The Incredible Case of the Cub

The incredible case of the Cuban Five International Commission of Inquiry into the Case of the Cuban Five

The incredible case of the Cuban Five Evidence from the International Commission of Inquiry into the Case of the Cuban Five

Law Society, London March 7 - 8, 2014 Report The Commission of Inquiry was initiated by Voices for the Five, an international coalition of campaigners calling for freedom and justice for the Cuban Five. It was widely endorsed by internationally renowned personalities. www.voicesforthefive.com

Edited by Isabelle Vanbrabant, Iniciativa Cuba Socialista Copy edits by Nancy Kohn, International Committee for the Freedom of the Cuban 5

Cover by Steven Struyf

Printed by EPO, 2015 Dedicated to Gema, baby daughter of Adriana Pérez and Gerardo Hernández, as testimony to the abiding love, hope, and perseverance of her parents

Table of content

Prologue ...... 11 Introduction ...... 15 – The case of the Cuban Five ...... 15 – The Commission of Inquiry...... 20 The commissioners...... 21. The coordinators ...... 24 – The proceedings ...... 26

The International Commission of Inquiry 7 & 8 march 2014...... 29 – Friday, March 7: Terrorist Attacks against Cuba and the activities of the Cuban Five in Miami...... 29 Session 1: Terrorist attacks against Cuba...... 29 1. Statements of the witnesses...... 30 2. Statements from experts...... 39 Session 2: The activities of the Cuban Five in Miami to prevent terrorist attacks on Cuba...... 77

– Saturday, March 8: The unfairness of the treatment of the Cuban Five...... 99 Session 3: Arrest, conduct of the trial, detention conditions and visiting rights...... 99 1. Statements of experts...... 100 2. Statements from witnesses...... 134

Findings of the Commission of Inquiry into the case of the Cuban Five...... 151 – Preliminary Findings ...... 151 – Final Findings ...... 154 Annexes ...... 175 – Schedule A ...... 175 – Summary Report of Peter Schey...... 176 – Exhibits of Martin Garbus...... 176 – Statement of Irmita González, daughter of René González...... 176 – Statement of Ricardo Alarcón, ex-president of the Cuban Parliament...... 178 – Letters of support...... 182 – List of endorsers...... 187 – List of donors...... 194 It always seems impossible until it’s done. nelson mandela

In September 2012 we organized a meeting with Olga Salanueva, wife of René González, and Jan Fermon, former vice president and current chair of the International Association of Democratic Lawyers, in Brussels. Together we talked through what already had been done for the Cuban Five and what more we could do next. ‘Why not organize a prestigious, international commission of inquiry into the case of the Five?’ Mr. Fermon suggested. And so we got the ball rolling. In November, we proposed the initiative in Berlin, at the European Solidarity Meeting with Cuba. It received the support of all organizations present.

More than a year after the first meeting between Olga Salanueva and Jan Fermon we were able to organize the International Commission of Inquiry into the Case of the Cuban Five in London, with the support of many people, both personalities and activists. It was one of the many steps that were taken worldwide to build up the jury of millions. After two days of hearing witnesses and experts, the judges came to unanimous preliminary findings. They took a few months to write the final findings. Unfortunately, by that time Judge Sabharwal had become too seriously ill to undersign them anymore.

We thank everyone who has helped to bring this commission of inquiry to a successful conclusion. In particular, the three internationally renowned judges, Judge Zakeria Yacoob, Judge Philippe Texier and Judge Yogesh Sabharwal, who invested their precious time to make this initiative a success. We are especially happy that the Cuban Five are free today, and that this book is no longer needed for further cam- paigning. It remains as a testimony to the commitment of all those

9 people that led to the end of 16 years of unjust imprisonment and the return of five Cuban heroes to their families. As the late Nelson Mandela said: ‘It always seems impossible until it’s done.’ We freed the Five!

Katrien Demuynck european coordinator of the free the five campaign

10 Prologue

The International Commission of Inquiry into the case of the Cuban Five, held in London March 7-8, 2014, was as good as it gets.

There was a packed house for each session in ideal quarters, the his- toric and spacious Law Society in the center of the city. Participants came from 27 countries, including England, Belgium, Cuba, and the United States, as a direct result of the massive global support for the Five.

The reason for the passionate support for the Five is clear: The Cuban revolution, the most important in our times, overthrew a totally corrupt government that invited foreign exploitation of Cuba’s resources including the labour of the poor, and permitted foreign criminal elements to profit from open gambling, prostitution, drug sales and strong arm tactics to protect their actions. When the revolution succeeded in 1959, some thousands of Cubans who had benefited from the old regime fled with all of the wealth they could carry. A large, emotionally charged number settled in nearby Miami, angry and anxious to return to Cuba, and to bring back the “good old days” and their corrupt ways. The attempted major invasion at the Bay of Pigs in the spring of 1961 revealed the magnitude of the exiles’ passion for a return to pre-Revolutionary Cuba, and more dangerous, the strong political support the armed exiles received within the United States.

Over the years that followed there were thousands of attacks on Cuba, the vast majority from U.S. soil and launched from the Miami area, resulting in more than 3,000 deaths of Cubans living at peace in their own country. Thousands more were injured.

11 The same revolutionary Cuban government that brought infant mor- tality down from 100 deaths per 1,000 births, to less than 20 deaths per 1,000 births during their first few years in power, acted vigorously to prevent and resist armed attacks from abroad against its people. But operating from protected bases close to Cuba, only minutes by air and knots by sea, made interception of any attackers extremely difficult.

As one means of defending its population from foreign-based terrorist aggression, Cuba sent five carefully selected, highly qualified, and well trained young men to infiltrate hostile operations in the Miami area who were conducting terrorist assaults against Cuba. With advance knowledge, Cuba could provide advance warnings of planned attacks, enabling Cuban forces to intercept and prevent these international crimes. It was an assignment that took courage, sacrifice, love of country, and nerves of steel.

The Five left their country, family and friends they loved in the most exciting and successful political/social revolution of our times to infiltrate and win the confidence of violent fanatics conducting a war against Cuba. Their goal? To end a terrorist campaign that was punishing Cuban civilians, men, women and children, from protected bases in the U.S.

The presence in the U.S. of the Five was detected. They were arrested, held separately in isolation, finally tried in a U.S. Court in Miami where the seething hatred of the Cuban exile population and its prominence in the community made a fair trial unsuccessful, convicted and given draconian prison sentences. The longest – two life sentences – assured that one of the Five would never be free again.

History records few who have given so much for their country, in so righteous a cause. The Burghers of Calais, six men who surrendered themselves to England in 1346 to save their starving city, immortalized by the heroic bronze statues of Auguste Rodin, come to mind.

12 How wonderful it would be for Cuban artists to create heroic statues of the Cuban Five – Gerardo Hernández, Ramón Labañino, Fernando González, Antonio Guerrero and René González – to be placed on the malecon in Havana, pointing to the North, at the sky, the sea, and towards Miami.

And in centuries to come, free Cubans and fortunate visitors can remember the courage and the cause of the Cuban Five on one of the most beautiful places on Mother Earth.

Ramsey Clark, former united states attorney general

Introduction

The case of the Cuban Five

In September 1998, five Cuban men were arrested in Miami by FBI agents. Gerardo Hernández, Ramón Labañino, Fernando González, Antonio Guerrero and René González were accused of the crime of conspiracy to commit espionage. The U.S. government never accused them of actual espionage, nor did it affirm that real acts of espionage had been carried out, as no classified document had been confiscated from the Five. Seven months after the arrest, a new charge was added against only Gerardo Hernández, namely conspiracy to commit murder.

Their actual mission in the United States was monitoring the activities of the groups and organizations responsible for terrorist activities against Cuba. After the triumph of the Cuban revolution in 1959, Cuba had been the victim of repeated terrorist attacks, killing 3,478 and in- juring 2,099. The vast majority of those attacks originated in southern Florida.

After their arrest, the Five were immediately placed in solitary confinement, isolated from all other inmates for the entire 17 months of pre-trial custody. In spite of the vigorous objections raised by the Five’s defense, the case was tried in Miami, Florida, a community with a long history of hostility toward the Cuban government. This prevented them from receiving a fair trial. The trial, which lasted over six months, became the longest trial in United States history. More than 119 volumes of testimony and over 20,000 pages of documents were compiled, including the testimony of three retired U.S. Army generals and a retired admiral, who agreed that no evidence of espionage existed.

15 Near the trial’s conclusion, when the case was about to be handed to the jury for consideration, the U.S. government recognized in writing that it had failed to prove the main charge against Gerardo Hernández, conspiracy to commit murder, admitting that it was facing an “insurmountable obstacle” in connection with winning the case. However, the jury, under intense pressure brought to bear on them by the local media and the Cuban-American community, nonetheless found the Five guilty of all charges. The Five were sentenced to a total of four life sentences plus 77 years and were imprisoned in five separate maximum-security prisons spread across the U.S.

The charges of conspiracy to commit espionage and conspiracy to commit murder represented life sentences for three of them. They were the first people ever to be sentenced to life imprisonment for espionage in the United States in a case where no secret document was ever obtained.

The appeals process has lasted nine years. In August 2005, a three- judge panel of the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals in Atlanta overturned all of the convictions on the grounds that the Five had not received a fair trial in Miami. The government then asked that all twelve of the judges of the Court of Appeals would review the panel’s decision through an en banc procedure. Exactly one year later, in August 2006, in spite of the strong disagreement voiced by two of the three judges who made up the original panel, the court revoked by majority the decision of the three judges.

Meanwhile, on May 27, 2005, the UN Working Group on Arbitrary Detention, after reviewing the arguments advanced by the families of the Cuban Five and the U.S. government, concluded that their imprisonment was arbitrary and urged the U.S. government to take the measures needed to rectify the situation. The UN Working Group stated that, based on the facts and the circumstances in which the trial was held, the nature of the charges, and the severity of the convictions, the imprisonment of the Five violates Article 14 of the International Convention on Civil and Political Liberties, to which

16 the United States is a signatory. Never before had the UN Working Group on Arbitrary Detention denounced as arbitrary, due to violations committed during the legal process, a conviction in a case in the United States.

During the appeals process there have been two key arguments advanced by the defense in its efforts to reveal the arbitrary nature of the convictions. First is the lack of evidence needed to substantiate the two main charges: conspiracy to commit espionage and conspiracy to commit first-degree murder. The second is the imposition of completely irrational and unjustifiable life sentences.

On September 2, 2008, the Court of Appeals ratified the guilty verdicts of the Five and ratified the sentences of Gerardo Hernández and René González. It judged the sentences of Antonio Guerrero, Fernando González and Ramón Labañino to be wrongful and revoked them, referring the cases once again to the Miami District Court so they could be re-sentenced.

At that time, the full Court of Appeals recognized that no secret or national defense information had been obtained or transmitted in the case of the defendants charged with conspiracy to commit espionage. One of the three judges, the Hon. Phyllis Kravitch, affirmed in a 16- page dissenting opinion that the government did not present sufficient evidence to find Gerardo guilty of the charge of conspiracy to commit murder.

On June 15, 2009, the U.S. Supreme Court announced, without explanation, its decision not to review the case of the Five, in spite of the solid arguments made by their defense attorneys concerning the obvious and multiple legal violations committed during the entire trial. The Supreme Court ignored the unprecedented backing of the petition for review of the convictions of the Five expressed by 12 amicus curiae briefs, which was the largest number of amicus briefs ever to have urged the U.S. Supreme Court to review a criminal conviction.

17 Ten Nobel laureates, among them East Timor President Jose Ramos Horta, Adolfo Perez Esquivel, Rigoberta Menchu, Jose Saramago, Wole Soyinka, Zhores Alferov, Nadine Gordimer, Gunter Grass, Dario Fo and Mairead Maguire, as well as the Mexican Senate, the National Assembly of Panama, and Mary Robinson, the former President of Ireland (1992-1997) and former UN High Commissioner for Human Rights (1997-2002), and UNESCO General Director Federico Mayor, amongst others, signed the amicus briefs. They were joined by hundreds of parliamentarians from around the world. Among them were 75 members of the European Parliament, including two ex-presidents and three current vice-presidents of this legislature. Also represented were numerous legal and human rights associations from different countries in Europe, Asia, and Latin America, as well as international personalities and legal and academic organizations in the United States.

With this U.S. Supreme Court decision, legal resources with which to appeal the ruling of the Atlanta Court that ratified their convictions have practically run out.

On October 13, 2009, the sentencing hearing of Antonio Guerrero took place in the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of Florida. During the hearing, the same judge that had condemned him to a life sentence plus 10 years in December 2001 admitted that in Antonio’s case evidence of gathering or transmitting secret information does not exist. However, she imposed on him a sentence of 21 years and 10 months of imprisonment plus five years of supervised release.

The sentencing hearings for Fernando González and Ramón Labañino took place on December 8, 2009. The original sentence for Fernando González (19 years) was changed to 17 years and 9 months, while Ramón Labañino’s sentence (life plus 18 years) was reduced to 30 years.

Since the Cuban Five were imprisoned on September 12, 1998, their relatives have faced constant delays in the granting of visas.

18 This has, in most cases, prevented these relatives from visiting the Five more than once a year on average, despite regulations at their different prisons allowing monthly visits.

Two of them, Gerardo Hernández and René González, have been prevented from receiving visits from their spouses, Adriana Pérez and Olga Salanueva. The entry permits into U.S. territory necessary to accomplish these visits have been repeatedly and systematically denied to the wives. As a result, Adriana and Olga have been prevented from visiting their imprisoned husbands for more than 11 and 9 years, respectively.

– Gerardo Hernández: Court of Appeals ratified his sentence 2 life terms plus 15 years – Ramón Labañino: Court of Appeals vacated his sentence Re-sentenced on December 8, 2009 to 30 years – Antonio Guerrero: Court of Appeals vacated his sentence Re-sentenced on October 13, 2009 to 21 years and 10 months – Fernando González: Court of Appeals vacated his sentence Re-sentenced on December 8, 2009 to 17 years and 9 months – René González: Court of Appeals ratified his sentence 15 years

On October 7, 2011, René González was the first of the Cuban Five to be released, after 13 years of imprisonment. On May 3, 2014, the judge gave him permission to remain in Cuba. On February 28, 2014, Fernando González, too, was released from prison after finishing out his entire sentence.

On December 17, 2014, finally the remaining three imprisoned members of the Five, Gerardo Hernández, Ramón Labañino and Antonio Guerrero; returned to Cuba. Thus ended the long and complicated battle to free the Five anti-terrorists. The Cuban Five spent 16 too- long-years in U.S. prisons but their case shows that with a collective struggle of the people justice will prevail.

19 The Commission of Inquiry

Reflecting on what else could be done to achieve justice for the Cuban Five, alongside the legal process, the idea of an Inquiry Commission was conceived in September 2012. The International Commission of Inquiry into the Case of the Cuban Five took place in London on March 7th and 8th, 2014. The concept of a People’s Commission has a recognized history and precedent internationally. Bertrand Russell convened a tribunal of international civic conscience on Vietnam in 1966, which has recently reconvened on Palestine in 2010-12. In both cases there was a need to highlight un-redressed violations of international law, by the USA in the first instance and Israel in the second. Another similar tribunal took place in The Hague to focus on human rights abuse in Iran. These initiatives have been entirely motivated and organized by civil society. A permanent international people’s tribunal was set up in Bologna in 1979.

The commission was initiated and promoted by the International Association of Democratic Lawyers (IADL) and the European Solidarity Movement, and coordinated by the British Cuba Solidarity Campaign and the Belgian solidarity movement, Iniciativa Cuba Socialista (ICS).

The terms of reference were extremely important. The Commission did not exist to conduct a public debate. It attempted to conduct a quasi-judicial process. The powers and resources that a proper judicial inquiry would have did not exist but, nevertheless, the proceedings of the Commission equate what the Commission did effectively with what the U.S. Government and U.S. courts should have done in the first place. The Commission of Inquiry is a commission of the people, a commission of conscience created in reaction to injustices and violations of international law.

Indeed, the Commission has no legal status, and draws its strength from the will of citizens who wish to put an end to the situation of the Cuban Five. It does not compete with other jurisdictions, domestic or international, but works on a complementary basis to enforce the law.

20 The eminence of the Commission stems from its extensive Support Committees and endorsers, which includes Nobel Prize laureates, other personalities who have held high political office, and representatives of civil society: writers, journalists, poets, actors, scientists, professors, lawyers, and judges.

The independence of the Commission is guaranteed by the diversity and scale of the voluntary material and financial assistance it receives.

The Inquiry Commission set itself two main objectives. A first objective was to examine Cuba’s need to rely on agents like the Cuban Five to defend itself against terrorist attacks organized from Miami, and to exercise its right to self-defense. A second objective of the commission was to examine whether the Cuban five received a fair trial. At the end of the report are the conclusions of the Commission composed after they had considered the oral and written evidence available on the days as well as the further written information provided to them.

The commissioners.

The commission was composed of three commissioners:

PHILIPPE TEXIER is a former judge of the Cour de Cassation in France. After obtaining his degree in Law at the University of Montpellier, Philippe Texier started his career at the embassy of France in Bogota, Colombia as a technical cooperation attaché. In Bogota, he also taught History on political ideas at l’Escuela Superior de Administración Pública.

In the early eighties, he represented the French Government in the working group of governmental experts for the implementation of the International Covenant on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights. At the same time, Texier was a technical adviser to the

21 Secretary of State for Family, Population, and Immigrant workers and the Vice-President of the District Court of Paris.

In 1984, Texier became a member of the National Consultative Commission on Human Rights, which he still is. At the end of the eighties, he worked as an independent expert of the Commission on Human Rights for Haiti. In 1991, he was the director of the Division of Human Rights at the United Nations Observer Mission in El Salvador (ONUSAL), an integrated peace-keeping operation that monitored all agreements concluded between the Government of El Salvador and the FMLN, the liberation movement. The ONUSAL aimed at ending a decade-long civil war.

In 1992 he became the President of the Chamber at the Court of Appeal of Paris and in 1996 a member of the Cour de Cassation (Social Division), until 2009. During those years, Texier also participated in numerous Human Rights missions in South and Central America, Africa, and Asia. Moreover, he worked as a consultant, both for the Center for Human Rights of the UN and on behalf of non-governmental organizations.

He was a representative of the French government as an expert of the working group of governmental experts on the implementation of the International Covenant on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights until 1987. After that, Texier was an expert-member on the Committee on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights, from 1988 until 2012, and he was its president in 2007-2008. He has authored several legal articles on human rights.

ZAKERIA YACOOB became blind at 16 months as a result of meningitis. He began his professional career when he completed his LLB and was admitted as an advocate. He was a junior counsel until 1991. Yacoob served as a member of the Society of Advocates of Natal for several years and took silk in May 1991. In 1981, he became a member of the executive of the Natal

22 Indian Congress, organizing and taking part in protests and anti- apartheid mass meetings. As a member of the executive of the Durban Detainees’ Support Committee, Yacoob was involved in helping to ameliorate the conditions under which detainees were held and helping to organize workshops, meetings and conferences to expose the evils of detention without trial. He belonged to the Democratic Lawyers Association from 1979 to 1984, was a member of the UDF’s Natal executive, was heavily involved in a campaign against the tri-cameral parliament from 1983 to 1985 and was a member of the underground structures of the ANC.

Yacoob has attended dozens of international conferences and workshops on topics as varied as blindness, children, and democracy. He served on the Independent Electoral Commission from December 1993 to June 1994 and was a member of the Panel of Independent experts of the Constitutional Assembly. Yacoob has also advised local-government bodies, the National Land Committee, and the Department of Finance.

Since 1998, Yacoob has been a Justice on the Constitutional Court of South Africa, until last year. In 2011, the UKZN conferred Yacoob with an honorary doctorate in Law, as did the University of Fort Hare on the Eastern Cape. Today Yacoob is running an enquiry for the Minister of Finance into the conduct of the commissioner of the SA Revenue Services and is participating in civil society organizations like Section 27 and the Socio-Economic Rights Institute. He is the president of the KwaZulu-Natal Blind and Deaf Society.

YOGESH KUMAR SABHARWAL is the former Chief of Justice of India. Justice Sabharwal practiced mainly as an arguing Attorney on the civil and constitutional sides in Delhi High Court from 1964 before his elevation as a Judge of Delhi High Court.

He was an Attorney for Indian Railways in Delhi High Court (1968-1981), Delhi State Government (1973-1976) and again as an Additional Standing

23 Counsel for Delhi State Government (1981-1982) and Standing Counsel for Delhi State Government in the High Court (1981-1986) when he was appointed a Judge. As an Attorney, he participated in the activities of the Bar Association of Delhi High Court, including serving as both Secretary and President. Additionally, he was a member of the Bar Council of Delhi and member of the Bar Council of India, representing Delhi (1969-73). Justice Sabharwal was elevated as a Judge of Delhi High Court on November 17th, 1986. He has been Chairman of various Boards and Honorary Secretary of the International Law Association (Indian Chapter) and later held the position of President of the International Law Association (Indian Chapter). Justice Sabharwal participated in various International Conferences organized by the International Law Association in Egypt, Argentina, Finland, Barbados, and Toronto.

After his elevation as a Judge, he later became Acting Chief Justice of Delhi High Court, Chief Justice of Bombay High Court, followed by Judge of the Supreme Court (2000-2005) and Chief Justice of India (late 2005-2007). Justice Sabharwal delivered various landmark judgements dealing with constitutional issues, criminal matters, environmental questions, labor laws, public interest litigations, and so on. As Judge of the Supreme Court and Chief Justice of the Country, further landmark judgements were delivered, several relating to the power and privileges of Parliament. Since 2007, he has been lecturing at Universities and other organizations on issues of human rights, the Constitution of India, environmental matters, and also has acted as Arbitrator, rendering opinions on key legal issues.

The coordinators.

SARA CHANDLER is a professor of clinical legal education at London South Bank University and the President of the Human Rights Commission of the Federation of European Bar Associations, which represents over 800,000 European lawyers. Sara Chandler studied at Swansea

24 University, Newcastle University, London School of Economics, South Bank Polytechnic and City Polytechnic. She entered the Law Center movement and became a professor at the College of Law, which she left to join London South Bank University in 2012.

She previously worked in Law Centers and legal aid firms, was a bi- lingual social worker with refugees from Chile and qualified as a social worker at South Bank Polytechnic. She has general experience in training international pro bono lawyers, and a particular interest in Uganda, Zambia, and Nigeria where she has worked with local Law Societies, Law Schools, NGO’s, and others.

Chandler works as a supervising solicitor for student volunteers in the London South Bank University Legal Advice Clinic, which provides free legal advice to the public.

Chandler is a member of the Law Society Council and Chair of the Law Society Human Rights Committee with responsibility for Colombia. She led the UK section of an international delegation of lawyers to Colombia in August 2008, 2010, and 2012 to investigate the situation of human rights’ lawyers, and is the current chair of the Colombia Caravana UK Lawyers Group, a charity formed to support human rights lawyers in Colombia. She is also a trustee of the Graham Turnbull Trust and the Central London Law Center.

The second coordinator, ELIZABETH WOODCRAFT is a barrister and author. After attending Birmingham University, Elizabeth Woodcraft taught English in Leicestershire and then lived in France for a year, in the Loire Valley. On her return she worked for the National Women’s Aid Federation where she assisted Jo Richardson with her private member’s bill as it worked its way through parliament to become the Domestic Violence and Matrimonial Proceedings Act 1976. Subsequently she read for the Bar.

25 She is a family barrister whose work covers a wide range of family issues, including care and private law cases. She has spoken widely about issues of Domestic Violence, in the UK, China, Argentina, and Turkey. In 2011 she spoke at the Domestic Violence International Symposium organized by the Center for Parliamentary Studies in Brussels. During her time at the Bar she has represented Greenham Common Peace Protesters, Anti-Apartheid demonstrators, striking miners and Clause 28 activists, as well as battered women, children who have suffered sex abuse in and out of their homes, and gay parents seeking parental rights.

In 1985 Woodcraft was a member of an investigative team researching the issue of strip-searching in Armagh Jail. More recently she was part of the legal team in the People’s Commission of Inquiry into the pro- posals by the Secretary of State for Health for closures at Lewisham Hospital. Woodcraft has written several legal articles and is also the author of 2 crime novels, a third one is on the way.

The proceedings

During public hearings, the commissioners heard evidence from key witnesses including the prisoners’ families, victims of terrorist attacks, politicians, and human rights, academic, and legal experts.

In session one, the commission reviewed the scale of terrorist aggression against the Cuban people. Expert witnesses explored the legal right to self-defense of the Cuban nation. The activities of Cuban groups based in Miami were examined.

Among those who testified were three victims of terrorism against Cuba: Betina Palenzuela Corcho, Margarita Morales and Giustino di Celmo (video message).

The Commission also heard a testimony by lieutenant Roberto Hernández Caballero, by Lorenzo Gonzalo, deputy director of Radio

26 Miami, and by Norman Peach, Emeritus Professor at the University of Hamburg in Germany.

In session two, the activities undertaken by the Cuban Five in Miami to prevent these harmful attacks were examined. The main witness was supposed to be René González, the first of the Five to be released, who was scheduled to testify in person in London. Late on Monday, March 3rd, just a few hours before he was due to fly from Havana to London, René González was refused a visa to enter the UK. In its letter of refusal, the UK Immigration and Visa Office quotes section 320 (2b) of UK immigration law, which says entry can be denied to a person who has been sentenced to more than four years in prison. Although dis- pensation can be granted in exceptional circumstances, the UK government states that it does not consider Mr. González’s attendance at the International Commission to be reason enough to justify this or “out- weighed by the public interest in maintaining a refusal.” Despite a series of legal appeals which culminated in a high level Judicial Review, the British Secretary of State’s Counsel argued that there was no compelling need for González to attend the Commission in person, and the Judge agreed and refused to overturn the Secretary of State’s decision. Despite this, González was able to give partial testimony to the Commission via Skype. He presented evidence about the work of the Five, and the arrest, trial and imprisonment.

Sessions three focused on the unfairness of the treatment of the Cuban Five in terms of their arrest, the conduct of the trial, detention conditions and visiting rights. In this session evidence was heard from Philip Horowitz and Martin Garbus, two of the Cuban Five attorneys, attorney Peter Schey, Angela Wright, senior researcher at the Americas desk of the International Secretariat at Amnesty International and of family members Adriana Peréz, wife of Gerardo Hernández; Elizabeth Palmeiro, wife of Ramón Labañino and Olga Salanueva, the wife of René González. Olga Salanueva had been due to travel with her husband on the Monday before the Commission, but due to the rejection of his visa application, she was only able to arrive in London on the morning of the second day of the Commission.

27 It is to be noted that the Ambassador of the United States of America to the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland was invited to attend and testify or submit responses. The Commission received apologies, noting that Ambassador Barzun’s schedule was particularly busy and that he was unable to join the sessions of the Commission, owing to existing diary commitments.

You can find the footage shot at the Commission of Inquiry into the Case of the Cuban Five on the following page: http://bit.ly/1Cz9Poc on www.cubanismo.net

To watch the documentary about the Commission, visit following link: https://vimeo.com/94515440

28 The international Commission of Inquiry, March 7-8, 2014

Friday, March 7: Terrorist Attacks against Cuba and the activities of the Cuban Five in Miami

.Session 1: Terrorist attacks against Cuba.

In session one the commission reviewed the scale of terrorist aggression against the Cuban people. Expert witnesses explored the legal right to self-defense of the Cuban nation. The activities of Cuban groups based in Miami were examined.

Among those who testified were three victims of terrorism against Cuba. Betina Corcho, whose mother Adriana Corcho, a Cuban diplo mat, was killed by a bomb placed by anti-Cuban terrorists in the Cuban Embassy in Portugal in 1976, testified. Margarita Morales, whose father died in the 1976 terrorist bombing of Cubana flight 455, when 73 people were killed, spoke movingly of her suffering and the pain of all the Cuban victims of the many years of terrorist attacks against the island. The third witness was Giustino di Celmo (video message) whose son died in a terrorist attack.

The Commission heard testimony by Roberto Hernández Caballero, an investigator of terrorist crimes committed against Cuba, who gave an overview of the history of aggression against Cuba which have resulted in the deaths of over 3,000 Cuban citizens over the past 50 years. Lorenzo Gonzalo talked about activities by anti-Cuban groups based in Miami. Norman Peach, Emeritus Professor at the University of Hamburg in Germany, explored the legal right of the Cuban nation to self-defense against terrorism under U.S. and international law.

29 1. Statements of the witnesses

Betina Palenzuela Corcho – daughter of victim terrorist attack

Betina Palenzuela Corcho is the daughter of Adriana Corcho Calleja, who died on April 22nd, 1976 as a result of a terrorist attack on the offices of the Cuban Embassy in Lisbon, Portugal. She was born in Havana, Cuba, in 1963. She graduated in Electrical Engineering from the Instituto Superior Politécnico José Antonio Echeverría (CUJAE) in 1986. She is the Director General of a Cuban company belonging to the Ministry of Science, Technology and the Environment (CITMA).

Palenzuela Corcho was only 12 years old when she lost her mother. Not long before the attack, she lived in Spain together with her father, mother and two younger brothers, where her parents were diplomats. But when their mission changed and the family went to Portugal, Palenzuela Corcho went to Cuba to start secondary school. The other family members stayed in Lisbon. Just by chance her brothers and father narrowly escaped the attack, because it occurred at exactly the time when they normally arrived from school.

‘I simply did not believe that my mother was dead,’ she said. ‘Not even when, the next day, I saw the news and the pictures in the newspaper and talked to my father on the phone. And how come you’re alive? I asked. All this was too terrible to be true. Only he, my father could give me the answer and I had to hear from his lips the dreaded truth: I would no longer see the person who gave me life and who I most needed in the world.’

30 Testimony

Members of the International Commission of Inquiry into the Case of the Five:

On April 22, 1976, my mother, Adriana Corcho Calleja, aged 35 years, and Efrén Monteagudo Rodríguez, aged 32 years, died, as a result of a vile act of terrorism against the Cuban Embassy in Lisbon, Portugal.

Two Cuban families have been in mourning since then. On that day, a girl of 12 years and two boys of 11 and 10 years, respectively, mourned the death of our mother. In another house something similar happened when two girls aged 8 and 4 years were told about the irrepara- ble loss of their father. Five Cuban children became orphans.

It is hard to hear the word orphan! But it is even harder to find out that this absurd and inhuman condition resulting from the separation of children from their mother was wrongfully caused, due to an attack directed to a part of Cuba, in the midst of the civilized Europe. The attack also threatened the life of several children, the children of the diplomats who were returning from school in that moment; only by chance were they saved from a certain death.

Many times during almost 38 years of suffering, I have wondered how my life might have been if I could have shared it with my mom. A few years ago I told a Cuban writer that I think I would have been different, perhaps more happy, and less responsible. Not that I do not like being responsible. During the few years that we shared my mother taught me to be responsible. But I was too young when that happened, how could I after such a monstrosity be able to feel carefree or even happy, as the rest of my fellow students? A teenager that lost her mother at the age of twelve destroyed by a bomb in an unknown country that she only knew by references and postcards, could never again be like other girls.

It is hard for children that don’t have their mother close by, to be deprived from sharing the joy you experience when finishing primary,

31 secondary, college and graduate studies. It is hard for a girl to be deprived from sharing with her mother the preparations for her 15th birthday or her marriage, to be denied from seeing her joy when the granddaughters were born, or just to be without maternal support when she has to undergo surgery. Together with my brothers I have experienced all these mixed emo- tions for 38 years.

My mom, demanding and loving mother, exemplary daughter, aus- tere, gentle and respectful, loyal friend and great neighbor, was always characterized by a high sense of responsibility and companionship. She detected the presence of the explosive device and realizing the danger that her peers were facing, alerted them calmly and launched herself inside in order to perform the required safety measures, but was then surprised by the explosion. The two floors belonging to the Cuban Embassy suffered extensive damage and several neighboring apartments also received considerable damage.

This was not an accidental action, it was another step taken within the so-called war against Cuba “around the world”, conceived and organized by known terrorists, with the consent of the U.S. government. Its purpose was to attack Cuban embassies and trade offices abroad, as well as airlines and representations that maintained relations with the island of Cuba. In just two years, from 1974 to 1976, 165 terrorist acts took place against Cuban property and employees in 24 countries.

Choosing the Cuban Embassy in the capital of Portugal for placing a bomb was not accidental. There was an intent and premeditation to try to frighten the Cuban authorities, punishing for the presence of Cuban internationalists in Angola and the strong support given by Cuba to the cause of independence of other Portuguese colonies in Africa.

We, children of Cuba, know of sad events that bring us painful memo- ries. Murderous hands have committed terrorist acts that have taken the lives of thousands of innocents, to punish us for deciding to be a free, sovereign and worthy people.

32 We cannot forget that in these 55 years, in the midst of a terrible and ruthless blockade, aggressions, mercenary invasions, pirate attacks, biological attacks, and sabotage have claimed the lives of 3,748 Cubans while 2,099 have become disabled, all victims of these acts of terrorism.

Just because we have the irrefutable need to defend ourselves from terrorist attacks, honest and worthy men have emerged, ready to ensure a better world, as Antonio, Fernando, Gerardo, Ramón and René, prisoners in U.S. jails for over 15 years. They were condemned solely for struggling at the risk of their lives, against anti-Cuban terrorist groups operating freely in Miami.

The unjust imprisonment, the biased and unfair trial, the inhumane way they have been treated, the hostility toward family visits, are cruel evidence of the double standards of U.S. policy in the so-called struggle against terrorism.

To prevent other children from suffering what Carlos, Jorge, Sonia, Amarilys and I felt on April 22nd of 1976, was the task of the Cuban Five, and that is reason enough for them to be released immediately.

The International Commission of Inquiry into the Case of the Five con- vokes us to continue fighting for justice and truth against terrorism. For that reason I wish to ask Mr. Obama: How many children have to continue growing up without parents because these men are unjustly imprisoned in the country that you rule? How many mothers have to continue suffering the absence of their most precious possession, a son? How many wives have to be deprived from sharing their love with those who have given everything for the good of many? For how long will the family members and other Cubans have to wait for this lengthy and unjustified incarceration of 3 of their best children to end?

President Obama: you have in your hands the possibility to release these men. Use your powers; do not delay this decision any more. It is time for them to return to their homeland, with their families and with the 11 million Cubans who are waiting for them. Free the Five, NOW!

33 María Margarita Morales Fernández – daughter of victim terrorist attack

María Margarita Morales Fernández is the daughter of Luis Alfredo Morales Viego, who was a victim of the mid-flight attack on a Cuban aviation plane. She was born in Havana, March 15, 1962. Morales Fernández is a graduate in Political Sociology from the State University of Kazan, Former Soviet Union. She has worked as a professor at the Instituto Superior Pedagógico in Havana and as a social researcher at the Center for Socio-political Studies and Public Opinion. Currently she works as an international buyer for TRB Caribbean.

