DOCSLIB.ORG

African Renaissance: Towards a New Sudan 7

Total Page：16

File Type：pdf, Size：1020Kb

Download full-text PDF Read full-text
African Renaissance: Towards a New Sudan 7 6 FMR 24 African renaissance: towards a New Sudan by Francis M Deng the mammoth Jonglei Canal to divert What was the war about? Have its causes been addressed the waters of the Sudd (the White by the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA)? What Nile’s vast floodplain) and channel are the future prospects for the South after the tragic its waters northwards for irrigation. SUDAN death of John Garang? Garang’s vision udan is a nation whose identity cultural development. Until colonial In 1983 Dr John Garang de Mabior has been divisively distorted policy dramatically shifted in 1947, it founded the Southern-based Sudan but which is now striving to appeared that the British intended to S People’s Liberation Movement and rediscover itself, albeit in a tragically prepare the South for independence Army. The SPLM/A’s stated objective violent way. The silver lining is that as a separate state. was not secession but the creation of a more constructive search for an a restructured New Sudan, in which identity framework around which The independence movement was there would be no discrimination on Sudanese could unite may be within pioneered and championed by the the bases of race, ethnicity, culture, reach. North, supported by Egypt. The religion or gender. cause was reluctantly supported by As with most, if not all, African coun- the South, which stipulated federal- Garang’s vision of the New Sudan tries, the colonial power brought ism and guarantees for the region as was initially not understood, far together into a state framework na- conditions for endorsing indepen- less supported, in the North and the tional groups that had been distinc- dence. The South opted for inde- South and even within his move- tive, separate and in some cases mu- pendence on the basis of Northern ment. For southerners, who over- tually hostile. The identities that are reassurances that their concerns whelmingly preferred separation, it currently in conflict are the result of would be given ‘serious consider- was incongruent with their aspira- a historical legacy characterised by a ation’. However, the North quickly tions, and in any case was utopian, form of slavery that classified groups reneged on promises to Southerners since the North could never allow into a superior race of masters and and stepped into the British colonial it. For the North, it was arrogant inferior enslaveable peoples. The shoes. As internal colonisers, North- and, at best, naïve. The fighting men North, two-thirds of the country’s ern governments sought to impose and women in the South took it as a land and population, is inhabited by Arabisation and Islamisation as the clever ploy to allay the fears of those ethnic groups, the more dominant bases of a unified homogeneous opposed to separation within Sudan, of which intermarried with incoming Sudan. the international community and the Arab male migrants and traders and, Organisation of African Unity (later over centuries, produced a mixed Southern opposition to impending the African Union). Their attitude African-Arab racial group that resem- Arab domination began in August was reflected in the Dinka saying bles the African peoples south of the 1955, six months before indepen- popular among fighters: “Ke tharku, Sahara. Indeed, the Arabic phrase, dence, when a battalion of southern angicku,” “What we are fighting for, Bilad al-Sudan (‘land of the blacks’) soldiers in the town of Torit muti- we know.” While Garang was talking refers to all of those sub-Saharan ter- nied and fled with their weapons. the language of a united Sudan, they ritories. Arab immigration and settle- Their protest escalated into a rebel- were fighting for secession. ment in the South were blocked by lion which resulted in a civil war that distance, environmental barriers, the was to rage intermittently for over Central to Garang’s philosophy was harsh tropical climate and resistance half a century. the conviction that the dichotomy of the warrior Nilotic tribes. Those between the Arab-Islamic North and Arabs who ventured southwards The initial conflict, secessionist in the African South is largely fictional. were primarily slave raiders, driven its objective, lasted until 1972 and While the North has been labelled by commerce, not interest in Arabis- ended in a compromise – the Addis Arab, even those who can trace ing and Islamising the South. Ababa Agreement – that granted the their genealogy to Arab origins are South regional autonomy and ush- a hybrid of Arab and African races As the dominant partner in the ered in a precarious decade of peace. and even their culture is an Afro- Anglo-Egyptian Condominium, the Its subsequent unilateral abrogation Arab mix. Significant portions of the British ended slavery and effectively by the government led by Gaafer country in the Nuba and Ingassana governed the country as two sepa- Nimeiri – the military strongman who or Funj areas bordering the South rate colonies. They developed the ironically had made it possible in the are as