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ransylvanian eview Vol. XXVII T R No. 1 /Revue de Transylvanie Spring 2018

Contents/Sommaire Romanian Academy Chairman: • Paradigms Academician Ioan-Aurel Pop Towards a Balanced Metropolitan Governance: Combating the “Back-door” Status Center for of Peripheral Rural Areas 3 Transylvanian Studies Júlia A. Nagy József Benedek Drivers of Change in Post-communist Agriculture in the Apuseni Mountains 21 Magdalena Drãgan Gabriela Cocean Pipelines for Energy, Interests for Companies and Great Powers 34 Artur L. Lakatos Egon Nagy Comparison of Changes in Urbanized Areas in Poland and Romania 56 Cezary Kowalczyk Jacek Kil Ciprian S. Moldovan Territorial Data Agregation and Trends of Regional Economic Convergence in Europe: A Geo-statistical Analysis for the 2003–2014 Period 73 Alexandru Rusu Octavian Groza Urban and Regional Competitiveness in the North-West Region of Romania 94 Melania-Gabriela Ciot • Transsilvanica Political Activism in the Romanian Countryside of the 1930s: The Peasants from Hunedoara County and the Ploughmen’s Front 121 On the cover: Sorin Radu Rareª Lupu, • Editorial Events Carpet (2018), Politics and Population in Romania (1948–2015) 139 oil on canvas Ioan Bolovan • Book Reviews Transylvanian Review continues the Ion Cârja, Dan Lucian Vaida, Loránd L. Mádly, tradition of Revue de Transylvanie, founded by Silviu Dragomir, which and Dan Prahase, eds., Un ardelean în Marele Rãzboi/ was published in Cluj and then in Sibiu Ein Siebenbürger im Großen Krieg/A Transylvanian between 1934 and 1944. in the Great War: Albert Porkoláb (1880–1920) Transylvanian Review is published (reviewed by Robert-Marius Mihalache) 144 quarterly by the Center for Transylvanian Studies and the Romanian Academy. Ottmar Traşcã and Stelian Obiziuc, eds.,

Diplomaþi români în slujba vieþii: Editorial Board Constantin I. Karadja şi salvarea evreilor români Cesare Alzati, Ph.D. din Europa în timpul celui de-al Treilea Reich Facoltà di Scienze della Formazione, Istituto (1932–1944) (reviewed by Mihaela Gligor) 147 di Storia Moderna e Contemporanea, Università Cattolica, Milan, Italy Pãun Ion Otiman, ed., Almãjul—de ieri, de azi Horst Fassel, Ph.D. şi de mâine sau mult dorita vale a miracolelor Institut für donauschwäbische Geschichte und Landeskunde, Tübingen, Germany (reviewed by Ioan Bolovan) 149 Konrad Gündisch, Ph.D. Robert D. Kaplan, În umbra Europei: Bundesinstitut für Kultur und Geschichte Douã rãzboaie reci ºi trei decenii de cãlãtorie prin der Deutschen im östlichen Europa, Oldenburg, Germany România ºi dincolo de ea Harald Heppner, Ph.D. (reviewed by Marta Petreu) 151 Institut für Geschichte, Graz, Austria Paul E. Michelson, Ph.D. Paolo Prodi, Homo europaeus Huntington University, Indiana, USA (reviewed by Alberto Castaldini) 153 Momčilo Pavlović, Ph.D. Yvonne Rydin, Governing for Sustainable Director of the Institute of Contemporary Urban Development History, Belgrade, Serbia Alexandru Zub, Ph.D. (reviewed by Júlia A. Nagy) 153 Academician, honorary director of A. D. Vasile Sebastian Dâncu, Politically incorrect: Xenopol Institute of History, Iaºi, Romania Scenarii pentru o Românie posibilã Editorial Staff (reviewed by Artur L. Lakatos) 156 Ioan-Aurel Pop Daniela Mârza Ioan Bolovan Robert-M. Mihalache Constantin MãruÞoiu, Daniela Popescu, Ioan Raveca Divricean Alexandru Simon Maria Ghitta Florian D. Soporan Bratu, Radu Moraru, and Luminiþa Dana Postolache, Rudolf Gräf George State Biserici de lemn din Transilvania: Cluj şi Sãlaj Virgil Leon (reviewed by Ciprian-Valentin Nicoarã) 158 Translated by • Contributors 159 Bogdan Aldea—English Liana Lãpãdatu—French Desktop Publishing Edith Fogarasi Publication indexed and abstracted in the Cosmina Varga Thomson Reuters Social Sciences Citation Index® Correspondence, manuscripts and books and in Arts & Humanities Citation Index®, should be sent to: Transylvanian Review, Centrul de Studii Transilvane and included in ebsco’s and elsevier’s products. (Center for Transylvanian Studies) 12–14 Mihail Kogãlniceanu St., ISSN 1221-1249 Cluj-Napoca 400084, Romania. All material copyright © 2018 by the Center for Transylvanian Studies and the Printed in Romania by Color Print Romanian Academy. Reproduction or use 66, 22 Decembrie 1989 St., without written permission is prohibited. zalãu 450031, Romania [email protected] Tel. (0040)260-660598 www.centruldestudiitransilvane.ro paradigms

Towards a Balanced Metropolitan Governance

J ú l i a A. N a g y Combating the “Back-door” J ó z s e f B e n e d e k Status of Peripheral Rural Areas

The main results of the study Introduction bring evidence for the peri- ven if urban centers provide pheralization of rural areas better job opportunities and E good service delivery, their rap- situated in the second ring id expansion faces spatial limitations. of the metropolitan area. Therefore, cities become reliant not only on the land but also the human as well as environmental resources of their surrounding rural territories. As a consequence, these spatial and sectoral flows result in linkages between the rural and urban territories, a process which requires a balanced and integrative approach in order to exploit the strengths and opportunities that rural- Júlia A. Nagy urban linkages can offer. Neverthe- Ph.D. candidate at the Faculty of Geogra- less, their interdependent relationship phy, Babeº-Bolyai University, Cluj-Napoca. and synergistic effect (Elmqvist et al. 2016; Hamilton 2014) are repeatedly József Benedek neglected by their governance systems Professor at the Faculty of Geography, which constantly fail to involve local Babeº-Bolyai University, Cluj-Napoca, elected academician of the Hungarian stakeholders from peripheral rural ar- Academy of Science and Country Repre- eas in the planning and development sentative at the Regional Studies Associa- of the metropolitan area. As a conse- tion, Seaford, United Kingdom. quence, the peri-urban interface is left 4 • Transylvanian Review • Vol. XXVII, No. 1 (Spring 2018) to marginalized local authorities which only function as a “back door” for the urban center, providing it with various resources and space without benefit- ing from infrastructure developments, service delivery, financial mechanisms or even active involvement in decision-making processes as members of the metropolitan area. Therefore, in order to achieve territorial cohesion and eliminate the marginalization of peripheral actors, an integrative metropolitan governance is crucial. Against this background, in its first section the paper provides a review of the concepts of periphery, peripheralization and integrative governance from a metropolitan perspective. By contrasting these concepts and approaching them from a practical perspective, the second section of the paper draws on experiences of local decision makers, urban planners and academics from the Cluj Metropolitan Area.

Metropolitan Governance: Changing Conceptions

he forces of globalization have not only led to the rapid growth of cities but they also changed their nature and texture. More and more people T are moving from rural to urban settlements hoping for better job and study opportunities, social interaction and improved public services. Neverthe- less, this rapid urbanization has its own downbacks as well, which lead to issues of social, environmental challenges that call for remedies from those responsible for the management, planning and development of urban areas. On the other hand, we must consider the socio-economic connections, the spatial as well as the functional relations between the core cities and their surrounding areas (Vasanen 2013), their interdependent relationship to one another as well as their synergistic effect (Elmqvist et al. 2016; Hamilton 2014) as metropolitan areas become decisive factors in the global economic growth. Therefore, in order to enhance this process and exploit the strengths and opportunities that rural-urban linkages can offer, governance at the metropolitan level becomes crucial. Although the concept of governance and its understanding has changed over the years and it is no longer considered as a state-centered practice only (Benn 2009), there is still concern about its implementation at a metropolitan level, especially regarding the fragmented approaches towards the management of urban growth and its socio-economic consequences (Gleeson et al. 2004). According to Pierre (2011) the governance approach entails a lower importance of the formal local government structures and raises attention on how public and private entities are supported in delivering common interests. As a consequence, there is an increasing pressure on local authorities and decision Paradigms • 5 makers to respond to the challenges presented by the regional economies and to look beyond their administrative and political boundaries (Hamilton 2014) in order to strengthen social cohesion and promote sustainable metropolitan development. Next to this, according to Rydin (2010, 47) governance is a policy system which is articulated through the organization of various stakeholder networks with the aim of delivering means of rightfulness, reveal new forms of resources and resolve issues by using innovative solutions. However, governance is not responsible for capacity building within the various government establishments, but rather it has to support the involvement and consultation of numerous stakeholders on decisions regarding development and public policy regulation within the overall area (Kübler 2005). Nevertheless, several metropolitan areas face problems of local government fragmentation and face limitations regarding the cooperation process. More- over, the complex interactional modes between the networks, the interdepen- dencies and the increasing movement between the urban-rural settlements of the metropolitan area aggravate the process of metropolitan governance (Williams 1999). Consequently, as Phares (2009) points out, if only a few local governments refuse to cooperate over a specific issue, the efforts for tackling effectively and sustainably problems for the metropolitan area as a whole will prove to be inefficient. The need for local initiatives to be part of and connected to a complex multi-scalar system where they have sustainable implications and effects at different scales (Carr and Affolderbach 2014) brings pressure on in- tergovernmental relations. In addition, the interests presented by various actors, stakeholders and institutions must be structured or planned in ways that serve shared values and long-term common benefits. Nevertheless, as long as there is a division between center and periphery, the inequalities are not diminished and the conflicts of interest will dominate the governance practice and throw back the governance perspective on a metropolitan scale. As Brenner (2004)—based on the studies of Veltz (1996)—points out, the metropolitanization process brought economic growth and better development capacities that concentrate in major metropolitan regions, on the one hand, but intensified territorial disparities, on the other, as the benefits are largely experienced by the core urban regions, leaving the peripheral areas lagging behind and in certain cases marginalized (Boudreau et al. 2006). 6 • Transylvanian Review • Vol. XXVII, No. 1 (Spring 2018)

The Concept of Periphery and Peripheralization from a Metropolitan Perspective

he concept of periphery has been proposed by different polarization and world-system theories as a socio-spatial category in subordinated rela- T tion to the core spaces (Benedek and Moldovan 2015). In terms of spatial planning and within the urban-rural bias it is frequently viewed as contrary to or a product of the asymmetry of the core (Lang et al. 2015) and, according to Kühn (2015, 368), it mainly refers to “sparsely populated rural regions, border regions or the suburban fringes of cities.” According to Blowers and Leroy (1994) the view created about a peripheral community is connected to a spatial basis that is physically distant from and hardly connected to the dominant area. However, as Lang (2012) points out, when considering the development in a certain area this must not be reduced only to processes within its geographical position or spatial boundaries, but needs to be seen on a multi-scalar level where peripheries in their overall understanding are “the result of societal processes of peripheralization and not as a structural condition of space” (Lang 2012, 1749). Therefore, even if the term indicates a distance between a declining, challenged area and a well-developed, strengthened core, the changing nature of temporal and spatial conditions over a certain area must not be disregarded. These spatial implications over a certain period of time result in a process referred to as peripheralization by those dealing with spatial planning and development (Blowers and Leroy 1994; Lang 2012; Bernt and Colini 2013; Fischer-Tahir and Naumann 2013). When talking about peripheralization several academics employ the work of Henri Lefebvre on space as a social product, and reflect on the implications that social relations have on the production and shaping of space. Therefore, the process of peripheralization is not a standalone sequence (Leibert 2013) but a systematic consequence of economic, demographic, political and facility concentration within a metropolitan center to the detriment of other marginalized—in many cases rural—areas (Fischer-Tahir and Naumann 2013). On the other hand, Lang (2012) argues that the process is dependent on discursive practices about what spatial division is seen as peripheral or central and not necessarily on its structural arrangement. Nevertheless, the concept is closely related to the academic debate about uneven development which, according to Bernt and Colini (2013), creates peripheries with reduced connectivity, economically less viable, depopulated and politically more reliant and therefore largely dependent on the metropolitan core. This is why Blowers and Leroy (1994, 203) consider that communities living in peripheral areas Paradigms • 7 are not only remote in terms of geographical location but also considered to be “economically marginal, politically powerless and socially homogeneous.” Therefore, in a detailed understanding and from a regional perspective, Nau- mann and Reichert-Schick (2013, 147) see these mostly rural peripheral areas characterized by outmigration with “poor transport facilities, few and lowly qualified jobs, and limited opportunities for economic development.” However, these characteristics do not define the periphery as stand-alone features. Conversely, it is important to remark that, next to the spatial inequalities, peripherality is influenced by temporal inequalities, which leads us to the understanding that it is not a static concept or process (Naumann and Reichert-Schick 2013; Török 2015; Kühn 2015), but it must be seen as a dynamic, relational (Lang 2012) and reversible notion (Leibert and Golinsky 2016) which creates the possibility for developing changeable conditions for the actors involved (Kühn 2015) and presents circumstances for becoming so-called non-peripheral. This way of understanding peripheralization involves the concept of “marginalization” which, although seemingly close in its meaning, is understood by Müller (2013) as a multiscale process which brings a set of cultural, economic, political, social disadvantages for the involved actors. Another aspect that touches upon the functional meaning of peripherality is the reflection on the different types through which it can manifest itself. Kühn (2015) in his theoretical analysis of this topic underlines three approaches that include economic polarization, social inequality and political power. Next to this, Blowers and Leroy (1994) associate peripheral communities with four characteristics: remoteness, economic marginality, powerlessness, culture of acceptance, and environmental degradation. It is not the aim of this paper to elaborate on these concepts. Nevertheless, the relevance and reasoning behind the reference to them is to highlight that both peripheralization and marginalization signify socio-spatial disparities and unbalanced spatial development. This understanding supports the fact that peripheralization is in relation to a process of centralization which rests on uneven spatial development. Therefore, within the field of spatial planning as a means to retain the inten- sification of centralization, the European Union in its Territorial Agenda 2020 (Kühn 2015) and in the eu Commission’s Green Paper on Territorial Cohesion (Lang et al. 2015) endeavors for polycentric and balanced spatial development in a multi-scalar system. As a consequence, several member states introduced a different settlement structure, the metropolitan areas, in order to promote them as growth centers in the globalized economy (Kühn 2015). 8 • Transylvanian Review • Vol. XXVII, No. 1 (Spring 2018)

Integrated Metropolitan Governance

At the eu level, the necessity for an integrated approach to urban planning was first stressed in 2007 in the Leipzig Charter on Sustainable European Cities, which has raised the attention upon the necessity for common principles and strategies in the development process and planning policy of European cities. The challenges however consist in recognizing the issues of the urban development process, understanding the conditions and developing such plans, strategies and initiatives which are able to tackle these problems in an integrative manner. Although the Europe 2020 Strategy stresses the importance of an integrated place-based approach which indicates the need for cooperation and coordination between different actors at diverse government levels, there is still a need to create a context for integrated governance on a metropolitan level. The concept of integrated urban governance is an ever-evolving one, being defined and expressed in various ways; the term is rarely used as such in the academic or policy-making discourse. Nevertheless, it has various synonyms con- ceptualized from a policy-making approach. For example, as Schwedler (2011, 11) relates, the unece and who (Stead and Jong 2006) use the notion of “policy integration” or “cross-cutting policy making” in the view of the United King- dom Cabinet Office (2000). Alternatively, several individual writers mention the term “concerted decision-making” (Warren et al. 1974), or as an alternative, the term “policy coordination” (Challis et al. 1988) or even “linked policy frameworks” (Wheeler 2000). Even though many of these terms vary from each other they all cover several common points such as: coordination not only between specific departments of the local authorities but also among the various levels of the governance systems; political organizing and leadership; development of effective regional institutions; involvement of different stakeholders such as civil society or businesses into the decision-making process; holistic political approach towards strategic planning as well as long-term visions and sustainability oriented planning (Schwedler 2011, 11).

Cluj Metropolitan Area (cma)

n Romania, the eu accession brought new challenges related to the urban phenomena. The Romanian growth pole program initiated in 2008 can be I considered as a top-down initiative aimed at decreasing regional disparities (Benedek 2016). In terms of territorial governance, it has led to the establishment of metropolitan areas (Grigorescu et al. 2012), as voluntary associations Paradigms • 9 between an urban core settlement and the neighboring rural and suburban areas (Benedek 2016). In the case of Cluj Metropolitan Area (cma), it comprises the core city Cluj-Napoca (around 320,000 inhabitants) and two rings or belts of rural settlements: the first ring (directly neighboring the core area and made up of 5 communes) and the second ring (directly neighboring the first ring, but less accessible from the core city, and made up of 12 communes). Even though the commitment behind the approach was to facilitate an easier access to eu funding and to promote cooperation between the parties concerned, a number of dilemmas emerged regarding the process, which require significant effort to promote metropolitan-wide, effective governance. In specific terms, the increasing jurisdictional fragmentation of metropolitan areas might question the regional thinking (Wheeler 2000) and the possible peripheralization of certain rural areas. A significant example of such efforts is presented by Cluj Metropolitan Area, founded in December 2008, which comprises the municipality of Cluj-Napoca and 17 communes.

Methodology

he main research question that this paper aims to answer is: to what extent does integrative governance eliminate the peripheralization of the T rural actors of the metropolitan area? In order to answer this question, the research methodology covers three phases. First, it involves a desk research of scientific references and policy outlines related to the topic. In this section concepts such as periphery, peripheralization, or integrated governance are analyzed from a specific metropolitan perspective. In the second phase, a total of twenty-three semi-structured interviews are conducted with various planners, decision makers and academics actively involved in the decision-making and planning process of Cluj Metropolitan Area. A total of fifteen representatives from the local authorities of the metropolitan area have been interviewed. Next to this, two representatives from each the academic sphere, the Regional Devel- opment Agency, the County Council and the Association for the Metropolitan Area of Cluj were asked questions related to the research topic. The main questions formulated in the interview guide are built around four themes: the dysfunctions of the metropolitan area, the existence of a common vision and plans shared by different players, the drawing forces of competition or cooperation and the pretention for institutionalization or dialog on a metropolitan scale. The third stage is completed by analyzing and assessing the qualitative aspects of the integrated metropolitan governance system in Cluj with regard to tendencies of peripheralization. 10 • Transylvanian Review • Vol. XXVII, No. 1 (Spring 2018)

The Existing Situation, Dysfunctions within the Metropolitan Area

n order to identify the existing issues and those believed to be most ur- gent to act on within the metropolitan area, the interviewees were asked to I highlight three main dysfunctions of their area. The most frequently mentioned problem was infrastructure, and in a narrower context almost 90% of the respondents highlighted the bad condition or shortage of road infrastructure, on the one hand, and mobility, on the other. Nevertheless, it is important to point out that both issues appear differently in the core city or even the first ring and in the peripheral areas (mainly the communes situated in the second ring). Therefore, in terms of the core city, even if there were no complaints about the quality of the roads, the biggest problem mentioned on this matter is the lack of parking spaces and traffic congestion. On the other hand, most of the decision makers from the peripheral areas have pointed out that there is still a high proportion of unpaved road network in their communes and highlighted the necessity for developing and extending the public transport which could enable the mobility of their residents. Some of the interviewees from the peripheral areas referred to their daily struggle with finding separate public transport companies that in some cases do not respect their agreed schedule, which leaves the inhabitants only with the option of travelling by their own car, which in many cases does not exist. This is a challenge also supported by the study of Leibert (2013, 107), who found that “inhabitants of rural areas are often left to their own devices and have to counterbalance the downscaling of the infrastructure with more private mobility.” Nevertheless, there was a common agreement on the fact that in the last few years great steps have been taken towards improving the public transport within the metropolitan area, as it now also covers the first ring, yet the implementation of plans to extend its coverage in the second ring is still delayed and causes frustration within the peripheral areas. As one of the interviewees stated: “This metropolitan mobility plan has been twisted in so many ways that in the end only the first ring benefits from it and we are still left to wait for it . . . left in the hands of other transport providers.” This is a dysfunction that has been highlighted by several academics in the literature review when mentioning the reduced connectivity, poor transport facilities in the peripheries and the centralized transport system (Blowers and Leroy 1994; Lang 2012; Bernt and Colini 2013). A second issue mentioned by most of the interviewees from the second ring and one representative from the first ring was the development of the sewage network. Thirdly, seven interviewees (mostly representatives of the academic sphere, some decision makers and two planners) believed that the third impor- Paradigms • 11 tant issue is that the metropolitan area does not function as an entity. The issue was ascribed to the considerable differences between the profile and problems of the core city and its surrounding rural communities. Therefore, “the planning is deficient so you cannot do anything integrated and everyone clearly follows their own interest without understanding the fact that administrative boundaries are no longer relevant.” Another interviewee believes that “there is no common strategic perspective . . . of the 18 localities, some have a larger interest area and others a lesser one, but there is no clear overlap between these interests.” Or, according to a decision maker, “everything we do is to see immediate interests articulated, we do not take in consideration any studies, therefore our localities develop in a chaotic manner.” As Hamilton (2014) has pointed out, in order to strengthen social cohesion and deliver sustainable metropolitan development, local authorities, decision makers need to look beyond their not only administrative but also political boundaries, structure or plan their interests and, according to Carr and Affolderbach (2014), to connect their initiatives to a complex and multi-scalar system. This problem was also alluded to by several interviewees through the common agreement that especially communities situated in the second ring and a few in the first ring suffer from a lack of investments. This is also an issue that has more facets. Some interviewees pointed out that it is due to the fact that in several areas there is lack of entrepreneurial spirit, many felt that it is because of the ageing population, and others ascribed it to the degraded quality of agricultural land such as the orchards, or the lack of a plot of land for setting up industrial parks. Some planners however ascribed this matter to the defective metropolitan governance, stating that the metropolitan area exists “only on paper, and several times Cluj—but also other similar towns—took advantage of the fact that they met the criteria to receive their own funding clearly on the basis of being a metropolitan area . . . and 95% or even 98% of the investments were made in the core area,” or, in another planner’s perspective, “because without a vision, investments are not rewarding.” Therefore, as Kübler (2005) argues, there is a need for a governance practice which is able to bring together and support various stakeholders in order to develop such public policy regulations and come up with decisions that serve and benefit the entire metropolitan area. Next to the main issues mentioned above there were several other concerns mentioned mostly once by some of the interviewees from the peripheral areas, such as: lack of other public facilities like water, gas, electricity, garbage disposal, lack of funds or education. Even though all of these concerns are equally important, we would like to draw a parallel with different outcomes by mentioning two examples that resulted from our research and are connected to education, brought up by one representative from the first ring and one from the second. In 12 • Transylvanian Review • Vol. XXVII, No. 1 (Spring 2018) the view of the decision maker from the first ring, “in terms of education there is a disadvantage that we are near Cluj. Although we have assigned and equipped spaces for educational activities and we have teaching personnel, many children of our locality go to Cluj to study.” Hence, the proximity and better transport connection to the city core might present disadvantages as well. On the other hand, the decision maker from the second ring stated that “we invested in re- habilitating the school . . . and we are thinking of a project through which we could cooperate with the University and offer scholarships for good students, which gives them an appropriate income in exchange for a contract through which they pledge to work in education in rural areas such as ours, for example.” When asked if accommodation would be provided as well, the answer was that it is planned to be offered, only the system needs to be worked out well. In brief, the idea behind the initiative is to attract well-educated young teachers who are willing to spend a period of time in a rural area and contribute to the development of a good quality education right on site. As a consequence, the aim of elaborating on these two examples was to reflect on the fact that there are cases when proximity to the core might present a disadvantage, a challenge. Furthermore, contrary to this, remoteness might be an opportunity or competitive disadvantage (Taylor and Birrell 2003) for a peripheral area to re-invent itself, to adapt and use its own resources, to develop a long-term perspective. The initiative can be viewed as a place-based approach with a spatial twist (Atkinson, 2000), which helps addressing issues originating from urban exclusion, such as centralized transport connectivity or centralized educational facilities as well as job creation in peripheral areas.

Development Visions, Plans and Strategies of the Metropolitan Area of Cluj

he results of the interviews show that in terms of the existence of a viable development vision for the cma, the answers were almost fairly T divided. However, less than half of the interviewees believe in the existence of a viable vision, of viable plans and strategies. Many felt that changes will be felt only over a longer period of time. On the other hand, two of the interviewees from peripheral local authorities based their belief in a viable vision on the fact that there are several ongoing developments and, even if these are not necessarily felt in their areas, they are confident that sooner or later these developments will enrich their communes as well. An example given by one of the interviewees from the second ring is: “I am optimistic . . . even if at the moment it is mostly beneficial for the urban core . . . but, you see, public transport Paradigms • 13 is going to be extended to [a locality in the second ring] and the water network is going to be extended to [another locality from the second ring], therefore even if it is not me it is my colleague, it is his privilege that he is geographically or strategically better situated.” In contrast, another interviewee from the second ring was not as optimistic, feeling that “we are like the seventh wheel of the wagon . . . the core city does whatever it wants with us,” as their vote does not have a high value or impact in the decision-making process. Nevertheless, this also highlights the fact that geographical position, especially when defining a metropolitan area, might not be the most appropriate approach to its delimitation. In support of this statement, Lang (2012) considers the categorization of space based on structural distances “problematic,” as the approach does not provide a platform for transparent discussions or considers specific measurable indicators when indicating precise areas—in our case communes—and furthermore, the accessibility of certain utilities is often not related to geographical distance but to other factors. One of the interviewees has seen the viability of the vision for the metropolitan area in the fact that the strategies have been developed based on studies through which the real problems of the metropolitan area were identified. However, there was a contradiction in the statement, as one of the problems mentioned by the interviewee was exactly the lack of a viable vision. With the aim of supporting the existence of viable vision and in relation to plans and strategies, three of the interviewees mentioned the existence of the Integrated Urban Development Plan and the Integrated Mobility Plan “as first strategies which have been developed with the involvement of most of the local authorities of the metropolitan area” or, in the case of the Mobility Plan, “at least those who are significant from the point of view of the plan” (according to one of the planners). Others felt that “a viable vision is in a permanent change,” and one planner stated that “this vision must be understood and assumed from the inside . . . decision makers . . . will have to assume a willingness for long- term cooperation and planning and to accept the fact that four years of mandate are not enough to finalize their plans, but they will leave a ‘legacy’ that will have to be coordinated and promoted by the metropolitan area as an independent body.” Conversely, more than half of the interviewees stated that they did not believe in the existence of a viable vision. The representatives of the academic sphere but also planners agreed on the fact that until the metropolitan area exists in the consciousness of the local authorities, of the political leaders, or while there is no institutional structure, there is no viable vision. Others have felt that each local authority follows its own interest, there is no coordinated decision-making process, and their plans and strategies are not harmonized. 14 • Transylvanian Review • Vol. XXVII, No. 1 (Spring 2018)

An example given by one of the planners was: “One local authority can have a territory designated for residential purposes within its administrative limit, and adjacent to it the neighboring local authority can have agricultural land . . . therefore it is difficult to plan and implement especially infrastructure projects in this manner.” As Van den Berg and Braun (1999) state, the process of urban policy should also promote integration. It is necessary to recognize that urban processes do not only involve social, economic and environmental criteria, but they are also reliant on the interrelationship between these, and therefore the harmonization of the different spatial strategies is necessary. In summary, only three interviewees were not sure about their answers, but it is important to point out that most of the decision makers, regardless of their geographical position, were not exactly sure that there is a viable vision for the metropolitan area in general. When asked about their own personal vision, most of the interviewees felt more confident in formulating one for their own area and not for the metropolitan region as a whole.

The Balance between Competition and Coalition Building

he next section of the interviews referred to the existence of partnerships and possible cooperation between the local authorities. The aim of this T set of questions was to find out the interviewees perception about the level of cooperation or competition within the metropolitan area. The answers to this question were almost fairly divided. Half of the interviewees felt stronger towards the existence of competition. Several interviewees thought that there is a competition because “that’s what the market forces impose,” or because “competition leads to progress.” Most of the interviewees felt that there is a competition especially within the local authorities situated in the first or inner ring of the metropolitan area. The most common reason mentioned was the competition for attracting investments or for being included in certain major development projects initiated by the core city, for example, related to road infrastructure, public transport or public utilities. This leads however to the point raised by Boudreau et al. (2006): if development capacities only concentrate on the urban core or the first ring, territorial disparities will intensify and will leave peripheral areas lagging behind. On the other hand, most of the decision makers working in the outer ring or periphery of the metropolitan area had a strong feeling that cooperation is dominant, especially within their communities. However, this cooperation has been seen from two angles. Some interviewees recognized the advantage and Paradigms • 15 benefits of cooperation between the local authorities, such as the exchange of experience. On the other hand, there were also a few interviewees who said that they must work together with other authorities, as their rural areas suffer from outmigration and do not have enough inhabitants to be able to attract European funds or initiate major projects: “We rely on each other.” One planner believed that “many actors only cooperate on the surface, but truly they compete for the next moment when they can take on the leadership.” Nevertheless, according to Ansell and Gash (2007), leadership is considered to be essential in delivering negotiation and assistance, in building trust, facilitating communication or even encouraging weaker stakeholders to get involved and, just as importantly, to balance power relationships, but this leadership must be collectively agreed. Another planner felt that “Cluj has the problem of looking at its surrounding territories as a third-rate territory instead of looking at it as a partner.” One interviewee felt that Cluj municipality is the dominant player and “the metropolitan area was founded only to serve the municipality.” Therefore, this might lead to what Phares (2009) was reflecting on: some of the local authorities might decide not to cooperate, which, in the long run, will result in ineffective initiatives to solve metropolitan problems. Two decision makers working for the County Council and the Regional De- velopment Agency mentioned that market forces imply competition, but there are essential efforts made for associations or partnerships development within companies but also universities and local authorities, as “at least six clusters have been founded so far” and “companies are aware of their own interest; thanks to their economic interest they get to a consensus much earlier and easier.” This shows that the coalition of interests is better recognized at the level of businesses and the creation of clusters serves as a good example for cooperation and inter- connections between interests. Nevertheless, because most of these actors are located in the municipality or the first ring, these initiatives might not get connected to a multi-scalar system, as Carr and Affolderbach (2014) suggest, and this would prevent them from having an effect on a larger scale in the peripheral areas as well.

Institutionalization and Networking

he next set of questions referred to the development of effective metropolitan institutions, as the main purpose was to analyze which approach T is considered to be more effective regarding the coordination and development at metropolitan level: developing institutions or concentrating on more effective networking. When asked if there is a need for an institution or orga- 16 • Transylvanian Review • Vol. XXVII, No. 1 (Spring 2018) nization which would be responsible for the management of the metropolitan area, most of the interviewees agreed that there is a need for such an organization, but not necessarily an institution. Many of the surveyed actors believe that it is necessary to have an entity which has its own legislature and power to make decisions regarding the planning and development of the metropolitan area. As Hamilton (2014) suggests, when regional institutions are missing even with the existence of cooperative and collaborative actions the successful promotion of long-term policy goals might be questioned. Several interviewees pointed out that this entity should be apolitical and employ professionals with various backgrounds. One of the planners imagined this entity as “a company with a board of directors having as members the mayors of each local authority, but with an apolitical ceo and management team . . . a very competent technical team for the implementation process.” Nevertheless, we must consider that the emphasis placed on horizontal forms of coordination also demands mutual benefits, trust and collective decision- making amid relevant stakeholders (Bortel and Mullins 2009). Yet, during the interviews it has been pointed out that because a large part of the investment remains in the municipality and the first ring of the metropolitan area, the trust of the peripheral communities is lower. Therefore, as one of the interviewees points out, “we cannot talk about getting to an agreement, to negotiate,” as it happened that several decision makers refused to take part at the meetings. The reasoning of those interviewees who were not in favor of creating a separate organization was that such an action would deepen the level of bu- reaucracy and “would increase our problems” and “it would require additional financial support.” This shows that several interviewees feel that there is a need for more coordination and for formal arrangements with the capacity for operational effectiveness. The answers provided to this question differ in a way from the evidence from the literature, as in many cases we can see that collaborative governance is a more effective alternative to institutionalization. It is also important to point out that from an organizational perspective, when asked who plays a greater role in the development process of the metropolitan area, most of the interviewees made a reference to the County Council of Cluj.

Conclusions

he main results of the study bring evidence for the peripheralization of rural areas situated in the second ring of the metropolitan area. This is Tmaterialized through the lack of resources, capacity and interaction. In addition, the inexistence of a strong institutional base for the coordination and Paradigms • 17 governance of the metropolitan area has created, in fact, major problems. Most of the interviewees agree that there is a lack of political leadership with regard to the integrated metropolitan approach and, even though there have been examples of interest coalitions between certain players, the partnership and cooperation chapter of this process is slow and ineffective at the moment. On the other hand, we found that peripheralization has a positive perception among some local actors, the peripheral areas being viewed as places with valuable assets which in the long run may provide compensation for their development efforts. Nonetheless, the lack of consensus regarding the development process, the organizational structure and the fragmentation of the metropolitan area in creating effective partnerships at metropolitan level has led to limitations and disagreement. The division of power between certain actors and the strong socio-spatial differentiation between the metropolitan rings trigger disputes and uneven development. Although most of the actors believe that there is a need for communicative and participatory planning, a common vision and a strong metropolitan institution to focus on the common needs are still necessary. q

References

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Abstract Towards a Balanced Metropolitan Governance: Combating the “Back-door” Status of Peripheral Rural Areas

With the emergence of the larger urban areas the cities become spatially and functionally reliant on their surrounding rural areas. In order to achieve their long-term development goals and territorial cohesion, metropolitan areas strongly rely on their capacity to practice integrated governance. Therefore, the question the paper addresses is to what extent does integrative governance eliminate the peripheralization of the rural actors of the metropolitan area? The efficiency of an integrated governance approach is analyzed through the case of Cluj Metropolitan Area. The investigation is based on interviews with decision makers, territorial planners and academics from the urban core and its surrounding rural authorities. The results show that in order to act in an integrative manner and avoid peripheralization of the surrounding areas there is a need for a common metropolitan vision, partnership development and an institutional framework on a metropolitan scale.

Keywords metropolitan governance, peripheralization, Cluj Metropolitan Area, integrated governance Drivers of Change in Post-communist Agriculture M a g d a l e n a D r Ã g a n G a b r i e l a C o c e a n in the Apuseni Mountains

The present paper consists Introduction of an analysis regarding ountain rural areas in the evolution of agriculture Romania have always faced M specific challenges and in the study area, in the problems raised by the difficult envi- post-communist period, ronment and the often harsh features of the landscape, to which farmers have and the main factors adapted throughout time (Rey 1985). involved in this evolution. At the present moment these areas are under pressure because the lifestyle of the people is based on traditional productive activities (often with out- of-date means of farming) that are less efficient in terms of outcomes. This aspect is also directly related to the ongoing demographic decline in such regions, which is most often associated with a degradation of the agricultural Magdalena Drãgan landscapes due to the decrease in the Junior researcher at the Romanian number of farmers. Academy, Cluj-Napoca Branch, Romania. The Disadvantaged Mountain Area in Romania was legally defined in the Gabriela Cocean national plans for rural development Researcher at the Romanian Academy, in order to provide some financial Cluj-Napoca Branch. Author, among others, of the vol. Munþii Trascãu: support meant to compensate for the Relief, geomorfosituri, turism (The lower productivity of the agricultural Trascãu Mountains: Relief, geomor- lands when compared to those located phosites, tourism) (2011). at lower altitudes. The criteria involved 22 • Transylvanian Review • Vol. XXVII, No. 1 (Spring 2018) in the selection of the Administrative-Territorial Units that would be part of the Disadvantaged Mountain Area (as outlined in Annex 4A of the National Rural Development Programme 2007–2013) were altitude and the declivity of the terrain. Thus, the communes located over 600 meters, or between 400 and 600 meters but overlaying slopes of more than 15° were included. Our study area is constituted by the Disadvantaged Mountain Area located in the Apuseni Mountains (Western Carpathians), a part of the Romanian Car- pathians. It is mostly a rural space, composed of 100 Administrative-Territorial Units (located in Alba, Arad, Bihor, Cluj and Hunedoara counties), covering a total surface of 958,024 ha. Nine towns are also included: Abrud, Aleºd, Baia de Arieº, Brad, Câmpeni, Geoagiu, Nucet, Vaºcãu and Zlatna, most of them with significant agricultural features due to the high number of component villages. Although this is a mountain area, the geomorphic features are not excessively constraining (the highest altitude of the region is of 1,849 m) and agriculture still remains the main economic activity of the local population; there were 91,699 holdings for a population of 268,028 in 2010. The present paper consists of an analysis regarding the evolution of agriculture in the study area, in the post-communist period, and the main factors involved in this evolution. The main focus is placed on systemic changes in the agrarian structure and in agricultural policies. However, these aspects were analyzed while also considering their permanent interaction with the specific local factors. The data presented throughout the paper for the Disadvantaged Mountain Area in the Apuseni Mountains resulted from our calculations using data collected from different sources: the General Agricultural Census of 2010, 1985– 1990 data regarding the communes, made available by the County Statistics Offices, various data covering the years 1990–2015 from the National Institute of Statistics (tempo-Online), lists and reports from the Agency for Funding Ru- ral Investments (afir) and the Ministry of Agriculture and Rural Development (madr, 2013). In the process of data analysis certain correlations between different data sets were identified and further analyzed, as presented later on in the present paper. The data were also analyzed using a gis software in order to outline the spatial distribution of the examined aspects. Paradigms • 23

General Features of the Agriculture in the Apuseni Mountains

etween 1990 and 2014 the agricultural activity in the Apuseni Moun- tains recorded a significant setback, the land use intensity decline being Breflected in the decrease of arable land by circa 15% (from 109,754 ha in 1990 to 93,531 ha in 2014) as well as the decrease of orchards by 70% (from 3,660 ha in 1990, to 1,130 ha in 2014) and of vineyards by 57% (from 870 ha in 1990 to 373 ha in 2014). Alongside the reduction of those areas used in a more intensive manner, the 2010 General Agricultural Census reveals large surfaces that had been declared non-utilized (38,176 ha), which represent 10% of the surveyed agricultural surface. Furthermore, for 17% of the arable surfaces included in agricultural holdings one can note a lowering in the intensity of usage. Agricultural surfaces in the Disadvantaged Mountain Area in the Apuseni Mountains are mainly constituted by hayfields and pastures (78.8% of the utilized agricultural area). However, these surfaces are underutilized as well because of the reduction of the livestock by half (from 155,687 in 1990 to 79,273 in 2010). At the time of the mentioned census only 29.3% of agricultural holdings also bred cattle. Most households in the Apuseni Mountains still practice subsistence farming and have rather small surfaces—35.3% of farms use a maximum of one ha and 88.6% less than 5 ha. But this type of traditional farming is gradually losing importance; we can already see this phenomenon expressed in the 2010 General Agricultural Census in the amount of unused agricultural land. The phenomenon is quite significant, with the demographic dimension joining other factors such as the accessibility and agricultural potential of the territory. Thus, extreme situations have resulted, such as the cases of communes where about half of the agricultural area is not used (Mãrgãu, Valea Ierii, Bucureºci). In other communes, such as ªuncuiuº, Mãriºel, Ciucea, Cãpuºu Mare, Bulzeºtii de Sus, Vorþa, Râmeþ, Ceru-Bãcãinþi, over a quarter of the agricultural area is unutilized. The demographic decline (Fig. 1) had been a feature of the entire study area before 1990, but it accelerated in the last two decades, in this period the population decreasing by 19% (from 317,751 inhabitants in 1992 to 256,400 inhabitants in 2015). One can also note changes in the structure of the population in terms of the main age groups. Thus, between 1992 and 2014, the population in the 0–19 age group decreased by 43%, the share of population between 20 and 64 years of age decreased by 15% and the elderly population increased by 11%. This resulted in a higher percentage of aging population than the national 24 • Transylvanian Review • Vol. XXVII, No. 1 (Spring 2018) average (20% of the population over 65 years of age compared to the national average of 15% in 2014), with tendencies of exacerbation due to the acute decline of the 0–19 age group.

