income was between Rs.10,000-50,000 have one or two children, whereas 20.8% of respondents whose monthly income was below Rs.10,000, 50% of respondents whose monthly income was between Rs.10,000- 50,000, 66.6% of respondents with monthly income level above Rs.50,000 have three to five children while 75% of respondents whose monthly income was below Rs.10,000, 47.8% of respondents with income level Rs.10,000-50,000 and 33.3% of respondents whose monthly income was above Rs.50,000 have more than five children. The data reveals that respondents who belong to lower income group have higher number of children.

In the second generation, it is evident from the table 2.24 that 3.2% of respondents have one-two children, 76.8% of respondents stated their number of children is between three to five and 20% of respondents have more than five children.

When the data was analysed on the basis of educational level, it is evident from the table 2.24 that 1.6% of respondents below high school and 7.5% of higher secondary respondents have one or two children whereas 62.5% of respondents who were illiterate, 74.5% of respondents below high school, 87.5% higher secondary , 100% of respondents who were graduate and above have three to five children whereas 37.5% of respondents below high school, 5% of those higher secondary have more than five children. The data reveals that illiterate respondents have higher number of children whereas literate respondents have lesser number of children.

On the basis of religiosity, it is clear from the table 2.24 that 3.4% of strictly religious respondents, 2.8% of respondents who were religiously moderate have one or two children whereas 77% of strictly religious respondents, 80% of respondents who were religiously moderate, 33.3% religiously indifferent have three to five children whereas 19.5% of strictly religious, 17.1% of religiously moderate and 66.6% of religiously indifferent have more than 5 children. The data reveals that respondents who were religiously indifferent have higher number of children whereas those who were religiously moderate has lesser number of children.

153 Further the data was analysed on the basis of residential background, it is evident from the table 2.24 that 2.8% of respondents who were urban born have one or two children as compared to 5% of rural born respondents whereas 76% of respondents who were urban born have three to five children as compared to 80% of rural born respondents while 20.9% of urban born have more than five children as compared to 15% of rural born respondents. The data reveals that majority of rural born respondents have higher number of children as compared to urban born.

When the data was analysed on the basis of income, the data from the table 2.24 shows that18.1% of respondents belonging to higher income has one or two children whereas 61.1% of respondents with monthly income below Rs.10,000, 81.1% of respondents whose monthly income lies between Rs.10,000-50,000, 72.7% having monthly income above Rs.50,000 have three to five children whereas 38.8% of respondents with monthly income below Rs.10,000, 18.8% of respondents with monthly income between Rs.10,000-50,000 and 9.09% of respondents with monthly income above Rs.50,000 have more than five children. The data reveals that respondents who belong to lower and middle income groups have 3-5 children whereas respondents who belongs to high income groups have l- 2 children.

In the third generation, it is evident from the table 3.24 that 62.4% of respondents is found to have only two children or below two children, 37.6% of respondents is found to have three to five children and no one have more than five children .

When the data was analysed on the basis of education, it is evident from the table 3.24 that 25% of illiterate respondents, 20% of respondents below high school, 56.8% of higher secondary respondents and 74.6% of graduate and above have one or two children, whereas 75% of respondents who were illiterate, 80% of respondents below high school, 43.1% of respondents higher secondary educated, 25.3% of respondents who were graduate and above have three to five children. The data reveals that illiterates have higher number of children and literates have lesser number of children.

When the data was analysed on the basis of religiosity, it is indicated from the table 3.24 that 69% of strictly religious respondents, 59.4% of respondents who were religiously moderate, 50% of respondents who were religiously indifferent have one or two children whereas 30.9% of strictly religious, 40.5% of religiously moderate

154 and 50% of religiously indifferent have three to five children. The data reveals that religious respondents have lesser number of children and those who were religiously moderate and indifferent have higher number of children.

When the data was analysed on the basis of residence, it is indicated from the table 3.24 that 62.4% of urban born respondents have one or two children and 37.6% of them have three to five children and no one have more than five children. It is also found that there were only urban born respondents in the third generation.

When the data was analysed on the basis of income, it is evident from the table 3.24 that 33.3% of respondents whose monthly income was below Rs.10,000, 52.4% of respondents whose monthly income lies between Rs.10,000-50,000, 75.8% of respondents with monthly income above Rs.50,000 have one or two children whereas 66.6% of respondents with monthly income below Rs.10,000, 47.5% of respondents having monthly income between Rs.10,000-50,000, 24.1% of respondents with monthly income above Rs.50,000 have three to five children. The data reveals that higher income group of respondents have lesser number of children and lower income group of respondents have higher number of children.

Findings:

After analysing the data of the three generation, it is found that the respondents having less number of children has increased from first generation to third generation. As far as the impact of education is concerned, educated respondents have lesser number of children whereas uneducated respondents have higher number of children. On the basis of religiosity , it is found that strictly religious respondents have lesser number of children whereas religiously moderate and indifferent have more number of children in the third generation whereas in the first generation, religiously moderate have lesser number of children. In case of residential background, rural born respondents have higher number of children as compared to urban born respondents in the first generation and in the third generation majority of urban born respondents have one or two children.

155 Respondent’s view on ideal number of children:

The table 1.25 presents that only 1% of respondents stated that their ideal number of children would be one or two, 36% of respondents viewed three to five as the ideal number of children and 63% of respondents viewed more than five as the ideal number of children.

When the data was analysed on the basis of educational level, it is evident from the table 1.25 that 11.1% of respondents higher secondary educated stated ideal number of children would be one or two whereas 38.4% of illiterate respondents, 33.3% of respondents below high school, 33.3% higher secondary viewed ideal number of children as three to five while 61.5% of illiterate, 66.6% below high school and 55.5% higher secondary stated that ideal number of children would be more than five children. The data reveals that educated respondent‟s ideal number of children would be one or two and those who were not educated viewed ideal number of children more than five.

The data was analysed on the basis of religiosity and it is clear from the table 1.25 that 35% of respondents who were strictly religious, 50% of respondents who were religiously moderate, 30% of respondents who were religiously indifferent stated that their ideal number of children would be three to five whereas 65% of strictly religious respondents, 50% religiously moderate, 60% religiously indifferent stated that their ideal number of children would be more than five children. Only 10% of respondents religiously indifferent viewed ideal number of children as one or two. The data reveals that strictly religious respondents viewed more than five children as the ideal number of children.

Further, the data was analysed on the basis of residential background, it is indicated from the table 1.25 that 2.3% of urban born viewed ideal number of children as one or two whereas 27.9% of them viewed three to five children as the ideal number of children whereas 42% rural born viewed three to five as the ideal number of children while 69.7% of respondents urban born viewed more than five as the ideal number of children and 57.8% of respondents who were rural born viewed more than five as the ideal number of children. The data reveals that urban as well as rural born respondents viewed ideal number of children as more than five.

156 When the data was analysed on the basis of income level, it is evident from the table 1.25 that 2.1% of respondents whose monthly income was between Rs.10,000-50,000 viewed one or two children as the ideal number of children whereas 41.6% having monthly income below Rs.10,000, 32.6% of respondents with monthly income between Rs.10,000-50,000 and 16.6% of respondents with monthly income above Rs.50,000 viewed three to five children as the ideal number of children. 58.3% of respondents belonging to monthly income below Rs.10,000, 65.2% of respondents having monthly income between Rs.10,000-50,000 , 83.3% of respondents with monthly income above Rs.50,000 said more than five is the ideal number of children. The data indicates that higher income group of respondents viewed more children as the ideal number.

In the second generation, it is evident from the table 2.25 that 18.4% of respondents said one or two as the ideal number of children, 67.2% of respondents said three to five as the ideal number of children, 14.4% of respondents said more than five is the ideal number of children.

When the data was analysed on the basis of educational level, it is evident from the table 2.25 that 8.3% of illiterate respondents, 20.3% of respondents below high school, 20% higher secondary, 50% graduate and above viewed ideal number of children as one or two whereas 70.8% of illiterate respondents, 66% of respondents below high school, 67.5% higher secondary, 50% of respondents who were graduate and above said three to five children is the ideal number of children whereas 20.8% of illiterate respondents, 13.5% of respondents below high school, 12.5% of respondents who were higher secondary viewed more than five as the ideal number of children. The data reveals that higher the education, lower the number of children.

The data when analysed on the basis of religiosity, it is clear from the table 2.25 that 5.7% of respondents who were strictly religious, 48.5% of respondents who were religiously moderate, 33.3% of respondents who were religiously indifferent viewed ideal number of children as one or two whereas 82.7% of respondents who were strictly religious, 28.5% of respondents who were religiously moderate and 66.6% of respondents who were religiously indifferent viewed three to five as the ideal number of children while 11.4% of respondents who were strictly religious, 22.8% of

157 respondents who were religiously moderate viewed more than five as the ideal number of children. The data reveals that religiously moderate respondents stated less number of children would be ideal as compared to strictly religious respondents. Strictly religious respondents viewed more children as the ideal number of children.

When the data was analysed on the basis of residential background, it is evident from the table 2.25 that 20.9% of urban born respondents and 5% of rural born respondents viewed ideal number of children as one or two whereas 65.7% of urban born respondents and 75% of respondents who were rural born said three to five as the ideal number of children. 13.3% of respondents who were urban born and 20% of respondents who were rural born viewed more than five as the ideal number of children. The data reveals that urban born respondents stated less number of children would be the ideal number of children.

When the data was analysed on income basis, it is indicated from the table 2.25 that 5.5% having monthly income below Rs.10,000, 12.9% of respondents with monthly income level between Rs.10,000-50,000, 50% of respondents with monthly income above Rs.50,000 viewed one or two as the ideal number of children. 50% of respondents whose monthly income was below Rs.10,000, 75.2% of respondents with monthly income level between Rs. 10,000-50,000 and 50% of respondents whose monthly income was above Rs.50,000 viewed three to five children as the ideal number. 44.4% of respondents whose monthly income was below Rs.10,000, 11.7% of respondents whose monthly income lies between Rs.10,000-50,000 viewed more than five children as the ideal number of children. The data reveals that higher income group of respondents viewed one or two as the ideal number of children whereas lower income group of respondents viewed more children as the ideal number of children.

In the third generation, it is evident from the table 3.25 that 76% of respondents viewed one or two children as the ideal number, 24% viewed three to five children, and no one viewed more than five children as the ideal number of children.

When the data was analysed on the basis of education, it is evident from the table 3.25 that 75% of illiterate respondents, 80% of respondents below high school, 70.4% higher secondary educated, 79.1% graduate and above viewed one or two children as

158 the ideal number of children whereas 25% of respondents who were illiterate, 20% of respondents below high school, 29.5% of respondents higher secondary educated, 20.8% of respondents who were graduate and above viewed three to five children as the ideal number of children. The data reveals that respondents who were highly educated respondents viewed one or two children as the ideal number.

When the data was analysed on the basis of religiosity, it is evident from the table 3.25 that 76.1% of strictly religious respondents, 75.9% religiously moderate, 75% religiously indifferent viewed one or two as the ideal number of children whereas 23.8% of respondents who were strictly religious, 24% religiously moderate, 25% religiously indifferent viewed three to five children as the ideal number of children. The data reveals that religion does not play significant role. Majority of the respondents viewed one or two children as the ideal number of children, no matter whether they are religious or not.

When the data was analysed on the basis of residential background, it is evident from the table 3.25 that 76% of urban born respondents viewed one or two children as the ideal number and 24% of respondents viewed three to five children as the ideal number of children. There were no one found rural born respondents in the third generation. The data reveals that majority of respondents viewed lesser number of children as the ideal number of children.

When the data was analysed on the basis of income level, it is evident from the table 3.25 that 83.3% of respondents whose monthly income was below Rs.10,000, 73.7% of respondents whose monthly income was between Rs.10,000-50,000 and 77.5% of respondents whose monthly income was above Rs.50,000 viewed ideal number of children as one or two whereas 16.6% of respondents whose monthly income was below Rs.10,000, 26.2% of respondents whose monthly income was between Rs.10,000-50,000, 22.4% of respondents whose monthly income was above Rs.50,000 viewed three to five children as the ideal number of children. The data reveals that lower income group of respondents viewed lesser number of children as ideal number and higher income group of respondents viewed higher number of children as the ideal number.

159 Findings:

After analysing the data of the three generations, it is found that respondents who viewed lesser number of children as ideal has increased in the third generation. In the first generation, respondents viewed more children as the ideal number of children. As far as the impact of education is concerned, highly educated respondents viewed one or two children as the ideal number of children. In case of religiosity, in the first generation strictly religious respondents viewed more children as the ideal number whereas in the third generation, they preferred lesser number of children. When it comes to residential background, it is found that in the first generation more children was considered ideal by the urban as well as rural respondents but in the third generation, majority of the urban born respondents viewed lesser number of children. As far as the impact of income level is concerned, in the first generation, higher income group of respondents considered more number of children as the ideal number of children whereas in the third generation, higher income group viewed lesser number of children as compared to lower income group.

160

CChhaapptteerr 55 CCoonncclluussiioonn aanndd SSuuggggeessttiioonnss

The present study is the result of the researcher‟s academic curiosity to understand the patterns of marriage among the three generations of Muslims in Aligarh. A Review of literature and field work was undertaken with a view to analyze the changing patterns of marriage among the three generations of Muslims in Aligarh. The study offers some relevant information about the respondents on their education, residence, religious observance, and monthly income. A gradual and steady change in their attitudes towards marriage and family matter is observed.

The study revealed that in the first generation majority of the respondents were married below 18 years whereas in the second and third generation the marriage age has risen above 25 years. Education and age at marriage are closely associated with each other. The attitude of Muslims towards the early marriage has changed and a greater proportion of them were in favour of late marriage. The nature of the responses suggests that early marriage were prevalent in the first generation whereas third generation prefers marrying late. As far as the impact of residential status is concerned, the study indicates that early marriages were more prevalent among rural born respondents whereas urban born respondents married late. Similarly, it is observed in the present study that income level of the respondents affects age at marriage. There are three categories lower income group (below Rs.10,000), middle income group (Rs.10,000-50,000) and high income group (above Rs.50,000), early marriages were found more common among lower income group whereas majority of high income group married late. Thus, we can say that socioeconomic background determines attitudinal changes among Muslims and the hypothesis proves to be correct.

Chekki (1968), Gupta (1972), Menon (1981) and Siddiqui (1987) observed change in respect of marriage age. It is found that early marriage is on the decline. Siddiqui (1987) observed that changes were found more pronounced among educated and urban women. Gupta (1972) also observed that age at marriage was high for

161 agriculturalists and artisans. Roy (1979) observed that education played very significant role in raising the status of Muslim women.

Thus, it can be concluded that the attitude of the Muslims towards early marriage has changed and a greater proportion of them were in favour of late marriage. So, the hypothesis that age at marriage is rising has proved to be correct.

Inspite of the fact that dowry has been made an offence under dowry prohibition Act, there is hardly any awareness in the public of this provision. A large majority of people continue to give and take dowry as an accepted social practice without being conscious of the evident violation of law by them.(Singhal,1993)

The present study also revealed that the first generation favoured dowry more in comparison to the third generation. The data indicates that in the third generation 68% of females and 50% of male respondents did not favour dowry. There was a gradual increase in the percentage of respondents whose families had not taken any dowry as education increases among them in the second generation also. On the basis of residential status, it is found that dowry was more favoured among rural born respondents as compared to urban born respondents in the first generation. Whereas in the third generation, there is only urban born respondents in the sample and majority of these respondents however, opposed dowry but in reality, they give and expect dowry when they got marry. In respect of religious observance, respondents were split into three categories strictly religious, moderate and indifferent. The study also shows that in the third generation, respondents who were strictly religious opposed dowry and those who were moderate and indifferent favoured dowry more. Strictly religious male respondents opposed dowry because dowry is prohibited in Islam and they follow Islam strictly. But among females, those who were not religious don‟t favour dowry. As far as Income is concerned, it is observed that in spite of low level of income 33.3% of female and 53% of male respondents favoured dowry in the third generation. The present study indicates that dowry is becoming an important aspect of Muslim marriages.

The study also revealed that in the first generation, majority of females (59%) and males (58.7%) had given and taken dowry respectively whereas in the second and third generation the percentage of such females had increased to 76.8% and 82.4%

162 respectively who have given dowry. The data shows that dowry is an important aspect of Muslim marriage. Rao and Rao (1982) concluded in their study that though majority of students expressed negative attitude towards the present dowry system but in reality, one third of the male respondents and their parents expected a dowry when they got marry. Similarly in the present study, majority of females and males expressed negative attitude towards the dowry but they practice dowry in reality. The study concludes that as education increased, the practice of dowry was also increasing. Among the educated respondents the practice of giving and taking dowry was more as compared to uneducated respondents. It is also concluded from the present study that dowry was given and taken among the urban born residence more in comparison to rural born residence. As far as religious observance is concerned, it is found that the respondents who were religiously moderate and indifferent practiced dowry more as compared to strictly religious. As far as Income level is concerned, the practice of dowry was prevalent even among the lower income groups also.

Batra and Dak (1993) observed the effects of urbanization that practice of dowry was more among urban respondents. It was found that if dowry was not given the girl‟s status in the family would be effected, while only 44% of rural women felt so. Dorrane (1976) also observed that dowry system was prevalent in Muslim community in Nimkhera village of Bhopal region of Madhya Pradesh. It was found that all Muslim brides were expected to bring dowries to their home. Detailed list of dowry items was given to the bride family. Thus, the hypothesis that dowry has increased has also proved correct.

The present study concludes that in the first generation 26% of female respondents faced domestic violence whereas in the second generation, it is 22.4% of female respondents and in the third generation the percentage of such respondents decreased to 14.4%. So, it can be concluded that domestic violence was more prevalent in the first generation as compared to the third generation. It is found that violence occurred mostly among illiterates or less educated families. The study also indicates that strictly religious respondents faced less domestic violence as compared to religiously moderate and indifferent. As far as the impact of income level is concerned, it is found that violence is more common among low income groups. The impact of residential status on domestic violence is that it is more found among rural born

163 respondents. It means that however, they have shifted to urban areas but their thinking has not changed.

In the first generation, the percentage of male respondents demanding dowry is 35%, whereas in the second generation , it is 29% and in the third generation it is 31%. The study indicates that it is still prevalent in the society. It can be concluded that as education increases among the respondents dowry demand is decreasing. Dowry is more demanded by the illiterate people. The present study also indicates that religiously moderate respondents demanded dowry more in comparison to religious respondents. Also, majority of urban born respondents did not demand dowry in the third generation but in the first generation urban born demanded more as compared to rural born and in the second generation rural born respondents demanded dowry more as compared to urban born. As far as the impact of Income level is concerned, it is found from the present study that dowry is demanded more among lower income group of respondents as compared to higher income group.

Mehr is considered as the fundamental right of a Muslim woman at the time of marriage. Mehr is a form of marriage transaction which is a characteristic of Muslim marriage. The present study indicates that in the first generation only 30% of females had received mehr and rest of them stated that they compromised on it whereas in the second generation the percentage of females who received mehr has increased to 45.6% and in the third generation it rises to 57.6% .The present study indicates that as the education rises among the respondents, the percentage of respondents who received and paid mehr has also increased. As far as the impact of religiosity is concerned, majority of the respondents who were strictly religious have received and paid mehr to their wives. It is found that majority of urban born respondents have paid mehr. It is also found that high income group of respondents paid mehr to their wives more in comparison to low income group. It can be concluded that in the first generation, mostly the amount of mehr was not given to the wives. Mostly the wives were easily tricked by their husband because they were innocent and not aware of their rights. But now women are aware of their rights and they don‟t compromise on it.

164 It is found that majority of the female respondents were not in favour of polygyny. The present study indicates that in the first generation 52% of female respondents were not in favour of polygyny whereas in the second generation 54.4% were not in favour of it and in the third 73.6% of respondents were not in favour of polygyny. It can be said that polygyny was not favoured by most of the female respondents with the passage of time. It can be concluded that with the rise of education among the respondents, they start opposing it. It is also found that strictly religious males and females were more in favour of polygyny in the first generation whereas religiously moderate and religiously indifferent males favoured more than strictly religious in the second and third generation. The study also indicates that rural born males favoured more polygyny in comparison to urban born respondents in the first and second generation.

The present study indicates that very few respondents experienced polygyny. It is found in the third generation that only 15.2% of female respondents stated that their husbands had married twice. This practice of polygyny was more prevalent in the first and second generation. It is found more among urban born and strictly religious respondents. It is found from the present study that in the first generation majority of the female respondents 57% never allowed their husband to marry. Only 29% of the respondents stated that if there is no issue, or to prevent divorce. In the second generation, only 1.6% stated that to prevent divorce they allow husband to marry again. 27.2% of respondents stated that they will allow only if there is no issue but in the third generation, this desire of having issue also decreased and only 8.8% of the respondents stated this reason and majority 87.2% of respondents never allowed their husband to marry.

The present study concludes that the percentage of respondents who stated that there is possibility of giving equal treatment to more than one wife has increased from first generation to third generation. But majority of the respondents cannot give equal treatment to two wives.

It can be concluded from the present study that divorce is more common in the third generation. In the first generation, it was not much favoured by the respondents. It is found that divorce was more favoured by educated female respondents. Higher

165 educational level of the respondents is responsible for the rise in divorce rate. As far as religious observance is concerned, respondents who were not religious favoured it. It is also found that it is favoured by females who belong to high income groups and males belonging to low income groups. Hasnain (1976) studied marriage customs among Muslims in India found that the rate of divorce was higher among the younger people than among the aged. Merchant (1993) also observed that Muslim women were asking for divorce in second marriage.

The present study indicates that in the first generation divorce rate is very low but it has risen in the second and third generation. It is found that divorce rates are high among the educated female and uneducated males respondents, religiously indifferent respondents, rural born respondents and lower income group of male and higher income group of female. Abdul Waheed (2003) observed that divorce was widely practised among lower social strata.

The present study indicates that the major cause of divorce in the third generation was husband‟s extra marital relations. In the first generation, the major cause was male child issue.

The present study also concludes that family planning methods were more adopted by Muslims in the third generation. Respondents have become aware of the advantages of small family norms. In the first generation, only a small percentage of women were using methods of family planning. Religion appear to be one of the factor for non use of family planning methods. But in the third generation, religiosity does not restrict respondents to use it. The popular perception that religious conservatism among Muslims is a major factor for not accessing developmental facilities was found incorrect. The acceptance of family planning among educated, higher income group and urban born respondents is high whereas its acceptance is low among illiterates, lower income groups and rural born respondents in the first and second generation. In the third generation, there is a change, illiterate respondents and lower income group of respondents have also begun to favour family planning methods. Majority of female respondents believe in having a small family norm in the third generation. The urban born educated females and higher income group of females were more willing to have lesser number of children. Muslim women‟s attitude towards small family

166 norm is a positive indicator of change among Muslims. A suitable education programme and other welfare facilities particularly better health services could go a long way in greater acceptance of family planning among Muslim women.

The present study also indicates that majority of the Muslim respondents favoured arrange marriage. Very few Muslim favoured love marriage. In the third generation, however love marriages were few but love marriages were increasing as compared with the first generation but the majority of the Muslims favoured arrange marriage. Love marriages were more common among educated Muslims. Education is an important factor in bringing about change in the attitude of people.

The study suggests that the percentage of male respondents who helped their wives in household work is high in the third generation as compared to the first generation. A change has occurred in the attitudes of men towards their wives. They have a feeling of partnership in all matters.

The present study indicates that the women have started to work outside. In the first generation, the husband did not allow them to work outside but now they allowed them to work outside. In the first generation, only 2.5% of respondents allowed their wives to work outside that rises to 23% in the second generation and reaches to 53% in the third generation. It is found that not only educated males allowed their wives to work, but uneducated males also allowed their wives to work outside in the third generation. It is also found that women can go for shopping alone as their husband allowed them to go and women can also take decisions on financial matters and any family matters. Ashrafi (1992) concludes in his study that it is a mistake to assume that Muslim society is conservative in nature and argues that changes are taking place in the life style, role, status and position of Muslim women in their families.

Thus, a gradual and steady change in their attitude is observed. The Pattern of marriage has undergone changes in the three generation has also proved true. We can conclude that in some aspect there is a change while in some aspects of marriage there is no change. Rural /urban locale as an important factor in bringing about change among Muslims has also proved true from the present study as marriage age is high among urban born, dowry demand is less and domestic violence is less found among them, willingness of small family is also more among them and Siddiqui study (1987)

167 also observed greater participation of urban woman in decision making whereas rural women were comparatively less active.

Suggestions:

1. Similar studies can be undertaken on a larger sample in different parts of the country for more valid results and broader generalization.

2. Similar studies should be conducted on other religious groups also.

3. There is a great need for creating awareness regarding legal aspects of marriage among people in India and particularly among Muslim women.

4. Education for women is very essential. Special attention should be given to legal education in order to teach them about their legal rights.

5. The media can play a very important role in educating the masses, creating awareness among them so that they can change and become rational in their attitude and are expected to cross cultural values and norms.

Limitations of the study:

1. The study is limited only to Aligarh city U.P

2. The present study concerns only Muslim population of Aligarh city. Hence the findings are limited to Muslims only.

3. The sample is limited because the present study is undertaken by a single researcher and it had to be done within specified time.

4. The study does not cover all the aspects of marriage. Aspects like intercaste marriages, and widow remarriage, divorce remarriage, inheritance of property, maintenance have not taken in the study.

168

TTaabblleess aanndd

FFiigguurreess IN TABLES AND GRAPHS 1.1TO 1.25 DATA ON THE RESPONDENTS BELONGING TO THE FIRST GENERATION IS PRESENTED

Table 1.1: AGE AT MARRIAGE OF THE RESPONDENTS

Educational Below 18 yrs Between 18-25 Above 25 yrs. Total level yrs

Female Male Female Male Female Male Female Male Illiterate 50(96.1) 27(87) 2(3.8) 4(12.9) 00 00 52 31 Below high 32(82) 20(74) 7(17.9) 7(25.9) 00 00 39 27 school Higher 6(66.6) 3(21.4) 3(33.3) 11(78.5) 00 00 9 14 secondary Graduate and 00 00 00 8(100) 00 00 00 8 above 88(88) 50(62.5) 12(12) 30(37.5) 00 00 100 80 Religious observance Strictly 73(87.9) 35(77.7) 10(12.5) 10(22.2) 00 00 80 45 religious Moderate 8(80) 10(50) 2(20) 10(50) 00 00 10 20 Indifferent 7(70) 5(33.3) 3(30) 10(66.6) 00 00 10 15 88(88) 50(62.5) 12(12) 30(37.5) 00 00 100 80 Residence Urban 35(81.3) 26(54) 8(18.6) 22(45.8) 00 00 43 48 Rural 53(92.9) 24(75) 4(7) 8(25) 00 00 57 32 88(88) 50(62.5) 12(12) 30(37.5) 00 00 100 80 Monthly Income level Less than 46(95.8) 39(88.6) 2(4.1) 5(11.3) 00 00 48 44 10,000 10000-50000 38(82.6) 10(34.4) 8(17.3) 19(65.5) 00 00 46 29

Above 50000 4(66.6) 1(14.2) 2(33.3) 6(85.7) 00 00 6 7

88(88) 50(62.5) 12(12) 30(37.5) 00 00 100 80 NOTE: Values in brackets are in percentage

SOURCE: Based on primary field work

169

120

100 96.1 82 80 66.6 60 Below 18 yrs Between 18-25 yrs 40 33.3 Above 25 yrs. 17.9 20 3.8 0 0 0 Illiterate Below high Higher Graduate and school secondary above

Fig 1.1a) Graph showing educational level and age at marriage of the respondent (female)

120 100 100 87 78.5 80 74

60 Below 18 yrs Between 18-25 yrs 40 25.9 Above 25 yrs. 21.4 20 12.9 0 0 Illiterate Below high Higher Graduate and school secondary above

Fig 1.1b ) Graph showing educational level and age at marriage of the respondent (male)

170

100 87.9 90 80 80 70 70 60 Below 18 yrs 50 Between 18-25 yrs 40 30 Above 25 yrs. 30 20 20 12.5 10 0 Strictly religious Moderate Indifferent

Fig 1.1c) Graph showing religiosity and age at marriage of the respondent

(Female)

90 77.7 80 70 66.6 60 50 50 50 Below 18 yrs 40 33.3 Between 18-25 yrs 30 Above 25 yrs. 22.2 20 10 0 Strictly religious Moderate Indifferent

Fig 1.1d) Graph showing religiosity and age at marriage of the respondent (male)

171

100 92.9 90 81.3 80 70 60 Below 18 yrs 50 Between 18-25 yrs 40 Above 25 yrs. 30 18.6 20 10 7 0 Urban Rural

Fig 1.1e) Graph showing residential background and age at marriage of the respondent (female)

80 75

60 54 50 45.8 Below 18 yrs 40 Between 18-25 yrs 30 25 Above 25 yrs. 20

0 Urban Rural

Fig 1.1 f ) Graph showing residential background and age at marriage of the respondent (male)

172

120

100 95.8 82.6 80 66.6 Below 18 yrs 60 Between 18-25 yrs 40 33.3 Above 25 yrs.