African as any further south in North as an Arab-Muslim society and first place – led to the resumption of the continent. The Beja in the Eastern forged in the South an identity that hostilities in 1983. Southerners were part of the country are also indige- was indigenously African, exposed to incensed by Nimeiri’s embracing of nously Sudanese. The Fur and several Western influences through Christian Islamism, his redrawing of North- other ethnic groups in Darfur to the missionaries, but otherwise denied South borders to incorporate south- far west are black African. And, in any political, economic, social or ern oilfields and plans to construct FMR 24 African renaissance: towards a New Sudan 7 most cases, these non-Arab pockets with the international community. Is- work in progress. Its main shortcom- SUDAN of the North, though predominantly lam, rather than Arab race or culture, ing was the asymmetrical relation- adherents of Africanised Islam, have was their only weapon for mobilising ship between the North and the been almost as marginalised as the the Northern majority. South which would have facilitated people of the South. The vision of gradual assimilation of the South by the New Sudan therefore promised CPA and Addis Ababa the North rather than equitable inte- to liberate all these people and to gration that would make diversity a create a country of genuine plural- The Addis Ababa Agreement gave source of enrichment. ism and equality, with a greater southerners a corner of the country influence for the previously margin- within which to exercise a limited On 9 January 2005, the Govern- alised African groups. degree of autonomy while major ment of the Sudan (GoS) and the national and international issues SPLM/A signed the Comprehensive Over time Garang’s constructive were left to be determined by the Peace Agreement (CPA). The CPA has approach neutralised those opposed centre. The agreement did not pro- brought peace between the North to secession in the North, Africa and vide the South with a financial base and the South and the neighbouring the world, and rallied support for and southern ministers remained regions of the Nuba Mountains and justice in a reconstructed Sudan. dependent on the goodwill of central Southern Blue Nile. The CPA gives Garang incrementally challenged the government and President Nimeiri the South the right to secede through whole country with the prospects of for revenues. a referendum to be exercised after a a nation enriched, rather than rav- six-year interim period and stipu- ished, by its racial, ethnic, religious However, the agreement was lates that unity be made an attractive and cultural diversity. His dream significant in that it gave interim option during the interim period. began to appeal to those non-Arab recognition to Sudan’s ethnic, cul- It also offers the Nuba Mountains groups that had been subsumed tural and religious diversity while and Southern Blue Nile significant under the Arab-Islamic umbrella opening channels of interaction regional autonomy. To a significant and, eventually, even to northern and mutual influence that would, extent, the CPA ensures a more liberals as many began to question over time, allow for the evolution of symmetrical or equitable relation be- their assumed ‘Arab’ identity. This an integrative national unity. That tween the North and the South than national identity ‘renaissance’ began identity would no longer emphasise was available under the Addis Ababa to challenge the dominant Arab- the divisive elements but would Agreement. SPLM/A Leader Islamic establishment. The reaction instead highlight that which, though John Garang of the establishment throughout The South now has its own govern- unrecognised, is in common, as the and Sudanese the 1990s was to adopt a radical of- basis for mutual self-identification ment. The Government of South Sudan Vice-President fensive posture that fuelled Islamic as Sudanese. In many ways, the (GoSS) is fully independent of north- Ali Osman Taha fundamentalism and led to a sharp Addis Ababa Agreement was a major ern interference, has its own army, during peace talks deterioration in Sudan’s relations achievement but also a phase of a its own resource base, access to oil in Kenya. IRIN 8 African renaissance: towards a New Sudan FMR 24 international community, hope that unity will be made attractive to the South during the interim period. As the non-Arab peripheries challenge the status quo, the country is called upon to transform itself and start constructing an inclusive framework of national identity in which all Suda- nese would find a sense of belonging as equal citizens. The choice for the Arab centre is to play a positive role in the equitable reconstruction of the SUDAN country. Given the genocidal nature of identity conflicts, the interna- tional community will continue to be needed not only to fill the vacuum of national responsibility and to provide humanitarian assistance and protection to the civilian population but also to promote the cause of a Sudan Mirror just and comprehensive peace, the only credible and viable means of revenues and control of its own Al-Bashir endorsed Salva Kiir as the preventing genocide.