Since 2005, Morales Fernández has been part of the Committee for Relatives of Victims of Terrorism in Cuba, participating in activities in solidarity with the campaign for justice and condemnation of the U.S. government’s policy of protecting perpetrators of acts of terrorism against Cuba.

Worthy of special mention is her involvement in the fight against the unjust decision of the U.S. government to give asylum to the terrorist Luis Posada Carriles who, along with other criminals financed by the CIA, organised the mid-flight attack on a Cuban aviation plane, killing 73 people, including her father, leaving her an orphan at just 14 years of age.

Testimony

Thank you very much, again, for inviting us to this Commission. I hope that the emotion caused by the words of Betina (previous testimony), including how they could affect me, will not interfere with the importance of the testimony of the families of the more than 5,500 victims of terrorism directed against Cuba.

34 I want to thank you, because our testimony here allows us to claim justice for our dead relatives, for our wounded relatives, and also justice for the Cuban Five.

The 70s were unfortunately productive years for the terrorist groups operating against the Cuban government and the Cuban people, which are inextricably linked. On October 6, 1976, an airplane from Cubana de Aviación exploded in midair. In that plane were 73 people, 57 of them were Cubans. In that crime, in that cruel terrorist attack, my father died – Luis Alfredo Morales Viego, technical director of the Cuban youth fencing team.

Who were the people on that plane? There were two crews of Cubana de Aviación, civilians, no military, and the Cuban youth fencing team. They returned from a Central American competition, the Central American Youth Championship in Venezuela. The Cuban youth team had won all the medals. The average age of the members of the team did not exceed 27 years, including the coaches. Most of the young people who died there were between 17 and 20 years. There was for example this woman, Nancy Uranga... Nancy Uranga was pregnant when she died in the attack. There was, for example, Infante... He was my teacher when I studied fencing. I was a child, about 14 years in that time. There were all the others, who had won all the medals. There was my dad...

When my mom told me the news that my father had died in an attack to the plane, I did not understand what she was talking about. For a child, it is very difficult to understand what an act of terrorism is. Perhaps some of you have met in your countries victims of terrorism, so you may know what this means, and about the emotional and physical damage affecting people who have suffered the loss of a loved one.

But this was not enough. That is, it was not enough to kill these people during the flight. I cannot imagine how these people locked up in the airplane died. It was not enough... We have had to endure for more than 35 years, since ’76, almost 38 years by now... we have had to constantly hear the names of Luis Posada Carriles and Orlando Bosch. Today the

35 expert witness proved them guilty, but not only the technical guilt of these murderers has been demonstrated. They recognized it publicly. It hurt a lot when in the ’90s Luis Posada Carriles in a public interview he gave, acknowledged that yes, he had placed the explosive device, and that it was necessary to put these bombs. But it was also horrifying to hear Orlando Bosch when he said that those who were on the plane were “five black girls”... They did not matter, another life did not matter.

Gentlemen, for us, for the families of the victims of terrorism, to fight for the freedom of the Cuban Five means honoring the memory of the more than 5,500 victims of terrorism. It means that while the U.S. government does not do justice to the real murderers, since Luis Posada Carriles wanders freely on the streets of Miami and receives public recognition, it imprisons the true fighters for justice. It means to honor and show all these victims, that what the Cuban Revolution has accomplished has not been in vain.

We will continue fighting for justice, we will continue showing the suffering inflicted on the Cuban people by terrorist acts, and we will never stop.

Giustino Di Celmo – father of victim of terrorist attack

Giustino Di Celmo was born in Salerno, Italy, December 24, 1920. He was conscripted at 20 years old and forced to endure the horrors of war. He fought and witnessed the death of many of his fellow soldiers and suffered the injustices of being imprisoned in a concentration camp. After completing his military service, he went to Czechoslovakia before immigrating to Argentina, where he lived for almost 10 years. When the dictatorship in Argentina ordered his immediate arrest, he managed to escape with his wife and children.

36 Just after returning to Italy, Di Celmo decided to set up a business in Prague, promoting commercial exchange with other countries. At the end of the 1980s, he travelled to Cuba with his youngest son Fabio because he believed that his experience as the owner of a medium-sized business, with multiple commercial links in various countries throughout the world, might help to counteract the effects of the blockade on Cuba, which were intensifying at the time.

On September 4, 1997, a bomb planted in the Hotel Copacabana as part of a terrorist attack carried out by the Cuban American National Foundation, killed his son Fabio. Di Celmo, in spite of his grief and the family’s shock, publicly denounced the Miami mafia and the U.S. government as being directly responsible for the terrorist acts against Cuba which caused the death of Fabio.

For several years, Di Celmo has been involved in a range of activities to denounce those who promote acts of terrorism against Cuba. His tours of Italy presenting his book, The Boy of Copacabana, has enabled him to transmit his message to more than 30 cities in the country in which, supported by organizations in solidarity with Cuba, he has been able to arrange meetings with political leaders and government authorities. Di Celmo graduated at the age of 83 from the University of Havana with a degree in Sociology, as well as writing and publishing his first novel in Cuba and Argentina.

Testimony

Well, I am Giustino Di Celmo.

I am an Italian citizen who came to Cuba with my son Fabio. A lad, the kind of which I believe very few are to be found in the world. Without exaggeration, he was a young man who loved children with all his soul, his intelligence and humanity. He would have given his life for any child in this world. And he was the youngest one of my own children. He had expressed to me his wish to continue the work,

37 the commercial activity to which I had dedicated my whole life. And, for me, it was the greatest fortune that the last of my children wanted to continue my work. And so, I brought him for the first time to Cuba. When the plane took off and we went to the National Hotel, Fabio had already – without exaggeration – tremendously fallen in love with this country. And he, next to me, began to learn of the activity that his father carried out. I remember that after a short time, the ex penses at the National Hotel were very high for us, and so we moved to Copacabana Hotel. After a month at the Copacabana Hotel, he already knew all the employees. And everybody fell in love with Fabio. Fabio became a sort of advocate for everyone. And he got mixed with the girls and the boys and with the people of a certain age… Lastly, there was a tragedy one day, when a little girl was drowning in the swimming pool. Since that day, he became a close friend of the lifeguard and when he got back to the Copacabana Hotel after working with me, he used to sit next to the lifeguard, to watch the children bathing in the pool. After so many years, I still cannot find the courage and the strength to stop asking myself why did God do it. But since I am a believer, I feel that God calls the best of this earth to be next to Him. And it is in this way that I calm down and I believe that Fabio is in heaven.

He also fell in love with the political system. He did not know the political system deeply and its every day activity from before. So, he always said to me: “Dad, this is the only system that can save humanity, because capitalism is a war, a death system, which does not offer humanity any possibility of life. And, throughout the years, if that system does not disappear from the face of the earth, they are going to destroy the most important of humanity: love for everybody, love for life and love for saving – he always said it like this – the children from any danger.” This was my son. This was Fabio.

38 2. Statements from experts lieutenant colonel ROBERTO HERNÁNDEZ CABALLERO

Lieutenant Colonel Roberto Hernández Caballero is from Matanzas, Cuba. He is a graduate in Criminal and Juridical Sciences, with 29 years of professional experience as a criminal investigator. He has postgraduate degrees in Legal Medicine; Psychology; Criminal Law; Fiscal Law; Criminal Investigation; International Law; Breakdowns, Explosions and Fire; and International Relations. Hernández Caballero was involved in the investigation into the surge in terrorist activity involving bombings in tourist centers in Cuba in the 1990s. He was also a witness in the trial in Tampa relating to the hijacking of a plane in the case of the Cuban Five, as well as in the ongoing case against the known terrorist Luis Faustino Posada Carriles in El Paso, Texas.

Testimony

Results of investigations and operational information demonstrating the Miami -Central America link in the promotion, organization and authorship, both material and intellectual, in the terrorist aggression against Cuba.

As a result of the investigations into the increased terrorist actions against Cuba in the ’90s, aimed mainly at the tourist industry, information has been obtained linking the Cuban American National Foundation (CANF) and other violent factions based in Miami, with Luis Posada Carriles and Central Americans recruited to carry out these acts.

After the disintegration of the socialist bloc in Eastern Europe and collapse of the USSR, the U.S. government took advantage of the

39 situation to increase its aggressiveness towards Cuba. This created some false expectations amongst counterrevolutionary organizations and groups of Cuban origin based in the U.S. of the imminent collapse of the Cuban Revolution. In order to hasten the violent overthrow of the Revolution, these groups intensified their aggressive actions, cre- ating an atmosphere of terror which reached its climax in 1997 with terrorist activities involving high explosives aimed at Cuban tourist centers, led by cells of mercenaries operating from Central America, following orders from the anti-Cuban mafia in Miami.

Despite the enemy’s efforts to keep their actions secret in order to avoid detection by Cuban authorities, our research bodies obtained evidence confirming the connection and participation of leaders and members of counterrevolutionary organizations based in Miami and New Jersey, in the promotion, organization and authorship, both intellectual and material, of terrorist actions carried out by Central American mercenaries. Among the mercenaries, the following names stand out due to their degree of involvement: Arnaldo Monzón Plasencia, Rolando Fernando Borges Paz, Dionisio Gonzalo Vidal and Santiago Gonzalo Penin.

The foundations of the plot date back to 1992, when the executive committee of the Cuban American National Foundation (CANF) created the so-called Cuban National Front (FNC), a clandestine group acting as the CANF’s armed wing. The FNC led and financed major terrorist plans and activities directed against Cuba from U.S. territory in the 1990s.

On August 23, 1993, “Voice of the Cuban National Front” began transmitting broadcasts directly to Cuba, in which they encouraged the Cuban population to physically attack Commander in Chief Fidel Castro Ruz and carry out acts of sabotage against vital economic targets, in order to overthrow the Revolution, claiming “the existence of an alleged internal resistance, composed of members of the FAR (Cuban armed forces) and the MININT (Cuban Ministry of Interior), disillusioned with and in overt contradiction with our political and social system.”

40 Similar arguments were put forward by the CANF in a message published on August 15, 1997 in the New Herald in which the Board of Directors of the CANF declared their support for terrorist actions carried out against tourist centers in Cuba, and linked the authorship of those actions to alleged commands operating in Cuba, comprised of members of the Cuban armed forces. This was clear evidence of the real motives of this organization in supporting “terrorist acts” in a country that is not at war.

The channel “Voice of the Cuban National Front” was also used to transmit coded messages to alleged clandestine cells in Cuba. The same technique was later used by the CANF to connect with the collaborator Frayle.

Research on these broadcasts showed that they were made at frequencies 7020 and 3507 kHz, frequencies that were not authorized for this type of transmission because they are amateur radio band frequencies. This prompted Cuba to write to the U.S. authorities and the Federal Communications Commission (FCC), and as a result, the transmissions ceased on July 27, 1994.

It was also established that these transmissions were broadcast from a cattle farm located in Salinas, close to Ponce in the south of Puerto Rico. The farm was property of Domingo Sadurni, CANF board member, information that was published in the Miami Herald on August 26, 1994, quoting statements by the Field Engineer of the Federal Communications Commission, Reuben Jusino. This proved that the CANF was responsible for the broadcast and that the FNC was the armed wing of the organization.

In 1993, Luis Manuel de la Caridad Zúñiga Rey and Alfredo Domingo Otero, members of the secret paramilitary wing of the CANF, recruited Percy Francisco Alvarado Godoy, a Guatemalan citizen resident in Cuba, known as Agent Frayle by Cuban State Security, who was informed of the need to keep secret the existence of the FNC and its relationship with the CANF. In addition he received hundreds of stickers

41 alluding to that structure, in order to promote its existence on Cuban territory.

From that date onwards, the CANF leaders Horacio Salvador García Cordero, Francisco José Hernández Calvo and Arnaldo Monzón Plasencia, and the aforementioned Alfredo Domingo Otero and Luis Manuel de la Caridad Zúñiga Rey, all FNC members, instructed collaborator Frayle to ensure the introduction into Cuba of explosive devices and other methods for carrying out terrorist actions against tourist centers and economic targets in Cuba. He was also encouraged to study and record information about the targets, which included filming, drawing survey maps and location through GPS receivers. He was given the necessary resources and means to do this.

On August 4, 1994, Alfredo Domingo Otero and Luis Manuel de la Caridad Zúñiga Rey gave collaborator Frayle a cellphone designed to ensure contact with him in Cuba. Following instructions, Frayle returned the cell phone to Alfredo Domingo Otero in December 1994. Two Cubans residing in Miami, Santos Armando Martínez Rueda and José Enrique Ramírez Oro used the same cell phone in 1995. They were recruited by the counterrevolutionary organization Cuban American Veterans Association (CAVA). These two Cubans were arrested after planting an explosive device in the Hotel Sol Palmeras, Varadero, Matanzas province, more details of which can be found below.

Investigations into the cell phone confirmed that it was rented from the company Tercel in Mexico, by the president of the CANF Board, Francisco José Hernández Calvo, and activated for use in Cuba through Tercel’s communication with its counterpart Cubacel. A call log was requested from Cubacel, which confirmed that the cell phone was used in Cuba for calls to Alfredo Domingo Otero, to his home number 5951656 and his cell phone 2995104 and in addition to the number 2994358, belonging to Guillermo Novo Sampoll, in the United States.

42 This is further corroborated by the fact that our research bodies also knew about the phone calls between Frayle and Alfredo Domingo Otero using the same mobile device.

In the case of Novo Sampoll, his phone number was linked to Santos Armando Martínez Rueda who, when captured in Mexico (see further below) handed a paper to a Mexican official, asking him to inform the person on it of his arrest and transfer to Cuba. The paper had a phone number, together with the name Mister Bill, and was handed over to Cuban authorities with the detainee. When checked against the records of our operating bodies, the phone number turned out to belong to Guillermo Novo Sampoll, also known in counterrevolu tionary milieu in Miami as Mister Bill.

Also in 1994, following instructions from Alfredo Domingo Otero and CANF Board members Francisco José Hernández Calvo and Horacio Salvador García Cordero, Frayle traveled to Guatemala City, staying at the Hotel Camino Real, where he was contacted by the terrorists of Cuban origin Gaspar Eugenio Jiménez Escobedo, Luis Posada Carriles and a third unidentified subject (all three were staying in room 561 of the same hotel). They trained Frayle in the manufacture of explosive devices, designed to be detonated in tourist and recreational centers in Cuba, and gave him 900 grams of C-4 plastic explosives, hidden in shampoo and conditioner bottles, two electric detonators disguised in a set of markers and two electric clocks.

On subsequent visits to Miami, Frayle was ordered by Alfredo Domingo Otero, Luis Manuel de la Caridad Zuñiga Rey, Horacio Salvador García Cordero and Arnaldo Monzón Plasencia to plant these explosive devices in tourist and recreational centers in the Cuban capital. He was promised a sum of $10,000 on completion of the mission.

In Miami, the aforementioned CANF Board members also provided Frayle with hundreds of fake Cuban exchangeable notes in 20 peso denominations, designed to be introduced into circulation in Cuba in order to wreak havoc on the domestic economy.

43 Identical bills were given by Rolando Borges Paz to collaborator Félix and found in the possession of terrorists Ernestino Cecilio Abreu Horta and Vicente Marcelino Martínez Rodríguez, caught when trying to infiltrate arms along the north coast of Pinar del Río in 1998. This is further evidence of CANF’s involvement in these actions and their use of other organizations and counterrevolutionary elements based in Miami to cover up their direct participation in terrorist activities directed against Cuba in the 1990s.

On March 20, 1995, the aforementioned Cuban citizens resident in Miami, Santos Armando Martínez Rueda and José Enrique Ramírez Oro, were arrested in Cuba, having been handed over by Mexican authorities for carrying passports with false identities. Both admitted responsibility for planting an explosive device (deactivated by Cuban authorities) at Hotel Sol Palmeras in Varadero, Matanzas, and initiating the Palma case.

Investigations and interrogations proved that it was a major operation, organized and financed by CANF, using the Cuban American Veterans Association (CAVA) as a front. Leaders of the CANF secret paramilitary group, Guillermo Novo Sampoll and Arnaldo Monzon Plasencia, were involved, the latter of whom was already involved in operations with Frayle.

In their statements, Martínez Rueda and Ramírez Oro stated that they arrived in Cuba with false Costa Rican identity documents, and that a week before they had illegally entered the country by sea, bringing with them 51 pounds of C-4 plastic explosives, electric detonators, detonating cord reels and two pistols, among other devices designed for use in subsequent terrorist attacks against tourist centers. Interestingly, the explosive device deactivated in the Hotel Sol Palmeras and the devices found subsequently in possession of Santos Armando Martínez Rueda and José Enrique Ramírez Oro had the same structure and operating system as the ones supplied to Frayle.

Martínez Rueda stated that he knew that the CANF’s aim was to develop a terrorist program involving planting bombs in Cuba, and that

44 they planned to move the operational base to Central America, which is corroborated by evidence of the training and supplying of explosives to collaborator Frayle in Guatemala and subsequent actions involving Central American mercenaries.

The neutralization of the terrorist activities described above, along with the need of the main leaders of the Cuban American extreme right to avoid problems with U.S. authorities for carrying out terrorist attacks from U.S. territory, influenced the decision of CANF terrorist elements to move operations to Central America. They took advantage of the opportunities provided by Posada Carriles to act in this region, even though plans and subsequent actions continued to be directed and financed by the terrorist mafia, in particular the CANF, from U.S. territory.

From April 12, 1997 onwards, a series of bombings started to take place in Cuban tourist centers, both in Cuba and abroad, which corroborated Martínez Rueda’s statement regarding the organization of further terrorist attacks, and the information obtained through Frayle of the planning of these actions against the Cuban tourism industry. Additional information was obtained by our research bodies about the terrorist network acting from Miami, a result of which was the capture of the Salvadoran terrorist Raúl Ernesto Cruz León on September 4, 1997.

Cruz León stated that fellow Salvadoran Francisco Antonio Chávez Abarca, mercenary in the service of Posada Carriles, recruited him. Journalistic records from El Salvador revealed that Chávez Abarca’s father, Francisco Chávez Díaz, had been involved with Posada Carriles in arms trafficking during the dirty war against the Sandinista Revolution in Nicaragua.

Regarding the involvement of Chávez Abarca in these actions, it was established that in addition to selecting and recruiting Central Americans operating in El Salvador and Guatemala, he was also responsible for the following terrorist activities: the planting of an explosive device on the 15th floor of the Hotel Meliá Cohiba between

45 March 7th and 8th, 1997, the detonation of a bomb in the Aché night- club of the same hotel on April 12, 1997, as well as the bombing of the offices of Cubanacán in Mexico, May 24, 1997 (his presence in Mexico was verified on this date).

According to the statements of the detainee Cruz León, Chávez Abarca confirmed his participation in these events. In addition, the link between both these men and Posada Carriles in these actions was recognized by the latter in his statements to the journalist Ann Louise Bardach of the New York Times on July 12th and 13th, 1998, and ratified to the CBS on August 2nd of the same year.

On August 23, 1997, an explosive device was detonated at the Hotel Sol Palmeras in Varadero and in October of the same year, traces of explosives were detected on a Transtur minibus and at a kiosk located in the area surrounding the International Airport Jose Martí in Havana. The investigation confirmed that the alleged perpetrators of these acts were Guatemalan citizens Jorge Venancio Ruiz and Marlon Antonio González Estrada, who entered the country using their real names the first time and the second time, with the fake identities José Luis Castillo Manzo and Nery de Jesús Hernández Galicia, respectively. (Actions described in the Research Records Palmeras, 7/97 and Panel, 25/97).

It was also established that a transfer of $375 was made to both Guatemalans through the tour operator agency Junior SA, by José Burgos, a resident of Guatemala. Burgos is linked in turn to the Guatemala-based Cuban-American José Álvarez, known as Pepe Álvarez. Both Burgos and Álvarez have connections to Posada Carriles and the Swiss American School of Guatemala City, which has the phone numbers 5023621744 and 5023621743 and which both Guatemalan terrorists called during their stay at the Hotel President.

A link was also established between Burgos and Álvarez and the commercial offices at the address 15-42 17th Street, Zone 10, apt. 2 in Guatemala City, phone number 333 5070, references given by

46 Venancio Ruiz and González Estrada to several Cubans whom they encountered during their stay in Cuba.

Following this chain of events, on March 4, 1998, Guatemalan citizens Nader Kamal Musallan Barakat (with the false identity of Miguel Abraham Herrera Morales) and María Elena González Meza de Fernández were arrested in Cuba. They were in possession of four explosive and other devices, designed to be brought into Cuba, using the same modus operandi indicated by collaborator Frayle in 1994.

In their statements Musallan Barakat and González Meza de Fernández claimed that they were recruited by Chávez Abarca, adding that on several occasions, he referred to the participation of Posada Carriles (using the identity of Ramón Medina) and Arnaldo Monzón Plasencia, in the organization, management and financing of the aforementioned plans.

González Meza de Fernández confirmed his awareness of the link between Cruz León and Chávez Abarca, and also referred to the problems that arose with “the man of New Jersey” as a result of delays in payment for the bombings in Havana, evidently referring to Monzón Plasencia.

Chávez Abarca in turn confirmed that he had met Monzón Plasencia and Ramón Medina at Hotel Cortijo Reforma, to deal with the issue of delayed payments. At that meeting they resolved the issues concerning payment for the planting of bombs in Cuba, and decided to continue the terrorist attacks having agreed to restart the provision of funds.

In the days prior to the departure of the Guatemalan terrorists to Cuba, Chávez Abarca told Musallan Barakat, that the person preparing the clocks and interfaces for the explosive devices was a Cuban American staying at the Hotel Cortijo Reforma in Guatemala City (where he had had the meeting with Ramón Medina and Monzón Plasencia).

On June 10, 1998 and as a result of operational work, the Salvadoran citizen Otto René Rodríguez Llerena was arrested at Jose Martí

47 International Airport, whilst trying to enter the country with 1519 grams of plastic explosive substances and other products designed for making two explosive devices.

Among the devices found in possession of Rodríguez Llerena, were phones and a picture of the granddaughter of the Cuban Juan Francisco Fernández Gómez (AKA collaborator Félix for Cuban State Security) who, during a visit to Miami in 1996, was recruited by the counterrevolutionary leader Rolando Borges Paz, who gave him a pen for invisible writing and an ultraviolet lamp for reading, indicating that the collaborator would use the pseudonym of “Juan” while he used that of “José García” or “García”.

From that date until the arrest of Rodríguez Llerena, collaborator Félix maintained several personal as well as indirect contacts (by phone or via messages in secret writing), with Borges Paz, in which the latter encouraged him to create the conditions necessary for receiving a supply of explosives via an illegal sea route. However, this plan turned out to be impossible to execute, and consequently the devices were delivered by a Central American who traveled to Cuba for this purpose, which resulted in the arrest of Rodríguez Llerena and was given the name “Operation Aunt Ramóna” by Borges.

The analysis of this operation provides further evidence of the close link between elements based in Miami and the actions of Posada Carriles in Central America as demonstrated by the following actions:

– During the preparation of collaborator Félix outside of Cuba, and following Borges Paz’s instructions, he was given training in making explosive devices in the Miami residence of counterrevolutionary Dionisio Gonzalo López, by the nephew of José Santiago Gonzalo Penin, a resident of New Jersey and linked to Monzón Plasencia, former member of the U.S. Army, who participated in the invasion of Granada.

48 – During this training, Gonzalo Penin gave Félix a sketch of the explosive device, with a similar operating principle as that used for assembling the bombs used by the Central American terrorists recruited, trained, supplied and sent to Cuba by Posada Carriles and his associates from Central America.

– Likewise, Borges Paz gave him a Casio digital watch, model PQ -10, similar to the ones found in possession of the Guatemalan terrorists and the Salvadoran Rodríguez Llerena.

– Significantly, during Félix’s last journey to the U.S., between March 26 and April 26 1996, Borges Paz informed him that he would be traveling to Central America, and on his return confirmed that the collaborator would continue to carry out their plans for terrorist activities in Cuba. He showed Félix a shoebox filled with hundreds of fake Cuban exchangeable banknotes in 20 peso denominations, and gave him a sample. When the sample was analyzed by Cuban operational bodies and compared by experts against similar notes from other cases previously described, it served as proof of the involvement of the CANF and other powerful interests of the Cuban- American extreme right, involved in previous attempts to introduce counterfeits into Cuba.

– The photo of the granddaughter of collaborator Félix, given by him to Borges Paz, to be used as a password, was found in possession of Salvadoran terrorist Rodríguez Llerena, who in turn had received the photo from his recruiter Ignacio Medina (Posada Carriles) together with the phone number of “Juan” (Félix) and the knowledge that the contact in Cuba (that he had seen pictures of) would be wearing a black cap with the inscription “100 % Cuban”.

– The arrangements around the contact in Cuba were made by Borges Paz when collaborator Félix was in the U.S. Félix never traveled to Central America or had contact with Posada Carriles. Thus, the possession of contact information by Rodríguez Llerena demonstrates

49 the connection between the leaders of terrorist organizations in Miami with Posada Carriles in Central America.

– This was corroborated during the training process, when Rodriguez Llerena voluntarily agreed to address his contact “Juan” and pass him the messages pre-arranged by Félix with Borges Paz in Miami, and by the detainee with Posada Carriles in El Salvador.

– The telephone conversations with collaborator Félix as well as the clandestine messages in secret writing demonstrate the involvement of the perpetrator Borges Paz in all parts of the process relating to the terrorist activity, his link to the main counterrevolutionary organizations involved in these actions, his constant monitoring of the situation, and the instructions and training of collaborator Felix, just before the appearance and arrest of Rodríguez Llerena, so that Félix would be ready to make contact with and receive the Central American terrorist and the explosive devices.

Conclusions:

The facts presented here, together with the results of expert technical analysis of all the evidence obtained in a variety of different ways through the investigation carried out while this terrorist activity was taking place, as well as statements by detainees and important disclosures published in the media in the U.S. and Central America, indicate the following:

1. The terrorist acts of 1997 and 1998 are not an isolated phenom- enon, but part of a longer-term strategy of counterrevolutionary right-wing organizations in Miami with roots in the past, and of the continuity of its policy designed to destabilize the Cuban Revolution by any means possible.

2. The terrorist acts of 1997 and 1998 were planned and organized by terrorist groups based in Miami, Florida, United States, financed and directed by the CANF, in connection with Posada Carriles as

50 executor in Central America, through the recruitment of mercenaries.

3. In the investigation of these events, information and evidence have been gathered which incriminates several counterrevolutionaries of Cuban origin residing in the United States, making it essential that U.S. authorities obtain complementary evidence in order to conclusively demonstrate their involvement in terrorist acts against Cuba.

LORENZO GONZALO – deputy director of radio miami

Lorenzo Gonzalo participated as a student in his youth in street protests and clandestine activities in Cuba against the dictatorship of Fulgencio Batista. To protect him against per- secution, his father arranged political asylum for him, sending him to Miami.

While in exile, he continued his involvement as Secretary of the Youth Section of the 26th of July Movement. After the Revolution, due to disagreements regarding the ways in which it was carried out, he opposed the revolutionary government. As a result of his actions he spent time in a Cuban prison, where some of the most prominent anti- government figures were incarcerated. He never gave up his left-wing political views, which made his years in prison even harder.

However, in 1979, having ended his opposition to the government, he decided to emigrate to Miami, where he had previously lived in exile. With the fall of the Soviet bloc and faced with the fear that Conservatives in Washington and the counterrevolution in Miami would attempt an invasion of Cuba, he decided along with other immigrants to contact the Cuban government to seek a normalisation of relations between the U.S. and Cuba. He became involved in a project

51 called Participative Democracy, run by immigrants with the support of Cuban institutions.

He was a member of the editorial team of the magazine Contrapunto, an alternative publication edited in Miami. He is currently Deputy Director of Radio Miami, an alternative press organization, and a member of the Martiana Alliance, an organization that opposes the blockade and campaigns for the release of the Cuban Five.

He has played an active role in alternative press and radio organizations for the past 22 years. He writes for various Internet blogs and in particular for Cuba Información, on social and political issues.

Testimony a return to terrorist activities, conspiracies and new political pressures from conservatives and counterrevolutionaries of the u.s. government

The political differences that had intensified in the 1980s became even starker with the collapse of the Soviet Bloc in the 1990s. The Cuban American National Foundation wasted this opportunity to try out other less destructive options than the policy of the blockade and which in fact may have had a more destabilising effect on the Cuban government. As always, the desire for revenge prevented them from seeing clearly and as an answer to the crisis, the strategy they adopted was to place demands on the U.S. administration to intensify the blockade. In the face of this, Fidel Castro called on Cubans to resist in order to keep the regime strong and unified and to avoid a similar fate to that of the Soviet Union.

If the Foundation had called for the lifting of the blockade at that time, the Cuban government would have had to adopt a different strategy, which would have involved greater risks.

52 In response to the position adopted by the Foundation, several former conspirators against the Cuban government, in spite of their differences, formed what could be called a moderate sector, along with other waves of immigrants. The counter-revolution referred to them as dialoguers, and they established a new discourse which involved finding ways of communicating with the Cuban government which, even if not amicable, was at least legitimate and respected by the Cuban people.

Cuba responded positively, opening its doors to representatives of these sectors, some of whom have since died, such as Francisco González Aruca, Amalio Fiallo, Eloy Gutiérrez Menoyo, Luis Ortega and others of whom are still alive, such as Nicolás Ríos and myself.

The Cuban government reinstated permission for flights, which had been unjustly suspended in 1980, when the Reagan administration authorised the setting up of Radio Marti and supported joint projects carried out by these immigrants alongside Cuban organizations, such as Seminars of Participative Democracy, PECA, RECUACO, la ATC, among others.

This process helped to bring together Cuban society and emigration, enabling the healing of old wounds, whilst at the same time widening the gulf between moderate emigrants and the counterrevolutionaries who defined themselves as ‘exiles.’ An important milestone during this stage was the Conference of the Nation and Emigration in which I participated.

This change in the tense relations that had characterised the past 30 years, along with the thousands of people who travelled every month to visit family and friends, alarmed violent extremists who felt that they owned Miami and the policy towards Cuba.

From this moment on, at the heart of the Cuban colony based in Miami, two distinct types of Cuban, types which had started to take shape during the debates of the 1980s, became apparent: the emigrants, who

53 wanted to go back to their country, to visit and help their relatives, and the so-called exiles, an obstinate elite that a journalist baptized the ‘Cuban-American Mafia.’

The mass decision of Cubans to travel to Cuba, in spite of the public pressure put on them by those who supported the Soviet-style collapse of the government, created a sense of desperation within the ranks of the counterrevolution.

During the 1990s, a suffocating climate of repression developed. Talking about anything related to Cuba at work was prohibited. People who travelled to visit relatives tried to keep it a secret and were warned by their employers and friends to maintain discretion. It was also risky to talk about Cuba in public places because any business owner or extreme conservative might get involved and become aggressive. As a result of that climate, the Conservatives, led by Mas Canosa, succeeded in getting Congress to pass a law known as the Torricelli Law (Cuban Democracy Act) in 1992.

From the start of the 1990s until 1998, the Foundation had contributed more than U.S.$1 million to the Democrat and Republican parties in the U.S. In 1996, the Helms-Burton Act, which banned all commercial transactions between the U.S. and Cuba, was passed.

Late in 1999, the law was extended to additionally ban any foreign subsidiary with more than a 10% share of investment from a U.S.- owned company from trading with Cuba. This was the first time in history that a law with an extraterritorial dimension was passed.

There is no doubt that U.S. foreign policy became more aggressive at this time, also involving renewed attacks and belligerent actions.

In 1994, Humberto Eladio Real disembarked in Cárdenas in the province of Matanzas along with several others, killing a man in order to steal his car. The purpose of the visit was to enter the country to carry out acts of sabotage and terrorism.

54 That same year, two more people landed on the coast of Caibarién, north of the province of Las Villas.

In 1997, the Guatemalan Cruz León planted bombs on successive occasions in five hotels in Havana and in the restaurant La Bodeguita del Medio. The bomb he planted in Hotel Copacabana caused the death of the young Italian Fabio Di Celmo.

In the same year, another Guatemalan planted a bomb in a hotel and was caught while carrying out formalities and plotting to plant explosives in several places, among them the monument to Che Guevara in the city of Santa Clara, Cuba.

The Guatemalan citizens Miguel Abraham Herrera Morales, Marielena González and Jazid Iván Fernández also carried out similar acts. They were recruited by the terrorist Luis Posada Carriles and, according to their statements to the journalist Ann Louise Bardach, the operation had been carried out with funding from the Cuban American National Foundation.

In 1998, the U.S. Coastguard held up the boat La Esperanza, which was carrying four Cuban-Americans. On board, high power assault rifles, night-time telescopic rifle scopes and a 50-calibre rifle were found. One of the crew members, Angel Alfonso Alemán, immediately told the authorities ‘those weapons are mine, the others did not know anything about them.’

The boat was heading for none other than the island of Margarita, where a meeting was due to be held at which Fidel Castro would be present. The plan was evidently to attempt to bring down President Castro’s plane as it landed on the island.

The Cuban American National Foundation was behind the incident and one of the weapons on board was registered in the name of Francisco José (Pepe) Hernández, its president.

55 It seems clear that the five Cuban agents and others that made arrangements with the authorities when they were arrested had been sent to gather information about this return to terrorist activity which the main groups and especially the Foundation had chosen as a new combat strategy. Of course the sweet face of this organization has always tried to project an image of being against violence.

It is worth noting that violence has always been used by these groups and only those that come to the realization that this is not the right approach and that it is the result of manipulation by Washington have ended up championing the cause of dialogue and recognizing the legitimacy of the Cuban Government. the trial and the press

On September 12, 1998, 10 people were arrested. Among them, Héctor Pesquera, the head of the Miami FBI, identified Gerardo Hernández, Ramón Labañino, Fernando González, Antonio Guerrero and René González.

Without a plausible explanation, the first people Mr. Pesquera notified of the arrest were the members of Congress, Ileana Ros-Lehtinen and Lincoln Díaz-Balart, iconic figures of the Cuban counterrevolution, who owed their political status precisely to the transformation the Cuban terrorist organizations had undergone at the hands of the Reagan administration, in an attempt to clean up Miami’s image.

Ileana Ros-Lehtinen was elected in 1989 and is currently a member of Congress. Lincoln Días-Balart was elected in 1993 and was a member of Congress until 2011. Senator Bob Menéndez was elected in 1993 and became the first Latino to represent New Jersey in the Senate.

The trial of the Five began in the Fall of 2000 and ended in June 2001. It is thought to be the longest trial in U.S. judicial history on record.

56 Because of this climate, it makes sense that the arrest and judicial process would be presented negatively by the Miami media, given that it is a strongly conservative city filled with hatred for the Cuban government.