17.3 20 4.1 0 Less than 10,000 10000-50000 Above 50000

Fig 1.1g) Graph showing monthly income and age at marriage of the respondent (female)

100 88.6 90 85.7 80 70 65.5 60 Below 18 yrs 50 Between 18-25 yrs 40 34.4 Above 25 yrs. 30 20 14.2 11.3 10 0 Less than 10,000 10000-50000 Above 50000

Fig 1.1h) Graph showing monthly income and age at marriage of the respondent (male)

173 TABLE 1.2 PREFERRED AGE OF MARRIAGE OF THE RESPONDENTS

Educationa Below 18 yrs Between 18-25 yrs Above 25 yrs. Total l level Female Male Female male Female Male Female Male Illiterate 7(13.4) 27(87.09) 43(82.6) 4(38) 2(3.8) 00 52 31

Below high 5(12.8) 14(51.8) 34(87.1) 13(48.1) 00 00 39 27 school

Higher 1(11.1) 3(21.4) 7(77.7) 11(78.5) 1(11.1) 00 9 14 secondary

Graduate 00 00 00 8(100) 00 00 00 8 and above

13(13) 44(55) 84(84) 36(45) 3(3) 00 100 80

Religious observance

Strictly 10(12.5) 19(42.2) 70(87.5) 26(57.7) 00 00 80 45 religious

Moderate 00 15(75) 7(70) 5(25) 3(30) 00 10 20

Indifferent 3(30) 10(66.6) 7(70) 5(33.3) 00 00 10 15

13(13) 44(55) 84(84) 36(45) 3(3) 00 100 80

Residence

Urban 4(9.3) 21(43.7) 36(83.7) 27(56.2) 3(6.9) 00 43 48

Rural 9(15.7) 23(71.8) 48(84.2) 9(28.1) 00 00 57 32

13(13) 44(55) 84(84) 36(45) 3(3) 00 100 80

Monthly Income level

Less than 5(10.4) 34(77.2) 43(89.5) 10(22.7) 00 00 48 44 10000

10,000- 8(17.3) 9(31) 35(76) 20(68.9) 3(6.5) 00 46 29 50,000

Above 00 1(14.2) 6(100) 6(85.7) 00 00 6 7 50,000

13(13) 44(55) 84(84) 36(45) 3(3) 00 100 80

NOTE: Values in brackets are in percentage SOURCE: Based on primary field work

174

100 87.1 90 82.6 77.7 80 70 60 50 Below 18 yrs 40 Between 18-25 yrs 30 Above 25 yrs.

20 13.4 12.8 11.1 11.1 10 3.8 0 0 0 0 0 Illiterate Below high Higher Graduate and school secondary above

Fig 1.2a) Graph showing educational level and preferred age of marriage (female)

120 100 100 87.09 78.5 80

51.8 60 Below 18 yrs 48.1 38 Between 18-25 yrs 40 Above 25 yrs. 21.4 20 0 0 Illiterate Below high Higher Graduate and school secondary above

Fig 1.2b) Graph showing educational level and preferred age of marriage (male)

175

100 87.5 90 80 70 70 70 60 Below 18 yrs 50 Between 18-25 yrs 40 30 30 Above 25 yrs. 30

20 12.5 10 0 0 0 0 Strictly religious Moderate Indifferent

Fig 1.2 c) Graph showing religiosity and preferred age of marriage (female)

80 75

70 66.6

60 57.7

50 42.2 Below 18 yrs 40 33.3 Between 18-25 yrs 30 25 Above 25 yrs. 20

0 Strictly religious Moderate Indifferent

Fig 1.2d) Graph showing religiosity and preferred age of marriage (male)

176

90 83.7 84.2 80 70 60

50 Below 18 yrs 40 Between 18-25 yrs 30 Above 25 yrs. 20 15.7 9.3 10 6.9 0 0 Urban Rural

Fig1.2e) Graph showing residential background and preferred age of marriage (female)

80 71.8 70

60 56.2

50 43.7 Below 18 yrs 40 Between 18-25 yrs 28.1 30 Above 25 yrs. 20

0 Urban Rural

Fig1.2f) Graph showing residential background and preferred age of marriage (male)

177

120 100 100 89.5

80 76

Below 18 yrs 60 Between 18-25 yrs 40 Above 25 yrs.

17.3 20 10.4 6.5 0 0 0 0 Less than 10000 10,000-50,000 Above 50,000

Fig1.2g) Graph showing monthly income and preferred age of marriage (female)

90 85.7 80 77.2 68.9 70 60

50 Below 18 yrs 40 Between 18-25 yrs 31 Above 25 yrs. 30 22.7 20 14.2 10 0 Less than 10000 10,000-50,000 Above 50,000

Fig1.2h) Graph showing monthly income and preferred age of marriage (male)

178 Table 1.3 RESPONDENTS WHO FAVOURED DOWRY

Educational level Yes No Total

Female Male Female Male Female Male Illiterate 36(69.2) 20(64.5) 16(30.7) 11(35.4) 52 31 Below high 16(41) 18(66.6) 23(58.9) 9(33.3) 39 27 school Higher secondary 4(44.4) 8(57.1) 5(55.5) 6(42.8) 9 14 Graduate and 00 3(37.5) 00 5(62.5) 00 8 above 56(56) 49(61.2) 44(44) 31(38.7) 100 80 Religious observance Strictly religious 45(56.2) 24(53.3) 35(43.7) 21(46.6) 80 45 Moderate 6(60) 12(60) 4(40) 8(40) 10 20 Indifferent 5(50) 13(86.6) 5(50) 2(13.3) 10 15 56(56) 49(61.2) 44(44) 31(38.7) 100 80 Residence Urban 20(46.5) 32(66.6) 23(53.4) 16(33.3) 43 48 Rural 36(63) 17(53.1) 21(36.8) 15(46.8) 57 32 56(56) 49(61.2) 44(44) 31(38.7) 100 80 Monthly Income level Less than 10,000 30(62.5) 25(56.8) 18(37.5) 19(43.1) 48 44 10,000-50,000 22(47.8) 21(72.4) 24(52.1) 8(27.5) 46 29 Above 50,000 4(66.6) 3(42.8) 2(33.3) 4(57.1) 6 7 56(56) 49(61.2) 44(44) 31(38.7) 100 80 NOTE: Values in brackets are in percentage

SOURCE: Based on primary field work

179

80 69.2 70 58.9 60 55.5

50 44.4 41 40 30.7 Yes 30 No 20

10 0 0 0 Illiterate Below high Higher Graduate and school secondary above

Fig1.3a) Graph showing educational level and respondents who favoured dowry (female)

70 66.6 64.5 62.5 60 57.1

50 42.8 40 37.5 35.4 33.3 30 Yes No 20

0 Illiterate Below high Higher Graduate and school secondary above

Fig1.3b) Graph showing educational level and respondents who favoured dowry (male)

180

70 60 60 56.2 50 50 50 43.7 40 40 Yes 30 No 20

0 Strictly religious Moderate Indifferent

Fig 1.3c) Graph showing religiosity and respondents who favoured dowry (female)

100 90 86.6 80 70 60 60 53.3 46.6 50 Yes 40 40 No 30 20 13.3 10 0 Strictly religious Moderate Indifferent

Fig 1.3d) Graph showing religiosity and respondents who favoured dowry (male)

181

70 63 60 53.4 50 46.5

40 36.8 Yes 30 No 20

0 Urban Rural

Fig 1.3e) Graph showing residential background and respondents who favoured dowry (female)

70 66.6

60 53.1 50 46.8

40 33.3 Yes 30 No 20

0 Urban Rural

Fig 1.3f) Graph showing residential background and respondents who favoured dowry (male)

182

70 66.6 62.5 60 52.1 50 47.8

40 37.5 33.3 Yes 30 No 20

0 Less than 10,000 10,000-50,000 Above 50,000

Fig1.3g) Graph showing monthly income and respondents who favoured dowry (female)

80 72.4 70

60 56.8 57.1

50 43.1 42.8 40 Yes 30 27.5 No

0 Less than 10,000 10,000-50,000 Above 50,000

Fig 1.3h) Graph showing monthly income and respondents who favoured dowry (male)

183 TABLE 1.4 RESPONDENTS WHO HAVE GIVEN AND TAKEN DOWRY

Educational level Yes No Total

Female Male Female Male Female Male Illiterate 30(57.6) 20(64.5) 22(42.3) 11(35.4) 52 31

Below high 23(58.9) 16(59.2) 16(41) 11(40.7) 39 27 school

Higher secondary 6(66.6) 8(57.1) 3(33.3) 6(42.8) 9 14

Graduate and 00 3(37.5) 00 5(62.5) 00 8 above

59(59) 47(58.7) 41(41) 33(41.2) 100 80

Religious observance

Strictly religious 47(58.7) 30(66.6) 33(41.2) 15(33.3) 80 45

Moderate 6(60) 6(30) 4(40) 14(70) 10 20

Indifferent 6(60) 11(73.3) 4(40) 4(26.6) 10 15

59(59) 47(58.7) 41(41) 33(41.2) 100 80

Residence

Urban 31(72) 30(62.5) 12(27.9) 18(37.5) 43 48

Rural 28(49.1) 17(53.1) 29(50.8) 15(46.8) 57 32

59(59) 47(58.7) 41(41) 33(41.2) 100 80

Monthly Income level

Less than 10,000 23(47.9) 25(56.8) 25(52) 19(43.1) 48 44

10,000-50,000 32(69.5) 19(65.5) 14(30.4) 10(34.4) 46 29

Above 50,000 4(66.6) 3(42.8) 2(33.3) 4(57.1) 6 7

59(59) 47(58.7) 41(41) 33(41.2) 100 80

NOTE: Values in brackets are in percentage

SOURCE: Based on primary field work

184

70 66.6 58.9 60 57.6

50 42.3 41 40 33.3 30 Yes No 20

10 0 0 0 Illiterate Below high Higher secondary Graduate and school above

Fig 1.4a) Graph showing educational level and respondents who have given dowry (female)

70 64.5 62.5 59.2 60 57.1

50 40.7 42.8 40 35.4 37.5

30 Yes No 20

0 Illiterate Below high Higher secondary Graduate and school above

Fig 1.4b) Graph showing educational level and respondents who have taken dowry (male)

185

70 58.7 60 60 60

50 41.2 40 40 40 Yes 30 No 20

0 Strictly religious Moderate Indifferent

Fig 1.4c) Graph showing religiosity and respondents who have given dowry (female)

80 73.3 70 70 66.6

40 33.3 Yes 30 30 26.6 No

0 Strictly religious Moderate Indifferent

Fig 1.4d) Graph showing religiosity and respondents who have taken dowry (male)

186

80 72 70

60 49.1 50.8 50

40 Yes 27.9 30 No

0 Urban Rural

Fig 1.4e) Graph showing residential background and respondents who have given dowry (female)

70 62.5 60 53.1 50 46.8

40 37.5 Yes 30 No 20

0 Urban Rural

Fig 1.4f) Graph showing residential background and respondents who have taken dowry (male)

187

80 69.5 70 66.6

60 52 47.9 50

40 33.3 Yes 30.4 30 No

0 Less than 10,000 10,000-50,000 Above 50,000

Fig 1.4g) Graph showing monthly income and respondents who have given dowry (female)

70 65.5

60 56.8 57.1

50 43.1 42.8

40 34.4 Yes 30 No 20

0 Less than 10,000 10,000-50,000 Above 50,000

Fig 1.4h) Graph showing monthly income and respondents who have taken dowry (male)

188 TABLE 1.5 FEMALE RESPONDENTS WHO CONSIDERED SOCIAL STATUS AS THE MAIN REASON OF DOWRY

Educational Agree Disagree Agree to some Total level extent Illiterate 15(28.8) 28(53.8) 9(17.3) 52 Below high 12(30.7) 16(41) 11(28.2) 39 school Higher 2(22.2) 5(55.5) 2(22.2) 9 secondary Graduate and 00 00 00 0 above 29(29) 49(49) 22(22) 100 Religious observance Strictly 25(31.2) 40(50) 15(18.7)) 80 religious Moderate 2(20) 5(50) 3(30) 10 Indifferent 2(20) 4(40) 4(40) 10 29(29) 49(49) 22(22) 100 Residence Urban 15(34) 20(46.5) 8(18.6) 43 Rural 14(24.5) 29(50.8) 14(24.5) 57 29(29) 49(49) 22(22) 100 Monthly Income level Less than 9(18.7) 28(58.3) 11(22.9) 48 10,000 10,000-50,000 18(39.1) 18(39.1) 10(21.7) 46 Above 50,000 2(33.3) 3(50) 1(16.6) 6 29(29) 49(49) 22(22) 100 NOTE: Values in brackets are in percentage

SOURCE: Based on primary field work

189

55.5 53.8

50 41

30.7 28.8

30 28.2 Agree 22.2 22.2 Disagree

20 17.3 Agree to some extent

0 0 0 0 Illiterate Below high Higher Graduate school secondary and above

Fig1.5a) Graph showing educational level and social status as the main reason of dowry

60 50 50 50 40 40 40 31.2 30 Agree 30 Disagree 18.7 20 20 20 Agree to some extent

0 Strictly religious Moderate Indifferent

Fig1.5b) Graph showing religiosity and social status as the main reason of dowry

190

60 50.8 50 46.5

40 34 Agree 30 24.5 24.5 Disagree 18.6 20 Agree to some extent

0 Urban Rural

Fig1.5c) Graph showing residential background and social status as the main reason of dowry

60 58.3 50

50 39.1 40 39.1

33.3 Agree

30 Disagree 22.9

21.7 Agree to some extent 18.7

20 16.6

0 Less than 10,000 10,000-50,000 Above 50,000

Fig 1.5d) Graph showing monthly income and social status as the main reason of dowry

191 TABLE 1.6 FEMALE RESPONDENTS WHO EXPERIENCED DOMESTIC VIOLENCE

Educational level Yes No TOTAL

Illiterate 14(26.9) 38(73) 52

Below high school 11(28.2) 28(71.1) 39

Higher secondary 1(11.1) 8(88.8) 9

Graduate and above 00 00 00

26(26) 74(74) 100

Religious observance

Strictly religious 20(25) 60(75) 80

Moderate 3(30) 7(70) 10

Indifferent 3(30) 7(70) 10

26(26) 74(74) 100

Residence

Urban 10(23) 33(76.7) 43

Rural 16(28) 41(71.9) 57

26(26) 74(74) 100

Monthly Income level

Less than 10,000 14(29.1) 34(70.8) 48

10,000-50000 12(26) 34(73.9) 46

Above 50,000 00 6(100) 6

26(26) 74(74) 100

NOTE: Values in brackets are in percentage

SOURCE: Based on primary field work

192

100 88.8 90

80 73 71.1 70 60 50 Yes 40 28.2 No 30 26.9

20 11.1 10 0 0 0 Illiterate Below high Higher Graduate and school secondary above

Fig1.6a) Graph showing educational level and female who experienced domestic violence

80 75 70 70 70

40 Yes 30 30 30 25 No

0 Strictly religious Moderate Indifferent

Fig1.6b) Graph showing religiosity and female who experienced domestic violence

193

90 80 76.7 71.9 70 60 50 Yes 40 28 No 30 23 20 10 0 Urban Rural

Fig1.6c) Graph showing residential background and female who experienced domestic violence

120 100 100

80 70.8 73.9

60 Yes No 40 29.1 26 20 0 0 Less than 10,000 10,000-50000 Above 50,000

Fig1.6d) Graph showing monthly income and female who experienced domestic violence

194 TABLE 1.7 MALE RESPONDENTS WHO DEMANDED DOWRY

Educational level YES NO TOTAL

Illiterate 16(51.6) 15(48.3) 31

Below high school 9(33.3) 18(66.6) 27

Higher secondary 2(14.2) 12(85.7) 14

Graduate and above 1(12.5) 7(87.5) 8

28(35) 52(65) 80

Religious observance

Strictly religious 15(33.3) 30(66.6) 45

Moderate 8(40) 12(60) 20

Indifferent 5(33.3) 10(66.6) 15

28(35) 52(65) 80

Residence

Urban 18(37.5) 30(62.5) 48

Rural 10(31.2) 22(68.7) 32

28(35) 52(65) 80

Monthly Income Level

Less than 10,000 17(38.6) 27(61.3) 44

10,000-50,000 9(31.03) 20(68.9) 29

Above 50,000 2(28.5) 5(71.4) 7

28(35) 52(65) 80

NOTE: Values in brackets are in percentage SOURCE: Based on primary field work

195

100 87.5 90 85.7 80 70 66.6 60 51.6 48.3 50 Yes 40 33.3 No 30 20 14.2 12.5 10 0 Illiterate Below high Higher Graduate and school secondary above

Fig 1.7a)Graph showing educational level and male who demanded dowry

70 66.6 66.6 60 60

50 40 40 33.3 33.3 Yes 30 No 20

0 Strictly religious Moderate Indifferent

Fig1.7b)Graph showing religiosity and male who demanded dowry

196

80 68.7 70 62.5 60

50 37.5 40 Yes 31.2 30 No

0 Urban Rural

Fig1.7c)Graph showing residential background and male who demanded dowry

80 71.4 68.9 70 61.3 60

50 38.6 40 Yes 31.03 28.5 30 No

0 Less than 10,000 10,000-50,000 Above 50,000

Fig 1.7d)Graph showing monthly income and male who demanded dowry

197 TABLE 1.8 RESPONDENTS WHO HAVE RECEIVED AND PAID MAHR

Educational level YES NO TOTAL

Female Male Female Male Female Male Illiterate 15(28.8) 16(51.6) 37(71.1) 15(48.3) 52 31

Below high 12(30.7) 18(66.6) 27(69.2) 9(33.3) 39 27 school

Higher secondary 3(33.3) 11(78.5) 6(66.6) 3(21.4) 9 14

Graduate and 00 8(100) 00 00 00 8 above

30(30) 53(66) 70(70) 27(33.7) 100 80

Religious observance

Strictly religious 26(32.5) 40(88.8) 54(67.5) 5(11.1) 80 45

Moderate 2(20) 8(40) 8(80) 12(60) 10 20

Indifferent 2(20) 5(33.3) 8(80) 10(66.6) 10 15

30(30) 53(66) 70(70) 27(33.7) 100 80

Residence

Urban 14(32.5) 32(66.6) 29(67.4) 16(33.3) 43 48

Rural 16(28) 21(65.6) 41(71.9) 11(34.3) 57 32

30(30) 53(66.2) 70(70) 27(33.7) 100 80

Monthly Income level

Less than 10,000 13(27) 23(52.2) 35(72.9) 21(47.7) 48 44

10,000-50,000 16(34.7) 25(86.2) 30(65.2) 4(13.7) 46 29

Above 50,000 1(16.6) 5(71.4) 5(83.3) 2(28.5) 6 7

30(30) 53(66.2) 70(70) 27(33.7) 100 80

NOTE: Values in brackets are in percentage

SOURCE: Based on primary field work

198

80 71.1 69.2 70 66.6

40 33.3 Yes 28.8 30.7 30 No 20

10 0 0 0 Illiterate Below high Higher Graduate and school secondary above

Fig 1.8a) Graph showing educational level and mehr received (female)

120 100 100 78.5 80 66.6

60 51.6 48.3 Yes 40 33.3 No 21.4 20 0 0 Illiterate Below high Higher Graduate and school secondary above

Fig 1.8b) Graph showing educational level and mehr paid (male)

199

90 80 80 80 67.5 70 60 50 Yes 40 32.5 No 30 20 20 20 10 0 Strictly religious Moderate Indifferent

Fig 1.8c) Graph showing religiosity and mehr received (female)

100 88.8 90 80 70 66.6 60 60 50 Yes 40 40 33.3 No 30 20 11.1 10 0 Strictly religious Moderate Indifferent

Fig 1.8d) Graph showing religiosity and mehr paid (male)

200

80 71.9 70 67.4

40 32.5 Yes 28 30 No

0 Urban Rural

Fig1.8e) Graph showing residential background and mehr received (female)

70 66.6 65.6

40 33.3 34.3 Yes 30 No 20

0 Urban Rural

Fig 1.8f) Graph showing residential background and mehr paid (male)

201

90 83.3

80 72.9 70 65.2 60 50 Yes 40 34.7 No 30 27 20 16.6 10 0 Less than 10,000 10,000-50,000 Above 50,000

Fig 1.8g) Graph showing monthly income and mehr received (female)

100 90 86.2

80 71.4 70

60 52.2 47.7 50 Yes 40 No 28.5 30 20 13.7 10 0 Less than 10,000 10,000-50,000 Above 50,000

Fig 1.8h) Graph showing monthly income and mehr paid (male)

202 TABLE 1.9 RESPONDENTS ATTITUDE TOWARDS POLYGYNY

Educational YES NO TO SOME TOTAL level EXTENT

female Male Female Male Female Male Female Male

Illiterate 8(15.3) 21(67.7) 27(51.9) 10(32.2) 17(32.6) 00 52 31

Below high 9(23) 18(66.6) 20(51.2) 9(33.3) 10(25.6) 00 39 27 school

Higher 1(11.1) 5(35.7) 5(55.5) 9(64.2) 3(33.3) 00 9 14 secondary

Graduate and 00 3(37.5) 00 5(62.5) 00 00 00 8 above

18(18) 47(58.7) 52(52) 33(41.2) 30(30) 00 100 80

Religious observance

Strictly 16(20) 32(71.1) 41(51.2) 13(28.8) 23(28.7) 00 80 45 religious

Moderate 1(10) 5(25) 9(90) 15(75) 00 00 10 20

Indifferent 1(10) 10(66.6) 2(20) 5(33.3) 7(70) 00 10 15

18(18) 47(58.7) 52(52) 33(41.2) 30(30) 00 100 80

Residence

Urban 11(25.5) 26(54.1) 20(46.5) 22(45.8) 12(27.9) 00 43 48

Rural 7(12.2) 21(65.6) 33(56.1) 11(34.3) 18(31.5) 00 57 32

18(18) 47(58.7) 52(52) 33(41.2) 30(30) 00 100 80

Monthly Income level

Less than 7(14.5) 30(68) 28(58.3) 14(31.8) 13(27) 00 48 44 10,000

10,000- 10(21.7) 14(48.2) 20(43.4) 15(51.7) 16(34.7) 00 46 29 50,000

Above 1(16.6) 3(42.8) 4(66.6) 4(57.1) 1(16.6) 00 6 7 50,000

18(18) 47(58.7) 52(52) 33(41.2) 30(30) 00 100 80 NOTE: Values in brackets are in percentage SOURCE: Based on primary field work

203

60 55.5 51.9 51.2 50

40 32.6 33.3 30 25.6 Yes 23 No 20 15.3 To Some Extent 11.1 10 0 0 0 0 Illiterate Below high Higher Graduate and school secondary above

Fig 1.9a) Graph showing educational level and their attitude towards polygyny (female)

80 67.7 70 66.6 64.2 62.5 60

40 35.7 37.5 Yes 32.2 33.3 30 No To Some Extent 20

0 Illiterate Below high Higher Graduate and school secondary above

Fig1.9b) Graph showing educational level and their attitude towards polygyny (male)

204

100 90 90 80 70 70 60 51.2 Yes 50 No 40 28.7 To Some Extent 30 20 20 20 10 10 10 0 0 Strictly religious Moderate Indifferent

Fig 1.9c) Graph showing religiosity and their attitude towards polygyny (female)

80 75 71.1 70 66.6

50 Yes 40 33.3 28.8 No 30 25 To Some Extent 20

0 Strictly religious Moderate Indifferent

Fig 1.9d) Graph showing religiosity and their attitude towards polygyny (male)

205

60 56.1

50 46.5

40 31.5 27.9 Yes 30 25.5 No 20 To Some Extent 12.2 10

0 Urban Rural

Fig 1.9e) Graph showing residential background and their attitude towards polygyny (female)

70 65.6

60 54.1

50 45.8

40 34.3 Yes 30 No To Some Extent 20

0 Urban Rural

Fig 1.9f) Graph showing residential background and their attitude towards polygyny (male)

206

70 66.6 58.3 60

50 43.4 40 34.7 Yes 30 27 No 21.7 To Some Extent 16.6 16.6 20 14.5

0 Less than 10,000 10,000-50,000 Above 50,000

Fig1.9g) Graph showing monthly income and their attitude towards polygyny (female)

80 68 70

60 57.1 51.7 48.2 50 42.8 Yes 40 31.8 No 30 To Some Extent 20

0 Less than 10,000 10,000-50,000 Above 50,000

Fig 1.9h) Graph showing monthly income and their attitude towards polygyny (male)

207 TABLE 1.10 FEMALE RESPONDENTS WHO EXPERIENCED POLYGYNY

Educational level YES NO TOTAL

Illiterate 4(7.6) 48(92.3) 52

Below high school 13(33.3) 26(66.6) 39

Higher secondary 1(11.1) 8(88.8) 9

Graduate and above 00 00 00

18(18) 82(82) 100

Religious observance

Strictly religious 16(20) 64(80) 80

Moderate 1(10) 9(90) 10

Indifferent 1(10) 9(90) 10

18(18) 82(82) 100

Residence

Urban 11(25.5) 32(74.4) 43

Rural 7(12.2) 50(87.7) 57

18(18) 82(82) 100

Monthly Income level

Less than 10000 8(16.6) 40(83.3) 48

10,000-50000 10(21.7) 36(78.2) 46

Above 50,000 00 6(100) 6

18(18) 82(82) 100

NOTE: Values in brackets are in percentage

SOURCE: Based on primary field work

208

100 92.3 88.8 90 80 70 66.6 60 50 Yes 40 33.3 No 30

20 11.1 7.6 10 0 0 0 Illiterate Below high Higher Graduate and school secondary above

Fig1.10a) Graph showing educational level and female who experienced polygyny

100 90 90 90 80 80 70 60 50 Yes 40 No 30 20 20 10 10 10 0 Strictly religious Moderate Indifferent

Fig1.10b) Graph showing religiosity and female who experienced polygyny

209

100 87.7 90 80 74.4 70 60 50 Yes 40 No 30 25.5

20 12.2 10 0 Urban Rural

Fig1.10c) Graph showing residential background and female who experienced polygyny

120 100 100 83.3 78.2 80

60 Yes No 40 21.7 16.6 20 0 0 Less than 10000 10,000-50000 Above 50,000

Fig1.10d) Graph showing monthly income and female who experienced polygyny

210 TABLE 1.11 Under what conditions female respondents would allow second wife

Educational If equal To prevent No issue Never Total level treatment is divorce guaranteed Illiterate 3(5.7) 2(3.8) 16(30.7) 31(59.6) 52

Below high 5(12.8) 3(7.6) 10(25.6) 21(53.8) 39 school

Higher 00 1(11.1) 3(33.3) 5(55.5) 9 secondary

Graduate and 00 00 00 00 00 above

8(8) 6(6) 29(29) 57(57) 100

Religious observance Strictly 5(6.25) 5(6.25) 24(30) 46(57.5) 80 Religious

Moderate 1(10) 00 4(40) 5(50) 10

Indifferent 2(20) 1(10) 1(10) 6(60) 10

8(8) 6(6) 29(29) 57(57) 100

Residence

Urban 3(6.9) 2(4.6) 13(30.2) 25(58.1) 43

Rural 5(8.7) 4(7.0) 16(28.07) 32(56.1) 57

8(8) 6(6) 29(29) 57(57) 100

Monthly Income level

Less than 4(8.3) 4(8.3) 14(29.1) 26(54.1) 48 10000

10000-50000 4(8.6) 2(4.3) 13(28.2) 27(58.6) 46

Above 00 00 2(33.3) 4(66.6) 6 50,000

8(8) 6(6) 29(29) 57(57) 100

NOTE: Values in brackets are in percentage

SOURCE: Based on primary field work

211

70 59.6

60 55.5 53.8

50 If equal treatment is guaranteed 40

33.3 To prevent divorce 30.7

30 25.6 No issue

12.8 11.1

7.6 Never

10 5.7

3.8

0 0

0 0 0 0 Illiterate Below high Higher Graduate and school secondary above

Fig1.11a) Graph showing educational level and conditions in which females allow second wife

70 60

60 57.5 50 50 If equal treatment is

guaranteed 40

40 To prevent divorce 30 30

No issue 20 20

Never

10 10 10 6.25

10 6.25 0 0 Strictly Religious Moderate Indifferent

Fig1.11b) Graph showing religiosity and conditions in which females allow second wife

212

70 58.1 60 56.1

50 If equal treatment is guaranteed 40 To prevent divorce 30.2 28.07 30 No issue 20 Never 6.9 8.7 7 10 4.6

0 Urban Rural

Fig 1.11c) Graph showing residential background and conditions in which females allow second wife

70 66.6 58.6 60 54.1

50 If equal treatment is guaranteed 40 33.3 To prevent divorce 29.1 28.2 30 No issue 20 Never 8.38.3 8.6 10 4.3 0 0 0 Less than 10000 10000-50000 Above 50,000

