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Road to Power the Border Roads Organisation Needs to Pull up Its Socks in the Interest of National Security

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Road to Power the Border Roads Organisation Needs to Pull up Its Socks in the Interest of National Security Guest Column | Lt Gen. Vinod Bhatia (retd) Road to Power The Border Roads Organisation needs to pull up its socks in the interest of national security To get rich, one must build roads the nation needs an effective and profes- frastructure developed has also helped -An ancient Chinese Proverb sional armed forces capable of defending China integrate Tibet and settle its Han its frontiers. China, on the other hand, majority, thus changing the demograph- The 73-day Doklam standoff has been having crossed the high Himalayas and ic pattern in this remote and generally apparently resolved at the politico-dip- reached the foothills in certain areas, hostile region. lomatic level. The peaceful resolution unilaterally withdrew, having realised India, on the other hand, shied away should be attributed to a firm and reso- the enormity of the task of sustaining a from constructing roads and building lute stand by the Indian Army at the face- force without an adequate road network. infrastructure along the Tibet border in off site. The tactical level demonstration The LAP on 20 November 1962 was star- a mistaken belief that lack of roads will of strength was possible as the Indian ing at a long and harsh winter, without degrade the China threat, and deter deep Army deployment at Doka La dominates the means to survive and sustain in the incursions in the event of another war. the Doklam Plateau fortunately duly sup- underdeveloped high altitude captured As a misplaced strategy, India did not ported by a functional road constructed Indian territories. China learned its les- construct any roads along the India-Chi- by the Army Engineers through what son well and has gainfully applied its na Border. In 2010, defence minister is commonly known as an operational energy and ample resources to create a A.K. Antony while addressing a function works. This sort of an infrastructural ad- world class, state-of-the-art, multi mod- organised by the Border Roads Organi- vantage along the 3,488 km India-China al, multi-dimensional infrastructure in sation (BRO) said, “Earlier the thinking border and the Line of Actual control Tibet Autonomous Region (TAR). This was that inaccessibility in far-flung areas (LAC) is lacking in most areas. includes a vast road and rail network, would be a deterrent to the enemy”. He It is also reported that the People’s Lib- airfields, oil pipelines, logistic installa- acknowledged that this was an ‘incorrect eration Army (PLA) has constructed a tions, habitat and warehousing. The in- approach’ and stated that the govern- road joining Merug La (north of Doklam) to South Doklam extending to Jampheri Ridge about four to five kilometre east PAVING THE WAY Army & of Doka La or the earlier face-off site, BRO clear the Jammu-Srinagar creating certain strategic vulnerabilities highway together for India. China has once again demon- strated that roads are the key to military domination along the Himalayan bor- ders. It will be prudent to analyse the infrastructure along the border areas to deduce relevant lessons and chart out an implementable and pragmatic ac- tion plan to ensure continued peace and tranquillity along the LAC. On account of differing perceptions of the LAC, an assertive and aggressive China and a growing new India, the peace and tran- quillity along the LAC will be constantly and continuously under stress, with in- crease in frequency, intensity and depth of transgressions, leading to more and more ‘stand-offs’. The Doklam is likely to be the new normal. The critical question is does India have relevant and future ready organisations and structures to meet the challenges and construct the requisite infrastructure especially along the LAC in an acceptable time-frame. The 1962 war was undoubtedly a de- bacle for India. Wars always bring out certain lessons, both for the victor and the vanquished. Though the Henderson Brooks report stays buried in secrecy, one lesson that India learned was that 50 FORCE | April 2018 Land ment has decided to upgrade roads, tun- border is indicative of a long period of tasked to secure India’s borders and de- nels and airfields in the border areas. The neglect as also the inference that BRO, velop infrastructure in remote areas of China Study Group approved 73 roads to which was once an effective organisa- the north and north-east states of the be constructed in 2005 and to be com- tion, has outlived its utility. country. The ROB develops and main- pleted by 2012. As per July 2017 update to Ladakh is connected by two major tains road networks in India’s border Lok Sabha, construction of 73 strategic passes, Zojila which remains open for areas and