At that time, there were no communists in Miami. You could count on one hand the number who would call themselves one. Nor were there many who would say they were in favor of or had any respect for the Cuban government.

This is in contrast to the current climate, in which there are more people who are willing to accept the Cuban government. Others of us in Miami may go even further than this and actually believe that the revolutionary process in Cuba can provide a better kind of state than a capitalist one and better ways of economic management.

But at the time of the trial, a more negative climate existed which was used by the press to inundate the news with information they came across and with editorials broadcast by the most important and fur- thest reaching media organizations.

Those of us who ran the alternative press attempted to be more objective and counteract these organizations, but their reach and the time of broadcast meant that we had no chance of competing with the official channels.

Before and during the trial, a series of journalists from Miami who worked in private media or as freelancers had two roles: writing for their respective press organizations, while being paid by the U.S. government to speak on Radio Martí.

In other words, the Broadcasting Board of Governors, the official propaganda agency for the U.S. government, hired these people, whose disdain for the Cuban government was well known, to work on Radio Martí and of course incentivized by the extra pay they received

57 from the government, waged a campaign of defamation and unsub- stantiated speculation.

Ariel Remos, a journalist from Diario de Las Américas, wrote an article on November 28, 1999 in which he referred to an interview he had conducted with the lawyer of José Basulto, head of the counterrevolutionary organization ‘Brothers to the Rescue,’ and which was used to hound Gerardo Hernández, falsely accusing him of murder. It appears that during the interview, this lawyer linked the agents’ actions with the figure of Fidel Castro, the result of which was that Remos ends his article by saying: ‘Castro, having been mentioned in this case accused of murder and under investigation for murder, could be arrested and brought to justice in this country, should he set foot on U.S. soil. Such is the view of the lawyer Fernández, as just expressed to Diario de Las Américas.’

A few months after the start of the trial, Ariel Remos published another article in Diario de las Américas (February 27, 2001), a letter from Jeane Kirkpatrick, the former conservative Ambassador to the UN during the Reagan administration, to the Attorney General of the Bush administration. Mr. John Ashcroft, in which she states ‘... In the trial of five Cuban functionaries in Florida, evidence has shown that the mur- ders (referring to the Brothers to the Rescue pilots) were premeditated.’ It also says in the letter, in another part that was published: ‘the highest authorities who approved this act of state terrorism have still not had charges brought against them.’

When Gerardo’s case was appealed on April 25, 2011, the response of the Department of Justice when denying the appeal was the following: ‘the jury of this court was strictly instructed not to read press reports about the case and there is no reason to believe that these instructions have not been followed. However, the unrestrained comments of people who are designated as witnesses in the trial, acting against the clear instructions of the Court, puts the process in jeopardy, and as such will not be tolerated by any of the involved parties.’

58 It is worth noting that in high profile cases, the jury is ‘kidnapped’ in a way that keeps them isolated from media opinion. This did not apply in the case of the jury assigned to the trial of the Five.

It is also interesting to observe how the press insisted on presenting the case as a threat posed by Cuba against the U.S.

The conservatives and the Cuban counterrevolution in Miami have always dreamed of a marine invasion of Cuba. Unable to gain power alone, they have relied on the ‘benevolence’ of Washington to carry out their dirty work for them by overthrowing the government and then having power handed to them on a plate.

Ariel Remos’ comments were all aimed at stirring the U.S. government into action against the Cuban government and highlighting the guilt of the detainees.

Pablo Alfonso, from the newspaper El Nuevo Herald, wrote on September 16, 1998 that: ‘The surprising attack on an alleged network of Cuban spies in Miami could be aimed at preventing a possible collaboration between the Cuban government and other countries involved in terrorist actions against the U.S., according to military and intelligence experts.’

As a source for this claim, Alfonso referred to the Cuban deserter, the former head of the Cuban Armed Forces, Orestes Lorenzo, who deserted in 1991 and who said, among other things, that he was not surprised that ‘Fidel Castro is lending or selling his intelligence services to Islamic terrorist groups.’

This type of journalism was a relentless assault, which began with the arrest of the Five and continued throughout their trial.

Wilfredo Cancio Isla, another journalist from El Nuevo Herald, repeated ly wrote about this, starting in September 2000. According to public data, employment contract number P 109 – 1036, between him and

59 Radio Martí specified that between September 30, 2000 and December 3, 2001, he was expected to participate in debate programmes on the radio station. For this, he received a total of $4,725.

On June 4, 2001, an article by Wilfredo Cancio Isla appeared in El Nuevo Herald with the headline ‘Cuba used hallucinogenic to train its spies.’

Between November 1st and December 3rd, 2001, Pablo Alfonso received a total of $58,600 from the government agency for broadcasting (BBG).

Ariel Remos received $10,400 between November 1, 1999 and February 9, 2001.

The 1948 Smith-Mundt Law, which regulates public diplomacy abroad and is responsible for monitoring broadcasts of Voice of the Americas, Radio Free Europe and TV Martí, banned the government from using state media organizations to carry out public propaganda campaigns targeted at national public opinion within the country.

The Office of Cuba Broadcasting has invested U.S. $500 million into its broadcasts to Cuba. With this money, it has paid journalists to broadcast the same message abroad as in local and national papers. This is a violation of the Smith-Mundt Law.

Several important figures have protested the fact that the trial had been held in Miami. Lawrence Wilkerson, advisor to Colin Powell’s team, stated on one occasion: ‘When the case reached court, a change of location was justified and was requested, due to the fact that no court in Miami was going to provide a fair trial to the Five, given that the city, in large part, is in the hands of some of those same Cuban-Americans and their supporters who have allegedly perpetrated atrocities against the Cuban people and who are prepared to invade the island. But the motion for a change of location was rejected. And the Five, since then, had no chance.’

60 Jimmy Carter stated: ‘I believe there is no reason to keep the Cuban Five in prison. There are doubts in the U.S. courts and in human rights organizations around the world. They have now been in prison for 12 years and I hope that in the near future they will be freed so they can return to their homes.’

Statements like these have been voiced for the past two years. the political and unjust nature of the sentences

To conclude, I want to highlight not only the injustice of the sentences, but also their political nature, evidence for which I will provide by briefly referring to other similar cases. Among these is the case of the Russian spies arrested in New York in June 2010. Eleven people in total were arrested and accused of conspiracy, because they did not register as agents from another country, and for money laundering. In total, they could have faced maximum sentences of 5 to 20 years in prison. They were tried immediately before Judge Kimba Wood, of the Southern District of Manhattan.

President Obama’s administration immediately negotiated with Russia, who offered to release four western agents sentenced in Russia in exchange for the deportation of the eleven. Among those was the Peruvian journalist Vicky Peláez, to whom the Russian government offered a life pension and payment of certain expenses.

Some of these people were compiling information about U.S. politicians, attending political gatherings and carrying out other tasks that bore no similarities with the work of the Cuban Five. The actions of some of these agents were much closer to spying than any of those of the Cuban Five and yet in just a few days, they were deported without further ado.

Ana Belén Montes, an American of Puerto Rican origin, was a Cuban affairs analyst for the U.S. Defense Intelligence Agency. She was arrested and found guilty of spying for Cuba. She was sentenced to 25

61 years in prison. She was not a foreigner spying on the U.S. government but something much more serious, an intelligence officer recruited by another country to provide it with classified state information.

She was a U.S. intelligence officer, arrested while in the middle of handing over highly classified data to a country considered by the U.S. treasury to be an enemy of the U.S. It is worth pointing out here that, in spite of the U.S. aggression, Cuba has never officially referred to it as an enemy country.

On December 29, John Kerry, Secretary of State for the Obama ad ministration, stated on arriving in Israel, that the Obama administration was considering deporting Jonathan Pollard. Mr. Pollard was spying for Israel while he was working as an analyst in the U.S. naval community.

A colonel from Israeli intelligence and received money and jewels in exchange for spying had recruited him.

Since February 2013, the government of Benjamin Netanyahu has been pressing for his deportation and the U.S. government is seriously considering it.

Pollard’s is a case of out-and-out spying: he was part of the U.S. intelligence community and was tried for a case that some intelligence analysts consider to have caused more damage to the U.S. than any other case of espionage.

In spite of this, they are considering deporting him. We hope that before deporting Pollard, Obama’s government first realizes that it has to deport the Five.

There is an endless list of cases whose seriousness is infinitely greater than that of these Cubans. Not only because they involve people who have been arrested for actual espionage, but because the sentences they have been given have been much more lenient than those of the Five.

62 The Cuban journalist Jorge Gómez Barata, in an article dated March 5, 2010, stated that: ‘The total sentences given to the two scientists in the Manhattan project, found guilty of handing over nuclear secrets to the Soviet Union, and that of Sergeant Greenglass, who confessed to recruiting the Rosenberg pair and personally handed over the information, together is considerably less than that given to just one of the five Cuban heroes sentenced in the U.S. for accusations that were never proven to be true and that did not damage any U.S. institution, the U.S. government or the American people.’ ‘The sentences of the five Cuban patriots are contrary to U.S. legal tradition and are not consistent with the fact that the U.S. and Cuba are not officially at war. Nor are they the result of a standard legal process, but the random product of a climate of political revenge that makes Miami a completely inappropriate place for this type of activity.’

It is without doubt an eminently political and essentially unjust sentence.

NORMAN PAECH – emeritus professor international law at hamburg university

Norman Paech is an Emeritus Professor at Hamburg University, a former Member of Parliament and an expert in International law. He was born on April 12, 1938 in Bremerhaven, Germany.

Paech started his career at the federal Ministry of Economic Cooperation in Bonn. He continued as a researcher at the Research Center of the Federation of German Scientists in Hamburg. In 1975 he became a professor in political science at the University of Hamburg and subsequently taught Public Law at the University of Economics and Politics in Hamburg.

63 For nine years he was chairman of the Association of Democratic Lawyers. He was the Chief Editor of the legal-political quarterly Democracy and Law and is a member of the Scientific Advisory Board of Attac Netzwerk (ATTAC), International Association of Lawyers against Nuclear Arms (IALANA) and International Physicians for the Prevention of Nuclear War (IPPNW). During the years 2005-2009 he was a member of the German Parliament and was the Foreign Affairs spokesman of the Party Die Linke. Paech has authored several articles and books mostly concerning international law.

Legal opinion on the right to self-defense

The following opinion considers the question, as to whether the activities the Cuban Five, in Florida USA, were justified under international law. They entered the USA under false pretenses, and, over a period of years, infiltrated and observed Cuban exile groups who were, from within the USA, actively subverting the sovereignty and territorial integrity of Cuba. They passed on this information to the Cuban Government. After their arrest by the U.S. authorities, and a blatantly unfair trial, they were convicted of conspiring to commit espionage, murder and violation of U.S. Immigration Laws. They were sentenced to long jail terms.

The aim here is not to revisit the dubious conviction handed down by the Miami Dade court, or the questionable circumstances surrounding the whole trial process. The question to be considered here – which was ignored in the trial – is, whether the illegal activities of the Cubans in the USA, were in fact, justifiable acts of self-defense, to protect the territorial integrity of Cuba and the lives of its citizens?

1. The Cuban Five were not acting as private individuals, infiltrating anti-Cuban groups operating from the south coast of the USA. They were sent by the Cuban government, with the clear, and limited goal of gathering information on terrorism being planned and carried out against Cuba. They were “emissaries” of the Cuban govern-

64 ment, directed and controlled by it, at all times. Because the Cuban government was responsible for the actions of the five, what is at issue here is, in fact, an international dispute between the USA and Cuba. This, as is the case in all international disputes, can only be judged and ruled upon, within the parameters of International Law. Of particular relevance in this case is the question, as to whether Cuba can claim the right of self-defense, under Article 51 UN- Charter, against acts of terror carried out from U.S. territory.

The USA itself, has justified military attacks on other countries on this basis, in particular when, after the attacks of the 11th of September 2001, George W. Bush declared the “War on Terror.” The bombing of Tripoli in April 1986, in response to the attack on the Disco La Belle in Berlin, was a case in point. Though the legitimacy of the U.S. action under Article 51 UN-Charter was criticized – the killing of a U.S. soldier abroad can hardly be deemed an armed attack – the proportionality of the U.S. response was not condemned by the United Nations. Similarly, there was only muted protest when the U.S. launched missiles against Baghdad in 1993, in response to a failed assassination attempt on the then U.S. President, George H.W. Bush. The only country which categori- cally condemned the attack, and justifiably so, was China. Other examples were the 1998 U.S. attacks on a pharmaceutical factory in Sudan, and a purported terrorist training camp in Afghanistan. Both of these attacks were claimed as legitimate responses, in self-defense, to the attacks on U.S. Embassies in Dar es Salaam and Nairobi – and, were accepted as such. Doubts as to the legitimacy of the U.S. action were muted, and limited to academic circles. So too, it claimed the invasion of Afghanistan, as a legitimate act of self-defense. The U.S. was responding to the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001. The rationale of legitimate self-defense, was expounded in a speech given by President George W. Bush on September 21, 2001. He declared the “War on Terror” to be worldwide in scope, and unlimited in duration. Countries as far afield as Yemen, Somalia and Pakistan, though not in a state of war with the U.S., could be targeted for attack, if terrorists were presumed to be

65 operating from there. The fact that the policy of “targeted killing” was not limited to foreign suspects, but also included U.S. citizens, caused an outcry in the U.S. and internationally. The practice of targeted killing is widely seen as illegal under International Law. In addition it is doubtful that the self-defense provision of Article 51 UN-Charter, either in its terminology or intent, could be construed to extend the duration and global scope to over 13 years.

The USA has abused the right of self-defense to justify its worldwide military interventions, it is widely rejected and considered unacceptable. On the other hand, this is exactly the justification which the ICJ accepted, in a case brought by Nicaragua against the USA in 19861. The case of the Cuban Five and their activities in the USA is exactly the same – the legitimate right of a sovereign government to self-defense against terrorism.

2. Firstly, it must be established, whether the activities of the exile Cubans, based in Florida, would constitute an armed attack, as laid out in article 51 UN-Charter. To establish this, the following is a sample of some of the activities which, were observed and documented by the Cuban Five2.

May 15, 1991. José Basulto, a veteran CIA operative, former Bay of Pigs mercenary, and founder of the self-styled “Brothers to the Rescue” group. He procured, with support from Congresswomen Ileana Ros-Lehtinen, three military versions of the Cessna plane.

May 8, 1992. The Cuban government files a complaint to the United Nations about the organized terrorism being carried out against it. At Cuba’s request, a document, dated June 23, 1989, was circulated as an official council document. The document lays out in detail the terrorist activities of Orlando Bosch. Among these activities

1 ICJ, Case concerning Military and Paramilitary Activities against Nicaragua, judgement of June 27, 1986 (Merits), ICJ Rep. 1986, 14. 2 The Perfect Storm – The Case of the Cuban Five, La Havana, Cuba, 2005, Page 58.

66 was the 1976 bombing of a Cuban passenger plane in mid-flight, with the deaths of all passengers and crew. Because of his proven participation in past and ongoing terrorist activities, he was banned from entering the United.

October 7, 1992. Varadero Meliá Hotel is attacked from the sea by four terrorists based in Miami. Though they were later arrested, and questioned by the FBI, they were all subsequently released without charge.

January 1993. The U.S. Coastguard stops a vessel that was armed with heavy machine guns and other weapons and heading for Cuba. The five terrorists on board were arrested and later released without charge.

January 7, 1993. At a press conference in Miami, Tony Bryant, the leader of the terrorist group “Commandos L,” announced plans for further attacks on hotels in Cuba. Specifically, he warned foreign tourists to “stay away from Cuba” because “from now on we are at war with Cuba.”

October 1993. The group “Brothers to the Rescue” warned of further violence against Cuba and threatened the life of President Castro. It also confirmed its readiness to accept “the risks that come with doing this.” Andrés Nazario Sargén, head of the terrorist group Alpha 66, admits in the U.S. that his organization had recently carried out five operations against Cuba.

November 7, 1993. Humberto Pérez, spokesman for Alpha 66, announced at a press conference in Miami that tourists visiting Cuba would be targeted – “we consider anyone staying in a Cuban Hotel to be an enemy.”

March 11, 1994. The “Guitard Cayo Coco Hotel” is the scene of a terrorist attack. This hotel had been attacked on October 6th of the same year and, yet again on May 20,1995. CBS News in Miami broadcast

67 an interview with an individual who claimed that he and Andrés Nazario Sargén were responsible for the attacks.

November 1994. During the 5th Ibero-American Summit in Columbia, Luis Posada Carriles and five accomplices smuggled weapons into the country, with the intention of assassinating President Fidel Castro.

July 12, 1995. Three armed terrorists were arrested in the United States while planning to infiltrate into Cuba. Though their weapons and explosives were confiscated, they were released without charge.

December 16, 1995. Two armed terrorists were arrested, trying to infiltrate into Cuba and released without charge.

January 13, 1996. Several planes piloted by the “Brothers to the Rescue” group violate Cuban airspace over Havana. José Basulto admitted “They say I was flying over Cuban airspace, something I have never denied.”

January 23, 1996. U.S. Coastguard intercepted a vessel near Marathon Key with five armed terrorists on board. It was heading towards Cuba with the intention of carrying out a terrorist attack, though questioned by the FBI, they were released the same day without charge.

February 24, 1996. “Brothers to the Rescue” launched an incursion into Cuban airspace. In the 20 month period, prior to this incident, there had been at least 25 other violations of Cuban Airspace. On this occasion 2 of the 3 light planes were shot down.

April 12, 1997. The “Meliá Cohiba” Hotel in Havana is bombed.

April 30, 1997. In the same hotel a bomb is discovered and defused, before it could detonate.

68 July 12, 1997. The “Capri” and “Nacional” hotels are bombed.

August 4, 1997. The “Meliá Cohiba” hotel is again bombed.

August 11, 1997. A statement by the Cuban American National Foundation (CANF) is published in the U.S. media openly endorsing the ongoing campaign of terrorist bombings against civilian and tourist targets in Cuba. The Chairman of CANF, referring to the bombing outrages, publicly stated “We do not think of these as terrorist actions,” and went on to say that, he considered any violent action against Cuba to be legitimate.

September 4, 1997. The “Tritón” Hotel is bombed.

September 4, 1997. The “Chateau Miramar” is bombed.

September 4, 1997. The “Copacabana” Hotel is bombed and the young Italian tourist Fabio Di Celmo is killed.

September 4, 1997. The “La Bodeguita del Medio” restaurant is bombed.

October 27, 1997. The U.S. Coastguard stops a vessel on the high seas, west of Puerto Rico, a large cache of military grade weapons and equipment was on board. The 4 crew members were identified as active members of anti-Cuban terrorist groups operating out of the U.S. Among the weapons confiscated, were two 50 caliber high velocity rifles with tripods and night vision sights. The vessel was registered under the name of a Florida company, the Chairman of which was a member of CANF’s board of directors. Also, one of the 50 caliber rifles was registered under the name of the CANF president. During questioning by the U.S. authorities, one of the crew confessed, the vessel was on route to Venezuela, where the Ibero-American Summit on Margarita Island, was due to begin on the 7th of November. They planned to assassinate the Cuban President Fidel Castro when he arrived. Despite the clear evidence

69 that they were in possession of illegal military grade weapons, and, that they intended to assassinate a foreign head of state, they were all acquitted by a Federal Court in December 1999.

November 16, 1997. The Miami Herald publishes the results of a 2 month investigation into Miami based, Cuban exile groups. The paper uncovered that, Luis Posada Carilles was the mastermind behind the bombing campaign in Cuba. The same terrorist was responsible for the destruction of a civilian Cuban plane in 1976, causing the death of all passengers and crew.

July 12 &13, 1998. “The New York Times” publishes an interview with Luis Posada Carilles about his terrorist activities. He openly admitted to having organized the bombing campaign against tourist hotels and restaurants in Cuba. He further confirmed, that these terrorist attacks were financed by CANF, and that the Chairman Jorge Mas Canosa had personally overseen the logistics and transfer of funds for the attacks.

August 2,1998. The “CBS News” television program “Opposing Points of View” broadcasts an interview with Luis Posada Carriles in which he openly stated his intention to continue his terrorist attacks, both within Cuba and internationally.

September 1998. The Cuban Five, Fernando Gonzáles, Gerado Hernández, Ramón Labiño, Antonio Guerrero and René González are arrested and imprisoned.

The anti-Cuban terrorist activities continue unabated.

April 26, 2001. A vessel is stopped by the Cuban Coastguard, off the coast of Via Clara, in Cuban waters. The vessel was transporting weapons and communication equipment. The 3 crew members were based in Miami and directly linked to the anti-Cuban terrorist groups “Commados F4” and “Alpha 66.”

70 March 29, 2002. At a public meeting in Tampa, Florida, the leader of “Commandos F4,” Rodolfo Frómeta, openly admitted that he was organizing the training of terrorists to attack Cuban targets.

January 2003. The “Wall Street Journal” publishes a report on the creation of a Cuban-Venezuelan “Civic Military Alliance,” with the objective of overthrowing both Fidel Castro and Hugo Chavez, President of Venezuela. Rodolfo Frómeta the leader of “Commandos F4” stated “We are preparing for the war,” he further went on to say that 50 men, 30 of them Cubans, were at that time being trained at a secret location in the Florida Everglades.

Up to 1999, terrorist attacks in Cuba had resulted in the deaths of up to 3500 civilians, and serious injury to a further 2100.

3. There is no doubt that the terrorist attacks, constitute an armed attack on the sovereignty, and territorial integrity of the Cuban State. That does not imply, however, that terrorist attacks carried out by individuals, or groups, constitute attacks as stipulated in Article 51 UN-Charter. Such attacks allow the State attacked to resort to measures in self-defense which in turn, infringe on the sovereignty of the State from which the attacks were launched. Article 51 UN-Charter was instituted to allow States the right of self-defense against acts of violence committed by other States. This concept of self-defense does not, however, cover acts of violence committed by free individuals against States.

The International Court, in its Ruling on the Nicaragua Case3, stated that the USA was not responsible for the infringements of International Human Rights Law committed by its proxy paramilitary “Contras,” because the crimes were not “directed or enforced” by the U.S. A very close link must be demonstrated between the actors and the State which sponsors them, to prove culpability under

3 ICJ, Case concerning Military and Paramilitary Activities against Nicaragua, judgement June 27, 1986 (Merits), ICJ Rep. 1986, 14, 54.

71 Article 51 UN-Charter. A case in point, would be the “targeted killing” with drones as practiced by the CIA in Pakistan, Somalia and Yemen – though it is a private organization, this warfare is clearly carried out by the U.S.

Such a strict interpretation of what would constitute “violent acts carried out by individual groups” would never have allowed, in the case of the September 11, 2001 attacks, the USA to claim the right of self-defense under Article 51 UN-Charter. Though Al Qaida was operating from Afghanistan, no case was made that the Taliban was involved, much less that it “directed or enforced” the actors. The UN Security Council therefore had to expand the scope of Article 51 UN-Charter, to cover Non State Entities such as Al Qaida and its attacks. The expanded remit of Article 51 UN-Charter now allowed for legitimate acts of self-defense which would, in turn, infringe the sovereignty of Member States (Article 2 Nr.7 UN-Charter), from which Non State Entities had operated. All extensions of the right to self-defense are in direct conflict with the absolute prohibition of violence as laid out in Article 2 Nr. 4 UN-Charter. There is a clear danger that States will cloak illegal military attacks with the right to self-defense. A chilling example of how this looks is the declaration of the “War on Terror” by the USA and NATO. Now practically any State on whose territory Non State Entities could be hiding, is in danger of military attack. Such States can no longer claim protection under the UN-Charter – now, their only protection is a credi- ble military deterrence of their own.

4. The UN-Security Council Resolution 1368 (2001) opened the way to extending the remit of Article 51 UN-Charter, without however, clearly stipulating the new limits. Because the situation after the attacks in September of 2001 was so confused, the Security Council did not want to give the USA a new mandate. This created a gap, which was thrown wide open with the adoption of Resolution 1373(2001) “Enduring Freedom.” This Resolution, and its ever more difficult consequences, has over the years proved highly contentious. Nevertheless, at the time, the vote in the UN Security

72 Council was broadly supported. Now the remit of Article 51 UN- Charter, covered terrorist acts committed by Non State Entities4, and with that, banished any doubts as to the limits of self-defense. Irrespective of this, some authors still require demonstrable evidence, connecting the Non State Entities to the State harboring them5. Others consider the existence of an “external link” sufficient proof, the attack was not perpetrated by the targeted State6. With this they adopt the reasoning of NATO, which invoked the Treaty Clause under Article 5 of the NATO Statute, to support the USA, as the attack originated outside of the USA7.

If, the territorial integrity of the State from which the terrorists operated, is to be violated by a military intervention, then a “certain control” must be demonstrated by the “ Guest” State over the “resident terrorists.” In the Nicaragua Ruling, the International Court stipulates that this control must also be “effective.” The Appeals Chamber of the Yugoslavia Tribunal (ICTY) however, ruled that “overall control” was sufficient8. In the case of the anti-Cuban terrorists based in Florida, this differentiation is not decisive. The terrorist activities were public, they made no attempt to hide, or keep secret what they were engaged in. On the contrary, they actively sought publicity and, even had their operational planning published in the New York Times. One must assume, the U.S. Administration was not only fully informed, but also exercising significant control. Clearly the U.S. Administration tolerated and supported them. If proof were lacking, then the fact, that Military Grade Cessna Aircraft were supplied to persons openly plotting terrorist attacks against Cuba, must suffice. The USA cannot claim

4 Compare for example Stahn, Carsten, Terrorist Acts an “Armed Attack”: The right to Self-Defense, Article 51 (1/2) UN Charter, and International Terrorism, in: The Fletcher forum of World Affairs, Vol. 27:2 Summer/Fall 2003, page 35, 37. 5 Compare Randelzhofer, Albrecht, “On Srticle 51”, in : Simma, Bruno (ed.), Charter of the United Nations, 2002, p. 802. 6 See also Stahn, Carsten, note 2, p. 33, 34. 7 Compare NATO, Press release No. 124, “Statement of the North Atlantic Council”, September 12, 2001. 8 Compare ICTY, Appeals Chamber, Prosecutor vs. Tadic, judgement of July 1999, par. 137.

73 ignorance of the terrorist activities it supported, which in turn, elicited military measures in self-defense.

5. It is however, a prerequisite, that the nature of the terrorist activity, is both serious and ongoing. The terrorist activity may not con- sist merely of minor outbreaks of limited intensity, which could be more an irritation to a State, than a concrete threat to its stabili- ty. Additionally, these activities must indicate that further attacks are in the offing, before measures of self-defense, as stipulated in Article 51 UN-Charter, can legitimately be triggered. In the long history of anti-Cuban activities, directed from the U.S., numerous acts of the most grievous nature, have been documented. For example, one could point to the many attempts to assassinate the Cuban President Fidel Castro. Also, the bombing of tourist hotels and restaurants, specifically designed to engender a climate of fear and damage the Cuban economy. There can be no doubt, that in such a situation, Cuba would be entirely justified in taking measures of self-defense to protect both its population, and its sovereignty.

When a State is compelled to adopt measures of self-defense, it is in turn obliged to ensure that such action is balanced and propor- tionate. The response to the violence already suffered, or expected to occur, must be commensurate to the terrorist acts. Essentially, States must avoid the temptation to punish, and take revenge for injury suffered. Basically, a State is defending itself from a danger which, is both concrete and ongoing. It is legitimate when a State initiates measures to prevent future attacks. It is obliged to defend both its citizens, and its territorial integrity. The State which is the victim of terrorism, must demonstrate that it has attempted, through diplomatic channels, to persuade the other State to desist. If, after repeated requests, the State refuses to desist, then, the ultima ratio is the legitimate resort to military self-defense.

It is common knowledge, that the U.S. “War on Terror” has rarely been proportional when responding to perceived threats. Whether the Cruise Missile attack on Baghdad in 1993 after the failed

74 assassination attempt on President George H.W. Bush, or the reck- less destruction of a Sudanese pharmaceutical factory in 1998. But it is the policy of “targeted killing,” using drone aircraft, in Pakistan, Somalia and Yemen which has caused most outrage. The large, and mounting number of innocent civilians, killed and wounded, ig- nores all proportionality. Clearly the constraints of Article 51 UN- Charter are being massively violated.

6. The defensive measures adopted by the Cuban government were different. The U.S. Administration was warned repeatedly, through both public and private channels, in New York, Washington and Havana that the ongoing anti-Cuban terrorism could, and would not be tolerated any longer. Cuban repeatedly requested that the U.S. Administration use its influence to reign in the exile Cuban groups operating from its territory. Only after the U.S. clearly demonstrated, it had no intention of curbing the terrorist activities, did Cuba react. Cuba sent its men to the USA with a limited mandate – to infiltrate the anti-Cuban groups and gather information. They were not authorized to, and certainly did not, gather any information which could have compromised Americas legitimate national security interests. This was confirmed at the trial by respected individuals, such as General James R. Clapper Jr, and Rear Admiral Eugene Carroll9. The documents and other material sent back to Havana by the Cuban Five, were largely from the public domain, and were directly related to the activities of the exile Cuban groups operating out of the Florida region.

Compared to the terrorist activities, and “Regime Change” plans of the exile Cubans, the self-defense measures implemented by the Cuban government were entirely proportional. Even if considered as espionage, under U.S. Law, the seriousness, extent and, ongoing nature of the terrorist activities would suffice to warrant a legitimate response under Article 51 UN-Charter. The 1996 shooting down of the 2 “Brothers to the Rescue” aircraft, operated by

9 Compare “The Perfect Storm”, p. 98.

75 the notorious terrorist José Basulto, was a direct and legitimate response to repeated violations of Cuban airspace. Both the U.S. Administration, and the groups, were directly and repeatedly warned that, if the terrorist activities were not halted, the Cuban government would adopt the military option. It is in strict con- formity with International Law and norms, when a sovereign State resorts to military measures, to defend its airspace from egregious and repeated violations.

In conclusion, it must be noted that, though the Cuban Five broke American law, they did so purely to defend their country. The gross violations of International Law, committed by anti-Cuban terrorists, had to be countered. The action was strictly proportional, and compatible with the remit of Article 51 UN-Charter. The activities of the Cuban Five were justified, and a fair trial would have resulted in their release or, at the very least, far more lenient sentences.

76 //Session 2: The activities of the Cuban Five in Miami to// //prevent terrorist attacks on Cuba//

In session two the activities undertaken by the Cuban Five in Miami to prevent these harmful attacks were examined.

The main witness was supposed to be René González, the first of the Five to be released, who was scheduled to testify in person in London. However, at the last minute, René received the news that the British Government had denied him a visa to travel to the UK. Despite a series of legal appeals which culminated in a high level Judicial Review, the British Secretary of State’s Counsel argued that there was no compelling need for René to attend the Commission in person, and the Judge agreed and refused to overturn the Secretary of State’s decision.

Despite this further injustice, René was able to give his testimony to the Commission via Skype. He presented evidence about the work of the Five, and the arrest, trial and imprisonment.

RENÉ GONZÁLEZ SEHWERERT – cuban five

René González Sehwerert was released in October 2011. He was an American citizen, born in Chicago, Illinois, on August 13, 1956. As a son of Cuban immigrants he arrived in Cuba in 1961. René is a pilot and flight instructor. Married to Olga Salanueva since 1983, they have two daughters: 29 year-old Irma González Salanueva, and 15 year-old Ivette González Salanueva. From 1977 to 1979 he participated as an internationalist combatant in the war of liberation in Angola and against apartheid. In 1990 René returned to the United States, and in 1996 his wife and elder daughter joined him in Miami. His daughter Ivette was born in that city in 1998.

77 On September 12, 1998 René was arrested. He was held in preventa- tive custody for thirty-three months before the sentence was passed and was isolated in special cell, known as “the hole”, designed for prisoners with serious disciplinary problems for 17 months prior to the trial and for 48 days after the verdict was passed. In February 2003 he was once again held in solitary confinement for a month without any reason being given.

His trial, held at the United States District Court Southern District of Florida, under Case No. 98-721-Cr-Lenard(S), began on November 26, 2000 and concluded on June 8, 2001, in Miami, Florida, home to over half a million Cuban exiles. Miami is a community with a long history of hostility toward the Cuban government – a record that a federal appellate court in the United States later described as a “perfect storm” of prejudice, precluding a fair trial.

Following his conviction, on December 14, 2001 he was sentenced to 15 years of imprisonment on the charges of General Conspiracy and Conspiracy to act as a non- registered foreign agent. After the trial, René was incarcerated in several prisons before arriving at Marianna FCI, Florida, where he served until Oct. 7, 2011. Despite repeated appeals, Judge Joan Lenard ruled that he must stay in Florida for the next three years under conditions of “supervised release.” Since the deportation of René’s wife, Olga Salanueva, in 2000, the government of the United States denied visa permits to her on 7 occasions.

After serving his entire sentence, René González was released on October 7, 2011. On March 31, 2012, U.S. District Judge Joan Lenard granted González his request to return to Cuba to see his ill brother, with the condition that he had to obtain permission from the U.S. government and return within 15 days. After the visit, René returned to the United States. On April 22, 2013 René González returned to Cuba for his father’s funeral and on May 11, Judge Lenard allowed him to stay there provided that he renounce his United States citizenship.

78 Testimony

I was born in Chicago, USA, on August 13, 1956 to a couple of Cuban immigrants. My family returned to Cuba in October of 1961 and I grew up on the island until my departure for the U.S. in December 1990, to comply with the mission of infiltrating the terrorist groups, which, with support from the U.S. Government committed acts of terrorism and other aggressive deeds against Cuba, in violation of both international and U.S. laws.

While growing up in Cuba, as part of my generation, I was witness to multiple acts of terrorism committed against its population, with the culprits coming from and going back to Miami. I remember the attack on Boca de Sama, which left several people dead and a young girl without her feet, by people who left from Miami and then returned to that city. I remember the armed kidnappings of fishermen by gun- boats belonging to organizations with public offices in Miami, with resulting deaths and injuries. I participated, together with the Cuban people, in the burial of the few victims who could be recovered from the bombing of the Cubana airliner in Barbados, whose mastermind is still living in the open in Miami in spite of having been identified as a terrorist by the U.S. government. I was a small child when Havana City was shaken by the shooting at a hotel on the shoreline from a boat, which came from and returned to Miami. I would, years later, meet with the gunner, Jose Basulto, when he founded Brothers to the Rescue in May 1991.

After all that experience, when I was asked to go to Miami to infiltrate those groups, I didn’t hesitate and consented to the mission of protecting my fellow Cubans from terrorism. All that I learned from those groups, some of it to be shared with this commission, was informed by me to the Cuban government.