Fig 1.11d) Graph showing monthly income and conditions in which females allow second wife

213

TABLE 1.12 MALE RESPONDENTS VIEW ON EQUAL TREATMENT TO WIVES

Educational level Yes, possible No, not possible Total

Illiterate 4(12.9) 27(87) 31

Below high school 11(40.7) 16(59.2) 27

Higher secondary 3(21.4) 11(78.5) 14

Graduate and above 4(50) 4(50) 8

22(27.5) 58(72.5) 80

Religious observance

Strictly religious 11(24.4) 34(75.5) 45

Moderate 11(55) 9(45) 20

Indifferent 0 15(100) 15

22(27.5) 58(72.5) 80

Residence

Urban 14(29.1) 34(70.8) 48

Rural 8(25) 24(75) 32

22(27.5) 58(72.5) 80

Monthly Income level

Less than 10,000 10(22.7) 34(77.2) 44

10,000 -50,000 9(31) 20(68.9) 29

Above 50,000 3(42.8) 4(57.1) 7

22(27.5) 58(72.5) 80

NOTE: Values in brackets are in percentage

SOURCE: Based on primary field work

214

100 87 90 78.5 80 70 59.2 60 50 50 50 40.7 Yes 40 No 30 21.4 20 12.9 10 0 Illiterate Below high Higher Graduate and school secondary above

Fig1.12a) Graph showing educational level and equal treatment to wives

120 100 100

80 75.5

60 55 Yes 45 No 40 24.4 20 0 0 Strictly religious Moderate Indifferent

Fig1.12b) Graph showing religiosity and equal treatment to wives

215

80 75 70.8 70

40 Yes 29.1 30 25 No

0 Urban Rural

Fig1.12c) Graph showing residential background and equal treatment to wives

90 80 77.2 68.9 70 60 57.1

50 42.8 Yes 40 31 No 30 22.7 20 10 0 Less than 10,000 10,000 -50,000 Above 50,000

Fig1.12d) Graph showing monthly income and equal treatment to wives

216 TABLE 1.13 RESPONDENTS WHO FAVOURED DIVORCE

Educational level YES NO TOTAL

female male Female Male Female male Illiterate 5(9.6) 18(58.06) 47(90.3) 13(41.9) 52 31

Below high 5(12.8) 11(40.7) 34(87.1) 16(59.2) 39 27 school

Higher secondary 1(11.1) 00 8(88.8) 14(100) 9 14

Graduate and 00 2(25) 00 6(75) 0 8 above

11(11) 31(38.7) 89(89) 49(61) 100 80

Religious observance

Strictly religious 7(8.7) 10(22.5) 73(91.2) 35(77.7) 80 45

Moderate 2(20) 6(30) 8(80) 14(70) 10 20

Indifferent 2(20) 15(100) 8(80) 00 10 15

11(11) 31(38.7) 89(89) 49(61) 100 80

Residence

Urban 5(11.6) 17(35.4) 38(88.3) 31(64.5) 43 48

Rural 6(10.5) 14(43.7) 51(89.4) 18(56.2) 57 32

11(11) 31(38.7) 89(89) 49(61) 100 80

Monthly Income level

Less than 10,000 5(10.4) 22(50) 43(89.5) 22(50) 48 44

10,000-50,000 6(13) 6(20.6) 40(86.9) 23(79.3) 46 29

Above 50,000 00 3(42.8) 6(100) 4(57.1) 6 7

11(11) 31(38.7) 89(89) 49(61) 100 80

NOTE: Values in brackets are in percentage

SOURCE: Based on primary field work

217

100 90.3 87.1 88.8 90 80 70 60 50 Yes 40 No 30 20 12.8 9.6 11.1 10 0 0 0 Illiterate Below high Higher Graduate and school secondary above

Fig1.13a) Graph showing educational level and respondents who favoured divorce (female)

120 100 100

80 75 58.06 59.2 60 Yes 41.9 40.7 40 No 25 20 0 0 Illiterate Below high Higher Graduate and school secondary above

Fig1.13b) Graph showing educational level and respondents who favoured divorce (male)

218

100 91.2 90 80 80 80 70 60 50 Yes 40 No 30 20 20 20 8.7 10 0 Strictly religious Moderate Indifferent

Fig1.13c) Graph showing religiosity and respondents who favoured divorce (female)

120 100 100

77.7 80 70

60 Yes No 40 30 22.5 20 0 0 Strictly religious Moderate Indifferent

Fig1.13d) Graph showing religiosity and respondents who favoured divorce (male)

219

100 88.3 89.4 90 80 70 60 50 Yes 40 No 30 20 11.6 10.5 10 0 Urban Rural

Fig1.13e) Graph showing residential background and respondents who favoured divorce (female)

70 64.5

60 56.2

50 43.7

40 35.4 Yes 30 No 20

0 Urban Rural

Fig 1.13f) Graph showing residential background and respondents who favoured divorce (male)

220

120 100 100 89.5 86.9

60 Yes No 40

20 10.4 13 0 0 Less than 10,000 10,000-50,000 Above 50,000

Fig1.13g) Graph showing monthly income and respondents who favoured divorce (female)

90 79.3 80 70 60 57.1 50 50 50 42.8 Yes 40 No 30 20.6 20 10 0 Less than 10,000 10,000-50,000 Above 50,000

Fig1.13h) Graph showing monthly income and respondents who favoured divorce (male)

221 TABLE 1.14 FEMALE RESPONDENTS WHO EXPERIENCED DIVORCE

Educational level YES NO TOTAL

Illiterate 2(3.8) 50(96.1) 52

Below high school 9(23) 30(76.9) 39

Higher secondary 3(33.3) 6(66.6) 9

Graduate and above 0 0 0

14(14) 86(86) 100

Religious observance

Strictly religious 11(13.7) 69(86.2) 80

Moderate 1(10) 9(90) 10

Indifferent 2(20) 8(80) 10

14(14) 86(86) 100

Residence

Urban 8(18.6) 35(81.3) 43

Rural 6(10.5) 51(89.4) 57

14(14) 86(86) 100

Monthly Income level

Less than 10,000 5(10.4) 43(89.5) 48

10,000-50,000 7(15.2) 39(84.7) 46

Above 50,000 2(33.3) 4(66.6) 6

14(14) 86(86) 100

NOTE: Values in brackets are in percentage

SOURCE: Based on primary field work

222

120

100 96.1

76.9 80 66.6 60 Yes 40 33.3 No 23 20 3.8 0 0 0 Illiterate Below high Higher Graduate and school secondary above

Fig1.13a) Graph showing educational level and female who experienced divorce

100 90 90 86.2 80 80 70 60 50 Yes 40 No 30 20 20 13.7 10 10 0 Strictly religious Moderate Indifferent

Fig1.13b) Graph showing religiosity and female who experienced divorce

223

100 89.4 90 81.3 80 70 60 50 Yes 40 No 30 18.6 20 10.5 10 0 Urban Rural

Fig1.13c) Graph showing residential background and female who experienced divorce

100 89.5 90 84.7 80 70 66.6 60 50 Yes 40 33.3 No 30 20 15.2 10.4 10 0 Less than 10,000 10,000-50,000 Above 50,000

Fig1.13d) Graph showing monthly income and female who experienced divorce

224 TABLE 1.15 MAJOR CAUSE OF DIVORCE

Educational Lack of Husband’s Wive’s Dowry Male Physical Total Level Adjustme extra extra dispute child violence nt with in- marital marital issue laws relations relations

Illiterate 00 1(50) 00 00 1(50) 00 2

Below high 3(30) 00 00 1(10) 5(50) 1(10) 10 school

Higher 00 1(33.3) 00 1(33.3) 1(33.3) 00 3 secondary

Graduate 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 and above

3(20) 2(13.3) 00 2(13.3) 7(46.6) 1(6.66) 15

Religious observance

Strictly 1(10) 1(10) 00 2(20) 6(60) 00 10 religious

Moderate 1(50) 1(50) 00 00 00 00 2

Indifferent 1(33.3) 00 00 00 1(33.3) 1(33.3) 3

3(20) 2(13.3) 00 2(13.3) 7(46.6) 1(6.66) 15

Residence

Urban 2(20) 2(20) 00 00 5(50) 1(10) 10

Rural 1(20) 00 00 2(40) 2(40) 00 5

3(20) 2(13.3) 00 2(13.3) 7(46.6) 1(6.66) 15

Income

Less than 00 1(20) 00 1(20) 2(40) 1(20) 5 10,000

10000-50000 2(28.5) 1(14.2) 00 1(14.2) 3(42.8 00 7

Above 1(33.3) 00 00 2(66.6) 00 3 50,000

3(20) 2(13.3) 00 2(13.3) 7(46.6) 1(6.6) 15

NOTE: Values in brackets are in percentage

SOURCE: Based on primary field work

225

50 50 50 Lack of Adjustment with 50 in-laws

40 Husband’s Extra Marital 33.3

33.3 Relations

33.3 30 30 Wive’s Extra Marital Relations

20 Dowry Dispute

10 10

10 Male Child Issue

0 0 0

0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 Physical Violence Illiterate Below high Higher Graduate school secondary and above

Fig1.15a) Graph showing educational level and cause of divorce

70 60 60 Lack of Adjustment with

in-laws

50 50 50 Husband’s Extra Marital Relations

40 Wive’s Extra Marital

33.3 33.3 33.3 Relations 30

Dowry Dispute 20 20

Male Child Issue

10 10 10

Physical Violence

0 0 0 0 0 0 Strictly religious Moderate Indifferent

Fig1.15b) Graph showing religiosity and cause of divorce

226

50 Lack of Adjustment with 50 in-laws 40 40 Husband’s Extra Marital 40 Relations Wive’s Extra Marital 30 Relations 20 20 20 Dowry Dispute 20 10 Male Child Issue 10 0 0 0 Physical Violence 0 Urban Rural

Fig1.15c) Graph showing residential background and cause of divorce

70 66.6

60 Lack of Adjustment with in-laws 50 42.8 Husband’s Extra Marital 40 Relations 40 33.3 Wive’s Extra Marital 28.5 30 Relations 20 20 20 Dowry Dispute 20 14.214.2 Male Child Issue 10 0 0 0 0 0 Physical Violence Less than 10000-50000 Above 50,000 10,000

Fig1.15d) Graph showing monthly income and cause of divorce

227 TABLE 1.16 RESPONDENTS WHO FAVOURED FAMILY PLANNING

EDUCATIONAL YES NO TOTAL LEVEL Female male female Male female male Illiterate 4(7.6) 3(9.6) 48(92.3) 28(90.3) 52 31

Below high school 5(12.8) 4(14.8) 34(87.1) 23(85.1) 39 27

Higher secondary 6(66.6) 9(64.2) 3(33.3) 5(35.7) 9 14

Graduate and above 00 6(75) 00 2(25) 00 8

15(15) 22(27.5) 85(85) 58(72.5) 100 80

RELIGIOUS OBSERVANCE

Strictly religious 8(10) 4(8.8) 72(90) 41(88.8) 80 45

Moderate 4(40) 8(40) 6(60) 12(60) 10 20

Indifferent 3(30) 10(66.6) 7(70) 5(6.66) 10 15

15(15) 22(27.5) 85(85) 58(72.5) 100 80

RESIDENCE

Urban 8(18.6) 18(37.5) 35(81.3) 30(62.5) 43 48

Rural 7(12.2) 4(12.5) 50(87.7) 28(87.5) 57 32

15(15) 22(27.5) 85(85) 58(72.5) 100 80

Monthly Income level

Less than 10,000 4(8.3) 6(13.6) 44(91.6) 38(86.3) 48 44

10,000-50000 9(19.5) 10(34.4) 37(80.4) 19(65.5) 46 29

Above 50,000 2(33.3) 6(85.7) 4(66.6) 1(14.2) 6 7

15(15) 22(27.5) 85(85) 58(72.5) 100 80

NOTE: Values in brackets are in percentage

SOURCE: Based on primary field work

228

100 92.3 87.1 90 80 70 66.6 60 50 Yes 40 33.3 No 30 20 12.8 7.6 10 0 0 0 Illiterate Below high Higher Graduate and school secondary above

Fig1.16a) Graph showing educational level and respondents who favoured family planning (female)

100 90.3 90 85.1 80 75 70 64.2 60 50 Yes 40 35.7 No 30 25 20 14.8 9.6 10 0 Illiterate Below high Higher Graduate and school secondary above

Fig1.16b) Graph showing educational level and respondents who favoured family planning (male)

229

100 90 90 80 70 70 60 60 50 Yes 40 40 No 30 30 20 10 10 0 Strictly religious Moderate Indifferent

Fig1.16c) Graph showing religiosity and respondents who favoured family planning (female)

100 88.8 90 80 70 66.6 60 60 50 Yes 40 40 No 30 20 8.8 10 6.66 0 Strictly religious Moderate Indifferent

Fig1.16d) Graph showing religiosity and respondents who favoured family planning (male)

230

100 87.7 90 81.3 80 70 60 50 Yes 40 No 30 18.6 20 12.2 10 0 Urban Rural

Fig1.16e) Graph showing residential background and respondents who favoured family planning (female)

100 87.5 90 80

70 62.5 60 50 Yes 37.5 40 No 30

20 12.5 10 0 Urban Rural

Fig1.16f) Graph showing residential background and respondents who favoured family planning (male)

231

100 91.6 90 80.4 80 70 66.6 60 50 Yes 40 33.3 No 30 19.5 20 8.3 10 0 Less than 10,000 10,000-50000 Above 50,000

Fig1.16g) Graph showing monthly income and respondents who favoured family planning (female)

100 90 86.3 85.7 80 70 65.5 60 50 Yes 40 34.4 No 30 20 13.6 14.2 10 0 Less than 10,000 10,000-50000 Above 50,000

Fig1.16h ) Graph showing monthly income and respondents who favoured family planning (male)

232 TABLE1.17 RESPONDENTS WHO USED CONTRACEPTIVE METHODS

EDUCATIONAL YES NO TOTAL LEVEL Female Male Female Male Female Male Illiterate 1(1.9) 2(6.4) 51(98) 29(93.5) 52 31

Below high school 1(2.5) 2(7.4) 38(97.4) 25(92.5) 39 27

Higher secondary 1(11.1) 4(28.5) 8(88.8) 10(71.4) 9 14

Graduate and above 00 3(37.5) 00 5(62.5) 00 8

3(3) 11(13.7) 97(97) 69(86.2) 100 80

RELIGIOUS OBSERVANCE

Strictly religious 1(10) 3(6.6) 79(98.7) 42(93.3) 80 45

Moderate 1(10) 5(25) 9(90) 15(75) 10 20

Indifferent 1(10) 3(20) 9(90) 12(80) 10 15

3(3) 11(13.7) 97(97) 69(86.2) 100 80

RESIDENCE

Urban 2(4.6) 6(12.5) 41(95) 42(87.5) 43 48

Rural 1(1.7) 5(15.6) 56(98.2) 27(84.3) 57 32

3(3) 11(13.75) 97(97) 69(86.2) 100 80

MONTHLY INCOME LEVEL

Less than 10,000 00 1(2.2) 48(100) 43(97.7) 48 44

10,000-50000 2(4.3) 4(13.7) 44(95.6) 25(86.2) 46 29

Above 50000 1(16.6) 6(85.7) 5(83.3) 1(14.2) 6 7

3(3) 11(13.75) 97(97) 69(86.2) 100 80

NOTE: Values in brackets are in percentage

SOURCE: Based on primary field work

233

120

98 97.4 100 88.8

60 Yes 40 No

20 11.1 1.9 2.5 0 0 0 Illiterate Below high Higher Graduate and school secondary above

Fig1.17a) Graph showing educational level and respondents who used contraceptive methods (female)

100 93.5 92.5 90

80 71.4 70 62.5 60 50 37.5 Yes 40 28.5 No 30 20 7.4 10 6.4 0 Illiterate Below high Higher Graduate and school secondary above

Fig1.17b) Graph showing educational level and respondents who used contraceptive methods (male)

234

120

98.7 100 90 90

60 Yes No 40

20 10 10 10

0 Strictly religious Moderate Indifferent

Fig1.17c) Graph showing religiosity and respondents who used contraceptive methods (female)

100 93.3 90 80 80 75 70 60 50 Yes 40 No 30 25 20 20 10 6.6 0 Strictly religious Moderate Indifferent

Fig1.17d) Graph showing religiosity and respondents who used contraceptive methods (male)

235

120

98.2 100 95

60 Yes No 40

20 4.6 1.7 0 Urban Rural

Fig1.17e) Graph showing residential background and respondents who used contraceptive methods (female)

100 87.5 90 84.3 80 70 60 50 Yes 40 No 30 15.6 20 12.5 10 0 Urban Rural

Fig1.17f) Graph showing residential background and respondents who used contraceptive methods (male)

236

120 100 100 95.6 83.3 80

60 Yes No 40

16.6 20 4.3 0 0 Less than 10,000 10,000-50000 Above 50000

Fig1.17g) Graph showing monthly income and respondents who used contraceptive methods (female)

120

97.7 100 86.2 85.7 80

60 Yes No 40

20 13.7 14.2 2.2 0 Less than 10,000 10,000-50000 Above 50000

Fig1.17h) Graph showing monthly income and respondents who used contraceptive methods (male)

237 TABLE 1.18 RESPONDENTS VIEW ON TYPE OF SUCCESSFUL MARRIAGE

Educational level Arrange marriage Love marriage Total

female male female Male female Male Illiterate 52(100) 28(90.3) 00 3(9.6) 52 31 below high school 36(92) 26(96) 3(7.6) 1(3.7) 39 27

Higher secondary 8(88.8) 14(100) 1(11.1) 00 9 14

Graduate and 00 8(100) 00 00 00 8 above

96(96) 76(95) 4(4) 4(5) 100 80

Religious observance

Strictly religious 79(98.7) 45(100) 1(1.25) 00 80 45

Moderate 8(80) 18(90) 2(20) 2(10) 10 20

Indifferent 9(90) 13(86.6) 1(10) 2(13.3) 10 15

96(96) 76(95) 4(4) 4(5) 100 80

Residence

Urban 41(95.3) 46(95.8) 2(4.6) 2(4.1) 43 48

Rural 55(96.4) 30(93.7) 2(3.5) 2(6.25) 57 32

96(96) 76(95) 4(4) 4(5) 100 80

Monthly Income level

Less than 10,000 46(95.8) 41(93.1) 2(4.1) 3(6.8) 48 44

10,000-50,000 44(95.6) 29(100) 2(4.3) 00 46 29

Above 50,000 6(100) 6(85.7) 00 1(14.2) 6 7

96(96) 76(95) 4(4) 4(5) 100 80

NOTE: Values in brackets are in percentage

SOURCE: Based on primary field work

238

120 100 100 92 88.8

60 Arrange marriage 40 Love marriage

20 7.6 11.1 0 0 0 0 Illiterate below high Higher Graduate and school secondary above

Fig 1.18a) Graph showing educational level and view on type of successful marriage (female)

120 100 100 96 100 90.3

60 Arrange marriage 40 Love marriage

20 9.6 3.7 0 0 0 Illiterate below high Higher Graduate and school secondary above

Fig1.18b) Graph showing educational level and view on type of successful marriage (male)

239

120

98.7 100 90 80 80

60 Arrange marriage Love marriage 40 20 20 10 1.25 0 Strictly religious Moderate Indifferent

Fig1.18c) Graph showing religiosity and view on type of successful marriage (female)

120 100 100 90 86.6 80

60 Arrange marriage Love marriage 40

20 10 13.3 0 0 Strictly religious Moderate Indifferent

Fig1.18d) Graph showing religiosity and view on type of successful marriage (male)

240

120

100 95.3 96.4

60 Arrange marriage Love marriage 40

20 4.6 3.5 0 Urban Rural

Fig1.18e) Graph showing residential background and view on type of successful marriage (female)

120

100 95.8 93.7

60 Arrange marriage Love marriage 40

20 4.1 6.25 0 Urban Rural

Fig1.18f )Graph showing residential background and view on type of successful marriage (male)

241

120 100 100 95.8 95.6

60 Arrange marriage Love marriage 40

20 4.1 4.3 0 0 Less than 10,000 10,000-50,000 Above 50,000

Fig1.18g) Graph showing monthly income and view on type of successful marriage (female)

120 100 100 93.1 85.7 80

60 Arrange marriage Love marriage 40

20 14.2 6.8 0 0 Less than 10,000 10,000-50,000 Above 50,000

Fig1.18h)Graph showing monthly income and view on type of successful marriage (male)

242 TABLE 1.19 TYPE OF MARRIAGE OF THE RESPONDENT

Educational Love marriage Arranged Love-cum- Total level marriage arranged marriage

female male female male female male female male

Illiterate 3(5.7) 1(3.2) 49(94.2) 30(96.7) 00 00 52 31

Below high 1(2.5) 00 37(94.8) 27(100) 1(2.5) 00 39 27 school

Higher 1(11.1) 00 7(77.7) 14(100) 1(11.1) 00 9 14 secondary

Graduate and 00 00 00 8(100) 00 00 00 8 above

5(5) 1(1.25) 93(93) 79(98.7) 2(2) 00 100 80

Religious observance

Strictly 3(3.75) 1(2.2) 76(95) 44(97.7) 1(1.25) 00 80 45 religious

Moderate 1(10) 00 8(80) 20(100) 1(10) 00 10 20

Indifferent 1(10) 00 9(90) 15(100) 00 00 10 15

5(5) 1(1.25) 93(93) 79(98.7) 2(2) 00 100 80

Residence

Urban 2(4.6) 1(2.08) 40(93) 47(97.9) 1(2.3) 00 43 48

Rural 3(5.2) 00 53(92.9) 32(100) 1(1.7) 00 57 32

5(5) 1(1.25) 93(93) 79(98.7) 2(2) 00 100 80

Monthly Income level

Less than 3(6.2) 1(2.2) 44(91.6) 43(97.7) 1(2) 00 48 44 10,000

10,000-50,000 1(2.1) 00 44(95.6) 29(100) 1(2.1) 00 46 29

Above 50,000 1(16.6) 00 5(83.3) 7(100) 00 00 6 7

5(5) 1(1.25) 93(93) 79(98.7) 2(2) 00 100 80

NOTE: Values in brackets are in percentage

SOURCE: Based on primary field work

243

100

94.2 94.8 90

80 77.7 70 60 Love marriage 50 Arranged marriage 40 30 Love-cum-arranged

20 marriage

11.1 11.1

10 5.7

2.5 2.5

0 0 0 0 0 Illiterate Below high Higher Graduate school secondary and above

Fig1.19a) Graph showing educational level and respondent’s type of marriage (female)

120

96.7 100 100 100 100

80 Love marriage 60 Arranged marriage 40 Love-cum-arranged 20 marriage 3.2 0 0 0 0 Illiterate Below high Higher Graduate school secondary and above

Fig1.19b) Graph showing educational level and respondent’s type of marriage (male)

244

100 95 90 90 80 80 70 Love marriage 60

50 Arranged marriage 40 30 Love-cum-arranged marriage

10 10 10

10 3.75

1.25 0 0 Strictly religious Moderate Indifferent

Fig1.19c) Graph showing religiosity and respondent’s type of marriage (female)

120

97.7 100 100 100

80 Love marriage

60 Arranged marriage

40 Love-cum-arranged marriage 20 2.2 0 0 0 Strictly religious Moderate Indifferent

Fig1.19d) Graph showing religiosity and respondent’s type of marriage (male)

245

100 93 92.9 90 80 70 Love marriage 60

50 Arranged marriage 40 30 Love-cum-arranged marriage 20 4.6 5.2 10 2.3 1.7 0 Urban Rural

Fig1.19e) Graph showing residential background and respondent’s type of marriage (female)

120

97.9 100 100

80 Love marriage

60 Arranged marriage

40 Love-cum-arranged marriage 20 2.08 0 0 Urban Rural

Fig1.19f) Graph showing residential background and respondent’s type of marriage (male)

246

120

95.6 100 91.6 83.3 80 Love marriage 60 Arranged marriage 40 Love-cum-arranged 16.6 20 marriage 6.2 2 2.1 2.1 0 0 Less than 10,000-50,000 Above 50,000 10,000

Fig1.19g) Graph showing monthly income and respondent’s type of marriage (female)

120

97.7 100 100 100

80 Love marriage 60 Arranged marriage 40 Love-cum-arranged 20 marriage 2.2 0 0 0 Less than 10,000-50,000 Above 50,000 10,000

Fig1.19h) Graph showing monthly income and respondent’s type of marriage (male)

247 TABLE 1.20 MALE RESPONDENTS WHO HELPED THEIR WIVES IN HOUSEHOLD CHORES Educational level Yes No Total

Illiterate 3(9.67) 28(90.3) 31

Below high school 2(7.4) 25(92.5) 27

Higher secondary 7(50) 7(50) 14

Graduate and above 4(50) 4(50) 8

16(20) 64(80) 80

Religious observance

Strictly religious 6(13.3) 39(86.6) 45

Moderate 5(25) 15(75) 20

Indifferent 5(33.3) 10(66.6) 15

16(20) 64(80) 80

Residence

Urban 7(14.5) 41(85.4) 48

Rural 9(28.1) 23(71.8) 32

16(20) 64(80) 80

Monthly Income level

Less than 10,000 8(18.1) 36(81.8) 44

10,000-50000 4(13.7) 25(86.2) 29

Above 50000 4(57) 3(42.8) 7

16(20) 64(80) 80

NOTE: Values in brackets are in percentage

SOURCE: Based on primary field work

248

100 90.3 92.5 90 80 70 60 50 50 50 50 50 Yes 40 No 30 20 9.67 7.4 10 0 Illiterate Below high Higher Graduate and school secondary above

Fig1.20a) Graph showing educational level and male respondents who helped wives in household chores

100 90 86.6 80 75 70 66.6 60 50 Yes 40 33.3 No 30 25 20 13.3 10 0 Strictly religious Moderate Indifferent

Fig1.20b) Graph showing religiosity and male respondents who helped wives in household chores

249

90 85.4 80 71.8 70 60 50 Yes 40 28.1 No 30

20 14.5 10 0 Urban Rural

Fig1.20c) Graph showing residential background and male respondents who helped wives in household chores

100 86.2 90 81.8 80 70 60 57 50 42.8 Yes 40 No 30 18.1 20 13.7 10 0 Less than 10,000 10,000-50000 Above 50000

Fig1.20d) Graph showing monthly income and male respondents who helped wives in household chores

250 TABLE 1.21 MALE RESPONDENTS WHO ALLOWED THEIR WIVES TO WORK OUTSIDE

Educational level Yes No Total

Illiterate 2(6.4) 29(93.5) 31

Below high school 00 27(100) 27

Higher secondary 00 14(100) 14

Graduate and above 00 8(100) 8

2(2.5) 78(97.5) 80

Religious observance

Strictly religious 00 45(100) 45

Moderate 1(5) 19(95) 20

Indifferent 1(6.66) 14(93.3) 15

2(2.5) 78(97.5) 80

Residence

Urban 1(2.08) 47(97.9) 48

Rural 1(3.1) 31(96.8) 32

2(2.5) 78(97.5) 80

Monthly Income level

Less than 10,000 2(4.5) 42(95.4) 44

10,000-50,000 00 29(100) 29

Above 50,000 00 7(100) 7

2(2.5) 78(97.5) 80

NOTE: Values in brackets are in percentage

SOURCE: Based on primary field work

251

120 100 100 100 100 93.5

60 Yes 40 No

20 6.4 0 0 0 0 Illiterate Below high Higher Graduate and school secondary above

Fig1.21a) Graph showing educational level and male respondents who allowed wives to work outside

120 100 100 95 93.3

60 Yes No 40

20 5 6.66 0 0 Strictly religious Moderate Indifferent

Fig1.21b) Graph showing religiosity and male respondents who allowed wives to work outside

252

120

97.9 96.8 100

60 Yes No 40

20 2.08 3.1 0 Urban Rural

Fig1.21c) Graph showing residential background and male respondents who allowed wives to work outside

120 100 100 100 95.4

60 Yes No 40

20 4.5 0 0 0 Less than 10,000 10,000-50,000 Above 50,000

Fig1.21d) Graph showing monthly income and male respondents who allowed wives to work outside

253 TABLE 1.22 RESPONDENTS WHO ALLOWED THEIR WIVES TO GO FOR SHOPPING ALONE

Educational level Yes No Total

Illiterate 6(19.3) 25(80.6) 31

Below high school 7(25.9) 20(74) 27

Higher secondary 7(50) 7(50) 14

Graduate and above 7(87.5) 1(12.5) 8

27(33.7) 53(66) 80

Religious observance

Strictly religious 10(22.2) 35(77.7) 45

Moderate 12(60) 8(40) 20

Indifferent 5(33.3) 10(66.6) 15

27(33.7) 53(66) 80

Residence

Urban 19(39.5) 29(60.4) 48

Rural 8(25) 24(75) 32

27(33.7) 53(66) 80

Monthly Income level

Less than 10,000 4(9) 40(90.9) 44

10,000-50,000 17(58.6) 12(41.3) 29

Above 50,000 6(85.7) 1(14.2) 7

27(33.7) 53(66) 80

NOTE: Values in brackets are in percentage

SOURCE: Based on primary field work

254

100 87.5 90 80.6 80 74 70 60 50 50 50 Yes 40 No 30 25.9 19.3 20 12.5 10 0 Illiterate Below high Higher Graduate and school secondary above

