Alabama Law Scholarly Commons Articles Faculty Scholarship 2013 The Polysemy of Privacy Ronald J. Krotoszynski Jr. University of Alabama - School of Law,
[email protected] Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.ua.edu/fac_articles Recommended Citation Ronald J. Krotoszynski Jr., The Polysemy of Privacy, 88 Ind. L.J. 881 (2013). Available at: https://scholarship.law.ua.edu/fac_articles/224 This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Faculty Scholarship at Alabama Law Scholarly Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Articles by an authorized administrator of Alabama Law Scholarly Commons. The Polysemy of Privacy RONALD J. KROTOSZYNSKI, JR. "The Polysemy of Privacy " considers the highly protean nature of the concept of "privacy," which extends to myriad disparate legal interests, including nondisclosure, generalized autonomy interests, and even human dignity. For a concept of such central importance to many systems of protectingfundamental rights, its precise contours are surprisingly ill defined This lack of determinate meaning is not limited to the concept of privacy in the United States; virtually all legal systems that utilize privacy (or its first cousin, "dignity") have difficulty reducing the concept into specific, carefully delineated legal interests. In some respects, privacy means everything-and nothing-at the same time. Moreover, even in those contexts where one can identify privacy at a relatively choate, rather than highly abstract, level of jurisprudentialanalysis, the right of privacy often comes into direct conflict with other fundamental rights. For example, commitments to freedom of speech and to a free press often conflict with privacy interests; these conflicts, in turn, force courts to secure one interest only at the price of undermining another.