This dissertation has been microfilmed exactly as received 66~1773 ENSLEY, Philip Chalfant, 1940- THE POLITICAL AND SOCIAL THOUGHT OF ELMER DAVIS. The Ohio State University, Ph.D., 1965 History, modern

University Microfilms, Inc., Ann Arbor, Michigan THE POLITICAL AND SOCIAL THOUGHT

OF ELMER DAVIS

DISSERTATION

Presented in Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements for the Degree Doctor of Philosophy in the Graduate School of The Ohio State University

"by Philip C ha Kant Easley, A.B., M.A.

The Ohio State University 1965

Approved "by

Adviser Department of History CONTENTS

Page

PREFACE...... i i i

CHAPTER

I AN AMERICAN OBSERVER...... 1

I I THE GOLDEN DECADE: ELMER DAVIS AND THE AGE OF NORMALCY...... 27

I I I CONFIDENCE IN MOM? EEMER DAVIS AND THE HOOVER YEARS, 1929-1933 ...... 58

IV IF ROOSEVELT FAILS: EEMER DAVIS AND THE NEW DEAL, 1933-1938...... 80

V HEADS I WEN, TAILS YOU LOSE: DAVIS* VIEKtfS OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS, 1938-19^5 ...... 102

VI YEARS OF TRIAL AND HOPE: EEMER DAVIS AND THE COLD WAR, 19^5-1950...... 131

V II YEAR ONE, THERMONUCLEAR ERA: DAVIS* VIEWS OF POLITICS AND FOREIGN AFFAIRS, 1950-1958 ...... 156

V III DON*T LET TEEM SCARE YOU: DAVIS* DEFENSE OF FREEDOM, 1950-1958 ...... l81fr

BIBLIOGRAPHY ...... 219

AUTOBIOGRAPHY...... 259

i i PREFACE

The purpose of this dissertation is to discuss the political and social thought of Elmer Davis, and to analyze.its development throughout his life. I am not attempting to write a "biographical study of his life; as a result I will use biographical data only where nec­ essary as background for his views. Davis discussed voluminously many aspects of the American scene through novels, short stories, essays, letters, book reviews, and radio broadcasts. Nbst of the material used in the preparation of this study was from Davis’ essays and articles, but the Elmer Davis Papers in the Library of Congress were helpful, particularly for his radio broadcasts after the war. In the dissertation I w ill select from this material the most representative aspects of his thought in order to analyze its development through his l i f e .

I would like to acknowledge the co-operation and assistance of those who made this study possible. The librarians in the Manuscript room at the Library of Congress were courteous and helpful. I would like to thank Mr. Boger Burlingame and Mr. Eobert Lloyd Davis for their helpful suggestions. I would particularly like to express my appreciation to ny adviser, Eobert H. Bremner, who not only suggested the topic, but also aided and advised me during its preparation.

Finally I am indebted to my wife, Cynthia Beam Ensley, whose unfailing encouragement was indispensable to the completion of this study. CHAPTER I

AH AMERICAN OBSERVER

As journalist, novelist, essayist, social critic, government

official, radio commentator, and defender of freedom, Elmer Davis exerted

a significant influence on the American scene during the middle decades

of the Twentieth Century. Although hest known for this last role of de­

fending freedom during the McCarthy hysteria of the early 1950's, Davis

also made Important contributions during the earlier phases of his life.

As a journalist on The New York Times he observed the United States both as a reporter and as an editorial writer; as a free-lance writer he viewed the American scene through novels, essays, and book reviews; as a rad io news a n aly st he commented on n a tio n a l and in te rn a tio n a l developments both before and after World War II; and as a government official during the war he inspected the American scene during years of

tension and crisis. His observations are characterized not by the originality of his ideas, but by the clarity with which he expressed well-known views. This ability to express familiar but sometimes for­ gotten ideas clearly and intelligibly was one of Davis' real contri­ butions to America. The purpose of this chapter is to examine the influences on and the conditions of Davis’ life, so that we can ascertain how these factors affected his political and social philos­ ophy.

1 Elmer Davis was "bora on January 15, 1890, in Aurora, Indiana,

an Ohio River town thirty miles from Cincinnati. He was the son of

Louise Severin and Elam Holmes Davis. His father was the cashier of

the First National Bank of Aurora, a Republican, and an active leader

in the Baptist Church. Davis' childhood was marked by a great interest

in both sports and study. Because he was a sickly child until he was

1^, he excelled more in studies than in physical activity. 'Having

learned to read early, and not being well enough to do much else, I was likely to read anything in sight," Davis recalled.^ This fact accounts for his proficiency in intellectual pursuits. He developed, however, an understanding of athletics which remained with him through­ out his entire life. While he was a reporter on The New York Times, he covered the Dempsey-Gibbons fight in 1923* the World Series of 1925, and the International match horse race between Zev and Papyrus in

October 1923. Although he excelled in school without any particular

effort, Davis was not a favorite of his teachers. Apparently he was a thorn in their flesh, for his inquiring mind questioned the orthodoxy prevalent in Aurora at the turn of the century. Roger Burlingame stated that "in such a Baptist stronghold, deviation from the orthodox in thought as well as in behavior was looked upon with horror by the guardians of youthful morality." Because he questioned this orthodoxy,

Davis, from his earliest high school days, was a rebel. "Whether he had been bom into that camp or whether hard-shell Baptist Aurora put

"Ssimer Davis, "Constant Reader," Harper's, CCI (October 1950)* 161. 2 him there, that is where he remained." As he looked "back upon his youth* Davis recalled: "we leaped defiantly over the mole-hills our elders had made into mountains; . . . we looked over the conventions of the day and rejected those which seemed superannuated.In his high school days he developed another characteristic trait, his wit and wry sense of humor. A boyhood friend discovered in Davis "a sort of wiry, dry, explosive, provacative humor, not respective of the dignity, of the victim, although such humor was impersonal*"1*'

In the fall of 1906, at the age ;?f sixteen, Davis enrolled in

Franklin College, a small institution twenty miles south of Indianapolis.

He was active in his fraternity, Phi Delta Theta, the college newspaper, the campus theater, and particularly in his studies. In his four years at Franklin he slipped "below an A only twice. He did well in nearly every subject, "but particularly in Greek and Latin; he read the AnabasisT the Hew Testament, and the Iliad in Greek and Livy, Horace, Plautus,

Terence, and Lucretius in Latin. This great interest in the classics remained with him through life; he often used classical allusions in his writings and speeches; also, he often reviewed "books dealing with the classics or xvith Greek and Koman history for The Hew York Times and

The Saturday Beview of Literature. Proficiency in the classics, together

‘Ttoger Burlingame, Don’t Let Them Scare You: The Life and Times of Elmer Davis (Philadelphia: J. B. Lippincott Co., 19Sl), 25. ""(Here­ after referred to as Burlingame.)

^Elmer Davis, "Good Old 1915*" Forum. EKXXF (May 1931)* 270 .

Burlingame, 2 k. with his degree of B.A. "magna cum laude" from Franklin, won for Davis the selection as a Rhodes Scholar in 1910.

Davis’ years in Oxford were significant in his development. He thoroughly enjoyed the intellectual atmosphere "because it allowed him to read and learn at his own pace. These years in preparation for his

"litterae humanoresH developed further his interest in and devotion to the classics; he mastered the Greek language and read extensively in the history and literature of Greece. But it was not only in scholarship that the Oxford period was important to his future development. By travelling extensively around the continent, he broadened his outlook on life and moved further from the narrow orthodoxy and provincialism of

Aurora and Indiana. On one of these travels, when in Paris, he met

Florence MacMillan, a g irl from Boston, who became his wife in 1917. ^

Although the period at Oxford was a happy one, he received word that his father had been overtaken by a financial disaster. As a result Davis accelerated his studies in order to receive his degree in two years instead of the usual three. Thus in June, 1912, Davis won a Second in his examination, and received his B.A. degree. His tutor, E. W. Walker, regarded Davis’ accomplishment in only two years of study, ”as one of 7 the most remarkable achievements I have ever known in this school."

His parents did not insist that he return home, so after graduation he

^ I b id .. 26-2 8 .

6X bid., 43.

7 I b i d . . ^ 6 . traveled through Europe for a year. By the time he returned in June

1915# Ills father had died, and Davis had to "begin to support his mother and himself.

Elmer's parents had hoped that he would "become a teacher and had attempted to discourage his interest in writing as a career. In a letter which Davis received at Oxford, his father stated that ’’"both your mother and myself were greatly shocked at the idea or suggestion of your giving

up or abandoning the teacher's profession. . . . You are a horn teacher.

I cannot hear the thought of your wasting all these golden opportunities for reaching professional distinction hy using your abilities in the O preparation of foolish stories." Nonetheless this was what Davis wanted to do, end finding a job on the editorial staff of the magazine

Adventure, he began to write "foolish stories." In 191^ he sold his first story to the Designer magazine, whose editor, Charles Hanson

Touraer, said "it's a good little story, with nice touches all through it. 9 I predict great things for you." But Davis was not satisfied with his

job on Adventure, partly because of the job itself, and partly because of the small salary (ten dollars per week). Also, it seemed to him that he would not make enough from his stories to support two people. As a result, he left the Adventure and took a position on The New York Times, where he remained for the next ten years.

8 Elam Holmes Davis to Elmer Davis, October 26, 1912. Elmer Davis Papers. Library of Congress.

9 Charles Hanson Tourner to Elmer Davis, June 5, 191^. Elmer Davis Papers. 6

World War I began in Europe only a few months after Davis began

to work for the Times. The beginning of the war brought to an end the era

of innocence and security in which Davis had come to maturity. As Davis

looked back upon this earlier era., he felt that "we of 1913 found a

better here and now than any generation for centuries before us, or any

generation which will follow for some decades to come. He'felt that

he had come of age "just before the war — in what seems to the

retrospective eye an age of incredible innocence and security." He

further believed that "our aspirations were fantastic and our doings

absurd, considering the tremendous irony of what was coming." Thus, the

fact that Davis had come of age in a time of great change and at the end

of an age of naivete had a definite impact upon his social and political views. He maintained the view of 1913 that if there were problems,

something "ought to be done about them." He never subscribed to the

pessimism and despair which overtook many of his generation in the crucial

times that lay ahead. In the middle of the depression, for example, Davis

stated that "with an irrational optimism befitting an alumnus of the

absurd age in which I came to the surface, I s till believe that higher

peaks of human felicity are ahead; that our race, if it keeps on trying, 11 can make a quite habitable place of the planet on which it resides."

He was able to maintain this feeling of optimism through most of his life.

He continued to feel that any problem, however difficult, must be met

10D avis, "Good Old 1913/* Forum. LXXXV (May 1931) j 266.

1XIb i d ., 266-276. r e a l i s t i c a l l y w ith hope and not w ith d e sp a ir. This "background should always he kept in mind during the discussion of Davis1 subsequent career as well as the political and social views which he came to hold.

From 191^-192^ Davis worked on The New York Times, as a cub reporter, sports writer, political expert, foreign correspondent, and editorial writer. His first major assignment for the Times was to cover the Ford Peace Ship and its visionary attempt to get the hoys "out of the trenches hy Christmas” of 1915* Even though Davis privately disapproved of the affair, his contempt did not appear in the articles which he sent hack to the Times. He covered the event fairly and truthfully; if the truth seemed to he humorous or critical of the Ford party, that was not the fault of the reporter. Later, on looking hack on this mission, he wrote: "they were not my enemies really—only a group of high-minded people who held with great fervor ideals on whose practicahility I had heen compelled to throw some doubt.” He added, "I s till think the Ford

Peace Party was a crazy enterprise; hut an endeavor, however visionary and inadequate, to stop a war that was wrecking Europe, appears in retrospect a little less crazy than most of the other purposes that were 12 prevalent in Europe in 1916.”

During the war Davis wanted to he a war correspondent, hut the

Times did not send him to Europe. Instead he was assigned to censorship of th e e d ito ria l page; in th is p o sitio n he supplied "background fo r war

12 Davis, ”0n Hot Being Dead, as Reported,” Harper^ Magazine. CLZXVIII (A pril 1939), 536. dispatches, and he also weighed and judged the emphasis which the news

should receive. In addition he wrote essays dealing with various aspects

of the war. Among his earliest essays was one entitled '’Concerning

Fatherlands," which he wrote for Forum in 1915. In this essay he analyzed

the German-Americans * devotion to the German Empire, and attempted to show

th a t th e Germany of 1914 was "not th e ir fath e rla n d , nor m ine," hut a "Ho

Man's land, a Utopia, existent only in . . . fantastic dreams," "a land

as legendary as Ruritania." In this essay, Davis stated his own feeling

of heing "neutral with the hitter, soul-searching neutrality of the man

whose reason tells him one thing while his emotions cry out the other.

Another essay written during the war years was entitled "When Peace

Without Victory Was a Failure." This essay written in 1917 is character­

istic of Davis in two ways: its realism and Its use of a classical

analogy. It Is prohahly one of the most realistic appraisals of the

reasons for the war and of the necessity for complete victory to hring

ahout a period of permanent peace. Davis used as the analogue of the

present the Peace of Hikias during the Peloppenesian War, "a peace that

settled nothing." In this peace treaty, the questions of territory, of

commerce, of prestige, "the actual specific war grievances which had led

up to war were ignored." He stated that the war could not end until

either one power dominated a ll the others or unless a super-national

"body, a League to Enforce Peace could he set up." Davis thus felt that

"the Greeks had gone to war to settle certain things, and they would not

^Davis, "Concerning Fatherlands," Forum. LIII (March 1915), 504-514. "be at peace until these things were settled one way or the other. In

1918, Davis wrote "Austria's Fate Hangs on West Front Battle," in which he discussed the impending doom of the Hapsburg Empire and the effect of this on th e m inority groups w ith in the B n p ire .^ The a r t ic le showed D avis' sympathy for oppressed nationalities. This idea remained one of the dominant influences upon his views of foreign affairs.

At the end of the war Davis began to take an increasingly important role on The Hew York Times. He continued to be a reporter, but he also became one of the leading editorial and political writers. Two of his most important reportorial activities for the Times were his coverage of the Washington Arms Conference of 1921-1922 and his coverage of the Jack Dempsey-Torn Gibbons fight in Shelby, Montana in 1923. These two events show the range of Davis' interest and understanding. Also, as an editorial w riter, Davis wrote a review of the Wilson Administration which was widely proclaimed for its excellent summary of the Wilson 3,6 years. in addition he wrote a commentary on the Memoirs of the former

Kaiser, published in the Times in September and October 1922. During these years, Davis began to write book reviews for the Times. a practice which he continued even after he left the paper in early 192k. In 1921, on the 70th anniversary of the paper, he published a History of the Hew

York Times, 1831-1921.

lli Davis, "When Peace Without Victory was a Failure," The Hew York Times, November 11, 1917, V II, llf.

15 Davis, "Austria's Fate Hangs on West Front Battle," The New York Times. May 26, 1918, IV, 4. 16 Davis, "Woodrow Wilson's Administration." The New York Times, February 27 , 1927, III, !• One of the most interesting aspects of his career on the Times was his coverage of political conventions. He covered these conventions by interviewing the oldest living conventioneer, Godfrey Gloom, "the old- 17 fashioned Jeffersonian Democrat from Amity, Indiana." This column, which Eoger Burlingame has called "the most engaging spoofing that had

"been created since the immortal dialogs of Mr. Dooley and Mr.

Hennessy," .,18 was an immediate success. Davis' toss, Carr Yan Anda of the

Times told him "your account of the session that nominated Cox was one of the finest pieces of convention reporting I have ever seen.Hot only did Gloom observe political conventions, tut he often commented on

Senate hearings, controversial issues such as a proposed tax cut, and presidential inaugurations.'* Davis covered the conventions in this manner even after he left the Times. Gloom also appeared at toth the

Republican and Democratic conventions of 1924, 1932, and 1936. Closely a llie d w ith th e Gloom ch aracter was W alter J . Woof, th e Washington correspondent of the Amity Grapevine-Telegraph. who also observed and commented on contemporary events.

Although Davis had made renarkable progress during his ten years on the Times, from cub reporter to editorial writer, he desired to get away from the daily routine of the office to devote his full time to

^Davis, "Mr. Gloom Caustic about Convention," The Hew York Times. June 13, 1924, 6.

Burlingame, 88.

19 Carr VanAnda to Elmer Davis, July 12, 1920. Elmer Davis P apers. 11 writing. The step would, of course, be a risk, but he felt that he could be a success as a free~lan.ce writer. Hot only had he written essays, but he had also written two relatively successful novels and a number of short

soories. Tnus au one beginning of 1924, he left his job at the Times with the relief which he felt "after tea years of writing for tomorrow's

paper, of cutting loose for once and trying to see if you can do some- 20 thing good." This was the beginning of a period of literary if not always monetary success. He suffered a brief period of strain during the depression, but in general he was financially successful. During fifteen years he wrote novels, short stories, essays, literary criticism, and book reviews.

While he was working for the Times he had written two novels, The

Princess Cecilia in 1915* which had won fair success, and Times Have

Changed (1923) which gained general approval from the critics. The

latter novel, the first of what he called his "lighthearted" or "farce" novels, concerned the adventures of a small-town teacher in New York

Cityfi It was called "a rollicking story," "a merry book," and 21 "conspicuously well-written." The success of Times Have ChanppA encouraged him to leave the Times and begin his writing in earnest.

Early in 1924 he wrote I 'l l Show You the Town, which was similar in

20 Burlingame, 100.

^"Times Have Changed," Boston Transcript. May 9, 1923 , 4; "Times Have Changed," The Literary Review. April 28, 1923, 650; Heywood Broun, "Times Have Changed," The New York World. May 27, 1923, 6e. 12 content to Times Have Changed. It was acclaimed by the critics as "a story of great and restrained humor / 1 a book "almost wickedly funny;. . . 22 and very nearly too amusing to be borne." This book and his next book,

Friends of Mr. Sweeney (1925), were made into successful movies. The critics again acclaimed the book for its wit, its intricate plot, and its style. Heywood Broun stated that Davis "is a wit and a satirist as well 23 as a shrewd story teller." y The last of this group of novels, Keys of the City (1925) was not nearly as lighthearted as the earlier works and pv was not cordially recieved by the critics. Like its predecessors, however, it contained definite characteristics: an intricate and well— constructed plot, a sprightly and flowing literary style, and an ability to place the least likely people in unlikely situations for heightened comic effects. This phase of Davis* literary career was, then, successful both from the literary and the monetary standpoints.

In 1927 Davis attempted to write about more serious aspects of

American life. The first novel of this, phase, Strange Woman, concerning the life of a woman after the age of forty, received mixed reviews from 25 the critics. in 1928 Davis wrote Giant K iller, a historical novel

22"Not a Guffaw," The Independent. CXII (June 7, 1924), 315; Kenneth Fuessle, " I'll Show You the Town," International Book Review, August 1924, 672 .

^R . L. Kurzman, "Friends of Mr. Sweeney," International Book Review, December 1925, 60; Heywood Broun, "Friends of Mr. Sweeney," The New York World, November 11, 1925, 15 • Qh "New Books in Brief Review," The Independent. CXIV (March 7 , 1925), 274; "The New Books," The Saturday Review of Literature, I (March 21, 1925), 618.

25"Books in B rie f," N ation, CXXV (Noveniber 2 , 1927), 484; H.E. ■based on the Old Testament story of King David’s rise to prestige and

power. This was Davis’ most ambitious effort and most critics were im­

pressed with its careful scholarship. In general, however, the critics

felt that G-lant Killer could hardly be called inspired. Stephen Vincent

Benet stated that "essentially it goes no deeper than the plaster. And 2 6 I think that Mr. Davis intended something more." Whether because of

the reactions to these serious novels, or because he did not feel at

home with this kind of writing, he never again attempted a novel of this

type. White Pants Willie (1932) and Bare Living (1933) were not as

important as his earlier works. White Pants W illie, which had actually

been written in serial form eight years earlier, was another of his light

novels, but 1932 was an unpropitious year for its appearance. Bare

Living, dealing with life in a nudist camp, was written in collaboration with Guy Holt. It was well received by the critics who called it a

"rollicking and irresponsible satire," "a light satirical novel," and "an 27 absurd, light-hearted, and pleasant book." Davis, however, never again wrote a novel after 1933J he confined his writing solely to short stories

and essays.

Dounce, "Strange Woman," The Hew York Evening Post, October 15, 1927, 15j "’Strange Woman’ and Other Hew Works of Fiction," The Hew York Times, September 25, 1927, III, 8 .

2^Herschel Brickell, "Books," The Hew York HearId Tribune, O ctober 1 , 1928, 6 ; "King D avid," The Hew York Times 1 October l4, 1928, IV, 6 ; Stephen Vincent B enet, "The Two-Edged B lade," The Saturday Beview of Literature, V (October 27 , 1928), 293*

2^Lisle B ell, "Books," The Hew York Herald Tribune. October 22, 1933 } 16; "Hudist Fantasy," The Hew York Times, Hovember 5, 1933 3 V, 20; "The Hew Books," The Saturday Beview of Literature, X (October 28, 1933 )> 222. 3A . Throughout the free-lance period Davis wrote innumerable short

stories for The Saturday Evening Post, Everybody * s , Harper's, and

C o llie r 1s. These stories, seemingly written without effort, enabled

Davis to maintain a steady source of income. He published two volumes of

short stories, Morals for Modems (1950) and Love Among the Bulns (1955),

in which he included many of the stories he had written earlier for

magazines. John Chamberlain complained that Davis had "never given him-

pQ self a chance to become a good short-story writer." The short stories

were not as good as Davis’ other writings because he had to fit his ideas

and plots into such a short space that he was not able to develop them

fully. Even though these writings included neither his best writings nor

any coherent statement of his political and social views, they helped to

sustain him financially.

The more serious phase of Davis’ free-lance career was the

writing of essays, book reviews, and literary criticism. He wrote a

number of essays in Forum, The Saturday Beview of Literature, and

Harper’s, and numerous book reviews for both The New York Times rma The

Saturday Beview of Literature. It is in these essays and reviews that

his political and social views can best be grasped. Because of his

activity on the Saturday Beview, he became a member of its editorial

board in 19^0. Although his essays, book reviews, and literary

criticism were not as lucrative financially as was his fiction writing,

they are more important in a study of Davis' political and social thought.

28 John Chamberlain, "The Short Story Muddles On," The Hew B epublic, IXV (January 7> 1951)> 226. Thus the majority of the material in the succeeding chapters will he taken from this phase of his free-lance career.

This free-lance period was probably the happiest of his life. He was a relatively successful writer, although he did, of course, have some literary and financial disappointments. He yearned for greater literary acclaim. In 192^ in a letter to his friend Carolyn Wilson he cried "but oh for that great novel that was to lift me up into the range of those who might be considered for the Pulitzer, if not the Nobel 29 prize.” He also faced some financial difficulty, particularly during the depression, but in general he felt that "we are pretty well off for ..30 us. But one of the most important reasons why he liked this period was the freedom of movement he enjoyed. He was able to cut loose from the daily routine of the office, to work at his own rate, and to write mainly what he wanted to write. He stated that during this period, "we have regained our freedom of movement, spiritual as well as physical.

. . . After a life-time of playing it safe I've at last climbed out of the shell. But in 1936 and 1937 this relatively happy period drew to an end, as Davis began to turn from fiction and light essays to articles dealing with the rise of Fascism in Europe. Because of these realistic analyses of Hitler and the European situation Davis was asked, in August 1939, to begin an entirely new career as a broadcaster

29 Burlingame, 108.

?0I b i d ., 109.

5 1lb id . 16 on CBS radio. This was a definite turning point in his life marking his transition from a writing to a speaking career.

In the summer of 1959 Davis was writing a series of articles about the European situation. On August 22, "Paul lMhite, who runs the news department of the Columbia Broadcasting System . . . told me that

£ \ , Y . J Ealtehbora was in Europe" and that "a news analyst was needed 52 in the home office, and would I come down and help out?" Davis was hesitant because he felt that to fill in for such a capable man in such a crisis "was a little like trying to play center-fleld in place of Joe

DiMaggio. Nonetheless, Davis decided to take the job as news analyst on CBS, a job which he held until June 19^2. Davis was an almost immediate success as he reported the significant events of September 1959,

in a calm, dry, reassuring twang. By Pearl Harbor it was estimated that

Davis had 12,500,000 listeners to his five-minute news sum m ary.Davis attributed his immediate radio success, to "the rise of Adolf Hitler, which compelled the public to be interested in the things I was interested in. Critics cited other reasons. Time said, "his voice was calm, incisive, with a Hoosier twang as reassuring as Thanksgiving, as shrewd as a small “town banker. Paul White, who hired Davis, stated that he

^Davis, "Broadcasting the Outbreak of Ifer," Harper's Magazine. CLKXIX 588 (October 1959), 581.

55Ib id ?

"Truth and Trouble," Time. XU (March 15, I1*-. ^Elmer Davis to Hoy Benjamin, J r., February 11, 19^7, Elmer Davis Papers. 56"Truth and Trouble," Time. 14. had "perceptiveness, the power to reason and the ability to express his views that are unm atched.R oger Burlingame recalled that Davis seemed to he "right in your room. You could almost see him. . . . The why of it was partly in the words, partly in the inflection. In that flat, even voice, the impact of the faintest up and down was stunning. And hearing 38 it, you could almost see facial expressions."

Davis’ broadcasts, like his novels, had a number of character­ istic traits. One was his celebrated Indiana twang, which, of course, set him apart from the other broadcasters. Also, his broadcasts were characterized by a remarkable economy of expression. His son, Robert

Lloyd Davis, stated that Davis' broadcasts "represented marvels of com­ pression—getting in a ll the important news salients and also somehow achieving the apparently impossible task of providing comment and balance and a sane point of view, just through the wording and the sequence, and an occasional flash of irony. Burlingame stated that "one word did for six in the mouth of anyone else; he had not only a flair but a great bO fondness for paring down a sentence." A third significant character­ istic of Davis as a broadcaster was his calm and realistic appraisal of events. John Crosby stated that Davis' most distinctive characteristic

^J.Paul W. White, "Upon the Return of Elmer Davis on the Air," The Hew Republic, CXXX (January 18, 195*0 s 10-11. 38 ^ Burlingame, 155- 39 Robert Lloyd Davis to the author, December 1 , 196b.

bo Burlingame, 157• 18

was "plain* ordinary horsesense." He had a "priceless gift of skepti­

cism," the ability "to assess what may happen and what probably won't"

and the ability to view disaster not with equanimity "but with the long,

calm view that there have been other disasters in the past and there w ill be others in the future. "1^

During the course of his broadcasts in early 19*12, Davis

criticized the government's information agencies. He stated that "the whole government publicity situation has everybody in the news business almost in despair, with half a dozen different agencies following different lines. . . . Under one head, with real power, they might get

somewhere."^ On March 14, 19*12, E. B. White in the Hew Yorker agreed and stated that Davis was "the man to sit at the desk." Whether these

two events influenced President Boosevelt is not known, but when he had decided to coordinate the information agencies of the government he asked Elmer Davis to become head of the new agency. On June 17, 19**2

Davis was appointed Director of the Office of War Information. Davis recalled that "I was brought down to Washington and told that I had Mi- been drafted as the Director of the Agency." He probably would have

^John Crosby, "Upon the Return of Elmer Davis on the Air," The Hew Republic, Cffl (January 18, 195*0, 11-12.

] lO Burlingame, 186. kx E. B. White, "Hotes and Comments," The Hew Yorker. XVIII (March 14, 19^2), 13. ^D avis, The Office of War Information, 13 June 19*1-2 - 15 September 19*1-5, Report to the President. Papers of the Office of War Information, national Archives, Washington, D. C. 19

preferred to remain with. CBS, hut Roosevelt persuaded him that he would

he the hest man for the job. Davis probably was not. He had never heen

an administrator, and the task of directing the activities of four

thousand men was a job for a trained executive not a commentator or a

reporter. Davis did a good job under the circumstances, hut there is

much truth in Time magazine's view that "the U. S. has the had end of the

bargain: In place of a voice that nightly made things sound clear,

plain, sensible, always reassuring for five minutes, they got an

administrator, lost in the fog of Washington.

Many of the difficulties which Davis faced as Director of the

O.W.I. concerned administrative matters. Although much of the admin­

istrative detail was to he handled by the deputy director, Milton

Eisenhower, Davis often had to make the final decisions. There were

numerous internal difficulties, both in the Domestic and Overseas

Branches. There was a split in the Domestic Branch between the artists

and creators, on the one hand, and the advertising and copy-writing men,

on the other. Davis’ inability to resolve the differences led to the

resignation of the artists; their resignation caused increasing attacks

upon Davis and the O.W.I. He was also faced with a problem in the

Overseas Branch which was headed by Robert E. Sherwood. Because the

Branch was not working e f fic ie n tly , Davis ordered Sherwood to reorganize

the Branch and to dismiss some of the leading men. When Sherwood refused,

Davis took the matter directly to President Roosevelt, who tried to

solve the difficulty peacefully. Davis refused to give in, threatened

^5"Truth and Trouble," Time, 15. 20 46 to resign, and eventually won a clear-cut victory. Although he was successful in this dispute, the difficulty hurt the prestige of the O.W.I. and hindered it from fulfilling its real purpose of co-ordinating government information.

Davis also got into political difficulties when Republicans accused the O.W.I. of conducting political propaganda. A pamphlet entitled Battle Stations for All: the Story of the Fight to Control

Living Costs was denounced by Ralph Robey of Newsweek as "one of the most bare-faced pieces of prejudiced propaganda that has every been directed at the American public by a presumably non-partisan government bureau."^

The O.W.I. was also criticized for a pamphlet about the life of President

Roosevelt, published solely for use In foreign countries. Republicans, such as Senator Rufus Holman of Oregon and Representative John Taber of

Hew York, asserted that the O.W.I. was using the pamphlet as propaganda for Roosevelt's bid for re-election in 1944. Representative Taber declared that the pamphlet was "purely political propaganda, designed to promote a fourth term and dictatorship." This political opposition, in addition to the internal disputes within the O.W.I., culminated in a

House Resolution of June 18, 19-45, which by a vote of 218-114 abolished the Domestic Branch. The House Appropriations Committee, under prodding by Representative Taber, had already cut thirteen million from the over­ a ll O.W.I. appropriation. The Senate, however, refused to abolish the

^'^Burlingame, 255“240. ^ R a lp h Robey, "B attle S tatio n s fo r A ll," Newsweek» XXI (May 3 , 1943), 61. 4 8 ...... "End of a Decade," Newsweek, XXI (March 15, 1943), 36. 21

Domestic Branch; hut by allocating only three million dollars for it, the

Senate effectively curtailed a number of O.W.I.1a services.^

Davis was much more successful in fulfilling the major role of

O.W.I., the attempt to inform the American people about the true war

situation. He felt that the basic principle of an official information

policy was that "the American people are entitled to full information—

except information which is not known to the enemy; and which, if it were

known to the enemy, would endanger American lives, American ships, or the success of American m ilitary operations . ”^0 In addition he believed that "the better the American people understand what this war is about, 51 the harder they will work and fight to win it." The opposition to this

policy of the O.W.I. came primarily from the Army and Navy, who, dis­ agreeing about what would "endanger the success of American military operations," often tried to withhold the truth about American losses.

Gradually Davis won this battle and was able to put into effect his policy

concerning this informational aspect of the O.W.I. It was in this

important aspect of the Office of War Information that Davis was most successful.

In spite of all of the difficulties which Davis faced during these years, the O.W.I. was successful, if not in shortening the war, at

least In enabling the American people to understand the reasons why the

liQ Burlingame, 216-217. 50 Elmer Davis and Byron Price, War Information and Censorship (Washington: American Council on Public Affairs, 19^3), 50.

53H b id ., 14. 22 war was 1)61)08 fought. It is probably true, also, that the propaganda of the Overseas Branch had some effect in lowering the morale of the soldiers and civilians within the Axis countries. At any rate, when the war ended and when the Office of War Information was liquidated, probably no one was more relieved than Elmer Davis. He had had to face more abuse and criticism than most government officials, and he received little credit for the accomplishments of the O.W.I. His friends, co-workers, and superiors, however, realized the great contributions he had made.

When Davis resigned from the O.W.I. President Truman wrote him: "I know that you took a thankless job when dark days were ahead; . . . that you made great personal sacrifice to serve the nation in its hour of need.

As part of your reward you received mare than your share of brickbats.

. . . But it is my firm conviction that you deserve the thanks of the ..52 Nation for a job well done.” When the O.W.I. was liquidated on

September 15, Davis left the government and resumed his radio career.

Davis decided to work for the American Broadcasting Company, not only for financial reasons but also because on ABC he could be a commentator rather than merely an "objective” reporter of the news. He believed the good reporter must guard against "the false objectivity that takes everything at face value and lets the public be imposed on by the charlatan with the most brazen front." He realized the dangers of interpretive reporting, the difficulty of drawing the line- between

"a reasonably well-established fact and what the reporter or editor

52 Harry S. Truman to Elmer Davis, September 11, 19^5, Elmer Davis Papers. 23 53 wishes were the fact." But he felt he could "best give the "whole

truth" not only "by reporting news, hut by endeavoring "to interpret it to

the best of my ability. Because CBS opposed this type of reporting,

Davis decided to work for ABC. His career on ABC was the most im­

portant phase of his life, primarily because it was from this position

that he conducted his famous defense of freedom against the dangers of

McCarthyism.

Davis commented on almost a ll of the significant events of the

posfwar decade. During most of these years his broadcasts were on the

air 15 minutes per night five days a week, enabling him to state his

views about the American and world situation clearly and fully. And

when controversial questions were being discussed, as they were

periodically between 19*1-5 and 1955; Davis frankly expressed his position.

Joseph C. Harsch said in 195**-: "one thing no one ever called Elmer Davis

is a pussyfooter or sailtrimmer. . . . He says whatever he thinks. He 55 says it concisely and beyond shadow of doubt, with reasons." Because

of this out-spoken attitude, characteristic of Davis' entire life, he

was often involved in disputes. His views were often at variance with

a fellow commentator, Fulton Lewis, Jr., who sometimes accused Davis of

being at best a fellow-traveler, because of his association with the

O.W.I., the American Labor Party, and the Americans for Democratic

^Davis, But We Were Bom Free, (Indianapolis: Bobbs M errill, 195*0; 175. 5*1- Elmer Davis to Hale Bondurant, November 16, 1952. Elmer Davis Papers, 55 Joseph C. Harsch, "Upon the Return of Elmer Davis on the A ir," The New Republic, CXXX (January 18, 195*1-); 12. 2k

Action. During the Truman-MacArthur controversy Davis was subjected to

vitriolic abuse. An outraged correspondent proclaimed it sacrilege for

Davis to even say the name MacArthur.-^ But the most significant and

courageous stand taken by Davis was his defense of freedom during the

early 1950's. During the McCarthy era he received numerous awards for

his defense of civil liberties. In 1951 lie received the George Foster

Peabody Radio Award for "the sanity, the horse sense, and the dry

Hoosier wit with which Mr. Davis contemplates a troubled world."^7 in

1955 1 be received the Lauterback Award and in 1955 the Stephen Wise

Award both in recognition for his contributions in the field of civil

lib e r tie s .

During this crucial decade Davis observed affairs not only on

radio, but also through essays, book reviews, and books. He wrote a

number of essays in which he analyzed issues more completely than he

could on radio. He wrote about such topics as the possibility and

effects of an atomic war, the world-state, and contemporary party

politics. His most important literary endeavor during these years,

however, was the writing of his last two books. But We Were Bom Free

(195*0 was written during the McCarthy era and was a coherent statement

of his views concerning freedom and liberty. It was an immediate

sensation and sold nearly a hundred thousand copies. Hot, as he had

once hoped, by a great novel, but by a book of essays in which he

56 Philip C. Eardley to Elmer Davis, April 13, 1951* Elmer Davis Papers.

^Burlingame, 311* 25

stated clearly Ms views about bow to defend the -American way of life in

its hour of peril, he was lifted "into the range of those who might be

considered for the Pulitzer" P rize.^ The second book, Two Minutes T ill

Midnight (1955), concerning the possibility of a nuclear war and its

threat to America and the world, was not nearly as successful as But We

Were Born Free. Its small circulation was due partly to its erudition,

and partly because, as he said, "nobody wants to read about the hydrogen

,.5 0 bomb, or even to think about it.

This book was Davis’ last great effort. His health had forced

him to discontinue broadcasting for almost half a year in 1955, and after

he returned he was allowed to broadcast only once a week. He had

suffered a stroke, and also had hypertension. In a letter in 195^ Davis

stated that "my blood pressure, for some months past, has been running

between 190 and 250." My doctor "has forbidden me to do anything out- 60 side a weekly broadcast." His condition worsened, and in the last

year of Ms life he could not write at all. In the last month he was

unable to speak or swallow, kept alive by intravenous feeding. He died

on May 18, 1958 at the age of 68 .

From this brief discussion of Davis’ life, it is obvious that

he had been in positions from which he could observe and comment on various aspects of the American and world scene. As a reporter,

58 See page 15.

^Davis, Two Minutes T ill Midnight (Indianapolis; Bobbs- Merrill Co., Inc., 1955), vii.

^E lm er Davis to H. F. G oldstein, March 1, 195^. Elmer Davis Papers. 26 essayist, novelist, and radio commentator he formulated his views on the events which he observed. Davis did, of course, play a significant role in American affairs during his latter years, but also in his earlier years, his role was not inconsiderable. Thus it would be of interest to attempt to ascertain the views which he held as well as to ascertain the development of these views throughout his life. The succeeding chapters, by analyzing his essays, novels, short stories, letters, and radio scripts, w ill discuss the political and social thought of Elmer Davis. CHAPTER I I

THE GOLDEN DECADE:

ELMER DAVIS AND THE AGE OF NORMALCY

The first important phase of the literary career of Elmer Davis was the age of "normalcy.” During the 1920's he reported and analyzed news as a reporter on The New York Times, he wrote essays, short stories, novels, and hook reviews, and he wrote letters to the editor in which he commented on various aspects of the American scene. Davis discussed such diverse aspects of life as prohibition, censorship, religion, literature, politics, and foreign affairs. His attitude toward these varied issues was consistent, and revealed the influence of his classical education, his newspaper experience, and his stoic philosophy of life.