Fig1.22a) Graph showing educational level and male respondents who allowed wives to go for shopping alone

90 77.7 80 70 66.6 60 60 50 40 Yes 40 33.3 No 30 22.2 20 10 0 Strictly religious Moderate Indifferent

Fig1.22b) Graph showing religiosity and male respondents who allowed wives to go for shopping alone

255

80 75

70 60.4 60

50 39.5 40 Yes

30 25 No

0 Urban Rural

Fig1.22c) Graph showing residential background and male respondents who allowed wives to go for shopping alone

100 90.9 90 85.7 80 70 58.6 60 50 41.3 Yes 40 No 30 20 14.2 9 10 0 Less than 10,000 10,000-50,000 Above 50,000

Fig1.22d) Graph showing monthly income and male respondents who allowed wives to go for shopping alone

256 TABLE 1.23 FEMALE RESPONDENTS WHO TOOK DECISION ON FINANCIAL MATTERS

Educational Yes No Sometimes Total level Illiterate 11(21.1) 32(61.5) 9(17.3) 52 Below high 11(28.2) 23(58.9) 5(12.8) 39 school Higher 2(22.2) 2(22.2) 5(55.5) 9 secondary Graduate and 00 00 00 00 above 24(24) 57(57) 19(19) 100 Religious observance Strictly 20(25) 46(57.5) 14(17.5) 80 Religious Moderate 2(20) 5(50) 3(30) 10 Indifferent 2(20) 6(60) 2(20) 10 24(24) 57(57) 19(19) 100 Residence Urban 10(23) 25(58) 8(18.6) 43 Rural 14(24.5) 32(56) 11(19.2) 57 24(24) 57(57) 19(19) 100 Monthly Income level Less than 11(22.9) 27(56.2) 10(20.8) 48 10,000 10,000-50000 11(23.9) 27(58.6) 8(17.3) 46 Above 50000 2(33.3) 3(50) 1(16.6) 6 24(24) 57(57) 19(19) 100 NOTE: Values in brackets are in percentage SOURCE: Based on primary field work

257

61.5 58.9

60 55.5

Yes 28.2

30 No

22.2 22.2 21.1

20 17.3 Sometimes 12.8

0 0 0 0 Illiterate Below high Higher Graduate and school secondary above

Fig1.23a) Graph showing educational level and females who took decision on financial matters

70 60 60 57.5 50 50

40 Yes 30 30 25 No 20 20 20 Sometimes 20 17.5

0 Strictly Religious Moderate Indifferent

Fig1.23b) Graph showing religiosity and females who took decision on financial matters

258

70 58 60 56

40 Yes 30 No 23 24.5 18.6 19.2 Sometimes 20

0 Urban Rural

Fig1.23c) Graph showing residential background and females who took decision on financial matters

70 58.6 60 56.2 50 50

40 33.3 Yes 30 No 22.9 23.9 20.8 Sometimes 20 17.3 16.6

0 Less than 10,000 10,000-50000 Above 50000

Fig1.23d) Graph showing monthly income and females who took decision on financial matters

259 TABLE 1.24 ACTUAL NO. OF CHILDREN IN RESPONDENT’S FAMILY

Educational 1-2 3-5 More than 5 Total level Illiterate 1(1.9) 17(32.6) 34(65.3) 52

Below high 1(2.5) 15(38.4) 23(58.9) 39 school

Higher 1(11.1) 5(55.5) 3(33.3) 9 secondary

Graduate and 00 00 00 00 above

3(3) 37(37) 60(60) 100

Religious observance Strictly 2(2.5) 29(36.2) 49(61.2) 83 religious

Moderate 1(10) 5(50) 4(40) 16

Indifferent 00 3(30) 7(70) 1

3(3) 37(37) 60(60) 100

Residence

Urban 1(2.3) 18(41.8) 24(55.8) 43

Rural 2(3.5) 19(33.3) 36(63) 57

3(3) 37(37) 60(60) 100

Monthly Income level

Less than 2(4.1) 10(20.8) 36(75) 48 10,000

10,000-50,000 1(2.1) 23(50) 22(47.8) 46

Above 50,000 00 4(66.6) 2(33.3) 6

3(3) 37(37) 60(60) 100

NOTE: Values in brackets are in percentage SOURCE: Based on primary field work

260

65.3 58.9

60 55.5

40 38.4 33.3 32.6 1-2 30 3-5

20 More than 5 11.1

2.5

1.9

0 0 0 0 Illiterate Below high Higher Graduate and school secondary above

Fig1.24a) Graph showing educational level and actual number of children in respondent’s family

80 70 70 61.2 60 50 50 40 1-2 40 36.2 30 3-5 30 More than 5 20 10 10 2.5 0 0 Strictly religious Moderate Indifferent

Fig1.24b) Graph showing religiosity and actual number of children in respondent’s family

261

70 63 60 55.8

50 41.8 40 33.3 1-2 30 3-5 More than 5 20

10 2.3 3.5 0 Urban Rural

Fig1.24c) Graph showing residential background and actual number of children in respondent’s family

80 75

70 66.6

60 50 47.8 50 1-2 40 33.3 3-5 30 20.8 More than 5 20

10 4.1 2.1 0 0 Less than 10,000 10,000-50,000 Above 50,000

Fig1.24d) Graph showing monthly income and actual number of children in respondent’s family

262 TABLE1.25 RESPONDENTS VIEW ON IDEAL NUMBER OF CHILDREN

Educational 1-2 3-5 More than 5 Total level Illiterate 00 20(38.4) 32(61.5) 52

Below high 00 13(33.3) 26(66.6) 39 school

Higher 1(11.1) 3(33.3) 5(55.5) 9 secondary

Graduate and 00 00 00 00 above

1(1) 36(36) 63(63) 100

Religious observance Strictly 00 28(35) 52(62.6) 80 religious

Moderate 00 5(50) 5(50) 10

Indifferent 1(10) 3(30 6(60) 10

1(1) 36(36) 63(63) 100

Residence

Urban 1(2.3) 12(27.9) 30(69.7) 43

Rural 00 24(42) 33(57.8) 57

1(1) 36(36) 63(63) 100

Monthly Income level

Less than 00 20(41.6) 28(58.3) 48 10,000

10,000-50,000 1(2.1) 15(32.6) 30(65.2) 46

Above 50,000 00 1(16.6) 5(83.3) 6

1(1) 36(36) 63(63) 100

NOTE: Values in brackets are in percentage

SOURCE: Based on primary field work

263

70 66.6 61.5 60 55.5

50 38.4 40 33.3 33.3 1-2 30 3-5 20 More than 5 11.1 10 0 0 0 0 0 0 Illiterate Below high Higher Graduate and school secondary above

Fig1.25a) Graph showing educational level and ideal number of children

70 62.6 60 60 50 50 50

40 35 1-2 30 30 3-5 More than 5 20 10 10 0 0 0 Strictly religious Moderate Indifferent

Fig1.25b) Graph showing religiosity and ideal number of children

264

80 69.7 70 57.8 60

50 42 1-2 40 3-5 27.9 30 More than 5 20

10 2.3 0 0 Urban Rural

Fig1.25c) Graph showing residential background and ideal number of children

90 83.3 80 70 65.2 58.3 60 50 41.6 1-2 40 32.6 3-5 30 More than 5 20 16.6 10 0 2.1 0 0 Less than 10,000 10,000-50,000 Above 50,000

Fig1.25d) Graph showing monthly income and ideal number of children

265 IN TABLES AND GRAPHS 2.1 TO 2.25 DATA ON THE RESPONDENTS BELONGING TO THE SECOND GENERATION IS PRESENTED.

Table 2.1 AGE AT MARRIAGE OF THE RESPONDENTS

Educational Below 18 years 18-25 years. Above 25years. Total level Female Male Female Male Female Male Female Male Illiterate 23(95.8) 6(40) 1(4.16) 9(60) 00 00 24 15 Below high 35(59.3) 7(20.5) 23(38.9) 25(73.5) 1(1.69) 2(5.8) 59 34 school Higher 16(40) 2(6.25) 23(57.5) 23(71.8) 1(2.5) 7(21.8) 40 32 secondary Graduate and 00 2(10.5) 2(100) 10(52.6) 00 7(36.8) 2 19 above 74(59.2) 17(17) 49(39.2) 67(67) 2(1.6) 16(16) 125 100 Religious observance Strictly 53(60.9) 10(28.5) 33(37.9) 15(42.8) 1(1.1) 10(28.5) 87 35 religious Moderate 19(54.2) 5(8.33) 15(42.8) 49(81.6) 1(2.8) 6(10) 35 60 Indifferent 2(66.6) 2(40) 1(33.3) 3(60) 00 00 3 5 74(59.2) 17(17) 49(39.2) 67(67) 2(1.6) 16(16) 125 100 Residence

Urban 63(60) 15(16.6) 40(38.09) 63(70) 2(1.9) 12(13.3) 105 90 Rural 11(55) 2(20) 9(45) 4(40) 00 4(40) 20 10 74(59.2) 17(17) 49(39.2) 67(67) 2(1.6) 16(16) 125 100 Monthly Income level Less than 15(83.3) 11(32.3) 3(16.6) 23(67.6) 00 00 18 34 10,000 10,000- 52(61.1) 4(11) 32(37.6) 29(80.5) 1(2.7) 3(8.3) 85 36 50,000 Above 7(31.8)) 2(6.6) 14(63.6) 15(50) 1(3.33) 13(43) 22 30 50,000 74(59.2) 17(17) 49(39.2) 67(67) 2(1.6) 16(16) 125 100 NOTE: Values in brackets are in percentage

SOURCE: Based on primary field work

266

120

100 100 95.8

59.3 57.5 60 Below 18 yrs 18-25 yrs 38.9 40 40 above 25 yrs

20 4.16 0 0 illiterate below high Higher graduate and school Secondary above

Fig2.1a) Graph showing educational level and age at marriage of the respondents (female)

80 73.5 71.8 70 60 60 52.6 50 40 40 below 18 yrs 18-25 yrs 30 20.5 21.8 above 25 yrs 20 10.5 10 5.8 6.25 5 0 0 illiterate below high higher graduate and school secondary above

Fig2.1b) Graph showing educational level and age at marriage of the respondents (male)

267

70 66.6 60.9 60 54.2

50 42.8 40 37.9 33.3 below 18 yrs 30 18-25 yrs above 25 yrs 20

0 strictly Religious Moderate Indifferent

Fig2.1c) Graph showing religiosity and age at marriage of the respondents (female)

90 81.6 80

70 60 60

50 42.8 below 18 yrs 40 40 18-25 yrs 28.5 28.5 above 25 yrs 30

20 8.33 10 10 0 0 Strictly religious moderate indifferent

Fig2.1d) Graph showing religiosity and age at marriage of the respondents (male)

268

60 60 55

50 45

40 38.09 below 18 yrs

30 18-25 yrs above 25 yrs 20

0 urban Rural

Fig 2.1e) Graph showing residential background and age at marriage of the respondents (female)

80 70 70

50 40 40 below 18 yrs 40 18-25 yrs 30 above 25 yrs 20 20 16.6 13.3 10

0 urban rural

Fig2.1f) Graph showing residential background and age at marriage of the respondents (male)

269

90 83.3 80

70 61.1 60

50 below 18 yrs 40 18-25 yrs 31.8 above 25 yrs 30

20 16.6 11 10 6.6 2.7 3.33 0 0 less than 10,000 10,000-50,000 above 50,000

Fig2.1g) Graph showing monthly income and age at marriage of the respondents (female)

90 80.5 80

70 67.6

60 50 50 43 below 18 yrs 40 18-25 yrs 32.3 above 25 yrs 30

20 11 8.3 10 6.6 0 0 less than 10,000 10,000-50,000 above 50,000

Fig2.1h) Graph showing monthly income and age at marriage of the respondents (male)

270 TABLE 2.2 PREFFERED AGE OF MARRIAGE OF THE RESPONDENTS

Educational Below 18 years 18-25 years Above 25 years Total level Female Male Female Male Female Male Female Male Illiterate 1(4.16) 4(26.6) 20(83.3) 11(73.3) 3(12.5) 00 24 15 Below high 3(5.08) 8(23.5) 56(94.9) 21(61.7) 00 5(14.7) 59 34 school Higher 2(5) 00 37(92.5) 23(71.8) 1(2.5) 9(28) 40 32 secondary Graduate 00 00 2(100) 13(68.4) 00 6(31.5) 2 19 and above 6(4.8) 12(12) 115(92) 68(68) 4(3.2) 20(20) 125 100 Religious observance Strictly 2(2.2) 2(5.7) 81(93.1) 23(65.7) 4(4.5) 10(28.5) 87 35 religious Moderate 4(11.4) 10(16.6) 31(88.5) 40(66.6) 00 10(16.6) 35 60 Indifferent 00 00 3(100) 5(100) 00 00 3 5 6(4.8) 12(12) 115(92) 68(68) 4(3.2) 20(20) 125 100 Residence Urban 5(4.7) 10(11.1) 97(92.3) 63(70) 3(2.8) 17(16.1) 105 90 Rural 1(5) 2(20) 18(90) 5(50) 1(5) 3(30) 20 10 6(4.8) 12(12) 115(92) 68(68) 4(3.2) 20(20) 125 100 Monthly Income level Less than 1(5.5) 8(23.5) 17(94.4) 24(70.5) 00 2(5.8) 18 34 10,000 10,000- 5(5.8) 3(8.3) 77(90.5) 26(72.2) 3(3.5) 7(19.4) 85 36 50,000 Above 00 1(3.3) 21(95.4) 18(60) 1(4.5) 11(36.6) 22 30 50,000 6(4.8) 12(12) 115(92) 68(68) 4(3.2) 20(20) 125 100 NOTE: Values in brackets are in percentage SOURCE: Based on primary field work

271

100 94.9 92.5 90 83.3 80 70 60 50 below 18 yrs 40 18-25 yrs above 25 yrs 30

20 12.5 10 4.16 5.08 5 0 2.5 0 0 0 0 illiterate below high higher secondary graduate and school above

Fig2.2a) Graph showing educational level and preferred age of marriage (female)

80 73.3 71.8 70 61.7 60

below 18 yrs 40 18-25 yrs 30 26.6 28 above 25 yrs 23.5

20 14.7

10 0 0 0 0 illiterate below high school higher secondary above graduate

fig2.2b) Graph showing educational level and preferred age of marriage (male)

272

120

100 100 93.1 88.5

60 below 18 yrs 18-25 yrs 40 above 25 yrs

20 11.4 4.5 2.2 0 0 0 0 strictly religious moderate indifferent

Fig2.2c) Graph showing religiosity and preferred age of marriage (female)

120

100 100

80 65.7 66.6 below 18 yrs 60 18-25 yrs above 25 yrs 40 28.5

20 16.6 16.6 5.7 0 0 strictly religious moderate indifferent

Fig2.2d) Graph showing religiosity and preferred age of marriage (male)

273

100 92.3 90 90

60 below 18 yrs 50 18-25 yrs 40 above 25 yrs 30

10 4.7 2.8 5 5 0 urban rural

Fig2.2e) Graph showing residential background and preferred age of marriage (female)

80 70 70

60 50 50 below 18 yrs 40 18-25 yrs 30 30 above 25 yrs 20 20 16.1 11.1 10

0 urban rural

Fig2.2f) Graph showing residential background and preferred age of marriage (male)

274

120

100 94.4 95.4 90.5

below 18 yrs 60 18-25 yrs above 25 yrs 40

20 5.5 5.8 3.5 4.5 0 0 0 less than 10,000 10,000-50,000 above 50,000

Fig2.2g) Graph showing monthly income level and preferred age of marriage (female)

80 70.5 72.2 70 60 60

50 below 18 yrs 40 36.6 18-25 yrs 30 23.5 above 25 yrs 19.4 20 8.3 10 5.8 3.3 0 less than 10,000 10,000-50,000 above 50,000

Fig2.2h) Graph showing monthly income level and preferred age of marriage (male)

275 TABLE 2.3 RESPONDENTS WHO FAVOURED DOWRY

Educational Yes No Total level Female Male Female Male Female Male Illiterate 6(25) 11(73.3) 18(75) 4(26.6) 24 15 Below high 20(33.8) 23(67.6) 39(66.1) 11(32.3) 59 34 school Higher 16(40) 14(43.7) 24(60) 18(56.2) 40 32 secondary Graduate and 1(50) 5(26.3) 1(50) 14(73.6) 2 19 above 43(34.4) 53(53) 82(65.6) 47(47) 125 100 Religious observance Strictly religious 34(39) 25(71.4) 53(60.9) 10(28.5) 87 35 Moderate 9(25.7) 25(41.6) 26(74.2) 35(58.3) 35 60 Indifferent 00 3(60) 3(100) 2(40) 3 5 43(34.4) 53(53) 82(65.6) 47(47) 125 100 Residence Urban 34(32.3) 46(51.1) 71(67.6) 44(48.8) 105 90 Rural 9(45) 7(70) 11(55) 3(30) 20 10 43(34.4) 53(53) 82(65.6) 47(47) 125 100 Monthly Income level Less than 10000 6(33.3) 22(64.7) 12(66.6) 12(35.2) 18 34 10,000-50,000 28(32.9) 17(47.2) 57(67) 19(52.7) 85 36 Above 50,000 9(40.9) 14(46.6) 13(59.09) 16(53.3) 22 30 43(34.4) 53(53) 82(65.6) 47(47) 125 100 NOTE: Values in brackets are in percentage

SOURCE: Based on primary field work

276

80 75

70 66.1 60 60 50 50 50 40 40 33.8 Yes 30 25 No

0 illiterate below high higher graduate and school secondary above

Fig2.3a) Graph showing educational level and respondents who favoured dowry (female)

80 73.3 73.6 70 67.7

60 56.2

50 43.7 40 32.3 Yes 30 26.6 26.3 No

0 illiterate below high school higher secondary graduate and above

Fig2.3b) Graph showing educational level and respondents who favoured dowry (male)

277

120

100 100

80 74.2

60.9 60 Yes No 39 40 25.7 20

0 0 strictly religious moderate indifferent

Fig2.3c) Graph showing religiosity and respondents who favoured dowry (female)

80 71.4 70

58.3 60 60

50 41.6 40 40 Yes 28.5 No 30

0 strictly religious Moderate indifferent

Fig2.3d) Graph showing religiosity and respondents who favoured dowry (male)

278

70 67.6

60 55

50 45

40 Yes 32.3 No 30

0 urban rural

Fig2.3e) Graph showing residential background and respondents who favoured dowry (female)

80 70 70

60 51.1 48.8 50

40 Yes 30 No 30

0 urban ruaral

Fig2.3f) Graph showing residential background and respondents who favoured dowry (male)

279

70 66.6 67 59.09 60

50 40.9 40 Yes 33.3 32.9 No 30

0 less than10,000 10,000-50,000 above 50,000

Fig2.3g) Graph showing monthly income and respondents who favoured dowry (female)

70 64.7

60 52.7 53.3 50 47.2 46.6

40 35.2 Yes 30 No

0 less than 10,000 10,000-50,000 above 50,000

Fig2.3h) Graph showing monthly income and respondents who favoured dowry (male)

280 Table 2.4 RESPONDENTS WHO HAVE GIVEN AND TAKEN DOWRY

Educational Yes No Total level Female Male Female Male Female Male Illiterate 18(75) 12(80) 6(25) 3(20) 24 15 Below high 52(88.1) 23(67.6) 7(11.8) 11(32.3) 59 34 school Higher secondary 25(62.5) 16(50) 15(37.5) 16(50) 40 32

Graduate and 1(50) 7(36.8) 1(50) 12(63.1) 2 19 above 96(76.8) 58(58) 29(23.2) 42(42) 125 100 Religious observance Strictly religious 75(86.2) 25(71.4) 12(13.7) 10(28.5) 87 35 Moderate 20(57.1) 30(50) 15(25) 30(50) 35 60 Indifferent 1(33.3) 3(60) 2(66.6) 2(40) 3 5 96(76.8) 58(58) 29(23.2) 42(42) 125 100 Residence Urban 85(80.9) 52(57.7) 20(19.0) 38(42.2) 105 90 Rural 11(55) 6(60) 9(45) 4(40) 20 10 96(76.8) 58(58) 29(23.2) 42(42) 125 100 Monthly Income level Less than 10000 6(33.3) 22(64.7) 12(66.6) 12(35.2) 18 34 10000-50000 70(82.3) 19(52.7) 15(17.6) 17(47.2) 85 36 Above 50000 20(90.9) 17(56.6) 2(9.09) 13(43.3) 22 30 96(76.8) 58(58) 29(23.2) 42(42) 125 100 NOTE: Values in brackets are in percentage

SOURCE: Based on primary field work

281

100 88.1 90 80 75

70 62.5 60 50 50 50 Yes 37.5 40 No 30 25 20 11.8 10 0 illiterate below high higher graduate and school secondary above

Fig 2.4a) Graph showing educational level and respondents who have given dowry (female)

90 80 80

70 67.6 63.1 60 50 50 50 Yes 40 36.8 32.3 No 30 20 20

0 illiterate below high school higher secondary above graduate

Fig 2.4b) Graph showing educational level and respondents who have taken dowry (male)

282

100

90 86.2

70 66.6

60 57.1 Yes 50 No 40 33.3 30 25

20 13.7 10

0 strictly religious moderate indifferent Fig 2.4c) Graph showing religiosity and respondents who have given dowry (female)

80 71.4 70 60 60 50 50 50 40 40 Yes 28.5 No 30

0 strictly religious moderate indifferent

Fig 2.4d) Graph showing religiosity and respondents who have taken dowry (male)

283

90 80.9 80

60 55

50 45 Yes 40 No 30 19 20

0 urban Rural

Fig 2.4e) Graph showing residential background and respondents who have given dowry (female)

60 60 57.7

50 42.2 40 40 Yes 30 No

0 urban Rural

Fig 2.4f) Graph showing residential background and respondents who have taken dowry (male)

284

100 90.9 90 82.3 80

70 66.6

50 Yes No 40 33.3 30

20 17.6 9.09 10

0 less than 10,000 10,000-50,000 above 50,000

Fig 2.4g) Graph showing monthly income level and respondents who have given dowry (female)

70 64.7

60 56.6 52.7 50 47.2 43.3

40 35.2 Yes 30 No

0 less than 10,000 10,000-50,000 above 50,000

Fig 2.4h) Graph showing monthly income level and respondents who have taken dowry (male)

285 TABLE 2.5 FEMALE RESPONDENTS WHO CONSIDERED SOCIAL STATUS AS THE MAIN REASON OF DOWRY

Educational level Agree Disagree Agree to some Total extent Illiterate 8(33.3) 13(54.1) 3(12.5) 24 Below high school 22(37.2) 26(44) 11(18.6) 59 Higher secondary 11(27.5) 17(42.5) 12(30) 40 Graduate and 1(50) 1(50) 00 2 above 42(33.6) 57(45.6) 26(20.8) 125 Religious observance Strictly religious 23(26.4) 43(49) 21(24.1) 87 Moderate 19(54.2) 12(34.2) 4(11.4) 35 Indifferent 00 2(66.6) 1(33.3) 3 42(33.6) 57(45.6) 26(20.8) 125 Residence Urban 38(36.1) 42(40) 25(23.8) 105 Rural 4(20) 15(75) 1(5) 20 42(33.6) 57(45.6) 26(20.8) 125 Monthly Income level Less than 10,000 8(44.4) 8(44.4) 2(11.1) 18 10,000-50,000 22(25.8) 41(48.2) 22(25.8) 85 Above 50,000 12(54.5) 8(36.3) 2(9.09) 22 42(33.6) 57(45.6) 26(20.8) 125 NOTE: Values in brackets are in percentage

SOURCE: Based on primary field work

286

60 54.1 50 50 50 44 42.5 40 37.2 33.3 30 30 27.5 agree disagree 18.6 20 agree to some extent 12.5 10

0 0 illiterate below high higher graduate and school secondary above

Fig 2.5a) Graph showing educational level and social status as the reason of dowry (female)

70 66.6

60 54.2 49 50

40 34.2 33.3 agree 30 26.4 24.1 disagree agree to some extent 20 11.4 10 0 0 strictly moderate indifferent religious

Fig 2.5b) Graph showing religiosity and social status as the main reason of dowry (female)

287

80 75

50 40 agree 40 36.1 disagree 30 23.8 agree to some extent 20 20

10 5

0 urban rural

Fig 2.5c) Graph showing residential background and social status as the main reason of dowry

60 54.5

50 48.2 44.444.4

40 36.3

30 25.8 25.8 agree 20 disagree 11.1 9.09 agree to some extent 10

fig 2.5d) Graph showing monthly income and social status as the main reason of dowry

288 TABLE 2.6 FEMALE RESPONDENTS WHO EXPERIENCED DOMESTIC VIOLENCE

Educational level Yes No Total Illiterate 16(66.6) 8(33.3) 24 Below high school 11(18.6) 48(81.3) 59 Higher secondary 1(2.5) 39(97.5) 40 Graduate and above 00 2(100) 2 28(22.4) 97(77.6) 125 Religious observance Strictly religious 17(19.5) 70(80.4) 87 Moderate 11(31.4) 24(68.5) 35 Indifferent 00 3(100) 3 28(22.4) 97(77.6) 125 Residence Urban 22(20.9) 83(79) 105 Rural 6(30) 14(70) 20 28(22.4) 97(77.6) 125 Monthly Income level Less than 10,000 11(61.1) 7(38.8) 18 10,000-50,000 10(11.7) 75(88.2) 85 Above 50,000 7(31.8) 15(68.1) 22 28(22.4) 97(77.6) 125 NOTE: Values in brackets are in percentage

SOURCE: Based on primary field work

289

120

97.5 100 100

81.3 80 66.6

60 Yes No 40 33.3

18.6 20

2.5 0 0 illiterate below high high school- above graduate school graduate

Fig 2.6a) Graph showing educational level and female who experienced domestic violence

120

100 100

80.4 80 68.5

60 Yes No 40 31.4

19.5 20

0 0 strictly religious moderate indifferent

Fig 2.6b) Graph showing religiosity and female who experienced domestic violence

290

90 79 80 70 70

50 yes 40 No 30 30 20.9 20

0 urban rural

Fig2.6c) Graph showing residential background and female who experienced domestic violence

100 88.2 90

80 68.1 70 61.1 60

50 Yes 38.8 40 No 31.8 30

20 11.7 10

0 less than 10,000 10,000-50,000 above 50,000

Fig 2.6d) Graph showing monthly income and female who experienced domestic violence

291 TABLE 2.7 MALE RESPONDENTS WHO DEMANDED DOWRY

Educational level Yes No Total Illiterate 8(53.3) 7(46.6) 15 Below high school 13(38.2) 21(61.7) 34 Higher secondary 6(18.7) 26(81.2) 32 Graduate and above 2(10.5) 17(89.4) 19 29(29) 71(71) 100 Religious observance Strictly religious 2(5.7) 33(94.2) 35 Moderate 27(45) 33(55) 60 Indifferent 00 5(100) 5 29(29) 71(71) 100 Residence Urban 25(27.7) 65(72.2) 90 Rural 4(40) 6(60) 10 29(29) 71(71) 100 Monthly Income level Less than 10,000 15(44.1) 19(55.8) 34 10,000-50,000 4(11.1) 32(88.8) 36 Above 50,000 10(33.3) 20(66.6) 30 29(29) 71(71) 100 NOTE: Values in brackets are in percentage

SOURCE: Based on primary field work

292

100 89.4 90 81.2 80 70 61.7 60 53.3 50 46.6 38.2 Yes 40 No 30 18.7 20 10.5 10 0 illiterate below high higher secondary graduate and school above