Fig.1. Features of the study area—demographic decline, mining sites and collectivized communes

Legend Demographic evolution (1992–2015)

-51.0% ... -25.0% -24.9% ... 0.0% 0.1% ... 16.0%

mining areas collectivized areas county limits

town

Source: own calculations based on data from tempo-Online.

This tendency is specific to the entire Disadvantaged Mountain Area at national level, with repercussions on the agricultural exploitation of the territory. Around 60% of the farmers who applied for direct payments to the Agency for Payments and Intervention in Agriculture (apia) in 2012 were over 60 years old, while farmers under 30 years represented only 8% (madr, 2014). Paradigms • 25

Systemic Post-communist Changes: De-collectivization and Deindustrialization

lthough the study area presents some disadvantages because of its geographical features, in areas with more flat landscape and lower altitudes A the suitable conditions for the collectivization of agriculture were met. Thus, 37 Administrative-Territorial Units were partially collectivized during the communist period (Fig. 1). These communes underwent radical transformations in terms of the structure of the holdings. Such transformations were firstly determined by the esta blishment of agricultural production cooperatives during communism—which meant a merger of the most productive plots and the specialization of production. The fall of communism also meant the collapse of this system and was followed by changes in the agricultural structure due to the agrarian laws (18/1991, 1/2000, 247/2005) that gradually reestablished private property upon land (Bãlteanu and Popovici 2010). From some points of view, these sets of laws were regarded as yet another setback for agricultural development, causing new productivity issues, due to the poor access to technologies for the new re-established farmers (Amblard et al. 2002; Otiman 2012). Two different but simultaneous trajectories of the agricultural structure were noticed: the dismantling of the socialist farms of great dimensions resulting into many small holdings (Popovici et al. 2016) and the concentration of lands into large holdings (Mikulcak et al. 2015). We have noted a similar trend in the Apuseni Mountains, when comparing the collectivized areas to the non-collectivized areas (where agricultural practices had a more linear evolution and the small dimensions of holdings and the subsistence character were maintained). While the collectivized and non-collectivized areas have a similar number of holdings, the collectivized communes displayed both a higher degree of disintegration of the structures as well as a higher concentration (Fig. 2). Putting things into perspective, we have noted that large agricultural holdings were functioning in 2010 in a great share of the 37 communes where agricultural production cooperatives had functioned previously: in 25 communes we have identified agricultural holdings having over 10 ha of arable land, while in 15 their surfaces were greater than 50 ha. Moreover, the greatest surfaces of arable land are recorded in Galda de Jos (2,300.34 ha), Ighiu (959.02 ha), Stremþ (616.37 ha), Geoagiu (1,098.67 ha) and Rapoltu Mare (627.67 ha), associated with the presence of agribusinesses. 26 • Transylvanian Review • Vol. XXVII, No. 1 (Spring 2018)

Fig. 2. Number of agricultural holdings by size class, in the Disadvantaged Mountain Area in the Apuseni Mountains

20,000 140 120 15,000 100

80 10,000 60

5,000 holdings of No. 40 20 No . of holdings of . No 0 0 < 1 ha 1–2 ha 2–5 ha 5–10 ha 10–20 20–30 ha 30–50 ha 50–100 ha > 100 ha ha collectivized non-collectivized collectivized non-collectivized

Source: own calculation based on data from the 2010 General Agricultural Census.

In spite of these changes reported in the agricultural structure, when analyzing the evolution of some agricultural indicators (Fig. 3), one can note that the situation was not dramatically different between the collectivized and non-collectivized communes. Of course there are some differences in regard to intensity or absolute values, but overall, the evolution of the two areas has not been out of sync. Greater differences can be observed for the evolution of the areas of orchards and vineyards, while for the arable lands, although in the last few years we can observe a slight difference in their tendencies, the overall evolution has been quite similar. However, when it comes to the number of cattle, one can note an almost identical evolution. This suggests that collectivization and de-collectivization had a greater impact upon the structure of the agricultural lands than on the intensity of the agricultural activity. These types of changes, directly related to agriculture, are not the only ones that have had an impact upon the evolution of agriculture, other structural changes in Romanian economy like deindustrialization and the shutdown of mining activities also contributing. 30 communes and small towns where mining had been an important activity or that were located near industrial centers were impacted the most in the study area. They are located in the Metaliferi Mountains around the perimeter Abrud–Roºia Montanã–Brad–Criºcior and in some other locations: Borod–ªuncuiuº, Nucet–Bãiþa, Aleºd etc. However, even in these areas, for most households agriculture had always been a secondary activity. For example, in Roºia Montanã, a traditional mining site, for a population of 4,002 inhabitants in 1992, the average number of employees was 1,453. Under these circumstances, the high number of cattle in the commune (2,045) seems surprising, especially when compared to other communes where Paradigms • 27

Fig. 3. Evolution of agricultural indicators in the collectivized and non-collectivized areas in the region:

A B C arable land (ha) orchards and vineyards (ha) no. of cattle 4,500 70,000 120,000 4,000 60,000 100,000 3,500 50,000 3,000 80,000 40,000 2,500 60,000 30,000 2,000 1,500 40,000 20,000 1,000 20,000 10,000 500

0 0 0 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2010 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 — collectivized — non-collectivized — collectivized — non-collectivized

Source: own calculation based on data from tempo-Online and the 2010 General Agricultural Census.

the number of employees was much lower, but had similar surfaces of agricultural areas (Albac: 1,682 bovines, Arieºeni: 1,490 bovines, Scãriºoara: 1,300 bovines). Just as mining did not exclude agriculture as an activity at a communal level (except, of course, in the mining areas and their vicinity), neither did industry exclude agricultural practices, as observed in towns likes Zlatna, with several component villages. In this case, for a population of 9,330 in 1992 there were 4,847 employees (a high percentage being employed in mining and industry) while agriculture was still widely practiced, the arable land covering 2,646 ha. 28 • Transylvanian Review • Vol. XXVII, No. 1 (Spring 2018)

The effects of the gradual reduction of the heavy industry and of mining activities were harshly felt in these areas, because of the large number of laid off employees, which also influenced the urban-rural migration in counties such as Alba and Hunedoara (Benedek and Török 2014). Between 1991 and 2006, the number of persons employed in the industrial and mining areas in the Apuseni Mountains decreased from 41,372 in 1991 to 22,678 in 2006, when most mines were closed down. In this context, for many households subsistence farming was a means of avoiding poverty (Luca 2013; Tudor 2015).

Recent Agricultural Policies

n the context of widespread subsistence farming, holdings found support and development opportunities in the more structured types of policies af- I ter the beginning of negotiations for the accession to the European Union, due to the fact that Romania was trying to assume the general objectives of the Common Agricultural Policy. These policies aimed at the efficiency of the agriculture and the promotion of a multifunctional agriculture, while also trying to respond to specific issues in Romania—the high percentage of elderly people involved in farming, low productivity, low quality standards, etc. A series of programs were launched, containing measures providing financial support and development opportunities for those farmers with a more entrepreneurial spirit. The investments in the area covered by the sapard program supported the consolidation of the big producers and processors that were developed on the foundation of the former communist production units in Oiejdea (Galda de Jos commune), as well as the initiatives of the self-employed or family associations. However, the measures meant to improve agriculture had less of an impact in the study area when compared to the other directions of development (particularly the diversification of economic activities). Thus in the agricultural domain two main measures were accessed and several projects were financed: Measure 1.1, Improvement of the processing and marketing of agricultural and fishery products (8 projects) and Measure 3.1, Investments in agricultural holdings (21 projects). Most projects regarded the acquisition of technological means necessary to meet the European quality standards. The following financing opportunities, provided by the National Rural De- velopment Programme 2007–2013, engaged more people in a more diverse range of activities. Measure 141, aimed at supporting the semi-subsistence farms in their development and orientation towards the market, had the biggest impact from the point of view of the number of beneficiaries (Fig. 4). The implementation of Paradigms • 29 this measure led to a total of 3,617 projects being signed and financed in the entire period of the National Rural Development Programme (2007–2013) in our study area, where most households still practice subsistence farming.

Fig. 4. Distribution of projects financed through measures of the national development programs targeting agriculture

Legend Beneficiares of measure 141

1–10 11–50 51–80 81–143 Beneficiares of measure 112 > 10 bihor county Beneficiares of measure 6.1 > 10 county limits

towns

Source: own calculations based on data from afir.

One can note a highly differentiated distribution of such projects, since 1,126 projects are concentrated in only 10 administrative units: Gârda de Sus, Sãcuieu, Albac, Mãguri-Rãcãtãu, Lupºa, Bistra, Horea, Meteº, Arieºeni and Zlatna. A relatively large share of communes with a low number of implemented projects was also noted (28 communes with less than 10 projects between 2007 and 2013). 30 • Transylvanian Review • Vol. XXVII, No. 1 (Spring 2018)

The fact that the spatial distribution of the projects is quite uneven can be easily observed on the map (Fig. 4), outlining of some areas with a higher concentration: along the Arieº Valley—between Bistra and Arieºeni, in the south of the Trascãu Mountains–—the Zlatna–Meteº–Ighiu area, in the Pãdurea Craiului Mountains—ªuncuiuº–Roºia–Cãbeºti. One can note that some of these areas overlap in part the development areas for rural tourism, especially the Arieº Val- ley and, to a smaller extent, the Meteº–Ighiu area. A fortunate complementarity has been observed between tourism and agriculture not only in what regards the touristic offer (the presence of farming activities being essential for rural tourism in terms of landscape and general appeal) but also because rural tourism represents a market for the local agricultural products. This is especially valid in the case of agritourism, which involves the use of local products in the preparation of the items in the menu. The areas with fewer projects are mostly located in the southwestern part of the analyzed area, often overlapping the former industrialized and mining sites and communes with a higher aging population (Bulzeºtii de Sus is a clear example of an area with an increased median age of the population that also presents a scarce accessibility, which is another discouraging factor). Measure 112 aimed at supporting young farmers was another important measure, especially in our study area, where young people might otherwise have few lucrative opportunities. Projects have been implemented in 75 communes in the territory, but with relatively few beneficiaries at the communal level, most communes having three or less than three projects. We can easily note the same type of polarization as in the case of the previously analyzed measure, with six outstanding communes in the southeastern part of the region, namely, Galda de Jos, Zlatna, Ighiu, Meteº, Stremþ and Cricãu. Of the 262 projects financed in the area, nearly one third (82 projects) were implemented in these six communes. We must also mention Measure 121 regarding the “Modernization of the agricultural holdings” and Measure 123 aiming at the “Increase of the added value of agricultural products,” although the number of projects was comparatively smaller (24 projects in total for both measures). In the following National Rural Development Programme (2014–2020) an important measure for the agriculture in the area so far is the one regarding the young farmers—Sub-measure 6.1. The manner in which it covers the study area is maintained to a similar percentage as the corresponding measure in the National Rural Development Programme 2007–2013—76 communes out of 100. However we must underline the fact that the number of selected projects is slightly higher (289), while this situation is only an intermediate one (the time of the writing of this paper corresponding to the middle of the period of implementation of the development program). Paradigms • 31

Two areas with a higher concentration were outlined in ªuncuiuº–Bratca– Borod (communes that after the closure of the mines and deindustrialization faced difficulties) and Mãriºel–Mãguri Rãcãtãu. Quite the opposite situation could be observed for some other communes where the interest in measures regarding young farmers was low. Overlapping the maps containing the coverage of Measure 112 from the 2007–2013 National Rural Development Programme and Sub-measure 6.1 from the 2014–2020 Na- tional Rural Development Programme, we identified some cases in which there were no beneficiaries of these measures in any of these 10 years: Bulz, Arieºeni, Scãriºoara, Horea, Avram Iancu, Poºaga, Ocoliº, Mogoº, Întregalde, and Râmeþ. For the villages located in the Upper Arieº Valley (Arieºeni, Scãriºoara, Horea, Avram Iancu), the sources of income are more diversified, and there are many farmers that have actually applied for other types of support (Measure 141 of the 2007–2013 National Rural Development Programme), while many locals are also active in tourism and forestry. Thus, the absence of beneficiaries for this measure is not in any case worrisome. However, one can note another low score in terms of projects in an area located in Alba County, consisting of the communes of Poºaga, Ocoliº, Râmeþ, and Întregalde, where no project was financed through these measures. Moreover, in the National Rural Development Programme 2007–2013 these communes also had few beneficiaries in general, not only in what agriculture is concerned, i.e. in Ocoliº there were 6 financed projects and in Râmeþ only 5. The situation doesn’t look better under the current program, as on the list of submitted projects there are only two projects submitted so far from Ocoliº and one from Râmeþ. One explanation can be traced to the acute demographic decline in the area: in Poºaga the 2014 population being lower than in 1992 by 38.2%, in Ocoliº by 41.9%, in Râmeþ by 49% and in Întregalde by 44.8%. A high percentage of the elderly population is also a contributing factor: 28% in Poºaga, 36% in Ocoliº, 36% in Râmeþ, and 32% in Întregalde, in 2014. We must also take into account the fact that all of the four communes are located in karstic areas with a rather rough morphology and fragmented landscape (karst ridges and gorges). Accessibility is rather limited in this area, especially for the smaller remote villages included in these communes, with obvious viability issues in some sectors (Drãgan and Cocean 2015). 32 • Transylvanian Review • Vol. XXVII, No. 1 (Spring 2018)

Conclusions

he evolution of agriculture in the Disadvantaged Mountain Area in the Apuseni Mountains reflects a descending trend similar to other moun- T tain areas in Romania, characterized by a decline in land use intensity associated with a demographic crisis. Although collectivization was intensely felt by the individuals and individual households that had been involved in this process, in our study area collectivization (and de-collectivization) as a factor of change did not have the impact that we might have assumed it had. It changed the structure of the agricultural lands, but it did not have an essential role in shaping the regional agricultural profile. Even in the most representative mining areas, agriculture has always been a supporting activity, especially in the other villages included in such communes. Its role as an economic activity continued to grow after the closure of mines and deindustrialization left the former employees without many options in terms of paid work. The spatial distribution and the success rate of agricultural policies stand out as indicators of the interactions and importance of the different drivers of change acting in the area and the results of their action. Different trajectories for the development of the local agriculture have thus resulted, ranging from degraded agricultural landscapes and aging communities disconnected from current positive developments, to agri-businesses managing hundreds of hectares of land, a successful conjunction of farming and tourism, and massive applications to access European funds. Overall, we estimate that subsistence agriculture will gradually reduce its role even more in the study area because the farmers are elderly people, while the young do not want to strive and make a living through agriculture. Only the ones with a more entrepreneurial spirit and more oriented towards higher quality products will remain to practice agriculture, if properly supported by agricultural policies. q

References

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Drãgan, M. and G. Cocean. (2015). “Constraints on Tourism Development Caused by the Road Network in the Apuseni Mountains.” Romanian Review of Regional Studies (Cluj-Napoca) 11, 2: 85–94. Institutul Naþional de Statisticã (National Institute of Statistics). Time series tempo-On- line. Available at http://statistici.insse.ro/shop/ Luca, L. (2013). “Ambivalence of Semi-subsistence Farms in Romania.” Lucrãri ºtiin þifice Management agricol (Timiºoara) 15, 1: 206–209. Mikulcak, F., J. L. Haider, D. J. Abson, J. Newig, and J. Fischer. (2015). “Applying a capitals approach to understand rural development traps: a case study from post- socialist Romania.” Land Use Policy 43: 248–258. Ministerul Agriculturii ºi Dezvoltãrii Rurale (Ministry of Agriculture and Rural De- velopment). Programul Naþional de Dezvoltare Ruralã 2007–2013. Extended version, November 2013. Available at http://www.madr.ro/docs/dezvoltare-rurala/ pndr_2007-2013_versiunea-consolidata-nov2013.pdf. Accessed on 29.04.2017. ——. Orientãri strategice naþionale pentru dezvoltarea durabilã a zonei montane defavori- zate (2014–2020), 2014. Available at http://www.madr.ro/docs/dezvoltare-rurala/ memorandum/Anexa-Memorandum-zona-montana-defavorizata-2014–2020.pdf. Accessed on 01.07.2017. Otiman, P. I. (2012). “Structura agrarã actualã a României—O mare (ºi nerezolvatã) prob- lemã socialã ºi economicã a þãrii.” Revista românã de sociologie 23, 5–6: 339–360. Popovici, E.-A., D. Bãlteanu, and Gh. Kucsicsa. (2016). “Utilizarea terenurilor ºi dezvoltarea actualã a agriculturii.” In România: Naturã ºi Societate, eds. Dan Bãlteanu, Monica Dumitraºcu, Sorin Geacu, Bianca Mitrica, and Mihaela Sima, 329–375. Bucharest: Ed. Academiei Române. Rey, R. (1985). Civilizaþie montanã. Bucharest: Ed. ªtiinþificã ºi Enciclopedicã. Tudor, M. M. (2015). “Small scale agriculture as a resilient system in rural Romania.” Studies in Agricultural Economics 117: 27–34.

Abstract Drivers of Change in Post-communist Agriculture in the Apuseni Mountains

After 1990, the agricultural activity in the Apuseni Mountains (Western Carpathians, Romania) has recorded a significant decrease reflected in the descending evolution of utilized agricultural area and of the livestock, and in the shift towards a more extensive use of the land. This situation is the result of several factors acting on different spatial and temporal scales, often interacting in various patterns. The fall of the communist regime also meant deep structural changes such as the dismantling of the communist agricultural system, deindustrialization and the shutdown of mining activities in several locations in the Apuseni Mountains. Other drivers of change are acting on a local level, such as demographic evolution, landscape features and the complementarity with other economic activities, causing different trajectories for the local agriculture. Starting with the accession to the European Union, the changes in the agricultural policies have meant financial support and development opportunities for many households in the area.

Keywords subsistence farming, demographic decline, collectivization, agricultural policies, mountains, economic complementarity Pipelines for Energy, Interests for Companies A rt u r L. L a k a t o s E g o n N a g y and Great Powers

Introduction “The eu–Russia energy dialogue is dominated by urope is currently import- ghosts and unfounded fears ing most of its energy based E on fossil fuels from the post- of dependency rather than Soviet space. This dependency has an appreciation of the real never been too appreciated and there were plans aiming to reduce it—for interdependency.” instance, finding other suppliers from (Jérôme Guillet) the Middle East or North Africa until the usage of renewable energy is fully developed. Given the Russian-Ukrai-

This paper is based on two conference pres- entations: Artur L. Lakatos, “Pipelines for Energy, Possibilities for Countries of East- Central Europe. Why Most of the Pipeline Projects Failed?,” in Fifth Workshop on eu- Asia Relations: eu-Asian Energy Politics in the 21st Century, Hong Kong, 10–12 Artur L. Lakatos March 2016, and Egon Nagy, “Pipelines for Postdoctoral researcher at the University Energy, Interests for Companies and Great of Szeged, external collaborator at the Powers: Introduction in the Issue of Pipe- Faculty of Geography, Babeº-Bolyai Uni- line projects for East-Central Europe and versity, Cluj-Napoca, Romania. the Black Sea Region,” in Regional Stud- ies Association, Regional Polarization and Egon Nagy Unequal Development in cee: Challenges Lecturer, head of the Department for for Innovative Place-Based Policies, Cluj- Geography in Hungarian at the Faculty Napoca, 10–13 September, 2017. It repre- of Geography, Babeº-Bolyai University, sents the joint work of the authors, which Cluj-Napoca, Romania. will be developed further in the future. Paradigms • 35 nian dispute that broke out in 2006, this need became more acute for strategic considerations. Thus, among others the Southern Gas Corridor initiative was born. At the same time, nowadays, energy supplies are undergoing a process of diversification. New and ecological sources of energy are introduced in the circuit of energy supplies, but the most important and reliable sources—from an economic point of view—are still represented by oil and gas. This aspect is especially true in the case of Eastern and Central Europe, where economic development and rising living standards require relatively greater energy resources. The importance of the natural gas supplies for the European Union, on its central level, is illustrated by the Southern Gas Corridor initiative (Jarosiewicz 2015) of the European Commission (European Commission 2016), officially proposed in 2008 (Commission to the European Parliament 2008), which is intended to devise strategies for the transportation of natural gas to the eu territory from the Caucasus, Central Asia and the Middle East (Euractiv 2016). According to the definition given on the site of the tap, “The Southern Gas Corridor (sgc) is a term used to describe planned infrastructure projects aimed at improving the security and diversity of the eu’s energy supply by bringing natural gas from the Caspian region to Europe” (tap homepage 2016). This presentation will examine a special aspect of the new energy supplies game through the evolution of the concepts of a series of rival pipeline proposals, functional or failed. As a Cold War tradition, the Soviet Union used to supply its allies-satellites in Central-Eastern Europe with oil and gas, and this trend survived the fall of the communist regime when the place of the Soviet Union was taken by the Russian Federation. However, the Mir pipeline had to pass through the territory of the newly independent Ukraine, and Russian-Ukrainian disputes (De Micco 2015, 4-6) unavoidably affected third parties (Horn 1999, 162). In their turn, newly independent countries in the Caucasus and Central Asia, which are rich in oil and gas deposits, like Azerbaijan, Turkmenistan or Kazakhstan, were trying to find an alternative way to transport their merchandise to avoid crossing the Russian territory (Cooley 2012; Cummings 2012; Hopkirk 1992; Johnson 2007; Kleveman 2004; Meyer and Blair Brysac 2000; Petersen and Barysch 2011; Rashid 2000; Cornell 2001; Peimani 2009; Anceschi 2009; King 2008; Hrair Dekmejian and Simonian 2001). The major challenge at the level of government policies, in the post-communist era, appeared during the 2005–2006 Russian-Hrair Ukrainian gas crisis, when the European Union and Central- Eastern European post-communist countries faced serious supply problems. In this context, ensuring energy supplies became a key priority for the European Union, as we can see in the case of the Southern Gas Corridor, and governments also devised their own strategies on a national level, for which they started to seek reliable partners. For example, in the case of Romania, a coherent Energy 36 • Transylvanian Review • Vol. XXVII, No. 1 (Spring 2018)

Strategy was adopted by the Tãriceanu government, and Romania openly supported the peop, agri, and Nabucco pipeline projects (Chifu et al. 2011, 64–67 and 93–95) and is generally open toward all proposed pipelines which can pass through Romanian territory; as a consequence, the government ensured a direct supply for the needs of the national economy. In the following pages we will see which were—and in some cases, still are—the major projects, what were their strengths and weaknesses, what is the potential of the still active ones and, in the case of unsuccessful ones what were the reasons for their failure, or why they were abandoned after a while.

Failed, Functional and Postponed Projects

ne of the most interesting projects—with very little chance to be put into practice in the context of the current crisis in the Middle East, even O if it has great potential—is the so-called Persian pipeline, also known as the Iran–Turkey–Europe (ite homepage 2016) pipeline. In 1996 Iran and Turkey signed a $20 billion agreement that called for Iran to supply Turkey with natural gas for twenty-two years. Exports of Iranian gas to Turkey were slated to start in 1999 at an initial rate of 300 million cubic feet a day (mcf/d) and they were supposed to rise to a level of 1,000 mcf/d in 2005 (Bahgat 2013, 113). Even though the Turkish-Iranian relationship is not completely free of tensions and regional rivalry, on the main issues they are natural allies; for instance in the problems regarding Kurdish nationalism or avoiding energy security risks which could be rooted in domination over oil and gas production, respectively over trading routes of the Gulf states. The idea was developed primarily by Iranian politicians, following the dé- tente with the West, and the project was discussed for the first time in Febru- ary 2014. The key transit country would be Turkey, thus the European part of the pipeline would avoid most of the Central-Eastern European countries, following a route through the territory of Greece, Italy, Austria, Switzerland, Germany, France, and Spain. The project was designed as a Built-Own-Operate type one, the National Iranian Gas Export Company being its main builder, operator and beneficiary, other companies being co-opted only with regional interests and reduced shares. The main beneficiary of the project, beside Iran, would be Turkey, where an important amount of the natural gas would remain for consumption. The ite would represent a major competition for other pipelines built through American, Russian and European investments, having also major gains for Iran on a political level: the pipeline would definitely end Iran’s image as a “rogue state” in Western Europe, would deepen regional cooperation Paradigms • 37 with another regional power of the Muslim world, Turkey, ending Iran’s relative isolation in this community as well. Even if Turkey is Iran’s second largest power client, importing about 2,500 million kwh of electricity from Iran (Shaban 2015), and the economic relations between the two are much better than the highly political frictions show, it is very unlikely that Turkey will commit itself to such an Iranian initiative. With its commitment to nato, Turkey is a close ally of one of Iran’s main current enemies, the United States of America. The two Muslim regional powers also have rivaling interests in Iraq, Syria and, on a lesser scale, in the Armenian-Azeri conflict (de Waal 2003; Croissant 1998) and in the Kurdish issue (Kreyenbroek and Sperl 2000; Aslan 2014) (this latter being vital for Turkey’s territorial integ- rity). Moreover, in the context of the Shia-Sunni religious conflict, once again radicalized following the Iranian-Saudi conflict of January 2016, on a short term any initiative similar to this is doomed to failure. On a long term however, the effects are incalculable as there are too many players and interests involved: the opposition of the usa, which can turn into support at any time, the political support of the Russian Federation for both countries, the Saudi rivalry with Qatar, common goals in the Kurdish question, but rivalry in case of Syria, and so on. The euphonious name of South-Eastern Europe Pipeline is associated with a proposal designed to create a link in the transportation of natural gas from Eastern Turkey to Baumgarten an de March, Austria. The proposing company was British Petroleum (Bloomberg Business Week 2011; Conn 2011), which announced it publicly on 24 September 2011, and the pipeline’s route was designed to pass through Turkey, Bulgaria, Romania, Hungary and Austria. This very practical proposal—called a “downsized Nabucco” (Socor 2011) by Vladimir Socor—was designed to have the shortest and economically most profitable route possible, and was planned to have its supplies from the Azerbaijani Shah Deniz natural gas field. However, on 28 June 2012, bp announced that it would direct its choice to one of the two more developed proposals, Nabucco West or the Trans Adriatic Pipeline; thus, the further development of the cees ceased. The Trans Adriatic Pipeline—also known as tap (tap homepage 2016)— seems to be the winner of the competition with the often more touted Nabucco project, and it represents an integral part of the Southern Gas Corridor project of the European Union. The project is operated through the Trans Adriatic Pipeline ag, its shareholders being British Petroleum, the State Oil Company of Azerbaijan Republic (socar), Snam of Italy (which bought its share from Statoil of Norway), the Belgium-based Fluxys, the Spanish Enagás, and the Axpo holding from Switzerland, which later made the official announcement of the tap initiative in 2003. The tap has the political support of the central institu- 38 • Transylvanian Review • Vol. XXVII, No. 1 (Spring 2018) tions of the European Union, and most importantly the political support of the three countries it crosses, Greece, Albania, and Italy, these three countries being among the relatively neutral ones in the Russian-American-Western-European disputes and geopolitical games. Expected to be finalized by 2018, the tap will represent probably an economic success for its operators, and from a political point of view, it is a rather neutral project, not affecting major great power interests. It is possible for it to represent a major gain for the small country of Al- bania, which has been considered an economic pariah of the European continent for a long time; many average European citizens look down on this small and beautiful country and associate it with the violent and insidious Albanian mafia. A possible—and, once the pipeline becomes functional, probable—future for this small country of the Western Balkans is to become the epicenter of Balkan gas politics. Also, the tap can give Albania the possibility to diversify its energy security, since almost all of its production relies on hydropower (Geropoulos 2014). However, the tap does not directly solve the issue of supplying most former socialist, currently eu-member countries which need a more direct and appropriate pipeline. Such a project could have been Nabucco, or the shorter and very practical agri project. The Azerbaijan–Georgia–Romania Interconnector (agri) was designed to offer a practical and feasible way to transport Azeri natural gas to the Western shore of the Black Sea. According to the original plans developed in 2010 by high ranking officials of Azerbaijan, Georgia and Romania, natural gas would be transported from the Sangachal terminal in Azerbaijan to the Kulevi terminal in Georgia, which has direct access through its port to the Black Sea, the Ku- levi oil terminal being operated in its turn by a subsidiary of socar. Here the gas would be liquefied and then transported by tankers to the Romanian port of Constanþa (Chifu et al. 2011, 93–95) where, following its re-gasification, it would be transported to customers from all over Romania and its neighboring countries. It is worth mentioning that this initiative is one of those where state officials settled the basic ideas, companies joining the development process only after that. The initiative was quickly welcomed by Hungary, with the possibility of Bulgaria joining as well, as socar Vice-president Vitaly Beylarbeyov proudly said in 2011: “Oil and gas companies from Japan, Korea, Turkey, France and Norway show interest in the project” (En.trend.az homepage 2011). In 2011, the project was joined by five companies, including socar, Romgaz, the Geor- gian Oil and Gas Corporation, and the Hungarian Magyar Villamos Mu˝vek group (mvm), the four corporations creating the agri lng Co; each one of its founding members have 25% of shares and the company is registered in Roma- nia. In the long term, supplies from Turkmenistan are also taken into consideration. However, since the Black Sea region became unstable due to the Russian Paradigms • 39 military intervention in Georgia, as well as to the Russian-Ukrainian and more recently the Russian-Turkish frictions, the short-term future of this initiative might be compromised.

Fig. 1. The Turkish Pipeline and the agri

Cartography: Zsombor Bartos-Elekes, basemap: maps.google.com

White Stream (White Stream homepage 2005) came into being as a Ukrainian proposal, in 2005, and was largely promoted in the forthcoming years at conferences and bilateral meetings. Also called the Georgia–Ukraine–eu gas pipeline, it was built on the traditionally good relations of the Ukraine with Georgia—the two countries sharing lots of similarities in their Soviet and post-Soviet heritage—and it could serve the beneficiaries of the Orange Revolution in reducing their country’s dependence on Russian supplies, improve its position in the Caucasus region and gain importance in the eyes of the eu officials, a structure in which the Ukraine wants to be integrated. The plan was to start the pipeline from near Tbilisi, Georgia, from a branch of the South Caucasus Pipeline, to Supsa, the village port on the Black Sea. From here there are two possible routes for the pipeline which could pass under the Black Sea, one having its end at Con- stanþa, Romania, and the second in Crimea. The Romanian network could also bring about major improvements in the Ukrainian-Romanian relations, the two countries often perceiving each other as regional rivals. For instance, during the last two decades there were a series of territorial and minority-related disputes, such as the Bistroe canal, the Serpent Island in the Black Sea, their policies towards the Republic of Moldova, the situation of the Romanian ethnic minority in the Ukraine. The White Stream Pipeline Company (gueu) was founded in 40 • Transylvanian Review • Vol. XXVII, No. 1 (Spring 2018)

London to manage the project but the composition of its consortium was never revealed. Around 2009, the importance of the White Stream project seemed to grow, in the aftermath of the events in Eastern Turkey. White Stream could have been crucial to reduce Russian positions in supply, also making Turkey lose a certain part of its capacity to put pressure on Europe through gas transit. Had everything happened according to plan, the pipeline would have become functional by 2016. However Ukraine’s position in the region is seriously weakened by the Russian occupation of Crimea. Turkish Stream (Gazpromexport homepage 2015; Turkstream.info homepage 2014) came into discussion following the unexpected demise of the South Stream project. Following the success of Blue Stream, supplying Turkey with Russian gas, and the demise of South Stream due to the attitude of Bulgaria, Russian officials and the Gazprom leadership came up with a new project, passing through the Black Sea directly to Turkey, from where it could supply part of Europe, but also countries from the Mediterranean such as Israel, Lebanon, Syria, and Cyprus. This project, being relatively new, has not been developed in detail until now, and as a Russian military airplane was shot down by the Turk- ish air force in November 2015, its future on a short term was compromised. Nevertheless, the building of Turkish Stream started in May 2017 and it will supply Turkey, Greece, Macedonia, and Serbia, before finally reaching Hungary and Austria. Serbia, as a candidate for full eu membership, has committed to respect the eu regulation stating that the owner, the operator and the supplier of the pipeline must be different market actors. Actually, Turkish Stream represents a partial revival of the South Stream project on an alternative trajectory with almost half the transit capacity (about 32 billion cubic meters per year). It would play a very important role in supplying Turkey, which is the second largest consumer of Russian gas after Germany, and presently is supplied by Blue Stream and the Balkan pipeline route. Another importance of Turkish Stream is its role of bypassing the Ukrainian route which is insecure, and very “hostile” towards Russia (Mészáros 2017). The building of the Russian portion of the pipeline started in May 2017. Both the Russian government and Gazprom are realizing—and express it through their doctrines—that Russian energy is a very useful and successful tool for the country’s foreign policy and strategic interests, which determines its geopolitical influence. It can also be used as a weapon: between 1991 and 2006, Russia exerted pressure over other former republics of the Soviet Union by interrupting energy supplies 55 times (Szabó 2013, 225-231). The Trans-Anatolian Pipeline or tanap (tanap homepage 2011) is a pipeline which will transport Azeri gas through Georgia and Turkey to Europe. The project was announced in 2011, the building of the pipeline started in 2015, and is expected to be finished in 2018. socar is the main shareholder with 58%, followed by the Turkish botas with 30% while British Petroleum has 12% of Paradigms • 41 the shares. According to the plans, the company which administers the pipeline will have its headquarters in the Netherlands, and it will start functioning in 2018. The Turkish-European route is still unclear. It is possible that the tanap will be connected to the tap, but alternative routes are also taken into consideration. The tanap represents a main strategic gain for both Azerbaijan and Turkey, and the project was successful due to its simple planning and relatively risk-free geographic and geopolitical setting; Turkey and Azerbaijan have good relations, and their geographical connection is relatively risk-free, it does not involve hostile third parties (it is not a coincidence that no pipeline originating from Azerbaijan passes through Armenia) and, in both countries, cooperation between state leadership and great companies is crucial, usually the state being the dominant party. Due to its secure nature, it is also not a coincidence that the rivaling Nabucco and tap projects both signed cooperation agreements with the tanap in 2013 (Euractiv 2013). If tanap is designed to transport on the Azerbaijan–Turkey route, the Turk- ish-European route being still unclear, the Pan-European Oil Pipeline or peop (Transnafta 2002) would be a pipeline which is designed to start from the city port of Constanþa, Romania, meant to transport oil through a pipeline system through Serbia, Croatia, Slovenia to Italy, also making a connection with the Transalpine Pipeline, running through Austria and Germany. The project was proposed in 2002, with the participation of Romanian, Serbian and Croatian investment, Italian and Slovenian companies being also encouraged to participate. The Pan-European Oil Pipeline Project Development Company was registered in London to manage the project, with the Romanian Conpet Ploieşti and Oil Terminal Constanþa, the Serbian Transnafta, and the Croatian janaf as participants. In 2010, the janaf froze its investment in the project; the Romanian- Serbian cooperation however is still active. This pipeline, planned for crude oil, in case of success, can be a model for a natural gas pipeline, too. Two of the most publicized projects were the Nabucco and the South Stream projects (Bíró 2008; Lakatos et al. 2015), due to their political background and geopolitical importance. In the following pages, we will make a summary of how these two projects evolved until the moment of their demise. Nabucco (Feller 2008, 50; Petersen 2001, 40–42; Rowley 2009, 72–73; Hoffstatner 2011) was planned to be a common investment of companies from the member states of the European Union, having strong support from Ameri- can politics and business. The project was officially born in 2002, with the intention to reduce the dependency of the European Union and its future member states on the Russian Federation. The start of its construction was planned for 2011, and it was planned to be functioning at full capacity by 2014. As far as the original plans are concerned, the pipeline was planned to start at the gas field of Shah Deniz in Azerbaijan. The Azeri leaders perceived Nabucco as a very 42 • Transylvanian Review • Vol. XXVII, No. 1 (Spring 2018) useful tool for expanding the country’s international profile and reducing its dependency on Russia (Mehdiyeva 2011, 10–14). Other sources could have been in Turkmenistan, Iraq, possibly Iran (Kuhn 2012, 77–78) or Kazakhstan. At a certain moment, Egypt was seriously planning to offer its resources for Nabucco as well, and the plans also contained a link to the Black Sea’s resources. Due to insecurities at Turkey’s eastern borders, the original plan was later modified and given the name Nabucco West. This plan was designed to start the pipeline from Turkish territory. This version was designed to be more secure, however, since the owners of the Shah Deniz field chose to supply the Trans Adriatic Pipeline project (tap), the shareholders of Nabucco could not find a viable replacement for this source. As former Hungarian Prime Minister, Ferenc Gyurcsány said in 2007: “the Nabucco is a dream” (Luft and Korin 2009), and it remained just that. In order to coordinate the Nabucco project a multinational company, the Nabucco Gas Pipeline International GmbH, was founded in Vienna in 2002. Its initial shareholders were 5 major companies from the five participating countries: omv (Austria) mol (Hungary), Transgaz (Romania), beh (Bulgaria) and Boas (Turkey). Initially the German rwe was also a founding member but it sold its share to the omv in 2013. In Hungary, mol was replaced by Földgázszállító Zrt., and French investors also bought some stock from omv. The potential of Nabucco was illustrated by the interest of the Polish pgnig, or the ipic, a strong investment fund from Abu Dhabi. Officially, neither the usa nor the eu were participating in the project, apart from lending their full moral support; the eu financed Nabucco through a series of batches (with 250 million Euro in 2009 alone), and additionally the European Bank for Development was ready to finance 25% of the building costs, in case the actual building process was started. This never happened and the failure of Nabucco made the Azeri expert Ilgar Gurbanov state in 2014: “Since Nabucco failed, Gazprom will still continue to dominate the price-setting process and keep its monopoly position in Central Europe” (Gurbanov 2013, 5). The main pro-Nabucco arguments were: • granting the benevolence of American capital and military power; • the diversification of Europe’s supply of gas; • the reduction of the dependence of the countries in the eu on Russian gas; • the states of the Caucasus, Central Asia, and the Arab world could have developed a closer relationship with the eu, a fact that could have granted not only economic but also some political advantages; • it could have deepened regional cooperation among often rivaling states in at least four distinct geographical regions: Central Asia, the Caucasus, the region of the Black Sea, and Central Europe. Paradigms • 43

On the other hand, the issues which compromised the building of the original Nabucco, and later of Nabucco West, proved to be more decisive. Among these, we have to mention: • regional warfare and the high risk of terrorist attacks; • the lack of perseverance of key companies and political forces in imposing the original plans; • the great number of alternatives, like the tap, mentioned above, or South Stream; • because Nabucco was planned to supply only a limited number of countries, it lacked the deep involvement of great powers of the Western world; • the project was criticized because of environmental and human rights issues by a series of ngos. The Nabucco project is not officially failed yet, but there is little chance for its building to start soon. Its fate can be best illustrated by the words of a Ro- manian diplomat, specialized in the Turkish world: “The Nabucco will be built when its name is Ivan Groznij” (personal discussion with the author during the summer of 2012). This sentence meant to illustrate the Russian influence in the region where the building of Nabucco was planned. In 2015, however, there appeared signs that the Austrian omv company had different plans (Stoica 2015), so it might be too early to bury the Nabucco project as an initiative in itself.

