Features
Environmental Change & Security Project REPORT
ISSUE NO. 6 • THE WOODROW WILSON CENTER • SUMMER 2000
TABLE OF CONTENTS
FEATURES
X5 Human Population and Environmental Stresses in the Twenty-first Century Richard E. Benedick
19 Oiling the Friction: Environmental Conflict Management in the Niger Delta, Nigeria Okechukwu Ibeanu
SPECIAL REPORTS
33 The Global Infectious Disease Threat and Its Implications for the United States National Intelligence Council
66 Exploring Capacity for Integration: University of Michigan Population-Environment Fellows Programs Impact Assessment Project Denise Caudill
COMMENTARY
77 Environment, Population, and Conflict Geoffrey D. Dabelko Ted Gaulin Richard A. Matthew Tom Deligiannis Thomas F. Homer-Dixon Daniel M. Schwartz
107 Trade and the Environment Martin Albrow Andrea Durbin Kent Hughes Stephen Clarkson Mikhail Gorbachev Anju Sharma William M. Daley Tamar Gutner Stacy D. VanDeveer
OFFICIAL STATEMENTS AND DOCUMENTS
119 William J. Clinton; Albert Gore, Jr.; Madeleine K. Albright; David B. Sandalow; Benjamin A. Gilman; George W. Bush; Kofi Annan; Mark Malloch Brown; Klaus Töpfer; Nafis Sadik; Gro Harlem Brundtland
ENVIRONMENTAL CHANGE & SECURITY PROJECT REPORT, ISSUE 6 (SUMMER 2000) 1 Features
132 NEW PUBLICATIONS
Environmental Change, Adaptation, and Security 132 Ecology, Politics, and Violent Conflict 135 Hydropolitics in the Third World: Conflict and Cooperation in International River Basins 136 Violence Through Environmental Discrimination: Causes, Rwanda Arena, and Conflict Model 139 The Sustainability Challenge for Southern Africa 140 Nature’s Place: Human Population and the Future of Biological Diversity 142 Protecting Public Health and the Environment: Implementing the Precautionary Principle 143 Promoting Reproductive Health: Investing in Health and Development 144 Population and the World Bank: Adapting to Change 145 Coastal Waters of the World: Trends, Threats, and Strategies 146 Life Out of Bounds: Bioinvasion in a Borderless World 147
149 THE WILSON CENTER’S ECSP MEETINGS
Preserving the Atmosphere as a Global Commons 149 Water: Conflict or Cooperation & Food Security in a Changing World 156 West Africa: A Briefing on Food Security, Environment, and Population Issues 158 Building Partnerships to Achieve Food Security: An NGO Consultation 160 United States Southern Command (USSOUTHCOM) Environmental Security Workshop 162 World Population Beyond Six Billion 163 The GLASS Model: Assessing Environmental Threats to Food and Water Security in Russia 164 Population Dynamics, Migration, and the Future of the Calakmul Biosphere Reserve 166 USAID-WHO Collaboration for Health in the Millennium 168 The Future of Environmental Security in European Institutions 169 Forest Futures: Population, Consumption, and Wood Resources 171 Trade and the Environment: Finding Common Ground 173 Population Growth, Environmental Degradation, and State-Sponsored Violence: The Case of Kenya, 1991-93 175 Water and Population Dynamics: Case Studies and Policy Implications 177 Oiling the Friction: Environmental Conflict Management in the Niger Delta, Nigeria 179 The Promises and Pitfalls of Environmental Peacemaking in the Aral Sea 182 Environmental Cooperation for Regional Peace and Security in Southern Africa 183 ISA Workshop on Environment, Population, and Conflict Research 184 Land, Water, People, and Conflict 185 Integrating Population and Environment: Current Practices, Future Potential 187 U.S. Central Command Workshop on Environmental Security 189 “Environmental Degradation and Migration” and “Sustainable Development: A Southern Perspective,” a two-part meeting in the AVISO Policy Briefing Series 192 The Global Infectious Disease Threat and Its Implications for the United States 194 One Planet, Two Hemispheres: Green Politics from an Indian Perspective 196 Migration, Environmental Change and Security: A Great Lakes Simulation 198 Nature’s Place: Human Population and the Future of Biological Diversity 200
202 UPDATE Academic Programs; Foundations; Nongovernmental Organizations; Governmental Activities; and Intergovernmental Activities
232 BIBLIOGRAPHIC GUIDE TO THE LITERATURE
2 ENVIRONMENTAL CHANGE & SECURITY PROJECT REPORT, ISSUE 6 (SUMMER 2000) Features
FEATURES
Human Population and Environmental Stresses in the Twenty-first Century
by Richard E. Benedick
Abstract: Human populations have put pressure on their natural surroundings throughout history. Yet the world is now facing truly global environmental challenges and rapid population growth in the final half of the twentieth century is a critical component to understanding these phenomena. In his article, Ambassador Richard Benedick examines a host of population dynamics and their complex interlinkages with three representative environmental issue areas: forests, freshwater resources, and climate change. These connections raise the impor- tance of meeting the commitments made at the 1994 Cairo International Conference on Population and Development. Benedick maintains that investments in measures to slow the rate of population growth-and thereby to reach a stable population earlier, and at lower levels, than under current trends-would significantly reinforce efforts to address the environmental challenges of the century ahead, and considerably lower the cost of such efforts.
INTRODUCTION: PEOPLE AND THEIR ENVIRONMENT
hen historians in the far distant future look back upon the tumultuous twentieth century, they will likely judge the most outstanding feature to be the extraordinary increase in human numbers that has occurred W during this relatively short time period. It took the entire history of humanity—tens of thousands of years—for the world’s population to reach one billion, which is now estimated to have occurred around 1804. It was more than a century later that the second billion was reached. But, it took only twelve years—from 1987 to 1999—for the most recent billion, the sixth, to be added. The world has never seen anything like the steep popula- tion growth of the twentieth century, with most of it concentrated during the last fifty years. That human populations can exert strains upon their natural surrounding is nothing new. However, from the dawn of history until about thirty years ago, the impacts of human activities were primarily localized. Early regional civilizations—Mesopotamia in the Near East, Mohenjo Daro in Southwest Asia, the Mayans of Central America, and possibly the Anasazi in the southwest of what is now the United States—collapsed due to a likely combination
Ambassador Benedick, formerly Deputy Assistant Secretary of State, was responsible for population and environmental policies. He was chief U.S. negotiator for the historic 1987 Montreal Protocol on Substances That Deplete the Ozone Layer, and author of Ozone Diplomacy: New Directions in Safeguarding the Planet (Harvard University Press, revised edition 1998). Currently, he is Deputy Director at Battelle Washington Operations, Visiting Fellow at Wissenschaftszentrum Berlin, and President of the National Council for Science and the Environment. This article reprinted with permission from Rolf Kreibich and Udo E. Simonis, eds. Globaler Wandel-Global Change: Ursachenkomplexe und Lösungsansätze. [Global Transformation-Global Change: Causal Structures, Indicative Solutions] Berlin: Verlag, 2000.
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of overpopulation and scarcity or depletion of arable extent already upon us, measured and tracked by scien- land and water supply. In some places, archaeologists tists. And, these environmental issues come in an era have found evidence of adverse environmental effects when human numbers are moving rapidly upward into caused by deforestation and by gradual salinization of uncharted territory. irrigated land. The final blow may have been a regional All of these global environmental trends are, in some climate change: a succession of unusual dry years, prob- ways, touched by demographic dynamics: population ably ascribed by local spiritual leaders to angry or size, population growth rates, population densities, and capricious gods. Many centuries before the Aswan High migration of peoples. Some environmental problems are Dam, Herodotus wrote of salinization in the Nile Delta. influenced more directly by population, some less—even Much later, rapid industrialization in Europe and North acknowledging that there are such mediating factors as America was accompanied by severe local pollution of income levels, consumption patterns, technological air and water. structure, and economic and political institutions. Be- Environmental stress has thus been a continuing cause of these intervening parameters, it is often difficult factor throughout human history. It is fair to say, how- to establish with scientific precision clear correlations ever, that at the close of the twentieth century, the six between population pressures and environmental deg- billion inhabitants of planet Earth find themselves threat- radation. Nevertheless, it is hard to disagree with the ened by environmental dangers that would have been conclusion of a recent study that “the least likely theory unimaginable to our 1.65 billion forefathers at the be- is that there are no relationships at all.”1 ginning of the century. The industrial, agricultural, and Many scientists are beginning to express concern energy policies that produced enormous improvements about the extent of the planet’s capacity, as reflected in in standards of living during the last half-century are the functioning of its natural cycles and ecosystems, to now beginning to have profound environmental impacts support the unprecedented numbers of people and their that can adversely affect the interactive natural planetary growing demands.2 Can enough food and energy be cycles upon which all life depends. For the first time, we provided—not to mention jobs, education, health care, confront a new generation of environmental problems and waste disposal—to accommodate these billions with- that are global in nature such as: out causing some irreversible ecological collapse that could imperil the whole human experiment? • Changing climate that could bring both drought and As one example, the fragile layer of ozone molecules flooding, altered rainfall patterns and loss of agri- scattered throughout the stratosphere is vital to the sur- cultural land, sea-level rise, severe storms, and the vival of life on Earth. The example of Antarctica offers spread of disease; us a sobering lesson: the sudden and totally unexpected • Depletion of the stratospheric ozone layer that protects depletion of the stratospheric ozone layer over the south- humans, plants, and animals from potentially fatal ern continent (the so-called “ozone hole”) demonstrates ultraviolet radiation; that when the atmosphere is perturbed, nature may not • Loss of biological diversity due to mass extinctions of provide convenient early warning signals to moderate animal and plant species that represent an irreplace- our activities in time. About twenty-five years ago, the able genetic library; cumulating effects of man-made chlorofluorocarbons • Spread of arid lands, desertification, and soil erosion (CFCs)—an “ideal” chemical whose usefulness in thou- on a global scale, affecting the livelihood of hun- sands of products and processes made it almost dreds of millions of already poor people; synonymous with modern standards of living—began • Pollution of marine and freshwaters that combine with slowly to lift the quantity of chlorine in the atmosphere overfishing to imperil a vital food source; from its natural level of 0.6 parts per billion (ppb). Con- • Destruction of forests at a rate never experienced in centrations increased gradually, to 0.9, 1.4, then 1.9 the history of the planet; and, ppb—yet the ozone layer remained unaffected. Only • Worldwide diffusion of hazardous substances , includ- when chlorine concentrations passed the minute but ing the persistent organic pollutants that may, even unforeseen threshold of two parts per billion did the in minute quantities and over long time periods, ozone layer over Antarctica suddenly collapse, to the adversely affect the metabolism of humans and ani- surprise and alarm of the scientific community. Not- mals. withstanding the successful global controls imposed by the 1987 Montreal Protocol and its subsequent revisions, These new environmental issues are not the premo- the long atmospheric lifetime of CFCs means that it nitions of modern Cassandras. They are to a significant will take about seventy years for the ozone layer world-
6 ENVIRONMENTAL CHANGE & SECURITY PROJECT REPORT, ISSUE 6 (SUMMER 2000) Richard E. Benedick . Human Population Featuresand Environmental Stresses in the Twenty-first Century wide to recover to natural levels.3 that under the low variant assumptions, population is By their very nature, the risks of other environmen- peaking and will begin a slow decline to eventual stabi- tal thresholds are not quantifiable. But they are not zero. lization around seven billion.) The most likely global In this article, I would like population in 2030 is 8.1 to explore population-environ- billion—over two billion ment interlinkages in three more people than at present. representative areas: forests, “ n 1950, there were fewer There are three aspects freshwater, and climate change. than half as many Afri- of these demographic devel- Following this, I will examine I opments that I would like to the most recent comprehensive cans as Europeans; now, highlight because of their rel- effort by the international com- evance to the environment. munity to address population despite the AIDS epidemic, First, population growth has issues, as manifested in the been, and will continue to twenty-year Cairo Programme there are nearly three times be, strongly skewed. Over of Action negotiated at the ninety percent of the popu- 1994 International Conference as many. lation increase during the last on Population and Develop- half-century occurred in the ment (ICPD). But before this, poorer regions of the world. I will look more closely in the following section at some The pace accelerated to ninety-seven percent in the dimensions of the population nexus. 1990s, and for the coming fifty years, it will be virtually 100 percent. Just the additions to India’s population in the last five years—eighty million people—was equiva- THE POPULATION CENTURY lent to the total population of Germany. This phenomenon has brought about a significant Some time during October 1999, the world’s popu- redistribution of the Earth’s population. Between 1950 lation passed six billion souls. Since the middle of the and 2000, the populations in developing regions grew century, when there had been 2.5 billion people, the by well over three billion (which was equivalent to total number of human beings on planet Earth had grown by world population in 1960). Whereas in 1950, the in- an additional 3.5 billion. Within the previous two de- dustrialized countries accounted for about one-third of cades alone, the increase was equivalent to the entire the total, their proportion dropped below twenty per- population of the world at the beginning of the twenti- cent by century’s end. According to the most likely U.N. eth century. Never in human history have populations estimate, by 2050 the developing nations will comprise grown so rapidly and in such dimensions.4 To be sure, eighty percent of the global population. Most of these the annual growth rate peaked at two percent in 1965- countries already face problems of health and deterio- 70, and the annual increments reached a height of nearly rating environments, with large numbers living in ninety million in 1985-90. Global population growth ecologically fragile areas (e.g., drylands, hillsides, savan- is currently estimated at 1.3 percent, representing an nas, low-lying deltas), and now confronting combined annual addition of just under eighty million. environmental impacts brought about by both poverty Using sophisticated demographic tools and assump- and by the early stages of industrialization. tions about the continuing rate of fertility decline, the Within the developing world itself there are also United Nations currently estimates that in fifty more significant differences in growth patterns. While Asia’s years, by 2050, the world’s population will probably lie growth rates are slowing, it was and will remain the larg- within a range of 7.3 billion (low variant) to 10.7 bil- est region in total numbers, with about sixty percent of lion (high variant), with the 8.9 billion medium variant the global population. The fastest growing—and poor- considered as “most likely.” The difference between the est—region is Africa, with its proportion projected to low and high variants depends largely on the degree to grow from less than nine percent in 1950 to nearly 20 which families in developing countries freely decide to percent of the much larger world total in 2050. In 1950, reduce their number of pregnancies. there were fewer than half as many Africans as Europe- Looking only thirty years into the future, the ranges ans; now, despite the AIDS epidemic, there are nearly are closer, and the estimates more accurate, because three times as many. Most industrialized countries cur- tomorrow’s parents have already been born. The low rently have stable, or even declining populations, the variant is 7.4 billion, the high variant 8.8 billion. (Note main exceptions being the United States and Canada
ENVIRONMENTAL CHANGE & SECURITY PROJECT REPORT, ISSUE 6 (SUMMER 2000) 7 Features
due to immigration and higher growth rates. sheds. Increased overcrowding will bring greater health A surprising note on aging: while there has been problems and higher vulnerability to epidemics and much written about the increase in numbers of older natural disasters such as earthquakes, volcanic eruptions, people in the industrialized world, looking ahead, the storms, and flooding. Issues of waste disposal—air and prospect is quite different. Currently, the over-sixty water pollution and solid wastes—will assume gigantic population in the South amounts to about 170 million, proportions. It is also worth mentioning that city dwell- or only forty-three percent of this age category world- ers consume more energy and natural resources per capita wide. However, during the next fifty years, the number than their country cousins. is projected to surge more than nine-fold, to 1.6 billion, The third and final dimension of the population which will then comprise eighty percent of the world’s picture is the phenomenon of demographic momentum. total elderly population. For industrialized countries, the In developing nations, an unusually large proportion of expected growth is from 226 million in 2000 to 376 the population is under fifteen years of age—in dozens million in 2050. of countries they exceed forty percent of the total. This A second outstanding demographic development of means that even if future families have fewer children, our era is the accelerated concentration of populations there is a continuing growth factor because the number in urban areas. In 1950, just over one third of the world’s of people that are entering into their reproductive years population were city (new parents) is greater dwellers, a total of 860 than the number that are million. By the close of leaving those years. Thus, the century, this number “ he industrial, agricultural, populations continue to had grown to just under grow significantly for three billion, forty-eight Tand energy policies that pro- many decades even after percent of total popula- fertility rates begin to de- tion. But in just the duced enormous improvements cline. Hence, there is a coming fifteen years, it is in standards of living during the built-in growth momen- expected that four bil- tum. lion people will live in last half-century are now begin- The current total fer- cities, or fifty-five per- tility rate (TFR, or cent of the global ning to have profound environ- average number of chil- population. dren per female) in most Again, most of this mental impacts that can of Africa and the Middle growth in urbanization East is well over five, will occur in the South, adversely affect the interactive which, combined with with masses fleeing rural high proportions of poverty brought about natural planetary cycles upon young people, explains by scarcity of arable land the continuing rapid and water, growing land which all life depends.” population growth pro- degradation, and aridity. jected for these areas. In By 2015, nearly three contrast, some develop- billion city dwellers in the poorer countries will consti- ing countries with slow growth now have reached TFRs tute three-fourths of the world’s urban population. of under three (e.g., Mexico, Brazil, and Indonesia), or Perhaps the most striking aspect of the urbanization even less than two (e.g., China, Thailand). However, as trend is the rise of “megacities,” agglomerations of over long as TFR exceeds 2.1 (representing one female child ten million people—a phenomenon new to the planet. per woman, with allowance for some deaths before the In 1950, there was only one megacity, New York City. female children themselves, reach reproductive age), a By 2015, it is anticipated that there will be twenty-six, nation’s population will continue to grow.5 of which twenty-two will be in the South. It is difficult Because of the factor of demographic momentum, to conceive of Lagos holding nearly twenty-five million for most developing countries, the greatest increase in num- inhabitants, or Dhaka with over nineteen million. bers actually lies ahead, not in the past. The following Such urban concentrations have significant environ- figures are based on the current U.N. medium variant mental implications. In many cases, cities will encroach (“most likely”) estimates published in 1999. Only if the on farmland or ecologically sensitive wetlands or water- fertility decline is steeper than is considered most prob-
8 ENVIRONMENTAL CHANGE & SECURITY PROJECT REPORT, ISSUE 6 (SUMMER 2000) Richard E. Benedick . Human Population Featuresand Environmental Stresses in the Twenty-first Century able based on recent experience, or if mortality rates and/ DWINDLING FORESTS IN THE DEVELOPING WORLD or emigration are higher than expected, will the num- bers for 2050 turn out to be below the current medium The forests of our planet have been basic to the de- variant estimate. velopment of human civilization. They are a resource With the exceptions of China, India, and Indone- that is unique in its combination of multifaceted utility sia (which are shown here because of their size), in all of and easy renewability, through planting. Wood prod- these countries and in many more, the greatest growth ucts are a major element in the global economy, in numbers will probably occur in the coming fifty years. fundamental for human settlements in housing, furnish- This is so, despite the fact that they have all witnessed a ings, fuel, paper and packaging, and for such non-wood doubling, tripling, or even quadrupling of their num- products as berries, nuts, and medicinal herbs. For ex- bers within the previous fifty years. By 2050, the number ample, nine of the ten most-prescribed pharmaceuticals of Afghans (and Sudanese, and Yemenis) will each ex- in the United States derive from forest plants and ani- ceed the number of Frenchmen; there will be more mals. Although wood has been replaced for many Tanzanians than Germans. traditional uses by coal, oil, steel, and plastics, wood In other words, the largest increases are still to come. and wood products still rank third in value among the Most of these countries are already in political and/or world’s commodities, trailing only behind oil and natu- ecologically precarious situations. Yet political leaders, ral gas.6 North and South, do not act as if they are aware of what Complementing their direct economic benefits are lies ahead demographically. Against this background, I the irreplaceable ecological functions of the world’s for- will now examine three specific environmental issues in ests. Forests are essential for biological diversity. Tropical terms of their relationship to population dynamics. forests alone shelter at least half of the world’s known
Chart 1. Population Growth: Past, Present, and Projected Future
(population in millions) 1950 2000 2050 (est.) Trouble Spots Afghanistan 9 23 61 Angola 4 13 37 Dem. Rep. 12 52 160 Congo Iraq 5 20 55 Water scarce Ethiopia 18 63 169 Saudi Arabia 3 22 54 Sudan 9 29 59 Yemen 4 18 59 Tropical Colombia 13 42 72 Guatemala 3 11 27 Philippines 21 76 131 Tanzania 8 34 81 Giants China 555 1278 1478 India 368 1014 1529 Indonesia 80 212 312 Nigeria 31 112 244 Pakistan 40 156 345
Source: U.N. Population Division, 1999.
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species.7 Through the evapotranspiration cycle between is also the poorest and most densely populated. In South soil, trees, and atmosphere, forests are a major determi- Asia, the U.N. Food and Agriculture Organization nant of local climate and their diminution could bring warned that conservation efforts “will be nullified and on drought. An estimated seventy-five to ninety-five per- in places reversed, unless...accompanied by a reduction cent of rainfall in the Congo River basin is recycled in the rate of growth of population.”11 through forests.8 Forests protect and enrich soils and Many analysts are convinced that the greatest fu- watersheds, providing erosion control against landslides ture threat to forests stems from the imperative to provide and flooding, enhancing water quality, and regulating food for the immense numbers of people on the hori- the quantity of water. As a major sink for carbon diox- zon. Judging from the recent half-century, there will be ide, the world’s forests help to offset anthropogenic pressures to clear more forests to provide land for crops emissions from burning fossil fuel, and thereby miti- and/or livestock. When dams are constructed to furnish gate potential climate change. Not to be ignored are the needed water for irrigation, forests are often flooded and recreational, esthetic, and spiritual aspects of forests. farmers are displaced to highlands, where the destruc- More forests have been cleared since 1850 than in tion cycle continues in order to make room for all of previous history, and the rates of destruction have agricultural land. Forests have also fallen victim to gov- been highest in recent decades. Although forest cover in ernment resettlement programs in response to local the industrialized world is now expanding, this has been population pressures (e.g., in Indonesia, Brazil, and the more than offset by destruction of forests in the devel- Philippines). Poverty and inequitable land tenure force oping nations. Asia and Africa, regions with the greatest landless workers to seek a livelihood by clearing forest population growth, have lost an estimated sixty-five to lands. seventy percent of their original forest cover.9 It has been estimated that by 1995, 1.7 billion people Global wood consumption has tripled during the in forty countries already were, because of inadequate twentieth century—roughly paralleling growth in hu- forest cover, vulnerable to shortages of fuel wood and to man numbers. But interestingly, forest loss is not a growing impacts of flooding and erosion. In just thirty problem caused by profligate consumers in the North. years, by 2025, this number is projected to rise to 4.6 Industrialized countries, largely with managed forests billion people in fifty-three countries. In many areas, and reforestation programs, produce seventy-five per- including Egypt, Kenya, and Pakistan, it is anticipated cent of the total industrial hardwood, while tropical that severe forest loss will combine with increased water forests account for only fifteen percent. Thus, the North scarcity over this period to compound the threats to the produces eighty percent of the world’s wood used for well-being of hundreds of millions of people.12 paper and pulp. In contrast, developing countries pro- duce ninety percent of wood used for household consumption as fuel and charcoal. In the ten develop- GROWING WATER SCARCITY ing nations that lost the most forest in the period 1990-1995, all but two consumed over ninety percent Water gives an illusion of abundance since it covers of their output domestically, including Brazil, Congo, about two thirds of our planet’s surface. The reality, Indonesia, Mexico, Sudan, and Thailand. Rising demand however, is that only 2.5 percent consists of the fresh- for wood, especially for fuel, in Bangladesh, China, In- water needed by human beings. Of this fraction, dia, Nepal, Pakistan, Sri Lanka, Thailand, and Vietnam, sixty-nine percent is locked into permanent snow cover poses increasing dangers to the viability of their forests.10 or glaciers. A further thirty percent consists of fresh Because of the complexities involved in human use groundwater, much of which is inaccessible, unusable, of forests, it has been difficult to provide definitive proof or only obtained at great expense of energy. Only three- of the link between population growth and forest de- tenths of one percent of total freshwater can truly be struction. Nevertheless, a recent study of 111 countries considered as renewable: the water from rainfall, seep- by an international research consortium concluded that ing into the soils to nourish plant and tree growth and approximately half of the deforestation over the course replenish underground aquifers, collecting in rivers and of human history could be explained by changes in popu- lakes, flowing into the oceans, and evaporating into the lation. The World Bank has noted that Central Africa, atmosphere in a natural hydrological cycle that will pro- during the 1980s, experienced the world’s second high- duce more rain.13 est rate of deforestation while having the lowest per capita Humanity uses freshwater for drinking and hygiene, income and the highest population growth rate. Haiti, for carrying away wastes (e.g., from urban areas), for the most severely deforested nation in Central America, industrial purposes, but most of all—more than two-
10 ENVIRONMENTAL CHANGE & SECURITY PROJECT REPORT, ISSUE 6 (SUMMER 2000) Richard E. Benedick . Human Population Featuresand Environmental Stresses in the Twenty-first Century thirds—for irrigating land to satisfy the world’s grow- Beyond the strictly utilitarian demands on freshwa- ing demand for food. In the past half-century, there has ter, scientists and environmentalists make a strong case been a virtual explosion of large-scale irrigation projects, for a holistic concept of freshwater as part of a network mostly concentrated in the developing world. The num- of interconnected ecological systems. Although econo- ber of large dams (defined as over fifteen meters in height) mists cannot assign a market price, freshwater ecosystems grew from 5,000 in 1950 to approximately 40,000 to- perform numerous vital functions: carrying nutrients day.14 Most of the expansion in irrigation has been into the sea that sustain marine life; providing habitats concentrated in Asia. China, India, Indonesia, and Pa- and spawning grounds for a diversity of animal and plant kistan, for example, species; replenishing soil depend on irrigated fertility; and diluting land for more than half “ wastes. And, as with for- of their domestic food oor quality drinking water ests, the waters possess harvest.15 affects the health of hundreds aesthetic and inspira- Current trends in P tional qualities that have water usage are disturb- of millions of people in the devel- enriched the human ex- ing. Growth in irrigated perience. land in recent decades oping world and is a major factor A symbol of the con- has not kept pace with flict between preserving population growth. in infant and child mortality. an ecosystem and con- The watersheds of some ventional economic of the largest Asian riv- development is the ers—the Indus, Ganges, Yangtze, and Yellow Okavango Delta in Botswana, the largest in the world. rivers—have been damaged by deforestation.16 Many The Okavango nourishes Africa’s biggest oasis, a water- of the world’s major rivers—including, in addition to ing ground for millions of animals fleeing the Kalahari the above-mentioned, the Nile, Colorado, Chao Phraya Valley during the dry season. About 100,000 local fish- (Thailand), and Amu Darya (Central Asia), are over- ers and herders also derive their livelihood from the used to such a degree that little or none of their flow Okavango. Development planners, advising neighbor- ever reaches the sea. Indeed the Yellow River has run ing Namibia, proposed a system of dams and dredging dry in every year throughout the 1990s.17 to divert the river for multiple purposes, including irri- Worldwide, cropland is being lost to cities, indus- gation, a rapidly growing metropolis, and diamond mine try, erosion, flooding, and to salinization—the slowly operations. A consortium of conservationists and local cumulating curse that accompanies big irrigation villagers was able to block the project and ecotourism schemes, described as “one of the gravest threats to irri- has been promoted as an alternative revenue source. But gated agriculture and food security.”18 Increasing reliance the demands, here and elsewhere, will inevitably grow.21 on nonrenewable groundwater is resulting in falling Looking into the coming century, it should be pos- water tables being recorded on every continent, includ- sible to meet the growing water needs for personal use, ing in the United States. It is estimated that India’s water for municipalities, and for industries, assuming there is withdrawals are already twice the rate of natural ground- more intensive conservation measures, more realistic water recharging—and a half-billion more Indians are water pricing, and some luck with technological inno- on the way.19 vation. However, there will be growing competition with Poor quality drinking water affects the health of hun- the needs of agriculture, which could lead to loss of food dreds of millions of people in the developing world and production. is a major factor in infant and child mortality. The num- The population-food-land equation is compounded ber of people without access to safe drinking water has by humans seeking ever greater supplies of water—un- risen by the end of the twentieth century to over 1.2 der the U.N.’s most likely variant, two billion additional billion, roughly one person in four in the poorer coun- people in the next thirty years. Because of the sheer vol- tries.20 The growth in the developing world of large ume of water required for irrigation, population growth cities with over one million inhabitants—from thirty- is the critical factor, translated into demand for food, four in 1950 to an estimated 400 by 2015—imposes which in turn implies more irrigated land. It is clear added strains on water supplies and leads to rainwater that the risks are growing that more people will face the being flushed away rather than recharging underground prospect of water scarcity and, therefore, food scarcity. aquifers by natural seepage through the soil. As a leading water resource scholar recently observed:
ENVIRONMENTAL CHANGE & SECURITY PROJECT REPORT, ISSUE 6 (SUMMER 2000) 11 Features
“Water scarcity is now the single biggest threat to food The future will need to see different and more effi- production.”22 cient management of the planet’s scarce freshwater The poor are particularly vulnerable. Researchers resources, combined with greater sensitivity to the in- have noted that approximately 470 million people in terconnected ecological systems—water, land, and the developing world were affected by water stress or forests—that provide the context for our civilization and scarcity in 1995. They estimate that this number could well-being. The productivity of irrigation water could rise more than six-fold in only thirty years, to over three be enhanced by greater conservation and by various tech- billion by 2025—nearly forty percent of the world’s nical improvements. Measures could include drip population.23 People in affected countries would be irrigation and high efficiency sprinklers; rational pric- subject to chronic shortages as not enough water would ing and water allocation planning; crop selectivity and be available to satisfy all the needs of cities, industries, better cultivation practices; more accurate weather fore- and irrigated agriculture. casting linked to water distribution; and recycling of With water scarcity affecting harvests, poor coun- urban water for irrigation use. If not discouraged by tries will need to import increased quantities of grain. political or emotional considerations, further advances Egypt, for example, which used to be self-sufficient, now in biogenetics could create food crop varieties that are depends on imports for forty percent of its grain con- resistant to drought, salts, and pests. Desalinization of sumption. If the situation worsens, economic seawater might provide unlimited supplies if problems development will be set back and serious environmen- of cost, energy, and transport can be solved. tal degradation may occur. The combination of hunger, If population growth could be slowed to the low rising prices for imported grain, and large urban popu- variant path of the UN estimates, with only one billion lations has the potential to destabilize societies in many additional people, the task of marshalling water resources parts of the world. to meet rising demands while preserving the planet’s As recently as twenty to thirty years ago, shortages associated ecosystems would be considerably more man- of water were only occasional, scattered occurrences. ageable. But clouding the future of water supply is the Now, the problem is becoming pervasive. Water scar- wild card of climate change, which itself will be influ- city on such a large scale, affecting hundreds of millions enced by population. Potential climate change can greatly of people, is a uniquely modern phenomenon. Security complicate issues of planning, timing, and location of concerns mount as nations compete for increasingly long-term investments in water management. scarce water to meet the needs of their people. Many of the great river systems provide water to countries with rapidly rising populations, and in most cases the great- GLOBAL CLIMATE CHANGE est numbers are, as we have seen above (see Chart 1), still to come, such as with the Tigris-Euphrates River Sophisticated models based on paleological evidence, (Turkey, Syria, and Iraq); the Ganges River (India and and on theories of physical, chemical, and biological Bangladesh); and the Nile River (Sudan, Ethiopia, and interactions, predict that continued unchecked emissions Egypt). In 1985, Boutros Boutros-Ghali, at that time, of greenhouse gases from anthropogenic sources (chiefly Foreign Minister of Egypt, warned that “the next war in carbon dioxide from fossil fuel combustion and destruc- our region will be over the waters of the Nile, not poli- tion of forests, but also methane and other gases) could tics.”24 precipitate a global change in the climate that has ac- Many agricultural specialists believe that the future companied the history of human habitation. In actuality, of the Green Revolution will depend on irrigation, since concentrations of carbon dioxide in the atmosphere have only an assured water supply will justify farmers’ large increased by about a third since the start of the Indus- investments in seeds, fertilizers, pesticides, and technolo- trial Revolution, and (like population numbers) they gies to increase land productivity. But, how will this are moving up into uncharted territory. There is scien- happen? Most potential major dam sites have already tific consensus that this growth cannot continue been exploited, at great social and economic cost. In indefinitely without throwing the Earth’s climate out of any event, the long-term viability of such massive projects the equilibrium that has prevailed for millennia – nota- is questionable. Rising costs (including compensation bly, since the dawn of agriculture.26 for displaced persons), greater awareness of ecological Great uncertainties, however, surround the issue of consequences, siltation, and waterlogging and salinity climate change. Since there is no prior experience with are diminishing the returns from mammoth irrigation this phenomenon, the prospective consequences are schemes.25 largely conjectural. There is no indication as to what
12 ENVIRONMENTAL CHANGE & SECURITY PROJECT REPORT, ISSUE 6 (SUMMER 2000) Richard E. Benedick . Human Population Featuresand Environmental Stresses in the Twenty-first Century level of concentration of greenhouse gases in the atmo- billion people in the South are yet to be supplied with sphere could prove dangerous, nor how severe or electricity, quite apart from the greater numbers that lie differentiated the possible impacts might be in different ahead. Unprecedented urbanization, combined with an regions of the planet. For example, intensified hurri- aging population (more households) will further con- canes and storms are expected, and rainfall and monsoon tribute to higher per capita energy consumption. patterns would almost surely shift. In some regions there Intensive industrialization in the currently less devel- could be more rainfall, in others less. Presently unpro- oped nations will also add to total energy demand. ductive areas (e.g., Carbon dioxide emissions Siberia) might become will rise as additional land more suitable for agricul- is cleared for agriculture ture. Elsewhere, there “ entral Africa, during the and fuelwood, and more could be flooding, ero- 1980s, experienced the methane will be released sion, drought, and the C from rice paddies and other spread of arid lands. Riv- world’s second highest rate of forms of agricultural pro- ers might change their duction, as well as from courses. More carbon deforestation while having the expanding livestock herds. dioxide could prove con- It is true that per capita ducive to higher crop lowest per capita income and the emissions of carbon diox- yields and the expansion ide from fossil fuel of agriculture. On the highest population growth rate. combustion in the cur- other hand, there might rently less developed be an increase in weeds, nations average only about disease, and pests. Higher sea levels and resultant salin- one-fifth that of the North. However, emissions of total ization of coastal farmlands and ecosystems are among greenhouse gases from the South are augmented by the the most probable consequences. For all of these pos- massive clearing of forests and savannas to acquire ever sible impacts, however, the extent and timing are unclear. more firewood and land for crops and settlements, a The continuing growth in anthropogenic green- factor as yet difficult to measure but nevertheless sig- house gas emissions might be mitigated to some degree, nificant. Some estimates place them at about one-fourth although not indefinitely, by offsetting natural forces of all anthropogenic emissions.27 Moreover, developing such as greater carbon absorption in the oceans or in- countries’ understandable priority for economic growth, creasing cloud cover. But because the gases have such means that their future per capita emissions will increase long atmospheric lifetimes, any major change in the great even as their population growth begins to taper off.28 planetary forces that determine long-term climate— In fact, developing nations’ emissions are already stratospheric windstreams, ocean currents, polar ice rapidly overtaking those of the North. Even consider- cover, or the hydrological cycle—could have portentous ing only carbon dioxide emissions from fossil fuel and potentially irreversible results. Crossing an invis- combustion (and ignoring those from deforestation and ible and unpredictable threshold would be dangerous. biomass burning), the South’s portion of the global to- The links between population and climate change tal has jumped in only twelve years from twenty-nine are subtle. Historically, most carbon dioxide emissions percent in 1985 to forty-two percent in 1997. China’s stem from the great economic expansion of the indus- emissions are already second only to the United States, trialized nations of the North, fueled largely by energy and the ground under 1.3 billion Chinese contains one from coal and oil during the last century. These nations third of the world’s known coal reserves. India’s emis- have relatively small populations and, at present, virtu- sions have surged nearly fifty percent since 1990 and ally no population growth. But, they also have very high are now higher than Germany’s. South Korea has sur- per capita emissions. However, climate change is decid- passed Italy, and Mexico’s emissions are almost as large edly not—as an Indian diplomat once remarked to me as those of France.29 Propelled by rapid population in the context of the ozone negotiations— “rich man’s growth and expanding industrialization, the South’s problem: rich man’s solution.” emissions will probably exceed those of the North in Demographic trends in the developing world can two to three decades. affect greenhouse gas emissions in several ways. More Unfortunately, efforts under the United Nations to energy will be consumed by large and growing popula- curb rising worldwide emissions of greenhouse gases have tions to enhance their standard of living. Even now, two met with little success to date. Beginning at Chantilly,
ENVIRONMENTAL CHANGE & SECURITY PROJECT REPORT, ISSUE 6 (SUMMER 2000) 13 Features
Virginia, in early 1991, 180 nations have been negotiat- CONTAINING POPULATION GROWTH: ing in vain to establish a realistic approach to the problem THE CAIRO SOLUTION of climate change. The U.N. Framework Convention on Climate Change was signed in June 1992 at the U.N. H.L. Mencken, the satirical American social com- Conference on Environment and Development in Rio mentator of the 1930s, has been quoted as stating that de Janeiro and entered into force two-and-a-half years for every difficult problem, there is a simple solution— later. This was followed by the Kyoto Protocol, agreed and it is usually wrong. The phenomenon of population upon in Japan in December 1997. The protocol, how- growth, as we have witnessed it in the twentieth cen- ever, has thus far, only been ratified by nineteen small tury, is surely one of the most difficult and complex of developing countries and none of the major emitting problems. countries. Its prospects for entering into force are ques- Birth rates in most countries of the South have be- tionable given continuing deep differences among the gun to decline during the past decade. But, in the face negotiating parties on the modalities for achieving emis- of the United Nations’ medium variant projection for sions reductions.30 2050, the “most likely” outcome, are they declining rap- During the negotiations for both of these treaties, idly enough? Is nearly nine billion people in the next population was an unwelcome guest. There was no overt fifty years—and still rising, possibly to eleven or twelve discussion of the linkages. Because of the inability of billion desirable? Is it inevitable? industrialized countries to undertake effective steps to Can we lower birth rates sufficiently to achieve the cut emissions, key developing nations have refused to 7.3 billion low variant—which, incidentally, would even consider commitments to rein in their own rap- imply a future stabilization of global population at some- idly rising emissions. Unfortunately, the populations of what below this level, just a billion or so more than at the South, most already living in ecologically fragile ar- present? Is “development the best contraceptive,” as pro- eas, are also the most vulnerable to possible impacts of pagandists for the South trumpeted for many years as climate change, especially altered monsoon patterns, an argument for more, and ever more, foreign aid? Will flooding, drought, aridity, sea-level rise, and severe the free market and less government interference pro- storms. vide the solution? Is “democratization” the key? Is it Climate change and population growth share the simply a matter of inundating the South with condoms characteristic of being long-term in their effects. Halt- and contraceptive pills? As the experience of popula- ing population growth will not by itself prevent climate tion programs over the last thirty years has demonstrated, change. Especially in the near term, a slower rise in popu- there are no simple answers. We will have to do many lation will barely affect total emissions, which will be things simultaneously. largely influenced by the nature of industrialization, At Rio de Janeiro in 1992, the U.N. Conference on energy use, and consumption patterns in the South. Still Environment and Development, the largest world sum- less, will it affect the level of atmospheric carbon diox- mit in history, culminated over two years of negotiations ide concentrations during the coming century, as it is on an agenda for the future. Among the many impor- mainly a product of previous emissions of the long-lived tant documents, resolutions, declarations, and gases? aspirations at this monumental conference, one historic However, in the longer term, the effects of slowing feature stands out. The leaders of nearly all the world’s population growth—and of an earlier stabilization of nations established for the first time the political legiti- global population—would cumulate and significantly macy of the concept, sustainable development: to conserve improve the chances of mitigating climate change. The and manage the planet’s resources in a manner that can further into the future one looks, the greater the differ- improve the conditions of today’s populations without ence between smaller (low variant) and larger (high foreclosing options for the well-being of the generations variant) population sizes could make in the ability of still to come. growing economies to achieve the substantial future A logical follow-up to the rather profound and cutbacks in carbon dioxide emissions that are necessary many-faceted implications of the Rio conference was in order to avoid dangerous levels of atmospheric con- the convening in Cairo, two years later, of the 1994 In- centrations. Slower population growth would also relieve ternational Conference on Population and Development pressures on fragile ecosystems—freshwater, forests, (ICPD). Again, following two years of preparatory ne- highlands, watersheds, and arid regions—and thus, im- gotiations, the world’s governments at Cairo affirmed prove the chances for adaptation to long-term climate that early stabilization of the Earth’s human population changes.31 would be crucial for attaining sustainable development.
14 ENVIRONMENTAL CHANGE & SECURITY PROJECT REPORT, ISSUE 6 (SUMMER 2000) Richard E. Benedick . Human Population Featuresand Environmental Stresses in the Twenty-first Century
In particular, they agreed on a “Cairo Programme of ric, the realities were different as the century drew to a Action.”32 close. About one third of women of reproductive age in This carefully negotiated document, a twenty-year developing nations—approximately 350 million—have program to the year 2015, was both more specific and no access to family planning information and services. more practical than the voluminous 800-page “Agenda Existing health programs were strained to meet the needs 21” that was adopted at Rio to encourage long-term of the increasing numbers of women entering their re- actions to promote sus- productive years. There are tainable development. approximately one billion Under the Cairo “ he populations of the adolescents—more than Programme, govern- ever before in history— ments accepted specific [ ]South, most already liv- who, largely because of quantitative and qualita- T religious and cultural mores, tive twenty-year targets ing in ecologically fragile areas, are hypocritically kept un- which, if achieved, educated about these might enable the world are also the most vulnerable to subjects, even though most to achieve population are sexually active. Thus, stabilization at just over possible impacts of climate they are particularly suscep- seven billion, rather than tible to sexually transmitted facing in mid-century a change, especially altered mon- diseases and unwanted early still-growing population pregnancies, which are in- of nine billion or even soon patterns, flooding, drought, imical to the health of both eleven billion. aridity, sea-level rise, and severe the young mothers and their The ICPD delibera- infants. And, finally, in most tions were influenced by storms. countries social equity for three decades of interna- women remains a cruel fic- tional experience that tion, and they are still clearly demonstrated that family planning programs denied equal access to education, health care, and job could succeed in countries widely differing in their cul- opportunities. tures, political and economic systems, and levels of Against this background, high-level representatives development—from Cuba to Tunisia, from Iran to Viet- of 179 governments at Cairo, under the sensitive lead- nam, and from Sri Lanka to Brazil. The key to significant ership of the conference secretary general Dr. Nafis Sadik, lowering of birth rates was the presence of certain en- Executive Director of the United Nations Population abling conditions: when girls and women enjoyed decent Fund, agreed on several quantitative targets to be health care and access to family planning methods and achieved in the ensuing two decades.33 These targets advice; when most girls received at least a primary edu- included: cation; when women had better economic opportunities and social status; when infant mortality was low; when • universal access by 2015 to the full range of “repro- adolescent child-bearing declined; when marriage was ductive health” services, covering family planning, delayed to a later age; and, when births were spaced more maternal health, and prevention and treatment of widely. Each of these factors reinforces the others, in a sexually transmitted diseases, including HIV/AIDS; cumulative effect. Perhaps most important, experience • universal primary education by 2015 for all girls worldwide showed that most women, if given the choice and boys; and the means, would have fewer children than their • specified, significant reductions by 2015 in mortal- mothers did. ity rates for infants, children, and mothers; and, For over twenty years, since the first world confer- • financial targets. ence on population in 1974 in Bucharest, governments had largely paid lip service (and then only after strenu- In addition, the Cairo Programme of Action iter- ous negotiations) to the concept that all couples and ated qualitative goals, or aspirations, which were just as individuals have a basic right to decide freely and re- carefully negotiated as the quantitative targets. These sponsibly the number, spacing, and timing of their included: increased access by young women to higher children—and to have the information, education, and education (beyond primary school); greater attention to means to do so. But, despite two decades of noble rheto- adolescents’ reproductive health needs; the elimination
ENVIRONMENTAL CHANGE & SECURITY PROJECT REPORT, ISSUE 6 (SUMMER 2000) 15 Features
of violence against women; broad-based measures to foreign donors, in particular, were far behind the needed ensure gender equity and equality; and the empower- pace. In 1997, only $1.7 billion had been raised, mak- ment of women in the job market and in the ing it highly unlikely that the donors would reach their development process. $5.7 billion target for 2000.35 With the exception of a The ICPD did not adopt or recommend demo- handful of nations (Denmark, Finland, Netherlands, graphic targets, such as specific reductions in birth rates Norway, and Sweden), aid-malaise appears to have taken or family size, since experience in some countries, nota- its toll on the health, education, and women’s programs bly India and China, had shown that such targets could recommended by the ICPD. To place the sums in per- lead to human rights abuses by overzealous administra- spective, the $17.5 billion global target for 2000 amounts tors. Instead, a consistent theme throughout the Cairo to less than one week of the world’s expenditures on Programme of Action was the emphasis on personal armaments.36 choice and on the quality of reproductive health and family planning services. Underlying the ICPD approach is the assumption CONCLUSION: UNCERTAINTIES AHEAD that creating suitable conditions will lead women—and their menfolk—to make the “right” choices in terms of It is clear that in the course of the new century, the birth spacing and family size. As discussed above, expe- human population will move into a zone—eight to rience has showed that birth rates can indeed decline twelve billion—which many analysts predict could ex- under certain circumstances. What remains an open ceed the Earth’s supportive capacity.37 The difference question after Cairo, however, is whether they can fall between the 7.3 billion United Nations low variant and fast enough and far enough to make a difference, or the 10.7 billion high variant for 2050 is equivalent to whether the total fertility rate might stall at three or even the total population of the world as recently as 1966. 2.5 children per woman. Were this to occur at anything That is quite a difference. above a TFR of 2.1 (the “replacement level of fertility”), There is no question that improving standards of population numbers would continue to climb to new living for the current poor of the world, plus providing heights, albeit more slowly. for the billions still to come, will increase global de- Unfortunately, follow-up negotiations during 1999, mand for food, water, energy, wood, housing, sanitation, to evaluate progress under the program, revealed back- and disposal of wastes. Even if the interrelationships sliding by some governments and sadly familiar between population and the ecological support systems controversies over issues of cultural and religious sensi- of the planet are not yet established with statistical cer- tivity, ranging from acknowledgment of adolescent tainty, it behooves us to act with prudence: to err on the sexuality and ensuring safe abortion (where legal) to the side of caution in both our population and our envi- status and rights of women in general. Five years after ronmental policies. Cairo, the trends were not encouraging: continued dis- Investments in measures to slow the rate of popula- crimination and violence against girls and women; tion growth—and thereby to reach a stable population hundreds of millions of couples still lacking access to earlier, and at lower levels, than under current trends— family planning services; HIV/AIDS spreading more would significantly reinforce efforts to address the rapidly than anticipated; tens of thousands of women environmental challenges of the century ahead, and con- still dying due to unsafe abortions; and, only limited siderably lower the cost of such efforts. We need to progress in reducing infant, child, and maternal mor- proceed on several fronts simultaneously, including: tality.34 Equally discouraging was the failure of governments • achieving the health, education, and gender equity to come up with the financial resources that had been goals of the ICPD Programme of Action; estimated at Cairo as essential to implement the pro- • reducing wasteful life-styles and consumption; gram. The ICPD, after hard negotiation, had calculated • investing in technology to facilitate new energy that a total of $17.5 billion would be required by the forms and less resource-intensive industrial and ag- year 2000, and $21.7 billion by 2015, to achieve the ricultural production; and, quantitative targets enumerated above. It was agreed that • adapting our political and economic institutions to two-thirds of these amounts would be raised by the de- the future, making them more responsive, more hu- veloping countries themselves, while the donor com- mane, and more focused on the long-term munity would furnish the remaining one-third. perspective rather than on tomorrow’s stock market The latest available data, however, revealed that the results or next year’s elections.
16 ENVIRONMENTAL CHANGE & SECURITY PROJECT REPORT, ISSUE 6 (SUMMER 2000) Richard E. Benedick . Human Population Featuresand Environmental Stresses in the Twenty-first Century
Seven years ago, the officers of fifty-eight national mine the future of our species. It is not merely a techni- academies of science met at a worldwide “Science Sum- cal problem of feeding the teeming billions. We must mit” in New Delhi. They issued a warning that is relevant define our vision of the future: an Earth of humans and to our current concerns. The scientific leaders wheat (or edible seaweed) without the wilderness, with- out the great animals? Decisions made now will be “... expressed a sense of urgent concern about critical. The central issue is the quality of life: how men the expansion of the world’s population and con- and women of the future will be able to live, their op- cluded that if current predictions of population tions and their trade-offs. Will it be a life of dignity, growth prove accurate and patterns of human activ- security, and beauty? ity on the planet remain unchanged, science and technology may not be able to prevent irreversible degradation of the natural environment and contin- REFERENCES ued poverty for much of the world. ... The academies believe that ultimate success in Ashford, Lori S. New Perspectives on Population: Lessons dealing with global social, economic, and environ- from Cairo. Washington, DC: Population Reference mental problems cannot be achieved without a stable Bureau, 1995. world population. The goal should be to reach zero population growth within the lifetime of our chil- Benedick, Richard E. Global Climate Change—The In- dren.”38 ternational Response. Wissenschaftszentrum Berlin Paper, FS II 97-401, 1997. The stable population goal of the national academies ______. Ozone Diplomacy—New Directions in Safe- is equivalent to the U.N. low variant estimate for 2050, guarding the Planet (rev. ed.). Cambridge, MA and which is also the objective of the ICPD’s Cairo London: Harvard University Press, 1998. Programme of Action. We are, clearly, not on that path. The interactions between human activities and the ______. “Contrasting Approaches: The Ozone Layer, Earth’s natural systems in the century ahead will deter- Climate Change, and Resolving the Kyoto Dilemma,”
NOTES
1 O’Neill et.al., 1998, emphasis added. 20 Watson, et.al. 1998. 2 Cohen 1995, Watson, et.al. 1998. 21 Gardner-Outlaw and Engelman 1997; Postel 1997. 3 Benedick 1998. 22 Postel 1999:6. 4 Demographic data throughout this article come from: 23 Ibid,128-132; Gardner-Outlaw and Engelman 1997. United Nations Population Division 1999 and, for urban data, 24 Gleick 1994. ibid., 1998. 25 Postel 1999:60-64. 5 United Nations 1999:70-72. 26 Benedick 1997; 2000. 6 Gardner-Outlaw and Engelman 1999:18-19. 27 Gardner-Outlaw and Engelman 1999:23. 7 Ibid, 22. 28 Meyerson 1998. 8 Ibid, 19. 29 CDIAC 1999. 9 Ibid, 25-27. 30 Benedick 2000. 10 Ibid, 9,34-37. 31 Meyerson 1998; Bongaarts et.al. 1997; O’Neill et.al. 11 Ibid, 32-33,56. 1998. 12 Ibid, 9,49-51. 32 Ashford 1995; UNFPA 1999. 13 Shiklomanov 1993. 33 UNFPA 1999. 14 Postel 1999:81. 34 Ibid. 15 Ibid, 41. 35 Ibid. 16 Gardner-Outlaw and Engelman 1999:21. 36 UNFPA 1997. 17 Postel 1999:65-73. 37 Cohen 1995. 18 Ibid, 109. 38 National Academy of Sciences 1993. 19 Ibid,73-80; United Nations 1999:28.
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In Global Biogeochemical Cycles in the Climate System, New York: United Nations Population Fund, 1997. E-D Schulze, et al, eds. Jena: Max Planck Institute for ______. The State of the World Population 1999: Six Biogeochemistry (forthcoming). Billion, A Time for Choice. New York: United Nations Bongaarts, John, Brian C. O’Neill, and Stuart R.Gaffin. Population Fund, 1999. “Global Warming Policy: Population Left Out in the United Nations Population Division. World Urbaniza- Cold.” Environment 39:9 (November 1997): 40-41. tion Prospects, The 1996 Revision. New York: United Cohen, Joel E. How Many People Can the Earth Support? Nations, 1998. New York: W.W. Norton, 1995. ______. World Population Prospects, The 1998 Revi- Engelman, Robert. Profiles in Carbon: An Update on sion. New York: United Nations, 1999. Population, Consumption, and Carbon Dioxide Emissions. Watson, Robert, et.al., eds. Protecting Our Planet—Se- Washington, DC: Population Action International, curing Our Future. Washington, DC: UN Environment 1998. Programme, U.S. National Aeronautics and Space Ad- Gardner-Outlaw, Tom and Robert Engelman. Sustain- ministration, World Bank, 1998. ing Water, Easing Scarcity: A Second Update. Washington, DC: Population Action International, 1997. ______. Forest Futures: Population, Consumption, and Wood Resources. Washington, DC: Population Action ECSP-FORUM International, 1999. The Environmental Change and Security Project’s Gleick, Peter H. “Water, War, and Peace in the Middle E-Mail Forum for Environment,Population, East.” Environment 36:3 (April 1994): 6-42 pp. and Security Issues ______. The World’s Water, 1998-1999. Washington, DC: Island Press, 1998. The Environmental Change and Security Project (ECSP) is pleased to announce its new e-mail fo- Meyerson, Frederick A.B. “Population, Carbon Emis- rum for environment, population, and security sions, and Global Warming: The Forgotten Relationship issues—ECSP-FORUM. This forum, which oper- at Kyoto.” Population and Development Review, 24:1 ates via e-mail, serves as a means for practitioners, (March 1998): 115-130. scholars, and policymakers to participate in a dia- National Academy of Sciences. Population Summit of the logue with others in the community. The purpose World’s Scientific Academies. Washington, DC: The Na- of ECSP-FORUM is to provide a forum for dis- tional Academy Press, 1993. cussing relevant issues and research, posting current policy questions, and listings relevant policy, schol- O’Neill, Brian C., F. Landis MacKellar, and Wolfgang arly, and teaching resources. Accessible from the Lutz. Population and Climate Change. Cambridge: Cam- ECSP Web site or by e-mail, it is a convenient and bridge University Press, 1998. resourceful tool for all interested in the topics of Postel, Sandra. Last Oasis (rev. ed.). New York and Lon- environment, population, and security. don: W.W.Norton/Worldwatch, 1997. To subscribe to ECSP-FORUM, send an email to ______. Pillar of Sand: Can the Irrigation Miracle Last? [email protected] and: New York and London: W.W.Norton/Worldwatch, 1999. 1) Leave the subject heading blank Shiklomanov, I. World Freshwater Resources, Water in 2) In the text box type sub ECSP-FORUM your Crisis: A Guide to the World’s Freshwater Resources, ed. name. Peter H. Gleick. New York: Oxford University Press, For example, sub ECSP-FORUM Jane Doe 1993. For more information, please visit our website at United Nations Population Fund. Coming Up Short: http://ecsp.si.edu/listserv. Struggling to Implement the Cairo Programme of Action.
18 ENVIRONMENTAL CHANGE & SECURITY PROJECT REPORT, ISSUE 6 (SUMMER 2000) Features
Oiling the Friction: Environmental Conflict Management in the Niger Delta, Nigeria
by Okechukwu Ibeanu
Abstract: The Niger Delta, a sensitive ecosystem rich in biodiversity, has witnessed considerable violence as a result of the tense relationship among oil companies, the Nigerian state, and oil-bearing communities. Environmental damage from the extraction and movement of fossil fuels is a central point of dispute among the parties while the precise extent of ecological damage remains unknown. Drawing on numerous interviews while living and working in the Niger Delta, Dr. Okechukwu Ibeanu analyzes the management of conflicts surrounding petro- leum production in the region, including the role of state violence and contradictory perceptions of security held by Delta communities and the oil companies and their partners in the Nigerian federal government.