Fig 2.7a)Graph showing educational level and male who demanded dowry

120

100 100 94.2

60 55 Yes 45 No 40

20 5.7 0 0 strictly religious moderate indifferent

Fig2.7b) Graph showing religiosity and male who demanded dowry

293

80 72.2 70 60 60

50 40 40 Yes No 30 27.7

0 urban Rural

Fig 2.7c)Graph showing residential background and male who demanded dowry

100 88.8 90

70 66.6

60 55.8

50 44.1 yes No 40 33.3 30

20 11.1 10

0 less than 10,000 10,000-50,000 above 50,000

Fig 2.7d) Graph showing monthly income and male who demanded dowry

294 TABLE 2.8 RESPONDENTS WHO HAVE RECEIVED AND PAID MAHR

Educational Yes No Total level Female Male Female Male Female Male Illiterate 7(29.16) 7(46.6) 17(70.8) 8(53.3) 24 15 Below high 29(49.1) 19(55.8) 30(50.8) 15(44) 59 34 school Higher 20(50) 24(75) 20(50) 8(25) 40 32 secondary Graduate and 1(50) 17(89) 1(50) 2(105) 2 19 above 57(45.6) 67(67) 68(54.4) 33(33) 125 100 Religious observance Strictly religious 38(43.6) 20(57.1) 49(56.3) 15(42.8) 87 35 Moderate 17(48.5) 42(70) 18(51.4) 18(30) 35 60 Indifferent 2(66.6) 5(100) 1(33.3) 00 3 5 57(45.6) 67(67) 68(54.4) 33(33) 125 100 Residence Urban 53(50.4) 61(67.7) 52(49.5) 29(32.2) 105 90 Rural 4(20) 6(60) 16(80) 4(40) 20 10 57(45.6) 67(67) 68(54.4) 33(33) 125 100 Income level Less than 10,000 5(27.7) 17(50) 13(72.2) 17(50) 18 34 10,000-50,000 50(58.8) 27(75) 35(41.1) 9(25) 85 36 Above 50,000 2(9.09) 23(76.6) 20(90.9) 7(23.3) 22 30 57(45.6) 67(67) 68(54.4) 33(33) 125 100 NOTE: Values in brackets are in percentage

SOURCE: Based on primary field work

295

80 70.8 70

60 49.1 50.8 50 50 50 50 50

40 Yes 29.16 30 No

0 illiterate below high school higher secondary graduate and above

Fig 2.8a) Graph showing educational level and mehr received (female)

120 105 100 89

80 75

60 53.3 55.8 Yes 46.6 44 No 40 25 20

0 illiterate below high school higher secondary graduate and above

Fig 2.8b) Graph showing educational level and mehr paid (male)

296

70 66.6

60 56.3 51.4 48.5 50 43.6

40 33.3 Yes 30 No

0 strictly religious moderate indifferent

Fig 2.8c) Graph showing religiosity and mehr received (female)

120

100 100

80 70

57.1 60 Yes 42.8 No 40 30

0 strictly religious moderate indifferent

Fig 2.8d) Graph showing religiosity and mehr paid (male)

297

90 80 80

60 50.4 49.5 50 Yes 40 No 30 20 20

0 urban rural

Fig 2.8e) Graph showing residential background and mehr received (female)

70 67.7 60 60

50 40 40 Yes 32.2 No 30

0 urban rural

Fig 2.8f) Graph showing residential background and mehr paid(male)

298

100 90.9 90

80 72.2 70 58.8 60

50 Yes 41.1 40 No 27.7 30

20 9.09 10

0 less than 10,000 10,000-50,000 above 50,000

Fig 2.8g) Graph showing monthly income level and mehr received (female)

80 75 76.6

60 50 50 50 Yes 40 No 30 25 23.3 20

0 less than 10,000 10,000-50,000 above 50,000

Fig 2.8h) Graph showing monthly income level and mehr paid (male)

299 TABLE 2.9 RESPONDENTS ATTITUDE TOWARDS POLYGYNY

Educational Yes No To some extent Total level Female Male Female Male Female Male Female Male Illiterate 4(16.6) 12(80) 12(50) 3(20) 8(33.3) 00 24 15 Below high 6(10.1) 20(58.8) 32(54.2) 14(41) 21(35.5) 00 59 34 school Higher 4(10) 14(43.7) 23(57.5) 18(56) 13(32.5) 00 40 32 secondary Graduate and 00 8(42) 1(50) 11(57.8) 1(50) 00 2 19 above 14(11.2) 54(54) 68(54.4) 46(46) 43(34.4) 00 125 100 Religious observance Strictly 11(12.6) 10(28.5) 52(59.7) 25(71.4) 24(27.5) 00 87 35 religious Moderate 3(8.5) 40(66.6) 13(37) 20(33.3) 19(54.2) 00 35 60 Indifferent 00 4(80) 3(100) 1(20) 00 00 3 5 14(11.2) 54(54) 68(54.4) 46(46) 43(34.4) 00 125 100 Residence Urban 12(11.4) 47(52.2) 57(54.2) 43(47.7) 36(34.2) 00 105 90 Rural 2(10) 7(70) 11(55) 3(30) 7(35) 00 20 10 14(11.2) 54(54) 68(54.4) 46(46) 43(34.4) 00 125 100 Monthly Income level Less than 8(44.4) 23(67.6) 5(27.7) 11(32.3) 5(27.7) 00 18 34 10000 10,000- 3(3.5) 16(44.4) 45(52.9) 20(55.5) 37(43.5) 00 85 36 50000 Above 3(13.6) 15(50) 18(81.8) 15(50) 1(4.5) 00 22 30 50,000 14(11.2) 54(54) 68(54.4) 46(46) 43(34.4) 00 125 100 NOTE: Values in brackets are in percentage

SOURCE: Based on primary field work

300

60 57.5 54.2 50 50 50 50

40 35.5 33.3 32.5 Yes 30 No to some extent 20 16.6 10.1 10 10 0 0 illiterate below high higher secondary graduate and school above

Fig 2.9a) Graph showing educational level and attitude towards polygyny (female)

90 80 80

70 58.8 57.8 60 56 50 50 43.7 41 42 Yes 40 35.5 33.3 32.5 No 30 To some extent 20 20

0 Illiterate below high Higher graduate and school secondary above

Fig 2.9b) Graph showing educational level and attitude towards polygyny (male)

301

120

100 100

59.7 60 54.2 Yes No 37 40 to some extent 27.5

20 12.6 8.5 0 3 0 strictly moderate indifferent religious

Fig2.9c) Graph showing religiosity and attitude towards polygyny (female)

90 80 80 71.4 70 66.6

50 Yes 40 33.3 No 28.5 30 To some extent 20 20

0 strictly moderate indifferent religious

Fig 2.9d) Graph showing religiosity and attitude towards polygyny (male)

302

60 54.2 55

40 34.2 35 Yes 30 No To some extent 20

11.4 10 10

0 Urban Rural

Fig 2.9e) Graph showing residential background and attitude towards polygyny (female)

80 70 70

60 52.2 50 47.7 Yes 40 No 30 30 To some extent

0 Urban rural

Fig 2.9f) Graph showing residential background and attitude towards polygyny (male)

303

90 81.8 80

60 52.9 50 44.4 43.5 Yes 40 No 27.727.7 30 To some extent

20 13.6

10 3.5 4.5 0 less than 10,000-50,000 above 50,000 10,000

Fig 2.9g) Graph showing monthly income attitude towards polygyny (female)

70 67.6

60 55.5 50 50 50 44.4

40 Yes 32.3 No 30 To some extent 20

0 less than 10,000-50,000 above 50,000 10,000

Fig 2.9h) Graph showing monthly income and attitude towards polygyny (male)

304 TABLE 2.10 FEMALE RESPONDENTS WHO EXPERIENCED POLYGYNY

Educational level Yes No Total Illiterate 5(20.8) 19(79.1) 24 Below high school 13(22) 46(77.9) 59 Higher secondary 4(10) 36(90) 40 Graduate and above 1(50) 1(50) 2 23(18.4) 102(81.6) 125 Religious observance Strictly religious 17(19.5) 70(80.4) 87 Moderate 5(14.2) 30(85.7) 35 Indifferent 1(33.3) 2(66.6) 3 23(18.4) 102(81.6) 125 Residence Urban 16(15.2) 89(84.7) 105 Rural 7(35) 13(65) 20 23(18.4) 102(81.6) 125 Monthly Income level Less than 10,000 3(16.6) 15(83.3) 18 10,000-50,000 15(17.6) 70(82.3) 85 Above 50,000 5(22.7) 17(77.2) 22 23(18.4) 102(81.6) 125 NOTE: Values in brackets are in percentage

SOURCE: Based on primary field work

305

100 90 90 79.1 77.9 80 70 60 50 50 50 Yes 40 No 30 20.8 22 20 10 10 0 illiterate below high school higher secondary graduate and above

Fig 2.10 a) Graph showing educational level and female who experienced polygyny

90 85.7 80.4 80 70 66.6 60 50

40 33.3 Yes 30 No 19.5 20 14.2 10 0 strictly moderate indifferent religious

Fig2.10b) Graph showing religiosity and female who experienced polygyny

306

90 84.7 80

70 65

50 Yes 40 35 No 30

20 15.2

0 Urban Rural

Fig 2.10c) Graph showing residential background and female who experienced polygyny

90 83.3 82.3 80 77.2

50 Yes 40 No 30 22.7 17.6 20 16.6

0 less than 10,000 10,000-50,000 above 50,000

Fig 2.10d) Graph showing monthly income level and female who experienced polygyny

307 TABLE 2.11 UNDER WHAT CONDITIONS FEMALE RESPONDENTS WOULD ALLOW SECOND WIFE.

Educational If equal To prevent No issue Never Total level treatment is divorce guaranteed Illiterate 1(4.1) 1(4.1) 6(25) 16(66.6) 24 Below high 2(3.3) 00 17(28.8) 40(67.7) 59 school Higher 1(2.5) 1(2.5) 10(25) 28(70) 40 secondary Graduate and 00 00 1(50) 1(50) 2 above 4(3.2) 2(1.6) 34(27.2) 85(68) 125 Religious observance Strictly 1(1.1) 1(1.1) 20(22.9) 65(74.7) 87 religious Moderate 2(5.7) 00 14(40) 19(54.2) 35 Indifferent 1(33.3) 1(33.3) 00 1(33.3) 3 4(3.2) 2(1.6) 34(27.2) 85(68) 125 Residence Urban 2(1.9) 00 19(18.0) 84(80) 105 Rural 2(10) 2(10) 15(75) 1(5) 20 4(3.2) 2(1.6) 34(27.2) 85(68) 125 Monthly Income level Less than 00 00 4(22.2) 14(77.7) 18 10,000 10,000- 2(2.3) 2(2.3) 26(30.5) 55(64.7) 85 50000 Above 2(9.09) 00 4(18.1) 16(72.7) 22 50,000 4(3.2) 2(1.6) 34(27.2) 85(68) 125 NOTE: Values in brackets are in percentage SOURCE: Based on primary field work

308

80 70 70 66.6 67.7

60 50 50 if equal treatment is 50 guaranteed 40 To prevent divorce 28.8 30 25 25 No issue

20 Never 10 4.14.1 3.3 2.52.5 0 0 0 0 illiterate below high higher graduate and school secondary above

Fig 2.11a) Graph showing educational level and conditions in which wives allow second wife

80 74.7

60 54.2 if equal treatment is 50 guaranteed 40 To prevent divorce 40 33.333.3 33.3 No issue 30 22.9 20 Never

10 5.7 1.11.1 0 0 0 strictly religious moderate indifferent

Fig 2.11b) Graph showing religiosity and conditions in which wives allow second wife

309

90 80 80 75

60 If equal treatment is guaranteed 50 To prevent divorce

40 No issue 30 18 Never 20 10 10 10 5 1.9 0 0 Urban Rural

Fig 2.11c) Graph showing residential background and conditions in which wives allow second wife

80 77.7 72.7 70 64.7

60 If equal treatment is guaranteed 50 To prevent divorce

40 30.5 No issue 30 22.2 18.1 Never 20 9.09 10 2.3 0 0 less than 10,000 10,000-50,000 above 50,000

Fig 2.11d) Graph showing monthly income and conditions in which wives allow second wife

310 TABLE 2.12 MALE RESPONDENTS VIEW ON EQUAL TREATMENT TO WIVES

Educational level Yes No Total Illiterate 1(6.6) 14(93) 15 Below high school 9(26.4) 25(73.5) 34 Higher secondary 12(37.5) 20(62.5) 32 Graduate and above 8(42) 11(57.8) 19 30(30) 70(70) 100 Religious observance Strictly religious 20(57.1) 15(42.8) 35 Moderate 10(16.6) 50(83.3) 60 Indifferent 00 5(100) 5 30(30) 70(70) 100 Residence Urban 29(32.2) 61(67.7) 90 Rural 1(10) 9(90) 10 30(30) 70(70) 100 Monthly Income level Less than 10,000 7(20.5) 27(79.4) 34 10,000-50,000 13(36.1) 23(63.8) 36 Above 50,000 10(33.3) 20(66.6) 30 30(30) 70(70) 100 NOTE: Values in brackets are in percentage

SOURCE: Based on primary field work

311

100 93 90

80 73.5 70 62.5 57.8 60

50 Yes 42 40 37.5 No

30 26.4

10 6.6

0 illiterate below high school higher secondary graduate and above

Fig 2.12a) Graph showing educational level and equal treatment to wives

120

100 100 83.3 80

57.1 60 Yes 42.8 No 40

20 16.6

0 0 strictly religious Moderate Indifferent

Fig 2.12b) Graph showing religiosity and equal treatment to wives

312

100 90 90

80 67.7 70

50 Yes 40 No 32.2 30

20 10 10

0 Urban Rural

Fig 2.12c) Graph showing residential background and equal treatment to wives

90 79.4 80 66.6 70 63.8 60

50 Yes 36.1 40 33.3 No 30 20.5 20

0 less than 10,000 10,000-50,000 above 50,000

Fig 2.12d) Graph showing monthly income and equal treatment to wives

313 TABLE 2.13 RESPONDENTS WHO FAVOURED DIVORCE

Educational level Yes No Total Female Male Female Male Female Male Illiterate 6(25) 10(66.6) 18(75) 5(33.3) 24 15 Below high 14(23.7) 16(47) 45(76) 18(52.9) 59 34 school Higher secondary 9(22.5) 6(18.7) 31(77.5) 26(81) 40 32 Graduate and 2(100) 6(31.5) 00 13(68) 2 19 above 31(24.8) 38(38) 94(75.2) 62(62) 125 100 Religious observance Strictly religious 23(26.4) 10(28.5) 64(73.5) 25(71.4) 87 35 Moderate 8(22.8) 25(41.6) 27(77) 35(58.3) 35 60 Indifferent 00 3(60) 3(100) 2(40) 3 5 31(24.8) 38(38) 94(75.2) 62(62) 125 100 Residence Urban 24(22.8) 33(36.6) 81(77.1) 57(63.3) 105 90 Rural 7(70) 5(50) 13(65) 5(50) 20 10 31(24.4) 38(38) 94(75.2) 62(62) 125 100 Monthly Income level Less than 10,000 6(33.3) 19(55.8) 12(66.6) 15(44) 18 34 10,000-50,000 20(23.5) 8(22.2) 65(76.4) 28(77) 85 36 Above 50,000 5(22.7) 11(36.6) 17(77.2) 19(63.3) 22 30 31(24.8) 38(38) 94(75.2) 62(62) 125 100 NOTE: Values in brackets are in percentage

SOURCE: Based on primary field work

314

120

100 100

77.5 80 75 76

60 Yes No 40

25 23.7 22.5 20

0 0 illiterate below high school higher secondary graduate and above

Fig 2.13a) Graph showing educational level and respondents who favoured divorce (female)

90 81 80 68 70 66.6

60 52.9 50 47 Yes 40 33.3 31.5 No 30 18.7 20

0 illiterate below high school higher secondary above graduate

Fig 2.13b) Graph showing educational level and respondents who favoured divorce (male)

315

120

100 100

77 80 73.5

60 Yes No 40 26.4 22.8 20

0 0 strictly religious Moderate Indifferent

Fig 2.13c) Graph showing religiosity and respondents who favoured divorce (female)

80 71.4 70

58.3 60

50 40 40 Yes 28.5 No 30 22.8 20

10 0 0 Strictly religious Moderate Indifferent

Fig 2.13d) Graph showing religiosity and respondents who favoured divorce (male)

316

80 77.1 70 70 65

50 Yes 40 No 30 22.8 20

0 Urban Rural

Fig 2.13e) Graph showing residential background and respondents who favoured divorce (female)

70 63.3 60 50 50 50

40 36.6 Yes 30 No

0 Urban Rural

Fig 2.13f) Graph showing residential background and respondents who favoured divorce (male)

317

80 76.4 77.2

70 66.6

50 Yes 40 33.3 No 30 23.5 22.7 20

0 Less than 10,000 10,000-50,000 above 50,000

Fig 2.13g) Graph showing monthly income level and respondents who favoured divorce (female)

80 77

70 63.3 60 55.8

50 44 Yes 40 36.6 No 30 22.2 20

0 less than 10,000 10,000-50,000 above 50,000

Fig 2.13h) Graph showing monthly income level and respondents who favoured divorce (male)

318 TABLE 2.14 FEMALE RESPONDENTS WHO EXPERIENCED DIVORCE

Educational level Yes No Total Illiterate 3(12.5) 21(87.5) 24 Below high school 10(16.9) 49(83) 59 Higher secondary 10(25) 30(75) 40 Graduate and above 1(50) 1(50) 2 24(19.2) 101(80.8) 125 Religious observance Strictly religious 19(21.8) 68(78) 87 Moderate 4(11.4) 31(88.5) 35 Indifferent 1(33.3) 2(66.6) 3 24(19.2) 101(80.8) 125 Residence Urban 19(18) 86(81.9) 105 Rural 5(25) 15(75) 20 24(19.2) 101(80.8) 125 Monthly Income level Less than 10,000 1(5.5) 17(94.4) 18 10,000-50,000 16(18.8) 69(81.1) 85 Above 50,000 7(31.8) 15(68.1) 22 24(19.2) 101(80.8) 125 NOTE: Values in brackets are in percentage

SOURCE: Based on primary field work

319

100 87.5 90 83 80 75 70 60 50 50 50 Yes 40 No 30 25 16.9 20 12.5 10 0 illiterate less than high higher secondary graduate and school above

Fig 2.14a) Graph showing educational level and female who experienced divorce

100 88.5 90 78 80

70 66.6

50 Yes No 40 33.3 30 21.8 20 11.4 10

0 strictly religious moderate indifferent

Fig 2.14b) Graph showing religiosity and female who experienced divorce

320

90 81.9 80 75

50 Yes 40 No 30 25 18 20

0 Urban Rural

Fig 2.14c) Graph showing residential background and female who experienced divorce

100 94.4 90 81.1 80 68.1 70

50 Yes 40 No 31.8 30 18.8 20

10 5.5

0 less than 10,000 10,000-50,000 above 50,000

Fig 2.14d) Graph showing monthly income and female who experienced divorce

321 TABLE 2.15 MAJOR CAUSE OF DIVORCE

Educational Lack of Husband’s Wive’s Dowry Male Physical Total level adjustment extramarital extramarital dispute child violence with in- relations relations issue laws Illiterate 00 2(66.6) 1(33.3) 00 00 00 3 Below high 3(30) 2(20) 00 1(10) 1(10) 3(30) 10 school Higher 1(10) 6(60) 00 1(10) 00 2(20) 10 secondary Graduate 1(100) 00 00 00 00 00 1 and above 5(20.8) 10(41.6) 1(4.16) 2(8.3) 1(4.16) 5(20.8) 24 Religious observance Strictly 3(37.5) 2(25) 00 1(12.5) 1(12.5) 1(12.5) 8 religious Moderate 2(16.6) 5(41.6) 00 1(8.3) 00 4(33.3) 12 Indifferent 00 3(75) 1(25) 00 00 00 4 5(20.8) 10(41.6) 1(4.16) 2(8.3) 1(4.16) 5(20.8) 24 Residence Urban 3(17.6) 6(35.2) 1(5.8) 2(11.7) 1(5.8) 4(23.5) 17 Rural 2(28.5) 4(57.1) 00 00 00 1(14.2) 7 5(20.8) 10(41.6) 1(4.16) 2(8.3) 1(4.16) 5(20.8) 24 Monthly Income level Less than 00 1(100) 00 00 00 00 1 10,000 10,000- 1(6.6) 7(46.6) 1(6.6) 1(6.6) 2(14.2) 3(20) 15 50000 Above 4(50) 2(25) 00 00 00 2(25) 8 50,000 5(20.8) 10(41.6) 1(4.16) 2(8.3) 1(4.16) 5(20.8) 24

322

120

100 100

80 lack of adjustment with inlaws 66.6 60 Husband extramarital 60 wive's extramarital Dowry dispute 40 33.3 30 30 Male Child issue 20 20 Physical violence 20 10 10 10 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 illitearte below high higher above school secondary graduate

Fig 2.15a) Graph showing educational level and cause of divorce

80 75

50 Lack of adjustment with inlaws 41.6 husband extramarital relation 40 37.5 33.3 wives extra marital relation 30 25 25 Dowry Dispute

20 16.6 Male child issue 12.512.5 Physical violence 8.3 10 0 0 strictly moderate indifferent religious

Fig 2.15b) Graph showing religiosity and cause of divorce

323

60 57.1

40 Lack of adjustment with inlaws 35.2 Husband extramarital relation 28.5 30 Wives extramarital relation 23.5 Dowry dispute 17.6 20 Male child issue 14.2 11.7 Physical violence 10 5.8 5.8

0 Urban Rural

Fig 2.15c) Graph showing residential background and cause of divorce

120 100 100

80 lack of adjustment with inlaws 60 46.6 50 Husband' extramarital relation 40 Wives extramarital relation 25 25 Dowry dispute 20 20 14.2 Male child issue 6.6 6.66.6 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 Physical violence 0

Fig 2.15d) Graph showing monthly income and cause of divorce

324 TABLE 2.16 RESPONDENTS WHO FAVOURED FAMILY PLANNING

Educational Yes No Total level Female Male Female Male Female Male Illiterate 7(29.1) 5(33.3) 17(70.8) 10(66.6) 24 15 Below high 19(32.2) 12(35.2) 40(67.7) 22(64.7) 59 34 school Higher secondary 21(52.5) 14(43.7) 19(47.5) 18(56.2) 40 32 Graduate and 1(50) 10(52.6) 1(50) 9(47.3) 2 19 above 48(38.4) 41(41) 77(61.6) 59(59) 125 100 Religious observance Strictly religious 34(39) 8(22.8) 53(60.9) 27(77.1) 87 35 Moderate 13(37.1) 30(50) 22(62.8) 30(50) 35 60 Indifferent 1(33.3) 3(60) 2(66.6) 2(40) 3 5 48(38.4) 41(41) 77(61.6) 59(59) 125 100 Residence Urban 43(40.9) 36(40) 62(59) 54(60) 105 90 Rural 5(25) 5(50) 15(75) 5(50) 20 10 48(38.4) 41(41) 77(61.6) 59(59) 125 100 Monthly Income level Less than 10,000 8(44.4) 10(29.4) 10(55.5) 24(70.5) 18 34 10,000-50,000 28(32.9) 11(30.5) 57(67) 25(69.4) 85 36 Above 50,000 12(54.5) 20(66.6) 10(45.4) 10(33.3) 22 30 48(38.4) 41(41) 77(61.6) 59(59) 125 100 NOTE: Values in brackets are in percentage

SOURCE: Based on primary field work

325

80 70.8 70 67.7

60 52.5 50 50 50 47.5

40 Yes 32.2 29.1 No 30

0 illiterate below high school higher secondary graduate and above

Fig 2.16a) Graph showing educational level and respondents who favoured family planning (female)

70 66.6 64.7

60 56.2 52.6 50 47.3 43.7

40 35.2 33.3 Yes 30 No

0 illiterate below high school higher secondary graduate and above

Fig 2.16b) Graph showing educational level and respondents who favoured family planning (male)

326

70 66.6 62.8 60.9 60

39 40 37.1 33.3 Yes 30 No

0 strictly religious Moderate Indifferent

Fig 2.16c) Graph showing religiosity and respondents who favoured family planning (female)

80 77.1

70 60 60 50 50 50 40 Yes 40 No 30 22.8 20

0 strictly religious moderate indifferent

Fig 2.16d) Graph showing religiosity and respondents who favoured family planning (male)

327

80 75

70 59 60

50 40.9 40 Yes No 30 25

0 Urban Rural

Fig 2.16e) Graph showing residential background and respondents who favoured family planning (female)

60 60

50 50 50

40 40 Yes 30 No

0 urban Rural

Fig 2.16f) Graph showing residential background and respondents who favoured family Planning (male)

328

70 67

60 55.5 54.5

50 44.4 45.4

40 Yes 32.9 No 30

0 less than 10,000 10,000-50,000 above 50,000

Fig 2.16g) Graph showing monthly income and respondents who favoured family planning (female)

80 70.5 69.4 70 66.6

40 Yes 33.3 29.4 30.5 No 30

0 less than 10,000 10,000-50,000 above 50,000

Fig 2.16h) Graph showing monthly income and respondents who favoured family planning (male)

329 TABLE 2.17 RESPONDENTS WHO USED CONTRACEPTIVE METHODS

Educational Yes No Total level Female Male Female Male Female Male Illiterate 5(20.8) 3(20) 19(79.1) 12(80) 24 15 Below high 8(13.5) 4(11.7) 51(86.4) 30(88.2) 59 34 school Higher secondary 12(30) 5(15.6) 28(70) 27(84.3) 40 32 Graduate and 1(50) 12(63) 1(50) 7(36.8) 2 19 above 26(20.8) 24(24) 99(79.2) 76(76) 125 100 Religious observance Strictly religious 17(19.5) 5(14.2) 70(80.4) 30(85.7) 87 35 Moderate 9(25.7) 15(25) 26(74.2) 45(75) 35 60 Indifferent 00 4(80) 3(100) 1(20) 3 5 26(20.8) 24(24) 99(71.2) 76(76) 125 100 Residence Urban 22(20.9) 20(22.2) 83(79) 70(77.7) 105 90 Rural 4(20) 4(40) 16(80) 6(60) 20 10 26(20.8) 24(24) 99(79.2) 76(76) 125 100 Monthly Income level Less than 10,000 5(27.7) 7(20.5) 13(72.2) 27(79.4) 18 34 10,000-50,000 3(3.5) 8(22.2) 82(96.4) 28(77.7) 85 36 Above 50,000 18(81.8) 9(30) 4(18.1) 21(70) 22 30 26(20.8) 24(24) 99(79.2) 76(76) 125 100 NOTE: Values in brackets are in percentage

SOURCE: Based on primary field work

330

100

90 86.4 79.1 80 70 70

60 50 50 50 Yes 40 No 30 30 20.8 20 13.5 10

0 illiterate below high school higher secondary graduate and above

Fig 2.17a) Graph showing educational level and respondents who used contraceptive methods (female)

100 88.2 90 84.3 80 80

70 63 60 50 Yes 36.8 40 No 30 20 20 15.6 11.7 10 0 illiterate less than high higher secondary graduate and above school

Fig 2.17 b) Graph showing educational level and respondents who used contraceptive methods (male)

331

120

100 100

80.4 80 74.2

60 Yes No 40 25.7 19.5 20

0 strictly religious moderate indifferent

Fig 2.17c) Graph showing religiosity and respondents who used contraceptive methods (female)

90 85.7 80 80 75

50 Yes 40 No 30 25 20 20 14.2 10

0 strictly religious moderate indifferent

Fig 2.17d) Graph showing religiosity and respondents who used contraceptive methods (male)

332

90 80 80 72.2 70

50 Yes 40 No

30 20.9 20 20

0 Urban Rural Fig 2.17 e) Graph showing residential background and respondents who used contraceptive methods (female)

80 77.7

70 60 60

50 40 Yes 40 No 30 22.2 20

0 Uban Rural

Fig 2.17f) Graph showing residential background and respondents who used contraceptive methods (male)

333

120

100 96.4

81.8 80 72.2

60 Yes No 40 27.7 18.1 20 3.5 0 less than 10,000 10,000-50,000 above 50,000

Fig 2.17g) Graph showing monthly income and respondents who used contraceptive methods (female)

90 79.4 80 77.7 70 70

50 Yes 40 No 30 30 20.5 22.2 20

0 less than 10,000 10,000-50,000 above 50,000

Fig 2.17 h) Graph showing monthly income and respondents who used contraceptive methods (male)

334 TABLE 2.18 RESPONDENTS VIEW ON TYPE OF SUCCESSFUL MARRIAGE

Educational level Arrange marriage Love marriage Total Female Male Female Male Female Male Illiterate 24(100) 14(93.3) 00 1(6.6) 24 15 Below high 57(96.6) 32(94.1) 2(3.3) 2(5.8) 59 34 school Higher secondary 39(97.5) 31(96.8) 1(2.5) 1(3.1) 40 32 Graduate and 1(50) 19(100) 1(50) 00 2 19 above 121(96.8) 96(96) 4(3.2) 4(4) 125 100 Religious observance Strictly religious 85(97.7) 35(100) 2(2.2) 00 87 35 Moderate 33(94.2) 58(96.6) 2(5.7) 2(3.3) 35 60 Indifferent 3(100) 3(60) 00 2(40) 3 5 121(96.8) 96(96) 4(3.2) 4(4) 125 100 Residence Urban 103(98) 88(97.7) 2(1.9) 2(2.2) 105 90 Rural 18(90) 8(80) 2(10) 2(20) 20 10 121(96.8) 96(96) 4(3.2) 4(4) 125 100 Monthly Income level Less than 10,000 18(100) 32(94) 00 2(5.8) 18 34 10,000-50,000 83(97.6) 35(97) 2(2.3) 1(2.7) 85 36 Above 50,000 20(90.9) 29(96.6) 2(9) 1(3.3) 22 30 121(96.8) 96(96) 4(3.2) 4(4) 125 100 NOTE: Values in brackets are in percentage