I arrived in Miami in December 1990 after having stolen a crop-duster airplane. Right upon arrival I joined CUPA (Cuban American Pilots Association), led by Eduardo Ferrer, a veteran pilot from the Bay of

79 Pigs. CUPA was more of a public, social gathering of mostly old pilots from the Batista army, veterans of the Bay of Pigs and mercenaries from the Congo. They also were involved in some violent plots together with ex-USA military of Cuban origin. In 1991 I was consulted by Ferrer on the feasibility of mounting a remote controlled airplane loaded with explosives on a sea platform, so as to launch it against Cuba, preferably on a political rally.

I met Jose Basulto through Eduardo Ferrer, on the same day that Brothers to the Rescue was publicly inaugurated. As a matter of fact, Basulto himself, on his first flight with the organization, invited me as his copilot.

Brothers to the Rescue was founded by people from what came to be known in the CIA’s terminology as the “Infiltration Teams” of the 1960s. People like Jose Basulto, Billy Schuss and Felix “El Gato” Rodriguez had been youngsters enrolled during the Bay of Pigs period in order to infiltrate them in Cuba in advance to the invasion so as to prepare the theatre of operations. They received training in explosives, psychological warfare, etc. Some of them were in the 1990s well- established businessmen with lots of connections with the political and law enforcement agencies in Miami, both federal and state.

Initially Brothers to the Rescue was a psychological operation, which aimed to create unrest in Cuba by adding pressure to the increasing outflow of rafters that came as a result of the economic problems faced by the island. It was a perfectly conceived scheme which fed on the “humanitarian” issue of saving lives on the high seas by spotting rafters for the U.S. Coastguard; with the added benefit that it worked as a perfect international propaganda tool, by taking journalists from all over the world on the flights so they could see how “Cubans fly from Communism.” It doesn’t mean that they didn’t have other goals and means in mind: In August 1992 Jose Basulto consulted me on a location in Cuba where a small plane could land so as to place an explosive device on some electric towers. He showed me a map of the Cuban electric grid, which he had marked as “Secret” and tried to pinpoint,

80 according to my experience as a pilot in Cuba, a place where a small plane could land next to some high voltage transmission tower. Later on, by 1993, he would become interested in buying some Russian- built warplanes.

Other groups also had jumped on the rafters’ wagon, although their public goals were more explicit. At the beginning of 1992 I was approached by somebody from PUND (Partido Unidad Nacional Democratica), which had created a branch to “look for rafters” called “Legion de Rescate de Balseros” (Rafters’ Rescue Legion). PUND was led by some ex-political prisoners and included Frank Fiorini, one of the former CIA operatives who had participated in the burglary on the Watergate building. Their public goal was the violent overthrow of the Cuban government, and they had training camps in the Everglades and a public office on 17th Ave. and th5 Street, SW Miami. The PUND was responsible for the infiltration of some armed teams into Cuba, including one, which ended up killing a fisherman on Caibarien in order to take away his vehicle. We provided aerial coverage for their infiltrations as well as scouting from the planes of the Cuban defenses. The PUND had also another, less public goal, which became evident to me as soon as I started to deal with them: Drug Traffic. Some of them dealt with loads of cash and their behavior was very suspicious. Their ranks were comprised mostly with recently arrived Cubans, who lived on the training camps and received $175 a week. They were more like idle, good-for-nothing individuals, than any sort of politicized in- surgent. The PUND was a mix of ex-counterrevolutionaries, ex-CIA operatives, unoccupied and drug dealers, with some connections with their likes in Central America. The airplane we were flying for them was constantly harassed by the U.S. authorities and ended up confiscated in August 1992. They continued with their naval operations.

After the confiscation of the airplane, I kept contact with PUND, although it didn’t involve any operations. At the end of 1994 one of the PUND’s leaders, who always seemed to be the guy behind the money, asked me to engage on a drug flight from Puerto Rico for a $25,000 payment. Tony Garcia “El Gordo” (The Fat One) told me that

81 everything was arranged with the authorities in Puerto Rico, and the deal had the approval of the U.S. government. It was at that instance that we agreed with our Cuban handlers to establish our first contact with the U.S. Federal authorities in order to inform them of the drug deal. As a result Tony “The Fat One” was arrested and returned to jail, where we learned he had been taken out of in order to use him as bait to entrap potential drug dealers. Apparently, our flight was to be on the side, without the consent of the authorities handling him, and they returned him to jail for it.

The end result of the arrest of Tony “The Fat One” was that the PUND ended up without resources and went into oblivion. It was also through the Central American contacts with PUND that I learned of the location of Luis Posada Carriles – mastermind of the Cubana airlines bombing – on that region.

By the autumn of 1994 the dynamics of the rafter’s issue were suffering a change, after reaching the climax in August of that year, when people rioted violently along the Havana sea wall, after a rumor said that some big ship would sail with migrants to the U.S. The Cuban government opened the shores of the island to everybody wanting to leave, bringing about the rafter’s crisis, which forced the U.S. government to come to a temporary agreement on immigration in September of that year. By refusing to allow any more rafters into their territory, all of a sudden the Americans left Brothers to the Rescue without a mission to justify their own existence. Now the U.S. government would offer 20,000 entry permits to Cubans every year, allowing potential immigrants from the island to travel safely and legally to the United States.

Now the riots came in Miami, led by Jose Basulto and a new leader: Ramón Saul Sanchez. Both were protesting the immigration accords; which one would have expected they would have supported if they really cared for the safety and “freedom to travel” of the Cubans on the island. All of a sudden the mission of Brothers to the Rescue changed from spotting rafters to something more aggressive: to invade the Cuban airspace at will and challenge the Cuban government’s

82 sovereignty. They were joined by a new organization: Movimiento Democracia (Democracy Movement).

Movimiento Democracia was led by Ramón Saul Sanchez. Sanchez had a long history of terrorism against Cuba, since his militancy with “Alpha 66”, through his leadership on “Abdala” and “Omega 7”, and his connection with the assassination of a Cuban diplomat assigned to the United Nations, on September 11, 1980. Now “Brothers to the Rescue” and “Democracia” joined forces in the new venture of pro- voking the Cuban government by infringing into Cuban territory, in violation of both U.S. and international laws: “Brothers to the Rescue” with its airplanes and “Democracia” with both airplanes and boats. I joined “Democracia” as a lieutenant to the chief of aerial operations. Although my militancy on “PUND” had separated me a little from “Brothers to the Rescue,” we still maintained some links.

1995 was the peak of the new mode of aggression against Cuba, with the most notable event being the flotilla on July 15. After repeated violations, the Cuban government started to warn of their will to put an end to those incursions by exercising their sovereign right to defend the country. The conditions started to concur to bring about the tragic downing of the “Brothers to the Rescue” planes. One of those conditions was the testing by Basulto of a fatal weapon, consisting of a device similar to a pyrotechnic flare, which would instead be charged with iron balls, to be dropped in Cuba in the event some riot would come as a result of those provocations from Miami. Juan Pablo Roque, another Cuban agent, gave the information about the plot to FBI agent Oscar Montoto. As was exposed in the trial, FBI agent George Kaczynski paid a visit to Jose Basulto and gave him a “warning” as to not continuing with the testing of the weapons. And that was all.

In the meantime, at the hangar of the International Flight Center in Tamiami Airport, where I operated as a flight instructor, some of the equipment gathered by the new paramilitary group of the Cuban American National Foundation – which included a helicopter under the care of Felix Rodriguez “El Gato” (The Cat) – was being stored

83 for further use against Cuba. The whole operation would become public after about a decade when Antonio Llama, a member of the Foundation who had put forward $1,500,000 for the purchase of the weapons and equipment, went to court demanding restitution of the money by the organization, the most powerful and well-connected on both Capitol Hill and the White House of all the Cuban organizations in Miami to date. Part of the operation included the attempt on the life of Fidel at Margarita Island, off Venezuela, which was cut short when the boat taking the assassins there suffered a rupture and was towed back into Puerto Rico in 1997, opening another murky legal process which ended up on the absolution of the plotters.

Still engaged with “Democracia,” by the end of 1995 I found an old acquaintance from PUND: Hector Viamontes. Viamontes, together with Justo Regalado, had been leaders at PUND but separated apparently for “tactical reasons.” They now led another organization, an offspring of PUND, named CLU or Comandos de Liberacion Unidos (United Liberation Commands). With a training camp on 12th Street NW and the Florida Turnpike, the personnel of CLU was left over from PUND, and had the same behavior. Justo Regalado had already being in jail for drug trafficking while Hector Viamontes was the owner of a security firm. It was Viamontes, at the beginning of 1996, the second anti-Castro mili- tant to offer me a drug deal, on this occasion by bringing a loaded airplane from Honduras. Again with our Cuban handlers we decided to pass on the information to the FBI. Hector Viamontes was arrested for drug dealings in 1997 and we didn’t hear much of CLU after that.

By 1997-1998 the new mode of confrontation with Cuba had started to dwindle, after the shootdown-down of the Brothers to the Rescue airplanes and due to the null results of the flotillas organized by “Democracia.” Nevertheless, Ramón Saul Sanchez insisted now and then into organizing one, while Brothers to the Rescue was only a small shadow of its past glory. In the meantime, other matters oc- cupied our attention: The bombing campaign against Cuban hotels, which ended up killing Fabio DiCelmo, an Italian tourist; The locali- zation of the means acquired by the paramilitary group of the Cuban

84 American National Foundation; The search for some weapons caches to be buried on some Bahamas islands in order to be taken to Cuba. Then, in the early morning of September 12, 1998, we were violently arrested and taken to the FBI headquarters. The process of the Cuban Five started.

After the arrest and initial interrogation at the FBI we were taken to the Federal Detention Center in Miami, where a “special treatment” was designed for us. We were placed in solitary confinement without access to any of the few privileges afforded to a prisoner by the rules. Isolated in solitary confinement, first on the th13 floor and later in the Special Housing Unit (the hole), I was to learn that it had been decided that I couldn’t receive the visits of my minor daughters, the only prisoner in the whole building with such limitation. It took months for my wife to be able to visit with me, and later on they decided that she couldn’t visit on weekends or holidays – when most people visit for obvious reasons – forcing her to come on work days.

While we were placed in the hole, another hole was designed for the evidence, by arbitrarily stamping the “secret” label on the totality of it. Every paper found at our houses was designed as “secret” in violation of the same code we had been charged for. In order to review the evidence, which was made of thousands of pages originally in Spanish, each with its translation into English; our lawyers needed to submit a request a day in advance for whatever time – maybe a couple of hours or three – that they would have at their disposal to work with us on the following day. Then we would be awoken at 4:30 in the morning, go through the whole journey usually designed to take the prisoners scheduled for court, await in the holding cells for hours until the requested time arrived, work with the evidence for whatever time our lawyers or their investigators had at their disposal, and spend a few hours in the holding cells until the last people who went to court would be taken back to the FDC. This process was repeated every time we needed to work with the evidence, be it for the review of a single document or for a couple of hours of work at the SCIF (Secured Classified Information Facility), which was the denomi- nation of the “evidence’s hole.” We spent 17 months on such a punitive

85 regime, until our continuous demands to the Court made them reflect on the convenience of taking us up to the general population.

As soon as the process started, the venue became an issue for us, and so we filed early motions asking for a change of venue, at least to Ft. Lauderdale, a few miles north of Miami. We asked the Court for permission to have the community surveyed by Dr. Moran, an expert on the subject. The judge approved of the survey, its size and the funds to pay for it. The results didn’t satisfy the prosecution as they – for obvious reasons – showed the prejudice of the community towards Cuba and the defendants. So we had to have a hearing in front of the judge.

The prosecutors argued – without having to present a competing survey or anything at all besides their words – that the size was too small to be taken into account. They added that the results of the survey matched another survey previously presented by Moran on another case, which meant that the surveyor was prejudiced and had only copied from the previous survey. The judge agreed on both counts and that’s how we discovered that with the tip of her tongue a prosecutor could wipe away the results of a survey and a previous decision by the Judge regarding the size of it. To add insult to injury, Mr. Moran refused to participate in the hearing in defense of his survey because the Judge had withheld the payment she had previously approved. We would learn more lately: The Judge had had previous conflicts with Mr. Moran and didn’t inform the defense when we named Mr. Moran as the surveyor. None of this would be accepted by the Judge to reconsider their rulings on the survey.

Another point of argument on the venue issue had to do with the hostile press coverage during the trial. The defense presented a thick dossier with all the press articles written during the pretrial period, absolutely hostile to the defendants and a good part with incendiary content, to no avail. We would learn something more about the press coverage latter.

The discussion of judicial precedent took long space on the issue of venue, revolving around the case known as Pamplin vs. Mason. This

86 was a well-established case of community prejudice, which the defense relied on to argue for a change of venue. The discussions went for long, with the prosecution arguing that Miami was a big, hetero geneous city, from where a good jury could be selected. The judge again sided with the prosecution and that’s how the venue issue was settled to our disadvantage, setting the stage for the results of the trial. Another issue was the subject of terrorism, but it was an issue for the prosecution. They were adamant about precluding the subject from going to the jury in order to prevent us from rubbing their faces in the evidence related to terrorism against Cuba. In March 2000 the government filed a motion asking the judge to preclude the subject of terrorism from being ventilated at the trial.

The argument went as follows: “Fighting terrorism was the motivation of the defendants, and their motivations are not an issue to be discussed with the jury.” This motion didn’t prosper and the way was opened for us to expose all the subject of terrorism against Cuba, and the complicity of the government with their terrorists. The prosecutors would now have to resort to their meanest behavior to compen- sate for the morale they would never have in the trial.

In August 2000, three months before starting the trial, another move by the prosecution was launched by attacking the heart of my family. They proposed a plea agreement to me, and the last paragraph was a reminder that my wife was just a resident, who could be taken away from the U.S. at the will of the U.S. government. As I refused to sign the plea agreement they went after my wife and put her in jail on August 16, subjecting her to the same conditions of confinement for three months before finishing a deportation process that sent her back to Cuba in November. She wasn’t allowed an entry visa back into the U.S. for the entire period of my sentence and supervised release.

The trial started in November 2000 with the selection of the jury. Since the beginning, it was clear that the prejudices and fears in the community would make it impossible for us to have a fair trial. We had to spend our peremptory challenges on the people of Cuban origin,

87 while the prosecution pushed to have as many Cubans as they could in the jury pool, and the press, on the other side, resounded with the message to the Cubans that they had the duty to be part of it. The prosecution openly challenged every Black person who would appear, blatantly making a mockery of the Batson rule against discrimination with the acquaintance of the Judge. At the end, we were able to have all the Cubans out of the jury box, but ended up with 12 individuals who would never be able to render a fair verdict, some of them glancing at us with open hatred, all under the intimidation of a press corps which we would later learn was being paid for by the U.S. government. The seven month trial was a lesson in how a government can bul- ly everybody in a court of law, including a Judge, who to be fair, did what she could to not lose the control of her Court to the prosecution. The prosecutors and their witnesses lied openly and were caught on it, even by the Judge herself. They tampered with the evidence, going to the extreme of rendering useless some depositions they didn’t like. They blackmailed our witnesses to prevent again the testimonies on terrorism against Cuba, threatening openly the witnesses we subpoe- naed with incarceration. They violated the same order of the Court again and again without consequences. They made it almost impossible for the defense to develop their case, by interrupting every move, opposing every motion or just interjecting themselves at any moment into the defense’s time just for the sake of it. Government law enforcement officials didn’t hide their indifference toward or their liking of the terrorists while testifying. What the prosecutors couldn’t do, because they had been precluded from by the Court’s orders, was done on their behalf by the press, which included the direct intimidation of the jury by videotaping their car license plate numbers.

On June 8, 2001, the jury returned a verdict of guilty on all counts. No surprise to us, but some people in the room who had watched the whole trial were in disbelief. The U.S. Marshals couldn’t stop from apologizing to us on the way back to the FDC.

The staff at the courtroom was all with us and showed their support in every manner possible. As one of the Marshals told us: “I’ve seen

88 some bad things happening in a trial, but this one is the worst in my entire career.”

The sentencing process showed to us a Judge full of hatred against the defendants, who didn’t consider a single mitigating factor, in spite of the evidence. The prosecutors asked for the maximum time that could be given in all cases and the Judge obliged, sometimes breaking away from the letter of the law in ways which challenged the rules of the most elemental English language. I ended up with a 15-year sentence, but not without a special condition requested by the prosecution for my three years of supervised release: “The defendant is forbidden to associate with or to visit places where terrorists or organized crime figures meet or are known to meet.” Before doing so, and responding to the request by the prosecution for my “inca- pacitation” during that period of supervised release, she gave us a lesson on jurisprudence: “Terrorism is bad and is evil, being it in Israel, Ireland, the United States or Cuba, but the terrorist acts by others do not justify the illegal and wrongful conduct of this or any other defendant.”

With the stroke of a pen, a Judge in America declared the right of the anti-Cuba terrorists to meet and operate without being molested.

In January of 2002, the five of us were taken to differentcorrectional facilities to comply with our sentencing. As time passed other develop ments would bring to light the vindictive nature of our trial and prosecution.

One of them was the case of Ramirez vs. Ashcroft. In the wake of the Elian González saga, an official of Spanish descent took the INS to court on grounds of harassment related to his opinions on Elian’s fate. This time around, now as the defendant, the government requested a change of venue to the same District Court, which had handled our case. To argue their case they now resorted to the same precedent we had applied unsuccessfully before: Pamplin vs. Mason. They argued, “In a case dealing with Cuba, in which the U.S. government is seen

89 by the community as the occasional ally of the Cuban government, it is impossible to have a fair trial in Miami.” The Court granted the government the change of venue, which had been denied to us. All of a sudden, in the space of about a year, in the eyes of the government and the judges, Miami had been transformed from a heterogeneous, big city, into a small town where prejudices against Cuba mattered. Our lawyers picked up on the Ramirez vs. Ashcroft case and went back to the Judge, arguing that either the government lied to her before or else they had lied to the court on Ramirez. Now they were acknowledging the same thing they denied before: that somebody linked with the Cuban government in the eyes of the Miami community didn’t have the chance of a fair trial in that city. The judge didn’t seem to care much and again denied our request for a review of the venue issue. Now again, in the eyes of the judge and the prosecutors, the city had returned to its original, big and heterogeneous condition.

Another new development came to light, magnifying the injustice of the case: In 2006 it became public that the local Miami journalists covering the trial, directly responsible for the massive, incendiary reporting on the Five, had been under payment by Radio Marti – a government broadcasting station designed only for international propaganda – without the payments having been disclosed to the public. In other words, at the time of the prosecution the same prosecuting government was paying the supposedly independent local journalists covering the trial, who not only spent all their efforts vilifying the defendants, but also directly participated in the intimidation of the seated jury. The issue of the surrep- titious payments to journalists is still pending with the judge, together with other grounds of appeal in the Habeas Corpus or 2255 motion.

Time has passed and the process has taken its course slowly and painful- ly for our families and for us. After an initial hope when the first appeals panel reversed the convictions based on the “perfect storm created when the surge of pervasive community sentiment, and extensive publicity both before and during the trial, merged with the improper prosecutorial references.” A further realignment of judges and the concerted actions of the judiciary and the executive soon overturned that decision, ending with

90 the refusal by the Supreme Court to hear a case where a record number of Amicus briefs were presented by prestigious people and organizations from all over the world, which included 10 Nobel Prize winners.

For the five of us completing our entire, unfair sentences continues to be the future prospect. Two of us have already done so and the rest would have to go through it if the U.S. government is not convinced to put an end to this injustice by the clamor of the decent people of the world. This would include the natural death of Gerardo Hernández in prison for a crime even the prosecutors admitted he is not guilty of.

As for myself, as the completion of the incarceration period approached I had to deal with the prospect of going to a halfway house – with the benefit of an early release – and the pending three years of supervised release imposed by the judge. Both issues had to take into account the consequences of having to return to my place of origin: The very city of Miami where the terrorists were shielded from me by the special condition imposed by the Judge, but at liberty to approach me and do me harm protected by the complicity from the authorities. My first step was to request a move to another district, more to the north of Florida, where some friends were willing to give me shelter. Provided that the move would be approved, I would then be able to benefit from the 6 months of halfway house earned by my good conduct, thus leaving prison in April 2011.

In the meantime we resorted to another recourse: Asking the Judge to allow me to complete my supervised release in Cuba. Before filing the motion with the Court my lawyer approached the prosecutors to have their input on the matter. They told him that they would be in- clined to accept provided I renounced my U.S. citizenship. Although I hesitated at first into renouncing a birth right under the pressure of the prosecutors, later on I reconsidered and by the beginning of 2011 my lawyer again approached the prosecutors. They seemed to agree on the renunciation and went into the motions of finding a U.S. consulate anywhere so that, according to the laws, I could travel there to renounce my U.S. citizenship. Initially they seemed to consider the

91 Bahamas or Havana. In spite of it, my lawyer filed the motion, while apparently the prosecutors would be working on the logistics of my renunciation to the U.S. citizenship.

As April approached, I was notified that the relocation to a place in northern Florida had been denied, which forced me to complete the whole sentence in jail instead of going to the halfway house in April. Then the prosecution filed a response to my motion to do my supervised release in Cuba. Basically they opposed it on the grounds that it was premature, and I needed some time of supervised release in order to show the Court that my behavior was to the satisfaction of the Judge. To my numerous humanitarian arguments they responded that according to the law even under supervised release I could travel to Cuba to see my family, which would remedy the impossibility of seeing my wife, banished from the U.S. In spite of the government’s response in opposition, we continued working with them on the logistics of traveling to a U.S. consulate somewhere to renounce my U.S. citizenship.

Finally, about a month before my release in October 2011 the prosecutor informed my attorney that the deal to travel to a U.S. consulate somewhere to renounce my U.S. citizenship was no longer on the table. Some days later the Judge ruled against my motion to modify the supervised release so it could be done in Cuba. On October 7, 2011, I was discharged from Mariana Correctional Institution to start my supervised release in a semi-clandestine condition in the Southern District of Florida, seat to the terrorist and violent organizations I’d been watching for eight years.

The period of supervised release in South Florida was an absurd year and a half of inhuman limitations, derived from the combination of conditions of supervised release and the threat to my life represented by the terrorists in Miami. I only relied on my discipline so as not to disclose my location. I couldn’t have a single document – other than a passport – so as not to disclose my address on any public record. I was unable to obtain a driver’s license or a credit card for the same reason. I was unable to befriend any neighbor because in doing it the rules

92 forced me to tell him about my legal status, which could open the way to his knowledge of the case. I had to rely on a handful of friends who knew of the case and sympathized with our cause. My days were spent in a house, showing up as little as possible, going on a bike for the gro- ceries, and jogging every other day very early in the morning. I had to fill the house with traps in order to put some security to my sleep. It was an additional punishment with the use of my U.S. citizenship to extend my sentence for three more years.

By the end of February 2012, four months into the supervised release, I was already working with my attorney to file the new motion to modify it and finish it in Cuba. It was then that my brother fell gravely ill and we had to change plans: A motion to travel to Cuba for 15 days to see my dying brother was filed at the end of the month. Unsurprisingly, the prosecutors, once again, opposed the motion in spite of their arguments the previous year telling the judge that I was at liberty to ask for a leave to travel. This time around they claimed that it was a risk to the U.S. if I used the leave to receive instructions from the Cuban intelligence. They also claimed that the Judge didn’t have the power to make me return to the U.S. once I was in Cuba. In spite of the government’s opposition, the Judge this time around gave me a two-week leave to travel and I did so in March, returning to my absurd supervised release in April 2012. My brother died in Cuba in June of that year.

It was in June of 2012 when at last I was able to file the new motion for modification of my conditions of supervised release, after having shown to the Judge that my behavior wasn’t a danger to the public. It was the first time that an offer came from me to the Court on the issue of the U.S. citizenship: I offered the Judge to travel to Cuba, provided the Court approved of it, and then renounce my U.S. citizenship in the U.S. Interest Office in Havana to remain in Cuba with the approval of the Court.

The prosecutor’s response – of course in the negative – came with a new argument: They now claimed that my word wasn’t to be trusted, and that once in Havana I could resort to not going to the U.S. Interest

93 Section to make good on my word of renouncing my citizenship. That, in spite that I had already been to Havana and returned to the U.S. a few months earlier.

Time went by as the motion was considered by the Judge. Then my father died in April 2013 and we had again to ask for a leave to be with my family for a couple of weeks. We filed a motion to travel and this time around the prosecution limited themselves to giving a hesitant nod to the Judge into deciding by herself. On April 22 I arrived in Havana with permission from the Court for two more weeks.

Once I was in Cuba, my lawyer in Miami filed a motion offering the Judge that at any moment, with her permission, I could present myself at the U.S. Interest Section in Havana to renounce my U.S. citizenship, provided the Court then would authorize me to complete my supervised release in Cuba. Caught unguarded and without argument, the prosecution decided not to respond to the new motion. The Judge agreed on my request and by the beginning of May I had renounced as promised, with the Court then allowing the requested modification of my supervised release.

My legal case is now officially closed, but the uphill battle to afford justice to my four brothers is still on. They are still facing all the hatred that my story shows was unleashed on me, a hatred that has reached the characteristics of a personal vendetta. A year and a half of an inhuman supervised release is all the victory we can claim against this injustice and it came at the price of my father’s life and my forced renouncing of my birth citizenship. We can’t allow ourselves to pay the price of Gerardo dying in prison for a crime even the prosecutors know he didn’t commit.

We count on you to put an end to this tragedy, derived from the most sordid and immoral instincts some human beings can harbor. Humanity should be more than that.

Thank you very much for your patience.

94 The Commissioners: Judge Philippe Texier, Judge Yogesh Kumar Sabharwal and Judge Zakeria Yacoob.

The public, in the magnificent Common Room of the Law Society

95 From left to right: attorney Martin Garbus, professor Sara Chandler and barrister Elizabeth Woodcraft

Attorney Phillip Horowitz

96 Attorney Peter Schey

René González giving testimony to the Commission via Skype.

97 From left to right: Elizabeth Palmeiro, Irmita González and Adriana Pérez

Irmita González and Alice Walker

98 Saturday, March 8: The unfairness of the treatment of the Cuban Five

/Session 3: Arrest, conduct of the trial, detention conditions/ /and visiting rights/

Day two of the commission focused on the unfairness of the treatment of the Cuban Five in terms of their arrest, the conduct of the trial, detention conditions and visiting rights. In sessions three evidence was heard from the U.S. legal team and family members.

Phillip Horowitz and Martin Garbus, two of the Cuban Five attorneys gave details of the denial of the Five’s rights to a fair trial by the U.S. government. They described the anti-Cuban hysteria whipped up in Miami making a fair trial impossible. Garbus presented a 558- page document to the Commissioners outlining the U.S. government’s illegal and secret payments to prominent Miami reporters who worked to condemn the Five through their highly prejudicial coverage.

Attorney Peter Schey spoke of the U.S. government’s refusal to provide vital satellite images of the shooting down of Brothers to the Rescue planes on February 24, 1996. The shooting down was falsely pinned on Gerardo Hernández and is the reason he is serving a draconian double-life sentence.

An important testimony was given by Angela Wright, senior researcher at the Americas desk of the International Secretariat at Amnesty International. She was principal author of the 2010 AI report ‘U.S.: The case of the Cuban Five.’ Angela explained the position of Amnesty International and the clear case of injustice perpetrated against the Five through the unfair trial and subsequent treatment of the Five and their families.

Family members Adriana Peréz, wife of Gerardo Hernández; and Elizabeth Palmeiro, wife of Ramón Labanino; provided testimonies.

99 Olga Salanueva, the wife of René González, had been due to travel with René on the Monday before the Commission, but due to the rejection of her husband’s visa application, she was only able to arrive in London on the morning of the second day of the Commission.

1. Statements of experts

MARTIN GARBUS – american trial lawyer

Martin Garbus is a leading American trial lawyer. He is one of America’s foremost Criminal, Constitutional, First Amendment and International lawyers. Garbus attended New York University Law School and Columbia University. The Guardian newspaper said, ‘in his willingness to fight for freedom, Garbus is as American as the bald eagle.’ Garbus was Legal and Associate Director of The American Civil Liberties Union, co- director of the Columbia University Center on Social Policy and Law, and Chairman of The Lawyers Constitutional Defense Committee. He has taught at many American and foreign Law Schools, including Harvard, Yale, Stanford and at Tsingua and Renmin Law School (Beijing), Milan and Prague, and has appeared before foreign governments, including Parliaments, in many countries.

Garbus has diverse litigation experience including copyright, intellectual property, criminal defense, libel and internet law. His courtroom skills have earned him a distinguished reputation as a scholar, appellate and trial lawyer. His cases have established new legal precedents in the areas of criminal and First Amendment law in the Supreme Court and in courts throughout the U.S. He is a leader in expanding the rights of criminal defendants and free speech. Garbus argued before the United States Supreme Court, testified before the U.S. Congress and the New York and California legislative branches on many different issues.

100 One of his Supreme Court Cases, Goldberg v. Kelly was described by Justice William Brennan as ‘perhaps the most important due process case of the Twentieth Century.’

Garbus, the author of six notable books, that have received awards, as well as numerous articles that have appeared, among other places, in the New York Times, the Washington Post and foreign publications, has worked on the Constitutions and criminal and free speech laws of half a dozen foreign countries. He has given hundreds of speeches on various aspects of law before Bar Associations, corporations and Law Schools, as well as on television and radio networks in the United States and abroad. His clients included Andrei Sakharov, Vaclav Havel, Daniel Ellsberg and Salman Rushdie.

He has practiced law and been involved in Rwanda, the Soviet Union, China, Taiwan and other countries. This has earned him numerous honours including the prestigious Senator William Fulbright Award for Global Leadership in International Law in 2012. The award notes, “Martin Garbus’ courage and his extraordinary contribution to law both in the United States and abroad”…calling him a “hero” in many foreign countries for his work in courtrooms throughout the world, said he is “renowned all over the world for his commitment to the rule of law and the protection of speech and action that guarantees individual rights.”

Honors include listings in Who’s Who in America, Who’s Who in Best Lawyers in America, as well as awards from Law Schools, colleges and civil rights and civil liberties organizations. Martin Garbus joined the team of lawyers trying to set aside the convictions of the Cuban Five in April 2012.

Testimony

This is my opportunity and obligation, on behalf of each member of The Cuban Five, to present to the Commission of Inquiry and the three eminent jurists a brief outline of the legal facts and the history

101 of the case. I will, in my short talk, refer to a good deal of printed information, hundreds of pages of Transcripts and evidence that I have prepared especially for them.

The Cuban Five Trial was a 7 month trial. There is a 16 year history of litigation. We have tried to consolidate the facts and law and to answer all of their questions.

We will furnish the Commission of Inquiry and the eminent jurists together with the outline documents that are presently before the Florida court on the Habeas Corpus as well as a lengthy and a close examination of everything that happened at the trial, before the trials, and during the appeals. All those documents fill a room of this size.

I have asked two of my colleagues to join in this presentation. Philip Horowitz, who will be joining me, is a distinguished member of the criminal Bar in Florida. He was involved with René at the very outset of the case. Many of the things that René was unable to answer yesterday, because he cannot be here, will be answered by Philip or me.

Peter Schey, a distinguished member of the California Bar, will focus on the satellite issues – where was the plane when it was shot down, as well as the government’s refusal to give the defendants documents essential for their defense.

Elizabeth Woodcraft and Sara Chandler, both of whom played a large role in the creation of this Commission for which we are grateful, asked us to advise the Commissioners of these specific acts that un- derlay our claim that the conviction and the arrest are unwarranted and unjustified. That we shall do.

We shall in the next four hours go through the facts prior to the shootdown, after the shootdown of February 1996, the period of time – two years – between the shootdown and coming arrests (it was three and a half years before charges concerning any charges related to the shootdown were filed), the pre-trial proceedings, the inability of the

102 defense to examine material and the use by the Government of the Classified Information Procedures Act to stop the defendants from getting information.

Eminent jurists and members of the audience, the trial itself, the extra ordinary events during the trial, the composition of the Jury, and the Judge’s ruling will also be discussed orally and in the submitted papers too, as well as the appeals that went on for 8 years and the post-appeal period that went on for 2 years.

This case is unparalleled in American legal history, with respect to the violations of fair trial issues, the manner of arrest and the venue issues, most specifically the way that the Jury was affected by the payment by the American Government of millions of dollars to journalists who covered the case.

Facts laboriously developed after the Supreme Court declined review, in thousands of hours of investigative time, showed conclusively the United State government’s spending money to get journalists to write stories to wrongly influence the jury and their success in achieving their goal of an unlawful conviction.

There were 1,930 days from arrest to conviction of The Cuban Five, 1,930 days of radio and television stories in the local newspapers. Over that period of time there were an average of 6 print stories a day paid for by the United States Government. They were in addition to these stories and articles on a daily, repetitive basis in newspapers, maga- zines, on radio and television, on NBC, CBS Radio, TV Marti and other outlets.

Potential and sitting juries were inundated with government paid-for propaganda. Long after the end of the trial, in September 2006, we found out for the first time the extent of the wrongful payments. This issue now sits, for the first time, before a Florida court as we try and overturn the convictions.

103 We will also discuss with you the facts concerning each of the Cuban Five’s innocence and particularly Gerardo’s innocence. Gerardo has absolutely nothing to do with the shootdown, nothing to do with any “conspiracy to murder.” The facts in this case substantiate his total claim of innocence.

Gerardo submitted in court his affidavit that said: “Prior to the events of February 1996 and up to present time, I knew and know nothing about any alleged plans of shooting the aircraft of the Brothers to the Rescue. None of the actions that I did take in advance of February the 4th were intended to be any part of any such plan, nor was I aware that any of my actions contributed to any such plan, if it existed.”

He said in his affidavit: “As I knew nothing of the alleged plan of the shootdown of the aircraft, still I could not contribute or have any knowledge of such plan that would cause any aircraft that would be shot down in international airspace or in territory of the maritime jurisdiction of the United States.”

That affidavit, uncontradicted, has been given to the eminent jurists who are presiding over this Commission of Inquiry.

This case was tried in a perfect storm of politics. The Cold War was still being fought in the Florida straits in 1966, 1967, 1978, and still in 1998, 1999 and 2000 when this case was tried. Miami, at that time, had 700,000 Cuban Americans, who were living with the issues of “Cuba” and “terrorism.”

There are four different factors to consider when looking at the wrongful and prejudicial issues bombarding the jury.

First, the allegations of Cuban terrorism, and the allegations that America was performing terrorism with respect to the Cuban state was part of the daily story in newspapers, radio and television in Miami. Its impact on the jury is set forth in the papers I have submitted.

104 Secondly, was the politics of the 2000 elections. Bush against Gore, the presidential election was decided for the country by the Miami Cubans. Both the Republicans and the Democrats very much wanted the Cuban vote. That is why Gerardo was charged, three and a half years after the event, with a conspiracy charge. The Government had all the facts on the date of the shootdown and for three and a half years no one was charged. It was an attempt by the Democratic President and Attorney General to court the Cuban voters. The prosecution was finished by the Bush Administration. Payback for the vote.