INTRODUCTION
“ IL, BLOOD, AND FIRE.” This was how an elderly resident of the Ogoni town of Bori described the Niger Delta to me in 1995. It was at the height of the violent conflicts between Shell (Shell Petroleum ODevelopment Company, an affiliate of the Royal Dutch/Shell Group), backed by Nigeria’s military rulers at the time, and the Ogoni, an ethnic minority in the oil-rich Niger Delta. The violence culminated in the execution of nine Ogoni rights activists by the military dictatorship of General Sani Abacha after a mock trial. Paradoxically, the violent suppression of the Ogoni, which the military had hoped would cow the restive region and keep the oil wells flowing, unleashed a rash of further conflicts involving the state, oil companies, and ethnic communities across the Niger Delta. Consequently, between 1996 and 1998, when the dictator Abacha died, crude oil produc- tion, the mainstay of the Nigerian economy, was paralyzed. Angry youths seized oil wells, terminals, and flow stations belonging to companies like Shell, Chevron, and Mobil, and took numerous hostages for ransom. Assailed by their angry hosts, petrobusiness1 began to withdraw from the Delta. Alarmed by the prospects of empty coffers to fund its unbridled corruption, the dictatorship responded by unleashing even more violence on the local commu- nities. The result was LESS OIL, MORE BLOOD, AND MORE FIRE. The violence of the last ten years in the Niger Delta has brought relations among oil companies, the Nigerian state, and oil-bearing communities full-circle. For four decades, ecological devastation on the one hand, and neglect arising from crude oil production, on the other hand, have left much of the Niger Delta desolate, uninhabitable, and poor. The shady modus operandi of oil companies and the incompetence and corruption of state officials, ensured that neither took responsibility for the enormous environmental and social damages caused by crude oil production. Frustrated, the people of the Niger Delta took up arms against petrobusiness and its political allies. The failure of a violent final solution to the community resistance, a tactic favored by successive military dictatorships, inevitably led to calls for a reassessment of the petroleum industry in Nigeria, and particularly the need for a new conflict management regime in Nigeria’s oil belt. Presently, these calls are even more pronounced since the inaugu- ration of an elected government in May 1999 appears not to have assuaged the people’s needs of the Niger Delta. As late as November 1999, there were very violent clashes between youths and security forces in the communities of Choba in Rivers State and Odi in Bayelsa State. In the case of the Odi, the new civilian administration surprisingly called in the army, which sacked the entire community, killed over 100 inhabitants, and destroyed property running
Dr. Ibeanu is Senior Lecturer in the department of political science at the University of Nigeria, Nsukka. Please see page 179 in the Meeting Summaries section of this Report for a synopsis of Dr. Ibeanu’s presentation on this same topic.
ENVIRONMENTAL CHANGE & SECURITY PROJECT REPORT, ISSUE 6 (SUMMER 2000) 19 Features
into billions of Nigerian Naira (100 Naira = US$1). Niger Delta is very high. The area contains diverse plant This article analyzes the management of conflicts and animal species, including many exotic and unique surrounding petroleum production in the Niger Delta. flowers and birds. Implied in this ecology is that the It sets out the dynamic of environmental conflict in the Niger Delta is an easily disequilibrated environment. region and explores how two different political regimes, There is also a serious scarcity of arable land and fresh- one authoritarian and the other democratic, have ap- water. Additionally, transportation through this proached conflict management in the area. ecosystem, which is usually via rivers and creeks that snake through dense, mosquito-infested swamps, is very difficult. There is a high incidence of malaria and other THE NIGER DELTA ENVIRONMENT water borne diseases in the area. Indeed, early European visitors to the area described it as the “white man’s grave- The Niger Delta is said to be the world’s largest yard” because of the high mortality rate they experienced. wetland. This 36,000 square kilometers (14,000 square In short, the Niger Delta is a very sensitive ecosystem. miles) of marshland, creeks, tributaries, and lagoons Not anymore, however. The white man’s graveyard drain the Niger River into the Atlantic at the Bight of has become the white man’s gold mine with the discov- Biafra. A third of this area, about 12,000 square kilo- ery of black gold. The introduction of petroleum meters, is fragile mangrove forest, probably the largest exploration and drilling in this very fragile environment, mangrove forest in the world. The biodiversity of the however, has had a devastating effect on the environ-
Figure 1. Map of West Africa
20 ENVIRONMENTAL CHANGE & SECURITY PROJECT REPORT, ISSUE 6 (SUMMER 2000) Okechukwu Ibeanu . Oiling the Friction: EnvironmentalFeatures Conflict Management in the Niger Delta, Nigeria ment. In the fifty years of crude oil production, the grave- ria, namely, Rivers, Bayelsa, Delta, Edo, Imo, Abia, yard is itself close to dying, while petrobusiness and Akwa-Ibom, Cross-River, and Ondo. Although it con- corrupt state officials continue to profit enormously. tributes only thirteen percent of Nigeria’s gross domestic Petroleum exploration in Nigeria dates back to the product, petroleum provides over eighty percent of gov- first few years of this century. Organized marketing and ernment revenues annually. This makes oil production distribution started around 1907 by a German Com- very central to the survival of state officials as most pub- pany, Nigerian Bitumen Corporation. In 1956, the lic works contracts and the continued functioning of Anglo-Dutch group Shell D’Archy discovered oil in government agencies depend on it. By law, the Nigerian commercial quantities at Oloibiri, a town in the Niger state owns all mineral deposits in Nigeria, including Delta. By February 1958, Nigeria became an oil exporter crude oil. The central government controls revenues from with a production level of 6,000 barrels per day. Other crude oil and sets up a formula for distributing them to multinational oil companies like Mobil, Elf Aquitane, the other tiers of government. Shell remains the largest Chevron, and Agip have since joined Shell. Nigeria is producer in Nigeria, controlling about fifty percent of the fifth largest producer of crude oil in the Organiza- total production. In 1995, the company reported that tion of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC). At peak in all, it had ninety-four oil fields scattered across an production in the 1970s, Nigeria’s export was two mil- area of 31,000 square kilometers in the Niger Delta, lion barrels of crude oil per day. Presently, exports stand from which nearly one million barrels of oil were pro- at about one million barrels daily, mostly to the United duced daily.2 Inevitably, this position has brought Shell States. Nigeria’s oil, the so-called Bonny Light, is said to very close to the ruling governments in Nigeria. In fact, be environmentally friendly because of its low sulfur for many communities in the Niger Delta, there is little content. difference between the oil companies, especially Shell, Today, crude oil is produced in nine states in Nige- and the Nigerian state. This assumption is not entirely
Figure 2. Map of Niger Delta Region, Nigeria
ENVIRONMENTAL CHANGE & SECURITY PROJECT REPORT, ISSUE 6 (SUMMER 2000) 21 Features
without justification. For instance, on countless occa- Prior to the Bonny project, the practice of oil com- sions, oil companies have called out directly the police, panies was to flare the gas. Enormous amounts of natural the army, and the navy to quell disturbances on their gas were flared annually, usually in the vicinity of hu- installations, without applying to the government for man dwellings. In 1982, Shell, Gulf, Mobil, Agip, help. Texaco, Pan Ocean, Ashland, Phillips, Tenneco, and Elf Apart from crude oil production, there are many flared over thirteen billion cubic meters of gas in 145 other upstream and downstream activities of the petro- communities in Nigeria (Table 1). Shell, the worst cul- leum industry in Nigeria including refineries, oil services, prit, flared nearly seven billion cubic meters of gas in liquefied petroleum gas, and liquefied natural gas pro- that year alone. In one case, in the town of Sapele, Shell duction and marketing. Export of liquefied natural gas burnt over 944 million cubic meters of gas. In 1991, began in late 1999 following the completion of the multi- Nigeria exceeded the world average for natural gas flar- billion dollar liquefied natural gas project in Bonny, said ing by seventy-two percent. In that year, while the world to be the largest in the developing world. Nigeria is said average for gas flared as a percentage of total production to have natural gas reserves of 100 trillion standard cu- was four percent, Nigeria flared seventy-six percent of bic feet (about 2.8317 trillion standard cubic meters) in that total production (Table 2). Apart from the huge the region. quantities of greenhouse gases that gas-flaring pumps
Table 1. Gas flaring in Nigeria by company, 1982-83
1982 Company Gas Produced Gas Flared Percent Flared (billion m3) (billion m3) Shell 7,367,789,877 6,932,385,329 94.09 Gulf 2,120,140,478 2,096,585,478 98.88 Mobil 983,743,700 673,759,700 68.49 Agip 2,699,179,721 2,382,145,001 88.25 Texaco 375,931,000 368,279,000 97.96 Pan Ocean 85,815,232 79,787,789 92.98 Ashland 224,416,103 223,232,456 99.47 Phillips 28,885,150 28,434,153 98.44 Tenneco 26,263,565 26,175,613 99.66 Elf 559,405,267 550,999,332 98.50 Total 14,471,570,093 13,361,783,851 92.33 1983 Company Gas Produced Gas Flared Percent Flared (billion m3) (billion m3) Shell 8,148,964,094 5,413,250,218 66.43 Gulf 1,824,902,000 180,0971,000 98.69 Mobil 1,272,157,000 900,286,000 70.77 Agip 2,192,274,700 2,102,150,861 95.89 Texaco 436,157,000 430,988,000 98.81 Pan Ocean 128,410,203 122,307,350 95.25 Ashland 435,503,850 430,560,153 98.86 Phillips 26,217,125 25,779,720 98.33 Tenneco 3,1145,189 31,145,189 100.00 Elf 696,543,040 690,734,090 99.16 Total 15,192,274,201 10,618,229,855 69.89
Source: Nigerian National Petroleum Corporation, Annual Reports.
22 ENVIRONMENTAL CHANGE & SECURITY PROJECT REPORT, ISSUE 6 (SUMMER 2000) Okechukwu Ibeanu . Oiling the Friction: EnvironmentalFeatures Conflict Management in the Niger Delta, Nigeria into the atmosphere, constant flares affect both wildlife cocktail of dangerous metals and chemicals. and human beings negatively. At temperatures of up to Finally, badly constructed canals and causeways built 1,400oC, the “sauna bath” effects that gas flares produce to facilitate activities of oil companies have devastated make living in many communities nearly impossible. the hydrology of the region, causing flooding in some The Niger Delta environment is being destroyed in areas and water deficiency in others. Large forests have many ways. High-pressure pipelines criss-cross villages atrophied as a result. Most of these artificial canals also carrying crude oil, premium motor spirits, diesel, and let saline waters of the Atlantic into freshwater sources gas. Spills and leaks from these pipelines and other in- thereby increasing the scarcity of drinking water and stallations destroy wildlife, farmlands, forests, aquifers, killing many species of plants, animals, and fish. In some and human lives. Within the last year, separate fires in cases, the entire vegetation is precipitously altered as the Jesse and Ngwa areas in the states of Delta and Abia freshwater is destroyed by oil company canals and cause- respectively, claimed hundreds of lives. Often, oil com- ways. For instance, water hyacinths3 have become very panies and the government claim that spillage is the result common in many areas where they were previously un- of sabotage by local communities for purposes of ille- known. Although oil companies and successive gally obtaining petroleum products and monetary governments in Nigeria would want to paint a contrary compensation. Note that Nigerian laws forbid the pay- picture, the devastation that petroleum production has ment of compensation in spills involving sabotage. inflicted on the environment is a central factor in un- However, many of the pipelines and valves in question derstanding the conflict dynamic in the Niger Delta. are very old and therefore prone to failure. Additionally, the discharge of refinery effluents into freshwater sources and farmland devastates the environ- UNDERSTANDING THE CONFLICT DYNAMIC IN ment and threatens human lives. Such effluents contain THE NIGER DELTA excessive amounts of very toxic materials like mercury and chromium. For instance, fish store mercury in their The Niger Delta contains most of Nigeria’s hydro- brains for a long time, which can then easily pass into carbon deposits. By implication, the Delta holds the bulk the human food chain with adverse affects on human of the economic resources that sustains the public trea- populations. Recent studies of some communities in the sury in Nigeria. Yet, years of neglect and ecological Niger Delta by the environmental group Environmen- devastation have left much of the Niger Delta despoiled tal Rights Action (ERA) showed that most of the and impoverished. This contradiction of riches is a con- underground aquifers are heavily contaminated with a stant refrain in most conflicts in the Delta. A myriad of specific factors is often adduced for the protracted conflict in the Niger Delta. Among them are Table 2. Natural Gas Flared as Percentage neglect by government and oil companies, unemploy- of Gross Production (1991) ment, military rule, the minority question, and a badly structured Nigerian federalism, especially as it concerns Country Percent of Gas finances. While these factors singly or jointly bear on Flared the conflict dynamic in the region, what has been lack- U.S.A 0.6 ing is their integration into an explanatory system to Holland 0.0 enable us to make sense of empirical data and support Britain 4.3 effective policy intervention. Thus, it is not often clear Ex-USSR 1.5 if all the factors are causal or only mediatory. If they are Mexico 5.0 all causal factors, are they principal, secondary, or ter- OPEC COUNTRIES tiary? It is also not clear if the factors are trigger, pivotal, Nigeria 76.0 mobilizing, or aggravating.4 Libya 21.0 Perhaps, the most commonly cited reason for con- Saudi Arabia 20.0 flict in the Niger Delta is the dissatisfaction of oil-bear- Iran 19.0 ing communities with monetary compensation paid by Algeria 4.0 oil companies and government for exploitation rights OPEC TOTAL 18.0 and ecological damage. The oil-bearing communities are WORLD TOTAL 4.0 then portrayed as greedy and unpatriotic. This explana- 5 Source: Friends of the Earth, Nigeria, 2000. tion is popular in government and petrobusiness circles. Surely, this explanation is simplistic and reductionist for
ENVIRONMENTAL CHANGE & SECURITY PROJECT REPORT, ISSUE 6 (SUMMER 2000) 23 Features
it explains everything in terms of money. Without doubt, state’s transactions with society. Although the use of vio- compensation is important in understanding what is lence and the emasculation of civil society make such happening in Nigeria’s oil belt, but it conceals more than states appear strong internally, it is only an illusion be- it reveals. For instance, it disguises the fact that in some cause they are in fact weak states.7 cases it is the type of compensation that is contested, Second, security has to do with relations of the la- and in others it is the procedure for arriving at the com- bor process. In this sense, security designates two pensation that is at issue. Still in other cases, what cre- organically connected relations. First is the relation be- ates discord is the tween members of a skewed distribution of society and the natural compensation. Most im- “ ocal communal or traditional environment in which portantly, in many cases they live. Security here of conflict, monetary conflict management struc- refers to the carrying ca- compensation is not the L pacity of the biophysical issue at all. Local people tures must be built into processes environment. In other are simply asking to have words, security measures their farmlands back in of conflict resolution.” the capacity of the natu- order to repossess con- ral environment to trol of their lives and en- sustain the physical vironment. Moreover, the monetary explanation is needs of man. In this sense, two issues are important in unacceptable for it simply blames the victims: it is the measuring security. One is the extent to which mem- villagers’ excessive monetary demands that generate cri- bers of the society understand the laws of nature (science) sis. and use this understanding to create tools (technology), thereby enhancing their capacity to derive their physi- A Contradiction of Securities cal needs from nature.8 Second, is their capacity to Contrary to conventional wisdom and prevalent efficiently exploit nature. Efficient exploitation in this explanations of the conflict in the Niger Delta, disagree- context is what is now commonly termed sustainable ments with state officials and petrobusiness over monetary development: the sustainable exploitation of nature, that compensation do not necessarily propel local commu- is striking a balance between the exploitation of nature nities into a conflict trajectory. Rather, conflicts arise for man’s immediate physical needs on the one hand, out of a contradiction of securities, which the Nigerian and its protection for his future needs on the other. state because of its character is unable to manage and The second labor process relating to security is the reconcile. This contradiction of securities hinges on the relationship among members of a society. The relation opposition between perceptions and conditions of se- between man and nature always manifests in a histori- curity advanced by local communities and those cally determined social form. It exists only in unity with advanced by state officials and petrobusiness. Put simply, certain relations of production expressed in social struc- security for local communities means recognition that tures and institutions. Here, security means the capacity mindless exploitation of crude oil and the resultant eco- of groups (and individuals as their agents) to provide logical damage threaten resource flows and livelihoods. their physical and psychosocial needs and livelihoods. For state officials and petrobusiness, security consists of This means a progressive elimination of objective con- an unencumbered production of crude oil at competi- ditions that limit this capacity, as well as reduction of tive (read cheap) costs. fears and anxieties about their abilities to meet these Conceptually, security has two related meanings.6 needs. In this sense, security has to do with protection First, it has a strictly political meaning that refers to the from poverty, exploitation, disease, bio-chemical con- capacity of a ruling group to protect its interests/values tamination, injustice, and the like. The issue here is the (internally and externally located), relative to external control of resource flows. In modern societies, social re- threats to these interests/values posed by other ruling lations are invariably antagonistic as all groups strive to groups. It is also the capacity of a ruling group to main- maximize security given finite resources. All groups de- tain order internally with minimal use of violence, given sire security, yet problems arise when people have challenges posed by other groups, the difference between different perceptions and want different conditions of weak and strong states. Externally, ruling groups of weak security. states show a relatively low capacity to protect their in- A primary role of the state is to mediate these op- terests. And internally, force/violence characterizes the posing relations and conditions of security in order to
24 ENVIRONMENTAL CHANGE & SECURITY PROJECT REPORT, ISSUE 6 (SUMMER 2000) Okechukwu Ibeanu . Oiling the Friction: EnvironmentalFeatures Conflict Management in the Niger Delta, Nigeria keep them within the bounds of order. To accomplish a repository of all the interests of the people-nation, the this role requires the state to “rise above” social contra- violence it vents in conflicts is devastating in terms of dictions and opposing conditions of security and appear social cost. Finally, state violence makes conflict resolu- as an impartial arbiter, always striving for consensus. By tion very difficult. that position, it becomes possible for the state to mini- This role of the state affects security in a number of mize force in its management of contradictions of ways. As the state is privatized and parceled out to groups security. It is this issue that has been variously posed in and interests, the security of private individuals and the literature as the problematique of state autonomy, groups becomes increasingly deflected as the security of Bonapartism, and the national popular state.9 the state. Internal security of the state, which consists in But an examination of elimination of force and the Nigerian state in the re- violence in the maintenance cent past shows that it has “ or oil-bearing communi of internal order, by con- been unable to become trast, becomes an unending popular/national. Instead of Fties, security means the cycle of conflict and vio- appearing as the representa- lence. State violence leads to tion of the general interests maintenance of the carrying resistance by targeted of the people-nation, the Ni- groups, which leads to more gerian state has been “priva- capacity of the fragile Niger state violence and more re- tized” and “parceled-out” as Delta environment… State of- sistance. The insecurity of “means of production” for re- the state against external ag- gional, ethnic, religious, ficials and petrobusiness, on gression and insecurity class, and other special inter- among victims of state vio- ests. Consequently, the Nige- the other hand, see security in lence increase tremen- rian state has been clearly dously. Synergy between embroiled in social struggles terms of uninterrupted pro- external threat and internal/ and has been most ineffective civil strife becomes increas- in mediating them. duction of petroleum irrespec- ingly possible.11 This involvement has Security of the environ- had profound consequences tive of environmental and ment also decreases. For for conflict and security. social impacts. one, the ability of people to First, social relations are par- protect the natural environ- ticularly conflictive and ment declines as a result of violent, as a privatized state becomes the instrument of growing social stress and violence by the state. In fact, groups prosecuting social struggles. Second, state vio- there is a positive correlation between environmental lence, that is the aggression of the state towards targeted stress and social stress. For instance, where entire vil- groups assumed to threaten state security, becomes a lages are sacked by the military and people are principal variable in social conflicts. Thus, it would be impoverished, environmental protection will be the least argued by some observers that what is happening in of their concerns. State violence also fuels the inefficient Nigeria is not conflict but state violence through mili- exploitation of nature as groups that control the state tarism, even though resistance to this state violence is use it to justify and perpetuate their unsustainable use always defined as relations between social groups. How- of natural resources and degradation of the environment. ever, this is an illusion for it is the aggression of a At the heart of conflicts in the Niger Delta, there- privatized state that appears as group conflicts.10 In other fore, are different meanings of security attached to crude words, it is state aggression against a targeted group in a oil. For oil-bearing communities, security means the conflict, rather than the aggression of one group against maintenance of the carrying capacity of the fragile Niger another, strictly speaking, that we observe in inter-group Delta environment. It is the realization that an unsus- conflicts. Consequently, state intervention in conflicts, tainable exploitation of crude oil, with its devastation which normally should be one of mediation, actually of farmland and fishing waters, threatens resource flows magnifies violence, while deflecting attention from state- and livelihoods for both individuals and communities sponsored violence and abuse of natural resources. Third, as collectives. When a population feels its livelihood since the Nigerian state has become essentially a reper- threatened, it feels insecure. Therefore, elimination of tory of violence used against specific groups, instead of deprivation is a key concern of the oil-bearing commu-
ENVIRONMENTAL CHANGE & SECURITY PROJECT REPORT, ISSUE 6 (SUMMER 2000) 25 Features
nities of the Niger Delta. Since the state and its allies region. The Ogoni and Ijaw are important ethnic groups appropriate almost all the oil wealth from these com- in understanding the story of the Niger Delta not only munities, they are resentful of the state and petrobusiness because in total they constitute about sixty percent of and feel that a good part of the financial resources should the population of the Delta, but also because they played be re-invested in the communities. a frontal role in resisting state violence against oil com- Finally, oil-bearing communities link group secu- munities. They are also important because the similarities rity to popular mobilization, since most of these and contrasts in their strategies and state responses fa- communities are made up of minority groups. In addi- cilitate appreciation of the different ramifications of tion, a greater part of the Niger Delta is still rural and state-community relations in Niger Delta conflicts. For inaccessible. Although the level of education has been instance, while the Ogoni struggle was highly cerebral rising across Nigeria’s rural communities since indepen- and led by the middle class and professionals, the Ijaw dence, a great majority of the people still lacks basic struggle has tended to be more militant and led by mainly education. Certainly, getting these people to understand unemployed youths. their plight and to do something about it requires effec- tive mobilization through grassroots organizations, Rise and Fall of Ogoni Resistance which are customarily led by the middle class. Organi- From about 1993, the Ogoni began a massive cam- zations like the Movement for the Survival of Ogoni paign against environmental pollution, material People (MOSOP), the Movement for the Survival of deprivation and social exclusion, which they attributed Ijaw Ethnic Nationality (MOSIEN), and Ijaw Youth to crude oil production by petrobusiness and discrimina- Council have been at the fore of popular mobilization tory policies of the Nigerian state. In October 1990 they in the Niger Delta. issued a Bill of Rights through their popular organiza- To state officials and petrobusiness, security is de- tion, the MOSOP. Among other things, the bill requested fined as an uninterrupted production of crude oil at proper compensation for destruction of the Ogoni en- “competitive” costs. Informed by a pro-growth ideol- vironment and a fair share of the $30 billion dollars ogy, their concern is the production of petroleum to they claimed accrued to Nigeria from crude oil extracted boost state revenues and company profits, irrespective from Ogoniland since 1958. The drafters of the bill also of environmental consequences and indeed, irrespective lamented the pervasive poverty in Ogoni, the lack of of long-term economic irrationality. For instance, one health, educational, and other social amenities, as well of the paradoxes of the petroleum industry in the Niger as the progressive disappearance of Ogoni languages as Delta is that it destroys renewable resources like arable “other Nigerian languages are being forced on us.”12 Un- land and aquifers in order to extract crude oil, which is satisfactory response to these demands by the military a non-renewable, finite resource. regime led to acts of “resistance” by the Ogoni. The untenable position of state officials and In Ogoniland, state violence has taken three major petrobusiness has been sustained over the years by the forms. First, it has taken the form of harassment of Ogoni authoritarian rule of the military in Nigeria. Having leaders through arrests, detention, surveillance, and re- banished all forms of institutional means to express lated tactics. Since the Ogoni campaign began in earnest popular feelings, the military, especially under General in 1991, their leaders have become regular victims of Abacha, widely employed state violence to impose its the state’s security and intelligence agencies. On many wishes in the Niger Delta. A draconian military regime occasions, the then leaders of MOSOP including G.B. and highly mobilized communities in the Niger Delta Leton, Kobani, and Ken Saro-Wiwa were detained and set the stage for a decade of disaffection and spiraling questioned. In January 1993, they were arrested in Lagos. violence in the region. In April of the same year, Saro-Wiwa was arrested twice. Again, on 21 June 1993, he was re-arrested together with two other MOSOP activists, N. Dube and K. Nwile. STATE VIOLENCE: THE SOLUTION THAT FAILED On 13 July, criminal charges were brought against them.13 In December 1993, Ledum Mitee, another State Violence and Popular Resistance by the Ogoni MOSOP leader was arrested and detained without and Ijaw charge. Between May and June 1994, following the The story of the relationship between the Nigerian murders of four Ogoni leaders, several hundreds of state and the Ogoni and Ijaw, two ethnic minorities in people were arrested in Ogoniland.14 the Niger Delta, is a useful illustration of the role of Second, state violence has been used against the state violence in understanding the politics of oil in the Ogoni by encouraging violent conflicts between the
26 ENVIRONMENTAL CHANGE & SECURITY PROJECT REPORT, ISSUE 6 (SUMMER 2000) Okechukwu Ibeanu . Oiling the Friction: EnvironmentalFeatures Conflict Management in the Niger Delta, Nigeria
Ogoni and their neighbors, and using this violence as a lence and sounded the death knell of the Ogoni struggle. pretext to repress the Ogoni. The government readily proclaims the clashes to be purely ethnic clashes. But, End of Ogoni Resistance the frequency of such clashes among erstwhile peaceful The implosion of MOSOP, which culminated in neighbors, the extent of devastation, and the sophistica- the killing of four Ogoni leaders by their own people on tion of weapons employed have convinced some 21 May 1994, did not surprise many. Following the independent observers that “broader forces might have Wilbros Affair in April 1993, some leaders of MOSOP been interested in perhaps putting the Ogonis under were accused of selling-out to government. The rancor pressure, probably to derail their agenda.”15 Between July generated by that episode had hardly died down when a 1993 and April 1994, there were at least three conflicts controversial decision by MOSOP led to the boycott of between the Ogoni and their neighbors, involving the the 12 June Presidential election that year. At the time, destruction of many villages, loss of life, and refugees— it was obvious that the leadership of the Movement had the Andoni in July 1993, the Okrika in December 1993, been split into two. Some accused Ken Saro-Wiwa of and the Ndoki in April 1994. In each case, the security being brash, foolhardy, confrontational, and authoritar- forces blamed the Ogoni. ian, claiming that he created the National Youth Council Finally, state violence has been by direct violence of Ogoni People (NYCOP) as a private army for in- using the armed forces and police. Extra-judicial kill- timidating and eliminating his enemies. They also ings, flogging, torture, rapes, looting, and extortion by accused him of planning to kill thirteen Ogoni leaders, the security forces against the Ogoni have been widely among them some of those who later died on 21 May reported. In fact, following the situation in Ogoniland, 1994. the Rivers State government established an Internal Se- On 21 June 1993, the security forces arrested Ken curity Task Force under one Major (later Lt. Col.) Saro-Wiwa in relation to the boycott of the presidential Okuntimo. His job has been the systematic use of vio- election by the Ogoni. In reaction, Ogoni youths, prob- lence against the Ogoni. Indeed, Okuntimo had bragged ably members of NYCOP, went on the rampage. Their on prime time national television that the army taught demonstration was later seized on by their neighbors, him 204 ways of killing people, but he had only used the Andoni, to attack some Ogoni villages like Kaa in three on the Ogoni. It is not surprising that since 21 August 1994. The Saro-Wiwa faction of MOSOP re- May 1994 when four Ogoni leaders were killed in the jected a subsequent peace accord brokered by the Rivers town of Giokoo, the security forces have executed at State government. Exchanges of angry letters among least fifty Ogonis.16 Earlier in April 1993, in what has leaders of the Movement followed until Gokana, one of become known as the Wilbros Affair, at least eleven the five clans making up the Ogoni ethnic group, repu- Ogonis, including one woman, were shot at Biara by a diated MOSOP and Saro-Wiwa in the so-called Giokoo detachment of the Second Amphibious Brigade based Accord of March 1994. At that point, the implosion of in Bori. The Ogoni were protesting the laying of a pipe- MOSOP was completed and the struggle became Ogoni line from Rumuekpe to Bori. Major U. Braimah of the against Ogoni. Brigade claimed that his men were carrying out duties The popular view in Nigeria is that the division directed by the Federal Government.17 within the Ogoni leadership was an ideological one be- To give legal backing to some of these acts, the mili- tween moderates led by Dr. Leton, president of the tary government of Babangida made a catch-all decree movement, and militants led by Saro-Wiwa. However, against treason on 4 May 1993. The decree, among other it is more than an ideological view. Without doubt, the things, stipulates the death penalty for anybody who mass of Ogoni people joined MOSOP to protect their organizes war against Nigeria, intimidates the President livelihoods. Nevertheless, their leaders were essentially of Governors, utters or publishes words suggesting the interested in personal power and money. The Nigerian break up of Nigeria, flies a flag, or suggests creation of a petty bourgeoisie is not given to ideological fidelity. They new state or local government for the country. are simply power fetishists. In any case, they lack the On their part, the Ogoni responded with increased discipline and strength of character to pursue any ideo- mobilization and a media campaign against the state logical line consistently. Money and power always and oil companies, sometimes through violent demon- overrides. Moderates could become militants and mili- strations spearheaded by the MOSOP. The strategy of tants moderates in a short space of time. violent demonstrations was the immediate (but not re- The tragedy of popular movements in Nigeria is mote) cause of the division within MOSOP. A weakened the inability of the ordinary people to impose their in- MOSOP, in turn, meant the intensification of state vio- terests on the leadership. Since popular control rarely
ENVIRONMENTAL CHANGE & SECURITY PROJECT REPORT, ISSUE 6 (SUMMER 2000) 27 Features
exists, popular movements led by the petty-bourgeoisie ing policemen and soldiers, believe that members of the easily degenerate into authoritarianism. The tendency cult were able to break into the well-guarded Govern- of this class is to concentrate power in themselves, first ment House because they wore charms that made them as leaders of the people and then as individuals. Collec- impervious to bullets. The success of the first Egbesu tive leadership remains difficult. The signs are always war obviously enhanced the profile of the youths and clear: internal bickering and self- the cult, and encouraged seeking maneuvers for power and more young people, many of money. Moderation and militancy “ ifferences of class, whom were unemployed, to are only strategies, not philoso- join the protests. In a matter phies. In short, a successful mass gender, and genera- of weeks, the invincibility of movement like MOSOP was des- D the Egbesu had spread tined to implode and crumble as tion should be addressed throughout Ijawland and be- a result of leadership in-fighting, yond. The success of the especially because of the money if productive community Egbesu youth in the “first and power that it was able to gar- war” also fed into wider de- ner. relations and conflict reso- mands by the Ijaw for more petroleum revenues. Prior to The Ijaw Egbesu Wars lution systems are to be the Egbesu, the Ijaw National The Ogoni have passed the Council and the Movement mantle of leading the struggle of developed in the Niger for the Survival of Ijaw Eth- the people of the Niger Delta to Delta.” nic Nationality (MOSIEN) the Ijaw. Since the implosion of had made vociferous de- MOSOP, Ijaw youths have in- mands for more petroleum creasingly taken center stage. In August 1997, over revenues to be allocated to the Ijaw. The formation of 10,000 youths from across the Delta demonstrated at MOSIEN was largely influenced by MOSOP, the Ogoni Aleibiri in Ekeremor Local Area of Bayelsa State to de- organization. mand an end to all Shell activities in the Niger Delta. The death of the dictator Abacha in June 1998, im- Aleibiri was chosen as the focus of the demonstration provements in human rights, and an expansion of the because, according to the youths, Shell has refused to political space made it possible for Ijaw demands to be- clear an oil spill that occurred there on 18 March 1997. come more openly articulated and massively pursued. Even at the time, evidence clearly pointed to more con- The first Egbesu war had guaranteed a central role for flicts between the state, oil companies, and Ijaw youths, the youth in this new dispensation. This guarantee be- in spite of repeated claims by government that peace came clear in late 1998 following a spate of oil had returned to the area. Speaking at the Aleibiri gath- installation hijackings by Ijaw youths. This phase of re- ering, a community leader and retired Navy Lieutenant, sistance, as the youths called it, culminated in a grand Chief Augustine Anthony, clearly stated that Ijaw youths Convention of Ijaw Youths in Kaiama town. The meet- would fight until there was freedom in the Niger Delta ing issued a document addressed to the government and because “we have been exploited for so long.”18 oil companies requesting more local control of oil rev- Within one year, Ijawland exploded again. Between enues and better environmental practices. The Kaiama mid-1998 and January 1999, Bayelsa State was in tur- Declaration also gave the government until 31 Decem- moil. The Ijaw inhabit Bayelsa, one of the main ber 1998 to respond positively to their demands. The petroleum producing states in Nigeria. What became government upped the ante with a spate of condemna- known as the first Egbesu war began when an Ijaw youth tions and threats to use force against the youths. In his leader was arrested and detained by the military Gover- new year/budget broadcast on 1 January 1999, the Head nor of the State during the rule of General Abacha. He of State General Abubakar, gave indications of military was held without trial in the Government House (the action against the youths. Since early December 1998, military Governor’s official residence) for distributing there had been massive military build-up in Bayelsa State “seditious” documents questioning the financial probity by the government, including the positioning of frig- of the governor. In reaction, a group of youths said to ates in the Gulf of Guinea. Throughout December 1998 be members of an Ijaw cult, the Egbesu, stormed the and early January 1999, Bayelsa State was virtually un- Government House in Yenagoa, disarmed the guards and der siege. The second Egbesu war started when military released their leader. Many residents of Yenagoa, includ- men in Yenagoa, the capital of Bayelsa State, confronted
28 ENVIRONMENTAL CHANGE & SECURITY PROJECT REPORT, ISSUE 6 (SUMMER 2000) Okechukwu Ibeanu . Oiling the Friction: EnvironmentalFeatures Conflict Management in the Niger Delta, Nigeria
Ijaw youths participating in a cultural festival. In the companies was a realization that with the situation on ensuing violence, which lasted for over one week, many the ground, that law was passé. Ijaw youths lost their lives in Yenagoa and Kaiama, prop- The new emphasis was on Memoranda of Under- erty worth millions of Naira was destroyed, and scores standing (MOUs) by stakeholders. Each MOU detailed of people were displaced. the duties, responsibilities, and benefits of the stakehold- ers. Essentially, the oil companies committed themselves to the development of host communities. In return, the A DEMOCRATIC APPROACH? communities pledged to protect installations and to solve problems through dialogue. For its part, the government Following the unbending resistance of oil-bearing was expected to serve as the umpire. An added element communities and the steady international condemna- of this “new” approach was the increasing involvement tion of the policies of the military government and oil of nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) and com- companies in the Niger Delta, petrobusiness began to munity-based organizations (CBOs) with the oil preach a new “community-based” approach to its ac- companies. This element came about partly because of tivities in the Niger Delta. Ostensibly, this change in the prominent role that these organizations played as attitude arose from a re-evaluation by the oil giants of advocates of the oil-bearing communities against the their activities in the developing world. For instance, in military dictatorship and petrobusiness. a rare case of mea culpa Shell embarked on a worldwide Unfortunately, the MOUs remain elitist in both review of its policy regarding its host communities. The conception and content. To illustrate, in the Memoran- commencement of this review was widely publicized dum of Understanding between the Bonny Kingdom even if its outcome was far less so. However, from 1997 and the Joint Industry Company, the collective work- it was clear that for oil companies to regain access into ing on the liquefied natural gas project in the area, little the oil-bearing communities, they had to alter their at- or no grassroots consultations took place.19 First, the titude toward the people. The giants like Shell had been signing of the document involved the elite of the Bonny forced to shut down operations in many parts of the society, most of whom live outside the Kingdom, gov- Delta costing them and the military government an es- ernment officials, and the oil companies. Secondly, the timated $1 million daily. At that point, petrobusiness projects envisaged under the Memorandum included realized that the violent solution of the military govern- paving of roads, electricity, water treatment, and a mas- ment, which they had widely supported with money ter plan for the town. These are clearly trappings of urban and munitions (the dreaded Rivers State internal secu- elite life. Across the Niger Delta, there is a deep-seated rity force was said to have been funded and equipped by feeling among unemployed youth and rural dwellers that Shell), could not secure their oil installations. such elite demands distort their struggles by fostering a Everywhere, oil companies began to drum up sup- pecuniary interpretation of their problems. In many port for this new approach. Its thrust, according to them, cases, the urban-based elite holds positions that run was a new partnership of all stakeholders in the petro- counter to those of their people living at “home” in the leum industry. The stakeholders were the oil rural areas. Many rural dwellers say that while these de- communities, petrobusiness, and government. Oil com- mands are not necessarily bad, they tend to favor only panies began to set up autonomous community relations the vocal, urban-based people who understand the lan- units, manned by community development specialists. guage of compensation and are in a position to enjoy In addition, the new approach sought to negotiate ac- the social amenities provided. In the process, the simple cess directly with oil communities rather than through needs of the vast majority are bypassed. government. Hitherto, oil companies sought to absolve The youth remain the powder keg. Unable to get themselves from the desolation of the Niger Delta by proper schooling or stable employment, they constitute claiming to be tenants of government and not the local a “reserve army” for social discontent. Frustration asso- communities. They also claimed that they met all their ciated with aspirations to elite status makes the youth of contractual obligations to the Nigerian government and the Niger Delta very volatile. The point is that to as- so could not be held responsible for the failures of gov- sume, as oil companies presently do, that their host ernment. This claim may well be correct in law because communities are internally monolithic is wrong. Dif- a previous military regime (ironically headed by the ferences of class, gender, and generation should be present civilian President) had passed an unpopular de- addressed if productive community relations and con- cree in 1978 declaring all land and minerals under it the flict resolution systems are to be developed in the Niger property of the state. The change in attitude by the oil Delta. Existing MOUs do not seem to be doing that.
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Finding the legitimate representatives of the com- grinds slowly. The second approach insists that while munities is also a problem encumbering MOUs. During occupants of structures that dictated the problems in the period of military repression in the Niger Delta, the the Delta may have changed, the structures themselves oil companies shot themselves in the foot by helping to and their internal dynamics have changed very little. hunt down the true representatives of the communities, Therefore, communities and civil society need to prac- who were described as trouble makers and security risks. tice continued vigilance to ensure fundamental Many of them were killed, others went into exile, and transformations. An important aspect of this transfor- most have been cowed. Illegitimate, government-in- mation is to renegotiate Nigeria’s fiscal federalism to stalled chiefs, extortionists, and other charlatans filled ensure that communities of the Delta retain the bulk of the vacuum created by their resources generated from exit. Consequently, in many their land. As such, they cases the response of the ordi- “ ecurity has to do with note that the constitution nary members of the given by the military, communities has been cyni- [S]protection from pov- which gave birth to the cism towards the recent present government, is overtures of the oil companies. erty, exploitation, disease, flawed and requires re-ne- The born-again commu- gotiation in a sovereign nity-based approach of the oil bio-chemical contamination, national conference. companies seems to have an- The continued vio- ticipated the end of military injustice, and the like.” lence in the Niger Delta dictatorship and inauguration suggests that the two posi- of an elected government under President Obasanjo, tions are still not reconciled. Violent conflicts continue himself a former army general. There has been great to occur across the Delta, both between government and optimism locally and internationally that the new civil- communities, and among communities themselves. ian administration will resolve the festering sore of Since the new government came into being, there has violent conflicts in the Niger Delta. In fact, many ob- been trouble in Bonny, which delayed the take off of the servers suggest that the litmus test for the success of the huge liquefied gas project there, Eleme and Okrika, Oleh, new administration will be events in the Niger Delta. Choba, and Odi, among others. The Odi case seems to Early on, the new government seemed conscious of confirm the fears of the human rights community in the importance of the problem in the Niger Delta. Soon Nigeria that it will take some time before the vestiges of after his inauguration, President Obasanjo toured the state violence as a solution to the Niger Delta problem area, preaching the need for non-violent resolution of are eliminated. conflicts between communities, government, and oil Odi is the second largest town in Bayelsa State, af- companies. The President immediately followed this ter the capital Yenagoa. In mid-November 1999, Odi with consultations with representatives of communities youths took several policemen hostage and later tortured and other stakeholders in the petroleum industry. Fi- them to death. The team of policemen had gone to the nally, a Niger Delta Development Commission town to investigate rumors that some Ijaw youths were (NDDC) would take charge of development activities mobilizing to storm Lagos in reprisal for attacks a month in the Niger Delta to supplement the direct efforts of earlier on Ijaw by the Lagos-based Yoruba youth group the federal, state, and local governments. the Oodua Peoples Congress (OPC). It was widely be- Two approaches to conflict resolution in the Niger lieved that the OPC attacks on Ijaw residents of the Lagos Delta have emerged since the new civilian government suburb of Ajegunle were a carryover from the conflicts came into office. The first suggests that civil society or- in the State of Ondo between the Ijaw and Ilaje, a Yoruba ganizations have done their work by mobilizing clan. The government interpreted the killing of the po- communities to resist the militarist state and insensitive licemen as a renewal of the activities of the Egbesu. oil companies. Now, they and the communities must However, it is known that one of the leaders of the youths allow the elected representatives of the people acting that murdered the policemen at Odi was in fact a mem- through democratic structures like local councils, state ber of the ruling Peoples Democratic Party (PDP), the assemblies, and governors, the national assembly, and party of both President Obasanjo and Governor the presidency, as well as the judiciary to tackle the prob- Diepreye Alamieyeseigha of Bayelsa State. This youth lems. This approach advocates patience and an leader is known to be very influential among Ijaw youths understanding that the wheel of democratic government and mobilized them to support the PDP in the guber-
30 ENVIRONMENTAL CHANGE & SECURITY PROJECT REPORT, ISSUE 6 (SUMMER 2000) Okechukwu Ibeanu . Oiling the Friction: EnvironmentalFeatures Conflict Management in the Niger Delta, Nigeria natorial elections of January 1999. ued violence and disaffection suggest that fundamental In response to the death of the policemen, Presi- problems remain. dent Obasanjo ordered Governor Alamieyeseigha to Policymakers continue to get it wrong in the Niger produce the culprits. When this failed, Obasanjo or- Delta by believing that the problem is money. True, the dered in the army. The consequence was chilling: over elite will continue to push for more money and con- one hundred inhabitants dead, many more missing, tracts. However, beyond the nummular interests of the thousands forced to flee, and virtually no house stand- elite, there are fundamental questions of participation ing in Odi. As if this devastation were not enough, the and social rights, both for individuals and for whole President in a televised interview ordered security forces communities. The solution to the Niger Delta’s prob- to shoot rioters at sight. These draconian measures have lem cannot be achieved only by providing amenities and been widely criticized in Nigeria, but the government paying compensation. It has to transcend these and make continues to defend its actions. In fact, the general atti- it possible for the people and their authentic representa- tude in the Niger Delta today is not whether there will tives to share in real decision-making with petrobusiness. be more trouble, but when and where. Such a fundamental change will not come from the iso- Part of the problem is the lingering militarist dis- lated activities of individual oil companies or the good position among individual members of the civilian intentions of a benevolent government. Instead, its government and the communities of the Niger Delta. achievement is linked to resolving the fundamental ques- President Obasanjo’s support for the summary execu- tions of the Nigerian federation, especially fiscal control tion of riotous youths and saboteurs of oil installations and the position of ethnic minorities. This question of in his recent “shoot-at-sight” orders to the police cap- federalism must be an integral part of the project to cre- ture this disposition. In fact, the government is setting ate a true democracy built on good governance and up a special paramilitary force to deal summarily with transparency in Nigeria. However, in the short term a people who vandalize petroleum pipelines. Such milita- new regime of conflict management in the Niger Delta rist tendencies are still very much ingrained in is necessary. First, such a regime must de-emphasize government circles. On the part of the Niger Delta monetary compensation to individuals and middlemen. people, years of military repression have left them bru- Instead, investment in community development projects, talized but militarized. The culture of violence is arrived at in full agreement with the local residents, deep-seated in the region.20 should be emphasized. Community development invest- ments should aim at building the stock of local human capital instead of just putting money in the pockets of CONCLUSION AND POLICY IMPLICATIONS individuals. Monetary compensation has tended to spawn “compensation merchants” and “conflict entre- The root of conflict in the Niger Delta rests in the preneurs” in the Niger Delta. These careerists exploit different meanings of security. On the one hand, local the grief of local people for personal financial ends. For communities see the current pattern of petroleum ex- example, it is known that “conflict entrepreneurs” go to ploitation, which devastates the environment, as a threat communities affected by oil spills buying damaged nets to security of livelihoods. State officials and petrobusiness, and poisoned seafood for purposes of claiming com- on the other hand, see security in terms of uninterrupted pensation and grants from government, oil companies, production of petroleum irrespective of environmental and international funding agencies. and social impacts. The long rule of the military failed Second, because the alliance between state bureau- to forge the consensus necessary for a peaceful manage- cracy and petrobusiness under the military was a central ment of this conflict of securities. Instead, the military casus belli in the Niger Delta, a new conflict manage- sought through state violence to impose the interests of ment regime in the region must be one that seeks to petrobusiness. This practice made the Niger Delta un- break and transcend this alliance. Therefore, it must governable. A spiral of violence enveloped the area in marginalize state bureaucracy, particularly the coercive the last ten years as local populations mobilized to con- organs of the state. The people and their popular repre- front state violence. Repression failed. It failed precisely sentatives in government and civil society must be the because it excluded the people. As such, oil companies bedrock of conflict resolution. Local communal or tra- have recently been claiming a new community and ditional conflict management structures must be built people orientation for their projects. This new attitude into processes of conflict resolution. Often, these tradi- dovetails into the efforts of the new civilian government tional conflict management structures emphasize to address the Niger Delta problem. However, contin- consultation and consensus, rather than imposition,
ENVIRONMENTAL CHANGE & SECURITY PROJECT REPORT, ISSUE 6 (SUMMER 2000) 31 Features
which was the preferred orientation under the military. Finally, the government should set up a Trust Fund Third, the oil companies must fundamentally alter for the Niger Delta with an elected board of trustees. their penchant to cast themselves as outsiders instead of Trustees should be elected on a non-party basis from responsible local corporate citizens. Oil companies tend the communities in the Niger Delta. A public hearing to ally too closely with state officials, especially under on the nominated candidates should precede their final the military. At best, they try to cast themselves as neu- confirmation by the State Assembly to stand the elec- tral in the conflict between government and people. This tion. The trustees should have a consolidated is backed up with massive public relations and image remuneration fixed by the National Assembly. They are laundering by the oil companies. However, all these strat- not to be paid from the Niger Delta Trust Fund. The egies are counterproductive. Local people continue to board of trustees should be the sole determinants of the associate oil companies with government, including bad use of the Trust Fund. The NDDC could then become governments. Oil companies have evaded public scru- the bureaucratic arm of the Trust Fund, manned by ex- tiny and accountability. Companies need to maintain a perts in capital investment, project development, and studied distance from government and to become more fundraising. ! accountable to the local communities.
NOTES
1 Petrobusiness refers to all aspects of the petroleum industry Longman, 1986; and Okechukwu Ibeanu, “The State and not just the oil companies that extract and sell crude oil (e.g., the Market: Reflections on Ake’s Analysis of the State in the oil refineries, oil services). Periphery.” Africa Development 18:3 (1993). 2 Shell Petroleum Development Company, The Nigeria Brief: 10 Claude Ake et al., “The Causes of Conflict in Africa,” The Ogoni Issue, Lagos: The Shell Petroleum Development Center for Advanced Social Science, Port Harcourt (mimeo), Company of Nigeria Limited, 1995: 1. not dated: 9 (b). 3 In many parts of the Niger Delta, water hyacinths are a 11 James Rosenau, ed. International Aspects of Civil Strife. non-native species whose growth has been propelled by the Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1964. activities of the oil companies. 12 Movement for the Survival of Ogoni People (MOSOP) 4 Clingendael Institute, Seminar on Intra-state Conflict and Ogoni Bill of Rights. Port Harcourt: Saros International Pub- Options for Policy: Seminar Documentation, The Hague: Neth- lishers, 1992: 10-11. erlands Institute for International Relations, 1998:4. 13 See Okechukwu Ibeanu, “Ogonis: Oil and Environmen- 5 N. Onishi, “Deep in the Republic of Chevron,” The New tal Conflict in Nigeria.” Nigeria Now 2:11 (1993); and Human York Times Magazine (July 4, 1999). Rights Watch, “Nigeria: The Ogoni Crisis: A Case-study of 6 Okechukwu Ibeanu, ‘Ogoni - oil, resource flow and con- Military Repression in Southeastern Nigeria.” Human Rights flict’ in Granfelt, T. (ed) Managing the Globalized Environment, Watch/Africa 7:5 (1995). London: Intermediate Technology Publications, 1999. 14 Human Rights Watch, 1995. 7 Samir Amin. “Preface: The State and the Question of 15 Claude Ake quoted in Human Rights Watch, 1995: 12. Development,” In Popular Struggles for Democracy in Africa, 16 Ibid: 17. ed. P. Anyang’ Nyong’o. London: Zed Press and United Na- 17 Ibid. tions University, 1987: 3-5. 18 The Guardian Newspaper, Lagos, Nigeria (28 March 8 See Walter Rodney, How Europe Underdeveloped Africa, 1994). Enugu: Ikenga Publishers, 1982. 19 Okechukwu Ibeanu, “Bringing the Local People Back 9 Cf. Antonio Gramsci, Selections from the Prison Notebooks. In: Community-Based Environmental Conflict Management London: Lawrence and Wishart, 1971; Hamza Alavi, “The in the Niger Delta, Nigeria.” Paper presented at the Open State in Post-Colonial Societies: Pakistan and Bangladesh.” Meeting of the Human Dimensions of Global Environmen- New Left Review 74 (1972); Colin Leys, “The ‘overdeveloped’ tal Change Research Community, Shonan Village, Kanagawa, post-colonial state: re-evaluation.” Review of African Political Japan, 24-26 June 1999. Economy. 5 (1976); Nicos Poulantzas, Political Power and So- 20 Goddy Nwabueze, “Contextualizing the Niger Delta Cri- cial Classes. London: Verso, 1978; Claude Ake, “The Future sis.” CASS Newsletter 6:2 (1999). of the State in Africa.” International Political Science Review 6:1 (1985); Eme Ekekwe, Class and State in Nigeria, Lagos:
32 ENVIRONMENTAL CHANGE & SECURITY PROJECT REPORT, ISSUE 6 (SUMMER 2000) Special Reports
SPECIAL REPORTS
National Intelligence Estimate: The Global Infectious Disease Threat and Its Implications for the United States
National Intelligence Council, January 2000
Abstract: Infectious diseases are a leading cause of death, accounting for a quarter to a third of all deaths worldwide. The spread of infectious diseases results from both human behavior such as lifestyle choices, land-use patterns, increased trade and travel, and inappropriate use of antibiotic drugs, as well as mutations in pathogens. These excerpts from a January 2000 National Intelligence Estimate highlight the rising global health threat of new and reemerging infectious diseases. The National Intelligence Council argues that the infectious disease threat will complicate U.S. and global security over the next twenty years. These diseases will endanger U.S. citizens at home and abroad, threaten U.S. armed forces deployed overseas, and exacerbate social and political instability in key countries and regions in which the United States has significant interests, according to the report.
PREFACE
his report represents an important initiative on the part of the Intelligence Community to consider the national security dimension of a nontraditional threat. It responds to a growing concern by senior U.S. Tleaders about the implications—in terms of health, economics, and national security—of the growing glo- bal infectious disease threat. The dramatic increase in drug-resistant microbes, combined with the lag in development of new antibiotics, the rise of megacities with severe health care deficiencies, environmental degradation, and the growing ease and frequency of cross-border movements of people and produce have greatly facilitated the spread of infectious diseases. In June 1996, President Clinton issued a Presidential Decision Directive calling for a more focused U.S. policy on infectious diseases. The State Department’s Strategic Plan for International Affairs lists protecting human health
This National Intelligence Estimate was produced under the auspices of David F. Gordon, National Intelligence Officer for Economics and Global Issues. The primary drafters were Lt. Col. (Dr.) Donald Noah of the Armed Forces Medical Intelligence Center and George Fidas, Deputy National Intelligence Officer for Global and Multilateral Issues, NIC. The Estimate also benefited from a conference on infectious diseases held jointly with the State Department’s Bureau of Intelligence and Research and was reviewed by several prominent epidemiologists and other health experts in and outside the U.S. Government. Comments and inquiries may be directed to Dr. Gordon at (703) 482-4128 or by e-mail at [email protected].. Special thanks to Dr. Gordon, George Fidas, and Gerald Fields for their assistance in reprinting the excerpts. Please see the Meeting Summaries section for coverage of an ECSP meeting highlighting the release of this National Intelligence Estimate.
ENVIRONMENTAL CHANGE & SECURITY PROJECT REPORT, ISSUE 6 (SUMMER 2000) 33 Special Reports
and reducing the spread of infectious diseases as U.S. Intelligence Estimate. It examines the most lethal dis- strategic goals, and Secretary Albright in December 1999 eases globally and by region; develops alternative announced the second of two major U.S. initiatives to scenarios about their future course; examines national combat HIV/AIDS. The unprecedented UN Security and international capacities to deal with them; and as- Council session devoted exclusively to the threat to Af- sesses their national and global social, economic, rica from HIV/AIDS in January 2000 is a measure of political, and security impact. It then assesses the infec- the international community’s concern about the infec- tious disease threat from international sources to the tious disease threat. United States; to U.S. military personnel overseas; and As part of this new U.S. Government effort, the to regions in which the United States has or may de- National Intelligence Council produced this National velop significant equities.
KEY JUDGMENTS
THE GLOBAL INFECTIOUS DISEASE THREAT AND ITS IMPACT WITHIN THE UNITED STATES IMPLICATIONS FOR THE UNITED STATES Although the infectious disease threat in the United New and reemerging infectious diseases will pose a States remains relatively modest as compared to that of rising global health threat and will complicate U.S. and noninfectious diseases, the trend is up. Annual infec- global security over the next twenty years. These dis- tious disease-related death rates in the United States have eases will endanger U.S. citizens at home and abroad, nearly doubled to some 170,000 annually after reach- threaten U.S. armed forces deployed overseas, and exac- ing an historic low in 1980. Many infectious erbate social and political instability in key countries diseases—most recently, the West Nile virus—originate and regions in which the United States has significant outside U.S. borders and are introduced by international interests. travelers, immigrants, returning U.S. military person- Infectious diseases are a leading cause of death, ac- nel, or imported animals and foodstuffs. In the opinion counting for a quarter to a third of the estimated fifty- of the U.S. Institute of Medicine, the next major infec- four million deaths worldwide in 1998. The spread of tious disease threat to the United States may be, like infectious diseases results as much from changes in hu- HIV, a previously unrecognized pathogen. Barring that, man behavior—including lifestyles and land use pat- the most dangerous known infectious diseases likely to terns, increased trade and travel, and inappropriate use threaten the United States over the next two decades of antibiotic drugs—as from mutations in pathogens. will be HIV/AIDS, hepatitis C, TB, and new, more le- thal variants of influenza. Hospital-acquired infections • Twenty well-known diseases—including tuberculo- and foodborne illnesses also will pose a threat. sis (TB), malaria, and cholera—have reemerged or spread geographically since 1973, often in more • Although multidrug therapies have cut HIV/AIDS virulent and drug-resistant forms. deaths by two-thirds to 17,000 annually since 1995, • At least thirty previously unknown disease agents emerging microbial resistance to such drugs and have been identified since 1973, including HIV, continued new infections will sustain the threat. Ebola, hepatitis C, and Nipah virus, for which no cures are available. • Some four million Americans are chronic carriers of the hepatitis C virus, a significant cause of liver • Of the seven biggest killers worldwide, TB, malaria, cancer and cirrhosis. The U.S. death toll from the hepatitis, and, in particular, HIV/AIDS continue virus may surpass that of HIV/AIDS in the next to surge, with HIV/AIDS and TB likely to account five years. for the overwhelming majority of deaths from in- fectious diseases in developing countries by 2020. •TB, exacerbated by multidrug resistant strains and Acute lower respiratory infections—including pneu- HIV/AIDS co-infection, has made a comeback. Al- monia and influenza—as well as diarrheal diseases though a massive and costly control effort is and measles, appear to have peaked at high inci- achieving considerable success, the threat will be sus- dence levels. tained by the spread of HIV and the growing
34 ENVIRONMENTAL CHANGE & SECURITY PROJECT REPORT, ISSUE 6 (SUMMER 2000) National Intelligence Estimate: The Global InfectiousSpecial Disease Reports Threat and Its Implications for the United States
number of new, particularly illegal, immigrants in- By 2010, the region could surpass Africa in the num- fected with TB. ber of HIV infections.
• Influenza now kills some 30,000 Americans annu- • The former Soviet Union (FSU) and, to a lesser ally, and epidemiologists generally agree that it is extent, Eastern Europe also are likely to see a sub- not a question of whether, but when, the next killer stantial increase in infectious disease incidence and pandemic will occur. deaths. In the FSU especially, the steep deteriora-
“ ome of the hardest hit countries in sub-Saharan Africa—and possi- Sbly later in South and Southeast Asia—will face a demographic up- heaval as HIV/AIDS and associated diseases reduce human life expect- ancy by as much as thirty years and kill as many as a quarter of their populations over a decade or less, producing a huge orphan cohort.”