SOURCE: Based on primary field work

335

120

100 97.5 100 96.6

60 50 50 Arrange marriage Love marriage 40

20 3.3 0 2.5 0 illiterate below high higher graduate and school secondary above

Fig2.18a) Graph showing educational level and views on type of successful marriage (female)

120

100 96.8 100 93.3 94.1

60 Arrange marriage Love marriage 40

20 6.6 5.8 3.1 0 0 illiterate below high higher graduate and school secondary above

Fig 2.18b) Graph showing educational level and views on type of successful marriage (male)

336

120

97.7 100 100 94.2

60 Arrange marriage Love marriage 40

20 5.7 2.2 0 0 strictly Moderate Indifferent religious

Fig2.18c) Graph showing religiosity and views on type of successful marriage (female)

120

100 100 96.6

60 60 Arrange marriage 40 Love marriage 40

20 3.3 0 0 Strictly moderate Indifferent religious

Fig 2.18d) Graph showing religiosity and views on type of successful marriage (male)

337

120

98 100 90

60 Arrange marriage Love marriage 40

20 10 1.9 0 Urban Rural

Fig 2.18e) Graph showing residential background and views on type of successful marriage (female)

120

97.7 100

80 80

60 Arrange marriage Love marriage 40

20 20

2.2 0 Urban Rural

2.18f) Graph showing residential background and views on type of successful marriage (male)

338

120

100 97.6 100 90.9

60 Arrange marriage Love Marriage 40

20 9 0 2.3 0 Less than 10,000-50,000 above 50,000 10,000

Fig 2.18g) Graph showing monthly income and views on type of successful marriage (female)

120

97 96.6 100 94

60 Arrange marriage

40 Love marriage

20 5.8 2.7 3.3 0 Less than 10,000-50,000 above 50,000 10,000

Fig 2.18h) Graph showing monthly income and views on type of successful marriage (male)

339 TABLE 2.19 TYPE OF MARRIAGE OF THE RESPONDENTS

Educational Love marriage Arranged marriage Love-cum- Total level arranged female Male female Male female male Female male Illiterate 1(4.1) 00 23(95.8) 15(100) 00 00 24 15 Below high 1(1.6) 00 58(98.3) 34(100) 00 00 59 34 school Higher 3(7.5) 00 37(92) 32(100) 00 00 40 32 secondary Graduate 00 00 2(100) 19(100) 00 00 2 19 and above 5(4) 00 120(96) 100(100) 00 00 125 100 Religious observance Strictly 3(3.4) 00 84(96.5) 35(100) 00 00 87 35 religious Moderate 1(2.8) 00 34(97) 60(100) 00 00 35 60 Indifferent 1(33.3) 00 2(66.6) 5 (100) 00 00 3 5 5(4) 00 120(96) 100(100) 00 00 125 100 Residence Urban 4(3.8) 00 101(96.1) 90(100) 00 00 105 90 Rural 1(5) 00 19(95) 10(100) 00 00 20 10 5(4) 00 120(96) 100(100) 00 00 125 100 Monthly Income level Less than 00 00 18(100) 34(100) 00 00 18 34 10,000 10,000- 2(2.3) 00 83(97.6) 36(100) 00 00 85 36 50,000 Above 3(13.6) 00 19(86.3) 30(100) 00 00 22 30 50,000 5(4) 00 120(96) 100(100) 00 00 125 100 NOTE: Values in brackets are in percentage

SOURCE: Based on primary field work

340

120

100 95.8 98.3 100 92

60 Love marriage Arrange marriage 40 Love-cum-arrange marriage

20 7.5 4.1 1.6 0 0 illiterate below high higher graduate and school secondary above

Fig 2.19a) Graph showing educational level and respondent’s type of marriage (female)

120

100 100 100 100 100

60 Love marriage Arrange marriage 40 Love-cum-arrange marriage

0 illiterate less than high higher Graduate and school secondary above

Fig 2.19b) Graph showing educational level and respondent’s type of marriage (male)

341

120

97 100 96.5

80 66.6

60 Love marriage Arrange marriage 40 33.3 Love-cum-arrange marriage

20 3.4 2.8 0 strictly Moderate Indifferent religious

Fig 2.19c) Graph showing religiosity and respondent’s type of marriage (female)

120

100 100 100 100

love marriage 60 arrange marriage love-cum arrange 40

0 strictly religious moderate indifferent

Fig 2.19d) Graph showing religiosity and respondent’s type of marriage (male)

342

120

100 96.1 95

Love marriage 60 Arrange marriage Love-cum arrange marriage 40

20 3.8 5 0 Urban Rural

Fig 2.19e)Graph showing residential background and respondent’s type of marriage (female)

120

100 100 100

Love marriage 60 arrange marriage Love cum arrange marriage 40

0 Urban Rural

Fig 2.19f) Graph showing residential background and respondent’s type of marriage (male)

343

120

100 97.6 100 86.3

Love marriage 60 Arrange marriage Love cum arrange marriage 40

20 13.6

0 2.3 0 less than 10,000 10,000-50,000 above 50,000

Fig 2.19g) Graph showing monthly income and respondent’s type of marriage (female)

120

100 100 100 100

Love marriage 60 Arrange marriage Love cum arrange marriage 40

0 less than 10,000 10,000-50,000 above 50,000

Fig 2.19h) Graph showing monthly income and respondent’s type of marriage (male)

344 TABLE 2.20 MALE RESPONDENTS WHO HELPED THEIR WIVES IN HOUSEHOLD CHORES

Educational level Yes No Total Illiterate 2(13.3) 13(86.6) 15 Below high school 5(14.7) 29(85.2) 34 Higher secondary 12(37.5) 20(62.5) 32 Graduate and above 10(52.6) 9(47.3) 19 29(29) 71(71) 100 Religious observance Strictly religious 00 35(100) 35 Moderate 24(40) 36(60) 60 Indifferent 5(100) 00 5 29(29) 71(71) 100 Residence Urban 26(28.8) 64(71) 90 Rural 3(30) 7(70) 10 29(29) 71(71) 100 Monthly Income level Less than 10,000 5(14.7) 29(85.2) 34 10,000-50,000 12(33.3) 24(66.6) 36 Above 50,000 12(40) 18(60) 30 29(29) 71(71) 100 NOTE: Values in brackets are in percentage

SOURCE: Based on primary field work

345

100

90 86.6 85.2

70 62.5 60 52.6 50 47.3 Yes 37.5 40 No 30

20 13.3 14.7 10

0 illiterate below high higher secondary above graduate school

Fig 2.20a) Graph showing educational level and male respondents who helped their wives in household chores

120

100 100 100

60 60 Yes

40 No 40

0 0 0 strictly religious Moderate Indifferent

Fig 2.20b) Graph showing religiosity and male respondents who helped their wives in household chores

346

80 71 70 70

40 Yes 28.8 30 No 30

0 Urban Rural

Fig 2.20c) Graph showing residential background and male respondents who helped their wives in household chores

90 85.2

70 66.6 60 60

50 40 Yes 40 33.3 No 30

20 14.7

0 less than 10,000 10,000-50,000 above 50,000

Fig 2.20d) Graph showing monthly income and male respondents who helped their wives in household chores

347 TABLE 2.21 MALE RESPONDENTS WHO ALLOWED THEIR WIVES TO WORK OUTSIDE

Educational level Yes No Total Illiterate 5(33) 10(66.6) 15 Below high school 5(14.7) 29(85.2) 34 Higher secondary 7(21.8) 25(78.1) 32 Graduate and above 6(31.5) 13(68.4) 19 23(23) 77(77) 100 Religious observance Strictly religious 4(11.4) 31(88.5) 35 Moderate 19(31.6) 41(68.3) 60 Indifferent 00 5(100) 5 23(23) 77(77) 100 Residence Urban 18(20) 72(80) 90 Rural 5(50) 5(50) 10 23(23) 77(77) 100 Income level Less than 10,000 6(17.6) 28(82.3) 34 10,000-50,000 8(22.2) 28(77.7) 36 Above 50,000 9(30) 21(70) 30 23(23) 77(77) 100 NOTE: Values in brackets are in percentage

SOURCE: Based on primary field work

348

90 85.2 78.1 80 68.4 70 66.6

40 Yes 33 31.5 No 30 21.8 20 14.7

0 illiterate below high school higher secondary graduate and above

Fig 2.21a) Graph showing educational level and male respondents who allowed their wives to work outside

120

100 100 88.5

80 68.3

60 Yes No

40 31.6

20 11.4

0 0 Strictly religious Moderate Indifferent

Fig 2.21b) Graph showing religiosity and male respondents who allowed their wives to work outside

349

90 80 80

60 50 50 50 Yes 40 No 30 20 20

0 Urban Rural

Fig 2.21c) Graph showing residential background and male respondents who allowed their wives to work outside

90 82.3 80 77.7 70 70

50 Yes 40 No 30 30 22.2 20 17.6

0 less than 10,000 10,000-50,000 above 50,000

Fig 2.21d) Graph showing monthly income and male respondents who allowed their wives to work outside

350 TABLE 2.22 MALE RESPONDENTS WHO ALLOWED THEIR WIVES TO GO FOR SHOPPING ALONE

Educational level Yes No Total Illiterate 7(46.6) 8(53.3) 15 Below high school 13(38.2) 21(61.7) 34 Higher secondary 22(68.7) 10(31.2) 32 Graduate and above 14(73.6) 5(26.3) 19 56(56) 44(44) 100 Religious observance Strictly religious 20(57.1) 15(42.8) 35 Moderate 35(58.3) 25(41.6) 60 Indifferent 1(20) 4(80) 5 56(56) 44(44) 100 Residence Urban 48(53.3) 42(46.6) 90 Rural 8(80) 2(20) 10 56(56) 44(44) 100 Income level Less than 10,000 13(38.2) 21(61.7) 34 10,000-50,000 20(55.5) 16(44.4) 36 Above 50,000 23(76.6) 7(23.3) 30 56(56) 44(44) 100 NOTE: Values in brackets are in percentage

SOURCE: Based on primary field work

351

80 73.6 68.7 70 61.7 60 53.3 50 46.6

38.2 40 Yes 31.2 No 30 26.3

0 illiterate below high school higher secondary graduate and above

Fig 2.22a) Graph showing educational level and male respondents who allowed their wives to go for shopping alone

90 80 80

70 58.3 60 57.1

50 42.8 41.6 Yes 40 No 30 20 20

0 strictly religious moderate indifferent

Fig 2.22b) Graph showing religiosity and male respondents who allowed their wives to go for shopping alone

352

90 80 80

60 53.3 50 46.6 Yes 40 No 30 20 20

0 Urban Rural

Fig 2.22c) Graph showing residential background and male respondents who allowed their wives to go for shopping alone

80 76.6

70 61.7 60 55.5

50 44.4 38.2 Yes 40 No 30 23.3 20

0 Less than 10,000 10,000-50,000 Above 50,000

Fig 2.22d) Graph showing monthly income and male respondents who allowed their wives to go for shopping alone

353 TABLE 2.23 FEMALE RESPONDENTS WHO TOOK DECISION ON FINANCIAL MATTERS

Educational Yes No Sometimes Total level Illiterate 7(29.1) 17(70.8) 00 24 below high 11(18.6) 30(50.8) 18(30.5) 59 school Higher secondary 18(45) 13(32.5) 9(22.5) 40 Graduate and 1(50) 00 1(50) 2 above 37(29.6) 60(48) 28(22.4) 125 Religious observance Strictly religious 14(16.09) 50(57.4) 23(26.4) 87 Moderate 20(57.1) 10(28.5) 5(14.2) 35 Indifferent 3(100) 00 00 3 37(29.6) 60(48) 28(22.4) 125 Residence Urban 32(30.4) 49(46.6) 24(22.8) 105 Rural 5(25) 11(55) 4(20) 20 37(29.6) 60(48) 28(22.4) 125 Income level Less than 10,000 7(38.8) 5(27.7) 6(33.3) 18 10,000-50,000 15(17.6) 50(58.8) 20(23.5) 85 Above 50,000 15(68.1) 5(22.7) 2(9.09) 22 37(29.6) 60(48) 28(22.4) 125 NOTE: Values in brackets are in percentage

SOURCE: Based on primary field work

354

80 70.8 70

60 50.8 50 50 50 45

40 Yes 32.5 29.1 30.5 No 30 22.5 Sometimes 18.6 20

10 0 0 0 illiterate below high school higher secondary graduate and above

Fig 2.23a) Graph showing educational level and females who took decision on financial matters

120

100 100

57.4 57.1 Yes 60 No Sometimes 40 26.4 28.5

20 16.09 14.2

0 0 0 Strictly religious moderate Indifferent

Fig 2.23b) Graph showing religiosity and females who took decision on financial matters

355

60 55

50 46.6

30.4 Yes 30 25 22.8 No 20 Sometimes 20

0 Urban Rural

Fig 2.23c) Graph showing residential background and female who took decisions on financial matters

80 68.1 70 58.8 60

50 38.8 Yes 40 33.3 No 27.7 30 Sometimes 23.5 22.7 20 17.6 9.09 10

0 Less than 10,000 10,000-50,000 above 50,000

Fig 2.23d) Graph showing monthly income and female who took decisions on financial matters

356 TABLE 2.24 ACTUAL NUMBER OF CHILDREN IN RESPONDENT’S FAMILY

Educational 1-2 3-5 More than 5 Total level Illiterate 00 15(62.5) 9(37.5) 24 Below high 1(1.6) 44(74.5) 14(23.7) 59 school Higher 3(7.5) 35(87.5) 2(5) 40 secondary Graduate and 00 2(100) 00 2 above 4(3.2) 96(76.8) 25(20) 125 Religious observance Strictly 3(3.4) 67(77) 17(19.5) 87 religious Moderate 1(2.8) 28(80) 6(17.1) 35 Indifferent 00 1(33.3) 2(66.6) 3 4(3.2) 96(76.8) 25(20) 125 Residence Urban 3(2.8) 80(76) 22(20.9) 105 Rural 1(5) 16(80) 3(15) 20 4(3.2) 96(76.8) 25(20) 125 Monthly Income level Less than 00 11(61.1) 7(38.8) 18 10,000 10,000-50,000 00 69(81.1) 16(18.8) 85 Above 50,000 4(18.1) 16(72.7) 2(9.09) 22 4(3.2) 96(76.8) 25(20) 100 NOTE: Values in brackets are in percentage SOURCE: Based on primary field work

357

120

100 100 87.5

80 74.5 62.5 60 1-2 children 3-5 children 37.5 40 more than 5 23.7 20 7.5 5 0 1.6 0 0 0 illiterate below high Higher secondary graduate and school above

Fig 2.24a) Graph showing educational level and actual number of children in respondent’s family

90 80 80 77

70 66.6

50 1-2 children 40 33.3 3-5 children 30 more than 5 children 19.5 20 17.1

10 3.4 2.8 0 0 strictly Moderate Indifferent religious

Fig 2.24b) Graph showing religiosity and actual number of children in respondent’s family

358

90 80 80 76

50 1-2 children 40 3-5 children more than 5 children 30 20.9 20 15

10 5 2.8 0 Urban Rural

Fig 2.24c) Graph showing residential background and actual number of children in respondent’s family

90 81.1 80 72.7 70 61.1 60

50 1-2 children 38.8 40 3-5 children more than 5 children 30 18.8 18.1 20 9.09 10 0 0 0 less than10,000 10,000-50,000 above 50,000

Fig 2.24 d) Graph showing monthly income and actual number of children in respondent’s family

359 TABLE 2.25 RESPONDENTS VIEW ON IDEAL NUMBER OF CHILDREN

Educational level 1- 2 3-5 More than 5 Total Illiterate 2(8.3) 17(70.8) 5(20.8) 24 Below high school 12(20.3) 39(66) 8(13.5) 59 Higher secondary 8(20) 27(67.5) 5(12.5) 40 Graduate and above 1(50) 1(50) 00 2 23(18.4) 84(67.2) 18(14.4) 125 Religious observance Strictly religious 5(5.7) 72(82.7) 10(11.4) 87 Moderate 17(48.5) 10(28.5) 8(22.8) 35 Indifferent 1(33.3) 2(66.6) 00 3 23(18.4) 84(67.2) 18(14.4) 125 Residence Urban 22(20.9) 69(65.7) 14(13.3) 105 Rural 1(5) 15(75) 4(20) 20 23(18.4) 84(67.2) 18(14.4) 125 Monthly Income level Less than 10,000 1(5.5) 9(50) 8(44.4) 18 10,000-50,000 11(12.9) 64(75.2) 10(11.7) 85 Above 50,000 11(50) 11(50) 00 22 23(18.4) 84(67.2) 18(14.4) 125 NOTE: Values in brackets are in percentage

SOURCE: Based on primary field work

360

80 70.8 70 66 67.5

60 50 50 50

40 1-2 children 3-5 children 30 more than 5 children 20.8 20.3 20 20 13.5 12.5 8.3 10 0 0 illiterate below high higher graduate and school secondary above

Fig 2.25a) Graph showing educational level and ideal number of children

90 82.7 80

70 66.6

60 48.5 50 1-2 children 40 33.3 3-5 children 28.5 30 more than 5 children 22.8 20 11.4 10 5.7 0 0 strictly Moderate Indifferent religious

Fig 2.25b) Graph showing religiosity and ideal number of children

361

80 75

70 65.7

50 1-2 children 40 3-5 children 30 more than 5 children 20.9 20 20 13.3

10 5

0 Urban Rural

Fig 2.25c) Graph showing residential background and ideal number of children

80 75.2

60 50 50 50 50 44.4 1-2 children 40 3-5 children 30 more than 5 children

20 12.9 11.7 10 5.5 0 0 less than 10,000 10,000-50,000 above 50,000

Fig 2.25d) Graph showing monthly income and ideal number of children

362 IN TABLES AND GRAPHS 3.1 TO 3.25 DATA ON THE RESPONDENTS BELONGING TO THE THIRD GENERATION IS PRESENTED

TABLE 3.1 AGE AT MARRIAGE OF THE RESPONDENTS

Educational Below 18 years 18-25years above 25 years Total level Female Male Female Male Female Male Female Male Illiterate 3(75) 00 1(25) 4(66.6) 00 2(33.3) 4 6 Below high 6(60) 4(40) 4(40) 00 6(60) 10 10 school Higher 2(4.5) 00 35(79.5) 7(20.5) 7(15.9) 27(79) 44 34 secondary Graduate 2(2.98) 00 26(38.8) 2(4) 39(58.2) 48(96) 67 50 and above 13(10.4) 00 66(52.8) 17(17) 46(36.8) 83(83) 125 100 Religious observance Strictly 2(4.7) 00 20(47.6) 4(40) 20(47.6) 6(60) 42 10 religious Moderate 11(13.9) 00 44(55.6) 9(12) 24(30.3) 66(88) 79 75 Indifferent 00 00 2(50) 4(26.6) 2(50) 11(73.3) 4 15 13(10.4) 00 66(52.8) 17(17) 46(36.8) 83(83) 125 100 Residence Urban 13(10.4) 00 66(52.8) 17(17) 46(36.8) 83(83) 125 100 Rural 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 13(10.4) 00 66(52.8) 17(17) 46(36.8) 83(83) 125 100 Monthly Income level Less than 4(66.6) 00 2(33.3) 8(61) 00 5(38) 6 13 10,000 10,000- 7(11.4) 00 38(62) 5(20) 16(26.2) 20(80) 61 25 50,000 Above 2(3) 00 26(44.8) 4(6.4) 30(51.7) 58(93.5) 58 62 50,000 13(10.4) 00 66(52.8) 17(17) 46(36.8) 83(83) 125 100 NOTE: Values in brackets are in percentage SOURCE: Based on primary field work

363

90 79.5 80 75

70 60 58.2 60

50 40 38.8 Below 18 yrs 40 18-25 yrs 30 25 above 25 yrs

20 15.9

10 4.5 2.98 0 0 0 illiterate below high school higher secondary graduate and above

Fig 3.1a) Graph showing educational level and age at marriage of the respondents (female)

120

100 96

79 80 66.6 60 60 below 18 yrs 40 18-25 yrs 40 33.3 above 25 yrs 20.5 20 4 0 illiterate below high school higher secondary graduate and above

Fig3.1b) Graph showing educational level and age at marriage of the respondents (male)

364

60 55.6 50 50 50 47.647.6

30.3 below 18 yrs 30 18-25 yrs above 25 yrs 20 13.9

10 4.7 0 0 strictly religious moderate indifferent

Fig 3.1c) Graph showing religiosity and age at marriage of the respondents (female)

100 88 90

80 73.3 70 60 60 below 18 yrs 50 40 18-25 yrs 40 above 25 yrs 30 26.6

20 12 10

0 strictly religious Moderate Indifferent

Fig 3.1d) Graph showing religiosity and age at marriage of the respondents (male)

365

60 52.8 50

40 36.8

below 18 yrs 30 18-25 yrs above 25 yrs 20

10.4 10

0 0 0 Urban Rural

Fig 3.1e) Graph showing residential background and age at marriage of the respondents (female)

90 83 80

50 below 18 yrs 40 18-25 yrs above 25 yrs 30

20 17

0 Urban Rural

Fig 3.1f) Graph showing residential background and age at marriage of the respondents (male)

366

70 66.6 62 60 51.7 50 44.8

40 33.3 below 18 yrs 18-25 yrs 30 26.2 above 25 yrs 20 11.4 10 3 0 0 less than 10,000 10,000-50,000 above 50,000

Fig 3.1g) Graph showing monthly income and age at marriage of the respondents (female)

100 93.5 90 80 80

70 61 60 below 18 yrs 50 38 18-25 yrs 40 above 25 yrs 30 20 20

10 6.4

0 less than 10,000 10,000-50,000 above 50,000

Fig 3.1h) Graph showing monthly income and age at marriage of the respondents (male)

367 TABLE 3.2 PREFFERED AGE OF MARRIAGE OF THE RESPONDENTS

Educational Below 18 18-25 years Above 25 years Total level years Female Male Female Male Female Male Female Male Illiterate 00 00 1(25) 2(33.3) 3(75) 4(66.6) 4 6 Below high 00 00 3(30) 4(40) 7(70) 6(60) 10 10 school Higher 00 00 21(47.7) 8(23.5) 23(52.2) 26(76) 44 34 secondary Graduate and 00 00 00 6(12) 67(100) 44(88) 67 50 above 00 00 25(20) 20(20) 100(80) 80(80) 125 100 Religious observance Strictly 00 00 9(21.4) 4(40) 33(78.5) 6(60) 42 10 religious Moderate 00 00 14(17.7) 16(21.3) 65(82.2) 59(78.6) 79 75 Indifferent 00 00 2(50) 00 2(50) 15(100) 4 15 00 00 25(20) 20(20) 100(80) 80(80) 125 100 Residence Urban 00 00 25(20) 20(20) 100(80) 80(80) 125 100 Rural 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 25(20) 20(20) 100(80) 80(80) 125 100 Monthly Income level Less than 00 00 1(16.6) 8(61.5) 5(83.3) 5(38.4) 6 13 10,000 10,000- 00 00 15(24.5) 7(28) 46(75.4) 18(72) 61 25 50,000 Above 00 00 9(15.5) 5(8.06) 49(84.4) 57(91.9) 58 62 50,000 00 00 25(20) 20(20) 100(80) 80(80) 125 100 NOTE: Values in brackets are in percentage

SOURCE: Based on primary field work

368

120

100 100

80 75 70

60 52.2 below 18 yrs 47.7 18-25 yrs 40 above 25 yrs 30 25 20

0 0 illiterate below high higher secondary graduate and school above

Fig 3.2a) Graph showing educational level and preferred age of marriage (female)

100 88 90 80 76 70 66.6 60 60 50 below 18 yrs 40 18-25 yrs 40 33.3 above 25 yrs 30 23.5 20 12 10 0 illiterate below high higher secondary graduate and school above

Fig 3.2b) Graph showing educational level and preferred age of marriage (male)

369

90 82.2 78.5 80

60 50 50 50 below 18 yrs 40 18-25 yrs above 25 yrs 30 21.4 20 17.7

0 strictly religious moderate indifferent

Fig 3.2c) Graph showing religiosity and preferred age of marriage (female)

120

100 100

78.6 80

60 below 18 yrs 60 18-25 yrs 40 above 25 yrs 40

21.3 20

0 0 strictly religious moderate indiffernt

Fig 3.2d) Graph showing religiosity and preferred age of marriage (male)

370

90 80 80

50 below 18 yrs 40 18-25 yrs above 25 yrs 30 20 20

0 Urban Rural

Fig 3.2e) Graph showing residential background and preferred age of marriage (female)

90 80 80

50 below 18 yrs 40 18-25 yrs above 25 yrs 30 20 20

0 Urban Rural

Fig 3.2f) Graph showing residential background and preferred age of marriage (male)

371

90 83.3 84.4 80 75.4

50 below 18 yrs 40 18-25 yrs above 25 yrs 30 24.5

20 16.6 15.5

0 less than 10,000 10,000-50,000 above 50,000

Fig3.2g) Graph showing monthly income and preferred age of marriage (female)

100 91.9 90

80 72 70 61.5 60 below 18 yrs 50 38.4 18-25 yrs 40 above 25 yrs 28 30

20 8.06 10

0 less than 10,000 10,000-50,000 above 50,000

Fig 3.2h) Graph showing monthly income and preferred age of marriage (male)

372 TABLE 3.3 RESPONDENTS WHO FAVOURED DOWRY

Educational level Yes No Total Female Male Female Male Female Male Illiterate 1(25) 5(83) 3(75) 1(16.6) 4 6 Below high school 4(40) 7(70) 6(60) 3(30) 10 10 Higher secondary 18(40.9) 22(64) 26(59.9) 12(35) 44 34 Graduate and above 17(25.3) 16(32) 50(74.6) 34(68) 67 50 40(32) 50(50) 85(68) 50(50) 125 100 Religious observance Strictly religious 12(28.5) 00 30(71.4) 10(100) 42 10 Moderate 28(35.4) 40(53.3) 51(64.5) 35(46.6) 79 75 Indifferent 00 10(66.6) 4(100) 5(33.3) 4 15 40(32) 50(50) 85(68) 50(50) 125 100 Residence Urban 40(32) 50(50) 85(68) 50(50) 125 100 Rural 00 00 00 00 00 00 40(32) 50(50) 85(68) 50(50) 125 Monthly Income level Less than 10,000 2(33.3) 7(53) 4(66.6) 6(46) 6 13 10,000-50,000 20(32.7) 16(64) 41(67.2) 9(36) 61 25 Above 50,000 18(31) 27(43) 40(68.9) 35(56) 58 62 40(32) 50(50) 85(68) 50(50) 125 100 NOTE: Values in brackets are in percentage

SOURCE: Based on primary field work

373

80 75 74.6

70 60 59.9 60

50 40 40.9 40 Yes No 30 25 25.3

0 illiterate below high school higher secondary graduate and above

Fig 3.3a) Graph showing educational level and respondents who favoured dowry (female)

90 83 80 70 68 70 64 60

50 Yes 40 35 No 30 32 30

20 16.6

0 illiterate below high school higher secondary graduate and above

Fig 3.3b) Graph showing educational level and respondents who favoured dowry (male)

374

120

100 100

80 71.4 64.5 60 Yes No 40 35.4 28.5

0 0 Strictly religious moderate Indifferent

Fig 3.3c) Graph showing religiosity and respondents who favoured dowry (female)

120

100 100

80 66.6

60 53.3 Yes 46.6 No 40 33.3

0 0 Strictly religious Moderate Indifferent

Fig 3.3d) Graph showing religiosity and respondents who favoured dowry (male)

375

70 68

40 Yes 32 No 30

10 0 0 0 Urban Rural

Fig 3.3e) Graph showing residential background and respondents who favoured dowry (female)

50 50 50

30 Yes No 20

0 0 0 Urban Rural

Fig 3.3f) Graph showing residential background and respondents who favoured dowry (male)

376 80 68.9 70 66.6 67.2

40 Yes 33.3 32.7 31 No 30

0 less than 10,000 10,000-50,000 above 50,000

Fig 3.3g) Graph showing monthly income and respondents who favoured dowry (female)

70 64

60 56 53

50 46 43

40 36 Yes 30 No

0 less than 10,000 10,000-50,000 above 50,000

Fig 3.3h) Graph showing monthly income and respondents who favoured dowry (male)