Fig. 2. The Nabucco Pipeline

Cartography: Zsombor Bartos-Elekes, basemap: maps.google.com 44 • Transylvanian Review • Vol. XXVII, No. 1 (Spring 2018)

South Stream (South Stream homepage 2007), the project considered to be the main rival of Nabucco, was designed to serve the interests of Russian gas suppliers and, as a consequence, to promote Russian interests in Europe and to offer an alternative to Western initiatives, such as Nabucco. Its birth was officially announced in 2007, as a common initiative of the Russian Gazprom and the Italian Eni companies. South Stream ag was registered in Switzerland in January 2008, its objective being the building of the pipeline called South Stream, as a pair to Nord Stream, already functional, the pipeline which supplies Germany with Russian gas through the Baltic. Nord Stream functioned as a model for South Stream and the countries initially planning to participate in the South Stream project were: Russia, Bulgaria, Serbia, Hungary, Slovenia, and Italy. Electricité de France and the German Wintershall companies joined as investors in the global project, besides Gazprom and Eni. On a national level, Gazprom planned to build the pipeline in cooperation with its partner on the respective country’s level, like Bulgargaz, Srbjagaz, mol and the Slovenian Geoplin Plin- odovi. The building of the Russian section started in 2012, but the project was canceled by Russia in December 2014 due to the hesitation of Bulgaria which was the result of heavy eu and American pressure because of the Crimean crisis. The main advantages of South Stream (Popescu 2013, 143-153; Stratfor 2015; Richard 2015) were the following: • Russia could reduce the blackmailing potential of the Ukrainian government; • it could have deepened the regional cooperation, especially among Chris- tian Orthodox states in the Balkans; • it could have opened new perspectives for cooperation between Russia and states of the European Union, especially with Italy, but on the long term, also with Germany and France.

Fig. 3. The South Stream project

Cartography: Zsombor Bartos-Elekes, basemap: maps.google.com Paradigms • 45

The project was replaced by the Turkish Stream project based on Russian-Turk- ish cooperation. This pipeline is planned to avoid small European states from South-East Europe, vulnerable when faced with Western pressures. But currently the future of this pipeline seems to be rather uncertain, and it is confronting a series of obstacles. A final blow to the South Stream project was given on 20 January 2016, when Gazprom officials announced the cancellation of the South Stream project. With some of its last efforts, the Obama administration tried to improve American-Turkish cooperation in the field of energy security by attracting Cyprus into the cooperation as well (Okumuº 2016, 41). Germany plays a very interesting and contradictory role in the European energy policy, because the Germans are the main pivot of the European unification process, on the one hand, advocating the idea of a powerful eu, but, on the other hand, their intention to base their economy preponderantly on Russian gas does not serve the reduction of the European energetic dependency. Because Russian gas sources are relatively the cheapest for Germany, they decided to double the capacity of North Stream (55 billion cubic meters per year) collaborating in a consortium with Gazprom (among other European partners). No wonder that the us intention to find ways for the American lng to enter the European market meets obstacles on both the Russian and the German side (Germany`s dependency on Russian gas is 43% of the total consumption) (Pogonyi et al. 2014).

Interests of States and Corporations

uilding the pipelines involves major interests, the financial aspect involves billions of dollars of investment and considerably more in profits, B but, at the same time, a series of risks and geopolitical interests are also important. To determine their role, in the following we will summarize the interests of major corporations, and of some of the great powers interested in the region. For great oil-and gas companies, the goals are clear: first of all, to be the one that builds the first pipeline, which means that the competitors should not be faster in achieving the same goal. However, designing a pipeline is preceded by a series of feasibility studies, and the analysis of geopolitical risks, which—as we could see in the examples mentioned above—are plentiful. For a better administration of this situation, often new companies are created, to be the operators of the project in which initiating companies affiliated to the project are shareholders. In such cases, the initiator generally owns the majority of stocks, local partners having also their share and crucial role, most 46 • Transylvanian Review • Vol. XXVII, No. 1 (Spring 2018) of them being nationally strategic companies from the small Central-Eastern European countries. The competition among rivalling pipeline projects is stiff and often involves great power interests. The structure most interested in developing some of the projects is the Euro- pean Union, as the Southern Gas Corridor initiative illustrates. It is of strategic importance for Brussels to assure the energy supply of its poorer South-Eastern periphery, to improve their economic indicators, and, if possible, to decrease their dependency on solely Russian supplies by diversifying the sources. How- ever, currently the eu is wrestling with a series of serious internal issues, like the refugee crisis, Brexit, and inequalities between its member states, and it is unlikely to be able to impose a coherent strategy in this field on the short term. The eu managed to abolish the contractual isolation of the gas market in Eastern European eu members, which meant that Gazprom prohibited former socialist eastern eu-members to transfer the gas purchased from Gazprom to other eu countries. With this contractual prohibition, Gazprom would divide and conquer, and geopolitically manipulate the Eastern European countries through this strategic merchandise. The eu would have threatened Gazprom with huge fines if it maintained its oligopoly for this market manipulation. But there is also a lack of sufficient interconnection, especially between Western and Eastern European gas pipeline systems, which makes it difficult to maintain the security of supplies through re-exportation or gas-swaps. The better interop- erability with Western European gas pipelines would be essential for Eastern Europe, because their exposure to Russian gas imports is still substantial. Only the Romanian gas consumption is less dependent on Russian import (10%), the Hungarian and Polish dependency is about 60–64%, while the Slovak, Czech, Bulgarian and the Baltic states’ dependency is more than 90%, even as high as 100%. The most dependent states on imported Russian gas are paying the highest price for this merchandise, although the general dependency on imported gas could also make the prices rise (Mészáros 2017). In any case, a gas war between Russia and the European Union makes no sense, as Jérôme Guillet noted, because nobody can win it: all parties lose—supplies, income, reputations, and trust—while remaining unavoidably linked by the pipeline. Guillet correctly emphasized: “The eu–Russia energy dialogue is dominated by ghosts and unfounded fears of dependency rather than an appreciation of the real interdependency” (Guillet 2011, 72). The United States of America, especially since the Ukrainian crisis, has similar interests with Europe, especially in weakening Russian economic interests and strategy. However, the prestige of the United States is not the same as it was during the nineties, and its influence can be balanced by the growing influence of Russia. The American-Russian new cold war has many aspects, in which the Fig. 4. The import gas price in selected eu member states (usd/1,000 m3, 2013)

550 530 510 490 470 450 430 410 390 370 350 u k UK Italy Latvia France Poland Austria Greece Estonia Letonia Bulgaria Slovakia Belgium Hungary Romania Germany Netherland

Czech Republic Czech

Source: European Commission, Eurostat.

Fig. 5. The dependency on Russian imported gas in total gas consumption in selected eu member states (%, 2013)

120%

100%

80%

60%

40%

20%

0% u k UK Italy Latvia France Poland Austria Greece Estonia Letonia Bulgaria Slovakia Belgium Hungary Romania Germany Netherland

Czech Republic Czech

Source: European Commission, Eurostat. 48 • Transylvanian Review • Vol. XXVII, No. 1 (Spring 2018) issue of pipeline projects is important, but not primarily important. A certain loss of ground for American companies in this region can be noticed—no wonder that in the case of Nabucco, even if it was supported by the usa, European companies had to take the initiative—but this situation, if the situation in the region is stabilized once again, will just improve for American interests. How- ever, in recent years the us has become a potentially important energy exporter due to the shale gas and shale oil revolution. Though the price of the us shale gas lng is relatively high, the price of the imported gas imposed by Gazprom is quite high as well for the Eastern European countries, unlike the lower price offered to Western European countries, especially to Germany. Consequently, based on the present price level, the us lng could be competitive, but the recent post-socialist eu members have a single lng terminal in Poland (another one is under construction in Croatia). That is to say, the receiving capacity of lng is still insufficient. At the same time, the us extended the sanctions against Russia in July 2017 due to an alleged Russian intervention in the us presidential election campaign, penalizing even those European energy companies which have joint pipeline-building projects with Russian energy companies. This could be evidence of the fact that the us has an aggressive expansionist policy in the context of energy-geopolitical games (Pogonyi el al. 2014). The Russian Federation and its companies are seemingly in pole position, having the greatest influence in Central Asia and in the Caucasus. They are strong in capital and the region falls within their strategic interest, but often this does not seem to be enough, like in the case of South Stream and Turkish Stream. The pipelines based on Russian initiatives will be built as relative stability and regional security are re-established in the Black Sea region. The Rus- sians still preserve the monopoly on the transfer of Central-Asian gas and oil to Western states via the Caspian Pipeline Consortium, between the Tengiz Field (Kazakhstan) and Novorossiysk (Russia), and trough the widespread Russian gas pipeline network. Russia, together with China, is trying to put pressure on Kazakhstan to prevent the construction of a pipeline connecting its oil fields with the Baku–Tbilisi–Ceyhan pipeline, thus preventing Western-led oil and gas consortia from playing a leading role in new developments of Kazakh oil and bypassing Russian transit routes (Cohen 2006, 39). The world’s next superpower, China, is expanding its economic interests in the region, but not yet at the level of investments in fossil fuels. Unlike in Cen- tral Asia, where China has a primal strategic interest in energy supplies (Lakatos 2014, 143), Chinese companies are not at all active in the Black Sea region. The Chinese will make joint efforts with the Russians to exclude the usa and the eu from Central Asia, thus seriously limiting the sovereignty of the Central Asian Paradigms • 49 countries. But, on the other hand, in the new great game around the energy resources in Central Asia, in the future the Chinese can easily come into a serious conflict with Russia regarding supremacy in the region and the control of supply with fossil energy resources. The rise of China as the new global economic superpower might change this in the near future, because China has all the chances to become a global oil player, while Russia remains predominantly a regional one (Cohen 2006, 17). For small Central-Eastern European countries, the equation is simple: each of them would prefer to have a pipeline crossing its territory, due to the financial and strategic gains. Both competition and cooperation are caused by this strategic goal, but they do not have the necessary capital to initiate actions. They can rely only on the existing projects of some great company.

Conclusions

s we could see, most of the pipeline projects failed. The importance of the gas pipelines for Europe is a crucial issue, and it will remain so A at least for a few years more. The rivalling economic interests of great companies and the geopolitical rivalry in the region which most of the pipelines should cross will however postpone or cancel most of their projects. We notice that usually the pipelines built without problems are those which have limited objectives and there is a small number of actors who reach an agreement more easily (e.g. North Stream—Russia and Germany), while the ones designed to serve major strategic goals and have almost decisive economic importance are experiencing a series of difficulties. In the latter cases they were discontinued because of insufficient investment capital, the impossibility of coordinating the interests of huge stakeholders, or the lack of strong buying commitment from the consumer side, the insecurity of sources, or they were simply (geo)politically killed (e.g. South Stream) (Guillet 2011, 72). The objective consequences of gas pipelines are the following: co • Through the burning of natural gas, less 2 is released into the atmosphere than in the case of coal or oil. An alternative to fossil fuels could be the “green” sources of energy, but these still account for only a small percentage of energy consumption, since their permanency is reduced as compared to fossil ones. • A pipeline is costly to build, but once it is finished, it is more economical than transporting gas by vehicles such as ships or trains. Its supply is also faster but, due to its length, it can also be very vulnerable to natural catastrophes or criminal attacks. 50 • Transylvanian Review • Vol. XXVII, No. 1 (Spring 2018)

• The building of a pipeline can cause serious modifications to the environment where it will be placed. It is less likely that, let to their own devices, great companies will pay more attention to possible environmental issues than to their profit. This is the role of ngos. • Shale gas can be a viable alternative to natural gas, but due to the cata- strophic and irreversible damages caused by its current technology of exploitation, it is not likely that great exploitations for shale gas will start in Europe in the near future. A good example for this is the case of Vaslui, Romania, where the Chevron Company was trying to exploit shale gas, but it was stopped by the popular protest of the locals, also supported by Greenpeace activists. Anyway, shale gas and shale oil exploitation was boosted so much in the last decade that it triggered a serious supply side boom, which considerably reduces the profitabil- ity of the oil and gas companies worldwide. That is the reason why these classic oil companies must reduce their investment costs, and they have to choose to execute only the most efficient pipeline projects due to the lack of sufficient financial resources (Horváth 2017). • The building of two pipelines designed for the transport of natural gas, meant to supply Central-Eastern Europe and South-Eastern Europe with gas from Russia and/or the Caucasus and Central Asia, and which had the important characteristic that it avoided the unstable Ukraine, was doomed to failure. Their failure proves the lack of influence of the possible beneficiaries to promote their own interests and it is an indicator of instability in the region. • In the following decades the lack of stable gas supplies will hang over the head of many of these states like a Sword of Damocles. However, this sword is very unlikely to fall and to cause a major crisis, due to the diversity of offers on the global energy market and the relatively low prices. • An alternative to the reliable, but environmentally harmful and exhaustible fossil fuels could be the renewable sources of energy. Time and investments are required in order for these to be a competitive answer to the energy question, which can be rewarding only on a long term (Cebotari and Benedek 2017). It is certain that the European Union and its Central-Eastern European member states definitely need one or more pipelines for the import of gas. What is not settled is which countries should be the main suppliers—because of political, geostrategic and geo-economic reasons—, and which companies should be the main beneficiaries for building and operating the system—economic interests are clashing, and not everybody can be a winner. Another factor, worthy of being taken into consideration, is that for building pipelines, a situation of relative security and peaceful international cooperation is required, which is not the case nowadays, neither in the Caucasus, nor in the European parts of the post-Soviet zone, nor in the Middle East. The situation could improve in the near future Paradigms • 51 and those companies that will operate their own pipeline project earlier will be in a winning position. Until then, however, we can only watch and analyze the evolution of the various pipeline projects. Undoubtedly, the price formation process and all the trading processes with hydrocarbons are definitely influenced by geopolitical factors, to the same extent as real market factors have their influence as well. According to the opinion of J. Guillet, we are not sharing the simplistic statement of “armchair geo-politicians” that the whole “gas-trade game” between Russia and Europe is serving only the new Russian imperialism, ignoring the practical, technical and economic re- quirements of the energy industry. All in all, theoreticians cannot make projects that do not have a strong underlying financial and business rationale (Guillet 2011, 58). The majority of the currently existing or proposed pipelines, with few exceptions, are based on Russian sources—consequently they do not serve the diversification of sources efficiently, though they can contribute to fostering the security of supply by diversifying the supplying routes, bypassing unstable or non-reliable countries. Anyway, Gazprom and Russia can put further geopolitical pressure on Eastern European states, since their supply sources are still quite one-sided, while Western Europe has enough energy autonomy by purchasing hydrocarbons from multiple sources. q

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Abstract Pipelines for Energy, Interests for Companies and Great Powers

Europe is currently dependent on fossil fuels from the post-Soviet space. With the outbreak of the Russian-Ukrainian dispute in 2006, this dependency became more relevant for strategic considerations, and thus the Southern Gas Corridor initiative was born. The North Stream pipeline— which supplies Germany from Russia, through the northern seas—is fully operational. The same cannot be said concerning pipelines which are meant to supply the former communist, currently eu member countries and the Balkans, due to rivalling economic (policies of big companies) and geopolitical interests. This article will analyze the most important pipeline projects, their economic and political background; it will also look into the reasons why some of these projects were unsuccessful while analyzing the possible outcomes of the projects that are still functional. The analysis will be placed in the context of current international relations and geopolitics, taking into consideration the Ukrainian crisis, the turmoil in the Middle East, and the frozen conflicts of the Caucasus and its vicinity.

Keywords gas pipelines, geopolitics, geo-economics, Central-Eastern Europe, South-Eastern Europe Comparison of Changes Cezary Kowalczyk in Urbanized Areas Jacek Kil Ciprian S. Moldovan in Poland and Romania

Is urban growth a conti Introduction nuous process? What is the he 20th century was a period dynamics of urban growth? of dynamic evolution for Eu- T ropean cities. In Europe, cities What are the directions were established in different centuries, of urban growth? which contributed to variations in their architectural design. The structure of residential districts evolved over time to accommodate local needs (Bajwoluk 2008). The 21st century brought a host of new challenges for European cities, including globalization, economic restructuring, social change and social exclusion (Kowalczyk and Nowak 2015; Cezary Kowalczyk Ph.D. at the Faculty of Geodesy, Geospa- Benedek 2016). Rapidly expanding tial and Civil Engineering, University of cities also exert considerable pressure Warmia and Mazury, Olsztyn, Poland. on the surrounding municipalities, and their administrative boundaries are ex- Jacek Kil panded to incorporate the adjacent ter- Ph.D. candidate at the Faculty of ritories (Rząd 2005). Geodesy, Geospatial and Civil Engineer- Rapid suburbanization is a relative- ing, University of Warmia and Mazury, ly new phenomenon in urban develop- Olsztyn, Poland. ment. During this process, low density Ciprian S. Moldovan development, in particular residential Lecturer at the Faculty of Geography, development, occupies increasingly Babeº-Bolyai University, Cluj-Napoca, more rural land, which leads to uncon- Romania. trolled urban sprawl outside the ad- Paradigms • 57 ministrative boundaries of a city (Z´róbek-Róz˙an´ska and Z´róbek 2017). Urban sprawl contributes to an increase in developed land (which is far more rapid than the corresponding increase in population or infrastructure), an increase in areas characterized by low density development and low population density, and an increase in residential floor area per capita (which can be partially attributed to the overestimation of residential needs at the planning stage) (Borsa 2014). Suburban zones are closely linked to the urban core, and they are highly attractive for developers. Regardless of the adopted growth strategy, developers have a growing interest in suburban areas not only due to lower prices for land, but also due to the greater availability of land and new business opportunities. Urban dwellers are also increasingly likely to move to suburban areas in search of a dream home in attractive natural surroundings (Stachura 2012). Inner-city development represents an opposite trend in urban planning. The term ‘compact city’ was coined in the 1970s by G. Dantzing and T. L. Saaty, American mathematicians who searched for a new model of urban development that would support a more efficient use of resources and curtail urban sprawl (Kowalewski 2006). Researchers investigating both urban sprawl and inner-city development continue to search for answers to the following questions: Is urban growth a continuous process? What is the dynamics of urban growth? What are the directions of urban growth? The answers to the above questions have to rely on certain paradigms. Urban growth is undoubtedly influenced by the standard of living in cities. The concept of development is strongly linked with the quality of life, the residents’ expectations and aspirations, their level of cultural and technological development and the fulfillment of their needs (Kowalczyk 2015). The first group of factors is correlated with the size of a city, the second group with its population, and the third with its social and economic development. Each group of factors should be analyzed to identify the current trends and phenomena in contemporary cities (Mironowicz 2010). Demographic analyses of cities and urbanized areas in their historical context reveal specific trends in economic development, major historical events, long-term processes, and they further our understanding of the prerequisites for growth (Chandler 1987). Each year, Mercer Human Resource Consulting surveys the quality of life in cities based on 39 socioeconomic factors grouped in 10 categories, including: political and social environment, economic environment, socio-cultural environment, medical and health considerations, schools and education, public services and transportation, recreation, consumer goods, housing, natural environment. Urban growth is manifested in numerous dimensions and spheres of human activity. Housing is a basic human need, and for many people a single-family 58 • Transylvanian Review • Vol. XXVII, No. 1 (Spring 2018) detached home is the ultimate dream. A home is the place where we sleep, work, eat meals and relax. A home provides its owners with a source of security, and it is the center of family and social life (Bartkowicz 2005). Residential floor area per capita is an indicator of the standard of living. For the needs of this study, it was assumed that changes in the above indicator reflect the growth dynamics of a city. However, analyses that focus solely on changes in floor area per capita can produce erroneous results because a decrease in population in successive years can be accompanied by an increase in floor area per capita. The above is not indicative of an improvement in the standard of living. On the contrary: the standard of living has deteriorated to the extent that urban dwellers begin to mi- grate and vacate residential areas in the city. To avoid interpretation errors, the urban population and total residential area should be analyzed jointly.

Research Area and Study Subject

he area was selected in such a way as to examine the conditions of urban development under various socio-economic and socio-cultural con- T ditions. The selected cities have an area of 267 km2 to 67 km2 (see Table 1 for details).

TABLE 1. Specification Of The Surveyed Cities—Data For 2016 Table 1. Specification of the surveyed cities—data for 2016

City area Floor area Floor area per capita City Population (km2) (m2) (m2/person) Białistok 102 7,690,741 295,981 26.0 Kielce 109 4,852,599 188,507 25.7 Lublin 148 8,842,939 340,466 26.0 Olsztyn 88 4,423,244 173,444 25.5 Braºov 267 5,993,726 290,955 20.6 Cluj-Napoca 180 7,260,025 321,916 22.6 Sibiu 121 3,422,395 169,880 20.1 Târgu-Mureº 67 2,841,457 150,290 18.9

Sources: Central Statistical Office of Poland—stan geodezyjny i kierunki wykorzystania powierzchni miasta; www.kielce.pl, accessed 19.08.2016; Powierzchnia i ludnos´ć w przekroju terytorialnym w 2016 r., gus, Warszawa, 2016; www.brasov.ro, accessed 18.08.2016; Romanian National Institute of Statistics.

The analysis covered four urbanized areas in Poland (East Poland) and Romania (Transylvania): Paradigms • 59

Białystok (municipalities of Choroszcz, Dobrzyniewo Duz˙e, Juchnowiec Kos´ cielny, Supras´ l, Turos´ n´ Kos´ cielna, Wasilków, Zabłudów); Kielce (municipalities of Daleszyce, Górno, Masłów, Miedziana Góra, Moro- wica, Piekoszów, Sitkówka-Nowiny); Lublin (municipalities of Głusk, Jastków, Konopnica, Niedrzwica Duz˙a, Niemce, Skrzyz˙ewice, Wólka); Olsztyn (municipalities of Barczewo, Dywity, Gietrzwałd, Jonkowo, Purda, Stawiguda); Braşov (municipalities of Sãcele, Ghimbav, Predeal, Râºnov, Bod, Cristian, Hãlchiu, Sânpetru); Cluj-Napoca (municipalities of Apahida, Baciu, Chinteni, Ciurila, Feleacu, Floreºti, Gilãu, Sãvãdisla, Tureni); Sibiu (municipalities of Cisnãdie, Ocna Sibiului, Cristian, Poplaca, Rãºinari, Roºia, ªelimbãr, ªura Mare, ªura Micã); Târgu-Mureº (municipalities of Corunca, Crãciuneºti, Cristeºti, Livezeni, Sâncraiu de Mureº, Sângeorgiu de Mureº, Sântana de Mureº). The Romanian cities selected for this study (Cluj-Napoca, Braºov, Sibiu and Târgu-Mureº) are the most important cities of the historical province of Tran- sylvania. The surveyed areas are cities and their neighboring municipalities. The evaluated objects are similar in size, population and residential floor area. Their geographic location is presented in Figures 1 and 2.

Research Methodology

he proposed research methodology allows us to answer the following questions: What is the pace of change? How quickly the value of the de- T pendent variable (living space per capita and the area of housing) changes over time? In statistics, an index is defined as a measure describing changes in a dependent variable in time or space, where time is the independent variable. Indicators of change dynamics are widely used in studies analyzing quantifiable social and economic factors (Timofiejuk 2006). In this study, the selected indicators were relative and dimensionless quanti- ties which are comparable regardless of the type and scale of the analyzed process, and are thus intuitive (Thompson and Cunningham 2002). In the first stage of the study, chained volume series were calculated where the expression preceding the analyzed expression constituted the basis of a time series. Fig. 1. Geographic location of the surveyed areas (Poland)

Fig. 2. Geographic location of the surveyed areas (Romania)

bukovina

Târgu-Mureș

Bucharest Paradigms • 61

X1 X 2 X n X 1 = ; X 2 = ;...... ; X n = 0 X 0 1 X1 n−1 X n−1 where:

X0 the analyzed phenomena (population, residential floor area per capita, total floor area) in the first year (1995) of observations;

Xn the analyzed phenomena (population, residential floor area per capita, total floor area) in successive years of observations;

Xn/n-1 the analyzed phenomena (population, residential floor area per capita, total floor area) in the period preceding the successive year of observations.

In the following stage, the rate of changes in the analyzed variables was determined over time, beginning from the first year of observations (chained volume series). It was assumed that in the first year of observations (1995), the analyzed phenomena (population, residential floor area per capita and total floor area) had the value of 1, and in successive years of observations, the value of the indicator was equal to the product of a dimensionless quantity in a given year and the change dynamics indicator.

Table 2. Algorithm for calculating change dynamics

Year 1995 1996 1997 … 2016

Observed value X1 X2 X3 … Xn

Chained X2 X3 Xn X2-1 = X3-2 = Xn = volume series – X X … X 1 2 n-1 Change dynamics * * * * * * * from the first year 1 1 X2-1 1 X2-11 X3-2 … 1 X2-11 X3-21 ... Xn of observations

Source: Kowalczyk 2014.

Table 3. An example of calculating the dynamics of population change in Białystok

Year 1995 1996 1997 … 2014 2015 2016 Population 278,489 280,592 282,530 … 295,459 295,981 296,628 Chained … 1,008 1,007 … 1,001 1,002 1,002 volume series Change dynamics from the first year 1 1,008 1,015 … 1,057 1,059 1,065 of observations

62 • Transylvanian Review • Vol. XXVII, No. 1 (Spring 2018)

Results

n the first stage a comparison of dynamics in Polish and Romanian cities was made. The results are shown in Figures 3 and 4. I In general it can be stated that only 3 of the 8 analyzed cities show positive dynamics for the period 1995–2016, including two from Poland. In 1995– 2016, the most dynamic population increase of 6.5% was noted in Białystok. Olsztyn’s population increased by around 5% between 1995 and 2009, after which the evaluated parameter continued to decrease in successive years. At present, Olsztyn’s population is only 3% higher than in 1995. The population of Kielce decreased by 7.5% and the population of Lublin by 4% in the analyzed period. The decline in population in these two cities is due to job cuts. Analyzing the population dynamics in Cluj-Napoca and neighboring communes, we find that between 1995 and 2017 the city of Cluj-Napoca experienced a slight increase in population of about 1.4%, four communes showing population declines between 6% and 15% (Tureni, Ciurila, Sãvãdisla and Fe- leacu), the rest of the communes registering population increases between 4 and 441% (Chinteni, Gilãu, Baciu, Apahida and Floreºti). The insignificant growth in the population of Cluj-Napoca, a city which nevertheless creates many well- paid jobs (especially in it&c), is due first and foremost to the very high price of construction land, the very high price of dwellings, and to the population who, although coming in very large numbers to work and study in the city (Cristea et al. 2017), prefer to live in communes near the city. The decline may also be ascribed to the closure of the major industrial sites after 1990 and the relocation of industrial production outside the city. Some explanations regarding the decrease of the population in the neighboring communes of Cluj-Napoca, besides the decreases related to natural causes and emigration, specific to the Romanian rural area, could be related to the orographic factor represented by the Feleac Hill, the poor road connection of these communes with the city and the lack of infrastructure in general. How- ever, although Feleacu commune is located in the immediate vicinity of the city, it seems that its inhabitants prefer to move to the city or other communities where housing and work offer is better. A relatively small population growth is recorded in Chinteni commune, which, although located in the vicinity of the city, seems to fail to attract many people mainly due to the lack of infrastructure. The population increases experienced by the other communes (Gilãu, Baciu, Apahida and Floreºti) are due to their proximity to the city, a good road connection with the city (E60, E81, E576 and city bypasses), the low price of the land for construction, the cheap housing stock (half, or even less, the prices the city) and good infrastructure in general. Paradigms • 63

Fig 3. Population dynamics in the urban core (excluding the neighboring municipalities)

1,08. 1,06.

1,04. 1,02. 1 0,98.

pulation dynamics 0,96. Po 0,94. 0,92. 0,9. 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016

Białystok Lublin Kielce Olsztyn Cluj-Napoca BraşovBrasov Târgu-MureşTirgu Mures Sibiu

Analyzing the population dynamics in Braºov and the neighboring municipalities, we find that between 1995 and 2017 the city of Braºov registered a decrease in population of 9.3%, a decrease in population being also registered by the town of Predeal (23%) and Halchiu commune (13%). A population increase was recorded in the city of Sãcele, the towns of Râºnov and Ghimbav, as well as in the communes of Bod, Cristian and Sânpetru. The decrease in Predeal’s population was caused by the lower efficiency of tourism services, which decreased the tourist attractiveness of resort towns (Ilinca 2003), by natural causes and emigration. The decrease in population of Braºov and Târgu-Mureº can be ascribed to the economic restructuring, the regress of the urban economy and services, starting with the second half of 1990, marked by the partial or total closure of the branches of the large industrial units, the reduction in industrial production, the dismissal of the working staff, their withdrawal to the villages of origin (Ilinca 2003) and migration to the neighboring areas. The increase registered by Sibiu is generated mainly by two causes: attracting labor from other parts of the country (especially from the less developed South) and natural causes. The data presented in Figure 4 indicate that total residential floor area in the evaluated cities increased between 1995 and 2016 regardless of the nature of the 64 • Transylvanian Review • Vol. XXVII, No. 1 (Spring 2018) observed change in population (increase or decrease). In the analyzed period, the greatest increase in total floor area was observed in Olsztyn (60%), and the smallest increase was noted in Kielce (41%). In Polish cities, total floor area increased most dynamically in 2001–2002 due to the rapid growth of the housing market, the high availability of mortgage loans and public housing programs for young couples. Comparing the dynamics of population change presented in Fig- ure 3 with the observed positive dynamics of changes in the area of apartments, the question is: Does the change in the number of inhabitants of the city prove its development if we are dealing with the simultaneous expansion of housing. Can any decrease in population show the “extinction” of the urbanized area? The analyzed data did not reveal direct correlations between population dynamics and urban growth within the administrative boundaries of the city. Fur- ther analyses were carried out to determine factors responsible for an increase in residential area in cities with a dwindling population, as well as factors that could be indicative of urban growth or decay. The rate of changes in residential floor area per capita is presented in Figure 5. Similarly to Figure 4, a significant increase in floor area per capita was observed in every analyzed city between 1995 and 2016. The dynamics of changes in floor area per capita was highly similar in Polish cities. The greatest increase in the analyzed parameter was noted in Olsztyn (55%), and the smallest increase was observed in Białystok (49%). After 1990, Romania experienced a decrease in the birth rate and an increase in the death rate, which led to a natural decrease of the population. At the same time, the number of emigrants exceeds that of immigrants, leading also to a decrease in population of Romania, including at the present time (Romanian National Institute of Statistics 2017). Two million Romanians intend to move to one of the country’s major cities over the next five years, while 1.1 million want to leave the country, according to a poll cited in the World Bank’s report from 2017, “Magnet Cities: Migration and Commuting in Romania.” In the case of Romanian cities, they have been affected by the economic (especially industrial) restructuring, the regress of the urban economy and services, starting with the second half of 1990, marked by the partial or total closure of the large industrial units, the decrease industrial production, the dismissal of the working staff and its withdrawal to their places of origin (Ilinca 2003). The regions that have developed the fastest are the dynamic cities and the areas around them, this being in fact the essence of development: concentration in a few growth centers and the diffusion of growth to surrounding areas, until every corner of the country is reached (Ionescu-Heroiu et al. 2013). The performance of each city is likely both the result of a set of givens (e.g. size, proximity to the Fig. 4. Change dynamics in residential floor area in the urban core

1.8.

1.6.

1.4.

1.2.

1 sidential area dynamics area sidential Re 0.8. 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015

Białystok Lublin Kielce Olsztyn Cluj-Napoca BrasovBraşov Târgu-MureşTirgu Mures Sibiu

Fig. 5. Change dynamics in residential floor area per capita in the urban core

1,8.

1,6.

1,4.

1,2.

Dwellingsfloor percapita dynamics 0,8.

1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016

Lublin Białystok Kielce Olsztyn Cluj-Napoca BraşovBrasov Târgu-MureşTirgu Mures Sibiu

66 • Transylvanian Review • Vol. XXVII, No. 1 (Spring 2018)

West, distance from Bucharest), but also the result of conscious interventions (e.g. strong local leadership, the development of metropolitan infrastructure, investments in business parks, or the increase in the quality of life) (Cristea et al. 2017). Analyzing the population dynamics in the most important four cities of Transylvania (Cluj-Napoca, Braºov, Sibiu and Târgu Mureº), we find that between 1995 and 2017, only Cluj-Napoca registered a slight increase in population (1.4%), Sibiu registered a slight decrease in population (-1.9%), while Braºov and Târgu-Mureº experienced population declines of over 9%. The decline of Sibiu, Târgu-Mureº and Braºov, may be also ascribed (obviously after the causes of natural decline of the population and emigration mentioned above) to the closure of the major industrial sites after 1990 and nowadays, the relocation of industrial production outside the city, obviously followed by the move of the workers outside the city (in majority of cases in the neighboring communes) (Petrovici 2013). For Romania, the period 2000–2008 saw an economic boom, not necessarily characterized by high growth in employment (just 6%), but rather by the increase in productivity and, implicitly, in income. The minimum wage increased from 28 euros in 2000, to 142 euros in 2008. All this has been manifested in the growing expectations of the population for a new home (especially the middle class), and with demand comes the offer. The number of building permits for residential buildings increased exponentially during the boom, but with the onset of the economic crisis at the local level, entrepreneurs with no demand and no financial resources available postponed the completion of the construction for a period of 1–2 years, which resulted in the spectacular growth of the residential area in general and obviously also of the per capita residential area, starting with 2011, despite the fact that the number of new building permits issued was less than half of the maximum reached in 2007–2008. Starting with 2013, the number of new building permits has been rising, and since 2014 we are witnessing a slight but constant increase in the residential area. However, the results of the analysis cannot be used to reli- ably determine the rate and direction of changes in urban growth because the observed increase in floor area per capita could result from a decrease in population, which is the case in Kielce and Lublin or in Romania. The analysis of the dynamics of changes in three areas of interdependent variables indicates a great variety of variables. In order to distinguish groups of most similar cities, factor analysis was performed, i.e. the geometric distance was determined in multidimensional space (distance (x, y) = [i (xi - yi) 2]½). Note that Euclidean distances (squares of Euclidean distances) are calculated on the basis of raw data, not on the basis of standardized data. This method has some advantages (for example, the distance between two objects is not affected Paradigms • 67

Fig. 6. Dynamics of changes in residential floor space per person in central cities

0.5

0.4

0.3

0.2 Euclidean distances

0.1

0.0 Târgu-Mureş Braşov Olsztyn Kielce Sibiu Cluj-Napoca Białystok Lublin by adding new objects that may be outgoing objects). However, distance differences are influenced by the differences in units between the dimensions from which the distances are calculated. Factor analysis shows that per capita living space dynamics is similar across countries. This confirms the distinctness of the changes in both countries. Changes in cities in Poland have a lower distance between them, which may be more coherent than in Romanian cities. Based on the assumption that the urban area is not only within the administrative boundaries, but also municipalities directly adjacent to the city, an attempt was made to compare the dynamics of the changes taking place on the basis of the bag charts. The bag graph is a two- dimensional version of the mustache frame. The basic concept of a bag chart is to ditch a point in the bag, i.e. its ‘half’ position relative to the total data. It is based on the extension to the two dimensions of the notion of rank. The bag graph illustrates the basic features of two-dimensional probability distribution of two variables (population dynamics and dwelling floor per capita), i.e.: location (Tukey median), spread (bag size), correlation (bag orientation), asymmetry (bag shape and envelope shape) and tails (shell size and standing points). Fig. 7. Bag charts of selected cities and adjacent in poland

Lublin and neighboring communes Białystok and neighboring communes 1.8 1.5 pop_dynamics pop_dynamics 1.7 median 1.4 median outliers outliers 1.6 1.3 1.5 1.2 1.4 1.1 1.3 1.0 1.2

opulation dynamics 0.9

P 1.1 1.0 0.8 0.9 0.7

0.8 0.6 0.6 0.8 1.0 1.2 1.4 1.6 1.8 2.0 2.2 0.6 0.8 1.0 1.2 1.4 1.6 1.8 2.0 2.2

Kielce and neighboring communes Olsztyn and neighboring communes 1.35 1.8 pop_dynamics pop_dynamics 1.30 median 1.7 median outliers 1.25 1.6 outliers 1.20 1.5 1.15 1.4 1.10 1.3 1.05 1.2 opulation dynamics P 1.00 1.1 0.95 1.0 0.90 0.9 0.6 0.8 1.0 1.2 1.4 1.6 1.8 2.0 2.2 0.6 0.8 1.0 1.2 1.4 1.6 1.8 2.0 2.2 2.4 2.6 Dwelling floor space per capita Dwelling floor space per capita Fig. 8. Bag charts of selected cities and adjacent in Romania Cluj-Napoca and neighboring communes Braºov and neighboring communes 0.5 2.0 pop_dynamics pop_dynamics 4.5 median median outliers 1.8 outliers 4.0 1.6 3.5 3.0 1.4 2.5 1.2 2.0

opulation dynamics 1.0

P 1.5 1.0 0.8 0.5 0.6 0.6 0.8 1.0 1.2 1.4 1.6 1.8 2.0 2.2 2.4 2.6 2.8 3.0 3.2 0.5 1.0 1.5 2.0 2.5 3.0 3.5

1.8 Târgu-Mureº and neighboring communes Sibiu and neighboring communes

pop_dynamics 2.2 pop_dynamics 1.6 median median outliers 2.0 outliers 1.4 1.8 1.2 1.6 1.0 1.4 0.8 1.2 opulation dynamics 0.6 P 1.0 0.4 0.8

0.6 0.8 1.0 1.2 1.4 1.6 1.8 2.0 2.2 2.4 2.6 2.8 3.0 3.2 0.8 1.0 1.2 1.4 1.6 1.8 2.0 2.2 2.4 Dwelling floor space per capita Dwelling floor space per capita 70 • Transylvanian Review • Vol. XXVII, No. 1 (Spring 2018)

Summary

he changes taking place in the urbanized area are a very complex process, influenced by various factors. Research has shown that the direc- T tions and speed of change in cities located in different countries can have a distinct dynamics. The general tendency in Polish and Romanian cities is the decreasing population within the administrative boundaries of the city (the core of the urbanized area), with a rapidly increasing population and dwellings in neighboring municipalities. As an exception can be Cluj-Napoca, where in the city there is a very dynamic population growth, much larger than in the neighboring municipalities. The process of developing urban areas in municipalities surrounding cities in Poland is positively correlated. On the bag charts we observe a small number of elements departing from the general trend in the presented urbanized areas in Poland. Conversely, changes occurring in the area of neighboring towns and cities in Romania are characterized by high dynamics within particular areas (large number of out-of-pocket observations). The biggest swing of trends occurs in the municipalities of Târgu-Mureº and Braºov. An in-depth analysis of spatial determinants is required to exclude the impact of terrain and natural conditions on the search for answers, which may be the reason for swaying trends in Tran- sylvanian urban areas. q

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——. tempo–Online database. Available at http://statistici.insse.ro/shop/. Accessed on 19.08.2017. Rząd, E. (2005). “Polityka i działania Unii Europejskiej na rzecz zdegradowanych ob- szarów miejskich.” In Transformacja zdegradowanych struktur przestrzennych metropolii polskich, eds. Tomasz Parteka, 370–400. Warszawa: Warszawa kpzk pan. Stachura, E. (2012). “Cultural Determinants of Housing Architecture. Based on Poland and Turkey.” Czasopismo Techniczne: Architektura 2: 207–216. Thompson, J. N. and B. M. Cunningham. (2002). “Geographic structure and dynamics of coevolutionary selection.” Nature 417, 6890: 735–738. Timofiejuk, I. (2006). Pomiar dynamiki mierników ekonomicznych. Warsaw: Wydawnict- wo wse–1. www.brasov.ro. Available at http://www.brasov.ro. Accessed on 18.08.2016. www.kielce.pl. Available at http://www.kielce.pl. Accessed on 19.08.2016. Z´róbek-Róz˙an´ska A. and S. Z´róbek. (2017). “How City’s Biggest Employers Shape Spatial Development of the Residential Areas—Evidence from Olsztyn, Poland.” International Conference Environmental Engineering, Vilnius (Lithuania) 27–28 April 2017. Available at https://doi.org/10.3846/enviro.2017.130. Accessed on 15.10.2017.