Thirdly, the Elian González case, returning the young boy to his father in Cuba, caused fury in much of the Cuban-American population of Miami. That case became the daily focus of the media resulting in an increase in the impact of prejudicial material for potential jurors against Cuba and anyone associated with Cuba.

Fourthly, the Brothers to the Rescue attempted to interfere on a daily basis with the jury trial and succeeded. What you will see, and what the Commissioners will read about, in the very lengthy documents that we have provided them, is that all of these things were the daily focus of the press; at the extraordinary rate of 6 columns a day for 1932 days. Radio, TV and newspaper columns written by people who often had long histories of anti-Cuban activities, who were paid by the American government.

The American law prohibits the paying of journalists to influence a Jury. And in this specific case you had specific findings by the Judge about the difficulties in finding an impartial jury, the failure to get an impartial jury and even these judges did not know of the millions of dollars paid to the journalists or the many millions of dollars paid each year to Radio Television Marti to help them influence juries.

Following the traditional concept of the American law, the Judge said that the government could not make statements outside of court, as the defendants could not make statements outside of court.

105 Nonetheless, we have learned, since 2006, that this has been done on a regular basis by the Government for 1930 days.

Many of the articles are exactly like the other articles. They repeated, repeated and repeated the same false factors and accusations. Also in addition to the written articles, three or four times a night there were newscasts done by the very same people paid by the United States, who were reporting the events.

To say that this is one of the worst trials in American history is not an exaggeration!

The documents I have given to the Commission are in part prepared by the National Committee to Free the Cuban Five, in part prepared by Peter Schey and in part by Gerardo’s defense. They go through every very specific detail of each one of the allegations against these defendants.

You must read the words of the Circuit Court in these case. The Circuit Court said the motion for the change of venue should have been granted, because it was impossible to get a fair trial in Miami at that time. Since then – that decision was in 2005 – we have learned all these additional allegations of government misconduct which were directly tied to that.

This is what the Circuit Court said in 2005, having only a fraction of the information we now have concerning the influence on the Jury.

The Court said: “despite the District Court’s numerous efforts to ensure a partial jury in this case, we find that an impartial jury in this community was an unreasonable probability because of a prejudicial community … The entire community is sensitive to the concerns of the Cuban exile population in Miami. Waves of public passion, evi- denced by the public opinion polls and newspaper articles regard a change of venue.”

106 The documents that we have submitted to the Commission show the power and influence of the Brothers to the Rescue and how they were able to violate orders of the Clinton Administration and the Judge to help get a fair trial.

For example, The Brothers to The Rescue were not permitted to make any public statements about the trial as the trial was going on. But they did. Ignoring the Judge, they circulated petitions throughout Miami. These petitions were asking for the indictment of Fidel Castro and others in the Cuban government. These petitions were re-fighting the Cold War and making reference to Hitler, Lenin, etc., making claims that the defendants in this case, the Cuban Five, were trying to get intelligence to soften Southern Florida so that it would be invaded by the Cuban Government.

Such claims, which the Judge ordered not to be repeated outside of court, were, we now know, constantly repeated outside of court, not only in papers and petitions in supermarkets, but also on radio and television. We have only learned this since the conviction. We have only learned this since the Supreme Court denied a review on this case.

Leonard Weinglass and I have litigated many motions for change of venue and it is rare that motions like that are granted. It’s a very difficult motion to win, but it was granted in our case.

But then the government appealed and asked the decision to be reversed. A motion to change the venue that is reversed is extremely rare. It was in this case.

The Court in granting the motion for change of venue said that: “Moreover, the Elian González matter, which was ongoing during the time of the change of venue motions, concerned the relation- ships between the United States and Cuba and raised the community’s awareness of the concerns of the Cuban exile community. It is

107 uncontested that the publicity about Elian González during the trial aroused passion within the Miami community. Despite the District Court’s aim to protect the Jury, the community’s awareness of this case and the one of Elian González, made the trial of the case impossible. In this instance there were no reasonable means of ensuring a fair trial.”

One of the things that the judges tried to do, was to keep secret the names of the jurors so that they would not be intimidated, prejudiced, wrongfully influenced. Those attempts failed. One of the reasons it failed is because the journalists paid by the government, who were working on the television networks, followed the jurors outside to their cars, they had their licences plates shown on television and followed them to their work. So within a relatively short period of time, the public knew who the jurors were and these jurors knew that their lives, their jobs, their futures, their children’s lives, were at stake. They believed they had no alternative other than to convict these defendants in trial.

In another case that the government was involved in at the same time, they sought to move a case outside of Miami, because they believed they could be prejudicial of the persuasive influence with respect to the Cuban community. In that case the government argued: we had to move the trial outside of Miami because there were such deep feelings on Cuban issues. The case was moved outside of Miami.

The government in the case of the Cuban Five made a contradictory decision that the Cuban Five case in fact should stay in Miami.

The sentencing in this case was outrageous. I have submitted documents to the Commission concerning the sentencing.

The injustice of the sentencing is a very important issue. If you would compare this case to any other case in the United States with respect to the sentences that were given, then you would realize soon that these were exaggerated. These sentences were only partially and in- significantly reduced. At the present time, Gerardo is serving two life sentences. His co-defendants are serving 30 years and 22 years.

108 In any other situation – even if there were a conviction – you are talking about two to five years at the most.

The sentencing, the composition of the Jury, the delayed charging and arresting of these people, are all unparalleled and unique, and given the politics of the time, not surprising.

This case was a travesty of justice.

PHILIP HOROWITZ – lawyer of rené gonzález

Philip Horowitz is a sole practitioner of the Law Offices of Philip R. Horowitz in Miami, Florida. He was born and raised in New York City and is a graduate of the distinguished Bronx High School of Science. He received his bachelor’s degree from the State University of New York at Stony Brook and his law degree from the University of Miami in 1984. Horowitz has been a patrician Criminal defense attorney since 1985. He is a member of the Board of Directors of the Florida Association of Criminal Defense Attorneys – Miami Chapter since 2011. In addition, he is also a member in good standing in various district and appellate courts as well as the United States Supreme Court.

For almost thirty years, Horowitz has been a member of the Criminal Justice Act (CJA) Panel in both the Southern and Middle District of Florida. His membership on the CJA panel has led to his appointment on numerous high profile cases. His practice in federal court has primarily focused on criminal cases at the trial level, as well as appellate court and post-conviction representation. To date, he has tried approximately 100 federal cases to verdict and handled almost 100 federal appeals to conclusion including matters before the United States Supreme Court.

109 In September of 1998 Horowitz commenced his representation of René González in federal court in Miami. After two years of arduous preparation, trial commenced in late November 2000. For more than seven months of trial, Horowitz was a valuable member of the trial team that represented The Five. Following the verdict, he continued to represent René González through sentencing as well as the more than seven-year appellate process, which ended in 2009. Horowitz continued to represent René through the remainder of his incarceration until his release from federal prison in 2011. He was instrumental in the negotiations that ultimately led to René González’s return to Cuba on a permanent basis in May 2013.

Testimony

First of all, I’m not a human rights attorney. I am a humble criminal defense attorney, practising law in Miami for nearly 29 years. My knowledge of Cuba prior to September 1998 was only what I read in the newspapers. I was prohibited from travelling there, pursuant to United States law. I had no knowledge of the country other than that there were a large number of exiles living in Miami. In September 1998, the phone rang in my office. It was the United States Districts Court. A lawyer had taken on the representation of René, took one look at the case and said “I’m out of here. I don’t want to represent René, I don’t want to be any part of this case, it is too politically charged.” The court had requested that I’d take over the representation of René after two days. I agreed.

It is a decision that I made more than 15 years ago, that I have never regretted. Fifteen years is a long time. I heard Irmita (daughter of René González, editor’s note) say yesterday that she was 29 years old. I’ve known her since she was fourteen. Her sister was still in diapers in her mother’s arms. She’s fifteen years old. My daughter, who is here today, was five. She is now a junior in College. Fifteen years is a long time. When I accepted this case, I had no idea what I was getting into, what René was getting into and what the families were getting into. René

110 was kept for the first 17 months in what was called a special housing unit. Special is not so special. It is isolation. It is for the worst of the worst. It is a special area in Miami, not just for René but for all of the Five, where they were kept isolated from other inmates and from each other. The misguided conception of the prisons at that time was that we can’t put people working for Cuba in the same jail with Cuban exiles, who are here on criminal charges. That was the rationale, how misguided it may be. After 17 months of litigation they were finally moved into the general population, where they were beloved. During the trial we had one inmate, who was released from the Federal Detention Center. When he was out, he came to the trial. Only to say hello to the Five and to thank them. We had tried for months to move them into the general population. The bureaucracies said: “We can’t do that.” We had the one floor above, totally empty. We said, “These are not security risks. Let them go to this empty floor by themselves. If you don’t want to put them together, give them at least some humane treatment.” The bureaucracies’ decision was: “Well, the helicopter may land on the roof of the prison and whisk them away.” Obviously, they have seen way too many movies. But after 17 months, they were moved into the general population where they remained until mid- June of 2001.

When you prepare a case for trial, your client’s input is crucial. You want your client to sit with you, review the evidence, give you their opinion on the evidence so that you can really understand the evidence and the allegations against him. Let’s talk a little bit more about the allegations. None of the members of the Five were charged with spying. Spying is not a crime. Because it doesn’t exist in the United States Code. Espionage is different because there is a military com- ponent. René was never charged with spying. Fernando was never charged with spying. Because it doesn’t exist.

The evidence in this case was gathered in a couple of different ways. It was gathered from search warrants that were executed on September 12, 1998, when the Five were arrested. The second way was by something called the Foreign Intelligence Service Act, prior to the arrest,

111 by using secret search warrants. Agents of the FBI were able to go into the residences and copy computer hard drives and leave. Most of the evidence in this case was classified. As a defense attorney you have the right to see discovery. For me to see the discovery, as well as for the other attorneys of the Five, we had to undergo a full FBI background check in order to see evidence that was taken from our clients. I would get calls from my relatives saying, “The FBI is here and they are asking about you” and it was a harrowing experience as a defense attorney. After being cleared, your client has the right to see the discovery. I couldn’t take it to René. I had to request that René be escorted from prison by the United States Marshals to a secret facility where classified information was kept. And at that time we had limited access to René, limited access to the evidence, and it was a nightmare. We had learned later on that the facility was full of asbestos and we had two pregnant investigators at that time and it was a nightmare to do this. So, our clients were denied full access to the evidence. I want to go into that a little bit further. When classified evidence is going to be used in a case, the United States Code has something like CIPA, Classified Information Procedures Act. That allows the government shortly after the acquisition of this evidence, to meet with the Court, without the benefit of the defendants, without the benefit of the defense lawyers, the prosecutors alone with the classified evidence, and in their opinion they tell the judges what they should give us, the defense council. And what they are not willing to give us. The Court at this time – these hearings were held in February 1999 – then said what we could have and we couldn’t have, based on the government’s sole representation. And at this time the Judge is in the dark. The Judge has not heard the evidence, she has no idea what the opening statements are going to be by the council. She has no idea what our defense is going to be. So the Court rules in this vacuum, as to what we can see that was taken from our own clients and what we can’t see.

During the trial and as the evidence is beginning to progress – it was a lengthy trial for about seven and a half months – we had requested that the Court revise the issue on the classified evidence that was seen in 1999, two years previously. At this point we had an idea, we had cross

112 examined witnesses, we had been able to confront witnesses, etc. The Court refused to re-examine its rulings taken back in 1999 about what we could see and we couldn’t see. The Court was much more informed about the case. There is evidence that was never turned over up to this day, as we sit here now, fifteen years later. I do not know everything that was taken from my client. I don’t know if there is evidence out there – that is for all the Five – that would show their innocence, that the government has kept from them under the Classified Information Procedures Act. Because it has never been revisited and I don’t know other than what the government tells me, what I can use and what I can’t use to defend my client. But that’s the way this case worked.

Before the commencement of the trial, motions for change of venue were filed. And Mister Garbus spoke a little bit about that but I want to add something. Clearly, counsel for the Five felt there is absolutely no way that we’re going to get a fair trial in Miami, and as Mister Garbus said, there were 700,000 Cuban exiles living in Dade County, with a population of about a million and a half. The FBI’s own studies show that Miami, Dade County was 50% Cuban-American. Passions were en- flamed, there was no way we were going to get a fair trial and we knew it. We had asked that the trial be removed out of our federal district, which would have been to either Orlando or Atlanta, nice cosmopolitan cities, about the same size as Miami. We were seriously considering Atlanta. The FBI studies also revealed that the county to the west is 6% Hispanic, 25 miles away. The county to the north, Palm Beach County, 2% Hispanic. We knew the judge lived in Miami, she’s a family person and I understood the hardship of taking her away from her children by moving the case to Atlanta. Our request was denied and the case commenced in Miami; the trial began November 27th 2000.

Eight days of jury selection, seven months of trial, it was one of the most incredible experiences that I have been through. The government fought us tooth and nail on every issue, even what time we were going to break at the end of the day. The jury began to deliberate on June 4th 2001, so seven and a half months later. In the four and a half days that they were out deliberating, they asked no questions, they

113 made no comment. And summarily convicted the Five at trial. Despite the lack of evidence, despite the fact that Tony Guerrero, whose charge was espionage, was never employed by the military, he was a ditch digger on the base, in public works.

In between the time of the verdict and the sentencing, the events of September 11 occurred and I think that really changed the dynamic of what we were looking at, at the time of sentence. The sentencing occurred over a two-week period in December of 2001. The sentences were unduly hard and in certain cases horrific, we are talking about Tony Guerrero and Ramón with 22 and 30 years sentences respectively, their sentences were originally life imprisonment. The sentence for Gerardo who had absolutely nothing to do with conspiracy to commit murder was life imprisonment. Those of you who don’t practice law may not know what conspiracy means, it sounds like a sinister word. Always has to me. A conspiracy is nothing more than an agreement to do something that the law forbids. You’re not actually doing anything, you just agreed to do stuff. Gerardo did not agree to do anything of what he was accused of.

The sentencing allowed, for the first time, the Five to speak. I know there was a book published that included the Five’s individual statements made at closure. I suggest that book be read because that really shows what these men were thinking, what they were doing and why they were in the U.S. Those goals were clear: to prevent terroristic acts on Cuban soil. End of story; the evidence was there. We had in the defense case a man from an organization in Miami which was called Commandos F4. This gentleman, Frometa, was arrested in Miami and convicted for attempting to purchase a Stinger missile. This is the type of people why René was there. René spoke yesterday about the PUND, which was a military organization. They raised their money selling cocaine on the streets of Miami. I called as a witness, Hector Vigemantes, who was in federal prison for trafficking cocaine. These are the types of people that were trying to make incursions into Cuba. We had Alpha 66 who had a store front like you would see walking into this building today, “Alpha 66, your Terrorist organization, come on in!” And it was

114 this store front that we showed to this jury. It was open, notorious and hostile, in Miami in the 1990’s. It was no mistaking, these organizations and what they were hell bent on. And that was terrorism against Cuba and terrorism inside Cuba. From the training in the Everglades it was open for business in Miami.

After sentencing in December of 2001, came one of the longest appeal processes I’ve ever seen. I looked at my files a few days ago and I noticed that I filed a notice of appeal on René’s case on December 31, 2001. The appeal process ended in June, 2009. In between that time, it took more than two years for the court to hear from the lawyers until March 2004.

Mister Garbus talked about some of the reasons and I want to talk about that as well. It was the Ramirez case in Miami. Mister Ramirez was an employee of the Immigration and Naturalization Service. He was part of the team who went to rescue Elian González in the house in Miami. He voiced his objections to it and was fired from Immigration; he sued the government for his wrongful termination. Because he sued the government, the government said, “We can’t get a fair trial in Miami.” They used the exact same arguments that we had used two years before. Due to the fact that the government was being very kind, disingenuous – there are lot more words that I could use – because of the disingenuous nature of the government in the Ramirez case versus the position they took in our case…

Leonard Wineglass filed a motion saying “We deserve a new trial,” which was denied by the court. That motion joined our appeal. After two years we were given an audience with the Appellant Court. The Court of Appeal was made up of three judges. The three judges heard from the lawyers, had the right to ask questions to the lawyers and then said, “Thank you, we reserve ruling and we’ll give you our ruling when we get done.” They got it done – one year and a half later. In August 2005, the three-judge panel led by Judge Birch, issued a 69-page opinion, one of the finest, most courageous opinions that I’ve read. That opinion, from what we believe is the first time in U.S. legal history, reversed a

115 decision to deny a change of venue. Judge Birch wrote about the way Miami was in the late 90’s, early 2000. All the events came together to form a perfect storm where there is no way these Five received a fair trial. If you haven’t read that opinion, I suggest it, I recommend it. It’s one of the finest, most courageous pieces of judicial opinion you’ll ever read. When you have judges that make courageous decisions against the government, you know what happens next. The government was not happy, to say the least. They immediately filed for what is called ‘en banc re-hearing.’ The Court of Appeal was made up of – at that time – 13 judges. Judge Harmon said, “We don’t like what these three judges said, I think all 13 of you should hear this man.” I’ve never seen a motion granted like that, that fast. But the motion was granted. Valentine’s Day 2006, we were in Atlanta, before 12 judges, arguing as one, that the three judges were right in the first place, we had a trio decision. We lost, ten – two. We had our original two judges who were in the panel, our third judge was a visiting judge from Vermont who wasn’t allowed to sit with the others. The other 10 judges that weren’t on the original three- judge panel, voted against us. The original three-judge panel had said: “There were 25 issues that you, the lawyers, have presented, but we’re only going to rule on one: venue. And we’re finding that the venue was bad and needed a new trial so therefore we don’t need to rule on the remaining.” The twelve judges said, “Well, we’re going to reverse that and by the way, we’re going to send your case back for the other 25 issues.” And that’s what they did.

By that time, the judge from Vermont was no longer sitting as a judge and they appointed another judge to fill out the panel, Judge William Pryor, who was a recess appointment. Presidents make recess appoint- ments when Congress is out of session so that they can appoint who they want and bypass the regular Senate confirmation process. Judge Pryor was one of the first ones of those, appointed by the President before Obama, whose name I cannot mention. That prior President, also that administration, interfered with the rights of attorneys to represent their client. During this period, we would visit with the families, we would go to Havana, and those who could, would come to see us. The attorneys, as a whole, were denied permission to travel

116 between 2003 and 2008. Not until the election of 2008 when President Obama was elected, before he was sworn in, was the travel permission restored. In August 2007, a new decision came down, affirming all the convictions and ordering new sentences for three of the Five. The result of that re-sentencing is what brought Fernando home last week. In October of 2011, despite the best efforts of the government, René completed his sentence. October 7, 2011. As with everything in this case, his release was not an uncomplicated affair. I drove to pick him up. To Marianna Federal Prison in North Florida, some 600 miles from my home. The press were ready, the circus was about to start. I was able to arrange a release for René with the prison, before the circus opened the tent. At 4 o’clock in the morning on October 7, 2011. There’s some grainy video from some gas station down the street from the prison. Operated by the wife of a Cuban inmate, Adriana, where for the first time, in fourteen years, sorry 13 years and 26 days, that was the exact sentence, René was able to hug his daughters, somewhere other than in the visiting room of a prison and his brother, and his father. But the nightmare was not over. René, at that time, was a dual citizen. As he told you yesterday: “Hi, my name is René González, I was born in Chicago, Illinois.” That’s true, he was a U.S. citizen as well as a Cuban citizen. Prior to René being released, I filed a motion; part of that motion says: “Treat René like he is not a citizen.” If you are a citizen in the United States and you complete your jail sentence you have a term of supervised release, of probation, at the end of it. If you’re not a citizen, you go straight from prison to immigration; from immigration you’re deported back to your home country, your term of probation, of supervised release, is non-reported. For example: if you’re a citizen in the UK, there’s no U.S. probation office here in London, so you’re technically on probation but you do not report to a probation office. In September 2001, three weeks before René’s release, the judge was basically saying: “René I don’t care if you’re a Cuban citizen. You’re a U.S. citizen too and you’re staying here in the U.S., to complete your three year term of probation.” Against his will – his daughters lived in Havana, his wife lived in Havana and was denied permission to come to the U.S. for years. His mother lived in Havana, his father lived in Havana, his brother lived in Havana. The only person that didn’t live in Havana, that René knew, was me.

117 Yet, the court denied René permission to go home. He had served his sentence, he had paid his debt to society. For a year and a half, René stayed in the U.S., against his will but in full and total compliance with the orders of the court. Motions were filed. In February of 2012, René’s brother, Roberto took ill. And it was grave, terminal. Unbelievably, René was given permission to go to Havana, to spend time with his brother, giving him a two-week pass. He went and pursuant to the court’s orders, he came back. He could have easily stayed in Havana but that is not who René is, he came back to the U.S. His father passed away. He was given permission to go back to Havana once again. We had made the offer to the government, prior to René’s release: “Please let him stay with his family.” That’s all he wants, to be reunited with his family. René was even willing to give up what he didn’t have to. He could have stayed in the U.S. for three years, and remained a U.S. citizen as well as a Cuban citizen, easily. Could have travelled back and forth for the rest of his life. However, to be with his family, to be with his daughters and his grandchild, who of course was born, not when he was there but when he was here. In May 2013, I received a phone call: the government had agreed to drop its opposition to René renouncing his U.S. citizenship. He was already in Havana, mourning the loss of his father and in order to renounce citizenship, you cannot be in the U.S. to do so. I had filed something to the court, saying: “Now is the perfect time, the court wants to rule, René is in Havana, we’re ready to do this.” The government dropped its opposition, the court signed an order and René has been in Havana since early May 2013. The extra year and a half he stayed in the U.S., his brother passed away, his father passed away and his grandchild was born and he was here for no reason. He was not in prison, but it was a prison, he wasn’t free to leave.

People have asked me: “Have you ever had a case like this before?” “Never have, never will again.” Cases like this are once in a life time. And when you have a case like this that is once in a life time, there are certain people you want to thank as well. I want to thank the family that is here: Adriana, Elisabeth, Mirta, my sisters, my surrogate mother, my surrogate children, they have become part of my family over the last 16 years. I want to thank someone who is near and dear to me

118 who is not here, and that’s René’s brother Roberto. Roberto was... us lawyers, we called ourselves, the other Five. Our sixth member was Roberto González, René’s brother, who’s an attorney, who was a consultant with us. Who was there every single day of the trial. All seven and a half months. Roberto was our strength, he was our brother and he was part of the defense team. His contributions to this case cannot be understated. The other person I want to thank is a person I always have trouble with how to address him. Do I address him as Mister President, or Ricardo. But I prefer to call him Mister President, just out of admiration. And Ricardo, anything we’ve ever needed, any questions we have ever had, this man has impressed, not just myself with the efforts that he has assisted us with, but how he has assisted the families, in these trying times and how the Cuban government has assisted these families and been there for them in the most difficult time. And I just want to say from the bottom of my heart, on behalf of myself and my client and my 4 other clients: Thank you.

PETER SCHEY – director of the chrl foundation

Peter Schey is the president and executive director of the Center for Human Rights and Constitutional Law Foundation (CHRL Foun dation). He was born March 23, 1947 in Durban, South Africa.

Schey has served as lead counsel or co-counsel in over one hundred major civil rights and class action cases in federal courts throughout the United States, involving access to education, health and welfare benefits, administrative law, the rights of children and indigenous people, rights of immigrants and refugees and complex individual cases involving constitutional, criminal, transnational and corporate issues. He has a private practice of law principally focusing on complex constitutional, transnational, corporate, criminal, administrative and appellate litigation. Schey

119 has also lectured at the University of Southern California Law Center (1987-1991) and the University of California School of Law (1989).

With the Center for Human Rights and Constitutional Law, Schey is dedicated to the protection and promotion of fundamental civil liberties and human rights through major class action litigation, direct legal services, education, training and the presentation of petitions before international forums.

The Center has filed numerous requests to various agencies of the U.S. Government seeking disclosure of records relating to the Cuban Five case. In 2010 it filed a lawsuit in the federal courts seeking disclosure of satellite images relating to the February 24, 1996, Brothers to the Rescue shootdown incident. Gerardo Hernández, one of the Cuban Five, was convicted of “conspiracy to commit murder” as a result of this incident. To date the U.S. Government has refused to state whether or not it possesses the requested satellite images.

In 2013 a U.S. Court of Appeals ruled that a sworn declaration provided to the lower federal court by the National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency did not justify the agency refusing to admit or deny that it possesses the requested satellite images. The case was returned to the lower court where it now remains pending. The Center is also seeking disclosure of records regarding the Cuban Five case from the U.S. Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA), the U.S. State Department, and several other U.S. military and intelligence agencies.

Testimony litigation against the u.s. national geospatial-intelligence agency under the u.s. freedom of information act

This is a Summary of Section III(6) of the [Draft] report entitled The Case Of The Cuban Five: How The Government Of The United States

120 Secured Unjust Convictions Of The Cuban Five And Why The Remaining Members Of The Five In U.S. Prisons Should Now Be Repatriated To Cuba by Peter Schey, President, Center for Human Rights and Constitutional Law

The Center for Human Rights and Constitutional Law (CHRCL) has initiated several requests under the U.S. Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) seeking access to U.S. Government records that may show (1) what the U.S. Government knew about the likelihood for a confrontation between Cuba and BTTR planes in 1995-96, and (2) what the U.S. Government could have done to prevent the February 24, 1996 shootdown incident. The Center also is seeking satellite images of the BTTR shootdown site and related documents from select government agencies. Satellite data is critically important because the U.S. Government claims that its radar data shows that the February 24, 1996 BTTR shootdown took place in international airspace (a fact used to convict Gerardo Hernández of conspiracy to commit murder), while Cuban radar data showed that the shootdown took place in Cuban airspace.

At the trial of the Cuban Five, an expert witness – retired American Air Force Colonel George Buchner – suggested the only way to defini- tively determine exactly where the BTTR planes went down would be to examine images of the area that may have been taken that day by United States satellites. “It is my expert opinion,” Buchner testified, “that the [United States] government has satellite photos that would resolve this whole issue.” Over defense objections, the judge ordered Buchner’s remarks stricken from the record.

On December 29, 2009, the CHRCL and Leonard Weinglass, the deceased former lead counsel for the Cuban Five, filed a Satellite FOIA request with the U.S. National Geospatial Intelligence Agency (NGA) seeking copies of satellite images, satellite imagery, satellite photo- graphs, or satellite video images, and documents of the area in which the BTTR shootdown took place on February 24, 1996.

121 The NGA responded by refusing to admit or deny that it possessed the requested satellite images.

A lawsuit was then filed against the NGA in the U.S. federal courts. On March 14, 2011, the federal district court entered a judgement in favor of the NGA because of the “near-blanket protection the National Security Act accords information pertaining to intelligence methods, as well as the NGA’s good faith and detailed affidavit stating that the information sought would tend to reveal such methods …” The federal court concluded: “The NGA has met its burden of showing that it acted permissibly in determining that acknowledging the existence or nonexistence of records responsive to plaintiffs’ request might disclose sources or methods of foreign intelligence and harm national security.”

On May 6, 2011, the Center appealed to the U.S. Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals. In 2013, the Court of Appeals ruled in favor of the Center, finding that “The district court erred in granting summary judgement without requiring the [NGA] to submit a classified declaration for in camera review. The government’s unclassified declaration failed to provide ‘reasonably specific detail’ that would show why merely acknowledging the existence of records might reveal intelligence sources or methods, or affect our foreign relations.” The Court held that the NGA failed to “show why merely acknowledging the existence of records might reveal intelligence sources or methods, or affect [U.S.] foreign relations.” The Appeals Court stated that under the NGA’s approach to the CHRCL’s request for satellite images “the government would be free to [refuse to confirm or deny the existence of records] in practically every case involving satellite images and records, as well as many other surveillance activities.” The Court of Appeals remanded the case and ordered that the NGA must “provide a classified more detailed declaration for in camera review by the district court....” This case remains pending before the district court. The CHRCL is also initiating several new requests for satellite imagery and related records of the BTTR shootdown from other U.S. intelligence and military agencies.

122 gerardo hernández’s conviction for conspiracy to commit murder manifests an extreme miscarriage of justice

This is a Summary of Section III(3) of the [Draft] report entitled The Case Of The Cuban Five: How The Government Of The United States Secured Unjust Convictions Of The Cuban Five And Why The Remaining Members Of The Five In U.S. Prisons Should Now Be Repatriated To Cuba by Peter Schey, President, Center for Human Rights and Constitutional Law

Gerardo Hernández was charged with conspiracy to commit murder for providing information on Brothers to the Rescue (BTTR) flights as part of an alleged plan to shoot down two BTTR planes in the U.S. jurisdiction, which extends to the international airspace between the United States and Cuba, on February 24, 1996. His trial, held in a United States District Court in Miami, Florida, home to over half a million Cuban exiles, began on November 26, 2000 and concluded on June 8, 2001.

At trial, the Government introduced an intercepted communication from Cuban intelligence headquarters to a Cuban intelligence officer in South Florida stating that on February 24-27, 1996, two Cuban intelligence officers who had penetrated the BTTR organization should not join BTTR flights because if BTTR provoked Cuba (as he it had previously done by illegally penetrating Cuban airspace) it may result in a “confrontation of counterrevolutionary actions of Brothers to the Rescue.” Hernández maintains that he did not even have the decoding program to read this message when it was sent. But in any event, all it did was warn Cuban intelligence officers in South Florida that a confrontation with BTTR planes could take place on the designated dates if BTTR planes penetrated Cuban airspace. The U.S. Government argued that Hernández’s guilt is shown by a coded message to Cuba after February 24th stating, “the operation to which we contributed a grain of salt ended successfully.” Hernández has always maintained this message did not involve the BTTR shootdown, but to the success of the operation to return another agent to Cuba.

123 Hernández did not in any way encourage the BTTR pilots to fly on February 24, 1996, the day two of their planes were shot down by a Cuban MiG. Hernández did not inform the Cuban Government when the BTTR planes took off from Florida on February 24, 1996. The U.S. Government informed the Cuban Government when the BTTR planes took off. Hernández gave no orders involving the shootdown nor was he in any way consulted about the decision to shoot down the BTTR planes. The U.S. Government, not Hernández, was in a position to block the BTTR flights because BTTR pilots previously had repeatedly filed false flight plans with the U.S. Federal Aviation Administration (FAA). The U.S. Government (not Hernández) monitored the BTTR flights on radar and could have recalled the planes when it saw that Cuban MiGs were in the area. The BTTR pilots were warned by Cuban air control authorities that they were in danger but ignored those warnings. Even if Hernández had been warned that a BTTR provocation on February 24, 1996 would lead to a “confrontation,” such a confrontation could have involved trying to force the BTTR planes to land, or firing warning shots to force them to leave Cuban airspace, etc. On the other hand, the U.S. Government had been specifically warned that a “shootdown” was possible and this information was communicated to the BTTR pilots who were willing to risk the dangers involved in their mission. Gerardo Hernández had virtually nothing to do with the shootdown, and certainly had less to do with it than the U.S. Government itself. Hernández is innocent of the conspiracy to commit murder charge and his conviction and life sentence are a major and egregious miscarriage of justice. the sentences of gerardo hernández, antonio guerrero, and ramón labañino were excessive and disproportionate to their involvement in any criminal conduct

This is a Summary of Section III(4) of the [Draft] report entitled The Case Of The Cuban Five: How The Government Of The United States Secured Unjust Convictions Of The Cuban Five And Why The Remaining Members Of The Five In U.S. Prisons Should Now Be Repatriated

124 To Cuba by Peter Schey, President, Center for Human Rights and Constitutional Law.

The sentences of the Cuban Five are unusually harsh given that nothing they did involved any significant threat to the national security of the United States. It is undisputed that the Cuban Five were primarily engaged in what the Cuban Government and the Five considered “counter-terrorist” activities, penetrating anti-Castro groups like Alpha 66, the F4 Commandos and Brothers to the Rescue. However, the sentences imposed violate both U.S. and international doctrine of proportionality and fairness.

Three of the Five (Gerardo Hernández, Antonio Guerrero, and Ramón Labañino) were charged with and convicted of “conspiracy” to violate the Espionage Act and Guerrero was eventually sentenced to 21 years and 10 months in prison, Labañino to 30 years in prison, and Hernández to life in prison. The U.S. courts refused to reconsider Hernández’s life sentence since he had already been sentenced to life in prison based on his conviction for conspiracy to commit murder in the February 24, 1996 BTTR shootdown. The report The Case of the Cuban Five discuss- es in detail Gerardo’s innocence on the murder charge.

Antonio Guerrero worked as a civilian employee at Boca Chica Naval Air Station in a series of menial jobs. Antonio basically counted planes landing and taking off to infer whether or not there was an increase in military aircraft that may signal a potential attack on Cuba. This information was available to the public simply by driving along U.S. Highway 1 and observing the planes taking off and landing. He also provided Cuban authorities with drawings of certain buildings that civilian employees could enter without security clearances. Ramón Labañino observed the number of planes landing and leaving MacDill Air Force Base in Tampa, Florida. He also supervised other agents reporting on matters of public information regarding the U.S. Southern Command and the neighborhood in which this Command was located. It is undisputed that none of the information gathered was intended to be used in any aggression against the U.S. Military

125 experts at the Cuban Five’s trial, including President Obama’s Director of National Intelligence, James Clapper, testified that the Cuban Five presented no substantial threat to national security.

The sentences of Gerardo Hernández, Antonio Guerrero, and Ramón Labañino are disproportionate to other similar cases of espionage tried in the United States and far exceed the scope of their intelligence activities and the insignificant harm it did to the U.S. national security. The principle of proportionality – that the punishment should be proportional to the seriousness of the crime – is a fundamental tenet of international human rights law.

This principle is embodied in Article 5 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (“No one shall be subjected to … cruel, inhuman or degrading … punishment”), Articles 7 and 9 of the ICCPR (“No one shall be subjected to … cruel, inhuman or degrading … punishment” and “No one shall be subjected to arbitrary … detention”), and the Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading Treatment or Punishment

ANGELA WRIGHT – amnesty international

Angela Wright has worked as a Researcher at the International Secretariat of Amnesty International for more than 20 years, covering human rights concerns in the USA and the English Speaking Caribbean. Her work has focused on criminal justice issues, including the death penalty and fair trial concerns, torture and ill-treatment in prisons and detention facilities, and use of excessive force by law enforcement officials. She was principal author of Amnesty International’s 2010 report, ‘U.S.: The Case of the ‘Cuban Five’ (AI Index: AMR 51/093/2010).

