nuclear powers could easily have No End in become a catastrophe. Sight At stake was disputed territory 1 high in the Himalayan Mountains. Understanding For a variety of historical reasons, India and China have never been the Sino-Indian able to agree upon a border to sep- Border Dispute arate their two states. In the east, Dr. Peter Harris, editor China claims much of what is now governed as the Indian state of

Arunachal Pradesh. In the west, India claims the territory of Aksai Chin, governed by Beijing as part of Xinjiang and Tibet. In between those two disputed territories runs a 2,500-mile border (punctuated by the independent states of Nepal and Bhutan) that has never been demarcated. Even the so-called Line of Actual Control (LAC) that supposedly separates Indian-con- trolled territory from Chinese-con- trolled territory is the subject of vigorous dispute. Both sides sta- tion troops along portions of the ndia and China compromise over LAC and conduct regular patrols. a third of the world’s population. They jockey for position by build- I Both maintain operable nuclear ing infrastructure—camps, roads, triads in addition to being the lookout posts—and trying to oc- planet’s second and third highest cupy strategic points. But physical spenders on conventional military clashes are rare. Until last year, arms. When the two countries’ mil- fatalities had not been recorded in itaries came to blows in May-June decades. of last year, then, it is no surprise In this roundtable, six scholars— that the whole world took notice. some based in the region, the rest Dozens of slain Indian and Chinese longtime analysts of Sino-Indian soldiers was a tragedy. A wider relations—put the recent border conflagration between the two Indo-Pacific Perspectives │ 1

Harris clashes in context. Liu Xuecheng trilateral relationship’s future; she begins by lamenting the flareup in knows that the India-China and violence and calling for a return to India-Pakistan sides of the triangle diplomatic negotiations. Liu is will remain fraught for the foresee- frank that a resolution (or “settle- able future. But she is also hopeful, ment”) of the border dispute is un- recognizing that a cycle of conflict, likely to materialize any time soon. humiliation, resentment, and more The best that China and India can conflict will bring nothing good for hope for is to “manage” the situa- the people of South Asia. tion and avoid further bloodshed. Sripana Pathak offers a starkly Liu encourages readers in China and India to put the border dispute different, less optimistic take on in a wider perspective, urging that last year’s clashes. According to this singular issue not be allowed Pathak, it is unrealistic to expect to blind either side to the manifest Indians to subordinate their coun- benefits of political and economic try’s border dispute to economic or cooperation. strategic concerns, as Liu wants. There is too much anger. The kill- Offering a view from Pakistan, ing of Indian soldiers—unjustified Maira Qaddos agrees with Liu that and unprovoked—will not easily be peaceful co-existence between In- forgotten. Pathak represents a dia and China is both possible and prominent strand of thought essential for regional prosperity. among Indians when she squarely Qaddos concedes that, in Pakistan, lays the blame for last year’s there had been little sympathy for deadly clashes at the feet of India during the bloody clashes China’s leaders. She argues that it with China. As she explains, it is is China’s conception of sover- perhaps overdetermined that Paki- eignty—one rooted in a unilateral stan will always tend to side with concern for restoring China’s for- China in any conflict with India. mer glory rather than an under- Few readers will be surprised by standing that rival powers each this. But Qaddos warns that such have conflicting claims that must zero-sum thinking can only lead to be reconciled—that fuels the bilat- ruin in the long term. What is eral dispute. In the end, it is China needed is for China, India, and Pa- that is at fault; it is China that kistan to all find common ground must change for there to be peace. for the sake of peace and stability across South Asia and beyond. Ashok Sharma expands on this Qaddos is realistic about the view to suggest that China’s Indo-Pacific Perspective │2

No End in Sight actions along the Sino-Indian bor- desecuritize other aspects of their der did not just provoke a backlash relationship. Might the border it- among the Indian public and politi- self be moved outside of the realm cal class—they also spurred inter- of security and into the realm of national-level pushback against normal politics and diplomacy? Un- perceived Chinese aggression. In fortunately, Ho argues, this might this sense, Sharma explains, con- be wishful thinking. While it is flict along the LAC must be consid- promising that China and India ered part of a larger Indo-Pacific have so far found ways to avoid se- struggle for mastery. In Sharma’s curitizing water management is- telling, international opinion sues, this bright spot in their rela- seems to have firmly swung behind tions does not provide much of a India and against China—espe- blueprint for desecuritizing other cially among the Quad (and “Quad aspects of the relationship. On the Plus”) states. Sharma’s analysis contrary, the trend might well be leaves little room for optimism that in the opposite direction: that is, the Sino-Indian border dispute can toward the eventual securitization be managed or resolved bilaterally; of water rather than the desecuriti- if the conflict truly does become re- zation of other issues. gionalized—just another theater in the Indo-Pacific great game—then Finally, Jeff Smith offers yet an- it surely will become unlikely that other reason to be gloomy about a grand bargain between India and the prospects of a peaceful resolu- China could ever be struck. tion to the dispute: the fact that Chinese leaders seem to have Selina Ho adds to the discussion of adopted the position that the ques- hope versus pessimism with her tion of demarcating the interna- analysis of water security in the tional boundary cannot be divorced Sino-Indian borderlands. On the from the question of Indian “inter- one hand, Ho explains that, ference” in Tibetan affairs. From against all the odds, both China the Chinese perspective, this and India have managed to desecu- makes some sense. After all, what ritize their relationship over water use is an agreed-upon interna- resources—even though access to tional border if New Delhi persists water ought to be considered one of in pursuing policies that meddle in the highest stakes issues to define affairs across that border? India, the Sino-Indian bilateral relation- however, is unlikely to abandon ship. This raises the possibility, the Tibetan exile community as the perhaps, that the two sides could price of settling its border disputes; Indo-Pacific Perspectives │3

Harris to agree to China’s demands in this Dr. Peter Harris respect would be nothing better Dr. Harris is Assistant Professor of Political Sci- ence at Colorado State University and Editor of than base appeasement. Viewed in the Indo-Pacific Perspectives series. this context, the border dispute is not so much about lines on a map as it is about mutual trust, respect, and toleration of each other’s inter- nal politics. Lines on a map would be hard enough. Adding the other issues to the mix makes the prob- lem all but intractable. These contributions make clear that just as China and India disa- gree on the border between their states, so too do they disagree over what the border dispute is truly about. As the old adage goes, where you stand depends on where you sit. The view from China looks precious little like the view from India. In many cases, the perspec- tive of those living closest to the border seems to be distorted— quite understandably—by anger, distrust, and a burning sense of in- justice. This spells danger ahead. The entire region—indeed, the whole world—has an interest in avoiding a return to violence along the Sino-Indian border. But efforts to manage the conflict failed badly last year. It is not obvious that the world can afford those efforts to break down again. ■

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