Abstract Comparison of Changes in Urbanized Areas in Poland and Romania

The main aim of this study was to examine the co-existing phenomena that occur dynamically in an urbanized area. This goal was achieved by analyzing trends and the rate of changes in geolocation data. The input data were obtained from statistical registers kept for administrative units (municipalities). The method was verified for a group of municipalities forming a cohesive urbanized area (a city and neighboring municipalities). The rate of changes was compared in two countries, including four cities in eastern Poland (Olsztyn, Białystok, Kielce and Lublin) and four cities in the region of Transylvania in Romania (Cluj-Napoca, Braºov, Târgu-Mureº and Sibiu). The studied areas encompassed the territories within the administrative boundaries of the analyzed cities as well as their neighboring municipalities in 1995–2016. The surveyed objects were characterized by a similar area, population and residential floor area per capita.

Keywords population changes, change dynamics, comparison of growth rates, residential floor area per capita, rate of changes in urban areas Territorial Data Aggregation and Trends of Regional Economic Convergence in Europe

A l e x a n d r u R u s u A Geo-statistical Analysis O ct a v i a n G r o z a for the 2003–2014 Period

Not only the starting level Introduction of the convergence process n this paper we explore the link will have an explanatory role, between the geographical scale of I analysis and the economic beta- but also the geographical convergence process in the European and economic context of the Union and fyrom, for the period 2003–2014. Our main hypothesis is proximity. that the economic convergence takes place differently, if one addresses its mechanism at nuts3, nuts2 or nuts1 scale. In order to test this hypothesis, we will deploy several ordinary least squares regression models (ols), for different periods of economic accumulation and for different territorial Alexandru Rusu scales. The first stage in our research Lecturer at the Faculty of Geography process consisted in the data quality and Geology, Alexandru Ioan Cuza check of the indicators and geometries University, Iaºi, Romania. retained for the analysis, mainly the Octavian Groza datasets provided by the eurostat, in- Professor at the Faculty of Geography cluding the gdp for the 2003–2014 pe- and Geology, Alexandru Ioan Cuza riod. In a second stage, we developed University, Iaºi, Romania. a methodological frame of investiga- 74 • Transylvanian Review • Vol. XXVII, No. 1 (Spring 2018) tion of the beta-convergence process in Europe, taking into account the latest research in this field (Monfort 2008; Bourdin 2013b) and data availability. One recent trend in the investigation of the economic catching-up processes is dedicated to the introduction of spatial variables in the statistical models that describe them (Bourdin 2013a; Grasland 2012) and we have made an option for the potential accessibility of the gdp, in a Gaussian functional neighborhood of 500 km. In this case, not only the starting level of the convergence process will have an explanatory role, but also the geographical and economic context of the proximity. The main part of the paper is dedicated to the implementation of the ols models of beta convergence, together with the testing procedures (statistical and geo-statistical ones). The results of the models’ implementation show that the economic accumulation is scale sensitive and that the explanatory variables behave differently, once we change the territorial reference frame of analysis. The best candidate for a better understanding of the convergence process is the nuts2 scale, as the results at nuts1 were biased and the results at nuts3 scale are affected by lower values of adjusted R2. At the same time, the standardized residuals of the ols depict the crystallization of local and regional clubs of economic over-performance, especially at nuts3 scale. In order to implement the models and the inherent analysis, a gis approach was needed. This gis approach consisted in the development of a gis tool that enabled the calculation of the potential accessibility in a Gaussian kernel with a 500 km span. Other secondary steps in the analysis were based on the development of sophisticated gis models that allowed us to automatically access the results of the ols beta-convergence models (Mitchell 2005). The final part presents the main scientific conclusions and some policy relevant key-findings derived from our analysis, together with the inherent limitations of our approach.

Literature Review

he research we propose in this paper can be considered an exploratory analysis of the role played by the geographical context in the manifesta- T tion of the economic convergence process, at the scale of the European Union and for a period that covers the accession to the eu of several Eastern Eu- ropean states, in 2004 and 2007. Some conceptual precautions are needed when one deals with the process of convergence, because the term can cover different aspects of the economic accumulation process. The first model of economic convergence has its roots in the ’50s, when Solow (1956) described the role played by the technical territorial endowment at the initial time of the analysis in the process of production growth, a model that will later became the basis for the Paradigms • 75 beta-convergence approach. Much later, Sala-i-Martín (1996) refined Solow’s approach and applied it to the eu states. However, different criticisms, especially focusing on the statistical results of the beta-convergence models (Quah 1996), indicated that there are other possible approaches to the convergence processes, more specifically dictated by the level of internal disparities (Neven and Gouyette 1995 and Dao et al. 2003), or by different trends in the dynamics of the accumulation, trends explained by a Markov-chain approach to the accumulation process (Quah 1996). Once the eu faced the integration of new states from the East, the topic of the convergence became interesting even for policy-makers, as the studies by Monfort (2008) and Stiglitz et al. (2009) prove. From a theoretical point of view, these recent studies will bring into discussion the role played by the convergence clubs in the governance of the process, but also a new theoretical background derived from the new spatial economy. More recent studies insist to introduce in the beta and sigma-convergence models the role played by the geographical space (Bourdin 2013a; Grasland 2012), generally using the concept of functional neighborhood as a filter for economic performance. Both Grasland and Bourdin focus on the possible construction of territorial cohesion indicators based on the local or regional sigma-convergence. Our research investigates the opportunity of the introduction of specific spatial variables in the beta-convergence models (potential accessibility functions of the gdp) and how these explanatory indicators interfere with the economic accumulation at different scales (Gutiérrez 2001; Stepniak and Rosik 2013).

Data and Geometries

he dataset we use in this paper is provided by eurostat in the panel of general and regional statistics datasets. The indicators we collected T cover the period 2003–2014 and they are composed of two distinct sets of variables: the gdp at nuts3 scale for the mentioned period and the population of nuts3. The gdp indicator is expressed in millions of Euro and it is not weighted with the purchasing power index, reflecting more accurately the differences in economic performance between regions. The ratio between the gdp at nuts3 scale and the number of inhabitants allowed us to build a new set of indicators, the gdp/inhabitant, starting from 2003 and ending in 2014. In order to have access to data describing the convergence process at nuts2 and nuts1 geographical scales, we have iterated the calculation of the gdp/inhabitant for these spatial frames and conserved the results in a geo-database file. The geometries needed for the mapping and spatial analysis process were extracted from the gisco eurostat internet portal and concern the nuts3 spatial data frame for 76 • Transylvanian Review • Vol. XXVII, No. 1 (Spring 2018)

2013. Moreover, the geocoding system of the nuts3 in 2013 perfectly matches the geographical id included in the economic tables extracted from the eurostat (General and regional statistics, National accounts, esa 2010 classification).The economic data previous to 2003 and the indicators related to 2015 are incomplete and not usable for large territorial scales of analysis. Specific operations of generalization were applied in Arcmap and the results of these operations were preserved as basemaps for the implementation of the beta convergence models at nuts2 and nuts1 scale. One major limitation related to the data and geometries consists in the exclusion of Norway, Switzerland and Iceland from our analysis. The states from the Western Balkans and Albania were also excluded, as only sparse information about the economic performance is available at intermediate geographical scales. As our intention is to focus on the trends of the economic convergence in the European Union, with a special highlight on the Eastern states, the regions composing the French dom (Domaines d’Outre-Mer) were also eliminated. Finally, our study area is composed of 1340 nuts3, 272 nuts2 and 96 nuts1 regions, from 29 countries, including the fyrom. All the spatial datasets were projected from gcs etrs 1989 in Lambert Azimuthal Equal Area system of projection, in order to allow the processes of spatial analysis to be run.

Methodology

ur main intention is to identify and explain the trends of the economic catching-up process in Europe, using a beta-convergence model ap- O plied at different spatial scales, for the 2003–2014 period of time. De- spite is simplicity, the beta-convergence model is extremely difficult to implement, if the data quality is poor (Quah 1996). The basic geo-statistical form of the model can be described as an ordinary least squares regression equation, with at least two explanatory variables: aagrt-tn = b*gdpt+a*sevt +c+e, where aagrt-tn = the average annual growth rate of the indicator describing the economic performance for the period t-tn (starting year and ending year). In our case, the indicator retained in the model is the gdp/inhabitant and the starting year is 2003 or 2008, while the ending year is 2008 or 2014, as three different models of beta-convergence were implemented. The equation we used for the calculation of the aagr is: aagr = ((gdp/ inhabitant tn)/ (gdp/ inhabitant tn)ˆ(1/(tn-t))-1 gdpt = the starting level of the economic process. It is basically an indicator that describes the differences in economic performance at the starting point of the analysis, 2003 or 2008, in our case. Generally, this indicator is introduced Paradigms • 77 in the equation in a logarithmic form, in order to eliminate the non-linearity of the explanatory variable, but also in order to reduce its amplitude. Our option was to use the gdp/inhabitant in 2003 or 2008 as a predictor after a logarithmic transformation. sevt = the second explanatory variable of the convergence process. In the literature, we find a wide range of possible candidates for this indicator: stock of fdi, spatial accessibility, stock of employed personnel in branches with high added value etc. (Ben-David 1993). In the geo-statistical models we propose, we have made an option for an indicator of potential accessibility of the gdp at nuts3 scale, using a Gaussian kernel with a span of 500 km. The t moment was set for 2003 and 2008. The values were transformed using base 10 logarithms, avoiding the massive amplitude of the data (Grasland 1990). The parameters of the model (b, a and c) reflect the role played by the candidate explanatory variables in the explanation of the economic convergence process. If the sign of b (beta-convergence) is negative and significant as a parameter, we have a statistical model that accurately describes the catching-up process of the less advanced regional economies. If the sign of b is close to 0 or negative, it indicates economic divergence or instability in the studied area. The steps needed to perform the beta-convergence analysis and the working flows are organized as follows: 1. Data collection and preparation. This step was presented in the previous section (Data and Geometries). 2. Investigation of a possible association between the aagr of the gdp/inhabitant and the spatial distribution of the gdp/inhabitant, at the starting year of the analysis (2003 or 2008), for different territorial configurations (nuts0, 1, 2 and 3 levels). The method used for this investigation is the ols regression. Three different statistical models were implemented: one for the period before the economic crisis (2003–2008), one for the period of the crisis and recovery (2008–2014) and one for 2003–2014, the latter functioning as a synthetic model. This exploratory approach was needed in order to assess the role played by the configuration of the economic performance at the starting point of the analysis. The results obtained also helped us to evaluate the link between the territorial distribution of the convergence process and the spatial scales of analysis. As the statistical models were valid, we were allowed to pass to stage 3 of our research, the implementation of the beta-convergence models. 3. Before starting to implement the beta-convergence models, a choice was made for a second explanatory variable in the ols regression equation. The indicator we retained is the potential accessibility of the gdp at nuts3 level, using a Gaussian kernel with a fixed span at 500 km. The indicator was calculated for all the 1340 nuts3 units in our table, and a gis tool was devised in order to col- 78 • Transylvanian Review • Vol. XXVII, No. 1 (Spring 2018) lect the results. The gis tool is based on the Model Builder instrument in Arcgis and it is supposed to function only with Euclidean or Manhattan distances, for the moment. In a first instance, our intention was to use road-distance between the nuts3 centroids, but the maup complications due to the variable size of the nuts3 denied the use of the Network Analyst functions. Indeed, an approach to distances using a nuts3 origin-destination cost matrix would have been interesting, but, as the literature suggests, it is rather appropriate for analysis at lau2 level (Spiekermann et al. 2015; Stepniak and Rosik 2013). Recently, Grasland (2012) used a time-distance matrix at nuts3 scale in order to assess the sigma- convergence process in Eastern Europe; however, the reliability of the time- distance matrix is questionable. The mathematical model of the potential accessibility function is based on a set of starting hypotheses and the weighting of the distance matrix, according to these hypotheses. The first hypothesis deals with the role played by the distance in the evaluation of the spatial interaction between the nuts3. Canonically, the value of this parameter (p, in our model) is sed at 2, but recent studies show that this value is overestimated in areas with a good territorial transport infrastructure and its value should be substantially lower. The second hypothesis describes the relation between the cumulated volume of spatial interactions and the distance between the nuts3. Explicitly, we assume that 50% of the cumulated spatial interactions between regions occur at a distance band S of n km (500 km, in our case). One can empirically test and validate the two hypotheses by using a model of spatial interaction based on economic flows between regions. However, this set of indicators is not accessible at nuts3 scale and few attempts to model the flows at nuts2 scale are found in the literature (Rusu 2017). The formalization of the potential accessibility function in our research is: P.A.i = eα*Dijˆp, where α = ln(0.5)/S2 and Dij represents the distance between each nuts3 (i) and the other nuts3 (j). The value of p was set to 2 and the value of S is 500 km. Once this function is calculated, it provides results between 0 and 1 and it can be used as a weighting function for the gdp available in the Gaussian functional neighborhood of each nuts3 i. The weighted values of the gdp are summarized and allow us to create an indicator labelled potgdp03, an indicator that will be used for further research on the convergence process. This indicator was devised at nuts3 scale and aggregated by summing operations for superior geographical levels (nuts2 and nuts1). 4. The exploratory regressions models performed at step 2 of our methodological approach show that there is little need to observe the convergence process for the period 2008–2014, as there is evidence that it is an economically divergent period. In this case, we have focused on two distinct beta-convergence models, covering the time gap of 2003–2008 and 2003–2014. The insufficient number of spatial units available at nuts0 scale allowed us to perform our in- Paradigms • 79 vestigation only at nuts3, 2 and 1 scale. The 3 layers of analysis combined with the two distinct periods of time were automatically merged by using the model builder function in Arcmap and the ols function, available in the Spatial Statiscs Tools panel. The result is a set of six distinct ols regression equations that describes the trends of the beta-convergence process, for different territorial scales. 5. Cartographic support and spatial analysis. The results obtained from the six beta-convergence models are also interesting from the point of view of mapping and for the inherent spatial analysis process. The validation of the six ols regression models, from a statistical perspective, is incomplete. Much more in- triguing is the fact the standardized residuals of the six models are spatially auto- correlated, as the calculated Moran’s I index suggests. This aspect indicates that there are other latent variables explaining the beta-convergence process and that further research is needed (Mitchell 2005). All these steps will be largely described in the next section of our paper, together with the technical decisions that made the beta-convergence process analysis possible.

Validation of Results

he main results of our analysis are compiled in this section. As the methodological steps were largely explained in the previous part, we consid- T ered that the results we obtained must be logically organized as a function of the deployment of our methodology. In a first instance (step 1), we have collected the needed data and the geometries to be used in the evaluation of the relation between the territorial scale and the process of economic convergence. As we mentioned, the lack of data for Norway, Switzerland and the states of the Western Balkans is a major problem for the calculation of the potential accessibility of the gdp in a Gaussian kernel of 500 km, affecting the reliability of the indicator for the countries in the vicinity of the missing data area (e.g. France, Germany, Italy, Sweden, Greece, Croatia, Bulgaria, or Hungary). The results obtained at step 3 are only partially reliable. In a second instance, we have investigated the statistical association between the aarg for each nuts3 and the starting level of economic performance, as described by the gdp/inhabitant at time t, where t is 2003 or 2008. Three periods were covered (2003–2008, 2008–2014 and 2003–2014) by our ols analysis, each period being declined as a function of the territorial frame of economic convergence manifestation (nuts0, 1, 2 and 3). 80 • Transylvanian Review • Vol. XXVII, No. 1 (Spring 2018)

Table 1. Coefficients and results of the ols Regression Models of partial beta-convergence for 2003–2008, 2008–2014 and 2003–2014, for each geographical scale of analysis

nuts0 nuts 1 nuts 2 nuts 3 Inter- Inter- Inter- Inter- Time ols R2 Slope cept R2 Slope cept R2 Slope cept R2 Slope cept 2003– V1 .6347 -.1047 .512 .7425 -.1336 .6232 .6993 -.1259 .587 .6687 -.1163 .54 2008 2008– V2 .0599 -.0139 .0693 .0071 -.0335 .0335 .0003 .0013 .0009 .0004 .0014 .0037 2014 2003– V3 .5885 -.0523 .2564 .6446 -.0607 .2872 .5515 -.0549 .2599 .5146 -.0501 .2386 2014

Source: author’s own calculations.

The formalization of the ols models in this part generally ignores the validation of the coefficients slope and intercept because it is supposed to provide only a superficial vision on the role played both by scale and economic cycles in the process of convergence. The y1, 2 and 3 labels in the ols column of the table represent the explained variable that is formalized as the annual average rhythm of growth of the gdp/inhabitant for 2003–2008 (y1), 2008–2014 (y2) and 2003–2014 (y3) (see the Methodology section). The explanatory variable is the gdp/inhabitant in 2003 and 2008, transformed in 10 base logarithm. Each model and its descriptors (R2, slope and intercept) were included in the table. The ols regression model for the 2008–2014 period of time is particularly important, showing that this interval is characterized by economic divergence or instability, regardless of the scale of analysis (nuts0 to nuts3). The slope of the regression line is negative or close to 0 and it indicates that the starting level of the analysis (gdp/inhabitant in 2008) is no longer relevant to explain the rhythm of economic growth or decline for the 2008–2014 period. According to the synthetic table, the nuts1 territorial scale is the most appropriate frame to analyze the process of economic convergence, as a function of the starting level of economic performance. At nuts2 scale, the coefficient of determination (R2) between the aagr and the logarithmic values of the gdp/ inhabitant (2003) drops to 0.69, compared to 0.74 at nuts1 level, and it will decrease even more, if the analysis is implemented at nuts3 scale (0.66). The same trend might be observed also for the coefficient of the slope. The set of the ols we calculated for step 2 indicates that the beta-convergence model is an option to be considered, when analyzing the rhythm of the economic catching-up process in Europe. Both the coefficients of determination R2 and the slopes of Paradigms • 81 the regression lines corroborate the idea that the annual average growth rhythm of the gdp per inhabitant is conditioned by the starting level of economic performance in 2003. In this case, we have proceeded further in our research and we devised a more sophisticated model of economic beta-convergence, that will take into account not only the starting level of economic performance in 2003, but also the geographical position of the spatial units included in the analysis, more specifically the potential accessibility of the gdp, in a Gaussian kernel with a 500 km span. The implementation of step 3 of our methodology demanded a more technically-oriented approach. In a first instance, we devised a distance matrix between the centroids of the nuts3 included in our database. The only option for the development of this matrix was the use of Euclidean distances, based on the latitude and longitude coordinates of the nuts3 centroids. The resulting table of distances was obtained through the implementation of the Point Distance function, from the Arcmap Toolbox Proximity Tolls (Analysis Tools panel). Once the distance matrix was created, the nest steps consisted in a join and relate operation, based on a common case field (the geographical identifier of the destination nuts3). The indicators that we joined in the distance matrix are the gdp in 2003 and 2008 (expressed in millions of euro), at nuts3 scale. Finally, these two variables were weighted using a distance function based on a Gaussian kernel approach (explained in step 3, the Methodology section). As the distance matrix was populated with economic performance indicators, we have managed to summarize the results in the form of a new variable called potential accessibility of gdp in 2003, labelled potgdp03. In the tables we used for the beta-convergence analysis, this indicator was transformed using base 10 logarithms. The missing data for the mentioned states (Norway, Switzerland, countries in the Western Balkans etc.) make the results questionable for all the neighboring states of the missing data area, but not only. However, taking into account the results obtained after the implementation of step 4 of our analysis, the major key findings might be independent of the quality of the statistical data. In order to complete the methodological approach, we have developed an analytical frame that encompasses the possible trends of economic convergence at nuts1, 2 and 3 scales. This frame is based on the results of six ols regression models, formalized as follows: y1 = b1*X03+a1*1potgdp03+c1+e1 y2 = b2*X03+a2*potgdp03+c2+e2, where: y1 = average annual rhythm of growth for 2003–2008, the indicator taken into account being the gdp/inhabitant (aarg_2003–2008); 82 • Transylvanian Review • Vol. XXVII, No. 1 (Spring 2018)

y2 = average annual rhythm of growth for 2003–2014, the indicator taken into account being the gdp/inhabitant (aarg_2003–2014); X03 = the gdp/inhabitant in 2003, expressed in logarithmic values (base10); potgdp03 = the potential accessibility of the gdp in 2003 (billions of Euro) and expressed in logarithmic values (base10); c1,2 = the intercept of the Y axis for each model; e1, e2 = standard error of the model residuals. The two ols regression models were iterated for all the available analysis scales in our database, meaning nuts1, 2 and 3. Minor modifications in the Arcgis Model builder (entry data, output results etc.) allowed us to automatically have access to the model coefficients and the main results. Two major observations might be derived from the analysis of these results. The first one suggests that approaches focused on infra-continental scales are not reliable. For example, if one follows the beta convergence process only at the scale of Eastern Europe, unstable results will be provided (a low R2, low values of the regressions coefficients or high p-values associated with the slope coefficients (>5%). Consequently, the beta-convergence models implemented at the scale of large economic and political unions are much more reliable, from a statistical point of view. The second point of interest is a matter of the geographical scale of analysis. As the implementation of step 2 of our methodology suggests that the proper scale of investigation of the economic catching-up process is the nuts1 frame (Y=aarg and X = gdp/ inhabitant in 2003—logarithmic values), adding a second variable in the explanatory model will bias the statistical efficiency of the model at exactly this scale. An R2 of 0.94 (in 2003–2008) or 0.97 (2003– 2014) for the beta-convergence ols model at nuts1 scale is high only because it is a statistical artefact. As a matter of fact, the role played by the potential accessibility of gdp in 2003 (Potgdp2003 indicator) is almost null, as the p-values of the slope coefficient suggest. With lower but significant coefficients of determination, the beta-convergence models for the nuts2 and nuts3 scales are more reliable. Additionally, the normal distribution of the residuals for 2003–2014, at nuts1 scale, is violated and the histogram of the residuals is rather bi-modal. For both periods of time (2003–2008 and 2003–2014), the beta-convergence ols equations firmly indicate that the appropriate scale of analysis of the economic catching-up process is rather appropriate for the nuts2 frame, when using two explanatory variables: the starting level of economic performance in 2003 and the potential accessibility of the gdp in 2003. Paradigms • 83

Table 2. Coefficients and results of the ols Regression Models of beta-convergence for 2003–2008 and 2003–2014, for each geographical scale of analysis

Coefficients (2003–2008) Models: R2 b a c p_b p_a ols1 nuts1 .945 -.058 -.001 -.570 .000 .475 ols2 nuts2 .700 -.132 .005 .593 .000 .070 ols3 nuts3 .681 -.131 .012 .566 .000 .000 Coefficients (2003–2014) Models: R2 b a c p_b p_a ols1 nuts1 .970 -.218 .333 .352 .000 .000 ols2 nuts2 .587 -.064 .008 .270 .000 .000 ols3 nuts3 .552 -.062 .010 .261 .000 .000

Source: author’s own calculations.

The coefficients and the labels in the table must be read as follows: 2003–2008 = the pre-crisis period; 2003—2014 = the post-crisis and recovery period; R2 = adjusted coefficient of determination for the ols models describing the beta-convergence process, both for the 2003–2008 and 2003–2014 period and for each scale (6 models).; B = coefficient describing the role played by the economic starting level of the spatial units in 2003. The indicator used to investigate this role is the gdp/ inhabitant in logarithmic values; A = coefficient describing the role played by the potential accessibility of the gdp in a Gaussian kernel with 500 km span nuts3 level in 2003 and logarithmic values; C = intercept in the regression models, for each geographical scale and for each period; p_b = probability that the coefficients attached to the explanatory variables are close to 0. Low values of this probability index mean that the coefficients are reliable and relevant; p_a = probability that the coefficients attached to the explanatory variables are close to 0. Low values of this probability index mean that the coefficients are reliable and relevant. The six models we implemented show that the process of economic convergence is scale dependent. With the exception of the ols no.1 and no. 4 (nuts1 scale), the four remaining models are acceptable, from a statistical point of view, 84 • Transylvanian Review • Vol. XXVII, No. 1 (Spring 2018) but far from perfect. As a matter of fact, according to the adjusted coefficient of determination R2, the best scale to capture the trends of the beta-convergence is the regional nuts2 frame and the models work better for periods with clear spatial patterns of economic growth, like the 2003–2008 period of time. When we include the crisis years in the analysis, we observe a drop in the performance of the model, an aspect that is also corroborated by the decrease in intensity of the coefficients describing the role played by the starting level of economic performance (gdp/inhabitant in 2003, logarithmic values). The sign of these coefficients (b in the table) is constantly negative, indicating that beta convergence is a functional process. The second variable we took into account is the potential accessibility of the gdp in 2003. Its sign is positive and it suggests that the potential of spatial interaction had an economic impact, in terms of growth. However, the values of the a coefficient are larger at nuts3 scale, meaning that the local level of geographical analysis is more sensitive to the economic context or its functional neighborhood. Before passing to point 5 in our methodological approach, we performed a final check on the residuals of the 6 models, testing them for spatial autocorrelation. From a canonical statistical point of view, this test is not necessary, as long as the other criteria of the model’s performance are respected. From a geo- statistical point of view, this step is crucial in order to detect the agglomerative process of economic over-performance based on spatial proximity. Detecting the spatial autocorrelation of the residuals has two consequences:

Table 3. Incremental spatial autocorrelation index (Moran’s I) of the Standardized Residuals

nuts3 nuts2 Distance (km) Moran‘s I Moran‘s I Distance (km) Moran‘s I Moran‘s I nuts3 2003–2008 2003–2014 nuts3 2003–2008 2003–2014 p value 532 .311 .131 1.500 .087 .019 .006 572 .290 .115 1.605 .076 .020 .004 612 .272 .105 1.711 .067 .017 .010 652 .255 .095 1.816 .057 .014 .021 692 .238 .090 1.922 .046 .008 .136 732 .223 .085 2.027 .040 .005 .265 772 .208 .084 2.133 .033 .002 .452 812 .194 .082 2.238 .027 .001 .542 852 .183 .079 2.343 .023 .000 .622 892 .173 .077 2.449 0.021 .001 .513

Note: Italic values are significant for a p<.05. Source: author’s own calculations. Paradigms • 85

1) A lack of stationary explanatory variables. Both the gdp/inhabitant in 2003 and the potential accessibility play different roles in different parts of the continent. If one notices agglomerations of positive residuals based on proximity, she/he might suspect the apparition of regional clubs of economic performance and convergence. 2) The models are incomplete. There are other explanatory variables at stake, both economic and spatial. However, this consequence is already suggested by the explanatory quality of the models described by R2. The method we used to test the residuals for spatial association is the classic Moran’s I index, with incremental distance bands. As the size of nuts3 and nuts2 is different, the distance bands also differ. The calculated values for the 4 sets of residuals are statistically significant, except for the ones described in the nuts2 column Moran’s I 2003–2008 and explained in the table’s legend. The residuals depict spatial autocorrelation, emphasizing the fact that latent variables might also be introduced in the ols beta-convergence models. The effect of spatial association is larger at nuts3 scale than nuts2 scale and shows a decreasing trend for the 2003–2014 period, indicating possible readjustments of the local and regional economic performance in Europe during the crisis (Fig. 1). The maps depicting the spatial distribution of the residuals on the short term in the convergence period (2003–2008) and on the long term (2003–2014) clearly suggest that the states of Eastern Europe are clearly included in a catching-up process of economic accumulation. This aspect is extremely visible in the 2003–2008 period of time, with three major exceptions: fyrom, Bulgaria, and Hungary. In Hungary, for example, only the nuts3 of the Budapest metropolitan area and the Komárom region are economically over-performing, all the other spatial units being placed in situations of under-performance, according to their gdp/inhabitant in 2003 and their potential for economic and spatial interaction. The case of Bulgaria is simpler. A concentric gradient of decreasing economic performance and accumulation is centered on Sofia, only 2 nuts3 escaping from this spatial regularity—Varna and Ruse, the first one being a confirmed metropolitan region (Groza and Rey 2008), the last one profiting from its economic extroversion near the Romanian border. The situation of the fyrom is illustrative for the destiny of countries placed in a bizarre geographical position of ‘entre-deux’ (Rey et al. 2004). Only the capital region of Skopje partially escapes the general under-performance rule that governs the area. At the opposite end, countries like Romania, Slovakia and the Baltic States are in a clear situation of over-performance concerning the average annual rhythm of growth of the gdp/inhabitant. However, in Romania, this over- performance is marked by the West-East opposition of the spatial units and complicated by the presence of metropolitan areas in nuts3 like Iaºi, Dolj, Galaþi Fig. 1. Spatial distribution of the Standardized Residuals of the ols Regression Models at nuts3 scale (2003–2008 and 2003–2014)

Legend Results of the ols model nuts3 (2003–2008) Standardized Residuals < -2.5 Std. Dev. -2.5 – -1.5 Std. Dev. -1.5 – -0.50 Std. Dev. -0.50 – 0.50 Std. Dev. 0.50 – 1.5 Std. Dev. 1.5 – 2.5 Std. Dev. > 2.5 Std. Dev. No data Legend Results of the ols model nuts3 (2003–2014) Standardized Residuals < -2.5 Std. Dev. -2.5 – -1.5 Std. Dev. -1.5 – -0.50 Std. Dev. -0.50 – 0.50 Std. Dev. 0.50 – 1.5 Std. Dev. > 1.5 Std. Dev. No data 88 • Transylvanian Review • Vol. XXVII, No. 1 (Spring 2018) or Constanþa. In Slovakia, the distribution of the positive residuals is also subject to a core-periphery logic, with Bratislava capital region in an advanced position. The Baltic States are generally included in a larger region with high rhythms of gdp/inhabitant growth and with few territorial differences, at national scale. The case of Poland is also interesting. In the 2003–2008 period, the Polish nuts3 shows a residual distribution that is generally close to the area of confidence of the model, but with a different pattern for the metropolitan areas of Warsaw and Wrocław. The same configuration is visible in the Czech Republic, with peaks of over-performance on the Prague-Brno axis (Fig. 2). On the long term (2003–2014), the situation seems to be stable, with the notable exception of countries that recover a positive and higher annual average rhythm of growth, after the crisis and during the recovery period. It is generally the case of some Western European states like France, Italy, or Great Britain. The situation of the Eastern European countries does not change too much, the patterns of over- or under-performance being almost identical to the pre-crisis period. However, in some of these states the dynamic territories previously described are defined by the new spatial distribution of standardized residuals. When we change the analysis scale from nuts3 to nuts2, we can easily identify the shifts in the trends of economic convergence, at continental scale. In the 2003–2014 period, few nuts2 regions remain in the cartographic classes of over-performance for their average annual rhythm of growth of the gdp/inhabitant. The nuts2 in Eastern Europe at least stick to the beta-convergence model, but the spectacular positive residuals observed on the nuts3 maps are now much lower. The logical conclusion is that the effects of the economic crisis and recovery period are scale-dependent. A focus on the local level of analysis (nuts3) shows that the economic accumulation period of 2003–2008 still has an impact on the process of convergence, despite the severity of the financial crisis. The aggregation of data at nuts2 level makes the economic effort of inter-regional catching-up extremely fragile.

Conclusions

his section is dedicated to the conclusions and it addresses the scientific key-findings observed during the research process and the policy recom- T mendation derived from the relevant scientific observations. First, as a general conclusion, we should mention that the main goal of our investigation was fulfilled. More specifically, we have found that the beta-convergence process affecting the European spatial units is a scale-dependent process, the results of Paradigms • 89 the models we implemented being affected by the geographical reference frame of the data. At the same time, we have observed that spatially aggregated indicators, such as the potential accessibility of the gdp, present a limited impact on the economic convergence process and this impact is also scale-dependent. A test concerning the aggregation of nuts3 in pseudo-nuts2 (Grasland 2012; Bourdin 2013a) was also implemented, but the high heterogeneity of data denied its feasibility. In this case, we considered it necessary to highlight only the most important results of our research in a paragraph dedicated to the synthetic key-findings: a) the beta-convergence models are solid enough to describe the economic trends of the European spatial units, excepting the nuts1 scale. The nuts0 scale was not analyzed due to an insufficient number of spatial units; b) if we focus our analysis on the nuts3 scale, the period 2003–2008 might be somehow considered as the ‘golden era’ of regional economic convergence in Europe, even if the rhythms of participation in this process are unequally distrib- uted, both in the Eastern and the Western states; c) the ols models describing the beta-convergence process are more effective at nuts2 scale than nuts3 or nuts1 scale, suggesting that this level of policy and decision interventions is still reliable in the implementation of the eu territorial policies; d) the starting level in the economic convergence process plays un undeniable role, the poor regions showing higher rhythms of economic growth than the rich ones. But, despite the high values of the aarg, the economic cohesion or a spectacular reduction of the disparities is not possible on the short term; e) the potential accessibility of the gdp in a Gaussian kernel of 500 km span is a factor of convergence mostly at nuts3 scale, losing its importance at nuts2 and nuts1. Despite the low values of its coefficients in the ols models at nuts3, its cumulative role and impact on the average annual rhythm of growth might not be an aspect to neglect on the long term; f) the distribution of the positive residuals of the models at nuts3 scale and the spatial autocorrelation coefficient suggest the crystallization of infra-national clubs of economic over-performance, both for the 2003–2008 and the 2003– 2014 periods. q Fig. 2. Spatial distribution of the Standardized Residuals of the ols Regression Models at nuts2 scale (2003–2008 and 2003–2014)

Legend Results of the ols model nuts2 (2003–2008) Standardized Residuals < -2.5 Std. Dev. -2.5 – -1.5 Std. Dev. -1.5 – -0.50 Std. Dev. -0.50 – 0.50 Std. Dev. 0.50 – 1.5 Std. Dev. 1.5 – 2.5 Std. Dev. > 2.5 Std. Dev. No data Legend Results of the ols model nuts2 (2003–2014) Standardized Residuals < -1.5 Std. Dev. -1.5 – -0.50 Std. Dev. -0.50 – 0.50 Std. Dev. 0.50 – 1.5 Std. Dev. 1.5 – 2.5 Std. Dev. > 2.5 Std. Dev. No data 92 • Transylvanian Review • Vol. XXVII, No. 1 (Spring 2018)

References

Ben-David, D. (1993). “Equalizing Exchange: Trade Liberalization and Income Con- vergence.” Quarterly Journal of Economics 108, 3: 653–679. Bourdin, S. (2013a). “Une mesure spatiale locale de la sigma-convergence pour évalu- er les disparités régionales dans l’Union européenne.” Région et Développement 37: 179–196. ——. (2013b). “Vers une réduction des inégalités régionales dans l’Union européenne ? Une approche multiscalaire des trajectoires de convergence.” asrdlf, Appel à communication. Available at http://www.asrdlf2013.org/img/pdf/C_-_Bourdin_-_Vers_ une_reduction_des_inegalites_regionales_dans_l_Union_europeenne_Une_ap- proche_multiscalaire_des_trajectoires_de_convergence.pdf. Accessed 5 September 2017. Dao, Q. H., C. P. Plagnat, and V. Rousseaux. (2013). “Sigma-convergence as a Measure of Territorial Cohesion.” In Science in Support of European Territorial Development and Cohesion, 32–37. Luxembourg: espon. Grasland, C. (1990). “Potentiel de population, interaction spatiale et frontières: des deux Allemagnes à l’unification.” Espace géographique 19–20, 3: 243–254. ——. (2012). “Transformation of Regional Indicators with Functional Neighbour- hood.” Presentation. espon Open Seminar, Aalborg, Denmark, 13–14 June. Groza, O. and V. Rey. (2008). “Bulgarie et Roumanie, une affaire d’européanisation.” Espace Géographique 37, 4: 289–296. Gutiérrez, J. (2001). “Location, economic potential and daily accessibility: an analysis of the accessibility impact of the high-speed line Madrid–Barcelona–French Bor- der.” Journal of Transport Geography 9, 4: 229–242. Mitchell, A. (2005). The esri Guide to gis Analysis. Volume 2: Spatial Measurements and Statistics. Redlands, Calif.: esri Press. Monfort, P. (2008). “Convergence of eu regions: Measures and evolution.” European Union Regional Policy Paper No. 01, Brussels. Neven, D. and C. Gouyette. (1995). “Regional Convergence in the European Commu- nity.” Journal of Common Market Studies 33, 1: 47–65. Quah, D. T. (1996). “Empirics for economic growth and convergence.” European Eco- nomic Review 40, 6: 1353–1375. Rey V., E. Boulineau, and L. Coudroy De Lille. (2004). L’élargissement de l’Union euro- péenne: réformes territoriales en Europe centrale et orientale. Paris: L’Harmattan. Rusu, A. (2017). “La mise en contexte géographique des disparités économiques entre les régions de l’Europe de l’Est—la construction d’une typologie des trajectoires de la divergence basée sur le voisinage fonctionnel.” 15th Conference ersa-gr, Ath- ens (Greece) 5–7 July 2017. Available at http://asrdlf2017.com/asrdlf2017_com/en- voitextefinal/auteur/textedef/296.pdf. Accessed on 5 September 2017. Sala-i-Martín, X. (1996). “Regional cohesion: evidence and theories of regional growth and convergence.” European Economic Review 40, 6: 1325–1352. Paradigms • 93

Solow, R. (1956). “A Contribution to the Theory of Economic Growth.” Quarterly Journal of Economics 70, 1 (Feb.): 65–94. Spiekermann, K. et al. (2015). tracc Transport Accessibility at Regional/Local Scale and Patterns in Europe: Applied Research 2013/1/10. Final Report/Version 06/02/2015. 4 vols. Luxembourg: espon. Available at https://www.espon.eu/sites/default/files/attachments/tracc_fr_Volume1_ExS-MainReport.pdf. Accessed on 7 September 2017. Stepniak, M. and P. Rosik. (2013). “Accessibility improvement, territorial cohesion and spillovers: a multidimensional evaluation of two motorway sections in Poland.” Journal of Transport Geography 31 (July): 154–163. Stiglitz, J. E., A. Sen, and J.-P. Fitoussi. (2009). Report of the Commission on the Measu rement of Economic Performance and Social Progress. Available at http://ec.europa.eu/ eurostat/documents/118025/118123/Fitoussi+Commission+report. Accessed 7 Sep- tember 2017.