126 Testimony

Amnesty International is a global movement of more than 3 million supporters, activists and volunteers in more than 150 countries who campaign to end grave abuses of human rights. Our vision is for every person to enjoy all the rights enshrined in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and other international human rights standards and treaties. We are independent of any government, political ideology, economic interest or religion – funded mainly by our membership and public donations.

One part of our remit has been to campaign for a fair retrial or other remedy where individuals in political cases are denied a fair trial. Amnesty is not a general criminal justice organization and we only become involved in a criminal case if it appears that there is a political element to the case, or someone is facing the death penalty. Often our concerns involve cases where there is a blatant flouting of fair trial norms, through, for example, setting up summary courts, holding the accused incommunicado or restricting right to counsel.

Of course, cases are not always that straightforward. It can be particularly challenging when the trial in question broadly follows international norms of criminal procedure and the charges themselves are not overtly political or do not flout internationally protected rights such as freedom of peaceful assembly or association, or the right to freedom of expression. We would consider anyone imprisoned on the latter grounds to be prisoners of conscience, regardless of the procedures used in the trial.

In this case, the defendants were charged with, what were on their face, serious offences, including conspiracy to gather and transmit national defense information. They were brought to trial in the ordinary U.S. criminal justice system providing the usual fair trial norms such as right to counsel, trial before a jury and right of appeal. Thus, it was necessary for us to scrutinize the case with great care and impartiality – looking at both sides and, in particular, seeing how the case

127 developed on appeal, the appeal process itself being an integral part of the right to a fair trial.

After this review and taking into account all the circumstances of this complex case, we concluded that there were serious concerns about the fairness of the convictions. These concerns are outlined in AI’s report published in 2010, and remain unresolved to date.

Before our report was published, AI had already for some years cam- paigned about the treatment of the defendants in custody, including denial of visas for the Cuban wives of two of the defendants (René Gonzales and Gerardo Hernández) to visit them in prison, and un- necessary delays in facilitating visits by relatives in some of the other cases: restrictions we found to be unnecessarily punitive and contrary to standards for the humane treatment of prisoners and states’ obligation to protect family life. We also appealed against the men being placed in solitary confinement in prison in 2003 and believe our appeals may have contributed to their removal from isolation at that point. However, on this panel I will focus only on our concerns about the criminal proceedings.

A central underlying concern relates to the fairness of holding the trial in Miami, given the pervasive community hostility to the Cuban government in the area and other events which took place before and during the trial. There is evidence to suggest that these factors made it impossible to ensure a wholly impartial jury despite the efforts of the trial judge in this regard.

The right to trial by an independent, impartial and competent tribunal is guaranteed under Article 10 of the UDHR and Article 14 of the ICCPR, a key human rights treaty to which the U.S. is a State Party. The UN Human Rights Committee (the treaty monitoring body) has emphasized that the requirements of competency, independence and impartiality of a tribunal – which includes all its components including the jury where there is one – is an absolute right that is not subject to any exception.

128 It is also a fundamental principle under international law that a trial must not only be fair but must be seen to be fair. This is a crucial element of public transparency and accountability, to ensure, among other things, that no influences are brought into play of which a defendant may be unaware and which may impede a proper defense.

The trial venue was the first issue that went to appeal as it under- pinned the whole question of the fairness of the trial. It is significant that the 3-judge panel of the 11th Circuit Federal Court of Appeals – a generally conservative circuit – were unanimous in ruling in August 2005 that the defendants were denied a fair trial, overturning the convictions and ordering a new trial outside of Miami.

The panel’s decision was based on the combined impact of pervasive community prejudice, events and publicity before and during the trial, and improper statements by the prosecution which inflated the harm inflicted or threatened by the defendants. In one of the most extensive rulings in the case to date, the panel found the evidence submitted in support of the motion for a change of venue to be (quote) “massive.” This included evidence of polls showing the decades of anti-Castro feeling in the Miami-Dade area which extended beyond the Cuban American community and which the judges found made ensuring an impartial jury from any jury pool in the area an “unreasonable probability.” The panel further noted the impact of events such as the anti-Cuban demonstrations around the Elián González case in the months leading to the trial as well as events during the trial itself, including ceremonies to commemorate the victims of the shooting down of the Brothers to the Rescue plane who had close ties to the area.

During the seven month trial, the jurors were not sequestered but went home every night. While they were instructed by the judge not to read or watch news about the case, as the 11th Circuit panel noted, it is hard to see how they would be completely insulated from the negative atmosphere surrounding the defendants and their ties to the Cuban government. The panel also considered prejudicial statements by the prosecution, which included inflammatory and unsupported

129 statements such as that the defendants were “bent on destroying the United States.” Although the trial judge sustained the defense’s objections to these and other improper statements, there were no specific instructions in her summing up that they must exclude such statements from their deliberations. The panel agreed with defense sub- missions that this too may have led to undue pressure on jurors to convict.

However, the government appealed and in 2006 the panel’s ruling was overturned by the full 12 member Court of Appeals, albeit by a 10-2 majority and with a strong dissenting opinion. The convictions were thus left in place, and no retrial was ordered.

While it is impossible to know for certain the extent to which the jurors were actually prejudiced against the defendants, there remain in Amnesty’s view grave doubts about the impartiality of the tribunal before which the defendants were tried and convicted. In rejecting the appeal, the majority decision of the 11th Circuit Court applied a nar- rower standard of review than the panel, largely disregarding events that took place outside the courtroom.

We believe that the broader approach taken by the panel was the right one, given all the circumstances surrounding this highly charged case and the absolute obligation on governments to do everything to ensure that a trial is both fair and seen to be fair.

In considering the options open to the government to ensure a fair trial, it is relevant that an alternative venue was readily available, and that the trial could have been moved to Fort Lauderdale just 24 miles away – as counsel for the defendants requested. This is exactly what the U.S. Government itself sought in another case, in which it sought a change of venue in an action brought against it in connection with the Elián González case. In this case (Ramirez v Ashcroft, 2005) the government said it would be “virtually impossible to ensure that the defendants will receive a fair trial if the trial is held in Miami-Dade County.” It submitted that a move to Fort Lauderdale would be suffi-

130 cient on the grounds that “as you move the case out of Miami-Dade you have less likelihood there are going to be deep seated ... prejudices in the case.”

Since then, of course, new evidence has emerged that casts even more doubt about the fairness of the trial, with information suggesting that the U.S. systematically paid journalists hostile to Cuba to cover the trial and provide prejudicial articles in the local media asserting the guilt of the accused. While this is the subject of new appeals, no remedy has yet been granted, despite it being well over a decade since the convictions.

Amnesty is not the only human rights organization to raise concern about this case. In May 2005, the UN Working Group on Arbitrary Detention adopted an opinion on the case in which it concluded that the USG had failed to guarantee the Cuban Five a fair trial under Article 14 of the ICCPR. It cited two concerns: the impartiality of the trial venue and the principle of “equality of arms,” another fundamental fair trial requirement. This means that the same procedural and other rights must be afforded to both the defense and prosecution in equal measure. The Working Group cited the circumstances under which the defendants were held in isolation during much of their pre-trial detention and the alleged difficulties their attorneys had in accessing information, much of which was initially classified.

AI shares the concern of the Working Group that their conditions of pre-trial detention undermined the principle of equality of arms and the right of every defendant to have adequate facilities for the preparation of their defense. Although the government ultimately declas- sified the materials the defense requested and no classified information was introduced as evidence at trial, the late Leonard Weinglass, a highly respected defense attorney, told me that “no-one was confident they had everything they needed.” The new evidence that has emerged since the trial – of journalists being paid to plant prejudicial stories against the accused during the trial – also raises concern about equality of arms in that the government, unknown to the defendants,

131 were stacking the case in the media – and also as we have seen very possibly in the courtroom itself – in the prosecution’s favour.

I will just briefly say a few words about the case of Gerardo Hernandez, the only one of the accused to be serving life in prison. He was convicted of two life terms, one for conspiracy to transmit national defense information and the second for conspiracy to murder. The latter was based on his alleged role in the 1996 shooting down by Cuba of two planes flown by members of the Brothers to the Rescue organization on a mission to drop anti-government leaflets over Cuba, charges he strenuously denies.

In assessing the fairness of judicial proceedings, Amnesty International does not purport to be a trier of fact or to substitute its own verdict of guilt or innocence for that of a properly constituted court. However, as we note in our report, there was no direct evidence against Hernandez of planning or knowing about an intended shootdown of the aircraft (whether in international or Cuban airspace) and the evidence introduced by the prosecution at trial consisted of nothing more than a few intercepted messages that were ambiguous at best. We believe there are serious questions as to whether the government discharged its burden of proof in this case or, given other prejudicial factors, whether Hernandez was afforded the full right of presumption of innocence, another fundamental prerequisite for a fair trial.

We are also concerned that Gerardo Hernandez remains sentenced to two life terms, despite an appeals court acknowledging that the life sentence imposed for conspiracy to transmit national defense information was over-inflated, as no top secret information had in fact been gathered or transmitted. On this ground, an appeals court vacated the life sentences imposed on his co-defendants Ramon Labanino and Antonio Guerrero (reducing those sentences to long prison terms instead). The appeals court declined to reduce Gerardo Hernandez’s life sentence on the ground that this would make no difference as he was already serving another life sentence. That he should

132 be serving two life sentences, when one is acknowledged by the courts to have been wrongly imposed, is a manifest injustice.

This case has been marked throughout by divided opinions of successive appeals courts – not only on the trial venue but on the shootdown charges as well. We believe it is significant that senior members of the U.S. judiciary have, in almost every appeal to date, expressed serious doubt about the fairness of the case. This makes it even more disturbing that the U.S. Supreme Court declined to review the case in 2009, without giving an opinion.

When Amnesty International sent its report to the USG, it urged it to review the case and address the concerns raised, noting as well the lengthy sentences being served by the accused. We framed our request in broad terms as there were a number of options open to the government through the clemency process, as well as pending legal appeals. Meanwhile, another three and a half years have passed and the current appeals may still take some time to work their way through the courts with no guarantee that justice will be served. Two of the five have now been released after serving their full sentence. Others remain in prison, possibly for life in Gerardo Hernandez’s case.

We are aware of the urgency of this case after so many years without a remedy, and will continue to appeal for justice to be expedited through all appropriate means. We look forward to continuing discussions with those involved as to how this can be done.

133 2. Statements from witnesses

ADRIANA PÉREZ O’CONNOR – wife of gerardo hernández

Adriana Pérez O’Connor was born in Havana on the 18th of January in 1970. She graduated in Chemical Process Engineering in 1994 and obtained a Masters in Food Engineering in 2004. She has worked as Head of the Department of Production at the Institute of Nutritional Research in Cuba.

She is also a Member of the National Assembly and of the Commission for Foreign Relations in Cuba.

Adriana was married on July 15, 1988 to Gerardo Hernández Nordelo, one of the Cuban Five, and has been intensively involved in the fight for his release as well as the right to obtain a visa to visit him. Adriana explains that she also has ‘two life sentences, or three if we include the one that keeps us from seeing each other even in these terrible circumstances. I am the instrument the U.S. authorities use to pressure Gerardo. This wasn’t determined in any courtroom but the facts speak for themselves.’

During her numerous visits to Europe in order to break the silence about the injustice that has been done to her husband, she has met with several international politicians and had various encounters in the European Parliament. She was invited several times to meetings of the Human Rights Commission of the United Nations in Geneva to talk about the case of the Cuban Five.

134 Testimony

When the year 1998 began, I knew that it wouldn’t be very special because once again Gerardo would have to depart, and we would have to be far from each other. I was however convinced that the great love we professed to each other would get us through our physical separation.

Of course, I was oblivious to what was truly separating me from the rest of the things that I enjoyed so much. Even without this knowledge, the bitter taste of our farewell in January of 1998 worsened still with the tragic news of the unexpected death of Gerardo’s older sister in an airplane crash. This was after we had enjoyed a lovely holiday and celebration of my birthday – the last we spent together.

I thought that Gerardo’s mother had already experienced too much pain for one year – a son’s distance and a daughter’s death aren’t easy to overcome. But fate and pitfalls of life showed me that was far from the reality I later would face.

Exactly seven months after his sister’s accident and eight after the last kiss Gerardo and I shared, I suffered the heaviest blow of my twenty-eight years on this earth. Surprise, pain, tears, despair, uncertainty, isolation, – and I do not know how many other feelings to join heaven and earth – at the moment I received the news of the arrest of my husband and other Cubans, as well as the true nature of his work and sacrifice: to carefully observe the actions of Miami organizations that were orchestrating terrorist attacks against the people of Cuba. Their only interest was to infiltrate these groups in order to discover their plans and avoid the attacks that might be conducted against our country, where many have died or otherwise been victimized already by this kind of aggression. This attempt to avoid violence was the only goal of their work in the United States.

It has been more than fifteen years since these awful events, and I never imagined that my life would take such a violent turn. Since

135 then I have comprehended the full weight of the vengeful hatred that motivates North American politics.

My husband received the highest possible sentence for performing all of his duties: two life imprisonments plus fifteen years, after a trial marred by irregularities and manipulations. The violation of human rights was not confined to the incarcerated Cubans – it extended also to us, their families, who have suffered and continue to suffer as arbitrary victims of an empire.

I’ve been denied twelve times a request for a visa so that I might visit my husband. It’s been argued that I represent a security threat to the United States, that I might be reunited with inappropriate persons or terrorist organizations, and I have even been accused of trying to stay in the United States as an immigrant or being an agent of the Cuban government. My only motivation for getting a visa and traveling to the U.S. is to see my husband who has been condemned to die in prison. My right to visit my husband to this point has been cruelly trampled upon in a form of psychological torture. The visa issue remains an obstacle to my visiting him regularly.

Twelve years ago, the United States Government granted me a visa to travel there, and the FBI submitted me to an interrogation. After eleven hours, they ordered my return to Cuba without explanation. It was a difficult moment that reaffirmed one more time the U.S. Government’s intentions regarding the Five. Once I had obtained the visa, there weren’t supposed to be any more obstacles because I had never had a problem with the law in North America. Sentenced a year before, other family members had visited him and I thought that all pressures would have ceased, but when I arrived at the airport they separated me from the line and interrogated me, and the authorities of this country, who by the way were not migration officials, ordered my return to Cuba. Conscious that the wait would be long, I went back without seeing my husband. He was attentive, knowing that the visit would be the next day and what time I would arrive at the airport in Houston. The uncertainty increased, and we

136 always expected the United States to try something. They made a show of their power.

This is the moment that started a struggle that has gone on until this day and will go on still. There have been many claims and allegations made by judicial, religious, political, and labor-related national and international individuals and organizations, including Amnesty, who from early on recognized these violations. Our strength and our will have not and will not be dented by heart breaking obstacles.

Consequences, like the absence of children in Gerardo and my marriage, a dream deferred and perhaps permanently endangered by my biological clock, have added further injuries to the time we have spent separated, but never absent from one another’s lives. Still, we haven’t let it destroy our shared happiness. So too, we have tran- scended the loneliness of a maximum-security prison, and the with- holding of correspondence intended to isolate my husband from the outside world.

It is a just cause that we defend, and the hope to return to our lives together, as soon as possible, keeps us active. The only future is his return, without this marking us more than it has already been marking each of us.

I don’t pretend that there aren’t moments of sadness, nostalgia, and homesickness, but he has assured me that everything we have experienced will be reversed for a better future, in the form of a permanent union with my husband, partner, and friend, which we will enjoy as though the time was never chopped down.

Upon waking up you shake and say, “Today I have no time to spend on nostalgia or sadness. I only have time to fight for his final return.”

137 ELIZABETH PALMEIRO CASADO – wife of ramón labañino

Elizabeth Palmeiro Casado is 48 years old and is a graduate of English literature and lin- guistics at the University of Havana. She went on to work for the Ministry of the Interior as an English translator. In 1990, she married Ramón Labañino Salazar, with whom she has two daughters: 21 year old Laura and 17 year old Lizbeth.

Although family members were to be allowed to attend the court dates when the Five were sentenced in 2001, Elizabeth did not receive her visa in time. She arrived at the courtroom for the sentencing of the final two defendants, Antonio and Fernando, by which time Ramón was no longer present. She was therefore unable to attend the sentencing of her husband, despite not having seen him for three and a half years.

During all these years, Elizabeth and the girls have had problems to exercise their visitation rights, as a result of the difficulties they have experienced with receiving the required visas to enter the U.S., as well as obstructions mounted by prison authorities.

Elizabeth has taken part in regional solidarity meetings with Cuba in Sofia, Bulgaria; Berlin, Germany; and Mexico. She has also travelled to Brazil, Peru, Nicaragua, Canada, the Czech Republic, Austria, Costa Rica, Venezuela, Japan, and elsewhere, participating in national meetings and tours in major cities to present the case of the Cuban Five. She attended the Peoples Tribunal and Assembly for the Cuban Five in Toronto, Canada in September 2012.

138 Testimony

In 1998, my family was a happy family even though my husband, Ramón Labañino Salazar, used to be away from home for long periods of time. Because of that, I assumed the care and education of our daughters and gave attention to an older daughter of Ramón’s from a previous marriage.

Ramón returned home every 18 months. He left behind personal plans and dreams, like to be present for the birth and growth of our children. Some important missions demanded from him and so many other Cubans to risk their own lives to go to Miami, Florida to infiltrate among persons who planned and carried out terrorist actions to overthrow the Cuban government. These criminal actions started at the very beginning of the revolution in 1959.

Our daughters and I waited for him to share moments that were impossible to share in a common way as any other family. Every time he was off from his mission, we enjoyed visiting our friends. We went to the beach; we played in amusement parks and had family meetings. In those moments, he was filled with the love of his daughters. He used to play with them all around the house.

In every visit Ramón was happy to see them growing and they never forgot him as a beloved father. Although we had few days together, we were very happy. Those were decisive moments in the creation of our family. The love that united us. The support of Ramón at any moment helped me to push ahead and make our dreams come true.

On September 12, 1998, our daughters and I were far from knowing what happened in Miami. At the time, we were not aware of the real mission of Ramón when far from home. Our girls could not understand. For me it was a complete surprise. I knew Ramón was doing important actions in favor of our people but never imagined he was risking his own life in such a way. For security reasons, he kept me away from the real nature of his work.

139 On Monday, September 14, they were presented in court. The same day, I was informed in Cuba of the arrest of my husband in Miami. He acted with a false identity. We could not have contact either. Nobody could know that Luis Medina was in fact the father of my daughters and my husband, Ramón Labañino Salazar.

Ramón and his four brothers stayed in isolation cells for 17 months, and we were for more than 27 months without communication: no letters, no phone calls, and no visits at all.

During this time, I tried to continue my life as normally as possible. I took care of my daughters, keeping in mind that someday Ramón would contact us. I had to stand strong for us and for him.

Finally, we talked by phone for the first time after 27 months of silence. It was in January of 2001. Ramón sounded optimistic and happy to know his daughters and I were fine. Even though I was so sad by this time, I did my best not to compromise the happiness of being in contact again.

We lived hard moments during the trial and the sentence hearings.

Miami is the last place in the U.S. that should harbor a trial against Cuban patriots defending the Cuban revolution. They could not receive a fair trial in such a hostile city. The judge denied all motions to change the venue. The five were found guilty of all charges.

I applied for a visa to be present in those unforgettable days. The visa was granted late, I could not be there, nor could a relative of Ramón be there for him.

He was sentenced to one life prison term plus 18 years. In 2009, after a long appeal process, during the resentencing hearings in Miami, Ramón was resentenced this time to 30 years in prison. He is supposed to be released in October 2026.

140 We were far from imagining how difficult it would be to visit Ramón in prison. Although my government expressed its disposition to support us in all that was necessary to visit our relatives, the government of the USA has continually put obstacles in our way to make those visits difficult and, in some cases, impossible.

In December of 2001, the American government granted me the visa the same day as Ramón’s sentencing hearing. I was not at the hearing but I could meet Ramón for the first time in more than 3 years at the Miami FDC.

Ramón was transferred to a maximum-security prison in Beaumont, Texas. Our daughters and I went to visit him there. For the first time our family was reunited. Lizbeth met her father; Laura rediscovered him after 4 years. At least we enjoyed the fact of being together.

The guards did not allow suspicious acts or any kind of movements of the girls. They did not understand because their father could not walk around in the visitation room, nor play with them and embrace them as he wished.

During the Bush administration, my family suffered severe irregularities in the process of getting a visa to enter the U.S. and visit Ramón. Visas were delayed for many months. We could visit Ramón less than once a year.

During those 8 years, Ramón spent 2 and a half years without family visits.

The visas were limited to just 30 days. We have limitations of movement. We cannot attend any meeting. Visas are granted under many preconditions: no public presentations, no media interviews to denounce the injustice. In case of any violation of the conditions, they would revoke the visas or they would deny us later applications.

141 The visas to enter U.S. territory have been used to deprive us of visits to the five. The visa is used to cause more pain and suffering to the fact of being unjustly in prison, far away from home and family in a foreign country. The American government tried to destroy our families.

Having the visas and being able to travel is not a guarantee to see Ramón.

The visits to the different prisons where my husband has been: USP Beaumont, Texas; USP McCreary, Kentucky; FCI Jesup, Georgia; and FCI Ashland, Kentucky, have been marked by long distances by airplanes and by cars. We have no support from our personnel in the Cuban Interests Section in Washington because they are not allowed by the U.S. authorities to visit Ramón with us. We can visit Ramón thanks to the support of solidarity friends that make it possible for us to get to those remote places where the prisons are located.

In all maximum-security prisons, where my husband was confined for several years, the inmate population is highly dangerous and aggressive. Because of that, there were many disturbances, fights and other problems. Those situations provoked total closings of the prisons or lockdowns. During those days, Ramón remained in his cell without being able to take a bath, with very limited meals, snacks or small sand- wiches, no access to telephone calls, and no visits. When our stay coincided with a lockdown, we could not carry out the programmed visits.

In early 2008, the oldest daughter of Ramón, Aylin, by this time 18 years old, could not visit her father in the USP Beaumont in Texas. During the time she was there, there was a lockdown for 45 days. She returned to Cuba before the expiration of her visa without any contact with Ramón. Aylin returned home with the pain and stressful experience of being so close yet so far from her father at the same time. Ramón did not receive the letters that she sent him from the house of the friends she stayed with in those days.

The same thing happened to me and our daughters of 9 and 13 years old in June 2006. We could only visit Ramón one weekend out of four

142 possible weekends. In May 2009 while in Kentucky to visit Ramón at the USP McCreary, there was a lockdown due to a flu breakout. The Center for the Control of Disease demanded that the prison follow the protocol and we could not extend our time in the USA to visit Ramón. In that instance, we saw Ramón just two weekends. We went back to Cuba without saying goodbye to him.

The lockdowns are not the only cause of Ramón’s lack of communication with the outside world. Sometimes he has been sent to isolation cells before or after a transfer to another prison.

Inmates are isolated when they do something wrong in the prison, but Ramón had been sent to the hole for so called security reasons several times.

In 2009, he stayed in the hole for two months waiting to be transferred to FCI Jesup, in Georgia. Early 2012 he spent more than one month in isolation cells during the transfer to FCI Ashland, Kentucky. All those days we did not know anything about Ramón’s status until he arrived at the final destination.

In January 2012, Ramón’s father, his brother, and his older daughter went to visit him in FCI Jesup, Georgia. They could not do more than three visits because of a lockdown and the transfer to the FCI Ashland.

The authorities of the prison did not take into consideration the fact that some relatives coming from Cuba were there to visit him.

The scanners and surveys we must get through to enter the visitation room are very severe. Sometimes these obstacles caused our sorrow and pain because they delayed the encounter with Ramón. According to the authorities of the prisons in the U.S., the visits are considered privileges and for that reason, they can be blocked for any reason. Visits are not a right.

143 We are allowed just an embrace and a kiss to say hello and goodbye. The only moments we can have a physical contact with Ramón are when we are able to take pictures. No other personal contacts are allowed.

We cannot bring anything with us to the visits except for some money to buy fast food from the vending machines.

During the Obama administration, we should clarify that there have been fewer delays on the visa processes and we have been able to visit Ramón at least twice a year.

My husband and his four brothers are unjustly in prison. They are anti- terrorist fighters and they are considered heroes, not only by the Cuban people, but also by many people around the world. They should be free because they did not cause any harm to the American people or to the American national security. They saved lives in Cuba. In the U.S. they are political prisoners, and only international solidarity can free them.

My husband and his brothers have been in prison for more than 15 years now. Justice has not been served at any level of the justice system.

We need the support of people of good will around the world to understand the truth in this case and to support the cause for the freedom of the Cuban Five.

OLGA SALANUEVA – wife of rené gonzález

Olga Salanueva is the wife of René González and mother of Irma and Ivette. She has a degree in industrial engineering and also studied accounting. When she met René, she was in the accounting department of the Cuban Ministry of Foreign Trade. René left for the U.S. in 1990 and they were separated for six years.

144 As a consequence of René’s American citizenship, Olga was able to join him in Miami in 1996, where she ended up in a telemarketing job for English language text books. At the time of René’s arrest, they had two daughters – Irma was 14 years of age and Ivette, 4 and a half months old.

Two years after René’s arrest, Olga was held in prison for three months, before being deported to Cuba in November 2000. ‘The real objective of my detention was to pressure René into signing a confession … in which he would declare himself guilty and testify against the other defendants. He refused and I was arrested a few days later.’

Following her deportation, on numerous occasions the government denied Olga a visa to enter the U.S., violating rules in the American Human Rights Convention concerning the treatment of prisoners, as well as Article 10 of the Convention of the Rights of the Child. During René’s imprisonment, as well as since his release, Olga has joined family members of the Five in taking the campaign for justice for the Five to audiences throughout the world.

Testimony

First of all, I would like to apologize because René should be here with me. He was the witness. I was supposed to be part of the panel discussion.

I never thought once René returned to Cuba, that we would be separated again. But today we are, since he did not get the visa. As we are one family, here I am, longing to hold his hand.

I will be quite brief because Irmita, as a member of the family, already reported part of our testimony, and so did Horowitz, René’s attorney.

This story goes back many years, like the story of the other comrades. It goes back to 1990. Until that time, we were a very happy couple. Two professionals, René – pilot, myself – engineer. We had been married 8

145 years. We had the opportunity to have a daughter, Irmita. She was 6 years old. You see her now, being almost 30 years.

One afternoon I was caught by surprise by the unpleasant news that René had taken a plane and left Cuba. In a split second he had become a traitor. For me it was one of the hardest blows I ever received in my life. That was not the man I had married, that was not the man I had made life plans with. I never conceived that idea entirely, but it was a reality. I was in Cuba, at the beginning of the special period, aged 31 years and with a daughter of 6, while René was a traitor. I had to face reality. So I just sat down, wrote a letter and put an end to our relationship.

Years passed by. I had to survive like the rest of our people, bringing up our daughter with the same values which had formed me, and which had formed René. I had to keep the family together, but never told Irmita that her father had left to the U.S. I won’t repeat how I managed it. Then, step-by-step, I had to tell her that we were going there, 6 years later.

As a family we felt complete when we reunited again in December of 1996. We resumed our plans. We were no longer so young, that is why there are 14 years between our daughters. Ivette was born in 1998.

René had many plans; he wanted to experience with Ivette all the things he had missed during the childhood of Irmita. But unfortunately for us all, what happened was actually the opposite. One day, at 5.30 a.m., when Ivette was only 4 and a half months of age, armed men broke into our apartment and brought away René. They stayed in the house searching everywhere. They made me get Irmita, who was only 14, out of bed, while armed men on both sides of the bed woke her up.

That was the second big blow in my life. This time I was not in Cuba. When I received the first blow, when I still was in Cuba, despite being in the special period, even though René was considered by everyone as a traitor, I was never discriminated against. They never took me out of my job. I kept on being a Party member. I kept my job as a super visor. My daughter was never discriminated against in school.

146 However, when René was arrested in the U.S., things were very different. I lost everything. When I say everything, I mean that I even lost my home. Since there are always caring people, I could stay with some friends of René, who had two little girls. I had to sleep in their living room. I had to leave my youngest daughter Ivette, aged only a few months, with René’s grandmother, an old lady of 80 who stood up for the love of her grandson and her great-granddaughters, and helped me raise Ivette. But I lived in Miami and Ivette lived in Sarasota – I’m talking about 240 miles separating us...And René was in the hole... René was kept there for 17 months without his daughters being able to see him. Although we lived in the same city, and they didn´t need a visa to go to the prison... But Philip (Horowitz, editor’s note) remembers well that Ivette and Irmita were not allowed to go up to the hole. They said that it was due to security matters. But later we learned that those being in punishment cells were allowed to go down to the visiting room, to meet their families and their children. This was a procedure directed specifically against René. Only once, as Irmita already told you, he was allowed to see the girls, after Philip had filed several motions.

The trial was due to begin in 2000. But it was postponed until November. It was August. I visited René on his birthday, August 13, and he told me of a letter that Philip had brought him, where the Prosecution suggested to René to give up his rights to live with his family where he had chosen, in exchange for another right, to defend himself in trial. They suggested to him to become a witness for the prosecution, in exchange for letting me and my daughters remain there, even though I had been legally claimed by then U.S. citizen René González, like our daughter Irmita, while the youngest child was a U.S. citizen.

As René strongly refused and decided to go to trial, three days later, I was taken to an Immigration facility. I could have been deported within 24 hours; it is known to be possible. But they decided to keep me there for three months. Three months in which our family was absolutely divided: René in one prison, me in another, Ivette with an old woman, and Irmita in Cuba, because this coincided with her being on holiday.

147 I remember Philip told us that the press approached him, and without telling lies, he did not tell the whole truth. They asked him if it was true that the FBI had arrested the wife of René González. He wisely said that the FBI did not do that. They were following the news, because there was also an American-born girl involved, and remember we were in 2000. We were in August 2000, and in that same year we had managed to get Elian González from the clutches of those murderers. I suffered all this while in prison, thinking that if they found out at some point that the girl was not in the custody of either parent this would have caused a major problem.

After three months I was deported. I was not allowed to leave the country with my youngest daughter. I was told that the deportation process was against me, not against Ivette González, since Ivette González was a U.S. citizen. A 2 year old girl... I returned to Cuba, and here I had to wait for Ivette, who was brought back to Cuba by her grandmother, René’s mother.

Since then I live in Cuba, raising our daughters like Elizabeth (wife of Ramón Labañino, editor’s note), taking care of the household. Our parents getting older, the parents who never appear in any story, but are the parents of the wives, the ones who give us strength, unconditional support... But gradually they lose strength as the years go by, and gradually they also die. We are left alone, raising our girls, and in my case realizing that I have no opportunity to see René again.

I was denied the visa many times, like Adriana (wife of Gerardo Hernández, editor’s note). In 2002, I visited this country (Great Britain, editor’s note) – with Ivette in hand – and it was the solidarity movement, it was you brothers and sisters, who recommended me to go to Amnesty International. Well, there they welcomed us and up till now they have joined us. First, for the claim of the rights of prisoners and visitation rights for the wives and children, and then, doing a thorough legal review, which was made by a defense attorney, it is the recognition of the ongoing injustice from the first day and the violations of legal character that have been present throughout the case.

148 But the years went by. We realized that Ivette would never meet her dad, because they would not grant me a visa. After 8 years we determined as parents that Irmita could accompany Ivette, and that’s when she met him.

The years kept passing by and so did the legal process in parallel. We realized that there was not going to be any justice in the case of René. Justice was not done in his case, as justice was not done in the case of Fernando. René ended his sentence, but he was forced to three years of supervised release, a process which had nothing to do with his situation. This procedure is related to the situation when someone is coming out of prison, and needs to adapt to life in society, to start looking for a job, to help materially and morally the family that is supposed to be living there with him. And this had nothing to do with the situation of René.

René went to a house; he went to a new cell. A place he had to leave by walking, by sneaking out to find some food, which he had to prepare. He was not able to socialize with anybody, because one of the premises when being on parole is that whenever you try to establish some communication or relationship with another person, the first thing you have to tell them is that you are a prisoner on supervised release. René would have to start explaining himself, being in the midst of a place where terrorist organizations are located; putting his life in extreme danger.

Unfortunately, as Mirta (mother of Antonio Guerrero, editor’s note) has said, there had to be a disease and the worsening of his brother’s health in order to give René permission to visit Cuba. A matter that is considered within the law; it was not a gift, it was not an act of kindness from the prosecution or the judge, it was a right of the person on parole. He came to see his brother. That was the first time the whole family met.

Then, unfortunately, our dear Cándido, René’s father; died, a lively man despite his age, but maybe his heart failed because of all the suffering, and then he died. René came again, and thanks to the excellent

149 strategy drawn by Philip and René, they managed to make the judge approve to eliminate the parole and so René could stay at home.

René came home last year, on April 22. April 24 was Ivette’s 15th birthday. It was the first time we celebrated a birthday together, the 15 years of our little Ivette.

René returned home after 23 years, from 1990 until 2013. He came after completing his duty, the duty to try to prevent terrorist actions against our people, and the duty of completing his sentence with dignity as a consequence of this mission. But René’s mission, like Fernando’s mission, has not concluded. Neither has our mission concluded. It will only end when we bring Gerardo back home, and this is our urgent call.

Our enemy has proven to do poorly in math. It has tried for many years to divide, to divide and divide. And what it has accomplished is to mul- tiply. It has tried to divide families; it has tried to divide a people. Today by denying a visa to René, it is trying to separate him from you, but the result is the opposite. We’re no longer the single family that received bad news in 1990, we are five families united to all of you that are now beyond being our friends, the solidarity movement with Cuba, thus becoming our family. And since a family never leaves its children, we are confident that we are going to bring them all back home.

150 Findings of the Commission of Inquiry into the case of the Cuban Five

Preliminary Findings

It is appropriate that these preliminary thoughts on this hearing, a hearing that could make some contribution to the realization of the human rights in general and the fair trial rights in particular, of five Cuban human beings be placed in the public domain now. All these persons, are Cuban nationals: Mr. Gerardo Hernández Nordelo, Mr. Ramón Labañino Salazar, Mr. Antonio Guerrero Rodríguez, Mr. Fernando González Llort, and Mr. René González were all convicted in the United States of America during 2001 of certain state security related offences. Mr. Hernández was, in addition, convicted of a conspiracy to commit murder.

We plead fervently that the course of action suggested by us below be adopted for the reasons that follow, reasons that will be elaborated in the report to follow:

1. There are serious concerns about whether any of these people have had the full benefit of the fundamental human right to a fair and speedy trial before an independent and impartial tribunal or Court, recognized universally in the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights as ratified by the United States of America.