• Highly virulent and increasingly antimicrobial re- tion in health care and other services owing to eco- sistant pathogens, such as Staphylococcus aureus, are nomic decline has led to a sharp rise in diphtheria, major sources of hospital-acquired infections that dysentery, cholera, and hepatitis B and C. TB has kill some 14,000 patients annually. reached epidemic proportions throughout the FSU, while the HIV-infected population in Russia alone • The doubling of U.S. food imports over the last could exceed one million by the end of 2000 and five years is one of the factors contributing to tens double yet again by 2002. of millions of foodborne illnesses and 9,000 deaths that occur annually, and the trend is up. • Latin American countries generally are making progress in infectious disease control, including the eradication of polio, but uneven economic devel- REGIONAL TRENDS opment has contributed to widespread resurgence of cholera, malaria, TB, and dengue. These diseases Developing and former communist countries will will continue to take a heavy toll in tropical and continue to experience the greatest impact from infec- poorer countries. tious diseases—because of malnutrition, poor sanitation, poor water quality, and inadequate health care—but de- • The Middle East and North Africa region has sub- veloped countries also will be affected: stantial TB and hepatitis B and C prevalence, but conservative social mores, climatic factors, and the • Sub-Saharan Africa—accounting for nearly half of high level of health spending in the oil-producing infectious disease deaths globally—will remain the states tend to limit some globally prevalent diseases, most vulnerable region. The death rates for many such as HIV/ AIDS and malaria. The region has diseases, including HIV/AIDS and malaria, exceed the lowest HIV infection rate among all regions, those in all other regions. Sub-Saharan Africa’s health although this is probably due in part to above-aver- care capacity—the poorest in the world—will con- age underreporting because of the stigma associated tinue to lag. with the disease in Muslim societies.
• Asia and the Pacific, where multidrug resistant TB, • Western Europe faces threats from several infectious malaria, and cholera are rampant, is likely to wit- diseases, such as HIV/AIDS, TB, and hepatitis B ness a dramatic increase in infectious disease deaths, and C, as well as from several economically costly largely driven by the spread of HIV/AIDS in South zoonotic diseases (that is, those transmitted from and Southeast Asia and its likely spread to East Asia. animals to humans). The region’s large volume of
ENVIRONMENTAL CHANGE & SECURITY PROJECT REPORT, ISSUE 6 (SUMMER 2000) 35 Special Reports
travel, trade, and immigration increases the risks of pace than new drugs and vaccines, wreaking havoc on importing diseases from other regions, but its highly world health. Although more likely than the “steady developed health care system will limit their impact. progress” scenario, we judge that this scenario also is unlikely to prevail because it underestimates the pros- pects for socio-economic development, international RESPONSE CAPACITY collaboration, and medical and health care advances to constrain the spread of at least some widespread infec- Development of an effective global surveillance and tious diseases. response system probably is at least a decade or more away, owing to inadequate coordination and funding at Deterioration, Then Limited Improvement the international level and lack of capacity, funds, and The most likely scenario, in our view, is one in which commitment in many developing and former commu- the infectious disease threat—particularly from HIV/ nist states. Although overall global health care capacity AIDS—worsens during the first half of our time frame, has improved substantially in recent decades, the gap but decreases fitfully after that, owing to better preven- between rich and poorer countries in the availability and tion and control efforts, new drugs and vaccines, and quality of health care, as illustrated by a typology devel- socio-economic improvements. In the next decade, un- oped by the Defense Intelligence Agency’s Armed Forces der this scenario, negative demographic and social Medical Intelligence Center (AFMIC), is widening. conditions in developing countries, such as continued urbanization and poor health care capacity, remain con- ALTERNATIVE SCENARIOS ducive to the spread of infectious diseases; persistent poverty sustains the least developed countries as reser- We have examined three plausible scenarios for the voirs of infection; and microbial resistance continues to course of the infectious disease threat over the next increase faster than the pace of new drug and vaccine twenty years: development. During the subsequent decade, more posi- tive demographic changes such as reduced fertility and Steady Progress aging populations; gradual socio-economic improvement The least likely scenario projects steady progress in most countries; medical advances against childhood whereby the aging of global populations and declining and vaccine-preventable killers such as diarrheal diseases, fertility rates, socio-economic advances, and improve- neonatal tetanus, and measles; expanded international ments in health care and medical breakthroughs hasten surveillance and response systems; and improvements movement toward a “health transition” in which such in national health care capacities take hold in all but the noninfectious diseases as heart disease and cancer would least developed countries. Barring the appearance of a replace infectious diseases as the overarching global deadly and highly infectious new disease, a catastrophic health challenge. We believe this scenario is unlikely upward lurch by HIV/AIDS, or the release of a highly primarily because it gives inadequate emphasis to per- contagious biological agent capable of rapid and sistent demographic and socio-economic challenges in widescale secondary spread, these developments produce the developing countries, to increasing microbial resis- at least limited gains against the overall infectious dis- tance to existing antibiotics, and because related models ease threat. However, the remaining group of virulent have already underestimated the force of major killers diseases, led by HIV/ AIDS and TB, continue to take a such as HIV/AIDS, TB, and malaria. significant toll.
Progress Stymied A more pessimistic—and more plausible—scenario ECONOMIC, SOCIAL, AND POLITICAL IMPACT projects little or no progress in countering infectious diseases over the duration of this Estimate. Under this The persistent infectious disease burden is likely to scenario, HIV/AIDS reaches catastrophic proportions aggravate and, in some cases, may even provoke eco- as the virus spreads throughout the vast populations of nomic decay, social fragmentation, and political India, China, the former Soviet Union, and Latin destabilization in the hardest hit countries in the devel- America, while multidrug treatments encounter micro- oping and former communist worlds, especially in the bial resistance and remain prohibitively expensive for worst-case scenario outlined above: developing countries. Multidrug resistant strains of TB, malaria, and other infectious diseases appear at a faster • The economic costs of infectious diseases—espe-
36 ENVIRONMENTAL CHANGE & SECURITY PROJECT REPORT, ISSUE 6 (SUMMER 2000) National Intelligence Estimate: The Global InfectiousSpecial Disease Reports Threat and Its Implications for the United States
cially HIV/AIDS and malaria—are already signifi- of influenza or yet-unknown disease or if there is a cant, and their increasingly heavy toll on substantial decline in the effectiveness of available productivity, profitability, and foreign investment HIV/AIDS drugs. will be reflected in growing GDP losses, as well, that could reduce GDP by as much as twenty per- • Infectious diseases are likely to continue to account cent or more by 2010 in some sub-Saharan African for more military hospital admissions than battle- countries, according to recent studies. field injuries. U.S. military personnel deployed at • Some of the hardest hit countries in sub-Saharan NATO and U.S. bases overseas, will be at low-to- Africa—and possibly later in South and Southeast moderate risk. At highest risk will be U.S. military Asia—will face a demographic upheaval as HIV/ forces deployed in support of humanitarian and
“ requent and often sudden population movements within and across Fborders caused by ethnic conflict, civil war, and famine will continue to spread diseases rapidly in affected areas, particularly among refugees.”
AIDS and associated diseases reduce human life peacekeeping operations in developing countries. expectancy by as much as thirty years and kill as many as a quarter of their populations over a de- • The infectious disease burden will weaken the mili- cade or less, producing a huge orphan cohort. Nearly tary capabilities of some countries—as well as forty-two million children in twenty-seven coun- international peacekeeping efforts—as their armies tries will lose one or both parents to AIDS by 2010; and recruitment pools experience HIV infection nineteen of the hardest hit countries will be in sub- rates ranging from ten to sixty percent. The cost Saharan Africa. will be highest among officers and the more mod- ernized militaries in sub-Saharan Africa and • The relationship between disease and political in- increasingly among FSU states and possibly some stability is indirect but real. A wide-ranging study rogue states. on the causes of state instability suggests that infant mortality—a good indicator of the overall quality • Infectious diseases are likely to slow socio-economic of life—correlates strongly with political instabil- development in the hardest-hit developing and ity, particularly in countries that already have former communist countries and regions. This will achieved a measure of democracy. The severe social challenge democratic development and transitions and economic impact of infectious diseases is likely and possibly contribute to humanitarian emergen- to intensify the struggle for political power to con- cies and civil conflicts. trol scarce state resources. • Infectious disease-related embargoes and restrictions on travel and immigration will cause frictions among IMPLICATIONS FOR U.S. NATIONAL SECURITY and between developed and developing countries.
As a major hub of global travel, immigration, and • The probability of a bioterrorist attack against U.S. commerce with wide-ranging interests and a large civil- civilian and military personnel overseas or in the ian and military presence overseas, the United States and United States also is likely to grow as more states its equities abroad will remain at risk from infectious and groups develop a biological warfare capability. diseases. Although there is no evidence that the recent West Nile virus outbreak in New York City was caused • Emerging and reemerging infectious diseases, many by foreign state or non-state actors, the scare and of which are likely to continue to originate over- several earlier instances of suspected bioterrorism seas, will continue to kill at least 170,000 Americans showed the confusion and fear they can sow regard- annually. Many more could perish in an epidemic less of whether or not they are validated.
ENVIRONMENTAL CHANGE & SECURITY PROJECT REPORT, ISSUE 6 (SUMMER 2000) 37 Special Reports
DISCUSSION
PATTERNS OF INFECTIOUS DISEASES projected a dramatic reduction in the infectious disease threat. This optimism, however, led to complacency and Broad advances in controlling or eradicating a grow- overlooked the role of such factors as expanded trade ing number of infectious diseases—such as tuberculosis and travel and growing microbial resistance to existing (TB), malaria, and smallpox—in the decades after the antibiotics in the spread of infectious diseases. Today: Second World War fueled hopes that the global infec- tious disease threat would be increasingly manageable. • Infectious diseases remain a leading cause of death Optimism regarding the battle against infectious dis- (see Figure 1). Of the estimated fifty-four million eases peaked in 1978 when the United Nations (UN) deaths worldwide in 1998, about one-fourth to one- member states signed the “Health for All 2000” accord, third were due to infectious diseases, most of them which predicted that even the poorest nations would in developing countries and among children glo- undergo a health transition before the millennium, bally. whereby infectious diseases no longer would pose a major danger to human health. As recently as 1996, a World • Infectious diseases accounted for forty-one percent Bank/World Health Organization (WHO)–sponsored of the global disease burden measured in terms of study by Christopher J.L. Murray and Alan D. Lopez Disability-Adjusted Life Years (DALYS) that gauge
Figure 1 Leading Causes of Death, 1998
53.9 million from all causes, worldwide.
Percent Other, Maternal, 6 5 Infectious diseases, Respiratory 25 (45 percent in low-income African and digestive, and Asian countries; 63 percent among 9 children under age five globally)
Injuries, 11
Cancers, 13 Cardiovascular diseases, 31
Note: Cancers, cardiovascular, and respiratory/digestive deaths can also be caused by infections and raise the percentage of deaths due to infectious diseases even more. Source: WHO, 1999.
38 ENVIRONMENTAL CHANGE & SECURITY PROJECT REPORT, ISSUE 6 (SUMMER 2000) National Intelligence Estimate: The Global InfectiousSpecial Disease Reports Threat and Its Implications for the United States
the impact of both deaths and disabilities, as com- • These trends are reflected in the United States as pared to forty-three percent for noninfectious well, where annual infectious disease deaths have diseases and sixteen percent for injuries. nearly doubled to some 170,000 since 1980 after reaching historic lows that year, while new and ex- • Although there has been continuing progress in con- isting pathogens, such as HIV and West Nile virus, trolling some vaccine-preventable childhood diseases respectively, continue to enter U.S. borders. such as polio, neonatal tetanus, and measles, a White House–appointed interagency working group iden- tified at least twenty-nine previously unknown THE DEADLY SEVEN diseases that have appeared globally since 1973, many of them incurable, including HIV/AIDS, The seven infectious diseases that caused the high- Ebola hemorrhagic fever, and hepatitis C. Most re- est number of deaths in 1998, according to WHO and cently, Nipah encephalitis was identified. Twenty the Defense Intelligence Agency’s Armed Forces Medi- well-known diseases such as malaria, TB, cholera, cal Intelligence Center (AFMIC), will remain threats and dengue have rebounded after a period of de- well into the next century. HIV/AIDS, TB, malaria, and cline or spread to new regions, often in deadlier hepatitis B and C—are either spreading or becoming forms (see Table 1). more drug-resistant, while lower respiratory infections,
Table 1. Examples of Pathogenic Microbes and the Diseases They Cause, Identified Since 1973
Year Microbe Type Disease 1973 Rotavirus Virus Infantile diarrhea 1977 Ebola virus Virus Acute hemorrhagic fever 1977 Legionella pneumophila Bacterium Legionnaires’ disease 1980 Human T-lymphotrophic Virus T-cell lymphoma/leukemia virus I (HTLV 1) 1981 Toxin-producing Bacterium Toxic shock syndrome Staphylococcus aureus 1982 Escherichia coli O157:H7 Bacterium Hemorrhagic colitis; hemolytic uremic syndrome 1982 Borrelia burgdorferi Bacterium Lyme disease 1983 Human Immunodeficiency Virus Acquired Immuno-Deficiency Virus (HIV) Syndrome (AIDS) 1983 Helicobacter pylori Bacterium Peptic ulcer disease 1989 Hepatitis C Virus Parentally transmitted non-A, non-B liver infection 1992 Vibrio cholerae O139 Bacterium New strain associated with epidemic cholera 1993 Hantavirus Virus Adult respiratory distress syndrome 1994 Cryptosporidium Protozoa Enteric disease 1995 Ehrlichiosis Bacterium Severe arthritis? 1996 nvCJD Prion New variant Creutzfeldt-Jakob disease 1997 HVN1 Virus Influenza 1999 Nipah Virus Severe encephalitis Source: U.S. Institute of Medicine, 1997; WHO, 1999.
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diarrheal diseases, and measles, appear to have at least gest regional burden, but the disease is spreading quickly temporarily peaked (see Figure 2).1 in India, Russia, China, and much of the rest of Asia. HIV/AIDS. Following its identification in 1983, the HIV/AIDS probably will cause more deaths than any spread of HIV intensified quickly. Despite progress in other single infectious disease worldwide by 2020 and some regions, HIV/AIDS shows no signs of abating glo- may account for up to one-half or more of infectious bally (see Figure 3). Approximately 2.3 million people disease deaths in the developing world alone. died from AIDS worldwide in 1998, up dramatically TB. WHO declared TB a global emergency in 1993 from 0.7 million in 1993, and there were 5.8 million and the threat continues to grow, especially from new infections. According to WHO, some 33.4 million multidrug resistant TB (see Figure 4). The disease is es- people were living with HIV by 1998, up from ten mil- pecially prevalent in Russia, India, Southeast Asia, lion in 1990, and the number could approach forty sub-Saharan Africa, and parts of Latin America. More million by the end of 2000. Although infection and death than 1.5 million people died of TB in 1998, excluding rates have slowed considerably in developed countries those infected with HIV/AIDS, and there were up to owing to the growing use of preventive measures and 7.4 million new cases. Although the vast majority of TB costly new multidrug treatment therapies, the pandemic infections and deaths occur in developing regions, the continues to spread in much of the developing world, disease also is encroaching into developed regions due where ninety-five percent of global infections and deaths to increased immigration and travel and less emphasis have occurred. Sub-Saharan Africa currently has the big- on prevention. Drug resistance is a growing problem;
Figure 2 Leading Infectious Disease Killers, 1998
Deaths in millions 3.5
Over age five 3.0 Under age five
2.5
2.0
1.5
1.0
0.5
0.0 Acute AIDSa Diarrheal TB Malaria Measles Hepatitis Bb respiratory diseases infections (including pneumonia and influenza)
a HIV-positive people who died with TB have been included among AIDS deaths. b Figure for hepatitis B is for 1997 and is not broken down by age. Source: WHO, 1998, 1999.
40 ENVIRONMENTAL CHANGE & SECURITY PROJECT REPORT, ISSUE 6 (SUMMER 2000) National Intelligence Estimate: The Global InfectiousSpecial Disease Reports Threat and Its Implications for the United States the WHO has reported that up to fifty percent of people co-infection with HIV. TB probably will rank second with multidrug resistant TB may die of their infection only to HIV/AIDS as a cause of infectious disease deaths despite treatment, which can be ten to fifty times more by 2020. expensive than that used for drug-sensitive TB. HIV/ Malaria, a mainly tropical disease that seemed to AIDS also has contributed to the resurgence of TB. One- be coming under control in the 1960s and 1970s, is quarter of the increase in TB incidence involves making a deadly comeback—especially in sub-Saharan
Figure 3 Global HIV/AIDS Prevalence, 1998
ARCTIC OCEAN ARCTIC OCEAN
Eastern Europe/ Central Asia North America Western Europe 270,000 N O R T H 890,000 500,000 (80,000) (44,000) (30,000) N O R T H N O R T H P A C I F I C East Asia/ North Africa/ A T L A N T I C Pacific Middle East P A C I F I C O C E A N 560,000 O C E A N 210,000 (200,000) Caribbean (19,000) 330,000 O C E A N (45,000) South Asia/ Southeast Asia 6,700,000 Sub-Saharan (1,200,000) Africa Latin America 22,500,000 I N D I A N O C E A N 1,400,000 SOUTH (4,000,000) (160,000) S O U T H P A C I F I C O C E A N ATLANTIC OCEAN Australia/ New Zealand 12,000 (600) 33,400,000 Total living with HIV/AIDS
(5,800,000) Total new HIV infections Boundary representation is Source: UNAIDS, 1998. not necessarily authoritative.
Figure 4 Estimated TB Incidence, 1997
ARCTIC OCEAN ARCTIC OCEAN
N O R T H N O R T H N O R T H P A C I F I C
A T L A N T I C P A C I F I C O C E A N O C E A N
O C E A N
I N D I A N O C E A N SOUTH
S O U T H P A C I F I C O C E A N ATLANTIC
OCEAN
Boundary representation is Source: World Health Organization, 1998. not necessarily authoritative. Range of rates (per 100,000)
Less than 10 10 - 24 25 - 49 50 - 99 100 - 250 Greater than 250
ENVIRONMENTAL CHANGE & SECURITY PROJECT REPORT, ISSUE 6 (SUMMER 2000) 41 Special Reports
Africa where infection rates increased by forty percent poor. In 1998, an estimated 300 million people were from 1970 to 1997 (see Figure 5). Drug resistance, his- infected with malaria, and more than 1.1 million died torically a problem only with the most severe form of from the disease that year. Most of the deaths occurred the disease, is now increasingly reported in the milder in sub-Saharan Africa. According to the U.S. Agency variety, while the prospects for an effective vaccine are for International Development (USAID), sub-Saharan
Figure 5 Malaria-Endemic Regions, 1997
ARCTIC OCEAN ARCTIC OCEAN
N O R T H N O R T H N O R T H P A C I F I C
A T L A N T I C P A C I F I C O C E A N O C E A N
O C E A N
I N D I A N O C E A N SOUTH
S O U T H P A C I F I C O C E A N ATLANTIC
OCEAN
Malaria-endemic region Boundary representation is Source: World Health Organization/CTC, 1997. not necessarily authoritative.
Figure 6 Estimated Hepatitis B Prevalence, 1997
ARCTIC OCEAN ARCTIC OCEAN
N O R T H N O R T H N O R T H P A C I F I C
A T L A N T I C P A C I F I C O C E A N O C E A N
O C E A N
I N D I A N O C E A N SOUTH
S O U T H P A C I F I C O C E A N ATLANTIC
OCEAN
Boundary representation is Source: World Health Organization, 1998. not necessarily authoritative. Proportion of population infected
Less than 2 percent 2 - 7 percent Greater than 7 percent No data available
42 ENVIRONMENTAL CHANGE & SECURITY PROJECT REPORT, ISSUE 6 (SUMMER 2000) National Intelligence Estimate: The Global InfectiousSpecial Disease Reports Threat and Its Implications for the United States
Africa alone is likely to experience a seven to twenty least 0.6 million deaths in 1997, is highly endemic in percent annual increase in malaria-related deaths and the developing world, and some 350 million people severe illnesses over the next several years. worldwide are chronic carriers (see Figure 6). The less Hepatitis B and C. Hepatitis B, which caused at prevalent but far more lethal hepatitis C identified in
Figure 7 Estimated Hepatitis C Prevalence, 1998
ARCTIC OCEAN ARCTIC OCEAN
N O R T H N O R T H N O R T H P A C I F I C
A T L A N T I C P A C I F I C O C E A N O C E A N
O C E A N
I N D I A N O C E A N SOUTH
S O U T H P A C I F I C O C E A N ATLANTIC
OCEAN
Boundary representation is Source: World Health Organization, 1998. not necessarily authoritative. Proportion of population infected
Less than 1.0 percent 1.0 - 2.4 percent 2.5 - 4.9 percent 5 - 10 percent Greater than 10 percent No data available
Figure 8 Reported Measles Incidence Rates, 1996
ARCTIC OCEAN ARCTIC OCEAN
N O R T H N O R T H N O R T H P A C I F I C
A T L A N T I C P A C I F I C O C E A N O C E A N
O C E A N
I N D I A N O C E A N SOUTH
S O U T H P A C I F I C O C E A N ATLANTIC
OCEAN
Boundary representation is Source: World Health Organization, 1998. not necessarily authoritative. Range of rates (per 100,000)
0 1 - 9 10 - 100 Greater than 100 No data available
ENVIRONMENTAL CHANGE & SECURITY PROJECT REPORT, ISSUE 6 (SUMMER 2000) 43 Special Reports
1989 has grown dramatically and is a significant con- malnutrition and growing microbial resistance to com- tributor to cirrhosis and liver cancer. WHO estimated monly used drugs such as penicillin, these children are that three percent of the global population was infected especially vulnerable to such diseases and will continue with the hepatitis C virus by 1997 (see Figure 7), which to experience high death rates. means that more than 170 million people were at risk Diarrheal diseases— mainly spread by contaminated of developing the diseases associated with this virus. water or food—accounted for 2.2 million deaths in Various studies project that up to twenty-five percent of 1998, as compared to three million in 1993, of which people with chronic hepatitis B and C will die of cir- about sixty percent occurred among children under five rhosis of the liver and liver cancer over the next twenty years of age in developing countries. The most com- to thirty years. mon cause of death related to diarrheal diseases is Lower respiratory infections, especially influenza and infection with Escherichia coli. Other diarrheal diseases pneumonia, killed 3.5 million people in 1998, most of include cholera, dysentery, and rotaviral diarrhea, preva- them children in developing countries, down from 4.1 lent throughout the developing world and, more recently, million in 1993. Owing to immunosuppression from in many former communist states. Such waterborne and foodborne diseases will remain highly prevalent in these regions in the absence of improvements in water quality Table 2. Factors Contributing to Infectious and sanitation. Disease Reemergence and Associated Measles. Despite substantial progress against measles Diseases in recent years, the disease still infects some forty-two million children annually and killed about 0.9 million in 1998, down from 1.2 million in 1993. It is a leading Contributing Associated Infectious cause of death among refugees and internally displaced Factor(s) Diseases persons during complex humanitarian emergencies. Human Dengue/dengue Measles will continue to pose a major threat in develop- demographics and hemorrhagic fever, ing countries (see Figure 8), particularly sub-Saharan behavior sexually transmitted Africa, until the still relatively low vaccination rates are diseases, giardiasis substantially increased. It also will continue to cause Technology and Toxic shock syndrome, periodic epidemics in areas such as South America with industry nosocomial (hospital- higher, but still inadequate, vaccination rates. acquired) infections, hemorrhagic colitis/hemolytic uremic syndrome FACTORS AFFECTING GROWTH AND SPREAD Economic Lyme disease, malaria, development and plague, rabies, yellow With few exceptions, the resurgence of the infec- land use fever, Rift Valley fever, tious disease threat is due as much to dramatic changes schistosomiasis in human behavior and broader social, economic, and International travel Malaria, cholera, technological developments as to mutations in patho- and pneumococcal gens (see Table 2). Changes in human behavior include commerce pneumonia population dislocations, living styles, and sexual prac- Microbial adaptation Influenza, HIV/AIDS, tices; technology-driven medical procedures entailing and change malaria, some risks of infection; and land use patterns. They also Staphylococcus aureus include rising international travel and commerce that infections hasten the spread of infectious diseases; inappropriate Breakdown of public Rabies, tuberculosis, use of antibiotics that leads to the development of mi- health measures trench fever, diphtheria, crobial resistance; and the breakdown of public health whooping cough systems in some countries owing to war or economic (pertussis), cholera decline. In addition, climate changes enable diseases and Climate change Malaria, dengue, vectors to expand their range. Several of these factors cholera, yellow fever interact, exacerbating the spread of infectious diseases.
Source: Adapted from U.S. Institute of Medicine, 1997. Human Demographics and Behavior Population growth and urbanization, particularly
44 ENVIRONMENTAL CHANGE & SECURITY PROJECT REPORT, ISSUE 6 (SUMMER 2000) National Intelligence Estimate: The Global InfectiousSpecial Disease Reports Threat and Its Implications for the United States in the developing world, will continue to facilitate the crease the incidence of zoonotic diseases—those trans- transfer of pathogens among people and regions. Fre- mitted from animals to humans. Water management quent and often sudden population movements within efforts, such as dambuilding, will encourage the spread and across borders caused by ethnic conflict, civil war, of water-breeding vectors such as mosquitoes and snails and famine will continue to spread diseases rapidly in that have contributed to outbreaks of Rift Valley fever affected areas, particularly among refugees. As of 1999, and schistosomiasis in Africa. there were some twenty-four major humanitarian emer- gencies worldwide involving at least thirty-five million International Travel and Commerce refugees and internally displaced people. Refugee camps, The increase in international air travel, trade, and found mainly in sub-Saharan Africa and the Middle East, tourism will dramatically increase the prospects that facilitate the spread of TB, HIV, cholera, dysentery, and infectious disease pathogens such as influenza—and vec- malaria. Well over 120 million people lived outside the tors such as mosquitoes and rodents—will spread quickly country of their birth in 1998, and millions more will around the globe, often in less time than the incubation emigrate annually, increasing the spread of diseases glo- period of most diseases. Earlier in the decade, for ex- bally. Behavioral patterns, such as unprotected sex with ample, a multidrug resistant strain of Streptococcus multiple partners and intravenous drug use, will remain pneumoniae originating in Spain spread throughout the key factors in the spread of HIV/AIDS. world in a matter of weeks, according to the director of WHO’s infectious disease division. The cross-border Technology, Medicine, and Industry movement of some two million people each day, includ- Although technological breakthroughs will greatly ing one million between developed and developing facilitate the detection, diagnosis, and control of cer- countries each week, and surging global trade ensure tain infectious and noninfectious illnesses, they also will that travel and commerce will remain key factors in the introduce new dangers, especially in the developed world spread of infectious diseases. where they are used extensively. Invasive medical proce- dures will result in a variety of hospital-acquired Microbial Adaptation and Resistance infections, such as Staphylococcus aureus. The globaliza- Infectious disease microbes are constantly evolving, tion of the food supply means that non-hygienic food oftentimes into new strains that are increasingly resis- production, preparation, and handling practices in origi- tant to available antibiotics. As a result, an expanding nating countries can introduce pathogens endangering number of strains of diseases—such as TB, malaria, and foreign as well as local populations. Disease outbreaks pneumonia—will remain difficult or virtually impos- due to Cyclospora spp, Escherichia coli, and Salmonella sible to treat. At the same time, large-scale use of spp. in several countries, along with the emergence, antibiotics in both humans and livestock will continue primarily in Britain, of Bovine Spongiform Encephal- to encourage development of microbial resistance. The opathy, or “mad cow” disease, and the related new variant firstline drug treatment for malaria is no longer effec- Creutzfeldt-Jakob disease (nvCJD) affecting humans, tive in over eighty of the ninety-two countries where the result from such food practices. disease is a major health problem. Penicillin has sub- stantially lost its effectiveness against several diseases, Economic Development and Land Use such as pneumonia, meningitis, and gonorrhea, in many Changes in land and water use patterns will remain countries. Eighty percent of Staphylococcus aureus iso- major factors in the spread of infectious diseases. The lates in the United States, for example, are emergence of Lyme disease in the United States and penicillin-resistant and thirty-two percent are methicil- Europe has been linked to reforestation and increases in lin-resistant. A U.S. Centers for Disease Control and the deer tick population, which acts as a vector, while Prevention (USCDC) study found a sixty-fold increase conversion of grasslands to farming in Asia encourages in high-level resistance to penicillin among one group the growth of rodent populations carrying hemorrhagic of Streptococcus pneumoniae cases in the United States fever and other viral diseases. Human encroachment on and significant resistance to multidrug therapy as well. tropical forests will bring populations into closer prox- Influenza viruses, in particular, are particularly efficient imity with insects and animals carrying diseases such as in their ability to survive and genetically change, some- leishmaniasis, malaria, and yellow fever, as well as here- times into deadly strains. HIV also displays a high rate tofore unknown and potentially dangerous diseases, as of genetic mutation that will present significant prob- was the case with HIV/AIDS. Close contact between lems in the development of an effective vaccine or new, humans and animals in the context of farming will in- affordable therapies.
ENVIRONMENTAL CHANGE & SECURITY PROJECT REPORT, ISSUE 6 (SUMMER 2000) 45 Special Reports
Breakdown in Public Health Care poor water quality in developing countries also will con- Alone or in combination, war and natural disasters, tinue to add to the disease burden that is overwhelming economic collapse, and human complacency are caus- health care infrastructures in many countries. So too, ing a breakdown in health care delivery and facilitating will political instability and conflict and the reluctance the emergence or reemergence of infectious diseases. of many governments to confront issues such as the While sub-Saharan Africa is the area currently most af- spread of HIV/AIDS. fected by these factors, economic problems in Russia and other former communist states are creating the con- Sub-Saharan Africa text for a large increase in infectious diseases. The Sub-Saharan Africa will remain the region most af- deterioration of basic health care services largely accounts fected by the global infectious disease phenomenon for the reemergence of diphtheria and other vaccine- —accounting for nearly half of infectious disease-caused preventable diseases, as well as TB, as funds for deaths worldwide. Deaths from HIV/AIDS, malaria, vaccination, sanitation, and water purification have dried cholera, and several lesser known diseases exceed those up. In developed countries, past inroads against infec- in all other regions. Sixty-five percent of all deaths in tious diseases led to a relaxation of preventive measures sub-Saharan Africa are caused by infectious diseases. such as surveillance and vaccination. Inadequate infec- Rudimentary health care delivery and response systems, tion control practices in hospitals will remain a major the unavailability or misuse of drugs, the lack of funds, source of disease transmission in developing and devel- and the multiplicity of conflicts are exacerbating the oped countries alike. crisis. According to the AFMIC typology, with the ex- ception of southern Africa, most of sub-Saharan Africa Climate Change falls in the lowest category. Investment in health care in Climatic shifts are likely to enable some diseases and the region is minimal, less than forty percent of the associated vectors—particularly mosquito-borne diseases people in countries such as Nigeria and the Democratic such as malaria, yellow fever, and dengue—to spread to Republic of the Congo (DROC) have access to basic new areas. Warmer temperatures and increased rainfall medical care, and even in relatively well off South Af- already have expanded the geographic range of malaria rica, only fifty to seventy percent have such access, with to some highland areas in sub-Saharan Africa and Latin black populations at the low end of the spectrum. America and could add several million more cases in Four-fifths of all HIV-related deaths and seventy developing country regions over the next two decades. percent of new infections worldwide in 1998 occurred The occurrence of waterborne diseases associated with in the region, totaling 1.8-2 million and four million, temperature-sensitive environments, such as cholera, also respectively. Although only a tenth of the world’s popu- is likely to increase. lation lives in the region, 11.5 million of 13.9 million cumulative AIDS deaths have occurred there. Eastern and southern African countries, including South Africa, REGIONAL TRENDS AND RESPONSE CAPACITY are the worst affected, with ten to twenty-six percent of adults infected with the disease. Sub-Saharan Africa has The overall level of global health care capacity has high TB prevalence, as well as the highest HIV/TB co- improved substantially in recent decades, but in most infection rate, with TB deaths totaling 0.55 million in poorer countries the availability of various types of health 1998. The hardest hit countries are in equatorial and care—ranging from basic pharmaceuticals and postna- especially southern Africa. South Africa, in particular, is tal care to costly multidrug therapies—remains very facing the biggest increase in the region. limited. Almost all research and development funds al- Sub-Saharan Africa accounts for an estimated ninety located by developed country governments and percent of the global malaria burden (see Figure 9). Ten pharmaceutical companies, moreover, are focused on ad- percent of the regional disease burden is attributed to vancing therapies and drugs relevant to developed malaria, with roughly one million deaths in 1998. Chol- country maladies, and those that are relevant to devel- era, dysentery, and other diarrheal diseases also are major oping country needs usually are beyond their financial killers in the region, particularly among children, refu- reach. This is generating a growing controversy between gees, and internally displaced populations. Forty percent rich and poorer nations over such issues as intellectual of all childhood deaths from diarrheal diseases occur in property rights, as some developing countries seek to sub-Saharan Africa. The region also has a high rate of meet their pharmaceutical needs with locally produced hepatitis B and C infections and is the only region with generic products. Malnutrition, poor sanitation, and a perennial meningococcal meningitis problem in a
46 ENVIRONMENTAL CHANGE & SECURITY PROJECT REPORT, ISSUE 6 (SUMMER 2000) National Intelligence Estimate: The Global InfectiousSpecial Disease Reports Threat and Its Implications for the United States
“meningitis belt” stretching from west to east. Sub-Sa- in the most developed countries, such as Japan and Aus- haran Africa also suffers from yellow fever, while tralia, have access to high-quality health care. Forty to trypanasomiasis or “sleeping sickness” is making a come- fifty percent have such access among the large popula- back in the DROC and Sudan, and the Marburg virus tions of China and South Asia, while southeast Asian also appeared in DROC for the first time in 1998. Ebola health care is more varied, with less than forty percent hemorrhagic fever strikes sporadically in countries such enjoying such access in Burma and Cambodia, and fifty as the DROC, Gabon, Cote d’Ivoire, and Sudan. to seventy percent in Thailand, Malaysia, and the Phil- ippines. In South and Southeast Asia, reemergent diseases Asia and the Pacific such as TB, malaria, cholera, and dengue fever are ram- Although the more developed countries of Asia and pant, while HIV/AIDS, after a late start, is growing faster the Pacific, such as Japan, South Korea, Australia, and than in any other region. New Zealand, have strong records in combating infec- TB caused one million deaths in the Asia and Pa- tious diseases, infectious disease prevalence in South and cific region in 1998, more than any other single disease, Southeast Asia is almost as high as in Sub-Saharan Af- with India and China accounting for two-thirds of the rica. The health care delivery system of the Asia and total. Several million new cases occur annually—most Pacific region—the majority of which is privately fi- in India, China, and Indonesia—representing as much nanced—is particularly vulnerable to economic as forty percent of the global TB burden. HIV/AIDS is downturns even though this is offset to some degree by increasing dramatically, especially in India, which leads much of the region’s reliance on traditional medicine the world in absolute numbers of HIV/AIDS infections, from local practitioners. According to the AFMIC ty- estimated at three to five million. China is better off pology, ninety to one hundred percent of the populations than most of the countries to its south, but it too has a
Figure 109 Malaria Mortality Annual Rates Since 1900
Per 100,000 population 250 World minus Sub-Saharan Africa World Sub-Saharan Africa 200
150
100
50
0 1900 1930 1950 1970 1990 1997
Source: WHO, 1999.
ENVIRONMENTAL CHANGE & SECURITY PROJECT REPORT, ISSUE 6 (SUMMER 2000) 47 Special Reports
growing AIDS problem, with HIV infections variously it still comprises two-thirds of the global cholera bur- estimated at 0.1-0.4 million and spreading rapidly. den. TB is a growing problem regionwide, especially in Regionwide, the number of people infected with HIV Brazil, Peru, Argentina, and the Dominican Republic could overtake Sub-Saharan Africa in absolute numbers where drug-resistant cases also are on the rise. Haiti does before 2010. not provide data but probably also has a high infection There were 19.5 million new malaria infections es- rate. HIV/AIDS also is spreading rapidly, placing Latin timated in the Asia and Pacific region in 1998, many of America third behind sub-Saharan Africa and Asia in them drug resistant, and 100,000 deaths due to malaria. HIV prevalence. Prevalence is high in Brazil and espe- Acute respiratory infections, such as pneumonia, cause cially in the Caribbean countries (except Cuba), where about 1.8 million childhood deaths annually––over half two percent of the population is infected. Malaria is of them in India––while dengue (including dengue hem- prevalent in the Amazon basin. Dengue reemerged in orrhagic fever/dengue shock syndrome) outbreaks have the region in 1976, and outbreaks have taken place in spread throughout the region in the last five years. Water- the last few years in most Caribbean countries and parts borne illnesses such as dysentery and cholera also take a of South America. Hepatitis B and C prevalence is great- heavy toll in poor and crowded areas. Asian, particu- est in the Amazon basin, Bolivia, and Central America, larly Chinese, agricultural practices place farm animals, while dengue hemorhagic fever is particularly prevalent fowl, and humans in close proximity and have long fa- in Brazil, Colombia, and Venezuela. Yellow fever has cilitated the emergence of new strains of influenza that made a comeback over the last decade throughout the cause global pandemics. Hepatitis B is widely prevalent Amazon basin, and there have been several recent out- in the region, while hepatitis C is prevalent in China breaks of gastrointestinal disease attributed to E. coli and in parts of southeast Asia. In 1999 the newly recog- infection in Chile and Argentina. Hemorrhagic fevers nized Nipah virus spread throughout pig populations are present in almost all South American countries, and in Malaysia, causing more than 100 human deaths there most hantavirus pulmonary syndrome occurs in the and a smaller number in nearby Singapore. southern cone.
Latin America Middle East and North Africa Latin American countries are making considerable The region’s conservative social mores, climatic fac- progress in infectious disease control, including the eradi- tors, and high levels of health spending in oil-producing cation of polio and major reductions in the incidence states tend to limit some globally prevalent diseases, such and death rates of measles, neonatal tetanus, some diar- as HIV/AIDS and malaria, but others, such as TB and rheal diseases, and acute respiratory infections. hepatitis B and C, are more prevalent. The region’s ad- Nonetheless, infectious diseases are still a major cause vantages are partially offset by the impact of war-related of illness and death in the region, and the risk of new uprooting of populations, overcrowded cities with poor and reemerging diseases remains substantial. Widening refrigeration and sanitation systems, and a dearth of income disparities, periodic economic shocks, and ram- water, especially clean drinking water. Health care ca- pant urbanization have disrupted disease control efforts pacity varies considerably within the region, according and contributed to widespread reemergence of cholera, to the AFMIC typology. Israel and the Arabian Penin- malaria, TB, and dengue, especially in the poorer Cen- sula states minus Yemen are in far better shape than Iraq, tral American and Caribbean countries and in the Iran, Syria, and most of North Africa. Ninety to 100 Amazon basin of South America. According to the percent of the Israeli population and seventy to ninety AFMIC typology, Latin America’s health care capacity percent of the Saudi population have good access to is substantially more advanced than that of sub-Saharan health care. Elsewhere, access ranges from less than forty Africa and somewhat better than mainland Asia’s, with percent in Yemen to fifty to seventy percent in the smaller seventy to ninety percent of populations having access Gulf states, Jordan and Tunisia, while most North Afri- to basic health care in Chile, Costa Rica, and Cuba on can states fall into the forty-to fifty-percent category. the upper end of the scale. Less than fifty percent have The HIV/AIDS impact is far lower than in other such access in Haiti, most of Central America, and the regions, with 210,000 cases, or 0.13 percent of the popu- Amazon basin countries, including the rural populations lation, including 19,000 new cases, in 1998. This owes in Brazil. in part to above-average underreporting because of the Cholera reemerged with a vengeance in the region stigma associated with the disease in Muslim societies in 1991 for the first time in a century with 400,000 and the authoritarian nature of most governments in new cases, and while dropping to 100,000 cases in 1997, the region. TB, including multidrug resistant varieties,
48 ENVIRONMENTAL CHANGE & SECURITY PROJECT REPORT, ISSUE 6 (SUMMER 2000) National Intelligence Estimate: The Global InfectiousSpecial Disease Reports Threat and Its Implications for the United States is more problematic, especially in Iran, Iraq, Yemen, oners to relieve overcrowding. The number of new in- Libya, and Morocco, with an estimated 140,000 deaths fections for the entire FSU in 1996 was 188,000, while in 1998. Malaria is significant only in Iran, Iraq, and East European cases totaled 54,000. More recent data Yemen, but diarrheal and childhood diseases caused 0.3 indicate that the TB infection rate in Russia more than million deaths each in 1998. Other prominent or re- tripled from 1990 to 1998, with 122,000 new cases re- emerging diseases in the region include all types of ported in 1998 and the total number of cases expected hepatitis, with Egypt reporting the highest prevalence to reach one million by 2002. After a slow and late start, worldwide of the C variety. Brucel- losis now infects some 90,000 people; leishmaniasis and sandfly fever also are endemic in the region; and vari- “ nfectious diseases are likely to slow socio- ous hemorrhagic fevers occur, as well. Ieconomic development in the hardest-hit The Former Soviet Union and East- ern Europe developing and former communist countries The sharp decline in health care and regions. This will challenge democratic infrastructure in Russia and else- where in the former Soviet Union development and transitions and possibly (FSU) and, to a lesser extent, in East- ern Europe—owing to economic contribute to humanitarian emergencies and difficulties—are causing a dramatic rise in infectious disease incidence. civil conflicts.” Death rates attributed to infectious diseases in the FSU increased fifty percent from 1990 to 1996, with TB accounting for a HIV/AIDS is spreading rapidly throughout the Euro- substantial number of such deaths. According to the pean part of the FSU beyond the original cohort of AFMIC typology, access to health care ranges from fifty intravenous drug users, though it is not yet reflected in to seventy percent in most European FSU states, includ- official government reporting. An estimated 270,000 ing Russia and Ukraine, and from forty to fifty percent people were HIV-positive in 1998, up more than five- in FSU states located in Central Asia. This is generally fold from 1997. Although Ukraine has been hardest hit, supported by WHO estimates indicating that only fifty Russia, Belarus, and Moldova have registered major in- to eighty percent of FSU citizens had regular access to creases. Various senior Russian Health Ministry officials essential drugs in 1997, as compared to more than predict that the HIV-positive population in Russia alone ninety-five percent a decade earlier as health care bud- could reach one million by the end of 2000 and could gets and government-provided health services were reach two million by 2002. East European countries will slashed. Access to health care is generally better in East- fare better as renewed economic growth facilitates re- ern Europe, particularly in more developed states such covery of their health care systems and better enables as Poland, the Czech Republic, and Hungary, where it them to expand preventive and treatment programs. ranges from seventy to ninety percent, while only fifty Diphtheria reached epidemic proportions in the to seventy percent have access in countries such as Bul- FSU in the first half of the decade, owing to lapses in garia and Romania. More than ninety-five percent of vaccination. Reported annual case totals grew from 600 the population throughout the East European region cases in 1989 to more than 40,000 in 1994 in Russia, had such access in 1987, according to WHO. with another 50,000 to 60,000 in the rest of the FSU. Crowded living conditions are among the causes Cholera and dysentery outbreaks are occurring with in- fueling a TB epidemic in the FSU, especially among creasing frequency in Russian cities, such as St. prison populations––while surging intravenous drug use Petersburg and Moscow, and elsewhere in the FSU, such and rampant prostitution are substantially responsible as in T’bilisi, owing to deteriorating water treatment for a marked increase in HIV/AIDS incidence. There and sewerage systems. Hepatitis B and C, spread prima- were 111,000 new TB infections in Russia alone in 1996, rily by intravenous drug use and blood transfusions, are a growing number of them multidrug resistant, and on the rise, especially in the non-European part of the nearly 25,000 deaths due to TB––numbers that could FSU. Polio also has reappeared owing to interruptions increase significantly following periodic releases of pris- in vaccination, with 140 new cases in Russia in 1995.
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Western Europe INTERNATIONAL RESPONSE CAPACITY Western Europe faces threats from a number of emerging and reemerging infectious diseases such as International organizations such as WHO and the HIV/AIDS, TB, and hepatitis B and C, as well as sev- World Bank, institutions in several developed countries eral zoonotic diseases. Its status as a hub of international such as the U.S. CDC, and nongovernmental organiza- travel, commerce, and immigration, moreover, dramati- tions (NGOs) will continue to play an important role cally increases the risks of importing new diseases from in strengthening both international and national sur- other regions. Tens of millions of West Europeans travel veillance and response systems for infectious diseases. to developing countries annually, increasing the pros- Nonetheless, progress is likely to be slow, and develop- pects for the importation of dangerous diseases, as ment of an integrated global surveillance and response demonstrated by the importation of typhoid in 1999. system probably is at least a decade or more away. This Some eighty-eight percent of regional population growth owes to the magnitude of the challenge; inadequate co- in the first half of the decade was due to immigration; ordination at the international level; and lack of funds, legal immigrants now comprise about six percent of the capacity, and, in some cases, cooperation and commit- population, and illegal newcomers number an estimated ment at the national level. Some countries hide or six million. Nonetheless, the region’s highly developed understate their infectious disease problems for reasons health care infrastructure and delivery system tend to of international prestige and fear of economic losses. limit the incidence and especially the death rates of most Total international health-related aid to low- and middle- infectious diseases, though not the economic costs. Ac- income countries—some $2-3 billion annually cess to high-quality care is available throughout most of ––remains a fraction of the $250 billion health bill of the region, although governments are beginning to limit these countries. some heretofore generous health benefits, and a grow- ing anti-vaccination movement in parts of Western WHO Europe, such as Germany, is causing a rise in measles WHO has the broadest health mandate under the and other vaccine-preventable diseases. The AFMIC ty- UN system, including establishing health priorities, co- pology gives somewhat higher marks to northern over ordinating global health surveillance, and emergency some southern European countries, but the region as a assistance in the event of disease outbreaks. Health ex- whole is ranked in the highest category, along with North perts give WHO credit for major successes, such as the America. eradication of smallpox, near eradication of polio, and After increasing sharply for most of the 1980s and substantial progress in controlling childhood diseases, 1990s, HIV infections, and particularly HIV/AIDS and in facilitating the expansion of primary health care deaths, have slowed considerably owing to behavioral in developing countries. It also has come under criti- changes among high-risk populations and the availabil- cism for becoming top heavy, unfocused in its mission, ity and funding for multidrug treatment. Some 0.5 mil- and overly optimistic in its health projections. WHO lion people were living with HIV/AIDS in 1998, down defenders blame continued member state parsimony that slightly from 510,000 the preceding year, and there were has kept WHO’s regular biennial budget to roughly $850 30,000 new cases and 12,000 deaths, with prevalence million for several years and forced it to rely more on somewhat higher in much of southern Europe than in voluntary contributions that often come with strings the north. TB, especially its multidrug resistant strains, attached as the cause of its shortcomings. is on the upswing, as is co-infection with HIV, particu- The election last year (1998) of Gro Harlem larly in the larger countries, with some 50,000 TB cases Bruntland as Secretary General, along with a series of reported in 1996. Hepatitis C prevalence is growing, reforms, including expansion of the Emerging and Other especially in southern Europe. Western Europe also con- Communicable Diseases Surveillance and Control tinues to suffer from several zoonotic diseases, among (EMC) Division, has placed WHO in a better position which is the deadly new variant Creutzfeldt-Jakob dis- to revitalize itself. Internal oversight and transparency ease (nvCJD), linked to the bovine spongiform encepha- have been expanded, programs and budgets are under- lopathy or “mad cow disease” outbreak in the United going closer scrutiny, and management accountability Kingdom in 1995 that has since ebbed following imple- is looming larger. Bruntland has moved quickly to mentation of strict control measures. Other recent dis- streamline upper-level management and has installed ease concerns include meningococcal meningitis new top managers, mostly from outside the organiza- outbreaks in the Benelux countries and leishmaniasis- tion, including from the private sector. She also is HIV co-infection, especially in southern Europe. working to strengthen country offices and to make the
50 ENVIRONMENTAL CHANGE & SECURITY PROJECT REPORT, ISSUE 6 (SUMMER 2000) National Intelligence Estimate: The Global InfectiousSpecial Disease Reports Threat and Its Implications for the United States regional offices more responsive to central direction. experts generally welcome the Bank’s greater involve- WHO is increasing its focus on the fight against resur- ment in the health sector, viewing it as efficient and gent malaria, while a better-funded EMC is expanding responsive in areas such as health sector financial re- efforts to establish a global surveillance and response form. Some remain concerned that the Bank’s emphasis system in cooperation with UNAIDS, UNICEF, and on fiscal balance can sometimes have a negative health national entities such as the U.S. CDC, the U.S. DoD, and social impact in developing countries. Some devel- and France’s Pasteur Institute. oping countries resent what they perceive as the domination of Bank decision-making and priority set- The World Bank ting by the richer countries. The growing sense that health is linked inexorably to socio-economic development, has prompted the Nongovernmental Organizations World Bank to expand its health activities. According Another major change in the global health arena to a 1997 study by the U.S. Institute of Medicine, the over the last decade is the increasingly important role of most significant change in the global health arena over NGOs, which provide direct assistance, including emer- the past decade has been the growth in both financial gency shelter and aid, as well as long-term domestic and intellectual influence of the World Bank, whose health care delivery. NGOs also build community aware- health loans have grown to $2.5 billion annually, in- ness and support for WHO and other international and cluding $800 million for infectious diseases. Health bilateral surveillance and response efforts. At the same
Figure 1012 Inadequate Commitment to Infectious Disease Control Policies at Country Level
Countries not adopting WHO policies Countries adopting WHO policies Number of Countries and Territories 250
200
150 120 developing countries only
100
50
0 Routine HIV/AIDS Directly Observed Integrated childhood education Treatment Short management of immunization in schools Course to childhood control TB illnesses
Source: WHO, 1999.
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time, health experts note that NGOs, like their govern- Table 3. Projected Change in the Rank mental counterparts, are driven in part by their own self Order of Global Disease Burden for interests, which sometimes conflict with those of host Leading Causes, Worldwide 1990-2020, and donor governments. According to the Optimistic Scenario Bilateral Assistance The United States, through USAID, the CDC, the 1990 Disease or Injury 2020 National Institutes for Health (NIH), and the Defense Rank Rank Department’s overseas laboratories, is a major contribu- Order Order tor to international efforts to combat infectious diseases. 1 Lower respiratory 6 It is joined increasingly by other developed nations and infections regional groupings, such as the European Union (EU), 2 Diarrheal diseases 9 that provide assistance bilaterally, as well as through in- 3 Conditions arising 11 ternational organizations and NGOs. The Field during perinatal period Epidemiology Training Programs––run jointly by the 4 Unipolar major 2 CDC and WHO—as well as the EU-U.S. Task Force depression on Emerging Diseases and the U.S.-Japan Common Sci- 5 Ischemic heart 1 entific Agenda, are key examples of developed-country disease programs focusing on infectious diseases. 6 Cerebrovascular 4 disease National Limitations 7 Tuberculosis 7 A major obstacle to effective global surveillance and 8 Measles 25 control of infectious diseases will continue to be poor 9 Road traffic deaths 3 or inaccurate national health statistical reporting by 10 Congenital 13 many developing countries and lack of both capacity abnormalities and will to properly direct aid (see Figure 10) and to 11 Malaria 24 follow WHO and other recommended health care prac- 12 Chronic obstructive 5 tices. Those areas of the world most susceptible to pulmonary disease infectious disease problems are least able to develop and 13 Falls 19 maintain the sophisticated and costly communications 14 Iron-deficiency anemia 39 equipment needed for effective disease surveillance and 15 Protein-energy 37 reporting. In addition to the barriers dictated by low malnutrition levels of development, revealing an outbreak of a dreaded 16 War 8 disease may harm national prestige, commerce, and tour- 17 Self-inflicted injuries 14 ism. For example, nearly every country initially denied 19 Violence 12 or minimized the extent of the HIV/AIDS virus within its borders, and even today, some countries known to 28 HIV 10 have significant rates of HIV infection refuse to cooper- 33 Trachea, bronchus, 15 ate with WHO, which can only publish the information and lung cancers submitted by surveying nations. Only a few, such as aOf the six infectious diseases ranked in 1990, only lower Uganda, Senegal, and Thailand, have launched major respiratory infections, diarrheal diseases, and measles are preventative efforts, while many WHO members do not trending downward as projected, while malaria is increasing even endorse AIDS education in schools. Similarly, some and tuberculosis and HIV are growing far faster than countries routinely and falsely deny the existence of chol- projected. Nonetheless, more pessimistic experts have not era within their borders. developed an alternative model and generally adopt the Aid programs to prevent and treat infectious dis- projections of the Murray and Lopez model. eases in developing countries depend largely on indigenous health workers for their success and cannot Source: Adapted from World Bank, WHO, 1996, edited by be fielded effectively in their absence. Educational pro- Christopher J. L. Murray and Alan D. Lopez. grams aimed at preventing disease exposure frequently depend on higher literacy levels and assume cultural and social factors that often are absent.
52 ENVIRONMENTAL CHANGE & SECURITY PROJECT REPORT, ISSUE 6 (SUMMER 2000) National Intelligence Estimate: The Global InfectiousSpecial Disease Reports Threat and Its Implications for the United States
ALTERNATIVE SCENARIOS AND OUTLOOK FOR the remainder of deaths due to accidents and other types INFECTIOUS DISEASES of injuries. According to the study’s ranking of major disease threats over this thirty-year time frame, nonin- The impact of infectious diseases over the next fectious diseases generally will rise in importance, led twenty years will be heavily influenced by three sets of by heart disease and mental illness, as will accidental variables. The first is the relationship between increas- injuries. TB will remain in seventh place in 2020, and ing microbial resistance and scientific efforts to develop HIV/AIDS will move from twenty-eighth place to tenth, new antibiotics and vaccines. The second is the trajec- with the two combined accounting for more than ninety tory of developing and transitional economies, especially percent of infectious disease-caused deaths among adults, concerning the basic quality of life of the poorest groups almost all of them in developing countries. Lower respi- in these countries. The third is the degree of success of ratory infections will fall from the top spot to sixth place, global and national efforts to create effective systems of however, while measles and malaria will drop precipi- surveillance and response. The interplay of these drivers tously from eighth and eleventh place to twenty-fourth will determine the overall outlook. and twenty-fifth, respectively (see Figures 11 and 12). On the positive side, reduced fertility and the aging Scenario Assessment. Our overall judgment is that of the population, continued economic development, the “steady progress” scenario is very unlikely to tran- and improved health care capacity in many countries, spire over the time period of this Estimate. Although especially the more developed, will increase the progress the scenario captures some real trends, it overstates the toward a health transition by 2020 whereby the impact progress achievable, while underestimating the risks. of infectious diseases ebbs, as compared to noninfec- tious diseases. On the negative side, continued rapid • The global life expectancy increases projected by population growth, urbanization, and persistent pov- the optimists are likely to be substantially offset erty in much of the developing world, and the paradox by HIV/AIDS and related diseases, such as TB, in which some aspects of socio-economic development– which are already causing a major reduction in life –such as increased trade and travel––actually foster the expectancy in the most heavily affected sub- spread of infectious diseases, could slow or derail that Saharan African countries and will be spreading transition. So, too, will growing microbial resistance extensively throughout heavily populated Asia among resurgent diseases, such as malaria and TB, and during the time period of the Estimate. Optimists the proliferation or intensification of new ones, such as acknowledge that HIV/ AIDS and TB will be the HIV/AIDS. overarching infectious disease threats by 2020, but Two scenarios—one optimistic and one pessimis- they understate the magnitude of that threat, tic—reflect differences in the international health while their projections of a steep decline in community concerning the global outlook for infectious malaria deaths is belied by the disease’s resurgence diseases. We present and critically assess these scenarios, and growing death toll. elaborate on the pessimistic scenario, and develop a third, combining some elements of each, that we judge as more • The picture of steady socio-economic progress is likely to prevail over the period of this Estimate. not consistent with the most recent surveys of con- ditions in developing countries undertaken by the The Optimistic Scenario: Steady Progress United Nations, the World Bank, and other inter- According to a key 1996 World Bank/WHO study national agencies. These studies point to a slowing cited earlier that articulated the optimistic scenario, a of progress in basic social indicators in much of the health transition––resulting from key drivers, such as developing world, even before the recent global fi- aging populations, socio-economic development, and nancial crisis. medical advances—already is under way in developed countries and also in much of Asia and Latin America that is likely to produce a dramatic reduction in the in- • Although we judge that economic growth is likely fectious disease threat. The study projects that deaths to continue, we are less confident that the dramatic caused primarily by infectious diseases will fall steadily reductions in poverty achieved in many countries from thirty-four percent of the total disease burden in in the last generation will be sustained. Growth is 1990 to fifteen percent in 2020. Those from noninfec- likely to be halting in many countries, owing to tious diseases are likely to climb from fifty-five percent structural economic problems and the impact of of the total disease burden to seventy-three percent, with recurring developing world economic crises.