friendly neighbouring coun- roads was revised with deadlines extend- approximate five months a year and tries. It is staffed by officers and troops ed to 2019-2020, this includes 43 by the Rohtang which remains open for even drawn from the Indian Army. Officers ministry of defence (MoD) and 27 by the a lesser duration. This limited period of from the Border Roads Engineering ministry of home affairs (MHA), of which road days available are just about ade- Service and personnel from the General only 21 roads by March 2017 and 30 quate to meet the ever-increasing ma- Reserve Engineer Force (GREF) form the roads by July 2017 have been completed terial demands of the people of Ladakh parent cadre. Currently, the organisation and remaining are under construction as and the army for their sustenance during maintains operations in 21 states, one progress was retarded. BRO is construct- the winters. UT (Andaman and Nicobar Islands), and ing 63 out of these 73 roads. The delays The Old Tibet road is the single road neighbouring countries such as Afghan- are attributed to multiple reasons like axis leading to Puh from Shimla in Him- istan, Bhutan and Myanmar. The ROB wildlife conservation and environmen- achal Pradesh. This Axis is prone to major operates and maintains over 32,885 kilo- tal approval, insurgency related security disruptions during monsoons and closes metres of roads and about 12,200 metres hurdles, delay in land acquisition by the in part during the winters. Similarly, the of permanent bridges in the country. The states, inaccessible terrain, inclement roads leading to Harsil, Joshimath, and BRO comprises 18 projects, nine each for weather, poor planning, construction Tawaghat are no better and no closer to east and west. capacities, lack of will to take hard de- the LAC. The Uttarakhand floods of June In order to ensure coordination and cisions, funding and more importantly, 2013 are a stark reminder of the state of expeditious execution of projects, the a now inefficient and ineffectiveRO B . road connectivity and susceptibility to government set-up the Border Roads The fact remains that the much-need- weather. Sikkim, too, remains connect- Development Board (BRDB) with the ed road connectivity along India-China ed from Siliguri with a single road axis Prime Minister as chairman of the board border is either non-existent or woefully prone to disruptions during monsoons and defence minister as deputy chair- inadequate even for development of the and winters. The 319 km road from Tez- man. Today, the board exercises finan- region, leave aside defence needs. A brief pur to Tawang remains in a poor state cial and other powers but is now chaired analysis of roads along the India-China and takes over 10 to 12 hours. by the minister of state for defence, a di- In the middle sector, Indian roads are lution which needs correction. The ROB , 30 to 70 km from the LAC vis-a-vis five though manned by personnel from the km of China, whereas in Sikkim and MoD and raised to ensure infrastructure Tawang sectors Indian roads are 10-15 for security concerns was functioning km wherein China has last mile connec- under the ministry of road transport and tivity to the passes. In the areas of east highways (MoRTH); a not very neat ar- Arunachal Pradesh, the state of roads rangement as the funds were allocated on our side is dismal with the LAC being by MoRTH. In a bid to boost border con- 20-70 km from the road-head whereas nectivity, the BRO has now been entirely Chinese roads are mostly up to the LAC brought under the MoD. The ROB ’s bud- and in a few places about 20 km away. To get is approximately a thousand crore summarise, road-heads in India are five with a manpower of 35,000 including to 50 km from the LAC whereas China 1,300 officers. has constructed roads right up to its per- According to wikipedia, to provide ception of the LAC in most areas. With connectivity to the army and border an anticipated increase in the frequency guarding forces, BRO is building 410 two- and intensity of transgressions by Chi- lane class-70 (heavy load bearing includ- na, it is an imperative that requisite in- ing tanks) road bridges along the China frastructure be developed in the fastest border which includes 144 in Arunachal possible time-frame. Pradesh (75 already under construction There is a need to analyse and review and will be completed by 2020), 100 un- the structure, organisation and effective- der construction in Jammu and Kashmir, ness of the BRO. There is no doubt that 55 under construction in Uttarakhand, the BRO has done an exceedingly excel- 40 in Sikkim and another 25 in Himachal lent work under the most challenging Pradesh. The concern is that the annual and difficult situations in construction capacity and plan of construction by the and maintenance of roads and other BRO as per their own claims and targets infrastructure along our vast and most- is 3 km of bridges.
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