Abstract Territorial Data Aggregation and Trends of Regional Economic Convergence in Europe: A Geo-statistical Analysis for the 2003–2014 Period

As the majority of studies and reports highlight, during the 2001–2013 period the Eastern eu states showed accelerated rhythms of economic convergence. The general conclusion stays that as the economic performance of the Eastern eu countries approaches that of the Western eu states, the level of internal disparities also increases, indicating that the trends of convergence might be affected by the territorial context of data aggregation and specific processes of economic accumulation at each nuts scale. This paper analyzes how the territorial scale of data aggregation can explain different intensities of the economic convergence, in a flexible multi-scalar approach to the indicators. A top-down descriptive approach is employed, starting with the national level and con- tinuing to the nuts3 spatial frame of data modeling, estimating how the trends of the convergence process are shifting when the scale of analysis is modified.

Keywords beta-convergence, potential accessibility, economic crisis, scale sensitivity, espon Space Urban and Regional Competitiveness in the North-West Region M e l a n i a -G a b r i e l a C i o t of Romania

“Cities need places, European Integration and Regional Competitiveness: not spaces.” New Challenges

n today’s interconnected and globalized world it is more and more I difficult to operate with dedicated concepts, because now the European citizen has to feel, in a concrete manner, the benefits of eu membership. We are living a period of transformation at eu level, in which Member States will have to negotiate constantly their position and future. Until now, in the European discourse we could hear, and we became accustomed to this approach, of competition between cities, regions and Member States. But now the paradigm is different: all these entities will have to collaborate on specific projects, at national, regional and Melania-Gabriela Ciot local level. But the main challenge for Associate professor at the Faculty of Eu- the topic that we will bring into dis- ropean Studies, Babeº-Bolyai University, cussion is the possibility to approach Cluj-Napoca. Author, among others, of a policy domain at European and local the book Negotiation and Foreign Poli- level, and here we are speaking about cy Decision Making (2014). urban policies. Paradigms • 95

The idea of writing this article comes from our past interest in the topic of competitiveness, regional competitiveness, and its expressions in our region, Transylvania, but also from our interest in trying to find a frame or a way to go for our local community and region in this transformational or revolutionary period that the European Union is going through, and to express a constructive and evolutionary view regarding the development and modernization of our local community and region at a time when we, the Romanians, are celebrating 100 years of Romanian unity. Throughout this article, we will try to find some answers to the questions that each European citizen is asking: What is the way forward for my community? What is the way forward for me? Being an expert in European affairs, we will try to provide some scientific answers from this point of view, taking into consideration, as a basis for our proposals, our cultural local background, appealing to the public local consciousness, as it happened when the journal Gândirea, with Lucian Blaga and the others from Cluj, supported the concept of European integration. As Professor Vasile Puºcaº mentioned, “the work of Lucian Blaga is . . . from the point of view of culture and doctrine, one of the deepest and smartest guides for Romania’s integration in Europe.”1 Referring to the same topic, of Transylvania’s integration in the eu, the abovementioned author said that:

In today’s globalized world it is more difficult to operate with the concepts used by Ratzel, such as Mittelpunkt. Of course, for us, who are living in this region, the Mittelpunkt is Transylvania. But, before we could see it in the integrated European construction of tomorrow, it will be better to find its own matrix in the integration on which Romanian state is building its identity as a member of the European Union. Otherwise, only a partial valorization of the local and regional potential will be achieved, which will demonstrate the lack of willingness and of the abilities to function/operate in today’s and tomorrow’s world.2

Urban Competitiveness in the eu

t the beginning of this article, we were speaking about the necessity of creating a framework, in which local authorities could define their own A objectives, projects and actions. But this has to take into account the present context: “What we are about to live, is, without a doubt, a change of world order . . . Our constant answer must be to civilize this globalization by all means and to anchor our actions in a Europe which becomes more and more in- dispensable.”3 One good example of European reconstruction discourse belongs 96 • Transylvanian Review • Vol. XXVII, No. 1 (Spring 2018) to the newly elected French President, Emmanuel Macron, who provided some of the guiding lines for the eu’s reform. These ideas generated intense debates across the eu during 2016–2017. The important ideas are: • the European project was based on three promises: peace, prosperity and liberty. To us, Europeans, these promises seemed betrayed and fragile; • the eu seems to languish, in the sense of experiencing an exhaustion of ideas and methods: “A broken world and reality system”;4 • “The founding fathers of Europe believed that policy could follow the economy and that a European state could be born from a single market and cur- rency. . . . reality has scattered this illusion. Political Europe did not appear. Or it has been even weakened, by our collective guilt”;5 • the eu is weakened because of the: weak eu leadership, weak organization and functioning of the European Commission, the loss of the vision for procedures, confusion between the end (a European Union) and the means (technical, monetary, juridical, institutional) through which it is realized,6 the lack of a real control over European policies (the options of European leaders, the habits of their administrations, the proliferation of rules, the insufficient application of the principle of subsidiarity), the incapacity of European institutions for intro- spection and of real defense of the values which underlie Europe;7 • the eu loses its power once it accepts its disintegration because of the lack of visionary conformism;8 • Europe needs to be revived: “The desire for Europe must be revived. For the project of peace, reconciliation, development. Nothing is more difficult to define, but a project quicly becomes what everyone believes about it”;9 • the eu will be the frame which will allow us to find the correct place and protection in the context of globalization10—the principle of reforming the eu. The latest Global Competitiveness Report 2016–2017 begins with the same description of the international context: “time of rising income inequality, mount- ing social and political tensions, and a general feeling of uncertainty about the future,”11 in which citizens and communities will have to see the positive elements, by using the pro-active approaches, “one of the most prosperous and peaceful times in recorded history, with less disease, poverty, and violent conflict than ever before. Against this backdrop of seeming contradictions, the Fourth Industrial Revolution brings both unprecedented opportunity and an accelerated speed of change.”12 The term competitiveness has to be understood in the light of the new international context, also shaped by the main event of 2016, Brexit. The Fourth Industrial Revolution is based on the digital platform and it is characterized by a “convergence of technologies that is blurring the lines between the physical, Paradigms • 97 digital, and biological spheres.”13 New ways towards prosperity, growth and development will be designed by artificial intelligence, biotechnology, the Inter- net of Things, robotics, 3D printing, and this will have also an impact at social level.14 That is why competitiveness needs a reform that will be based on innovation. Practically, we are living a transformation, with a historic dimension in terms of size, speed and scope, a “transition to new systems that are being built on the infrastructure of the digital revolution.”15 Professor Xavier Sala-i-Martín16 identified five directions to measure competitiveness in the years of the Fourth Industrial Revolution: • productivity, as a key driver of prosperity: “Prosperity can increase only if inputs of production are used in smarter and more efficient ways to fulfill constantly the evolution of human demands”;17 • a future orientation is central—the successful economies will have to be ag- ile, adaptive to changes and reactive to shocks in a smooth and speedy manner;18 • the meaning of innovation is being updated—the new way of approaching innovation has do with a country’s ability to bring new products and services to market and with a balanced importance given to technical and non-technical inventions. In order to be innovative, a country should “provide a networked, connected environment that promotes creativity and entrepreneurship, fosters collaboration, and rewards individuals who are open-minded and embrace new ways to perform tasks”;19 • ict infrastructure is an imperative—the transition to the digital economy is a must and that is why certain reforms have to be done for pillars like technology adoption, business agility, and innovation capacity;20 • the world is more leveled that it used to be—“a country’s priorities evolve as it develops, with infrastructure, institutions, macroeconomic stability, and basic health and education more important for lower-income countries and innovation and business sophistication more important for higher-income countries.”21 Each country will define its own policy priorities. Regarding European competitiveness, the latest report is dated 201422 and the approaches took into account the international factors and context of that time, which are outdated for the purposes of the present article. This also underlines the decline in the eu’s interest for global competition and its focus on short-term objectives. Instead, we will refer to another important report, drawn up in 2016 by the European Investment Bank, Restoring eu Competitiveness.23 The European context is also defined by the new challenges, to which we will re- ply with increased competitiveness, in order to assure productivity, employment and prosperity. We can support the answers to these new challenges through: • deeper European market integration; • further cohesion and convergence; 98 • Transylvanian Review • Vol. XXVII, No. 1 (Spring 2018)

• strengthening and developing markets; • stepping up efforts for a stronger and more competitive Europe.24 The eu’s competitiveness drivers are: • openness; • innovation; • skills development; • free movement of goods and services, labour, and capital.25 Other important findings of this study, which could be used as guidelines for a future framing of eu competitiveness, are: • eu firms trail behind in their capacity to innovate and absorb new technologies and know-how; • young, innovative and modernising firms face financial constraints in the eu; • Europe’s infrastructure is increasingly unfit to provide the foundations for eu competitiveness; • public policy can foster competitiveness by addressing market inefficiencies; • restoring eu competitiveness.26 According to the abovementioned report, European competitiveness depends on the capacity of companies to adapt and to change through innovation and to support it financially, through long-term investments in human capital and strategic infrastructure, and an appropriate framework of competitive markets and institutions.27 European competitiveness should be supported by way of financial means, provided by the European Investment Bank, the European Commission, and other European entities. European integration is one of the ways to assure European competitiveness, and it could be realized by implementing European policies at national and local level. Regional policy is one efficient instrument which supports economic growth, sustainable development, business competitiveness, and improves the quality of life for European citizens.28 The relation between cohesion and regional policies and regionalism is linked with the way in which the eu interacts in relation to regional identity issues. The aspiration of creating a Europe of regions isn’t always shared by Member States willing to keep their own national identity. But the European Commission is providing a good alternative with the option of partnerships with subnational partners, aiming to increase cohesion.29 The eu is addressing specific needs and supports certain categories of cities and regions and communities. Over two-thirds of the eu’s population are living in Europe’s urban areas, which are “the engines of the European economy and act as catalysts for creativity and innovation throughout the Union.”30 Urban competitiveness was described in a “classical” manner from the per- pective of the following elements: Paradigms • 99

• knowledge and innovation; • entrepreneurship; • labour market; • transforming economy.31 If we take into account the latest definition of the concept, then we have to underline that it “can be defined as the demonstrated ability of cities to attract capital, business, talent and visitors (The Economist 2012): those cities that become more globally linked and responsive to the competitive needs of business will attract investment and jobs while those that do not will decline (Rondinelli et al. 1998).”32 Urban development could be achieved only through an integrated approach and a strong partnership between local citizens, civil society, industry and various levels of government.33 The objectives for 2014–2020 of the regional policy for European cities aim at: • investment priorities through the European Regional Development Fund (erdf), supporting sustainable urban mobility, deprived communities, improved research and innovation capacity; • a minimum 5% of the erdf, in each Member State, is directed to local authorities for integrated sustainable urban development; • innovative actions will provide 371 million euro in the framework of sustainable urban development; • an urban development network will be created in order to review the use of European funds and boost the sharing of knowledge between cities involved in integrated sustainable urban development and in Urban Innovative Actions; • urbact III programme acts as a European exchange and learning program promoting sustainable urban development.34 The urban dimension of the eu has an integrated and coordinated approach— the eu Urban Agenda, which tries to improve the quality of life and bring prosperity to European citizens. This method will use the growth potential of cities, will address the social challenges and will promote cooperation and collaboration between cities, regions, Member States in order to stimulate growth, liv- ability and innovation in the cities of Europe.35 In a study released in December 2016, the Committee of the Regions36 found that in all Member States urban policies are less represented, even though two-thirds of the eu’s population live in the cities. Most Member States give a lot of attention to regional development, granting regional administration the freedom of self-government, without a specific interest in city or urban areas. One important conclusion of the report was that current administrative structures do not adequately respond to changes caused by global challenges and that the urban policy does not support a sustainable and integrated approach. That 100 • Transylvanian Review • Vol. XXVII, No. 1 (Spring 2018) is why at eu level is needed a combination of top-down and bottom-up policies which better serve the integrated approach. Another conclusion of the study is that the new eu Urban Agenda will have to address the most pressing urban challenges, by respecting the contextual differences of cities and urban areas, seeking homogeneous key parameters to pressing challenges across Europe and empowering cities and urban authorities to follow their own individual integrated approach to climate change and social and demographic change.37 Anther important conclusion to be taken into consideration states that the growth impact of urban areas is based on four business cases (and a horizontal one) built around the most important policies with the highest impact at local level: • urban economy (policies: culture, public amenities, ict networks education, rtdi, business development); • resource efficiency (policies: public procurement, zoning and land use, waste and water management, urban transport, energy efficiency, education); • social fabric (policies: education, housing, health and social care, social security); • transport is considered to be a transversal theme for urban areas; • modern urban governance is understood in a broad sense as the capacity to administer and govern the urban territory through cross-sectoral coordination implementing participatory approaches and more open forms of government in order to attract the interest of a diverse society.38 Urban growth will depend on the ability of urban economies to shape new development paths and one of the major approaches in this sense is smart spe- cialisation.39 Special attention should be given to European Innovation Partner- ships (eips), which is challenge-driven for research and innovation and focuses on societal benefits and the modernisation of the associated sectors and markets, by bringing together relevant actors at eu, national and regional levels. The smart urban technologies can contribute to the sustainable development of Eu- ropean cities. We mention in this context the Smart Cities and Communities eip (scc), which includes the areas of energy, transport and information and communication and focuses on industry-led innovation, by promoting actions across the innovation cycle and different sectors.40 The main important guideline for European integration which the eu Urban Agenda provides is the consideration of the main eu policies and their urban dimension, which we outline in the following synthetic table: Paradigms • 101

Table 1. eu policies and their urban dimension eu policies Urban dimension Agriculture, fisheries and food Food industries are often concentrated in/around agglomerati- on areas. Cities are the main markets for food products. Urban lifestyles and habits are crucial for trends in production (and thus for the energy consumption of the sector). Business The service sector has been the driver for job growth. It is concentrated in urban areas. Climate action Cities present manifold options for economies of scale in climate action through sustainable transport and energy efficiency of buildings, on the one hand, and, on the other, by capacity building, awareness raising and exchanging knowledge and good practices in order to ensure effective adaptation strategies.

Cohesion policy Strengthened urban dimension in esif period 2014–2020. Cultural policy European capital of culture as a driver of urban development and growth. Economy, finance and tax The sector has been the driver for job growth and is concentrated in urban areas. Employment and social rights Growth of employment concentrated in urban areas Urban poverty in Western Europe; most diverse social fabric in urban areas. Energy and natural resources Health and environment protection are essential policy elements but these are also sectors that have contributed and will continue to contribute to sustained economic growth. Environment, consumer Health and environment protection are essential policy ele- protection and health ments but these are also sectors that have contributed and will continue to contribute to sustained economic growth. External relations Cities are hubs in trade and major targets for migration, etc. and foreign affairs External relations are thus vital for larger conurbations. A second aspect is that the transfer of knowhow and practices of sustainable development is crucial, given the global developments in urbanisation with their numerous adverse impacts.

Science, Technology Cities are the centres of tertiary education and sti infrastructu- and Innovation (sti) re. Funding is usually concentrated in cities and in agglomerati- on areas, respectively. Transport Urban areas are the nodes and hubs in national and European transport networks.

Source: Committee of the Regions, The growth potential of an integrated eu Urban Agenda, 2016, pp. 41–44 (cor.europa.eu/.../Growth_potential_integrated_urban_agenda.pdf). 102 • Transylvanian Review • Vol. XXVII, No. 1 (Spring 2018)

“Smart city regionalism” is the concept introduced in an interesting study by Tassillo Herrschel41 who intended to identify a bridge between economic competitiveness and sustainability. This concept derived from the principles of smart growth and new regionalism, as a policy-shaping mechanism and analytical framework. The concept of “smartness” refers not only to “smart” and “smart growth” (focusing on energy and transportation), but also to innovation, participation, collaboration and co-ordination. The new concept of “smart city regionalism” is circumscribed “by the interface between the sectorality and ter- ritoriality of policy-making processes.”42 So, the smart-city strategies will offer the technological solutions to link urban challenges, ict support, meeting the needs and challenges of social exclusion.43

eu Models for Increasing Urban Competitiveness

n order to analyze the urban competitiveness of an important Romanian city from the North-West region, it is useful to identify the guidelines for I measuring urban competitiveness in other eu regions. We will refer to representative studies not only from the specialist literature, but also from the Eu- ropean region to whom they belong: Belgium (Flanders), Poland, Italy, Spain, Lithuania. As a former Ph.D. student at the University of Ghent, based on the similarities that we could find with our hometown of Cluj-Napoca (the main city of the North-West region of Romania), we consider that one good example would be the city of Ghent, located in Flanders, Belgium. The two cities are similar: the second important city in their region (Flanders and Romania), both cities have a substantial student population (Ghent has about 70,000 students and Cluj- Napoca about 100,000), both are a small European metropolis (150 square km for Ghent and 179.5 square km for Cluj-Napoca), both have a similar population (Ghent with total population of around 500,000, and Cluj-Napoca about 400,000), both cities underline the importance of innovation and are trying to use it for urban development and for the benefit of their citizens.44 The urban development strategy model could be used as an inspiring model, because it is based on the concept of redevelopment, exploring the drivers of revival and identifying the factors which will assure its growth and development for the future. This action has a suggestive motto: “Cities need places, not spaces,”45 and is concentrated around three factors, which will generate an innovative ecosystem: Paradigms • 103

• physical assets—public and private areas and assets (houses, streets, parks, etc.), and the intent to stimulate new forms of connectivity and collaboration. They create the framework for generating innovative solutions to urban issues, for example for traffic management; • economic assets—revenues and employment; • networking assets—networking the flow of information.46 In order to become competitive, Ghent has to find the answers to the challenges of the 21st century: • viability—the city represents an environment which has to satisfy the aspirations of the young and the old population alike, the need to connect the green areas, and also has to provide a response to the questions of identity and density; • economy—economic growth, a modification of the structures of the economy with “spatial” consequences for the city; • sustainability—response to the climate question (in the light of cop 21, Paris 2015); • demographics—understanding and responding to the needs of a changing and growing population; • mobility—guaranteeing selective access to the city and its peripheral districts (suburbs).47 Aiming to become a European neutral energy city by 2030, the city of Ghent is transforming urban competitiveness into urban atractiveness through the following actions: • creating a relationship between all of the functions of the city: socio-economic, socio-ecological, political (structures and lines of power) and cultural factors; • seeking a compromise between quality and efficiency in areas destined for a number of objectives (housing, economic, cultural); • starting the thought process, beginning with the principle that the city is a place of ownership and of coproduction which has to remain accessible and affordable for all; • abandoning the notion of nimbyism (Not in My Back Yard) and considering the city as a place for the spatio-social process; • recognising that an urban layout is not neutral and reflects on whom (which socio-economic groups) it benefits.48 Another important study is that referring to Poland’s urban competitiveness,49 which, in the beginning, underlines the territorial and productivity dimensions of the concept of competitiveness in order to better understand the abovementioned concept. Also, the author mentions that the competition between cities 104 • Transylvanian Review • Vol. XXVII, No. 1 (Spring 2018) is based on investment, human capital, tourism, technology, cultural and sports events.50 One of the classifications of factors for the measurement of the city’s competitiveness identifies two groups: those related to enterprises (including productivity and employment policy) and those related to city policies aimed at increasing the city’s attractiveness. In her analysis, the author used Begg’s model of city competitiveness,51 which is based on three factors: employment rate, productivity, standards of living, and four determinants: top-down sectoral trends and macro influences, company characteristics, business environment, capacity for innovation and learning. For the year 2013, when the analysis was made, the results were important, because Poland was one Member State to be taken into consideration as a model of development for Central European states. The conclusions of the study were: most drivers of competitiveness are ex- ecuted at the central level in Poland, cities rely mainly on incentives from higher levels of government when it comes to their development, the “top-down” or “macro” policies are the major determinant, local governments create incentives for innovation by attracting a chosen group of workers and companies or encouraging contacts between business partners and the sharing of good practices. As the author said, the results of the quantitative analysis showed that Polish cities present similar levels of competitive positioning, but are less competitive than other cities in the European Union, and the only Polish city that stands out in this comparison is Warsaw.52 The competitive strategies of Polish cities include sources of competitiveness such as innovation (Kraków), human resources (Warsaw), and cultural opportunities (Wrocław).53 Another relevant study for our research topic belongs to four Italian experts, who tried to analyze the urban competitiveness of all Italian cities.54 They used a model with 31 variables, divided in two groups: determinants (12) and factors (19). Some of the variables (determinants and the specific factors) were: mobility and communication (international airports, passengers on international flights, networks for telephony and telematics, high-speed connections), economy (per capita income, number of bank branches, etc.), production (number of firms, exhibitions, etc.), environment (population density, residential square meter price, etc.), research and training (universities, number of patents, etc.), human capital (population, population of the provincial capital, etc.), etc. The 110 Italian provinces in the study were clasified into five categories: • first class—provinces with a consolidated role on the international scene; • second class—provinces with international potential; • third class—provinces with national relevance; • fourth class—provinces with national potential; • fifth class—provinces of local relevance. Paradigms • 105

Even though the model is an updated version of a former model from 1995 and does not have a European policy with an urban dimension approach, it is important to see the cultural and academic specificity of approaching this topic in a certain eu region. It is important to see which is the basis from where the local governments will prospect the development strategy. Another concept that Italian researchers resort to is urban smartness, which is described as a new urban dimension. The indicators of urban smartness are: economy, environment, mobility, governance, people, living.55 By using to classification, the main findings of the study are: the North- South divide, noticeable in both classifications: a leader North-Central Italy includes urban systems of international or potentially international competitiveness and, at the same time, cities with a high smart quotient, despite a laggard South Italy that hosts almost only provinces of local level and cities with a quite low smart quotient;56 the case of Rome represents another point of convergence between competitiveness and smartness.57 The conclusions of the study were that the research provided a contribution for a better understanding of the label of “smart city”; the idea of smart city comes from that of competitive city, with a different evolution (if a competitive city aims to attract human and financial capital, a smart city aims also to improve the quality of life of its users by using icts to maximize the efficiency of urban spaces) and that means that “today a city needs to improve its smart quotient in order to be more attractive and so more competitive.”58 The Italian study is relevant for the present article because it shows the cultural specificity in approaching the urban dimension of competitiveness. Another interesting study belongs to a Spanish researcher59 and is important because he links urban competitiveness with urban governance and with the urban regeneration process, focusing of the role of the involvement of the private sector in this process: “The aim of this new approach was to promote public-private partnerships that combined the interests of the public and private sectors. . . . The challenge was to merge both positions in order to increase the residents’ quality of life; however, rather than ‘socialising’ private sector’s objectives, cities became converts to the tenets of business.”60 The abovementioned author stated that in Spain there are two models of successful urban renewal: the renovation of Bilbao’s image with the inauguration of the Guggenheim Museum (1997), and the Olympic Barcelona’s new maritime front (1992) and forum (2004); both models created “a delusory vision of Spain at the turn of the century.”61 These two models were taken up by other important Spanish cities, but the public spending was exorbitant and the eu asked for a drastic reduction in the public deficit, which by 2009 had reached 11% of the gdp.62 Then austerity was imposed on the 106 • Transylvanian Review • Vol. XXVII, No. 1 (Spring 2018) public agenda with cuts of all kinds, so the “urban governance was prohibited by law, or more specifically, from December 2013, all local governments in Spain were forbidden to establish new consortia or public-private entities.”63 It is relevant for our study to underline the factors which characterized urban renewal: transport infrastructures, museums, convention and exhibition centres, gentrification and new residential districts. The main important conclusion of the cited study is that Spain has to change its model for urban renewal/competitiveness to one which encompasses social empowerment, in which economic parameters take into account the characteristics of the specific urban area, in which urban planning takes into account the needs of the disadvantaged social categories of population (women, elderly, youth, children) and in which the cultural ecosystem takes into account the creativity and the talent of the inhabitants and the roots of their identity.64 The last set of studies relevant for the present article have Lithuanian authors. The first study gives us important data regarding the most useful methods used for analysizing urban competitiveness (understood in terms of economic competitiveness, social competitiveness and environmental status competitiveness).65 We will present the synthetic table of analysis methods used for urban competitiveness:

Table 2. Advantages and disadvantages of the most frequently used non-econometric-qualitative methods from the urban competitiveness measurement perspective

Method Description Advantages Disadvantages swot The most frequently used Does not require much Requires a comparison method. Facilitates identi- data. of the city data with the fication of the strong and Both quantitative and same data outside its weak sides of the city, its qualitative (e. g. provided borders—other cities, possibilities and threats. by experts) information region, country (external can be used. information). Convenient to use beca- Falsely interpreted and use it facilitates analysis applied methodology on of various spheres and application of this method aspects. determines a false defi- Frequently serves as the ning of strong and weak initial source of informa- points and their confusion tion for identification of with possibilities and the urban development threats. priorities and competitive advantages. Does not require much method application-related costs. Method Description Advantages Disadvantages Problem Facilitates identifying the Most frequently qualitative Complicated stages of analysis essential problem/challen- data is used. conducting analysis. ge of the city. The analysis Various data interpretation Practically the problem is conducted in four forms are available: by hierarchy and causes- stages: setting up a problem tree, consequences chain is not 1. making a long initial list objectives tree, etc. always successfully iden- of problems and challen- tified, because majority of ges (or description of the Possibility to describe visu- problems are determined undesirable situation and ally the problems hierarchy by many problems. and causes-consequences its characteristic features); There is a demand for the chain. 2. identification of one or experts, involved in the several basic – essential This method does not analysis, to be well aware problems causing the request econometric of the situation in the city occurrence of other knowledge. and specificity of the local problems; Does not require much economy. 3. identification of the method application-related Quality of the obtained problems-causes and costs. results often depends problems-consequences; upon the problem analysis 4. setting up the hierarchy moderation process and of problems identified. concern of people involved in the analysis process. Competitive Facilitates measuring the Due to the lack of stan- Methodological justificati- advantage competitive potential of dardized methods of on of the competitiveness analysis the city, create and main- analysis, there is a pos- model used in the measu- tain competitive advanta- sibility for various data rement is requested. ge with respect to other interpretation forms by The model adaptation competitive rivals. applying different models to the city specificity is of competitiveness, com- important. bining majority of factors Usually requests for a determining competiti- more comprehensive infor- veness of the city into a mation, both quantitative common system. and qualitative, by each Encourages a novel factor of competitiveness approach to the competi- identified in the model. tive potential and advan- For the purpose of making tages of the city through comparisons between the other competitiveness cities, identical information determining factors, whi- on other cities is required. ch constitute the model. Excellent proficiency of This method does not experts, conducting the require econometric or analysis, knowledge on other methods applicati- competitiveness theory on-related knowledge. and its application to the city and regional economy is required.

Continued on next page 108 • Transylvanian Review • Vol. XXVII, No. 1 (Spring 2018)

Table—continued

Method Description Advantages Disadvantages Scenario Facilitates identification of Future perspective-orien- Not all forecasted future planning possible future changes, ted and facilitates prepa- changes can occur in (identification) and based on them, selec- ring for particular challen- reality, or not all changes tion of appropriate strate- ges in advance. can be forecasted and gies for the development May act as an aid of measured. and maintenance of com- measuring the efficiency Although the number of petitiveness of the city. of current strategies on scenarios is not specified, Scenario planning involves the increase in competi- usually in practice two three measures: tiveness of the city and or three scenarios are – qualitative scenario preparation for future identified. planning (by employing changes. Three is a demand that experts‘ knowledge and Scenario planning can be experts who conduct the prognosis); based on both quantita- analysis were creative and – quantitative scenario tive and qualitative infor- distinguished themselves planning (by employing mation. by dynamic approach. economic prognosis There might be a need methods, in pursuit to to employ econometric identify how particular methods and computer- microeconomic chan- based modeling ges can affect compe- programs. titiveness of the city; frequently the qualitative and quantitative scenario planning methods are combined together; – identification of the future (first describing what the city will be in the future, and then preparing the strategy and forming measures for the achievement of specified objectives).

Source: Bruneckiene, Cincikaite, and Kilijoniene, 2012, p. 260 (inzeko.ktu.lt/index.php/ee/article/viewFile/1272/1561, accessed on 8 August 2017).

The second study is important for providing us with a very complex model of city competitiveness:66

CITY COMPETITIVENESS

Internal city environment Level of quality of life Feedback Productivity OUTPUTS Value added/person Income/Purchasing power Corporate profit

Inward investment Growth of work places Immigration Physical city growth City image/ attractiveness

Ecological situation

PROCESSES Housing Work

People

Leisure Transport

Human factors Institutional factors Physical factors Economic factors Labour skills Local government City location and Economic structure Training and education effectiveness accessibility High value-added activities INPUTS possibilities Institutions, leaders Urban infrastructure Local tax system Local demographic situation Institutional networks Natural resources Local wages level

Local leaders Urban facilities and of the city Access to capital in the city Innovativeness/creativity/talent amenities Local institutions of scientific of local people City development strategy research and experimental Tolerance/culture/traditions development of local people City industry clusters

Political-legal factors Technological factors Economic factors Social-cultural factors Ecological-environmental factors

Political and legal stability Development of ICT Macroeconomic situation Demographics Climate International agreements Establishment of new industries Fiscal Policy Gender equality Water resources of higher authorities development of production Regulatory Policy Life style specifics Waste treatment systems External security technologies Development of scientific research Effectiveness of health care Land and land use Activity of external interest Polity of technology development and experimental development and educational systems Biological assets groups Development of communications External employment opportunities Energy resources External city environmentActivity of external institutions Income level Natural disasters Crime level

110 • Transylvanian Review • Vol. XXVII, No. 1 (Spring 2018)

Analysis of Urban Competitiveness in Romania’s North-West Region

here are a lot of studies which analyze the competitiveness of Romania and its regions, drawn up by Romanian or foreign authors. The com- T mon approach is the economic one. We are more interested in a Euro- pean affairs approach, in terms of urban renewal, development, and increased competitiveness. In the Global Competitiveness Report 2016–2017,67 Romania is ranked 62nd, losing 9 places since the previous classification (2015–2016). A descriptive analysis, based on the data of the rci Index from 2013,68 took into consideration the following sub-indices and dimensions of competitiveness: (a) basic sub-indices: a.1. institutions a.2. macroeconomic stability a.3. infrastructure a.4. health a.5. basic education (b) efficiency sub-index: b.1. higher education b.2. labour market efficiency b.3. market size (c) innovation sub-index: c.1. technological readiness c.2. business sophistication c.3. innovation.69 The results of the study revealed that, except for the Bucharest–Ilfov region, all other regions are positioned among the least competitive of the European Union (ranks lower than 240 among 262 positions), and that the South-East region is classified as the penultimate in the European Union (the lowest score for overall competitiveness between regions in the new Member States, next the Severozapaden region of Bulgaria as early as 2010). Also, for some sub-indices of competitiveness, Romanian regions are ranked among the last: all Romanian regions in the case of basic education, the region Bucharest–Ilfov in the case of institutional quality, the region of South-West Oltenia in the case of infrastructure, the West region in the case of the basic skills pillar, the South-East region in the case of healthcare, higher education, lifelong learning, efficiency of the labour market, as well as in the areas of efficiency drivers and drivers of innovation, the North-East region, in the case of market size, technological readiness Paradigms • 111 and the innovation drivers pillar, and finally the South Muntenia region in the case of business sophistication.70 Regarding innovation, the regions of the eu member countries have been classified into four performance groups: the innovation leaders, innovation follow- ers, average innovators and modest innovators. For Romania, it has only one region that surpasses the class of modest innovators (the Bucharest–Ilfov region).71 Regarding urban competitiveness, we take into consideration in our analysis of the North-West region of Romania the city of Cluj-Napoca, because it is one of the seven urban growth poles in Romania, with great chances of developing high competitiveness, also supported from the European investment funds. We begin our analysis with a short presentation of the North-West region of Romania, one of the poorest regions in the eu, with a gdp/capita of less than 50% of the eu average. This characteristic was one of the aguments for which the eu decided to support this region with a project called “Less developed regions,” which included 21 regions from the eu, of which two belong to Roma- nia: North-West and North-East. We mention that we do not have updated statistical data from 2017 or 2016, the public information available regarding the city characteristics is poor, referring mainly to the region to which it belonged and dating—the most recent— back to 2011. Even though Cluj-Napoca belongs to an underdeveloped European region, it is the main city of the region, which has the characteristics needed to increase its potential, its urban competitiveness: universities, entrepreneurial initiatives, companies, outsurcing companies, medical excellence centers, cultural and leisure activities. The competitive cities from the eu are: Debrecen and Szeged (Hungary), Graz and Linz (Austria), Bonn and Mannheim (Germany), Karlovy Vary (Czech Republic), after a simulation performed on specific indices (universities and medical centers, cinemas).72 We won’t discuss here the urban development strategy for Cluj-Napoca, but we shall present the data (as competitiveness potential) taken from the urban development strategy for Cluj-Napoca, based on a questionnaire applied to its inhabitants, and not on the statistical data from the National Institute of Sta- tistics. One indicator is the quality of life. This was measured in keeping with seven indices (self-evaluation of life, safety, health, education, environment, local government quality and economic prosperity), which were organized into 18 themes and 196 sub-indices. The main results indicated that the main factors which positively influence the quality of life in Cluj-Napoca are family life, living conditions and the healthcare system (a general European perspective on life quality). The citizens have a positive opinion of the healthcare system, especially 112 • Transylvanian Review • Vol. XXVII, No. 1 (Spring 2018) the family doctors. Referring to the economic-financial sector, the citizens consider that they are not rich, but also not poor, and that they spend their money on food and living conditions. The quality of the environment is seen as moderate by the citizens, especially when it comes to water and air quality. Safety scores quite high in the perception of citizens. Regarding the local government efficiency, the level is moderate but increasing. A high level of appreciation is enjoyed by the local cultural and identity indices and the educational system. We can affirm that these results could be used as a basis for a prospective strategy for urban development, but we need longitudinal statistical data, in order to create a framework in which we could maximize the city’s potential for competitiveness. In the figure presented in the above sub-chapter, the city competitiveness model featured five important categories of factors that have to be taken into consideration: political-legal, technological, economic, socio-cultural, and ecologic-environmental, which will push on inputs (human, institutional, physical and economic factors) with effects on processes regarding the quality of life (housing, jobs, leisure, transport), and will generate outputs (productivity, value-added/person, income/purchasing power, corporate profit, inward investment, more workplaces, immigration, physical city growth, city image/ attractiveness, ecological situation), which will influence the level of the quality of life and thus generate city competitiveness.73 So, in order to see the potential for urban competitiveness, we will have to focus more on the outputs, not on processes. The oficial data stated that the urban area of Cluj-Napoca was established in 2008, with 18 administratives entities, with a surface of 1,625 ha and 418,153 inhabitants (official data from last general census of 2011). The density of the population is 272 inhabitants/km2, with an accentuated tendency of concentration.74 The health status of the population is defined by: high mortality, short life expectancy and healty life expectancy (13 years less than the life expectancy). In the whole North-West region a special situation is represented by the access to medical services for the persons from the rural areas or with disabilities. There are important intra-regional discrepancies. To be mentioned is the role of the excellence center for medical services of Cluj-Napoca, with effects on the health of its inhabitans.75 When we refer to education, the targeted age groups (0–4 years, 5–9 years, 10–14 years, 15–19 and 20–24 years) have been steadily decreasing, according to statistical data from 2005–2011. In the North-West region, in 2011, the school population was of 516,575 persons (10.4% less then in 2005).76 Pre- school education had an asceding trend (according to the number of enrolled children), but for primary and secondary education the trend is slightly decreas- Paradigms • 113 ing. The dramatic decrease in the number of pupils from professional and vocational education is linked with the decision to abolish vocational schools or turn them into technological highschools, as well as with the attitude of the parents and pupils towards vocational schools. A significant decrease is also seen in the number of college students: 19.2%.77 The estimations regarding the preschool and school population in 2015 and 2025, in comparison with 2005, indicate a strong decrease by 33.27% till 2025, especially for the population 15–24 years of age (38.71%). This is accompanied by consistently low percentages of students in the population aged 20–24 (51.3% in 2012, decreasing from 55.3% in 2008, according to Eurostat), and this could seriously affect the quality of human resources and regional competi- tivenenss in the long term.78 Another challenge for the educational system is the reorientation towards lifelong learning, taking into account the increase in the adult population. With- out any data at regional level, we could affirm that we have a serious deficiency in this case. The percentage of adults aged 25–64 years who participated in training programs was 1.4%, as compared to the 9% European average, according to the eu Labour Force Survey from 2012.79 One of the biggest educational problems in Romania, and also in the North- West region, is the school drop-out rate: it was 14.9% in 2012, as compared to the 12.8% European average, the target being to bring it under 10% in keeping with the Europe 2020 strategy. Regarding the number of employees, in this region, 22.6% of the stable population of the region was working, with the following distribution: the agricultural sector with 1.5% of workplaces, industry with 33.4%, construction with 6.99%, and services with 58.09%. The distribuiton of the employees is the following: manufacturing industry (29.41% of total), commerce (17.58%), education (9.70%), health and social work (7.90%), and construction (7.05%).80 Regarding the level of salaries, in the Cluj area we find the biggest salaries in the region, according to the official data from 2011, 21.5 % higher than the regional average.81 In the North-West region, in 2011, the employees in the energy field had the biggest salaries, followed by the financial-banking sector and it. At the opposite pole are the employees from the hotels and restaurants sector, the administrative sector, and culture. Interestingly, in this region, the employees from the public administration are in the top category of big salaries, and at the bottom we find the construction and commerce sectors, the level of professional training having a direct effect upon this distribution.82 One of the challenges of this region is the demographic decrease and population aging, amplified by the phenomenon of external migration, especially 114 • Transylvanian Review • Vol. XXVII, No. 1 (Spring 2018) among the highly-skilled workforce (brain-drain): specialists from fields like medicine, education, computer science, engineering, research and development. One particular example is that of Cluj-Napoca, the only city in Romania where there is no decrease in population, which counterbalances the migration from the region. This city has a long tradition in the field of high quality education, especially higher education, being also the most specialized medical center in Romania, after Bucharest.83 Regarding the infrastructure, we take into account the following types: road, rail and air transport (with the possibility of connecting with the ten-t network from a territorial perspective), public urban transport, street infrastructure, utilities infrastructure, communications infrastructure, social infrastructure, infrastructure for emergency situations, health infrastructure, education infrastructure, rdi infrastructure, cultural infrastructure. Accessibility and reduced mobility represent important weak points of the region, with a potential of increasing the discrepancies at interregional and intraregional level. From the point of view of business or research, the region has a varried but territorially unbalanced offer, the innovation infrastrucure is insufficient, and the one that would stimulate entrepreneurial development is inexistent.84 An important element to be mentioned is the number of employees from the rd field, which increased systematically in the North-West region, 9% of these employees being from this region, of which 89% are from Cluj County, respectively Cluj-Napoca city. The rd fields and projects implemented in the region are: raw materials, machines and equipments, energy and fuels, nano and bio- technologies, health, environment, agriculture/food industry, itc and creative industries/art and design. The gdp ratio for rd activities in the North-West region is low, with an average of 0.34%/year, under the national average of 0.49% and the European average of 1.89% (for 2005–2010). However, since 2011 the situation has been improving, with rd activities increasing as a percentage of the gdp. Also, the companies have increased by 18% the level of spending for rd activities carried out by universities, 2.4 times more then in 2010, and this is a positive result of the absorption of the funds for this sector, with an impact on urban and regional competitiveness.85 Regarding the economy of the region, the gdp increased (for 2005–2011) with 78% (16.3% increase till 2008 and then by 2.6% since 2009). For 2011, the region contributed with 11.32% to the national gdp (third place at national level), regional gdp/capita was 5.200 euro in 2010, 21% of the European average. For gross value added we have 11.32%, 9.5% below the national average. For labour productivity (gross value added/ocuppied population) the figure is 9% under the national productivity. Inside the region, Cluj County is the biggest contributor, with 34.93%.86 The economy of the region is based on the Paradigms • 115 tertiary sector, namely: commercial, public, financial, real estate and construction services, and industries.87 As compared to the European average, the region has low scores in all economic activities: 6 times less productivity in agricultural activities, 3 times less in industry, 2 times less in construction and 4 times less in services.88 Regarding entrepreneurial development, Cluj County was ranked second in Romania, in 2011, with 36% local active units in the North-West region,89 in fields such as: research and development; software production and it services; pulp and paper industry; pharmaceutical industry; rubber and plastics industry; electrical equipment industry; medical devices, equipment and instruments; production and delivery of electrical energy; construction; hotels and restaurants; finances and insurance and real estate transactions.90 In 2011, as to the business turnover, in the North-West region the sme sector contributed with 74.12% to the total turnover of the region, with a level of contribution over the national average. The sector in question employs 77.44% of the workforce and accounts for 62.92% of the net investments in the region.91 Investments are crucial for economic development, with a direct impact on labour productivity for the physical ones (buildings, works, machines, machin- ery). From the point of view of the most relevant indices, in 2009 the region had a level of investment above the European one (19.1%), but below the national one in 2011 (24.4%). After the financial disruptions of 2008–2010 (a 60% decrease), 2011 marked a turnaround (a 26% increase).92 In the North-West region, the biggest investments are in industry (between 35 and 41% of the total investments), and in Cluj County we find 44% of all investments in the region.93 From the point of view of foreign direct investments, in 2011 the value was of 2,454 million euro, only 4.5% of the total value for Romania.94 The countries of origin for these investments are: Italy, Germany, Austria, France, the uk, Spain, and Hungary. Cluj-Napoca is among the most attractive cities for outsourcing it services, and an important role is played by the workforce, because it is a university center. Also, the outsourcing for financial services was done for companies such as: Emerson, Office Depot, Sykes Enterprises Eastern Europe, Genpact, and Steelcase.95 Another important element for regional development is the evolution of foreign trade, seen in the volume of exports and imports, as well as their structure on the outlets and product markets. For 2007–2011, we see an increase in the volume of exports at regional and national level, with a contraction during the economic crisis. The average degree of covering of the imports through exports was about 80%.96 We can say that in the case of an emerging economy, the North-West region—with an increasing share of services and a decreasing share of the agri- 116 • Transylvanian Review • Vol. XXVII, No. 1 (Spring 2018) cultural sector, the latter employing one third of the population, and with two thirds of all services activities represented by commerce, to which we can add an intensive industry in terms of human capital and resources, with a lower labour productivity than the national average and far below the European average—shows that a model focused on added value is not anchored in the region’s reality. The regional model of economic development, influenced by polycentric development, is focused on economic growth through polycentric territorial development, by using a functional specialization given by the sectors with high economic performance, which take into consideration the dynamic of soft indices (itc, creative industries, scientific and technical activities).97