Load more

Recommended publications
  • 26 October 2019 Dr John Garang Mausoleum Juba, South Sudan REGISTRATION FORM for PARTICIPANTS (Registration Is FREE)
    WALK THE TALK: THE HEALTH FOR ALL CHALLENGE 2019 South Sudan participation to the Walk the Talk: 10 or 5 Kilometer Run/Walk 26 October 2019 Dr John Garang Mausoleum Juba, South Sudan REGISTRATION FORM FOR PARTICIPANTS (Registration is FREE) UN staff/personnel? Yes No If yes, specify agency: ___________________ Male Female Shirt size M L XL XXL PLEASE WRITE LEGIBLY Name: _________________________________________________________ Age: ______________ Address: ___________________________________________________________________________ Contact no.: _______________________________E-mail: _____________________________ Name of person to notify in case of emergency: ____________________________________________ Contact no.: ____________________________________________ IMPORTANT NOTES Deadline for registration for participants is Tuesday, 22 October 2019, at 12:00 noon. Distribution of shirts will be at the John Garang Mausoleum. Assembly time is 7:00 a.m. on Saturday, 26 October 2019, at the Dr John Garang Mausoleum grounds. Anyone who is well and fit can join the marathon but the medals and prizes are only reserved for South Sudanese nationals who are non-UN personnel. Submit this form to WHO office, MINISTRY OF HEALTH –Ministerial Complex, Juba, South Sudan. WAIVER I know that running or walking a road race is a potentially hazardous activity. I should not participate unless I am medically able and properly trained. I also know that, although police protection will be provided, there will be traffic on the course route. I assume the risk of running into traffic. I also assume any and all other risks associated with running this event including but not limited to falls, contact with other participants, the effects of the weather, including high heat and/or humidity, and the condition of the roads, all such risks being known and appreciated by me.
    [Show full text]
  • The Fall of Al-Bashir: Mapping Contestation Forces in Sudan
    Bawader, 12th April 2019 The Fall of al-Bashir: Mapping Contestation Forces in Sudan → Magdi El-Gizouli Protests in Khartoum calling for regime change © EPA-EFE/STR What is the Sudanese Professionals Association (SPA) anyway, perplexed commentators and news anchors on Sudan’s government-aligned television channels asked repetitively as if bound by a spell? An anchor on the BBC Arabic Channel described the SPA as “mysterious” and “bewildering”. Most were asking about the apparently unfathomable body that has taken the Sudanese political scene by surprise since December 2018 when the ongoing wave of popular protests against President Omar al-Bashir’s 30-year authoritarian rule began. The initial spark of protests came from Atbara, a dusty town pressed between the Nile and the desert some 350km north of the capital, Khartoum. A crowd of school pupils, market labourers and university students raged against the government in response to an abrupt tripling of the price of bread as a result of the government’s removal of wheat subsidies. Protestors in several towns across the country set fire to the headquarters of the ruling National Congress Party (NCP) and stormed local government offices and Zakat Chamber1 storehouses taking food items in a show of popular sovereignty. Territorial separation and economic freefall Since the independence of South Sudan in 2011, Sudan’s economy has been experiencing a freefall as the bulk of its oil and government revenues withered away almost overnight. Currency depreciation, hyperinflation and dwindling foreign currency reserves coupled with the rise in the prices of good and a banking crisis with severe cash supply shortages, have all contributed to the economic crisis.
