US-Mexico Border Policy in the Age of Terrorism 2001-2016 Ionut Gitan
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Allen W. Dulles and the CIA
THE GILDED AGE Allen W. Dulles and the CIA Allen W. Dulles spent his tenure as the Director of Central Intelligence (DCI) entrenched in secret power struggles that would ensure his ultimate power over the foreign and domestic aff airs for the United States. Th roughout his childhood, Dulles learned to use political power in order to get ahead, and to use secrecy to make unilateral deci- sions. Aft er analyzing examples of his treatment of various foreign aff airs disasters, as well as his manipulation of American media and politicians, Dulles is exposed as a man whose legacy lives in the CIA, as a legendary fi gure who is in fact much more of a craft ed legend than a man of truth. By Sada O. Stewart ‘16 Princeton University of the CIA’s own making, the product of the publicity and the political propaganda Allen Dulles manufactured in the 1950s.”4 How, though, did Dulles craft a fl awless, genius im- age for the CIA? What methods did Dulles use to manipulate the press, the public, and even the other branches of govern- ment to bring forth an agency with “a great reputation and a terrible record?”5 Dulles made the CIA seem like an elite agency full of top agents resulting in high risk, high reward missions—how is this reconciled with the reality of the CIA under Dulles’ reign? INTELLIGENCE IN YOUTH To begin, it is vital to identify the signifi cance of developing and running an intelligence agency in an open democratic system.6 Sun Tzu, author of Th e Art of War, insists the best A Bas-relief of Allen Dulles at the Original Headquarters of (only) way to fi ght a war is to know the enemy. -
ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE on the BATTLEFIELD an Initial Survey of Potential Implications for Deterrence, Stability, and Strategic Surprise Zachary S
ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE ON THE BATTLEFIELD An Initial Survey of Potential Implications for Deterrence, Stability, and Strategic Surprise Zachary S. Davis Center for Global Security Research Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory March 2019 ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE ON THE BATTLEFIELD | I ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE ON THE BATTLEFIELD An Initial Survey of Potential Implications for Deterrence, Stability, and Strategic Surprise Zachary S. Davis ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE ON THE BATTLEFIELD | III Table of Contents About the Author. VI Introduction . 1 A Realistic Appraisal of AI, Big Data, and Machine Learning . 2 Characterizing the Military Potential of AI . 4 Illustrative AI Applications at the Operational Level of War . 5 Illustrative AI Applications at the Strategic Level of War . 6 The Negative Side of Disruptive Technologies . 8 AI’s Potential Effects on Deterrence and Stability . .14 AI is Only One Piece of a Larger Puzzle. 17 Notes . .18 ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE ON THE BATTLEFIELD | V About the Author Zachary Davis is a senior fellow at the Center for Global Security Research at Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory and a research professor at the Naval Postgraduate School in Monterey, California, where he teaches courses on counterproliferation. He has broad experience in intelligence and national-security policy and has held senior positions in the executive and legislative branches of the U.S. government. His regional focus is South Asia. Davis began his career with the Congressional Research Service at the Library of Congress and has served the State Department, Congressional committees, and the National Security Council. Davis was the group leader for proliferation networks in LLNL’s Z Program and, in 2007, senior advisor at the National Counterproliferation Center, in the office of the Director of National Intelligence. -
Deception, Disinformation, and Strategic Communications: How One Interagency Group Made a Major Difference by Fletcher Schoen and Christopher J