While discussing specific problems of the 1920's, Davis often expressed his general views about the era. He declared that this

"Golden Decade," the heroic Age," grew out of the "Iron Quinquennium" and "began as a reaction against the hard realities which the world had endured from 191^“1919. "**’ Davis opposed the entire atmosphere of

"normalcy" arising out of this retreat from reality. The climate of opinion in the decade was "a materialism that runs from the top to the

■*E2mer D avis, "The Passing of a Great Race," Show Window (New York: John Day Co., 1927), 107-

27 28 bottom of society . 11 It was responsible for one of the most serious faults of the society of the 1920*s, the fact that "a man with neither ability nor industry can become rich, and acquire with riches a social position and a voice that speaks with authority on all subjects.

Davis attacked this materialism because of its unfortunate effect on some important aspects of the American way of life. There was little independence in thought or action during the decade for it was "an age when gang thinking Is pretty nearly all the thinking there k is." The age was dominated by the doctrine that "it's always fair weather when good fellows get together, and that a good fellow undefiled by any taint of intellect is good enough to be trusted with the nation's business. . . . If he is a good mixer and a good story teller, he is all right." in this era "of gang thinking and high pressure persuasion, self "respect is as out of fashion as sales resistance."^ Davis found a classical analogy which characterized the decade: the decline of Borne.

p Davis, "Not Such Defenders," Saturday Review of Literature. YI (August 10, 1929), 35. 3 Davis, "Exposing Business," Saturday Beview of Literature» I (November 22, 192*0 > 299.

4 D avis, "To You, Whoever you A re," Show Window» *k 5 Davis, "Four Years of Normalcy," The New York Times s March 12, 192*1-, 1 8 .

^Davis, "What Can a Man B eliev e?," Saturday Beview of Literature, IV (September 3, 1927), 82. . 29

He realized that a ll analogies must he used with caution; hut he believed that "there should he some provocation for reflective Americans in this account of what happened to a great nation in which wealth accumulated 7 while men decayed.

D avis1 views of these years were similar to the views of other

intellectuals and literary figures. But Davis differed from these men

in that he never completely suhscrihed to pessimism. He thought that defeatism would not endure "because the normal human mind is so made as 8 to recoil, sooner or later, from a creed of complete negation." The

proof of this is the human race, which "stands on its legs, however un­

stably. It would still he hanging by its tail from a tree, if it were

composed e n tire ly of th e so rt of people Huxley k n o w s .M o re o v e r, Davis maintained his wit and sense of humor and often laughed at situations

in the decade. If a modern moralist had been in Adam’s position, said

Davis, he "would have proved it was all the fault of the tree for growing

in the garden, and would have rehabilitated mankind by prohibiting the

culture of apples.Statem ents such as this, in addition to his attacks on defeatism, are indicative of the contrast between Davis and more pessimistic critics. This disparity is clearly seen in his

Toavis, "The Perennial Problem of Rome's Decline," The New York Times, August 29, 1926, III, 17.

®Davis, "The Cupboard 1/tfas Bare," The Saturday Review of L ite r a tu r e , 7 (May 25, 1929) > lOW.

^Davis, "A Counterblast to Defeatism," The Saturday Review of Literature, 7 (March 2, 1929); 7 25«

^Davis, "Treaties to Run a Hew Gauntlet," The Hew York Times, February 11, 1922, 5« 30

statement that "the test of a man or a nation is not the way he feels

about disaster, but what he does about it."**''*'

D avis' comments on p ro h ib itio n suggest h is general outlook. He

believed that prohibition was unfortunate because it was making the United 12 States a "country of spies, sneaks, and informers." In addition,

prohibition encouraged public disrespect of laws and of public officials

by fomenting governmental corruption and popular hypocrisy. **-3 Davis also

ridiculed the various attempts at enforcement. Because there was alcohol

in gasoline, gasoline would have to be added to the fluids prohibited by ill. the Volstead Act. Also, in order to prohibit rum-running there should

be "a general embargo forbidding motor traffic on country roads altogether,

which would make detection of rum-runners and division of profits quite t>15 easy. The ultimate solution to the problems, however, was the Gandhi

plan: "to cut down all the fruit trees in the U. S. (every one a source

of potentially felonious juices); . . . to extirpate the potato from

which strong waters may be distilled; to see that no farmer plants any

more com—or indeed any cereal; . . . and keep watch over every

^■^Davis, "America’s Coarse Babbitry," The Hew York Times. February 20, 1927, III,

12 Davis, "Indiana," Show Window, 202.

15 Davis, "What Can We Do About It? The Candid Misgivings of a Wet," Harper’s Magazine, CLVIII (December 1928), 9- ik Davis, "Trouble Ahead for Gasoline," The New York Times, August 11, 1926, 20. 15 Davis, "Motoring and Rum-Running," The Hew York Times, August 31, 1921+, V III, 10. suburban lawn In this broad land against the appearance of the fer- 1 /T mentable and unconstitutional dandelion . 11

Davis went beyond ridicule and analyzed what could be done about

amending or repealing prohibition. He realized that any change or

revision would be difficult because the drys were "a compact group

fighting for life . . . and united on a platform admirable at least in i its clarity and exactitude." What was needed to change prohibition was

concentration and tenacity. ^ He stated that the wets would have little

success until they could agree on such problems as local option, the definition of intoxicating liquors, and the problem of beer and wine.

He personally believed that the ideal solution was to "let all citizens 1ft practice personal moderation and stop minding other people's business."

He thought that outright repeal was unlikely in 1928 because the time

would never come "when the Methodist bishops and their allies cannot

control thirteen state legislatures. He suggested that the best

thing to do was to let affairs continue under the existing conditions:

"the wets get liquor, the drys get moral satisfaction, and the public pQ officials get money." When the 18th Amendment was repealed Davis was

^Davis, "Gandhi Plan Has Points," The Hew York Times, April 25, 1950, 2k.

17 Davis, "If Prohibition is Beaten," The Hew York Times, March 28, 1926, VIII, 14.

^Davis, "What Can We Do About It," Harper's Magazine. 9. 32 toth surprised and pleased. He asserted that its repeal was a victory for democracy. "The people at last had a chance to speak, and they spoke without ambiguity. . . . No one could have dreamed that the decision

0*1 would have been so speedy or so one-sided."

A closely related problem which interested Davis in the 1920's and throughout his life was censorship. His involvement in a New York

censorship law, a theater padlock b ill, and censorship of the arts led him to write a general article, "The Comstock Load," detailing his views about censorship. In this article Davis analyzed one of the leading fig u re s in th e movement, Anthony Comstock, no tin g "the se rv ic e he pO rendered by making his ideas ridiculous." To Davis, the crux of the matter was that censorship was geared to the lowest elements in society, regardless of the effect it might have on the rest of society. "The diet of a ll of us must be that prescribed for the weakest stomach; for fear that the wicked may be still further depraved, the pervert s till further perverted, the clean and intelligent must be treated as of no 23 account." Censorship not only had this detrimental effect, but it failed to fu lfill its intended purpose of improving public morality. ^

Davis' views about censorship were characteristic of his later ideas

21 D avis, "How th e Wets Won," Current H isto ry » XXXIX (December 1935), 282-283.

22 D avis, "The Comstock Load," Show Window. 7^*

23 I b i d . , 93-

2k 0 I b i d . , 78 . 55 as well, particularly during the hook-burning hysteria of the 1950's .

For Davis realized that "the agitation for a censorship of the arts recurs as irregularly but as inevitably as Florida hurricanes. "25

During the 1920's and through life, Davis supported toleration in the United States. He opposed intolerance of any kind, whether that of the drys, censors, rural Fundamentalists, the Eu Elux Elan, anti-Semites, or anti-immigrants. Against all of these forms of Intolerance Davis took a definite stand. His opposition to prohibitionists and censors has already been noted. Similarly Davis attacked the intolerance of rural

Fundamentalism, which was characteristic of the decade. He stated that

"the one irrepressible conflict in American politics and American p/T ideology today is the antagonism between city and country. " This anti­ city feeling began with Amos, the rural prophet of Tekoa, who looked around him and concluded that "the evils of the time could be cured only by a return to the old-time religion; by which he meant . . . to his personally revised concept of the old-time religion and no other."27

The present-day prophets, following Amos' beliefs, attacked the ideas and behavior of the city population: cigarettes, short skirts, synthetic gin, the Pope and Darwin. "If it is something we don't do in 28 Tekoa, it is an abomination unto the Lord." Davis concluded by saying

2^ Ib id .» 71 .

2^Bavis, "Beds of Iv o ry ," Show Window. 117.

27ibid., 122-125.

28I b id ., 151. "more good for more people has come out of the Samarias than out of the

Tekoas.

Davis* views of the Elan are test seen in an essay entitled

"Indiana.11 He wondered why the Protestants in Indiana were afraid of

Catholicism when Catholics composed only ten per cent of the population.

His answer was that to the Hoosier "Indiana is the most desirable spot on

earth, and any potentate might reasonably covet it.” In addition the Elan

had become powerful because "it gave to persons of no importance a sense

of consequence and an illusion of something to do."^° Davis also

discussed anti-Semitism, a problem closely related to the Elan. The

reason for anti-Semitism was that the Aryan Protestant was "afraid that

his race and his faith are dying out. Bewildered and alarmed, he can

think of no defensive measure but to keep to himself as far as possible,

preserve himself from the contaminating presence of more devout and

more prolific breeds." Davis asserted that the real danger of anti-

Semitism was not to the Jews themselves, but to the American way of life

because it was delaying "an assimilation which Is important for the well- 31 being of American society." He was concerned also with the related

problems of immigration and Americanism. His views of these aspects are

best expressed in a "discovered" memoir entitled "The Private Life of

Paris of Troy." In this memoir ostensibly written by Helen, Davis

30 Davis, "Indiana," Show Window» 196-197* 31 Davis, "On the Gentility of Gentiles," Harper*s Magazine. CLXVII (July 1933), 15^-155* 35 humorously attacked many of the ideas of Americanism. Helen complains:

'Sector only makes things worse with his speeches to the Kappa Kappa

Kappas about hundred per cent Trojanism and exclusion of Nordic immi- *32 gration. * Helen also states that she is no "hyphenated Trojan" even if she was a “war bride" of "enemy alien origin.”^

Davis commented ex ten siv ely on th e problems of re lig io n both during the 1920*s and after. He felt that religious questions deserved thoughtful consideration and he seriously discussed religious ideas to ascertain if religion could contribute constructively to American society; he also analyzed various religious views in order to formulate his own concepts. He criticized various aspects of denominational struggles and institutional religion. Proliferation of Christian denominations, although unnecessary, struck him as inevitable because many churches were "unwilling to give up their sanctified peculiarities for the sake of Christian unity." To attain church unity was a noble

ideal, but to do so you must sacrifice time-hallowed doctrines for the sake of intellectual integrity. "It must be said for the Church that it 3k has never hesitated for one moment, when confronted with that choice."

32 Davis, "The Private Life of Paris of Troy," Show Window» 61.

33 Ibid., 67-69.

3k Davis, "SlUhat Can a Man Believe?,” The Saturday Beview of Literature, IV (September 3» 1927 ) s 82. - Davis also attacked ministers who talked solely of ‘'envy, malice, hatred, and a ll uncharitableness.

D avis1 best-known attacks on institutional religion were his two articles concerning Episcopal Bishop William Manning*s endeavor to build the Cathedral of St. John the Divine in New York. Davis not only con­ demned th e way in which Manning received co n trib u tio n s, but he also questioned the necessity of building such a cathedral at all. Manning solicited contributions with the understanding that the cathedral could be used by people of all faiths. Davis, contending that the cathedral was so le ly fo r E piscopalian use, commented: " if th e merchandiser had been any but a Bishop, offering holy wares, this would have seemed perilously like misrepresentations of the quality of the goods.He declared that Sfc. John's was a fitting monument to "the nan of vision who got contributions from all people for a house of prayer owned by only one per cent of the people, who put religion over in a big way.

Davis also deprecated this attempt to build a Gothic cathedral in the Twentieth Century. He believed that a building must express something the people of the age generally feel. Unless people have a twelfth-century mind, "twelfth-century architecture has no more

55 Davis, "Hews from the Pulpits," The Hew York Times. December 7, 192^, II, 6.

3 6 Davis, "Portrait of a Cleric," Show Window. 281-282. relevance to our needs than twelfth-century plumbing." The building of a

Gothic cathedral in the twentieth century confessed ’’frankly that the

Church has had nothing new to say in the past seven hundred years." The bare styleless ugliness of most present-day churches indicated the vitality of religion; the people wanted to go to church so badly that they built whatever building they could afford. When the churches became prosperous and began to build bigger and more beautiful churches, they had lost their original vitality. Thus, what the contemporary 38 church needed was ”a formula for surviving prosperity. Davis, then, was not critical of religion as such but only those aspects which had no relevance to contemporary life a®' which were concerned more with material than with spiritual values.

Davis* serious views about religion can be seen clearly in a number of essays in which he discussed various religious beliefs. These essays analyzed the relationship between science and religion in order th a t a view of the universe could be formulated which would be compatible with reality. Davis analyzed theological ideas by this criterion of reality, and, by so doing, formulated his own religious views. By using science as the criterion, the bulk of the old-time religion, such things as the six-day creation, the geocentric universe, the Fall-and-Atonement,

“is incredible, if the human mind can be trusted at a ll.” But although science nullified the old-time religion, it did not abolish God; on the

38 Davis, ’^Dr. Manning's Pious Anachronism," The lew BepubliOa XLI (January 28, 1925), 256-257 . contrary science gave man the credible and inescapable beginning: "There is an Order in the Universe, and it is dynamic, not static; . . . an immense and ordered Creation, working out its destiny under the law.

The question, then, is this: What is the relationship between this ordered Universe and man? One answer to this question was that given by the Modernists, one of whose leaders was Harry Emerson Fosdick.

Davis stated that the Modernists attempted to hold fast to that which was good in the old faith and weld it together with the new truth "in the high faith that the True, the Beautiful, and the Good are one. Because of this, the Modernists believed in a theology of intuition rather than of dogma; "but a purely intuitional theology as evidence for a God of love is a very sandy foundation for so pretentious a skyscraper. in addition Davis asserted that what the Modernists’ argument comes down to is that "he £j?oed.lck.J believes in God and immortality, because other­ wise the Universe would be meaningless and Fosdick would be uncomfort - lj.g ab le. 1 Thua, although the Modernists had progressed from the old "time religion they had not made their views completely compatible with r e a lity .

The greatest stumbling block of the Modernists was their attempt to reconcile human and divine ideas of justice. Davis declared that

39 Davis, "God Without Religion," Harper’s Magazine. CEK (March 1930), 399. 40 Davis, "God and the Modernists," The Saturday Review of Literature. XIII (December 21, 1935 ) s 10.

^^Davis, "God Without Religion," Harper’s Magazine. 405. 42 Davis, "Prolegomena to Christology," Show Window. 153« 39

"the mistakes of society are avenged on individuals; very often on individuals who had no faintest responsibility for the mistakes. ” It was also undeniable that punishment often fell on the innocent more than on the guilty. Thus Spinoza and the author of the book of Job were correct in their belief that because God*s idea of Justice was unknowable# "we might as well do the best we can# take what comes to us# and agree that

God knows best. Davis found it ridiculous to suppose that a God whose cells are thousands of light-years wide could be "greatly con­ cerned whether# on the microscopic satellite of a remote and incon- siderable star# kings rule Justly# or Methodists dance.

Davis,, then# found both the traditional and Modernistic approaches to religion inadequate# and he advocated instead the rational­ istic approach. According to this view people should "see what they can make out of the universe not as they would like it# but as to the best of their knowledge it appears actually to be. ” People should not look for a crutch; they Bhould not invent a religion that deceives them for their own comfort; but they should recognize the Universe for what it is 1*5 and try to make the best of it. It was a creed that casteth out fear#

"for you are beyond fear when you know the worst and stand up to it.

. . . There is no reason to be ashamed of a faith that enables a nan to

43 Davis, "God and the Modernists," Saturday Beview of 1 0 .

^Davis# "God Without Religion."Harper’s Magazine. 1*00. 1*5 Davis# "Prolegomena to Christology," Show Window, 1 5 8 . 40 look the universe in the eye, and stand on his own feet.” This was Davis*

personal view of the Universe, a view which he maintained through life.

At various times he ’’stood on his own feet” and fought "beasts in no hope

of future reward or of future punishment, hut merely because ’’beasts

ought to be fought on general principles.”^ Thus Davis’ ideas of

religion are important to his political and social thought because they

help to explain his general outlook on life.

Further light on Davis’ political and social thought comes from

his discussion of the literature and literary figures of the 1920’s.

Davis, like other writers, criticized many aspects of "normalcy,” but he

never sank to the depths of despair. He deprecated the pessimistic

literature of the 1920*s which he called "Futilitarianism, ” particularly

because it had lost touch with the reality of contemporary life. This

idea, which Bernard DeVoto later treated as the "literary fallacy," is

the core of Davis’ literary criticism during the decade.

Davis’ basic criterion for judging literature was the pragmatic

one: "hot, Does it Satisfy the author? but, Does it satisfy the hi reader?" He believed that a novelist must persuade people to buy his

book; and if the customers find in fiction only the chaos and futility

they had already found in life, "they w ill go to gin quite sensibly for

the illusion that art ought to furnish." Davis did not mean that the

novelist should concern himself with illusion and not with reality; on

^ Ib id ., 161-163.

^ D avis, "The Age of Impotence," Show Window. 16. in

the contrary, he believed that because there were so may aspects to

r e a l i ty , th e a r t i s t should s e le c t and rec o n stru c t th e phenomena in to some

coherent pattern. He declared that even if life was without form and void, which, Davis believed, could not be proved, ”it does not follow 48 that the novels must also be without form and void. " He condemned not the attempt of novelists to be realistic, but rather the presumption of novelists who felt they were portraying truth and reality when actually they merely discussed selected fragments on the surface of life.

Although Davis shared some of the.pessimism of the writers of the

1920 *s he opposed dogmatic assertions of the meaninglessness of life.

For Davis believed that it was impossible to understand completely the nature of the universe. Davis stated, however, that even if the Chaotics were right about the sorry scheme of things in the Universe, they were 49 wrong about one portion of the Universe, the human race. These

"Invertebrate" novelists forgot that most men keep on trying in spite of all the difficulties which they might face. These Invertebrates, or

Impotents, ignored the fact that man w ill keep on trying anyway, how­

ever thin his hope of success. "For the Impotents*",Davis asserted"are flying in the face of Nature, a Nature which created the majority of ..50 organisms with a tendency to fight rather than quit."

Davis was unable to perceive that the Universe 'becomes any

48 Ibid.» 10-12. ^Ibid., 47.

5° I b ld .* 56. 42 more appetizing merely "because somebody has w ritten a gloomy book about it." He believed that this great solemnity in literature was due to "the work of earnest young people who are unaware that they are not the first earnest young people in history." Ho one need give up his convictions as to the faults of the universe, Davis declared, but "it w ill work no great harm to American letters to compel an author to live on his merits, instead of riding to fame and fortune by the mere accident that he never laughs. " ^

Similarly Davis compared the Entertainers with which he identified, to the "Serious Writers" and ruefully attempted to explain why the latter were more successful. The Serious Writer did not have to write in a recognizable variant of the English language; he "may invent his own vocabulary and his own syntax. If his sentences are meaningless and his paragraphs unintelligible, so much the better on the principle of *omne ignotum pro magnifico'. . . . He is Creating a Hew Medium." Also the subject matter differed, because the Serious Writer could, write about anything and anybody; his heroine "may be and usually is as thoroughly ruined as his sentence structure." In conclusion Davis stated that he did not want to "Interpret Life or Be Representative of My Generation," as the Serious Writers were; but he worked for a living and "Inter­ preting Life is a good deal easier and better paid than merely trying to amuse the customers."^

^“Wvis, "Suaviter in Modo," The Saturday Review of Literature. I l l (August 14, 192 6) , 3k.

5^1)avis, "Farewell to the Slapstick," The Saturday Review of Literature, I (December 20, 1924), 391. lot only did Davis ridicule the solemnity of the Futilitarians

and their unrealistic view of the Universe, hut he also attacked their

dogmatism. He began to see that they were making the ideas of H. L.

Mencken "the doctrine of a new and popular religion which, lacking an

official name, may well be called Mercurianity; a creed which covers

more departments of life in practice than Christianity ever attempted

to control even in theory. It controls not only what you shall think,

but the words in which you shall clothe your thought."-^ Mencken, the

prophet of the new religion, no doubt set out to teach truth with the

idea that it would set men free; but “like other prophets he sees them

line up in a Joyful goosestep, proclaiming that his truth is the sole

truth, in which alone lies salvation," As a literary critic Mencken

was a moralist; “if a book fails to teach, or at least to imply, what he

regards as a good moral lesson, it is not a good book.

As he moved further from the decade Davis observed the lite r­

ature of the 1920‘s with more detachment and could better appreciate

some of its accomplishments. Because of the literary doldrums which

overtook America during the 1930*s Davis* appreciation of literature of

the Twenties increased. He declared that the decade had "turned up,

perhaps, more good and fairly good writers than any other decade in

American history." In addition many books were popular both with

53 D avis, "Prolegomena to C h risto lo g y ," Show Window, 132-133*

5lf Davis, "Suavlter in Modo," Saturday Beview of Literature, critics and with, customers; this "seemed to prove that literature was no longer something apart from the life of the nation.""^ He asserted that there mere conditions in the Twenties conducive to good literature.

First there was credulity; "the Golden Age was made golden not so much by the creative writers as by the critics" who discovered every morning "a new Balzac, a new Voltaire, a new Rabelais." Secondly, there was much novelty in the literature of the decade . ^ Thirdly, there was a definite background, a definite national character. "Author and reader must both accept certain presuppositions; you must know where you stand before you can be sure where you are going. In the 1920’s there was that "cohesive and apparently unshakable background . . . against which dissenters could rave in a general negative, and the orthodox would let them rave, with no prospect that anything was going to be done." Because of this common and well-known national character "almost a ll of the

’im portant 1 literature of the twenties was literature of protest."

After 1929 their fire went out. They had don© a fine job of den© lit ion; 58 but "when th e tim e came fo r co n stru ctio n , they were bankrupt.

55 Davis, "Interregnum," The Saturday Review of Literature. VII (May 16, 1951 ), §50.

^^Davis, "Brakes on Inflation," The Saturday Review of Literature. XVI (September kf 1957 )> 5.

^D avis, "The Cupboard Was Bare," The Saturday Review of L ite r a tu r e . V (May 25, 1929), 1048.

5%)avia, "Brakes on Inflation," Davis, "Interregnum," 830 . Davis’ social views, then, had a wide range during the decade of the 1920’s. This is also true of his political thought during these years.

He discussed politicians, nominating conventions, the Republican and

Democratic parties, the Senate, political graft and corruption, and

political elections. His political views were characterized not only hy great variety, but also by a definite cynicism. He was mere cynical about

politics than about any other aspect of life during the decade. He ridiculed politics in general and had particular contempt for the politi­

cians who attempted to be all things to all people. He was also critical of the entire electorate, because it refused to elect better public officials. He remarked that "nothing seems to please the voters so much as snicking off the political head of a man who protrudes above the level of the average, who thinks and speaks for himself instead of falling in 59 with the sentiments of the crowd. Voters prefer to "vote for men who say nothing and against men who say something." In addition he asserted that "applause, mingled with boos and hisses, is about all that the 60 average voter is able or willing to contribute to public life. Thus it is the people themselves who are to blame, "if in some crisis, we have wobblers in office.

-^Davis, "Rounding Fathers and Straddling Sons," Harper’s Magazine, CLXI (September 1930), 385 . 60 Davis, "Politics—A Two-Handed Game. Reflections on Campaigns, Ancient and Modern," Harper’s Magazine, CXLIX (October 192*0, 561.

^Davis, "Founding Fathers and Straddling Sons," Harper’s Magazine. 388 . 46

What, then,characterized these "wobblers," the politicians who controlled the political life of the United States? Davis declared the average politician was "even more incompetent than the average golfer, but he has the advantage of practicing an art in which the factor of luck is considerably larger, and he has a better alibi for his Bcore." The men who controlled politics were "inferior, their ideas are inferior, and they naturally incline to prefer inferiority in others, because that is a ll they understand." As a result the nominating conventions, composed of these politicians, picked inferior men who were easy to manage. In particular they picked the Available Candidate, a man "who has no enemies, against whom nothing can be said, to whom nothing need be for­ given because he has done nothing." The "locus classicus" of availa­ b ility was the Republican convention of 1920; it nominated Harding who had nothing against him except that "he was not big enough for the office. The politicians rightly judged that this was no objection at a l l . 1,62

In general Davis believed that the American people usually elected better presidents than they deserved. When there are no powerful individuals dominating public life, the "great intelligent electorate" w ill choose "somebody like Harding or Franklin Pierce. That is the sort of President we deserve." The nominating conventions were responsible

62 Davis, "The Presidents We Deserve," Harper*s Magazine. CXUX (November 1924), 755^758.

63 I b i d .. 760. for the selection, of unfit presidential candidates. At a convention 75 per cent of the mental effort m s to nominate a man who can get a majority in the convention, 25 per cent to his chances in the electoral college, "and not more than 2 per cent at the outside to the aspirants* resp e c tiv e q u a lific a tio n fo r th e presidency. As Godfrey Gloom s ta te d ,

"we are not in the hah it of selecting Presidents on the ground of their fitness for the office, and I don't believe either of the great parties is goin* to break with the most deeply rooted tradition of American p o litic s ." 65

Davis had definite views about the two -party system. He stated that a party's object was not the triumph of an issue, "but the acquisition of Jobs, honors, and emoluments by the people who run the party." Both Republicans and Democrats struggled over who would live off the public trough, "while non-partisan or bi-partisan action takes care of the issues." He believed that the politics of the preceding sixty years had indicated the character of the two-party system. "One set of rascals, becoming insufferable, can be turned out and replaced by the other set of rascals." When they in turn become insufferable, they can be replaced by the first set, "now chastened with enforced retirement and willing to behave with reasonable virtue for a term of

^ I b id ., 756-757*

65Davis, "Houston Too Good, Gloom Declares," The Hew York Times, July 4, 1924, 5«

66Davis, "P olitics—A Two-Handed Game," Harper's Magazine, 554. 48

two.” But if there was no difference Between the two parties, why did

an . individual choose one party over the other? Hot Because of issues or

principles But Because "his father Belonged, or his friends Belong; . . .

Because he found some specific social or Business advantage; . . . or

Because he has an abstract admiration for Jefferson or Lincoln." If there

were any real party difference it would Be harder for the individual 68 Because, Davis declared, "he would have to think."

Although Davis emphasized the sim ilarity of the objectives and

methods of the two parties, he found some minor differences. The Repub­

lican party contained "a slightly higher percentage of crooks," the

Democratic party a larger percentage of fools.^9 Davis ridiculed Both

parties But he was more critical of the Republicans, primarily Because

they controlled politics during the decade. He commented on the Senate

investigation of the Michigan Senatorial race Between Truman H.

Newberry, Republican, and Henry Ford, in which there was evidence of

corruption. Godfrey Gloom stated that the Republican Party, the party

of intelligence and morality, had to decide Between the two. And "it

responded to the Best traditions of American public life. It came down

strong for morality and let intelligence slide.Gloom also stated

67 Ibid.. 55^“555.

^ I b i d . , 558-559.

69 Ibid., 553.

^ D a v is , "Newberry's Speech Moves Mr. Gloom*" The New York Times» January 10, 1922, 2. that the Civil War had left a train of evils "behind it, such as the

Soldiers’ and Sailors* Monument and the Republican Party. "Neither of

than has any other excuse for existence, and both of ’em are pretty well 71 smudged and sooted up, but you can’t g et r id of ’em ." 1 Gloom a sserted

further that the motto of the Republican Party was "pack up your

principles in your old kit bag and smile, smile, smile ."^2 In 1924 Davis

declared that the Republicans had "succeeded in disgusting the nation in

four years, vjhile the slower-witted Democrats required eight.

Davis reproached the Democrats in the 1920*s, particularly for

their internal split in 1924, for their evasion of issues, and for

certain individuals in the party. Gloom asserted that William Jennings

Bryan should "be loaded up with a ll the sins of the party, and chased

out into the wilderness, never to come back. But Davis believed that

the Democratic presidents, Grover Cleveland and Woodrow Wilson, were two

of the best United States Presidents since 1865 . Cleveland was a strong

president because he stood for what he "conceived to be the general 75 welfare. ” He was nominated three times and elected twice even though

71 D avis, "Mr. Gloom R egrets l o s t P arty F erv o r," The New York Times„ June 12, 1924, 5»

/^Davis, "Party Dissension Pains Mr. Gloom," The New York Times» June 29, 1924, 12.

^D avis, "Four Years of Normalcy," The New York Times. March 12, 1924, 18 .

74 1 D avis, "Mr. Gloom Has Idea to Reward W alsh,” The New York Times, July 6, 1924, 4.

^Davis, "Founding Fathers and Straddling Sons," Harper's Magazine, 388 . 50 the politicians "were afraid of him "because he had made enemies.

Davis admired Wilson "because it could "never "be charged against him that he was false to his ideals, that he ever "betrayed his principles and his followers." Because of this, "a great and high place is reserved for him” in the annals of history . 1,77

The Congress of the United States, particularly the Senate, also came in for numerous attacks "by Davis. He criticized the Senate during the Newberry affair, and for its defeat of the League of Nations. In general Davis believed that a Senator had such an exaggerated view of his own importance that it was impossible for anyone to show to any

Senator "the fu ll measure of respect which the customary manner of some of them seem to exact."7® Concerning the Newberry affair Davis stated that the Senate had endorsed the eighth commandment in principle. "Thou shalt not steal, says the Senate, but If somebody else does it and slips thee then proceeds, all right. "7^ He was critical of certain North­ western Senators who were "supposed to average a higher content of righteousness than Senators from anywhere e ls e ." But when th e se same

Senators dipped into the Treasury to help the Northwestern farmer, or

78 Davis, "The Presidents We Deserve," Harper8s Magazine. 7 60.

77 Davis, "Woodrow Wilson," The New York Times» February 27 , 1921, II, 2.

78 Ib id .

7 ^Davis, "Mr. Gloom Finds Senate is L earning," The New York Times, January 13, 1922, 3. 51 voted for a tariff to help their state while damning the principle of

protective tariff, "they are not governed hy selfish interests of their

own, hut only hy the purest considerations of public w elfare."^

Davis' most caustic attack against the Senate concerned the

ratification of treaties. He asserted that when a treaty is sighted, the

press gallery begins to pound the old war-drum, and under its psychic

influence "the Senators gradually begin to weave in orgiastic dance

around the camp-fire while the tom-toms thud rhythmically in the

gallery." Many Senators, those who neither stood on their own feet nor

had any ideas of their own, felt that "the mere submission of a treaty was Q*i a sort of infraction of that body's sovereignty." He was particularly

bitter about the defeat of the Treaty of Versailles, partly because of

his belief in the League of Nations and partly because of his great de­

votion to and admiration of Woodrow Wilson. The Senators "were little

concerned with the peace and safety of the world, with international

good faith and morals; . . . it was personal vengeance they sought."

The debates were characterized by "hypocrisy," "false pretense,"

"calumny," "malice," "the whole brood of hates," and the "evil sisters

of uncharitableness." "The heart of the world might burst its auricles 82 and ventricles, but Woodrow Wilson must be put down."

^°Davis, "Founding Fathers and Straddling Sons," Harper's Magazine. 390.

^Davis, "Treaties to Run a New Gauntlet," The New York Times. February 11, 1922, 3 .

82 Davis, "Woodrow Wilson," The New York Times. February 27 , 1921, II, 2. Thus, Davis was more hitter and cynical ahout the political life of the 1920's than ahout any other aspect of the decade. But he was not in complete despair. He hoped, as the Founding Fathers had hoped, that

"just and tenacious men would he chosen for public office and that they would not he shaken hy popular outcries; also, that they would govern solely with an eye to the public interest."^ If this were to occur, two things must happen. First, the Better-Element, the first-rate men, must again become interested in and participate in the politics of the 8k age. Secondly, the electorate must elect political leaders who will te ll the people what they need to hear, instead of what they want to 85 hear. ' When these two things have occurred the politics of the nation w ill improve. Until that time we will have to hope that Providence w ill

"deal us a Lincoln off the bottom of the deck every time we need one.

The final aspect of Davis* social and political thought was his view of foreign affairs. His interest in foreign affairs was not as central to his thought in the twenties as it was in later phases of his life. But he discussed some problems of foreign relations, particularly the League of nations, the relationship between the United States and the world, and the isolationistic and pacifistic views of the American people.

83 Davis, "Founding Fathers and Straddling Sons," Harper*s Magazine. 389 . 8k Davis, "Portrait of an Elected Person," Show Window. 221.

85 D a v is , "S till Seeking a Leader," The Hew York Times. January 13, 1952, 22.

^ D a v is, "Founding Fathers and Straddling Sons," 395. Davis* interest in the League of Nations grew out of his ad­ miration for Woodrow Wilson. He felt that if a true League were ever set up, "it will stand through all time as the memorial of its chief

"builder." Davis believed that Wilson was thinking "more of the future, of the permanence of peace. His great aim was to make a treaty that would breed no new w ars. . . . The League of Nations Covenant was . . . his foremost inspiration, its adoption the 0 3mm and triumph of the

Qiy cause of which he had made himself the champion." ' Although D a v is favored a League of Nations, he was not naive in his support of it. He realized that "the ideal of a world permeated by the general will . . . OO is only an ideal, and unlikely to be realized in this generation." If it were set up it would not be able "to remove all cause of conflict of interest and sentiment between different economic, religious, social, or regional groups."®^ Thus Davis was in sympathy with the aims of the

League, although he realized that it had definite limitations.

The Washington Conference on the Limitation of Armaments, closely related to the aims of the League, also interested Davis. He covered th e Conference fo r th e Times and thus made numerous comments about it. In general he felt that at the Conference "things have been

8*7 Davis, "Woodrow Wilson," The New York Times. 2.

88 Davis, "The Character of the American Influence on Eastern Europe," The Annals of the American Academy. CII (July 1922), 121.

89 'Davis, "What of the Future?," The Saturday Review of L ite r a tu r e . H I (November 13, 1926), 29. accomplished that seemed impossible a few months ago”; this was possible because "the personal contacts here have caused more good feeling and less 90 friction than in most international gatherings of this sort." He com­ pared the Conference to an intercollegiate track meet "in which teams of five big universities fight for the campionship, with representatives of four small colleges hanging around in the hope of picking up a point or two in some of the events." The Japanese won, with Great Britain second and the United States a close third. "But as for the other six teams 91 they might as well have saved traveling expenses." But the real winner was "Status Quo Ante, ^hey may have thwarted him now and then on the 92 water, but on land he is hard to beat. Davis was critical, however, of some aspects of the Conference, such as its length—"it is about as near interminable as anything short of eternity or certain speeches in 93 Congress, could be" — and the idea of moral trusteeship, "the same sort of moral trusteeship that the well-known priest and Levite exercised 94 over the unfortunate on the road to Jericho. His summation of the

9°Davis, "Capital’s Elation Like Armistice Day," The Hew York Times, February 6, 1922, 2.

^^Davis, "Arms Conference Like a Track M eet," The Hew York Times, January 8 ,,1 9 2 2 , 17 .

92 D avis, "Status Quo Ante Conference V ic to r," The Hew York Times, February 1, 1922, 2.

^Davis, "Statesmen Show Great Endurance," The Hob York Times, January 18, 1922, 4.

^1

Conference is indicative of his realistic and sometimes prophetic ideas. He "believed that the ultimate estimate of the result of the Conference must depend "on the wisdom and good sense of future Japanese policy on the continent of Asia. 95

During th e 1920‘s Davis commented on c e n tra l and ea ste rn Europe.

He observed the struggle in central Europe as one "between progress and reaction, between democracy and oligarchy." The new democratic states seemed to be winning against the "beaten, broken, but not yet dead reactionary elements which find their chief center in Hungary;" but if they were to win they w ill have to get it for themselves without de­ pending on the great powers for aid.In discussing eastern Europe

Davis stated that in spite of the powerful influence of the United States over the ideals of these countries, "most of them have ceased to think of

America as anything except the nation with money." The opportunities for American capital were great, primarily because by our political

Isolation, "America is not ‘in* Europe." But the national timidity which cost America its great political opportunity after the war might also cost the United States the investment opportunity but "with far less 97 excuse." 1 Davis continued to be interested in the affairs of central

^Davis, "Japan Gains Most, Russia the loser in the Conference," The Hew York Time6 « February 6, 1922, 2.

96 Davis, "Central Europe In C risis," The Hew York Times. November 27, 1921, V II, 3*7»

97 Davis, "American Influence on Eastern Europe," Annals» 123-126. and eastern Europe, particularly concerning the threat of Hitler in the

1930»s.

The political isolation which had cost the United States a

commanding ro le in th e a f f a ir s o f Europe also in te re ste d Davis during th e

decade. Because of the enormous economic power which America possessed

at the Armistice, "the opportunity to dominate Europe lay "before Wilson

almost as the opportunity to absorb Greece lay before Flamininus." This

power was not used because of "the insular interests of the American 1 ..98 peopi^ an important determinant of American foreign policy during the

1920's. The insularity of the United States was closely allied with

pacifism, another important American viewpoint during the decade. Davis

c r itic iz e d th e p a c if is t movements because of th e ir " in a b ility to p er­

ceive the difference between the theoretically desirable and the 99 / practically possible."^ He also ridiculed the naivete of the Kellogg-

Briand pact. He stated that Borah’s proposal to mate all wars illegal was too moderate; "if he will only add a clause providing that on and

after January 1 next sin, sorrow, and suffering shall be forever

prohibited, I am with him. "10°

Thus, in the 1920's Davis wrote on a greater variety of topics

than in any other period of his life. Ho central issue dominated his

98 I b i d .. 121- 122.

99 Davis, "Henry Ford's Adventure with the Lunatic Fringe," The Hew York Times» October k, 1925, III, 3»

100Davis, "A Senator Too Moderate," The Hew York Times» Hoveniber 18, 1925# 22. 57 thought. He observed the American scene from various positions, and in various types of communication. During the decade we are able to see

Davis’ wide range of interest and understanding which remained with him throughout his life. Almost all of the problems which characterized his views in later phases of his career interested him for the first time during these years. CHAPTER III

confidence -nr mom

ELMER MVIS AND THE HOOTER YEARS, 1929“1953

October 24, 1929# ended the prosperity of the age of

"normalcy,” and brought on the greatest depression in the history of the

United States. This depression changed the outlook of the American people from hopeful optimism to pessimistic despair. Most Americans were surprised that a depression occurred, because they had expected to see the "abolition of poverty" promised by President Hoover. At first they were hopeful that the depression would be of short duration. But when conditions did not improve, and when the Hoover administration seemed to do nothing, the American attitude changed. In spite of the great economic difficulties and the pessimistic feeling, most Americans s till hoped for recovery within the existing Bystem rather than in large- scale reform or violent revolution. This feeling of hope mixed with despair was characteristic of the American people during the Hoover depression.