    [Show full text]
  • United States Institute of Peace Association for Diplomatic Studies and Training Sudan Experience Project
    United States Institute of Peace Association for Diplomatic Studies and Training Sudan Experience Project Interview # 19 - Executive Summary Interviewed by: Haven North Initial Interview Date: August 22, 2006 Copyright 2006 USIP & ADST The Interviewee was a high-ranking U.S. official assigned to Sudan from 1992- 95. During this time, the war between the North and the South was being “prosecuted in a brutal way” and “relief operations were being interrupted.” The U.S. “representations or charges (to both sides) were considered by both Governments “without foundation.” Therefore, “the U.S. policy was one of denouncing the excesses of the Sudanese Government, and denouncing their policies such as giving aid and refuge to terrorist organizations.” The Sudanese Government denied these charges, but came to the table to end the rebellion in the South and forge better relations with the West and the U.S. The Clinton Administration was “not as supportive of the SPLA,” but supported the IGAD, even though we did not participate in the negotiations. Former U.S. Ambassadors to Sudan Petterson and Kontos, as a private initiative, met with government and non-government representatives of the North and South. Their conclusion was that, as long as the was going on, there could be no improvement in relations with the U.S., in Sudan’s economy, or in reducing repression and human rights violations. Their recommendations were that the “U.S. should take a direct and important part in an international effort to end the war between the North and South… and reestablish a diplomatic presence. ” These recommendations were rejected by the Clinton Administration.
    [Show full text]
  • Congressional Record—House H2172
    H2172 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD — HOUSE March 6, 2007 COMMUNICATION FROM THE Whereas Dr. Garang skillfully managed to tlewoman from Florida (Ms. ROS- CLERK OF THE HOUSE consolidate his base after the devastating LEHTINEN) each will control 20 minutes. split in the SPLM/A in 1991; The SPEAKER pro tempore laid be- The Chair recognizes the gentleman Whereas as the undisputed leader of the from New Jersey. fore the House the following commu- SPLM/A, Dr. Garang demonstrated remark- nication from the Clerk of the House of able political and military leadership for GENERAL LEAVE Representatives: over two decades; Mr. PAYNE. Madam Speaker, I ask Whereas Dr. Garang was a soldier, a schol- unanimous consent that all Members HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, ar, a statesman, and a father, who had a Washington, DC, March 5, 2007. may have 5 legislative days to revise clear vision and unwavering love for his peo- Hon. NANCY PELOSI, and extend their remarks and include ple and country; Speaker, U.S. House of Representatives, extraneous material on the resolution Whereas Dr. Garang fought for 22 years to Washington, DC. under consideration. achieve a just peace for his people, but only DEAR MADAM SPEAKER: Pursuant to the served 21 days as First Vice President of The SPEAKER pro tempore. Is there permission granted in Clause 2(h) of Rule II Sudan; objection to the request of the gen- of the Rules of the U.S. House of Representa- Whereas Dr. Garang fought not only for tleman from New Jersey? tives, the Clerk received the following mes- the people in Southern Sudan, but also for There was no objection.