These material concerns emerge in the light of facts like: a. all five Cuban Nationals were placed in solitary confinement for about seventeen months before the trial began; b. none of them have had sufficient access to documents relevant to the trial and necessary for the adequate preparation of a defense;

151 c. the opportunity to consult with their legal representatives was, in all the circumstances, less than sufficient; d. the trial was held in a part of Miami, Florida where, according to three respected judges of the Eleventh Circuit of the United States Court of Appeals, a fair trial could not be guaranteed; e. serious allegations have been made that the United States Government paid the media to ensure prejudicial publicity against these persons both before and during the trial; f. these five human beings were certain of their fate only eight years after the trial in the District Court had been concluded.

2. According to all the judgements, not one of these persons either committed or intended to commit any act of violence.

3. No conduct of any of these persons was aimed at the United States of America or its Government. The Cuban Five gathered information aimed at preventing privately-inspired violence and other anti- Cuban action emanating from United States soil.

4. The perception of the Cuban Five, indeed their firm belief, was that the United States Government was not doing enough to stem violent anti-Cuban action from United States soil.

5. There is no doubt at all that hundreds of compatriots and country- men who were ordinary citizens of Cuba have died in unacceptably horrendous circumstances as a result of the actions of Cubans opposed to the Castro government in Cuba from United States soil. The families of the deceased would have suffered immeasurably.

6. Two of the members of this group of persons have already served their full sentences, and there can be no prejudice in pardoning them now.

7. The other three persons have, in any event, already served inor- dinately long periods of imprisonment in all the relevant circumstances summarized in this statement.

152 8. The families of these people have undergone tremendous suffering and hardship in consequence of the internment of their loved ones, and it can be said without any fear of contradiction that enough is enough.

9. None of these persons acted out of malice or any kind of ill-will towards the United States or its Government, people, or policies: each of them was carrying out the instructions of their government.

10. Private anti-Cuban aggression from American soil is quite impossible to be justified from any viewpoint.

11. It is urged that the normalization of relations between Cuba and the United States is a laudable and achievable goal, in the interests of both the United States of America and the Republic of Cuba, and that the generous grant of pardons by the President of the United States of America to the people who have been described as the Cuban Five will contribute immeasurably to the achievement of this vitally important purpose.

12. The President of the United States is also respectfully informed of the prevailing reasonable view that it is important to signal that the achievement of fairness and justice is not the preserve of the judiciary alone of any country, but, ultimately, a vital political responsibility that must be embraced when the moment comes.

13. It is suggested, with the greatest of respect, that the grant of these pardons will have a significant impact on world justice and world peace.

In summary, the grant of unconditional Presidential pardons to the members of the Cuban Five has the real potential to achieve effective justice for the five human beings who have been the concern of this enquiry; demonstrate the adherence of the President of the United States of America and its Government today to universally accepted norms of morality, fairness and justice; contribute substantially to the

153 normalization of relations between the United States and Cuba; and represent a meaningful stride towards world justice and world peace.

Having heard two full days of compelling evidence, we would urge the President of the United States of America, President Barack Obama, to pardon completely all these five persons and to release immediately and unconditionally the three persons who continue to languish in prison in the United States.

Signed by: – Commissioner Zakeria Yacoob, South Africa, former Justice of the Constitutinal Court of South Africa – Commissioner Philippe Texier, France, former Judge French Cour de Cassation – Commissioner Yogesh Kumar Sabharwal, India, former Chief Justice – Professor Sara Chandler, UK, solicitor, Chair of the Human Rights Committee of Law Society of England & Wale and Elizabeth Woodcraft, UK, barrister and author who acted as coordinators of the International Inquiry Commission

Final Findings

THE COMMISSION OF INQUIRY INTO THE CASE OF THE CUBAN 5 HELD IN LONDON ON FRIDAY, MARCH 7 AND SATURDAY, MARCH 8, 2014

Constitution of the Commission

The Commission was constituted at the instance of the International Cuban Solidarity Committee after international consultation. They are all retired judges, renowned members of the international judicial community: Commissioner Yogesh Kumar Sabharwal, India, former Chief Justice of India; Commissioner Philippe Texier, France, former Judge, French Court de Cassation; and Commissioner Zakeria Yacoob, South Africa, former Justice of the Constitutional Court of South Africa.

154 The Commission was served by two co-ordinators: Professor Sara Chandler, UK, solicitor, Chair of the Human Rights Committee of Law Society of England & Wales and Elizabeth Woodcraft, UK, barrister and author.

Report of the evidence and findings of the Commission

(A) Introduction

1. At the close of the hearings of the Commission in London on March 8, 2014, we issued a report in which we expressed our preliminary views. We undertook then to produce a more detailed final report which we do now. We may say at the outset that we confirm our preliminary views and conclusions. This International Commission was appointed to hear evidence and argument from all interested parties and to make recommendations on whether, in all the circumstances, justice required that 5 Cuban nationals (who have come to be known as the Cuban 5), convicted of certain offences in Miami, Florida, United States of America be pardoned and that those persons still serving terms of imprisonment pursuant to their convictions be unconditionally released. The Cuban 5 are: Mr. Gerardo Hernández Nordelo (Mr. Hernández), Mr. Ramón Labañino Salazar (Mr. Labañino), Mr. Antonio Guerrero Rodríguez (Mr. Guerrero), Mr. Fernando González Llort (Mr. Llort), and Mr. René González (Mr. González). They were all convicted during 2001 of certain state security related offences. Mr. Hernández was, in addition, convicted of a conspiracy to commit murder. Mr. González and Mr. Llort have been released from prison already but the other three people who were convicted remain in custody.

2. The Commission received written and oral argument and heard evidence from 14 witnesses whose names and designations are set out in Schedule A. In broad terms, evidence and argument was presented by lawyers and families of the Cuban 5, expert lawyers including an international law expert, Amnesty International and Cuban officials responsible for intelligence. It bears mention at the

155 outset that Amnesty International’s approach was consistent with all the other evidence we had received and supported the grant of pardons and immediate and unconditional release of the Cuban 5. The Commissioners had access to the evidence presented in the case and all relevant judgements: a. the judgement of the District Court on the application for change of venue decided on July 27, 2000;(1) b. the judgement of the three judge panel of the Court of Appeals of the 11th Circuit upholding the appeal and ordering a change of venue decided on August 9, 2005;(2) c. the en banc judgement of the 11th Circuit of the Court of Appeals vacating the judgement of the 3 person Court of Appeal and holding that the change of venue judgement of the District Court should not have been set aside and referring the merits of the appeal for consideration to a 3 judge panel;(3) d. the judgement of the 3 judge Bench rejecting by a majority the appeals on convictions but setting aside some of the sentences;(4) and e. the judgement of the District Court on sentence.(5)

(B) Status of the Commission

3. We emphasise that this Commission has no legal status or power. No government or judicial authority in the United States of America or any other country is bound to do anything pursuant to this report. We have done our work, however, in the belief that the moral persuasiveness of our report as well as its reasonableness and accuracy will result in greater support for the campaign for the release of the Cuban 5. We are also of the optimistic conviction that appropriate, sensitive and careful political decisions in the

1 District Court (DC) change of venue judgement. 2 Court of Appeals (CA) change of venue judgement. 3 The vacation judgement decided on August 9, 2006. 4 CA merits judgement decided June 4, 2008. 5 The re-sentencing judgement.

156 United States of America will result in the pardoning of the Cuban 5 and in the immediate and unconditional release from prison of the three members of the Cuban 5 who remain incarcerated.

4. In early 2000, all the Defendants (the Cuban 5) ultimately made an application for a change of venue on the basis that the trial should not be held in Miami, Florida because they will be “denied their rights to due process of the law and a fair trial with an impartial jury because of the inflamed atmosphere in this community concerning the activities of the Government of the Republic of Cuba.”(6) The Government submitted that “Defendants have not met their burden of showing that a different jury venire is neces sary in these circumstances” and in particular that “pervasive community prejudice exists.” The change of venue application was denied on the basis that the Cuban 5 had “not demonstrated the degree of pervasive community prejudice (to) warrant a presumption of jury prejudice.” The Court would ensure the “right to a fair and impartial jury in Miami.” The Court also held that it would reconsider an application for change of venue if a fair and impartial jury could not be convened. In the event, a jury was convened and the Cuban 5’s legal representatives conceded that the process of jury selection had been very good and that they had no problems with the jury.

5. The Cuban 5 were charged with, amongst other things, “conspiracy to become unregistered foreign agents, becoming unregistered foreign agents, and conspiracy to commit espionage.” The conduct of Mr. Hernández was “alleged to have culminated in the shootdown of two private aircraft from the United States and the deaths of four members of Brothers to the Rescue, a Miami-based Cuban exile group.”(7)

6 DC change of venue judgement, p. 2. 7 DC change of venue judgement, p. 1.

157 6. The trial proceeded but was plagued by much anti-Cuban Five media publicity, concerns about the jurors being able to perform their functions appropriately, as well as two motions for a mistrial and change of venue, which were both denied.

7. All the accused were convicted of the conspiracies referred to earlier. Mr. Hernández was, in addition, convicted of a conspiracy to commit murder of four people who died as a result of the shootdown of two airplanes which took off from American soil to conduct anti- Cuban activities in Cuba. He received two life sentences, Messrs Guerrero and Labañino were sentenced to life, Mr. Llort got 19 years imprisonment and Mr. González was sentenced to 15 years.

8. The appeal to the 11th Circuit of the United States Court of Appeals succeeded. The three judge panel unanimously reversed their convictions and remanded the case back to the District Court for retrial on the basis that the “pervasive community prejudice against Fidel Castro and the Cuban government and its agents and the publicity surrounding the trial and other community events combined to create a situation where they were unable to obtain a fair and impartial trial.”(8)

9. The Government then made an application for an en banc review of the Court of Appeal change of venue judgement, in accordance with American courts procedural law. The majority of judges in the 11th Circuit voted for an en banc review with the result that all the judges of the 11th Circuit considered the review by the Government. The en banc Court split in the determination of “whether the district court abused its discretion when it denied their multiple motions for change of venue and for new trial.” The majority affirmed the decision of the District Court but the minority was firm that the Court of Appeals was right in concluding that the trial had been unfair and in ordering a re-trial. The review

8 Court of Appeals change of venue judgement.

158 Court found that the merits of the appeal had to be determined (which had not been determined by the Court of Appeals in the change of venue decision) by a three judge panel.

10. The three judge panel considered the appeal on the merits and confirmed all the convictions. The panel did however set aside the life sentences imposed on Mr. Guerrero and Mr. Labañino as well as the 19 year sentence imposed on Mr. Llort and remitted the matter to the District Court for new sentences.

11. The minority dissented on the issue of whether Mr. Hernández was correctly convicted of a conspiracy to commit murder. We return to this later.

12. The District Court later re-sentenced Mr. Labañino to 30 years imprisonment and Mr. Guerrero to 21 years imprisonment and Mr. Llort was sentenced to 17 years and 9 months.

13. Applications by the Cuban 5 for an en banc review as well as an effort to engage the Supreme Court were both refused. As at the date of this Commission’s hearing in London there was pending a habeas corpus hearing.

(D) Discussion and findings

14. Most of the findings in this report confirm and elaborate upon the findings already in the preliminary report. We do however add certain additional matters which will be described as additional findings.

(a) Change of venue (Preliminary Report)

15. We found in the preliminary report that “the trial was held in a part of Miami, Florida where, according to three respected judges of the Eleventh Circuit of the United States Court of Appeals, a fair trial could not be guaranteed.”

159 16. The preliminary report dealt with this issue under the heading of a fair trial. We believe however that this is an independent issue though relevant to the question of a fair trial. The question is whether the decisions of all the courts concerning the defendants application for a change of venue have an impact, independently of whether the trial was ultimately fair on whether the defendants should be pardoned.

17. We have carefully studied the three judgements which relate to change of venue and have heard considerable evidence about the pervasive prejudice that the defendants suffered because the trial continued to be held in Miami. The District Court refused to allow a change of venue despite the fact that more than one application had been made to it and despite the fact that there had been extensive media publicity concerning the accused. We have heard persuasive uncontradicted evidence of the strong anti-Castro feeling in the Cuban American society of Florida, feelings so strong that they resulted in murderous attacks being perpetrated from American soil at the instance of Cuban Americans to destabilize the government of President Fidel Castro. We understand how difficult it would have been in that society in 1998 for any American, Cuban or not, to even express views which may be taken as even an indication that the government of President Fidel Castro may not be as evil or as heinous as people generally thought.

18. Neither the District Court nor the majority that sat en banc took sufficient cognizance, in our respectful view, of this pervasive public opinion against President Fidel Castro of Cuba and its likely prejudice to the Cuban 5. It is vital to remember that the Cuban 5 did not deny being representatives of the Cuban government and always accepted that they did work for Cuban intelligence and that each of them sympathized with the Cuban government and its policies. It would have been a different matter if the Cuban 5 had denied that they were Cuban government agents and the dispute that had to be resolved by the jury was whether they were

160 agents of the Cuban government. In these circumstances, it could be expected that jurors would adjudicate that debate fairly and openly. The majority of the population of Miami, to put it simply, fervently believed that the Cuban government was immoral and needed to be exterminated, that the Cuban government was dis- honest and that the Cuban government was a threat to the United States of America. We ask the question whether it was even possible for a juror from the Miami community, at that time, to find that people who were admittedly agents of the Cuban government were reasonably honest, were to some degree honourable and had versions that could possibly be true. The whole trial was shrouded in an atmosphere that made a finding by the jury that was favourable to admitted agents of the Cuban government virtually impossible. This conclusion must be elaborated.

19. First, it would have been difficult for jurors in Miami to think objectively about supporters of a government which they considered an evil regime in a just effort to determine whether they were speaking the truth. In these circumstances, it was unfortunate in our view for the District Court to have regard to statements by potential jurors that they are able to apply their minds objectively to the facts before them. This is because human beings are unlikely to make the concession that they are biased but there is also the possibility that their bias was not conscious but so subconscious that the potential jurors were not even aware of that bias. The determination of whether a potential juror is able to discharge his or her functions appropriately and fairly is not one that can be made from the point of view of the subjective juror concerned. The determination must always be objective. We have found it difficult to discover any objective evidence for any reasonable conclusion that potential jurors were indeed in a position to exercise a fair and objective judgement when the issues concerned admitted agents of a strongly perceived to be evil Castro regime with no potential for good.

20. It may have been thought that the exclusion of Cuban Americans from the jury could have alleviated the problem. This is in our

161 view problematic. Cuban Americans and non-Cuban Americans lived together in the same communities; they worked in the same enterprises; they attended the same places of entertainment; they walked the same streets; their children attended the same schools. And what is more non-Cuban Americans too, would have regarded the Castro regime with as much, if not more, negative sentiment.

21. The case of the Cuban 5 was that they were passing information to Cuban intelligence so as to ensure that murderous attacks perpetrated by agencies and organizations which were spawned in Miami were reduced. In effect, they said that they were acting in the service of their country, in defense of their country and in an effort to stop people in Cuba from being killed. The essence of their case was that this was legitimate activity. Consider the position of a juror who did ultimately hold that the Cuban 5, even though they were agents of the Cuban government, had no intention of harming the American government, had no intention to commit violence and had acted legitimately. In our respectful view, that juror would, objectively speaking, have found it impossible subsequently to continue to live secure comfortable lives in Miami. The human condition, fear, and above all, the need and desire of every human being to secure the safety of one’s family, to live safely and to be respected by one’s peers points inexorably away from the objective possibility that a potential Miami juror would be able to give a verdict perceived to be favourable to agents of the Cuban regime.

22. It is true as was pointed out by the en banc majority that the District Court went through a very careful jury selection process. But this is beside the point. There are circumstances in which the storm of pervasive prejudice is so engrained into the very soul of the community concerned that careful jury selection is perfectly pointless. We have come to the view that this was the situation in Miami and, like the 3 judge panel that voted for a change of venue, that a change in venue was the only way to ensure a fair trial.

162 23. The en banc Court of Appeals of the 11th Circuit also placed considerable reliance on the fact that the legal representatives of the accused were happy with the jury selection process and that they praised the District Court judge for the way in which the jury had been selected. But too much reliance on this factor was in our view inadvisable. Two factors failed to be brought into the equation. The first is that the media campaign against the Cuban 5 continued even after the jurors had been selected. The second, perhaps more important factor that appears to have been ignored by the en banc majority, was that even after the defense lawyers of the Cuban 5 expressed satisfaction about the jury, two further change of venue applications were made. The real point is that it was not the jurors who were being objected to in their person. They were all probably honest human beings doing their best. The essential question is really this: How fair did the objective circumstances which were beyond their control permit them to be? In reality therefore, in our view, the fact that the lawyers were happy with the jury did not and could not by any means suggest that they were happy with the venue and the objective prejudicial circumstances that prevailed within that venue.

24. The conclusion of the en banc majority judgement is captured in the following passage:

“In sum, to establish a presumption of juror prejudice necessitating Rule 21 change of venue, a defendant must demonstrate that (1) widespread, pervasive prejudice and prejudicial pretrial publicity saturates the community, and (2) there is a reasonable certainty that the prejudice prevents the defendant from obtaining a fair trial. We find that the defendants in this case failed to meet this two-pronged test. They failed to show that so great a prejudice existed against them as to require a change of venue under Rule 21, in light of the court’s effective use of prophylactic measures to carefully manage individual voir dire examination of each and every panel member and its successful steps to isolate the jury from every extrinsic influence. Under these circumstances, we

163 will not disturb the district court’s broad discretion in ruling that this is not one of those rare cases in which juror prejudice can be presumed.” (footnotes omitted)

25. It is instructive to note that the en banc majority was assured that community prejudice was not established by the defendants on the basis of the District Court’s careful management of the jury appointment process and its successful steps to isolate the jury from every extrinsic influence. We have two difficulties with this conclusion. The first is that the management of the jury selection process could have nothing to do with pervasive community prejudice and its control. This, no court had the power to do. Second, the jurors went back into the storm of media publicity and to the communities in which the pervasive prejudice existed every time they were not in court. These jurors could in the circumstances hardly have liberated themselves from the pervasive community prejudice, for to do so would have required their total isolation from their communities. This, the District Court judge did not and could not do. We find the 3 judge change of venue decision and the en banc minority position more palpable and persuasive. It is appropriate in our view in a case of this kind for a political decision-maker to take account of differences of opinion amongst judges in cases where people are convicted of crimes and sentenced to terms of imprisonment as an important factor in determining whether the political decision to pardon accused persons should be exercised. Here, three judges (Birch J, Kravitch J and Oakes J), were strongly of the view that the change of venue application should have been granted. Although ten judges were not of that view, we would suggest, that the issue is not one of numbers alone. At this late stage, we suggest that the serious disputation around a change of venue question is certainly one of the factors that fail to be taken into account in determining whether the defendants should be pardoned. It is by no means the only factor.

164 (b) Fair and speedy trial (Preliminary Report)

26. The first finding in our preliminary report was that we hadserious concerns about whether the Cuban 5 had the full benefit of the fundamental human right to a fair and speedy trial before an independent and impartial tribunal or Court, recognized universally in the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights as ratified by the United States of America.

27. We start by pointing out that the right to a fair and speedy trial is guaranteed in the 5th and 6th Amendments of the United States Constitution. International human rights instruments like the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights, the American Convention on Human Rights all insist upon the right to a fair trial. By way of example, the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights imposes on all State parties (the United States of America is included) “a fair ... hearing by a(n) ... impartial tribunal.”

28. There are a number of grounds upon which the preliminary report raises concerns about the fairness of the trial. Each must be dealt with in turn.

(i) Solitary confinement

29. The preliminary report states that “all five Cuban Nationals were placed in solitary confinement for about seventeen months before the trial began.” Between their arrest and the trial, the Cuban 5 were detained with no right to bail for 33 months; they were kept in isolation for 17 months; they were again placed in solitary confinement for a further 48 days. Again during preparations for the appeal they were sent to isolation cells on orders from Washington. It is plain that it was extremely difficult for all 5 of these human beings to consult with their legal representatives and to properly prepare for their trial or appeal. This seems to have been deliberate in an

165 effort to disadvantage the defendants on trial. The European Court of Human Rights has held9 that solitary confinement for 4 days and 6 hours violates the right to a fair trial. We do not wish to burden this report unduly but say emphatically that international and humanitarian standards make it plain that the periods of solitary confinement imposed on the Cuban 5 were far too long and impact severely on the fairness of the trial. The families have stated that the fact that they were prevented from visiting the Cuban 5 during these times has had a tremendous impact upon them; the lawyers have stated that these periods of solitary confinement prevented them from preparing properly for the trial and appeal; Mr. González has made it plain that it was difficult beyond measure to prepare for trial and to maintain contact with lawyers and family. The demeaning and crushing effect of these long periods of solitary confinement on the very personalities and souls of the Cuban 5 can never be over- emphasised. This egregious infringement is, in our view, by itself enough to vacate all the judgements against the Cuban 5.

(ii) Consultation with legal representatives

30. We confirm our preliminary view that the “opportunity to consult with their legal representatives was, in all the circumstances, less than sufficient.” This conclusion is inextricably bound up with the incontrovertible fact of their unduly extensive solitary confinement. No more need be said on this issue.

(iii) Trial delay

31. It was also unfair in our view that these “five human beings were certain of their fate only eight years after the trial in the District Court had been concluded.” Indeed it was 11 years after the defendants were first arrested in 1998 that the United States Supreme Court refused them leave to appeal. This delay was undue and should also be taken into account as factor in considering the pardon.

9 Brogan et al v United Kingdom 10/1987/133/184/187, November 29 1988 para 62.

166 (iv) Access to relevant documents

32. Our preliminary report recorded our concern that none of the Cuban 5 “have had sufficient access to documents relevant to the trial and necessary for the adequate preparation of a defense.” There were thousands of documents. The Cuban 5 were denied access to even those documents which had been taken from them at the time when they were arrested and those documents that were copied from the hard drive of the computer of one of the defendants. It is impossible to know what purpose would be served (except the purpose of a deliberate unfair trial) by denying access to documents which had been taken from the defendants themselves.

(v) Government funding media

33. We were also concerned that “serious allegations have been made that the United States Government paid the media to ensure prejudicial publicity against these persons both before and during the trial.” We do not elaborate on these allegations in this report but the details are readily available. The arguments are new and were raised to our knowledge for the first time during this hearing in the sense that they had not been made in any judicial court proceedings before. We recommend that the United States Government takes measures to investigate these matters carefully and if true, to determine who in government is responsible and to ensure that appropriate action be taken. We must say though that we find these arguments cogent. At the very least if the State itself contributed deliberately to an unfair trial by stoking up media publicity this factor counts heavily for the defendants being pardoned.

34. Inappropriate, highly prejudicial and irrelevant comment and argument was placed before the jury in circumstances where it is

167 difficult to conceive members of the jury being able to disabuse their minds of the comments unbecoming of the representatives of the United States Government.

35. Examples of these comments are that “the Cuban government” had a “huge” stake in the outcome of the case and that the jurors would be abandoning their community unless they convicted the “Cuban sp[ies] sent to ... destroy the United States.” The Cuban government sponsored “book bombs,” “telephone threats of car bombs,” and “sabotage,” and “killed four innocent people.” Cuba “was not alone” in shooting down civilian aircraft as they “are friends with our enemies,” including “the Chinese and the Russians.” It argued that Cuba was a “repressive regime [that] doesn’t believe in any [human] rights.” The jury was “not operating under the rule of Cuba, thank God.”(10)

36. Although the defendants’ objections were sustained, and the jury was instructed to consider only the evidence admitted during the trial and to remember that the lawyers’ comments were not evidence, we are of the view that comments as serious as these could not be entirely cancelled by a judicial instruction.

(d) Other factors mentioned in the Preliminary Report to be taken into account

37. We mention a number of other factors in the preliminary report that were to be taken into account in a consideration of the pardoning and release of the Cuban 5. We elaborate here that each of these factors is really concerned with the issue of sentence on the assumption that the convictions were correct. We wish to ex- pound the view that if each of these factors is properly taken into account the conclusion is inescapable that all of the members of the Cuban 5 have already served enough time in prison to justify their pardon and release. It must be borne in mind that the 3

10 Paragraph 1171 of en banc minority judgement (footnotes omitted).

168 members of the Cuban 5 who are still in prison have been there for 16 years since their arrest.

38. We have had extensive and persuasive argument to the effect that bearing in mind the extent of murderous activity which resulted in deaths of civilians and tourists in Cuba, that the government of Cuba was entitled to take measures and gather information to protect its own citizens. Although we find these arguments cogent, the actions of the Cuban 5 are in any event wholly under- standable from any reasonable moral perspective or any patriotic standpoint.

39. According to all the judgements not one of these persons either committed or intended to commit any act of violence.

40. No conduct of any of these persons was aimed at the United States of America or its Government. The Cuban 5 gathered information aimed at preventing privately-inspired violence and other anti- Cuban action emanating from United States soil. All five persons acted in defense of their motherland and not in opposition to the stated objectives of the Government of the United States of America.

41. It was the perception of the Cuban 5, indeed their firm belief, that the United States Government was not doing enough to stem violent anti-Cuban action from United States soil.

42. There is no doubt at all that hundreds of compatriots and coun- trymen who were ordinary citizens of Cuba have died in unacceptably horrendous circumstances as a result of the actions of Cubans opposed to the Castro government in Cuba from United States soil. The families of the deceased would have suffered immeasurably.

43. Most importantly, insofar as the personal circumstances of the Cuban 5 are concerned, full weight must be given to the fact that

169 each of these human beings genuinely believed that their actions and their cause were both laudable and fully morally justified in defense of their motherland, and that they have done nothing morally objectionable.

(e) Conspiracy to commit murder

44. Mr. Hernández was also convicted of a conspiracy to commit murder. It may be briefly stated by way of background that during the period 1995 to 1996 a Cuban American, Mr. Basulto, was in charge of an organization called Brothers to the Rescue which, amongst other provocative acts frequently invaded Cuban air space despite the fact that he, Brothers to the Rescue and the American government were repeatedly warned about not doing so. During a flight on February 24, 1996, two of the Brothers to the Rescue airplanes were shot down by the Cuban Air Force as a result of which the pilots died. This conviction was despite the fact that there was no evidence that Mr. Hernández had informed the Cuban government of the flight and that it was indeed the United States government that had conveyed the relevant information to the Cuban Government.

45. It must be mentioned that there was a debate about whether the airplanes were shot down in Cuban airspace or in neutral airspace between the United States and Cuba. We heard evidence to the effect that the American authorities are in possession of satellite information that would establish precisely where the airplanes were at the time when they were shot down. The importance of the resolution of this dispute is that if the airplanes were shot down in Cuban airspace nobody could have been found guilty in relation to that shootdown.

46. Mr. Hernández was convicted on the conspiracy to murder charge on the basis that he entered into a conspiracy which led to the shootdown. The judges in the Court of Appeals of the 11th Circuit who decided the merits of the appeal differed on whether Mr. Hernández had been rightly convicted of the conspiracy to

170 murder. We have no hesitation in saying that we agree with the minority judgement of Kravitch J to the effect that the conspiracy to commit murder charge had not been established. In any event at the factual level, there is no evidence that Mr. Hernández knew that the airplanes would be shot down before they entered Cuban airspace, if that had indeed been the case.

47. As far as we are concerned there are two possibilities. The first is that the airplanes that were shot down did enter Cuban airspace, in which case the shootdown was justified and Mr. Hernández could not be convicted of murder. If on the other hand, the airplanes were shot down before they entered Cuban airspace, there is nothing to suggest that Mr. Hernández knew that the airplanes would be shot down or that there was a plan to shoot down these airplanes before they entered Cuban airspace. It is also of considerable significance that according to the evidence, it was not Mr. Hernández who drew the attention of the Cuban government to the fact that the flights were to take place; it was the United States government itself. It was not surprising therefore that the prosecution did not wish to proceed with this charge and difficult for us to understand how it was that the conviction followed in these circumstances.

48. In any event, we would suggest that Mr. Hernández’s participation in the entire exercise was so minimal that the double life imprison ment term was wholly unjustified. This minimal participation too must be taken into account and serves as a further important reason that Mr. Hernández in particular should be pardoned and released immediately.

(E) Final motivation

49. We think it is now appropriate to repeat the final motivations and recommendations as it was encapsulated in the preliminary report. 50. Two of the members of this group of persons have already served their full sentences, and there can be no prejudice in pardoning them now.

171 51. The other three persons have, in any event, already served inor- dinately long periods of imprisonment in all the relevant circumstances summarised in this report.

52. The families of these people have undergone tremendous suffering and hardship in consequence of the internment of their loved ones, and it can be said without any fear of contradiction that enough is enough.

53. None of these persons acted out of malice or any kind of ill-will towards the United States or its Government, people, or policies: each of them was carrying out the instructions of their government.

54. Private anti-Cuban aggression from American soil is quite impossible to be justified from any viewpoint.

55. It is urged that the normalization of relations between Cuba and the United States is a laudable and achievable goal, in the interests of both the United States of America and the Republic of Cuba, and that the generous grant of pardons by the President of the United States of America to the people who have been described as the Cuban 5 will contribute immeasurably to the achievement of this vitally important purpose.

56. The President of the United States is also respectfully informed of the prevailing reasonable view that it is important to signal that the achievement of fairness and justice is not the preserve of the judiciary alone of any country, but, ultimately, a vital political responsibility that must be embraced when the moment comes.

57. It is suggested, with the greatest of respect, that the granting of these pardons will have a significant impact on world justice and world peace.

172 58. In summary, the granting of unconditional presidential pardons to the members of the Cuban 5 has the real potential to achieve effective justice for the five human beings who have been the concern of this enquiry; demonstrate the adherence of the President of the United States of America and its Government today to universally accepted norms of morality, fairness and justice; contribute substantially to the normalization of relations between the United States and Cuba and represent a meaningful stride towards world justice and world peace.

59. Having heard two full days of compelling evidence, we urged the President of the United States of America, President Barack Obama, to pardon completely all these five persons and to release immediately and unconditionally the three persons who continue to languish in prison in the United States.

CONCLUSION 60. We reiterate and urge once again the President of the United States of America to pardon each of the persons who have come to be referred to as the Cuban 5 and to unconditionally and immediately release those of the Cuban 5 who remain incarcerated.

61. We also emphasise the salutary fact that this course is supported by Amnesty International. In addition, we make a fervent call on the international community, all international organizations, and all States to leave no stone unturned in persuading the United States of America to embark upon this course.

Signed:

Philippe Texier former judge of the court de cassation, france Zakeria Yacoob, former justice of the constitutional court of south africa

173

Annexes Schedule A

María Margarita Morales Fernández, daughter of Luis Alfredo Morales Viego, who was a victim of the mid-flight attack on a Cuban aviation plane. Betina Palenzuela Corcho, daughter of Adriana Corcho Calleja, who died in 1976 as a result of a terrorist attack on the offices of the Cuban Embassy in Lisbon, Portugal. Giustino Di Celmo, father of Fabio di Celmo who was killed by a bomb planted in the Hotel Copacabana in 1997 as part of a terrorist attack carried out by the Cuban American National Foundation. Lieutenant Colonel Roberto Hernández Caballero, criminal investigator involved in the investigation into the surge in terrorist activity involving bombings in tourist centers in Cuba in the 1990s Lorenzo Gonzalo, deputy director of Radio Miami Norman Paech, Emeritus Professor at Hamburg University, former Member of Parliament and expert in International law. René González Sehwerert, one of the Cuban Five, sentenced to 15 years and released in October 2011. Martin Garbus, defense lawyer of Gerardo Hernández. Philip Horowitz, former defense lawyer of René González Sehwerert. Peter Schey, president and executive director of the Center for Human Rights and Constitutional Law Foundation (CHRL Foundation). Angela Wright, Researcher at the International Secretariat of Amnesty International Adriana Pérez O’connor, wife of Gerardo Hernández Nordelo. Elizabeth Palmeiro Casado, wife of Ramón Labañino Salazar Olga Salanueva Arango, wife of René González

175 Summary report of Peter Schey

Available online. Visit: http://cubanismo.net/cms/sites/default/files/peter_scheycenter_ for_human_rights_report_to_pres_obama_legal_analysis_of_cuban_ five_case.pdf

Exhibits of Martin Garbus

Available online. Visit: http://cubanismo.net/cms/nl/articles/exhibits-case-cuban-five

Statement of Irmita González

Irmita González – daughter of rené gonzález

Dear Friends

The first time I came to London was the year 2007, I was very young and I was already struggling very hard to raise awareness on this case. But I was a child when I lived through the night of my father’s arrest, the harassment in Miami and the absurd sentence given to him by the court. Years have passed and many vital events happened in my family, good ones and bad ones, but a constant thought was always in mind, “the wish for my father’s presence.”

I graduated and I dedicated that moment to him. I got married and the most important picture of the festivity was that of me speaking with him on the phone. I had a beautiful baby and named him after his grandpa who could only meet him a few months after his birth. And then my uncle and my grandfather died and we had to suffer knowing that my dad was struggling alone with his pain and grief.

176 Today I’m 29 and again, I am in this city fighting for the freedom of those known by you as the “Miami Five,” the only difference is that time had passed, grey hair is appearing on their faces and heads and after accomplishing their full, extreme sentences, my father and Fernando have returned home. But they are not free, and we, their relatives are not relieved. Their three brothers or how I call them, my three uncles are still in prison.

Antonio’s mom, who is here right now, Mirta, goes to bed every night wondering if she’ll make it to 2017 to see her son get out of the Marianna Federal Prison. Ramón’s wife, Elizabeth, also here, has to wait for him to accomplish the same years my father accomplished in jail and Gerardo’s wife, Adriana could never see that day.

My reality has been the reality of six other children, and we can’t give up until their fathers are all home. Luckily we are not alone. I said before that I was here when I was very young and since then we have been receiving the support of many of you. This event is proof of how much effort and love you have invested on our behalf.

It is a real shame that my dad was denied a visa to come address you. It might seem braggy coming from me, but you’d be amazed to meet the honour, the courage, the strength and the kindness of a man, who although he suffered unbearable actions against him and his family for so long, is capable of an easy smile and can care for any cause or anybody deserving it. That man hasn’t started enjoying his freedom, he doesn’t sleep enough, he doesn’t take the time to savour the things and the people he loves and missed the most and we understand but we worry. He is still behind bars and he’ll behave like that until his brothers are released. He won’t stop working and thinking of ways to make that be. But I want to stop worrying about him; I want to stop this feeling of sadness that has been on my back since I was six years old and my father had to leave home to stop terrorism. I want our five families to finally have a moment without hoping for the presence of three of their most important members.

177 I want my families to be happy; it’s been too much. Today, I was not supposed to be sad. Today, I thought I was not going to wish for my dad’s presence. Today, he should have been here to witness the solidarity and warmth I have felt since that year when I met many of you. But it seems that there are still some people who want to make him pay even further for the sole crime of saving lives.

My only comfort comes with the hope, that perhaps, very soon, because of the effort from the people and organizations that have made this concert and commission possible, and others sitting here who will join them after tonight. My father will be able to thank you as he asked me to do on his behalf, but personally and most importantly, side by side with his four brothers, Ramón, Gerardo, Fernando and Tony.