This attitude was also characteristic of Elmer Davis during these years. In contrast to his thought during the 1920*s Davis was greatly concerned with the American economic system. Although he had made general comments about economics previously, he had never seriously discussed the problems inherent in the system. Other questions seemed

58 more important to Mm in a period of prosperity; tut in a time of economic collapse, he naturally devoted more attention to economics and attempted to ascertain why the depression had occurred and how the country could overcome it. As he analyzed the capitalistic system, he "became critical ahout business in general and ahout the business domination of the govern­ ment in particular. Observing the close relationship between business and the government he became even more cynical about politics than he had been in the 1920’s. Although more pessimistic than previously, Davis never lost hope. He believed that "higher peaks of felicity are ahead f

Before the depression occurred Davis warned of the "unsound" economic system in the United States. He believed that a rising stock market did not necessarily mean prosperity because real prosperity could occur only when the economy had returned to a frugal econony of normal needs. ‘But how can we get back to normal needs when millions of people make their living by the creation and stimulation of abnormal needs?"

How can f ru g a lity become a p art of th e economic system when i t is believed that "a man must spend not only all that he makes but all that he hopes to make?" Davis warned, however, that the present trend must

•4simer D avis, "Good Old 1913," Forum. I2XXV (May 1931), 271.

2Bavis, "Confidence in Whom?," Forum. LSXXDC (January 1933), 32. "be curtailed or "we shall come at last to an automatic stop, after 3 rushing violently down a steep place into the sea."

The prosperity of the 1920’s was an automobile prosperity in which ’’the American people have become rich and happy by selling automo­ biles to one another." In the past prosperity had its own corrective; when people had all they could afford to buy they stopped buying; this brought on decreased production, unemployment, depression, and eventual recovery. But during the 1920’s the corrective was no longer present because of installment plan "buying. "We can have as much as we want, not as much or as little as we can pay for; and we can have it now, while the b ill w ill be produced only when the party is over." Because of this, the installment plan "has probably done more harm to American homes than beer 4 ever d id ."

The b asic problem in th e American economy, Davis a s se rte d , was that the United States had an industrial plant and an industrial technique that could make more things than the people could use. To make the people buy more was not the solution; the only way out was to

"make only so much as we can conveniently use." If the emphasis were taken off quantity, the United States might become a "frugal society, with normal needs and a natural economies.These views indicated

X Davis, "If Hoover Fails," Harper’s Magazine. CLVTII (March 1929), 4l4.

S h l d .. 1+15-416. 61

Davis* conventional way of looking at economic problems. He often over­ simplified economic problems, and opposed many concepts of Keynesian economics.

When the depression occurred and the American economy plunged into inactivity, Davis began to have some doubts about the entire capitalistic system. He stated that the system of free enterprise, of unrestricted competition, which had made America rich and great, was about

55 per cent efficient. It gives us "in every decade five or six years of greater or less prosperity, against two or three years of moderate recession and two years of panic." Davis* plan to reform this inefficient business system was similar to his solution before the depression occurred.

"If consumption cannot be forever Inflated to meet the demands of pro­ duction, production must be adjusted to the needs of the consumer. Such a change could not occur unless there was some "organization of industry and business, the substitution of some rational plan for the operation of greed and chance."

Davis realized, however, that any program of planning would Incur the strenuous opposition of business. The real obstacle to reform of the system was "the emotional loyalty of the average businessman to the system that made him rich, such a loyalty as the typical old grad feels to his alma mater." To these men ’‘whoever suggests that the business

^Davis, "Can Business Manage I ts e l f ? ," Harper*s Magazine. CLXII (March 1951), 587^89.

^Davis, "Repressible Issues," Harper*s Magazine. CLXIII (July 1951), 196. o system might he improved spits on the flag and blasphemes God. Business opposition to planning was also a result of ’'that nervous constipation which so often afflicts American business when it encounters something ,,9 new. in addition planning was suspect because of its effect on business.

"Everybody w ill walk on tiptoe and speak in whispers, for fear of scaring the timorous creature into another collapse."*1'0 Davis realized* however, that if businessmen refused to support planning, and if hard times con­ tinued, someone might do it for them. To forestall this business leaders must change their ideas and "apply an ounce of prevention before we need 11 a pound of c u re ."

Any form of business planning, radical or moderate, sound or unsound, must aim at flattening out the business cycle. It must prohibit booms and panics, for you can not have one without the other. Also, "a planned national economy ought to mean comfort and security for every- 12 body." it should allow all of us to "have a little prosperity all the time," which would mean that "nobody would have as much prosperity as a few people had before last October."*^ Davis originally believed that

^Davis, "Can Business Manage Itself?," Harper’s Magazine» 393. o •\Davis, "Repressible Issues," Harper’s Magazine * 196.

■^Davis, "Can Business Manage Itself?," Harper’s Magazine 3 387 .

i:LIbid., 396. 12 D avis, "Happy Days W ill Come A gain," H arper’s Magazinej CLXIII (October,1931), 522. 13 Davis, "We Seem Bound to Lose," The Hew York Times» August 28, 1930, 18. "the plan could he adopted voluntarily, and adopted hy "businessmen them­ selves. . . . Only as a last resort should the government endeavor to promote th e o rg a n iz in g ." ^ By th e f a l l of 1932 Davis re a liz e d th a t business could no longer do it alone. What was needed to get business started again was "heavy government expenditures.” Davis asserted that

"the government w ill have to start it, and exercise more control after it 15 has started than it ever has in the past." ^

In the midst of the depression Davis looked beyond the immediate situation and discussed the next period of prosperity. He declared that in the next boom "most people w ill be buying things rather than pieces of ownership in th e corporations th a t make th in g s. D The boom w ill be characterized by gaiety touched with hysteria, the feeling of people "who do not know how long good times will last, or if they will ever come again." Davis stated, however, that this boom would inevitably lead to another panic. . . . Think about the next boom instead, and plunge head­ first into it when it comes; for it’s going to be a good one, and it my be the last. ” Davis believed that a boom and an even more serious depression would occur if "our glorious system of unchecked individual enterprise" was s till in operation at the end of the present depression.^

14 D avis, "Mr. Hoover’s Issu e ," The Hew York Times a June 22, 1931* 18 .

•^Davis, "The Collapse of Politics," Harper’s Magazine» CLXV (September 1932), 392.

^Davis, "Happy Days W ill Come Again," Harper’s Magazine. 519.

17I b id .. 522. Davis analyzed the reaction of the American people to the

changing economic situation. It was natural to assume that the reaction

in the United States would have worse repurcussions than anywhere else in

the world* for in the United States "the Laws of Nature had been solemnly

repealed." The country was "just on the point of abolishing poverty" and was a n atio n "where Humpty Dumpty had roosted hig h er than any of h is 10 foreign cousins." But the American people did not agitate for

revolution or demand great changes. Instead they decided "the best thing

to do was to have as good a time as possible* as cheaply as possible till

things took a turn for the better."^ Thus the American people found

solace for the vanishing of their milennial dreams "by knocking a little

ball across a surface of crushed cottonseed hulls and through a tin

pipe." Miniature golf came to the rescue and took "our minds off our

tro u b le s .

Another way in which the people could take their minds off their

tro u b les was by th e discovery of a good menace* which was "a more or le ss

probable catastrophe that may be averted if only some vigilant citizen

sounds the tocsin in time." In the 19208s there were numerous menaces

such as the Pope or the Klan. "You could wake up every morning* in

those happy days* with the cheering thought that there was a good fight

"Miniature Golf to the Rescue*" Harper’s Magazine. CLXII (December 1930), 4-5. going on somewhere and that you could get into it right after "breakfast."

What the citizens of the 1930’s needed was a menace which could f ill the void, hut which could he laid aside when something important came along.

"Whoever can invent a menace like that ,lf said Davis "and sound the loud 21 distracting tocsin w ill have deserved well of the country. ”

Davis observed that "not many people in this country want a revolution." Instead; "the most astounding aspect . . . has heen the quiet acceptance of the situation hy men who have lost their jobs and everything else through the operation of the policies that were to abolish i22 poverty.Rather than finding agitation for reform or revolution Davis could find only listlessness and cynicism. He declared that "the cynicism industry is ahout the only one in which business is really brisk. There; and there alone; the Hoover administration has pronoted a 23 vast increase in output and a notable gain in employment."

Davis found that Communism had little appeal to the American people during these years. "Even in these distressful times, it needs a lively imagination to see any serious danger (or hope, if you prefer) that America w ill go Communist." There might be a change in the present profit system, and the new system might be unrecognizable to Alexander

^‘Slavis, "Menace Wanted," Harper°s Magazine» CIXV (July 1932) 248-230.

22 Davis, "The Collapse of Politics," Harper^ Magazine. 386.

2^Davis, "Hoover the Medicine Man," Forum, LXXXI7 (October 1930), 195. 66

Hamilton or Commodore Vanderbilt. "But unless a wholly improbable change

occurs in the mentality of the American people, that order w ill be quite 2h as alien to orthodox Communism." The only ’Tied Peril" in the United

States was among some intellectual and literary figures. The proletarian

novel, prevalent in th e 1930’% was a good example of th is Communist appeal.

But Davis believed that there was room in literature for much that had

nothing to do w ith Communism. And a Communist so c ie ty can not produce

great literature, because such literature "can hardly flourish in a state where the existing order regulates all phases of life with its dogmas,

and any serious critic is sent to chop wood in Siberia." Davis asserted

that if these purposeless intellectuals had "a little more intellect and

a little mere guts" there would have been no "Red Peril" at all in the

United States during the Hoover years.^5

Davis noted that the most characteristic tra it of the American

people in the early 1930’s was skepticism. "For after three years*

deflation of the smart men, who is there in whom we can put our con­

fidence?" The leaders of industry and finance were thoroughly dis­

credited. The general public had no more confidence in politicians than

it had in bankers. The experts never have had the confidence of the

American people because "there s till lingers a good deal of the pioneers'

conviction that anybody can do anything about as well as anybody else."

ok Davis, "The Bed Peril," The Saturday Review of Literature, VIII (April 16, 1932), 661.

^Davis, "Interregum," The Saturday Review of Literature. VII (May 16, 1931 ), 831. Thus the hulk of the country remained soundly and healthily skeptical.

"At present ’Oh Yeah?' ’Is That So?* and 'S a y s you." are safer mottoes for this country than 'In God We Trust

This same feeling of skepticism was characteristic of the attitude of the American people toward politics during the Hoover years. The country was skeptical of its political leaders, "even though it nay have to vote for one or another of them "because there is nobody else to vote 07 for. * Davis himself went beyond mere skepticism to a feeling of intense apathy. "There are no more issues, as yet, than in a roulette game. The Bepublicana are betting that hard times w ill soon be over,* the

Democrats are betting that they w ill last. . . . Whichever wins, the public seems likely to lose."2^ Gradually he became more critical of the entire political process, attacking the two-party system, the

Hoover administration, and the parties and candidates in the election of

1932. His political ideas of the early 1930's were the most pessimistic of his entire political and social thought and were the closest he ever came to despair.

Before the depression began Davis renarked that continued prosperity was the crucial question on which Republican success depended.

In the election of 1928 "the Republicans have persuaded the country that

p/f -■ .Davis, "Confidence in Whom?," Rorum, LHXIX (January 1933)j 33.

2?Ibld.

2^Davis, "We Seem Bound to Lose," The New York Times. August 2 8 , 1930. 18 . 68 prosperity is the visible proof of God8s "blessing on Republican policies; and with prosperity they must stand or fa ll." If prosperity continued there would he no need for an opposition party. But if prosperity does not continue and Republicanism fails, America w ill need "a fundamental revision of the national faith.” For the failure of Republicanism "will he more than a political failure; it w ill mean a twilight of the gods which we have worshiped, even though we have not called them gods. An opposition which could retrieve that disaster would have to he prepared to build everything from the ground up.

When prosperity collapsed Davis detected this disintegration of

Republicanism. President Hoover and the Republicans offered no new plans to bring the country out of the depression. Instead the administration maintained first that "there is no depression.” Then it admitted “there was a depression, but it was passing.” And finally it announced that

"the depression, which was caused by the obstructionist tactics of the

Democrats, would have ruined the country but for the protective tariff and the policies of the Republican Party. When the Republicans finally came to the third stage and realized that the country was, indeed,

In a serious depression, and with the country In its most serious s it­ uation since 1861, the Republican party declared boldly: "This Is no time to experiment." Davis asserted that this statement was not conservatism;

29 Davis, "If Hoover Fails," Harper8a Magazine. it09”J+ll.

30 Davis, "The Depression Cycle," The Hew York Times» March 17, 1930, 22. 69 31 "it ia sheer fosailization. * As a result of Republican inactivity "the

national faith in Santa Claus is weakening. People begin to see that

causes still have effects, and effects causes, and that you can not secure

the abolition of poverty by merely voting against an Irish Catholic.

Davis also discussed the Republican President, Herbert Hoover.

He declared that the Hubris-Nemesis scheme of Greek tragedy admirably

fitted the case of Hoover. His '^Hubris" was not wanton violence but

"smug arrogance" combined with "overweening presumption." Hoover's

campaign promises "ran to that excess which above a ll things offended the

Greek temperament, which seemed above a ll things to invite the correcting

interposition of Nemesis." Hoover walked out on a limb and challenged

Nemesis to saw it off. "Well, Nemesis sawed it off." Hoover, th en , was

one of the greatest recent examples of "the overweening presumption that

invokes its Nemesis." Davis believed, however, that Hoover "fell con­

siderably short of tragic grandeur.

Davis wondered why Hoover made such outlandish promises. Why

did Hoover, who understood the basic unsoundness of the American economy,

fail to tell this to the American people? "Because it was not what

people wanted to hear. . . . No President would have said it unless he

^^Davls, "The Collapse of Politics," Harper's Magazine. 387 .

32 Davis, "Present Discontents," The New York Times, June 25, 1930, 2k.

V i a , "Hoover and Hubris," The New Republic. IXXIII (November 16, 1932), 7”9» 70 xlf. had guts.' Hoover was ‘basically timid and said "what he correctly

judged the majority of voters thought, and promised what the majority

wanted. M ult Americans elected him for the same reasons that would have

led Americans to elect Santa Claus.Davis declared th a t "when Hoover was an engineer he thought as a scientist, he understood as a scientist,

he spake as a scientist; hut when.he became a presidential candidate he

put away scientific things.

Davis criticized other aspects of the Hoover administration,

such as foreign relations, government appointments, and the tariff. But

it would he unfair to Hoover not to mention his one striking success,

"the glorifying of the American home." Since his election there had heen

a marked decline in divorces. This occurred because husbands and wives

did not have enough money to get out of the American home. Thus, the

Hoover panic "has saved many a home and desolated many a lovenest—though

it hardly seems likely that that argument would reelect Mr. Hoover in 37 1932. In conclusion Davis compared Hoover to Louis XV of France;

each of than believed that "the conditions which gave glamour to the

rule of his great predecessor had not changed, and that there was no need

of doing much about anything." In both cases the deluge need not have

come "if a little flood-control work had been done in time.

3k Davis, "Hoover the Medicine Man," Forum. 196.

^ Ib ld .. 198.

^^Davis , "Can Business Manage I ts e l f ? ," H arp er's Magazine. 396.

37])avis, 'Hoover the Medicine Man," Forum. 198.

^Davis, "Repressible Issues," Harper's Magazine. 200. Finding no hope for recovery in. the Republican party, Davis turned to the Democratic party. But he found there no greater hope for

improvement, because the Democratic party "is only a coalition of dissenting groups, which is neither strong enough to win under normal

conditions, nor . . . harmonious enough to do any good if some great business depression enabled it to win by default. And Davis believed

that the country needed something more than an opposition by default; we needed "a real opposition and a genuine alternative administration."^0

The Democrats had said nothing and they had shown no in d ic a tio n th a t

"they would have done any better with this depression or averting the

next one." Instead they feel they should not complicate the political

situation by bringing up an issue; they "had the great good luck not to be in office when the depression hit us and that ought to be enough."

The Democrats did not take a stand, for "you cannot expect more than one

politician in a hundred to think of the ultimate interest of the nation when it might cost him his job.

Davis disapproved of the close relationship between business and

government which existed during the Hoover years. He believed that government aid given only to business would not directly help the entire

American economy and would not solve th e economic d if f ic u ltie s . In

^Davis, "If Hoover Fails," Harper»s Magazine. 417.

^Davis, "Present Discontents," The Hew York Times. June 25, 1930, 24.

/ |,’4)avis, "Opportunities Going to Waste," The Hew York Times. A p ril 9f 1932, 14. discussing a tax measure "before Congress, Godfrey Gloom stated that

''there is a strong feeling that Congress ought to soak the rich, so they come down hard on such millionaires* play "things as soap, toothpaste, ,.ko Hatches, and chewing gum.” in a special article on the influence of lobbyists in Washington, D. C., Davis found that business and special groups were well-represented. The big loser on Capitol H ill was "the nan in the lower brackets of the income tax, the man with a profession, a lfZ small business, or a small salary who has nobody to represent him.” y

Thus Davis believed that the business-dominated government offered little aid or support to the other aspects of the American economy; and without such aid complete economic recovery would be delayed.

The presidential election of 1952 took place in the midst of severe economic crisis, with neither major party offering any hope for recovery. Davis* criticism of the parties increased during the nominating conventions and the campaign. Both political conventions, in their attempts to pick men to govern the country and to formulate policies needed for the common good "came pretty close to being national )|)i disasters.' The Republicans, who had promised "a chicken in every pot, two cars in every garage, and the abolition of poverty . . . Just stand there, firm and unshaken, and make it clear that nobody at all well-bred

42 Davis, "Godfrey G. Gloom Watches Congress," The Hew York Times. March 51> 1952, 2.

^D avls, "Lobbyists Found Mostly Nuisances," The New York Times. May 14, 1952, 9. )i )i Davis, "The Collapse of Politics," Harper*s Magazine. 385 . 75 would mention the fact that somewhere things have gone a little wrong.

The real issue in the campaign, according to Bepublicans, would he the

’Bed” menace. "Whoever ta lk s change wants re v o lu tio n ; . . . th e choice is between Hoover and bolshevism." The voters might believe it; if in

1928 enough of them believed that the Democrats wanted to turn the country- over to the Pope, "it may be possible to persuade the same people in 1952 that the Democrats want to turn it over to Sfcalin. Davis declared that there would be no Bed peril if the government would take care of the unemployed and get them back to work. Thus, the Bed peril (if there ever is any) w ill not be a result of a Democratic victory, but rather

"the fruit of Bepublican mismanagement. Davis emphasized, then, that the chief issue in the campaign should be "to get rid of the medicine men who think they can bring prosperity by promising prosperity, and whoever in the midst of adversity seem to think that adversity is prosperity ,JiA because prosperity is what they promised.

But Davis believed that the Democratic Party was not the best alternative to Bepublicanism, for the Democratic platform hardly mentioned the depression, offering little more help on that than the

l|.Ej 'Davis, "Chicago Beticence Puzzles Mr. Gloom," The Hew York Times. June 14, 1952, 16.

^^Davis, "Mr. Hoover's Issue," The Hew York Times, June 22, 1951, 19.

hi 'Davis, "The Collapse of Politics," Harper's Magazine. 388 .

i|^Davis, "Capitalizing Discontent," The Hew York Times. August 27 , 1952, lh. 711-

Republicans.1^ In addition be felt that the Democrats would probably overlook the most capable men in the party. It would be particularly unfortunate to overlook A1 Smith, "the only nan in the United States who by his past record and his outspoken opinions on current events has proved himself obviously fit for the presidency in 1932."-^° Instead of Smith, the Democrats chose a candidate “whose reputation for fearlessness rests on his stinging rebuke of a couple of clergymen who control no votes but i«51 their own. He thought that Roosevelt was "a conspicuous and im­ pressive figure—more impressive the farther away you get. . . .H e never takes sides till he has to, and then leaves an anchor to windward; . . . not the most desirable quality in a President ."-^2 In addition Roosevelt thought that "the shortest distance between two points is not a straight line but a corkscrew.” You can't quarrel with his generalities; "but what they mean ( if anything) is known only to F ran k lin D. Roosevelt and h is God . 1,55

Having lost hope in the two major parties, Davis felt that the ideal solution was a third party. Because politics of the old type had

^Davis, "The Collapse of Politics, Harper's Magazine. 390.

5° l b i d ., 388 .

^^Davis, "Opportunities Going to Waste," The Hew York Times, A p ril 9, 1932, 1^,

^2Davis, VRepresslble Issues," Harper's Magazine s 199.

^D avis, "The Collapse of P o litic s, Harper's Magazine , 389. 75 become a luxury and because dictatorship and revolution were impossible as well as undesirable, the only solution was to "vote for a different sort of politician; or rather for men who have never been successful enough to become politicians." And the only third party that could do anything

in 1932 was the Socialist Party, because its program "is the only one

that seriously attempts to cure our disease." It probably would not win,

Davis asserted, but if it commanded strong support, "it may force the

other parties to face a few facts and to consider national instead of ejk local interests.

Davis was accused of a lack of realism for supporting a candidate who could not win. He replied by saying that "even if Mr. Thomas is not

elected, a heavy vote for him would make both ^Republicans and Democrats

realize that the people are concerned about other issues than the dis­

tribution of offices." In addition he said that in 1956 the country may badly need the Socialist Party as an alternative to blind stand-pattism;

"every vote cast for Thomas this fall helps to make the party a more

useful instrument to meet that need. Davis observed that probably

the greatest contribution the Socialists could make was their program,

not their party or their leaders. He declared that "it is not incon­

ceivable that within ten years this country will be largely Socialist

in fact--but not in name; and if it should happen, leaders of traditional

Socialism would play a small part in bringing it about.

^ I b i d . . 594-5.

^ D a v is, "A ll on His Own," The Hew York Times , October 1, 1952, 14. ^^Davis, "Repressible Issues," Harper*s Magazine» 195. In general Davis * "beliefs a"bout politics of the Hoover era were the most pessimistic views which he ever held. But as always, Davis attempted to find a solution for the problem; in this case the solution for the depression was the program of the Socialist Party. As he realized that it had little chance of success he was overtaken "by almost complete despair. This feeling can he clearly seen in the statement that “if you can’t swallow the name ./"Socialism //"* if yon prefer to vote for the kind of politicians we used to think we could afford in the fat years—well, God save the United States.

Although Davis* vieos were dominated by the economic collapse, he also commented on aspects which were only indirectly related to the depression. One of these other questions was foreign affairs.' His observations about it were similar to his views during the 1920’s ; he regarded foreign affairs as a question worthy of serious consideration, even though he ridiculed certain aspects. He was concerned with the failure of the League of Nations, the Manchurian question, and pacifism within the United States.

Davis was in sympathy with the League of Nations, but he recognized its limitations as a peace-keeping body. He began to see that the League was completely without power. In regard to the conflict between Paraguay and Bolivia, Davis stated that “the ponderous and intricate international peace machinery . . . has accomplished nothing."

The League, "in which idealists and optimists put their faith has

57 Davis, "The Collapse of Politics, Harper’s Magazine» 395* 77 failed miserably, failed in as easy a task as it w ill ever be called to

In the Manchurian situation, the League "mobilized world opinion, and every time world opinion makes another gesture the Japanese go out and win another b a t t l e . 11 As a result the League must be either

"a League to Enforce Peace, or give up trying to be in any effective sense a League at all.

The Japanese aggression in Manchuria led Davis to express his general views about war. War was a world peril and the nations of the world must make a beginning at trying to prevent it. "lifer can be pre­ vented only by making the appeal to force unprofitable," which cannot be done "without American co-operation." The United States must not depend solely on the Kellogg-Briand pact because the signatories of the pact 60 were "renouncing only the wars they thought they might lose." Another deterrent to war would be the abolition of economic rivalries. But this would not be effective in bringing peace unless there is "a w ill to peace, a readiness to overlook trivial affronts to 'national honor’, a willingness to settle disputes by arbitration or adjudication, even at the risk of not getting all you want . "61

^^Davis, "Paradigm in Paraguay," The lew Republic. LXXI7 (February 22, 1933)# 4l.

^ D a v is, "Peaceful S ettlem ent," The Hew York Times. November 12, 1931# 2 4 .

^^Davis, "Paradigm in Paraguay," 4l. Davis also discussed the specific effects of World War I on the

United States. Without the war there s till would have teen prosperity and depression, “though probably neither would have been so pronounced."

Even though the American econony had improved since 1915, it would have been better if "the pre-war upward trend of national income had con­ tinued. " In addition the war left a number of evils in its train:

" 8normalcy 1 and its malodorous scandals in high places"; "insularity with its corollary defensive mechanisms of insensitiveness to foreign opinion and contempt for peoples who do not happen to be quite like ourselves."

In addition the war did not teach us to effectively "prevent another like it." Because of our dislike for Europeans and Democrats we have vetoed

"most of the measures of international co-operation on which future peace depends." Thus, it is hard to say that "there has been any intangible 62 gain at a ll." This critical view of World War I was one of the reasons for Davis* neutrality and isolation during the first year of World War II.

As in the 1920’s Davis lampooned various aspects of American foreign affairs. He ridiculed the naive pacifistic sentiments of the

American people, particularly its leading exponent, Senator William E.

Borah of Idaho. It was difficult to determine over what Mr. Borah was sovereign. The Chinese mass meeting solved the problem by sending identical complaints to "the League of Nations, Soviet Kussia, and

Senator Borah, the three parts into which all the world is divided."

^Davis, "Our Legacy from the World War," Current History. XXXV (Eebruaiy 1952), 6^5 "6^8 . 79

Davis also compared Borah with the Pope Because the authority of each was chiefly moral. "Mr. Borah has no more personal experience with the pro­ cesses of international appeasement than the Pope has had with marriage; hut he does not mind laying down the law to the men who have to do the ,,63 work. Davis also humorously discussed the recognition of Soviet Russia.

Because of what had happened to the governments of Brazil and Guatemala after American recognition, Davis Believed there should Be a change in our

Russian policy. "Let Mr. ^Secretary of State Henry_7 Stimson recognize the Soviets and their doom is sealed; no foreign government Blessed with his Benison lasts longer than forty-eight hours.

In general Davis 1 views of the Hoover years were dominated By the economic collapse. His observations of the American economy, the government, politics, and to a lesser degree foreign affairs, were determined By the great depression. As a result there is little variety in his thought. Also, he was much more pessimistic than he had Been previously and more than he ever would Be again; But even during this period he never reached the depths of complete despair. Thus, Davis’ thought of the early 1930's, is easily differentiated from the rest of his thought By its emphasis on economic matters, its pessimism, and its d esp air.

^D avls, "One Way Out," The Hew York Times, October 27 , 1931, 2k.

^Davls, "negative Benefits," The Hew York Times, December 22, 1930, 18. CHAPTER 17

IF ROOSEVELT FAILS:

EEMER DAVIS ADD THE HEW DEAL, 1933“1938.

On March kf 1933 t with the United States in the midst of its

most serious depression, Franklin D. Roosevelt asserted that "the only

thing we have to fear is fear itself." As Roosevelt "began to put his

program into effect the American people "began to change from a feeling

of fear and despair to one of confidence and hope. Complete recovery had not been achieved by Roosevelt’s Hew Deal program, but by 1938 th e

American economy was much improved over what i t had been in 1933* Be­

cause most Americans were concerned with the recovery of the economy, they seemingly ignored the world situation. As a result, isolationism was prevalent in the United States during the 193°*s. Thus isolationism and economic matters dominated the American scene during the Hew Deal

period.

Elmer Davis was also concerned with these questions during the

Roosevelt years.. He was more optimistic in this period than he had been

in the Hoover years; in many ways his outlook was similar to that of the

1920’s. He was hopeful about the economic recovery, although he was not

completely satisfied with the results of the Hew Deal. In many instances he opposed Roosevelt*s measures and methods, although in general he

favored the Hew Deal. Because of his support of the Hew Deal program, he

80 S i was critical of the opposition of business leaders to the Roosevelt administration. His attitude toward politics remained the same, partic­ ularly concerning the Republican Party. And although he was more con­ cerned about foreign affairs than he had been previously, his views during the Roosevelt years were s till dominated by the domestic situation, the

American economy in p a rtic u la r.

In 1933 Davis noted that the American economic system was far from ideal. "Any fair-minded person must perceive the perfection of an economic system in which . . . such depressions are a recurrent necessity.”’1' He believed that changes and reforms must be enacted if

"these necessary depressions" were to be curtailed. He hoped that

Roosevelt would secure the necessary reforms, but, as has been noted previously, he had little confidence in Roosevelt as an effective leader.

Roosevelt’s Commonwealth Club speech in San Francisco in September 1932 gave Davis encouragement because the speech outlined a definite program of government action. If Roosevelt meant what he said there would be

"a national plan of some sort, an endeavor to get business to accept that plan voluntarily; with governmental regulation in the background, if business cannot or w ill not govern itself." Such a$ program, Davis asserted, would "destroy the foundations of the old system of American life; the system that has brought us to these hard times, and w ill bring us to hard times again unless we get rid of it ."2 If Roosevelt could do

%lmer Davis, "These Uecessary Depressions," The Hew York Times» December 10, 1935# 2^.

2Davis, "If Roosevelt Fails," Harper’s Magazine. CLXVI (March 1933), 387-388. t h i s , "March, k, 1935 w ill "be one of the brightest days in American h isto ry .

On the other hand, Davis feared what might occur if Eoosevelt failed to execute his plan. Unless Eoosevelt was successful "you and I rcay pay for his mistakes, at an even higher price than we have paid for the mistakes of Coolidge and Hoover." Either "a fanatical religious nationalism, secretly supported by multi-millionaires" might take over as

it had in Germany, or "a fanatical and unintelligent radicalism, a new fiat-money party" might gain control. "Almost anything may happen, if I4. Eoosevelt fails. Thus Davis was greatly concerned about the Eoosevelt administration’s attempts to bring about economic recovery, because the future of the United States depended upon its success or failure.

Davis regarded Eoosevelt's cancellation of the mail contracts of the American aviation industry as the first significant act of the Hew

Deal. This action was important because it represented an attack upon the underlying philosophy of the old system. The history of the aviation

industry was a close parallel to the system of government subsidy of an

"infant Industry," which was the foundation of the old system. Under

this system government aid to an infant industry was continued long after

the industry was self-sufficient. These industries were flourishing, but they were s till "officially regarded as infants in need of protection."

The philosophy underlying this system was that men powerful enough to get something "have a right to ca,ll on public officials to help them get it, to the exclusion of outsiders.” Thus, Eoosevelt, by cancelling the govern­ ment subsidy of the airm ail contracts, was "striking at the foundation of the American system of life. That particular system ought to be 5 destroyed.” The cancellation of the contracts was important to Davis, even though it was not one of the most important New Deal acts.

Davis supported the New Deal because he believed Eoosevelt was willing to experiment and act rather than theorize. He admitted Eoose­ velt 's measures might be wrong. But "there was no experience to serve as C a guide; it was a condition that confronted us, not a theory.” Eoosevelt was looking for a program with "a best possible equilibrium between the economically and politically necessary and the psychologically acceptable, a program which blends as well as possible what the country needs, and 7 what the country w ill accept." In an attempt to find such a program

Eoosevelt used many different policies; he acted like a quarterback on a football team, "who is always ready to try a different play when the first one fails—and who, it must be added, has often tried to send the ball ft around both ends at the same time." But Davis did not attack Eoosevelt's

^Davis, "A Blow at the Foundations: Eoosevelt and his Air Mail Policy," Harper*s Magazine, CtXVIII (May 193*0, 6^6~6kO.

^Davis, "Praying for Defeat," The New York Times, August 10, I93h, 16.

7 Davis, "On the American Way of Life," Harper^ Magazine, CLXXI7 (February 1937); 332.

^Davis, "Post-Convention Eeflections," Harperfs Magazine, CLXXIII (September 1936), 4l8. 81f inconsistency. "If you want to see where reasoned and consistent doctrine 9 gets you, look at Europe."

Because Davis favored Roosevelt’s general attitude, he supported most of the measures of the early New Deal. He stated that the Agri­ cultural Adjustment Act may_not have "been the correct method to deal with the farm problem. But something had to he tried; and if it was not the right method, "what is the right one, and who is going to find it and sell it to the country?" The National Recovery Administration was "the first endeavor, necessarily crude and awkward, to meet the situation created by a productive plant able to turn out more than the domestic market can absorb under our present system. "10 Although the NRA was a hodgepodge of compromises and did not seem to be a success, the alternative was

"floundering, inadequately reasoned endeavors to establish some kind of order." The next step might not be a step at all,'only a stumble in the dark. "Until you see some practicable alternative you had better support 11 it," advised Davis, "for fear of something else."

Two aspects of the New Deal attacked by Davis were Roosevelt's inflationary policies and the continued use of pump-priming. He criticized inflation because it tended to liquidate "the existing

9 Davis, "On the American Way of Life," Harper’s Magazine> 332.

^Davis, "Praying for Defeat," The New York Times, August 10, 193^ 16. 11 D avis, "The NRA—Or E lse ," The Saturday Review of L ite ra tu re . X (September 23, 1933), 126. 85 salaried and professional classes."12 Inflation merely expropriated certain occupational groups, a ll those mho had relatively stable incomes whether from investments, professional services, salaries, or wages, "in favor of farmers who speculate in land and capitalists who speculate in commodities."1^ Inflation, he predicted, would wipe out the salaried and professional classes, "the most vociferous opponents of capitalism," and drive them into subsistence farming. "Then they will be able to demand, and get, a government guarantee of their livelihood, and w ill have no further excuse for criticizing the established order. "li|‘

Davis also criticized Hew Deal pump-priming. All that Eoosevelt had been able to think of was "the old-program of government spending financed by a deficit." As late as 1959 Davis called the resort to more spending "a mere compulsion neurosis—bhe' automatic behavior of an organism unable to adapt itself to any other pattern. He doubted that public spending would bring lasting results. "Years and billions of pump-priming did not start business going well enough to keep on going under its own power; and many of us begin to wonder if business

12 D avis, "C apitalism ’s O pportunity," The Hew York Times, A p ril 28, 1953, 16.

^ D a v is, "Hot a Swing to th e L e ft," The Hew York Times, Hovember 29, 1953, 18.

li!Davis, "Capitalism's Opportunity," 16.

^Davis, "Eoosevelt: The Eich Man’s A libi," Harper’s Magazine, CLXXIX (October 1939), ^62. 86

will do any letter now that the priming ia to start again. Because

the New Deal had not brought about permanent recovery it was a failure;

it had "kept us going, but by expedients that cannot be kept up forever."^

Thus by 1938 th e United S tates was "stuck a t dead cen ter"; business had no

confidence in Eoosevelt, and the American people had no confidence in

business. "Agamemnon writhes in his net, crippled and helpless; Aegisthus

can do nothing because the Argives don't like him, and he doesn't know

what to do anyway. And where is the young Orestes who may come in some

day to clean things up and restore some sort of equilibrium.

Thus Davis judged the New Deal to be a failure because it had not

brought permanent recovery. But he realized that it had at least kept

the economy going and had returned hope and confidence to the American

people. Also, Davis knew that there was no practical alternative to

Eoosevelt's policies except a return to the program of the 1920's. He

sympathized with Eoosevelt's attempts to deal realistically with the

economic problems. Because he saw no alternative to the New Deal he

attacked its critics. By analyzing Davis' views concerning the business

opposition on th e rig h t and th e Communist opposition on th e l e f t , h is

position during the New Deal can be ascertained more clearly.

During the Eoosevelt years Davis was even more bitter in his

opposition to business leaders than he had been previously. They

3.6 Davis, "After the Happy Ending," The Saturday Beview of Literature, XVIII (May 7 , 1938), 17-

^Davis, "No Comfort for Optimists," The Saturday Beview of Literature, XX (May 20, 1939 )> l8 Davis, "After the Happy Ending," 17* \

87 attacked Eoosevelt as a dictator and the Hem Deal as Communistic without

offering any realistic alternatives. To business leaders the New Deal

"was spontaneously generated in a vacuum from the vindictive malice of

one man.” They seemed to forget, Davis declared, that something had

"happened to an American society dominated by business; it almost stopped working, and is not working well even yet.

Because business men saw nothing wrong in the economic system

itself, they believed the way to bring recovery was to go back to the

system in existence before 1933• To bring about recovery they would

reduce surtaxes, ease the Securities Act, abolish collective bargaining

and minimum wage laws, stop Federal relief expenditures, and put the hoboes and unemployables to work under a form of m ilitary discipline.

When this had been done, "corporate earnings would become as irrelevant

as they were in 1929 } and all the rich could grow rich by selling

securities to one another.” This program would be ”an alternative to

dictatorship.” Davis asserted that responsible conservatives should

muzzle such ideas. For "the one thing they cannot afford to admit is

that if we give them enough rope they would hang themselves as well as

everybody else.

Davis asserted that business leaders had no other plan. Business’

only reaction was to proclaim its lack of confidence in everything but

19 Davis, 'deduction to the Absurd," The Saturday Review of Literature. XVIII.(September 17, 1938), 18.

20 Davis, "Avoiding a Dictatorship," The New York Times. December 11, 193^* 22. 88 itself. Business was’ such a timid and sensitive creature that if anyone ventured to imply some lack of confidence, "Business is terribly hurt, and calls him a crackpot and a Communist.” “If Business wants to he restored to power," said Davis, "it had better try to think up better answers instead of ignoring the existence of the questions;" business had not earned enough confidence from the American people to be restored to power. 21

Because of the reaction of business leaders to President

Eoosevelt, Davis reasoned that' they ought to be among the most zealous third “termers in the country. Eoosevelt was a godsend to them because he was a sufficient cause for everything that had gone wrong, as well as for everything that had stayed wrong since the depression began. Davis asserted that "as long as Eoosevelt is in the White House they are spared the painful effort of trying to think; spared, it may be, the still more painful confession that even if they tried to think no thoughts would 22 come." Davis attacked the idea that there was a close relationship between ch aracter and poverty®! He sta te d th a t economic conditions had more to do with poverty than did the, character of an individual; "if a man is equipped by Providence with the abilities of a machine tender and the boss shuts down the factory, . . . it is hard to see how the saintly 23 character of the employee w ill help him much this side of heaven."

