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Scale Back Or Forge Ahead? Opportunities and Risks Associated with the Intergovernmental Conference on the European Constitution SWP Comments Andreas Maurer

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Scale Back Or Forge Ahead? Opportunities and Risks Associated with the Intergovernmental Conference on the European Constitution SWP Comments Andreas Maurer Introduction Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik German Institute for International and Security Affairs Scale back or Forge ahead? Opportunities and risks associated with the Intergovernmental Conference on the European Constitution SWP Comments Andreas Maurer On 4 October 2003 the heads of state and government and foreign ministers of all 25 existing and imminently acceding Member States of the European Union, European Commission President Romano Prodi and two representatives of the European Parlia- ment opened the Intergovernmental Conference (IGC) convened in Rome to discuss the draft European Constitution. Just under nine weeks from that date, by mid-December, after a probable total of nine meetings, the Constitution will supposedly be adopted. The period elapsing between the official that the Italian EU Presidency is proposing reception of the draft Constitution and the to subject both the institutional and start of the IGC totalled three-and-a-half security policy chapters of the Constitution months. Bearing in mind the widely dif- to review by the IGC. However, in addition fering standpoints, the questions arising to this, Italy, France, Germany, the Benelux with regard to the IGC are as follows: countries and – since just recently – Den- firstly, whether the draft Constitution mark have all rejected the call to scale back should undergo any substantial changes, the draft Constitutional Treaty consider- and secondly, what consequences such ably, pointing out that any Member State changes might have for the EU’s further wishing to call into question the Conven- development. It should be clear by now that tion’s consensus on a particular issue will all actors involved in the IGC are unhappy be responsible for reaching a fresh agree- with some sections of the draft Constitu- ment. tion. Indeed, in Brussels more than 1,000 Nonetheless, the IGC will have no choice motions for amendments were tabled. It but to word its answers to the questions may also be safely assumed that no govern- raised by individual countries that are ment has any serious interest in seeing the critical of the draft Constitutional Treaty in IGC fail. The alternative would be the such a way that a consensus of the afore- Treaty of Nice, yet it was the style of the mentioned type can be reached. It should Nice IGC and the existence of that Treaty be borne in mind here that those countries which triggered the Convention’s forma- which failed to dispatch their foreign tion in the first place. Finally, it is also clear ministers to the Convention tend to regard SWP Comments 17 November 2003 1 the draft Constitution as a ‘basis to work the European Parliament would also trigger on,’ in stark contrast to those countries the resignation of the EU foreign minister. which delegated their foreign ministers to Furthermore, the parties to the negotia- co-write the draft Constitution in the Con- tions asked questions about the following vention and then duly signed it. The whole points: debate is characterised by different con- The definition of a ‘qualified majority’ in ceptions of what the Convention is and the the Council of Ministers; basis for its legitimacy. Indeed, it is viewed the scope of qualified majority votes in either as a kind of ‘sherpa’ IGC, a constit- the Council in the areas of foreign and uent power, a parliamentary council or an security policy, justice and home affairs open forum, and this divergence of views is policy and the budget; logically also impacting on the IGC. the fine details of structured co-oper- ation in security and defence policy; the composition and decision-making Positions adopted by the procedures of the Commission; and Member States the minimum share of seats in the Euro- The first meeting of foreign ministers pean Parliament. ended in their reaching a broad consensus So far two main lines of conflict have that the following issues should be ex- crystallized, though they are nothing new plored: (in principle they have existed ever since 1. The regular rotation of the EU Presi- the IGC on the Treaty of Amsterdam in dency (Council of Ministers). The Italian IGC 1996–1997). Consequently, the only some- Chair is focussing on the debate about what surprising fact is that the number of Group or Team Presidencies alternating protagonists advocating each position is every two years. The issues to be raised here growing. include both the duration of such presiden- On the one hand, 15 smaller and cies and the number of Member States in- medium-sized countries find themselves volved in them. Of course, an alternative head to head with the six EEC founding would be for every specialist Council of members, the United Kingdom and Den- Ministers to elect its own President