Statement of Ricardo Alarcón

Ricardo Alarcón – former president of the cuban parliament

I will go directly to one point that I think is probably the key question, right now. That is: the reason why president Obama should immediately order the freedom for Gerardo, Ramón, and Antonio.

It is a long and very complicated appeal process, so I want to concentrate on the fundamental issues of the accusation against the Cuban Five. You might find from time to time, in the British media, a reference to the ‘Cuban spies.’ That has to do with one of the two main charges against them, which was not spying, but conspiracy to commit espionage. The other main charge was conspiracy to commit murder. Those are the important charges against the Five. There were minor things about fake documents, not telling the truth, or other things that are, of course, for all of them. 15 years is several times the greatest amount of prison time any person ever was sentenced for, in the U.S., for those violations.

178 But let’s go to what the government said at that time. In September 1998, when the Five were arrested, the first indictment was issued. There was only one general conspiracy against the U.S. charge and some minor charges, and one important count, conspiracy to commit espionage. President Obama should know by now that that count, the conspiracy to commit espionage, was legally destroyed by none other than the court of appeals in Atlanta, by a unanimous vote in 2008. The court of appeals in Atlanta ordered that those charged with count two – conspiracy to commit espionage – Ramón and Antonio, should have their sentences vacated and needed to be resentenced by the judge in Miami.

Ironically, in the same court order, the court of appeals recognized that Gerardo Hernández was also entitled to have the same ‘advantage’ of being resentenced on count two. But they refused to do that because Gerardo was already serving another life term due to count three: conspiracy to commit murder.

The court of appeals in Atlanta found, and mentioned repeatedly in a long document of more than 90 pages containing this court order, that nothing in this case was involving national security or endangering the U.S. national security. You see how certain tricks operating the legal system support the legal system in the U.S. They were not accused of spying, so the government did not have to produce evidence of actual spying, they were just accused of ‘conspiring’ to commit espionage. But the court imposed the highest sentence possible for the crime of spying, which is a life term. The court of appeals obviously saw the illegality of that and vacated the life term for Ramón and Antonio and ordered for them to be resentenced. That is one point: to pardon them or to forget the accusation of spying is very easy. The president only has to take the word of the court of appeals of the USA.

Then the second main count, on which I will concentrate a little bit more, count three: conspiracy to commit murder. As I said, the original indictment came in September 1998. Nothing in that indictment referred to small planes, air incidents, the Cuban air force shooting down American planes… nothing of that kind.

179 But between September and sometime in April or May the following year, a big media campaign erupted in Miami, demanding that the government added that accusation against one of the prisoners, Gerardo Hernández. I remember reading in the Miami press about meetings held very openly in that city between the attorneys of the city of Miami, the FBI chief, and Mr. Basulto1 and other individuals linked with terrorist groups involved in that incident. What happened? On February 24, 1996, the Cuban Air Force was obliged after many months of warnings, after dozens of provocations by that group which included armed provocation, and terror provocation. And so the Cuban Air Force interrupted the flight of three small planes; two were shot down over Cuban territory.

The indictment made a very interesting point: that the FBI had discovered who Gerardo Hernández was and what he was doing in Miami since some time around 1994 or 1995, that means more than a year before the incident of the small planes. When that incident took place, according to President Clinton, who was president at that moment – he wrote that in his memoirs – he was advised to bomb Cuba, to go to war with Cuba. But he decided to do a different thing. He signed the Helms-Burton Act, reinforcing the embargo against Cuba instead of going to war.

But, I repeat, according to the indictment, the FBI knew when the incident took place that Gerardo Hernández was conducting the very serious and delicate mission he was serving in Miami, but he was not accused for that. In those days, Miami was a cauldron: people were on the streets, clamoring for war against Cuba. A question that the U.S. should answer, is, ‘how do you explain that you have there, under your control, the man who was responsible for the shooting down of those planes, and you didn’t do anything against that man?’

Time passes; Gerardo remains in Miami, performing his duties. Cuba didn’t take him out of Miami, which was something that we would

1 José Basulto was head of the Brothers to the Rescue, the organization that owned the planes involved in the February 24, 1996 incident.

180 have done if we were afraid that he might be trapped because of that incident. We knew he didn’t have anything to do with that and the FBI also knew, that is why they didn’t act against Gerardo. When the Five were detained in 1998, the first indictment doesn’t mention the incident with the planes at all.

A few months later, after that campaign in the local media, demanding the court to add the accusation of the small planes incident, the second indictment was added. But what happened with that second indictment? The same government, in May 2001, just before the jury was going to make their decision, asked for something that they themselves, the government, asked on page 2 of an Emergency petition for writ of prohibition for that charge to be withdrawn. Why? According to their words, because that accusation amounts to an insurmountable hurdle for this prosecutor that mainly took the acquittal of the accused man. They recognize that that accusation became an insurmountable obstacle for them. Notwithstanding, you know that he was found guilty and sentenced on that charge, even though the prosecutor recognized that they had not been able to prove it.

Peter Schey2, who is a lawyer in California, has been involved in another dimension of this incident: the strange case of the location of the incident. For one strange reason, since 1996, the U.S. government has refused to show the images taken by U.S. satellites regarding that incident. I was there when the International Civil Aviation Organization of the UN asked the U.S. government for that. You know the answer, it was no. At the trial the question came again, but what was the prosecutors reaction? No! And since then several organization and lawyers in the U.S. have been demanding the same.

The U.S. government recognized that it couldn’t prove Gerardo’s participation, his link to the incident, and that accordingly, that accusation became an obstacle. The same government is still refusing

2 Peter Schey is executive director of the Center for Human Rights and Constitutional Law Foundation.

181 to contribute to define the exact place of the incident. I may be very suspicious, but my conclusion is that the problem with the images is that those satellite images simply show the truth: that the incident took place over Cuba. There is no other reason why they still prohibit anybody from seeing the images.

Gerardo had nothing to do with that incident. He was not a pilot in the Cuban Air Force, he was not a military leader, he was not an air traffic control person. Besides, Cuba didn’t need that. Because our authorities get that information many times every day directly from the Federal Aviation Administration or the air traffic control in Miami. Every day, day and night.

President Obama has a very simple question in front of him. These people have been serving 15 years, a little bit more now, on two main counts. One is conspiracy to commit this espionage without espionage. During these 15 years, in the U.S., people guilty of spying have gotten much less than 15 years.

Secondly, Gerardo is also accused of something that the accuser himself, in an unprecedented step, asked to withdraw from the accusation.

Then it is not so difficult for Obama to take his hand and sign a piece of paper ordering Gerardo, Ramón, and Antonio to be released from prison immediately.

Letters of support

Günter Grass

Günter Grass was a german novelist, poet, playwright, illustrator, graphic artist, sculptor and recipient of the 1999 nobel prize in literature. he was widely regarded as germany’s most famous living writer. he sent his support for the international commission of inquiry into the case of the cuban five.

182 Dear commission members and members of the “Cuban Five” solidarity community.

Since, in all likelihood, I will not be able to come to the hearing of the European Inquiry Commission in spring 2014, I am glad to have the opportunity to speak to you in writing.

For many years I have been following this scandalous case of politically-motivated injustice, which has been successfully kept out of the mass media’s headlines. During all this time my respect for the five men has been increasing, as they are continually denied a fair trial while suffering fifteen years of imprisonment.

Gerardo Hernández, Ramón Labañino, Antonio Guerrero, Fernando González and René González, as well as their family members, are the brave representatives of the Cuban people, who are continually threatened in their living conditions by an economic blockade and by terrorist attacks. To me, they personalize – despite permanent harassment by their powerful neighbour – the ideals and human accomplishments of their island, which they readily share with all discriminated nations.

This case is further evidence for me of how much we should insist not only on obeying our respective constitutions, but also on com- plying with international law, the greatest accomplishment after the grievous experiences of World War II; and on the other hand, we should unmask the double standard of the “War against Terror” on behalf of “Democracy and Human Rights.”

I wish the European Inquiry Commission on the case of the “Cuban Five,” “Miami Five,” respectively, much success so that it may deci- sively contribute to the release of the Five, enabling them to return to their homeland and their families.

G.G.

183 Michael Mansfield

Michael Mansfield is an english barrister. he has represented defendants in criminal trials, appeals and inquiries in some of the most controversial legal cases, particularly where issues of civil liberty have arisen.

Over the years I have given repeated support to the campaign for freedom and justice for the Miami 5. This is their 15th year of imprisonment and is redolent of some of the worst miscarriages in the UK.

The release and final return home of René González is welcome but as he himself has observed, the 5 remain as one and justice will not be done until all 5 are reunited in Cuba.

It is absurdly worthy of Lewis Carroll that any remain in prison on account of seeking to gather information about terrorist groups in the USA planning violent attacks on Cuba and its people. The insidious and subversive ambitions of the U.S. in South America are well documented. Presently there is a parallel hypocrisy in the conviction of Bradley Manning, the categorisation of Edward Snowden as an enemy of the U.S. State on espionage charges, the nine hour detention of David Miranda by UK authorities and the GCHQ intrusion at the Guardian.

In both the case of the Miami 5 and the disclosures about the security agencies in the USA and the UK, the perpetrators of the illegal activity which has been exposed have not been prosecuted. In both cases those who uncover the truth are fulfilling a public duty and end up being incarcerated.

Gradually civil society worldwide is awakening to these injustices and seeking redress.

One method which has been adopted is the People’s Tribunal.

184 Bertrand Russell began this process with regard to U.S. transgressions of international law in Vietnam. Recently I have sat on three such commissions, one in relation to Israeli violations in Palestine, another examining violations by the Revolutionary Council in Iran, and finally another exposing the violations by the present government’s policies on the NHS and Lewisham Hospital in particular.

I am delighted therefore to endorse the Inquiry into the Miami 5 to be held in London next March at the Law Society. It will serve as an expression of truth and conscience by the people for the people. Politicians cannot be trusted to undertake such an exercise.

M.M.

Alice Walker

Alice Walker is an internationally celebrated writer, poet and activist. she won the pulitzer prize in fiction in 1983 and the national book award. she has been following the case of the cuban five since the start.

A Grievous Wrong Has Been Done To 5 Of Our Cuban Brothers: Such Good Men Are Hard To Find

It was an odd sensation in London recently to be part of an International Inquiry into the case of the Cuban Five. Two have recently, after serving 15 year sentences, been released.

Since their arrest I have followed the case. It has been a sad one, though these men, who have been growing old in prison, and were placed there basically for being good and courageous people, mus- ter all their energies, whether in “the hole” for months or out of it, to stand upright for their families and their nation. They are remarkable humans. For me, it was especially moving to meet and to embrace the mother of one of the men, and to tell a daughter, who was six or so

185 when her father was taken away, that there are those in the world who were never misled by the propaganda; and that of course, I would be there beside her on International Women’s Day as she talked about her years of growing up without her father. He, meanwhile, beaming love and guidance through letters and scarce phone calls, in an effort to be present in her and her baby sister’s life.

Sometimes the wilful harm humans do to each other is unfathomable. Perhaps we are created to be the complex, sometimes cruel and sa- distic beings some of us are. Perhaps as the lawyers and judges and Miami mafioso sit down to bright dinners at tables ringed by the laughter of their own children and grandchildren there is a moment of feeling pleased that evil has been done to those they hate: that they have not only succeeded in maligning them, but have succeeded in locking them away. If this is true, it is a misguided notion of power. For true power causes things and people to grow, to flourish, not to wither. It rules, if rule it must, with an open heart and hand. It would be ashamed to deprive children of their fathers, to make a political point.

A.W.

Frei Betto

Frei Betto is a brazilian writer, political activist and liberation theologist.

Dear friends,

The Five Cuban heroes, incarcerated since Septem ber 1998, are being charged with terrorism. The truth is that they were in Miami exactly to diffuse terrorist initiatives by anti-Castro groups. And they were used as a tool to wedge between the renewed rapprochements between the USA and Cuba.

Even the Human Rights Commission of the UN called the verdict unjust.

186 The Court in Atlanta unanimously admitted that the sentences of three of the five Cubans (Hernández, Labaniño, and Guerrero) have no legal grounds. There was no exchange of secret military information, nor was there a threat to the security of the USA.

U.S. Law allows for the President to pardon an accused person before, during, or after their court case, as has happened in the past.

It is pointless for Washington to expect that the ties with Latin America could be ameliorated and that a new ‘post-Bush’ era could be achieved without first bettering the relationship with Havana.

Obama won the elections in Florida, too, – and so: also in Miami – without depending on the machinations of the Supreme Court or the aid of right- wing groups, as was the case with Bush Jr. Now he just needs to prove that his foreign policy is able to resist manipulations by anti-Castro terrorists, who have been the masterminds behind 681 proven attacks, which mur- dered 3,478 people and left 2,099 people permanently injured.

F. B .

List of endorsers

Diplomatic, politics, world organizations

Ricardo Alarcón, former President, National Assembly, Cuba Gerry Adams, President, Sinn Féin Damien Alegría, FMLN, member, Legislative Assembly of El Salvador Maximilien Arvelaiz, former Venezuelan Ambassador to Brazil Dennis Banks, co-founder American Indian Movement Tony Benn, (1925-2014), former Government Minister, UK Torbjörn Björlund, Member of Swedish Parliament (The Left Party) Sfia Bouarfa, socialist Member of Brussels Parliament Nessa Childers, Member, European Parliament, Ireland Emer Costello, Member, European Parliament, Ireland

187 Celine Delforge, Member, Brussels Parliament (Ecolo), Belgium Kurt De Loor, Member, Flemish Parliament (sp.a), Belgium Miguel d’Escoto Brockmann, President UN General Assembly (2008- 2009), former Foreign Minister of Nicaragua (1979-2000) Wouter De Vriendt, Member of Parliament (Groen), Belgium Maritza Espinales, FSLN member National Assembly, Nicaragua Zoé Genot, Member of Parliament (Ecolo), Belgium Lindsey German, Convenor, Stop the War Coalition, Britain Leonid Kalashnikov, First Vice-Chair, Committee on International Affairs, The State Duma, Russian Federation Amineh Kakavabeh, Member of Swedish Parliament (The Left Party), Committee on Civil Affairs Jan Lindholm, Member of Swedish Parliament (Green Party) Miguel Angel Martinez, vice president of the European Parliament Rita Martufi, Permanent Representative of World Federation of Trade Unions in Food & Agriculture organization (FAO) of the UN Peter Mertens, Chair, Workers Party of Belgium (PTB-PVDA) Finian McGrath, Member, Irish Parliament Martin McGuinness, MLA, north of Ireland Cynthia McKinney, U.S. politician and activist Mairead Maguire, Nobel Peace Prize (1976), N. Ireland Eugene McCartan, Communist Party, Ireland Maureen O’Sullivan, Member of Irish Parliament Adolfo Pérez Esquivel, Nobel Peace Prize (1980) Thage G. Peterson, former Speaker of Swedish Parliament Samuel Pinheiro Guimarães, former Vice Minister of Foreign Affairs, Brazil Yeidckol Polvensky Gurwitz, former Vice President of Mexican Senate Thomas Pringle, Member, Irish Parliament Alexander Romanovich, Vice-Chair, Committee on International Affairs, The State Duma, Russian Federation Emir Sader, Director, International Relations of CLACSO (Latin American Social Science Council), Argentina Kenia Serrano, President, Cuban Institute for Friendship with the Peoples (ICAP), Cuba

188 Baroness Angela Smith, House of Lords, UK Wayne Smith, former Chief of U.S. Interests Section, Havana Bart Staes, Member, European Parliament (Greens), Belgium Valentina Tereshkova, Vice-Chair, Committee on International Affairs, The State Duma, Russian Federation Dirk Van der Maelen, Member of Parliament (sp.a), Belgium Gianni Vattimo, Member of European Parliament, Italy Federico Mayor Zaragoza, President, Peace Culture Foundation, former Director General of UNESCO

Legal, human rights

Rafael Anglada-López, Puerto Rican lawyer, member, Cuban Five defense team Stephen Cavalier, Chief Executive, Thompsons Solicitors, UK Louise Christian, lawyer, UK Ramsey Clark, lawyer, former United States Attorney General Steve Cottingham, human rights lawyer, UK Giustino di Celmo, father, Fabio di Celmo, victim of terrorist attack in Havana Pierre Galand, President, European Humanist Federation Martin Garbus, Cuban Five defense team, trial lawyer, author Lord Anthony Gifford QC, Queens Counsel, UK lawyer John Hendy, QC, Queens Counsel, UK lawyer Baroness Helena Kennedy, QC, Queens Counsel, UK lawyer Kenneth Lewis, lawyer, Former President of Lawyers without Borders, Sweden Michael Mansfield QC, Queens Counsel, UK legal Fabio Marcelli, attorney, Italian Association of Democratic Lawyers Claudia House Morcom, retired judge, Wayne County Circuit Court, Detroit Paul O’Connor, Pat Finucane Center for Human Rights, Derry City, N. Ireland Professor Norman Paech, Professor Emeritus, University of Hamburg and former Member German Parliament José Pertierra, Attorney at Law, USA

189 Vanessa Ramos, Continental President, American Association of Jurists Graciela Rosenblum, President, Liga Argentina de los Derechos del Hombre (League of Human Rights, Argentina) Peter Schey, President, Center Human Rights and Constitutional Law, USA Cindy Sheehan, campaigner for peace, USA Beinusz Szmukler, President, American Association of Jurists Consultative Council, Argentina Peter Tatchell, Director, Peter Tatchell Foundation, London UK Gaston Vogel, Avocat de la Cour, Luxembourg Jean Ziegler, former member UN advisory committee on Human Rights, Switzerland

Media

Steve Bell, cartoonist for Guardian, UK Frank Connolly, investigative journalist, Ireland Andres Gómez, Cuban American journalist, Director, Areito Digital Richard Gott, UK journalist and writer Stephen Kimber, journalist and author, Canada Max Lesnik, Director, Radio Miami, USA Hugh O’Shaughnessy, UK journalist and writer Hernando Calvo Ospina, journalist, Columbia John Pilger, investigative journalist, Australia Ignacio Ramónet, former editor Le Monde Diplomatique, writer Frank Stappaerts, journalist, Belgium

Arts, fashion, literary, music, sport, theatre

Professor Dawn Ades, Fellow of British Academy (FBA), Commander of British Empire (CBE) Rasheed Araeen, artist, UK Robert Ballagh, artist, Ireland Miguel Barnet, President of UNEAC (National Union of Cuban Writers and Artists)

190 Rolf Becker, actor, Germany Dr. Ross Birrell, Lecturer, Forum for Critical Inquiry, The Glasgow School of Art, Scotland Gilbert Brownstone, art curator, President, Brownstone Foundation, U.S. Peter Capaldi, actor, UK Julie Christie, Oscar and BAFTA award winning actor, UK Caryl Churchill, playwright, UK Professor Annie Coombes, art historian, curator, UK April de Angelis, playwright, librettist, UK Andy de la Tour, actor, theatre director, UK Joke Devynck, actor, Belgium Elyse Dodgson, International Director, Royal Court Theatre, London UK Mighty Gabby, musician, Cultural Ambassador for Barbados Etienne Glaser, actor, director, screenwriter, Sweden Nadine Gordimer, (1923-2014), Nobel Prize Winner, South Africa Tony Graham, theatre director, UK Lena Granhagen, actor, singer, Sweden Günter Grass, Nobel Prize for Literature, Germany David Harding, Officer of British Empire (OBE), artist and teacher, Scotland Sir David Hare, playwright, screenwriter, director, UK Dann Hugaert, actor, Belgium Paterson Joseph, actor, writer, director, UK John Keane, official war artist during Gulf War, UK John Le Carré, novelist, UK Chris Lomme, actress, Belgium Roger Lloyd Pack, (1940-2104), actor, UK Kim Longinotto, film maker, UK Phil Manzanera, musician, Roxy Music Jehane Markham, poet, dramatist, UK Fernando Morais, writer and journalist, Brazil Nancy Morejón, poet, critic, essayist, Cuba Jim Nolan, playwright, theatre director, Ireland Johan Notte, director, August Vermeylen Society, Belgium

191 Maxine Peake, UK actor Jonathan Pryce, CBE, stage and film actor, singer, Wales Kevin Sinfield, Captain, England Rugby League team Emma Thompson, Oscar and BAFTA award winning screenwriter and actor, UK William ‘Willie’ Toledo, actor and activist, Spain Dirk Tuypens, actor, Belgium Ludo Vandeau, musician, Belgium Alice Walker, Pulitzer prize winning author, USA Dame Vivienne Westwood, international fashion designer, UK Susan Wooldridge, actor and author, UK

Inter faith community

Frei Betto, liberation theologist, Brazil Father Michael Lapsley, Anglican priest, social justice activist, South Africa Monsignor A.-J. Leonard, Archbishop of Belgium Jon Sobrino, Jesuit priest, academic in El Salvador, Spain Lord Rowan Williams, former Archbishop of Canterbury, UK

Trade unions, campaigns

David Begg, General Secretary, Irish Congress of Trade Unions Bob Crow, (1961-2014), General Secretary, National Union of Rail, Maritime and Transport Workers John Douglas, President, Irish Congress of Trade Unions Jimmy Kelly, Regional Secretary, Unite the union, Ireland Len McCluskey, General Secretary, Unite the union, UK Dr. Jack McGinley, Chair, Cuban Solidarity Forum of Services Industrial Professional and Technical Union (SIPTU), Ireland Josef Mampuys, former editor, Raak KWB, Christian Workers Movement, Belgium Frances O’Grady, General Secretary, Trade Union Congress, UK Cormac Ó Dálaigh, President, Communication Workers of Ireland Dave Prentis, General Secretary, Unison, UK

192 Jack O’Connor, General President, Services Industrial Professional and Technical Union (SIPTU), Ireland Tuur Vanempten, member, Cuba Working Group, Christian Labour Movement, Belgium Eddy Van Lancker, former member, National Board, General Federation of Belgium Labour (ABVV) Tony Woodley, former Executive Officer, Unite the union, UK

Academic, foundations, professionals, publishers

Arnold August, author, journalist and lecturer, Canada William Blum, U.S. author and historian Jean Bricmont, Professor, Université Catholique de Louvain, Belgium Mariela Castro, director, Cuban National Center for Sex Education Noam Chomsky, U.S. academic and activist Professor Gary Craig, Wilberforce Institute for Study of Slavery and Emancipation, UK Angela Davis, academic and activist, USA Jan Dumolyn, Professor, Department of History, Ghent University, Belgium Terry Eagleton, author and academic, UK Jane Franklin, writer and historian, USA Raul Garces, Dean of Faculty of Communications, University of Havana, Cuba Dr. David Hickey, medical consultant, Ireland Ernesto Laclau, academic, Argentina Salim Lamrani, academic, Sorbonne, France Alexander Main, analyst, Center for Economic and Policy Research, Washington DC Mike Marqusee, author, UK Professor Juan Carlos Monedero, Complutense University of Madrid Nurit Peled-Elhanan, Israeli academic and campaigner James Petras, author, Professor (Emeritus) of Sociology, Binghamton University, New York Colin Robinson, publisher, OR Books, New York Michael Vanhoorne, President, Left Ecological Forum, Belgium

193 Professor Luciano Vasapollo, University of La Saprienza, Rome Chris von Christierson, Director, Watch Hill Foundation, UK Mary Alice Waters, President, Pathfinder Press, USA Professor Roger Willemson, journalist and author, Humboldt University, Berlin, Germany

List of donors

The Commission of Inquiry is grateful to all those organisations and individuals who supported, donated and volunteered to help make the event an outstanding success.

Organisations

ABVV (Socialist Union), Belgium Amigos de Cuba de Lleida, Spain Asociacion De Amistad Checo-Cubano, Czech Republic Asociacion Suiza-Cuba, Switzerland Asociacion Cuba-Suiza de Berne, Switzerland Associated Society of Locomotive Engineers and Firemen, UK Association France Cuba, France Associazione Nazionale di Amicizia Italia-Cuba, Italy Barry Amiel & Norman Melburn Trust, UK Casal de Amistat en Cuba de Badalo CDR – Austria, “Antonio Maceo” Christenen voor het socialisme, Belgium Christenen voor het socialisme – Cuba werkgroep, Belgium Communist Party, South Yorkshire, UK Cuba Solidarity Campaign National, UK and branches from Brighton, Derby, Leicester, Manchester, Merseyside, North London, Nottingham, Oxford, Sheffield,South London. Cuba Support Group Belfast Cuba Support Group Ireland Communication Workers Union, National, UK. Branches CWU

194 Birmingham, Black Country & Worcestershire, CWU London Postal Engineering, CWU Northern Ireland Telecom Branch Cymru Cuba North Wales, UK Danish-Cuban Association Docwerkers, Belgium Defensem Cuba, Casal Rubi, Barcelona, Spain Defensem Cuba, Spain DKP, Germany EAD Solicitors LLP, UK El Casa Amistat Catala – Cuba di Barcelona, Spain Free the Cuban 5 Campaign, Ireland Free the Cuban Five Committee, Vancouver, Canada Free the Five, Stockholm, Sweden Garden Court Chambers London, UK General Federation of Trade Unions, UK General, Municipal, Boilermakers and Allied Trade Union (GMBATU) UK Scotland, GMBATU Southern Region and branches GMBATU Holborn, GMBATU Milton Keynes City, GMBATU Unite M23, GMBATU Birmingham General. Greek-Cuban Friendship and Solidarity Association Indian Workers Association (GB) Iniciativa Cuba Socialista (ICS), Belgium and ICS Antwerpen, ICS Gent, ICS Heist-op-den-berg International Association of Democratic Lawyers International Committee to Free the Five, USA Ken Gill Memorial Fund, UK Komitee-Austria Free the Five, Austria Lipman-Milliband Trust, UK Musicians Union, UK National Association of Probation Officers, UK Netzwerk-Cuba, Germany Northern Ireland Public Service Alliance – NIPSA, UK Norwich & District Trades Union Council, UK National Union of Teachers Islington (NUT), UK and Merton NUT and Wolverhampton NUT

195 National Union of Rail, Maritime and Transport Workers (RMT) National, UK and RMT Scotland Regional Council OH Parsons, UK ÖKG, Austria RMT National, UK RMT Scotland Regional Council, UK Sean Smyth Belfast Marathon Sponsor – Unite Luton Auto, Unite Kent GPM, Unite IR 360 Branch, GWU N I Telecom, Unite Central Office, Unite Belfast 0303, Unite L and E Region, Unie N E 408/26, Unite NI71, Unite NW Region, Unite SE Region, Unite West Mids Region, Unite Welsh Region, Unite West Mids 6050, P Orawe and Dr Kelly, Mr and Mrs Smith, UK Services Industrial Professional and Technical Union – SIPTU, Ireland Soli Cub E.V, Germany South Yorkshire Communist Party, UK Svensk-Kubanska, Sweden Teachers Association Newham, UK Third World Health Aid, Belgium Thompsons Solicitors, UK Trades Union Council, Chelmsford, UK Trades Union Congress North West Regional Council, UK Treballem per Cuba, Spain Union of Construction, Allied Trades and Technicians (UCATT), National, UK and Crawley branch Union of Shop, Distributive and Allied Workers National (USDAW), UK Unison National, UK, Unison Regions: Aberdeenshire, Greater London, Staffordshire Unison branches: Bradford, Dorset 10293, Ealing, Essex Police, Falkirk Council, Glasgow Housing Branch, Hammersmith & Fulham, Knowsley, Leeds, Mid Yorkshire Health 206710, Norfolk County, Stockport NW, University of Westminster Branch Unite National, UK, Unite Regions: East Midlands, Ireland, London and Eastern Region, NE Yorkshire & Humberside, NW Region, Scotland, SE Region, SW Region, Wales Region, West Midlands. Unite Branches: 0754 branch, 1/1228 branch, Bebington NW/0096 branch, Belfast South branch 0303, Bolton NW 0121 branch, Brighton

196 SE 6246 branch, Cambridge Medical 369 branch, Cannock WM 6141 branch, Cardinal Health branch 6/355, Central Office, Clerkenwell & St Pancras branch, Crawley SE/6227, Dartford branch, Dartford & North Kent branch, First Mainline 302/25 branch, Hartlepool 2 NE/1907 branch, Hull NE/GEO/25 branch, IR 360 branch, Kent GPM branch, LE/0001 branch, LE/230 branch, LE/1906 branch, LE/684 branch, London NW 9708 branch, Luton Auto branch, Manchester & Salford branch 0515, Manchester Central branch 0604, Merseyside & Cheshire 0159M branch, NE 408/26 branch, NE/22/GEO branch, NI71 branch, NW 0056 branch, NW 1400/5 branch, NW 63 branch, NW 64 branch, Scottish Professional Executive Staffordshire branch, SE/6144 branch, SE/6248 branch, Dartford & North Kent branch, Sheffield NE/GEO/1 branch, Sheffield West GE/02 branch, South West 8006 branch, Sudbury LE979 branch, Teeside Geographical branch, Tyneside EEES branch, West Midlands 6050 branch, WM 6030 Birmingham South, WM 7685 branch, WM 7686 branch, Yeovil SW/8007 branch USDAW National, UK Vancouver Communities in Solidarity with Cuba, Canada Vrienden van Cuba / Amis de Cuba, Belgium Worker to Worker, Canada-Cuba Labour Solidarity Workers’ Music Association, UK World Circuit, UK

Individuals

Emmanuelle Adidi, Paul Adriaanse, Stephen Allen, Romero Alvarenga, Kevin Amis, Freddy Apers, Richard Aubery, Steve Ballard, Rod Barrett, Marie Barry, Chris Bartter & Doreen Kean, Ivan Beavis, Beert-Caljon, Myra Berg, David P Betchley, William Bohen, Zoe Plochet Bonne, Dorothy & Nigel Braithwaite, J.D. Brickwood, Elizabeth Briemberg, Patricia Buyle, Beert-Caljon, Ria Cabus, Jan Caris, Erwin Carpentier, Maisie Carter, Peter Chadwick, Michael Chambers, David Chapell, Imti & Mary Choonara, Kate Clark, Paula J Clarke, Dr Helen Colley, Mrs M D Condon, Richard Cote, Tom Coughlan, David Credland, Leonardo Cruz, Anne Danhieux, Leen

197 Danhieux, Toon Danhieux, Lieve Debaecke, Danhieux – De Clercq, Peter Dean, L. De Baecke, Peter De Groote, Katrien Demuynck, Christiane De Schrijver, Erik De Smedt, De Vos-Vanderstruijf, Jan De Wachter, De Winter, Jean Pierre D’Hulster, Carla Diego, Etienne Dierick, Andrea Duffour, Jim Dye, Catherine Eden, Winnie Eldrup, James Ennis, Dave Esbester, Gwyn Evans, Peter Farrell, Christiane Evrard, Stephen Fawcett, Hellen Merete Gade, Robert Garven, Patrick Gavigan, Frances Gourday, Tony Graham, Albert Grant, Gyselings- Deprez, M. Haentjens, Haeve-Decoodt, Dr Rupert Halliday, Gail Harper, Kevin Harris, Jon Heal, Robert Heritage, Koen Hessens, Alison Hogg, Stuart Hyslop, Cathy Jacobs, Richard Kane, Roisin Kane, Ken Keable, A. Kerckhove, Samuel Lievens-Lauwers, Mike Le Cornu, Philippe Looverie, Mr W.R. Lowrey, Maehoudt-De Plae, Dirk Martijn, Patricia Matthews, Ivo Mattys, Robert McCafferty, Ciaran McGeough, Elinor McKenzie, Michael McPadden, Etienne Megroedt, Maria Milagra, Miller Family, Sille Moens, Toon Mondelaers, Albert Murawski, Thys Naessens, Thomas Napier, Jenny Newton, Raymond Newton, Doug Nicholls, Brigitte Oftner, Graham Ogden, Anne O’Leary, P. Orawe & Dr Kelly, Miriam Palacios-Callender, Ben Parker, Russell Partridge, Lodewijk Pelleman, Timothy Perceval, Martin Perfect, Mr & Mrs Plant, Stefan Potums, Ivano Prat, Cecile Rapol, Maurice Rennie, Ben Richards, Joseph Richards, Thomas Riggins, Don Robertson, Sophie Robinson -Tillett, Ingrid Roeland, Frank Roels, Jasper Rommel, Jacqueline Roussie, Egont Ruelens, Anne Schuman, Martin Schwander, Errol Sharpe, Andrew & Gina Siddons, David Slater, Smets-De Doncker, Colin Smith, Nigel Smith, Robert J. Smith, Horst Smok, Mr & Mrs Smyth, Sean Smyth, Prof. Dr. Richard Sorg, Herman Struyf, Maria Tackx, Robin Talbot, Ian Taylor, Susan Toole, Hilde Toussen, Trevor Tucker, Mrs Maureen Tullett, Evelyn & John Turk, Tim Turner, Annemie Uyttendaele, Godelieve Van Assche, André Van Boxstael, Ary Van den Broek, Van Duppen-Seuntjes, Van den Bosch – Buys, Van Eeckhoute – De Ruyter, Magdda Van Hove, Tijs Van Hoyweghen, Franki Van Moerkerke, Vancoillie - Vandaele, Elza Vandelaer, Anne Vandewalle, Christine Vandewalle, Francoise Vandewalle, Martine Vandewalle, Vandewalle-Dhondt, Vandewalle- Vandeberghe, Linda Vansteenkiste, Elisabeth Ven, Roberto Veneziani,

198 Tom Vermeir, An Verstraete, Tom Veys, Stijn Vuerstaek, Wagnaar- Wuisbeek, Heidi Walgraeve, Larry Wartel, Madeline Watson, J.M. Welch, Elsje Weyns, Eileen Whitehead, Yvonne Wilkin, Dean Williams, J. Wolf, Pamela Wood, Anthony G Woods, Brian Woodward, Hugo Wuyts, Andrew Young, Kathleen Yzerbyt.

With special thanks to

Salvador Combarro, Toon Danhieux, Natasha Hickman, Jo Hillgrove, Darryl Hillgrove, Josune Iriondo, Jos Kussé, Marijke Martens, Trish Meehan, Lies Michielsen, Koen Ooms, Silvia Peralta, Carole Regan, Bruno Stas, Steven Struyf, Tim Turner, Annemie Uyttendaele, Stephanie Van der Kelen, Pieter De Vos.

Interpretors for Commission: Alessio Demartis, Chiara Baldo, Myriam Garcia Bernabé, Christopher Fish, Sheila Horvat, Rhiannon Nicolson, Eleanor Pitt, Adriana Singleton, Ivan Vazquez.

Translators of written documentation: Morgan Green, Alicia Jrapko, Josie Michel-Brüning, Natasha Rosner, Vania Ramírez, Robin Talbot, Laura De Vos.

The International Commission was organised by

199