2LDavis, '^Roosevelt: The Eich Man's A libi," Harper's Magazine, ^65. 22I b i d ., 1*61.

25Davis, "Reduction to the Absurd," The Saturday Beview of Literature. 18. S9

Davis directed some of Ms sharpest "barbs at the American Liberty

League. The League, under the leadership of John W.. Davis and A1 Staith,

talked about "saving the Constitution of the founding fathers when what

they were chiefly interested in was saving their own powers and privi­

leges. "2i*' TMs can be seen by the fact that 'Very few poor men are afraid

of losing their freedom" under the Roosevelt administration.2^ jwvm

Davis seemed to agree with the Marxians that economics was everything,

that restrictions on hours and wages meant restrictions on bdiavior and

conscience too.2^ . This interpretation confessed an unusual definition of 27 individual liberties. 1 At any rate, John Davis' individual liberty was

under no restraint; "so long as there is any law business at all, such

talent as his will get the pick of it. 2 8 The situation of the republic

was not yet as desperate as that of the Roman Republic; Davis cautioned

that if it grew more desperate, it would be partly the fault of the

American Liberty League. 29

Elmer Davis had supported A1 Smith in the election of 1928 and

pli D avis, "The Case of th e Great Pompey," The Hew York Times. February 1, 1936, 14.

25 •'Davis, "Post-Convention Ref lections , 81 Harper's Magazine. 419.

26Davis, "It Happened in Rome," The Saturday Review of Literature. XIII (February 29, 1936), 4.

27 Davis, "Post-Convention Reflections," Harper's Magazine. 419.

2SDavis, "It Happened in Rome," Saturday Review, 4.

29I b id ., 15. in the Democratic convention of 1932. But "by 1936 Smith had "become a

leader of the Liberty League. Davis compared Smith to Pompey in that they

both had changed from opposition to the reactionaries in their early

careers to support for them in their later lives. Smith was ''one of the

ablest and most popular public men of his time . . . but somehow he never

attained the dominant position to which he aspired.” After his successor

attained the position Smith had desired# he felt "shoved into the back”

ground, unoccupied and disappointed." When he was approached by the

plutocrats, the men who had been responsible for many of his disappoint­

ments, he joined them "out of concern for the republic—and perhaps out

of personal pique as well . 11 These plutocrats "dragged him down to ruin

because as a class they had no principles but a class interest, and no

policy except turning back the clock.

Hie threat of an exodus to Canada by members of the Liberty

League after the election of 1936 aroused Davis' scorn. The Liberty

Leaguers differed from other emigres in that nobody was running them out;

and they were not threatened with the loss of life, liberty, or the right

to pursue happiness, '"unless they can’t be happy except when they are

promoting utility-holding companies." They w ill go, Davis asserted,

either because they believed Republican orators or because they refuse

to play unless their side always wins. "Either way, we could get along without them." But he did not think that these men would actually move

to Canada, because however vigorously they applauded the pioneer, they

30 Davis, "The Case of the Great Pompey," The New York Times» February 1, 1936, l^. 91

"would rather see than he one." And however devoted to principal such a

conservative might he, he would not go "if he figures it w ill cost him

money.^ »31

Conservative attacks upon the New Deal were hased on a narrow

reading of the Constitution and a literal interpretation of the ideas of

the founding fathers. These critics had adopted "the alien and Marxian hahlt of thinking that what the prophet said a hundred years ago with

relation to the conditions of his day was divinely inspired and applies „32 to the conditions of any day. The history of the Roman Republic

showed what would happen when rich men took shelter ’'behind the unalter­

able wisdom of the Founding Fathers, and imposed the Constitution . . .

as a barrier to changes whose desirability the Founding Fathers could

never have foreseen. Davis pointed out that the devotion of these men

to some parts of the Constitution, particularly the B ill of Rights, had

not been conspicuous. He suggested asking them: "Which would you

rather have—the Constitution with the due-process clause left out, or

the due-process law with the Constitution left out?"

51Davis, "Let % People Go," The New Republic, LXXXIX (November 25, 1936), IO 7 -IO8 .

32 J Davis, "Last Jeffersonian Expires with Convention," The New York Times, June 28, 1936, 28.

^Davis, "A Politician Behind His Time," The Saturday Review of Literature. XII (August 10, 1935)* 16.

^D avis, "An Interesting Choice," The New York Times. June 13* 1935* 22. 92

Davis maintained that the Constitution was meant to he adapted to meet changing circumstances. He felt that it "had a fair amount of vitality; . . . that it could suffer a minor operation or two, if it should he found necessary to cut out the tonsils or extract an infected tooth, without dying of shock. Consequently he was strongly critical of decisions of the Supreme Court. "Does any other modern democracy permit five men to veto any reform, however overwhelmingly demanded, of which they happen to disapprove?"^ He was particularly critical of the

Guffey decision, because it meant that "in the,next depression, the

Federal Government cannot constitutionally do anything ahout i t ." These decisions, "the ablest and most authoritative interpretation of what the

Constitution means," signify that "in the next depression the choice lies between dictatorship and catastrophe.157

Because of his views about the Supreme Court Davis favored some attempt to change it. He believed that something needed to be done because interstate problems could not be solved by state action which is what the Court advocated.^® Believing the Court should be changed by a

55 Davis, "Borah*s Remarks Please Mr. Gloom," The Hew York Times, June 9, 1956, 19.

■^Davis, "Merit Seen in Scheme," The Hew York Times, February 10, 1957# 21.

57 Davis, "Looking to a Grim Future," The Hew York Times» May 21, 1956, 22. 38 Davis, "Post-Convention R eflection s," Harper*a Magazine. k l8 . 93

Constitutional amendment, lie opposed Roosevelt's court-packing plan as 39 "the wrong way to do what needs to he done. He also attacked Roose­ velt* s methods and tactics, comparing Roosevelt to a bridge player who

"loves deep finesses; . . . hut it looks as if this time he may have got the lead in the wrong hand, and nay never he ahle to establish his long itO suit." Thus, even though Davis realized the necessity of some kind of action, he could not support Roosevelt's plan because it "would probably make the conditions worse in the long run, whatever its immediate advantages might be."1***-

Davis was as critical of the opposition on the left as on the right. The Communist, he said, "regards the class struggle as some­ thing like a prize fight in which one of the contestants is supposed to be rigidly limited by the Queensberry rules, while the. other may kick, butt, gouge." If the capitalist also started gouging, "the affronted howls of th e Communist can be heard around th e world. " These howls did not indicate a sincere concern for capitalistic justice, however, but an attempt to use injustice for their own gain. Their professed concern fo r th e Negro was in r e a lity a Communist attem pt "to use them as machine- gun fodder." In the Scottsboro case the Communists "kidnapped the

^Davis, "Opposing Theories to Pacts," The New York Times» June 2k, 1931, 2k.

^D avis, "Faulty Technique Charged," The New York Timesi March 15, 1937, 22.

^^Davis, "Opposing Theories to Pacts," The New York Times. 2k. 94 defendants and "baptized them as oppressed proletarians." If they went to the electric chair the dictatorship of the proletariat would have sent them there. The Communists, Davis indicated, were more interested "in the vindication of the principle than in the fate of the victim who happens to exemplify it.

Other innocent "blood has "been shed because of similar actions by

"persons of principle." This was true in the case of Sacco and Yanzetti.

When outsiders, such as Communists and other devotees of principle, challenged a decision of a local court, the local "civic culture is impugned; and the more the outsiders insist that we are bigoted barbarians, lix the more our local patriotism is inflamed. ^ And as outside pressure increased it was likely to bring "certain death to the victim." If these people really wanted to save the innocent, Davis declared, they should try to put themselves in the other fellow’s place and consider how they would feel if their community were so harassed.^4 Although he criticized the Communists* hypocritical defense of causes, he realized, as he had previously, th a t Communism had no g reat appeal, and th a t th e re was no danger of a Communist rev o lu tio n in th e United S ta te s.

Davis also speculated about the possibility of a Fascist revolution in the country. After observing statements made by Senator

Eugene Talmadge, The American Legion, and the Daughters of the American

^Davis, "Makers of Martyrs," Harper's Magazine. CLXYII (August 1933), 341-551.

^ I b id .. 341-342.

^ I b id .. 351. Revolution, he asserted that "it could happen here—not in 1936, perhaps; hut sooner than anybody might think, if the hard times go on. But he felt that there would, he no serious threat if prosperity returned to the

United States. "The strongest fortification against communism or fascism is the satisfactory working of capitalist democracy—satisfactory to the majority of the people, not merely to corporation lawyers.

Davis commented ahout party politics during the period, hut not as extensively or as critically as he had previously. He attacked hoth parties, hut particularly the Republicans because he felt they were not realistically facing the issues of the day. Most of his remarks ahout politics concerned the conventions, campaign, and election of 1936, an election which he stated was "essentially a choice between the past and h7 a future, between a sentiment and a reality." 1

The Republican party, as Davis saw it, was the party of sentiment, the party of the past. He declared that "a forward “looking Republican is a contradiction in terms. A man who adheres to what has become the

Republican creed is looking backward, looking at something that probably k8 cannot and certainly should not ever be again." The Republican con­ vention of 1936 was dominated by "a homesickness for the good old days;

JlC •'Davis, "Ode to Liberty," The Saturday Review of Literature» VII (October 19, 1955)* 5-

^^Davis, "Merit Seen in Scheme," The Hew York Times» February 10, 1937* 21.

^Davis, "Post-Convention Reflections." Harper's Magazine. kl2.

ll^Davis, "If Roosevelt Fails," Harper's Magazine* 392. 96 a devout hope that vae may -wake up some morning and realize that it was a ll a bad dream, and that nothing really serious needs to he done after 1+9 a ll.” This demand for a return to normalcy, to the good old days, would have a great appeal in the United States. If Landon wins it w ill he because "millions of tired and puzzled grown-up children want to go home and forget their worries at mother’s knee—want it so badly that they refuse to recognize that mother is no longer there.

Nostalgia would he the Republicans best asset; but their chief thesis would be that ”we are (or are soon to be) oppressed by a Fascist

(or Communist) dictatorship. " You might have expected them to agree in advance whether it would be Fascist or Communist and when it would occur.

But people who believed it ”are not likely to be disturbed by intel­ lectual contradictions. It is an article of faith, and the truly faithful have always been able to believe incompatibles. Another Republican asset, Davis declared, was the existence of a number of statesmen little inferior in virtue and wisdom to the Founding Fathers—John W. Davis, A1

Smith, and Amos Pinchot. "If John W. Davis and A1 Smith are such paragons of prudence and patriotism, why did the Republicans run candi­ dates against them in 1924 and 1928? " ^

49 Davis, "Post-Convention Reflections,” Harper’s Magazine» 412.

50Ibid., 414-4-15.

5IIbid., 412.

^2Davis, "Puzzled By P o litics,” The New York Times.t October 22, 1956, 24. Davis also discussed irreverently the Democratic party during the election of 1936. He asserted that it was difficult to ascertain the nature of the Democratic convention. '^But since it's taking a whole week to do a day's work, I'm afraid it is unmistakably a WPA convention."*^

Godfrey Gloom declared that the Democrats ought to use the phrase '^Forgive us our debts" in the lord's Prayer, because "they can't think of any other way to get rid of them. He believed, however, that the Democratic f party was more realistic than the Republicans and that their platform was an improvement over that of the Republicans. The Democrats displayed a more civilized attitude toward foreign relations, and it recognized that

"nation-wide economic ailments, if they are to be remedied at all, must be remedied by fe d e ra l a c tio n , even i f th a t req u ires amendment o f th e

Constitution to make it possible.

Of p o litic a l conventions in g en eral, Godfrey Gloom s ta te d th a t every one was "the most momentous convention o f a l l tim e, in a c r is is when the very existence of the Republic is at stake. " In 192 kf fo r example, the Republicans met to defend the Republic against the *!Red

Radicalism" of John W. Davis. The only trouble was that when the existence of the Republic was really at stake, voters would not recognize

•^Davis, "'Prompt* Opening Annoys Mr. Gloom,” The Hew York Times, June 26, 1936, 15.

-^Davis , "Landon Ox Vfegon fre ts Mr. Gloom," The Hew York Times, June 10, 1936, 18,

•^Davis, "Post Convention Reflections," Harper's Magazine, 4l8. It "because they had heard keynote speakers cry ’Wolf.’* too often.5^

Commenting on the qualifi cat ions of candidates, Davis said that the

President should have "no wife, no parents, no children, no "brothers and sisters, and if possible no friends.” In other words, the President should

"be like a mule, "without pride of ancestry or hope of posterity," "but a good worker. 57 jf the conventions would nominate such a man many of our problems would be solved.

Observing the European situation, Davis noted several differences between it and the American scene. One major difference was the reaction of the defeated party in an election: in America the defeated party co­ operated with the victors for the common good; in Europe the losers started a war. In Spain, the conservatives, "not having enough Spaniards on their sid e to win . . . called in Germans, I ta lia n s , and Moors to save th e national tradition, called in Lutherans, and Moslems to save the Catholic faith ." The same practice was followed by the Austrian conservatives and th e R ussian Communists who " f i r s t seized power by fo rce a f te r they had 58 lost an election.

Another characteristic of European politics was the practice of blaming the United States for everything. If Mussolini was stopped by sanctions or the British fleet, every Italian would remember that it

^^Davis, "Mr. Gloom Regrets S h iftin g on Borah," The Hew York Timesi June 8, 1936, 2.

57 Davis, "Melchizedek for President," Harper^ Magazine. CLXXHI (June 1936), 108.

^^Davis, "On the American Way of Life," Harper^ Magazine. 330-331. 99 would not hare happened if the United States had supported its traditional policy of freedom of the seas. If Mussolini was not stopped and Britain must divide Haile Selassie's assets with the aggressor,; every Englishman would know th a t th e need of assuming " th is repugnant added "burden of empire" was due solely to America's failure to support "Britain's altru­ istic policy." And even if the United States entered the next war on the winning side, our allies would know that "any faults of the peace treaty would he due to our having come in too late, or not having lent than, enough money.

As Davis observed the rise of totalitarianism throughout the world he feared its effect upon civilization. There were some people in the United States and in the four surviving democracies who "hold that truth is not truth unless it conforms to their dogmas." And in the countries of central and eastern Europe, the countries which seem likely to make the history of the n&xt few decades, "there is no appetite at all for what G*_7" Wells calls truth. Without the free pursuit of truth the fate of civilization would he at stake. In a struggle between barbarians and civilized men, barbarians must always win because "they can throw themselves into it wholeheartedly without considering the consequences, and their civilized opponents can not." Thus modern struggles are likely to result in "the survival of the unfittest—unfit

59 Davis, "All Our Fault, Anyway/" The New York Times , October 25, 1935# 20.

^°Davis, "Loose Leaf Wisdom for Seekers of Truth," The Saturday Review of Literature. XVIII (April 1.6, 1938), 17* for any civilized future." Until evolution has refined the anthropoid

survivals out of human nature, "civilization may he a disease, incurable and f a t a l .

Davis thought that such a war was not inevitable* because it would break out only as a result "of what individual men do or fail to 62 do." But he feared the disastrous consequences of war. The result would be "a world of isolated and hostile village communities, a

population kept down to the subsistence level permitted by a very rude agriculture; universal ignorance and squalor, relieved emotionally and

intensified by an authoritarian religion."^ Because of his belief that a war would result in a period similar to the Dark Ages, he asserted that wars should be avoided if at all possible. His conception about

the consequences of war affected his views of American involvement in

World War II, as w ill be seen in the next chapter.

But Davis did not completely despair. He realized that there was

"no ineluctable historical necessity for men to hate; impossible for men

to think." He felt that it was possible for men to cultivate a quality

of "coolly realistic resolution," which, more than any other, seemed

^Davis, "Apocalyptic Literature»" The Saturday Review of Literature,, X (April 21, 193*0 j 6*4-5. 62 Davis, 'Tteads I Win,. Tails You Lose," The Saturday Beview of Literature. XV (February 13, 1937 )> 5» 63 Davis, "Apocalyptic Literature," Saturday Review » 6k2. 1 0 1

likely to save the world.® Davis was•optimistic about the future because he believed that at least some of the English have begun to possess that

necessary realistic quality. Because they were free from the national

passions, and from uncritical optimism, they took "a detached and dis­

passionate view of the immediate peril of all humanity.1'® If enough

people had this inclination "to find out what is what, to be fair and

give every man his due as the facts may warrant; rather than to take a

dogmatic position and stick to it, with the machine gun or the thumbscrew

as a sufficient reply to dissidents,"^ the future of civilization will

not be in doubt. Thus Davis maintained a feeling of hope and optimism

even in the midst of economic instability and world aggression in the

1930 »s.

Davis’thought in the Hew Deal period was dominated by the

economic depression and Roosevelt's attempts to overcome it. His views

of business and Communist opposition to th e Hew D eal, and h is ideas

about politics were dominated by the economic situation. By 1937 and

1938 Davis was becoming more interested in and more concerned about the

Fascist threat to world peace. By 1938, as he turned his complete

attention to this problem, he was no longer concerned with the economic

problems which had dominated his thought in the years of the Hew Deal.

gk ■ Davis, "How to Save the World," The Saturday Review of Literature. XI (September 22, 193*0, 123*

®Davis, "Apocalyptic Literature," 6k5 .

®Davis, "A Herald of the Hew Barbarism," The Saturday Review of. Literature. " X (March 10, 193*0 , 533. CHAPTER Y

HEADS I WIN, TAILS YOU LOSE:

DAVIS’ YIWS OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS,

During 1937 and 1938 Adolf H itler, in an attempt to achieve

"Lebensraum" or living space for the German people, increased his

pressure on neighboring countries. As he continued his demands and took

possession of more territory, many Americans became aware of the possible

consequences of such aggression. A fte r 1938 many more Americans re a liz e d

the danger of the Fascist threat. But only an overt attack against the

United Skates finally overcame the feeling of isolationism which had been

so prevalent in the United States during the 1930*s. From 19^1“19^5 the

American people continued to co-operate with the Allied powers, first to win the war, and then to insure peace in the post-war world. The years

from 1938-19^5 j then, were characterized by a change from isolationism

to internationalism.

This change is also characteristic of Elmer Davis. Davis under­

stood the seriousness of the Fascist threat as early as 1937> and inter­

national problems dominated his thought from that time on. He attempted

to enlighten the American people about the European situation so that

they would understand it and would be able to face the problems realisti­

cally. Although he was not, as he phrased it, a "head-under-the bed­

clothes" isolationist, he opposed immediate American intervention because

102 103 he "believed it would not improve the situation. After May 19^0, however,

Davis changed his opinion and "became a proponent of American co-operation with the Allies. When the United States intervened in the war, Davis was greatly concerned with the American war effort. Because of his great concern he was appointed Director of the Office of War Information; from this position he discussed the war, emphasizing the ways in which a democracy must fight a war, "both on the "battlefields and on the home front, in order to remain a democracy. Although he s till commented on some of the domestic problems which had concerned him earlier, his views during these crucial years were dominated, as were those of most Ameri­ cans, by the international situation.

Davis wrote extensively about Adolf H itler, discussing not only his actions, but also the reasons behind the actions. He believed that

H itler’s plans were so clearly stated that everyone could easily under­ stand them and their consequences. The best way to understand H itler’s policies would be to read Mein Kampf» the Bible of the new dispensation, because in it Hitler stated his plans coherently. He asserted that

Hitler, although ridiculous in the field of ideals or ideas, was un­ surpassed when he stuck to his trade, "the physical and mathematical analysis of the world of force that we live in ." The book gives to the reader Hitler’s "instinct for realities, his brilliant insight; the incalculable genius, and his ’heroic’ Weltanschauung, the offspring of m

a bastard Darwinism by a bastard Wagnerism. " Such gifts, in the service

of such a mind was a good explanation for the precarious world situ­ a tio n .

Davis emphasized that Mein Kampf contained the ideology behind the

entire Hazi movement. H itler’s theology had just ’’enough determinism to

convince its adherents that they are sure to win, and not so much that

they w ill be tempted to think they can coast in without exerting them­

selves.” Hitler believed that in the struggle between men for survival

and dominance God was "the One Great Scorer” who "watches the game with 2 an objective and disinterested eye." H itler’s theology, according to

Davis, was characterized more by justification by works than justification

by faith. For Hitler never wavered in his faith that he would win in the

end, although he never deluded himself that he would win solely because

God was on his side. Hitler knew he would win only if he worked for it,

and he never expected "the One Great Scorer to credit him with anything

but what he earned."^ .As a result, Davis warned that those who did not

like H itler’s works should follow H itler’s example and remember that

" fa ith w ithout works is dead."**-

^Elmer Davis, "Required Reading," The Saturday Review of Literature. XX (October 14, 1959 ) j 5- 2 Davis, "The God of H itler and Spinoza," Harper’s Magazine. . CLXXXI (July 19^0), 187.

^I b id .. 195* 14. I b id ., 188. 105

In addition Davis believed that H itler had an incomparable instinct for the realities. Many people underestimated Hitler because they refused to believe that things were as he saw them. But Davis declared that it should never be overlooked that a ll of the adventures of the Nazi government through 1958 had been successful. They might have been gambles, but gambles that won, “proof not of megalomania but of a shrewd calculation of realities.Davis also maintained that Hitler could not be considered insane. For if sanity is defined "as the holding of opinions about people and phenomena which are verified by experience,

Hitler is the sanest man of our time.”^

Davis defended the realism and sanity of H itler not because he approved of what H itler was doing, but rather to warn the American people not to underestimate the Nazi threat. Many people hoped that if they ignored H itler he would not bother them. Others, particularly economic determinists, felt that economic conditions rather than personality were responsible for the Nazi movement. Davis agreed that economic conditions had made an opening for H itler; but he stated that the world would have been different and more comfortable "if Membership Card No. 7 in the 7 German Workers Party had been issued to a nan named Joe Blotz. Because

^Davis, "Czechoslovakia: Bridge or Barricade",” Harper*s Magazine , CLXXV (June 1957) , 86.

^Davia, "The Road from Munich,” Harper*s Magazine » CEXXVII (December 1958), h2.

^Davis, 'Required Reading," Saturday Review» 5- Adolf Hitler and not Joe Blotz held that card, a "unitary integrated

Europe" under the leadership of Nazi Germany was possible. Because in

such a system rebellion would be so improbable, the new European empire O would be more closely related to the Assyrian than to the Roman Empire.

To forestall such an Assyrian empire in Europe, Davis realized that both

Americans and Europeans must recognize the seriousness of the Nazi threat.

Davis was particularly concerned about the danger of Nazi

aggression to the countries of Belgium, Holland, and Czechoslovakia.

Belgium and Holland, because they did not desire to undergo the same

disasters as in World War I, wanted a policy of isolation; they desired

to resign from the "Western European Club" and fight for themselves and

not for anybody else. Although this was a natural feeling, isolation and

neutrality would not keep them out of war. The only way to avoid war,

Davis asserted, was through a policy of preparedness and collective

security. Although uncertain whether preparedness among great powers

made war more or less likely, he declared emphatically that preparedness

by a small country would go a long way to safeguard national security.

Germany would strike only if what she got was worth the trouble; thus

Holland and Belgium should insure tbat "a German invasion of the Low

Countries would not be worth the trouble.Another way to avoid war

would be through a policy of collective security. The only hope for the

future of Europe "lies in making collective security collective enough

8 Davis, "To Polybius for Perspective," The Saturday Review of Literature, XXII. (May 2 5 , 19^0), 10.

9 D avis, '^Belgium and H olland—Is o la te d ? ," H arp er^ Magazine,, CLXXIf (May 1937), 630-653. 107 and secure enough."^ A European war could he avoided if the western democracies would hase their policy on "a practical calculation of realities, not on any declarations of neutrality."XX

These same problems concerned Davis in his discussion of

Czechoslovakia which he believed to be under more immediate threat than western Europe because it was the barricade against Nazi aggression in the East, the direction in which H itler hoped to find his "Lebeusraum."

Czechoslovakia was also important to Uazi Germany because of the large

German minority within the country. Davis was interested in Czechoslo­ vakia because of his admiration for and devotion to the Czech people in their struggle for freedom and liberty. His interest in this region began during World War I when he wrote an article on the Austro-

Hungarian Empire; this interest continued into the 1920’s as he wrote special articles on the Balkan region for The Hew York Times. For these reasons Davis commented extensively on Czechoslovakia, both before and after the Munich crisis of 1938.

Although the Czechs would defend their freedom and liberty to the end against Genian or any other aggression, Davis realized, however, that they could not withstand a German attack without support from

England and France; and he was uncertain what support, if any, these countries would give. These western democracies had been willing to make s a c rific e s to buy H itle r off, "but as yet," Davis declared, "they

10I b id ., 636.

lxIbld., 630. 108 TO have only sacrificed other people’s property, not their own.” If they

followed the same policy toward Czechoslovakia, the Czechs “can die heroically in a hopeless defense of the democratic ideals they share with

the English, solacing themselves with the thought that their resistance has weakened the Germans and thus made England a little safer.

As Davis observed British foreign policy during the 1950’s# he became convinced that Britain would abandon the Czechs in their struggle

against Hitler. British policy had lost the skill it had during and after

World War Ij "imprudent advances are followed by precipitate retreats, and

those by other retreats which no advance preceded. Because England was

not yet ready or willing to fight, she began to appease Hitler. Implicit

in the reasoning behind British appeasement was the premise that "to let

th e Germans have anything they want is a le s s e r e v il than a general w a r."

But Davis remarked that it was naive to assume that the Germans, after

having absorbed Czechoslovakia and Poland, would be willing "to beat

their swords into plowshares and be friends and brothers with the world.

. . . It takes optimism to believe that.

The policy of appeasement culminated in the Munich conference in

September 1958 in which B ritish Prime Minister Neville Chamberlain, to

12 Davis, "Czechoslovakia,”1 Harper8s tfegazine, 85 “86 .

^Davis, "Heads I Win, Tails You Lose," The Saturday Review of Literature* X? (February 15, 1957)# 5*

^Davls, "England Turns a Corner," Harper’s Magazine* CLXXI7 (April 1957)# ^92.

^-^Davis, "Heads I Win, T ails You Lose," Saturday Review* 5* assure '‘peace in our tim e,11 abandoned Czechoslovakia to Genian aggression.

During 1938 Davis indicated that the British slowly and steadily picked the resolution of the Czech nation to pieces. Whether or not the Runciman mission had such an intention was difficult to asoertain; hut, Davis declared, "like so many things in English history, it worked out to the same end as if it had been deliberately intended." Also at Munich, the

French government, which had promised six times within the previous year to stand by the Czech alliance, abandoned Czechoslovakia when the pinch came. As a result, Czechoslovakia was thrown to the Nazi wolves by France and England in order to save their own skins.^

Davis maintained that the Munich conference had done more than abandon Czechoslovakia to German aggression. It had reduced France to the status of Belgium and reduced England to the status of Holland, without a fight. Chamberlain also gave away "the major premise of

English foreign policy ever since modem nations arose—the Balance of

Power, the principle that no one nation can be allowed to dominate the

Continent.in addition Munich lost without a fight the "substance of what half the world achieved by four years of war." The most important lesson of Munich, particularly to the United States, said Davis, was the realization that England would ransom London at any price, so long as the price was paid by others. "The Czechs paid it this time. Somebody else w ill pay it next time."'1’®

^Davis, "The Road from Munich.” Harper's Magazine, 42. In analyzing British foreign policy, Davis discussed the im­

portance of the city of London, which he termed, ''England's weak spot.”

He asserted that too much of England was concentrated in London—a fifth of the nation's population, with a fourth of the nation's tangible wealth.

This circumstance became even more important because London was located

in the southeast corner of Britain, "within two hours flight of the

German f r o n tie r ; w ith in gunshot of th e French channel coast. The vulnerability of London was vital to an understanding of British foreign policy, because Britain might be willing to support H itler’s future demands

in order, to protect London, as they had done in Munich. "If Hitler gave thou another way out, let them ransom London by helping to force the surrender of other people's territory and liberty, would they not take

it?," he asked.

The realization of this underlying assumption of British foreign

policy led Davis to question the advisability of American co-operation or intervention in the European war. After Munich he began to discuss the relationship between the United States and Europe. Although he realized that the best hope for the future was a victory for the western democracies over the Axis powers, he felt that American intervention was not the best way to achieve that end. It would only bring on more

problems, particularly for the United States, and would not solve the

European situation. Davis adhered to this feeling of isolationism until

19 Davis, "England's Weak Spot," Harper's Magazine» GLXXIV (March 1937)> 587.

20 Davis, "The Road from Munich»” Harper's Magazine. 48. I l l

May 19^0* when he re a liz e d th a t th e end of th e balance of power on th e continent necessitated further American co-operation with the Allies.

Before the European war began* Davis* in discussing isolationism and interventionism* asserted that, on the one hand* "too many co- operationists talk as if we can buy world peace at a bargain price"; on the other hand* too many isolationists seem to think that "if we only say we are going to stay out of war everybody will live happily ever after." 21

In reality the situation was much more complex; what the American people needed was hard and realistic thinking. They should not shut their eyes to facts, but instead they should recognize the nature of the world in which they lived. "The first and great commandment is to try to think straight* without letting our judgment by deflection by either hope or fear." Such straight thinking* Davis declared, would make this nation strong and allow us "to stand up vigorously and affirmatively for what we judge to be our interests."^

In an attempt to ascertain the best policy for the United States,

Davis analyzed various American policies. He attacked the naivete of what he called the "head-under-the-bedclothes" isolationists* those who believed that if you did nothing* said nothing* and thought nothing, everything would come out all right. Isolationists seemed to believe that by staying out of the war we can make this country an Island of

^Davis* "We Lose the Next War," Harper's Magazine. CEXXVI (March 1938), 338. 22 Davis, "God of H itler and Spinoza," Harper's Magazine. 193-^ . 112 23 of the Blest.” Some isolationists, Believing that economic intercourse with Europe had caused American intervention in the World War, advocated the abolition of all trade with warring nations By a repeal of the cash- and-carry clause of the Neutrality Act. Although such a policy would keep the peace, it would, Davis asserted, Be difficult to enforce. It would mean "control over exports and stock markets such as we have never known Oh in peacetime, with endless possibilities of evasion and graft."

Another difficulty of the extreme isolationist policy was that it would increase the possibility of a Fascist victory. ”By refusing to co­ operate now with the peaceful powers we make a world war more probable;” and in such a war a Fascist victory would be more likely with the 25 American policy of isolation. ^ Davis emphasized that there was a con­ siderable difference between an Allied victory and a Nazi victory in

Europe. If the Allies won, future difficulties would be solved with good w ill and mutual tolerance, in a conference between equals. There would be hope of a decent peace i f th e A llie s won; " if th e Germans win th e re is no evidence on which to base any hope at a ll." Thus from a purely selfish standpoint of American interest, the American people would prefer a Europe which seems likely to run itself and let us alone rather than a

Europe "whose resources are all under the control of a ‘dynamic’ group of world revolutionaries."2^

23 Davis, "We lose the Next War," Harper’s Magazine* 3^2. ^ Ib id ., 338.

2^ I b id ., 3^ . 26Davis, "The War and America," Harper’s Magazine. CLXXX (April 191+0 ) 1*57 - 9. 115 Davis asserted* however* that American intervention would not he

the "best way to thwart a Nazi victory. The United States, according to

Davis* should ait tight* keep the record clear* and "keep out of this war

so long as it —and its clear and immediate implications—keeps out of 27 * us*" The way to keep out is to maintain a "vigilant, active, affirm­ ative national policy that looks ahead* and tries to make sure that a

situation w ill never arise in which you have to decide whether war may

pQ not he the lesser of two evils.The United States should fight only for the protection of purely American interests* rather than to save

Europe or to make the world safe for democracy. If a more serious question arose* it should he approached from the standpoint of national

interest, because* as Davis stated* national interest* not rage or panic*

should determine American policy.2^

Why* then* did Davis* although critical of the naivete^of extreme

isolationism* so strongly oppose any American intervention in the

European war? In the f ir s t place, he f e l t that the United States had

unfinished business of its own~"vitally important domestic problems that have not been solved* and may never be solved if we get entangled in a 30 first-class war.1 Until reforms begun under the New Deal had been

completed* the United States should not become involved in a foreign

27I b i d ., 462.

28Davis* Badio Broadcast, on the Coltnribia Broadcasting System* April 22, 1940. New York Public Library* New York* New York. 29 Davis, "The Whr and America*" Harper^ Magazine. 462.

5°Ibid., 450. war. A second reason why the United States should remain aloof from

Europe was the British government. Davis, as was noted earlier, attacked the British and French policy of appeasement. By emphasizing the almost unbroken series of Blunders which characterized British foreign policy in the 1930’s, Davis emphasized that the present British government was an

excellent argument for American isolation. "A government that hazards its

imperial interests to protect class interests, and fails to protect

either, would he no safe partner in war of in the making of peace.

A third and more important reason': against American intervention was the possibly dangerous effect of war on the American way of life.

Davis feared that an American war effort would lead to regimentation within the United States and might lead to totalitarianism. Intervention might stop Fascism on the continent hut if we went in "we might let

Fascism into America right from the start."^2 For in a war, "we should have to sign away our liberties while the war lasted, and we might never get them hack." To win a war required concentration of national

effort; and that might mean "a concentration of power which may approx­

imate a dictatorship" by big business, which was, Davis declared, "the

strongest of all arguments for isolation."^

■^■^Davis, "We Lose the Next War," Harper’s Magazine. 3 ^ -

^ 2D a v is , "Comment, Favorable and Adverse, on ’The Way of Life’," The Hew York Times. June 19, 1938, IF, 9.

^Davis, "We Lose the Next War," Harper’s Magazine i 3^5. Finally, Davis opposed intervention because of his conception of the consequences of war. He believed that the European war would be "the most intemperate since the Thirty Years War, and is likely to be about as decisive for the victors as for the vanquished."'^ A war of this kind would culminate in a period similar to the Dark Ages, a world of uni- ' versal ignorance and squalor among isolated and hostile village

communities.55 addition I1® believed that war would probably not

improve the situation in 19^0 any more than it had in 1917. In World War

I the United States won what was called a victory—"and look at Europe, twenty years after. What reason is there to. suppose that a second inter­ vention would have better results?" But even if the United States won, there was no guarantee that "we would not be called on to save the world for democracy a third time about 1959.

Hot only did Davis oppose American m ilitary intervention, but he also criticized any attempt to arbitrate or mediate the dispute among the European powers. His views of a negotiated peace, or a peace without victory, were similar to his ideas expressed in the 1917 article "When

Peace Without Victory was a Failure." A negotiated peace would last,

Davis said, "only ’till one side or the other felt strong enough to go

3^ Davis, "Belgium and Holland—Isolated?," Harper’s Magazine. 63^.

^Davis, "Apocalyptic literature," The Saturday Review of Literature* X (April 21, 193*0, 6^2.

^^Davis, "Comment, Favorable and Adverse, on ’The Why of L ife'," The Hew York Times. June 19, 1938, IV, 9. m at it again and fight for the attainment of the issues at stake." In such a situation the warring nations would blame the country that had intervened to thwart their inevitable victory. Also, the United States should not intervene to impose terms even if both sides became exhausted, because, on the one hand they would resent it, and, on the other hand, he doubted that there was enough wisdom in this country to settle the affairs 57 of Europe. 1

Thus Davis believed that intervention in the European war was not the best American policy. Although recognizing that it was to America’s interest to achieve an Allied rather than a Nazi victory in Europe, he felt that American intervention to effectuate such an Allied victory would cost mere than it would be worth. ' It seemed to him, at least until

Why 19*10, that the A llies would probably win without any American inter­ vention. He stated that the advantage in population and resources was on the side of the Allies; what they lacked "in military supplies and economic preparedness this country is supplying now.” If their leadership lacked energy and resourcefulness the United States could do nothing about that.T hus Davis maintained that the United States should con­ tinue its economic and military aid to the Allies, but should not inter­ vene directly in the war. He believed that everyone would lose the

37 Davis, Radio Broadcast on the Columbia Broadcasting System, April 26, 19*tO, New York Public library, New York, New York. See Chapter 1, p. for Davis’ views of a negotiated peace.

TDavis, Radio Broadcast on the Columbia Broadcasting System, A p ril 22, 19*K). 1 1 ? vjar—victors, vanquished, neutrals, and "belligerents. "We are going to lose it whether we go in or stay out. I believe we shall lose it less disastrously if we stay out."-^

Davis* viewpoint can be seen clearly in his discussion of the

Ludlow Amendment, an amendment which would allow th e people to d eclare war by a popular referendum. "A decision made by a popular referendum would,” Davis stated, "give us a much higher degree of national unity than a representative vote.” In addition the people who would have to do the fighting should be allowed to decide whether prestige is some­ thing they wanted to fight for. Although it was argued that the Amend­ ment might hamper the State Department in the defense of American interests, in reality it would only deprive the government of the opportunity to bluff in foreign policy. He declared that "it is open to serious question whether any government has the right to bluff.” Davis recognized the objection that the people might make a wrong decision.

But such a possibility was "part of the price of democracy. And auto­ cracies, oligarchies, and representative governments have been known to Jin make wrong d e c isio n s, too.

As late as April 19^0 Davis expressed the conviction that the

A llies were going to win anyway.!"so we needn*t worry about how the war in would come out. But as events began to shake this conviction, Davis

^D avis, "We Lose the Next War,” Harper's Magazine. 3^6-7 .

^D avis, "Should the People Declare War?," The New York Times, December 19* 1937* IV* 8* ^^Davis, Eadio Broadcast on the Columbia Broadcasting System* April 22, 19^0. 110

began to change his ideas about the American relationship to the European

war. On May 10, 19^0 th e s itu a tio n changed d ra s tic a lly , when Germany

invaded Belgium, the Netherlands, and Luxembourg, endangering the pre­

carious balance of power on the continent. The beginning of what the

Nazi leaders called a ‘'world revolution” brought a definite change in

Davis* viewpoint. After May 10 he advocated an increased American role

in European affairs, not to resettle the affairs of Europe, but to defend

American interests and values. The decline of the balance of power in

Europe meant that only England stood between a Nazi Europe and the United

States; such a situation necessitated a different American policy.

Previously Davis had stated that any war would bring an end to

civilization. But after observing the European situation he believed

that the Nazi control had so endangered civilization that it could be

saved only by the actions of Great Britain and the United States. The

Americans and British, in order to preserve culture, humanitarianism,

toleration, and the social virtues, needed courage, foresight, an alert

suspicion, and "a hard grim realism which they have lacked, and which 1|_2 we have yet to prove that we possess.” Davis declared that unless

the Allies possessed these qualities, civilization, as it had been known, would be in serious danger.