Conclusions

s the eu Urban Agenda stated and the Committee of the Regions afirmed, urban areas across the world and in eu are confronted with enormous transversal challenges (climate change, demographic change A 98 and immigration), which lead to urban social change, structural change, and environmental pressures. There is no single path to be followed, or a single typology or generalisation that could provide a scenario for European cities in terms of competitiveness. It will depend on contextual aspects such as Member State size, administrative structures, political systems, geographical location and size of the urban area.99 New challenges require integrated approaches. At European level there are some policy areas with an explicit urban dimension, but the cohesion policy explicitly addresses it, by providing several levers which are important in strengthening an integrated perspective and deserve particular attention in urban policies.100 The recommendations from the Committee of the Regions are: Smart Spe- cialisation Strategies (S3), Integrated Territorial Investment (iti) and Commu- nity Led Local Development (clld). Also, it is important to support and dis- seminate guidance on the European instruments and encourage the exchange of experiences.101 As the example above demonstrates, regarding urban competitiveness in the North-West region of Romania, we can say that the evolution of the city is not based on strategical thinking, even though we are in the eu, and the financial context forces us to pursue it, as well as the convergence and regional development programs. For the moment, it is a local evolution, based on electoral/ political short-term interests. q Paradigms • 117

Notes

1. Vasile Puºcaº, “De la avatarele integrãrii la strategiile dezvoltãrii,” in Spiritul european, azi (Cluj-Napoca: Eikon, 2013), 192. 2. Vasile Puºcaº, “Provincialism, regionalism, unitate ºi integrare,” in Spiritul european, azi, 192. 3. Emmanuel Macron, “Sã fim stãpâni pe soarta noastrã,” in Revoluþie, transl. (Bucha- rest: Trei, 2017), 282. 4. Ibid., “Sã refundamentãm Europa,” in Revoluþie, 287. 5. Ibid., 288. 6. Ibid. 7. Ibid., 290. 8. Ibid., 291. 9. Ibid., 293. 10. Ibid., 300. 11. Klaus Schwab, ed., Xavier Sala-i-Martín, chief advisor, The Global Competitiveness Report 2016–2017, published by the World Economic Forum, xi. Internet source available at www.weforum.org/reports/the-global-competitiveness-report., accessed on 10 August 2017. 12. Ibid. 13. Ibid., 3. 14. Ibid. 15. Ibid., 4. 16. Ibid., 53–54. 17. Ibid., 53. 18. Ibid. 19. Ibid. 20. Ibid. 21. Ibid. 22. Klaus Schwab, et al., The Europe 2020 Competitiveness Report: Building a More Com- petitive Europe, published by the World Economic Forum, 2014. Internet source available at ec.europa.eu/growth/industry/competitiveness/reports/eu., accessed on 10 August 2017. 23. European Investment Bank, Restoring eu competitiveness, 2016 updated version. In- ternet source available at www.eib.org/attachments/efs/restoring_eu_competitive- ness_en.pdf, accessed on 10 August 2017. 24. Ibid., v. 25. Ibid. 26. Ibid., v–ix. 27. Ibid., 10. 28. European Commission, Regional policy. Internet source available at http://ec.europa. eu/regional_policy/en/policy/what/investment-policy/, accessed on 10 August 2017. 118 • Transylvanian Review • Vol. XXVII, No. 1 (Spring 2018)

29. David Allen, “Fondurile structurale ºi politica de coeziune,” in Elaborarea politicilor în Uniunea Europeanã, eds. Helen Wallace, Mark A. Pollack, and Alasdair Young, 6th rev. edn., transl. (Bucharest: Institutul European din România, 2011), 211. 30. European Commission, Urban Development. Internet source available at http:// ec.europa.eu/regional_policy/en/policy/themes/urban-development/, accessed on 10 August 2017. 31. Marloes Hoogerbugge, “Competitiveness in Urban Europe: research based, practice led,” 1. Internet source available at www.academia.edu/9839925/Competitive- ness_in_Urban_Europe_research, accessed on 10 August 2017. 32. Rocco Papa, Carmela Gargiulo, Stefano Franco, and Laura Russo, “Urban Smart- ness vs. Urban Competitiveness: A Comparison of Italian Cities Ranking,” TeMA: Journal of Land Use, Mobility and Environment, Special Issue, 2014: 771. 33. Ibid. 34. Ibid. 35. European Commission, Urban Agenda, 2016. Internet source available at https:// ec.europa.eu/info/eu-regional-and-urban-development/cities/urban-agenda-eu_en, accessed on 11 August 2017. 36. European Union, Committee of the Regions, “The growth potential of an integrated eu Urban Agenda,” 2. Internet source available at cor.europa.eu/./Growth_po- tential_integrated_urban_agenda.pdf, accessed on 9 August 2017. 37. Ibid. 38. Ibid. 39. Ibid., 30 40. Ibid. 41. Tassilo Herrschel, “Competitiveness and Sustainability: Can ‘Smart City Regional- ism’ Square the Circle?” Urban Studies 50, 11 (2013): 2332. 42. Ibid. 43. Ibid., 31. 44. Urban Land Institute, “Ghent and Urban Competitiveness: Cities need places, Not spaces,” 2016. Internet source available at europe.uli.org/wp-content/uploads/./uli- Belgium-Infoburst-Ghent-Roundtable.pdf, accessed on 10 August 2017. 45. Ibid., 1. 46. Ibid. 47. Ibid., 3. 48. Ibid. 49. Ewelina Szczech-Pietkiewicz, “Poland’s Urban Competitiveness in the European Context,” The Polish Review 58, 2 (2013): 16. Internet source available at http:// www.jstor.org/stable/10.5406/polishreview.58.2.0015, accessed on 9 August 2017. 50. Ibid., 17. 51. Ibid., 22. 52. Ibid., 24. 53. Ibid., 36. 54. Papa et al., 774. Paradigms • 119

55. Ibid., 778. 56. Ibid., 779. 57. Ibid. 58. Ibid., 780. 59. Xosé Somoza Medina, “Governance, Urban Competitiveness and Crisis in Spain,” Journal of Urban and Regional Analysis 8, 1 (2016): 47. Internet source available at www.jurareview.ro/2016_8_1/a4_47_60.pdf, accessed on 8 August 2017. 60. Ibid. 61. Ibid., 50. 62. Ibid. 63. Ibid. 64. Ibid., 57. 65. Jurgita Bruneckiene, Renata Cincikaite, and Akvile Kilijoniene, “The Specifics of Measurement the Urban Competitiveness at the National and International Level,” Inzinerine Ekonomika-Engineering Economics 23, 3 (2012): 256, 260. Internet source available at inzeko.ktu.lt/index.php/ee/article/view/1272, accessed on 8 August 2017. 66. Jolita Sinkiene, “City Competitiveness: Concept, Factors, Model,” 2009, 8. Inter- net source available at www.nispa.org/files/conferences/2009/papers/200904201 457480.Sinkiene.doc, accessed on 8 August 2017. 67. Schwab and Sala-i-Martín, 7. 68. Vittorio Amato, “Regionalization, competitiveness and innovation: The case of Ro- mania,” Perspective politice (Bucharest) 7, 8, 2 (December 2015): 19. Internet source available at perspective.politice.ro/sites/default/files/pdf/Dec%202015_split_2.pdf, accessed on 8 August 2017. 69. Ibid. 70. Ibid., 21. 71. Ibid., 23. 72. “Strategia de dezvoltare a municipiului Cluj-Napoca 2014–2020,” 2015, ix. Inter- net source available at https://www.dropbox.com/s/6nlwh4epqbanw5a/strategie- cluj-napoca-2014-2020.pdf?dl=0, accessed on 8 August 2017. 73. Sinkiene, 8. 74. “Planul de dezvoltare al Regiunii Nord-Vest 2014–2020,” 2014, 24. Internet source available at http://www.nord-vest.ro/wp-content/uploads/2016/09/7r238_ pdr_2014_2020.pdf, accessed on 7 August 2017. 75. Ibid., 33. 76. Ibid., 34. 77. Ibid. 78. Ibid., 36. 79. Ibid., 37. 80. Ibid., 40. 81. Ibid., 42. 82. Ibid. 83. Ibid., 56. 84. Ibid., 59. 120 • Transylvanian Review • Vol. XXVII, No. 1 (Spring 2018)

85. Ibid., 77. 86. Ibid., 99–100. 87. Ibid., 101. 88. Ibid., 104–105. 89. Ibid., 105. 90. Ibid., 108. 91. Ibid., 110. 92. Ibid., 112. 93. Ibid. 94. Ibid. 95. Ibid., 114. 96. Ibid., 115. 97. Ibid., 117–118. 98. “The growth potential,” 141. 99. Ibid. 100. Ibid., 142. 101. Ibid.

Abstract Urban and Regional Competitiveness in the North-West Region of Romania

We are living now a period of transformation at eu level, in which Member States will have to constantly negotiate their position and future. Until now, in the European discourse we could hear, and we became accustomed to this approach, of competition between cities, regions and Member States. But now, the paradigm is different: all these entities will have to collaborate on specific projects, at national, regional and local level. The present article analyzes the newest aproaches to urban and regional competitiveness in the light of the latest eu released documents and reports, and, after presenting some eu examples of urban competitiveness, it focuses on a particular case, the Transylvanian city of Cluj-Napoca, aiming to identify the potential for developing its urban competitiveness.

Keywords urban competitiveness, regional competitiveness, urban renewal, urban transformation, eu Urban Agenda, cohesion policy transsilvanica

Political Activism in the Romanian Countryside of the 1930s The Peasants from Hunedoara S o r i n R a d u County and the Ploughmen’s Front

The Ploughmen’s Front was a mi- “The clock strikes twelve, nor organization on the Romanian po- wake up ploughmen! litical scene of the 1930s. Nevertheless, in order to understand the political Mr. Groza has raised engagement of the peasants and their the peasant community connection to political life, we have to realize that the founding and the de- of Transylvania as Jesus velopment of the ploughmen organi- raised Lazarus from zation, particularly in this county, represents a special case in the history of the dead.” interwar Romania and a model for the political mobilization of the peasants. Without minimizing Petru Groza’s involvement and the impact of certain local personalities in the organizational process, our thesis, based on the cur- Sorin Radu rently available information, claims Professor at Lucian Blaga University of Sibiu (Romania), dean of the Faculty of that there was a direct involvement of Social and Human Sciences and head of the peasants in the organization of the the Research Center of Patrimony and Ploughmen’s Front, with great enthu- Socio-Cultural History. Co-editor of the book Politics and Peasants in Interwar Project financed from Lucian Blaga Univer Romania: Perceptions, Mentalities, sity of Sibiu research grant lbus‐irg‐ Propaganda (2017). 2015‐01. 122 • Transylvanian Review • Vol. XXVII, No. 1 (Spring 2018) siasm on their part, which may partially refute the dominant thesis in Romanian history which states that the peasants were an unstructured, uneducated, easily manipulated crowd, freely recruited in a political maneuver conducted by a sort of dandy of Romanian politics. In this respect, two theses are clashing in the current historiography: on the one hand, the classical thesis of communist historiography, according to which the Ploughmen’s Front was the result of a communist project to transfer the “class struggle” to the rural society through the political organization of the peasants under the strict supervision of the communist regime,1 and, on the other hand, the thesis which claims that the ploughmen organization was rather the initiative of a marginal political figure, Petru Groza, who directed his material resources towards regaining the spotlight in politics.2 In this article we will try to highlight another aspect of this problem. Our thesis is that the effort of organizing and developing the Ploughmen’s Front, even if it was first limited to Hunedoara County, represents a case of political engagement and activism in which the peasants showed that they could surmount political passivity, understanding that in order to overcome the underdevelopment of the rural world and the economic decay, voting and ballot participation were not enough; that is why they decided to adhere to a political structure. The question that arises is to what extent the political engagement generated by the Ploughmen’s Front can be understood as a successful form of integrating the peasants in party organizations and implicitly in politics. This is a justifiable question especially in the context of the interwar period: the peasants, those from the Old Kingdom, as well as those from the provinces that joined Romania in 1918, took part enthusiastically in the ballot and frequently with joy, at least in the first ten years after the Great War. However, they did not show the same enthusiasm when it came to enrolment in party organizations. At the end of political campaigns and elections, the peasants went into a state of political apa- thy until the next elections. There were a few political organizations in the rural world but they had no stamina. Such a discussion is important since researching the connection between politics and the Romanian rural society between the two World Wars has only been declared as a goal, but not actually pursued.3

Politics and Peasants in Interwar Romania

he research of the way in which politics has been perceived in the Romanian rural society represents a side note in historiography, since T historians, sociologists and political scientists have focused on the government’s activity, on the analysis of political institutions etc. The scientific literature is dominated by the portrayal of the village as an economically backward Transsilvanica • 123 structure, with illiterate peasants who lack political education and are profound- ly religious and mystical people. Despite the fact that it is generally accepted that the Great War, the union of Transylvania with Romania and the postwar electoral and land reforms radically changed Romania, with the peasantry coming to represent more than two thirds of the electorate, experts have analyzed the attitude of peasants towards politics only by accident. The founding of political organizations in the rural society and the participation of the peasants in electoral campaigns were mostly perceived as tragicomic events, which was, of course, only an incomplete portrayal of the political realities. The success or the failure of integrating the peasants in the politics of Greater Romania still remains an open matter. As in most Central and Southeast European states, the Romanian intellectual elite was also obsessed with the “peasant question.”4 Intellectuals and politicians alike saw the peasant population both as the cultural and social pillar of the nation and as an obstruction in the process of modernization and westerniza- tion, which were major objectives in the process of nation-building. The debate on this issue in the second half of the 19th century and the first half of the 20th century between liberals, conservatives and socialists, with populist and peasantry undertones, was not just a regional exception. In a society marked by a profound gap between the rural and the urban spaces, socialist and nationalist thinkers were convinced that only by bringing these two realities closer together would social change be possible. The peasants were the subject of major political debates that either idealized them or described their lives as gloomy cases of decline, social disruption and social disorder. From this point of view, the peasants became representatives of the opposite of modernity, which was associated with the urban space. The peasants were seen as a major obstacle to social change. The idea of such a rupture was formulated in the theory of the “Two Romanias,” which presented an urban, Westernized sphere inhabited by a minority of the Romanian society and a rural, backward sphere, disconnected from the alert pace of urban development.5 The Great War, the land and electoral reforms and the union of Transylvania with Romania created not only a brand new political reality but also an auspi- cious climate for reducing the gap between the rural and the urban world. For the first time in Romanian history, the socio-political integration of the peasant population became a political reality. The reforms introduced a marginalized social body on the political scene, one that was often mentioned in the discourse of political parties and became a key political actor overnight: the peasantry. The village, a place of endemic backwardness, was no longer preferred to the city, which was the center of electoral activities. Mostly illiterate and disinterested in public affairs, the peasant now had the power of universal suffrage. This new 124 • Transylvanian Review • Vol. XXVII, No. 1 (Spring 2018) electoral actor entered politics in Greater Romania thinking that it had carried most of the weight during the war and that the electoral reform as well as the assignment of property was legitimate. The peasants from the Old Kingdom as well as those from the provinces that joined it in 1918 took part enthusiastically—at least in the first decade after the Great War—in politics but they remained reticent towards political parties. As opposed to the urban working class, which was inclined towards social-political movements and that had at least in part followed the social-democratic political organizations, the rural class lived in seclusion, apparently, without understanding the purpose of political parties and disinterested in issues of local and central government and politics. The agrarian reform seemed to have discouraged the peasants, directing most of their attention to land and to the social issues generated by the reform. From this point of view, the paradigm of the “agrarian issue” that had marked Romania before the war continued to manifest itself at a lower level. To an observant researcher of interwar political realities it is obvious that the political parties were not concerned with the political integration and the civic education of peasants. In general, the candidates for the eligible positions and the notable members of the community (teachers/schoolmasters and priests) did not become agents of change within the village. There are a few counterexamples to this but they are irrelevant at state level.6 Mattei Dogan noticed another phenomenon: the priests and teachers from the rural society occupied a marginal position on the electoral lists of political parties and those who managed to reach a position of power at a local or central level quickly experienced a sort of alienation from the peasantry.7 Not much can be said about the representation of the peasantry in Parliament and the appearance of peasants on the electoral lists, since these cases were extremely rare during the interwar period.8 Even if the peasants represented 80% of the population, they had a parliamentary representation of no more than 0.4% in the Assembly of Deputies and 0.2% in the Senate. Dogan calls this phenomenon “the inverted pyramid.”9 To conclude the brief description of the peasants’ path towards the interwar political scene, we may introduce another issue: political and intellectual elites as a whole did not believe in the project of Western democratization. A significant part of the militant elite was passionately opposed to the liberal model of political modernization, supporting instead a so-called national model of political state development in which the virtues of the village and of the peasantry were highly praised and idealized and turned into the keystone of the national edifice. The country was held together by the peasant, the keeper of the moral values of Romanian society.10 This trend grew stronger during the 1930s, and the nationalist, extreme nationalist and ethnicist discourse increased the doubts towards democracy, the Western model, and political liberalization. In such a climate Transsilvanica • 125 and especially in an atmosphere heated by ethnicist-Orthodoxist rhetoric, it was extremely hard for the politically emancipated peasant, enfranchised and granted a patch of land, to understand his purpose within a parliamentary democracy. We may conclude that during the time when the universal vote was applied in the constitutional monarchy of Romania (1919–1937) the peasants were not able to learn and play the part that the universal suffrage had offered them.

The Peasants from Hunedoara County and the Ploughmen’s Front

e came back from the war and we found that everything was ruined back home. We accumulated debts to set everything straight. There W was money but not for long. We wanted to pay. We were eager to earn something just as a child is anxious before the arrival of his father. We are poor and impoverished. We’re not able to pay our taxes, certainly not on our assets. (Speech given by peasant Moise Gheorghe from the village of Nojag) I am a successful peasant. I own land, cattle, I’ve traded, I had money. Today I am poor, having everything does not pay for everything. But what will do those of us who are poorer? In this country the foreigners have more rights than the Roma- nians. Let’s take a different path today, let’s not fight, we are so many and yet so weak. The hour of change has come. (Speech given by peasant Nicolae Bembea from the village of Bampotoc)11

These quotes are excerpted from the speeches of two peasants who participated in the ploughmen’s assembly in Deva on 8 January 1933. On Sunday morn- ing, significant groups of peasants from the region of Hunedoara gathered in the city of Deva, in the city theatre hall and outside it. It is not very clear who gathered the peasants; the most circulated version of the story is that a group of peasants from the area of Deva had the initiative of spreading the word and dis- tributed flyers in December 1932 calling the ploughmen to an assembly where they would discuss the tough situation that the peasantry was facing, the issue of converting agricultural debts, as well as the next steps they would have to take to improve their lives. Among the ones that had the initiative were Ion Moga-Fileriu, Miron Belea, Guia Petru Moþu, Tudor Cionca, Ioniþã Dumbravã, Dãnuþ Şotângã etc.12 The peasants who came to the assembly had also read the calls published in the Horia gazette, edited by liberal attorney Aurel Filimon.13 Beyond the simplicity of the speech, the message was clearly directed towards the idea of peasant civic engagement, since the responsible actors (political and 126 • Transylvanian Review • Vol. XXVII, No. 1 (Spring 2018) governmental) had not solved the economic and social problems of the peasantry in an efficient manner. The assembly only ended on the evening of 8 January after a long list of speeches. In the end, the peasants decided that they “support the movement,” they declared their “resignation from all the political parties in which they were members” and that they would start “organizing from one village to the next,”14 without clearly specifying what they were referring to. More- over, a 19-point document was adopted (“Cererea-hotãrâre”) that was meant to be sent to King Carol II. Essentially, the document described the state of economic decay that the peasants were facing, it identified the main causes of economic and cultural backwardness (mainly the lack of ideas and the inaction of the political class) and it urged local personalities to join the ploughmen in the fight against injustice, finally confirming their loyalty towards the king.15 The measures taken in Hunedoara County after the peasants gathered in January 1933 are important for our analysis. Responding to Petru Groza’s call and to other messages published in the Horia gazette—for “a new life”—in the second half of January, several groups of peasants took the initiative of creating committees in the villages and communes of Hunedoara County. On 1 Febru- ary, the representatives of peasants from 45 villages from the district (“plasa,” county administrative subdivision) of Deva elected an action committee. The name of Ploughmen’s Front is mentioned for the first time: “We have decided to organize as all guilds are organized, forming a tight front to include all ploughmen that, in turn, will know how to lay out its demands in order to get rid of its troubles.” This statement is attributed to Miron Belea, “ploughman and the president of the committee of Deva district, the Ploughmen’s Front.” He argued that “the idea to form this organization stemmed from the sufferings and the troubles that united us at the great assembly of 8 January 1933, and the seed that was planted then has started to take root. Conscious of its needs, the peasantry is organizing” (emphasis mine).16 Two days later, the committee of Brad district was created in an assembly of over 3,000 moþi (motzen, inhabitants of the mountain area).17 Another large assembly of the peasants took place on 19 February at Þebea. The gendarmes closely monitored the proceedings of the assembly that was presided by peasant Ioan Moga. A large number of ploughmen insisted once more upon the issue of the economic and political crisis that was affecting the country, declaring that “Today the times have once again become rotten!” (sic!). Miron Belea explained the program and the purpose of the ploughmen organization to the participants. The participants shouted slogans that expressed their loyalty to the Crown: “Long live the King and the Ploughmen!” Petru Groza had also been present at this gathering of the moþi.18 In March, peasant assemblies were organized in a number of towns from Hunedoara Country. The national-peasant authorities were concerned about these manifestations, sus- Transsilvanica • 127 pecting them of communist interference, and prohibited some of them (the case of the assembly that had been announced for 19 March in the town of Hune- doara).19 The region of Hunedoara seemed to have been seized by a civic fever. Apart from the local initiatives of organizing peasant committees, the initiative group became preoccupied with the explanation and the programmatic definition of the new movement. One of the initiators of the movement, Romulus Zãroni,20 had argued that the Ploughmen’s Front wanted to become a “professional ploughmen organization that intends to defend its interests and support our rights,” as well as a means of expressing “the will [of its members] in general matters.” Zãroni had urged the peasants to leave their political parties since “they have long exploited the country and us peasants so that now we are dirt-poor.” The affirmation that stood at the basis of the whole political movement of the ploughmen—“our rise to well-being can be accomplished only by ourselves”—was especially interesting. Romulus Zãroni criticized the policy promoted in the rural society by political parties, such as the creation of Agricul- tural Chambers seen as “nests where politicians get their own way.” In addition, he claimed that the ploughmen movement must also aim to send representatives of peasants in the state’s Parliament, in the county committee or in the Agricul- tural Chamber because “[our] rights and dignity must be respected regardless of the fact that one is wearing a ‘ºuba,’ a sheepskin or a coat.”21 The organizing group continued to take action and the Horia gazette would declare its direct support for the new movement. Since the authorities were extremely suspicious of the initiative to establish a peasant organization, the initiative group decided to send a statement to the Minister of Internal Affairs in which they wanted to specify “the kind of organization, which is established only in accordance to the law and does not intend to go against it, that is: to organize ourselves in the same way as all the guilds in the country.” The minister had to be informed that this movement had no connection to the com- munists and that its members were not “instigators.” The participants had also conducted an analysis of the number of registrations in the organization. From the quoted report, 3,000 members were registered in district of Deva and 4,000 members were registered in the other ones.22 On 19 February, a programmatic document entitled “The Ploughmen’s Front: Our Program” was published. This manifesto was signed by the Com- mittee of the Ploughmen’s Front, district of Deva, Hunedoara County. General- ly, the programmatic points were those included in “Dorinþa þãranilor” (Wishes of the peasants) manifesto, published on January 31. These were some of the most notable provisions: the waiver of 3/4 of the peasants’ debt, the stamping of money, people should not hold multiple offices, the reduction of ministries by half and the dissolution of state sub-secretariats, the reduction of the num- 128 • Transylvanian Review • Vol. XXVII, No. 1 (Spring 2018) ber of mps by half, the cancellation of allowances and attendance fees in the administrative councils, the regulation of industrial production and commerce for the people according to everyone’s needs.23 Between 4 February and 18 April 1933—when the first congress of the organization was held—the draft program had been the subject of “peasant debates” during public assemblies where it was improved and expanded. Petru Groza played a significant part in explaining and disseminating the programmatic principles of the Ploughmen’s Front to the peasantry.24 Letters from peasants who showed their support to the Ploughmen’s Front were published regularly in the Horia gazette. There were also calls to “join the Ploughmen’s Front.”25 The initiators of this organization had repeatedly expressed their belief that “the road we have taken is difficult and treacherous,” but they were convinced that this “road of suffering can only lead to salvation.”26 After an intense organizational effort, the first congress of the ploughmen organization was held on 18 April 1933. In the courtyard of Decebal Bank in Deva, where the main shareholder was Petru Groza himself, approximately 12,000 peasants gathered from most villages in Hunedoara County.27 The congress drew the attention of the press in Transylvania and also in Bucharest.28 Miron Belea was elected president of the congress.29 A 17-point program was adopted.30 All articles were followed by explanations and substantial arguments. The style of argumentation and the legal terms proved that this was not the work of peasants but of people familiar with the legal and economic language. The last article emphasized the idea that the Ploughmen’s Front wanted to be an organization that would represent the interests of all peasants, irrespective of language, race and religion: “This is why the Ploughmen’s Front from Hunedo- ara County, which was created from the bottom up, based on the sufferings of people, without the artificial and compromised intervention of party-makers . . . feels entitled to shout from one border to the next: Ploughmen from all corners of the country, join us!” At the end of the congress, the peasants were extremely agitated, emotional and fretful, and some of them demanded that the programmatic provisions be enforced immediately. This can be considered to be the moment of the official founding of the Ploughmen’s Front. It is interesting to observe that Petru Groza appeared in the texts and the documents of the Front as an “animator.”31 The message at the end of the works of the congress was that the Ploughmen’s Front had set its objective of fighting “against politicians, or the tools of capital, who cheated the peasants; . . . against the capital and the order based on it since it is the root of evil...” The means with which the organization was meant to fight consisted of “uniting the groups of peasants and putting aside the feud stirred among them by politicians; it will organize these groups Transsilvanica • 129 from top to bottom; it will request the enforcement of the law and the right to improve its condition, rights that are written down in the Constitution.”32 During the following months, the initiative groups of the ploughmen organization went from village to village in Hunedoara County with the mission to recruit as many members as possible. The local manner of organization was very simple and it copied the way in which mass political parties (national peasant parties) would organize: the ploughmen in a commune gathered in the same place, they drafted a report signed by everyone and they chose a delegate and an alternate (deputy). In large communes, each settlement chose a liaison and together they formed the communal committee. At the level of district, a president, vice-president and a district committee (8–12 people, according to the size of the district) were elected. At the county level, a county committee was founded with 5 delegates from each district. “This being a ploughmen organization only—a memorandum stated—the delegates of communes, the members of the district and county committees can only be ploughmen themselves. Intellectu- als and friends of the front with a spotless past and who are known to fight the good fight may be elected as honorary members of the commune, district and county organizations, without the right to vote, acting as animators and guides.”33 According to this statement, Petru Groza could not occupy an active position in this organization. Any peasant who embraced the program and the struggle to accomplish it could have become a member of the Ploughmen’s Front to the extent of his abilities and strengths. Each member had to pay a one leu membership fee.34 On 10 May 1933, the first county Committee of the Ploughmen’s Front was founded in Deva. Its members were: Miron Belea, Tudor Cionca, Gheorghe Borca, Adam Mariş, Nicolae Bembea, Petru Maliþa etc.; Petru Groza, Aurel Filimon and Petru Guia-Moþu became honorary members.35 The Horia gazette claimed that the organization of the Ploughmen’s Front had spread so much and so fast due to the poverty that most of the rural class was facing. The peasants had understood that this movement had nothing in common with the actions of political parties. The members of the Front referred to their opponents as “the network of leeches, exploiters, big financiers who hold the banks,” and to the political parties and politicians as “the tools they use against us.”36 The organizational activities of the Ploughmen’s Front drew the attention of the provincial press and of the central newspapers. Thus, the Temeswarer Zeitung of Timişoara, Gazeta comercianþilor of Oradea, Déli Hírlap of Târgu-Mureş and Reggeli Újsag of Cluj had commented upon the actions of the peasants from Hunedoara County. Without any evidence, the Bucharest newspaper Epoca declared that the ploughmen’s movement had Bolshevik origins. The Bucharest magazine Realitatea ilustratã dedicated several pages of its 130 • Transylvanian Review • Vol. XXVII, No. 1 (Spring 2018)

27 April 1933 issue to the congress held on 18 April 1933 including pictures from the event. The Bucharest newspapers Lupta, Dimineaþa and Universul had widely reported on the assembly in Deva on 18 April. The editor of Adevãrul made some meaningful remarks, saying that “what happened in Deva with the Ploughmen’s Front is a warning for the political parties that still hope to conquer villages with a few long talks, with several phrases that have flexible meanings, with a few last-minute promises. . .”37 The founding of “a new kind” of group was also noted by the right wing press. For example, in his article published in Cuvântul on 11 May 1933, Nae Ionescu, discussing the stages of peasant movements in the Old Kingdom that were successful in Transylvania, said: “Now, finally, [there is] the founding of the so-called ‘ploughmen’s front’.”38 The commotion caused by the ploughmen organization and by Petru Groza drew the attention of the authorities and alerted the Police, Gendarmerie and “Siguranþa” (State Security). The Horia gazette regularly reported on the abuses that the gendarmes or policemen committed against peasant groups and on the arrests of Front leaders or propagandists. Moreover, the Front gazette and the propaganda brochure What Do We Want? were seized by the authorities repeatedly.39 During the year 1933, authorities in Hunedoara Country had regularly pointed out the agitated state induced in the rural society by the initiative groups of the Ploughmen’s Front.40 The notary in Rişculiþa commune reported to the prefect that “the peasants are driven by dreams and ideas which . . . the way we see it, could be easily considered to be of a communist nature. They flatly refuse to pay their debts and are starting to refuse paying taxes. They absolutely believe that a government should come and eliminate such high taxes since they no longer have the money for that.”41 The Minister of Internal Affairs, a member of the National Peasant Party, Alexandru Vaida-Voevod, characterized the ploughmen organization as a “dangerous and subversive movement.”42 By the autumn of 1933 the Ploughmen’s Front had already become a consolidated organization within the rural world of Hunedoara County. Even if the involvement of Petru Groza was obvious, the organization still did not have an elected leader. The explanation lies in the fact that Petru Groza preferred to stay in the shadow of the organization, simply to confirm the fact that the initiators had founded the organization “from the bottom to the top.” Perhaps he feared that the movement would turn out to be a failure and so he hesitated to take the reins of the organization. Dorin-Liviu Bîtfoi believes that Petru Groza’s hesitance to officially become the leader of the new organization was due to the fact that he secretly wanted to make Marshal Alexandru Averescu the leader of the Ploughmen’s Front.43 Finally, on 8 November, Groza was elected president of the Ploughmen’s Front in an assembly of representatives from 12 district committees.44 Transsilvanica • 131

In the years that followed, the rhythm of political activities in Hunedo- ara County slowed down, but other concerns surfaced, such as extending the ploughmen organization to the neighboring counties and beyond. It is extremely difficult to approximate the number of members of the Ploughmen’s Front, as is the case with every political party at that time. In July 1936, the Ploughmen’s Front had organizations in 122 communes of Hunedoara County.45

The Ploughmen Organization and the Elections

he political aims of the new organization were clear and the historical sources confirm the idea that the peasants were enthusiastically involved T in the election campaign of December 1933, even if the organization had neither a solid basis, nor substantial financial support. The political mobilization of ploughmen organizations became apparent through the initiation of various election assemblies, man-to-man propaganda, as well as the distribution of election flyers including short messages or poems about the election.46 The Plough- men’s Front submitted an electoral list with nine candidates for the Assembly of Deputies and another list with three candidates for the Senate.47 The election program was the one adopted by the congress in April 1933 and the brochure Ce vrem? (What do we want?) represented a fundamental element of propaganda. The electoral symbol of the Ploughmen’s Front assigned by the Central Election Commission was two horizontal parallel lines.48 The allocated symbol had been assigned during the previous parliamentary elections to the commu- nists; therefore, the members of the Front showed their disapproval and filed a protest with the Commission. The leaders of the organization from Hunedoara stated that “our enemies will try to raise a new army against us” by assign- ing them such a symbol. The new electoral symbol was defined as the “New Path.” In the Senate, Petru Groza was first on the list for Hunedoara County, followed by ploughmen Ion Fãrcaş and Aron Baicu, and in the Assembly of Deputies, Miron Belea was at the top of the list, followed by ploughmen Ion Moga, Guia Petru Moþu, Romulus Zãroni, Trifon Costache, Miron Cranciova, Aurel Saturn, Remus Lula, and Ion Cazan. The candidate for the college of municipal and county councils was peasant Ion Pãsculescu.49 The entire election campaign revolved around Groza, portrayed as the “great man of our nation, our worthy president...” The message sent by the leader of the organization focused on the idea of his sacrifice for the peasants and not for his own interests; he was fighting “for everyone’s cause, for a sacred cause,” for the creation of a “new world.”50 The image of the president of the organization created by the propaganda that surrounded him was that of the savior of the peasantry, a new 132 • Transylvanian Review • Vol. XXVII, No. 1 (Spring 2018)

Messiah of the rural world: “The clock strikes twelve, wake up ploughmen! Mr. Groza has raised the peasant community of Transylvania as Jesus raised Lazarus from the dead . . . The president of the Ploughmen’s Front, Dr. Petru Groza, did not go to Monte Carlo or to bathe at Karlsbad, he bowed neither to Hitler, nor to Mussolini, neither did he seize the power from the French, nor from the English, he empowered the soul of the life of ploughmen, he strengthened his health with water from our country’s springs, his luxury baths were the cold waves of the Strei River in the Haþeg Mountains, he rejoiced in the exploration of our mountains, always keeping an eye on our fate.”51 The percentage of votes obtained by the Ploughmen’s Front was 0.27%, but in Hunedoara County the results were surprising: it came second in the Assembly of Deputies, after the National Liberal Party which had organized the elections, and in the Senate it got 13.47% of the total number of votes.52 In the partial elections of Hunedoara County held on 18 February 1936, the Ploughmen’s Front supported the National Peasant Party candidate, Ghiþã Pop.53 Some members were not satisfied with this. Miron Belea publicly expressed his objections during an assembly in Deva.54 Groza argued that the alliance with the National Peasant Party could be justified by the changes that Romania was going through at that time, by the danger of fascism and far right movements.55 Ghiþã Pop participated in several meetings organized by the Ploughmen’s Front. Pop won the elections with 31,965 votes, almost 7,000 more than the candidate of the liberals and almost 25,000 more than the candidate of the Goga–Cuza group.56 Thus, the victory obtained by Ghiþã Pop in the partial elections of Hunedoara County had only been possible with the extremely significant support of the Ploughmen’s Front. Consequently, a large number of peasants joined the Ploughmen’s Front following its indirect success in the elections. This also became apparent when, during a gathering of the Agrarian Union Party from Târnava Mare County at Rupea, Constantin Argetoianu observed with sadness that the Ploughmen’s Front was animating the people in his own organization.57 The participation of the Ploughmen’s Front in the election for the City Council of Deva in 18 April 1937 represented a failure. The main reasons for this were the alliance with madosz (Magyar Dolgozók Szövetsége/the Union of Hungarian Workers), as well as the coalition of the Liberal Party with the National Peasant Party and the Goga–Cuza Group.58 Moreover, the Plough- men’s Front did not obtain a favorable result in the communal and county elections that were held on 25 July 1937. The results were as follows: the common list obtained 15,458 votes and the liberal government got 24,648 votes.59 The number of votes obtained by the ploughmen organization is not to be neglected. To be able to take part in the elections of December 1937, the Ploughmen’s Front joined an alliance which supported the National Peasant Party.60 Romulus Transsilvanica • 133