STRATEGIC PERSPECTIVES 11 Deception, Disinformation, and Strategic Communications: How One Interagency Group Made a Major Difference by Fletcher Schoen and Christopher J. Lamb Center for Strategic Research Institute for National Strategic Studies National Defense University Institute for National Strategic Studies National Defense University The Institute for National Strategic Studies (INSS) is National Defense University’s (NDU’s) dedicated research arm. INSS includes the Center for Strategic Research, Center for Complex Operations, Center for the Study of Chinese Military Affairs, Center for Technology and National Security Policy, Center for Transatlantic Security Studies, and Conflict Records Research Center. The military and civilian analysts and staff who comprise INSS and its subcomponents execute their mission by conducting research and analysis, publishing, and participating in conferences, policy support, and outreach. The mission of INSS is to conduct strategic studies for the Secretary of Defense, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and the Unified Combatant Commands in support of the academic programs at NDU and to perform outreach to other U.S. Government agencies and the broader national security community. Cover: Kathleen Bailey presents evidence of forgeries to the press corps. Credit: The Washington Times Deception, Disinformation, and Strategic Communications: How One Interagency Group Made a Major Difference Deception, Disinformation, and Strategic Communications: How One Interagency Group Made a Major Difference By Fletcher Schoen and Christopher J. Lamb Institute for National Strategic Studies Strategic Perspectives, No. 11 Series Editor: Nicholas Rostow National Defense University Press Washington, D.C. June 2012 Opinions, conclusions, and recommendations expressed or implied within are solely those of the contributors and do not necessarily represent the views of the Defense Department or any other agency of the Federal Government. -
Barriers Along the U.S. Borders: Key Authorities and Requirements
Barriers Along the U.S. Borders: Key Authorities and Requirements Updated January 27, 2017 Congressional Research Service https://crsreports.congress.gov R43975 Barriers Along the U.S. Borders: Key Authorities and Requirements Summary Federal law authorizes the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) to construct barriers along the U.S. borders to deter illegal crossings. DHS is also required to construct reinforced fencing along at least 700 miles of the land border with Mexico (a border that stretches 1,933 miles). Congress has not provided a deadline for DHS to meet this 700-mile requirement, and as of the date of this report, fencing would need to be deployed along nearly 50 additional miles to satisfy the 700-mile requirement. Nor has Congress provided guidelines regarding the specific characteristics of fencing or other physical barriers (e.g., their height or material composition) deployed along the border, beyond specifying that required fencing must be reinforced. The primary statute authorizing the deployment of fencing and other barriers along the international borders is Section 102 of the Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996 (IIRIRA; P.L. 104-208, div. C). Congress made significant amendments to IIRIRA Section 102 through three enactments—the REAL ID Act of 2005 (P.L. 109-13, div. B), the Secure Fence Act of 2006 (P.L. 109-367), and the Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2008 (P.L. 110-161, div. E). These amendments required DHS to construct hundreds of miles of new fencing along the U.S.-Mexico border, and they also gave the Secretary of DHS broad authority to waive “all legal requirements” that may impede construction of barriers and roads under IIRIRA Section 102. -
The History and Politics of Defense Reviews
C O R P O R A T I O N The History and Politics of Defense Reviews Raphael S. Cohen For more information on this publication, visit www.rand.org/t/RR2278 Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data is available for this publication. ISBN: 978-0-8330-9973-0 Published by the RAND Corporation, Santa Monica, Calif. © Copyright 2018 RAND Corporation R® is a registered trademark. Limited Print and Electronic Distribution Rights This document and trademark(s) contained herein are protected by law. This representation of RAND intellectual property is provided for noncommercial use only. Unauthorized posting of this publication online is prohibited. Permission is given to duplicate this document for personal use only, as long as it is unaltered and complete. Permission is required from RAND to reproduce, or reuse in another form, any of its research documents for commercial use. For information on reprint and linking permissions, please visit www.rand.org/pubs/permissions. The RAND Corporation is a research organization that develops solutions to public policy challenges to help make communities throughout