Davis found in the American people not courage, foresight, and

realism, but instead a feeling of apathy. Americans seemed to rely on

k2 Davis, "War on the State of the Mind,” The Saturday Review of Literature. XXII (June 29, 19^0), 17. 119

such premises as "mankind w ill not,” or "God must," or "the spirit of

history decrees." In H itler’s hard-hoiled theology, on the other hand,

"God helps those who help themselves."^ The Nazis had come a long way

in twenty years, and they may go s till further, "thanks to the amiable

and chuckle-headed persons who don’t see why anybody (except the Nazis,

of course) should work up a belligerent feeling." These people seemed to

feel that it would be a happy life if everyone "would only stop feeling

belligerent, and exhausting H itler’s patience, and plotting aggression

against peaceful Germany." Davis hoped that these people would follow

the example of Finland, one of the most highly civilized nations in

Europe, which fought so effectively against overwhelming odds that even

when defeated it escaped annihilation. ^

Davis realized, however, that much more than realistic thinking

was needed for victory, for without further American aid an Allied

victory would be impossible. He asserted that the war could be won

only "by an all-out effort of America and England together—a partner­

ship in which America, by mere size and volume of resources, must be the 46 senior." Such a partnership was necessary if we were to win this war;

43 Davis, "Organization or Subjugation?," The Saturday Beview of L ite r a tu r e . XXIV (November 29, 194l) 20.

44 Davis, "The Non-Belligerent," The Saturday Beview of L ite r a tu r e . XXI? (Ju ly 5 , 1 94l), 8.

45 Davis, "War on the State of the Mind," Saturday Beview. 17.

^^Davis, "Journey to England, 1941, Footnotes for a Future Gibbon," Harper’s Magazine. CLXXHI (August 1941), 236. and. "by ''we*' he meant England, and. the United. States* because "it is our

problem* too* regardless of this nonsense of its not being our war. They are working hard in England and by working hard we can win. The United

States should begin to work hard immediately because ultimate victory would be a good deal harder "if we let the front-line troops—the men* women* and children of England—be overpowered before the reserves come

h 48 up. Thus, from. May 10, 1940 until the actual American intervention in

World War II* Davis advocated further American co-operation with the

A llie s .

During this period of crisis, Davis also discussed some of the domestic problems which had interested him throughout his life. His

comments on politics were confined almost exclusively to the election of

19*10. In the election he regarded President Roosevelt with mixed

emotions. He opposed Roosevelt not because of the third term* but rather because of the devious way in which he received the nomination. Instead

of stating that he would take the nomination if the convention asked him* he preferred "the tortuous* the roundabout, the too-clever-by-half* which is no cogent argument for a vote of confidence." On the other

hand* Davis declared that Roosevelt "has seen more clearly than any

other man in public life the paramount issue now facing the nation* and

47 England Reported Awaiting Invasion," The Hew York Times, May 28* 1941* 11. Interview with Davis. 48 Davis* "Journey to England," Harper’s Magazine. 236. has put that issue "before the people more effectively than anyone else who speaks with authority.

Davis "believed that Wendell Willkie was also an able candidate who stood out ahove all of the other Republicans at the Philadelphia

convention. Willkie understood the world situation, even though he had

not yet told the American people what they ought to do about it. As a result the electorate in 19^0 had about as good a choice as could have been desired. He hoped, however, that both candidates would soon state what the American people ought to do, and why. In light of the present world situation, the next President may have nothing to offer us but

"toil and sweat—and perhaps blood and tears, too. . . . For God*s sake

let him te ll us so now; it has been proved that even a comfortable democracy that likes business as usual is capable of responding to such an appeal."^0

Another important question which aroused Davis’ interest, not only in these years but particularly in the post-war period, was freedom of thought. This problem concerned Davis in 19bO because of the

controversy over the appointment of Bertrand Russell to the faculty of City

College of Hew York. Justice McGeehan of the Hew York Supreme Court refused to allow Russell to teach at City College because Russell’s alleged immorality would have had a detrimental effect on his students.

kg Davis, "Contradiction at Chicago," The Saturday Review of L ite r a tu r e . XXII (August 3 , 1 9 ^ ) , 9* 12±

Davis asserted that the principle involved in the McGeehan decision was

that people would prefer evil to good if they had the choice. Such a

principle "has "been the "basis of every religious persecution in history;

. . . it has probably been responsible for more human misery than any

other belief ever entertained by the mind of man." I£ the McGeehan

doctrine were correct, we would have to reject progress and "go back to

some authority, secular or sacred, to learn what is that truth which 51 alone we are permitted to teach and to believe.”

But the most dangerous doctrine in the decision, according to

Davis, was the idea that academic freedom was the freedom to do good,

not to teach evil. He asserted that the First Amendment attempted to

g et r id of th e d o c trin e ; but i f McGeehan is co rrect th e amendment means

only that Congress "shall make no law abridging the freedom of speech,

provided a man speaks good and not evil." And, as Davis noted, good and

evil were defined as "whatever seems good and evil to someone in

authority, in this case to one of the many Justices of the Supreme Court

of Hew York.

In the same year Davis discussed another aspect of freedom of

expression when he commented on C h arlie C haplin’s "The Great D ic ta to r."

Although he himself had used humor and satire extensively, he felt that

"The Great Dictator" was not funny and was detrimental to the best

Davis, "Implications of the Bussell Case. I. For Education," The Saturday Beview of literature. XXI (April 15, 19^0), 8.

52 Ibid. interests of the United States. He believed that comMy could he used if

it dealt with universals valid at all times, things that happened to people because they were human, "and w ill go on happening even when the battle flags are furled and the front pages have no more exciting news than debates in the Parliament of Man." But the comedy in "The Great

Dictator" was not something that inevitably happens and always w ill happen; "it is something that is being done to us, or to people like ,,53 118• Davis declared that if comedians were to render service to the national morale in the difficult years ahead, they should pick out material that "would have been just as recognizable and just as funny, b efore H itle r was ever born.

Although Davis probably discussed Japanese aggression in the Far

E a st, i t was im possible to a s c e rta in h is comments about th e problem. In

19^ and 19^1; when the Japanese situation was crucially important,

Davis, because he was broadcasting on CBS radio, wrote very little . He no doubt discussed the Japanese problem on his broadcasts, but, un­ fortunately, his CBS radio scripts are unavailable. After the United

States entered the war he commented very little about national affairs, primarily because of his official governmental position. Unfortunately, then, Davis* views about several significant problems during these years cannot be ascertained.

53 Davis, "No Time for Comedy?," The Saturday Eeview of L ite ra tu re n X X III. (November 9, 19^0 ) y 8.

5^ Ib id ., 12. During the period of crisis leading up to American, intervention

Davis had teen concerned about how the United States would conduct a war

if it occurred. His interest in this question increased when the United

States actually entered the war. He believed that the war should be

fought to preserve democracy; and to achieve that end only democratic

means should be used. As a result, such essentials of democracy as civil

liberties, freedom of speech, and the free pursuit of ideas attracted

Davis’ attention during these years. Because of this interest and

because he had criticized the information policy of the government, he was appointed Director of the Office of Hilar Information in June 19^2.55

From this position he discussed the war effort, with a particular

emphasis on the conflict between truth and military security. His in­

volvement with this question brought clearly into view his ideas about

censorship. Thus, the O.W.I. phase of his career is extremely important

to an understanding of his political and social thought.

Davis asserted that the basic idea behind the information policy

of the O.W.I. was that the American people "are entitled to know every­

thing that the enemy knows."56 a democracy fighting a total war "will

fight it more enthusiastically and effectively if it knows what is

going on. "5^ in addition he stated that the O.W.I. would never withhold

55 See Chapter 1, p. 18 .

56Davis, "War Information," Davis and Byron Price, War Infor - mation and Censorship (Washington: American Council on Public A ffairs, WTT 9.

■^Davis, The Office of War Information. 1^ June 19^2—15 September 19^5. Report to the Presidents 15. Papers of the Office of War Information, National Archives, Washington, D. C. 'bad news, and it would never wait until good news was available to balance it, because "the -American people are courageous enough to stand bad n e w s . "58 ge aiso emphasized that the O.W.I. was telling the same s to ry a t home and abroad, and th a t same sto ry was th e tru th . The O.W.I. told the stoiy truthfully because of their belief that "truth is on our side, not only as to the nature and issues of this war, but as to who is going to win it." Davis admitted that the O.W.I. used propaganda, but a propaganda that used "truth instead of falsehood in its operations." To condemn propaganda because th e wrong people used i t fo r th e wrong purposes "is like condemning the autombile because criminals use it for a getaway.

Such use of propaganda and censorship would not be detrimental to the American way of life. Davis declared that the free press had survived other wars; the present situation would strengthen it rather than hindering it as some of the alarmists declared. Reversing his own earlier position, Davis criticized those who believed that wartime restrictions would k ill freedom of thought, freedom of speech, freedom of the press, and the democratic system. Alarmists forgot that "a democracy may see fit to curtail its own liberties in its own long-term interest; they forget that if curtailment should be abused, we have recourse at the ballot box." Davis always emphasized that freedom

58 Davis, "War Information," 39. of ideas and communication were necessary to the American way of life.

So long as “this traffic in ideas remains reasonably free, so long as we

have traffic policemen who know that their business is to keep the traffic

moving, I can see no sense in talking about the end of our American way

of l i f e . " 61

Davis’ views about the freedoms for which the United States was

fighting can be seen in an O.W.I. pamphlet presenting the official inter­

pretation of the Four Freedoms. Although it was an official O.W.I.

publication it was written under Davis’ direction and contained many of his ideas. Freedom of speech and expression, freedom of religion,

freedom from want, and freedom from fear, although separate, were not

independent; each relied upon all the others and “each supports the whole, which is liberty. When one is missing, all the others are

jeopardized." Thus to be truly free, Davis declared, “a man must live

in a society which has relieved those curious pressures which conspire

to make men slaves: pressure of a despotic government, pressure of

intolerance, pressure of want. Davis also emphasized that the American people must understand

th e war and th e enemy. He a sserted th a t th e Germans and th e Japanese were able men, and they meant business; they believed that "anything goes, if it advances the interest of their own nation. ” There w ill be

61 , I b id ., %

62 United States Office of War Information, “Four Freedoms," Congressional Digest, XXI (October 19^2), 2kk-2k^. a s f no peace until such men are beaten down. ® Wot only should the American people know the enemy, but they should also know the world in which they lived. These were historic times; this is "no ordinary war and no ordinary crisis, but probably the greatest turning point in human destiny."

The world was involved in a total war which affected the life of every citizen; and the outcome would be affected in some degree by what every citizen does. Davis was certain that the American people would do what was necessary to win if they were shown "how many things, different and fik apparently irrelevant things, are going to be necessary.

Because Davis believed that unity and determination were necessary for victory, he disapproved of those who were using the war solely for personal gain. He particularly criticized the difficulties in labor- management relations. Certain business associations and their friends in Congress attacked the labor unions and an Administration which was friendly to labor unions. Such a campaign created confusion in the government and dissension in the country. Although this campaign served the ends of Axis propaganda and indirectly aided the Axis powers, their real purpose was "to get on with the war against Hitler and

Hirohito after they win the war against Roosevelt and the labor unions, but they put first things first. For the same reason Davis attacked

63 Davis, "Whr Information," k^-k6.

6k Davis, "The Teacher’s Job in the War," The Saturday Review of Literature, XX7 (September 12, 19k2), J-k. 6*5 ■\Davis, Radio Broadcast on the Columbia Broadcasting System, March 2k, 19k2. John L. Lewis' attempt to prohibit the manufacture of arms unless his demands were met by management and by the government. Davis maintained that domestic political battles were a luxury of democracy, but it might be a little safer to get together and get rid of Hitler first. For if we lose the war, "neither radicals nor conservatives w ill have anything left to argue about.

Davis asserted that domestic attacks on the O.W.I. were also p o litic a lly m otivated. Those who claimed th a t th e re was Communist influence in the O.W.I. were bush-league Fascists, the copperhead press, or "honest men who considered anybody to the left of their own position as Communists."0® In reply to the charges, Davis declared that the O.W.I. hired no known Communists; in addition every prospective employee had to undergo a rigid security clearance before being hired.other attac k s were conducted by a few leading Republicans who "chose to make a career out of fighting O.W.I." Such attacks compelled the agency to fight a war on two fro n ts . During th e two o r th re e months when Congress was voting appropriations Davis and the O.W.I. had to devote "more time and energy to repelling the attacks of our enemies at home than we were able to spend on Dr. Goebbels and our other enemies abroad." It was under­ standable to Davis why these men attacked; "men who seldom in their lives

66 "Warns John L. Lewis May Halt Arms Flow," The Hew York Times, May 1, 19^3j3eDavis radio speech of April 30, 19^3*

67D avis, CBS, March 2k, l$k2. 68 Davis, Report to the President, Office of War Information. 38-9. 129

had been actuated by any but partisan motives could not believe that any

man, possessing such an instrument would use it for any other purpose."7°

Davis also ldoked to the future, emphasizing what type of future

it would be, and how the American people should respond to it. He

anticipated that the future "will be what we are strong enough to make it,

against the opposition of able and ruthless men who are determined to '

make it something else.” He warned that when we wake up tomorrow, it w ill

not be yesterday; that there will be no normalcy or golden age; that there w ill be no Santa Claus; and that "we w ill get no more than we work fo r.”7’1-

But in addition to the danger inherent in the post-war situation, Davis

emphasized that there would also be unprecedented opprotunlty. America

could repair the losses and "go ahead with the rebuilding of a world which could be far better than any we have ever seen. ” All that was

needed was to continue "the hard and uncomfortable labor of thinking,”

and to behave more intelligently than our ancestors. If this were done

the post-war period could be a period of hope, opportunity, and

p e a c e .172

Thus, from 1938 to 19^5 Davis* thought underwent a significant

change. Although he had called himself an isolationist until May 19^0,

his position should mere accurately be termed anti-interventionist; he believed in the necessity of American preparedness and in an awareness

7° I b id ., 95“96.

7‘LDavis, "Teacher's Job in the War,” Saturday Review» 3*

?2I b id ., 16-17. 1 3 0 of European problems, but he opposed direct American intervention in

European affairs. From May 19^0 until American intervention in the war he advocated further American involvement in world affairs. During the war he became a strong advocate of American co^operation with Europe, not only for victory but also for post-war recovery. His belief that the

United States should exert a role in rebuilding and making a better world indicated a complete change in his thought from that of 1938; and this view dominated his political and social thought in the period of the Gold

War a f te r 19^5. CHAPTER VI

YEARS OF TRIAL AND HOPE:

ELMER DAVIS AMD THE COLD WAR, 19^5"1950.

The post-war years were characterized "by tension and crisis, in domestic as well as in foreign affairs. The reconversion of the American economy from a war-time to a peace-time footing led to problems of in­ flation and of conflicts in labor-management relations. In foreign affairs the end of the war did not bring peace, as many hoped, but rather a period of increased tension and aggression known as the Cold War.

The United States became concerned with protecting the free world against

Russian aggression; by fulfilling such a role the nation broke completely with isolationism and became, in a real sense, a world power. In order to face the problems of the post-war years, the American people needed hard and realistic thinking, not the fear and panic which seemed to overtake them. Elmer Davis attempted to impart to the American people this necessary trait of cool and realistic thinking. He recognized that the only way the American people could solve the problems would be by a clear understanding of a ll the difficulties involved. From 19^5 "1950

Davis maintained his realism and sanity. His effort to encourage the

American people to be mare realistic was facilitated in December, 19^5* when he began daily news broadcasts on the American Broadcasting

151 132

Company radio netwoifc. These broadcasts made Davis' views more fam iliar to the American people than they had been previously; because of these broadcasts Davis exerted his most important influence upon the American scene in this post-war decade.

Davis emphasized that in 1945 the United States had come to the peak of her national power. When Japan surrendered, the United States stood first, "m ilitarily as well as economically, among the nations of the world."'1' He warned the American pe®ple, however, that in spite of the great power they had achieved, they should remember that there would be no return to normalcy; for it does no good to cry "normalcy, normalcy, when there is no normalcy. It is going to be quite a while before we ever see normalcy again ."2 He further asserted that they were living in dangerous times; he hoped that the American people would become in­ telligently concerned about the situation in order to understand what should be done. "Cool thinking and rational appreciation of the things we have to watch out for can lessen the danger. Panic never did anybody any good. in addition he declared that the American people, who were accustomed to getting quick results, must also learn the art of patience; they must "learn to hang on" and not let themselves get bored into defeat. 4

’'"Elmer Davis, Eadio Broadcast on the American Broadcasting Company Network, December 23, 19^5* Elmer Davis Papers, Library of Congress.

2Xbid., August 16, 1948.

^Ibld., December 7, 1949.

I b id ., December 27, 1948. 155 Davis maintained that in order to face successfully the trials of the Cold War, the United States needed a constructive nationalism. He meant hy this not a blind patriotism that defended country, right or wrong, not a nationalism that emphasized the perfection of the American way of life, not a jingoistic nationalism, "but a nationalism "proud of the best in the American tradition, ashamed of our occasional lapses from our own principles." A constructive nationalism should also be a recognition of the best that a nation has meant to its citizens and to humanity, a faith that those principles are still valid, and "a resolute determination both to defend them against any attack from without, and to make them effective in the internal life of the nation."^

Davis declared that such nationalism could usually be found during wartime; but it was just as necessary, and unfortunately more difficult to attain, in a period of peace. He stated that "too few of us have proved willing in peacetime to set aside the interest of the group or the individual in favor of the paramount interest of the national society." As a result the national strength had been paralyzed by in­ ternal discords. Because of this internal dissension the government was hampered in its conduct of international affairs; in many cases the leaders were handcuffed "by the universal knowledge that too few

Americans are devoted to the national interest at home." The United

'■’Davis, Commencement Address, St. Lawrence University, Canton, Hew York, June 23, 19^6. Elmer Davis Papers.

6Ibid.

<9 States, if it were to maintain its role as a world power, could not afford to waste its energies in too much internal squabbling among its c itiz e n s .^

Davis noted that in the post-war crisis the entire American system was on trial—"the simplest kind of trial~tO ' see whether it works." For if the people can not make the system work the government w ill have to, because "no government could allow the nation to relapse ft into chaos and anarchy. In order to forestall such an occurrence, the people should approach every question with an endeavor to ascertain the national interest, and to pursue it as effectively as they had done while the war was on. And above a ll, they should remain calm, because getting angry does not help. "What we need is forebearance, Intelligence, and cool thinking." These qualities along with "ordinary common sense" would enable the United States to solve its problems during the Cold

War.^

The most important problem facing the United States was the re­ conversion of the American economy from a war-time to a peace-time basis.

Davis realized that reconversion would be a very difficult problem; It would be more d i f f i c u l t in th e American economy than in a co n tro lled economy such as R ussia, where governmental planning could make th e desired changes. But the difficulties could be overcome in the United

^Davis, ABC, December 19^5*

8 Ibid., May 19, 19^6. States by using the test men, available and "by a willingness to appreciate the other man's point of view . 10 One difficult problem facing the govern­ ment was the growing national debt. Davis was critical of those who believed that because we owed the debt to ourselves, it could be ignored; such an argument "was no good when th e n atio n a l debt was 30 b illio n dollars and it is hard to see that it is any better when it is 250 b illio n 1 1 dollars.” Some people defended a national debt because they knew that in order to reduce it, taxes would have to be maintained. Their passion for a tax cut often went so far that it might even hinder national security. Davis warned that to cut taxes at the price of reducing the m ilita ry establishm ent would be a poor economy. "Even those who cry loudest for tax reduction ought to prefer giving up some of their money TO to risking the loss of all their money." Davis’ views about the national debt, however, ignored the most recent economic ideas on the problem. His comments are an example of his often over-simplified view of economic questions.

The same desire for a tax cut led many people to advocate the abolition of many of the Hew Deal governmental agencies. The attacks against these agencies occurred not only for economic reasons, but also because some people feared that the existence of such agencies in the

United States would lead to a welfare state. Davis’ reply to these critics was that the welfare state as such was nothing new; the United

1QIbid., February 10, 1946.

i:LIbid., July 2, 1948.

^ I b ld ., November 25, 1946. 136 States had "been, throughout most of it history, a welfare state for somebody—"the land companies, or the protected manufacturers; or the larger groups whose welfare has been aided by the government in recent ii 13 years. The only question was where to draw the line; to ascertain where "the financial cost would become impossible, and where the limi­ tations on individual initiative would become more injurious than the benefits of the program. Davis maintained that criticism should be centered on particular programs not on the vague ideas of a welfare s ta te .

Davis considered inflation to be the most important economic problem confronting the United States. He had attacked the Hew Deal for its inflationary policies, and he feared that such a tendency would also occur in the post-war period. Inflation would lead to a higher cost of living for everybody, which would mean "not only nullifying the wage raises that have been granted in the major industries . . . but cutting 15 the wages of people who never got any raises at a ll." ^ Davis asserted that the only way to curtail the rising cost of living was to maintain some of the wartime price controls. Instead of this, the House ended price controls and legislated "in so far as it was able, a quick boom and a loud bust. Although Congress had abolished price control and

^Ib id ., September 5, 19^9*

^ T b id ., November 10, 19^9*

^Ibid., June 3* 19^6.

l 6Ibld., April 17, 19^6. . 137 thus caused a higher cost of living for everyone, they soothed themselves with the moral consolation that "American enterprise is no longer throttled by the bureaucratic hands of O.P.A. /"Office of Price Admini­ s t r a t i o n ^ .

Another post-war disturbance which affected the American economy was the prevalence of strikes, particularly in 19^6. Davis feared that the serious strikes would have an adverse effect upon the security of the

United States; "it is hardly to be supposed that foreign nations do not note that the American national economy is liable, every so often, to a 1ft paralytic stroke." He believed that industrial disputes between great corporations and great unions were not private feudal wars, but were disputes which affected "the well-being of a ll the people of the United

States, and. should be settled—if possible—in the national interest."^

The most serious disturbance, according to Davis, was the coal strike waged by the United Mine Workers under the leadership of John L. Lewis.

As the strike continued the imperative need of the country was to find out "whether or not John L. Lewis is an absolute autocrat in his own field, whether he is bigger than the government of the United States.

In addition, Davis noted that Lewis’ action had the effect of weakening democracy both at home and abroad. Although Lewis was personally

17 Ibid., February 25, 19V7 . l 8 Ibid.. May 2, 19^6.

^ Ib id ., December 30, 19^-5 • 20 I b id .» November 30, 194-6. 158

opposed to the Russian system, he had "done more to promote its extension

than a ll the Communists and fellow travelers in this country have ever

accomplished. "2^

Davis predicted that the most unfortunate result of the coal

s trik e would he i t s e ffe c t upon th e e n tire labor movement. He feared

that public resentment would be directed, not solely against the United

Mine Workers, but against all labor unions. Such resentment might be

used by the reactionary employers and politicians "to put labor back where it was thirty years ago.” These men seemed to forget that the

"reckless blundering of a few labor leaders” did not affect the rights

pp and wrongs of disputes within industries. Davis’ fears were realized

when Congress passed restrictive labor legislation, the Taft-Hartley Act

of 19^7. The act was not a slave bill, "but it was certainly intended

to weaken the strength of labor unions, and it pretty effectively

accomplishes that purpose.”2^

Politics also concerned Davis in the post-war years as they had

throughout his life. He discussed specific events, personalities,

elections, particularly the election of 19*1-8. At the end of 19^5 Davis

discussed the Roosevelt years, and attempted to assess Roosevelt’s role

as President and his influence upon the American scene. Although he

criticized Roosevelt for the devious methods he often used, for "doing

2^Ibid.» December 3t 19*+ 6.

22I b ld ., May 26, 19*+6.

25rbid., June 19, 19*+7* 159 oh in a circle what he might have done in a straight line,' he asserted that Roosevelt was "a truly great nan.tr She "best proof of his greatness was the "continuous venomous endeavor of his enemies to smear his memory."

Roosevelt and Thomas Jefferson were hated mere viciously than any of our other Presidents, because they both tried to give the average man a break by diminishing the power of the rich. "Men like that," Davis asserted,

"will always be hated—and loved—so long as private property carries private power with i t . ,|2^

Davis found that the interests of private property which had opposed Roosevelt, had taken a dominant role in the Congress of the United

States. A bi-partisan coalition in Congress between Republicans and

Southern Democrats had been set up to extend the power of government over labor, and reduce the power of government over business. This dominant coalition could be summarized in a phrase—"it is for money and against people." This coalition’s view of the public interest required it to support people who have money, or "pressure groups who want the chance to go on making money out of the rest of the people. This coalition, especially in the Republican controlled 80th Congress, asserted the idea of Congressional supremacy, for which there was no warrant in the

^^^Davls, "‘Roosevelt and Hopkins’: The Years of Desperation and Victory," The.Saturday Review of Llteraturej XXXI (October 23, 19bQh 8 .

2^Bavis, ABC, December 23, 19^5«

26I b id ., March 10, 19^6. 1.1+0

Constitution. Davis stated,however, that the 80th Congress served a useful purpose in reminding the American people what the Old Deal was lik e ; "and one dose was enough.

Davis emphasized the need for Congressional reorganization. Two of the most important drawbacks of Congress were the Senate filibuster and the seniority system. The filibuster, although justifiable in theory, had often thwarted necessary legislation. The seniority system, on the other hand, was unjustifiable, because it led to poor committee chairmen.

Continuous service, the core of the seniority system, was generally possible only in a district that was safe for one party; if a man won the primary, he was sure of reelection no matter what he had done. This system, then, was not the best way to get chairmen "who are alert, up on

p O their toes, responsive to new ideas." ° Davis found that many Committee

Chairmen, rather than being responsive to new ideas, seemed "to be s till fighting the battle of Bunker Hill.As a result there would be little chance for the "urgent reconstruction of the governmental system.

As the election of 19^+8 approached, Davis predicted, as did most political observers, that the Republicans would win the election.

Not only did the people seem dissatisfied with the Truman Administration,

2^Davis, "History Without Ideas," The Saturday Review of Literature, XXXII (August 6, 19^9 ) s 72.

p Q Davis, ABC, A p ril 28, 191+6.

2^ Ib ld . , December 18, 19^5-

^°Ibid., August 2, 19^+9- 1*H

"but in addition many Democrats, "both conservatives and literals, opposed the renomination of President Truman. Davis denounced the anti-Truman

Democrats, who were "men of principle, truly Democratical in their be­ havior instead of helping to e le c t somebody they did not lik e much,

they would see the victory go to somebody they do not like at a ll.^ He

also attacked the candidacy of Henry A. Wallace, because it would split

the liberals and allow a conservative administration to win. Although

such a reactionary administration might thoroughly disgust the country,

Davis maintained that the United States could not afford "four years of 39 calamity in the present state of the world. In addition, he asserted

that a Wallace administration would be no better than a reactionary one,

because Wallace's "fuzzy" thinking and irrational policies "would get us 33 and the world into serious trouble. Davis felt, then, that President

Truman would be the best Democratic candidate in 19^-8.

Davis originally hoped that Senator Robert A. Taft would receive

the Republican nomination, because Taft was the leading representative

of the dominant element in the Republican party—"a sincere, able and

honest conservative." Taft’s nomination would enable us "for once to 3k fight a presidential election on a clearly defined issue." He

51Ibid., July 9, 19^8 .

52Davis to M. Bostwick, December 30> 19^7* Elmer Davis Papers, Library of Congress.

^Davis to E. J. Higgins, April 28, 19kj. Elmer Davis Papers.

5^+Davis, ABC, June 3 ° , 19^7. believed, however,, that Thomas Dewey was a better candidate, although he

criticized what he referred to as Dewey's "strange bedfellows." These men—Speaker Joe Martin, Charlie Halleck, Leslie Arends, John Taber, Leo

Allen, and Dewey Short—were "men of principle" who believed that what was good fo r business was good fo r th e country, th a t money was worth more

than what you bought with it, and that "the inhabitants of the rest of the world are a lot of moochers, whom we can safely disregard when we get

tired of bestowing handouts. Dewey would have a difficult time with

these men, because the Republicans had been traditionally an "oligarchic

party, . . . a party of group leadership." If Dewey won and attempted

to be a strong President, he would have to lead "the most rambunctious

and ill-assorted team, in his own party, that any President has dealt with ^•6 since 189^."'' Davis acknowledged, however, that Dewey was an able,

intelligent, practical conservative, the best candidate the Republicans

could have chosen in 19^8 .

Davis stated that Dewey had an overwhelming lead over Truman

and would easily win the election. He declared that Dewey was in the

position of a football team with a long lead which needed only to play it

safe, risk no interceptions, and punt on fourth down; Truman's "only

chance is throwing long forward passes.Also, he found that in the

35Davis, "President Dewey's Strange Bedfellows," Harper's Magazine, CXCVU (September 19^8), 28.

^ 6I b id .» 33.

37 Davis, ABC, September 27, 19^8. Ik3

campaign th e two teams seemed to be playing in d iffe re n t parks; Truman

campaigned against Congress and not Dewey, and Dewey was not campaigning

against anybody, "but merely promising that if he is elected the year of 58 jubilee is come." Davis attacked the low intellectual level of the

campaign, as he had in previous elections; it was regrettable that in

every campaign, intelligent and honorable men promised things that they

knew they could not deliver, and made statements which were, "to put it 59 mildly, much exaggerated." The outcome of the election surprised him

greatly; it was perhaps "the most dramatic and startling upset in

American political history, a victory of David over Goliath ."^9 The

election, Davis said, was a mandate to make the economic system work

better, "to see that its unqualified output is more fairly distributed,

for the benefit not of individuals but of society as a whole.

D avis1 greatest interest during the post-war years from 19^5“

1950 concerned the role of the United States in world affairs and the

containment of Russian aggression. Davis stressed that American foreign

policy must be based on an understanding of the "aggressive expansionism

of Russia, an empire using a world religion as an instrument for k2 softening up its intended victims." The United States must oppose

58 I b id . 1 October 12, 19^8.

59Ibid., October 19, 19^8.

^ I b id ., November 5, 19^8.

^ I b i d . , November 25, 19^8. ho Davis, "Objections to World Government," The New Republic, CXXII (February 27 , 1950) > 144 this Russian religion with the idea of freedom—"the freedom of nations to govern themselves, the freedom of the individuals in those nations against oppressive government; free nations of free citizens."^ But the idea of freedom would not he enough unless it were hacked up by enough force "to convince the Russians that they cannot get what they want with­ out war, and that they could not possibly win a war.

Davis emphasized that the United States should build up her own depleted m ilitary strength. He advocated American preparedness and opposed the demobilization that occurred at the end of the war, because demobilization would hinder the national interest, and would prohibit the

United States from conducting a vigorous foreign policy.^ He declared •< that too many Americans were like the people who ridiculed Noah for building an ark; they were opposed to floods, they didn't believe in them, and since it was not raining, there was no sense in building an ark.

But, if a flood does come, the fact that you don't like it "doesn’t help you stay out of it; if a flood does come you need an ark, and you can’t build one in ten minutes. ^ reasonable preparation would be_more

likely to prevent a catastrophe, "as well as to give us a better chance to win i t i f i t comes. ..47

^ D a v is , ABC, November 25, 19^8. ^liDavis, "Objections to World Government," 15.

^D avis, ABC, January 3, 1946.

^6I b l d ., March 29, 19^8.

lbid., April 25, 1948. 1^5

Davis maintained that in order to block Bussian aggression the

United States should not only huild up her own military power, but should also aid in the rebuilding of Europe. The United States should restore the balance of power in Europe, by building up western Europe so that it could stand on its own feet and "serve as a counterweight to the immense power of Eussia." The United States should build up the remaining free nations of the world, economically, politically, and m ilitarily, so that they would be able to retain their freedom.^9 Davis asserted that Ameri­ can foreign aid would be a valuable investment; the political advantages to be gained from promoting stability and democracy abroad would out­ weigh "the relatively small sum of money we might have to invest without absolute certainty of repayment.

Davis believed that the most important program of American foreign aid was the economic aid of the Marshall Plan. He felt that in many ways it xuas the most necessary aspect of American foreign policy, because it attempted to improve the desperate economic situation in western Europe, which was the chief danger to the democratic countries of E u ro p e . 51 He supported the Marshall Plan because it was a "co­ operative recovery program by European nations with American assistance— not a relief program but a plan which, if it succeeds, w ill make further

Ib id ., May 10, 191*9.

^ lbid., March 29, 1948.

50Ibid.., January 9, 19^7-

51Ibid. Ik6

relief unnecessary.’^ As a result he was critical of Congressional delay; the greatest danger to the program was not Eussian aggression hut

rather "the sluggish operation of the United States government." He

feared that the aid that was sent might he "too little and too late. "55

If the plan failed the result would he a chaos and disorganization that

"would cost us more in the long run than anything we might do for Europe

now. Congress finally acted in time and thus made the Marshall Plan

a success. Thus, Europe was better off, economically, politically, and

psychologically, than she had heen before; and if the aid continued, the

Marshall plan "will have enabled western Europe to keep going and to stay

free," meaning a very great advantage to the political and strategic

interest of the United States.55

After Europe had become stabilized, both economically and

politically, Davis emphasized the need for an alliance among the western

powers against Eussian aggression. Before the war he had been a strong

advocate of collective security to maintain the peace of Europe; after

May 19^0 he also advocated American involvement in collective security.

Thus he favored the formation of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization

because it would help prohibit further Eussian aggression in Europe. He

declared that if, in 1917 and. in 19^0 , our enemies had "positively

^ Ib id . , January 1, 19^7 •

55ibid., July Ik, 19^7.

5^I b ld ., September 1, 19^7-

55rbid., January k, 19^9* 147 known beforehand that we would take action if we had to, we might never

have had to at a ll."^ The necessity, then, in the Atlantic alliance was

to persuade the Bussians that we mean business, that we w ill meet force with force. If Bussia understood our determination "they might decide to

s e t t l e down w ith what they have.Thus Davis described American

foreign policy as a chair with four legs—"American rearmament, the

Marshall Plan, the Atlantic treaty, and the military-aid program. Take

away one of those four legs and your chair teeters insecurely."-^

Davis affirmed that the greatest example of American determination

against Bussian aggression in the immediate post-war years was the Berlin

air-lift. When Bussia set up the Berlin blockade the United States re­

fused to back down, and set up the air lift instead. That action was

"a demonstration of American resolution and of American capacity which

has already had a profound effect on the minds of Europeans, east as well

as west of the iron curtain.standing firm, the United States

showed to the Europeans that we were ready to stand up and resist

aggression. If we had not, many in Europe would have expected a series

of retreats and thus would have begun to climb aboard the Bussian

56 Ib id ., February 14, 1949.

57 Davis, "Objections to World Government," The New Bepublic, 13.

1 5 8 J Davis, ABC, April 27 , 194 9.

59 Ib id ., December 24, 1948. 148

■bandwagon. ^ Thus Davis declared that the Berlin a ir-lift was "one of

our great peace-time victories—a victory which may have been decisive

in the Cold War;" it prevented a disastrous blow to American prestige,

and gave to people who needed it "a lesson not only in American power but

in American ingenuity which they may remember to their own profit as well

as to ours."^

Although Davis emphasized the struggle between Bussia and the

United States and discussed the ways in which the United States and the western powers could win, he never ignored the necessity of a world

organization as exemplified in the United Nations. Davis, remembering

the failure of the League of Nations, ha d reservations about the efficacy

of the UN. In general he felt the UN was a good investment because as

long as people were talking to each other, they would not be shooting at 62 each other. But he had seen clearly that, because of the failure of

the Bussians to co-operate, the UN had been unable to solve the post-war

problems. In addition he believed that the impotence of the UN was one

of its assets; for if the organization had seriously tried to solve the

international antagonism "between the Bussian empire and the free world, the result would probably have been a world war.

^°Ib id ., December 27 , 1948.

6lIbid., July 29, 1949.

^ Ib id ., August 16, 1949.

Davis, "Objections to World Government," The New Bepublic, 10. 149

Davis maintained that if an effective world organization were to be set up it "would have to build on the existing realities. The most potent of those realities was the sentiment of nationalism; thus any effective international cooperation must be the outgrowth—and not the antithesis—of a sane and true nationalism."^ Because of the refusal of the Russians to co-operate, Davis asserted that, at the present time, no true world government would be possible. Any world government would have to be a coalition government in which Russia would have a large share. Every such coalition in which the Communists had been involved was faced eventually with a choice between throwing them out, and letting them take over. To forestall such an event from occurring it would be

"simpler, and safer, to keep them out in the first place. Thus-Davis favored an organization in which the members would cooperate, such as

MATO, rather than a quarrelsome international government which might lead to a global civil war.

Davis hoped, of course, that collective security and American determination would keep the United States out of any future war. But since it was possible that a war still might occur in spite of all our efforts, he discussed how the next war should be fought. The United

States must have a national objective; "we had better make sure that what we are doing is what we want to do; and that we know why we want to do it." Davis agreed with Clausewitz that war aims should be the

^Davis, Commencement at St. Lawrence University,June 23, 1946.

^ D avis, "Objections to World Government," The Mew Republic , 13. 150 same as the aims of peacetime diplomacy, because "war, if it came, would be the continuation of national policy by other means." The United

States should fight Bussia to prohibit their encroachments upon the interests of the free world. We should fight not for free enterprise but for "a world of free nations composed of free citizens," with guarantees of freedom of the mind, freedom of the individual, and freedom of nations to manage them selves in th e ir own way. 66 He a]_so "believed that it would do little good to use the atomic bomb; and he emphasized that no matter how horrible atomic war would be "it would be more horrible to have to live under totalitarian rule. Thus the aim of

American foreign policy, both in peacetime and in wartime, should be to prohibit the further spread of totalitarianism.

The tension and uncertainty of the Cold War affected not only the foreign policy of the United States, but also the attitudes of the

American people. Many people, impatient and fearful about post-war conditions, began to find domestic reasons for the indecisiveness of the Cold War. Many blamed the Cold War stalemate not on Bussian aggression but on the alleg ed Communist conspiracy w ith in th e United

States. The resulting feeling of fear and hysteria was of great concern to Elmer Davis, because he realized the detrimental effect of such h y s te ria upon the freedom and lib e rty of th e American, people. Thus

^^Davis, "What Are Wars For," Harper's Magazine, CXCVIII (January 19^9 )> 23-50.

^ D a v is, ABC, September 23, 19^9• 151 during this period of tension and fear, and particularly during the

McCarthy hysteria of the early 1950'a lie commented extensively on civil lib e r tie s .