377 TABLE 3.4 RESPONDENTS WHO HAVE GIVEN AND TAKEN DOWRY

Educational level Yes No Total Female Male Female Male Female Male Illiterate 3(75) 6(100) 1(25) 00 4 6 Below high school 7(70) 7(70) 3(30) 3(30) 10 10 Higher secondary 37(84.09) 23(67.6) 7(15.9) 11(32.3) 44 34 Graduate and above 56(83.5) 20(40) 11(16.4) 30(60) 67 50 103(82.4) 56(56) 22(17.6) 44(44) 125 100 Religious observance Strictly religious 33(78.5) 00 9(21.4) 10(100) 42 10 Moderate 66(83.5) 50(66.6) 13(16.4) 25(33.3) 79 75 Indifferent 4(100) 6(40) 00 9(60) 4 15 103(82.4) 56(56) 22(17.6) 44(44) 125 100 Residence Urban 103(82.5) 56(56) 22(17.6) 44(44) 125 100 Rural 00 00 00 00 00 00 103(82.4) 56(56) 22(17.6) 44(44) 125 100 Monthly Income level Less than 10,000 4(66.6) 9(69) 2(33.3) 4(30.7) 6 13 10,000-50,000 58(95.08) 16(64) 3(4.9) 9(36) 61 25 Above 50,000 41(70.6) 31(50) 17(29.3) 31(50) 58 62 103(82.4) 56(56) 22(17.6) 44(44) 125 100 NOTE: Values in brackets are in percentage

SOURCE: Based on primary field work

378

90 84.09 83.5 80 75 70 70

50 Yes 40 30 No 30 25

20 15.9 16.4

0 illiterate below high school higher secondary graduate and above

Fig 3.4a) Graph showing educational level and respondents who have given dowry (female)

120

100 100

80 70 67.6 60 60 Yes No 40 40 30 32.3

0 0 illiterate below high school higher secondary graduate and above

Fig 3.4b) Graph showing educational level and respondents who have taken dowry (male)

379 120

100 100 83.5 78.5 80

60 Yes No 40

21.4 20 16.4

0 0 Strictly religious Moderate Indifferent

Fig 3.4c) Graph showing religiosity and respondents who have given dowry (female)

120

100 100

80 66.6 60 60 Yes No 40 40 33.3

0 0 Strictly religious Moderate Indifferent

Fig 3.4d) Graph showing religiosity and respondents who have taken dowry (male)

380

90 82.5 80

50 Yes 40 No 30

20 17.6

10 0 0 0 Urban Rural

Fig 3.4e) Graph showing residential background and respondents who have given dowry (female)

60 56

50 44

30 Yes No 20

0 Urban Rural

Fig 3.4f) Graph showing residential background and respondents who have taken dowry (male)

381

100 95.08

80 70.6 70 66.6

50 Yes No 40 33.3 29.3 30

10 4.9

0 less than 10,000 10,000-50,000 above 50,000

Fig 3.4g) Graph showing monthly income and respondents who have given dowry (female)

80 69 70 64

60 50 50 50

40 36 Yes 30.7 No 30

0 less than 10,000 10,000-50,000 above 50,000

Fig 3.4h) Graph showing monthly income and respondents who have taken dowry (male)

382 TABLE 3.5 FEMALE RESPONDENTS WHO CONSIDERED SOCIAL STATUS AS THE MAIN REASON OF DOWRY

Educational level Agree Disagree Agree to Total some extent Illiterate 2(50) 2(50) 00 4 Below high school 10(100) 00 00 10 Higher secondary 30(68) 9(20) 5(11) 44 Graduate and above 23(34) 28(41.7) 16(23.8) 67 65(52) 39(31.2) 21(16.8) 125 Religious observance Strictly religious 24(57.1) 13(30.9) 5(11.9) 42 Moderate 39(49.3) 24(30.3) 16(20.2) 79 Indifferent 2(50) 2(50) 00 4 65(52) 39(31.2) 21(16.8) 125 Residence Urban 65(52) 39(31.2) 21(16.8) 125 Rural 00 00 00 00 65(52) 39(31.2) 21(16.8) 125 Monthly Income level Less than 10,000 3(50) 3(50) 00 6 10,000-50,000 35(57.3) 21(34.4) 5(8.1) 61 Above 50,000 27(46.5) 15(25.8) 16(27.5) 58 65(52) 39(31.2) 21(16.8) 125 NOTE: Values in brackets are in percentage

SOURCE: Based on primary field work

383

120

100 100

80 68

60 Agree 50 50 41.7 disagree 40 34 agree to some extent 23.8 20 20 11 0 0 0 0 illiterate below high higher graduate and school secondary above

Fig 3.5a) Graph showing educational level and social status as the main reason of dowry

60 57.1

49.3 50 50 50

30.9 30.3 30 Agree Disagree 20.2 20 Agree to some extent 11.9 10

0 0 Strictly Moderate Indifferent Religious

Fig 3.5b) Graph showing religiosity and social status as the main reason of dowry

384

60 52 50

31.2 agree 30 disagree Agree to some extent 20 16.8

0 0 Urban Rural

Fig 3.5c) Graph showing residential background and social status as the main reason of dowry

60 57.3

50 50 50 46.5

40 34.4 agree 27.5 disagree 30 25.8 agree to some extent 20

10 8.1

0 0 less than 10,000 10,000-50,000 above 50,000

Fig 3.5d) Graph showing monthly income and social status as the main reason of dowry

385 TABLE 3.6 FEMALE RESPONDENTS WHO EXPERIENCED DOMESTIC VIOLENCE

Educational level Yes No Total Illiterate 3(75) 1(25) 4 Below high school 3(30) 7(70) 10 Higher secondary 7(15.9) 37(84) 44 Graduate and above 5(7.46) 62(92.5) 67 18(14.4) 107(85.6) 125 Religious observance Strictly religious 4(9.5) 38(90.4) 42 Moderate 14(17.7) 65(82.2) 79 Indifferent 00 4(100) 4 18(14.4) 107(85.6) 125 Residence Urban 18(14.4) 107(85.6) 125 Rural 00 00 00 18(14.4) 107(85.6) 125 Monthly Income level Less than 10,000 5(83.3) 1(16.6) 6 10,000-50,000 9(14.7) 52(85.2) 61 Above 50,000 4(6.8) 54(93.1) 58 18(14.4) 107(85.6) 125 NOTE: Values in brackets are in percentage

SOURCE: Based on primary field work

386

100 92.5 90 84 80 75 70 70

50 Yes 40 No 30 30 25

20 15.9

10 7.46

0 Illiterate below high school higher secondary graduate and above

Fig 3.6a) Graphs showing educational level and female who experienced domestic violence

120

100 100 90.4 82.2 80

60 Yes No 40

17.7 20 9.5 0 0 Stricly religious Moderate Indifferent

Fig3.6b) Graphs showing religiosity and female who experienced domestic violence

387

90 85.6

50 Yes 40 No 30

20 14.4 10 0 0 Urban Rural

Fig 3.6c) Graphs showing residential background and female who experienced domestic violence

100 93.1

90 83.3 85.2 80

50 Yes 40 No

20 16.6 14.7 10 6.8

0 less than 10,000 10,000-50,000 above 50,000

Fig3.6d) Graphs showing monthly income and female who experienced domestic violence

388 TABLE 3.7 MALE RESPONDENTS WHO DEMANDED DOWRY

Educational level Yes No Total Illiterate 6(100) 00 6 Below high school 7(70) 3(30) 10 Higher Secondary 14(41) 20(58) 34 Graduate and above 4(8) 46(92) 50 31(31) 69(69) 100 Religious observance Strictly religious 00 10(100) 10 Moderate 25(33.3) 50(66.6) 75 Indifferent 6(40) 9(60) 15 31(31) 69(69) 100 Residence Urban 31(31) 69(69) 100 Rural 00 00 00 31(31) 69(69) 100 Monthly Income level Less than 10,000 8(61) 5(38) 13 10,000-50,000 10(40) 15(60) 25 Above 50,000 13(20.9) 49(79) 62 31(31) 69(69) 100 NOTE: Values in brackets are in percentage

SOURCE: Based on primary field work

389

120

100 100 92

80 70

58 60 Yes

41 No 40 30

20 8 0 0 illiterate below high school higher secondary graduate and above

Fig 3.7a) Graph showing educational level and male who demanded dowry

120

100 100

80 66.6 60 60 Yes No 40 40 33.3

0 0 Strictly religious Moderate Indifferent

Fig 3.7b) Graph showing religiosity and male who demanded dowry

390

80 69 70

40 Yes 31 No 30

10 0 0 Urban Rural

Fig 3.7c) Graph showing residential background and male who demanded dowry

90 79 80

70 61 60 60

50 38 40 Yes 40 No 30 20.9 20

0 less than 10,000 10,000-50,000 above 50,000

Fig 3.7d) Graph showing monthly income and male who demanded dowry

391 TABLE 3.8 RESPONDENTS WHO HAVE RECEIVED AND PAID MAHR

Educational level Yes No Total Female Male Female Male Female Male Illiterate 1(25) 00 3(75) 6(100) 4 6 Below high school 3(30) 4(40) 7(70) 6(60) 10 10 Higher Secondary 25(56.8) 16(47) 19(43.1) 18(52.9) 44 34 Graduate and above 43(64) 35(70) 24(35.8) 15(30) 67 50 72(57.6) 55(55) 53(42.4) 45(45) 125 100 Religious observance Strictly religious 26(61.9) 8(80) 16(38) 2(20) 42 10 Moderate 45(56.9) 35(46.6) 34(43) 40(53.3) 79 75 Indifferent 1(25) 12(80) 3(75) 3(20) 4 15 72(57.6) 55(55) 53(42.4) 45(45) 125 100 Residence Urban 72(57.6) 55(55) 53(42.4) 45(45) 125 100 Rural 00 00 00 00 00 00 72(57.6) 55(55) 53(42.4) 45(45) 125 100 Monthly Income level Less than 10,000 1(16.6) 4(30.7) 5(83.3) 9(69.2) 6 13 10,000-50,000 31(50.8) 9(36) 30(49.1) 16(64) 61 25 Above 50,000 40(68.9) 42(67.7) 18(31) 20(32.2) 58 62 72(57.6) 55(55) 53(42.2) 45(45) 125 100 NOTE: Values in brackets are in percentage

SOURCE: Based on primary field work

392

80 75 70 70 64

60 56.8

50 43.1

40 35.8 Yes 30 No 30 25

0 Illiterate below high school higher secondary graduate and above

Fig 3.8a) Graph showing educational level and mehr received (female)

120

100 100

80 70 60 60 52.9 47 Yes 40 No 40 30

0 0 Illiterate less than high higher secondary graduate and above school

Fig 3.8b)Graph showing educational level and mehr paid (male)

393

80 75

70 61.9 60 56.9

50 43 38 40 Yes No 30 25

0 Strictly religious Moderate Indifferent

Fig 3.8c) Graph showing religiosity and mehr received (female)

90 80 80 80

60 53.3 50 46.6 Yes 40 No 30 20 20 20

0 Strictly religious Moderate Indifferent

Fig 3.8d)Graph showing religiosity and mehr paid (male)

394

60 57.6

50 42.4 40 Yes 30 NO

0 Urban Rural

Fig 3.8e) Graph showing residential background and mehr received (female)

60 55

50 45

30 Yes No 20

0 0 0 Urban Rural

Fig 3.8f) Graph showing residential background and mehr paid (male)

395

90 83.3 80 68.9 70

60 50.8 49.1 50 Yes 40 31 No 30

20 16.6

0 less than 10,000 10,000-50,000 above 50,000

Fig 3.8g) Graph showing monthly income and mehr received (female)

80 69.2 70 67.7 64

40 36 Yes 32.2 30.7 No 30

0 less than 10,000 10,000-50,000 above 50,000

Fig 3.8h) Graph showing monthly income and mehr paid (male)

396 TABLE 3.9 RESPONDENTS ATTITUDE TOWARDS POLYGYNY

Educational Yes No To some extent Total level Female Male Female Male Female Male Female Male Illiterate 00 6(100) 4(100) 00 00 00 4 6 Below high 1(10) 6(60) 7(70) 4(40) 2(20) 00 10 10 school Higher 5(11.3) 23(67.6) 33(75) 11(32.3) 6(13.6) 00 44 34 Secondary Graduate 5(7.4) 21(42) 48(71.6) 29(58) 14(20.8) 00 67 50 and above 11(8.8) 56(56) 92(73.6) 44(44) 22(17.6) 00 125 100 Religious observance Strictly 8(19.4) 5(50) 27(64.2) 5(50) 7(16.6) 00 42 10 religious Moderate 3(3.79) 36(48) 61(77.2) 39(52) 15(18.9) 00 79 75 Indifferent 00 15(100) 4(100) 00 00 00 4 15 11(8.8) 56(56) 92(73.6) 44(44) 22(17.6) 00 125 100 Residence Urban 11(8.8) 56(56) 92(73.6) 44(44) 22(17.6) 00 125 100 Rural 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 11(8.8) 56(56) 92(73.6) 44(44) 22(17.6) 125 100 Monthly Income level Less than 00 9(69.2) 6(100) 4(30.7) 00 00 6 13 10,000 10,000- 7(11.4) 16(64) 46(75.4) 9(36) 8(13.1) 00 61 25 50,000 Above 4(6.8) 31(50) 40(68.9) 31(50) 14(24.1) 00 58 62 50,000 11(8.8) 56(56) 92(73.6) 44(44) 22(17.6) 00 125 100 NOTE: Values in brackets are in percentage

SOURCE: Based on primary field work

397

120

100 100

80 75 70 71.6

60 Yes No 40 to some extent

20 20.8 20 11.3 13.6 10 7.4 0 0 0 Illiterate below high higher secondary graduate and school above

Fig 3.9a) Graph showing educational level and attitude towards polygyny (female)

120

100 100

80 67.6 60 58 60 Yes No 40 42 40 32.3 to some extent

0 0 Illiterate below high higher secondary graduate and school above

Fig 3.9b) Graph showing educational level and attitude towards polygyny (male)

398

120

100 100

77.2 80 64.2 Yes 60 No to some extent 40

19.4 18.9 20 16.6 3.79 0 0 0 Strictly religious Moderate Indifferent

Fig 3.9c) Graph showing religiosity and attitude towards polygyny (female)

120

100 100

Yes 60 52 50 50 48 No to some extent 40

0 0 Strictly religious Moderate Indifferent

Fig 3.9d) Graph showing religiosity and attitude towards polygyny (male)

399

80 73.6 70

50 Yes 40 No 30 To some extent

20 17.6 8.8 10 0 0 Urban Rural

Fig 3.9e) Graph showing residential background and attitude towards polygyny (female)

60 56

50 44

Yes 30 No To some extent 20

0 0 0 Urban Rural

Fig 3.9f) Graph showing residential background and attitude towards polygyny (male)

400

120

100 100

80 75.4 68.9 Yes 60 No To some extent 40 24.1 20 11.4 13.1 6.8 0 0 0 less than 10,000 10,000-50,000 above 50,000

Fig 3.9g) Graph showing monthly income and attitude towards polygyny (female)

80 69.2 70 64

60 50 50 50 Yes 40 36 30.7 No 30 to some extent

0 less than 10,000 10,000-50,000 above 50,000

Fig3.9h) Graph showing monthly income and attitude towards polygyny (male)

401 TABLE 3.10 FEMALE RESPONDENTS WHO EXPERIENCED POLYGYNY

Educational level Yes No Total Illiterate 1(25) 3(75) 4 Below high school 00 10(100) 10 Higher secondary 5(11.36) 39(88) 44 Graduate and above 13(19.4) 54(80) 67 19(15.2) 106(84.8) 125 Religious observance Strictly religious 6(14.2) 36(85.7) 42 Moderate 11(13.9) 68(86.07) 79 Indifferent 2(50) 2(50) 4 19(15.2) 106(84.8) 125 Residence Urban 19(15.2) 106(84.8) 125 Rural 00 00 00 19(15.2) 106(84.8) 125 Monthly Income level Less than 10,000 00 6(100) 6 10,000-50,000 9(14.7) 52(85.2) 61 Above 50,000 10(17.2) 48(82.7) 58 19(15.2) 106(84.8) 125 NOTE: Values in brackets are in percentage

SOURCE: Based on primary field work

402

120

100 100 88 80 80 75

60 Yes No 40 25 19.4 20 11.36 0 0 Illiterate below high school higher secondary graduate and above

Fig 3.10a) Graph showing educational level and female who experienced polygyny

100

90 85.7 86.07

60 50 50 50 Yes 40 No

20 14.2 13.9 10

0 Strictly Religious Moderate Indifferent

Fig3.10b) Graph showing religiosity and female who experienced polygyny

403

90 84.8

50 Yes 40 No 30

20 15.2

10 0 0 0 Urban Rural

Fig 3.10c) Graph showing residential background and female who experienced polygyny

120

100 100 85.2 82.7 80

60 Yes No 40

17.2 20 14.7

0 0 less than 10,000 10,000-50,000 above 50,000

Fig 3.10d) Graph showing monthly income and female who experienced polygyny

404 TABLE 3.11 UNDER WHAT CONDITIONS FEMALE RESPONDENTS WOULD ALLOW SECOND WIFE

Educational If equal To prevent No issue Never Total treatment is divorce level guaranteed Illiterate 00 00 1(25) 3(75) 4 Below high 00 00 1(10) 9(90) 10 school Higher 00 1(2.27) 3(6.8) 40(90.9) 44 Secondary Graduate and 2(2.98) 2(2.98) 6(8.95) 57(85) 67 above 2(1.6) 3(2.4) 11(8.8) 109(87.2) 125 Religious observance Strictly religious 2(4.7) 2(4.7) 3(7.1) 35(83.3) 42

Moderate 00 1(1.2) 6(7.5) 72(91.1) 79 Indifferent 00 00 2(50) 2(50) 4 2(1.6) 3(2.4) 11(8.8) 109(87.2) 125 Residence Urban 2(1.6) 3(2.4) 11(8.8) 109(87.2) 125 Rural 00 00 00 00 00 2(1.6) 3(2.4) 11(8.8) 109(87.2) 125 Monthly Income level Less than 10,000 00 00 1(16.6) 5(83.3) 6

10,000-50,000 1(1.6) 2(3.2) 4(6.5) 54(88.5) 61 Above 50,000 1(1.7) 1(1.7) 6(10.3) 50(86.2) 58 2(1.6) 3(2.4) 11(8.8) 109(87.2) 125 NOTE: Values in brackets are in percentage

SOURCE: Based on primary field work

405

100 90 90.9 90 85 80 75 70 If equal treatment is 60 guaranteed 50 To prevent divorce 40 No issue 30 25 20 Never 10 6.8 8.95 10 2.982.98 0 0 0 0 02.27 0 Illiterate below high higher graduate and school secondary above

Fig 3.11a) Graph showing educational level and conditions in which wives allow second wife

100 91.1 90 83.3 80 70 If equal treatment is 60 guaranteed 50 50 50 To prevent divorce

40 No issue 30 Never 20 7.5 10 4.74.77.1 0 1.2 0 0 0 Strictly Moderate Indifferent religious

Fig 3.11b) Graph showing religiosity and conditions in which wives allow second wife

406

100

90 87.2

70 If equal treatment is 60 guaranteed to prevent divorce 50

40 No issue

30 Never 20 8.8 10 1.6 2.4 0 0 0 0 0 Urban Rural

Fig 3.11c) Graph showing residential background and conditions in which wives allow second wife

100 88.5 86.2 90 83.3 80

70 If equal treatment is 60 guaranteed To prevent divorce 50

40 No issue

30 never 20 16.6 10.3 6.5 10 3.2 0 0 1.6 1.71.7 0 less than 10,000 10,000-50,000 above 50,000

Fig 3.11d) Graph showing monthly income and conditions in which wives allow second wife

407 TABLE 3.12 MALE RESPONDENTS VIEW ON EQUAL TREATMENT TO WIVES

Educational level Yes, Possible No, not possible Total Illiterate 00 6(100) 6 Below high school 2(20) 8(80) 10 Higher secondary 7(20.5) 27(79.4) 34 Graduate and above 20(40) 30(60) 50 29(29) 71(71) 100 Religious Observance Strictly religious 6(60) 4(40) 10 Moderate 20(26.6) 55(73.3) 75 Indifferent 3(20) 12(80) 15 29(29) 71(71) 100 Residence Urban 29(29) 71(71) 100 Rural 00 00 00 29(29) 71(71) 100 Monthly Income level Less than 10,000 2(15.3) 11(84.6) 13 10,000-50,000 5(20) 20(80) 25 Above 50,000 22(35.4) 40(64.5) 62 29(29) 71(71) 100 NOTE: Values in brackets are in percentage

SOURCE: Based on primary field work

408

120

100 100

80 79.4 80

60 60 Yes No 40 40

20 20.5 20

0 0 Illiterate below high school higher secondary graduate and above

Fig 3.12a) Graph showing educational level and equal treatment to wives

90 80 80 73.3 70 60 60

50 40 Yes 40 No 30 26.6 20 20

0 Strictly Religious Moderate Indifferent

Fig 3.12b) Graph showing religiosity and equal treatment to wives

409

80 71 70

40 Yes 29 No 30

10 0 0 0 Urban Rural

Fig 3.12c) Graph showing residential background and equal treatment to wives

90 84.6 80 80

70 64.5

50 Yes 40 35.4 No 30 20 20 15.3

0 less than 10,000 10,000-50,000 above 50,000

Fig 3.12d) Graph showing monthly income and equal treatment to wives

410 TABLE 3.13 RESPONDENTS WHO FAVOURED DIVORCE

Educational level Yes No Total Female Male Female Male Female Male Illiterate 2(50) 6(100) 2(50) 00 4 6 Below high school 4(40) 8(80) 6(60) 2(20) 10 10 Higher secondary 23(52.2) 21(61.7) 21(47.7) 13(38.2) 44 34 Graduate and above 39(58.2) 23(46) 28(41.79) 27(54) 67 50 68(54.4) 58(58) 57(45.6) 42(42) 125 100 Religious observance Strictly religious 22(52.3) 1(10) 20(47.6) 9(90) 42 10 Moderate 43(54.4) 45(60) 36(45.5) 30(40) 79 75 Indifferent 3(75) 12(80) 1(25) 3(20) 4 15 68(54.4) 58(58) 57(45.6) 42(42) 125 100 Residence Urban 68(54.4) 58(58) 57(45.6) 42(42) 125 100 Rural 00 00 00 00 00 00 68(54.4) 58(58) 57(45.6) 42(42) 125 100 Monthly Income level Less than 10,000 1(16.6) 10(76.9) 5(83.3) 3(23) 6 13 10,000-50,000 28(45.9) 17(68) 33(54.09) 8(32) 61 25 Above 50,000 39(67.2) 31(50) 19(32.7) 31(50) 58 62 68(54.4) 58(58) 57(45.6) 42(42) 125 100 NOTE: Values in brackets are in percentages

SOURCE: Based on primary field work

411

70 60 60 58.2 52.2 50 50 50 47.7 41.7 40 40 Yes 30 No

0 Illiterate below high school higher secondary graduate and above

Fig 3.13a) Graph showing educational level and respondents who favoured divorce (female)

120

100 100

80 80

61.7 60 54 Yes 46 No 38.2 40

20 20

0 0 Illiterate below high school higher secondary graduate and above

Fig 3.13b) Graph showing educational level and respondents who favoured divorce (male)

412

80 75

60 54.4 52.3 47.6 50 45.5

40 Yes No 30 25

0 Strictly religious Moderate Indifferent

Fig 3.13c) Graph showing religiosity and respondents who favoured divorce (female)

100 90 90 80 80

70 60 60

50 Yes 40 40 No

30 20 20 10 10

0 Strictly Religious Moderate Indifferent

Fig 3.13d) Graph showing religiosity and respondents who favoured divorce (male)

413

60 54.4

50 45.6

30 Yes No 20

0 0 0 Urban Rural

Fig 3.13e) Graph showing residential background and respondents who favoured divorce (female)

60 58

50 42 40 Yes 30 No

0 0 0 Urban Rural

Fig 3.13f) Graph showing residential background and respondents who favoured divorce (male)

414

90 83.3 80

70 67.2

60 54.09 50 45.9 Yes 40 32.7 No 30

20 16.6

0 less than 10,000 10,000-50,000 above 50,000

Fig 3.13g) Graph showing monthly income and respondents who favoured divorce (female)

80 76.9 68 70

60 50 50 50 Yes 40 32 No 30 23 20

0 less than 10,000 10,000-50,000 above 50,000

Fig 3.13h) Graph showing monthly income and respondents who favoured divorce (male)

415 TABLE 3.14 FEMALE RESPONDENTS WHO EXPERIENCED DIVORCE

Educational level Yes No Total Illiterate 00 4(100) 4 Below high school 1(10) 9(90) 10 Higher secondary 5(11.36) 39(88.6) 44 Graduate and above 15(22.3) 52(77.6) 67 21(16.8) 104(83.2) 125 Religious observance Strictly religious 1(2.3) 41(97.6) 42 Moderate 20(25.3) 59(74.6) 79 Indifferent 00 4(100) 4 21(16.8) 104(83.2) 125 Residence Urban 21(16.8) 104(83.2) 125 Rural 00 00 00 21(16.8) 104(83.2) 125 Income level Less than 10,000 2(33.3) 4(66.6) 6 10,000-50,000 7(11.4) 54(88.5) 61 Above 50,000 12(20.6) 46(79.3) 58 21(16.8) 104(83.2) 125 NOTE: Values in brackets are in percentage

SOURCE: Based on primary field work

416

120

100 100 90 88.6

77.6 80

60 Yes No 40

22.3 20 10 11.36 0 0 illiterate below high school higher secondary graduate and above

Fig 3.14a) Graph showing educational level and female who experienced divorce

120

97.6 100 100

80 74.6

60 Yes No 40 25.3 20

2.3 0 0 Strictly religious Moderate Indifferent

Fig 3.14b) Graph showing religiosity and female who experienced divorce

417

90 83.2 80

50 Yes 40 No 30

20 16.8

10 0 0 0 Urban Rural

Fig 3.14c) Graph showing residential background and female who experienced divorce

100 88.5 90 79.3 80

70 66.6

50 Yes No 40 33.3 30 20.6 20 11.4 10

0 Less than 10,000 10,000-50,000 above 50,000

Fig 3.14d) Graph showing monthly income and female who experienced divorce

418 TABLE 3.15 MAJOR CAUSE OF DIVORCE

Educational Lack of Husband Wives Dowry Male Physical Total level adjustment extra extra dispute child violence with in-laws marital marital issue relations relations Illiterate 00 00 00 1(50) 1(50) 00 2 Below high 00 00 00 1(100) 00 00 1 school Higher 2(28.5) 5(71.4) 00 00 00 00 7 secondary Graduate and 3(27.2) 6(54.5) 2(18.1) 00 00 00 11 above 5(23.8) 11(52.3) 2(9.5) 2(9.5) 1(4.7) 00 21 Religious observance Strictly 2(66.6) 00 00 1(33.3) 00 00 3 religious Moderate 3(30) 5(50) 1(10) 1(10) 00 00 10 Indifferent 00 6(75) 1(12.5) 00 1(12.5) 00 8 5(23.8) 11(52.3) 2(9.5) 2(9.5) 1(4.7) 00 21 Residence Urban 5(23.8) 11(52.3) 2(9.5) 2(9.5) 1(4.7) 00 21 Rural 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 5(23.8) 11(52.3) 2(9.5) 2(9.5) 1(4.7) 00 21 Monthly Income level Less than 00 00 00 1(50) 1(50) 00 2 10,000 10,000-50,000 2(28.5) 3(42.8) 2(28.5) 00 00 00 7 Above 50,000 3(25) 8(66.6) 00 1(8.3) 00 00 12 5(23.8) 11(52.3) 2(9.5) 2(9.5) 1(4.7) 00 21 NOTE: Values in brackets are in percentages

SOURCE: Based on primary field work

419

120

100 100 lack of adjustment with in-laws

80 71.4 Husband's extramarital relations 60 54.5 Wives extramarital 5050 Dowry Dispute 40 28.5 27.2 Male child issue 20 Physical violence 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 illiterate below high higher graduate and school secondary above

Fig 3.15a) Graph showing educational level and cause of divorce

80 75

70 66.6 Lack of adjustment with in- 60 laws 50 Husband's extramarital 50 relations 40 wives extramarital relations 33.3 30 30 Dowry dispute

20 Male child issue 12.512.5 1010 10 Physical violence 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 Strictly Moderate Indifferent religious

Fig 3.15b) Graph showing religiosity and cause of divorce

420

60 52.3 50

40 Lack of adjustment with inlaws Husband extra marital relations 30 Wives extramarital relations 23.8 Dowry dispute 20 Male child issue Physical violence 9.59.5 10 4.7 0 0 0 0 0 Urban Rural

Fig 3.15c) Graph showing residential background and cause of divorce

70 66.6

60 5050 50 42.8 40 lack of adjustment with inlaws 28.528.5 Husband extramarital relations 30 25 Wives extramarital relations 20 Dowry dispute 8.3 10 Male child issue 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 Physical violence 0