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• The rapidly expanding costs of many drugs, espe- from rising pension and other costs, may limit the cially those that attack critical infectious diseases, prospects for increased health financing. such as HIV/AIDS and multidrug resistant TB and malaria, threaten to limit the sustainability of im- • The optimists may place too much emphasis on the proved health care. Furthermore, despite economic steady progress of science, which is inconsistent with growth, pressures on government budgets, especially the demonstrated difficulty of developing new drugs
Figure 1113 Projected Changes in the Global Distribution of Deaths and DALYS by Causes According to the Optimistic Scenario, 1990-2020 Percent
Noninfectious diseases Infectious diseases Injuries Projected Deaths
1990 2020
11 12
15 34 55 73
Projected DALYS (Disability-Adjusted Life Years)
DALYS provide a broader measure of the disease burden by including disabilities as well as deaths. One DALY is equivalent to one lost year of healthy life. 1990 2020
11 14
17 42 47 69
Sources: Adapted from World Bank; WHO; The Global Burden of Disease, edited by Christopher J. L. Murray and Alan D. Lopez, 1996.
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and vaccines for complex pathogens such as HIV gists have done little to project the long-term implica- and malaria. tions of their analysis and simply adopt the longer term projections of the World Bank/WHO model in the ab- The Pessimistic Scenario: Progress Stymied sence of a worst-case model. We have developed a worst Surprisingly, even the most pessimistic epidemiolo- case scenario culled from a variety of epidemiological
Figure 1214 Note scale change Various Projected HIV/AIDS Death Rates Per 1,000 People, by Region, 1990-2020 Murray and Lopez Bongaarts Global AIDS Policy Coalition Asia Latin America and Caribbean
AIDS death rate per 1,000 AIDS death rate per 1,000 0.8 0.8
0.6 0.6
0.4 0.4
0.2 0.2
0 1990 95 2000 05 10 15 20 0 1990 95 2000 05 10 15 20
Eastern Europe and Central Asia Established Market Economies
AIDS death rate per 1,000 AIDS death rate per 1,000 0.8 0.8
0.6 0.6
0.4 0.4
0.2 0.2
0 1990 95 2000 05 10 15 20 0 1990 95 2000 05 10 15 20 All three of the above projections on HIV/AIDS Sub-Saharan Africa death rates have underestimated the number of deaths thus far, and their future estimates also are likely to be AIDS death rate per 1,000 exceeded, in our view. The three sets of projections are 3.0 by Murray and Lopez (1996), Bongaarts (1996), and the Global AIDS Policy Coalition (Mann and Tarantola 2.5 1996). Since the Global AIDS Policy Coalition (GAPC) 2.0 does not explicitly project an adult death rate, the projection for 2005 used here is derived from its 1.5 estimate of the number of new HIV infections in 1995 1.0 by using Bongaarts' rule of thumb that AIDS deaths in any given year will approximately equal the number of 0.5 people infected with HIV during the year 10 years 0 1990 95 2000 05 10 15 20 before. According to this formula, the 5.8 million new HIV infections in 1998 will result in 5.8 million deaths in 2008. Sources: Adapted from World Bank, Confronting AIDS, 1997.
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and broader health studies. This scenario highlights the pecially give impetus to the search for a more cost- dangers posed by microbial resistance among reemergent effective approach than at present. diseases such as TB and malaria. It takes a more con- cerned view of new diseases and of the HIV/AIDS • While growth in surveillance and response capabili- pandemic, in particular, and is skeptical about the ad- ties are slow, they are real and are unlikely to be equacy of world health care capacity to confront these reversed. challenges. It emphasizes continuing and difficult-to- address poverty challenges in developing countries and The Most Likely Scenario: Deterioration, Then Limited projects an incomplete health transition that prolongs Improvement the heavy infectious disease burden in the least devel- According to this scenario, continued deterioration oped countries and sustains their role as reservoirs of during the first half of our time frame—led by hard infection for the rest of the world. core killers such as HIV/AIDS, TB, and malaria—is fol- Scenario Assessment. Our overall judgment is that lowed by limited improvement in the second half, owing the “progress stymied” scenario, while more plausible primarily to gains against childhood and vaccine-pre- than the optimistic scenario, is also unlikely to develop ventable diseases such as diarrheal diseases, neonatal over the period of this Estimate. Although the pessimis- tetanus, and measles. The scale and scope of the overall tic scenario provides an important counterpoint to the infectious disease threat diminishes, but the remaining assumptions in the “steady progress” scenario, it under- threat consists of especially deadly or incurable diseases states the likely longer term impact of economic such as HIV/AIDS, TB, hepatitis C, and possibly, here- development, scientific progress, and political pressures tofore unknown diseases, with HIV/AIDS and TB likely in responding to the infectious disease threat. comprising the overwhelming majority of infectious disease deaths in developing countries alone by 2020. • The demographic projections understate the likely Scenario Assessment Because some elements of both impact of continued progress in reducing infant the optimistic and pessimistic scenarios cited above are mortality. likely to appear during the twenty-year time frame of this Estimate, we are likely to witness neither steady • Improvements in the economic conditions of poor progress against the infectious disease threat nor its un- countries and the poorest within countries are prob- abated intensification. Instead, progress is likely to be ably more important for the infectious disease slow and uneven, with advances, such as the recent de- outlook than the widening “prosperity gap” both velopment of a new type of antibiotic drug against certain between countries and within countries. Although hospital-acquired infections, frequently offset by re- the outlook for sub-Saharan Africa remains bleak, newed setbacks, such as new signs of growing microbial for the rest of the world progress against infectious resistance among available HIV/AIDS drugs and with- diseases would stall only under the most dire global drawal of a promising new vaccine against rotavirus economic scenario. because of adverse side effects. On balance, negative driv- ers, such as microbial resistance, are likely to prevail over • The negative impact on health care delivery of the next decade, but given time, positive ones, such as privatization and the transitions in former commu- gradual socio-economic development and improved nist states is likely to be most heavily felt in the health care capacity, will likely come to the fore in the immediate future. Free market reforms eventually second decade. will improve health care delivery. • The negative trends cited in the pessimistic scenario • The current success of the “mutating microbes” in above, such as persistent poverty in much of the the race against scientific innovation will, in and of developing world, growing microbial resistance and itself, call forth a greater research effort that will, a dearth of new replacement drugs, inadequate dis- over time, increase the likelihood of a reversal of ease surveillance and control capacity, and the high this trend. prevalence and continued spread of major killers such as HIV/AIDS, TB, and malaria, are likely to • The rapid spread of HIV/AIDS in developing and remain ascendant and worsen the overall problem former communist countries is likely to reinvigo- during the first half of our time frame. rate international efforts to address the virus through both medical and behavioral approaches. It will es- • Sub-Saharan Africa, India, and Southeast Asia will
56 ENVIRONMENTAL CHANGE & SECURITY PROJECT REPORT, ISSUE 6 (SUMMER 2000) National Intelligence Estimate: The Global InfectiousSpecial Disease Reports Threat and Its Implications for the United States
remain the hardest hit by these diseases. The Euro- killers such as dengue, diarrheal diseases, and possi- pean FSU states and China are likely to experience bly even malaria will further ease the infectious a surge in HIV/AIDS and related diseases such as disease burden and help counter the microbial re- TB. The developed countries will be threatened sistance phenomenon. principally by the real possibility of a resurgence of the HIV/AIDS threat owing to growing microbial Together, these developments are likely to set the resistance to the current spectrum of multidrug stage for at least a limited improvement in infectious therapies and to a wide array of other drugs used to disease control, particularly against childhood and vac- combat infectious diseases. cine-preventable diseases, such as respiratory infections, diarrheal diseases, neonatal tetanus, and measles in most • The broadly positive trends cited in the more opti- developing and former communist countries. Given mistic scenario, such as aging populations, global time––and barring the appearance of a deadly and highly socio-economic development, improved health care infectious new disease, a catastrophic expansion of the capacity, and medical advances, are likely to come HIV/AIDS pandemic, or the release of a highly conta- to the fore during the second half of our time frame gious biological agent capable of rapid and widescale in all but the least developed countries, and even secondary spread—such medical advances, behavioral the least developed will experience a measure of changes, and improving national and international sur- improvement. veillance and response capacities will eventually produce substantial gains against the overall infectious disease • Aging populations and expected continued declines threat. In the event that HIV/AIDS takes a catastrophic in fertility throughout Asia, Latin America, the turn for the worse in both developed and developing former FSU states, and sub-Saharan Africa will countries, even the authors of the optimistic World sharply reduce the size of age cohorts that are par- Bank/WHO model concur that all bets are off. ticularly susceptible to infectious diseases owing to environmental or behavioral factors. ECONOMIC, SOCIAL, AND POLITICAL IMPACTS • Socio-economic development, however fitful, and resulting improvements in water quality, sanitation, The persistent infectious disease burden is likely to nutrition, and education in most developing coun- aggravate and, in extreme cases, may even provoke so- tries will enable the most susceptible population cial fragmentation, economic decay, and political cohorts to better withstand infectious diseases both polarization in the hardest hit countries in the develop- physically and behaviorally. ing and former communist worlds in particular, especially in the worst-case scenario outlined above. This, • The worsening infectious disease threat we posit for in turn, will hamper progress against infectious diseases. the first decade of our time frame is likely to further Even under the most likely scenario that posits some energize the international community and most attenuation of the infectious disease threat in the sec- countries to devote more attention and resources to ond half of our time frame, new and reemergent improved infectious disease surveillance, response, infectious diseases are likely to have a disruptive impact and control capacity. The WHO’s new campaign on global economic, social, and political dynamics. against malaria, recent developed country consid- eration of tying debt forgiveness for the poorest Economic Impact Likely To Grow Macroeconomic Im- countries in part to their undertaking stronger com- pact mitments to combat disease, self-initiated efforts by The macroeconomic costs of the infectious disease sub-Saharan African governments to confront HIV/ burden are increasingly significant for the most seriously AIDS, and greater pharmaceutical industry willing- affected countries despite the partially offsetting impact ness to provide more drugs to poor countries at of declines in population growth, and they will take an affordable prices are likely to be harbingers of more even greater toll on productivity, profitability, and for- such efforts as the infectious disease threat becomes eign investment in the future. A senior World Bank more acute. official considers AIDS to be the single biggest threat to economic development in sub-Saharan Africa. A grow- • The likely eventual approval of new drugs and vac- ing number of studies suggest that AIDS and malaria cines—now in the developmental stage—for major alone will reduce GDP in several sub-Saharan African
ENVIRONMENTAL CHANGE & SECURITY PROJECT REPORT, ISSUE 6 (SUMMER 2000) 57 Special Reports
countries by twenty percent or more by 2010. • A recent study by the Zimbabwe Commercial Farm- • The impact of infectious diseases on annual GDP ers’ Union estimated that production losses due to growth in heavily affected countries already amounts HIV/AIDS in the communal and resettlement ar- to as much as a one-percentage point reduction in eas—the African farm-holder sector—is close to fifty the case of HIV/AIDS on average and one to two percent. percentage points for malaria, according to World Bank studies. A recent Namibian study concluded • WHO estimates that small farmers in Nigeria and that AIDS cost the country nearly eight percent of Kenya spend thirteen and five percent, respectively, GDP in 1996, while a study of Kenya projected of total household income on malaria treatment that that GDP will be 14.5 percent smaller in 2005 than would otherwise go to other forms of consumption it otherwise would have been without the cumula- of more benefit to the economy. tive impact of AIDS. The annual cost of malaria to Kenya’s GDP was estimated at two to six percent Although a 1996 World Bank–sponsored study of and at one to five percent for Nigeria. nearly 1,000 firms in four African countries focusing solely on the impact of AIDS-related employee turn- Microeconomic Impact over concluded that it was not likely to substantially The impact of infectious diseases—especially HIV/ affect firm profits, several individual firms and their AIDS––at the sector and firm level already appears to AIDS consultants paint a much bleaker picture by 1999. be substantial and growing and will be reflected eventu- Using broader measures of AIDS-related costs, such as ally in higher GDP losses (see Figure 13), especially in absenteeism, productivity declines, health and insurance the more advanced developing countries with special- payments, and recruitment and training, they projected ized work force needs. profits to drop by six to eight percent or more and productivity to decline by five percent. They are espe- cially troubled by the high rate of loss of middle-and Figure 1513 upper-level managers to AIDS and the dearth of replace- Projected Impact of AIDS ments, as well as the loss of large numbers of skilled on GDP of Selected Countries workers to AIDS in the mining and other key sectors. According to one expert, South African companies will in Sub-Saharan Africa begin to feel the full impact of the AIDS epidemic by 2005. One study of the projected impact of AIDS on employee benefit costs in South Africa concludes that benefit costs would nearly triple to nineteen percent of Percent reduction in GDP salaries from 1995 to 2005, substantially eroding cor- 0 porate profits. Fiscal Impact. Infectious diseases will increase pres- -5 sure on national health bills that already consume some seven to fourteen percent of GDP in developed coun- -10 tries, up to five percent in the better off developing countries, but currently less than two percent in least -15 developed states. • By 2000, the cumulative direct and indirect costs -20 of AIDS alone are likely to have topped $500 bil- lion, according to estimates by the Global AIDS -25 Zimbabwe Zambia Kenya Tanzania Policy Coalition at Harvard University. In Latin 2000 2000 2005 2010 America, the Pan-American Health Organization in 1994 estimated it would take a decade and $200 billion to bring the cholera pandemic in the region under control through a massive water cleanup ef- fort, or nearly eighty percent of total developing country health spending for that year. The direct Source: USAID, 1999. costs of fighting malaria in sub-Saharan Africa in-
58 ENVIRONMENTAL CHANGE & SECURITY PROJECT REPORT, ISSUE 6 (SUMMER 2000) National Intelligence Estimate: The Global InfectiousSpecial Disease Reports Threat and Its Implications for the United States
creased from $800 million in 1989 to $2.2 billion cost Russia several billion dollars annually to pro- in 1997, largely owing to the far higher cost of treat- vide such treatment for its surging HIV/AIDS case ing the growing number of drug-resistant cases, and load—which is unlikely given its fiscal difficulties. the trend toward higher costs is likely to continue. In addition to the cost of the drugs, few countries can afford to build and maintain the health care AIDS, along with TB and malaria—particularly the infrastructure that makes effective treatment pos- drug-resistant varieties––makes large budgetary claims sible. on national health systems’ resources (see Figure 14). Policy choices will continue to be required along at least Disruptive Social Impact three dimensions: spending for health versus spending At least some of the hardest-hit countries, initially for other objectives; spending more on prevention in in sub-Saharan Africa and later in other regions, will order to spend less on treatment; and treating burgeon- face a demographic catastrophe as HIV/ AIDS and as- ing AIDS-infected populations versus treating other sociated diseases reduce human life expectancy illnesses. dramatically and kill up to a quarter of their popula- tions over the period of this Estimate (see Table 4). This • Although prevention is cost-efficient––the eradica- will further impoverish the poor and often the middle tion of smallpox has shaved $20 billion off the global class and produce a huge and impoverished orphan co- health bill, and polio eradication would save as much hort unable to cope and vulnerable to exploitation and as $3 billion annually by 2015––most countries will radicalization. not be able to afford even basic care for those in- Life Expectancy and Population Growth. Until the fected with diseases such as TB and HIV/AIDS. In early 1990s, economic development and improved health Zimbabwe, for example, more than half the meager care had raised the life expectancy in developing coun- health budget is spent on treating AIDS. Yet, treat- ing one AIDS patient for a year in sub-Saharan Africa costs as much as educating ten primary school Figure 1416 students for one year. Potential AIDS Treatment Costs in Selected Countries in • Public health spending on AIDS and related dis- eases threatens to crowd out other types of health Sub-Saharan Africa care and social spending. In India, for example, simulated annual government health expenditures in the context of a severe AIDS epidemic in which total expenditures, including AIDS costs, are subsi- Percent of Ministry of Health Budget dized at twenty-one percent would add $2 billion 70 annually to the government’s health bill through 2010 and $5 billion with a government subsidy of 60 fifty-one percent. In Kenya, HIV/AIDS treatment 50 costs are projected to account for fifty percent of health spending by 2005. In South Africa, such costs 40 could account for thirty-five to eighty-four percent 30 of public health expenditures by 2005, according to one projection. 20 10 • Even given the budgetary dominance of AIDS, care is likely to be limited to the most basic of therapies. 0 Ethiopia Kenya Zimbabwe 2014 2005 2005 Few countries will be able to afford the high cost of multidrug treatment for HIV/AIDS—or for drug- resistant TB and malaria—ensuring that such Note: The number of AIDS patients seeking care diseases will continue to be highly prevalent. Only is already overwhelming health care systems. In about one percent of HIV/AIDS patients even in many hospitals in Sub-Saharan Africa, half of hospital relatively well off South Africa currently undergo beds are now occupied by AIDS patients. multidrug treatment, for example, while it would Source: USAID, 1999.
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tries to sixty-four years, with prospects that it would go Botswana and Zimbabwe, by twenty years in Nigeria higher still. The growing number of deaths from new and South Africa, by thirteen years in Honduras, by eight and reemergent diseases such as AIDS, however, will slow years in Brazil, by four years in Haiti, and by three years or reverse this trend toward longer life spans in heavily in Thailand. affected countries by as much as thirty years or more by Family Structure. The degradation of nuclear and 2010, according to the U.S. Census Bureau. For example, extended families across all classes will produce severe life expectancy will be reduced by thirty years in social and economic dislocations with political conse-
Table 4. Projected Demographic Indicators for 2010 in Selected Countries With and Without AIDS
Country Projected Child Mortality1 Per 1,000 Projected Life Expectancy, 2010 Live Births,, 2010 With AIDS Without With AIDS Without Sub-Saharan Africa Botswana 120 38 38 66 Burkina Faso 145 109 46 61 Burundi 129 91 45 61 Cameroon 108 78 50 63 Cote d’Ivoire 121 84 47 62 Dem. Rep. of 116 97 52 60 Congo Ethiopia 183 137 39 55 Kenya 105 45 44 69 Lesotho 122 71 45 66 Malawi 203 136 35 57 Namibia 119 38 39 70 Nigeria 113 68 46 65 Rwanda 166 106 38 59 South Africa 100 49 48 68 Swaziland 152 78 37 63 Tanzania 131 96 46 61 Uganda 121 92 48 60 Zambia 161 97 38 60 Zimbabwe 116 32 39 70 Latin America Brazil 31 21 68 76 Haiti 129 119 54 59 Honduras 55 29 60 73 Southeast Asia Burma 80 70 59 63 Cambodia 134 124 53 57 Thailand 25 21 73 75
1Probable deaths before age 5. Source: Adapted from United States Bureau of the Census, 1998.
60 ENVIRONMENTAL CHANGE & SECURITY PROJECT REPORT, ISSUE 6 (SUMMER 2000) National Intelligence Estimate: The Global InfectiousSpecial Disease Reports Threat and Its Implications for the United States quences, as well. Nearly thirty-five million children in and disruptive regime transitions. High infant mor- twenty-seven countries will have lost one or both par- tality has a particularly strong correlation with the ents to AIDS by 2000; by 2010, this number will increase likelihood of state failure in partial democracies. to 41.6 million. Nineteen of the hardest hit countries are in sub-Saharan Africa, where HIV/AIDS has been Infectious diseases also will affect national security prevalent across all social sectors. Children are increas- and international peacekeeping efforts as militaries and ingly acquiring HIV from their mothers during military recruitment pools experience increased deaths pregnancy or through breast-feeding, ensuring prolon- and disabilities from infectious diseases. The greatest gation and intensification of the epidemic and its impact will be among hard-to-replace officers, noncom- economic reverberations. With as much as a third of missioned officers, and enlisted soldiers with specialized the children under fifteen in hardest-hit countries ex- skills and among militaries with advanced weapons and pected to comprise a “lost orphaned generation” by 2010 weapons platforms of all kinds. with little hope of educational or employment oppor- tunities, these countries will be at risk of further • HIV/AIDS prevalence in selected militaries, mostly economic decay, increased crime, and political instabil- in sub-Saharan Africa, generally ranges from ten to ity as such young people become radicalized or are sixty percent (see Table 5). This is considerably exploited by various political groups for their own ends; higher than their civilian populations and owes to the pervasive child soldier phenomenon may be one risky lifestyles and deployment away from home. example. Commencement of testing and exclusion of HIV- positive recruits in the militaries of a few countries, Destabilizing Political and Security Impact is reducing HIV prevalence but it continues to grow In our view, the infectious disease burden will add in most militaries. to political instability and slow democratic development in sub-Saharan Africa, parts of Asia, and the former • Militaries in key FSU states are increasingly experi- Soviet Union, while also increasing political tensions in encing the impact of negative health developments and among some developed countries. within their countries, such as deteriorating health infrastructure and reduced funding. One in three • The severe social and economic impact of infectious Russian draftees currently is rejected for various diseases, particularly HIV/AIDS, and the infiltra- health reasons, as compared to one in twenty in tion of these diseases into the ruling political and 1985, according to one Russian newspaper report. military elites and middle classes of developing coun- tries are likely to intensify the struggle for political • Mounting infectious disease-caused deaths among power to control scarce state resources. This will the military officer corps in military-dominated and hamper the development of a civil society and other democratizing polities also may contribute to the underpinnings of democracy and will increase pres- sure on democratic transitions in regions such as Table 5. HIV Prevalence in Selected the FSU and sub-Saharan Africa where the infec- Militaries in Sub-Saharan Africa tious disease burden will add to economic misery and political polarization. Country Estimated HIV Prevalence • A study by Ted Robert Gurr, et al., on the causes of (percent) state instability in 127 cases over a forty-year pe- Angola 40 to 60 riod ending in 1996 suggests that infant mortality Congo (Brazzaville) 10 to 25 is a good indicator of the overall quality of life, which Cote d’Ivoire 10 to 20 correlates strongly with political instability. Accord- Democratic Republic of the 40 to 60 ing to the research, three variables out of Congo seventy-five––high infant mortality—which in de- veloping countries owes substantially to infectious Eritrea 10 diseases; low openness to trade; and incomplete de- Nigeria 10 to 20 mocratization accounted for two-thirds of Tanzania 15 to 30 demonstrated instability. The study defined “insta- Source: DIA/AFMIC, 1999. bility” as revolutionary wars, ethnic wars, genocides,
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deprivation, insecurity, and political machinations tion in weapons systems and platforms. Over the that incline some to launch coups and counter-coups longer term, the consequences of the continuing aimed, more often than not, at plundering state spread of deadly diseases such as HIV/AIDS on the coffers. capabilities of the more modernized militaries in FSU states and possibly China and certain rogue It is difficult to make a direct connection between states with large armies and modern weapons arse- high HIV/AIDS and other infectious disease prevalence nals may be severe as well. in military forces and performance in battle. But, given that a large number of officers and other key personnel The negative impact of high infectious disease preva- are dying or becoming disabled, combat readiness and lence on national militaries also is likely to be felt in capability of such military forces is bound to deterio- international and regional peacekeeping operations, lim- rate. iting their effectiveness and also making them vectors for the further spread of diseases among coalition peace- • Infectious disease-related deaths and disabilities are keepers and local populations. likely to have the greatest impact on the capabilities of sub-Saharan militaries, particularly those that • Although the United Nations officially requires that have achieved at least a modest level of moderniza- prospective peacekeeping troops be “disease free,”
Mechanisms of Disease Entry Into the United States
The following are a few prominent methods of pathogen entry into the United States:
• International travel. More than fifty-seven mil- Moreover, U.S. law prohibits the Immigration lion Americans traveled outside the United States and Naturalization Service from returning refu- for recreational and business purposes in 1998— gees who have credible reasons to fear political often to high risk countries—more than double persecution, including those refugees afflicted the number just a decade before. In addition, with infectious diseases. tens of millions of foreign-born travelers enter the United States every year. Travelers on com- • Returning U.S. military forces. Although U.S. mercial flights can reach most U.S. cities from military populations are immunized against many any part of the world within thirty-six hours— infectious diseases and are especially sensitized which is shorter than the incubation periods of to detecting any symptoms before or after their many infectious diseases. return to the United States, not all cases are likely to be detected, especially among National • Immigration. Approximately one million immi- Guardsmen and Reservists, who are far more grants and refugees enter the United States legally likely to enter the civilian health care system and each year, often from countries with high infec- may not associate a later-developing illness with tious disease prevalence, while several hundred their overseas travel. thousand enter illegally. The U.S.CDC has the authority to detain, isolate, or provisionally re- • The globalization of food supplies. Foodborne ill- lease persons at U.S. ports of entry showing nesses have become more common as the number symptoms of any one of seven diseases (yellow of food imports has doubled over the past five fever, cholera, diphtheria, infectious TB, plague, years, owing to changing consumer preferences suspected smallpox, and viral hemorrhagic fe- and increased trade. At certain times of the year, vers). Although each individual must undergo a more than seventy-five percent of the fruits and medical examination before entering the coun- vegetables available in grocery stores and restau- try, potentially excludable conditions may be in rants are imported and, therefore, potentially the incubating and therefore less detectable more likely to be infected with pathogenic mi- stages. croorganisms, according to a foodborne disease expert.
62 ENVIRONMENTAL CHANGE & SECURITY PROJECT REPORT, ISSUE 6 (SUMMER 2000) National Intelligence Estimate: The Global InfectiousSpecial Disease Reports Threat and Its Implications for the United States
Figure 1517 Note scale change Trends in Infectious Disease-Related Mortality Rates in the United States
Infectious Disease Mortality in the United States Infectious disease mortality in the United States has generally declined since 1900, but the trend has been up since 1980 when deaths reached a low of 36 per 100,000, as compared to 59 per 100,000 in 1996. Most of the increase owes to HIV/AIDS and, to a lesser extent, to pneumonia and influenza.
Deaths per year per 100,00 2,000 All diseases Noninfectious diseases Infectious diseases
1,500
1,000
60 500 30
0 1960 1980 1996
0 1900 1920 1940 1960 1980 1996
Pneumonia, Influenza, AIDS Deaths in the United States and AIDS Mortality Multidrug therapy has dramatically reduced Deaths per year per 100,000 HIV/AIDS deaths in the United States from their peak in 1995, but the rate is slowing 40 as preventive measures ebb and microbial resistance increases. 30 Pneumonia Thousands deaths and influenza 60 20 45 10 AIDS 30 0 1970 1980 1990 1996 15
0 Source: Adapted from Journal of the American 1985 1990 1995 1998 Medical Association, January 6, 1999; CDC 1999.
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it is difficult to enforce this rule with such methods interstate relations as related embargoes and boycotts to as HIV testing, given the paucity of available troops prevent their spread create trade frictions and contro- and the potential noncompliance of many contrib- versy over culpability, such as in the recently ended uting states. three-year EU embargo of British beef, which was im- posed to stop the spread of “mad cow disease”. Developed • Healthy peacekeeping forces will remain at risk of countries, moreover, will come under pressure from in- being infected by disease-carrying forces and local ternational and nongovernmental organizations, as well populations, as well as by high-risk behavior and as from developing countries, to deal with infectious inadequate medical care. disease-related instability and economic and medical needs in the hardest-hit countries. A growing contro- In developed countries, the political debate over versy, in this regard, will be over drug-related intellectual AIDS and other infectious diseases is likely to focus on property rights, in which developing countries will press budgetary issues and negligence in the handling of blood for more and cheaper drugs from developed country and foodstuffs, as well as on treatment of infectious dis- pharmaceutical firms and resort to producing their own eases. generic brands if they are rebuffed. States will remain concerned, as well, about the growing biological war- • HIV blood and other controversies in several Euro- fare threat from rogue states and terrorist groups. pean countries have sparked political uproars and led to the dismissal or prosecution of government officials, and have even contributed to the fall of INFECTIOUS DISEASES AND U.S. some governments. NATIONAL SECURITY
Infectious diseases also will loom larger in global As a major hub of global travel, immigration, and
Figure 1618 US Army Hospital Admissions During War
Percent 90 Wounds 80 Injuries Diseases 70
60
50
40
30
20
10
0 WWII Korea Vietnam Persian Gulf
Source: DIA AFMIC, 1999.
64 ENVIRONMENTAL CHANGE & SECURITY PROJECT REPORT, ISSUE 6 (SUMMER 2000) National Intelligence Estimate: The Global InfectiousSpecial Disease Reports Threat and Its Implications for the United States commerce, along with having a large civilian and mili- countries and regions of interest to the United States. tary presence and wide-ranging interests overseas, the This will challenge democratic development and United States will remain at risk from global infectious transitions and possibly contribute to humanitar- disease outbreaks, or even a bioterrorist incident using ian emergencies and military conflicts to which the infectious disease microbes. Infectious diseases will con- United States may need to respond. tinue to kill nearly 170,000 Americans annually and many more in the event of an epidemic of influenza or • Infectious disease-related trade embargoes and re- yet-unknown disease or a steep decline in the effective- strictions on travel and immigration also will cause ness of available HIV/AIDS drugs. Although several frictions among and with key trading partners and emerging infectious diseases, such as HIV/AIDS, were other selected states. first identified in the United States, most, including HIV/AIDS, originate outside U.S. borders, with the The Biological Warfare Threat entry of the West Nile virus in 1999 a case in point. The biological warfare and terrorism threat to U.S. national security is on the rise as rogue states and terror- Threats to the U.S. Civilian Population ist groups also exploit the ease of global travel and The U.S. civilian population will remain directly communication in pursuit of their goals: vulnerable to a wide variety of infectious diseases, from resurgent ones such as multidrug resistant TB to deadly • The ability of such foreign-based groups and indi- newer ones such as HIV/AIDS and hepatitis C. Infec- viduals to enter and operate within the United States tious disease-related deaths in the United States have has already been demonstrated and could recur. The increased by about 4.8 percent per year since 1980 to West Nile virus scare, and several earlier instances fifty-nine deaths per 100,000 people by 1996, or roughly of suspected bioterrorism, showed, as well, the con- 170,000 deaths annually, as compared to an annual de- fusion and fear they can sow regardless of whether crease of 2.3 percent in the preceding fifteen years and or not they are validated. an alltime low of thirty-six deaths per 100,000 in 1980 (see Figure 15). The U.S. CDC estimates that the total • The threat to U.S. forces and interests overseas also direct and indirect medical costs from infectious dis- will continue to increase as more nations develop a eases comprise some fifteen percent of all U.S. health capability to field at least limited numbers of bio- care expenditures or $120 billion in 1995 dollars. logical weapons, and nihilistic and religiously motivated groups contemplate opting for them to Threats to Deployed Military Forces cause maximum casualties. Deployed U.S. military forces have historically ex- perienced higher rates of hospital admission from infectious diseases than from battlefield combat and non- combat injuries (see Figure 16). In addition to disease NOTES transmission between deployed troops and indigenous populations, warfare-related social disruption often cre- 1 All data concerning global disease incidence, including ates refugees and internally displaced persons that can the World Health Organization (WHO) data, should be pass infections along to U.S. military forces. Allied coa- treated as broadly indicative of trends rather than accurate lition forces may themselves bring infectious diseases measures of disease prevalence. Much disease incidence in into an area for the first time and transmit them to U.S. developing countries, in particular, is either unreported or forces and the indigenous population. under-reported due to a lack of adequate medical and admin- istrative personnel, the stigma associated with many diseases, Impact on U.S. Interests Abroad or the reluctance of countries to incur the trade, tourism, and In addition to their impact on the U.S. population, other losses that such revelations might produce. Since much infectious diseases will add to the social, economic, and morbidity and mortality are multicausal, moreover, diagnosis political strains in key regions and countries in which and reporting of diseases can vary and further distort com- the United States has significant interests or may be called parisons. WHO and other international entities are dependent upon to provide assistance: on such data despite its weaknesses and are often forced to extrapolate or build models based on relatively small samples, • Infectious diseases are likely to slow socio-economic as in the case of HIV/AIDS. Changes in methodologies, more- development in developing and former communist over, can produce differing results.
ENVIRONMENTAL CHANGE & SECURITY PROJECT REPORT, ISSUE 6 (SUMMER 2000) 65 Special Reports
Exploring Capacity for Integration: University of Michigan Population-Environment Fellows Programs Impact Assessment Project
by Denise Caudill
Abstract: Since 1993, the University of Michigan Population-Environment Fellows Programs (PEFP) has linked the population and envi- ronment sectors of development both at the field level and in policy analysis. The PEFP and Denise Caudill of World Neighbors launched the Impact Assessment Project to develop a framework for assessing an integrated program. This article addresses project findings, includ- ing the successes, constraints, and obstacles of integrated/linked programs, as well as provides field examples from Ecuador and Madagascar. Denise Caudill, the coordinator for this project, offers lessons on the implications of implementing integrated/linked programs from the community to the national, regional, and international levels.
or millions of people living in at-risk ecosystems around the world, issues of survival, food security, natural resource use, family health, and family size are inseparable, all simply aspects of life. In recent years, the global Fcommunity has recognized that sustainable development, population, and the environment are interrelated, and approaches to address these issues should be gender-equitable and linked or integrated. The convergence of views is evident in the platforms and plans of action resulting from the 1992 UN Conference on Environment and Development in Rio, the 1994 International Conference on Population and Development in Cairo, the 1995 World Summit for Social Development in Copenhagen, and the 1995 Fourth World Conference on Women in Beijing. The great challenge is to transform these global policies and platforms into effective, measurable, and sustainable programs. Since 1993, the University of Michigan Population-Environment Fellows Programs1 (PEFP) has been placing Fellows with a range of organizations around the world attempting to link the population and environment sectors. Given the absence of clear models for linkage, the PEFP has taken a decentralized approach, allowing host agencies to define what they mean by a population-environment (PE) linkage or integration. Opportunities to capitalize on these years of experience and the wide network of organizational relationships were identified in October 1998 following a U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) evaluation of the program. Among the new initiatives launched at that time was an evaluation project to begin the process of developing a framework for assessing integrated program approach, process, results, and impact—the Impact As- sessment Project. The first phase of the project is now complete. Phase one was designed to identify hypotheses and assumptions concerning the process, impact, and value added of linked/integrated interventions, and to begin developing a methodological framework for monitoring and evaluating such programs.2 The strategy for phase one was to convene short roundtable meetings at the field level with integrated/linked program practitioners to enable those participants to:
• share experiences in planning, implementing, and assessing integrated/linked programs; • identify challenges and benefits of linkage; • define assumptions and hypotheses related to the value-added nature of integrated/linked programs; and,
Denise Caudill is the Impact Assessment Project Coordinator for the University of Michigan’s Population-Environment Fellows Programs project and Action Learning Coordinator, World Neighbors.
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• discuss specific measurable outcomes, indicators of • The trunk represents the community or the integration/linkage and methodology for assess- organization(s) through which the program takes ment. place. • The branches, limbs, and leaves represent the vari- Workshops and field visits were arranged and co- ous program activities related to population, health, sponsored with CEMOPLAF [Céntros Médicos de environment, and development. Orientación y Planificación Familiar] in Ecuador and • The roots represent the organizational capacities re- John Snow Incorporated (JSI) in Madagascar, as the lo- quired to manage and sustain such programs. cal partners. Participants in the workshops represented • The soil represents the predisposing factors (eco- a wide range of local and international organizations nomic, political, cultural, social environment) involved and interested in the integration/linkage of necessary for such growth. population and environment. • The sun and rain symbolize external enabling fac- For example, CEMOPLAF, the national family plan- tors (resources, funding, services, positive leaders, ning and women’s health organization in Ecuador, has and supportive policies). partnered with World Neighbors, a U.S.-based devel- • The lightening bolt represents external constraints opment organization, to work with hard-to-reach and threats outside of the program’s control. indigenous populations in rural areas was highlighted as a successful integration program. The first phase (start- ing in the early 1990s) of the partnership involved WORKSHOP EXPERIENCES training CEMOPLAF staff in people-centered, capac- ity-building approaches. This cooperation soon evolved During this same period, two “Next Steps” meet- into an experimental integrated program in the ings on population and environment integration brought Guaranda canton, in the Bolivar province of Ecuador. After three years, CEMOPLAF conducted a survey to assess the impact of the program noting that attitudes Figure 1. Capacity Tree for Integrated about sustainable agriculture had changed appreciably Programs as had family planning awareness in the villages using the integrated approach.3 The Impact Assessment Project (IAP) Coordinator developed a conceptual model and participatory meth- odology for use in the workshops. The “Capacity Tree for Linked/Integrated Programs” was used to identify and analyze the various components in linked/integrated population and environment programming: organiza- tional capacities, predisposing and enabling factors, and linked program activities, results, and indicators. Fol- lowing is rendering of the tree that the IAP Coordinator created. Lessons learned concerning the challenges of plan- ning, implementing, and evaluating integrated/linked programs have been drawn from the experience and are summarized below.
CONCEPTUAL MODEL AND METHODOLOGY DEVELOPED FOR WORKSHOPS
The conceptual model “Capacity Tree for Linked/ Integrated Programs” proved to be useful in helping workshop participants identify and analyze the various components present in linked/integrated population and environment programming.
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together practitioners in Washington, D.C.4 These meet- seen to be more cost effective because of both prac- ings reviewed progress to date on understanding if, how, tical (introducing two interventions at once is and why linked interventions were effective and met cheaper) and strategic reasons (working with orga- targeted goals. Additionally, the sessions discussed ways nizations already known and trusted). USAID could integrate population-health-environment linkages into its strategic framework. The resulting ideas • Greater Efficiency: It is possible to avoid duplica- are blended in with those gained during the Ecuador tion, at both the program and community levels, and Madagascar field visits. and to manage, allocate, and leverage resources more Key themes concerning the benefits, advantages, and efficiently while at the same time improving the reasons to integrate or link population, health, and en- work and reducing the effort. vironment were discussed in the Ecuador and Madagascar workshops and during the “Next Steps” • Better Communication and Collaboration: Integra- meetings in Washington. Common factors were identi- tion improves communication, coordination, and fied in all the meetings. cooperation between the program and participat- ing communities and between the implementing organizations. BENEFITS OF INTEGRATION/LINKAGE • Improved Quality of Life is An Overall Goal: Overall • Obvious, Inherent Linkage : Especially at the com- goals of integrated/linked population, health, and munity level, life is naturally integrated. Problems environment approaches are to improve the quality have multiple causes and therefore need multi-dis- of life and well-being of people, and to achieve eco- ciplinary, multi-sector, and multi-level solutions. nomic development and environmental equilibrium.
• Door-Openers: Integrated programs allow for one ac- The common views held by participants, from tivity to serve as an entry point for additional policymakers to practitioners in the United States, Ec- activities, by means of trust-building within the uador, and Madagascar, are positive indicators of the community and/or as a strategy for introducing new convergence of thinking at all levels about integration ideas and messages. and linkage of population, health, and environment strategies. Other key factors mentioned at the field level • Community Based and Participatory: Integrated pro- in Ecuador and/or Madagascar were: grams require a high level of participation from the community people who are the principal actors, ben- • Integration can facilitate access to and support by eficiaries, and audience of the programs. Greater donors, and is a strategy to avoid “donor bombard- participation and capacity building can lead to more demand for services.
• Responds to People’s Needs: Integrated programs are more responsive to community needs, are often community-specific, starting with the immediate priority needs of the people, regardless if those are population, health, or environment related.
• Reaches More and Most Marginalized People : The in- tegrated approach has the potential to reach more people, especially the indigenous, marginalized, iso- lated, and under-served communities.
• Strategy for Sustainability: Among the results of an integrated program are outcomes that are more ap- propriate, concrete, and sustainable. Julio Beingolea, Ecuador Country Director for World Neighbors, CEMOPLAF’s partner in integrated programs, reports back on small • More Cost Effective: Integrated/linked programs are group results.
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ment” at the program and community levels. common set of goals and objectives for integration nor is there a common definition of the concept of • Institutional learning and growth can come through integration. Thus, different and sometimes conflict- taking a new look at program strategies, by inte- ing points of view persist between and within grating the needs of the community with the organizations. objectives of the institution. • Lack of Data and Evaluation Results: There is a lack • Integration can facilitate follow-up, information col- of data on the results of integration and a need for lection, and achievement of cross-cutting results and monitoring and evaluation of the complementary impact. impacts, costs, and benefits.
“ he integrated approach has the potential to reach more people, Tespecially the indigenous, marginalized, isolated, and under- served communities.”
CONSTRAINTS AND OBSTACLES TO • Complex and Risky Integration: The approach is more INTEGRATION/LINKAGE complex and complicated than single sector pro- grams, taking time and resources, and requiring Key constraints and obstacles to integration and more coordination and planning, with risk of fail- linkage were also discussed in Ecuador, Madagascar, and ure and staff overload. Washington meetings: • Sectoral Specialization Still Dominates: There are few • Funding Challenges: The most common constraints dedicated “champions” for integration. Traditional identified were related to a lack of funding, a lack structures, divisions, vertical approaches, and cen- of donors for integration, sector-specific funding tralized decision-making still dominate the field. and reporting requirements, and short-term financ- ing. One hypothesis raised in the Washington • Challenges at the Community Level: There can be a meeting was that “invisible integration” may be tak- lack of community trust of the implementing orga- ing place at the program level. Sector-specific funds nizations, non-acceptance of new ideas, and lack of go in and sector-specific reports come out, but in- community organizations. For programs, the chal- tegration may be happening, unknown to the donor. lenges involve dealing with complexities of the local socio-economic situation, lack of knowledge of the • Partnership Problems: Difficulties in coordination area, language, culture, and needs of the people. among partners was the next most common con- straint, with specific problems named such as absence of coordination, conflicting strategies, lack of continuity, varying stages of program develop- ENABLING FACTORS FOR INTEGRATION/LINKAGE ment among partners, and simply a lack of quality partners. Key enabling factors for integration/linkages were also discussed at the Ecuador and Madagascar work- • Lack of Political Will: Lack of policy and support by shops. In some cases the enabling factors can be seen as governments, multilateral, and bilateral agencies, countervailing forces to the previously listed constraints. along with weak administration or other political influences comprises a third key area of constraint. • Political Will: There do exist positive governmental policies, supportive commitments by local authori- • Lack of Understanding of Integration: There is no ties and staff of government ministries, and
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participation by international and national organi- LESSONS LEARNED zations. Roundtable Workshops are a Valuable Opportunity for • Institutional Partners: Some inter-institutional co- Networking and Sharing ordination does take place, competent intermediary The workshops conducted in Ecuador and Mada- actors are at work, and there is movement toward gascar were successful in bringing together a new and decentralization and eco-regional planning. wide range of participants to creatively share experiences in implementing integrated/linked programs. Evalua- • Available Funding: There are some existing finan- tion feedback from all three workshops indicated that cial resources and donors, though not many. participants enjoyed and benefited from the opportu- nity to exchange ideas with other organizations, to • Predisposed Communities: Community interest and establish new organizational relationships, and to envi- enthusiasm are seen as strong factors, with estab- sion potential networks of organizations committed to lished community organizations and structures to working in integrated programs. The mix of participants build upon. was broad, with individuals from USAID, local govern- ments, international organizations and national NGOs, • Know-how: There are emerging local initiatives, representing population and family planning, health, and available technical assistance, and existence of inte- environment sectors. These workshops can also serve as grated program examples. catalysts for future collaboration and action.
• Need and Opportunity: There are great needs in terms Capacity Tree Proves To be a Dynamic Analytical Tool of population, health, environment, and sustainable for Systematic Discussion of Opportunities and Con- development along with interest and support of the straints of Integration public to attain economic stability and preservation Use of the conceptual model, Capacity Tree for In- of the ecological richness. tegration, as the central analytical tool in the workshops was of great interest to the participants and lead to cre- ative reflection and discussion. Constructing the tree to ORGANIZATIONAL CAPACITY FOR INTEGRATION identify the components of an integrated program was the essential first step in each workshop, with the subse- In each workshop, participants were asked to think quent exercises, analysis, and discussion based upon the more deeply about the organizational capacities they unique, immediate results in each workshop. The use of listed in the Capacity Tree exercise and determine what the tree to identify more than simply the types of activi- those capacities would be in an integrated program. Eight ties that may be linked or integrated enabled the key capacity areas were identified and described in the participants to reflect more deeply on the meaning, pur- workshops in both countries pose, challenges, and strategies of integrating/linking population, health, and environment in their work.
POSSIBILITIES FOR INTEGRATED/LINKED PROGRAM Definitions of Integration Must Include Explicit Goal ACTIVITIES, RESULTS AND INDICATORS Statements for Clarity Defining integration/linkage of population with Workshop participants also experimented with the environment, health, and development may be influ- idea of linking different sectoral activities and themes. enced by different implied perspectives of goals, that is, In these exercises, groups developed possible linked ac- if integration is seen as an end in and of itself and/or a tivities, and anticipated results and indicators for means to another end. assessment. The exercises were challenging and may have been the first time some participants seriously consid- Population is Best Discussed in the Broader Context of ered how their work might be more holistic and linked Health to other issues. Although the exercises were somewhat In both Ecuador and Madagascar the concept of artificial, not tied to program objectives, and done population was somewhat problematic. It was more dif- quickly in small groups, the experience enabled partici- ficult for participants to list quickly the activities that pants to think in very practical terms about integration can be described as “population” compared to listing of activities across sectors. health or environment activities. In general, people are
70 ENVIRONMENTAL CHANGE & SECURITY PROJECT REPORT, ISSUE 6 (SUMMER 2000) Exploring Capacity for Integration: U of M Population-EnvironmentSpecial Reports Fellows Programs Impact Assessment Project
Table 1. Organizational Capacity
CAPACITY DESCRIPTION Holistic vision Know how to perceive and relate humans with nature according to life experiences (Ecuador) Coordination of actions Strengthening capacity to conceive a model of integrated development (Fianar, Madagascar) Clarity of the program’s mission, roles, objective, activities, target populations Results orientation There when most needed Good understanding of how the program fits with other actors and at different levels Operational research (Tana, Madagascar)
Community organization Lends itself to problems, needs and celebrations of the community, with the participation of both families and institutions that work as a team, leaders and followers seeking community development (Ecuador) Competence in community-based approaches (PRA/RRA, PAR) Aptitude to work well with local communities Able to do an effective site analysis Value local customs and traditions and include them in implementation of program activities ( Tana) Knowledge of : Culture Felt or expressed needs Customs/Behaviors Geography Demography Community social organization (Tana)
Inter-institutional Take advantage of all the existing resources in the coordination community, to broaden the coverage, and the quality of services. Participatory. United missions and shared commitments (Ecuador) Mutual sharing of knowledge and information about objectives, approaches, strategy, domains of intervention Improved level of knowledge of each about all (Fianar) Existence of coordinating bodies (Fianar) Project planning and In accordance with satisfying the felt needs of the evaluation community and institution (Ecuador) Preparation of a comprehensive plan which also includes the unique details for each actor From the outset, plan follow-up and evaluate (Fianar) Evaluations performed with the community Identify the needs of the community and the solutions Respond to needs that are multidisciplinary in nature Multidisciplinary Include experts from each sector (Tana)
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Table 1. Organizational Capacity (continued)
Technical expertise and To have available trained staff, teams and materials, know-how planning, and adequate logistical knowledge of methodologies for work in accordance with the activity and the group objective (Ecuador) Valuing and capitalizing on what has been learned (Fianar) Knowledge of training needs for the personnel Background of personnel Experience of personnel Training in many technical areas or other integrated disciplines Multidisciplinary approach (Tana)
Mobilizing financial Existence of sources of financial assistance in health, resources environment, and development (Ecuador) Identifying needs for material needs of each program actor Comprehensive management of resources (Fianar) Auto-financing, gifts, loans, in-kind assistance Problem to solve: sector financing limitations where it is often impossible to mix financial sources for an integrated program Possible solution: more coordination between donors, creativity, and diplomacy (Tana)
Mobilizing material Be able to count on infrastructure and base resources resources in order to be able to respond to interrelated demands (Ecuador) Clear strategies to identify financial needs and to search for and negotiate financial support Mechanism to put in place appropriate strategies (Fianar) Vehicles, medicines, equipment, medical supplies, mobile health team supplies, tools, office supplies, other Items common to all: vehicles, office supplies, tools Items unique to each program: medical supplies, agricultural supplies (Tana)
Mobilizing human Trained in health, agriculture, and environment and resources available to work in any situation with positive attitude, strong self-confidence, sensitive to social problems and conservation of the environment (Ecuador) Strengthening the capacities of personnel Posting/hiring according to competencies Conflict management (Fianar) Consultation and meetings among the stakeholders Conflict resolution training Use of mediators (Fianar)
72 ENVIRONMENTAL CHANGE & SECURITY PROJECT REPORT, ISSUE 6 (SUMMER 2000) Exploring Capacity for Integration: U of M Population-EnvironmentSpecial Reports Fellows Programs Impact Assessment Project more comfortable discussing population activities un- Community Capacity-Building for Improved Livelihood der the umbrella category of health or reproductive at the Center of Integration health for political, cultural, and religious reasons. This preference seems a reasonable and strategic approach but • Conduct community based needs/assets diagnosis could be a cause for concern if health does not include in a participatory manner, with shared input, analy- population-related needs and activities. In an integrated/ sis, and negotiation by project staff with community linked population, health, and environment program, members. there must be commitment and “intentionality” to ulti- mately undertake population activities, including family • Respond to community-identified and analyzed pri- planning. ority needs first and then build on successes achieved and trust created. This process is more sequential Intuitive Confidence in Integrated Approach is Strong than simultaneous. From world capitals to remote communities, people representing population, health, environment, and de- • Involve community in planning, implementation, velopment disciplines intuit that integration works. It decision-making—more than an instrumental act, feels and looks good and seems the right thing to do. the involvement is in terms of co-ownership and
Table 2. Organizational Capacity, Ecuador
CAPACITY DESCRIPTION Leadership Working toward collective interests, being creative, democratic, facilitator, respect the participation of followers Supervision by division Specific, directed, periodic, coordinated, in a specific time period Creation of policy and To have very clear and specific policies and guidelines guidelines for the institution and community work for each activity Credit policies Motivate people and make possible the accessibility to development activities of improved communities Decentralized To have an adequate institutional organization with administration defined policies, objectives, goals, guidelines and procedures, trained and committed staff in/for the execution of integrated development programs
Table 3. Organizational Capacity, Madagascar
CAPACITY DESCRIPTION Learning Strengthening the capacities for financial and project management Strengthening the capacity for analysis (Fianar) Organizational adaptability Realism and able to self-evaluate and learn from others Keeping abreast of the latest developments (Tana)
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management of the program—with the project tak- rience demonstrates that health, population, environ- ing a true pro-poor, pro-community approach. ment, and development actors can address their • Create and work through groups, not just individu- respective issues/problems with the same people or als—women’s groups, user’s groups, forest protection groups from different sector perspectives while at the groups, and health and development coordination same time each supports the others. groups. Integrated Implementation Is Essential No Matter the Continuum of Projects: Bounded by Single Sector Ap- Model proaches at One End and Holistic Integrated Programs Regardless of the model, implications for implemen- at the other with Many in the Middle tation of an integrated/linked program include the Many integrated programs are more accurately co- following points: existing to parallel single sector projects, planned, implemented, and assessed separately within a broader • Integration needs to begin in the planning stage, institutional definition of program. The Ecuador expe- starting with the needs/assets diagnosis step, and
Table 5. Possibilities for Integrated/linked Program Activities, Results, and Indicators, Ecuador
SECTOR THEMES LINKED ACTIVITY ANTICIPATED RESULTS INDICATORS Improved guinea Visits to the 50 women trained in FP and Number of users of pig breeding AND community, guinea pig breeding FP, Number of Family planning by practical training in 20 women who use the FP improved guinea women in family planning, services pig, Increased community and breeding of income guinea pigs Soil conservation Training of adults in 50 men trained in FP Number of men AND Family health and 20 men using methods of trained and planning by men in agriculture and FP family planning they learned Number of FP the community counseling about in the training users, Number of 10 hectares cultivated and hectares protected protected against soil erosion Reproductive During coordinated Better knowledge of Number of women health AND agriculture and techniques for crop that get a PAP Improved crop health visits and cultivation and technology smear among cultivation and work days, take for prevention of cervical families that are production PAP smears cancer using improved crop cultivation Improved crop Home visits for Knowledge and use of the Number of couples cultivation and counseling in family different methods of family visited that are production AND planning and crop planning and improvement using FP methods Family planning by production of crops by couples visited Number of couples in experimental tests community and demonstration plots Soil conservation Visits by medical Optimizing program Number of users AND Reproductive team during resources in health and soil attending, Number health program activities conservation of families trained in soil conservation
74 ENVIRONMENTAL CHANGE & SECURITY PROJECT REPORT, ISSUE 6 (SUMMER 2000) Exploring Capacity for Integration: U of M Population-EnvironmentSpecial Reports Fellows Programs Impact Assessment Project
continuing through the setting of objectives, activi- is more effective, efficient, and sustainable, there is little ties, indicators, and means of verification, through evidence other than impressions, anecdotes, hopes, and the implementation and assessment steps. hunches.
“ he global community has recognized that sustainable devel- [T]opment, population, and the environment are interrelated, and approaches to address these issues should be gender-equitable and linked or integrated.”
• Coordination by staff of work schedules, plans, Significant Need for Process and Tools for Planning, worksites, IEC messages, and approaches—follow- Monitoring and Evaluation of Integration up and data collection are essential. Processes and tools are lacking. In the rush to iden- tify indicators for integration, thought must be given to • Decentralized decision-making and strong support new processes for blending the accepted and expected from CEMOPLAF leadership are important com- sector-related methodology and indicators with context- ponents in the Ecuador experience—flexibility and specific integration outcomes. responsiveness to community opinion are key to the trust-building process. Post-ICDP Challenge Is to Demonstrate Value of Inte- gration for Conservation Programs • A move from parallel to integrated implementation Conservation projects are moving away from Inte- is a logical first step. grated Conservation and Development Programs toward facilitation of eco-regional planning processes that in- Valid and Reliable Evidence of Effectiveness, Efficiency, volve national and international policy issues. Questions and Sustainability is Weak remain concerning the implications of this at the com- Data are missing to substantiate the confidence in munity and project levels. To what extent are the integration/linkage. Programs have not actually assessed environmental conservation organizations willing and/ the integration effect. Although people in Washington, or interested to be active partners in integrated/linked Ecuador, and Madagascar felt strongly that the approach community level work?
Table 6. Possibilities for Integrated/linked Program Activities, Results, and Indicators, Madagascar
SECTOR THEMES LINKED ACTIVITY ANTICIPATED INDICATORS RESULTS Land improvements, Training/awareness Increased level of Number of regular training on soil raising of the people contraceptive users, Area of fertilization AND about FP and prevalence, improved land Family Planning improving agricultural Increased agricultural land production Reproductive health, Integrating more youth Productive youth at Decrease in the level migration AND into agricultural home, Increase in of unemployment, Valuing natural production employment rate Surfaces cultivated resources and put in production
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Need to Stimulate Donor Investment in Integrated Pro- methodology framework for participatory monitoring gramming and assessment of linked/integrated population, health, Programs that would like to take an integrated ap- and environment programs. ! proach often have to break down integrated strategies to develop sector-specific funding proposals, and after receiving the funding try to find ways to do the integra- NOTES tion, yet ensure that the sector-specific results can be reported—the “invisible integration” phenomenon. 1 For more information on the PEFP, see Shannon England, Donors could be more supportive in furthering the in- “Making a Difference at the Intersection of Population, En- tegration approach by strongly encouraging project vironment, and Security Issues: A Look at the University of partners to conceive, plan, prepare, and present inte- Michigan Population Fellows Program,” Environmental grated grant proposals in partnership. Change and Security Project Report 5 (Summer 1999): 73-81.
2 For more information and to request a copy of the full PLANS FOR PHASE TWO report, contact: University of Michigan, Population-Environ- ment Fellows Programs, 109 Observatory, SPH II, Ann Ar- Convene More Networking Workshops and Events bor, MI 48109-2029; Tel: (734) 647-0222; Fax: (734) Facilitate additional awareness-raising workshops 647-4947; E-mail: [email protected]. bringing together a wider range of health, conservation, 3 Denise Caudill, “Integration of Population and Environ- and development organizations as a vehicle for sharing ment: World Neighbors People-Centered, Capacity-Strength- experiences and forming networks. ening Approach,” Lessons from the Field: Integration of Population and Environment. Oklahoma City, OK: World Neighbors, Implementation of Monitoring and Evaluation Partner- 1998: 11-20. ship Projects Facilitate action research process in at least two coun- 4 These “Next Steps” meetings were co-sponsored by the tries to develop participatory methodology and tools for U.S. Agency for International Development, the Woodrow planning, monitoring, and evaluation of the integrated/ Wilson Center, and the University of Michigan Population- linked programs and accompany the programs in the Environment Fellows Programs. use of this methodology over three-year period.