the world safer and more secure, healthier and more prosperous. RAND is nonprofit, nonpartisan, and committed to the public interest. RAND’s publications do not necessarily reflect the opinions of its research clients and sponsors. Support RAND Make a tax-deductible charitable contribution at www.rand.org/giving/contribute www.rand.org Preface The 1993 Bottom-Up Review starts with this challenge: “Now that the Cold War is over, the questions we face in the Department of Defense are: How do we structure the armed forces of the United States for the future? How much defense is enough in the post–Cold War era?”1 Finding a satisfactory answer to these deceptively simple questions not only motivated the Bottom-Up Review but has arguably animated defense strategy for the past quarter century. -
Border Security: the San Diego Fence
Order Code RS22026 Updated May 23, 2007 Border Security: The San Diego Fence Blas Nuñez-Neto Analyst in Domestic Security Domestic Social Policy Division Michael John Garcia Legislative Attorney American Law Division Summary This report outlines the issues involved with DHS’s construction of the San Diego border fence and highlights some of the major legislative and administrative developments regarding its completion; it will be updated as warranted.1 Congress first authorized the construction of a 14-mile, triple-layered fence along the U.S.-Mexico border near San Diego in the Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigration Responsibility Act (IIRIRA) of 1996. By 2004, only nine miles had been completed, and construction was halted because of environmental concerns. The 109th Congress subsequently passed the REAL ID Act (P.L. 109-13, Div. B), which contained provisions to facilitate the completion of the 14-mile fence. These provisions allow the Secretary of Homeland Security to waive all legal requirements determined necessary to ensure expeditious construction of authorized barriers and roads. In September 2005, the Secretary used this authority to waive a number of mostly environmental and conservation laws. Subsequently, the Secure Fence Act of 2006 (P.L. 109-367) removed the specific IIRIRA provisions authorizing the San Diego fence and added provisions authorizing five stretches of two-layered reinforced fencing along the southwest border. While the specific authorization of the San Diego fence was deleted, the project appears permissible under a separate, more general authorization provision of IIRIRA. In the 110th Congress, S.Amdt. 1150, the Secure Borders, Economic Opportunity, and Immigration Reform Act of 2007, which has been proposed in the nature of a substitute to S. -
What Role for the Cia's General Counsel
Sed Quis Custodiet Ipsos Custodes: The CIA’s Office of General Counsel? A. John Radsan* After 9/11, two officials at the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) made decisions that led to major news. In 2002, one CIA official asked the Justice Department’s Office of Legal Counsel (OLC) to clarify how aggressive CIA interrogators could be in questioning al Qaeda operatives held overseas.1 This request led to the August 2002 memorandum, later leaked, in which John Yoo argued that an interrogator crosses the line into torture only by inflicting pain on a par with organ failure.2 Yoo further suggested that interrogators would have many defenses, justifications, and excuses if they faced possible criminal charges.3 One commentator described the advice as that of a “mob lawyer to a mafia don on how to skirt the law and stay out of prison.”4 To cool the debate about torture, the Bush administration retracted the memorandum and replaced it with another.5 The second decision was made in 2003, when another CIA official asked the Justice Department to investigate possible misconduct in the disclosure to the media of the identity of a CIA employee. The employee was Valerie Plame, a covert CIA analyst and the wife of Ambassador Joseph Wilson. * Associate Professor of Law, William Mitchell College of Law. The author was a Justice Department prosecutor from 1991 until 1997, and Assistant General Counsel at the Central Intelligence Agency from 2002 until 2004. He thanks Paul Kelbaugh, a veteran CIA lawyer in the Directorate of Operations, for thoughtful comments on an early draft, and Erin Sindberg Porter and Ryan Check for outstanding research assistance. -
Who Watches the Watchmen? the Conflict Between National Security and Freedom of the Press