Fig 3.15 d) Graph showing monthly income and cause of divorce

421 TABLE 3.16 RESPONDENTS WHO FAVOURED FAMILY PLANNING

Educational level Yes No Total Female Male Female Male Female Male Illiterate 4(100) 4(66.6) 00 2(33.3) 4 6 Below high school 6(60) 7(70) 4(40) 3(30) 10 10 Higher Secondary 37(84) 30(88.2) 7(15.9) 4(11.7) 44 34 Graduate and above 63(94) 45(90) 4(5.9) 5(10) 67 50 110(88) 86(86) 15(12) 14(14) 125 100 Religious observance Strictly religious 41(97.6) 2(20) 1(2.3) 8(80) 42 10 Moderate 65(82.2) 69(92) 14(17.7) 6(8) 79 75 Indifferent 4(100) 15(100) 00 00 4 15 110(88) 86(86) 15(12) 14(14) 125 100 Residence Urban 110(88) 86(86) 15(12) 14(14) 125 100 Rural 00 00 00 00 00 00 110(88) 86(86) 15(12) 14(14) 125 100 Monthly Income level Less than 10,000 5(83.3) 6(46.1) 1(7.6) 7(53.8) 6 13 10,000-50,000 50(81.9) 20(80) 11(44) 5(20) 61 25 Above 50,000 55(94.8) 60(96.7) 3(4.8) 2(3.2) 58 62 110(88) 86(86) 15(12) 14(14) 125 100 NOTE: Values in brackets are in percentage

SOURCE: Based on primary field work

422

120

100 100 94 84 80

60 60 Yes 40 No 40

20 15.9 5.9 0 illiterate below high school higher secondary graduate and above

Fig 3.16a) Graph showing educational level and respondents who favoured family planning (female)

100 88.2 90 90

80 70 70 66.6

50 Yes No 40 33.3 30 30

20 11.7 10 10

0 illiterate below high school higher secondary graduate and above

Fig 3.16b) Graph showing educational level and respondents who favoured family planning (male)

423

120

97.6 100 100

82.2 80

60 Yes No 40

17.7 20

2.3 0 0 Strictly religious Moderate Indifferent

Fig 3.16c) Graph showing religiosity and respondents who favoured family planning (female)

120

100 100 92

80 80

60 Yes No 40

20 20 8 0 0 Strictly religious moderate indifferent

Fig 3.16d) Graph showing religiosity and respondents who favoured family planning (male)

424

100 88 90

50 Yes 40 No

20 12 10 0 0 0 Urban Rural

Fig 3.16e) Graph showing residential background and respondents who favoured family planning (female)

100

90 86

50 Yes 40 No

20 14 10 0 0 0 Urban Rural

Fig 3.16f) Graph showing residential background and respondents who favoured family planning (male)

425

100 94.8

90 83.3 81.9 80

50 44 Yes 40 No

20 7.6 10 4.8

0 less than 10,000 10,000-50,000 above 50,000

Fig 3.16g) Graph showing monthly income and respondents who favoured family planning (female)

100 94.8 90 81.9 80

60 53.8 50 46.1 Yes 40 No

30 20 20

10 3.2 0 less than 10,000 10,000-50,000 above 50,000

Fig 3.16h) Graph showing monthly income and respondents who favoured family planning (male)

426 TABLE 3.17 RESPONDENTS WHO USED CONTRACEPTIVE METHODS

Educational level Yes No Total Female Male Female Male Female Male Illiterate 4(100) 2(33.3) 00 4(66.6) 4 6 Less than high 5(50) 4(40) 5(50) 6(60) 10 10 school Higher secondary 32(72.7) 18(52.9) 12(27.2) 16(47) 44 34 Graduate and above 55(82) 40(80) 12(17.9) 10(20) 67 50 96(76.8) 64(64) 29(23.9) 36(36) 125 100 Religious observance Strictly religious 33(78.5) 4(40) 9(21.4) 6(60) 42 10 Moderate 61(77.2) 50(66.6) 18(22.7) 25(33.3) 79 75 Indifferent 2(50) 11(73.3) 2(50) 4(26.6) 4 15 96(76.8) 64(64) 29(23.2) 36(36) 125 100 Residence Urban 96(76.8) 64(64) 29(23.2) 36(36) 125 100 Rural 00 00 00 00 00 00 96(76.8) 64(64) 29(23.2) 36(36) 125 100 Monthly Income level Less than 10,000 2(33.3) 4(66.6) 4(66.6) 9(69.2) 6 13 10,000-50,000 41(67.2) 15(60) 20(32.7) 10(40) 61 25 Above 50,000 53(91.3) 45(77.5) 5(8.6) 17(27.4) 58 62 96(76.8) 64(64) 29(23.2) 36(36) 125 100 NOTE: Values in brackets are in percentage

SOURCE: Based on primary field work

427

120

100 100 82 80 72.7

60 50 50 Yes No 40 27.2 17.9 20

0 0 Illiterate below high school higher secondary graduate and above

Fig 3.17a) Graph showing educational level and respondents who used contraceptive methods (female)

90 80 80

70 66.6 60 60 52.9 50 47 40 Yes 40 33.3 No 30 20 20

0 Illiterate below high school higher secondary graduate and above

Fig 3.17b) Graph showing educational level and respondents who used contraceptive methods (male)

428

90 78.5 80 77.2

60 50 50 50 Yes 40 No 30 21.4 22.7 20

0 Strictly Religious Moderate Indifferent

Fig 3.17c) Graph showing religiosity and respondents who used contraceptive methods (female)

80 73.3 70 66.6 60 60

50 40 40 Yes 33.3 No 30 26.6

0 Strictly religious Moderate Indifferent

Fig 3.17d) Graph showing religiosity and respondents who used contraceptive methods (male)

429 90

80 76.8

50 Yes 40 No 30 23.2 20

10 0 0 0 Urban Rural

Fig 3.17e) Graph showing residential background and respondents who used contraceptive methods (female)

70 64

40 36 Yes 30 No

10 0 0 0 Urban Rural

Fig 3.17f) Graph showing residential background and respondents who used contraceptive methods (male)

430

100 91.3 90

70 66.6 67.2

50 Yes

40 No 33.3 32.7 30

20 8.6 10

0 less than 10,000 10,000-50,000 above 50,000

Fig 3.17g) Graph showing monthly income and respondents who used contraceptive methods (female)

80 77.5 69.2 70 66.6 60 60

50 40 Yes 40 No 30 27.4

0 less than 10,000 10,000-50,000 above 50,000

Fig 3.17 h) Graph showing monthly income and respondents who used contraceptive methods (male)

431 TABLE 3.18 RESPONDENTS VIEW ON TYPE OF SUCCESSFUL MARRIAGE

Educational level Arrange marriage Love marriage Total Female Male Female Male Female Male Illiterate 4(100) 5(83.3) 00 1(16.6) 4 6 Below high school 10(100) 9(90) 00 1(10) 10 10 Higher secondary 38(86.3) 29(85) 6(13.6) 5(14.7) 44 34 Graduate and above 55(82) 35(70) 12(17.9) 15(30) 67 50 107(85.6) 78(78) 18(14.4) 22(22) 125 100 Religious observance Strictly religious 34(80.9) 10(100) 8(19) 00 42 10 Moderate 69(87.3) 53(70.6) 10(12.6) 22(29.3) 79 75 Indifferent 4(100) 15(100) 00 00 4 15 107(85.6) 78(78) 18(14.4) 22(22) 125 100 Residence Urban 107(85.6) 78(78) 18(14.4) 22(22) 125 100 Rural 00 00 00 00 00 00 107(85.6) 78(78) 18(14.4) 22(22) 125 100 Monthly Income level Less than 10,000 6(100) 11(84.6) 00 2(15.3) 6 13 10,000-50,000 54(88.5) 22(88) 7(11.4) 3(12) 61 25 Above 50,000 47(81) 45(72.5) 11(18.9) 17(27.4) 58 62 107(85.6) 78(78) 18(14.4) 22(22) 125 100 NOTE: Values in brackets are in percentage

SOURCE: Based on primary field work

432

120

100 100 100 86.3 82 80

60 Arrange marriage Love marriage 40

17.9 20 13.6

0 0 0 Illiterate below high higher graduate and school secondary above

Fig 3.18a) Graph showing educational level and views on type of successful marriage (female)

100 90 90 83.3 85 80 70 70 60 50 Arrange marriage 40 Love marriage 30 30

20 16.6 14.7 10 10 0 illiterate below high higher graduate and school secondary above

Fig 3.18b) Graph showing educational level and views on type of successful marriage (male)

433

120

100 100 87.3 80.9 80

60 Arrange marriage Love marriage 40

19 20 12.6

0 0 Strictly Moderate Indifferent Religious

Fig 3.18c) Graph showing religiosity and views on type of successful marriage (female)

120

100 100 100

80 70.6

60 Arrange marriage Love marriage 40 29.3

0 0 0 Strictly Moderate Indifferent religious

Fig 3.18d) Graph showing religiosity and views on type of successful marriage (male)

434

90 85.6

50 Arrange marriage 40 Love marriage 30

20 14.4

10 0 0 0 Urban Rural

Fig 3.18e) Graph showing residential background and views on type of successful marriage (female)

90 78 80

50 Arrange marriage 40 Love marriage 30 22 20

10 0 0 0 Urban Rural

Fig 3.18f) Graph showing residential background and views on type of successful marriage (male)

435

120

100 100 88.5 81 80

60 Arrange marriage Love marriage 40

18.9 20 11.4 0 0 less than 10,000-50,000 above 50,000 10,000

Fig 3.18g) Graph showing monthly income and views on type of successful marriage (female)

100 88 90 84.6

80 72.5 70 60 50 Arrange marriage 40 Love marriage 30 27.4 20 15.3 12 10 0 less than 10,000-50,000 above 50,000 10,000

Fig 3.18h) Graph showing monthly income and views on type of successful marriage (male)

436 TABLE 3.19 TYPE OF MARRIAGE OF THE RESPONDENTS

Educational Love marriage Arranged marriage Love-cum- Total arranged level marriage Female Male Female Male Female Male Female Male Illiterate 00 00 4(100) 6(100) 00 00 4 6 Below high 00 9(90) 10(100) 1(10) 00 00 10 10 school Higher 2(4.5) 1(2.9) 41(93.1) 31(91.1) 1(2.2) 2(5.8) 44 34 Secondary Graduate 7(10.4) 6(12) 53(79.1) 35(70) 7(10.4) 9(18) 67 50 and above 9(7.2) 16(16) 108(86.4) 73(73) 8(6.4) 11(11) 125 100 Religious observance Strictly 2(4.7) 00 37(88) 10(100) 3(7.1) 00 42 10 religious Moderate 6(7.5) 15(20) 68(86) 52(69.3) 5(6.3) 8(10.6) 79 75 Indifferent 1(25) 1(6.6) 3(75) 11(73.3) 00 3(20) 4 15 9(7.2) 16(16) 108(86.4) 73(73) 8(6.4) 11(11) 125 100 Residence Urban 9(7.2) 16(16) 108(86.4) 73(73) 8(6.4) 11(11) 125 100 Rural 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 9(7.2) 16(16) 108(86.4) 73(73) 8(6.4) 11(11) 125 100 Monthly Income level Less than 1(16.6) 00 5(83.3) 13(100) 00 00 6 13 10,000 10,000- 5(8.1) 8(32) 51(83.6) 17(25) 4(6.5) 00 61 25 50,000 Above 3(5) 8(12.9) 52(88) 43(69.3) 4(6.7) 11(17.7) 59 62 50,000 9(7.2) 16(16) 108(86.4) 73(73) 8(6.4) 11(11) 125 100 NOTE: Values in brackets are in percentage SOURCE: Based on primary field work

437

120

100 100 100 93.1

79.1 80

60 Love marriage Arrange marriage 40 Love-cum-arrange marriage

20 10.4 10.4 4.5 0 0 0 0 2.2 0 Illiterate below high higher graduate and school secondary above

Fig 3.19a) Graph showing educational level and respondent’s type of marriage (female)

120

100 100 90 91.1

80 70

60 Love marriage Arrange marriage 40 Love-cum-arrange marriage

18 20 10 12 5.8 0 0 0 2.9 0 Illiterate below high higher graduate and school secondary above

Fig 3.19b) Graph showing educational level and respondent’s type of marriage (male)

438

100 88 90 86 80 75 70

60 Love marriage 50 Arrange marriage 40 30 25 Love-cum arrange marriage 20 7.1 7.5 10 4.7 6.3 0 0 Strictly Moderate Indifferent religious

Fig 3.19c) Graph showing religiosity and respondent’s type of marriage (female)

120

100 100

80 73.3 69.3

60 Love marriage Arrange marriage 40 Love-cum arrange marriage

20 20 20 10.6 6.6 0 0 0 Strictly Moderate Indifferent religious

Fig 3.19d) Graph showing religiosity and respondent’s type of marriage (male)

439

100

90 86.4

60 Love marriage 50 Arrange marriage 40 Love-cum-arrange marriage 30

10 7.2 6.4 0 0 0 1.8 0 Urban Rural

Fig 3.19e) Graph showing residential background and respondent’s type of marriage (female)

80 73 70

50 Love marriage 40 Arrange marriage 30 Love-cum-arrange marriage

20 16 11 10 0 0 0 0 Urban Rural

Fig 3.19f) Graph showing residential background and respondent’s type of marriage (male)

440

100 88 90 83.3 83.6 80 70 60 50 Love marriage 40 Arrange marriage Love-cum arrange marriage 30 20 16.6 8.1 10 6.5 5 6.7 0 0 less than 10,000-50,000 above 50,000 10,000

Fig 3.19g) Graph showing monthly income and respondent’s type of marriage (female)

120

100 100

80 69.3 Love marriage 60 Arrange marriage Love-cum-arrange marriage 40 32 25 17.7 20 12.9

0 0 0 0 less than 10,000 10,000-50,000 above 50,000

Fig 3.19h) Graph showing monthly income and respondent’s type of marriage (female)

441 TABLE 3.20 MALE RESPONDENTS WHO HELPED THEIR WIVES IN HOUSEHOLD CHORES

Educational level Yes No Total Illiterate 1(16.6) 5(83.3) 6 Below high school 1(10) 9(90) 10 Higher secondary 7(20.5) 27(79.4) 34 Graduate and above 37(74) 13(26) 50 46(46) 54(54) 100 Religious observance Strictly religious 6(60) 4(40) 10 Moderate 25(33.3) 50(66.6) 75 Indifferent 15(100) 00 15 46(46) 54(54) 100 Residence Urban 46(46) 54(54) 100 Rural 00 00 00 46(46) 54(54) 100 Monthly Income level Less than 10,000 3(23) 10(76.9) 13 10,000-50,000 3(12) 22(88) 25 Above 50,000 40(64.5) 22(35.4) 62 46(46) 54(54) 100 NOTE: Values in brackets are in percentage

SOURCE: Based on primary field work

442

100 90 90 83.3 79.4 80 74 70 60 50 Yes 40 No 30 26 20.5 20 16.6 10 10 0 Illiterate below hgh school higher secondary graduate and above

Fig 3.20a) Graph showing educational level and male respondents who helped wives in household chores

120

100 100

80 66.6 60 60 Yes No 40 40 33.3

0 0 Strictly religious Moderate Indifferent

Fig 3.20b) Graph showing religiosity and male respondents who helped wives in household chores

443

60 54

50 46

30 Yes No 20

0 0 Urban Rural

Fig 3.20c) Graph showing residential background and male respondents who helped wives in household chores

100 88 90

80 76.9

70 64.5 60

50 Yes 40 35.4 No

30 23 20 12 10

0 less than 10,000 10,000-50,000 above 50,000

Fig 3.20d) Graph showing monthly income and male respondents who helped wives in household chores

444 TABLE 3.21 MALE RESPONDENTS WHO ALLOWED THEIR WIVES TO WORK OUTSIDE

Educational level Yes No Total Illiterate 4(66.6) 2(33.3) 6 Below high school 5(50) 5(50) 10 Higher Secondary 16(47) 18(52.9) 34 Graduate and above 28(56) 22(44) 50 53(53) 47(47) 100 Religious observance Strictly religious 5(50) 5(50) 10 Moderate 45(60) 30(40) 75 Indifferent 3(20) 12(80) 15 53(53) 47(47) 100 Residence Urban 53(53) 47(47) 100 Rural 00 00 00 53(53) 47(47) 100 Monthly Income level Less than 10,000 7(53.8) 6(46.1) 13 10,000-50,000 15(60) 10(40) 25 Above 50,000 31(50) 31(50) 62 53(53) 47(47) 100 NOTE: Values in brackets are in percentage

SOURCE: Based on primary field work

445

70 66.6

60 56 52.9 50 50 50 47 44

40 33.3 yes 30 No

0 Illiterate below high school higher secondary graduate and above

Fig 3.21a) Graph showing educational level and male respondents who allowed wives to work outside

90 80 80

70 60 60 50 50 50 40 Yes 40 No 30 20 20

0 Strictly religious Moderate Indifferent

Fig 3.21b) Graph showing religiosity and male respondents who allowed wives to work outside

446

60 53

50 47

30 Yes No 20

0 0 0 Urban Rural

Fig 3.21c) Graph showing residential background and male respondents who allowed wives to work outside

60 60 53.8 50 50 50 46.1 40 40 Yes 30 No

0 Less than 10,000 10,000-50,000 above 50,000

Fig 3.21d) Graph showing monthly income and male respondents who allowed wives to work outside

447 TABLE 3.22 MALE RESPONDENTS WHO ALLOWED THEIR WIVES TO GO FOR SHOPPING ALONE

Educational level Yes No Total Illiterate 6(100) 00 6 Below high school 8(80) 2(20) 10 Higher secondary 30(88) 4(11.7) 34 Graduate and above 46(92) 4(8) 50 90(90) 10(10) 100 Religious observance Strictly religious 7(70) 3(30) 10 Moderate 70(93.3) 5(6.6) 75 Indifferent 13(86.6) 2(13.3) 15 90(90) 10(10) 100 Residence Urban 90(90) 10(10) 100 Rural 00 00 00 90(90) 10(10) 100 Monthly Income level Less than 10,000 11(84.6) 2(15.3) 13 10,000-50,000 21(84) 4(16) 25 Above 50,000 58(93.5) 4(6.4) 62 90(90) 10(10) 100 NOTE: Values in brackets are in percentage

SOURCE: Based on primary field work

448

120

100 100 92 88 80 80

60 Yes No 40

20 20 11.7 8 0 0 illiterate below high higher secondary graduate and school above

Fig 3.22a) Graph showing educational level and male respondents who allowed wives to go for shopping alone

100 93.3 90 86.6

80 70 70

50 Yes 40 No 30 30

20 13.3 10 6.6

0 Strictly Religious Moderate Indifferent

Fig 3.22b) Graph showing religiosity and male respondents who allowed wives to go for shopping alone

449

100 90 90

50 Yes 40 No

20 10 10 0 0 0 Urban Rural

Fig 3.22c) Graph showing residential background and male respondents who allowed wives to go for shopping alone

100 93.5

90 84.6 84 80

50 Yes 40 No

20 15.3 16

10 6.4

0 less than 10,000 10,000-50,000 above 50,000

Fig 3.22d) Graph showing monthly income and male respondents who allowed wives to go for shopping alone

450 TABLE 3.23 FEMALE RESPONDENTS WHO TOOK DECISION IN FINANCIAL MATTERS

Educational level Yes No Sometimes Total Illiterate 2(50) 1(25) 1(25) 4 Below high school 5(50) 2(20) 3(30) 10 Higher secondary 32(72.7) 6(13.6) 6(13.6) 44 Graduate and above 50(74.6) 5(7.4) 12(17.9) 67 89(71.2) 14(11.2) 22(17.6) 125 Religious observance Strictly religious 30(71.4) 4(9.5) 8(19) 42 Moderate 56(70.8) 9(11.3) 14(17.7) 79 Indifferent 3(75) 1(25) 00 4 89(71.2) 14(11.2) 22(17.6) 125 Residence Urban 89(71.2) 14(11.2) 22(17.6) 125 Rural 00 00 00 00 89(71.2) 14(11.2) 22(17.6) 125 Monthly Income level Less than 10,000 4(66.6) 1(16.6) 1(16.6) 6 10,000-50,000 42(68.8) 10(16.3) 9(14.7) 61 Above 50,000 43(74.1) 3(5.1) 12(20.6) 58 89(71.2) 14(11.2) 22(17.6) 125 NOTE: Values in brackets are in percentage

SOURCE: Based on primary field work

451

80 72.7 74.6 70

60 50 50 50

40 Yes 30 No 30 25 25 Sometimes 20 20 17.9 13.613.6 10 7.4

0 Illiterate below high higher graduate and school secondary above

Fig 3.23a) Graph showing educational level and females who took decision on financial matters

80 75 71.4 70.8 70

50 Yes 40 No 30 25 Sometimes 19 20 17.7 9.5 11.3 10 0 0 Strictly religious Moderate Indifferent

Fig 3.23b) Graph showing religiosity and females who took decision on financial matters

452

80 71.2 70

50 Yes 40 No 30 Sometimes

20 17.6 11.2 10 0 0 0 0 Urban Rural

Fig 3.23c) Graph showing residential background and females who took decision on financial matters

80 74.1 68.8 70 66.6

Yes 40 No 30 Sometimes 20.6 16.616.6 20 16.314.7

10 5.1

0 less than 10,000 10,000-50,000 above 50,000

Fig 3.23 d) Graph showing monthly income and females who took decision on financial matters

453 TABLE 3.24 ACTUAL NO. OF CHILDREN IN RESPONDENT’S FAMILY

Educational level 1- 2 3-5 More than 5 Total Illiterate 1(25) 3(75) 00 4 Below high school 2(20) 8(80) 00 10 Higher secondary 25(56.8) 19(43.1) 00 44 Graduate and above 50(74.6) 17(25.3) 00 67 78(62.4) 47(37.6) 00 125 Religious observance Strictly religious 29(69) 13(30.9) 00 42 Moderate 47(59.4) 32(40.5) 00 79 Indifferent 2(50) 2(50) 00 4 78(62.4) 47(37.6) 00 125 Residence Urban 78(62.4) 47(37.6) 00 125 Rural 00 00 00 00 78(62.4) 47(37.6) 00 125 Monthly Income level Less than 10,000 2(33.3) 4(66.6) 00 6 10,000-50,000 32(52.4) 29(47.5) 00 61 Above 50,000 44(75.8) 14(24.1) 00 58 78(62.4) 47(37.6) 00 125 NOTE: Values in brackets are in percentage

SOURCE: Based on primary field work

454

90 80 80 75 74.6

60 56.8

50 43.1 1-2 children 40 3-5 children 30 25 25.3 more than 5 children 20 20

0 illiterate below high higher graduate and school secondary above

Fig 3.24a) Graph showing educational level and actual number of children in respondent’s family

80 69 70 59.4 60 50 50 50 40.5 40 1-2 children 30.9 3-5 children 30 more than 5 children 20

0 Strictly Moderate Indifferent religious

Fig 3.24b) Graph showing religiosity and actual number of children in respondent’s family

455

70 62.5 60

40 37.6 1-2 children

30 3-5 children more than5 children 20

10 0 0 0 Urban Rural

Fig 3.24c) Graph showing residential background and actual number of children in respondent’s family

80 75.8

70 66.6

60 52.4 50 47.5

40 1-2 children 33.3 3-5 children 30 24.1 more than5 children 20

0 less than 10,000-50,000 above 50,000 10,000

Fig 3.24d) Graph showing monthly income and actual number of children in respondent’s family

456 TABLE 3.25 RESPONDENTS VIEW ON IDEAL NUMBER OF CHILDREN

Educational level 1- 2 3-5 More than 5 Total Illiterate 3(75) 1(25) 00 4 Below high school 8(80) 2(20) 00 10 Higher secondary 31(70.4) 13(29.5) 00 44 Graduate and above 53(79.1) 14(20.8) 00 67 95(76) 30(24) 00 125 Religious observance Strictly religious 32(76.1) 10(23.8) 00 42 Moderate 60(75.9) 19(24) 00 79 Indifferent 3(75) 1(25) 00 4 95(76) 30(24) 00 125 Residence Urban 95(76) 30(24) 00 125 Rural 00 00 00 00 95(76) 30(24) 00 125 Monthly Income level Less than 10,000 5(83.3) 1(16.6) 00 6 10,000-50,000 45(73.7) 16(26.2) 00 61 Above 50,000 45(77.5) 13(22.4) 00 58 95(76) 30(24) 00 125 NOTE: Values in brackets are in percentage

SOURCE: Based on primary field work

457

90 80 79.1 80 75 70.4 70

50 1-2 children 40 3-5 children 29.5 30 25 more than 5 children 20 20.8 20

0 illiterate below high higher graduate and school secondary above

Fig 3.25a) Graph showing educational level and ideal number of children

80 76.1 75.9 75

40 1-2 children 3-5 children 30 25 23.8 24 more than 5 children 20

0 Strictly Moderate Indfferent religious

Fig3.25b) Graph showing religiosity and ideal number of children

458

80 76

50 1-2 children 40 3-5 children 30 24 more than5 children

10 0 0 0 Urban Rural

Fig 3.25c) Graph showing residential background and ideal number of children

90 83.3 77.5 80 73.7 70

50 1-2 children 40 3-5 children more than 5 children 30 26.2 22.4 20 16.6

0 less than 10,000 10,000-50,000 above 50,000

Fig 3.25d) Graph showing monthly income and ideal number of children

459

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AAppppeennddiixx –– II IInntteerrvviieeww SScchheedduullee

INTERVIEW SCHEDULE

Respondents No.______Date:______

FEMALE RESPONDENT’S PERSONAL INFORMATION

A. ADDRESS: B. EDUCATIONAL LEVEL: a) Illiterate b) below high school c) higher secondary d) graduate and above C. RELIGIOUS OBSERVANCE: a) Strictly religious b) moderate c) indifferent D. INCOME LEVEL; a) Less than 10,000 b) 10,000-50,000 c) above 50,000 E. RESIDENCE Urban born/ Rural born F. AGE a) Less than 31 b) 31-60 c) above 60 1. What was your age at marriage? a) Below 18yrs b) between 18-25yrs c) above 25 yrs 2. What is the preferred age of marriage? a) Below 18yrs b) between 18-25yrs c) above 25 yrs 3. Are you in favour of Dowry (given by parents not on demand by husband’s family) a) Yes b) No 4. Did your parents give dowry? a) Yes b) No 5. Social status is the main reason for Dowry? a) Agree b) disagree c) agree to some extent 6. Have you ever faced any domestic violence regarding dowry? a) Yes b) No 7. Mehr is paid or not as required by contract in Muslim marriage? a) Yes b) No 8. Polygyny is approved in Islam. Are you in favour of it? a) Yes b) No c) To some extent 9. Under what conditions wives would allow husband to take another wife? a) If equal treatment is guaranteed b) To prevent divorce c) No issue due to biological defect of the wife d) Never 10. Have you ever experienced polygyny (Second marriage of husband)? a) Yes b) No 11. Are you in favour of divorce? a) Yes b) No 12. Have you ever been divorced? a) Yes b) No 13. Major cause of divorce? a) Lack of adjustment with in-laws b) Husband’s extramarital relations c) Wife’s extra marital relations d) Dowry dispute e) Male child issue f) Physical violence 14. Are you in favour of family planning? a) Yes b) No 15. Use contraceptive methods? a) Yes b) No 16. Type of marriage successful in your opinion? a) Arranged marriage b) Love marriage. 17. What is the type of your marriage? a) Love marriage b) Arranged marriage c) love-cum-arranged 18. Do you take decisions in consultation with your husband regarding financial matters? a) Yes b) No c) Sometimes 19. Actual number of children? a) 1-2 b) 2-5 c) More than 5 20. Ideal number of children? a) 1-2 b) 2-5 c) More than 5

INTERVIEW SCHEDULE Respondents No.______Date:______

MALE RESPONDENT’S PERSONAL INFORMATION

A) ADDRESS B) EDUCATIONAL LEVEL: a) Illiterate b) below high school c) higher secondary d) graduate and above C) INCOME LEVEL: a) Less than 10,000 b) 10,000-50000 c) above 50,000 D) RESIDENCE: a) Urban born b) rural born E) RELIGIOUS OBSERVANCE a) Strictly religious b) Moderate c) Indifferent F) AGE a) Less than 31 b) 31-60 c) above 60

1. What was your age at marriage? a) Below 18yrs b) between 18-25 yrs c) above 25 yrs 2. What is the preferred age of marriage? a) Below 18 yrs b) between 18-25 yrs c) above 25 yrs 3. Are you in favour of dowry? a) Yes b) No 4. Did you take dowry? a) Yes b) No 5. Did you demand anything? a) Yes b) No 6. Have you paid the amount of mehr? a) Yes b) No 7. Are you in favour of polygyny? a) Yes b) No c) To some extent 8. Can you give equal treatment to more than one wife? a) Yes, possible b) no, not possible

9. Are you in favour of divorce? a) Yes b) No 10. Are you in favour of family planning? a) Yes b) No 11. Use contraceptive methods? a) Yes b) No 12. Type of marriage successful in your opinion? a) Arranged marriage b) Love marriage 13. What is the type of your marriage? a) Love marriage b) Arranged marriage c) Love-cum –arranged marriage 14. Help wife in household work? a) Yes b) No 15. Allow wife to go for shopping alone? a) Yes b) No 16. Allow wife to take a job? a) Yes b) No

AAppppeennddiixx –– IIII PPuubblliisshheedd PPaappeerr