Develop and Disseminate Participatory Action Research and Evaluation Tools Document and disseminate research results and
Global Environmental Politics
Global Environmental Politics invites submissions that focus on international and comparative environmental politics. The journal covers the relationship between global political forces and environmental change. Topics include the role of states, multilateral institutions and agreements, trade, international finance, corporations, science and technology, and grassroots movements. Particular attention is given to the implications of local- global interactions for environmental management as well as the implications of environmental change for world politics. Articles must make a theoretical or empirical contribution to understanding environmental or political change. Submissions are sought across the disciplines including political science and technology studies, environmental ethics, law, economics, and environmental science.
For more information, contact: Peter Dauvergne, Editor of Global Environmental Politics, University of Sydney, Faculty of Economics and Business, Merewether Building, H04, NSW, 2006, Australia; Email: [email protected]; and Internet: http://mitpress.mit.edu/GLEP.
76 ENVIRONMENTAL CHANGE & SECURITY PROJECT REPORT, ISSUE 6 (SUMMER 2000) Commentary
COMMENTARY: DEBATING ENVIRONMENT, POPULATION, AND CONFLICT
The environment, population, and conflict thesis remains central to current environment and security debates. During the 1990s, an explosion of scholarship and policy attention was devoted to unraveling the linkages among the three variables. While it can easily be argued that both the research and policy communities have made significant advances, the scholarly findings and policy lessons remain the subject of intense debate. The recent publication of a host of significant contributions to this debate dictated a special commentary section to supplement the lengthy book reviews provided in this 2000 issue of the Environmental Change and Security Project Report.
In the first article, leading figure Thomas Homer-Dixon and his colleagues from the University of Toronto respond to the prominent critique enunciated by fellow peace researcher Nils Petter Gleditsch from the International Peace Research Institute, Oslo (see box on Gleditsch’s critique). Richard Matthew of the University of California, Irvine, comments on the five-year NATO Committee on the Challenges of Modern Society pilot study entitled Environmental Security in an International Context. Geoffrey D. Dabelko joins Richard Matthew to draw conclusions from a March 2000 environment, population, and conflict workshop with leading scholars. In the last commentary, University of California, Irvine researcher Ted Gaulin briefly critiques Indra de Soysa and Nils Petter Gleditsch’s To Cultivate Peace: Agriculture in a World of Conflict, portions of which were reprinted in issue 4 of the ECSP Report.
The Environment and Violent Conflict: A Response to Gleditsch’s Critique and Some Suggestions for Future Research
by Daniel M. Schwartz, Tom Deligiannis, and Thomas F. Homer-Dixon
INTRODUCTION
ils Petter Gleditsch, senior researcher at the International Peace Research Institute, Oslo, has written a widely noted critique of recent research in the new field of environmental security (Gleditsch, 1998). NGleditsch’s critique echoes and builds upon criticisms leveled by skeptics of environment-conflict research (e.g., Deudney, 1991; Levy, 1995; and Rønnfeldt, 1997). He identifies a number of specific “problems” of theory, conceptualization, and methodology, sometimes singling out the work of the team led by Thomas Homer-Dixon of the University of Toronto (henceforth referred to as the Toronto Group). In this article, we respond to these con- cerns and propose avenues for future research.
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Methodological issues underpin Gleditsch’s critique, and we therefore deal with them in detail. Gleditsch BACKGROUND asserts that much environment-conflict research is meth- odologically unsound and fails to qualify as “systematic research.” He contends it violates the rules of quasi- Norwegian peace researcher Nils Petter experimental methodology—used by conventional social Gleditsch makes a nine-point critique of envi- scientists in lieu of true experimental methods that are ronment, population, and conflict literature in not viable for many social scientific inquiries. This per- his seminal 1998 article, “Armed Conflict and spective is his starting point for identifying many of the the Environment: A Critique of the Literature.” specific problems in environment-conflict research. As These nine points, summarized below, spurred a result, he disregards the detailed findings of the Toronto Thomas Homer-Dixon and his colleagues at the Group, the Swiss-based Environmental Conflicts project University of Toronto to pen the response pub- (ENCOP), and other research projects that do not meet lished here. Gleditsch, senior researcher at the his standards of evidence. We argue that Gleditsch’s pro- International Peace Research Institute, Oslo, posed approach is a methodological straightjacket that (PRIO) maintains the literature has the follow- would, if widely adopted, severely constrain research in ing characteristics. the field. We do not take issue with the quasi-experi- mental methodology per se. Rather, we show that the 1. There is a lack of clarity over what is meant case-study method used by the Toronto Group has quali- by “environmental conflict”; ties that complement quasi-experimental methods. 2. Researchers engage in definitional and po- In Section One, we address some of the conceptual lemical exercises rather than analysis; and theoretical “problems” identified by Gleditsch and 3. Important variables are neglected, notably discuss his selective critique of the literature on the rela- political and economic factors, which have tionship between environmental scarcity and conflict. a strong influence on conflict and mediate Gleditsch’s critique does not address the validity of the the influence of resources and environmen- specific findings that emerged from ENCOP and the tal factors; Toronto Group. Instead, he treats these projects with a 4. Some models become so large and com- broad brush, at times associating them with other, less plex that they are virtually untestable; rigorous, research. Section two examines underlying 5. Cases are selected on values of the depen- methodological issues and addresses Gleditsch’s concerns dent variable; arising from his methodological perspective. The final 6. The causality of the relationship is reversed; section of the article looks forward and suggests avenues 7. Postulated events in the future are cited as for future research on the environment-conflict nexus. empirical evidence; 8. Studies fail to distinguish between foreign and domestic conflict; and, I. CONCEPTUAL AND THEORETICAL ISSUES 9. Confusion reigns about the appropriate level of analysis. Gleditsch identifies a number of common “prob- lems” with the literature on environmental stress and Nils Petter Gleditsch. “Armed Conflict and the conflict. This section responds to conceptual and theo- Environment: A Critique of the Literature.” Journal of retical criticisms aimed explicitly at the Toronto Group’s Peace Research Vol. 35, no. 3, 1998: 381-400. research.
Daniel M. Schwartz and Tom Deligiannis are Ph.D. candidates at the University of Toronto. Thomas F. Homer-Dixon is the Director of the Peace and Conflicts Studies Program at the University of Toronto and author of Environment, Scarcity, and Violence (Princeton University Press, 1999). This article is drawn from the forthcoming November 2000 edited volume by Paul F. Diehl and Nils Petter Gleditsch entitled Environmental Conflict (Westview Press). Published with permission of the publisher (Copyright WestviewPress). The editors of the ECSP Report wish to thank Tad Homer- Dixon, Dan Schwartz, Tom Deligiannis, Paul Diehl, Nils Petter Gleditsch, Leo A. W. Wiegman, and Ian Gross for their assistance.
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Employing a Comprehensive Definition of Scarcity This article— “The Environment and Violent Con- Disputes among scholars about how to conceptual- flict: A Response to Gleditsch’s Critique and ize environmental stress have long hindered research on Some Suggestions for Future Research” by the links between this stress and violent conflict. Essen- Daniel M. Schwartz, Tom Deligiannis, and Tho- tially, these are disputes about the delineation of the mas Homer-Dixon—is drawn from the forthcom- independent, or causal, variable. Gleditsch faults much ing November 2000 edited volume by Paul F. of the literature for being “unclear as to whether the Diehl and Nils Petter Gleditsch entitled Environ- mental Conflict (Westview Press). This volume causal factor is absolute resource scarcity or environ- promises to make a significant contribution to mental degradation.” He criticizes Homer-Dixon’s the environment, population, and conflict litera- concept of environmental scarcity—which integrates sup- ture. Following, is the table of contents for Envi- ply, demand, and distributional sources of the scarcity ronmental Conflict: of renewable resources—suggesting it “muddies the wa- ters,” although he fails to explain why (Gleditsch, 1998: Chapter 1. Controversies and Questions 387). Paul F. Diehl & Nils Petter Gleditsch Following Stephan Libiszewski, Gleditsch adopts a Chapter 2. The Case of South Africa distinction between conflicts that result from “simple Val Percival & Thomas Homer-Dixon Chapter 3. Causal Pathways to Conflict resource scarcity” and those that result from “environ- Wenche Hauge & Tanja Ellingsen mental degradation” (Libiszewski, 1992). Unfortunately, Chapter 4. Demographic Pressure and however, Libiszewski’s distinction is a wholly inadequate Interstate Conflict starting point for research on the environmental causes Jaroslav Tir & Paul F. Diehl of violence. First, as Gleditsch himself acknowledges, Chapter 5. Demography, Environment, and the two categories are not causally separate: degradation Security of an environmental resource, like cropland or fresh Jack Goldstone water supplies, can cause a straightforward—or “simple” Chapter 6. Water and Conflict Steve Lonergan scarcity of that resource. Second, degradation of an en- Chapter 7. Resource Constraints or vironmental resource is only one of two possible sources Abundance? of a decrease in a resource’s supply. “Degradation” refers Bjørn Lomborg to a drop in the quality of the resource; but cropland, Chapter 8. Democracy and the Environment fresh water, and the like can also be “depleted,” which Manus Midlarsky means the resource’s quantity is reduced. If we restrict Chapter 9. The Limits and Promise of our analysis to conflicts caused by degradation of envi- Environmental Conflict Prevention Rodger Payne ronmental resources, we will omit a main source of the Chapter 10. The Spratly Islands Conflict reduced supply of these resources in many poor coun- David Denoon & Steven Brams tries around the world. Chapter 11. Environmental Cooperation and Third, environmental degradation, the phenomenon Regional Peace Gleditsch wants us to emphasize, is exclusively a sup- Ken Conca ply-side problem: if we degrade a resource, then there is Chapter 12. Armed Conflict and the less of it available. Any hypothesis linking environmen- Environment tal degradation to violence is linking, essentially, the Nils Petter Gleditsch Chapter 13. The Environment and Violent reduction in the resource’s supply to violence. However, Conflict if we want to explore the causes of violence, a resource’s Daniel M. Schwartz, Tom Deligiannis & absolute supply is not interesting. What we should in- Thomas Homer-Dixon vestigate, rather, is the resource’s supply relative to, first, demand on the resource, and, second, the social distri- To order a copy of this book, please contact bution of the resource. The relationships between supply Westview Press at: and demand and between supply and distribution de- Westview Press termine people’s actual experience of scarcity, and under Perseus Books Group Customer Service any practical hypothesis, it is these relationships that 5500 Central Avenue influence the probability of violence. This is the reason Boulder, CO 80301 that we include demand and distributional aspects in (800) 386-5656; Fax: (303) 449-3356 our definition of environmental scarcity.1 E-mail: [email protected] Fourth and finally, focusing on environmental deg-
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radation alone tends to lead researchers to overlook or and misses crucial aspects of the environmental chal- neglect key interactions—such as the processes we call lenges facing the developing world. It is better, we believe, resource capture and ecological marginalization—among to acknowledge explicitly that the fundamental issue is supply, demand, and distributional pressures (Homer- one of scarcity of renewable resources and that any treat- Dixon, 1999: 73-80). Resource capture occurs when the ment of this scarcity should encompass the exhaustive degradation and depletion of a renewable resource (a set of scarcity’s sources: decreases in supply, increases in decrease in supply) interacts with population growth (an demand, and changes in distribution. The Toronto increase in demand) to encourage powerful groups Group incorporates these three facets of scarcity in its within a society to shift resource access (that is, to change tripartite definition of scarcity. the resource’s distribution) in their favor. These groups
“ e argue that Gleditsch’s proposed approach is a methodologi- Wcal straightjacket that would, if widely adopted, severely con- strain research in the field.”
tighten their grip on the increasingly scarce resource and Challenging Simonesque Optimism use this control to boost their wealth and power. Re- At a more fundamental level, Gleditsch questions source capture intensifies scarcity for poorer and weaker the very idea that humanity is facing increasing envi- groups in society. Ecological marginalization occurs when ronmental scarcities. His critique seems to be guided by unequal resource access (skewed distribution) combines the assumption that the links between environmental with population growth (an increase in demand) to cause scarcity and violence are overstated, because humanity long-term migrations of people to ecologically fragile shows astonishing capacity to adapt to scarcities regions such as steep upland slopes, areas at risk of de- (Gleditsch, 1998: 383-384 and 395). Markets stimu- sertification, tropical rain forests, and low-quality pub- late human inventiveness and commerce that open up lic lands within urban areas. High population densities new sources of scarce resources, encourage conservation, in these regions, combined with a lack of knowledge and create technologies that allow substitution of rela- and capital to protect the local ecosystem, cause severe tively abundant resources for scarce ones. These adaptive resource degradation (a decrease in supply) (Homer- processes certainly operate in many cases, as we have Dixon, 1999: 177). Resource capture and ecological previously noted (Homer-Dixon, 1995; Homer-Dixon, marginalization are often intimately inter-linked, with 1999: 31-5 and 107-32). But Gleditsch does not ac- one leading to the other. knowledge that societies often fail to adequately adjust Some might argue that by including distributional to scarcity, with poverty, migrations, and institutional issues in our definition of environmental scarcity, the failure the result. Environmental scarcities unquestion- Toronto Group makes the concept so broad as to be ably have profoundly debilitating effects on some useless, because the group classes conflicts solely over economies, societies, and social groups.3 Just because resource distribution as environmental conflicts.2 The humans are remarkably adaptive in some cases does not argument is misguided. Uneven distribution never acts mean that they are always adaptive. on its own: its impact is always a function of its interac- Gleditsch seems particularly influenced by Julian tion with resource supply and demand. In practical Simon’s cornucopian thesis that, based on the historical terms, the reason resource distribution is important is record, human societies can bring to bear on their re- that the resources people want (that are, in other words, source scarcities sufficient ingenuity to prevent any in demand) are in finite supply. Indeed, the Toronto decline in well-being over the long run (Simon, 1996). Group found in its research that problems of declining But Simon’s techno-optimist arguments are too simplis- resource supply and rising resource demand were always tic, for three reasons. First, he tends to project the truly intimately entangled with uneven resource distribution. extraordinary improvements in human well-being over For these four reasons, an exclusive focus on envi- the past two centuries linearly into the future, without ronmental degradation in environment-conflict research much questioning or reflection. Yet, if we look back fur- unreasonably restricts, distorts the scope of the research, ther than two hundred years, it is clear that human affairs
80 ENVIRONMENTAL CHANGE & SECURITY PROJECT REPORT, ISSUE 6 (SUMMER 2000) Commentary have my been marked by many ‘non-linear’ events— he writes. “The greatest weakness in this respect is that sudden, sharp changes in economic and social much of this literature ignores political, economic, and behavior—some of which have had decidedly negative cultural variables” (Gleditsch, 1998: 389). By effects on human well-being. The progress of the last deemphasizing environmental scarcities, Gleditsch cor- two centuries is not the only evidence we should use to respondingly emphasizes other variables. estimate our trajectory into the future. This approach implies that environmental stress may Second, when Simon analyzes trends in human well- be no more than an intermediate or intervening vari- being, he usually uses highly aggregated data, such as able between dysfunctional political and economic in- statistical averages for all of humankind. Yet, when these stitutions and conflict. Thus, Gleditsch asks if data are disaggregated—that is, environmental conflict “may be broken into sub-categories— primarily an underdevelopment Simon’s optimism is less “ nvironmental scarci- problem,” because environ- persuasive. For example, although mental degradation or “load” is both the percentage and absolute ties unquestionably strongly correlated with poverty number of hungry people have E (Gleditsch, 1998: 396). He fallen globally in the last twenty have profoundly debili- seems to argue that conflict in years, Latin America, South Asia, developing countries is best ex- and especially sub-Saharan Africa tating effects on some plained by social causes, not by have not seen reductions in the the physical influences of the absolute number of hungry economies, societies, and natural environment. In the people.4 Third and finally, close process, like many scholars of study of specific cases shows that social groups.” comparative development, societies do not always generate the Gleditsch marginalizes the ingenuity they need when and physical circumstances of hu- where it is needed (Lele and Stone, 1989). Although man society as explanatory variables; he appears to con- environmental and demographic stress often drives up sider them to be, at most, secondary causes of social the requirement for ingenuity in poor countries, a num- behavior. When it comes to violent conflict, they are ber of factors—including market failure, inadequate merely aggravators of already existing social stresses. If human capital, and political competition over scarce this is his position, Gleditsch is making a classic natural resources among powerful groups—can impede endogeneity mistake: he is claiming that environmental the flow of ingenuity (Homer-Dixon, 1999: 107-32). problems are a consequence of, and endogenous to, the Homer-Dixon and others have responded with con- broader social system and that, therefore, any conflict siderable theoretical and empirical detail to the caused by environmental problems is ultimately caused arguments of Simon and other techno-economic opti- by social factors. mists (Homer-Dixon, 1999: 28-44; Cohen, 1995; It is unquestionably true that social variables must Ahlburg, 1998). Nowhere does Gleditsch acknowledge be central to any adequate explanation of human con- these responses. The determinants of adaptation to scar- flict, whether in rich or poor countries. The Toronto city are a major outstanding issue for researchers in this Group discusses at length the political, economic, and field. Gleditsch would better advance our understand- cultural factors that interact with environmental scar- ing if he engaged with the various positions on the issue, city to cause violence. The societies most vulnerable to rather than appearing to accept the arguments of the environmentally-induced violence are those simulta- optimists at face value. neously experiencing severe environmental scarcity and various forms of institutional failure (especially failures Bringing Nature into Social Theory of states and markets) that hinder social adaptation to Gleditsch’s skepticism about the seriousness of en- the scarcity. The key role of social variables must there- vironmental scarcities is the starting point for a key fore be acknowledged. However, this requirement does element of his critique of the environment-conflict lit- not mean that physical variables should be made fully erature. He argues that the literature overstates the impact endogenous to the social system and, consequently, of environmental scarcities on violent conflict and, in turned into relatively uninteresting secondary causes of the process, ignores other, perhaps more powerful causal social conflict and stress.5 variables. “Far too many analyses of conflict and the As Homer-Dixon has noted, there are three reasons environment are based on… overly simplistic reasoning,” why environmental scarcity should be considered at least
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partly an exogenous factor in social behavior and con- 1979). Furthermore, in his recent work, Colin Kahl ex- flict and why, therefore, environmental scarcity deserves plicitly builds on the Toronto Group’s model to further research attention in its own right (Homer-Dixon, 1999: our understanding of how regime type affects the links 16-18 and 104-6). First, environmental scarcity is not between environmental scarcity and violence (Kahl, only influenced by social variables like institutions and 1998). policies; it can itself affect these institutions and poli- More specifically, however, Gleditsch’s suggestion cies in harmful ways. This is the case when shortages of that the Toronto Group is blind to the importance of a renewable resource, such as cropland or forests, moti- regime type is, on close reading, actually a call for the vate elites to seize control, through either legal or coer- inclusion of a democracy variable in environment-con- cive means, of the resource’s remaining stocks (resource flict models (Gleditsch, 1998: 389).6 We agree with capture). In other words, we should not assume that so- Gleditsch that a more explicit focus on democracy could cial variables are completely independent and external be beneficial—as long as analysts are careful in their use starting points in the causal chain; it turns out that they of “democracy.” As Homer-Dixon has argued, “the term can be affected by environmental scarcity, sometimes democracy is used too loosely by lay commentators and negatively. Second, the degree of environmental scar- experts alike. It commonly encompasses an extraordi- city a society experiences is not, as it turns out, wholly a narily variegated set of social phenomena and institutions result of economic, political, and social variables, like that have complicated and multiple effects on the inci- failed institutions and policies; it is also partly a func- dence of social turmoil and violence” (Homer-Dixon, tion of the particular physical characteristics of the 1999: 182).7 Gleditsch deserves credit for advancing society’s surrounding environment. These characteris- environmental conflict literature along this important tics are, in some respects, independent of human activi- theoretical path. If future research can address the diffi- ties. For example, the vulnerability of coastal aquifers to cult issues surrounding the precise definition and salt intrusion from the sea and the depth of upland soils operationalization of democracy, important findings may in tropical regions are physical “givens” of these envi- yet emerge.8 ronmental resources. Third, once environmental scar- city becomes irreversible—as when most of a country’s Using Historical Evidence vital topsoil washes into the sea—then the scarcity is, Finally, Gleditsch claims that the Toronto Group’s almost by definition, an external influence on society. theory about the links between environmental scarcity Even if enlightened reform of institutions and policies and conflict is flawed, in part because it is founded on removes the underlying social causes of the scarcity, be- inferences about future scarcities. Gleditsch asserts that cause the scarcity itself is irreversible, it will remain a “Homer-Dixon, and many other authors. . .have stressed continuing burden on society. the potential for violent conflict in the future” without The claim that environmental scarcity can be, in providing adequate empirical evidence of past or present part, an exogenous variable, should not be confused with linkages between environmental scarcities and violent the claim (which we do not make) that environmental conflict (Gleditsch, 1998: 393).9 scarcity can have a direct impact on conflict. We argue Gleditsch is mistaken that the Toronto Group uses that the link between environmental scarcity and con- “the future as evidence” to substantiate its claims that flict is most often indirect. Nevertheless, environmental there are links between environmental scarcities and scarcity can still have an exogenous impact on the social conflict. In the process of developing its model, the conditions that eventually lead to conflict. Group has undertaken more than a dozen detailed his- torical case studies. These include studies of the Chiapas Identifying Key Variables rebellion, the Rwandan genocide, violence between Gleditsch claims that the Toronto Group and other Senegal and Mauritania, civil conflict in the Philippines, researchers overlook important variables like regime type and ethnic violence in Assam, India.10 The historical and democracy. However, the Group’s full model does analyses in these case studies were informed by the rich integrate regime-type variables into its analysis of the literatures on the causes of revolution, insurgency, and social and economic effects of environmental scarcities. ethnic strife. Taken together, they are a foundation for In the scholarly literature on the origins of revolutions the Toronto Group’s larger theoretical model about link- and civil violence, the variables of opportunity structure ages between environmental scarcity and violent conflict. and state capacity, which are central to the Toronto None of the hypotheses in this model depends on events Group’s model, are recognized as integral aspects of re- yet to come; rather, the model is informed by events gime type (Goodwin, 1997; Tarrow, 1994; Skocpol, that have already taken place.11
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To support his claim that the Toronto Group uses atic research in the social sciences; this method comple- the future as evidence for its model, Gleditsch takes is- ments more conventional quasi-experimental sue with commentators who argue that water scarcity in approaches. Drawing a distinction between causal ef- the Middle East could lead to armed conflict in the fu- fects and causal mechanisms, we then show why Gleditsch’s ture. Without referring to any research in particular, but criticisms of the Toronto Group’s research—as identi- having identified the Toronto Group by name at the fied in the previous paragraph—are unfounded. We also beginning of the paragraph, Gleditsch concludes that recap some of the key findings of the Toronto Group this is a hypothesis “based on controversial theory and that Gleditsch overlooked as a result of his methodologi- debatable extrapolations, rather than ‘data’ which may cal bias. In short, we show that there are more than a confirm the prediction” (Gleditsch, 1998: 394). “few lights in the wilderness” to guide future research Gleditsch thus conflates the findings of the Toronto into the relationship between environment and conflict. Group with largely unsubstantiated claims by other writ- ers regarding the potential for conflict over water Conducting Systematic Research resources. Gleditsch asserts that scholars have conducted little The specific findings of both the Toronto Group systematic research to date on the link between envi- and ENCOP are certainly worthy of detailed consider- ronmental scarcity and violent conflict (Gleditsch, 1998: ation in any discussion of links between environmental 384-7). By “systematic” research, he seems to mean ei- scarcity and conflict. In this case, Gleditsch did not to ther experimental or quasi-experimental analyses. (He refer to the Toronto Group’s thinking on the conse- discusses statistical analyses and controlled-case com- quences of water scarcity. Had he done so, he would parisons in particular, but quasi-experimental methods have noted a number of interesting hypotheses worthy can include counterfactual analyses and congruence pro- of testing. Homer-Dixon argues that the world is not cedures.) Gleditsch additionally contends that past about to witness a surge of water wars. “Wars over river research into the links between environment and con- water between upstream and downstream neighbors are flict consisted merely of “exploratory case-studies” that likely only in a narrow set of circumstances,” Homer- failed to demonstrate causal connections (Gleditsch, Dixon writes. “The downstream country must be 1998: 392). threatening to restrict substantially the river’s flow; there In our opinion, Gleditsch has an overly circum- must be a history of antagonism between the two coun- scribed view of what counts as systematic research in tries; and, most importantly, the downstream country the social sciences. Many social science methodologists must believe it is militarily stronger than the upstream have long recognized that systematic research includes country. . . .There are, in fact, very few basins around not only experimental and quasi-experimental methods, the world where all these conditions hold now or might but single-case methods as well.12 Highly influential hold in the future” (Homer-Dixon, 1999: 139). The studies in the social sciences—such as Graham Allison’s Toronto Group’s research on water scarcity is, in fact, at Essence of Decision (1971) and Arend Lijphart’s The Poli- odds with sensationalist claims about water wars. tics of Accommodation (1975)—have used single case studies to build and test theories.13 At issue in this debate over the merits of the case- II. FINDING OUR WAY IN THE WILDERNESS study method are fundamental ontological and epistemological questions pertaining to the nature of Underpinning many of Gleditsch’s criticisms are causation. Among competing views on how causation deeper methodological issues pertaining to the conduct can be demonstrated, philosopher David Hume’s argu- of social science inquiry. Gleditsch claims, for instance, ments remain influential.14 Hume asserted that causation that the Toronto Group fails to select cases appropri- could be demonstrated only by showing a high degree ately, neglects to investigate the possibility of reverse of covariance between types of events, which he termed causation, devises untestable models, overemphasizes the constant conjunction. Hume’s notion of constant con- complexity of ecological-political systems, and lacks the junction underpins experimental and quasi-experimental tools to weight causal variables. These criticisms can only methodologies in the social sciences; many researchers, be understood in the context of Gleditsch’s unduly nar- including Gleditsch, appear to believe that it also viti- row perspective on what constitutes “systematic ates the single-case method. research.” However, Andrew Bennett (1997) shows convinc- In this section, we first show that process-tracing ingly that Hume’s notion of causality underpins not only within single cases should be an integral part of system- experimental and quasi-experimental methods but the
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single case-study method as well. Bennett notes that understand why Allison’s Essence of a Decision and Hume recognized three “sources of causality,” only one Lijphart’s The Politics of Accommodation had such mo- of which was constant conjunction. The other two were mentous impact on the field of political science. Both temporal succession and contiguity. Bennett argues that seriously challenged long-standing theories: Allison’s while constant conjunction is related to what method- analysis of decision-making during the Cuban missile ologists term causal effect, temporal succession and crisis undermined the notion of the state as a unitary, contiguity are related to causal mechanism. The causal rational actor; and Lijphart’s analysis of politics in the effect of an explanatory variable is defined by Bennett Netherlands challenged prevailing ideas about the im- as “the change in probability and/or value of the depen- pact of political cleavages. The important processes these
“ n exclusive focus on environmental degradation in envi- [A] ronment-conflict research unreasonably restricts, distorts the scope of the research, and misses crucial aspects of the environ- mental challenges facing the developing world.”
dent variable that would have occurred if the explana- authors identified in their case studies would have been tory variable had assumed a different value.” Causal overlooked in a statistical analysis. McKeown (1999: mechanism, on the other hand, is defined as “the causal 172-174) asserts these case analyses had a large impact process and intervening variables through which causal precisely because they highlighted how events unfolded or explanatory variables produce causal effects” (Bennett, by identifying their causal mechanisms.16 1997: 18-19). Both causal effect and causal mechanism Several leading philosophers of science have made are therefore essential and complementary facets of cau- similar points. Wesley Salmon (1984: 121), for example, sality. While the experimental and quasi-experimental argues in favor of explicating causal mechanisms: “The methods aim to gauge causal effect, they say little about mere fitting of regularities into patterns has little, if any, causal mechanism. The single-case method, conversely, explanatory force.” Andrew Sayer (1992: 106-7) states helps reveal causal mechanism but gives little indication that “what we would like… is a knowledge of how the of causal effect. In short, neither the experimental and process works. Merely knowing that C has generally been quasi-experimental nor the single-case method is suffi- followed by E is not enough: we want to understand the cient to demonstrate causation with any finality. It is continuous process by which C produced E…” And equally evident, however, that the single-case method is Abraham Kaplan (1964: 329) asserts that “we see better a necessary tool to demonstrate causation. why something happens when we see better—in more An example from the natural sciences illustrates the detail, or in broader perspective—just what does hap- distinction between causal effect and causal mechanism. pen.”17 Although the correlation between smoking and cancer Bennett notes that the distinction between causal has been known for many years, only within the last five effect and causal mechanism has prompted a debate years have researchers pinpointed exactly how smoking among methodologists about which of these two sources engenders cancer. That is, the causal effects were already of causality is more important. Although some analysts known, but until recently the causal mechanisms re- suggest that causal effects are “logically prior to the iden- mained unknown. The recent identification of these tification of causal mechanisms” (King, Keohane, and mechanisms has put the tobacco industry on the defen- Verba, 1994: 86), others insist that causal mechanisms sive, because they now find it harder to retreat to the are “ontologically prior” to causal effect (Yee, 1996: 84). claim that scientific proof is lacking.15 Bennett dismisses this controversy, arguing that “cau- The distinction between causal mechanism and sality involves both causal effects and causal mechanisms causal effect is also cogent for the social sciences. Timo- and its study requires a diversity of methods, some of thy McKeown notes that only by distinguishing between which are better adapted to the former and some to the causal effect and causal mechanism can one begin to latter” (Bennett, 1997: 25).
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Bennett’s reluctance to confer priority on either social science, it is impossible to control all variables causal effect or causal mechanism, however, does not that may affect the dependent variable under study; suggest that the identification of one should not pre- therefore, researchers must pick and choose their con- cede the identification of the other in terms of the trol variables carefully. Process-tracing helps identify practical task of puzzle solving in the social sciences. those particularly worthy of control.21 Also, process- Indeed, when a research program is in its early stages tracing reveals variables and causal patterns that may and the underlying theory is still largely undeveloped, not emerge from statistical analysis. For instance, the
“ he societies most vulnerable to environmentally-induced vio- Tlence are those simultaneously experiencing severe environmen- tal scarcity and various forms of institutional failure… that hinder social adaptation to the scarcity.”
focusing first on causal mechanisms is probably the best patterns of ecological marginalization and resource cap- strategy. Once researchers have discovered these causal ture, which were discovered by the Toronto Group using mechanisms and elaborated the theory, they can then process-tracing, are not obvious and would undoubt- begin to estimate causal effects.18 Thus George and edly have remained hidden from statistical analysis. The McKeown emphasize the role that single-case methods Group’s research suggests, however, that quasi-experi- (involving process-tracing) can play in the development mental and statistical methods should now be used to of theory (George and McKeown, 1985: 34-41).19 investigate these patterns.22 This more inclusive under- With this methodological underpinning, the standing of systematic research helps us address five Toronto Group set out to perform a series of case stud- further concerns raised by Gleditsch about contempo- ies of the causal links between environment scarcity and rary environment-conflict research: selection of cases on conflict. Although the possibility of such links had been the independent and dependent variables; failure to con- recognized by previous scholarship, theory was rudimen- sider that the dependent variable may in fact be an tary. Using a process-tracing approach, the Toronto important cause of the independent variable; a propen- Group conducted over a dozen case studies to better sity to develop untestable models; overemphasis on the understand the causal mechanisms that might connect complexity of ecological-political systems; and an in- environmental scarcity to conflict. The results produced ability to gauge the relative power of environmental by the Toronto Group reflect the methodology used: scarcity as a cause of conflict. the Group does make general claims about causal mecha- nisms (for example, at the end of his second International Selecting Case Studies Security article on the subject, Homer-Dixon says ex- Following Marc Levy (1995) and Carsten Rønnfeldt plicitly that “environmental scarcity causes violent (1997), Gleditsch contends that choosing cases in which conflict”), but it has been careful to avoid making such both environmental scarcity and violent conflict were claims about causal effects (nowhere in the Group’s re- known a priori to exist, violates a fundamental principle search reports are there any claims about the power of of research design that applies to both qualitative and environmental scarcity relative to other potential causes quantitative analyses. Consequently, Gleditsch of conflict).20 (1998:391-92) asserts this practice produces nothing Without undertaking research into causal mecha- more than “anecdotal evidence” to support its hypoth- nisms, estimates of causal effect are far less illuminating, eses. for two reasons. First, researchers will not know which Gleditsch’s approach to research design appears to potentially confounding variables they should control hinge on the assumption that causality is little more than in their statistical tests; and, second, researchers may causal effect. Causal mechanism is regarded as less im- overlook key processes and causal relationships that are portant or is simply not considered at all. Although we hidden in the data. In quasi-experimental methods of agree that researchers must allow for variation on both
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the independent and dependent variable if they want to We do not deny that conflict may exacerbate envi- estimate casual effect, we contend researchers will find ronmental scarcity, but this possibility was not the focus such an approach less helpful in identifying causal of the Toronto Group’s research. Nevertheless, we would mechanisms. If causal mechanism is believed to be an argue that process-tracing offers an excellent way to dis- integral aspect of causality, then selecting case studies cover reverse causality, because it unearths causal on the independent and dependent variable is hardly an mechanisms. It allows researchers to trace causal mecha- egregious error in research design. Indeed, in order to nisms that unfold over long periods of time and thereby understand whether there are causal links between envi- to investigate the impacts of past conflicts on subsequent ronmental scarcity and violent conflict—and, if there environmental conditions. An approach that focuses on are, how these variegated links work—it will be some- causal effects, however, cannot reveal reverse causation times necessary to select cases in this manner. The as easily. Although simultaneous equations can be used Toronto Group therefore intentionally selected cases in to model reverse causation, and although quasi-experi- which environmental scarcities and violent conflict were mental methods, using lagged variables or congruence known a priori to exist (Homer-Dixon, 1999: 169-76). procedures, can be used to span time, a far more intui- The Group then used process-tracing to determine if the tive approach is to focus on causal mechanisms, because independent and dependent variables were actually caus- they will tell the researcher exactly how past conflicts ally linked, and, if they were, to induce from a close exacerbated environmental scarcity. study of many such cases the common mechanisms of Moreover, the quasi-experimental method can pro- causality and the key intermediate variables that charac- duce ambiguous results when attempting to differentiate terized these links. between cause and effect. Consider the following ex- A related objection to selecting cases on both the ample: When a barometer falls, deteriorating weather is independent and dependent variables is that the re- likely to follow. Although it precedes the change in searcher might as a result, overlook possible confounding weather, the falling barometer clearly does not cause this variables and spurious relationships. The researcher change. Thus, we can not distinguish between cause and might, for instance, believe that data show a causal link effect. If we understand the mechanism that causes the between variables A and B, a link that fits the researcher’s barometer to fall, however, we understand that cause hypothesis nicely. But the researcher might fail to look and effect can only be differentiated once weather con- for variable C, a variable that is linked to both A and B ditions prior to the barometer’s fall are controlled (Miller, and is a cause of both. For example, environmental scar- 1987: 34). city might appear to be a cause of conflict, but, in reality, not be a cause, if poverty is actually a cause of changes Constructing Testable Models in both these variables. This concern, however, is mis- While Gleditsch contends that much of the envi- placed, because vigilant case-study researchers should ronment-conflict literature to date is overly simplistic, detect such situations. Eckstein (1975: 125-26) contends he asserts that the Toronto Group is guilty of just the that such researchers can test “countertheories”—that opposite mistake—that is, of developing overly com- is, theories about other likely causes of changes in the plex models that are not testable (1998: 391-92). We value of the dependent variable.23 Just as the quasi-ex- believe that Gleditsch contradicts himself here by de- perimental researcher must anticipate variables to manding a strict adherence to conventional research control, the case-study researcher must anticipate po- design while simultaneously agitating for an incremen- tentially spurious causal mechanisms. tal and modular approach to theory building. Conventional research design forbids the omission of Investigating Reverse Causation variables that are correlated with the key independent A distinction between causal effect and causal variable. Such an omission creates what Gary King, mechanism helps us address Gleditsch’s concern that Robert Keohane, and Sidney Verba (1994: 168-176) violent conflict (the dependent variable in most research) term an omitted variable bias. Many of the variables con- may in fact be an important cause of environmental scar- sidered by the Toronto Group are correlated with the city (the independent variable). Gleditsch (1998: 393-3) key independent variable of environmental scarcity. If claims that environment-conflict researchers have ne- Gleditsch is suggesting that we drop these variables out glected this possibility of reverse causation and have of the equation in the name of testable models, he is likewise failed to consider the possibility that environ- also suggesting that we contravene a fundamental canon mental scarcity and violent conflict are related to each of conventional research design. other in a positive feedback loop—that is, a vicious circle. Since the Toronto Group did not adopt such a re-
86 ENVIRONMENTAL CHANGE & SECURITY PROJECT REPORT, ISSUE 6 (SUMMER 2000) Commentary search design, however, this internal contradiction does cal, and physical systems are just as complex or even not directly concern us. Nevertheless, Gleditsch’s agita- more complex (although some unquestionably are not). tion for less complexity is disturbing. If environmental The problem of complexity exists in the real world. scarcity were either a necessary or a sufficient cause of It cannot be wished away by assuming that it resides conflict, it would be possible to reduce our model’s com- only in the mind of the researcher. Gleditsch’s extraor- plexity. Of course, environmental scarcity is neither a dinarily strong constructivist position on this issue is necessary nor sufficient cause (there are few, if any, such questionable both empirically and philosophically
“ he Toronto Group and ENCOP, among others, is not only [T]theoretically and conceptually intact, but also rests on sound methodological pillars.” causes of conflict). If, therefore, researchers are to make (Rescher, 1998). Researchers in a variety of fields in- a nomothetic claim about the relationship between en- creasingly acknowledge the reality of complexity and are vironmental scarcity and conflict, environmental scarcity developing powerful theories to understand complex must be part of what philosopher J. L. Mackie (1965) systems. These theories raise serious questions about terms an INUS condition: it must be an insufficient but conventional (often mechanistic) explanations of social necessary component of a condition that is itself an un- phenomena and about the conventional methodologies necessary but sufficient cause of conflict. used to study these phenomena (Cowan, Pines, and Discovering INUS conditions is the goal of the case- Meltzer, 1994). Rather than denying complexity’s exist- study researcher. For environmental-conflict researchers, ence, Gleditsch and other social scientists should this entails unearthing the myriad and variegated ways explicitly acknowledge the problems it creates for their in which environmental scarcity interacts with other research and try to develop methods—such as those fo- social, economic, and political factors to engender con- cusing on causal mechanisms—for dealing with it. flict. We do not mean to suggest that a process-tracing approach eclipses the important goal of parsimony. Weighting Causal Variables Rather, by focusing on relevant causal mechanisms, pro- Gleditsch implies that process-tracing within single cess-tracing helps the environment-conflict researcher case-studies does not allow researchers to gauge the rela- determine the boundaries of the INUS condition. With- tive weights of causal variables (1998: 384-386). He also out a clear picture of these boundaries, simply dropping suggests that the quantitative analysis by Wenche Hauge variables in the name of parsimony becomes a haphaz- and Tanja Ellingsen (1998) is one of the few attempts to ard affair. Once these boundaries have been defined, test systematically the relationship between environmen- however, estimating causal effects becomes a more pre- tal scarcity and conflict. These researchers, he notes, did cise procedure. find a statistically significant relationship between envi- ronmental degradation and violent conflict, but they Dealing with Complex Systems concluded that economic and political variables were According to Gleditsch, the Toronto Group claims more important than environmental variables. Thus, that ecological-political systems are more complex than Gleditsch implicitly accepts the notion that indepen- strictly social or physical systems. He goes on to argue dent variables can be assigned weights that indicate their that this claim is unwarranted because “any social sys- relative causal power. Gleditsch, of course, is hardly alone tem is as complex as the theory developed to study it” here. Causal weighting is widely considered to be the (1998: 392). In other words, the complexity is in the ultimate goal of statistical analyses, and the lack of abil- mind of the beholder, rather than in the phenomenon ity to weight variables using single case studies is itself. Actually, the Toronto Group does not argue that considered this method’s foremost drawback. ecological-political systems are more complex. They ar- The practice of causal weighting, however, has its gue simply that these systems are, intrinsically, problems. Elliott Sober (1988) contends that the stan- exceedingly complex. No doubt many social, biologi- dard statistical technique of analysis of variance
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(ANOVA) does not actually yield causal weights. Rather, extent and degree of soil, water, and forest degradation it identifies the difference that various causes can make in developing countries; data on resource distribution in an observed effect. Ascertaining the difference, Sober and resource-use practices are also poor. The field there- maintains, is distinct from ascertaining a causal weight. fore needs a more systematic and rigorous approach to Similarly, Richard Lewontin (1976) argues that, although data collection. Because this research crosses so many causal weighting may be appropriate when the relation- disciplinary boundaries, systematic data collection must ships among variables are additive, it is misguided when involve intimate collaboration with experts in a wide the relationships are interactive. Lewontin contends that range of disciplines, including soil science, hydrology, analysis of variance produces uninterpretable results forest ecology, and the political economy of commu- when dealing with interactive variables. nity resource use. If environmental scarcity is one component of an In our efforts to improve the foundation of data on INUS condition, as argued above, then environment- which we build our environment-conflict research, how- conflict researchers are not dealing with additive relations ever, we must recognize that not all good data are among causal variables. Rather, these relationships are quantitative: process-tracing of single cases, in fact, gen- interactive. Environmental scarcity, for example, inter- erates thick descriptions of environment-conflict acts with a society’s ability to supply social and technical linkages—descriptions rich with qualitative data. More ingenuity. If the society can supply abundant ingenuity local case studies are needed, which build upon research in response to its environmental problems, then severe done to date, and test and refine existing hypotheses at social disruptions will probably be avoided; if it cannot, the local level. then negative outcomes, including conflict, are much more likely. Operationalizing Key Variables Interactivity is hardly limited to the relationships If environment-conflict researchers want to estimate among variables in ecological-political systems. Most causal effect, it is essential that they include in their analy- social systems exhibit interactivity among variables. That ses key variables identified by environment-conflict so many researchers treat the relationships among vari- research. In order to include these variables, efforts must ables in social systems as additive does not reflect the turn towards their operationalization. reality of these systems. Rather, it reflects misguided at- The Toronto Group has identified a number of vari- tempts by researchers to avoid dealing with the reality ables that play a pivotal role in the link between of the complexity of these systems. environment and conflict. For instance, as noted above, the quantity of ingenuity a society supplies in response to environmental scarcity can play a key role in deter- mining its ability to adapt to that scarcity. The supply III. SUGGESTIONS FOR FUTURE RESEARCH of ingenuity, then, is an independent variable that should be included in any statistical analysis attempting to In Gleditsch’s final section, entitled “The Way measure the causal effect of environmental scarcity on Ahead,” he asserts that “critique will serve to advance conflict (Homer-Dixon, 1999: 107-114). the field only if it stimulates more satisfactory research” But, operationalizing this variable is not a straight- (Gleditsch, 1998: 395). Although we do not agree that forward task. Researchers need an adequate measure of all work on environment and conflict has been unsatis- ingenuity. The Toronto Group has identified other mea- factory, we do agree that debates in the field, such as the sures that should be included in any complete statistical one we are engaged in here, can provide the spark for analysis—and that therefore require operational- new research agendas. In this spirit, we draw on the above ization—including state capacity and social remarks to make some suggestions for future work. These segmentation, as well as the aforementioned processes suggestions fall in five categories: filling data gaps, of resource capture and ecological marginalization operationalizing key variables, specifying contextual fac- (which can potentially be represented as single vari- tors, dealing with complexity, and encouraging ables).24 methodological pluralism. Specifying Contextual Factors Filling Data Gaps Empirical research has now identified some causal We agree with Gleditsch that serious data gaps im- mechanisms linking environmental scarcity and violence. pede research on the links between environment and However, much more work remains to be done to de- conflict. There is a particular lack of good data on the termine precisely the intervening and interacting
88 ENVIRONMENTAL CHANGE & SECURITY PROJECT REPORT, ISSUE 6 (SUMMER 2000) Commentary variables—the contextual factors—affecting the strength of these processes. Under what circumstances, exactly, Encouraging Methodological Pluralism do these processes unfold? In the following, we refer to In order to deal with the research challenges de- some of the specific findings of the Toronto Group, and scribed above, we encourage our colleagues to accept a suggest some contextual factors worthy of further in- degree of methodological pluralism. The various meth- vestigation. ods available to us make up a diverse set of arrows in the quiver of the social scientist, and we should choose the • By setting in motion processes of resource capture arrow most likely to hit our target. Statistical and quasi- and ecological marginalization, environmental scar- experimental methodologies are needed to identify city often increases the wealth gap between those correlations and causal effects; process-tracing of single elites that take advantage of the opportunities scar- cases is needed to specify causal mechanisms. These two city offers and those marginal groups that suffer the general approaches should not be used in isolation from brunt of scarcity. How does the degree of state au- each other; rather, we should try to exploit the synergies tonomy affect these two processes? To what extent that are possible when they are used in parallel by col- would better-defined and enforced property rights laborating researchers. For instance, statistical analysis reduce the predatory behavior of elites? can identify outliers and anomalous cases that deserve focused attention using process-tracing; in turn, pro- • The multiple effects of environmental scarcity in- cess-tracing can identify key interacting variables and crease demands on the state, stimulate intra-elite scope conditions that should be incorporated into sta- behavior, and depress state tax revenues. Such pres- tistical tests of the environment-conflict hypothesis. sures can weaken the administrative capacity and Methodological pluralism, however, is not a license legitimacy of the state. How does institutional de- for shoddiness. Researchers should be held to high stan- sign affect state capacity in the presence of these dards of evidence. This paper has demonstrated that the pressures? How do international economic forces environment-conflict research of the Toronto Group and both aggravate and mitigate these pressures? ENCOP, among others, is not only theoretically and conceptually intact, but also rests on sound method- • Narrow distributional coalitions (e.g., coalitions of ological pillars. We hope that future researchers will use rent-seekers that work to redistribute the economy’s this body of evidence to deepen our understandings of wealth in their favor) often block institutional re- the linkages between environmental scarcity and vio- form—including reform of markets, property rights, lent conflict. judicial systems, and the state’s resource-manage- ment regimes—essential to reducing environmental scarcity or alleviating its harsh effects. To what ex- tent does scarcity provoke such behavior? Can a REFERENCES robust civil society counteract the obstructionist behavior of these narrow distributional coalitions? Ahlburg, Dennis. “Julian Simon and the Population Growth Debate.” Population and Development Review Dealing with Complexity 24:2 (June 1998): 317-27. At the methodological level, we need to explore how causation works at the interface between the physical/ Allison, Graham. Essence of Decision: Explaining the ecological and social worlds. Environment-conflict re- Cuban Missile Crisis. Boston, MA: Little, Brown, 1971. search brings us face to face with some of the most intractable issues in philosophy of science, specifically Baechler, Günther, Volker Böge, Stefan Klötzli, Stephan whether causal generalizations describing the social world Libiszewski, and Kurt R. Spillmann. Kriegsursache have the same status as those describing the natural Umweltzerstörung, Band I, Ökologische Konflikte in der world. Because systems in both these domains are fun- Dritten Welt und Wege ihrer friedlichen Bearbeitung. Chur/ damentally complex—characterized by huge numbers Zürich: Verlag Rüegger, 1996. of components, causal interactions, feedback loops, and nonlinearity—environment-conflict researchers can gain Baechler, Günther and Kurt R. Spillman, eds. insights from complexity theory. We urge greater recep- Kriegsursache Umweltzerstörung [Environmental Causes tivity to the concepts and findings of this rapidly of War, in German]. Vol. 2, Regiona und Länderstudien developing field. von Projektmitarbeitern [Regional and Country Studies of
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NOTES
1 The three main sources of environmental scarcity include which natural variables play a significant causal role. reduced supply, increased demand, and skewed distribution. 6 Gleditsch writes that ‘words such as “democracy” or “au- See Homer-Dixon (1999: 47-72). tocracy” do not occur in the model. In view of the extensive 2 An anonymous reviewer of this article raised this objec- theoretical literature “relating the degree of democracy to civil tion, as well as David Dessler (1999: 100-101). violence . . . a democracy variable should have been included 3 The literature supporting this claim is so vast it cannot be explicitly.” summarized. An excellent survey can be found in, World Bank 7 For an excellent treatment of the variegated nature of de- (1992). See also Midlarsky (1999) who provides compelling mocracy, see Collier and Levitsky (1997). empirical evidence on the intimate connections between scar- 8 The differentiation of the “democracy variable,” in the city (including resource scarcity), inequality, and social conflict. State Failure Task Force’s Phase II report, represents an at- Dasgupta (1993) provides an economic analysis of the effect tempt to move in this direction. See Esty, et al (1999: 52-53). of resource scarcity on communities in the developing world. 9 Good and relatively current surveys of the state of the envi- “Much of the literature,” Gleditsch writes, “deals with ronment in China and India, which together constitute about conflicts of interest involving potential violence rather than forty percent of the world’s population, are Smil (1993) and with actual violence. . . . The argument is entirely in terms of Repetto (1994). future wars, which may happen.” (Italics in original.) 10 4 Recent data from the Food and Agriculture Organiza- Several of the Toronto Group’s historical case studies are tion (FAO, 1999a) shows that the percentage of reproduced in Homer-Dixon and Blitt (1998). undernourished people in all three regions has either remained 11 ENCOP similarly relied upon a large number of histori- steady (sub-Saharan Africa) or fallen (South Asia and Latin cal case studies during the course of the project research. These America). However, the absolute number of undernourished case studies are published, along with their theoretical find- people over the past thirty years has either grown (sub-Sa- ings in a three volume work, Bächler, et al (1996). This volume haran Africa and South Asia), or remained relatively stable contains: M. Abdul Hafiz and Nahid Islam, “Environmental overall (Latin America). See also FAO, 1999b. Degradation and Intra/Interstate Conflicts in Bangladesh;” 5 Dan Deudney (1999), has recently coined the phrase so- Mohamed Suliman, “Civil War in Sudan: the Impact of Eco- cial-social theory for theories that presume social events have logical Degradation;” Mohamed Suliman, “War in Darfur or only social causes; he uses nature-social theory for theories in the Desert versus the Oasis Syndrome;” Peter B. Okoh, “En-
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vironmental Degradation, Conflicts, and Peaceful Resolution 18 Research is sometimes sparked by a preliminary correla- in Nigeria and between Nigeria and Neighboring States;” tion analysis that offers a promising avenue for further research Stephan Klotzli, “The Water and Soil Crisis in Central Asia: (e.g. the Democratic Peace). Nevertheless, we maintain that a A Source for Future Conflicts?”; Stephen Libiszewski, “Water full-blown statistical analysis of these preliminary findings Disputes in the Jordan Basin Region and Their Role in the would benefit greatly from case-study research into causal Resolution of the Arab-Israeli Conflict;” Gunther Bächler, mechanism. The research process then, should be viewed as “Rwanda: The Roots of Tragedy, Battle for Elimination on an an iterative one, with quasi-experimental and case-study meth- Ethno-Political and Ecological Basis.” ods complementing one another. 12 See, for example, Eckstein (1975); Campbell (1975); 19 Although the logic for separating the testing and build- George (1979); George and McKeown (1985); Dessler ing of theories in quantitative methodologies is sound, (1991); Yee (1996); Bennett (1997); and McKeown (1999). Campbell (1975:178-193) shows that this partition is not 13 This point is made in McKeown (1999: 172-174). Non- necessary in case-study research. Campbell convincingly dem- experimental methods have also been widely used in the onstrates that the problem of ex post facto hypothesizing is overcome in the ‘pattern matching’ methodology—from which natural sciences. See McKeown (1999: 171), and Eckstein (1975: 114-115). process-tracing was conceived—because this procedure opens the possibility that an hypothesis initially generated by a par- 14 Hume was, in fact, highly skeptical of our ability to show ticular case could subsequently fail to be supported by the causation. His analysis of causation was meant to ascertain same case. Also, see Collier (1993: 115). the bare epistemic facts that undergird our intuition of cau- 20 sality. Although the above quote from Homer-Dixon’s Interna- tional Security article does not refer explicitly to causal 15 See Grady (1996: 3). A similar distinction between causal mechanism, the underlying approach taken throughout the effect and causal mechanism has implications for other areas article consists of an explicit attempt to discover these pro- in the natural sciences as well. For instance, although scien- cesses. It is therefore reasonable to assume that the nomethetic tists have known for nearly a century that aspirin relieves pain, claim made is this article refers to causal mechanisms. it is only within the last few years that they have discovered 21 The common mistake among researchers is to omit a vari- the causal mechanisms behind this pain relief. See Garavito (1999: 108). able that should be controlled in a statistical analysis. This can result in what statisticians refer to as a Type I error, where 16 Although qualitative quasi-experimental methods, such the null hypothesis is true but researchers decide it is false. as the comparative case study, can also detect causal mecha- However, it can be equally dangerous to include a variable nisms, the single-case method is often a more efficient means that should not be controlled. This can result in a Type II of discovering these processes. Moreover, because control is error, where the null hypothesis is false but researchers decide extremely difficult to achieve in the comparative method, it is it is true. Cartwright (1979: 429-32) points out that an “ir- questionable if causal mechanisms can be more accurately relevant” control variable can always be found that annuls or detected than with the single-case method. reduces a true relationship. A Type II error can also be com- 17 Kaplan also argues that descriptions, which are often dif- mitted by failing to include a suppressor variable; that is, a ferentiated from explanation, may themselves be explanatory, variable that, once controlled for, unmasks a true relation- ‘because the “how” may provide a “why” and not just a “what”.’ ship. To avoid both Type I and Type II errors, we suggest that Noted philosopher of science, Rom Harré (1985: 40), makes researchers use process-tracing to determine the appropriate a similar point when he asserts, “In practice we never rest control variables. content with laws for which there is no explanation.” One 22 A parable recounted by Diana Baurmind (1983:1297) notable criticism of this approach is made by Kincaid (1994: illustrates why research into causal mechanisms can be in- 117), who argues that causal mechanisms can always be dis- valuable in discovering control variables. “The number of covered at deeper levels (e.g. at psychological or even never-married persons in certain British villages is highly in- neurophysiological levels). King, Keohane, and Verba make a versely correlated with the number of field mice in the similar point (1994: 86). We believe this criticism ultimately surrounding meadows. Marital status of humans was consid- fails, however, because a researcher must always conduct their ered an established cause of field mice by the village elders research at a chosen level of analysis, and the causal mecha- until the mechanism of transmission were finally surmised: nisms they seek should correspond to the level of analysis of Never-married persons bring with them a disproportionate their research. Moreover, if deeper causal mechanisms are dis- number of cats relative to the rest of the village populace and covered, and if they support the theory, then the theory will cats consume field mice. With the generative mechanisms un- only be more robust. derstood, village elders could concentrate their attention on
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increasing the population of cats rather than the proportion 23 Although it is not possible for case-study researchers to of never-married persons.” Glymour et al. (1987:19-21) op- consider all possible spurious relationships, neither is it pos- pose Baumrind’s “generative” account of causality. They argue sible to include all possible confounding variables in a statistical that in fact “never-married persons” do cause variation in field model. David Dessler (1999: 101) adopts this approach when mice, even if the causation is indirect, and nothing in the he suggests that environment-conflict researchers “Test causal story prevents the use of covariance analysis on uncontrolled claims not against the null hypothesis but against rival sub- samples to discover that the intervening variables is the den- stantive accounts of political violence in the cases analyzed.” sity of cats. But this belies the process that social scientists use 24 The State Failure Task Force’s Phase II report makes sig- to discover control variables. Without an investigation of the nificant strides in this direction. Unfortunately, data causal mechanisms, it is doubtful that the density of cats would limitations seriously impeded their ability to adequately have been included in a statistical analysis. operationalize some key variables. See Esty, et al (1999).
PECS NEWS
A TRI-ANNUAL NEWSLETTER ON ISSUES OF POPULATION, ENVIRONMENTAL CHANGE, AND SECURITY PUBLISHED BY THE ENVIRONMENTAL CHANGE AND SECURITY PROJECT.
FEATURES OF EACH ISSUE:
Meeting reports from recent ECSP meetings Past synopses have covered meetings that explored the demographic, environmental, and food security conditions in West Africa; the connection between population, consumption, and wood resources; and migration and environmental issues.