inde- mark over the issue of the institutional pendently. organisation of the Union. For whilst the 2. The function and flexibility of the so- ‘small countries,’ which include the ac- called Legislative Council in relation to the cession states, have been insisting since other Council formations. On this subject, their meeting in Prague on 1 September the foreign ministers agreed that no inde- 2003 that the rule stipulating that there pendent Legislative Council should be shall be “one Commissioner with voting formed. Instead, the individual Council rights per country” should continue to meetings on specific topics will always apply in the European Commission, the serve as ‘Legislative Councils’ when they founding Member States, the United King- adopt legislative measures and public dom and Denmark are backing the Con- debates take place in that connection. vention’s proposal to reduce the number 3. The status and role of the future EU of Commissioners. The line of attack foreign minister. The most controversial adopted by the ‘smaller’ countries with issue is the incumbent’s position within the respect to retaining the traditional Com- Commission, the real questions being these: munity method is also reflected in the firstly, whether they should also have reservations expressed by Austria, the voting rights in areas that have nothing to Czech Republic, Lithuania, Latvia, Finland do with the CFSP, and secondly, whether a and Estonia, which are opposed to the vote of no confidence in the Commission by creation of the post of elected President of the European Council. SWP Comments 17 November 2003 2 A second bone of contention pits the vis-à-vis the other ‘big’ countries in the United Kingdom, Ireland, the Czech Repub- Council more visible than in the past, since lic, Slovenia and Malta against the rest. the size of the population will count as a Here, the group headed up by the British direct factor alongside the respective coun- government is insisting that unanimous try’s single vote. Meanwhile, Poland and voting remains the norm in the Council Spain reject the associated ‘downgrading’ when dealing with issues to do with fiscal of the weighted vote they would enjoy and justice policy, social security policy, under the Treaty of Nice. When all is said foreign policy, security policy and defence and done, both countries are probably less policy, whereas other countries, led by concerned about maintaining their dis- Germany, Belgium and the Netherlands, proportional special status than about want to see qualified majority voting ex- retaining their ability to veto structural and tended to these areas as well. cohesion fund policies that are associated Latvia, Poland, Sweden the Czech Repub- with major spending. The IGC should focus lic and Hungary are sceptical about closer on this very connection, for both these or structured co-operation between indi- areas of policy will only effectively switch vidual countries on defence policy. Since from being subject to unanimous votes to the Anglo-German-French summit, in the majority decision-making system in principle the United Kingdom appears to 2013. be prepared to discuss this matter, though A provisional compromise could entail together with Spain it continues to clearly raising the required quorum for such reject a scenario in which the EU would financially weighty policies from 60% to have military structures independent of two thirds. Alternatively, the current NATO. system of vote weighting for these areas of Another point to bear in mind in con- policy could be retained, but at the same nection with ratification is the insertion of time slightly altered, to ensure that the a reference to God in the preamble. Poland, required quorum of weighted votes is Spain, Malta and Portugal are in favour of lowered from its present level of 74% to two such an inclusion, but Belgium and France thirds. That would leave Poland and Spain in particular are opposed to it. with their special status, but it would also Finally, in Germany rumblings in some become considerably easier to attain major- federal states, the CDU/CSU and some in- ities in the areas of policy in question, as fluential ministries are starting to raise the well as much more laborious to build block- spectre of broader opposition to EU reform, ing coalitions than under the rules set out especially where the Commission’s powers in the Treaty of Nice. in the areas of economic, social, health, criminal justice and immigration policy are concerned. Commission efficiency In preparation for EU enlargement, a Protocol was annexed to the Treaty of Nice, Countries’ relative clout leaving the composition of the Commission in the Council up to a unanimous decision by the Council There is a massive gulf between Spain and taken when the 27th Member State acceded Poland, on the one hand, and the other to the Union. By contrast, the draft Con- countries with regard to the planned intro- stitution contains more precise provisions duction of the so-called ‘double majority’ regarding the number of members of the from 1 November 2009 in qualified major- Commission.
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