Davis declared that the nation was in no serious danger either from foreign foes or their domestic agents; hut the people of the country were in danger "of making asses of ourselves." Some individuals and newspapers encouraged the country to do so by trying to spread fear and hysteria.These men smeared individuals with a little direct alle­ gation and a lot of innuendo; if enough suspicion was cast upon an individual he might be dismissed from public office with a black mark on his record for the rest of his life. The consequences of such tactics would be that people of spirit and pride would not apply for government employment; as a result the public service would be staffed "either by reactionaries who are beneath any Congressman’s suspicion, or by people who are so dull that they despair of finding jobs anywhere else.

These attacks were conducted not only by private individuals and newspapers but also by the Congress of the United States particularly by the House Committee on Un-American A ctivities. This committee cast suspicion upon a government official, promised him a chance to give his side of the story, and then gave him the runaround. "Some of us," declared Davis, "would like to believe that that sort of thing is an unamerican activity. In addition this Committee put more faith "in th e word of somebody who used to be a Communist, and now claims to be

& I b id ., June 15, 19^9-

69I b id .. July 15, 19^7- 71 cured, than in th e word of somebody who never was a Communist a t a l l . '

Davis also regarded the Committee's attacks against the foreign policy of the United States as detrimental to the operations of American diplomacy, a fact which did not seem to bother the Committee.7^

Davis emphasized that such tactics not only endangered the in­

terests of the United States directly but also indirectly by creating

confusion and mistrust which made the country more susceptible to

Communist in f iltr a tio n . Nothing would help the Communists more than "to

create a general conviction that the government is rotten and unsafe— 73 if it is not true—and to make everybody distrust everybody else."

The enemies of the United States would like to create such an atmosphere, because it would lower the national morale and the national efficiency.

But, Davis declared, "our enemies don't have to waste any effort on that

enterprise; our own super-patriots are doing it for them." 7b

This feeling of hysteria, Davis maintained, greatly endangered the basic freedoms and liberties of the American people. Many people believed that the republic was in such danger that we would have to throw away the Constitution in order to save it.Some73 people defended

70Ibid., April 1^, 19k8.

71I b i d ., May 26, 19^9-

72Ibid., August 12, 19^8.

7^ I b id ., March k, 19^8.

7^I b id ., November 3, 19^7*

7^Davis to M. Barber, November 16, 19^7* Elmer Davis Papers. 155 their actions on the ground that the Constitution with its guarantees of c i v i l lib e r tie s was w ritte n before th e in te rn a tio n a l Communist con­ spiracy was ever dreamed of. "Nevertheless," Davis asserted, "it is still the Constitution—boo good a barn to burn down to get rid of a few rats." Furthermore he feared the far-reaching consequences of the suspension of the Bill of Eights; such suspension would mean that any majority could suspend it for any minority; "a Republican administration might suspend it as applied to Democrats, or vice versa."77

Davis emphasized that the most important freedom endangered by fear and hysteria was the freedom to choose among different alternatives.

The most fundamental of all freedoms was "the freedom of choice, the freedom of decision. "7® Although there was some risk that people would choose the wrong alternative, "you can’t be right in human thinking till you have run the risk of being wrong." If people talked and listened and thought, enough of them would distinguish sense from nonsense. "Once abolish that principle, or even throttle it down, and whatever you have left, it won’t be the faith once delivered to the fathers, it won’t be 79 the American way of life ." The men who, in attempting to preserve democracy against Communism, led the attack against freedom of thought were unaware that the basic difference between free countries and

7^Davis, ABC, March 15, 19^7.

77Ibid., October 2k, I9V7 .

7^Ibid. , February 20, 19^6.

79I b id ., May 2, 19^9- 154 totalitarian countries was the intellectual freedom which they attacked. 80 Thus Davis "believed that the most important internal problem facing the United States was how to defend the freedoms guaranteed in the

Constitution from the self-proclaimed protectors.

Davis asserted that what was needed to make sensible decisions on

Q *i national policy was facts, not panic or hysteria. To defeat the

Communist conspiracy, th e United S tates needed men w ith cool judgment,

Op "men who know what is what.,IUC To guard against real disloyalty and insecurity, the government should pick trustworthy men and women, whose trustworthiness was proved by carefully devised procedures rather than by the views of "headline-hunting Congressmen. in addition the government should make American democracy work so well, economically and politically, that it can prove to the world that "we have something fill. better than Communism on all fronts." Davis emphasized that Fascism was no cure fo r Communism; recen t h is to ry had shown th a t "you c a n 't beat Communism with reaction; you can beat it only with progressive Qc democracy." ? Thus, Davis asserted that the way to maintain basic

American freedoms and also to defeat Communism was to possess cool,

80 Ibid., July 6, 19^9.

8 l I b id ., May 27 , 1949. ftp 0 I b i d ., March 2 , 1948.

8 ^I b id ., March 4 , 1948.

811 Ib id ., March 15, 1947-

' 8 ^I b id ., September 28, 1946. 155 realistic thinking, trustworthy public officials, and a progressive democracy which would undercut th e Communist appeal.

From 19^5“1950 Davis discussed many aspects of the American scene. He commented ex ten siv ely on th e domestic economy, p o litic s , fo reig n affairs, and the attacks upon freedom. He had discussed most of these problems previously; but he was beginning to become more concerned about the internal threats to freedom, which became more important to him in the years after 195°• Thus the years from 19^5“1950 can be considered a transitional period from his earlier career to the last and most well- known phase of h is l i f e . CHAPTER V II

YEAR ONE, THERMONUCLEAR ERA:

DAVIS' VIEWS OF POLITICS AND FOREIGN AFFAIRS, 1950-1958.

In. the five years after World War II, the United States had fulfilled successfully its role as a world power; Russian aggression had been contained and western Europe had been rebuilt both economically and politically. These significant victories had been won with a minimum of internal strife. But the outbreak of the Korean War in June 1950 ushered in a more serious challenge to the power and influence of the

United States. The nation was relatively successful m ilitarily, but the war had unfortunate domestic repurcussions. Political opponents of the

Truman Administration openly attacked United States foreign policy with an implication that un-American elements were involved. As the attacks continued, there were increasing assertions that subversion was prevalent in the United States. Many people were convinced that the way to pro­ hibit subversion was to curtail the freedoms and liberty of the alleged subversives. These attacks culminated in the McCarthyism of the early

1950's.

Elmer Davis was greatly concerned with assaults on the freedoms guaranteed in the Constitution. As w ill be seen in the next chapter he was one of the most articulate opponents of McCarthyism. But during th e se years he also commented on p o litic s , th e economy, and fo reig n affairs. Davis' views, although dominated by the prevailing

156 157

McCarthyism of the early 1950*can also he considered a culmination of his ideas on the problems with which he had been concerned throughout his entire life.

As always Davis took pleasure in ridiculing conservative groups and ideas. In 1955 he noted that conservative columnists and politicians were furious at the Democratic program to reduce the taxes of the poor; they expressed indignation at this "twenty-dollar handout." But if a man’s taxes were reduced by twenty "thousand dollars it was not a handout but "just a return of money to people who can be trusted to make good use of it—in the nation’s interest or in their own."’1' in one of his broadcasts he said that if the Daughters of the American Revolution were told that the United States was menaced by flying saucers they would

"promptly and patriotically pass a resolution denouncing flying saucers." He predicted that the DAR would not recognize the conquest of Mount Everest because the mountain climbers had planted a United

Nations flag on the peak. If the Daughters were in session, said Davis, they would "probably demand that the result be thrown out and the climb 3 made over again.

Davis observed that the American people had made some mistakes in the post-war years; we had indulged in the sport of party politics,

’'"Elmer Davis, Radio Broadcast on the American Broadcasting Company Radio Network, July 28, 1950* Elmer Davis Papers, Library of Congress.

2Ibid., April 23, 1953.

^I b id ., June 2 , 1953. 158 and had now come "to where we have to pay for "both our virtues and our 1|. faults; hut we need not he dismayed." No foreign enemy could defeat us if we would pull together; hut "thanks to a hlend of politics and de-

5 featism, we seem to he doing our level hest to lick ourselves." He emphasized that the American people needed courage and confidence in order to overcome their difficulties. Davis noted; however, that the people preferred to run out on their obligations, or, "as is more fashionable now, to in s is t th a t we re a lly have no o b lig a tio n s." The prevalence of such an attitude throughout the world had made the world situation more precarious.^

The world situation resulted more particularly from what Davis called "the Nature of Man." He believed that there was no use over­ looking the fact that "whatever progress the human race may make w ill he in spite of a hall and chain about its ankle; the hall and chain of what is traditionally called Original Sin." The theological term may he rejected, "hut whatever you call it, the thing is there. Human nature, then, was responsible for Man, '‘who is sometimes sinful; and more often, and more calamitously, is stupid." But man also has glimmers of in­ telligence and of self-denying good*will; "those glimmers have been

k Ibid., July 28, 1950.

^rbid., December 22, 1950.

^Ibid., January 1, 1951*

^Davis, Address to the New School for Social Eesearch, New York, New York, June 2, 1953* Elmer Davis Papers. 159 enough to save us, just barely, from catastrophe, so far; they may do so g again." In addition Davis stated optimistically that men can be brave, unselfish, ami can think; "so long as they keep bn thinking, the human 9 race has a future."

Davis regarded the world as being in a state of antagonistic co­ operation; in order to make the best of this situation society should increase the co-operation and reduce the antagonism. The antagonism was the result of original human nature, while the co-operation was probably due to "a reasoned conclusion that co-operation is better for everybody."

Davis maintained that the world would be in a better situation if it did not ignore emotion or human nature but instead attempted to harmonize it with reason; or if harmony failed, emotion should be reduced "to some degree of rational guidance if not control.Davis' discussion of human nature and its effects on society indicate two of his most character­ istic traits: realism by the emphasis on original sin and emotion; and optimism by his belief that emotion can be harmonized or eventually con­ trolled by reason.

Throughout his life Davis discussed not only the nature of man, but also the nature of history and historical evelopment. He examined

% )avis, "Another View from i 960," The Saturday Review of L ite ra tu re ^ XXXIII (September 2 , 1950), 55•

9 Davis, Address to United Nations Mucational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO), January 26, 1952. Elmer Davis Papers.

^Davis, Address to the New School for Social Research, June 2 , 1953. various historical theories, such as the teleological, ethnological, and either-er interpretations, and then formulated his own view of history.

As early as 1927 he had called the teleological or divine will inter­ pretation "protahly the most pernicious error in the history of human thought. People who "believed the current trend of events was contrary to the order of nature, or a denial of the meaning of History, really meant that "this is the sort of thing that would not be allowed to happen 12 if they were God." Davis held that God was not personally involved in human developments, but was merely the One Great Scorer who did not care how well or how badly we played: a ll he would record was whether we won i a. 13 or lost. Thus Davis insisted that there was no ethical meaning in history; from the available evidence the logic of history was not dis­ cernible, and possibly, Davis stated, "it may be non-existent."^

Davis also criticized the ethnological interpretation of history.

Some ethnologists knew that the Goths and Vandals belonged to the Great

Bace, the Hords, who were predestined to be rulers and saviors of the world. But the ethnologists overlooked the fact that the Goths and

^^Davis, "Beds of Ivory," Show Window (Hew York: The John Day Co., 1927 )7 130.

■^Davis, "Isn’t God Going to Save Us?," Two Minutes T ill Midnight (Indianapolis: Bobbs-Merrill, 1955)7 1^+8«

15rbi_d., 15^. Um. ^Davis, "A Herald of the Hew Barbarism," The Saturday Bevlew of Literature, X (March 10, 193*07 535* 161

Vandals did not know it, nor did they know that "the fifth-Century Romans were a degenerate bastard mixture of Alpines and Mediterraneans."^

Davis also discussed the either^or interpretation, the belief that there are only two possible alternatives to any historical event or crisis

(i.e ., Communism or Fascism, Catholicism or Atheism, Roosevelt or ruin).

He attacked this interpretation because it encouraged sloppy thinking and because it was false: "history seldom if ever runs in a channel with only two outlets." To speak of a dilemma was inaccurate because civilization could not possibly face all of the existing dilemmas at one time; a mere accurate observation might "classify the monster as a polylemma, a beast

1 /T with seven heads and ten horns—and maybe some exits in between. ",LD

Davis maintained that conscious thought, or ideas, had had almost no effect on recent history. Ideas were a minor element in the Nazi movement; th e Communist successes came p rim arily not from th e ir ideology but from "the most pernicious invention in human history—the Leninist technique of seizing and retaining power." Even the United States, which more than any other nation owed its origin to ideas, had not had its fate molded by conscious thought; the changes in the government enacted during the Hew Deal were "emotional rather than intellectual changes"; the fact that we won the war was not due to any reasoning process "but to the emotional shock of Pearl Harbor," which was "a

15 Davis, "Chance and Personality in History: Men and Women Who Gave a Push to Falling Rome," Mew York Times, April 1, 1925# I I I , 2k.

^Davis, "Prophets at the Crossroads," The Saturday Review of Literature, XVI (October 2 , 1957)# k6. 162 profound affront to the national self-esteem.” Davis, as a "stubborn and unreconstructed rationalist," believed that the mcst important part of human experience was "what happens above the neck, and that the brain is a more dependable thinking instrument than the muscles or the bowels."

And although he s till thought so, he admitted that conscious thought "has not often had a decisive influence on recent history."^

Davis was convinced that most interpretations of history T-mrl over­ emphasized historial Forces, and had overlooked the factors of chance and personality. He contended that the so-called Forces that make history were mere superstition; for the irresistible forces had been converging for decades, and had several times been successfully resisted by 1 ft individual men. The record would show that at crucial moments Forces had been interfered with, and with decisive effect, "by something to which at present we can give no better name than Chanced Chance and what is perhaps a subdivision of Chance—Personality."^ Davis' view of the relationship between Forces and Chance-Personality can be seen in his discussion of the fall of Home. He criticized those who emphasized that the fall occurred because of some divine and natural law;

instead he agreed with J. B. Bury that the fall of Rome was something

17 Davis, "History Without Ideas," The Saturday Review of L iterature» XXXII (August 6, 19^9 )j 65”72.

18 Davis, "What of the Future," The Saturday Review of Literature , I I I (November 15, 1926), 291.

^D avis, "The 'Logic* of History," Harper's Magazine, CDXIX (August 193k), 338. 165 like an accident, due to the fact that at a crucial moment the western h a lf of th e Roman Empire was in th e hands of two men, "of whom one was an imbecile and the other a crook.

Although Davis did not accept completely the Great Man Theory of history, he emphasized the importance of the individual in all historical events. He stated that it made a great difference in 191^ that William

Hohenzollern instead of Bismarck controlled Germany when the Austrians came up with their engaging proposal that "they should start a war and 2i leave i t to th e Germans to f i n i s h ." H isto ry had no purpose except what was put into it by men—men who worked at it, men who were better than other men, "men who work hard and resolutely and intelligently to 22 make their will and not that of their enemies prevail." History., was "what men make it . . . ineluctable economic necessity to the con- 25 trary notwithstanding." Because he believed strongly in individualism, he naturally emphasized the role of personality in determining his­ torical events. Such a view, however, led him to under-estimate other factors in history, particularly economic factors. He often seemed to observe only the event itself rather than attempting to understand some of the underlying causative factors.

20 Davis, "Chance and Personality in History," The Hew York Times, April 1, 1925, III, 2k.

21Ib id .

22Davis, Address to UNESCO, January 26, 1952. 25 Davis, "Organization or Subjugation," The Saturday Review of L ite ra tu re , XXIV (November 29, 19^1), 20. Among Davis’ abiding concerns was the nature of the American form

of government. He asserted that the American government was basically a democracy, whose fundamental principle was to do "things that w ill be as

satisfactory as possible to as many people as possible. He also

regarded the government as a republic, and unlike many conservatives he

found no contradiction between the two. He averred that the United States would be a republic even ''if the right to vote and hold office was re­

stricted to Mayflower Descendants who are also stockholders of the United

States Steel Corporation."^ Conservatives who emphasized the term

"republic" and criticized the term "democracy" were 150 years behind the

times; they used the term "democracy" as the Founding Fathers had used

i t , meaning th e d ire c t democracy of a mass meeting, ignoring th e more

general meaning it had acquired since. Davis stated, then, that the

American government was a democratic republic—"a government of the 2 6 people by the same people."

According to Davis the American government was also a welfare

republic and had been one since the Civil War and to a considerable

extent before that; 'the only point is whose welfare gets consideration

and assistance from the government." Since 1935 the welfare haiS been

given to much larger sections of the population, to people "who are in

greater need of consideration, if not of assistance, than those who

2k Davis, ABC, May 1, 1950.

“^Davis to Elizur Yale Smith, May 9> 19^9- Elmer Davis Papers.

Davis, ABC, June 21, 1950. 165 27 have usually got it in the past." 1 Davis criticized the idea that the

Welfare State would inevitably lead to Socialism and then to a police state. The important factor was the political system, not the economic system; for if a nation maintained a free political system, the people oQ could change the economic system by a free vote.

In his discussions of politics Davis stated, for the first time, his political philosophy. He referred to himself as an "old"fashioned

Hamiltonian Democrat," believing in a strong government that would use its powers "in the interest of all the people rather than in the interest of the rich and well-born—or just the rich. "2^ The United States, under the Constitution, was a democratic republic, where the rights "belong to all citizens—everywhere in theory and in most places in practice ."^0

He indicated that in order to better understand the politics of the

1950's it should be remembered that there were actually five parties in the United States Congress. There were the liberal Northern and Western

Democrats, the conservative Southern Democrats, the sprinkling of

Southern liberals, the mass of conservative Eepublicans, and finally the thin fringe of liberal Eepublicans. The Eepublicans and Southern

Democrats usually voted together on domestic affairs, while all

2^Davis, Address to Society of Indiana Pioneers, December 11, 19^+8. Elmer Davis Papers.

2^Davis to W. L. Howard, September 6, 195°. Elmer Davis Papers.

^Davis, Embree Lecture, Transylvania College, Lexington, Kentucky. Elmer Davis Papers.

5°Davis, ABC, May 2, 19^9. 166

Democrats with a small number of Eepublicans were almost always united in support of an internationalist foreign policy.-^ Davis emphasized that the most serious problem of government in the post-war years was Congress­ ional usurpation, Congress telling the Executive not only "This is what we want to do (which is their right) but, This is the way we want you to do i t ."52

Davis was severly critical of the political life of the 1950's, particularly as it related to the Congress. He remarked that politics in Washington resembled the game of hearts in which the main point was to get rid of the queen of spades, or to keep somebody else from sticking you with it. Both parties seemed to be doing their best to prove that they did not want to be stuck with the task of governing. But someone had to run the government, and "the ordinary citizen would be grateful if both parties would pull up their socks . 1,55 After visiting the

Scandinavian countries fo r a month in 195l j he was amazed a t th e d i f ­ ferences between Scandinavian and American politics. Although the

Scandinavians differed on issues, they did not find it necessary to accuse their opponents of being traitors or Communists. Davis found it a pleasure to spend a few weeks among "these cool and reasonable people, who know how to make democracy work without getting steamed up about

51 D avis, Embree Lecture.

52Ib id .

33Davis, ABC, March 15, 1951. 167 it, before I turn to the goulash of envy, malice, hatred and all un­ char itahleness in Washington.

After observing the activities of the 82nd Congress, Davis speculated on what kind of Declaration of Independence its members would have produced had. they been in Philadelphia in 1776. They would have held it self-evident that some men are created equal; that all men are endowed with the inalienable rights of life, liberty and the pursuit of happiness, "except in so far as it might be abridged by injurious slanders emitted under cover of Congressional immunity;" they would have concurred in the denunciations, because "most members of Congress like to denounce." Then they would have resolved that the United

Colonies ought to be free and independent states, "except in so far as independence might inconvenience or reduce the profit of an influential group of any man's constituents.He concluded by saying that they probably would never have had time to write any declaration at all; they would have been too busy with committee hearings, "investigating charges that George Washington was appeasing the British.

Davis felt that there was a need for Congressional reorgan­ ization; but he realized, as he had previously, that Congress, which was so zealous to reform everybody else, "shows little enthusiasm about reforming it s e lf ." Vl He contended that the la st American in stitu tio n

^Ib id ., August 31, 1951.

55Ibid., July k, 1951.

56rbid., July 5, 1951.

^Ibld., January 27 , 1953* 168 to go down, surviving after all else had "been destroyed, would he "the seniority system in Congress and the privilege of unlimited debate in 38 the Senate." If the Senate began to operate on merit rather than on seniority, "the very foundations of the republic" would be undermined .^9

He emphasized that the seniority system had been responsible for inept and reactionary committee chairmen, "men who might have been regarded as progressives in the Old Stone Age, but not since.

Since the 1920’s Davis had maintained that a United States

Senator had an exaggerated opinion of his own worth. A Senator was always concerned with his dignity; but it seemed to Davis that the

Senators who were most concerned about their dignity "are the ones who have least dignity to be concerned about. "i|'1 He also criticized the

Senate's conduct of foreign affairs. He wondered how the government could carry on its foreign affairs in a country where the Senators had to know all the secrets and also had to tell them. The Russians did not need any spies; they could get all they needed by "just reading k-2 what comes out of secret sessions of a Senate committee." Davis

^^Davis, "Congress and Foreign Policy," Address at Princeton University, Princeton, New Jersey, March 10, 1951. Elmer Davis Papers.

^D avis, ABC, January 12, 1955*

4°Ibid,, December 13, 1951.

^Ib ld ., April 1, 1952.

11-2 lb id ., January 16, 1951. 169 concluded his views of Congress "by stating that whatever the United

States would lose in a hydrogen-bomb raid, "Congress would probably s till be w ith us—and th e same Congress.

In discussing the Truman administration Davis stated that there were two Trumans: th e White House Truman who carried on su ccessfu lly th e important affairs of the United States; and the Courthouse Truman, who lowered the prestige and dignity of the office by his outbursts at news conferences and by h is famous le tte r s . Truman was unsuccessful in domestic affairs but a great success in foreign affairs. Truman's greatest moment came when he decided: "If we don't stop this thing now, we may never be able to stop it." As a result of this decision, Greece,

Turkey, France, Italy, Korea, and Japan were saved; and It was probable

"that they would have been lost but for Mr. Truman's interventions."

Davis was certain that future historians would remember the White House

Truman rather than the Courthouse Truman, and would record that Harry

S. Truman was the man who la id th e foundations of world peace and freedom. ^

■ Although Davis g en erally approved of th e Truman ad m in istratio n , he contended that a change of administration might be good for the

American people. By the 1950*0 the Democrats had grown tired, slack, and lax, while the Eepublicans, out of office for twenty years, had become vindictive, venomous, and irresponsible; a change of

Davis, "When the Balloon Goes Up," Two Minutes T ill M idnight, 185.

^ ^ a v is , "Harry S. Truman and th e T e rd ict of H isto ry ," The Reporter, VIII (February 3, 1953 )> 17“22- 170 administration would "chasten the Democrats, reform the Eepublicans, and

educate them b o th .D a v is believed that Dwight D. Eisenhower had been an ex cellen t commander of th e A tla n tic a llia n c e ; no one but Eisenhower

could have "breathed courage and hope into the Europeans as he has b& done." But he was not impressed by Eisenhower as a political leader;

Eisenhower seemed to be chiefly concerned with net offending anybody; he

seemed to be a "conscientious man who wants to do what is right, but

usually finds it advisable to do what they tell him." The United States has had Presidents like that before, Davis remarked, and "one of them had been a great General, too." hi 1

During the election of 1952 Davis became an enthusiastic

supporter of the Democratic candidate, Adlai E. Stevenson. He believed

that Stevenson was the best, ablest, and most intelligent candidate who

has been nominated for President during his entire lifetime. He

applauded Stevenson’s determination "to te ll people what he thinks they U) ought to hear, whether they like it or not."4-0 Even though many of

Stevenson's advisers opposed this campaign tactic, Stevenson continued

his strategy; he went "right on treating the American people as if they

were grown up and capable of thought."^

^ D a v is, ABC, November 22, 1951.

^6I b id .. June h, 1952.

Ibid., October 6, 1952.

^ Ib id ., September 1, 1952.

^ ib id ., September 50, 1952. 171

In this campaign, as in most of the others he had covered, Davis regretted that ordinarily sensible men said things that made no sense.

He ridiculed the custom whereby a candidate refused to mention the name of his opponent; each candidate referred to his opponent as the Governor of I llin o is or th e General but not by name. They seemed to f e e l th a t " if you don’t mention the name, maybe people won’t know who is running against you. But," Davis noted, "the evidence would seem to indicate 50 that the voters always find out.He held that the campaign was one of the most discreditable in American history, primarily because

Eisenhower was persuaded to conduct a fighting campaign, not the kind he was used to, but a type of fighting "not limited by Queensberry rules.

The campaign was the meanest since 1884, and "it has gravely damaged

our national standing. Davis felt that not only the acrimony and

mud-slinging, but also the cost and length of the campaign should con­

cern the American people; the physical strain on the candidates would

be lessened, and the length of the campaign would be cut in half if the

national conventions were held in September instead of July.53 This

sensible suggestion has recently been considered by many political

leaders of both parties.

Davis listed several reasons why Eisenhower won; one was

5°Ibid., September 2, 1952.

5-*-Ibid ., October 6, 1952. A

-^Ibid. , October 51 > 1952.

55rbid., Hovember 4, 1952. 172

Eisenhower's great prestige, and another was the fact that the Democratic

administration showed many signs of wear and tear. Another factor might

have teen Stevenson's decision to discuss the issues intelligently with

the American people. Because of Stevenson's decisive defeat, Davis con­

tended that "it may he that no other presidential candidate will dare run

that risk for a hundred years.He hoped that the Democratic party would prove more intelligent opposition than the ^Republicans, that if

things went wrong, the Democrats would not ascribe it to stupidity or to

treason, and that the Democrats in opposition would have "not only

enough patriotism hut enough common sense to refrain from the kind of

campaign th a t was waged a g ain st them w hile they were in o f f i c e ." ^

Davis did not comment extensively on the Eisenhower Adminis­

tration hut criticized Eisenhower's attitude toward the presidency.

"After all," said Davis, Ike "is still President, when he happens to

remember it.The people thought they had elected Eisenhower to

determine and direct national policy; hut as time passed "it hegan to he

doubtful if he is firmly behind any national policy."57 Davis compared

the pro-business attitude of the Administration with Carthage. He

doubted whether the Administration, which despised eggheads, had ever

I b id ., November 5 ) 1952.

55rb id . , November 27, 1952.

5^Davis, "Vdhen the Balloon Goes Up," Two Minutes T ill Midnight, 166.

^^Davis, ABC, February 20, 1955- 175 heard of Carthage. But Carthage was ruled By rich men mho preferred

saving their money and Balancing their Budget to saving their liberty.

In the end, Davis declared, "they lost Both. So did all the other citizens mho mere dependent on their policies."^

Davis mas mere concerned mith the threat of nuclear mar, and less

concerned mith European stability than in the immediate post-mar period.

He Believed that the situation in Europe had improved greatly By 1950; the

improvement mas "not only the outstanding achievement of American policy

since the mar ended, But one of our great achievements of all time—not

the least Because it mas carried out against Bussian opposition."^ But

even though Europe had Been stablized and had Become a Bulwark against

Bussian aggression, the old Balance of pomer mas no longer in existence;

something new must replace it. Davis contended that the American people

must understand that the "something nem won’t mork unless me take an

active part in it; and that me must take an active part in it, in our 60 omn interest."

Davis warned, however, that the American people must not under­

estim ate th e pomer of B ussia nor over-estim ate th e power of th e United

States. He referred to such a tendency as the "illusion of American

omnipotence—the idea that if we simply te ll the Bussians to do what me want, they must do it. Davis maintained that the Bussians would not

58Ibid_., January 9 , 1955-

•^Ibld. . June 5j 195° •

60 IB id . , May 10., 1951.

6lIbid., June 19, 1955. VJk

"be that easy to deal with. The American people would have to consider foreign policy more realistically, and that they should base any such policy on what was best for the national interest, rather than what

"would have been good for a partisan interest, in situations which now 62 have completely changed." In general Davis favored the policy of con­ tainment, which, although it was expensive and would bring no immediately visible results, avoided war as well as an "aggressive policy that would 65 run a considerable risk of war."

The first real test of containment, according to Davis, was the

Korean War. He regarded the outbreak of hostilities in Korea as the beginning of the old game of totalitarian conquest—picking off the opposition one by one, "and relying on the war weariness of all decent people to make sure that nobody w ill come to anybody's help." Recent history had shown, however, that the time to stop aggression of that kind was the first time; "if you don't stop it then you will have to stop it later, nearer home and at far greater cost.Thus Davis favored President Truman's decision to commit American forces to repel th e Communist aggression in Korea.

Davis believed that American policy in Korea should have three major aims: first, to re-establish a united and independent Korea; second, to avoid being forced in to a g eneral war w ith Communist China;

£ 0 Davis, "Or If Not," Two Minutes T ill Midnight, 196.

^Davis, ABC, August 8, 1952.

^ Ibid.. June 26, 1950. 175 and third, to achieve the support of the rest of the United N a t i o n s . ^

The success of th is th ird aim was s ig n ific a n t "because i t had th e e ffe c t

of transforming the United Nations from a debating society into something with teeth. In addition the entrance of the UN into the Korean War was

"one of the most remarkable achievements of American diplomacy in modem

times." By encouraging the UN to support our policy in Korea, the United

States received valuable military, political, and moral support. All of that was done, "not by ramming our policies down the throats of other

people but by persuading them that their interests coincide with ours;

fifi which is what diplomacy is for."

Davis regarded the decision to enter the Korean War as the most

important decision that President Truman made during his administration.

I f th e d ec isio n had not been made, worse th in gs would have happened—

"the collapse of collective security, a universal loss of confidence in

th e United S ta te s, and a deadly menace to Japan and th e whole P a c ific

area." Davis emphasized that the armistice was also necessary, because

it was the only alternative to deadlock, other than a greatly intensi­

fie d and expanded war. Such a war would have cost more liv e s and money, would have entailed dangerous political complications, and "fought

against the vast land masses of China would have had very uncertain

chances or prospects of success ."^7 Thus containment was a success in

^ Ibid., December 8 , 1950*

66Ibid., October 9, 1950.

67 Ibid., July 27, 1955. 176

Korea because it was a limited war fought for a limited objective rather than a full-scale war of aggression.

Although Davis supported the foreign policy of the Truman admin­ istration, he was less than enchanted with the conduct of foreign affairs under Eisenhower and Secretary of State John Foster Dulles. He believed that Eisenhower and Dulles generally carried on the same policy of con­ tainment, but with certain differences, more of methods than of objectives; such differences might be summed up as "an inclination to be 68 brusk—bo tell the Allies, not to ask them." Davis maintained that the

United States had been "painfully inept" in presenting its policies to the

A llie s . "You would think that we were Russia, and England and France were

in the position of Poland and Bulgaria." In addition instant retaliation aroused little enthusiasm among people who saw things differently than we did, and who were "three thousand miles nearer than we to the retaliation which our r e ta lia tio n would provoke.Davis feared that such tactics might isolate the United States from its allies and force the nation to

face the Communists alone.

In addition Davis criticized Dulles’ attempts to bluff the

enemy by threatening American retaliation unless the Communists gave in

to our demands. Many of these threats, such as the policy of lib eration

of Eastern Europe, the rescue of Dien Bien Phu, and massive retaliation,

68 Ibid.. January 5, 195^. 6Q •\Davis, "Year One, Thermonuclear Era," Two Minutes T ill M idnight, 39. were never backed by American force; as a result "the bloodcurdling threats" no longer scared our enemies since they could be sure that "most of them w ill be brushed away in a moment by the explanation that we never 70 really meant it." The greatest example of the failure of Dulles’ foreign policy, according to Davis, was the Far East. In that area

Dulles had a lofty and noble objective: peace; but his diplomacy forced the United States into a position from which the only apparent exit was retreat, with a serious blow to national prestige; or an unnecessary and unpopular war with China and Bussia. There had been, Davis stated, "no such diplomatic achievement since the diplomacy of Napoleon the Third in I87 O; which was the last year of Napoleon the Third.

Davis maintained that the solution to the Cold War was not as simple as Dulles seemed to believe; there was more involved than bluff and th reats of in sta n t r e ta lia tio n . The American people would have to learn to live in the period of crisis and tension of the Cold War. He contended that peaceful co-existence was "the best way to secure the independence of the United States and the freedom of its citizens."

But it also entailed continual vigilance against possible Bussian advances, and a continual heavy defense expenditure to make sure that the Bussians did not get ahead of us. Such a policy, necessitating patience and determination would have to be maintained until Bussia

7°Davis, "Or If Not—?," Two Minutes T ill Midnight, 205.

^^Davis, ABC, February 20, 1955- 178

repudiated its policy of aggression, or "so long as Communists really 72 ■believe in Communism."

Davis was concerned about the effect Congress - in particular,

Congressional committees - would have upon the conduct of foreign affairs.

He recognized that Congress should be kept informed about American foreign

policy, and that its unquestioned constitutional authority should be

exercised. But there was a twilight zone where authority could not be

precisely defined; in that zone, the executive must act in foreign

a ffa ir s , because i t was the one organ that could act fa st and "sometimes

must act fast lest those who intend us no good should act first. A

more serious threat to American foreign policy resulted from the actions

of Congressional committees. Some committees made public diplomatic

reports written years ago, and then examined their authors "on the

apparent assumption that they were and are traitors." Such actions

threatened to stop "the flow of confidential information that is the raw 7b material of foreign policy."1 Davis believed that Congressional

committees, such as the McCarthy committee in the Senate, by undermining

the State Department's conduct of affairs, actually aided the enemies of

the United States.

72Davis, "Or If Not--?," Two Minutes T ill Midnight, 200-201.

^ D avis, "Congress and Foreign P olicy," March 10, 1951* Elmer Davis Papers.

^ D avis, "What Are Wars For? or How Not To Do I t Next Time," Two Minutes T ill Midnight. 153. 179 The classic example of extra“constitutional pressure on foreign affairs was the Truman-MacArthur controversy. Davis supported President

Truman because the President, as Commander-In-Chief of the United States, had the constitutional authority to make the policy decision. Most

Congressional Republicans favored MacArthur’s policy of an extension of the Korean War, and attempted by the use of "noise, uproar, propaganda, ta lk of impeachment" to force Truman to change his mind. But, Davis asserted, such activity was unnecessary, because Congress could have fu l­ filled its constitutional prerogative by declaring war on Communist

China; then President Truman would have had to change American policy.

Congress refused to take the Constitutional solution, because of the un­ spoken corollary that they would have had to accept the resp o n sib ility fo r what happened. Thus, Congress continued the extra-con stitu tion al pressure against President Truman because, although favoring a change in policy, "they lacked the guts to do it themselves."^

Davis continued to support the United Nations; even though it had not been completely successful, it represented "a hope that must not be

r y / f allowed to vanish from the world." The UN was a platform from which every country could air its grievances, where east and west could go on talk in g, however fr u itle s s ly . The collapse of the UN would be a political and psychological disaster because people might believe that

7^Ibid. . 135-136.

^ D a v is, ABC, October 24, 1951* 180 war was nearer, and "that very belief might bring it nearer."77 Davis did not, however, advocate a world-state, unless it would be the kind of government that could guarantee the freedom add independence of its members. If the wrong kind of world government were set up, if the one- world were "totalitarian or obscurantist, we might better have no world at a ll." 78

Davis was more pessimistic about the possibility of avoiding a nuclear war than he had been previously. Part of his pessimism resulted from the successful explosion of a thermonuclear bomb by the Bussians in

August 1955 > this event was "possibly the most important event in the history of the United States—certainly the most important since the end

of the Civil War."7-^ He realized that the danger of nuclear war became much more likely now that two powers rather than one had a hydrogen bomb. As a result he felt that things would continue to get worse,

until, more likely than not, a nuclear war would begin. "It w ill be

excellent if we can keep it from happening, but I doubt that we can." 80

Although he feared that a nuclear war would occur, he

emphasized that it was extremely important to win such a war. He differed with scientists and others who stated that everyone would lose

77Ib id ., May 24, 1950.

78Davls, "Ho World, If Necessary," Two Minutes T ill Midnight, 77.

7%)avis, "Year One, Thermonuclear Era," Two Minutes T ill Midnight, 15.

^Davis, "Or If Hot—?," Two Minutes T ill Midnight, 204-205. 181 in a nuclear -war; he held that "the losers would he sunk a good deal deeper than the winners, and if we lost it we might he sunk to stay ,,8l sunk. He maintained that such a war would not necessarily destroy civilization because civilization was more than buildings or the real estate; it was what was inside the people who live and work in those buildings—"the way they feel, the way they think, their capacity for thinking." It was not what "your ancestors have built, but your capacity 82 to build—intellectually and spiritually as well as architecturally." ' Thus civilization would be in more danger from Bussian domination than from a nuclear war. For if Communists, who believe they have discovered the complete and final truth, or at least the infallible method to achieve such truth, should win the next war, there would be no civili­ zation. "The next war," Davis stated, "calamitous as it would be to everybody, would not destroy civilization unless we lost i t ." 85J

Davis emphasized then, that if war occurred, "we had damn well 84 better take care not to lose it." He stated that no matter how much it would cost to win a war, or to prevent one if possible, "it costs 85 everything you have got to lose one to a totalitarian enemy."

^^Davis, "Year One," Two Minutes T ill Midnight, 55*

82I b i d ., 51-52.

8?I b i d . , 58 -59.

^Ibid., 18.

85Davis, ABC, January 12, 1951. 182

Whatever happens, we must not surrender; for If war comes it w ill he for

"all we have and are; if we value that, we can't give up, in any circum­ stances. If we can't go on being Americans, we might as well not be at all. Davis declared that those people who would survive the initial nuclear attack would, in all truth, "nobly save, or meanly lose, the last best hope of earth.

Davis' views about the future can be seen clearly in an article he wrote for the Saturday Review, entitled "Another View from i 960." In this article Davis discussed the reasons for and the consequences of the nuclear war of the 1950's. Stalin started the war in 1950 when he realized that many Congressmen believed that the United States "must not win a war unless Chian-Kai-shek and General Franco could win it, too."

If he had waited until 1952 he could have sat back and watched Americans

"tearing one another to pieces and saving their enemies the trouble."