    [Show full text]
  • Working Title Here
    Network Text Analysis in Computer-Intensive Rapid Ethnography Retrieval: An Example from Political Networks of Sudan* Laurent Tambayong California State University at Fullerton; [email protected] Kathleen M. Carley Carnegie Mellon University; [email protected] Abstract: Advances in text analysis, particularly the ability to extract network based information from texts, is enabling researches to conduct detailed socio-cultural ethnographies rapidly by retrieving characteristic descriptions from texts and fusing the results from varied sources. We describe this process and illustrate it in the context of conflict in the Sudan. We show how network information can be extracted from vast quantities of unstructured texts-based information using computer assisted processes. This is illustrated by an examination of changes in the political networks in Sudan as extracted from the Sudan Tribune. We find that this approach enables rapid high level assessment of a socio-cultural environment, generates results that are viewed as accurate by subject matter experts, and match actual historical events. The relative value of this socio-cultural analysis approach is discussed. Keywords: social networks; text mining; network text analysis; rapid ethnography retrieval (RER); Sudan _________________________ *This work is part of the Rapid Ethnographic Retrieval project at the center for Computational Analysis of Social and Organizational Systems (CASOS) of the School of Computer Science (SCS) at Carnegie Mellon University (under a Multidisciplinary University Research Initiative (MURI) grant, number N00014-08-1-1186. Additional support was provided by CASOS, the center for Computational Analysis of Social and Organizational Systems at Carnegie Mellon University. The views and conclusions contained in this document are those of the authors and should not be interpreted as representing the official policies, either expressed or implied, of the Office of Naval Research, or the U.S.
    [Show full text]
  • The Derg-SPLM/A Cooperation: an Aspect of Ethio-Sudan Proxy Wars
    The Derg-SPLM/A Cooperation: An Aspect of Ethio-Sudan Proxy Wars Regassa Bayissa∗ Abstract The warm and friendly Ethio-Sudan diplomatic relations that followed Sudan’s independence in 1956 and the long standing frontier trade between the two countries have been severely damaged by the outbreak of civil wars in southern Sudan in 1955 as well as in Eritrea in 1962. As the civil wars intensified in both countries, the influx of refugees and insurgents across their common border took place. Internal political and socio-economic problems in Ethiopia and the Sudan, together with super-power rivalries in the Horn brought about periods of increasing hostilities between the two countries. On a tit for tat basis, both the Imperial and military governments of Ethiopia and the successive governments of the Sudan came to encourage and assist cross-border guerrilla forces from either side. Thus, animosity rather than cooperation characterized relations between the Sudan and Ethiopia until the fall of the Derg in 1991. Keywords: Derg, Ethio-sudan relations, SPLM/A, proxy wars Introduction The Upper Nile and Jonglei regions of Southern Sudan bordering Gambella and the Gambella region itself were intensively affected by the wars between the governments of the Sudan and the Anyanya I (the southern Sudan Guerilla group in the first civil war 1955- 1972), the SPLA (Sudan People’s Liberation Army of the second civil war 1983-2005), the Lou-Jikany conflict (1993-1994), the armed conflicts following the splits within the SPLM/A and the South Sudan Independence Movement Army (SSIM/A) 1991-2005). The Sudan governments claimed that Ethiopia was supporting the South Sudan guerrillas struggling to secede from the north while the governments of Ethiopia accused successive Sudanese governments of material and moral support to the Eritrean secessionist movements.
    [Show full text]
  • Addis Ababa Agreement: Was It Destined to Fail and Are There Lessons for the Current Sudan Peace Process? In: Annales D'ethiopie
    David H. Shinn Addis Ababa Agreement: was it destined to fail and are there lessons for the Current Sudan Peace Process? In: Annales d'Ethiopie. Volume 20, année 2004. pp. 239-259. Citer ce document / Cite this document : Shinn David H. Addis Ababa Agreement: was it destined to fail and are there lessons for the Current Sudan Peace Process?. In: Annales d'Ethiopie. Volume 20, année 2004. pp. 239-259. doi : 10.3406/ethio.2004.1077 http://www.persee.fr/web/revues/home/prescript/article/ethio_0066-2127_2004_num_20_1_1077 Annales d'Ethiopie, 2005, vol. XX: 239-258 ADDIS ABABA AGREEMENT: WAS IT DESTINED TO FAIL AND ARE THERE LESSONS FOR THE CURRENT SUDAN PEACE PROCESS? David H. Shinn Past May Be Prologue Sudan is approaching the end of a peace process whose origins in some respects began soon after the collapse in 1983 of the 1972 Addis Ababa Agreement and the resumption of civil war. An estimated two million Sudanese, primarily Southerners, have died since 1983 of famine, disease and the direct consequences of the renewed fighting. Following the failure of a number of discrete peace initiatives, the Intergovernmental Authority on Deve lopment (IGAD) took responsibility in 1993 for bringing the Sudanese civil war to an end. Mediators from IGAD countries outlined in 1994 a Declaration of Principles (DOP) for ending the civil war. The DOP endorsed the right of the South to self-determination and creation of a secular society throughout the country. The Sudan People's Liberation Movement/Army (SPLM/A) almost immediately accepted the DOP. The Government of Sudan (GOS) initially rejected it and only in 1997 agreed to accept it as a basis for negotiations.