Book review A solicited review of a recently released publication looking at population, environment, and/or security issues.
Lessons from the Field This section is dedicated to sharing field reports from the University of Michigan Population Fellows Programs.
Project News This final section includes information on new ECSP publications, website features, and staff activities.
Early feedback on the first issue of the PECS News:
“You have really put together a first-rate piece. The layout is crisp, clean, highly readable… You have a fine assortment of articles, all at just the right length for all-in-one-sitting readability. I loved the book review you solicited… it was refreshing to read a true critique, with both positive and constructive comments… I also especially liked the report highlights and project news sections—they really give the reader a sense of the breadth of your work at a glance.”
The next issue of PECS News will be published in October 2000. If you are interested in receiving a copy, please contact the Project at [email protected] or by telephone at 202-691-4130. All issues of the newsletter are available on-line at http://ecsp.si.edu/PECS-News.
94 ENVIRONMENTAL CHANGE & SECURITY PROJECT REPORT, ISSUE 6 (SUMMER 2000) Commentary
Environment and Security in an International Context: Critiquing a Pilot Study from NATO’s Committee on the Challenges of Modern Society
by Richard A. Matthew
n Pakistan’s North-West Frontier Province, the combination of severe environmental stress and diffuse, violent conflict along the Afghanistan border might seem to provide an excellent example of the relationships examined in the NATO Committee on the Challenges of Modern Society’s (CCMS) new report on Environment and I 1 Security in an International Context. At first blush, one might conclude that environmental stress in this region is escalating the conflict. However, on closer examination it seems that the effect of environmental stress is mixed. Sometimes it acts to reinforce or trigger conflict, while other times it motivates people to reduce tensions and cooperate to solve problems. It has proven very difficult to model the varying effects of environmental stress in an accurate way. The co-chairs of this CCMS pilot study have undertaken the arduous task of developing a general model of environmental stress and conflict applicable to the entire world. In my experience, modeling a small region of a country abounding with many factors pulling in different directions is so complex that it is impossible to be satisfied with the results. Although the problem is an exceedingly complex one, the new CCMS report on environment and security is very lucid and well organized. It asks several explicit questions: What is environmental security? How can we model it? What sort of information would be useful to policymakers? And what sort of responses are available? Much of the value of the NATO/CCMS and Science Programme work on environmental issues is in the process of bringing people together to focus on certain challenges, view them from new perspectives, and, perhaps, come to a shared understanding. These benefits may add value to the task force experience beyond what is written in the report, but I shall consider only the text of the report, recognizing that it is a small part of a valuable and important initiative. In many ways, it is a bold report. It is bold not only in its recommendations but also in that it addresses the question of complexity very directly, unlike many other policy documents. This is a source of strength, but it also introduces some theoretical problems, which are the focus of my comments. The report begins by noting that NATO has a long-standing interest in non-traditional security issues, and that environmental stresses are emerging as one of these issues. As anybody who studies environmental history knows, a number of scholars believe that environmental stress has been the driving force behind many events in human history.2 The report is not introducing new issues. What is new is that a set of institutions that traditionally have not looked at these issues are now starting to examine them. Among the questions that have divided scholars and policymakers recently are whether security institutions
Richard A. Matthew is Assistant Professor of International Relations and Environmental Policy at the University of California, Irvine.
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ought to be studying this set of issues, whether these environmental stress and conflict or insecurity. The au- issues are best addressed by security institutions, and thors of the report are clearly aware of this. Early on, whether these institutions bring a certain value to the they write, “It is not environmental stress in isolation process that is not found elsewhere. It is important to that characterizes the nature of conflict between groups, mention these concerns since many of the conclusions but other factors.” (My emphasis) in this report are similar to those of work undertaken by Insofar as other factors include things like poverty development organizations and other organizations. and inequality, the report validates policies aimed at One might be encouraged by the apparent conver- promoting development and social justice. In being so gence of thinking among institutions that ostensibly have inclusive, however, it also reproduces a problem that is little in common. Indeed, one possible value of rethink- widespread in the field of environmental security. To- ing security is that this can provide a framework in which day one wants to learn not that many factors—including dialogue can take place among different groups and in- environmental ones—lead to stress, but rather the ex- stitutions, largely free of preconceptions and prejudices. tent to which environmental stress is related to conflict. Of course, one might also raise the concern that mili- Put another way, how much leverage will reducing envi- tary institutions are moving into areas already occupied ronmental stress give us over conflict and insecurity? By by the development and other communities, and won- using a very inclusive model, it becomes difficult to dis- der if this will lead to better outcomes in the long run. tinguish cases in which environmental stress is actually One of the fears of those critical of security institu- contributing to conflict in important ways, and ought tions examining environmental stress is that they will to be managed, from cases in which it is other factors study it from a perspective or with a mindset that sim- that are important. Equally worrisome, if we simply as- ply reinforces or extends their traditional mandates. sume that environmental stress is always a part of the Critics worry that particular environmental issues will problem and therefore must be dealt, we may actually be identified as important, while others will be neglected be neutralizing what some historical work suggests is an because they do not fit well into a traditional security important progressive element in a lot of social conflict framework. Environmental problems identified as se- situations. We may actually make the situation worse, curity issues, and hence likely to receive support from because it is often environmental stress that causes people governments and publics, could begin to monopolize to cooperate on problems and resolve some of the social resources. Critics are concerned that the neglected is- tensions that exist. In other words, one wants to know sues might be those most important to the developing (a) whether one should devote resources to environmen- world, and that the ultimate result of military involve- tal stress in a given case, and, if so, then (b) when the ment will be to reinforce inequalities in the international deployment of these resources is likely to be most effec- system tive. A model that does not distinguish among those A different type of concern is that once the state of cases where environmental stress needs to be addressed, the environment has been characterized as a security those where it is playing a minor role, and those where problem in ways relevant to security institutions, a path- it may be having a diffuse therapeutic effect, makes it way has been created towards the eventual use of force difficult for policymakers to act with confidence. and coercion. The authors of this report have provided a very com- These familiar concerns do not seem justified by prehensive conceptual model. The next phase might be the CCMS report. Instead of narrowing the concept of to clarify those feedback mechanisms that are reinforc- environmental security to cases that could benefit mili- ing conflict outcomes and those that are offsetting them, tary interests, this report opens the concept up. The and the conditions under which these dynamics are op- authors do this by taking a very liberal position on the erative. Then the model can be pared down and social impacts of environmental stress by defining con- researchers and policymakers can try to identify time flict very broadly. By being so broad, the authors are sensitivities to see which variables should be addressed able to be very inclusive. There are many roles for many immediately and how they can apply resources most ef- different institutions. There are clear suggestions of the ficiently to obtain desirable outcomes. Unfortunately, I importance of inter-agency dialogue and cooperation. am not sure that this sort of fine grain predictive mod- There is no sense that now is the time for the military to eling can be accomplished given the complexity of become involved and start solving problems others have conflict. We may have no choice, ultimately, but to use not been able to address effectively. very general conceptual models such as this as a starting Being broad, however, does introduce some prob- point for detailed case specific analysis that can yield lems in terms of modeling the phenomenon of clear policy preferences.
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A good example of this modeling concern is the sec- caused by disputes over status, wealth, injustice, or power ond phase of the State Failure Task Force project.3 The but lacks any ethnic, environmental, or migration com- task force’s report suggests that researchers should only ponent. Nor does it seem that these three cases always focus on large environmental stresses in a specific area have a significant environmental dimension, although over a short time period because beyond that point, the they might in some distant and indirect fashion. Nor, issues become too complicated to trace out causal rela- finally, does it seem that only these cases ever have a tionships. This may not be right, but it is worth noting significant environmental component. The conflict in that the Correlates of War Project researchers invested Kakadu National Park in Australia is between those com- much time into modeling conflict so that they would mitted to the spiritual value the land holds for some be able to predict it, and they were unsuccessful. Un- indigenous peoples and those seeking to exploit the ura- derstanding and predicting conflict are big challenges, nium it contains. I do not want to suggest that the and perhaps the CCMS model goes as far as researchers report’s typology is not valuable, but rather that its value can with very general, abstract models. needs further explanation. There are a few specific items in this report that I This same problem is repeated in chapter four on would like to raise questions about. One is the proposed integrated risk assessment where the authors present six- typology of environmental conflict cases, the topic of teen syndromes of environmental stress. This stands in chapter three. I disagree with the authors’ claim that a sharp contrast to Thomas Homer-Dixon’s work, which typology has to meet certain complexity requirements. simplifies environmental stress into three categories of A typology requires a clear organizing principle. That is scarcity (supply-induced, demand-induced, and struc- what a typology is. For example, one can collect food tural).4 One of the benefits of Homer-Dixon’s eaten at a meal and organize it in a number of different categorization is that it is very easy to understand and ways, such as by fat content, by the cost of it, or by its use. The CCMS model proposes sixteen syndromes gen- shelf life. Each of these might be valuable for a certain erating four conflict types with five levels of intensity, end. But if I divided the food into green food, food that which results in 320 different cases. The value of this comes from the ocean, and food that has a lot of pro- level of differentiation needs to be carefully explained, tein, one might ask me why I was organizing food stuffs because one might justifiably feel overwhelmed by its into this particular typology? What is my ordering prin- complexity and hence inclined to raise questions about ciple? In this report, readers need to be told what logic its validity. Certainly the world is complex; but models informs the division into migration conflicts, ethnic aimed at the policy world ought to reduce this com- conflicts, and resource scarcity conflicts. These do not plexity in a manner that has some explicit value, rather seem to cover all cases of conflict-surely some conflict is than reflect it. Perhaps the problem is that there is no
New Brochure from the Environmental Protection Agency
“Environmental Security: Strengthening National Security Through Environmental Protection” is a new brochure released by the Environmental Protection Agency, detailing the agency’s outlook and activities on environmental security. In addition to defining environmental security and providing examples of specific projects on which EPA has worked, the brochure features synopses of other organizations including ECSP, and how they are working to foster dialogue on the critical connections between environment and security.
For more information please contact the Environmental Protection Agency, Office of International Activities, MC 2660R Ronald Reagan Building, 1300 Pennsylvania Ave, NW, Washington, DC 20460.
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analytical filter that distinguishes how often these six- vironmental stress as a strategy for conflict prevention teen syndromes appear or how likely it is that they will or resolution; (c) inter-agency and transnational dialogue connect to the various levels of intensity in the various about the environmental security paradigm; and (d) ex- conflict situations. Including such a filter would pro- ploration of the roles of conventional security institutions vide the reader with a clear sense of the benefits of using within the context of this paradigm. this approach rather than Homer-Dixon’s simple tripar- tite structure. Finally, it is premature to discuss indicators and iden- tify thresholds, as the authors attempt to do. Obviously NOTES it would be tremendously valuable to be able to say, here are the key indicators of environmentally-induced con- 1 Gary Vest, Principal Assistant Deputy Under Secretary of flict, and here are the thresholds that, once surpassed, Defense for Environmental Security and Kurt Lietzmann, contribute to or trigger or generate conflict. But the Head of Division, Nature Conservation and Nuclear Safety, conceptual model does not actually provide a basis for Federal Ministry for the Environment, Germany co-chaired identifying indicators or thresholds. I suspect the au- and co-authored this NATO/CCMS pilot study on environ- thors are fully aware of this, which may explain why, in ment and security. This commentary is an extension on the end, the report moves away from prediction, its stated comments made at an Environmental Change and Security objective, and towards prevention and risk management, Project meeting, held on 1 September 1999, featuring the which are much more compelling policy approaches. pilot study’s release in the United States. In this context, it is difficult to disagree with the 2 See for example, Jared A. Diamond, Guns, Germs, and recommendations of the report. The authors provide a Steel: The Fates of Human Societies. New York: W.W. Norton logical and compelling set of prescriptions. and Co., 1999; Clive Ponting, A Green History of the World: In the end this report reaffirmed my personal belief The Environment and the Collapse of Great Civilizations. Lon- that environmental stress and conflict are often related don: Penguin Books, 1993; Brian M. Fagan, Floods, Famines, in significant ways. However, it also reaffirmed my be- and Emperors: El Niño and the Fate of Civilizations. New York: lief that we are a long way from developing a simple Basic Books, 1999; and Richard E. Leakey, The Origin of model that will adequately explain this relationship or Humankind. New York: Basic Books, 1996. provide us with the means to make useful predictions. 3 This may not please policymakers who want clear evi- In response to a request from Vice President Al Gore in dence of cause and effect, predictive models, and 1994, the Central Intelligence Agency established the “The assurance that if they do X, Y will or will not happen. State Failure Task Force,” a group of independent researchers But these are very difficult demands to satisfy. to examine comprehensively the factors and forces that have The authors of the report do a good job in convey- affected the stability of the post-Cold War world. The Task ing the complexity of this issue. Their general conceptual Force’s goals were to identify the factors or combinations of model is successful in reminding us that many factors factors that distinguish states that failed from those, which can and do lead to conflict. Moreover, in some cases, averted crises over the last forty years. The study represents environmental stress will be one of these, and perhaps the first empirical effort to identify factors associated with even the dominant factor. Therefore the study of con- state failure by examining a broad range of demographic, so- flict ought to include consideration of environmental cietal, economic, environmental, and political indicators stresses. Attempts to reduce conflict or resolve conflict influencing state stability. To read excerpts of the report, please ought to carefully consider the potential benefits of ad- see Daniel C. Esty, Jack A. Goldstone, Ted Robert Gurr, Bar- dressing environmental problems and promoting bara Harff, Marc Levy, Geoffrey D. Dabelko, Pamela T. Surko, sustainable environmental policies. and Alan N. Unger, “State Failure Task Force Report: Phase I am less convinced, however, that the authors make II Findings.” Environmental Change and Security Project Re- a compelling case that the next step is to refine this work port 5 (Summer 2000): 49-72. into a predictive model. I suspect this would be a very 4 See for example, Thomas F. Homer-Dixon, Environment, large and costly step, and I doubt that the probability of Scarcity, and Violence. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University success is very high. Press, 1999 or Thomas Homer-Dixon and Jessica Blitt, eds, The report is concise, engaging and useful, but it Ecoviolence: Links Among Environment, Population, and Secu- might better serve as the foundation for: (a) further dis- rity. Lanham, MD: Rowman and Littlefield, 1998. cussions about vulnerability, risk management, and conservation measures; (b) case specific analyses of en-
98 ENVIRONMENTAL CHANGE & SECURITY PROJECT REPORT, ISSUE 6 (SUMMER 2000) Commentary
Environment, Population, and Conflict: Suggesting a Few Steps Forward
by Richard A. Matthew and Geoffrey D. Dabelko
he thesis that environmental stress and population change contribute to violent conflict has undergone intensive examination over the last ten years.1 Both case study and quantitative efforts have sought to unpack Tthe complex mix of causal factors leading to violent conflict. Historically neglected in the study of conflict, environmental stress has moved into mainstream debates for a combination of reasons including the findings of new research on the pervasiveness and magnitude of environmental degradation, opportune political timing, and the search for an orienting post-Cold War security paradigm. On 19 March 2000, a group of scholars assembled at the University of California, Irvine to examine the current state of environment, population, and conflict research and to discuss the most promising directions for future research.2 Dividing their discussions into findings, methodology, and next steps, these frequent contributors to the literature engaged in a lively debate over the precise nature of causal dynamics and the most appropriate methods for investigating environmental-social linkages.3 Consensus on key issues was not forthcoming and the seemingly contradictory claims advanced by different researchers dictate the need for additional research and methodological diversity in the field of inquiry. Yet a num- ber of important, unifying themes emerged from the discussions that give this sub-field a clear history, identity, and future. From our perspectives as co-chairs of the workshop, we seek to group points of convergence and highlight areas of continued dispute. We hope this reporting facilitates the entry of new researchers into the field, the clarifi- cation of next steps for active scholars, and the utilization of findings by practitioners.
COMMON THEMES, DIVERSE PERSPECTIVES
Methods • The multiple methodologies applied to the environment as a cause of conflict thesis have identified a number of causal pathways, both general and case specific, with a higher level of confidence in the latter. All findings agree on the importance of intervening political, economic, and social variables, something various investiga- tors have termed capacity, vulnerability, or ingenuity.4 These societal variables appear critical in determining whether or not a country or a society can adapt to environmental and demographic stress in a manner that avoids conflict.
Despite some convergence of conclusions, fundamental differences among prominent research efforts remain. The Toronto Group,5 commonly associated with a case study approach, places environmental and demographic stress at the center of its causal diagrams. Need, in the form of various scarcities, contributes to the conditions that precipitate violence. Conversely, some elements of the Oslo Group6 utilize quantitative methods and find that abundance of natural and mineral resources correlates with violence. Greed then, rather than need, con- tributes to violence in a different set of cases also experiencing conflict according to this body of research.7 These need versus greed causal claims remain to be satisfactorily reconciled.
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• Differences along the lines of preferred methodolo- ern cases. North-South collaborative work is diffi- gies persist as they do in other realms of social sci- cult to establish, time-consuming, and often expen- ence. Large N quantitative and theory-driven studies sive. Yet it is fundamental to real progress in the may have reached points of diminishing returns, at evolution of this line of research inquiry. least until a new wave of in-depth case studies can be conducted. These methodologies have proven • Despite the recognition for some years of the need valuable for identifying associations of variables. Yet, to study the null cases, or cases where environmen- in the absence of extensive fieldwork, it is difficult tal and demographic stress are severe but no con- to move to the next step of developing truly persua- flict is present, attempts to address this explicit sive causal arguments. research need remain scattered and have clearly not yet reached critical mass. The call for more case study • Insofar as large N studies are concerned, data qual- work includes a call to investigate why the dogs bark ity and quantity currently available are mixed over in some cases but not in others in the face of similar space and time functions. Furthermore, the incred- levels or forms of environmental stress. Such case ible complexity of the conflict stories in individual studies could also provide a window into the forces cases provides a constant cautionary reminder of the generating various forms of cooperation in the face impediments to designing generalizable analyses and of shared stress. This cooperation, the potential ba- uncovering generalizable conclusions that are not sis for environment confidence or peace-building, highly abstract and hence of limited interest or value. represents an under-explored but critical next step These methods of statistical inquiry remain vital to in understanding environment, population, and 10 the field, however, as checks on case studies, while conflict linkages. providing guidance for more detailed research into particular cases or types of cases that may be fruit- Data ful. • Prominent investigations by research groups such as the State Failure Task Force,11 the Oslo Group, the Toronto Group, NATO’s Committee on the • For theory-driven work such as that undertaken by 12 8 Challenges of Modern Society, and the Environ- Thomas Homer-Dixon, the acknowledged critical 13 next step is developing far more nuanced under- mental Conflicts Project (ENCOP), have all come standings of causal mechanisms and intervening to the conclusion that we do not have enough reli- variables through more finely detailed case studies. able environmental data. Just how much water is being used in different cases? What is the air quality It is vital at this juncture that the next interdiscipli- in major urban areas and how is it changing over nary wave of researchers move into the field to do time? What is the actual rate of deforestation in a fine grain analysis that is informed by and sensitive given area, or the real amount of arable land avail- to local conditions. Such work is needed to better able? This is the common—and entirely understand the interactions among environmental, valid—complaint of many researchers who rely on political, economic, and social variables. One clear environmental data. Working with large gaps and need is to generate better understandings of the ele- unreliable or incommensurable measurements, it is ments and dynamics of adaptation to environmen- difficult to move beyond crude analyses and back- tal stress. of-the-envelope projections. The anecdotal, inaccurate, and fragmentary quality of much of the • If environment, population, and conflict research data used today further underscores the importance is to be policy relevant and tell as complete and ac- of fine grain fieldwork. curate a story as it possible to tell, it is going to have to break free of the Western knowledge base and its • Similar problems exist with the intervening variables institutions. More frequent and meaningful partici- most models use. For example, attempts to pation of developing country scholars and practi- operationalize and measure critical concepts such tioners is critical to understand better the dynamics as capacity, vulnerability, or ingenuity are often com- of many of the cases in which the linkages among promised by a lack of appropriate data, especially these variables would appear to be most pronounced. data across space and time boundaries. Although some efforts have been made in this di- rection,9 the research remains largely conducted by Suggesting a Few Steps Forward European and North American scholars and practi- In many ways the research conducted during the tioners despite the overwhelming focus on South- 1990s on environment, population, and conflict has been
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compelling and influential. It has penetrated the Participants at the Environment, Population, and field of security studies, breaking through con- Conflict Workshop 19 March 2000, Irvine, California. cepts and theories that staunchly resisted change for decades. It has propelled environmental stud- ies in a bold—and controversial—new direction. WORKSHOP CO-CHAIRS It has guided a flurry of policy innovation and Geoffrey D. Dabelko, Environmental Change and interagency cooperation in the United States and Security Project, Woodrow Wilson Center abroad. But at the close of the 1990s, the results Richard A. Matthew, Department of Urban and of several major research initiatives seemed to Regional Planning, University of California Irvine do little more than reiterate or clumsily dispute claims made by Homer-Dixon, Norman Myers,14 and others at the start of the decade. The engine PARTICIPANTS driving the research seems to have stalled. This Sheldon AhSing, University of California, Irvine is equally true outside the academic world. Gov- Michele Carus-Christian, Woodrow Wilson Center ernmental efforts have been bleached of innovation and controversy by the politics that Mathew Coleman, University of California, Los Angeles demands consensus or insists that particularly Diana Cammack, University of California, Irvine sensitive issues be set aside. Turkish demands to Simon Dalby, Carleton University eliminate references to freshwater in the NATO/ Indra de Soysa, International Peace CCMS pilot study present a glaring example of Research Institute, Oslo this kind of problem. The degree to which the findings of recent Tom Deligiannis, University of Toronto studies recall those of earlier ones, or seem ex- David Dessler, College of William & Mary ceptionally unfocused and constrained, has led Joe DiMento, University of California, Irvine some observers to conclude that the field of in- Ted Gaulin, University of California, Irvine quiry is itself exhausted. This is far from true or even likely. What is needed today is a new wave Jonathan Hall, University of California, Irvine of meticulous fieldwork generating case studies Betsy Hartmann, Hampshire College that will provide fuel for a new round of theory Lynn Harris, University of California, Irvine development. We believe that contemporary communications technologies conspire to create Thomas Homer-Dixon, University of Toronto the false and arrogant impression that we gener- Colin Kahl, University of Minnesota ally have a good sense of what is happening on Shanda Leather, Woodrow Wilson Center the ground in the far reaches of the globe. This Marc Levy, CIESIN, Columbia University facile, ungrounded expertise, which shifts the emphasis of scholarship to highly abstract de- Ronnie D. Lipschutz, University of bates, is proving the death of any authority the California-Santa Cruz social sciences may once have had—clearly no Bryan McDonald, University of California, Irvine substitute measures up to fieldwork insofar as Jamie Morgan, University of California, Irvine understanding and modeling complex causal networks linking social and ecological systems is Karin Mueller, Woodrow Wilson Center concerned. Jimmy Ng, University of California, Irvine The UCI discussions pointed to a needed Kate O’Neill, University of California, Berkeley direction for research that focuses on cases where Nathaniel Osgood, University of California, Irvine environmental stress is present but a spectrum of outcomes from cooperation to conflict occurs. D.J. Peterson, The RAND Corporation This approach will be critical in helping resolve Jessica Powers, Woodrow Wilson Center the Oslo Group-Toronto Group argument of Clair Twigg, Woodrow Wilson Center need versus greed as precipitators of conflict. It Stacy VanDeveer, University of New Hampshire will also help answer the conflict versus coop- eration questions that have been asked repeatedly by critics of the field, yet remain to be answered.15
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In addition to the work required to improve our this evolutionary process. In this case, what is really understanding of complex environment-population- needed today is more high quality research that might conflict linkages, the sub-field is, inevitably perhaps, help drain the sea of some of its competing, abstract, plagued by lingering problems over the nature of cau- and highly similar models and concepts. sality and the most productive and appropriate The efforts to untangle the linkages among envi- methodologies.16 These problems vex other fields of in- ronment, population, and violent conflict have quiry and the environmental and demographic stress accomplished a great deal in a short period of time. interactions should not be held to a higher standard than Environmental and demographic stress are firmly on is the case in investigations of other causal variables. In research and practitioner agendas, as these stresses are other words, some of the criticism is based on unrealis- understood to be part of the complex causal mix that tic expectations or demands, which have not been met shapes the character and behavior of our social systems. anywhere in the social sciences. Although their impacts often are felt early and/or indi- This is not to say that the causal and methodologi- rectly in the causal chain,17 environmental and cal debates should be terminated. These methodological population variables have been added—rightly—to the debates will help sort out the very different conclusions basket of more traditional causes of violent conflict. This drawn from various research programs. As workshop attention is given despite the inability to provide pre- participant and methodology expert David Dessler em- cisely weighted linkages (arguably an unreachable phasized, it is critical to return to the basic distinctions standard in the realm of complex social phenomena). among association, correlation and causation when Reaching this threshold of inclusion and consideration evaluating research and drawing scholarly conclusions is a tangible contribution made in the last ten years of and policy lessons. Focusing on methodological limita- research, one that holds promise and relevance to both tions would likely lead to more cautious causal claims scholarly and policy communities. Having raised as and to narrow differences between opposing research many questions as it has answered, the field of inquiry conclusions. Progress must be ongoing and interactive; must now conduct the more varied and in-depth field- theory guiding research, leading to a reworking of theory, work that will allow us to build on the foundation of identifying further research needs, and the repetition of knowledge that exists today.
NOTES
1 For an extensive list of works in the field, see the biblio- distinguish states that failed from those, which averted crises graphic guide to the literature published in the Woodrow over the last forty years. The study represents the first em- Wilson Center’s annual Environmental Change and Security pirical effort to identify factors associated with state failure by Project Report, available on-line at http://ecsp.si.edu. examining a broad range of demographic, societal, economic, environmental, and political indicators influencing state sta- 2 This workshop was co-sponsored by the University of bility. To read excerpts of the report, please see Daniel C. California, at Irvine’s Focused Research Group on Interna- Esty, Jack A. Goldstone, Ted Robert Gurr, Barbara Harff, Marc tional Environmental Cooperation and the Woodrow Wilson Levy, Geoffrey D. Dabelko, Pamela T. Surko, and Alan N. Center’s Environmental Change and Security Project. The Unger, “State Failure Task Force Report: Phase II Findings.” workshop was made possible by support from the co-spon- Environmental Change and Security Project Report 5 (Summer sors and the International Studies Association workshop 2000): 49-72; Thomas Homer-Dixon, Environment, Scarcity, program. and Violence. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1999; 3 See the participant list at the end of this article. Thomas F. Homer-Dixon, “The Ingenuity Gap: Can Poor 4 In 1998, Phase II of the U.S. State Failure Task Force Countries Adapt to Resource Scarcity?” Population and De- results focused on “capacity” and “vulnerability” in an envi- velopment Review 21 (September 1995): 587-612; Daniel M. ronmental sub-model. Thomas Homer-Dixon of the Schwartz, Tom Deligiannis, and Thomas Homer-Dixon, “The University of Toronto utilizes the term “ingenuity.” In response Environment and Violent Conflict: A Response to Gleditsch’s to a request from Vice President Al Gore in 1994, the Central Critique and Some Suggestions for Future Research.” Envi- Intelligence Agency established the “The State Failure Task ronmental Change and Security Project Report 6 (Summer Force,” a group of independent researchers to examine com- 2000): 77-94. prehensively the factors and forces that have affected the 5 The Toronto Group commonly refers to the work of Tho- stability of the post-Cold War world. The Task Force’s goals mas F. Homer-Dixon and colleagues affiliated with the were to identify the factors or combinations of factors that University of Toronto. Homer-Dixon has led three major
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research projects in the 1990s, producing a large number of 11 Esty et al., 1998. See endnote 4 for a description of the qualitative case studies on environment, scarcity and violence. State Failure Task Force. See citations listed in endnote 5. Toronto Group research can 12 Germany and the United States co-chaired a three-year be accessed at http://www.library.utoronto.ca/www/eps/ pilot study of environment and security with a special focus state.htm. on environment, population, and conflict ending in 1999. 6 The Oslo Group commonly refers to a set of researchers See Kurt M. Lietzmann and Gary D. Vest. Environment and affiliated with the International Peace Research Institute, Oslo Security in an International Context. NATO/Committee on (PRIO). PRIO researchers have made both qualitative and the Challenges of Modern Society, 1998. See also Issue 5 of quantitative contributions to the environment, population and the Environmental Change and Security Project Report for ex- conflict literature, including a set of prominent critiques. See cerpts of the pilot study report. Nils Petter Gleditsch. “Armed Conflict and the Environment: 13 ENCOP was a major Swiss research project co-directed A Critique of the Literature.” Journal of Peace Research 35:3 by Günther Baechler of the Swiss Peace Foundation and Kurt (May 1998): 381-400; Wenche Hauge, and Tanja Ellingsen. Spillmann of the Center for Security Studies and Conflict “Beyond Environmental Scarcity: Causal Pathways to Con- Research at the Swiss Federal Institute of Technology. ENCOP flict.” Journal of Peace Research 35:3 (May 1998): 299-317; researchers conducted over forty qualitative case studies on Nils Petter Gleditsch, ed. Conflict and the Environment. environment, population and conflict. ECOMAN, succeeded Dordrecht: Kluwer Publications, 1997; Dan Smith and Willy ENCOP in the late 1990s to focus on the environment, popu- Østreng, eds. Research on Environment, Poverty and Conflict: lation and conflict linkages in the Horn of Africa. See Günther A Proposal. (PRIO Report 3/97) Oslo: Fridjtof Nansen Insti- Baechler, Volker Böge, Stefan Klötzli, Stephan Libiszewski and tute and International Peace Research Institute, Oslo, 1997; Kurt R. Spillmann. Kriegsursache Umweltzerstorung. Indra de Soysa and Nils Petter Gleditsch. “To Cultivate Peace: Okologische Konflikte in der Dritten Welt und Wege ihrer Agriculture in a World of Conflict.” Environmental Change friedlichen Bearbeitung. [Ecological Conflicts in the Third and Security Project Report 5 (Summer 1999): 15-25; Indra World and Ways for their Resolution.] Vol. I, Zurich: Ruegger de Soysa and Nils Petter Gleditsch. “The Natural Resource Verlag, 1996; Günther Baechler and Kurt R. Spillmann, eds. Curse: Are Civil Wars Driven by Need or Greed?” Paper pre- Environmental Degradation as a Cause of War, Vol.s 2-3. Zurich: sented at the International Studies Association annual Ruegger Verlag, 1996; Günther Baechler. “Why Environment convention. Los Angeles, CA, 14-18 March 2000; Paul F. Causes Violence: A Synthesis.” Environmental Change and Diehl and Nils Petter Gleditsch, eds. Environmental Conflict. Security Project Report 4 (Summer 1998): 24-44; Günther Boulder, CO: Westview Press, forthcoming 2000. Baechler. Violence through Environmental Discrimination: 7 Indra de Soysa and Nils Petter Gleditsch. “The Natural Cause, Rwanda Arena, and Conflict Model. Dordrecht: Kluwer Resource Curse: Are Civil Wars Driven by Need or Greed?” Academic Publishers, 1999. Paper presented at the International Studies Association an- 14 Norman Myers, Ultimate Security: The Environmental nual convention. Los Angeles, CA, 14-18 March 2000. Basis of Political Stability. New York: W.W. Norton and Co., 8 See Thomas F. Homer-Dixon, “On the Threshold: Envi- 1993. ronmental Changes as Causes of Acute Conflict.” International 15 Conca, forthcoming 2000; Conca and Dabelko, forth- Security 16:2 (Fall 1991): 76-116; Thomas F. Homer-Dixon. coming. “Environmental Scarcities and Violent Conflict: Evidence 16 from Cases.” International Security 19:1 (Summer 1994): 5– David Dessler, “Review of Environment, Scarcity, and 40; Thomas F. Homer-Dixon. The Environment, Scarcity, and Violence.” Environmental Change and Security Project Report 5 Violence. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1999. See (Summer 1999): 100-101. also Colin H. Kahl. “Population Growth, Environmental 17 While current research suggests this early and/or indirect Degradation, and State-Sponsored Violence: The Case of environmental and demographic causal contribution, it is Kenya, 1991-93.” International Security 23:2 (Fall 1998): worth briefly noting that environmental change does not al- 80-119. ways occur in a linear fashion. The natural environment’s 9 For example, developing country participation in research propensity to have thresholds, that when crossed, can lead to is an explicit principle for research conducted through the sudden environment shifts (such as in temperature or pre- Global Environmental Change and Human Security Project cipitation patterns), raises the distinct possibility that
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To Cultivate a New Model: Where de Soysa and Gleditsch Fall Short
by Ted Gaulin
here is a tendency in the environmental security literature to criticize the work of Thomas Homer-Dixon.1 Primary among the critiques, are that his models are too complex,2 that key terms are vague,3 and that, Twhen stripped down to their essence, his models do not tell us anything new.4 Yet research efforts that seek to improve upon Homer-Dixon’s work have not produced models with more explanatory power or models that contain new insights. Indeed, in many instances, such efforts take us backwards rather than forwards in our understanding of the dynamics of human vulnerability and conflict. One example of this is an article by Indra de Soysa and Nils Petter Gleditsch entitled “To Cultivate Peace: Agriculture in a World of Conflict.”5 In “To Cultivate Peace,” de Soysa and Gleditsch argue that a lack of physical, human, and social capital—what they call poverty—reduces agricultural production, which often leads to violent conflict. Their point is well taken, and their discussion of the interactions that give rise to violence (e.g. rent seeking, urban bias, etc.) is interesting. However, a careful analysis of the basic causal processes that de Soysa and Gleditsch describe, reveals that they are covering the same terrain previously covered by Homer-Dixon. To be sure, the terms used by the different authors vary but the meanings and processes are the same. For example, in Figure 1 (following page), where I have sketched out de Soysa and Gleditsch’s basic argument, one sees that in both models, the outcome is largely determined by the presence or absence of physical, human, or social capital. De Soysa and Gleditsch call the lack of these attributes “poverty;” Homer-Dixon calls the lack of these attributes an “ingenuity gap.” In both models, it is a lack of adaptive capacity, whether one calls it poverty or an ingenuity gap, that leads to deleterious social effects. In de Soysa and Gleditsch’s model, the focus is on low agricultural production; in Homer-Dixon’s model, low agricultural produc- tion is one of five negative social effects. In both models, the negative social outcome is the proximate cause of violent conflict and, in both cases, violence has a positive feedback into the system. For de Soysa and Gleditsch, conflict exacerbates the conditions of poverty; in Homer-Dixon’s model, it exacerbates scarcity and reduces ingenu- ity. In short, the model proposed by de Soysa and Gleditsch bears an uncanny resemblance to the Homer-Dixon model of which they are critical. Of the two, Homer-Dixon’s is more elaborate because it attempts to explain more. For example, Homer-Dixon’s model covers cases in which negative social effects besides agricultural decline lead to violent conflict. In this respect, Gleditsch and de Soysa have succeeded in avoiding what they view as one of the problems with Homer-Dixon’s work, namely the high level of complexity. However, in doing so, they have pro- duced a model that is largely derivative6 and has less explanatory power than its progenitor. The value of the linkage de Soysa and Gleditsch make between low agricultural production and conflict is limited in so far as low agricultural production is presented as the outcome of a complex and vague set of processes packaged into the concept of poverty. In contrast, Homer-Dixon’s model shows that environmental scarcity, ren- dered destructive due to the lack of social ingenuity, is an important force behind low agricultural production.
Ted Gaulin is a Ph.D. candidate at the University of California, Irvine.
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Figure 1. Comparison of the de Soysa / Gleditsch Model and the Homer-Dixon Model
de Soysa and Gleditsch
Poverty Poverty Lack of Physical Capital (loss of livelihood) Lack of Physical Capital (loss of livelihood) LackLack of ofHuman Human Capital Capital (development failure) failure) LackLack of ofSocial Social Capital Capital (state(state failure, failure, penetration) penetration)
egative Social Effect NegativeLow Agricultural Social ProductionEffect ViolentViolent Low Agricultural Production ConflictConflict
Homer-Dixon
Ingenuity IngenuityPhysical Capital (physical endowment of the land) PhysicalHuman Capital Capital (physical (capacity for endowment new technologies) of the land) HumanSocial Capital Capital (capacity (state capacity; for new sound technologies) institutions) Social Capital (state capacity; sound institutions)
NegativeNegative Social Effects Effects Environmentalntal LowLow Agricultural Agricultural Production,Production, ViolentViolent Scarcity Low Economic Productivity, Conflict LowMigration, Economic Social Productivity, Segmentation, Conflict Migration,Disrupted InstitutionsSocial Segmentation, Disrupted Institutions
Given the enormous amount of environmental damage cultural decline, then the ensuing conflict is essentially that can be traced to agricultural practices, Homer- political. One might also ask why the authors seem to Dixon’s argument makes a good deal of sense and in conceptualize subsistence conflicts as a post-cold war spite of its complexity, is analytically more focused. phenomenon. Historians have long believed that a sub- The authors’ characterization of agriculturally in- sistence crisis was an important cause of the French duced conflict as “apolitical”7 is unpersuasive. As Harold Revolution.8 Similarly, scholars have argued that chronic Lasswell argued over fifty years ago, politics is, at base, food shortages in the 1980s among Latin American peas- about the authoritative allocation of resources. When citi- ants made revolutionary movements in those countries zens of a particular country do not have enough to eat particularly compelling, and these revolutionary move- because state failure or development failure causes agri- ments fomented much conflict.
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The larger disappointment, however, is that de Soysa eds. Daniel H. Deudney and Richard A. Matthew. Al- and Gleditsch have produced a model that essentially bany, NY: State University of New York Press, 1999: covers the same ground previously covered by Homer- 91-108. Dixon. Moreover, their model is less compelling than Homer-Dixon’s and it adds little to our understanding Gleditsch, Nils Petter. “Armed Conflict and the Envi- of the dynamics of human vulnerability and conflict. ronment: A Critique of the Literature.” Journal of Peace When one puts the de Soysa-Gleditsch model in Research 35:3 (1998): 381-400. the context of other attempts to improve upon or refute Homer-Dixon’s theoretical work (I think of the models Levy, Marc. “Is the Environment a National Security proposed in the NATO and CIA studies summarized in Issue?” International Security 20:2 (1995): 35-62. this journal), one must conclude that this has not been a very productive approach to improving our under- Schama, Simon. Citizens: a Chronicle of the French Revo- standing of the complex ways in which environmental lution. New York: Knopf, 1989. scarcities interact with social systems. It would, perhaps, be far more fruitful to undertake more extensive field- work in areas facing severe environmental scarcities (as NOTES Colin Kahl and others are doing), and then adjust our environment-conflict theories in the light of this detailed 1 Critiques include Dabelko, 1999; Dessler, 1999; Deudney, empirical evidence. 1999; Dalby, 1999; and Frédérick, 1999. For more on Tho- mas Homer-Dixon’s work, see, for example, Thomas F. Homer Dixon, “On the Threshold: Environmental Changes as Causes REFERENCES of Acute Conflict,” International Security 16 (Fall 1991): 76- 116; Thomas F. Homer-Dixon, “Environmental Scarcities and Dabelko, Geoffrey. “The Environmental Factor.” Wil- Violent Conflict: Evidence from Cases.,” International Secu- son Quarterly 23:4 (Autumn 1999): 14-20. rity 19 (Summer 1994): 5-40; and Thomas F. Homer-Dixon, Environment, Scarcity, and Violence (Princeton, NJ: Princeton Dalby, Simon. “Threats from the South? Geopolitics, University Press, 1999). Equity and Environmental Security,” In Contested 2 Gleditsch, 1998. Grounds: Security and Conflict in the New Environmen- 3 Ibid. tal Politics, eds. Daniel H. Deudney and Richard A. Matthew. Albany, NY: State University of New York 4 Levy, 1995. Press, 1999: 155-185. 5 de Soysa and Gleditsch, 1999. 6 In addition to the basic model, other key elements of de Deudney, Daniel H. “Environmental Security: A Cri- Soysa and Gleditsch echo the work of Homer-Dixon. For tique,” In Contested Grounds: Security and Conflict in example, de Soysa and Gleditsch describe a process called the New Environmental Politics, eds. Daniel H. Deudney “preemption” in which one party arrogates the limited re- and Richard A. Matthew. Albany, NY: State University sources of another group to forestall future shortages. This of New York Press, 1999: 187-219. parallels Homer-Dixon’s concept of “resource capture.” Dessler, David. “A Review of Environment Scarcity and 7 de Soysa and Gleditsch, 1999: 21. Violence by Thomas Homer Dixon.” Environmental 8 Schama, 1989. Change and Security Project Report 5 (Summer 1999): 100-101.
de Soysa, Indra and Nils Petter Gleditsch. “To Cultivate Peace: Agriculture in a World of Conflict.” Environmen- tal Change and Security Project Report 5 (Summer 1999): 15-25.
Frédérick, Michel. “A Realists’s Conceptual Definition of Environmental Security,” In Contested Grounds: Se- curity and Conflict in the New Environmental Politics,
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COMMENTARY: TRADE AND THE ENVIRONMENT AFTER SEATTLE— PERSPECTIVES FROM THE WILSON CENTER
Free trade, seen by many as the engine of world economic growth, has once again become the subject of bitter dispute. Nowhere was this more evident than at the meeting of the World Trade Organization (WTO) in Seattle at the end of 1999. There, environmentalists joined with trade unionists and advocates for developing countries in staging mass protests. These diverse groups claimed the WTO is unrepresentative and undemocratic, overlooking environmental interests and those of the world’s poor in favor of big business. Inside the negotiating halls, the United States and the European Union clashed over agricultural subsidies and genetically modified organisms (GMOs). Developing country representatives complained that they remained marginalized in the official talks.
As a first step in addressing these complex linkages, we at the Wilson Center have drawn upon Wilson Center speakers and fellows, past and present, to comment on trade and the environment in the wake of Seattle. Future activities of the Environmen- tal Change and Security Project will promote dialogue and exchange on this topic and we are especially pleased that William Krist (formerly of the American Electronics Association) has joined the Center as a senior policy scholar to facilitate these debates.
WILLIAM M. DALEY, SECRETARY OF COMMERCE
Remarks excerpted from address at a Wilson Center Director’s Forum on trade and the environment, sponsored by the Environmental Change and Security Project on 22 November 1999. Please see the report on this speech and the accompa- nying roundtable in the meeting summary section of this report.
…I have a unique position in all this [the link between trade and the environment]. I am the voice for business and competition in the Administration. And I am responsible for a big part of the environment. You may not know this, but the largest agency at Commerce is the National Oceanic and Atmosphere Administration (NOAA), which manages fisheries, endangered species, and coastal ecosystems. So, I know the pressures that growth can put on the environment, and the need to protect places like our National Marine Sanctuaries. But I also know the needs of the business community. That is what the Administration’s trade and environment policy is all about. …Let me say, at Commerce, I insist on close cooperation between NOAA and our trade people in ITA [Inter- national Trade Administration]…[W]e now have a very effective approach, where all concerns are voiced and addressed before there is a crisis. Take, for example, our recent agreement with forty-two nations to build back Atlantic tuna and swordfish populations. We include strong enforcement provisions, and we believe it is WTO- compliant. Let me briefly outline what Commerce brings to the table at the WTO and beyond. First, we are leading the charge on lowering trade barriers that also pay environmental dividends. The top issue is ending fish subsidies that lead to too many boats, chasing too few fish. This, plus our efforts on international agreements, will help protect the
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world environment. protect the environment. Let me use forestry manage- And we are moving on other fronts. We want the ment as an example. Obviously, we should be working WTO to reduce tariffs on environmental and clean en- to develop a global forestry industry that is sustainable ergy products, which would make them cheaper and in the long run. This means we must remove distorting more widely available. Since America makes some of tariffs—which we have proposed in the WTO. It also the best of this technology in the world, I have asked means developing better tools to monitor the health of my staff to develop an aggressive program to increase forests. And we believe one way to achieve this is by a our exports of these products. I believe we can at least marriage of the forest products, and space industries. double them to $18 billion, in five years. Today I am calling on them to begin working on One final point on WTO. I know that many of you that partnership. I hope it will develop new manage- are concerned that the WTO can over-ride international ment tools that use satellite remote sensing to improve environmental agreements. And worse yet, that they can forest conservation. At the heart of this is doing a better override U.S. law. Both the President and the Vice Presi- job of sharing and using these satellite images around dent have been very clear on this one. Nations have the the globe. We will be the catalyst for opening the dia- right to set environmental standards, based on sound logue. science, at the levels they believe are necessary—even if Before closing, let me make a final point. We can- these are higher than international standards. This prin- not achieve any of these goals—despite the commitment ciple is absolutely consistent with WTO rules. of this [Clinton] administration—without your help. Second, at [the Department of ] Commerce, we will No way, no how. The fact is, we need your patience and be looking for new partnerships that expand trade and your participation. This is a very new issue.
MIKHAIL GORBACHEV, FORMER PRESIDENT OF THE SOVIET UNION AND PRESIDENT, GREEN CROSS INTERNATIONAL
Remarks excerpted from his speech at a Director’s Forum at the Wilson Center on 7 December 1999.
…[O]bjectively there are many problems and chal- grew four times. In the beginning of the century, the lenges that nations cannot meet alone. And therefore, world was producing $60 billion less of gross product a there [is] a need to develop a global approach, a global year. Now the same amount is produced in just one day. vision and global institutions, in order to identify and So imagine what kind of pressure that puts on the envi- harmonize interests and find ways out of these difficult ronment. situations…. At the beginning of the century, mankind used 300 But today the whole paradigm of development is cubic kilometers of water. Now mankind uses 4,000 changing, not just the end of the Cold War, the civiliza- cubic kilometers of water, which is more than [a] ten- tion is changing. And these are overlapping processes fold increase. Everywhere we are in conflict with nature. and we should rethink the world and develop new poli- The natural environment that produced mankind, the cies that will be consistent with these challenges and natural environment that resulted in our long evolu- develop the new context in which we [will] live….I be- tion, is being destroyed today. And in this we are lieve that the environment is the number one item on destroying the very conditions of our existence. the agenda of the twenty-first century…. So it [is] not just that we need a good environment Only one third of mankind has decent living con- for the town or in a village or in a region or—of course ditions. Two thirds are in bad shape. They do [not] have that [is] necessary. Of course that [is] where we begin to enough to eat and they live in misery as you well know. create an environmental awareness. What is more im- But, if by providing decent living conditions for only portant, we need to change the very modes of economic one third of mankind, we still face environmental crisis, activity. We need to critically reassess the way of life that the root cause is that the very foundations, the very fun- leads to this kind of situation. damentals of our existence may be wrong….[T]he Now let [us] imagine everyone wants to live accord- civilization that mankind selected has resulted in real ing to the American standards. Where are the resources conflict between man and nature. for this kind of energy, for the fuel? It [is] simply In the twentieth century, the population of the world unacceptable…we need to preserve nature and find har-
108 ENVIRONMENTAL CHANGE & SECURITY PROJECT REPORT, ISSUE 6 (SUMMER 2000) Commentary mony so that each nation, within the framework of its with oil products, and particularly fifty percent of stra- history, culture and mentality, cooperating with others, tegic reserves of freshwater and strategic aquifers of finds its own way. Kuwait have been polluted. A similar situation is now At Green Cross International, we have been work- becoming clear in . . . Yugoslavia. Petro-chemical facto- ing on the preparation of the Earth Charter. It [is] a ries were bombed and the Balkans have now been kind of set of ecological commandments….It is ad- possibly polluted. dressed to everyone—to politicians, to business- And finally we have a freshwater project. We have men….Politics and business need a push from civil begun this project in the Middle East. It is very difficult society. There should be mechanisms to influence poli- there to negotiate the interests of different sides. We are ticians and businessmen because society [will not] like supported by the leaders of Middle Eastern countries, environmental problems that much. Even social prob- and I believe that we will be able to be a very important lems, they accept with a lot of difficulty and certainly project that will be a precedent to solve not only [the not environmental problems. Middle East’s own] problems but other problems of Another project that we [Green Cross International] drinking water and of freshwater…. are doing with UNESCO . . . is a project for To conclude my remarks let me say this. If the envi- environmentalized education. Education at all levels, in ronmental movements in the United States, in Russia, primary school and all the way to university level, to and in Brazil, and China, and Europe [can] work effec- study the environment and to study every problem or tively, then we can hope to do a great deal. I would like every discipline, how to [respect] the environment. you in the United States to help us in developing a very …[A project that is of ] great importan[ce] for Rus- strong organization. In the United States, a strong envi- sia and the United States [is] the environmental legacy ronmental organization is emerging, an affiliate of Green of the arms race…. Cross in the state of Georgia. The governor will be help- We are also working on the consequences of . . . the ing us to develop a regional branch—a state branch of wars in the Gulf. . . . the very brief use of weapons re- Green Cross. That [is] very important.… sulted in the poisoning of the soil, and in poisoning
ANDREA DURBIN, DIRECTOR, INTERNATIONAL PROGRAM, FRIENDS OF THE EARTH—U.S.
Seattle: What it Meant and Where To Go From Here? country activists—recognizes the inevitability of global- The World Trade Organization (WTO) meetings ization, but contends that it must be changed so it in Seattle have put international trade issues and the elevates social values, and does not leave them behind. way in which trade policy is made under new public It is calling for the economic rules of the game to change scrutiny. The old way of conducting global trade talks— so they put the public interest before the corporate in- where governments negotiated agreements in closed, terest. Environmental organizations, like Friends of the exclusive settings—proved unacceptable to ordinary Earth (FoE), are calling for specific reforms of the trad- people and even to many governments, especially those ing system, which include: from the developing world. The protests’ fundamental message was that global institutions like the WTO need 1. Democratizing Trade: In Washington and Geneva to be democratic and accountable and that economic In Seattle, President Clinton acknowledged the rules must be balanced and should promote social val- need to democratize trade policy and to make the WTO ues, such as environmental, labor, and human rights more transparent and accountable to people. FoE be- protections. lieves democracy starts at home. Before we can reform Since Seattle, protests at the World Economic Fo- the WTO, we should first reform the way the United rum in Davos, Switzerland and the World Bank/ States makes trade policy. Today, the corporate sector International Monetary Fund (IMF) meetings in Wash- provides input into United States’ trade policymaking ington, D.C. have amplified that message. A new social process, but the public is largely shut out. U.S. posi- movement of environmental, labor, human rights, stu- tions on trade therefore reflect the corporate interest, dents, and other groups is growing in the United States. not environmental, human rights, and labor interests. This movement—which joins the calls of developing This must change before the United States can credibly
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argue for a more democratic WTO. to protect the environment or to enact environmental If the public has a greater voice in the domestic trade laws that impact trade. The environment has been on policymaking process, better, more balanced trade policy the losing end of every environmental dispute that has and more public confidence in international trade will reached arbitration at the WTO. In the United States, result. FoE recommends that the U.S. trade advisory the Clean Air Act and Endangered Species Act have been system be opened to environmental organizations and weakened as a result of a WTO ruling. In Europe, at- other public interest groups, and that public notice be tempts to keep hormone-injected beef off the market given when the U. S. government uses the WTO to have been overturned. In Japan, U.S. complaints about threaten other countries’ environmental laws. The United proposed fuel efficiency regulations have led to a weak- States Trade Representative’s (USTR) office should not ening of the regulations. In the past five years, the WTO’s
“ ations have the right to set environmental standards, based on Nsound science, at the levels they believe are necessary—even if these are higher than international standards.”
be able to decide on its own whether to challenge an trade rules have been used to both weaken existing envi- environmental law of another country without input ronmental laws and “chill” the development of new laws from the public and appropriate environmental agen- and regulations for fear that they will impede free trade. cies. Environmental organizations have called for the environmental reform of trade rules so they will not be 2. Change the Balance of Power from Trade to Envi- used to undermine environmental protection goals. ronment Environmental groups are not trying to convert the World A decade of advocacy has led environmental orga- Trade Organization into an environmental organization nizations to the conclusion that one of the main obstacles as some business representatives have alleged. In fact, to environmental reform of trade policy is the USTR. that assumption is far from the truth. The WTO does Even though USTR lacks environmental expertise and not have the competency to deal with environmental is perceived as being beholden to business interests, it issues, nor should it. In reality, what FoE wants, is to plays the lead role in setting U.S. policies on trade and reduce the WTO’s involvement in environmental the environment. In the lead up to Seattle, USTR policymaking so trade rules do not interfere with envi- blocked the environmental community’s calls for WTO ronmental laws. reforms that would have reduced threats to environmen- What this requires are some substantive rule changes tal laws. The solution to this problem is to give to grant greater deference to environmental and health environmental agencies like the Environmental Protec- laws and to change the dispute resolution process at the tion Agency (EPA) and the Council on Environmental WTO. The rule changes should: Quality (CEQ) the lead role in setting the environmen- tal aspects of U.S. trade policy. USTR would then be • Provide deferential treatment to local, national, and responsible for representing these positions in trade ne- international environmental and public health laws; gotiations. Until the balance of power shifts from USTR • Protect the right to limit the harmful effects of re- to environmental agencies, environmental reform of source extraction and methods of production; trade will be hard to achieve. • Protect the consumer’s right to know labeling pro- grams; 3. Environmental Reforms of the WTO: More Neutral- • Protect the right to use purchasing power to pro- izing than Greening tect the environment; Since the WTO’s establishment in 1995, environ- • Protect the right to strong environmental standards mentalists have pointed to conflicts between its trade that err on the side of caution in the face of scien- rules and environmental protection laws. These rules tific uncertainty; and, undermine governments’ ability to use trade measures • Establish the right to full-disclosure of the WTO’s
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activities and deliberations, as well as the ability to mendations that mitigate or avoid these problems. These participate in proceedings that affect public health assessments should follow the National Environmental and the environment. Policy Act, and provide for public input.
4. Conduct Environmental Assessments of Trade and Next Steps Investment Agreements The level of protests in Seattle was unprecedented It is now widely acknowledged that trade impacts and will continue to grow until real changes are made. the environment. It should become routine policy to The test now will be whether and how soon govern- conduct environmental assessments of trade and invest- ments will respond to the calls for changing the way in ment agreements early in the negotiating process to which trade policy is made and whose interest it serves.1 anticipate the problems and provide for policy recom-
MARTIN ALBROW, WOODROW WILSON CENTER FELLOW AND PROFESSOR OF SOCIOLOGY, UNIVERSITY OF SURREY, ROEHAMPTON, U.K.
Is it confusion to want both free trade and the good gious representatives; transnational corporations with society, or just the latest version of pragmatic politics, poor fisher people. Parties in national politics formed trying to find compromises between irreconcilable, out of coalitions of interest, not ideology; we can expect equally logical alternatives?2 the same in global politics. Seattle was primarily an event in the new global poli- Not all is confusion. The opposing sides reduce the tics, in which, as in any other type of politics, parties make complexity to one slogan, to being for or against global- unholy alliances in their quest to control the agenda. Pure ization—no matter what that might mean. For the
“ stablished trade rules and practices have run up against E deeply held notions of national sovereignty and concerns for environmental protection, health, human rights, labor rights, and the safety of the workplace.” principle is a casualty, but there is a fine line between pragmatist, it just means we have reached this point and, the assertion of principle and dogma. I would defy any- in the words of President Clinton, “can[not] turn the one to show that the idea of free trade in principle either clock back.”3 excludes or includes worker’s rights. Yet many will go to Ten years of academic exploration of complexity of the barricades on either side, and the lack of a deter- “globalization” shows how we can not just be for or minable outcome fuels the demand to end ambiguity. against it when it often means contradictory things. The point is not the logic of the arguments but the am- Thus, removing barriers to free trade is globalizing; so, bition to be in charge of the situation. too, is imposing global labor standards. The WTO, the This further suggests a widespread conviction that International Labor Organization (ILO), and the Inter- there is something to be in charge of, namely, global national Forum on Globalization are all agents of politics itself. The importance of Seattle is that it inti- globalization in different ways. But away with these aca- mates the coming consolidation of political alliances in the demic niceties! struggle to determine the direction of global economy and Globalization as a concept is the main casualty of society. We should not be surprised that the alliances are Seattle. There is now little hope of saving it from being unholy: first world labor unions with third world reli- simply a device for political rhetoric. The concept, which
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has expressed, more than any other, the way the world As a battle cry, it will echo in history. For intellectual of the 1990s was different from what went before has direction in the new global governance, we will have to now fallen a victim of the very changes it proclaimed. develop a new language from now.
STACY D. VANDEEVER, ASSISTANT PROFESSOR OF POLITICAL SCIENCE, UNIVERSITY OF NEW HAMPSHIRE
He is co-editor of Saving the Seas: Values, Scientists, and International Governance and Protecting Regional Seas: Developing Capacity and Fostering Environmental Cooperation in Europe, a conference proceedings volume pub- lished by the Wilson Center’s Environmental Change and Security Project and the East European Studies and the West European Studies programs.