Stalin also hoped that the United States would turn world sentiment against them by indiscriminate bombing of populations, or that in fear of such reaction we would not use the bomb at all; but instead we used it for "semi-tactical purposes" which caused them considerable military and political embarrassment. Russia retaliated by bombing our cities which eventually culminated in full-scale nuclear war. The war did considerable damage and killed many people; but the destruction was not

^^Davis, "Year One," Two Minutes T ill Midnight, 50.

^Davis, "Or If Hot—?," Two Minutes T ill Midnight. 206. 185 as severe as had "been expected by scientists who had taken everything 88 into account ’’except chance and inefficiency." Such a catastrophe

could be avoided, Davis declared, if people would realize that "it is not

enough to control bombs, atomic or hydrogen, or biological warfare. What

you have to control is the inclination to use them.

During the years after 1950 Davis commented on various aspects

of the American scene; his views on many problems were similar to the views he had expressed in other periods of his life. He was, however,

much more pessimistic than he had been before; this pessimism did not

concern specific problems as it had previously, but rather it concerned

the future of the world and of civilization as he knew it. But even in

the face of such possibly disastrous consequences, Davis maintained a

feeling of hope and optimism: hope that the war could be prevented, and

a belief that a war would not necessarily mean an end to civilization

unless the United States was defeated. Although Davis‘ views about these

problems in the years after 1950 were significant they were not as

important to him as was the problem of McCarthyism, the internal threat

to the freedom of the United States. His views on McCarthyism can be

considered the basis of his entire political and social thought; and it

was this defense of freedom during the McCarthy years which made the

American people most fam iliar with the ideas of Elmer Davis.

88Davis, "Another View from I960," The Saturday Review of Literature," XXXIII (September 2, 1950), 8~9.

8^Davis, "Ho World, If Necessary," Two Minutes T ill Midnight, 71. CHAPTER V III

DON'T LET HUM SCARE YOU:

DAVIS’ DEFENSE OF FREEDOM, 1950-1958

Night after night on ABC radio, in magazine articles, and in hooks, particularly in But We Were Born Free, Elmer Davis emphasized the dangers of McCarthyism to the American way of l i f e . Although it is difficult to determine the influence of any one individual in molding public opinion, there is no doubt that Davis’ influence on the

American scene was greater during the McCarthy hysteria of the early

1950’s than it had been in any other period of his life. His defense of freedom and attempt to in still courage and common sense in the midst of hysteria made him the most vigorous and consistent opponent of

McCarthyism in national communications media.

Although Davis discussed various aspects of American l i f e during this period, his views were dominated by the internal dangers to freedom and liberty. He emphasized that the post-war period was a time of danger and would probably continue to be for a long time to come.

Such dangers were inescapable, but if the American people were fit to be the descendants of the men who had founded the republic, they should

"keep on working and trying to build up situations of strength as the best hope of preserving the peace. " Such a situation required clear

%lmer Davis, Radio Broadcast on the American Broadcasting Company Network, February 8, 1950. Elmer Davis Papers. Library of Congress. lfil* 185 and cool thinking. Davis found it rather depressing, however, that in the hundred and sixty-second year of the republic, so many of its citizens "think that our problems can be solved by mere hysteria and 2 hate." Thus the early 1950'a were "bitter days—full of envy, hatred, malice, and all uncharitableness," with public men saying more than they mean and saying it violently, and when some men "seem totally indifferent to the distinction between truth and falsehood.

Davis warned that the habit of suspecting and watching everybody would be disastrous for the United States; for it would be a quick and

easy way "to undermine the national morale and make it pretty hard to win k a war." He hoped that we would not get involved in a war, because not

even Divine Providence would help us win "if we no longer have the guts <5 to win it for ourselves."^ Many people seemed- to feel that the enemy was not the government of the Soviet Union but the government of the

United States; these people were afraid, "and afraid of the wrong things; by fighting the wrong enemy "they weaken our hopes of defeating the real

enemy by whatever means may be required."

Some people believed that the only way to restore confidence was by immediate confessions, "apparently whether there is anything to admit

2I b i d ., A p ril 17, 1951.

5I b id ., January 16, 1951.

^Ibld., March 6, 1950.

^Ibid., January 31, 195^*

^Davis, "Land of the Scared," Address at Yale University, Hew Haven, Connecticut, May 20, 1955* Elmer Davis Papers. 186 or not.”' These people refused to "believe anything except a confession of guilt; if Communists praised your hooks, you are a Communist, hut if they denounced them, they are trying to cover you up; if you were against the Marshall Plan you are a Communist, hut if you were for it you are s t i l l a Communist whom th e p arty has exempted so th a t he can cover up.

Davis asserted that "you can't win" in defending yourself against people who believed that "if you are accused, you must he guilty."

Although Davis deplored the feeling of fear and hysteria, he was not surprised that it had occurred. He maintained that the feeling re­ sulted from a conviction that after we have won a war there w ill never again he any serious foreign trouble; when foreign trouble continued, particularly when it came from a power that had recently been an ally, as it did from France in the 1790's and as it does from Russia today, the people are upset; and the easiest way to indicate dissatisfaction was

"to turn on their neighbors, who are both weaker and nearer than the real source of the trouble. Many people deplored such a situation; but, Davis declared, "it is going to take more than a little high-level deploring to stop it ."-1-0

The people who lei the attack against the government and against

^Davis, ABC, May 5, 1950*

8 Ibid., April 26, 1950.

^Ibld., May 8 , 1955*

1QIbid., February 7> 195^ 187 freedom and liberty based their attack upon the danger of the alleged

Communist conspiracy within the United States. Davis did not deny the ex isten ce of an in te rn a l Communist th r e a t, but he f e l t th a t i t s influence was being exaggerated by politicians who were looking for a means of attaining political power. He noted that there had been a headlong decline in the membership of the Communist party; whether they had gone underground or merely quit, the "hard core is shrinking fast."’1"1'

Yet the Communist party, though tiny and dwindling, served a useful purpose, for it provided some men "with a cover for attacks on liberalism and progressive reforms," attacks which would have less hope of success if they had to be made honestly, out in the open. Also, it enabled some politicians to find the road to publicity and power. "It has been,” Davis declared, "quite a meal ticket for some of our states­ men whose natural gifts might not otherwise have carried them very fa r."

Many organizations made a lucrative business out of fighting Communism,

"or rather what they chose to call Communism." "I sometimes suspect,"

Davis stated, "that the people engaged in that business are more ..12 numerous than the Communists.

Davis had emphasized previously that Communism, as exemplified

in Bussian aggression, was dangerous to the interests of the United

States. But those involved in the anti~Communist movement were not afraid of Communism in Bussia, where it was powerful and dangerous;

■^Davis, "Through the Perilous Night," But We Were Bom Free (Indianapolis: Bobbs-Merrill Co., Inc., 195*0 > 81."

12lb id ., 8 2 . 188 th ey seemed "to he more a fra id of th e 23,000 Communista among us th an of the hundred of millions overseas."*^ Davis contended that many of the crusaders, "especially the unofficial vigilantes—really "believe that

Communism is a purely American phenomenon." But they had a strange conception of Communism: it was merely opinions different from their own.

Davis maintained that these men, in the name of anticommunism, "would suppress the freedoms guaranteed by the Constitution which are one of the principal differences between a free and a totalitarian society.

The most important of these professional anti-Communist leaders, a man whose influence was so great that the entire period is synonymous with his name, was Joseph McCarthy, United States Senator from Wisconsin.

Davis regretted that he had to tali: about McCarthy. ”1 regret that he exists; but he does exist, and not to mention him would be as if people in a malarial country refused to mention the anopheles mosquito." Davis thought that McCarthy was neither a Fascist nor a Communist, even though a Communist assigned to undermine th e American government would probably have done what he had done; "he is a McCarthyist, and a very successful^one," who had cashed in heavily on fear. -*-5 McCarthy had the advantage of working against the state of mind prevalent in the country,

■^Davis, "Common Sense and Courage," The New Republic, CXXXiy (January 9, 1956), 7*

^D avis, "Through the Perilous Night," But We Were Born Free. 26-29.

^ I b id ., 24-26. "which he did not create though he has greatly strengthend it—a general suspicion and fear.

Davis commented extensively on the tactics used "by McCarthy and his Senate Committee on Government Operations. McCarthy was "a master of the obscene innuendo, and he has more effrontery in direct attack than any of his fellow saviors of the nation. " The McCarthy Committee had little appetite for publication; McCarthy used the front-page headlines of newspapers for his charges rather than setting it down in print where readers could critically examine them. ^ In addition McCarthy had a remarkable agility for evasive action; "as fast as one of his phonies is exposed he hits the front-page with another which won't be exposed till 1ft tomorrow; and how many people read the second "day story?" Davis also emphasized th a t McCarthy's exposures had uncovered no big Communist f is h ; th is was because he was not a f te r Communist f is h , bu t only a f te r people whose opinions disagreed with his; thus McCarthy did not attain his professed end of exposing the evils and methods of Communism, but he did attain what Davis felt was his real end, "of persuading many people that all liberals are Communists."^

Davis, after observing McCarthy's tactics, noted sim ilarities between McCarthy and H itler. This observation became clearer to Davis after listening to McCarthy's speech on October 27 , 1952 in which he

l6Davis , ABC, February 7 > 195^ •

^Davis, "Through the fejrilous Night," But We Were Bom Free, 92-93- 190 attacked the "Communist" influences around Adlai Stevenson. Davis asserted that these alleged Communists, Wilson Wyatt, Arthur Schlesinger,

J r., James Wechsler, and Archibold MacLeish, "were fighting Communism when McCarthy was heating Boh LaFollette out of the Senatorial nomination ..20 w ith th e aid of Communist v o te s." As Davis liste n ed to McCarthy's speech, "the past rose before me like a dream—a past that I thought had heen buried seven years before." It reminded him of "another rabble- rousing broadcaster in another republic" whose talent for publicity was used by rich men and conservatives against a middle-of-the-road govern­ ment. Thus when Davis heard the applause for McCarthy after the speech,

"an echo of memory seemed to give it an undertone—'Sieg Heil.' Sieg

Heil.' Sieg Heil.""21

McCarthy also resembled H itler in that he used lying, deceit anfl distortions. Davis stated that McCarthy used the familiar tactic of the big lie, "repeated again and again in the confidence that eventually

pp people w ill believe it." Both Hitler and McCarthy had gone a long way by "effrontery, brutality, and a force of personality." Eventually

H itler was stopped by people who not only could but would fight him.

Davis believed that McCarthy could also be stopped by such people; but

19I b id ., b9.

20 Davis, "Care and Feeding of Intellectuals," The Saturday Beview of L iterature» XXXVI (February 28, 1955 )> 15.

21 Davis, "Through the Perilous Night," But We Were Born Free. 95.

22D avis, ABC, May 15, 1950. 191

"there are plenty of people who would fight McCarthy; hut they can't; there are plenty of people who could, hut they won't. ”2^

One of the men who could have stopped McCarthy hut would not was

President Dwight D. Eisenhower. Eisenhower had "restrained" McCarthy several times, hut, asserted Davis, he had not "popped" him. The times when he restrained McCarthy "were special instances, with little relation ,2k to the general problem of M cCarthyism .Davis, after noting that

Eisenhower's brother Arthur had called McCarthy the most dangerous menace to America, concluded that "some Eisenhowers at least have strong 25 opinions about McCarthy." And if people seem to run away from McCarthy, they are "not encouraged by the fact that the President has set the example. 1,2 ^

The extent to which Eisenhower condoned and the Republican

National Committee supported McCarthy's activities can be seen in his

Lincoln Day speech in February 195^* In this speech entitled "Twenty

Years of Treason, " which was paid for by the Republican National

Committee, McCarthy asserted that every Democratic administration since

1933 had been engaged in treasonous activities, "You would think,"

Davis remarked, "that would wreck even a country as big as this." Was

2^Ibid., March 21, 195^.

2lkDavis, "Through the Perilous Night," But We Were Bom Free. 96.

25Davis, ABC, July 2k, 1953*

26Davis to Simeon H. F. Goldstein, March 1, 195^» Elmer Davis Papers. 192 it treason to get the country out of the great depression?, Davis aslced.

Was it treason to lick H itler and the Japs? Did McCarthy think we should have "been on the other side in that war? The Republicans seemed to think that the only way to win the fall elections was to claim that "all

Democrats are traitors. "2^ Bart of the problem concerned the definition of treason. If treason were defined as disagreement with McCarthy, and if his own word were substituted for the two witnesses now required the difficulties would be overcome, and McCarthy "would fiifi life less .28 troublesome.

Davis declared that such tactics and accusations had caused a great deal of damage to the United States. McCarthy had done more than any other man to "encourage the spread of suspicion and distrust and hatred among ourselves which is the best formula for losing a war. Il29

He had organized the cesspools of vindictiveness and hatred; he had created an outlet for frustrated men, who, in the mood of a man afraid to stand up to his wife, "relieves his feelings by kicking the cat.

He had received the support of respectable men on the theory that he might turn them up a winning issue; the consequences of that could be

2?Davis, ABC, February J, 195^.

28 Ibid.. March 21, 195^.

2% avis, "Are We Worth Saving? And If So, Why?," But We Were Bora Free. 227.

^°Davis, "Through the Perilous Night, But We Were Bora Free, 56. 193 more disastrous for the Republicans than for the Democrats , and "more disastrous for the nation than for either. "5^ Davis asserted that the

"spirit of McCarthyism could lick us . . . by persuading every man that he must keep looking over his shoulder, to make sure that the man beside him doesn't stab him in the back.

McCarthy's attacks also damaged the entire foreign policy of the

United States. McCarthy used false and slanderous accusations against the men responsible for American diplomacy in a time of great inter­ national crisis. By such attacks he undermined the confidence of the allies in the foreign policy of the United States, shook and disturbed the free-world coalition, and thereby aided "the interests of Russian imperialism. Davis declared that the damage done by McCarthy to the

State Department and to the army "has helped the enemy far more than anybody he has attacked has helped th e enemy. As an example, Mc­

Carthy and another reactionary Senator, William Jenner of Indiana, attacked Michael Pearson, the Foreign Minister of Canada, and advocated cutting off all aid to England in hopes of getting American prisoners out of China. Such actions, by stirring up suspicion and ill-w ill

31 Davis, ABC, June 1, 1950*

^2Davis, "Are We Worth Saving?," 228.

^ D a v is , ABC, November 3 , 1950* xL. Davis, "McCarthy: His Enemies and His Friends," Atlantic Monthly, CXCIII (May 195*0, 65. l$k among the three leading nations of the Atlantic alliance would, only weaken and isolate the United States. Thus, Davis contended that Jenner and McCarthy "seem to have helped out the objective of the Soviet government, in the name of anti-Communism, from no other motive except their own publicity and their own power.

Davis maintained that McCarthy's most detrimental effect upon the foreign policy of the United States were his attacks upon the

Secretary of State, Dean Acheson. Davis refused to speculate on

McCarthy's motives for the attack against Acheson, because he was "neither a psychoanalyst nor an inspector of sewers." He found the attack both illogical and irresponsible, because Acheson had done more "to check the advance of Bussian aggression than any other public official we have ever had" and because he was at that time, "clearly the most successful 56 Secretary of State since Seward. The House of Bepresentatives hoped to curtail Acheson by cutting off his salary; such an action, Davis stated, "as an act of statesmanship, is about in the class with chalking dirty words on the sidewalk. Davis recognized the seriousness of this crusade against Acheson, because if it succeeded our European allies might attempt to make terms with Bussia; they might conclude that "the

35 Davis, "Through the Perilous Bight," But We Were Bora Free. 73. 36 Davis, "The Crusade Against Acheson," Harper's Magazine. CCII (March 1951 )» 23"2^.

57 D avis, ABC, Ju ly 25, 1951. 195 United States was ready to run out on them; ready to turn either to 58 appeasement or to isolationism.

The attacks made on individuals and on the State Department were conducted not only "by McCarthy, hut also by Congressional investigating committees, one of the most important agencies in the anti-freedom crusade. Davis questioned the constitutionality of Congressional investi­ gations; "it is a serious question whether Congress has a right to investigate in fields where the Constitution forbids it to legislate."

The committees had invaded fields where Congress could do nothing, and acted as "package television shows for the entertainment of the public;" they had little concern for accuracy and less for the rights of the defendant; the chief product of their activity was "publicity—especially for the chairman of the committee—the publicity that leads to power.

Davis hoped that the Supreme Court would decide whether Congress could do, "by the pressure and intimidation of an investigation, what the JiO Constitution explicitly forbids it to do by passing a law.

Although the McCarthy Committee on Governmental Operations was the most well-known investigating committee, it was not the only one involved in the investigating business. Senator Jenner was chairman of

58Ibid., March 22, 1950.

^Davis, "Through the Perilous Night," But We Were Bom Free. 43-^ 5.

^°Davis, ABC, March 10, 1955. the Senate Internal Security Committee, which investigated various sub­ versive activities; Davis, remembering Jenner*s vicious attack on General

Marshall, was unable to recognize his "qualifications for sitting in judgment on the patriotism of his fellow citizens. Harold Velde, chairman of the House Committee on Un-American A ctivities, conducted an investigation of Communism in the universities. Davis doubted that

Velde was qualified to conduct such an investigation; but "if he is trying to prove that there are defects in our educational system he has unintentionally furnished one bit of proof. He is a university graduate h2 himself.” Davis contended that these men, along with Jenner's predecessor, Senator Patrick A. McCarran, were unqualified to investi­ gate the beliefs and activities of the American people.

Davis observed that the investigating committees had several common characteristics. One characteristic was the doctrine of per­ petual jeopardy; "in Congressional jurisprudence, nobody is ever acquitted. If a committee is weak enough to find a man not guilty, you have to get another committee to try him again. Constitutional guarantee against double jeopardy did not apply, because the Committees did not deprive a man of life or limb, only "his good name and his

1*1 Ibid. . February 10, 1955*

^2Ibid., February 19, 1953* 197 opportunity to earn a living. a second characteristic of Congress­ ional committees was their reliance on the testimony of the "touring company of ex-Communists."^5 These "wandering minstrels," as Davis called them, were ex-Communists who had become reactionaries, and "their te sti­ ly mony is worth more than that of people who never were Consaunists."

A third characteristic was what Davis called the "pertinent excerpt," which was a refined and modernized version of the sentence taken out of context. The committees would take a line from a letter written several years before, and read out of context, or they would use a line that the nan being questioned had never written or had never seen before. Such tactics made it difficult for the witness as well as for the reporter covering the investigation. How does the reporter know, asked Davis, whether "in context it might have a quite different meaning?" There was a danger that the reporter would give a false report, not of what was actually said, but of the three-dimensional truth of which what they heard was only one dimension.^ The reporter should go behind the false objectivity that took everything at face

1<‘i|D avis, "Hews and the Whole Truth," But We Were Bom Free, 16^. ft L.5 Davis, "Through the Perilous Hight," But We Were Bora F ree, 91.

^^Davis, ABC, April 23, 1953 > and "Through the Perilous Hight," But We Were Bom F ree, 66. P rofessor Louis Budenz o f Foxdham U niversity and Elizabeth Bentley were two of the most well-known of the "wandering minstrels."

^D avis, "Hews and the Whole Truth," But We Were Born Free, 165-168. value and "lets the public be imposed upon by the charlatan with the most brazen front." The reporter must attempt, Davis asserted, to in­ terpret the news so as to give the reader or listener "not only the truth lift and nothing but the truth, but the whole truth." °

The Congressional committees often used loaded words, which also tended to mislead the public. When a man was "named" before an in­ vestigating committee as a Communist it meant "nothing at a ll without

corroboration." But, Davis declared, "if that man keeps appearing in the news the tag w ill stick to him; he has been named. Another

loaded word used by the Committees was "Identifield"; Davis stated that

"identified" in Congressional idiom meant only that "somebody has said they are Communists. The Committees hoped that i f they used the names over and over again the American people would b elieve that those who had been accused must Is guilty.

Another aspect of Congressional investigations concerned the use of the Fifth Amendment of the Constitution. Davis realized that every

individual had a right to use the Amendment; and he recognized that no one could be convicted if he refused to testify against himself by

using the Amendment; but it was difficult "to prevent spectators from

48 Ibid., 175. See chapter 1, p. 22-3.

^9I b id ., 170 .

5®Davis, "Through the Perilous Night," But We Were Bom Free. 8 5 . 199 51 drawing . . . the inevitably logical conclusion. Although many people who used the Amendment might have had something to hide, it was dis­ tressin g to Davis "to see penalties imposed on people who claim th eir rights under the Constitution. How long before people who claim liberty of religion, of speech, of press under the First Amendment are similarly 52 penalized.” Davis concluded, then, that although everyone had, a right to refuse to testify, a citizen could not afford to be sensitive; to fall back on the Fifth Amendment, whether innocent or guilty, was ”bad public rela tio n s.

The feeling of distrust, which was expressed against individuals in the government, was also expressed against government i t s e l f . This feeling led to a number of attempts to amend the Constitution, which

Davis referred to as an attempt to "improve on the founding fa th e r s.”

Although Davis realized that the Constitution was not perfect, he maintained th at most of the proposed amendments would weaken rather than strengthen the government of the United States. The leaders of the movement seemed to f e e l that th eir enemy was not the government of the

Soviet Union or Communist China but the government of the United

^^Davis to Arthur C. Cole, American Civil Liberties Union, March 1, 1955* Elmer Davis Papers.

^D avis, ABC, October 1^, 1953.

^ D a v is, "Through the Peri lotas H ight,” But We Were Bora Free» 6^-65. 200

S t a t e s . 5^ F e a r 0f a strong government was nothing new; it had been eloquently expressed In the debates over the adoption of the Constitution.

Those who feared a strong government in 1788, however, were "the poor and the champions of the poor; now it is the champions of the rich'1 who, if the government were weakened, would become more powerful. Davis declared that their increase in power would be at too high a price if it meant "weakening the government of the United States in a time when it may have to act firmly, and to act fast.

The first attempt was to limit the President of the United States to two terms in o ffic e ; th is attem pt was su ccessful when th e 22nd

Amendment was ratified. Davis opposed the Amendment for several reasons; first, he felt there were times when a nation "absolutely needs a particular man in a particular situation; . . . there are crises . . . when it would be foolish to substitute inexperience for experience."

Second, Davis opposed it because it implied a distrust of the people to choose "the man most capable of serving the public in some great emergency." Third, he opposed it because it was "one long hymn of hate against Roosevelt; men who couldn't lick him when he was living relieved their feelings by dancing on his grave." This emotional release would have been less dangerous to the country, Davis stated, if they would have merely repealed his enactments, smashed his statues, and chiseled

54 Davis, "Improving on the founding Fathers," But We Were Bora Free, 127.

■ ^Ib id ., lk^-lk-6, and "Land of th e Scared," Address a t Yale University, May 20, 1953* Elmer Davis Papers. 201

Ms name off of buildings, as the Roman Senate used to do after the death of a hated Emperor . ^ After the Amendment was ratified, Roosevelt’s

enemies could relax; "they have made sure that he can never run against

them again, even i f he rose from the grave.

Another amendment proposed during this period was the Bricker

amendment which would have lim ited the treaty-making power. Davis was

not surprised to see Congress distrusting the President, or the Supreme

Court; but he had never expected to see "the Senate distrusting the

Senate" which was the meaning of the Bricker amendment. Senator John W.

Bricker of Ohio, the sponsor of the amendment, apparently felt that two-

thirds of the Senate might be corrupted and ratify an unconstitutional

treaty; Davis stated that because Bricker knew his fellow Senators

better, "it is not for me to question his estimate of his colleagues."

The Amendment would have required any treaty, after being ratified by the Senate, to be passed as an act of legislation; in addition the

"which" clause stating that a treaty could only become effective through

legislation "which would be valid in the absence of a treaty," meant

that many treaties would require the approval of all forty-eight states

to become e ffe c tiv e . ^

This Amendment, then, would "hobble if not cripple the treaty-

making power." Davis contended that very few foreign governments would

^ D avis, "Improving on the Founding Fathers," But We Were Bom Free, 128-130.

^D avis, ABC, February 27, 1951. be eager to jump the triple hurdle—fcwo-thirds of the Senate, legislation before both Houses of Congress, and legislation by a ll of the states; this

"mould cause a certain reluctance on the part of foreign powers to enter into treaties with us,” and thus have a disastrous effect upon the foreign relations of the United States. But the supporters of the Amendment were dominated by fear, ostensibly fear of the United Nations but actually

"fear of the government of the United States." These people, Davis asserted, did not trust the President, the Supreme Court, or the House of Representatives very much; the only officials whom "these scared bunnies" really trusted were the members of the state legislatures, "the very men whom the Pounding Fathers distrusted above a ll others."^

Other proposals were vying for the honor of being the Twenty-

Third Amendment. One amendment would have forbade income and estate taxes from being raised above 25 per cent; this proposal, Davis stated, was a program "for transferring as much as possible of the tax burden from the rich to the poor." Another amendment would have prohibited the government from engaging in any kind of business whatever; those advocating this amendment probably "have their eyes on atomic energy and public power developments." An amendment proposed by Senator

McCarran would have prohibited a President from taking over private property except in a manner prescribed by act of Congress; because Con­ gress would be unable to act quickly enough in an emergency, the

^ D a v is, "Improving on the Founding Fathers," But We Were Bom Free , 150-l40. 203

McCarran amendment would have meant that "no unforeseen contingency sh a ll ever occur.

Although Davis believed that these amendments would he harmful to the United States, and would weaken the government, he maintained that some Constitutional amendments were necessary to clear up some loopholes.

He contended that one of the most necessary amendments should concern presidential disability; any such amendment should define "what it is, who decides when it begins, and who decides when it has ended." A situation might occur, when a disabled President might feel that he was ready to reassume his office, while the filling-in Yice-President and

Congress might feel that he was not; in such a situation, the government could become paralyzed. He thus felt that an amendment to deal with this problem should be proposed.^

He also proposed that an amendment be set up to correct some of the loopholes in the procedure for the election of a President. Davis opposed the abolition of the Electoral College because "in a continental nation with a federal government and a federal tra d itio n , i t seems desirable to give consideration to geography as well as to population.1

He proposed to leave the electoral vote by states Just as it was, and 63 to merely abolish "the flesh-and-blood electors." He also hoped that

60Ibid,, lte-lM*.

6l I b id ., 123.

^Davis', Embree Lecture, Translvania College, Lexington, Kentucky. Elmer Davis Papers.

^ B a v is, "Improving on the Pounding Fathers," But We Were Bom Free* 117. an amendment would "be proposed to deal with the possible death of a

President-elect between the November election and his inauguration in

January. He stated that until Congress formally counted the electoral votes on January 6, there would be neither a President-elect nor a Yice-

President elect. If the man elected by the popular vote died during this period, there would be no one who could constitutionally receive his electoral votes; the Vice-President-elect could not, because he could only succeed a President-elect who had died, and officially there would be no President-elect. The election would then go to the House of

Representatives who would choose the President from among those candi­ dates having electoral votes; since probably only the defeated Presi­ dential candidate would have any electoral votes, he would automatically be elected President. Davis realized that the situation might never arise, but he felt that the Constitution should mate provisions for a ll eventualities in order to avoid a paralysis of the American govera- ment. 64

Davis declared that one other constitutional amendment should be set up, particularly in the atomic age; there should be constitu­ tional provisions "to take care of the unlikely but not impossible contingency that a bomb might wipe out a majority of Congress or a ll persons in the statutory line of Presidential succession." Davis emphasized, however, that even if the Constitution had some loopholes, it was still a pretty good Constitution; it was not every efficient, 205 •** 65 Taut it had "always proved efficient enough to do what it had to do*!1' ^

Although it needed some repairs, we should guard against some proposed repairs, such as the Bricker amendment, that would make it worse not better. He concluded by saying that the United States had operated under the Constitution "with a pretty fair degree of success; there seems no occasion to talk of changing it for another.

Davis believed that the greatest danger facing the nation was

"the widespread movement against the freedom of the mind—against d if­ ference of opinion, and the right to find out all about a subject and, then decide what you think. The movement had become a general attack on schools, colleges, libraries, teachers, textbooks, on all people who think and write, on freedom of inquiry and dissent--"in short, on the freedom of the mind, the basic freedom from which a ll other freedoms 68 spring." This crusade against freedom was, Davis declared, "the 69 greatest internal danger in the United States today."

Davis discussed the different elements in the antirfreedom crusade. Although there were few real Fascists involved, there were

65 Ibid., 123-124.

66Davls, Embree Lecture.

^ D a v is, ABC, December 26, 1952.

^Davis, "Through the Perilous Hight," But We Were Bom Free. 18-19.

^Davis, ABC, January 6, 1953• 206 large numbers of people who could "be called Fascistoid, people who adhered to the principle that "our side has a right to put your side down and keep you down, regardless." The leaders could he considered an elite who had "a good deal of influence, a great deal of money, and even some ideas, twisted and erroneous as those ideas may he." But, Davis declared, this elite was supported hy people with little money, no influence, no ideas, hut plenty of emotion; people whose surface emotion was hatred, hut underlying that, "besides an appalling ignorance, is fear. They are afraid to think because it is hard work, afraid to let others think because it might turn out that what they themselves have always thought, is wrong. These people tried to suppress, in the name of Americanism, the right to think what you like and say what you think. People like that, Davis asserted, "are not merely un-American; 71 they are anti-American."

The people involved in the crusade possessed what Davis called

"totalitarian minds"; the totalitarian mind believed that "their dogmas, whatever they maybe, are complete, perfect, infallible." The first essential was "to deceive one's self; and that, to the totali­ ta r ia n mind (whether Communist o r etf-Communist) o ffe rs l i t t l e d i f - 72 iculty." The totalitarian thinker believed that there was a final

7°Davis, "Through the Perilous Bight," 19“21.

f^Davis, "Are We Worth Saving? And If So, Why?," But We Were Born Free. 226.

72D avls, "H istory in D oublethink," But We Were Bom F ree. 179-181. 207 truth and that he must have it; to them '‘experimental thinking is only a 75 groping in the dark.” They also "believed that there was no middle ground; everything was either black or white, and there was no gray. If such a view required a man to misread history, that was a small matter

"so long as it enables him to retain confidence in his own intellectual 74 integrity.” Davis* views of the totalitarian thinker, of the art of doublethink, were quite similar to the ideas of Eric Hoffer in his book, The True Believer.

Davis emphasized that the "experimental thinking," which the totalitarian thinkers and crusaders against freedom so strongly opposed, was necessary for the survival of the American way of life. He followed

Jefferson's idea that "error of opinion may be tolerated so long as 75 truth is free to combat it.*' He declared that in the 18th Century the

Founding Fathers had attempted to guarantee to the American people the freedom of religion, of speech, of the press—"all corollaries of the basic right to think what you like." With a great price "our ancestors obtained their freedom; but," Davis emphasized, "we were born free."

Freedom could be retained, however, "only by the eternal vigilance which has always been its price. "7^

75 Ibid., 190.

^ Ib id ., 182.

75 Davis, ABC, January 26, 1955*

f^Davis, "Through the Perilous Hight," But We Were Bora Free, 15-16. 208

Internal v ig ila n c e , th en , was necessary, "because "what makes

Western civilization worth saving is the freedom of the mind.Davis felt that the loss of freedom would "be even worse than a destructive nuclear war; the most appalling picture of a possible future was not a picture of the world destroyed by radioactive dust but was George Orwell's

1984, "the nost horrible book that has ever been published. ”^8 A

Communist victory would put an end to the freedom of the mind, and thus to civilization itself; Davis asserted, then, that "the next war would not mean the end of civilization unless we lost it. If the American people did not have the courage to defend the freedoms achieved for us by the Founding Fathers, "it won't matter much whether we are saved or n o t." 80

Several incidents concerning the attacks against freedom interested Davis during these years. He felt that it was unfortunate that one hundred “Sixty one years after the B ill of Eights had been enacted an organization, the Fund for the Eepublic, had to be set up to work for "the elimination of all restrictions on freedom of thought, inquiry, and expression in this country, the very things the B ill of

^D avis, "Are We Worth Saving? And If So Why?," But We Were Bom Free. 228.

7&Davis, Scholar in a Time of Peril," The American Scholar. XX (Winter 1950-1951)# 12.

79Davis, ABC, October 24, 1951.

8°Davis, "Are We Worth Saving? And If So Why?," But We Were Bom Free* 228. ftl Eights is supposed to guarantee. " When Congressman Clifford P. Case of Hew Jersey resigned to become president of the organization, Davis found it painful to reflect that a good Congressman should conclude that the B ill of Eights can he more effectively defended outside of Congress 82 than in it. Davis also discussed the question of freedom of speech on

The Ohio State University campus. He stated that the inability of

Professor Harold Eugg to speak on campus meant that to the administration

"loyalty must mean conservatism." It seemed to Davis that the corollary of the decision was that the conservatives who controlled the university

"are afraid that their doctrines wouldn't stand up if the students had a chance to hear anything on the other side."8-’ Davis maintained that a monument to the five freedoms guaranteed by the Constitution which was to be put up neat to Arlington Cemetery, should be put in the cemetery,

Oh "along with the monuments to a ll the other distinguished dead."

Davis also attacked the idea that civil liberities should not protect those who wanted to destroy them. Such an argument was used by the crusaders against freedom as a reason for blocking freedom of speech. Davis contended, however, that there was nothing in the B ill of Eights that said, or even implied that "any citizen or group of citizens is excepted from its guarantees." If the Constitution were

8^Davis, ABC, December 15, 1952.

82Ibid., fey 26, 1955.

8^Ibid. , October 30, 1951.

^ Ib id . 5 July 28, 1953- 210

to apply to everybody but Communists, i t might be applied in the future to everybody but "Sooialists, Jehovah’s Witnesses, or Episcopalians, or Democrats." To prevent the majority from doing anything that may suit

its whim was precisely the reason "why we have a Constitution." He

emphasized that the freedoms should apply to everybody; "subversion

should be kept down, but by other means."8-*

Another attack upon the freedom of the mind concerned academic freedom. Davis defined academic freedom as "the right of any man pro­ fessionally qualified by study and experience to teach anything that honestly seems to him to be true, without reprisal. 1,88 This conception

of academic freedom was not widely held in the Uhited States, particularly by that "most irresponsible of a ll agencies of government, the Con­

gressional investigating committee." The committees were attacking not

Communists, but lib era ls and progressives, people who were not

reactionaries in politics or economics, and ''who prefer to think for

themselves .rather than le t others do th eir thinking fo r them. "8^

Davis doubted that Congress had any right to investigate edu­

cation; schools and state universities were under the jurisdiction of

state authorities, and Congress had no authority whatever over private

institutions. The First Amendment stated that Congress shall make no

05 Davis, "Through the Perilous Hight," But We Were Bom Free. 78-79.

86Ibid., 57.

87 Davis, "Academic Freedom: What and Why?," Elmer Davis Papers. 211 law abridging the freedom of speech; it did not say "except in schools 88 and colleges." The committees, operating on the principle that Congress must see that "colleges and universities implant only what Congress regards as sound ideas," greatly hindered academic freedom on the college and university c a m p u se s. rp^e committees, by ruining individuals who held certain ideas, discouraged other people "from holding, or at least admitting that they hold, those ideas, or anything that a Congressional committee or a veterans* post my think resembles them.Such a tta c k s lessened academic freedom and thus were attacks upon the freedom of the mind.

The anti-freedom crusaders also became involved in literary and artistic criticism. Davis stated that the primary criterion of literary criticism used by the professional super-patriots was "never mind what is in it—all you need to know is who did it; if he is suspect, it doesn't .,91 matter what is in it. This attitude led to a book-burning hysteria during the McCarthy era in which books written by "suspect" authors were removed from libraries and destroyed. There were also attacks against the churches, particularly against the liberal clergy. Congress defined

^Davls, "Through the Perilous Wight," But We Were Bora Free, 51.

®^Davis, "Giving Wolves an Appetite." Nation. CUXXVT (January 2k, 1955), 78 .

^°Davis, "Academic Freedom," Elmer Davis Papers.

^^Davis, "Through the Perilous Wight," But We Were Bom Free. k-2. 212

a Communist clergyman as anyone who "believed th a t "C h ristia n ity im plies

some endeavor to improve conditions here "below instead of a single-minded 92 concentration on preparation for the next world.” These serious

attacks on the freedom of the mind were undertaken by a committee or an

organization that regarded itself as a "competent critic of books (even

if it has not read them), motion pictures (even if it has not seen them),

and ideas (even if it does not understand them).

Davis emphasized that the United States had been conceived in

liberty and dedicated to the principle that honest men may honestly

disagree, that if all men say what they think, the majority w ill be able

to distinguish truth from error, that the sounder ideas will eventually win out. For almost four years the nation had been engaged in ”a cold

civil war—it is nothing less—testing whether any nation so conceived

and so dedicated can long endure. ” Davis believed that the nation would

endure, "but only if we stand up for it;" we shall have no heirs and

beneficiaries, and shall deserve to have none, "if we lack the courage .,9k to preserve the heritage they won for us."

How could the nation endure, asked Davis, and by what methods

should freedom be defended? Davis replied in the statement most often

associated with his name;: "The first and great commandment is, Don’t let

92 I b id ., 7^-76.

95 Davis, "Academic Freedom," Elmer Davis Papers.

^D avis, "Through the Perilous Hight," But We Were Bom Free» 114-115. 2X3 them, scare you.” For those who attacked freedom were scared themselves; they were afraid that their ideas would not stand critical evaluation, that the principles on which the republic was founded were wrong. Davis granted that there was a risk in freedom, that in trying to think right there was a danger of thinking wrong. But, "there is no hazard at a ll, no uncertainty, in letting somebody else tell you what to think; that is sheer damnation. " "

Davis emphasized the need for common sense and courage in facing the crisis in the United States. The American people "ought to keep our heads, keep our nerves steady, refuse to be upset by trivial provo­ cations but be alert to really serious dangers. . . . In short, we 96 ought to think.” There was, Davis asserted, a quinine that could neutralize McCarthy’s venom: ”it is called courage.”97 It was badly needed at a time ”when a lo t of people seem to think i t is the duty of a true American to be afraid; if not of his own shadow, at least of 98 everybody e ls e ’e shadow.” He was certain that there was enough common sense and courage in the American people "to maintain the government

. . . which lias worked pretty well for the last hundred and sixty-five years.”^9

" i b i d .♦ 113.

96Ibid., 35-36.

97Ib id ., 2k.

S ^ a v is, ABC, June 15, 1953.