    [Show full text]
  • The Addis Ababa Peace Agreement, 1972
    View metadata, citation and similar papers at core.ac.uk brought to you by CORE provided by NORA - Norwegian Open Research Archives What factors contributed to the failure of the Addis Ababa Peace Agreement, 1972 Dawit Yemane Tekle [Master’s Degree Thesis in Peace and Conflict Studies, History Track] UNIVERSITY OF OSLO [30 October, 2015] Preface May 2008, it was my first journey outside my home country Eritrea to Khartoum, Sudan. I lived in Sudan for 3 and half years as a refugee before I came to Norway. After staying 3 months in Khartoum as a refugee, I had the opportunity to work in Khartoum as a teacher. Sudan is the largest country in Africa and because of its natural resources the country was given the name “Mother of Africa”. Indeed the people of Sudan have been kind, helpful and hospitable to the Eritreans’ refugees who lived in Sudan for a long time. But it was my daily question why this country had suffered of civil war, starvation and corruption while the country is endowed with natural wealth. I was in Sudan when the long and bloody civil war between North and South Sudan came to an end after the referendum in 2011, in which the South Sudan became the newest African state in the world. However, still a lot of questions remained unresolved between the two nations, consequently, there were continuous confrontation over the ownership of the oil resource over the Abyei region. Therefore, it was my personal interest to study and write at an academic research on the Addis Ababa Peace Agreement, 1972.
    [Show full text]
  • 1 United States Institute of Peace Association for Diplomatic Studies and Training Sudan Experience Project
    United States Institute of Peace Association for Diplomatic Studies and Training Sudan Experience Project Interview # 72 –Executive Summary Interviewed by: Barbara Nielsen Initial interview date: March 22, 2007 Copyright 2007 USIP & ADST The interviewee, director of a U.S. NGO, has been working in the Sudan since 1998. Her mission is to connect the church there with resources in the U.S. Her organization seeks to create awareness of the needs of the Sudanese church and of the suffering of Sudanese Christians, and to provide concrete help in creating economic livelihoods for the poor. Since the signing of the CPA, this interviewee notes that persecution of Christians continues unchanged, with churches continuing to be destroyed. She notes that despite the nominal peace brought by the CPA, there are ongoing attacks by the Lords Resistance Army mixed with Sudanese Armed Forces. In her view, these attacks are part of a plan by the Khartoum government to destabilize the South and to keep divisions among Southerners alive. Because it controls the media, the government also sows seeds of dissention among southerners through disinformation. Despite intelligence cooperation with the U.S. after 9/11, and despite signing the CPA, the Government of Sudan has not, in her view, changed its fundamental attitudes. While admiring the leadership of Salva Kiir, she is critical of many of the officials of the government of South Sudan in Juba, noting their high degree of conspicuous consumption and seeming preoccupation with their new positions. According to this interviewee, the biggest failure of the CPA is the international community’s failure to pressure the Northern government to comply with its terms, given that strong pressure is the only way to get the Khartoum government to change its negative behavior.