WHO WATCHES THE WATCHMEN WATCHES WHO WHO WATCHES THE WATCHMEN WATCHES WHO I see powerful echoes of what I personally experienced as Director of NSA and CIA. I only wish I had access to this fully developed intellectual framework and the courses of action it suggests while still in government. —General Michael V. Hayden (retired) Former Director of the CIA Director of the NSA e problem of secrecy is double edged and places key institutions and values of our democracy into collision. On the one hand, our country operates under a broad consensus that secrecy is antithetical to democratic rule and can encourage a variety of political deformations. But the obvious pitfalls are not the end of the story. A long list of abuses notwithstanding, secrecy, like openness, remains an essential prerequisite of self-governance. Ross’s study is a welcome and timely addition to the small body of literature examining this important subject. —Gabriel Schoenfeld Senior Fellow, Hudson Institute Author of Necessary Secrets: National Security, the Media, and the Rule of Law (W.W. Norton, May 2010). ? ? The topic of unauthorized disclosures continues to receive significant attention at the highest levels of government. In his book, Mr. Ross does an excellent job identifying the categories of harm to the intelligence community associated NI PRESS ROSS GARY with these disclosures. A detailed framework for addressing the issue is also proposed. This book is a must read for those concerned about the implications of unauthorized disclosures to U.S. national security. —William A. Parquette Foreign Denial and Deception Committee National Intelligence Council Gary Ross has pulled together in this splendid book all the raw material needed to spark a fresh discussion between the government and the media on how to function under our unique system of government in this ever-evolving information-rich environment. -
Bureaucratic Resistance and the National Security State
Yeshiva University, Cardozo School of Law LARC @ Cardozo Law Articles Faculty 2018 Bureaucratic Resistance and the National Security State Rebecca Ingber Benjamin N. Cardozo School of Law, [email protected] Follow this and additional works at: https://larc.cardozo.yu.edu/faculty-articles Part of the Law Commons Recommended Citation Rebecca Ingber, Bureaucratic Resistance and the National Security State, 104 139 (2018). Available at: https://larc.cardozo.yu.edu/faculty-articles/479 This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Faculty at LARC @ Cardozo Law. It has been accepted for inclusion in Articles by an authorized administrator of LARC @ Cardozo Law. For more information, please contact [email protected], [email protected]. A4_INGBER (DO NOT DELETE) 10/26/2018 8:48 AM Bureaucratic Resistance and the National Security State Rebecca Ingber* ABSTRACT: Modern accounts of the national security state tend toward one of two opposing views of bureaucratic tensions within it: At one extreme, the executive branch bureaucracy is a shadowy “deep state,” unaccountable to the public or even to the elected President. On this account, bureaucratic obstacles to the President’s agenda are inherently suspect, even dangerous. At the other end, bureaucratic resistance to the President represents a necessary benevolent constraint on an otherwise imperial executive. This account hails the bureaucracy as the modern incarnation of the separation of powers, an alternative to the traditional checks on the President of the courts and Congress, which are faulted with falling down on the job. These “deep state” and “benevolent constraints” approaches to bureaucratic behavior track debates in the scholarship over the legitimacy of the administrative state more broadly, and are used as rhetorical devices to challenge or defend current allocations of power. -
Union Calendar No. 443
1 Union Calendar No. 443 109TH CONGRESS " ! REPORT 2d Session HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 109–741 REPORT ON LEGISLATIVE AND OVERSIGHT ACTIVITIES of the HOUSE COMMITTEE ON HOMELAND SECURITY together with ADDITIONAL VIEWS ONE HUNDRED NINTH CONGRESS SECOND SESSION 2006 (Pursuant to House Rule XI, 1(d)) JANUARY 2, 2007.—Committed to the Committee of the Whole House on the State of the Union and ordered to be printed. U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE 59–006 WASHINGTON : 2007 VerDate Aug 31 2005 22:19 Jan 10, 2007 Jkt 059006 PO 00000 Frm 00001 Fmt 4012 Sfmt 4012 E:\HR\OC\HR741.XXX HR741 rwilkins on PROD1PC63 with HEARING E:\Seals\Congress.