The World Trade Organization negotiations in Se- WTO liberal trade regime, expecting it to increase pros- attle gave us a preview of the complicated trade and perity; alleviate poverty; protect labor rights; promote environmental issues policymakers will be facing in the international peace, democratization, and societal open- twenty-first century. Established trade rules and prac- ness; preserve the environment; lessen human rights tices have run up against deeply held notions of national abuses; increase market competition and efficiency; ben- sovereignty and concerns for environmental protection, efit consumers; and so on. Obviously, each and every health, human rights, labor rights, and the safety of the one of these goals cannot be maximized at the same time. workplace. Now that some of the smoke is clearing from Choices will need to be made, as evidenced by President Seattle (and Y2K hysteria has passed), it is time to take Clinton looking to the WTO to provide more access to stock and draw a few lessons. foreign markets for U.S. companies, more environmen- Lesson 1: Trade is rule-based, not “free.” Saying that tal protection, integration of China into international WTO participants negotiate “free trade agreements” is (read: Western) institutions, and increased labor protec- a misnomer. International trade, like domestic trade, is tion for children. Clinton’s list reflects both his foreign based on a detailed set of rules and norms governing policy goals and the pressures he is under from Ameri- conduct. So although WTO agreements (like the GATT can interest groups. agreements before them) have succeeded in “freeing” Against this background, none of today’s political trade from many of the tariffs that burdened it previ- players can afford to ignore the neoliberal trade agenda. ously, trade is by no means free—as evidenced by the Those involved in making foreign policy, for instance, WTO agreements themselves, which are hundreds, of- cannot set policy on security and the environment with- ten thousands, of pages long and filled with narrow and out checking for WTO compliance and consistency with broad exceptions of all kinds. economic policy. Likewise, organized domestic interests The groups that gathered in Seattle were thus not no longer have the luxury of ignoring trade policy (and debating the merits of trade and whether it should be policymakers no longer have the luxury of being ig- “free” or “not free.” Rather, they were debating what the nored). Today’s trade politics involves not just the rules of international trading should be. The protestors traditional players of labor unions and domestic manu- who traveled to Seattle were only too aware of this and facturers but also a plethora of public interest advocates. have been educating society at large by posing pertinent Whether advocating environmental protection, con- questions: Do we want an international trading system sumer rights, human rights, food safety, religious that is deaf to the voices of child labor and human rights freedom, indigenous peoples, democratization, or in- abuses? Do we want one that is indifferent to the plight ternational development, such groups simply cannot of endangered species and the global environment? Does accomplish their goals without directly engaging in the it matter that some societies object to genetically altered trade rules debate. Furthermore, they are systematically organisms more than others? The rules for twenty-first educating their members and political allies about this century international trade will continue to grapple with fact. Prior to the American elections later this year, can- questions of this kind. didates at all levels will continuously be asked to reconcile Lesson 2: More than ever, trade politics is a volatile their positions on trade with those on the environment, combination of domestic politics and foreign policy. Po- human rights, and related issues. litical leaders and scholars alike pin vast hopes on the Lesson 3: The protests will continue, so be prepared.
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The protests in Seattle were not a one-time occurrence. labor rights are here to stay. Most consumers believe that While WTO reformers and opponents decried the vio- dolphins and child laborers should not die for cheaper lence (and the police conduct), the media attention consumer goods and that the contents of food should emboldened the protestors, and the failure of the nego- not be a secret. These people are unlikely to change their tiations succeeded in raising their political profile. The minds any time soon.
“ ontrary to [the] Western conception, it is possible for human Ccommunities and wildlife to live together, but this only happens if the community is given responsibility for the resources of its land.” protestors now have too much at stake to give up the Officials in Seattle were clearly unprepared for the fight for trade rules more attuned to their interests. That protests. No doubt, future host cities will be better pre- said, open hostility to open markets and international pared. It is policymakers who continue to look and sound trade, like that sometimes espoused by Pat Buchanan, is unprepared. If they plan to wait and see, hoping this unlikely to catch on in most Western democracies. We moment of liberal trade-skepticism will pass, they may have too much to lose by wholesale restrictions on trade. be surprised again. But consumer protection, environmental protection, and
ANJU SHARMA, CENTRE FOR SCIENCE AND ENVIRONMENT, NEW DELHI, INDIA
Remarks excerpted from an interview following a Wilson Center public seminar on 20 April 2000, featuring the release of Sharma’s co-edited volume, Green Politics: Global Environmental Politics. Please see the Meeting Summary section for the full text of the interview between Sharma and Justine Kwiatkowksi, Editorial Assistant, Wilson Quarterly.
…I am not so sure how much the protests in Seattle …Environmental negotiations become “business and Washington were linked. In Seattle, the protesters transactions” when the interests of the business world were concerned with issues such as Tibet and saving overtake a country’s agenda. At major environmental turtles. These are worthy goals, but they[are] what I call conferences, developed countries tend to take positions “sovereign issues,” and the actions the protesters were that the industries in their countries want them to take. advocating would infringe on the rights and sovereignty For example, at the Climate Change Convention, the of other nations. The protesters were asking industrial- United States took the position that their automobile ized countries to put pressure on India and other and oil industries had instructed them to take. Ameri- Southern Hemisphere nations to deal with such sover- can car and oil businesses feared that their counterparts eign issues, which is unfair…. in developing countries would gain a competitive edge …[Few] Southern countries had an overview of what if the United States agreed to global environmental com- goes on in global environmental negotiations….Poor mitments, and so these native U.S. industries attempted countries do not know what is going on in these nego- to co-opt the process. tiations, yet their environmental and economic future Clinton and Gore made it easy for American busi- depends on the outcome…. ness to take over in that they did not talk to the Congress [The Centre for Science and Environment] would first to get a unified opinion—they just rushed off to also like to start a dialogue so that people everywhere the climate change meeting without a coherent opin- perceive the importance of democracy in a global con- ion. That vacuum allowed the industries’ perspective to text—especially countries in the Northern Hemisphere, dominate. And this conference is only one example of which often overlook the need for equality and justice the North’s failure to withstand business pressure. There in their environmental negotiations. are many others.
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…The management of national parks is a good ex- sibility for the resources of its land. If they have a vested ample of how this tension [between economic interest in preserving the land and understand that it is development and environmental protection] has mani- their future, they will protect it…. fested itself in India. India has adopted a Western concept The Centre for Science and the Environment where of national parks—essentially declaring certain areas I work in New Dehli advocates a separate [global] orga- inaccessible to human beings. But that is not practical nization, one that acts as a counterweight to the WTO for our country with a large and expanding population, and addresses both environmental and development is- not to mention a tradition of a symbiotic relationship sues. Or, alternately, the UN could get its act together between the people and the land. This Western method and become a more democratic and streamlined organi- has isolated Indian communities from wildlife manage- zation. As to whether it is possible or not, I am not sure. ment, in many ways stunting their understanding of the People have spoken about a separate organization, but importance of preserving the environment—and thereby if the current political nexus continues, it will not hap- working against the very goals the policy set out to pen. It is in the current interests of the United States to achieve…. keep the WTO dominant, and the United States deter- Contrary to [the] Western conception, it is possible mines most of what happens in the global environmental for human communities and wildlife to live together, realm. but this only happens if the community is given respon-
STEPHEN CLARKSON, PROFESSOR OF POLITICAL ECONOMY, UNIVERSITY OF TORONTO, CANADA, AND A FELLOW AT THE WOODROW WILSON CENTER
The author of Trudeau and Our Times and other works on Canadian politics, Clarkson is currently researching whether WTO and NAFTA constitute an “external constitution” for the three North American states of Canada, the United States, and Mexico.
Martin Albrow [see above] lamented that the con- fifty years of trade policy development culminating cept of globalization had become the casualty of political in the breakthroughs achieved during the Uruguay rhetoric and had in the process lost its analytical utility. Round (1986-94). The scope of these norms has As a result he feels that a new language is needed to been vastly expanded to include trade in services describe what is happening to global governance. and agricultural products, including an elaborate Until we get such a new lexicon, we may have to set of provisions governing the way scientific stan- make do by transposing our present political vocabu- dards are to be applied to the trade of sanitary and lary to the supranational. In so doing, it becomes phytosanitary goods such as genetically modified apparent that, in the gradual development since World food. These rules have to be incorporated in the War II of a supranational political order, the creation in domestic law of the signatory states. Because in some 1994 of the WTO marked a major and exciting advance. cases this required radical changes in the regimes of This substantial addition to the existing set of interna- the signatory states—obliging them, for instance, tional institutions and regimes that comprise the to alter their agricultural protection schemes from emerging system of global governance was distinguished quotas and other quantitative restrictions to tariffs— by what we could consider an embryonic constitutional they constitute substantial amendments to these order. states’ own legal orders. The evidence of what I call the “new constitution- • Through its Trade Policy Review Board the WTO alism” is as follows. shows it has an administrative function. It moni- tors the extent to which the member states are • The WTO is an institution with an international implementing its trade rules and publishes oversight juridical personality that exists autonomously from reports on each country noting where progress has its signatory member states. been made and specifying which measures need to • The WTO governs the trading behavior of its mem- be changed. ber states with hundreds of pages of rules based on • Through continuing negotiations the WTO has
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been able to expand its rules, demonstrating a legis- and environmentalists in all countries are incensed lative capacity to alter the regulatory framework of at the WTO’s dispute rulings which have consis- its members in their financial services and telecom- tently privileged free-trade norms over munications sectors. considerations of cultural diversity, long-term health • The WTO defines rights for its constituent players, risks, or environmental sustainability. notably those of transnational corporations (TNCs) • Its responsiveness is asymmetrical. The information, vis-á-vis member states. entertainment and pharmaceutical TNCs got what
“ oday, the corporate sector provides input into United States’ T trade policymaking process, but the public is largely shut out. U.S. positions on trade therefore reflect the corporate interest, not environmental, human rights, and labor interests.”
• The WTO boasts an enforcement capability that they wanted in TRIPs, but labor and environmen- enables it to apply these rules and impose a high talists have been largely excluded from the WTO’s degree of discipline on its member-states. This ju- deliberative process. dicial mechanism gives the WTO’s norms incomparably more heft than the idealistic formu- The resulting democratic deficit lies at the heart of lations to be found, for instance, in the Universal the anger displayed outside the closed doors of the offi- Declaration of Human Rights or the many worthy cial negotiating rooms in Seattle. These demonstrators conventions of the International Labor Organiza- showed the world, for the first time, components of a tion. Commercial conflicts between members are global civil society in action. to be resolved by an independent dispute settlement I have used the familiar constitutional metaphor to board whose rulings (following the inevitable ap- explain the WTO’s character and functions. If my ex- peal to an Appellate Body) the member-states are planation is persuasive, what does it suggest about the bound to accept on pain of retaliation. This is in challenges facing the WTO’s next stage? effect a global judiciary whose rulings declare that Given the many conflicts of interest between North legislation democratically enacted by states is illegal and South, between the United States and the EU, be- because it contravenes the WTO’s norms. tween TNCs and social activists, it is unlikely that even a tranquil Seattle would have yielded a consensus on the Clearly, this commercial constitutional order is only Millennium Round’s negotiating agenda. In other words, embryonic: the WTO’s legislative process may well mark time— not a bad thing when so many of its rules have still to be • Its membership is still not universal. China, Russia tested in action by interpretation via dispute settlement and a number of much smaller states have not yet panels. been admitted. This judicial action is likely to be much more re- • Its scope is uneven. Some rules such as trade-related sponsive to the views expressed in Seattle’s streets. Up intellectual property rights (TRIPs) are extremely until now, the dispute panels have been fixated on ren- elaborate and demanding whereas other issues such dering judgments based on the black letter of the WTO’s as labor standards are virtually ignored. rules. Henceforth they will be much more conscious that • Its effectiveness is still not fully established. they have to keep in mind a second audience that is far Washington’s threat to boycott the proceedings was broader than the trade lawyers and government officials enough to dissuade the European Union from with whom they were concerned in the first years of the launching a dispute with the United States over the late 1990s. Without a single new rule being drafted, the Helms-Burton Act’s violation of WTO rules. panelists and members of the Appellate Body could de- • Its legitimacy is disputed. Cultural nationalists in cide to privilege the references to international France and Canada, consumers throughout Europe, environmental treaties and to import into their judg-
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ments the values of social justice that lurk, explicit and tion of TNC interests and its inadequate responsiveness implicit, in the WTO texts. to civil society’s values. Seattle’s streets offered a stage The administration of the global trading system is for frustration over this imbalance to be expressed. To also likely to make more room for representations from thrive in its role of supranational governing body, the civil society. The already considerable efforts made by WTO must anchor its constitutional legitimacy in a the WTO to increase its transparency will be enhanced praxis that is sensitive to the multiple publics that will as it tries to become more sensitive to general demands be monitoring every dispute settlement ruling it makes. for more people-friendly, less corporate-dominated glo- We may not yet have a language for expressing this bal governance. new reality, but Seattle has changed the way we use our The global trade regime as constitutionalized six old notions and gives hope that they may yet be applied years ago was deeply flawed by its excessive incorpora- creatively at the supranational level of governance.
KENT HUGHES, FORMER ASSOCIATE DEPUTY SECRETARY OF COMMERCE, AND PUBLIC POLICY SCHOLAR, WOODROW WILSON CENTER
Hughes is currently working on a book tracing the development of national competitiveness as an idea and a political force in the United States particularly during the Bush and Clinton administrations.
It is easy to downplay the Seattle demonstrations as growing ease of communications will help to in- just an exercise in street theater. crease the volume of international trade. Specific None of the other commentators [See above] made trade agreements on a regional or sector specific basis the mistake of simply dismissing the demonstrators. For are likely—and will only augment the trend. the most part, they see the demonstrators as raising seri- • Interest groups, workers, environmentalists, and ous questions about what rules should apply to an consumers in every country of the world share an increasingly global society. I share the other commenta- interest in trade, growth, and innovation. Billions tors’ concerns about child labor, environmental of people still aspire to move out of poverty and degradation, and the importance of human rights. I do, into a world of greater health, better education, and however, want to add a few points: relative prosperity. To reach even a 1960s level of European prosperity, the combined populations of • Certain trends will persist regardless of whether glo- India and China alone would put enormous pres- bal negotiations take place. Whether referred to as sure on available resources and the environment globalization or by a more exact vocabulary, ideas, unless technology changes. Growth is often associ- products, investments, and technologies will con- ated with higher levels of pollution and greenhouse tinue to flow from one nation to another. America gases; but higher incomes are also associated with is no exception. Today, Americans listen to African stable populations and a demand for greater envi- pop, buy more salsa than ketchup, and follow the ronmental protection. Growth matters in the United rush of Japanese children to buy Pokemon charac- States, too. It is growth and innovation that prom- ters. Economies are also more tightly linked as the ise our children greater health, a cleaner environ- volume of international commerce grows. And we ment, and greater prosperity. are continuing the trend to trading parts rather than products at the same time as companies are adopt- • Recent experience has been tenacious in teaching ing a just-in-time approach to inventories. The us that markets depend on a set of complex institu- combination is making trade sanctions more costly tions. The difficult transition from centrally planned in terms of growth and jobs. economies to market-based democracies, the Asian financial crisis, and the economic stagnation in many • Even if no global round of trade negotiations takes countries—all are reminders that markets are em- place for another decade, the trend to global eco- bedded in customs and cultures that evolve over nomic and cultural ties will continue. New time. Today’s fast-moving American markets grew technologies, cross border partnerships, and the out of two centuries of development in the public
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as well as the private sphere. This long experience with equity. Trade is an important part of that agenda taught us the need for providing safety nets, setting but so are global standards on everything from account- up retirement programs, and developing standards ing to workplace safety; to protect workers and consumers. 3. Forge global agreements to protect the global com- • America needs to develop a strategy for global en- mons. We should be able to distinguish between gagement in what will surely be a thoroughly global standards that are designed largely to protect a domestic century. It is an imperative that nurtures our ideals interest and those that are focused on shared environ- as well as favoring our interests. The American mental concerns; economy is closely linked to the rest of the world; we suffer from the costs of world-wide pollution; 4. Make a commitment to global health. Recent pro- and we are only a plane ride away from any disease. posals for developing vaccines targeted at tropical diseases By bringing world poverty into our living rooms, are an important start; and, modern communications have created an added moral dimension in seeking development and eq- 5. Strengthen global and national institutions. Greater uity around the world as well as at home. transparency in decision-making can yield better results and build popular support. U.S. foreign assistance can America’s global strategy will evolve in response to be targeted at helping interested countries improve their achieving hoped for successes as well as facing new chal- ministries of labor and the environment. The Organiza- lenges. As a start, I propose a five-step approach. We tion for Economic Cooperation and Development has need to: taken an important step in developing proposed codes of conduct that apply to multinational corporations 1. Broaden the dialogue on international economic based in OECD member countries. policy by considering everything from more inclusive congressional hearings to a reformed advisory approach At times, America has tried to lead by example and, for U.S. trade policy; at other times, by active engagement in the world. To- day we need to pursue both. It is a case of “doctor heal 2. Continue to press for domestic and global growth thyself,” but also help to heal others.
TAMAR GUTNER, ASSISTANT PROFESSOR OF POLITICAL SCIENCE, AMERICAN UNIVERSITY
Dr. Gutner authored “Cleaning up the Baltic Seas: The Role of Multilateral Development Banks,” in Protecting the Regional Seas: Developing Capacity and Fostering Cooperation in Europe, a conference proceedings volume published by the Wilson Center’s Environmental Change and Security Project and the East European Studies and the West European Studies programs.
Critics of the World Trade Organization (WTO) matic illustration of this is NATO’s shift from a collec- used the institution and its late 1999 ministerial meet- tive defense organization designed to deter Soviet attack, ings in part as a proxy for deeper criticism of to one involved in fighting inside non-member states, globalization and trade liberalization. But to what ex- where the driving issues are ethnic conflict and human tent is reform of the WTO itself the answer to problems rights abuses. The United Nations, too, has struggled to caused by world trade? Clearly, there is scope for im- address new demands for peacekeeping operations in proving the WTO’s ability to address environmental, intra-state conflicts where its mandate is not always clear, labor, and human rights issues. But fixing the institu- such as in Somalia and Bosnia. The World Bank is con- tion is only part of the solution. stantly adding new issues—from gender to judicial Pressure to reform the WTO is part of a broad trend reform—to its bread-and-butter work promoting eco- where international organizations are being asked to take nomic development. And the IMF’s recent involvement on a variety of new policy issues that did not exist when in multi-billion dollar economic “bail-outs” is far from these institutions were created. Perhaps the most dra- its original mandate of overseeing the par value system
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and helping countries with temporary balance of pay- attention on redressing areas where the agreements they ments deficits. All of these institutions have come under make under one institutional framework clash with attack for doing a poor job juggling their growing num- agreements under another, such as areas where global ber of mandates, yet simultaneously there are calls for environmental agreements conducted under UNEP’s these institutions to continue taking on new policy is- auspices clash with trade rules agreed upon through the sues. WTO. This loading up of new mandates reflects the fact Pressure from civil society will play a key role in the that patterns of global governance are becoming both WTO reform process, but this pressure is best focused more diffuse and complex, heightening the need for on member state governments in general, and trade min- stronger international organizations with a greater ca- istries in particular—the primary sources of changing pacity to address global and regional issues. Yet instead the WTO. Stronger national regulations are also the key of a stronger set of global institutions, we are seeing per- to raising labor and environmental standards. Finally, formance difficulties that reflect, in part, what has been activists can press their governments to strengthen other called “mandate congestion.” international organizations and to raise public aware- Looking at the WTO’s evolution from the Global ness about the comparative advantages and responsibili- Agreements on Tariffs and Trade (GATT), we see that ties of the lesser-known organizations. ! its mandate has also broadened over the years, from an initial emphasis on promoting trade liberalization by reducing tariff barriers on goods, to addressing non-tar- iff barriers, trade in services, intellectual property rights, NOTES agriculture, and other sectors. The WTO also has more power than its predecessor to settle trade disputes among 1 For more information on Friends of the Earth’s position states. Now many are calling for the WTO to add regu- on the WTO, view the web-site at http://www.foe.org/inter- lation of labor and environmental standards to its work. national/wto. Such regulation can play an important role in reducing 2 In his recent book The Global Age: State and Society Be- the negative side effects of more open trade. yond Modernity, Albrow argued that globalization provided Politically, it is difficult to imagine the WTO adopt- opportunities but no guidelines. ing these new standards since many of its member states 3 see these issues as infringing on their sovereignty. Un- “Larry King Live,” 23 December 1999. like the World Bank and IMF where voting on the executive board is weighted, the WTO operates on a “one country, one vote” basis. This structure reduces le- verage for countries like the United States to push the WTO to address labor and environmental issues. In addition, the WTO is not home to a large, relatively autonomous bureaucracy, as are the World Bank, IMF, and United Nations. Its secretariat of 500 people is among the smallest of major international organizations. While all international organizations can be said to be “member-driven,” this claim has more force with the WTO, since its major actions are the rules agreed to through sets of interstate negotiations. Rather than loading up the WTO with responsi- bilities it may not be equipped to handle, it is important to build closer links of cooperation with the other insti- tutions that may be more appropriate fora—such as the International Labour Organization (ILO), or the United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP). Such co- operation will involve better equipping these institutions—or providing them with political sup- port—to monitor or enforce the programs and treaties under their purview. Governments can also focus more
118 ENVIRONMENTAL CHANGE & SECURITY PROJECT REPORT, ISSUE 6 (SUMMER 2000) Official Statements
OFFICIAL STATEMENTS
Below are excerpts from recent official statements in which environment and population issues are prominently cited in the context of security and national interests. The Wilson Center encourages readers to inform the ECSP Report of other related public statements.
STATEMENTS BY WILLIAM J. CLINTON President of the United States
Excerpts from President Clinton’s remarks to the People of New Zealand, Antarctic Centre, Christchurch, New Zealand 15 September 1999
...The overwhelming consensus of world scientific opinion is that greenhouse gases from human activity are raising the Earth’s temperature in a rapid and unsustainable way. The five warmest years since the fifteenth century have all been in the 1990s; 1998 was the warmest year ever recorded, eclipsing the record set just the year before, in 1997. Unless we change course, most scientists believe the seas will rise so high they will swallow whole islands and coastal areas. Storms, like hurricanes and droughts both, will intensify. Diseases like malaria will be borne by mosquitoes to higher and higher altitudes, and across borders, threatening more lives—a phenomenon we already see today in Africa. ...In 1992, the nations of the world began to address this challenge at the Earth Summit in Rio. Five years later, 150 nations made more progress toward that goal in Kyoto, Japan. But we still have so much more to do. ...[We] have a big responsibility because America produces more greenhouse gases than any other country in the world. I have offered an aggressive program to reduce that production in every area. We are also mindful that emissions are growing in the developing world even more rapidly than in the developed world, and we have a responsibility there. ...[T]he largest obstacle to meeting the challenge of climate change...is the continued...idea that the only way a country can become wealthy and remain wealthy is to have the patterns of energy use that brought us the Industrial Age. In other words, if you [are] not burning more oil and coal this year than you were last year, you [are] not getting richer; you [are] not creating more jobs; you [are] not lifting more children out of poverty. That is no longer true. We now know that technologies that permit breathtaking advances in energy conservation, and the use of alternative forms of energy, make it possible to grow the economy faster while healing the environment, and that...it is no longer necessary to burn up the atmosphere to create economic opportunity. ...We are committed to doing more at home and to do more to help developing nations bring on these tech- nologies, so they can improve living standards and improve the environment. [In] 1987, the international community came together in Montreal and agreed to stop the use of chemicals that deplete the ozone layer. Experts tell us that if we keep going, the ozone hole will shrink, and by the middle of the next century the ozone hole could actually close, so that, miracle of miracles, we would have a problem created by people solved by people, and their develop-
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ment. This is the sort of thing we have to do with cli- ...... mate change-and the stakes are even higher.... STATEMENTS BY ALBERT GORE, JR. Excerpts from President Clinton’s State of the Union Vice President of the United States Address, Washington, D.C. 27 January 2000 Excerpts from Vice President Gore’s remarks to United Nations Security Council Opening Session, New York, ...America must help more nations to break the N.Y. bonds of disease. Last year in Africa, ten times as many 10 January 2000 people died from AIDS as were killed in wars-ten times. The budget I give you invests $150 million more in the Let me thank the distinguished members of the fight against this and other infectious killers. And to- Council for the...willingness to greet the dawn of this day, I propose a tax credit to speed the development of new millennium by exploring a brand new definition of vaccines for diseases like malaria, TB [tuberculosis], and world security. AIDS. I ask the private sector and our partners around Today marks the first time...that the Security Coun- the world to join us in embracing this cause. We can cil will discuss a health issue as a security threat. We save millions of lives together, and we ought to do it.... tend to think of a threat to security in terms of war and ...The greatest environmental challenge of the new peace. Yet no one can doubt that the havoc wreaked and century is global warming. the toll exacted by HIV/ The scientists tell us the AIDS do threaten our secu- 1990s were the hottest de- “ e must understand rity. The heart of the security cade of the entire millen- agenda is protecting lives- nium. If we fail to reduce the that the old conception and we now know that the emission of greenhouse gases, W number of people who will deadly heat waves and of global security-with its fo- die of AIDS in the first de- droughts will become more cade of the twenty-first frequent, coastal areas will cus almost solely on armies, century will rival the num- flood, and economies will be ber that died in all the wars disrupted. That is going to ideologies, and geopolitics- in all the decades of the happen, unless we act. twentieth century. When ten Many people in the has to be enlarged.” people in sub-Saharan Africa United States...and lots of are infected every minute; folks around the world still - Albert Gore when eleven million children believe you cannot cut green- have already become or- house gas emissions without slowing economic growth. phans, and many must be raised by other children; when In the Industrial Age that may well have been true. But a single disease threatens everything from economic in this digital economy, it is not true anymore. New strength to peacekeeping-we clearly face a security threat technologies make it possible to cut harmful emissions of the greatest magnitude. and provide even more growth. This historic session not only recognizes the real ...In the new century, innovations in science and and present danger to world security posed by the AIDS technology will be the key not only to the health of the pandemic...this meeting also begins a month-long fo- environment, but to miraculous improvements in the cus by this Council on the special challenges confronting quality of our lives and advances in the economy. the continent of Africa. The powerful fact that we begin ...These steps will allow us to lead toward the far by concentrating on AIDS has a still larger significance: frontiers of science and technology. They will enhance it sets a precedent for Security Council concern and ac- our health, the environment, the economy in ways we tion on a broader security agenda. By the power of [can not] even imagine today. But we all know that at a example, this meeting demands of us that we see secu- time when science, technology, and the forces of global- rity through a new and wider prism, and forever after, ization are bringing so many changes into all our lives, think about it according to a new, more expansive defi- [it is] more important than ever that we strengthen the nition. For the past half century, the Security Council bonds that root us in our local communities and in our has dealt with the classic security agenda-built upon national community. common efforts to resist aggression, and to stop armed
120 ENVIRONMENTAL CHANGE & SECURITY PROJECT REPORT, ISSUE 6 (SUMMER 2000) Official Statements conflict. We have witnessed wars among nations, and depths of insight and cooperation by nations, nongov- violence on the scale of war within nations, for many ernmental organizations, and citizens at all levels. Our reasons: task is not merely to recognize and confront these chal- lenges, but to rise to our higher ideals, and work to- • Because of claims of religious or racial superiority. gether to make our brightest dreams real in the lives of • Because of lust for power, disguised as ideology or our children. In order to succeed, I believe, along with rationalized as geo-strategic doctrine. growing billions around this planet, that we must create • Because of a sense that a small place or a larger re- a world where people’s faith in their own capacity for gion-or the whole world-was too small to allow for self-governance unlocks their human potential, and jus- the survival and pros- tifies their growing perity of all, unless the belief that all can powerful could domi- share in an ever-wid- nate the weak. “ nvironmental threats ening circle of human • Because of the tendency should be seen for what dignity and self-suffi- of too many to see them- [E] ciency.... A world in selves solely as separate they are—namely, threats to our which parents are free groups, celebrating and to choose the size of defending their exclusiv- security.” their families with the ity, by demonizing and confidence that the dehumanizing others. - Madeleine Albright children they bring • Because of poverty, into this world will which causes the col- survive to become lapse of hopes and expectations, the coming apart healthy adults, with economic opportunity in prosper- of a society, and makes people first desperate, then ous and peaceful communities. A world where we edu- freshly open to evil leadership. cate girls as well as boys, and secure the rights of women everywhere, as full members of the human family. But while the old threats still face our global com- All this and more constitutes the great global chal- munity, there are new things under the sun-new forces lenge of our time: to create and strengthen a sense of arising that now or soon will challenge international or- solidarity, as we seek a newer world of security for all- der, raising issues of peace and war....From this new security not only from loss of life and the ravages of war, vantage point, we must forge and follow a new agenda but security from constant fear and degradation, and for world security, an agenda that includes: from a loss of the quality of life and liberty of spirit that should belong to all. If we are to succeed in addressing • The global environmental challenge, which could this new security agenda, we must recognize that be- render all our other progress meaningless, unless we cause of our rapid growth in population, and the deal with it successfully. historically unprecedented power of the new technolo- • The global challenge of defeating drugs and cor- gies at our widespread disposal, mistakes which once ruption, which now spill across our borders. were tolerable can now have consequences that are mul- • The global challenge of terror-magnified by the tiplied many-fold. availability of new weapons of mass destruction so For example, for almost all the years of recorded small they can be concealed in a coat pocket. history, people could do whatever they wished to their • The new pandemics, laying waste to whole societ- environment, and do little to permanently harm it. ies, and the emergence of new strains of old diseases People could wage war in the world, and do nothing to that are horrifyingly resistant to the antibiotics that destroy it. But now, threats that were once local can have protected the last three generations. consequences that are regional or global; damage once temporary can now become chronic and catastrophic. Our new security agenda should be pursued with As a world community, we must prove to our citizens determination, adequate resources, and creative use of that we are wise enough to control what we have been the new tools at the world’s disposal that can be used to smart enough to create. We must understand that the bring us together in successful common efforts-tools such old conception of global security-with its focus almost as the Internet and the emerging global information in- solely on armies, ideologies, and geopolitics-has to be frastructure-which, if used imaginatively, will enable new enlarged. We need to show that we not only can contain
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aggression, prevent war, and mediate conflicts, but that then the connection that this university does now be- we can work together to anticipate and respond to a tween the defense of American security and the new century with its new global imperatives. The hu- protection of the world environment. As our armed man mind-our ingenuity, our dreaming, our restless forces can attest, that connection has been on display quest to do better-created this moment. Now the hu- throughout the past decade. man will-not of one individual, not of one nation or In the former Soviet Union, we have been helping group of nations-but the collective will of truly united to dismantle nuclear and chemical weapons facilities nations, must master this moment. We must bend it in safely. And we know that easing that region’s environ- the direction of life, not death; justice, not oppression; mental challenges must be part of any real democratic opportunity, not deprivation-a new security for the new transition there. world we now inhabit.... We also know that regional conflicts pose a major threat to international stability, and that competition ...... for natural resources can contribute to political extrem- ism and civil strife. Somalia was an example of this, and STATEMENTS BY MADELEINE K. ALBRIGHT the Congo now is another. U.S. Secretary of State And as we have seen in Africa, Haiti, and the Balkans, environmental problems slow [the] recovery Excerpts from Secretary of State Albright’s remarks to from conflict, and make the transition to stability that the National Association for the Advancement of Col- much harder. ored People (NAACP) in New York, N.Y. With the Cold War long since over, the need to re- 13 July 1999 spond to natural disasters has placed new pressure on our armed forces. During the past two years, we have ...Neither numbers nor statistics, are adequate to sent troops to aid recovery efforts in Southeast Asia, the describe the human destruction being caused by [AIDS], Caribbean, Central America, and Mozambique. especially in Africa.... Beyond this, there is an even more basic connec- The imperative in Africa now, as in our own coun- tion. Our citizens cannot be secure if the air we breathe, try a decade or so ago, is to face squarely the reality of the food we grow, and the water we drink are at risk this disease, for we know that with national leadership, because the global environment is in danger. international assistance and local interventions, the tide The Clinton Administration came to office under- can be turned. Uganda was among the first nations to standing these linkages. And that is why, in its first year, be devastated by AIDS, but it fought back. President we established the positions of Under Secretary of State Museveni has urged every cabinet minister, every school, for Global Affairs, the Deputy Under Secretary of De- every church, and every business to promote AIDS fense for Environmental Security, and an environmental awareness, prevention, and treatment. Ugandans call this director at the National Security Council.... “the big noise,” and it has cut HIV infection rates by Since coming to office, President Clinton and Vice fifty percent. President Gore have made it clear that environmental Today, the big noise is starting to be heard in more threats should be seen for what they are—namely, threats and more African nations. The United States has helped to our security. by urging others to heed Uganda’s example, and by steer- That is why four years ago, Secretary of State War- ing to Africa more than one-half of the $1 billion we ren Christopher explicitly incorporated environmental have invested in the global fight against AIDS. But so goals into the mainstream of U.S. foreign policy. And much more needs to be done. So I can pledge this morn- we have been acting on that basis ever since. ing that I will do all I can to see that we will do more-and Our priorities for the year 2000 include President that we stick with this fight until its won.... Clinton’s “Greening the Globe” initiative, under which USAID, will allocate $150 million to the conservation Excerpts from Secretary of State Albright’s remarks of tropical forests. entitled “An Alliance for Global Water Security in the We are asking the Senate to ratify the Desertifica- Twenty-first Century” at the National Defense Uni- tion Convention and to back efforts to reverse the versity, Washington, D.C. life-stealing loss of agricultural land, especially in Af- 10 April 2000 rica. We are also urging the Senate to approve the Biodiversity Convention, for we cannot ensure our fu- ...[N]ot even [President] Theodore Roosevelt drew ture without safeguarding our biological base. We are
122 ENVIRONMENTAL CHANGE & SECURITY PROJECT REPORT, ISSUE 6 (SUMMER 2000) Official Statements working toward an agreement that would ban or severely grow, demand increases, pollution continues, and glo- restrict the production of twelve of the world’s most bal climate change accelerates. deadly and persistent toxins. And we are asking Con- As competition for water intensifies, further dis- gress to restore full funding for international family agreements over access and use are likely to erupt. And planning, which reduces environmental stress, while sav- unless properly managed, water scarcity can be a major ing human lives. source of strife, as well as a roadblock to economic and And we are waging a worldwide diplomatic cam- social progress. paign to combat global climate change. This is the ...[T]he World Water Forum... [declared] that “ev- Administration’s highest environmental priority. By now, ery person, everywhere, should have access to enough the scientific consensus is clear that the earth is getting safe water at an affordable cost.” Together, we must ad- warmer. If we don’t address the problem, the economic dress the water crisis in three ways. The first is technical, and ecological consequences will be enormous-drought because our problems result far less from how much in some areas, floods in others, rising sea levels, and water we have, than from how much we waste. For ex- spreading disease. ample, agriculture accounts for seventy percent of global The United States has the world’s largest economy. water use; yet irrigation systems squander as much as Our scientists have designed the best environmental tech- three out of every five gallons pumped. Better technolo- nology. And our society is by far the largest emitter of gies, such as drip irrigation systems, and improved the gases that cause global climate change. So we have measurement and forecasting can reduce water use sub- both the capacity and the obligation to lead. stantially while still getting the job done. The result is That is why the Administration has taken bold more crop per drop; a better payoff for the farmer, and strides to control greenhouse gas emissions while also a smaller environmental cost... growing our economy-and why we are striving to shape Second, [addressing the water crisis] requires good an effective world response. The Kyoto Protocol was an economics....[W]ater is wasted because it is underpriced. essential first step. We are committed to completing its Direct and indirect subsidies are common in both de- rules in a manner that will pave the way for U.S. ratifi- veloped and developing countries. These subsidies are cation. Getting those rules right will help the often built into investments that serve primarily those environment while also promoting economic gains. We who are already well off. For example, the residents of cannot solve this problem alone. Soon, fifty percent of many urban shantytowns can only obtain fresh water global emissions will come from developing countries. from peddlers, at a price far higher than that charged by And that is why we are seeking their meaningful partici- local utilities... pation... [I]ncentives must be found for more water-related As a diplomat, I have seen firsthand the tensions investments and technology. Using the right techniques, that competition for water can generate, and the suffer- and developing sound-pricing policies can help a na- ing that mismanagement and shortages can cause. tion get the most out of their water resources. But it ...I have been to village after village, especially in cannot guarantee water security. As is common, those Africa, where the term “water shortage” translates not resources extend across national lines. There are more into brown lawns and wilted flowers, as in our suburbs, than 300 shared river basins and aquifers in the world. but into whole communities of people prostrated by And two out of every five people rely upon them. dehydration and weakened by disease. These people are dependent not only on what they Today, around the world, more than one billion do themselves, but also on the practices of their neigh- people lack access to safe drinking water. More than two bors who live up the river or across the lake, or who billion live in countries experiencing some kind of wa- draw water from the same underground source....The ter stress. At least five million people die every year from ability to work together is critical, but will likely be com- water-related illness. That [is] more than the popula- plicated by political, social, economic, and even cultural tion of Maryland. considerations. And this is where the third element, di- And pollution is the great thief of freshwater, de- plomacy-comes in... spoiling an ever-growing fraction of the world’s supplies. ...But there are other issues that we need to deal Of every two major rivers and lakes on the planet, one is with overseas. A good example is in the Middle East, seriously sick. On every continent, freshwater ecosys- one of the world’s most environmentally-stressed areas- tems have been harmed. And half the world’s wetlands stressed in other ways also, but environmentally-stressed have disappeared. Moreover, studies show that the areas-where the United States chairs a working group squeeze on water resources will tighten as populations on water resources. Its purpose is to encourage techni-
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cal cooperation, and bring parties together with donors donor countries to Washington in early summer to talk for the purpose of increasing water security for all. further about how we can better help others deal coop- In Central Asia, the former Soviet Republics inher- eratively with regional water issues. Our focus will be ited from their Communist predecessors a legacy of on supporting nations that show a willingness to de- “ecocidal” practices. The two river systems of the Aral velop and implement constructive strategies. And our Sea Basin are sorely degraded. Improvements will de- goal will be to assure that donor assistance is not hap- pend on multilateral cooperation and the proper hazard and at cross purposes, but rather coordinated and integration of technical and political resources. And as I complementary. said, I [will] visit the region next week, and I hope to Third, we will strongly support efforts by the World explore these issues with the local leaders. Bank and private foundations to see that investments in In Southeast Asia, the Mekong River Basin is the water-related projects reflect and encourage sound man- primary source of economic survival for nearly a quar- agement practices. ter billion people. But pollution, poorly-placed dams, Fourth, with the support from Congress, the State and flooding may prevent the area from realizing its po- Department is contributing $2 million to start a new tential. A stronger political commitment from within fund within the United Nations Development the region, and better coordination from without, would Programme to improve regional water management. Our improve the Mekong River Commission’s ability to ad- goal is to bring the parties together to discuss and re- dress these issues. solve transboundary water problems, and we encourage The longest river in the world is the Nile, whose other countries to contribute, as well. waters flow through half a dozen countries in Central And, finally, we will seek to develop a more regular and Northeast Africa. Within the past year, these coun- and mutually productive dialogue with the scientific and tries have made significant progress in working together. academic communities on water-related issues.... And this is good, because an agreement governing the Overall, the goals of our alliance must be to dra- development and management of basin resources would matically improve the management of transboundary go far to reassure potential donors and combat the pov- water resources; eliminate water as a source of regional erty that burdens much of the local population. instability; and use cooperation on water as a basis for More Africans lack access to safe water now than a bringing nations together on other issues.... decade ago. Almost half the people on the continent suffer from water-related disease. The result is economi- ...... cally crippling and, from a humanitarian standpoint, flat-out unacceptable. STATEMENTS BY DAVID B. SANDALOW The African Development Bank declared recently Assistant Secretary of State for that the lack of integrated management for most of the Oceans and International continent’s fifty-four transboundary water bodies is a Environmental and Scientific Affairs potential threat to regional stability. The Bank approved a new plan for water resources management and pledged Excerpts from Assistant Secretary Sandalow’s remarks to help riparian countries work together. And the United on “Protecting and Conserving the World’s Forests” at States will back this effort. the National Press Club, Washington, D.C. ...I am proposing a global alliance for water secu- 6 January 2000 rity in the twenty-first century...open to all who comprehend the urgency of working together to con- ...[W]e value forests for all these reasons: their rich serve transboundary water, manage it wisely, and use it biological diversity, their many ecological services, their well.... role in disaster prevention, their many products-so ubiq- Technically, we will build capacity and identify op- uitous in our lives-the habitat they offer, and the way tions for improving conditions on the ground. We will they help our spirits soar. spur training in water management techniques, and en- ...In the past decade, the world has lost an average courage water engineers to forge relationships across of thirty-eight million acres of forest per year....But the national lines. We will support early warning and other clearing of forests is not the only challenge. Around the means for reducing tensions and increasing confidence. world, the health of forests is threatened by air pollu- We will promote the development of water sharing agree- tion, increases in insect infestations, invasive species and ments and institutions capable of implementing them.... disease, catastrophic fire, and other human-induced Second, we will be inviting representatives from key environmental hazards.
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First, roughly seventy-five percent of the world’s for- to enhance the use of remote sensing as a tool in manag- ests are found in just sixteen countries (Russia, Brazil, ing forests and responding to forest fires. We will actively Canada, the United States, China, Indonesia, Demo- pursue this initiative, with a view to creating and main- cratic Republic of Congo, Peru, India, Mexico, taining databases and facilitating access to such Colombia, Bolivia, Venezuela, Sudan, Australia, and information around the globe. Papua New Guinea). Indeed, roughly fifty percent of Use the power of the market. The marketplace can the world’s forests are found in just the first four coun- be a powerful tool for protecting and conserving for- tries (Russia, Brazil, Canada, and the United States). ests. But too often, markets fail to value essential forest Second, forests are services. Certification and found within the sover- labeling programs, along eign territories of many “ hat is taking place in with industry codes of countries, with different conduct, can help correct cultures, political sys- Ethiopia today is a this problem. Another tems, and levels of devel- [W] important tool for valuing opment. Any strategies man-made disaster. Without the forests is carbon trading. to protect forests must Forests play a central role recognize and respect war, there would be no famine.” in the global carbon cycle; these vastly different cir- we must find new and in- cumstances. - Benjamin Gilman novative ways to value the ...There is no one- carbon-absorbing services size-fits-all solution to that forests provide. protecting the world’s forests. The world’s forests and Focus UN discussion on practical results. Since their circumstances are too diverse....What can we do 1995, governments from around the world have come to protect and conserve the world’s forests? together under the auspices of the UN Commission on Move forward with the Tropical Forest Conserva- Sustainable Development (CSD) to discuss approaches tion Act. The U.S. Congress has shown great leadership for conserving the world’s forests. Governments have by enacting the Tropical Forest Conservation Act. This identified more than 135 proposals for action. In the statute authorizes reduction of official debt owed to the years ahead, we should build on this work. When the U.S. Government by countries with significant tropical Intergovernmental Forum on Forests meets next month, forests, in return for conservation measures. it should take the next step, which is to focus on imple- Adopt multilateral standards for forest lending. Ev- mentation of what has already been agreed. We should ery year, national governments support forest sector move forward to shape a transparent, practical, results- investments worth hundreds of millions of dollars with oriented forum-one focused not on talk but action.... export credits and investment guarantees. In doing so, governments should promote sound forest practices...... Address subsidies. There is a need to address gov- ernment subsidies that promote over-logging and distort STATEMENTS BY BENJAMIN A. GILMAN trade. Such subsidies can skew resource decisions, cost U.S. Congressman from New York,Chair, tax revenues, and damage ecosystems. Some experts es- House Committee on International Relations timate that these subsidies total billions of dollars per year worldwide, but more information is needed. We Excerpts from Congressman Gilman’s remarks at a should gather information about the scope and nature House International Relations Committee hearing on of subsidies affecting the forest sector that may be envi- the “Looming Famine in Ethiopia,” Washington, D.C. ronmentally damaging and trade-distorting and develop 18 May 2000 appropriate responses worldwide. ...Invest in remote sensing. Satellite observation and ...The war is inextricably linked to the famine, which new technologies such as the Global Positioning Sys- is the focus of our hearing today. In southeastern Ethio- tems (GPS) are critical tools for assessing, monitoring, pia and in parts of the central highlands, food shortages and managing forests. Remote sensing played a central have reached a critical stage. Eight million of Ethiopia’s role in almost all forest fire programs in Brazil, Mexico, sixty million citizens are at risk of starvation. Nearly a Russia, and Southeast Asia during the 1997-98 El Niño. billion metric tons of food are required, and the United Last year, the G-8 agreed to a U.S.-proposed initiative States is prepared to supply half of it.
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The cycle of famine in Ethiopia will not be broken, [U.S.] Congress to increase substantially our assistance however, for as long as the government continues to to dismantle as many of Russia’s weapons as possible, as spend a third of its budget on the military. The Interna- quickly as possible... tional Institute for Strategic Studies estimates that Ethiopia spent $467 million on its military last year, a ...... dramatic increase over previous years. Economic devel- opment efforts have been put on hold while scarce STATEMENTS BY KOFI ANNAN resources are committed to the war effort. Secretary-General, United Nations ...[W]hat is taking place in Ethiopia today is a man- made disaster. Without the war, there would be no Excerpts from Secretary-General Annan’s remarks on famine. The decisions of the governments of Ethiopia the Occasion of World Environment Day, New York, and Eritrea have directly contributed to the dire condi- N.Y. tion of their populations. 5 June 2000 This is the same pattern we saw in the early 1980s when the horrific Dergue regime under Mengistu used We may be at the dawn of a new millennium, but famine to make war on its own people. How regrettable the environmental problems we face are painfully fa- that the current governments of Eritrea and Ethiopia, miliar. They may even be getting worse. Despite the which had valiantly fought against the Dergue, now share Earth Summit, and despite success stories like the this aspect with it.... Montreal Protocol to protect the ozone layer, human beings continue to plunder the global environment...... Unsustainable practices remain deeply embedded in the fabric of our daily lives. We are failing to protect STATEMENTS BY GEORGE W. B USH resources and ecosystems. We are failing to invest enough Governor of Texas in alternative technologies, especially for energy. We are failing even to keep the debate alive. These are deeply Excerpts from Governor Bush’s remarks on “A Dis- troubling trends. I recommend four priorities for re- tinctly American Internationalism” at the Ronald versing them. Reagan Presidential Library, Simi Valley, California First, we need a major public education effort. Un- 19 November 1999 derstanding of the challenges we face is alarmingly low. Corporations and consumers alike need to recognize that ...Our first order of business is the national security their choices can have significant consequences. Schools of our nation—and here both Russia and the United and civil society groups have a crucial role to play. States face a changed world. Instead of confronting each Second, environmental issues must be fundamen- other, we confront the legacy of a dead ideological ri- tally repositioned in the policymaking arena. The valry-thousands of nuclear weapons, which, in the case environment must become better integrated into main- of Russia, may not be secure. And together we also face stream economic policy, and the surest way is through an emerging threat-from rogue nations, nuclear theft, green accounting. and accidental launch. All this requires nothing short of Third, governments must not only create environ- a new strategic relationship to protect the peace of the mental agreements, they must enforce them. They can, world. for example, cut the subsidies that sustain environmen- In an act of foresight and statesmanship, [Senator tally harmful activities each and every year. They can Richard Lugar and Senator Sam Nunn] realized that ex- also devise more environment-friendly incentives for isting Russian nuclear facilities were in danger of being markets to respond to. compromised. Under the [1991] Nunn-Lugar program, And fourth, we need sound scientific information. security at many Russian nuclear facilities has been im- This is the only basis for effective policy, yet large gaps proved and warheads have been destroyed. in our knowledge remain. Even so, the Energy Department warns us that our Technological breakthroughs that are unimaginable estimates of Russian nuclear stockpiles could be off by today may well solve some of the environmental chal- as much as thirty percent. In other words, a great deal of lenges we face. But it would be foolish to count on them Russian nuclear material cannot be accounted for. The and to continue with business as usual. The theme for next president must press for an accurate inventory of this year’s World Environment Day says it best: the year all this material. And we must do more. I [will] ask the 2000 begins the environment millennium; the time to
126 ENVIRONMENTAL CHANGE & SECURITY PROJECT REPORT, ISSUE 6 (SUMMER 2000) Official Statements act is now. There will be no easy solutions. Unpleasant manage the environment, poverty will grow more en- ecological surprises lie ahead. But the start of the new trenched, and even peace may remain out of reach. century could not be a more opportune time to commit ...The Kyoto Protocol on climate change can begin ourselves-peoples as well as governments-to a new ethic to control carbon emissions-if it is ratified and imple- of conservation and stewardship. mented, not least by the United States, the world’s largest producer of greenhouse gases... Excerpts from Secretary-General Annan’s remarks as ...All of you, as consumers, can help protect the en- the Commencement Speaker for Class of 2000, vironment through your individual choices. And as Stanford University, Stanford, California citizens and voters, you can put pressure on governments 11 June 2000 not only to reach environmental agreements, but also to enforce them. ...[O]ne of our main responsibilities is to leave to successor generations a sustainable future...... The world needs you to take the lead in safeguard- ing the global environment. STATEMENTS BY MARK MALLOCH BROWN We have long been aware that unsustainable prac- Administrator, United Nations tices remain deeply embedded in the fabric of our daily Development Programme lives. What was shocking was not so much the state of the environment, as the state of the debate on the envi- Excerpts from Administrator Brown’s remarks at the ronment. In a nutshell, the need for sustainable U.N. Security Council Special Session on HIV/AIDS, development is failing to register on the political radar New York, N.Y. screen. 10 January 2000 That is something that should concern us all, not least because half the world’s jobs depend directly on ... At a time when the industrialized world has re- the sustainability of ecosystems. Scientists and others laxed in the face of a declining incidence of new HIV who study these matters may have disagreements here infections, Africa is under siege: many times more people and there; that is the nature of inquiry. But they are are being killed from the disease in sub-Saharan Africa unanimous in saying we face extraordinarily grave chal- each year than in the world’s wars. lenges. They say that if freshwater consumption trends ... HIV/AIDS has a qualitatively different impact continue, by the year 2025 two out of every three people than a traditional health killer such as malaria. It rips on Earth will live in “water stressed” countries. They say across social structures, targeting a young continent’s that if population and land-use trends continue, the young people, particularly its girls; by cutting deep into world will face a real threat to global food security by all sectors of society it undermines vital economic mid-century. And they say that if emissions and energy growth-perhaps reducing future national GDP size in trends continue, global warming will only accelerate. the region by a third over the next twenty years. And by Already, we can see portents of a world that has failed putting huge additional demand on already weak, hard to take climate change seriously. As the warming trend to access, public services it is setting up the terms of a has accelerated, weather patterns have become more desperate conflict over inadequate resources. volatile and extreme. Economic losses from natural di- ...Change must begin by confronting the region’s sasters in 1999 alone totaled approximately $100 troubled inheritance: extensive migrant labor, social billion-more than the cost of all such disasters in the norms and gender inequality making it hard for women 1980s... and girls to deny men sex-leading to HIV incidence rates ...[A]ll too often a collective blindfold seems to de- among girls three or four times higher than boys. scend on those in a position to make a Let me propose to this council a set of actions: dif-ference...[M]anagement of the environment is viewed First, resources....The U.S., with 40,000 new cases as a luxury, not a necessity. All too often, the issue is annually, spends approximately $10 billion annually framed as an intractable conflict between economy and from all sources for prevention, care, treatment and re- ecology, when, in fact, sustainable development offers a search, whereas approximately $165 million is spent on roadmap for reconciling the two. All too often, it is HIV/AIDS related activities in Africa where there are thought that safeguarding the environment means giv- four million new cases a year. We must mobilize more. ing up the fight against poverty or setting aside other Second, a coordinated response. I currently chair vital concerns. But unless we find a way to sustainably the committee of UNAIDS co-sponsoring organizations-
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UNICEF [United Nations Children’s Fund], UNDP, ...... UNFPA [United Nations Population Fund], UNESCO [United Nations Economic, Cultural, and Social Orga- STATEMENTS BY KLAUS TÖPFER nization], WHO [World Health Organization], the Executive Director, United Nations World Bank, and UNDCP [United Nations Interna- Environment Programme tional Drug Control Programme]. Together, we and the bilaterals, the private sector, and NGOs must do more Excerpts from Executive Director Töpfer’s remarks on at the country and global levels. We applaud the forma- “Environmental Security, Stable Social Order, and Cul- tion of the International Partnership Against HIV/AIDS in Africa which is a foot in the door to private-sector ture” at the Teri Silver Jubilee Conference Series, New supported affordable care. Delhi, India Third, UNICEF, WHO, and the World Bank to- 21 February 2000 gether with UNAIDS and a number of innovative foun- dations have begun to innovate new public-private ...The great economic and social issues of our time partnerships that by guaranteeing a market for afford- are intimately linked with the quest for political stabil- able vaccines will incentivize drug company research and ity. But a more significant long-term development of development. The African the past few years has market for international been the intensification pharmaceuticals now ac- “ t is high time to revisit the of the debate concerning counts for less than 1.5 the impact of the current percent of the industry. notion of security and fully ecological crises on the This “pull” must be com- [I] political stability of na- bined with the “push” to appreciate the role of global health tions, and regions and increase basic public even within societies. health research spending. for the future of the [United Today, people around Fourth, we cannot the world, particularly in lapse into a global two-tier States] and the entire system of the developing world are treatment regime: drugs international cooperation.” struggling to survive in for the rich; no hope for the face of growing the poor. While the em- deserts, dwindling for- phasis must be on preven- - Gro Harlem Brundtland ests, declining fisheries, tion, we cannot ignore poisoned food, water, air treatment-despite its costs. We must work with the co- and climatic extremes and weather events that continue operation of the pharmaceutical industry to bring down to intensify-floods, droughts and hurricanes. treatment costs. The question that must be asked is whether the scar- Finally, we cannot break this epidemic in isolation city of renewable resources-such as cropland, forest, from the broader development context. Weak govern- freshwater and fisheries-could precipitate violent civil ment, poor services and economic failure translate di- or international conflicts? There are clear signs that en- rectly into failed vaccine and contaminated blood supply vironmental scarcities could contribute to violent chains. More broadly it means the failure of schools, conflicts in many parts of the world. In the coming de- families, workplaces and economies to be able to meet the challenge. In this region where official development cades, accelerating environmental pressures could finance is drying up, I find myself fighting to reverse transform the very foundations of the international po- UNDP’s own projection that our program resources for litical system. Africa next year will be only a third of what they were ...Let us take the availability of water first. Supplies five years ago. Amidst the good news of more help for of fresh water are finite. The populations of water-short HIV/AIDS, progress on debt relief, and some improve- countries today, estimated to be 550 million, are expected ment in private sector flows, the overwhelming fact is to increase to one billion by the year 2010. Water short- the region’s basic development needs are not being met. ages will be especially adverse for agriculture in general There is a money gap and a governance and capacity and irrigation agriculture in particular. As the demand gap. Neither the finance nor the institutions and poli- grows and in the absence of clear consensus on how best cies are adequately in place. to use shared water resources for the benefit of all, that
128 ENVIRONMENTAL CHANGE & SECURITY PROJECT REPORT, ISSUE 6 (SUMMER 2000) Official Statements competition has the potential of erupting into acrimo- ...It would be too much to say that the global com- nious disputes. munity has learned how to balance resources and ...An even greater threat to future human welfare is population. But the basics are in place. Poverty and rapid through the undermining of the productivity of the land population growth play an important role in environ- through accelerated soil erosion, increased flooding and mental destruction: but so does the unconsidered declining soil fertility. The growing number of people exploitation of resources. affected by desertification-estimated to be one billion- ...Population projections for the early part of this are not simply waiting to be touched by the magic wand century assume continuing and accelerating declines in of development. They are literally “losing ground,” as fertility, longer life spans and a gradual aging of world their lands suffer more and more from the effects of this population....But it is also true that in many countries disease. low fertility has not yet become the norm: Africa in par- ...Conflicts could occur when political and eco- ticular has only recently begun its move towards smaller nomic institutions and processes degrade environmental families. Many things, from economic collapse to AIDS, settings, and place individuals and populations at could prevent long-term fertility decline from taking risk....The half decade since the demise of the Cold War hold in the poorest countries with the fastest popula- has been characterized by numerous attempts at rede- tion growth. In other, more fortunate, developing coun- fining the notion of security. tries, fertility is falling rapidly, but past high fertility The classical conception of security in world poli- will fuel rapid population growth for some time to come. tics is rooted in Walter Lippmann’s famous contention Believe me, there is no “birth dearth.” Globally, there that security is about the possession by a state of a level are over a billion young people between fifteen and of military capability sufficient to avert the danger of twenty-four, the parents of the next generation. Good having to sacrifice core values, if it wishes to avoid war, information and high-quality services will guarantee and is able, if challenged, to maintain them by victory smaller families in this group and long-term fertility in such a war. decline: meanwhile, the new generation represents a re- This traditional conception of security is now be- source for development. With wise investment, they will ing challenged by the emergence of new issues. As power economic growth to support the other new gen- military threats have subsided or disappeared, other eration, the growing numbers of older people. threats, especially environmental ones, have emerged ...We have almost certainly seen the last doubling with greater clarity. It is thus possible to argue that envi- of world population: but the demand for labor in in- ronmental care is an essential component of national or dustrial countries combined with large numbers of young international security. people in developing countries means that there will be Armed force is impotent in the face of ecological increased migration pressures....But they do mean that breakdown. It is relentless ecological degradation, rather policymakers at all levels in all countries have to con- than any external enemy, which poses the gravest threat sider their options very carefully. All our experience in to international and national security today. Clearly, any population contradicts the old adage that “all politics aspect which threatens the survival of the planet and its are local.” Today, all politics are international. National human and non-human inhabitants should be treated decisions must be made in the knowledge that they will as a security threat. International security has to rest on have global effects: and events outside national borders the elimination of the real scourges of humankind-hun- will increasingly have an effect within them. The need ger, disease, illiteracy, poverty, and deterioration of the for international cooperation in policymaking has never earth’s life systems. been greater ...There is broad and deep agreement today that ...... population policies have a place in development plan- ning; and that, whether they are dealing with fertility or STATEMENTS BY NAFIS SADIK migration, they succeed to the extent that they respect Executive Director, United Nations choice and human rights. This is a profound change Population Fund from the time when population was seen in some coun- tries as irrelevant and in others as a matter for govern- Excerpts from Executive Director Sadik’s remarks on ments, not individual decision....Improved understand- “Population-A New View for the New Millennium” at ing has been encouraged by the international dialogue the Carnegie Council, New York, N.Y. which began in the 1960s under United Nations 28 February 2000 auspices....Through a generation of experience, discus-
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sion and action, developing countries and donors alike bal issues are paving their way to the limelight of deci- have learned that there are no short cuts to good popu- sion-makers. And maybe we are seeing that national lation outcomes. Population policies must speak directly political leaders, many of whom remain confined within to the people with whom they are concerned. the logic of their nation-states, are lagging behind their ...Most women in developing countries have a very electorate’s perception of security. long way to go before they can make their own deci- ...[The] Global Health Council conducted a nation- sions about fertility and family planning. Extreme pov- wide public opinion survey aimed at assessing what erty, illiteracy, and ill-health, compounded by a tradi- Americans know and think about global infectious tion of male superiority, limit their decision-making diseases....Global health matters for their own health and power. security and for the future of their children. Conditions ...In an environment of inequality and active dis- of ill-health around the world directly and indirectly crimination, women can make few choices of any kind threaten the lives of large numbers of Americans. about their lives, and their contribution to development Over the course of the last fifty years, at least five is much more limited than it need be. Yet we have seen times as many Americans have died from communicable more change in this area in the last generation than in diseases that have come to the U.S. from developing any comparable period. Over the last thirty years of the countries, than have died in all the military conflicts of millennium, the female half of humanity began to make the same period. Even the most ardent isolationists will itself heard. not be able to argue that the United States can handle ...Indeed, social investment, especially in health and this challenge by turning inwards. With globalization- education, and for women as well as men, fights the on which this nation’s prosperity so much depends-all root causes of poverty, and has been shown to be in some of humankind today paddles in a single microbial sea- ways a precursor to economic growth. and we have to conclude: There are no health sanctuaries. Experience has brought a more balanced view of ...Diseases cannot be kept out by rear guard defen- development-not economic and trickle-down but cen- sive action. The separation between domestic and tered on human rights and human potential. Successful international health problems is losing its usefulness as population policies are at the heart of human-centered people and goods travel across continents. Two million development. people cross international borders every single day, about a tenth of humanity each year. And of these, more than ...... a million people travel from developing to industrial- ized countries each week. STATEMENTS BY GRO HARLEM BRUNDTLAND Health is tradable-as is ill-health. Health may in- Director-General, deed be the single most important bridge to tie World Health Organization together-whether we like it or not-the destinies of the fortunate and the unfortunate. Excerpts from Director-General Brundtland’s remarks What is emerging today is a notion of “human se- at the Council on Foreign Relations on “Why Invest- curity.” The levels of ill-health in countries constituting ing in Global Health is Good Politics, New York, N.Y. a majority of the world’s population pose a direct threat 6 December 1999 to their own national economic and political viability, and therefore to the global economic and political in- ...[It is] an illustrative sign of change that the Council terests of the United States and all other countries. of Foreign Relations, traditionally known to be driving Territorial dispute is no longer the prime source of con- the debate on national and international security, has flict. It is increasingly rooted in general misery, aftermaths invited the Director-General of the World Health Or- of humanitarian crises, shortage of food and water and ganization to talk about the need to invest in global the spreading of poverty and ill-health. health. So, investing in global health is investing in national ...[W]e need to redefine the notion of security in security. This very notion has diverse and profound the age of globalization...[I]t is high time to revisit the implications for the way we perceive national invest- notion of security and fully appreciate the role of global ments, foreign aid and, private-public collaboration. The health for the future of the [United States] and the en- awareness of these shifts is gradually sinking in. The U.S. tire system of international cooperation. Department of State has defined public health as an area ...[G]lobal issues really start to matter for people’s of attention in its own strategy for defending national daily lives. Global issues trigger popular response. Glo- interests. And it is indeed a small sign of changing times
130 ENVIRONMENTAL CHANGE & SECURITY PROJECT REPORT, ISSUE 6 (SUMMER 2000) Official Statements when the Clinton Administration, for the first time in we are working on presenting a realistic and combined U.S. history, has added a global health specialist to the package of interventions-based on existing technology staff of the National Security Council....Let me dwell and knowledge-addressing the leading health killers of on three arguments for U.S. investment in global health. poverty. I believe that with around ten billion dollars First about protecting people...From food safety, the world could realistically make a giant leap towards through disease spread by airline passengers, to the dan- halving the number of fellow human beings living in ger of bacteriological attacks from rogue states and absolute poverty by 2015. terrorists; protecting U.S. citizens means improving glo- It will not be a blueprint for action-but a clear illus- bal health levels; improving international food standards; tration of concrete interventions-or products if you and by concerted attempts help limit the spread of deadly like-that are likely to lead to very concrete results. This virus and bacteria; and international action to contain is about human security-and ultimately about national terrorist elements. and international security. ...This leads to the second argument: the economic ...[I]nvesting in global health is indeed good poli- gain. There are moral and ethical arguments why the tics, it is good economics and it is good for national and United States and other developed countries should in- international security. It means addressing up front the vest in halting the global AIDS epidemic which is many components of global health; reproductive health, accelerating at a dreadful pace in Southern Africa-or join immunization, environmental health, nutrition, the forces to stop the spread of tuberculosis and join us in emerging tide of non-communicable diseases such as Rolling Back Malaria. cancer, heart disease and diabetes and the growing bur- ...Looking at the world, we have to be clear about den from mental health disorders. it: So far the war on poverty has failed. Differences are ...Health is truly a bridge to peace, an antidote to spreading inside countries and between countries. This intolerance, a source of shared security. degrades us and threatens us. It looms as a threat to the One of the key challenges to everyone who will help environment-not only that of the poor-but of all of us. build the twenty-first century will be to find the anchor ...We need effective and targeted policies. General points for a better common future. Health is one of them. programmatic declarations aimed at poverty reduction The question that each and everyone of us has to an- rarely bring much success. However, there is a growing swer is: Can we face up to that challenge? ! and solid body of evidence, which shows that investing in health reduces poverty. In fact, health may be far more central to poverty reduction than macro-economists have previously thought. We have cost-effective health inter- ventions to reduce dramatically the excess burden of disease among the poor. Remember smallpox eradica- tion. Witness the great reductions in mortality from the spread of other immunizations. [P]rivate involvement is absolutely necessary. But there is no way in which this can replace a strong public commitment to global health-through investments, dedi- cated research and political attention....It is about extending democracy and the rule of law to another level- to the global level. And hand-in-hand with this lies the crucial need for promoting certain global public goods- of which health is a critical one. Today, ninety percent of resources allocated to health are spent on ten percent of the world population-the wealthy part-whereas ten percent of the resources go to cover ninety percent of the disease burden, which lies with the poor. This clearly has to change. And it can be changed as we begin to take seriously the interdependence and the enlightened self-interest which should lead the devel- oped world to take global health seriously....At WHO
ENVIRONMENTAL CHANGE & SECURITY PROJECT REPORT, ISSUE 6 (SUMMER 2000) 131 New Publications
NEW PUBLICATIONS
Environmental Change, Adaptation, and Security Steve C. Lonergan, Editor Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic Press, 1999. 432 pp.