Zãroni was a candidate on the National Peasant Party list.61 The ploughmen organization published the propaganda brochure De ce nu trebuie sã fie plugarul român fascist (Why the Romanian ploughman must not be a fascist) signed by Romulus Zãroni. Conceived in the wake of an antifascist national-peasant-party discourse, the brochure included the following chapters: “Parliamentarism”; “The period of false democracy”; “Election Law”; “The Parties”; “The election proceedings”; “Politics”; “Dictatorship”; “The slogan of dictatorship”; “The ploughman in fascist countries”; “Capitalism”; “What does the Ploughmen’s Front do?”; “Right and Left.”62 Romulus Zãroni justified the brochure by the fact that, at that time, a part of the peasants had been lured “unknowingly” in the trap of certain fascist organizations. The author believed that “the salvation of ploughmen under the dictatorship of the rich is a deceptive illusion which will cost us dearly.”63 Zãroni employed Groza’s discourse regarding the political organizations that were threatening Romanian democracy and declared that the National Christian Party, the Romanian Front and the Totul pentru Þarã (All for the Country) Party are the main agents of fascist dictatorship: “They promote the fight against the kikes [Jews] so that they may install the dictatorship, to lead us, Romanians, by force. They say that the people are too dumb and should not decide their own fate, they must be led by force and they also say that only the kikes are supporters of democracy since they reap all the benefits of it” (sic!).64 These parties would not be able to solve the peasants’ plight. “It is our duty to find the cure in ourselves and by our own means, seeking the single recipe that could cure our diseases.” The Ploughmen’s Front was the only organization that tried and managed to find a healing recipe for the maladies of the Romanian peasantry included in their program What Do We Want?.65 Romulus Zãroni’s conclusion was that “all the points of this program can only be accomplished if the system of false democracy changes so that the ploughmen and those that try to live by their own physical and intellectual means have the possibility of directing their own fate and household. That is to say, the introduction of a clean democracy would prevent the installation of a personal, party or military dictatorship of racketeers. Serious democracy in our country can only be achieved when we ploughmen are more organized, united together in a tight bond.”66 The leaders of the Ploughmen’s Front participated alongside the leaders of the Hunedoara County organization of the National Peasant Party at several assemblies that were organized during the election campaign. Thus, on 17 De- cember 1937, an assembly was organized in Deva and held in the courtyard of Decebal Bank with the participation of over 1,200 peasants. Iuliu Maniu was also among the participants.67 The National Peasant Party list, also supported by the Ploughmen’s Front, was voted by 13,733 people in Hunedoara and only came in third place after the liberals and the legionaries.68 Groza’s hopes had not been based on a realistic assessment of the force of the Ploughmen’s Front. 134 • Transylvanian Review • Vol. XXVII, No. 1 (Spring 2018)

Conclusions

he establishment of the regime of authoritarian monarchy would end the first stage in the short history of the Ploughmen’s Front marked by T the attempts of a group of peasants led by Petru Groza to establish a ploughmen organization, an alternative to the National Peasant Party. In the early years, the Front was only limited to the Hunedoara County where the rural population (in 1930) represented 85.82% of the total population.69 There it suc- ceeded to attract a significant number of peasants, attempting to extend its reach to the nearby counties or even to other areas of the country. Although its impact on the country was insignificant, we could say that the organization led by Petru Groza was a serious competitor of the political parties in Hunedoara County, especially of the National Peasant Party.70 The loss of trust in the National Peas- ant Party’s message became apparent in the early 1930s and was generated by the economic crisis as well as by the party’s unsuccessful governments. The erosion of Iuliu Maniu’s popularity, the lack of profound connections between the local national-peasant elites and the peasants and the demagogy of party agents led to the dissatisfaction of many peasants who sought other ways to solve the economic and social problems they were facing. The organizations of the Ploughmen’s Front were founded rapidly in Hune- doara County and within three years there were 120 organizations in communes and villages. Despite the fact that we do not have exact figures on the size of these organizations, the documents of that time show that peasants had enthusiastically joined the organizational structures of the Ploughmen’s Front. In this case, the peasants were important actors in the process of building a political organization and not just the subject of political rhetoric and propaganda. Also, during the interwar period, the turnout in elections for Hunedoara County was high and it often exceeded the national average, standing as evidence of the high level of political activism in the area. If we add another ingredient to all these realities—the political project of Petru Groza, a charismatic leader who was willing to spend resources—we get the appropriate conditions for the birth of a rural political movement, with an agrarian orientation, an alternative to the National Peasant Party. At the same time, this political activism led to the emergence of local peasant leaders (Romulus Zãroni,71 Ion Moga-Fileriu, Miron Belea, Guia Petru Moþu, Tudor Cionca, Ioniþã Dumbravã, Dãnuþ Şotângã etc.) who played a major role in building the ploughmen organization and who would also become part of the leadership of the Ploughmen’s Front in its second stage of development, from 1944 onwards. These local leaders were the core members of the Front until the party’s dissolution in 1953. q Transsilvanica • 135

Notes

1. Mircea Valea, “Înfiinþarea organizaþiei ‘Frontul Plugarilor’ şi primii ani de activitate (1933–1935),” Sargetia (Deva) 8 (1971); Gh. I. Ioniþã and Gh. Þuþui, Frontul Plu- garilor (1933–1953) (Bucharest: Institutul de Studii Istorice şi Social-Politice de pe lângã cc al pcr, 1970). 2. Dorin Liviu-Bîtfoi, Petru Groza, ultimul burghez: O biografie (Bucharest: Compa- nia, 2004). In recent years, more has been published on the postwar activity of the Ploughmen’s Front: Vasile Ciobanu, Sorin Radu, and Nicolae Georgescu, eds., Fron- tul Plugarilor: Documente, vol. 1, 1944–1947; vol. 2, 1948–1951 (Bucharest: inst, 2011, 2012); Gabriel Moisa, Frontul Plugarilor din Regionala Crişana-Maramureş (1945–1953) (Oradea: Ed. Universitãþii din Oradea, Ed. Muzeului Þãrii Crişurilor, 2012); Sorin Radu, “‘Tovarãşi de drum’: Frontul Plugarilor şi Partidul Comunist în anii 1944–1947,” Revista istoricã (Bucharest) 23, 1–2 (2012): 107–138; id., “The Political Organization of the Peasantry in Communist Romania: the Ploughmen’s Front (1945–1953),” Bulgarian Historical Review 1–2 (2013): 79–101; Sorin Radu, Cosmin Budeancã, and Flavius Solomon, “The ‘Comrades,’ Propaganda and the Collectivization of Agriculture in Eastern Europe: The Ploughmen’s Front in Ro- mania,” Historický časopis 63, 1 (2015): 113–135. 3. See Sorin Radu and Oliver Jens Schmitt, eds., Politics and Peasants in Interwar Roma- nia: Perceptions, Mentalities, Propaganda (Newcastle upon Tyne: Cambridge Scholars Publishing, 2017). 4. Stephen Fischer-Galati, “Peasantism in Interwar Eastern Europe,” Balkan Studies 1–2 (1967): 103–114; Heinz Gollwitzer, ed., Europäische Bauernparteien im 20. Jahrhun- dert (Frankurt a.M.: Fischer Verlag, 1977); Eduard Kubu˚ et al., eds., Agrarismus und Agrareliten in Ostmitteleuropa (Berlin–Prague: Berliner Wissenschaftsverlag, 2013); Helga Schultz and Angelika Harre, eds., Bauerngesellschaften auf dem Weg in die Mo- derne (Wiesbaden: Harrassowitz Verlag, 2010); Dietmar Müller and Angelika Harre, eds., Agrarian Property and Agrarianism in East Central Europe in the Nineteenth and Twentieth Centuries (Innsbruck–Vienna–Bozen: Studienverlag, 2011); Liviu Neagoe, The “Third Way”: Agrarianism and Intellectual Debates in Interwar Romania (Buda- pest: ceu Press, 2008); Hannes Siegrist and Dietmar Müller, eds., Property in East Central Europe: Notions, Institutions and Practices of Landownership in the Twentieth Century (New York–Oxford: Berghahn Publishing House, 2015). 5. Sorin Radu and Oliver Jens Schmitt, “Introduction,” in Politics and Peasants in Inter- war Romania, 2–3. 6. Ibid. 7. Mattei Dogan, Comparaþii ºi explicaþii în ºtiinþa politicã ºi în sociologie (Iaºi: Institutul European, 2010), 267. 8. Rãzvan Florin Mihai, “A Socio-Professional Analysis of the Candidates in General Elections (1926–1937): Case Study: Agriculturalist Candidates on the Lists of the Assembly of Deputies,” in Politics and Peasants in Interwar Romania, 271–293; Valer Moga, “The Road of Transylvanian Romanian Farmers to Greater Romania’s Politi- cal Arena,” in Politics and Peasants in Interwar Romania, 295–327. 9. Dogan, 267, 272. 136 • Transylvanian Review • Vol. XXVII, No. 1 (Spring 2018)

10. Alex Drace-Francis, The Traditions of Invention: Romanian Ethnic and Social Stereo- types in Historical Context (Leyden–Boston: Brill, 2013). 11. “Deşteptarea þãranilor români: Mãreaþa adunare din 8 ianuarie la Deva,” Horia (Deva) 2, 1 (14 January 1933). 12. Valea, 224; Ioniþã and Þuþui, 13–16. 13. The first issue of the Horia gazette was printed on 25 June 1932. 14. Frontul Plugarilor: Cum s-a nãscut. Ce este. Ce vrea? (Bucharest: n.p., n.d.), 18. 15. Nicolae Georgescu and Sorin Radu, “Întemeierea ºi organizarea Frontului Plugarilor (1933),” in Stat şi societate în Europa, eds. Sorin Damean and Lucian Dindiricã, vol. 4 (Târgoviºte: Ed. Cetatea de Scaun, 2012), 187–188. 16. Miron Belea, “Democraþia naþional-þãrãniştilor,” Horia 1, 1 (19 February 1933). 17. “A treia mare adunare a plugarilor þinutã la Bãiþa,” Horia 1, 1 (19 February 1933). 18. “Marea adunare de la Þebea sub gorunul lui Horia,” Horia 1, 5 (26 February 1933); the proceedings of the assembly are also widely described in no. 6 of 1 March 1933. 19. “Moartea minciunei,” Horia 1, 8 (22 March 1933). 20. Sorin Radu and Cosmin Budeancã, “Romulus Zãroni: un personaj politic atipic de la jumãtatea secolului XX,” in Marginalitãþi, periferii şi frontiere simbolice: Societatea comunistã şi dilemele sale identitare, Anuarul Institutului de Investigare a Crimelor Co- munismului ºi Memoria Exilului Românesc (Bucharest) 9 (2014): 59–86. 21. “Sã pãrãsim partidele,” Horia 1, 1 (19 February 1933). 22. “Proces-verbal,” Horia 1, 5 (26 February 1933). 23. Ibid. 24. Horia 1, 8 (22 March 1933). 25. An example of a call: “Attention, ploughmen! There is no law that stops citizens from organizing as they wish and the freedom of belief is sacred in our Constitution and laws. Our program is completely legal and constitutional. Organise!” Horia 1, 6 (1 March 1933). 26. “Credeul nostru,” Horia 1, 7 (11 March 1933). 27. Ce vrem? Istoricul. Programul. Organizarea (Deva: Tip. Decebal, 1933), 5. In a later paper, the approximate number of participants was exaggerated to 20,000: Primul Congres general al Frontului Plugarilor (Bucharest: Ed. Frontul Plugarilor, 1945), 31. 28. News correspondents from Bucharest, Timişoara, Braşov, Târgu-Mureş, Arad, Oradea, and Cluj were present. Dimineaþa (20 April 1933) described the enthusiasm of the participants; for hours “peasant speakers hold speeches in turn on the improvised platform. All of them criticize petty politics and point out the evil caused by politics since the war.” 29. Horia gazette had widely covered the proceedings of the Congress in no. 11 of 22 April 1933 (“Botezul Frontului Plugarilor”). In the same year, this article was published in a brochure entitled Ce vrem? (What do we want?). 30. Central National Historical Archives, Bucharest, Archive of the Central Committee of the Romanian Communist Party (hereafter cited as cnhab, accrcp), coll. Frontul Plugarilor, R. 430, c. 54–57. 31. Georgescu and Radu, 47–50. 32. cnhab, accrcp, coll. Frontul Plugarilor, R. 430, c. 54. 33. Ibid., c. 56, 57; Ce vrem?, 63–64. 34. Frontul Plugarilor: Cum s-a nãscut. Ce este. Ce vrea?, 28–29. Transsilvanica • 137

35. Ioniþã and Þuþui, 37. 36. “Împotriva cui?” Horia 1, 16 (29 June 1933). 37. “Presa din þarã despre Frontul Plugarilor,” in Ce vrem?, 58–63. 38. Nae Ionescu, “Dupã demisia d-lui Maniu,” Cuvântul (Bucharest) 2887 (11 May 1933). 39. See Horia 1, 20 (11 September 1933). 40. National Archives, Hunedoara County Branch (hereafter cited as nah), coll. Pre- fectura Judeþului Hunedoara, file 1/1933, fol. 76. 41. nah, coll. Prefectura Judeþului Hunedoara, file 4/1933, fol. 23. 42. Mircea Chiriþoiu, “Cine a fost dr. Petru Groza?,” Dosarele istoriei (Bucharest) 3, 2 (18) (1998): 4. 43. Bîtfoi, 157–158. 44. “Consiliul Frontului Plugarilor,” Horia 1, 24 (29 November 1933). 45. Ion Lungu, Vasile Radu, Mircea Valea, Gheorghe I. Ioniþã, Liviu Mãrghitan, and C. Enea, Din trecutul de luptã al þãrãnimii hunedorene (Deva: Muzeul Regional Hune- doara, 1967), 309, 405. 46. cnhab, accrcp, coll. Frontul Plugarilor, R. 430, c. 126–127. 47. “Consiliul Frontului Plugarilor,” Horia 1, 24 (29 November 1933). 48. Sorin Radu, Electoratul din România în anii democraþiei parlamentare (1919–1937) (Iaşi: Institutul European, 2004), 194. The County Committee of the Ploughmen’s Front had proposed eight geometric shapes as an electoral symbol and none of them were approved by the Central Election Commission. 49. cnhab, accrcp, coll. Frontul Plugarilor, R. 430, c. 50; “Chemarea Frontului Plu- garilor!,” Horia 1, 24 (29 October 1933). 50. “Plugari Români, Plugari ai României!” Horia 1, 25 (16 December 1933). 51. “Bate ceasul al 12-lea,” Horia 1, 25 (16 December 1933). 52. Ioniþã and Þuþui, 53. 53. Ioan Scurtu, Istoria Partidului Naþional-Þãrãnesc, 2nd edition (Bucharest: Ed. Enci- clopedicã, 1994), 296. 54. Gheorghe Micle, Frontul Plugarilor şi clasa muncitoare (n.p.: Frontul Plugarilor, 1945), 13–14. 55. Ion Frãþilã and Nicolae Wardegger, eds., Documente hunedorene din istoria mişcãrii revoluþionare 1920–1944 (Deva: n.p., 1971), 292–293. 56. Scurtu, Istoria Partidului Naþional Þãrãnesc, 298–299. Commenting on the results of the partial elections, Mihai Popovici, president of the National Peasant Party in Transylvania and Banat, said that the victories in the counties of Hunedoara and Mehedinþi had been obtained due to the fact that Ghiþã Pop and Nicolae Lupu “had the support of Romanian democracy, of the Ploughmen’s Front and the social- democrats.” Dreptatea (Bucharest) 10, 2502 (22 February 1936). 57. Constantin Argetoianu, Pentru cei de mâine: Amintiri din vremea celor de ieri, vol. 11 (Bucharest: Humanitas, 1997), 59. 58. Lungu et al., 310. 59. Adevãrul (Bucharest) 51, 16408 (28 July 1937); Dr. Petru Groza, Articole, cuvântãri, interviuri, foreword by George Ivaşcu (Bucharest: Ed. Politicã, 1973), 191–195. 60. Involved in the alliance were also: the Socialist Party (Popovici), the Conservative Party, and the madosz. Ioan Scurtu, “Lupta partidelor politice în alegerile parlamen- 138 • Transylvanian Review • Vol. XXVII, No. 1 (Spring 2018)

tare din decembrie 1937,” Studii (Bucharest) 1 (1967): 153; Anghel Nistor, “Poz- iþia forþelor democratice hunedorene în alegerile parlamentare din decembrie 1937,” Sargetia 14 (1979): 503. 61. nah, coll. Chestura de Poliþie, file 4/1937, fol. 117. 62. cnhab, accrcp, coll. Frontul Plugarilor, R. 430, c. 159–193. 63. Ibid., c. 162, 163. 64. Ibid., c. 172. 65. Ibid., c. 182, 183. 66. Ibid., c. 190. 67. nah, coll. Chestura de Poliþie Deva, file 82/1937, file 4/1937, fols. 95–99. 68. Nistor, 505. 69. Sabin Manuilã, Studiu etnografic asupra populaþiei României (Bucharest: Ed. Institu- tului Central de Statisticã, 1940), 46. 70. Marcel Ivan observed that the strongest electorate favourable to the National Peas- ant Party (npp) had been in the counties of Caraº, Alba, and Hunedoara: Marcel Ivan, Evoluþia partidelor noastre politice în cifre şi grafice 1919–1932 (Sibiu: Krafft & Drotleff, 1934), 12. In Hunedoara County, the npp was extremely sympathised during the interwar period, a fact confirmed by the large number of votes—more than the national results—obtained when the party was in power and also when it was in the opposition. The npp obtained the following number of votes in Hunedoara County: 1926, 35,771 votes, 59% (national percentage 27.73%); 1927, 26,768 votes, 44.91% (national percentage 22.09%); 1928, 56,517 votes, 88.68% (national percentage 77.76%); 1931, 22,800 votes, 35.02% (national percentage 14.99%); 1932, 34,358 votes, 54.11% (national percentage 40.30%). Ivan, 48–65. 71. Radu and Budeancã, 59–86.

Abstract Political Activism in the Romanian Countryside of the 1930s: The Peasants from Hunedoara County and the Ploughmen’s Front

Our article contends that the effort of organizing and developing the Ploughmen’s Front, even if it was first limited to Hunedoara County, represents a case of political engagement and activism in which the peasants showed that they could surmount political passivity, understanding that in order to overcome the underdevelopment of the rural world and economic decline, voting and ballot participation were not enough; that is why they decided to adhere to a political structure. In this case, the peasants were important actors in the process of building a political organization, and not just the subject of political rhetoric and propaganda. Our thesis claims that there was a direct involvement of the peasants in the organization of the Ploughmen’s Front, with great enthusiasm on their part, which may partially refute the dominant thesis in Romanian history which states that the peasants were an unstructured, uneducated, easily manipulated crowd, freely recruited in a political maneuver conducted by a sort of dandy of Romanian politics.

Keywords political integration, Romanian countryside, electorate, Ploughmen’s Front, Petru Groza editorial events

Politics and Population

I o a n B o l o v a n in Romania (1948–2015)

The size and the structure of a country’s population during a cer- i h ae l a

M tain period of time are essential for the understanding of historical evolu- and , tions. The demographic research on contemporary Romania, especially nes c u Ã after World War II, is still quite mod- u m

D est. Among the few approaches, it is a Þ worth mentioning the works of Vladi-

u m ini mir Trebici, Vasile Gheþãu, Dumitru , L (Romania’s demography in the post-war Sandu, Cornelia Mureºan, and oth-

Demografia României în perioada postbelicã ers. Consequently, any professional o t a r iu ª,

R contribution is not only necessary g u Ã r

Ã but welcomed as well. In this context, r aian T H (1948–2015) period, 1948–2015)(Iaºi: Polirom, 2017). the book written by Professor Traian Rotariu, Ph.D., and by two young researchers (Luminiþa Dumãnescu, Ph.D., and Mihaela Hãrãguº, Ph.D.), both of them trained at the Center for Population Studies of Babeº-Bolyai University in Cluj-Napoca, an elite scientific entity set up more than a quarter of a century ago and run until recently by the competent Traian Ro- Ioan Bolovan tariu, represents an elaborated scien- Head researcher at the Center for Tran- tific approach which fills a gap in the sylvanian Studies, Romanian Academy, specialised literature in Romania. Not vice-rector of Babeº-Bolyai University, only Professor Traian Rotariu but also Cluj-Napoca. the other two authors are consecrated 140 • Transylvanian Review • Vol. XXVII, No. 1 (Spring 2018) specialists in demography and population history. Traian Rotariu’s name is tied not only to the fundamental instruments published during a period of two decades (some massive volumes related to the censuses in Transylvania during 1850 and 1941), but also to a number of books that have been included lately in the mandatory list of bibliographic resources for students studying sociology, history, etc. Luminiþa Dumãnescu and Mihaela Hãrãguº have also published several books pertaining to the field of history and family demography, so that the expertise of the publishing authors in the field of demography and population studies is beyond any doubt. The book is comprised of two parts dedicated to the two chronological—and historical—segments making up the period of time ranging from 1948 to 2015: the first part—“Population and Demographic Policies during the Communist Regime (1948–1989)”—approaches, in roughly 100 pages, the history of the population from the first census carried out by the communist authorities in Romania until the fall of Nicolae Ceauºescu’s dictatorial regime in December 1989. Even though the upper limit of this first part is not delineated by a new census (the last one being carried out in 1977), it is justified by the repeal—immediately after 22 December 1989—of the anti-abortion law introduced by the Bucharest authorities after 1966. As the authors pertinently underline in the first part, especially in chapters 2 and 3—“Death Rate and Health Policies” and “Family and Population Repro- duction: Family Policies”—, the period of the communist regime in Romania (1948–1989) was a very interesting one from the point of view of the major role played by the state through its extremely active demographic policies. The communist state always interfered in the reduction of the death rate, even more so in what concerns the adjustment of the reproductive behaviour of the population by introducing laws, some of which seemed modern at that time, but the same totalitarian state also imposed, by coercion, measures to ensure a satisfac- tory demographic increase. As such, the demographic policy of the communist regime legitimated the state’s intervention in the “internal affairs” of its citizens, serving as a mechanism through which the state was able to control the Ro- manian population. Just like in the case of other totalitarian states, in Romania too the communist government acted at three levels to materialise its demographic policy. First, it took measures through repression, introducing a law against abortion and divorce; then, the communist regime in Bucharest stimu- lated pro-birth measures, granting financial aid and other advantages to women and families with many children; last but not least, it acted through persuasion, modifying and directing the public opinion—through the mass media—towards a reproductive behaviour as fruitful as possible. As such, for four decades, the Editorial Events • 141 focal point was the policy regarding general and child death rates, fertility, the family and the woman, all in a wider cultural, economic and social framework. Chapter 4 of the first part concentrates on “The Evolution of the Popu- lation Number and Some of Its Structural Modifications” between 1948 and 1989: dynamics, ethnical modifications, internal mobility, and population ageing. First of all, mention has to be made that the Romanian communist regime had the absurd obsession of increasing the country’s population at an alert pace, granting to the human potential an important role in the mission of building an ideal society. By presenting the figures pointing out the dynamics of the Romanian population between 1948 and 1989, one has to understand that the demographic policy of the communist regime reached its purpose only apparently. As such, Table 4.1 on page 83 shows that, in almost four decades of existence of the communist state, Romania’s population increased by more than 7 million inhabitants, which was one of the fastest growth rates in Europe. If, however, one refers to the ambitions of the dictator Nicolae Ceauºescu, included, in 1974, in The Programme of the Romanian Communist Party for the Creation of a Multilaterally Developed Socialist Society and for Romania’s Advance- ment Towards Communism (Bucharest, 1975), one shall see that the size of the Romanian population upon the fall of the communist regime was not really the one forecast 15 years earlier. The Programme of the Romanian Communist Party stipulated: “Appropriate measures shall be taken to ensure a normal demographic increase, to ensure a correct age distribution of the population, to maintain the youth of our people. A policy to increase the birth rate, and to help children and families with many children shall be consistently applied so that by 1990 Romania’s population should reach at least 25 million inhabitants, and by the year 2000 around 30 million inhabitants” (p. 92). His megalomania generated in Ceauºescu the desire of having as many subjects as possible; this made him implement an obsessive and abusive birth rate increase policy, which caused a lot of pain and suffering to the Romanian population in 1966–1989. His pro-birth efforts were connected to a nationalist rhetoric through which he claimed that “a great nation needs a large population.” Following the authors’ footsteps, it is worth mentioning at this point that through emigration Romania lost more than 600,000 inhabitants, a fact that has greatly affected especially the ethnical structure of the country (the Jewish and German communities drasti- cally decreased). The evaluation of the 1948–1989 period is made sine ira et studio, the remarks are balanced and take into consideration both the strengths and the weaknesses of the era, while the authors’ conclusion is one that leaves no doubt on what really matters in an analysis carried out by professionals: “The demographic heritage of the communist regime was one that did not create 142 • Transylvanian Review • Vol. XXVII, No. 1 (Spring 2018) any concern for the post-communist governments and also one that cannot be invoked to answer to the social problems that appeared afterwards” (p. 113). The second part of the book—“Demographic Phenomena and Processes during the Post-communist Era (1990–2015)”—focuses upon an extremely complex period, that of Romania’s transition from dictatorship back to democracy, a chronological stage defined by a series of structural transformations of powerful demographic impact. From this perspective, this book represents a pioneering work in the specialised literature in our country since it provides an overview of the main demographic phenomena in post-communist Romania. The scientific corpus of the past few years (studies and articles published by a few specialists in national or foreign reviews or volumes) made possible and at the same time necessary the transition from analysis to synthesis in order to bring out the researchers’ findings. Mention has to be made from the very start that the authors of this book have favoured this period in Romania’s recent history, this second part being more consistent than the 1948–1989 period, and that is why this section also has a larger number of chapters (six). The first topic approached in the second part looks at the size and structure of Romania’s population after 1990, highlighting first the data resulted from the censuses carried out in 1992, 2002, and 2011, as well as from the official statistics of the National Institute of Statistics. After having investigated the trends and determinants of the death rates, the authors allocate a large number of pages to marriage and divorce, but mostly to the issue of fertility that became responsible for Romania’s demographic collapse at the middle of the last decade of the 20th century. The Romanian family suffered significant changes after 1989, and the main elements determining these changes in the transformations suffered by the family were the major restructur- ings of the post-communist Romanian society which deepened the erosion of the existing traditional family that existed even before 1989 (we refer here to the “deindustrialization” process, the international exodus of the workforce after the removal of visas for most of the European countries at the beginning of the 2000s, etc.). Certainly, women emancipation has significantly progressed after 1989 not only due to the loosening of the divorce law, but also due to the cultural contacts and the access to information, and this has considerably impacted the fertility rate in Romania. And since bad things come in threes, the general reduction of the fertility rate brought another negative aspect to light. A large number of the children born in Romania in the last decades have been born to single mothers or to a family where only the father is employed; as such “at least half of the children born in Romania live in precarious conditions, which puts a strain on their future development chances” (p. 295). At the end of this chapter (as well as in other parts of the book), the authors don’t stop at diagnosing the Editorial Events • 143 problem, but they also come up with solutions that could provide a remedy to the negative aspects brought out by their research. Thus, to ensure a brighter future for the children born to underprivileged families, the authors think it would be more profitable for the Romanian state if it invested in the improvement of living standards for the born ones in order to increase their chances of a decent life than to give large amounts of money to increase fertility. Although the book does not insist upon the foreign mobility of the Romanian population both after 1989 and during the communist regime, migration played an important role in the change of the ethnical structure of the country’s population (the massive emigration especially of Jews and Transylvanian Saxons) and in the population ageing after 1990, in a context in which most of the emigrants fall into the young age groups. Once they have finished reading the book, the readers will be able to grasp the considerable effort made by the three authors who took up the challenge of offering an overview of Romania’s demographic potential in the past 70 years. The usefulness of this approach is complex as this work is addressed not only to specialists, students, political and administrative decision-makers, but also to the large educated audience that is in search of answers to the numerous (and most of the time negative) phenomena the Romanian society has been facing in the post-communist period. The tables and the graphs inherent to a book on population studies suggestively acompany the description, while the apparently plain and sober style associated with demographic research is adorned with historical, sociological and anthropological introspections that contribute to the readability of this book. q Book Reviews

d’étudier le thème de la Première Guerre Ion Cârja, Dan Lucian Vaida, Loránd L. mondiale sous un angle différent de celui Mádly, Dan Prahase, dir. traditionnellement connu, basé sur le Un ardelean în Marele Rãzboi/ caractère exceptionnel des événements et Ein Siebenbürger im Großen Krieg/ des personnalités de référence, et recom- A Transylvanian in the Great War : mandent pour la recherche un homme qui Albert Porkoláb (1880-1920) ne faisait pas partie de la première ligne Cluj-Napoca : Argonaut & Mega, 2016 des événements historiques, qui ne se re- trouvait pas nécessairement dans le canon ’ du héros de guerre. Par conséquent, tant L historiographie roumaine récente la direction d’approche que le contenu du a abordé sous diverses formes (conférences volume représentent une nouveauté remar- scientifiques nationales et internationales, quable dans l’historiographie roumaine. publications, etc.) le sujet de la guerre En termes de structure, le livre se com- transnationale et transcontinentale connue pose de sept chapitres inégaux, non seule- comme la Grande Guerre – déroulée entre ment comme taille, mais aussi par les moda- 1914-1918 (par exemple, le volume Pri- lités scientifiques employés. Dans les deux mul Rãzboi Mondial. Perspectivã istoricã şi premiers chapitres – « Albert Porkoláb istoriograficã/World War I : A Historical and – le destin d’un officier oublié. Considé- Historiographical Perspective, sous la direc- rations introductives » et « Note sur l’édi- tion de Ioan Bolovan, Gheorghe Cojocaru tion » – on peut voir comment les édi- et Oana Mihaela Tãmaş, Cluj-Napoca, teurs démontrent pourquoi ils ont choisi Académie Roumaine – Centre d’Études la vie sur le front d’Albert Porkoláb Transylvaines, Cluj University Press, pour leurs études. Les auteurs affirment 2015 ; Première Guerre mondiale : l’autre que l’officier transylvain a le mérite d’avoir visage de la guerre, publié par Ioan Bolovan, laissé comme héritage plus de 300 images Rudolf Gräf, Harald Heppner et Oana et transmis des dizaines de pièces épisto- Mihaela Tãmaş, Cluj-Napoca: Académie laires au cours des années 1903 à 1919, Roumaine – Centre d’Études Transyl- d’où la motivation pour démontrer l’as- vaines, Cluj University Press, 2016 ; Impe- pect unique de ces sources primaires et de ri e nazioni nell’Europa centro-orientale alla les mettre en circulation scientifique. vigilia della Prima Guerra Mondiale (Atti Une autre raison pour laquelle Albert del Convegno internazionale, Cluj-Napoca, Porkoláb a été choisi pour faire l’objet 21 febbraio 2014), édité par Ion Cârja, in- d’une telle enquête scientifique est parce troduction par Andrea Ciampani, Rome – qu’il y a eu peu de cas de participants à la Cluj-Napoca, Argonaut, 2016 etc.). Première Guerre mondiale à avoir légué un Les éditeurs du livre Un ardelean în si grand nombre de photographies faites Marele Rãzboi/Ein Siebenbürger im Großen en temps de guerre. D’autre part il y avait Krieg/A Transylvanian in the Great War : aussi peu de cas où des soldats originaires Albert Porkoláb (1880-1920) ont essayé de Transylvanie (autres que les Roumains), Book Reviews • 145 après avoir combattu sous l’Empire aus- Les rudes années passées sur le front tro-hongrois pendant la Première Guerre ont eu une influence négative sur la santé mondiale, se sont transférés dans l’armée de l’officier de Transylvanie, qui devient roumaine à la fin des hostilités. parti de l’armée roumaine en 1919. Deux Par conséquent, selon les auteurs, le ca- ans après que la Grande Guerre transna- ractère multinational de l’officier de Tran- tionale eut pris en 1920, il meurt – pro- sylvanie est une bonne raison de préserver bablement de grippe. Il n’avait pas eu un sa mémoire, tout comme sa collection rôle extraordinaire dans les batailles qui se personnelle de centaines de photographies déroulaient sur le front, étant seulement prises pendant la Grande Guerre. l’un des milliers d’officiers participant à Albert Porkoláb est né en 1880, à la Première Guerre mondiale. Cependant, Nãsãud, dans le Nord-Est de la Transylvanie sa contribution scientifique, qui consistait et a fréquenté l’École des Cadets d’Infante- dans la conservation des 308 photogra- rie à Budapest, entre 1895 et 1899. Après phies et 49 cartes postales couvrant la plu- l’obtention du diplôme de l’école militaire part de la période de la guerre, est beau- a été intégré dans le Régiment d’infante- coup plus importante que sa contribution rie k. u. k. no 63 de Bistriþa. Il a participé aux luttes. à diverses missions de l’armée austro-hon- Le chapitre « “Pour l’Empereur et la groise dans les régions de Bosnie et Mon- Patrie”. Albert Porkoláb sur le front de ténégro avant le déclenchement de la Pre- 1914 à 1918 » contient plus de 300 photos, mière Guerre mondiale en 1914. On peut la plupart ayant comme personnage prin- être sûr que cette période de sa vie pendant cipal Albert Porkoláb. Les auteurs nous re- laquelle il a participé aux luttes en qualité latent que les photographies de ce chapitre d’officier dans l’armée impériale de Vienne ont pour but de recréer l’atmosphère sur le dans la Première Guerre Mondiale a repré- front dans une double hypostase, l’une of- senté l’étape la plus difficile de sa carrière. ficielle et l’autre plus relaxante, présentant Lorsque la guerre a pris fin et que la re- A. Porkoláb à des moments différents de configuration de la carte politique de l’Eu- la vie. Il est important de noter qu’à côté rope – la désintégration des grands empires de l’attitude rigide, typique de sa fonction, européens – s’est terminé aussi, après 1918, amplifiée par l’atmosphère oppressive de la Transylvanie ferait partie du Royaume la guerre, l’officier de Nãsãud esquisse de la Roumanie, connu sous le nom la même des sourires dans ses images, ce « Grande Roumanie ». Dans ces circons- qui parle de son caractère, bien au-delà tances, l’officier Albert Porkoláb a choisi de tout aspect professionnel, obligatoi- de rester fidèle à la carrière militaire, et il rement maintenu. Le message possible a demandé le transfert dans l’armée rou- transmis par les sourires se traduirait tout maine. En fait, il est l’un des rares officiers simplement par l’espoir qu’il y aurait une de Transylvanie à avoir recours à ce geste, vie après la guerre, par l’optimisme que la et on pourra l’accuser de ne pas être fidèle vie elle-même reviendrait peut-être à l’état à l’ancienne armée dans laquelle il a lutté, d’avant la guerre. Il y a des images dans mais cette structure étant abolie – l’armée ses archives qui tombent dans la catégo- austro-hongroise – nous croyons qu’Albert rie de non-officiel ou qui nous présentent Porkoláb a demandé son transfert en affir- des scènes de détente, elles surprennent les mant sa loyauté à la carrière militaire et non soldats dans différentes situations quoti- au régime politique. diennes – soit en réparant leur chaussure 146 • Transylvanian Review • Vol. XXVII, No. 1 (Spring 2018) ou leurs chariots, renforçant des ponts et humeur : une telle guerre est une horreur, même en mettant des vêtements à sécher, grâce à Dieu que c’est fini [pour moi]. » qui sont des actions qui démontrent que Nous en déduisons alors la désillusion des les soldats ne participaient pas perpétuel- soldats, quelle que soit la partie du front lement aux luttes dans les tranchées, mais qu’ils sont placés, et nous voyons à travers ils avaient des moments d’accalmie aussi. un sourire une certaine libération de la Toujours dans la catégorie des photos non- pression psychique et physique causée par officielles sont celles dans lesquelles Albert les longues luttes épuisantes. Porkoláb apparaît aux côtés de ses co- Nous pouvons observer, comme détail llègues officiers, où ils socialisent, chantent. technique, que certaines photos contiennent Mais il ne faut pas supposer que l’officier des notes au dos, dans la plupart des cas elles transylvain aurait surpris seulement les identifient le lieu, la date, le destinataire ou le moments de détente, au contraire, la plu- nom de l’expéditeur et un court message. La part des photos prises sur le front conte- langue dans laquelle les dates mentionnées naient des activités spécifiques de la guerre sont écrites est l’allemand, étant la langue (p. 35-198) – représentant les équipements de commandement dans les régiments de militaires, les postes et les emplacements l’armée austro-hongroise (p. 23). Les édi- offensifs ou défensifs de leurs soldats, les teurs du volume ont traduit les notes écrites fils de fer barbelé, les tranchées, les ponts, en allemand vers le roumain, afin de faciliter les abris, les annexes de construction, les l’accès du public à ces informations sur la scènes de prestation de serment par les Grande Guerre. soldats. Toutes les photos sur ces thèmes Certes, chaque officier, outre la carrière s’y ajoutent dans la catégorie des cadres militaire, a eu une vie sociale active, comme officiels. S’y ajoutent les photos qui nous ce fut le cas d’Albert Porkoláb. Le cha- partagent quelques moments solennels de pitre intitulé génériquement « L’amour en l’armée, par exemple des scènes de visites temps de guerre. Itinéraire sentimental » des hauts fonctionnaires de l’Armée aus- illustre justement cet aspect en présentant tro-hongroise – la visite de l’héritier du l’officier de Nãsãud dans différentes situa- trône et futur empereur Charles Ier (IV), tions quotidiennes – s’agenouiller devant avec le prince Léopold de Bavière. sa fiancée, à qui il déclare son amour, ou Parmi ces cadres, quelque-uns dé- accompagner ses parents et ses amis (p. voilent des moments surprenants, comme 201-215). ceux qui montrent un soldat russe capturé Il paraît qu’Albert Porkoláb n’avait pas par le régiment de Nãsãud. Jusqu’ici il n’y de journal de guerre, mais il avait quelque a rien de spécial, parce que de nombreux chose que beaucoup ne pouvaient même avions ont été abattus, mais le sourire du pas espérer – la possibilité de réalisation prisonnier russe, pris par l’appareil pho- d’une chronique photographique. De nom- tographique, provoque au premier coup breux images et cartes postales montrent d’œil un grand étonnement. Dans ce cas que le front n’a pas complètement isolé les nous voulons souligner l’aspect humain soldats de leurs parents qui restaient à la de la capture du prisonnier russe, et notre maison. Les cartes postales étaient donc une étonnement provoqué par le sourire du manière efficiente de communication avec prisonnier disparaît quand on lit le mes- la famille, la communauté, mais les soldats sage sur le dos, écrit par Albert Porkoláb : ont dû faire attention au contenu des mes- « Le prisonnier russe capturé est de bonne sages, car aucune lettre n’a pu échapper à la Book Reviews • 147 censure militaire. Ainsi, le chapitre « À ceux Ottmar Traşcã and Stelian Obiziuc, eds. qui sont restés à la maison. Correspondance Diplomaþi români în slujba vieþii: 1903-1919 » rassemble la correspondance Constantin I. Karadja şi salvarea reçue et envoyée du front par l’officier de evreilor români din Europa în timpul Transylvanie (p. 219-241). celui de-al Treilea Reich (1932-1944)/ On peut dire que ce volume cherche à Romanian diplomats in the service répondre à des questions sur la Première of humanity: Constantin I. Karadja Guerre mondiale sous un autre angle, op- and the salvation of Romanian Jews posé à celui qui vise seulement la nature ex- in Europe during the Third Reich ceptionnelle des événements et des person- (1932–1944) nalités de référence. Il a essayé de recons- Foreword by Radu Ioanid, afterword by truire la réalité historique sous une forme Dennis Deletant différente – en récréant les événements non Cluj-Napoca: Argonaut, 2017 en se basant sur des documents officiels ou non-officiels (journaux de guerre, etc.) – mais en s’appuyant sur le format photogra- oon after the Law 217/2015 was ap- phique. Et par cette réalisation les éditeurs S proved by the Romanian Parliament, the ont réalisé une innovation non seulement delicate issue of anti-Semitism in interwar pour l’historiographie roumaine, mais aussi Romania appeared, again, into the public au niveau international. discourse. Knowing the truth is very im- Les photos prises rendent la réalité portant for a complete image of interwar objective expérimentée sur le front plus Romania. efficace que les mots, mots qui peuvent Several historians published very inter- être faux à cause de l’intervention subjec- esting volumes of documents about that tive de l’inconscient de l’écrivain. Ainsi, period or critical papers regarding one la chronique photographique de l’officier event or another. In the first category we de Transylvanie, qui nous montre des mo- can include the volume edited by historians ments du front, représente une nouveauté, Ottmar Traşcã and Stelian Obiziuc, a won- non seulement pour ces temps-là, mais derful collection of first hand documents aujourd’hui aussi on peut affirmer que about the fight for justice and, in the end, la nouveauté de la démarche des auteurs for life, during a very dark period in history. persiste, en publiant cette collection dans With a foreword signed by Radu Ioanid, le volume, qui introduit la figure d’Albert from the United States Holocaust Memo- Porkoláb dans le circuit universitaire. En rial Museum, the volume tells the story of plus la collection photographique peut être a rescuer of Romanian Jews during the utilisée comme source primaire pour les Holocaust. Constantin I. Karadja (1889– chercheurs, et non seulement historiens, 1950) was a diplomat, head of the Con- mais aussi pour ceux des autres domaines sular Department in Berlin and Romania’s tels que l’anthropologie, la littérature, la general consul in Berlin from 1932 to sociologie, la psychologie ou même les 1941. He was also director of the Consular médias. Department of Royal Ministry of Foreign q Affairs during 1941–1944. From these Robert-Marius Mihalache positions he could easily see the injustices done to Jews and he began to use his influence to help them. On 18 July 2005, 148 • Transylvanian Review • Vol. XXVII, No. 1 (Spring 2018)