    [Show full text]
  • Sudan: the Crisis in Darfur and Status of the North-South Peace Agreement
    Sudan: The Crisis in Darfur and Status of the North-South Peace Agreement Ted Dagne Specialist in African Affairs June 15, 2011 Congressional Research Service 7-5700 www.crs.gov RL33574 CRS Report for Congress Prepared for Members and Committees of Congress Sudan: The Crisis in Darfur and Status of the North-South Peace Agreement Summary Sudan, geographically the largest country in Africa, has been ravaged by civil war intermittently for four decades. More than 2 million people have died in Southern Sudan over the past two decades due to war-related causes and famine, and millions have been displaced from their homes. In July 2002, the Sudan government and the Sudan People’s Liberation Movement (SPLM) signed a peace framework agreement in Kenya. On January 9, 2005, the government of Sudan and the SPLM signed the final peace agreement at a ceremony held in Nairobi, Kenya. In April 2010, Sudan held national and regional elections. In January 2011, South Sudan held a referendum to decide on unity or independence. Abyei was also expected to hold a referendum in January 2011 to decide whether to retain the current special administrative status or to be part of South Sudan. The Abyei referendum did not take place. In the Southern referendum, 98.8% voted for independence and 1.17% for unity. In late May 2011, Sudan government forces dissolved the joint Abyei Administration and invaded the town, displacing more than 100,000 people in the Abyei area. The crisis in Darfur began in February 2003, when two rebel groups emerged to challenge the National Congress Party (NCP) government in Darfur.
    [Show full text]
  • Conflict, the Rise of Nations, and the Decay of States: the Transformation of the International System
    Counterinsurgency in Southern Sudan: The Means to Win? by Roger C. Glickson Roger C. Glickson is a Political-Military Analyst with Science Applications International Corporation in Arlington, Virginia. INTRODUCTION Since early 1992. the Sudanese Government has made a concerted effort to conclude militarily its long-running civil war with the southern-based Sudan People's Liberation Army (SPLA), led by John Garang. While Khartoum initially made serious inroads into insurgent-held territory, these gains were confined largely to former rebel garrisons, leaving the SPLA controlling much of the countryside. Moreover, the insurgents exacted a terrible price in terms of the number of government soldiers killed, while the financial cost of the escalated fighting took a continued toll on the Sudanese economy. Now, more than three years after the government launched the "final" assault against the SPLA, the two sides appear to be mired in a conflict in which both lack the means to win, yet which neither can afford to lose. The purpose of this essay is to briefly examine the origins and nature of the Sudanese Civil War, then describe and assess the government's counterinsurgency campaign against the SPLA in 1992, and finally, comment on the outlook for the future in Sudan. ROOTS OF CONFLICT The current struggle between the government of Sudan and the SPLA is rooted in the imperfectly implemented agreement that ended Sudan's first civil war in 1972. Known as the Addis Ababa Agreement, this accord was designed to reintegrate the south, and southerners,
    [Show full text]
  • The Khartoum-Splm Agreement
    THE KHARTOUM-SPLM AGREEMENT: SUDAN'S UNCERTAIN PEACE Africa Report N°96 – 25 July 2005 TABLE OF CONTENTS EXECUTIVE SUMMARY AND RECOMMENDATIONS................................................. i I. INTRODUCTION .......................................................................................................... 1 II. THE TERMS OF AGREEMENT................................................................................. 2 III. THE QUEST FOR POLITICAL INCLUSIVITY....................................................... 3 IV. THE SOUTH SUDAN DEFENCE FORCES (SSDF) ................................................. 6 A. MOTIVATIONS.......................................................................................................................6 B. RELATIONS WITH THE GOVERNMENT ....................................................................................8 C. RELATIONS WITH THE SPLM ..............................................................................................10 D. POLICY ALTERNATIVES.......................................................................................................11 E. THE INTERNATIONAL ROLE.................................................................................................12 V. SPLM DIFFICULTIES................................................................................................ 13 A. INTERNAL OBSTACLES AND CENTRALISED DECISION-MAKING...........................................15 B. MONEY PROBLEMS .............................................................................................................16
    [Show full text]