99Davis, "Common Sense and Courage," New Republic, CXXXIV (January 9, 1956), T« 21k

Although he maintained that a ll Americans should stand up for freedom, he particularly emphasized that men who had already achieved success should take the lead. He asserted that it took courage for a young man with a family to stand up to it; as a result it put "all the more obligation on those of us who have nothing left to lose." At any age it was better to be a dead lion than a living dog, though even better to be a living and victorious lion; but, he declared, "it is easier to run the risk of being killed (or fired) in action if before long you are going to be dead anyway. This freedom seems to me the chief consolation of old age. "'1-00

Davis criticized those people who, because they feared they might be wrong, refused to take a stand on the question of freedom. These people refused to trust their own judgment; they kept "their mouth shut, on the chance, however small, that they might be wrong." To trust your judgment entailed a hazard that even after the most careful evaluation of the evidence you might be mistaken. But, Davis asserted, so does any other exercise of human judgment; "and a man who is afraid on that account to exercise his judgment and report his conclusions does not amount to much. "‘L0'L

As a Biblical text for his message Davis used I Samuel 4:18-19, the mutual exhortations of the Philistines before the battle of

l°^Davis, "Grandeurs and Miseries of Old Age," But We Were Bom Free. 203.

■^^Davis, "Lattimore and the Liberals: Must We Keep Our Mouth Shut?." The Hew Leader.XXXIII (May 27, 1950), 18. 2 1 5 Ebenezer. The P h ilistin es were afraid to fight "because their opponents, the Israelites, had brought the ark of God with them to battle. But when they realized that nobody was going to deliver them, they said to one another: "Be strong, and q.uit yourselves like men; and fight." And, said Davis, they did fight, and delivered themselves. "So may we; but only if we quit ourselves like men. This republic was not established by cowards; and cowards w ill not preserve it." 102

CONCLUSION

Davis’ defense of freedom during the McCarthy era of the early

195°1 s was the best-known phase of his entire political and social thought. During this phase as w ell as throughout his l if e , Davis* thought was characterized by several distinctive traits. One of the most im­ portant aspects of his thought was its great variety; he discussed literature, religion, economics, politics, foreign affairs, as well as freedom; and although in certain periods he emphasized one particular topic, he always maintained his wide range of interests in all aspects of the American sem e. His greatest forte concerned p o litics and the defense of freedom while probably the area about which he knew the least was economics. When he discussed economic problems he often over­ simplified the problems involved. There were definite underlying assumptions which determined his views on these various topics: he believed that the United States was a democratic republic, a

102 D avis, "Are We Worth Saving? And If So Why?," But We Were Bom Free. 229. 2X6 representative government elected "by the people; that such a government should he a government of a ll the people and should protect the rights and privileges of all, not solely the rich, well-born, or conservative; that the basis for such a democratic government was freedom, the most important being the freedom of the mind. These underlying assumptions, then, determined Davis* views on the various topics which he discussed.

But the ideas which he expressed were not as important as the unique and original way in which he expressed fam iliar ideas. He always stated frankly his views about the problems of the day; he was, as

Joseph C. Harsch stat'4, no "pussyfooter or sailtrimmer. He said whatever he thought on every topic which he discussed. He also used humor and sarcasm to indicate the ridiculous aspects of American life; his humor was usually derived from the irony of events which he dis­ cussed. But he never used sarcasm for it s own sake; he attacked undesirable or ridiculous aspects of American life with the hope that the American people would improve upon them. His method could be considered constructive criticism aimed at improvement rather than at destruction. Another characteristic of Davis* expression was his continual use of classical analogies. Throughout his life he had been interested in the lif e and history of Greece and Home, and he often used these cla ssica l analogies to illu stra te his view of contemporary events.

105 •'Joseph C. Harsch, "Upon the Return of Elmer Davis on the A ir .” The Hew Republic. CXXX (January 18, 195^), 12. 2X7 Davis* thought was also characterized "by realism. He had ideals which he hoped would he fulfilled* hut he realized that any improvement or change would have to he hased upon the existing situation; even though he opposed the actual conditions he never ignored the fact that such situations existed. He had a hasic soundness in his approach and a fundamental clarity in his thinking. Horman Cousins stated that Davis' mind was "less cluttered with trivia than any man of our acquaintance.

Davis continually criticized "fuzzy-headed" id ea lists and in tellectu als who had completely lost touch with reality.

Davis' thought was also generally optimistic; although he often discussed the worst aspects of situations he never despaired; no matter how had the situation might he, he always cautioned, ’’don't he dismayed.”

He usually remained calm and rational, no natter how difficult the situation. The Hew York Times stated that Davis did not raise goose- pimples on his listen ers, and ”he always sounded lik e a rational adult. He maintained this attitude in observing the intolerance of the 1920's, the depression of the 1930's, the war of the 19^0*s, and the attacks on freedom in the 1950's; he emphasized that as long as the mind was free, the American people could overcome their problems.

In general Davis' views can be considered liberal or progressive rather than conservative. Although his father had been a conservative

^Horman Cousins, "Elmer Davis, Director of the Office of War Information.” The Saturday Review of Literature. XX? (June 20, 19^2), 8.

"Elmer Davis," The Hew York Times. May 19, 1958, 2k. 218 Republican and he had grown up in a conservative Indiana town, he questioned th is orthodoxy early in his lif e . He supported the lib eral program of an increased governmental role in the economy; and he supported the Hew Deal, although he believed that if often did not go far enough in enacting reforms. In addition he vehemently opposed the business- dominated governments of the 1920's and the 1950’s. And he took, of course, the liberal view in his defense of freedom during the McCarthy era. Davis' views are interesting, not only for his ideas and particularly for the unique way in which he expressed them, but also because they indicate what an intelligent, well-informed, articulate observer thought of the world in which he lived. Elmer Davis’ greatest legacy to the American people, however, was the idea that he emphasized throughout his l i f e —the freedom of every citizen to express his opinions. Every citizen in the United States, even those who disagreed totally with his viewpoint toward events and affairs, gained freedom to express their views from the very fact that Davis exercised his freedom to the utmost. As long as all Americans are able to express their views as fearlessly and freely as Elmer Davis expressed his, the American way of life w ill not perish. For, as Davis said, "our national anthem describes this as the land of the free and the home of the brave; i t w ill remain the one only so long as i t remains the other. If it ever becomes the land of the scared, this republic as we have known it goes down the drain.

10^Davis, "Land of the Scared," Address at Yale University,.May 20, 1955* Elmer Davis Papers. BIBLIOGRAPHY

MANUSCRIPT SOURCES

Elmer Davis Papers, Library of Congress. Washington, D. C.

Elmer Davis Papers, The New York Public Library New York, New York.

United States Office of War Information Papers, National Archives. Washington, D. C.

GOVERNMENT PUBLICATIONS United States Office of War Infoimation. "The Four Freedoms," Congressional Digest. XXI (October 19^2), Qhk-ek%

BOOKS - ELMER DAVIS

Davis, Elmer and Guy Holt. Bare Living; Indianapolis: Bobbs-Merrill Co., Inc., 1953*

Davis, Elmer. But We Were Bora Free. Indianapolis: Bobbs-Merrill Co., Inc., 1951*. Davis, Robert Lloyd (ed.). By Elmer Davis. Indianapolis : Bobbs-Merrill Co., Inc., 196^1

Davis, Elmer. Friends of Mr. Sweeney. New York: Robert M. McBride and Co., 1925.

______. Giant K iller. New York: John Day Co., 1928. . History of the New York Times» 1851-1921. New York: New York Times Co., 1921.

. 1*11 Slow You the Town. New York: Robert M. McBride and Co., 1925.

219 ______. Keys of the City. New York; Robert M. McBride and Co., 1925» ______. Love Among the Ruins. Indianapolis; Bobbs- Merrill Co., Inc., 1955* ______. Morals for Modems. Indianapolis; Bobbs- Merrill Co., Inc., 1930*

______. Not To Mention the War. Indianapolis: Bobbs- Merrill Co., Inc., 19to.

______. Show Window. New York; John Day Co., 1927. . Strange Woman. New York: Robert M. McBride and Co., 1927.

______. Times Have Changed. New York: Robert M. McBride and Co., 1923. ■______. Two Minutes T ill Midnight. Indianapolis: Bobbs-Merrill Co., In c., 1955.

Davis, Elmer and Byron Price, liter Information and Censorship. Washington, D. C .: American Council on Public Affairs, 19^3. Davis, Elmer. White Pants W illie. Indianapolis: Bobbs- M errill Co., D ie., 1952.

ATypTrrr.-ES—-m m DAYIS

"Another Yiew from i 960, ” The Saturday Review of Literature. XXXIII (September 2 , 1950),'8-9 . "Apocalyptic L iterature,” The Saturday Review of Literature. X (April 21, 193^57 6to-$3.

"Aims Conference Like a Track Meet," The New York Times. January 8, 1922, 17.

"Austria's Fate Hinges on West Front Battle," The New York Times. May 26, 1918, 3Y, 4.

"Belgium and Holland—Isolated?," Harper's Magazine. CIXXIV (May 1937), 627 - 636..

"A Blow at the Foundational Roosevelt and his Air Mail Policy, Harper's Magazine. CLXVTII (May 193to, 653~6to. /

221

"Borah1 a Remarks Please Mr. Gloom," The New York Times* June 9, 1956, 19. "Brakes on Inflation," The Saturday Review of Literature. XVI (September ^, 1957), 5"^ . ^Broadcasting the Outbreak of War," Harper*a Maaazine. CIXXIX (October 1959), 579“588. "Can Business Manage Itself? ," Harper*a Magazine. CIXII (March 1951), 585-596. ■ . "Capital's Elation Like Armistice Bay," The Hew York Times. February 6, 1922, 2.

"Central Europe in C risis," The Hew York Times. November 27, 1921, V II, 5,7- "The Character of American Influence on Eastern Europe in the Near Future," The Ammla of the American Academy of Political and Social Science. CU (July 1922;, 321-324$. "Chicago Reticence Puzzles Mr. Gloom," The New York Times. June 14, 1952, 16. "The Collapse of P o litics," Harper's Magazine. CIXV (September 1952), 585-595.- "Common Sense and Courage," The New Republic. GXXXIV (January 9, 1956), 7* "Concerning Fatherlands," Forum» LIII (March 1915), 504~5l4. "Conference Sages Talk in O racles," The New York Times» December 9, 1921, 5. "Confidence in Whom?," Forum. I2XXIX (January 1955), 51"55» "Constant Reader," Harper's Magazine, CCI (October 195°), 161- 172 . ------"Contradiction at Chicago," The Saturday Review of Literature. XXII (August 5 , 19^0), 6 -9 . "The Crusade Against Acheson," Harper's Magazine. CCII (March 1951), 25-29. "The Cupboard Was Bare," The Saturday Review of Literature. V (May 25, 1929), 1048-1050. "Czechoslovakia: Bridge or Barricade?," Harper’s Magazine? CLHV (June 1931), 84-93. "Delegates Return From Crime Waves," The Nero York Times. January 3> 1922, 2.

"Democratic Dilemma," The Saturday Review of Literature* X3X (February 1§, 1939)» 6-9.

"Dr. Manning*s Pious Anachronism," The Hew Republica XU (January 28, 1925), 256-257. "The Dutiful aid Damned. A Plea for the Middle Generation," Harper*s Magazine* CLIX (August 1929), 294-300. "End of Conference S till Not in Sight," The New York Times. January 27, 1922, 2.

"England Turns a Corner," Harper*a Magazine. CLXXIV (April 1957), 492-501. "3&agland*s Weak Spot," Harper’s Magazine. CLXXI7 (March 1937), 385-392.

"Everybody’s Gloomy but Godfrey Gloom," The New York Times. June 9, 192k, 4.

"Farewell to the Slapstick," The Saturday Review of Literature. I (December 20, 1925)", 396-397. "Founding Fathers and Straddling Sons," Harper’s Magazine. CIXI (September 1930), 385-395.

"G. G. Gloom Holds Victory F irst Issue," The New York Times„ July 2, 1924, 5. "G. G. Gloom Unable to R esist Whoops," The New York Times. June 27, 1936, 9. "G. Gloom Admits March for Bryan," The New York Times. June 28, 1924, 6.

"Giving Wolves an Appetite," Natloni CIXXVI (January 24, 1953), 78. "Gloom Sees Smith Victim of Kindness," The New York Times. June 26, 1924, 5.

"The God o f H itler and Spinoza," Harper’s Magazine^ CI2XXI (July 1940), 186-195. "God Without R eligion /' Harper8a Magazine. CLX (March 1930), 3 9 7 -^ 9 .

"Godfrey G. Gloom Fears Dull Session," The Hew York Times. June 13, 1932, 10. "Godfrey G. Gloom Watches Congress," The Hew York Times. March 31, 1932, 2.

"Good Old 1913>" Forum. H O T (May 1931), 266-271.

'Happy Days W ill Gome Again," Harper9s Magazine. CLKIII (October 1931), 513“322.

'Harry S. Truman and the Yerdict of History." The Reporter. YIII (February 3, 1953), 17 -2 2 . , 'History Without Ideas," The Saturday Review of Literature. XXXII (August 6, 19V9), 65-^6 . 'Hoover and Hubris," The Hew.Republic. IXXIII (November 16, 1932), 7“9. 'Hoover the Medicine Man," Forum. IXXXI7 (October 1930), 195-199. 'Houston Too Good, Gloom Declares," The Hew York Times. July k, 1924, 5 .

•How the Wets Won," Current History. XXXIX. (December 1933), 276-281 *.

" If Hoover F ails," Harper9s Magazine. CLYIII (March 1929), 1*0 9-^ 18 . "If Roosevelt F ails," Harper9a Magazine. 01X71 (March 1933), 385-396. . .

"Implications of the Russell Case. I. For Education," The Saturday Review of Literature. XXI (April, 13, 19^0), 8. "Interregnum," The Saturday Review of Literature. YII (May 16, 1931), 830-831. "Is Ragland Worth Fighting For?," The Hew Republic. XC7III (February 15, 1939) ^ 35-37. "Japan Gains Most, Russia the Loser, in the Conference," The New York Times. February 6, 1922, 1-2. "Journey to England, 1941, Footnotes for a Future Gibbon" Harper's Magazine* CLXXXIII (August 1941), 255-236. "Landon Ox Wagon Frets Mr. Gloom," The Hew York Times. June 10, 1936, 18 . "Last Jeffersonian Expires with Convention; Godfrey Gloom a Victim of Modem Devices," The Hew York Times. June 28, 1956, 1,28.

"Lattimore and the Liberals: Must We Keep Our Mouths Shut?," The Hew Leader. XXXHI (May 27 , 1950), 16, 18.

"Let My People Go," The Hew Republic. LXXXIX (November 25, 1936), 107 - 108 . "Lobbyists Found Mostly Nuisances," The New York Times. May 14, 1932, 9. "The ‘Logic* of History," Harper‘s Magazine. CLXIX (August 1934), 335-3^6.

"Maters of Martyrs," Harper's Magazine. CIXVII (August 1933), 341-351. ■ "McCarthy: His Enemies and His Friends," The Atlantic Monthly. CXCIII (May 1954), 63

'Melchizedek for President," Hyper's Magazine. CIXXIII (June 1936), 105-10~

"Menace Wanted," Harper's Magazine. CESV (July 1932), 247-250.

"Miniature Golf to the Rescue," Harper's Magazine. CLXII (December 1930), 4-l4.

"Mortician," American Mercury. XI (May 1927), 31“40.

"Mr. Gloom Caustic about Convention,” The New York Times. June 13, 1924, 6. "Mr. Gloom Doubtful on Congress Saying," The New York Times. April 3 , 1932, 2. "Mr. Gloom Finds Newberry is Shy," The New York Times. January 11, 1922, 4. "Mr. Gloom Finds Senate is Learning," The New York Times, January 13, 1922, 3 . "Mr. Gloom Has Idea to Reward VfeLlsh," The New York Times , July 6, 192k, If. "Mr. Gloom on Hand as a Jeffersonian," The New York Times » June 1 , 1956, 3k. "Mr. Gloom Regrets Lost Party Fervor," The New York Times, June 12, 192lf, 5 . "Mr. Gloom Regrets Shifting on Borah," The New York Times, June 8, 1936, 2.

"Mr, Gloom Stirred by Dickinson’s Art," The New York Times, June 15, 1932, 11. "Mr. Gloom Yearns to "be Postmaster," The New York Times. June 11, 1936, 20.

"Newberry1 s Speech Moves Mr. Gloom," The New York Times, January 10, 1922, 2.

"No Time for Comedy?," The Saturday Review of Literature XXIII (November 9, 19W),~BI

"The Non-Belligerent," The Saturday Review of Literature. XXIV (July. 5, 19M), 8 -9. "Notes on the Failure of a Mission," The Saturday Review of Literature. XXIX (August.31, 19^6), 6-8. "Objections to World Government," The New Republic. GXXII (February 27 , 1950), 10-13.

"On the American Way of Life," Harper’s Magazine. CLXXIV (February 1937)/ 329"332. •'On the G entility of G entiles," Harper’s Magazine. CLXVTI (July 1933)/ lVr-155. f,0n Not Being Dead, as Reported," Harper’s Magazine. CLXXVIII (April 1939), 536-5^2,

"One Mystery Left at the Conference," The New York Times, January 20, 1922, If.

''Our Legacy from the World War," Current History. XXXV (February 1932), 6*f3“w 9.

''Our Russian Terms Adopted at Cannes," The New York Times, January 9, 1922, 2. 226

"Paradigm in Paraguay," The Hew Republic, LXXIV (February 2 2 , 1935) , 58^ 1. "Party Dissension Pains Mr. Gloom," The Hew York Times, June 29, 1924, 12.

"P olitics—A Two-Banded Game. R eflections on Campaigns, Ancient and Modern," Harper’s Magazine. CXLIX (October 1924), 555“561.

"Post-Convention Reflections," Harper’s Magazine. CLXXIII (September 1956), 412-420. "President Dewey’s Strange Bedfellows," Harper’s Magazine, CXCTII (September 1948), 25*35. "The Presidents We Deserve," Harper’s Magazine. CXLIX (Hovember 1924), 755 -7 6 O.

"’Prompt' Opening Annoys Mr. Gloom," The Hew York Timon. June 26, 1956, 15.

"The Red Peril," The Saturday Review of Literature. YIII (April 16, 1952), 661-662. Si "Repressible Issues," Harper's Magazine. CLXIII (July 1931), 189 - 200 . .

"Required Reading." The Saturday Review of Literature. XX (October 357 19397,' 3 -5 7 ------* ------"Reversal Cited in Hughes Policy," The Hew York Times. January 22, 1922, 20. "The Road from Munich," Harper’s Magazine, CLXXVIII (December 1938), 40-48. "Roosevelt: The Rich Man’s A libi," Harper's Magazine, CLXXIX (October 1939), 460-468. "The Scholar in a Time of P eril," The American Scholar, XX (Winter 1950-1951), 9raST“ "Sees Republicans nominating McAdoo," The Hew York Times, June 22, 1924, 5*

"Senate Lions Roar, Hungry for Treaty," The Hew York Times, December 14, 1921, 2.

"Shaw and the Inner Light," The Saturday Review of Literature, XII (July 6 , 193577” 5“5 . ’’Sign 'em and Send 'em,” Collier*a. LXXIX (May 7, 1927), 22,

"Statesmen Show Great Endurance,” The Hew York Times. January 18 , 1922, **.

"Status Quo Ante Conference V ictor," The Few York TimesT February 1, 1922, 2,

"Suaviter in Modo," The Saturday Review of Literature. Ill (August l£7~1926), 35-3V."

"The Teacher's Job in the War," The Saturday Review of Literature, XXV (September 12, 1942), 3-4 .

"To Polybius for Perspective," The Saturday Beview of Literature, XXII (May 25, 19^0), 10.

"Too Stately Mansions," The New Republic, IXXI (June 1, 1932), 67-69-

"Treaties to Run a New Gauntlet," The New York Times, February 11, 1922, 5*

"The War and America," Harper's Magazine, CLXXX (April 19*4-0), 4*4-9-462.

"We Lose the Next War," Harper's Magazine, CLXXVT (March 1938), 337-^5^

"What Are Vfers For?," Harper's Magazine, CXCVIII (January 19*4-9) , 23-30. "What Can We Do About It? The Candid Misgivings of a Wet," Harper's Magazine, CLVTlI (December 1928), 1-9..

"When Peace Without Victory Was a Failure," The New York Times, November 11, 1917* V II, 10,1**.

"While the Senate Sits Around," The New York Times, February 3* 192*4-, IV, 6 .

"The White Horse of Sam Parks," Harper's Magazine, CLIII (July 1926), 217-228.

"Wisconsin Is D ifferent," Harper's Magazine. CLXV (October 1932) , 613-62**.

"Woodrow Wilson," The New York Times, February 27 , 1921, II, 2

"Woodrow W ilson's Administration," The New York Times, February 27, 1921, III, 1-11. 228

BOOK REVIEWS—ELMER DAVIS

"After the Happy Biding," The Saturday Review of Literature. XVIII (May 1,. 1938), 3*^ . Review of Public Papers and Addresses of Franklin D. Roosevelt, 3 y o l. Compiled hy Samuel 1. Rosenman.

"America and the War," The Saturday Review of Literature. XXII (May 18, 1940), 5 * Review of Charles A. Beard, A Foreign Policy for America, and Raymond L. Buell, Isolated America.

"America*s Coarse Babbitry," The Hew York Times. February 20, 1927, III, 1 . Review of C. E. M. Joad, The Babbitt Warren.

"At the Washington Conference," The New York Times, May 14, 1922, I I I , 11. Review of Mark S u lliv an , The Great Adventure at Washington: The Story of the Conference.

"Ca Ira," The Saturday Review of Literature, V (September 15, 1928), 119-120. Review of Simeon Strunsky, King Akhnaton. A Chronicle of Ancient Egypt.

"Care and Feeding of Intellectuals," The Saturday Review of Literature, XXXVI (February 28, 1953), 12“13* Review of Peter Viereck, Shame and Glory of the Intellectuals, and America and the Intellectuals: A Symposium.

"Chance and Personality in History: Men and Women Who Gave a Push to Falling Rome," The New York Times, April 1, 1923, III, 1. Review of J. B. Bury, History of the Later Roman Empire: From the Death of Theodorlus I to the Death of Justinian I,

'Competdium of Information for Well-Behaved Women," The New York Times, March 30s 1924, III, 10. Review of Delia Thompson L ates, The Gracious H ostess.

"A Counterblast to Defeatism," The Saturday Review of Literature, V (March 2, 1929)# 725« Review of C. E. Montague, Action, and Other Stories.

"Exposing Business," The Saturday Review of Literature, I (November 22, 3.92V), 299“300. Review of W. E. Woodward, L o tte r y ..

"For the Opposition," The Saturday Review of Literature, XVIII (October 8, 1938)7 20. Review of George D. Aiken, Speaking from Vermont. 229 "God and the Modernist a," The Saturday Review of Literature. XIII (December 21, 1935)# 10. Review of Henry P. Van Dusen, God in Theae Times.

"Heads I Win, Tails You Lose," The Saturday Review of Literature» XV (February 15, 1937), 5* Review of Walter M illis, Viewed Without Alarm: Europe Today.

"Henry Ford’s Adventure with the ’Lunatic Fringe’," The Hew York Times. October h, 1925, III, 5* Review of Louis P. Lochner, Henry Ford "America 8 a Don Quixote.

"A Herald of the Hew Barbarism," The Saturday Review of Literature. X (March 10, 193^), 533• Review of Reinhold Niebuhr, Reflections on the End of an Era.

"How It All Began," The Saturday Review of Literature. I ll (May l i , 1927 ), &20. Review of Lee Wilson Dodd, The Golden Complex; A Defense of Inferiority.

"How to Save the World," The Saturday Review of Literature. XI (September 22, 193*0, I23» Review of Bertrand Russell. Freedom Versus Organization. I814-191U.

"Hungary and the Democratic Mferth," The Hew York Times. November 18, 1925, H I , 7* Review of C. J . C. Street, Hungary and Democracy.

"The Indiana Faith," The Saturday Review of Literature. XXIII (April I S ^ lJ T T r . Review of Heath Bowman, H oosier.

"It Happened in Rome," The Saturday Review o f L itera tu re. XIII (February 29, 1936), 5”^ . Review of Phyllis Bentley, Freedom. Farewell.

"Loose Leaf Wisdom for Seekers of Truth," The Saturday Review o f L ite ra tu re . XVTII (A pril 16, 1938), 17. Review o f H. G. W ells, World B rain.

"Memoirs of the Ex “Kaiser," The New York Times. October 7 , 1922, 17 . Review of the l^th Installment.

"Modern-Day Bravos," The Saturday Review of Literature. V (June 15, I 929), 1110. Review of W. R. Burnett, L ittle Ceasar.

"Mr. Lewis Attacks the Clergy," The Hew York Times. March 15, 1927, III, 1 . Review of Sinclair Lewis, Elmer Gantry. 250

"No Comfort for Optimists," The Saturday Review of Literature, XX (May 20, 1959) , 5"^v Review o£ Charles and Mary Beard, America in Mid Passage. v.5»1

"Not Such Defenders," The Saturday Review of Literature, VT (August 10, 1929), 33"55* Review of Alfred Zimmem, Solon and Croesus.

"The NRA—Or Else," The Saturday Review of Literature. X (September 25, 1933), 125“126. Review of Mauritz A. Hallgren, Seeds of Revolt.

"Ode to Liberty," The Saturday Review of Literature, XII (October 19, 1935), 5* Review of Sinclair Lewis, It Can’t Happen Here.

"Organization or Subjugation?," The Saturday Review of L ite ra tu re , XXIV (November 29, 194l ) , 9 • Review o f Harry Seherman, The Last Beat Hone o f E arth.

"People Follow a Parade," The Saturday Review of Literature, XVIII (July 25, 1938)V 5 ." Review of Brinckerhoff Jackson, S aints in Summertime.

"People of Sorts," The Saturday Review of Literature, V (A p ril 20, 1929) , 905* Review of Josephine Bentham, O utsiders.

"The Perennial Problem of Rome’s Decline," The New York Times, August 29, 1926, III, 8 . Review of M. Rostovtzeff, The Social and Economic History of the Roman Empire.

"A Politician Behind His Time," The Saturday Review of Literature, XII (August 10, 1935), 15“l6. Review of G. C. R ichards, C icero.

"Population Problems and Conditions of Living," The New York Times, January 15, 1924, III, 5 . Review of Harold Wright, Population.

"Prophets at the Crossroads," The Saturday Review of Literature, XVI (October 2, 1937), 3‘^ • Review of Hilaire Belloc, Crisis of Civilization, and Gerald Heard, The Third Morality.

"Reduction to the Absurd," The Saturday Review of Literature, XVTII (September 17, 1938), 18“19^ Review of Henry Morton Robinson, Private Yirtue—Public Good. 251

"Religion and Morals," The Saturday Review of Literature» VI (July 12, 1950T, H 87 -II 8 8 . Review of C. E. M. Joad, The Present and Future of Religion.

”'Roosevelt and Hopkins’. The Years of Desperation and Victory,” The Saturday Review of Literature. XXXI (October 2 3 , 19^8), 7 -9 . Review of Robert E. Sherwood, Roosevelt and Hopkins: An Intimate H isto ry .

"A Scriptural Hovel,” The Saturday Review of Literature. VII (March 7 > 1951) > Gbfr-Oik. Review of Ivan Nazhivin, According to Thomas.

"Subversion: The Old Story," The Saturday Review of Literature, XXXIII "(April 1, 1950), 8 -9 • Review of Nathaniel Weyl, The Story of Disloyalty and Betrayal in American History.

"True Believers," The Saturday Review of Literature* XVTII (July 16, 1958), 14-15. Review of Granville Hicks, I Like America» and Robert Forsythe, Reading from Left to Right.

"War on the State of the Mini," The Saturday Review of Literature, XJs.il (June 29, 19^0), 5 • Review of Edmond Taylor, Strategy of Terror.

"What Can a Man Believe?," The Saturday Review of Literature, 17 (September 3, 1927)# Sl-82. Review of Bruce Barton, What Can a Man Believe?

"What of the Future?," The Saturday Review of Literature. Ill (November 13, 192<£)",' 290-291. Review of John C arter, Man Is War.

"Will Appeasement Work for Us?," The Saturday Review of Literature, xjsJ .I 1 (December 28, I 9W ), 7 . Review of Frank Munk, Economics of Force.

LETTERS TO THE EDITOR—ELMER DAVIS

"All on His Own," The New York Times» October 1, 1952, 1^.

"All Our Fault, Anyway," The New York Times. October 25, 1955, 2 0.

"American Citizenship," The New York Times» May 30 > 1929* 18. "An Interesting Choice," The New York Times, June 13, 1935, 22. "Avoiding a Dictatorship," The Hew York Tines. December 11, 1934, 22.

"The ’Biased Wet Press,’," The New York Times, February 6, 1930, 2 2 .

"Capitalism’s O pportunity,The New York Times. April 28, 1933, 16. "Capitalizing Discontent," The New York Times. August 27, 1932, 14.

"The Case of the Great Pompey," The New York Times, February 1, 1936, 14.

"Citizen Recommended for Presidency," The New York Times, November 12, 1952, 26.

"Comment, Favorable and Adverse, on 'The Way of L ife’," The New York Times, June 19, 1938, IV, 9* "The Depression Cycle," The New York Times, March 17, 1930, 22.

"Europeans’ Idea of Americans," The Saturday Review of Literature, XV (December 5, 1936), 13.

"Faulty Technique Charged," The New York Times, March 15, 1937, 22. "Four Years of Nonmlcy," The New York Times, March 12, 1924, 18.

"Gandhi Plan Has Points," The New York Times, April 25, 1930, 24.

"Hardships of Taxpayers," The New York Times, January 8, 1936, 1 8 .

"The Homicidal Impulse," The New York Times, July 21, 1924, 10.

"If Prohibition Is Beaten," The New York Times, March 28, 1926, V III, 14.

"In Support of Mr. Hull," The New York Times, June 26, 1933, 14.

"Italy's Overpopulation," The New York Times, August 6, 1925, 18. 235

"The Late Thomas Masaryk," The Hew York Times. September 23, 1937, 26.

"Living By Waste," The Hew York Times, August 6, 1929, 24.

"Looking to a Grim Future," The Hew York Times. May 21, 1936, 22.

"A Man for the Ages," The New York Times. September k, 1924, 18.

"Marketing Government Bonds," The New York Timesa. June 3, 1933, 12. "Merit Seen in Scheme," The New York Times. February 10, 1937, 21.

"A More Workable Plan," The flew York Times. January 8, 1929, 30.

"Motoring and Rum-Running," The New York Times. August 31, 1924, VIII, 10.

"Mr. Darrow on Wealth," The New York Times. September 1, 1924, 12.

"M r. Hoover’s Iss u e ," The Hew York TimeB. June 22, 1931, 18.

"Heed Is S till With Us," The Hew York Times, June 1, 1935, Ik. "negative Benefits," The Hew York Times. December 22, 1930, 18 .

"Hew Disarmament Parley," The Hew York Times. May 6, 1924, 2 0 .

"Hews from the Pulpits," The Hew York Times. December 7, 1924, I I , 6$

"Hot a Swing to th e L e ft," The Hero York Times. Hovember 29, 1933, 18.

"One Way Out," The Hew York Times, October 27 , 1931, 24.

"Opinion and Ownership," The Saturday Review of Literature. XII (September 28, 1935), 9-

"Opportunities Going to Waste," The Hew York Times. April 9, 1932, 14. "Opposing Theories to Facts," The Hew York Times, June 24, 1937, 2k.

"Peaceful Settlement ,“ The New York Times. November 12, 1931, 2k. "Plays and Books," The New York Times, April 11, 1927, 20.

"Praying for Defeat," The New York Times, August 10, 1954, 16.

"Present Discontents," The New York Times, June 25, 1950 , 2k.

"Puzzled by Politics," The New York Times, October 22, 1956, 24.

"Recalling a Precedent," The New York Times, March 22, 1958, 20.

"Revitalizing Literature," The Saturday Review of Literature. X (March 5 , 1 9 3k) , 520.

"Royalties and Radio," The New York Times, October 11, 1924, 14.

"Russia and China," The New York Times , March 51, 1924, 16.

"A Senator Too M oderate," The New York Times. November 18, 1925, 22.

"Should the People Declare War?," The New York Times. December 19, 1937, IV, 8.

"S till Seeking a Leader," The New York Times. January 15, 1932, 22.

"The Submarine Problem," The New York Times. October 11, 1929, 30.

"Suggested Nicaraguan Policy," The New York Times. March 16, 1927, 24.

"These Necessary Depressions," The New York Times. December 10, 1935, 24.

"Trouble Ahead for Gasoline," The New York Times. August 11, 1926, 20.

"We Seem Bound to Lose," The New York Times. August 28, 1930, 1 8 .

SECONDARY WORKS

Bell, Lisle. "Books," The New York Herald Tribune, October 22, 1933, 16. 235 Benet, Stephen Vincent. "The Two-Elged Blade," The Saturday Review of Literature. V (October 27, 1928), 293.

"Books in B rie f," R ation. CXXV (November 2 , 1927), 484.

Brickell, Herschel. "Books," The New York Herald Tribune. October 7 j 1928, 6.

Brock, H. I. "Uncle Sam Hires a Reporter," The New York Times. June 21, 1942, VII, 8.

Broun, Heywood. "Friends of Mr. Sweeney," The New York World. November 11, 1925, 13.

. "Times Have Changed," The New York World. May 27 , 1923, 6e.

Burlingame, Roger. Don’t Let Them Scare You: The Life and Times of Elmer Davis. Philadelphia and New York: J . B. L ip p in co tt Co., 1961.

B urr, H. C. "Keys of th e C ity ," In te rn a tio n a l Book Review. June 1925, 486.

Chamberlain, John. "The Short Story Muddles On," The New Republic. LXV (January 7, 1931), 225“226^

Cousins, Norman. "Elmer Davis, Director, Office of War Information," The Saturday Review of Literature. XXV (June 20, 1952), 8.

Cowley, Malcolm. "The Sorrows of Elmer D avis," The New Republic. CVTII (May 3, 1943), 591-593*

Darrock, Michael and Joseph P. Dorn. "Davis and Goliath: The OWI and Its Gigantic Assignment," Harper’s Magazine. CLXXXVT (February 1943), 225“237*

Dounce, H. E. "Strange Womn," The New York Evening Post, October 15, 1927, 15.

"Elmer," Time. XXXV (January 22, 1940), 55"56.

"Elmer Davis," The New York Times. May 19, 1958, 24.

"Elmer Davis, Newsman, is Dead; Broadcaster, 68. Headed OWI," The New York Times. May 19, 1958, 1,25. "End of a Decade," Newaweekj XXI (March 15, 1943), 36. 236 •^England Reported Awaiting Invasion/' The Hew York Times. May 28, 1941, 11.

Fuessle, Kenneth. " I'll Show You the Town," International Book Review. August 1924, 672.

"King David," The New York Times. October 14, 1928, 17, 6.

Kurzman* R. L. "Friends of Mr. Sweeney," International Book Review, December 1925* 60.

"The New Books," The Saturday Review of Literature. I (March 21, 1925)* 6181

"The New Books," The Saturday Review of L iterature. X (October 28, 1955;* 222.

"New Books in B rief Review*" The Independent. CXI? (March 7* 1925), 27 C

"Not a Guffaw," The Independent, CXII (June 7* 1924), 315-51^ " "Nudist Fantasy," The New York Times. November 5* 1955* V, 20.

Robey* Ralph. "B attle S tatio n s fo r A ll*" Newsweek. XXI (May 5* 1943), 61.

"Spokesman fo r Freedom,11 The.New York Times. December 31* 1955, 18.

"’Strange Woman' and Other New Works of Fiction*" The New York Times. September 25* 1927* III* 8.

"Times Have Changed," Boston T ra n sc rip t. May 9* 1923* 4.

"Times Have Changed*" The Literary Review. April 28, 1923* 650.

"Truth and Trouble," Time, XLI (March 15, 1943), 13“15-

"Warns John L. Lewis May Halt Arms Flow," The New York Times. May 1, 1943, 3.

White, E. B. "Notes and Comments," The New Yorker. XVIII (March 14, 1942), 13. ,

White, Paul W., Barrett, Biward W., Crosby, John, and Joseph C. Harsch. "Upon the Return of Elmer Davis on the A ir," The New Republic. CXXX (January 18, 1954), 10-12. 237

GENERAL TORES

Allen, Frederick Lewis, Only Yesterday: An Informal History of the Nineteen "twenties. New York: Harper anfl Brothers, 1957*

Chafee, Zechariah, Jr. The Blessings of Liberty. Philadelphia and New York: J. B. Lippincott, 1956.

Commager, Henry Steele. The American Mjnfl: an Interpretation of American Thought and Character since the 1880*8. New Haven: Yale University Press, 1950.

Curti, Merle. The Growth of Auer lean Thought. New York and London: Harper and Brothers, 19^3.

Freidel, Frank. America in the Twentieth Century. New York: A lfred A. Khopf, i 960.

Gabriel, Ralph Henry. The Course of American Democratic Thought; an Intellectual History Since I 815 I New York: The Ronald Press Co., 1956.

Goldman, Eric F. The Crucial Decade and After. 19^5-1960. New York: Vintage Books Inc., I960.

Hicks, John D. Republican Ascendency. 1921-1955♦ New York: Harperand Brothers, 1960.

Kempt on, Murray. Part of Our Time; Some Ruins and Monuments of th e T h irtie s. New York: Simon and S chuster, 1955*

Leuchtenburg, William E. Franklin D. Roosevelt and the New Deal. 1952-19^-0. New York: Harper and Row, 1963-

______. The Perils of Prosperity, 191^-1952. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1958.

Link, Arthur S. American Epoch. A History of the United States Since the 1890 *s. New York: Alfred A. Khopf, 1959.

Morris, Lloyd. Postscript to Yesterday: America the Last Fifty Years. New York: Random House, 19^7-

Perkins, Dexter. The New Age of Franklin Roosevelt. 1952-19^5. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1957* 258

Rovere, Ei chard H. Senator Joe McCarthy. New York: Ear court, Brace and Co., 1959.

Wish, Harvey. Contemporary America: The National Scene Since 1900. Hew York and London: Harper and Brothers, 19^5. AUTOBIOGRAPHY

I , P h ilip C halfant Easley, was "bom in Norwood, M assachusetts, on June 10, 19^0. I attended public schools in Columbus, Ohio, and

Des Moines, Iowa, and then attended Ohio Wesleyan University where I received an A.B. degree in June 1961. I received an assistantship at

The Ohio State University in September 1961, and received an M.A. degree in August 1962.

I have accepted a position as Assistant Professor of History at

Baker University in Baldwin City, Kansas.

239