Constantin I. Karadja was recognized by happened on 12 June 1941, when he was Yad Vashem Institute from Jerusalem as recalled to the central administration of Righteous Among the Nations, a very im- the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and hand- portant distinction granted to those who ed over the management of Romania’s had rescued Jews from extermination dur- General Consulate in Berlin. Before that, ing the Holocaust. he managed to propose a solution for the This very important volume brings to- Jews who traveled, one that would save gether 331 diplomatic documents from their lives: “mention on the passports of the reference collections kept in the ar- Romanian Jewish citizens of a convention- chive of the Romanian Ministry of For- al sign known by our authorities, but kept eign Affairs. Most of the reports signed by as discreet as possible, if not confidential Constantin I. Karadja during his time in . . . without insisting upon their race in Berlin contain information and details writing.” His proposal was accepted by about specific activities of a consular sec- the Leader of the State. tion, like passports issued, visas, Roma- From 1 July 1941, Constantin I. nian students studying in Germany, taxes Karadja assumed the new position of head or certificates. But, because of the rise of of the Directorate for Consular Affairs anti-Semitism in all Europe, and especially within the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. in Germany, Karadja’s reports to the Ro- That was a culminating moment of the manian Foreign Affairs Ministry contain relations between Romania and the Third distinct details about the situation of Ro- Reich. The new position offered him the manian Jews residing in Germany. He was possibility—between 1942 and 1944—to able to offer a detailed account of the Ro- be involved in saving the Romanian Jew- manian Jewish community in Berlin be- ish citizens from those territories occu- tween 1932 and 1938. His reports show pied/controlled by the Reich. But the po- his concern regarding the fate of these litical situation was rapidly degrading and people. In order to protect them from through the voice of the vice-president of the intolerant attitude of Nazi authori- the Council of Ministers, Mihai Antonescu, ties, Karadja proposed consultations with the Romanian Government declared that diplomatic representatives of the usa and there was “no interest in the return of Ro- Great Britain, so that the Romanian Jew- manian Jews.” The Reich started to de- ish citizens could be protected. port the Jews to concentration camps in Constantin I. Karadja was the first Poland. The “final solution” was prepared. Romanian diplomat who offered to his The attitude of the Romanian politi- superiors details about the measures im- cal regime towards the Jewish population plemented by the Nazi authorities for the in Romania, and the Romanian Jews in deportation of Jews to labor camps. He the Reich and the states under its control, was deeply concerned about “the situation would take a decisive turn at the end of of deported Jews” and asked for the inter- 1942 and beginning of 1943. Marshal Ion est of the Romanian state for its citizens, Antonescu started to review the politics regardless of their ethnic origins. His ac- on the Jewish question. During this time, tions did not remain unknown to German reports on the persecution of Romanian authorities, and his replacement was con- Jews continued to arrive from all over Eu- sidered not very difficult to secure. That rope. Constantin I. Karadja was involved Book Reviews • 149 in all the matters regarding Jewish Roma- Pãun Ion Otiman, dir. nian citizens. He sent a series of reports in Almãjul – de ieri, de azi şi de mâine the second half of 1943, and throughout sau mult dorita vale a miracolelor 1944, through which he requested the im- (L’Almãj d’hier, d’aujourd’hui et de mediate intervention of Romanian author- demain ou la tant souhaitée vallée ities for the repatriation of Romanian Jews des miracles) from extermination camps. His efforts Édition soignée par le professeur Dumitru made possible the salvation of thousands Popovici avec le soutien de l’Association of Jews from certain death. culturelle « Þara Almãjului », Bucarest, Constantin I. Karadja was not the only Académie Roumaine, Artpress, 2017 Romanian diplomat involved in this noble fight. As documents from this volume show, a number of other Romanian dip- a rénovation du discours historio- lomats, such as Constantin Mareş, Virgil L graphique en Roumanie a signifié, entre Zaborovschi, Mihail Stãnescu, Alexandru autres, le développement d’un domaine Stãnescu, Emil Pavelescu, Mihai Marina qui, avant 1989, est resté en quelque sorte and many others, distinguished themselves à la périphérie de la recherche scientifique, as part of Romanian diplomacy’s efforts to- la micro-histoire. Elle est devenue, pen- wards rescuing the lives of Romanian Jews dant les dernières décennies, une des ten- threatened by Nazi anti-Semitic measures. dances fertiles dans l’historiographie uni- This excellent volume of documents verselle que les historiens roumains n’ont edited by two prolific historians, Ottmar pas pu contourner, comme en témoignent Traşcã and Stelian Obiziuc, is very im- les volumes de la Bibliographie historique de portant for the recovery of the true his- la Roumanie parus après 1989. tory of interwar Romania. Besides the La récupération du passé de l’une ou 331 historical documents, the volume also de plusieurs communautés qui forment contains excellent explanatory notes and une entité géographique ou politico-ad- an extremely useful index of names and ministrative distincte est une nécessité places. The afterword signed by Dennis professionnelle. De pareilles monogra- Deletant and the list of facsimiles (includ- phies locales sont indispensables à l’éla- ing the Certificate of Honour from the Yad boration de futures synthèses d’histoire Vashem Jerusalem) complete this exquisite régionale, nationale ou universelle. Une volume which will be very useful both to série de monographies dédiées à différents professors, researchers and students in his- « pays » de Transylvanie ont été rédigées tory, and to the general public. All readers après 1989 sous forme de thèses de docto- will be able to learn more/new facts about rat en géographie régionale à l’Université Constantin I. Karadja and his incredible Babeş-Bolyai à Cluj-Napoca. Cette fois-ci, efforts to save lives in a very dark time in il s’agit d’une monographie monumen- history. tale dédiée à une entité historique-géo- q graphique du Banat : la Vallée de l’Almãj, Mihaela Gligor une micro-zone qui ne diffère en rien des « pays » étudiés pendant les dernières décennies. Ce qui la distingue des autres monographies susmentionnées est cepen- 150 • Transylvanian Review • Vol. XXVII, No. 1 (Spring 2018) dant sa perspective complexe, exhaustive, jusqu’au début du XXIe siècle. Les 31 la dimension géographique prédominante localités mentionnées sont des villages dans la plupart des monographies n’étant de différentes tailles. La première partie, dans ce cas qu’un prétexte pour rechercher intitulée « Population, habitat, parler dans l’histoire, l’économie, l’ethnographie de l’Almãj » fait une description physique et la zone. Paru dans la collection « Restitu- géographique de cette région (Ana-Neli tions » (6e volume), une série initiée par Ianãş), passe en revue l’évolution histo- l’académicien Pãun Ion Otiman, le pré- rique des localités depuis l’antiquité à nos sident de la Filiale de Timişoara de l’Aca- jours (Dan Oberşterescu, Dacian Runcu), démie Roumaine, cet ouvrage est dédié à présente l’habitat et les caractéristiques la fois à l’an 2018, « le centenaire du para- démographiques (Ana-Neli Ianãş) ainsi chèvement de la nation roumaine » et à que le parler de la population (Florina- l’an 1918, lorsque l’Almãj est devenu une Maria Bãcilã). Dans la deuxième partie partie intégrante de la Grande Roumanie, de l’ouvrage, intitulée « L’économie de grâce au travail et à la lutte de plusieurs l’Almãj », les auteurs reconstituent des générations. aspects concernant le milieu des affaires et Le thème du livre est généreux et d’ac- l’économie rurale non-agricole des 31 lo- calités de cette région (Pãun Ion Otiman, tualité dans le paysage de l’historiographie Vasile Goşa, Caius Goşa), de même que roumaine contemporaine, et il est abordé l’agriculture, la sylviculture et l’économie d’un point de vue interdisciplinaire, les forestière de l’Almãj (Pãun Ion Otiman, auteurs ayant constamment recours à Caius Goşa). La diversité du relief et les des méthodes propres à la géographie, la merveilles de la nature (telles que la source démographie historique, l’anthropologie intermittente Bigãr ou la Vallée Rudãriei) historique, l’histoire de l’économie, l’his- qui font de la Vallée de l’Almãj un lieu toire de la culture etc. L’Avant-propos suc- touristique malheureusement peu exploité cincte, dans lequel le professeur Dumitru sont abordées dans le dernier chapitre de la Popovici dévoile les intentions de l’ou- deuxième partie par le professeur Gheorghe vrage, est suivi d’un Argument qui passe Popovici. judicieusement en revue les motivations La troisième partie de la monographie, de la démarche du collectif coordonné par intitulée « Éducation, culture, traditions, le professeur Pãun Ion Otiman (16 cher- spiritualité dans l’Almãj » porte sur ce qui cheurs) et met en évidence le trait caracté- est vital dans le développement de toute ristique de la Vallée ou du Pays de l’Almãj : communauté et dans l’affirmation de sa « une unicité des sentiments, une unité du propre identité : l’éducation, la culture, les pays rarement rencontrée sur le territoire traditions et la spiritualité du peuple. Le de la Roumanie » (p. 19). chapitre consacré à l’enseignement (Pavel Le livre est structuré en cinq grandes Panduru) met en valeur aussi bien les réa- parties, complémentaires, chacune formée lités du passé qui apparaissent dans les de plusieurs chapitres (les trois premières documents relatifs à l’organisation scolaire parties ont quatre chapitres, les deux der- que la situation actuelle de l’éducation dans nières deux chapitres). Cette architecture les localités de l’Almãj. La culture et l’art organique, logique, assure la véridicité de populaires, les traditions de la région font cette monographie exhaustive de la Vallée l’objet de deux autres chapitres (Florina de l’Almãj depuis les temps anciens Nica, Maria Vâtcã, Diana Otiman), met- Book Reviews • 151 tant en avant la sensibilité et le goût esthé- nautés locales. Les perspectives écologiques tique de la population, les rites et les rituels sont complémentaires et peuvent être liés aux occupations et aux événements es- considérées comme une véritable radiogra- sentiels de la vie humaine. Le dernier cha- phie des options et des voies qui s’ouvrent pitre de cette troisième partie (Gheorghe devant les autorités et la population locale. Rancu-Bodrog, Daniel Alic) concerne l’or- L’impression qui se dégage à la fin de ganisation ecclésiastique et la vie religieuse cette monographie est celle d’un ouvrage dans les paroisses de l’Almãj et souligne la impressionnant aussi bien par son contenu valeur historique et artistique de quelques que par sa taille. Fruit d’un travail labo- monuments religieux en pierre ou en bois. rieux, il a nécessité une documentation La quatrième partie, intitulée « Écrits choi- complexe et une coordination profession- sis sur l’Almãj. Personnalités d’Almãj », est nelle et responsable pour que les diffé- structurée en deux chapitres (Iosif Bãcilã, rentes parties puissent s’intégrer harmo- Florina-Maria Bãcilã) qui passent en revue nieusement dans la conception générale les écrits ayant fait référence à la région et du passé, du présent et de l’avenir. Nous rendent hommage aux personnalités nées félicitions les auteurs et espérons qu’il dans le pays d’Almãj qui avaient large- pourra constituer un modèle pour d’autres ment contribué à l’évolution de la civili- sation roumaine et universelle à l’époque approches monographiques de ce genre. moderne et dans la contemporanéité. Sans q parler des auteurs de ce volume, qui sont Ioan Bolovan déjà des personnalités remarquables, nous découvrons au fil des pages une série de personnages nés dans les villages de la Robert D. Kaplan Vallée de l’Almãj qui avaient fait l’histoire În umbra Europei : Douã rãzboaie tant chez eux qu’à l’étranger. Il suffit de reci ºi trei decenii de cãlãtorie prin mentionner l’érudit et révolutionnaire qua- România ºi dincolo de ea rante-huitard Eftimie Murgu, le général Traduction de l’anglais par Constantin Traian Doda, le sociologue et démographe Ardeleanu et Oana Celia Gheorghiu Anton Golopenþia, l’historien Ion Sârbu, Bucarest, Humanitas, 2016 l’évêque Iosif Traian Bãdescu, la famille Novacovici, Iosif Coriolan Buracu, Ion ’ Luca Bãnãþeanu, Grigore Popişi et ainsi Lauteur, Robert D. Kaplan, connaît de suite. l’Europe de l’Est par sa propre expérience, Si les quatre premières parties de cette précisément dès 1971, du temps de la monographie ont surtout visé le passé guerre froide, et la Roumanie dès 1973, et le présent de l’Almãj, la dernière partie donc du temps de Ceauºescu. Conduit par regarde l’avenir. Le chapitre sur le futur dé- une impulsion subite, il est revenu ici, depuis veloppement rural de la région et celui sur l’Israël, en 1981, et cette fois-ci il a visité les projets de développement rural (Caius notre pays d’un œil avisé, car entre temps il Goþa, Pãun Ion Otiman) sont non seule- s’était documenté sur l’histoire politique de ment d’actualité mais ils constituent aussi cette zone ; et cette visite, pendant laquelle un modèle de recherche scientifique et un il a connu le gris frileux de notre monde support pour les actions censées contribuer et la pâleur de détenus des habitants (« Ils au développement durable des 31 commu- étaient si pâles qu’ils semblaient n’avoir 152 • Transylvanian Review • Vol. XXVII, No. 1 (Spring 2018) jamais vu la lumière du soleil », p. 40), l’a américain des problèmes roumains a étu- fait se pencher sur le problème roumain. À dié notre culture, il connaît notre histoire l’esprit de l’auteur, la Roumanie du temps et a parcouru notre géographie, depuis de l’ancien régime, qu’il avait visitée plu- Otopeni jusqu’au Maramureº. Il considère sieurs fois dans les années 1980, est restée, la Roumanie comme un pays de frontière, de manière significative « un pays détruit mélange de latinité et d’Église orthodoxe, et presque oublié » (p. 42). Et Robert D. avec un passé douloureux, aux mœurs Kaplan a écrit sur la Roumanie des choses contaminées (à cause du passé) par le by- si vraies et inconfortables (entre autres, il zantinisme ; et avec une culture originale. a comparé les mégaprojets de Ceuºescu à De tout ce que notre pays est et de tout ce ceux de Hitler, voir p. 43), qu’il est devenu, qu’il a, Kaplan aime : les églises, y compris à partir de 1984 jusqu’à la chute du socia- celles en bois de Maramureº, et la musique lisme réel roumain, persona non grata. orthodoxe d’église : « la musique religieuse Il y est retourné après la chute du ré- est la plus exaltante et troublante que je gime du socialisme réel, il a visité plusieurs connaisse » (c’est un aveu qui m’a fait me fois tout le pays, il s’y est fait des connais- demander si quelqu’un de ceux qu’il avait sances et des amis ; et, à force d’observer rencontrés ici avait eu ou non la bonne idée sur le vif les problèmes de la Roumanie et de lui offrir L’Oratoire byzantin de Noël de de l’étudier dans l’ensemble de la zone euro- Paul Constantinescu…). péenne où elle est géopolitiquement placée Robert D. Kaplan se rend compte de la – car, affirme-t-il, « pour pouvoir observer multitude de nos problèmes internes, de la le monde il faut lire sérieusement pendant corruption, de notre byzantinisme (qui, ne des décennies dans les domaines de l’his- nous faisons pas d’illusions, s’est propagé toire, de la philosophie et des sciences poli- tiques » (p. 45) –, il est devenu expert amé- très vite depuis la Petite Roumanie en Tran- ricain des problèmes roumains. In Europe’s sylvanie aussi ; je ne sais pas comment l’ex- Shadow (2016) n’est pas le premier livre sur pliquer, mais les traits négatifs s’auto-dif- la Roumanie de Robert D. Kaplan, il est le fusent plus facilement et plus rapidement fruit de cette spécialisation. Une « spéciali- que les traits louables). Comme problème sation » qui, d’ailleurs, n’est pas dépourvue de politique extérieure, l’auteur considère d’affectivité pour son objet, chose que l’on que notre voisinage avec l’Empire russe est peut observer immédiatement à la lecture une réalité qu’il ne faut ignorer à aucun ins- du livre ; car l’auteur tresse dans ses phrases tant, car l’Europe est fragile et l’Amérique la présentation du pays, ses propres convic- lointaine. Je ne sais pas traduire ses infor- tions et attitudes de vie et, troisièmement, mations en actes de politique intérieure et son attitude pleine de compréhension en- extérieure, mais je suppose, de manière op- vers notre monde. timiste, que les spécialistes savent le faire. Pour nous, avides d’apprendre les opi- C’est un beau livre, compréhensif avec nions des autres sur nous – oh, nos éter- nos ambiguïtés innées et perpétuées. La nels complexes d’infériorité, de peuple non tonalité de confession de l’auteur le recom- reconnu universellement ; j’utilise le terme mande aussi à la lecture. de reconnaissance/non-reconnaissance dans le sens donné par Hegel, dans La phéno- (Traduction : Letiþia Ilea) ménologie de l’esprit – le livre du journaliste q américain soigne nos blessures. L’expert Marta Petreu Book Reviews • 153

Il testo, edito dalla nota casa editrice il Paolo Prodi Homo europaeus Mulino di Bologna, della cui associazione Bologna: il Mulino, 2015 culturale costitutiva Paolo Prodi fu cofon- datore nel 1965, si inserisce in quel filone di riflessione storiografica sugli assetti co- stitutivi della civiltà europea di cui Prodi fu aolo Prodi, storico dell’età moderna, P attento interprete, come dimostrò nei suoi professore emerito presso l’Università di volumi sulla Chiesa post-tridentina, il giu- Bologna, scomparso alla fine del 2016, fis- ramento politico e la figura del “Sovrano sa nel suo saggio quelli che ritiene i fonda- Pontefice” nella prima età moderna. menti costituitivi della modernità dell’Oc- cidente europeo, e cioè: la laicità, il distac- q co del potere spirituale dal potere tempo- Alberto Castaldini rale proprio della cristianità occidentale, il tema del giuramento con una divinità “su- per partes” che diviene così testimone di Yvonne Rydin un patto politico, la separazione del diritto Governing for Sustainable Urban naturale-divino dal diritto positivo, civile Development e canonico, il sorgere del dualismo tra la London: Taylor & Francis, 2010 sfera della coscienza e quella della giustizia umana. Questi stessi assunti – uniti da un filo comune – appaiono oggi in uno sta- It is a known fact that within the con- to di crisi profonda che investe non solo il temporary urban management it is im- campo economico e politico, ma la stessa perative how the growing complexity of dimensione antropologica, identitaria. Le urban systems is administered and the ragioni di questo fenomeno sono comples- extent to which the development of these se ma l’autore evidenzia come l’uomo eu- systems is managed by adopting the most ropeo, il cui profilo si caratterizza per una effective attitudes and instruments in or- duplicità dimensionale, della coscienza e der to deliver sustainable urban develop- della legge, sia chiamato a misurarsi, spes- ment. Nevertheless, even if writings on so con difficoltà, con la globalizzazione. this topic continue to expand, scientific Questo compito, nella sfida attuale, non research lacks empirical studies on such spetta dunque all’Europa storica, econo- policy tools and specific technical details mica o geografica ma anzitutto al singolo that sustainable urban development can cittadino nella consapevolezza della sua ar- be engineered with. Therefore, Yvonne ticolata e complessa appartenenza. Anche Rydin’s Governing for Sustainable Develop- lo storico è chiamato nel contempo a inter- ment (2010) provides not only a concep- rogarsi sulla questione della “identità euro- tual overview but also a resource on how pea”, poiché l’Europa costituisce un labora- sustainable urban development can be torio della modernità in quanto “insieme di delivered in practice through such an ex- esperienze, tra le quali alcune (si pensi alla plicit, methodological yet comprehensive rinascita del diritto romano, fondamento analysis that is quite rare amongst studies della costruzione dello Stato) risalgono al dealing with this particular research topic. medioevo, mentre molte altre si sono estese Hence, the book serves as a brilliant guide e sviluppate sino ai nostri giorni” (p. 15). and essential reading not only for academ- 154 • Transylvanian Review • Vol. XXVII, No. 1 (Spring 2018) ics and students but also for professionals different perspectives towards this topic. from various related fields such as spatial In the rest of the chapter the author brings planning, architecture, urban design, etc. the term of sustainable development into Even though the title suggests a general an urban context stressing in particular the approach to sustainable urban develop- impact and relevancy of climate change on ment, Rydin’s work offers a much more this scale. As an addition to the previous definite analysis placed not only on the chapter, Chapter 2, “Dimensions of Sus- urban scale—or more specifically on the tainable Urban Development,” takes the building or the development site—but concept of sustainability to the level of its also in broader regional and national per- applicability in an urban context, features spective. Based on the inclusive analysis its practical facet by contrasting it to its en- of different modes of governing, the aim vironmental, economic and social aspects of the book is to explore the role of ur- on the building, development site and ban development in the complex process overall on the urban and regional scale. of achieving sustainable development. There is no doubt that the thorough analy- The focal point of the book is that market sis performed by the author is an extreme- forces alone cannot be accountable for the ly valuable compilation of the technical el- success of sustainable urban development. ements that help explain the focal point of It is subject to a governance procedure the chapter. However, what gives perhaps that is shaped by a network created with a demanding understanding of this sec- the involvement of a wide range of stake- tion is the detailed technological account. holders and based more on a trust-based Nevertheless, the various examples given model which has knowledge and learning by the author in support of her analysis as- at its heart. Hence, Rydin introduces the sist the reader in understanding what pres- reader not only to a conceptual analysis of ently rates as sustainable urban develop- the subject but also to a range of financial, ment. After discussing the complex notion construction and planning elements neces- of sustainability in the context of urban sary to be taken into account in delivering development, in Chapter 3, “Producing sustainable urban development. Urban Development,” Rydin discusses the The book is organized into ten chap- interactional processes that lead to sustain- ters. In the first two chapters Rydin focuses able Urban Development by which she sets on the broader conceptual understanding the scene for the following two chapters. of sustainable development and accurately In trying to conceptualize such processes connects it to the scales of building, de- that produce sustainable urban develop- velopment site, urban area and the region. ment, the author draws on Patsy Healey’s Chapter 1, “Sustainable Development and (1991) four models. Nevertheless, a vari- the Urban Agenda,” introduces the holis- ant of the agency model proves to be the tic nature of the concept captured through most appropriate for conceptualizing ur- the interrelationship of economic, social ban development as “a network process and environmental dimensions and illus- and emphasizing relationships between trated with the help of different models. actors, the resource flows between them Rydin intuitively reveals the different con- and, hence, the way that power can be ceptual interpretations by drawing a con- exercised across the network” (p. 32). In trast between the strong-weak sustainabili- order to illustrate the market processes and ty duet which flashes upon the relevancy of networks that frame the production of ur- Book Reviews • 155 ban development through more pragmatic interaction. The pervasive reflection domi- means, Rydin presents some evidence on nating the chapter is to think about how the construction process and elaborates on knowledge and learning is central to gov- the role of finance by drawing a distinction erning for sustainable urban development. between construction and development in In chapters 6 through 9 Rydin elabo- a well-crafted manner. rates on the framework of policy tools for The following two chapters are yet analyzing governing for sustainable urban again conceptual in their nature and ground development. Lastly, in chapter 10 the the rest of the chapters of the book. The main idea of the book with specific rec- main terms that both chapters are built ommendations is developed. Chapter 6, around are governing and learning from “Information and Sustainable Urban De- the sustainability’s point of view. Chapter velopment,” focuses on various informa- 4, “Governing for Sustainability,” discusses tional policy tools that set and shape urban the notions of government, governance and development in a sustainable manner. The governmentality. It relates to the different discussion has a technical dimension and modes of governing from the conventional covers different assessment schemes on en- approach to the contemporary systems, the ergy efficiency, carbon emissions and zero- resurrection of governance, governmental- carbon development. The analysis of dif- ity and their coexistence with policy sys- ficulties and conflicts related to definition, tems. A special focus is given to the urban policy development and regulatory pro- scale and a discussion of power as a feature cesses make the discussion rather captivat- of policy systems and of various modes of ing. Chapter 7, “Financial Incentives and governing is also an interesting ingredient Sustainable Urban Development,” elabo- that Rydin fits elegantly under the gover- rates on policy tools that consider financial nance–governing heading. The chapter instruments and in particular taxes, subsi- ends with a framework of governing tools dies as relevant. Nevertheless, the author which sets the scene for the last part of the mainly stresses upon the level to which book. Chapter 5, “Governing and Learn- justification is based on rational economic ing,” acts as a platform where a central decision-making or more dependent on governing feature considered by the overall a social context where behavior is deter- perspective of the book is discussed, the im- mined by various backgrounds. Therefore, portance and role of learning in the govern- emphasis is placed on the importance of ing system. With the opening thought of institutional arrangements and their ability “movement towards sustainable develop- to change behavior. ment requires learning and places new de- The following two chapters explore the mands on knowledge resources” therefore way spatial planning and regulatory pro- “such movement will require change and cesses contribute to sustainable urban de- change requires learning” (p. 61) Rydin velopment. Chapter 8, “Spatial Planning entices the reader to think about the insepa- for Sustainable Urban Development,” rable learning-knowledge relation and their summarizes how social capital can con- interplay with the policy process. The chap- tribute at making spatial planning through ter calls for the need to emphasize the im- governance an effective tool. The chapter portance of networks, the rightful selection joins in the key elements of spatial plan- and engagements of different actors as well ning—energy, waste, transport, water, as the selection of the appropriate arenas for housing systems—that deliver sustainable 156 • Transylvanian Review • Vol. XXVII, No. 1 (Spring 2018) urban development and stresses the rel- his political credo for Romania, a mixture evance of learning in this process. Chap- of objective facts, subjective statements and ter 9, “Regulating for Sustainable Urban patradigms of values, centered around the Development,” shows how regulatory author, who is present through the whole processes play a vital role in the sustain- text as some kind of observer-narrator-an- ability agenda. Quite constructively the alyst, due to his large and diverse life ex- author brings the key themes discussed perience—professor in sociology and career in the book together in Chapter 10, “The politician—and comprehensive knowledge Prospects for Sustainable Urban Develop- concerning the life of the elites and of the ment,” reevaluates whether the different rural and urban working masses in Roma- modes of governing truly lead to sustain- nia. The various subjects of this present ability and deliberates on future prospects, book are reflexions on these topics. the eventual need for alternative govern- Most of the essays and the studies in ing modes in order to deliver sustainable this volume have been published in the urban development. Sinteza journal. As a structure, the book is In conclusion, Yvonne Rydin, with divided into five large collective chapters, this insightful, well-structured and com- centered around the notion in their title. prehensive material provides a concise Such are “Politics,” “The State,” “Society,” conceptual background, a clear argument “Culture”and last, but not least, “Us,” this supported with the help of various ex- latter concept being a synonym in this case amples and captures some of the existing for the contemporary society in Romania, challenges and addresses vital deficiencies with all of its achievements, but even more of the governing process of sustainable ur- with its issues. ban development. There is no doubt that Two Romanias are intersecting in this the author provides an extremely valuable book. First, the Romania visible day by investigation of delivering sustainability in day in the news and tv is present through the urban development. its fragments. Second, the invisible, but q perceived Romania is present and largely Júlia A. Nagy explained through the whole book, as a complex, but malleable dimension, consisting of a sum of perceptions, based on Vasile Sebastian Dâncu fragments of realities. Even if the tone is Politically incorrect: Scenarii pentru o critical, in many places melancholy being Românie posibilã mixed with nostalgia, it is not a “Black (Scenarios for a possible Romania) Book,” the approach being constructive to- Cluj-Napoca: ªcoala Ardeleanã, 2017 wards the main issues of Romanian society. There is no aggression toward politics, and the volume is not offering a structured po- Vasile Sebastian Dâncu is an important litical program to replace the current trends personality of current Romanian political of the Romanian political life; experience and intellectual life, characterized by a very shows that the common elements of such complex personality. Such is his present theoretical programs are short term, they book, which is practically a cross-sectional are not put into practice. At the same time, view of Dâncu’s beliefs, a true synthesis of the title—Politically Incorrect—introduces Book Reviews • 157 the critical attitude of the author toward from page 396: “We should deal especially current Romanian political life and politi- with the problem of poverty, but not with cal class in general. In Dâncu’s present ac- artificial lectures and shiny, colorful pow- ception, the seemingly invisible Romania erpoints. Poverty is ugly, that is why the is present in its material reality, it is only majority of the people feel hatred toward hidden: the best examples for this can be the poor, but politicians remember them found in the essay “An Invisible Roma- with lots of love during the campaigns. nia,” from which we will quote here two They do not visit their neighborhoods and short passages, concerning two large social houses even then...” classes, seen through the general percep- It is hard to choose a specific essay to tion of the author: “The peasants are long recommend for reading, because all of gone by now from the public scene, the the short essays are very well written, and notion became a swear word in traffic. The contain ideas full of meaning, even if the reader might not agree with all of them. If inhabitants of the villages are visited by the I had to choose only one, I would choose reporters only during electoral campaigns, the essay bearing the title “The Tiranny of or by the prosecutors who are asking them Television,” a large critical essay, contaning with whom they voted, if they actually thoughts like, for example, that televized voted on the referendum.1 What do we talkshows are not the “arena” of democ- know concerning the daily life of the in- racy, but a tool of manipulation. Another habitants from the rural areas, except that very suggestive essay is “2014—A Politics many of them went to work in Italy, Spain Paralyzed by Fear,” in which the author is or Ireland?...” describing the phenomenon of the lack of “About the workers from current capital- courage to have initiatives within Roma- ist factories we cannot hear much, because nian society, with a special focus on poli- some of the latest governments killed the tics and public administration. “The fear colective work contracts, and the syndi- of the dna3 or of secret servicies is freezing cates became formal, being active only the blood of politicians, who are rather in tv shows. The millions of interna- seeking for measures of protection than tional migrants2 become interesting only act according to the neccesary plans and when they appear as a force for electoral strategies. The Parliament became during manipulations” (p. 153). the last few years dominated by these fears The same stoicist approach, mixed and made a series of mistakes, due to the with a personal dissaproving realism is wrongly understood absurd solidarity, but present through the whole text, like some also generated by the dreadful idea that kind of allegory—for example, the quote

1. Allusion to the scandal around the referen- 3. In Romanian: Direcþia Naþionalã Anti- dum concerning the impeachment of Presi- corupþie (National Direction Against Cor- dent Traian Bãsescu from 2012. ruption), a juridical structure, specialized in 2. From the next idea of the essay it can be issues of middle- and high level corruption. deduced that the author is not speaking The dna in Romania is in close coopera- here about the current crisis of immigration tion with structures of the executive and the from Africa and the Near East, but about judiciary system, but at the same time, is Romanians working abroad. operating largely independently from them. 158 • Transylvanian Review • Vol. XXVII, No. 1 (Spring 2018) tomorrow, anybody could be the next vic- Cette démarche était fondée sur une tim” (p. 37). évaluation théologique, artistique et his- This present book is hard to read, even torique des portes royales soumises à if it is written in an accessible style, it re- l’investigation, et elle a été réalisée à l’aide quires serious attention from the reader, for de spécialistes du domaine culturel, scien- important ideas, hidden throughout the tifique et académique de Cluj-Napoca et text, to not be missed. At the same time, de Bucarest. the mirror represented by the system of Un des fruits de ce projet est l’album ideas from the book is worthy of attention Églises en bois de Transylvanie : Cluj et Sãlaj, and reflection. Dâncu’s book definitely rep- où sont présentées 71 églises en bois du resents an interesting mosaic for our con- département de Cluj et 68 de Sãlaj. Parmi temporary society in Romania. les localités concernées nous mentionnons q Apahida, Aşchileul Mic, Berindu, Nicula, Artur L. Lakatos Sãliştea, Sic, Tioltiur – dans le départe- ment de Cluj – et Chieşd, Dragu, Letca, Petrindu, Rãstolþu Deşert, Sânmihaiu Constantin MãruÞoiu, Daniela Popescu, Almaşului, Voivodeni – dans le départe- Ioan Bratu, Radu Moraru et Luminiþa Dana ment de Sãlaj. Postolache Les images et les présentations de ces Biserici de lemn din Transilvania : églises en bois sont une ouverture vers Cluj şi Sãlaj l’horizon culturel et spirituel du patrimoine (Églises en bois de Transylvanie : national et international, englobant des va- Cluj et Sãlaj) leurs de l’art populaire et des pratiques ar- Cluj-Napoca: Mega, 2017 tistiques et religieuses roumaines. La collaboration entre les chercheurs du champ de l’art, de la théologie, de l’histoire et de Un projet initié en 2013 portait sur la science a réussi à « animer » l’album, les une Évaluation pluridisciplinaire des por- images suggestives étant accompagnées de tes royales des églises édifiées entre le XVe et présentations succinctes mais tout aussi le XIXe siècles en vue de leur restauration édifiantes des éléments qui font la spécifi- par des méthodes classiques et numériques, cité des églises en bois. afin d’en assurer la viabilité communautaire La qualité du matériel et des présenta- (astercrig). Ce projet a été financé par tions aide le lecteur à parcourir et déchif- l’État à travers le programme pnii (Projets frer plus facilement les idées et les nuances de recherches appliquées en collabora- artistiques et spirituelles inscrites sur ces tion). Il proposait « une recherche inter- portes royales. Elles constituent l’épicentre disciplinaire de l’état de conservation d’un aussi bien des églises en bois soumis à important symbole du patrimoine culturel, notre attention que, surtout, de ceux qui les portes royales de l’iconostase des églises avec croyance et amour se sont rapprochés en bois édifiées entre le XVe et le XIXe siè- de cette Source de la Vie qui est le Christ. cle dans deux départements transylvains, q Cluj et Sãlaj » (comme le professeur Radu Ciprian-Valentin Nicoarã Moraru le précise dans la préface). contributors

József Benedek, Ph.D. Octavian Groza, Ph.D. Professor at the Faculty of Geography, Babeº-Bolyai Professor at the Faculty of Geography and Geology, University Alexandru Ioan Cuza University 5–7 Clinicilor St., 400006 Cluj-Napoca, Romania 20A Carol I Blvd., Iaºi 700505, Romania e-mail: [email protected] e-mail: [email protected]

Ioan Bolovan, Ph.D. Jacek Kil, Ph.D. candidate Researcher at the Center for Transylvanian Studies, Faculty of Geodesy, Geospatial and Civil Romanian Academy, vice-rector of Babeº-Bolyai Engineering, University of Warmia and Mazury University 15 Prawochen´skiego St., Olsztyn 10-724, Poland 12–14 Mihail Kogãlniceanu St., Cluj-Napoca 400084, e-mail: [email protected] Romania e-mail: [email protected] Cezary Kowalczyk, Ph.D. Faculty of Geodesy, Geospatial and Civil Alberto Castaldini, Ph.D. Engineering, University of Warmia and Mazury Associate member of the Center for Jewish Studies 15 Prawochen´skiego St., Olsztyn 10-724, Poland of the University of Bucharest e-mail: [email protected] 5–7 Edgar Quinet St., Bucharest 010017, Romania e-mail: [email protected] Artur L. Lakatos, Ph.D. Postdoctoral researcher at the University of Szeged, Melania-Gabriela Ciot, Ph.D. external collaborator at the Faculty of Geography, Associate professor at the Faculty of European Babeº-Bolyai University Studies, Babeº-Bolyai University 5–7 Clinicilor St., 400006 Cluj-Napoca, Romania 1 Em. de Martonne St., Cluj-Napoca 400090, e-mail: [email protected] Romania e-mail: [email protected] Robert-Marius Mihalache, Ph.D. Researcher at the Center for Transylvanian Studies, Gabriela Cocean, Ph.D. Romanian Academy Researcher at the Romanian Academy, 12–14 Mihail Kogãlniceanu St., Cluj-Napoca 400084, Cluj-Napoca Branch Romania 42 August Treboniu Laurian St., Cluj-Napoca e-mail: [email protected] 400271, Romania e-mail: [email protected] Ciprian S. Moldovan, Ph.D. Lecturer at the Faculty of Geography, Babeº-Bolyai Magdalena Drãgan, Ph.D. University Junior researcher at the Romanian Academy, 5–7 Clinicilor St., 400006 Cluj-Napoca, Romania Cluj-Napoca Branch e-mail: [email protected] 42 August Treboniu Laurian St., Cluj-Napoca 400271, Romania Egon Nagy, Ph.D. e-mail: [email protected] Lecturer, head of department at the Faculty of Geography, Babeº-Bolyai University Mihaela Gligor, Ph.D. 5–7 Clinicilor St., 400006 Cluj-Napoca, Romania Researcher at George Bariþiu Institute of History, e-mail: [email protected] Department of Humanities, Romanian Academy 8 Mihail Kogãlniceanu St., Cluj-Napoca 400084, Júlia A. Nagy, Ph.D. candidate Romania Faculty of Geography, Babeº-Bolyai University e-mail: [email protected] 5–7 Clinicilor St., 400006 Cluj-Napoca, Romania e-mail: [email protected] Ciprian-Valentin Nicoarã, Ph.D. Sorin Radu, Ph.D. Faculty of Orthodox Theology, Babeº-Bolyai Professor at Lucian Blaga University University 5–7 Victoriei St., Sibiu 550024, Romania Episcop Nicolae Ivan St., Cluj-Napoca 400692, e-mail: [email protected] Romania e-mail: [email protected] Alexandru Rusu, Ph.D. Lecturer at the Faculty of Geography and Geology, Marta Petreu, Ph.D. Alexandru Ioan Cuza University Professor at the Faculty of History and Philosophy, 20A Carol I Blvd., Iaºi 700505, Romania Babeº-Bolyai University e-mail: [email protected] 1 Mihail Kogãlniceanu St., 400084 Cluj-Napoca, Romania e-mail: [email protected]