#13 VerDate Aug 31 2005 22:19 Jan 10, 2007 Jkt 059006 PO 00000 Frm 00002 Fmt 4012 Sfmt 4012 E:\HR\OC\HR741.XXX HR741 rwilkins on PROD1PC63 with HEARING LETTER OF TRANSMITTAL HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, COMMITTEE ON HOMELAND SECURITY, Washington, DC, January 2, 2007. Hon. KAREN HAAS, Clerk of the House of Representatives, The Capitol, Washington, DC. DEAR MS. HAAS: Pursuant to clause 1(d)(1) of Rule XI and Rule X of the Rules of the House of Representatives, here is a report of the legislative and oversight activities of the Committee on Home- land Security during the 109th Congress. Sincerely, PETER T. KING, Chairman. (III) VerDate Aug 31 2005 22:19 Jan 10, 2007 Jkt 059006 PO 00000 Frm 00003 Fmt 7633 Sfmt 7633 E:\HR\OC\HR741.XXX HR741 rwilkins on PROD1PC63 with HEARING VerDate Aug 31 2005 22:19 Jan 10, 2007 Jkt 059006 PO 00000 Frm 00004 Fmt 7633 Sfmt 7633 E:\HR\OC\HR741.XXX HR741 rwilkins on PROD1PC63 with HEARING Union Calendar No. -
Excising the National Security Council from Foia Coverage1
Notes "DID I MISS ANYTING?": EXCISING THE NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL FROM FOIA COVERAGE1 R. KEVIN BAILEY INTRODUCTION Several weeks prior to the 1996 presidential election, the New York Times published a one-column story about a set of docu- ments that the government had recently declassified. The article described the culmination of a lengthy effort on the part of histo- rian Stanley I. Kutler to gain access to tapes and memoranda from the darkest days of President Richard Nixon's administration.' This collection contained many gems, including a memorandum written by Nixon in which the President related a description by his aide Donald Rumsfeld of the then-chair of the Republican National Committee, Bob Dole. The aide pointedly observed that Dole had lost "some of his effectiveness because he is a 'knee- jerk' defender of the Administration."3 Based at least in part on Rumsfeld's criticism of Dole's unnuanced defense of the administration, Nixon concluded that Dole should be removed from the chairmanship of the Republican Party and subsequently dismissed him.4 The irony: Donald Rumsfeld served as Dole's na- tional campaign coordinator for the 1996 election.' These Nixon documents have been sequestered from public view since the early 1970s.6 The National Archives only released 1. The author acknowledges the Honorable Michael Daly Hawkins, United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, for his suggestion of the title. The noted phrase within it was spoken by Lt. Col. Oliver North in his testimony before Congress during the Iran-Contra investigation, in response to a question regarding whether he had shred- ded all documents related to the affair. -
David Greenberg
DAVID GREENBERG Professor of History Professor of Journalism & Media Studies Rutgers University, The State University of New Jersey 4 Huntington Street, New Brunswick, NJ 08901 646.504.5071 • [email protected] Education. Columbia University, New York, NY. PhD, History. 2001. MPhil, History. 1998. MA, History. 1996. Yale University, New Haven, CT. BA, History. 1990. Summa cum laude. Phi Beta Kappa. Distinction in the major. Academic Positions. Rutgers University, New Brunswick, NJ. Professor, Departments of History and Journalism & Media Studies. 2016- . Associate Professor, Departments of History and Journalism & Media Studies. 2008-2016. Assistant Professor, Department of Journalism & Media Studies. 2004-2008. Appointment to the Graduate Faculty, Department of History. 2004-2008. Affiliation with Department of Political Science. Affiliation with Department of Jewish Studies. Affiliation with Eagleton Institute of Politics. Columbia University, New York, NY. Visiting Associate Professor, Department of History, Spring 2014. Yale University, New Haven, CT. Lecturer, Department of History and Political Science. 2003-04. American Academy of Arts & Sciences, Cambridge MA. Visiting Scholar. 2002-03. Columbia University, New York, NY. Lecturer, Department of History. 2001-02. Teaching Assistant, Department of History. 1996-99. Greenberg, CV, p. 2. Other Journalism and Professional Experience. Politico Magazine. Columnist and Contributing Editor, 2015- The New Republic. Contributing Editor, 2006-2014. Moderator, “The Open University” blog, 2006-07. Acting Editor (with Peter Beinart), 1996. Managing Editor, 1994-95. Reporter-researcher, 1990-91. Slate Magazine. Contributing editor and founder of “History Lesson” column, the first regular history column by a professional historian in the mainstream media. 1998-2015. Staff editor, culture section, 1996-98. The New York Times.