Reviewed by Simon Dalby
his four hundred-page volume contains the proceedings of the NATO advanced research workshop on “Environmental Change, Adaptation and Security” held in Budapest in October 1997. Twenty-seven edited Tchapters organized into seven sections comprise versions of all the papers presented at the workshop, mak- ing this a complete record of this meeting. The decision to print the entire set of papers makes for an uneven collection of styles, approaches, and academic quality which the editor and his assistants have obviously worked very hard to massage into a readable and editorially consistent volume. There are very diverse views in these pages and a variety of different perspectives on what counts as both security and environment. This will interest those who find the broad conceptual matters congenial and probably frustrate those who wish to follow a narrowly focused empirical research agenda. Environment here is understood in general terms and security is about much more than armed conflict and overt violence. Notable in the titles of the first three sections of the book is the specification of matters in terms of human security, which, while not explained in an introduction, obviously gestures at the formulation of security as a matter of more than states, or for that matter, the military concerns of NATO. This theme runs through the rest of the book; obviously, the notion of security here is much broader than traditional understandings in terms of national security and alliance politics. Section one has four conceptual chapters that offer some overall reflections on the debate. Michael Redclift’s chapter opens the discussion by arguing that environmental change is not the given premise from which the debate should start. Rather he argues that the global economy has increasingly turned the environment into a matter of competition and conflict as competing corporations struggle to appropriate resources from all over the world. The consequences are that development wins out over sustainability repeatedly, and ensures that environmental security is not practically addressed. Richard Matthew’s chapter also tackles the big picture by focusing on what he calls disequilibria between the political views of liberals and realists, rich and poor, institutions and needs, social and ecological systems, which added together summarize the current crisis. These are then reinterpreted through a reading of Rousseau’s Social Contract to explore the politics of global environmental change. Marvin Soroos argues for an understanding of security that gets beyond traditional definitions in national security studies and stimulates thought about the larger threats to human well-being. He concludes ruefully, that experience suggests that societies will opt for avoidance, defense, and adaptation to environmental change, rather than take the better option of prevention. Philippe Le Prestre’s chapter, the final one in the first section, focuses on how to conceptualize the political processes of adaptation in the face of both known risks and, more importantly, large scale uncertainty. The second section consists of four chapters on matters of resources and human security, starting with David Greene’s analysis of the continued high dependence of the transportation sector on petroleum and the effects of Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries’ actions on world energy prices. For economic reasons as well as
132 ENVIRONMENTAL CHANGE & SECURITY PROJECT REPORT, ISSUE 6 (SUMMER 2000) New Publications environmental concerns, he argues that high US depen- water supply situation in Istanbul focuses on the theme dence on oil needs policy attention. Chapter six, by Mike of urbanization and the consequences of the rapid shift Brklacich and Shona Leybourne, reviews concepts of of populations in developing states into urban areas. food security, suggesting, among other things, the im- Security here is interpreted as guaranteed water supplies portance of understanding food in terms of individual to urban consumers. In chapter twelve, K.S. Losev and and community access and entitlements. Chapter seven M.D. Ananicheva briefly discuss recent trends in green- by Samir Allal and Martin O’Conner, focuses on the house gas emissions in Russia, echoing the point in question of the “ecological distribution” of water re- chapter eight that emissions have been reduced as a re- sources in the Jordan-Israel-Palestine area, and the sult of economic decline rather than technical necessity of political actors to understand that they have innovation. Chapter fourteen by Adele Finco and Peter to operate on the basis of some shared interests if solu- Nijkamp offers a discussion of technical aspects of land tions to water supply questions are to be found. Sandor use sustainability analysis and policy evaluation with an Kerekes discusses the environmental dimensions of post- application to the Po delta in Italy. The final chapter Soviet economic development in Hungary in chapter (fifteen) in this section by A. Makarenko and Z. Klestova eight, concluding that much of the gain in suggests, but does not demonstrate in any environmental performance has been detail, the applicability of Makarenko’s achieved by the closure of polluting Soviet mathematical modeling procedures to era factories. global questions. Its not quite clear why chapter eight is Section four addresses transboundary not included in the third section on re- problems, first with chapter sixteen by gional perspectives, which explore Elena Nikitina and Vladimir Kotov, on everything from water supplies in Istanbul, BOOK the question of Norilsk Nickel’s sulfur di- the vulnerabilities of Pacific islands to en- oxide emissions, from their smelters on vironmental change, to the environmental the Kola Peninsula, which remain a prob- situation in Kyrgyzstan. The seven chap- lem despite various mitigation attempts. ters in this section show the eclectic The political crisis in Russia has made approaches to the overall theme of the book policymaking and environmental enforce- most clearly, and inevitably raise the ques- ment more difficult requiring an tion as to whether all these authors are really talking adjustment from top down national and international about the same topic. Environment is a common theme, arrangements to a more complex political process that but security is only implicit in some of these chapters. deals with local authorities and the enterprises involved Chris Cocklin’s chapter nine on the Pacific islands’ vul- directly. B. Constantinescu and Roxana Bugoi discuss nerability to environmental change and more specifically, the social adaptation to the Chernobyl accident in chap- to the increased vulnerabilities of many societies as a ter seventeen emphasizing the importance of prompt result of the economic “development” strategies of es- and accurate government information in such a crisis. tablishing mines and forestry exports, is a detailed Aaron Wolf discusses the persistent question of “water academic analysis. On the other hand, Kazimir Karimov wars” in chapter eighteen linking questions of resources and Razia Gainutdinova’s discussion of Kyrgyzstan’s en- once again to traditional security discussions of armed vironment in chapter thirteen is only a very brief conflict. Wolf’s analysis supports other work that sug- overview. gests that the possibilities of war breaking out over Barbara Jancar-Webster’s chapter 10 offers an analy- inter-state water disputes are fairly remote. Violence and sis of the institutional dimensions of adaptation to conflict over water resources are usually internal to states post-Soviet situations and concludes that the focus on and stop short of full-scale warfare. developing appropriate institutions for applying for Eu- Section five covers matters of institutional capacity ropean Union or NATO membership may not produce and adaptation. In chapter nineteen, Joanne Caddy re- the necessary capabilities for adapting to and handling turns to the themes introduced in chapter ten, suggesting potential environmental problems. Cocklin is more op- the importance of innovative institutional arrangements timistic arguing that in the case of the Pacific Islands’ in the transition economies of Central and Eastern Eu- regional strategies in negotiating international agree- rope. Radioactive contamination in Russia is the theme ments on climate change and related matters have of chapter twenty. In particular, L. Uspenskaya is con- suggested the possibilities of considerable cooperation cerned about the Kyshtym accident near Chelyabinsk among those states. Ilter and Gul Turan’s analysis of the in 1957 that contaminated a large area. The only effec-
ENVIRONMENTAL CHANGE & SECURITY PROJECT REPORT, ISSUE 6 (SUMMER 2000) 133 New Publications
tive method of dealing with this accident was the con- is a complex part of violence and change in poorer parts struction of a strictly enforced exclusion zone, or a of the world, and that security is not a matter of inter- “radiation reserve” where, ironically, long-term increases state warfare the authors develop an “index of human in biodiversity due to the lack of human activity have insecurity.” This human security index draws in part been documented. Sedar Guner uses game theory to from work done on developing humanitarian and fam- investigate the possible state alliance combinations in ine early warning systems, but suggests that longer term conflict over water in the Euphrates and the Tigris riv- predictions may be of more use for development plan- ers in chapter twenty-one. This chapter precedes a ning and that a few key indicators coupled with an consideration of Romanian environmental strategies by effective mapping system, may be most useful in identi- Daniela Constantin, who suggests that “mosaic fying key areas of insecurity. Not surprisingly, the data ecodevelopment,” starting with small local areas and for the 1990s, as well as projections into the future, sug- gradually extending sustainable development over the gests that sub-Saharan Africa contains the most insecure whole country, coupled with careful communication, populations on earth. Interestingly, Pakistan, Afghani- nongovernmental organization participation, and more stan, and the Arabian penninsula are also featured as general behavioral changes, offers the most promising insecure. possibilities for the future. The final chapter of this sec- The dialogue with NATO partners for peace states tion is by Edward Barbier and Thomas Homer-Dixon, in Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union is well who discuss the fact that the resource-rich poorest coun- represented in these pages. This volume is a useful con- tries often remain poor with conflict over the allocation tribution to discussions of global problems, even as the of resources occurring, while economic diversification locale from which the writers work obviously influences and growth are stalled. the perspectives and priorities of the authors. As a snap- Chapter twenty-four by Dilrom Fayzieva on water shot of the current debates about sustainable pollution in Uzbekistan and chapter twenty-five by Alexi development and the uneasy links between such con- Danchev on climate change in Bulgaria constitute the cepts and the literature on rethinking security, this sixth section on health, environment, and security. volumes’ eclecticism is noteworthy. Rather than a weak- Fayzieva documents the health effects of degraded wa- ness, it suggests the multiplicity of concerns under the ter supplies in Uzbekistan and, noting the effects of rubric of environmental security and the importance of degradation around the Aral Sea in combination with understanding such discussions as a useful focus for at- the poor economic situation in the region, paints a bleak tention to pressing problems rather than as a tightly picture of the complex causes of widespread childhood defined analytical lens through which to view the world. illness. Danchev suggests that climate change may ag- That said however, some introductory comments about gravate the already serious health problems in Eastern the broader agenda of human security, and the process Europe, but that people’s perceptions of matters need- that brought the authors together in Budapest in 1997 ing attention focus on short-term concerns with crime would be helpful to an audience beyond the environ- and health services rather than ameliorative measures in mental security cognoscenti. Possibly placing the editor’s anticipation of long-term disruptions. This discussion own contribution, which includes a useful discussion implicitly suggests, again, the more general difficulties of what insecurity means, or Marvin Soroos’ contribu- of addressing climate change issues, given long-term tion, or both, at the beginning as an introductory section, uncertainties and pressing short-term problems. might have provided a more thorough conceptual basis The last two chapters deal with measurement is- for the disparate themes in the individual papers. sues: Peter Nijkamp on natural resource issues and the Above all, two things about the current environ- importance of decision support systems in agricultural mental security debate are clear in this collection. First, policy analysis; and Steve Lonergan, Kent Gustavson, are the limitations of various disciplinary perspectives and Mark Harrower on mapping insecurity at the glo- in terms of how they define matters. Economists, geog- bal scale. Nijkamp focuses on the definitional debate raphers, and political scientists often do not start from about sustainable development and the important con- similar assumptions about the world and how to study siderations of carrying capacity, soil and water quality, it. While this is accentuated by the regional focus of and especially, their critical threshold values in scenario many of the authors in this volume, the conceptual as- analysis. Mapping insecurity at the global level takes the sumptions are not always consistent. Second, and related questions of indicators to the largest scale and sketches to this limitation, is the unavoidable matter of the clas- out some of the components of an index of human inse- sical concerns of politics. As is especially clear in the curity. Combining the understanding that environment chapters by Michael Redclift and Richard Matthews,
134 ENVIRONMENTAL CHANGE & SECURITY PROJECT REPORT, ISSUE 6 (SUMMER 2000) New Publications the larger questions of humanity’s place in the order of support from UNHCR [United Nations High Com- things, and the consequent assumptions about how hu- missioner for Refugees]. man affairs ought to be arranged, are unavoidable when If you are a nazih woman, you are particularly vul- global environmental considerations are discussed. How- nerable. Wearing your traditional clothing from, say the ever important the technical discussions are, and they Nuba region, you immediately become a target of abuse, matter greatly, the case that security is a fundamentally not only by the police, but by men in general. Even in political matter is squarely put, even if often only im- their migrant homes, nazih women face greater risk of plicitly, in the pages of this volume. violence than in their place of origin, since the level of violence in migrants’ homes tends to rise. Simon Dalby is Associate Professor of Geography and This is how Mahmoud portrays the link between Environmental Studies at Carleton University in Ottawa. ecological disruption and violence, primarily against women, in today’s Sudan. It is an understanding that ...... can only come from detailed studies and privileged in- side knowledge. It is also one of the great strengths of Ecology, Politics, and Violent Conflict the book Ecology, Politics, and Violent Conflict, edited by Mohamed Suliman. Mohamed Suliman, ed. It is a strength which is replicated in another case London: Zed Books, 1999. 288 pp. study of Sudan, by Abdel-Galil Elmekki, which con- cerns the large-scale changes in the country’s Reviewed by Leif Olhsson food-producing sector. In an extremely well-reasoned chapter, he gives a detailed account of the roots of the If you really wish to get confirmation of the exist- food crisis in Sudan. The enigma to be explained is ence of a phenomenon such as the hypothesized link succintly formulated: why is it that producers of food between ecological disruption and potentially violent are the first and most seriously affected by famine? political and social outcomes, then you should go to The explanation is that access of peasant commu- changes in language, according to Fatima Babiker nities to food is declining at both the production and Mahmoud, a contributing author in this exchange levels. Farmers in eastern and edited volume, Ecology, Politics, and Vio- western Sudan are no longer capable of lent Conflict. producing enough sorghum and millet, as If you are a naziheen in Sudan, you a result of both land degradation and will know of this link from bitter personal forced changes in the production process. experience. The term was coined in the As a result of what ironically was termed early eighties to cover a new pattern of the “bread-basket” policy, sorghum and migration caused by environmental crisis. BOOK millet no longer are produced in order to Before the advent of this type of migra- provide people with food, but as a contri- tion, migrants were referred to simply as bution to the country’s balance of “rural people” (igleemiyeen). The term payments. In the process, the large-scale differentiaties between migrants and refu- mechanized farming sector has become gees in the sense that when a person is a one of the most powerful lobbying groups, nazih, he or she is moving within national completely marginalizing small-scale boundaries. It is also so specific to the farmers, who can neither produce enough for their own drought-displaced that, in general usage, the war-dis- needs, nor afford the produce offered on the market. placed, who are mainly from southern Sudan, are referred At the bottom lies a system of perverted govern- to simply as “Southerners.” ment-induced subsidies favoring the interests of The number of naziheen in Sudan today may be large-scale mechanized farmers, the end result of which more than three million. About half of them live in or has turned out to be both starvation and ecological di- near Khartoum in miserable squatter settlements, sub- saster in a context of civil war and massive flows of ject to regular kashas, rounding-ups by the police, often internal and external refugees. The case of Sudan thus, with the object of assembling train-loads of forced la- underpins the links between ecology, politics, and vio- bor for the large commercial farms. In contrast to lent conflict, sought for by the book. international refugees (e.g. from Eritrea), or even war- Starting out the book, however, the reader gets a displaced people, none of the naziheen qualify for healthy inoculation against too simplistic notions of such
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links. Nicholas Hildyard’s criticism of proponents of the final example, the chapter on climate change has much “blood and babies” family of theories is a passionate, yet to do with politics, but the link to violent conflict (as balanced, treatment of the basic theoretical issues en- the chapter heading promises) is absent. Similar com- countered whenever a treatise is attempted that involves ments could be made about other chapters. violent conflicts of seemingly ethnic origin, in a context of continuing population increase. Neither ethnicity, nor Leif Ohlsson is a Ph.D. researcher at the Department of scarcity are “primordial” causes of conflict—both, in Social Sciences at Orebro University, Sweden. Hildyard’s terms—are socially constructed or induced phenomena, open to manipulation by actors with an ...... agenda based on self-interests. By placing Hildyard’s thoughtful piece at the very Hydropolitics in the Third World: Conflict and beginning of the book, the editor, Mohamed Suliman, promises a fruitful intellectual journey to come. To a Cooperation in International River Basins large part, such promises are fulfilled—Günther Arun P. Elhance Baechler’s theoretical chapter deserves mention—but in Washington, DC: United States Institute of some cases they are not. Peace Press, 1999. 309 pp. Unfortunately, Suliman’s own chapter on “The Ra- tionality and Irrationality of Violence in Sub-Saharan Reviewed by Ariel Dinar and Shlomi Dinar Africa” belongs to the latter group. An expert on the conflicts in the Horn of Africa, Suliman deserves credit Hydropolitics in the Third World is a major contribu- as an editor for bringing to the light contributions like tion to our understanding of conflict and cooperation the two chapters on Sudan mentioned. But he would patterns among states that share international river ba- have been wise to abstain in his own chapter from an sins. Arun Elhance, a scholar on international water attempt to gain easy points through rather empty de- resource management, has prepared for readers of vari- nunciations of cultural essentialism and ous disciplines a comprehensive analytical framework neo-malthusianism. Here, serious researchers are lumped that covers several aspects of international waters, such together with authors of best-selling books, and all of as hydrology, geography, history, economics, politics, and them discarded in little more than a paragraph on the international relations. This book is the first attempt at grounds that “only a combination of unfavourable fac- applying a robust analytical approach that compares and tors will make [people] cross the threshold between war analyzes conflict and cooperation in several river basins. and peace.” This is a straw-man type of argument, since All previously known works were case studies that ex- every serious author, including several of those discarded, amined only one international river basin.1 What can would be very careful to make the same point. the reader gain from reading this book and what are the Likewise, Suliman’s own point, that “the most per- main assets of the book? nicious [factors leading to conflict] are the denial or First, the book is an endless source of information limiting of people’s access to renewable natural resources, on the geography, hydrology, and politics of the ripar- and ecological degradation,” is well worth emphasiz- ian countries sharing six of the major international river ing—but it also conforms to precisely the link that a basins around the world. The case studies in the book whole strand of environment and conflict research, in- include the Paraná-La Plata in Latin America, the Nile cluding some of the researchers previously dismissed, in Africa, the Jordan and the Euphrates-Tigris in the has gone to considerable lengths to problematize and Middle East, the Ganges-Brahmaputra-Barak in the In- illuminate. dian sub-continent, and the Mekong basin in South East Having said this, the overall evaluation of the book, Asia. of course, depends on its intended readership. As one in Second, Elhance presents an analytical framework a row of “readers” for the interested general public or that guides the reader through a rigorous analysis of undergraduate courses it may fill a certain need. The hydropolitics in each basin and a synthesis for all ba- replications of already published material are not a draw- sins. The reader is exposed to eye-opening information back for this purpose, although some of the pieces would on one of the most interesting trends in the world— then have benefitted from a different style of writing. conflict and cooperation over the most precious resource, As an edited volume for the scientific readership (as its water. In addition, scholars of all disciplines can apply style of writing would imply), there remains—apart from this approach developed by Elhance to other river ba- several highlights mentioned—certain weaknesses. As a sins, and make use of the framework since conflicts
136 ENVIRONMENTAL CHANGE & SECURITY PROJECT REPORT, ISSUE 6 (SUMMER 2000) New Publications around international river basins are the rule rather than Elhance also notes that the inability to assert hege- the exception. The waters of these basins are just as rare mony affects the relationship between security and and scarce as cooperative solutions to the conflicts. sovereignty. In the case of Egypt, the Nile River is cru- In terms of international relations, Elhance not only cial to the state’s survival as evidenced in the past, when discusses many traditional and emerging concepts, but the Egyptian government has threatened to go to war also adds tremendous insights into the manner in which over the river if the water flowing into Egypt is threat- politics on water and environment interact—a very im- ened or altered in any way. In a similar manner, water portant issue since the end of the Cold War. has already had a role in instigating a war between Israel Unfortunately, for overall implications of and Syria and is a great issue of contention between the hydropolitics and international relations, the river ba- two countries as they negotiate a peace treaty. 3 This sins chosen do not permit analytical generalization brings us to a central question: Will states actually go to because of the hydropolitical uniqueness of each basin. war over shared water resources? This has been a topic Nonetheless, Elhance’s comparative case of great interest and debate among several study approach does produce some “con- scholars that is still unresolved.4 What is tingent generalizations” which can be certain, according to Elhance, is that con- beneficial as the states within the different flicts over shared waters of international basins often face similar constraints and river basins will continue to undermine objectives under which they conduct their interstate relations for the near future. relations. In several of the regions, such as the One very important aspect of water, BOOK Ganges-Brahmaputra-Barak Basin, water of which the reader is constantly reminded, is linked to a political conflict. This link- is the interdependency of riparian coun- age is important to such an extent that, tries. This interdependency draws nations Elhance argues it is difficult to imagine into a web, compelling them to interact the states in the basin making a substan- with each other, yet making them vulner- tial improvement in their contentious able to the vagaries of uncertain interstate bilateral and multilateral relations if issues relations, the anarchic state of the international system, relating to the division and sharing of water are not re- domestic politics, and geo-politics. The picture is even solved. On the other hand, as Elhance reiterates, basins more complex when colonial-era legacies are present, such as the Jordan are afflicted with a protracted con- where contested national borders become a conflicting flict where the main obstacle to cooperation is embedded issue, and where identities and other political conflicts in identities and territorial disputes. Regions where the are embedded in the water conflict and vice versa. Thus, low politics (water) cannot be separated from the high nations are often faced with both sensitivities and vul- politics (protracted conflict) also involve domestic poli- nerabilities in terms of their riparian relations.2 tics and the influence of pressure groups on the policies To his credit, Elhance also stresses the importance and negotiating positions of states. Still, as the nations of geography to the international relations between ri- of the Jordan River basin continue their reconciliation, parian states. This often forgotten variable in conflict, a final peace agreement will not be possible without an cooperation, war, or peace in international relations, is equitable division, or at least a fair division of the wa- of great importance to hydropolitics. As such, geogra- ters. This conflict, however, demonstrates the phy shapes hydropolitics and often dictates the positions problematic nature of water. In some regions, the in- and foreign policies of states vis-á-vis a waterway. For separability of water from the protracted conflict or the example, a nation such as Turkey that is the upstream centrality of water in the state’s international relations, state in the Tigris and Euphrates basin, is a potentially makes water the subject of high politics. hegemonic nation since the rivers both originate from As Elhance illustrates when introducing the example its territory. Yet, hegemony in terms of geography can of the Mekong River, only when states have committed sometimes mean nothing when a state is not able to ex- themselves to cooperation and are also “ripe” in terms ploit its hegemonic potential (i.e., the hydrological of their domestic and international environments, can assets). Ethiopia for example, is an upstream state where they then commence negotiations over the waterway they more than eighty percent of the Nile waters originate. It share. In addition, only then can international organi- is unable, however, to exploit its position given its inferior zations and other nongovernmental organizations be able economic status and its military and political stance in com- to mobilize and assist states in realizing their shared in- parison with the political and economic power of Egypt. terests. Thus, cooperation is very much linked to the
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overall political environment among states and their cooperation among a sub-group of riparian states shall perceptions of one another. It is important to note, how- be the first objective and over time this cooperation will ever, that nongovernmental organizations, epistemic strengthen and the sub-group will expand. communities, and international organizations can of- Finally, while Elhance admits that his book only fo- ten put pressure on governments or mobilize citizens to cuses on states (although he does mention the support a certain political track even if the government importance of separatist movements such as with Eritrea, itself would not have initiated the political track alone. Kurdistan, and Kashmir/Panjab), his argument could At the same time, cooperation, as the Mekong River have benefited from a more rigorous analysis and dis- basin demonstrates, can also be a derivative of the real- cussion of the influence and effects of emerging states ization among the riparian states that a water crisis may and national entities on already established states’ be realized if the they do not take immediate coopera- hydropolitics. This impact on hydropolitics is especially tive action. important with the introduction of new actors after the There are also several areas of the book where Cold War. Elhance’s argument is weak. First, we find it very unfor- Despite the deficiencies described above, we recog- tunate that the most important contribution of the nize the fact that not every issue can be addressed in one book—the analytical framework—is hidden in an ap- study or model. Hydropolitics in the Third World is one pendix at the end of the book. One would expect to of the building blocks in the process of establishing the have the analytical model at the front of the book, fol- necessary analytical framework for the science of lowed by the case study chapters, the comparative hydropolitics, as well as the challenging field of water analysis, and conclusions. diplomacy. It is our hope therefore, that our criticism Second, the restriction of the book to “hydropolitics will offer ideas for further research in this important in the third world” is an artificial construct. The model field. developed by the author has relevance to cases in the developed world as well. Why should it be restricted Ariel Dinar is a Principal Economist at the World Bank only to the third world? We feel that extending the dis- and an Adjunct Professor of Economics at the George cussion to include a wider range of conditions pertaining Washington University, Washington D.C. Shlomi Dinar is to the variables used in the comparative model (such as a Ph.D. candidate in Energy, Environment, Science and the country’s level of development), would add value to Technology at the Paul H. Nitze School of Advanced the book. Elhance extrapolates from the analysis of International Studies of Johns Hopkins University. present situations to future predicted scenarios, but he ignores other contemporary basins also in need of analy- sis. This practice, in our view, is a missed opportunity NOTES to demonstrate the robustness of the analytical frame- work. To Elhance’s credit, he does generalize some of 1 For example, see John Waterburry, Hydropolitics of the Nile his findings in the conclusion section, but in our view, Valley. Syracuse, N.Y.: Syracuse University Press, 1979; John this brief mention is not enough. V. Krutilla, The Columbia River Treaty: The Economics of an Third, Elhance approaches cooperation with a nar- International River Basin Development. Baltimore: Johns row focus. The fact that mainly water-related cooperative Hopkins University Press, 1967; Aaron T. Wolf, Hydropolitics projects are discussed and used to explain trends in be- along the Jordan Valley: Scarce Water and its Impact on the Arab- havior of riparian states may have biased the conclusions Israeli Conflict. Tokyo: United Nations University Press, 1995; of the comparative analysis. Cooperative theory suggests and B.G. Verghese, Waters of Hope: Integrated Water Resources that the larger the “cake,” the more likely the arrange- Development and Regional Cooperation within the Malayan- ment is to be stable and sustainable. Experience indicates Ganga-Brahmaputra-Barak Basin. New Delhi: Oxford and that there are many venues of cooperation that are out- IBH Publishing Co, 1990. side the water arena.5 Use of relative advantages in 2 neighboring economies may add needed aspects to co- Kenneth A. Waltz, “Structural Causes and Economic Ef- operation. Here we suggest the notion of sub-coalitions, fects,” Theory of International Politics. Reading, MA: Addison as was suggested by Richard Just and Sinaya Netanyahu.6 Wesley Publishing Company, Inc, 1979. The basic issue that does not get the attention it de- 3 In the negotiations between Syria and Israel that are cur- serves, is whether or not full cooperation (Grand rently (as of May 2000) at a stalemate, water plays a key role. Coalition) among all riparian states is a necessary con- If Israel withdraws from the Golan Heights it will lose con- dition for conflict resolution in the basin, or that trol over the tributaries, which feed into the Jordan River.
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Any agreement with Syria will include a detailed agreement volume offers a full-length elaboration of both the model on the control, management and division of the tributaries’ and the findings. As such, this volume is a most useful waters. For background information, see for example, Itamar addition to the environment and conflict literature. Rabinovich, The Brink of Peace: The Israeli- The basic premise in the study follows Syrian Negotiations. Princeton, N. J.: Princeton much of the literature in the field in argu- University Press, 1998; and Helena Cobban, ing that political conflicts in the The Israeli-Syrian Peace Talks 1991-96 and underdeveloped world have identifiable Beyond. Washington, D.C.: United States In- material roots. In exploring the chains of stitute of Peace Press, 1999. causation that link environmental factors 4 Aaron T. Wolf, “Conflict and Coopera- to conflict, Baechler develops a complex tion along International Waterways.” Water BOOK model that emphasizes political factors Policy. 1:2 (1998): 251-265; Thomas F. within states as crucial to predicting the Homer-Dixon, “On the Threshold: Environ- eruption of violence. The ENCOP find- mental Changes as Causes of Acute Conflict,” ings confirm other research, which suggests International Security, 16:2 (Fall 1991); Tho- that environmental conflicts are mostly in- mas F. Homer-Dixon, Environment, Scarcity ternal to particular states and unlikely to and Violence. Princeton, N.J.: Princeton Uni- cause inter-state conflict in the immediate versity Press, 1999. future. Unraveling the important causal 5 See for example Peter Rogers, “The Value of Cooperation factors and the circumstances that are likely to lead to in Resolving International River Basin Disputes.” Natural organized conflict, if not to full-scale warfare, is not an Resources Forum, 17:2 (1993): 117-31, for the case of the easy task although this volume carefully lays out the Ganges-Brahmaputra and Haim Ben Shachar, Gideon causal connections. But, Baechler wants to do more than Fishelson, and S. Hirsh. Economic Cooperation and Middle revisit this research; he tries to extend the analysis to East Peace. London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1989, for the suggest some practical ameliorative measures that will case of the Middle East. take the pressure off rural resources and hence prevent 6 Richard E. Just and Sinaya Netanyahu, “International conflicts occurring. This attempt at ameliorative mea- Water Resource Conflicts: Experience and Potential.” In Just, sures leads him back to a discussion of security and Richard E. and Sinaya Netanyahu (Eds.), Conflict and Coop- sustainable development towards the end of the book. eration on Trans-Boundary Water Resources. Boston, CT: Kluwer, While much of the environment and conflict re- 1998. search focuses on the question of environmental degradation as a factor in causing conflict, Baechler ...... emphasizes that the other side of the coin, the transfor- mation of environments by human action on the largest Violence Through Environmental scale, is also an important part of the current processes. Discrimination: Causes, Rwanda Arena, In particular the actions of industrialization, the devel- and Conflict Model opment of a fossil-fueled economy, and the expansion Günther Baechler of industrial agriculture in the second half of the twen- Dordrecht: Kluwer, 1999. tieth century have been major factors in the transformation. Right from the first page of chapter one, Reviewed by Simon Dalby Baechler uses Vandana Shiva's term "maldevelopment," to make the connections between violence, poverty, and Günther Baechler was the director of the Environ- environmental degradation in Africa explicit. But more ment and Conflicts Project (ENCOP) supported by the generally he discusses this within the framework devel- Swiss Peace Federation in the 1990s. This volume draws oped by Karl Polanyi, of the "Great Transformation" heavily on the work of the project and its case studies. from traditional agricultural to modern industrial soci- Although not officially ENCOP's final report, much ety in Europe which has directly driven many of the of this volume effectively acts as such. It provides a sum- large-scale environmental changes of the last few centu- mary of the theoretical framework as well as a synthesis ries. Crucially Baechler suggests that maldevelopment of the findings of the empirical material. While much in Africa, in particular, is part of the larger consequences of the project material has appeared in summary form of the "Great Transformation." in articles and book chapters, including in the Envi- These conceptual considerations suggest clearly that ronmental Change and Security Project Report, this conflict is a result of the disruptions of development
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and transformation rather than a result of solely indig- cussion of the "Borana solution" to the potential con- enous causes. This connection is crucial to the discus- flicts between fourteen ethnic groups in an area in East sion in this volume and a very useful contribution to Africa. Here cooperation and an intricate agreement the larger literature linking environment and conflict. forestalled conflict and generated a locally sustainable While some researchers might demur at the broad gen- pattern of resource use as well as an agreed arrangement eralization that the places that are likely to have envi- for enforcing the agreement. Baechler suggests that there ronmental conflicts are arid grasslands and mountain is much to be learned from this case, but this reviewer areas, which have been only partly disturbed by the pro- was disappointed that much more was not made of this cesses of industrial transformation, this volume has the analysis. In particular, Baechler would have strength- very considerable advantage of making the geographical ened the volume, if he had explicitly worked the Borana factors of conflict much more explicit than is often the solution back into the model on the one hand, and, on case in this environment and conflict literature. Focus- the other hand, if the crucial question of keeping cen- ing on the particular kinds of environments that are in- tral state officials out of the way to allow a local solution volved in conflicts simplifies both the relevant causations to be worked out, was discussed in more detail. to be studied, and also narrows the often loose defini- How all this might lead to alternative modes of "off tions of both "environment" and "resources" included farm" rural economic employment that reduce the strain in models that try to offer very broad generalizations on agricultural resources in other situations needs much about the processes of environmental conflict. further work. Hopefully, the results of such research will Using the African "maldevelopment" cases where be forthcoming in future volumes based on the current violence is directly linked to the environment and the research in Africa that has followed on from the ENCOP lack of development, Baechler suggests that these pro- analyses. What is abundantly clear in this important cesses must also clearly be understood in terms of the volume is the necessity of understanding violence as a unfortunate history of colonization and the economic part of contemporary social transformation, and of un- marginalization of rural populations. Discussing these derstanding the political specificities of particular marginalized people, as the title of the volume suggests, environmental contexts in predicting conflict, as well as in terms of environmental "discrimination," may not in suggesting ameliorative actions. be the ideal terminology. But, discrimination does con- vey the crucial point of the whole volume, that many Simon Dalby is Associate Professor of Geography and people do not have access to either the resources they Environmental Studies at Carleton University in Ottawa. need, or economic alternatives to these resources, for political reasons, and are often forced to fight to survive ...... as a consequence. The Rwanda case study that forms the empirical demonstration of the ENCOP model how- The Sustainability Challenge for Southern Africa ever emphasizes that environmental factors were not the Jim Whitman, Editor crucial cause of the violence there in the 1990s. Rural New York: St. Martin’s Press, Inc., 1999. 299 pp. discrimination there was overlain with powerful ethno- political fractures that were mobilized by elites in a Reviewed by Shanda Leather desperate genocidal bid to maintain power in a crisis situation. This book is the result of a collaborative effort by a Parts of this book read more like a technical report team of southern African practitioners and academics than a scholarly monograph, but apart from some mi- who on the environmental challenges facing their re- nor irritants like the unusual designation of quotation gion. As is stated in the preface, the authors are marks, the volume is easily accessible. The detailed sum- attempting to investigate the sources of sustainability mary presented in the introductory pages clearly lays and stability in the region from a global security per- out the overall argument of the volume. Appendices and spective. By examining a variety of topics from this a detailed bibliography are also useful scholarly addi- viewpoint, the contributors are seeking to emphasize the tions to the field. The last substantive chapter argues importance of political comprehension that is inclusive convincingly that thinking about practical policy ini- and recognizes that collaboration between states in this tiatives requires linking the debates about rethinking region may be essential to ensure environmental and security, conflict research, and the possibilities of sus- political sustainability. tainable development. The introductory chapter lays out the global secu- The volume closes in chapter eight with a brief dis- rity approach in a comprehensive manner, beginning
140 ENVIRONMENTAL CHANGE & SECURITY PROJECT REPORT, ISSUE 6 (SUMMER 2000) New Publications with fundamental definitions and discussions of sustain- over a decade-long desire to expand discussions to in- able development, global security, global civil society, clude a wider definition of human security. An and indeterminism. The theoretical understanding and awareness of this debate groundwork is well set, and a framework is reflected by the authors of the chapters through which we can view a variety of on those topics in their ability to think more topics is very clearly defined. Unfortu- broadly and introduce a wide range of pos- nately, the remaining topically-oriented sible directions for southern Africa. chapters do this with a wide-ranging level Although less well developed, this broad- of success. ening debate has also taken place within Chapters on global security, regional BOOK the literature on development economics cooperation in the sustainable develop- and environmental economics, and it ment of tourism, sustainable water would have been welcoming to see some development, and population and energy of those discussions and innovative ways are well-developed and seek to examine of approaching the topics incorporated these topics in new and innovative ways. here. All of these chapters attempt to broaden An inherent weakness in a book incor- the traditional political definitions of security and in- porating topically-oriented chapters by a variety of corporate innovative ways of looking at resource authors is that it will lack an overall common theme. In sustainability. The authors incorporate the global secu- the case of this volume, there are many direct and spe- rity approach through discussions of cross-boundary cific policy recommendations throughout the book, resources and the interdependence of populations and some more constructive and innovative than others. The states, and very clearly support the statement in the first final chapter is dedicated not to reiterating these recom- chapter that the link between the global and the regional mendations, but to identifying common themes that security is two way. emerge from the chapters. The various authors come Discussions of more traditional economic topics together in this final chapter and refer to these themes such as economic integration, sources of sustainable de- as “policy pressure points.” The authors assert that it is velopment, and cooperation for intra-regional trade are essential for these overall issues to be addressed in order less successful in incorporating the global security per- to create the environment for the other specific policy spective, and as a result, read as little more than literature recommendations to be effective. Listed briefly, these surveys on the topics. Several of these chapters simply themes are: democracy, equity, cooperation, policy moni- present the variety of theories one after another and leave toring information systems, and a shared value system. little room for innovative thinking. For example, in the These are broad and cross-cutting themes that get right literature on human development, there has now been to the crux of a global security oriented approach to
Environment and Security in the Amazon Basin
Sponsored by the Latin American Program and the Environmental Change and Security Project of the Wilson Center, this series of three meetings on Environment and Security in the Amazon Basin was a wide-ranging and stimulating discussion on politics and policy in the Amazon Basin. The first meeting covered the following topics: environmental and sustainable development initiatives in the Amazon Basin; the roles of local, national, and international actors; the evolving Brazilian national security perspective; and the rising threat of drug trafficking in the region. The second meeting focused on environmental policy in the Brazilian Amazon and featured Mary Helena Allegretti, Special Secretary for the Coordination of Amazonian Policy in Brazilian Ministry of the Environment, while the last meeting examined Brazil’s SIVAM Project and its implications for the Amazon. Issue 7 of the ECSP Report will feature a comprehensive report of the three meetings.
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sustainable development. Unfortunately, these themes these biodiversity “hotspots” are explored in this Popu- remain underdeveloped, and other than expanding on lation Action International (PAI) report, and several what is meant by each, no recommendations are given recommendations are made to improve decision-mak- as to how this group would recommend proceeding to- ing and policymaking, as well as offer further avenues wards them. of research. In general, I was disappointed by this volume. There More than 1.1 billion people now live within the is precious little available about sustainable development twenty-five global biodiversity hotspots, identified by in southern Africa that is written by authors from the Conservation International. The term “hotspots” is a region. I had hoped that this would prove an exception, concept that Norman Myers, Russell Mittermeier, and and that it would turn up some innovative ideas and other ecologists have defined as the most threatened spe- stimulate discussion. Aside from one or two authors, cies-rich regions on earth. About twenty percent of the my general sense is that the volume restates much of the world’s population lives in these biologically diverse ar- northern development literature with African voices. eas, and these numbers of people are only projected to There is debate and there are innovations within the increase, thus expanding the need for “additional land, region, and the book would have been stronger had some water, waste-absorbing sinks” to support them. Ecolo- of that more recent literature been reflected here. That gists estimate that at least half of the world’s terrestrial said, it is good to see a collaborative effort bringing to- species live within these hotspots, but human popula- gether professionals from across the southern African tion growth and migration have made conservation region. If the challenges to sustainable development are efforts simultaneously more difficult and more impor- to be met within the global security perspective pro- tant. According to the PAI report, “By 1995, population moted in this volume, it will only be successful through density (people per square kilometer) in the global collaboration and cooperation. biodiversity hotspots was, on average, almost twice that of the world as a whole.” Conservation is thus threat- Shanda Leather is a Project Associate at the Woodrow Wilson ened given the Earth’s finite resources and a growing Center’s Environmental Change and Security Project and population. On the other hand, conservation is also the Editor of the PECS Newsletter. advocated as way to preserve these finite resources. What are some of the direct causes of biodiversity ...... loss? Cincotta and Engelman explore the linkages in the literature and identify some key causes including habitat loss and fragmentation, deforestation, biologi- Nature’s Place: Human Population and cal invasion, pollution, and over-harvesting of fish and the Future of Biological Diversity agricultural products. Other factors to consider in look- Richard P. Cincotta and Robert Engelman ing at the relationship between biodiversity and human Washington, DC: Population Action population growth, according to the authors, include International, 2000. 80 pp. the role of indigenous people, the impact of migration and land inequity, the impact of development and ur- Reviewed by Jessica Powers banization, the increased use of land for agricultural purposes, and the contrast between poverty and ineq- “The more fundamental causes [of biodiversity uity on the one hand, and consumption patterns in the loss] are rooted in the contemporary human wealthier nations on the other. To illustrate the severity condition, especially as they are amplified by of the many causes and consequences of biodiversity loss, the explosive growth in human numbers in the Cincotta and Engelman highlighted the case of Mada- last three centuries.” gascar, one of the twenty-five identified hotspots. Michael Soulé, 19911 The Case of Madagascar Such is the premise upon which Nature’s Place looks at the impact of human population pressures on Earth’s Madagascar, detached from the African continent biodiversity. Richard Cincotta and Robert Engelman more than 140 million years ago, is separated from the report on biologically diverse and species-rich regions mainland by the Mozambique Channel, and is the fourth that are particularly threatened from population pres- largest island in the world. Ecologists have shown that sures and by the extractive and destructive practices of about eighty percent of Madagascar’s plants are endemic human beings. The causes and consequences affecting to the island. All twenty-nine lemur species were unique
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to Madagascar, with sixteen of the species having been activity and Earth’s biological diversity. The report of- exterminated since the arrival of humans on the fers several feasible recommendations for island. lessening the impact of human population While rich in biological material, in the identified hotspots and does a solid Madagascar, like many of its African job of synthesizing different research efforts neighbors, is afflicted by extreme poverty on biodiversity. Additionally, this report and has a debt nearly equal to its gross na- contains many useful graphs, charts, ex- tional product. According to the Population planatory boxes, and photos that elucidate Reference Bureau, the average annual in- the points made in the text. come in the last decade was about $200 per capita. Furthermore, Madagascar has a Jessica Powers is an Editorial Assistant at population of about fifteen million that is the Woodrow Wilson Center’s Environ- growing at about 2.7 percent a year. Mala- mental Change and Security Project and gasy women have, on average, between Managing Editor of the Environmental five and six children during their lives Change and Security Project Report. with a life expectancy of only about fifty- three years. The impact of AIDS will ! Please see the Meeting Summaries further decrease life expectancy, but nev- section for an ECSP meeting on this report ertheless, by the year 2020, Madagascar is and its findings. predicted to have a population of more than thirty million. This growth represents a doubling of its current population in only NOTES twenty years. Since the arrival of humans on the is- 1 Michael E. Soulé, “Conservation: Tactics for land of Madagascar roughly 2000 years ago, a Constant Crisis,” Science 253 (1991): 745, the dry deciduous forest of western Mada- quoted in Richard P. Cincotta and Robert Engelman, Nature’s Place: Human Popula- 0 gascar has been radically fragmented, as have the mangrove forests along the coast. tion and the Future of Biological Diversity. (See maps of Madagascar from 2000 years Washington, DC: Population Action In- ago and as of 1995.2) Deforestation, ternational, 2000: 53. unmonitored cattle ranching, and the 2 Maps reprinted with permission from charcoal production industry, especially Population Action International. ECSP would since 1950, all threaten Madagascar’s tropical like to thank Richard Cincotta, Robert Engelman, and forest habitats. Rapid population growth, massive pov- Jennifer Wisnewski of PAI for their assistance with the maps. erty, economic underdevelopment, and political instability have had an impact on the species-rich but ...... ecologically sensitive island of Madagascar. Thus, these socio-political factors combined with the highly endemic nature of species on Madagascar has led to island being Protecting Public Health and the Environment: designated as one of the world’s hotspots. Implementing the Precautionary Principle Different research projects have used satellite imag- Carolyn Raffensperger and Joel Tickner, eds. ery to study the effects that population growth, Washington DC: Island Press, 1999. 385 pp. widespread poverty, an absence of effective development infrastructure, and the attendant development resources Reviewed by Kate O’Neill and techniques have on deforestation and species sur- vival. In conducting their analysis, the authors relied The precautionary principle (PP) has taken on an upon data from organizations such as the Word Con- important role in current debates over international and servation Monitoring Centre that have been actively national environmental law and policy. It is a complex involved in conserving remaining vegetation on Mada- principle, in both its definition and implementation, gascar. and debates over its relevance tend to generate more heat In sum, this PAI report is an excellent overview of than light. Briefly stated, at its core lies the notion that the interaction between human population growth and “preventive action should be taken in advance of scien-
ENVIRONMENTAL CHANGE & SECURITY PROJECT REPORT, ISSUE 6 (SUMMER 2000) 143 New Publications
tific proof of causality” (p.8). Its origins lie in the Ger- and focus of the essays detracts from the book’s overall man system of environmental regulation, and it became coherence. However, it still makes for a good introduc- prominent on the international scene as part of the 1992 tion to the subject of the PP as it applies to U.S. policy, Rio Declaration on Environment and Development. and how it has been implemented or applied overseas Since then, it has appeared in many national and inter- and in international law. national environmental rules and agreements, including the Cartagena Protocol on Biosafety, signed in Montreal Kate O’Neill is Assistant Professor in the Department of in January 2000. Environmental Science, Policy, and Management at the The PP (potentially) marks a radical shift in envi- University of California at Berkeley. ronmental policy with its mandate to change the substance and guiding principles of policymaking to- ...... wards proaction and greater caution, a far more fundamental change than procedural measures, such as Promoting Reproductive Health: Investing in environmental impact assessments. Powerful economic interests frequently oppose the PP. This book tackles Health and Development some of the more difficult questions surrounding the Shepard Forman and Romita Ghosh, Editors PP at different levels and stages of policymaking, most Boulder, London: Lynne Rienner Publishers, notably, the key issues of implementation and the role 2000. 315pp. of scientific knowledge versus legal expertise. The essays collected here came out of the 1998 Wingspread Con- Reviewed by Simona Wexler ference on Implementing the Precautionary Principle. Attended by a group of 35 academics, scientists, activ- Promoting Reproductive Health: Investing in Health ists, government researchers, and labor representatives for Development outlines policies, programs, and financ- from the United States, Canada, and Europe, the con- ing that developing countries have implemented ference goal was to bring the PP to the following the International Conference on forefront of public health discussions in Population and Development (ICPD) held the United States. At the same time, the in Cairo, Egypt, in 1994. Six case studies book has an international focus, drawing looking at Bangladesh, Egypt, Indonesia, on examples from international agree- Mexico, South Africa, and Tanzania are ments, Scotland, and Sweden. presented to illustrate the progress and fail- Its strengths, in particular, lie in three ures made in the reproductive health front excellent overview chapters (i.e., those by BOOK since 1994. The case studies were authored Andrew Jordan and Timothy O’Riordan, by a joint collaboration between an inter- David Santillo, et al., and R. Michael national team of experts and the Center M’Gonigle) that discuss the history and on International Cooperation (CIC) at evolution of the concept from political and New York University. A chapter of the legal perspectives. They also clarify some book is devoted to the assistance provided of the definitional ambiguities associated by two donor countries: the United States with the PP. For international scholars and practitio- and the United Kingdom. ners, most useful are the discussions in chapters and According to Simeen Mahmud and Wahiduddin appendices of the increased frequency of the PP in in- Mahmud, who authored the case study on Bangladesh, ternational agreements. The discussion does lack, how- there are mixed results on the reproductive health front ever, a focus on the specific problems of implementing in that country. Although considerable progress was the principle under international law or how implemen- made even before the ICPD conference of 1994, the tation issues vary among countries and political systems. status of women’s reproductive health “remains compro- Most significantly, though, the book tackles theoretical mised despite the fact that women’s childbearing burden and empirical implementation issues at the national and has been halved.” Access to reproductive health services, subnational levels. Cases and examples are very diverse for instance, continues to be problematic. Furthermore, (perhaps too much so), and the contributors to the vol- women’s access to public health facilities is often ham- ume discuss a wide range of actors. Legal, economic, pered by “the widespread but unofficial collection of community/grassroots, and scientific perspectives are all user fees.” represented. To an extent, the diversity in length, style, Hind Khattab, Lamia El-Fattal, and Nadine
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Shorbagi analyze the case of Egypt, which hosted the the ICPD platform. Margaret Bangser details how 1994 ICPD conference. According to the authors, al- Tanzania’s debt, dismal poverty, and lack of political though Egypt has made significant progress in commitment have undermined progress in the repro- contraceptive health and family planning, the level of ductive health care sector. Bangser points out how health care is in dire need of improvements. Egypt has Tanzania’s reliance on funding from international do- implemented many of the recommenda- nors is driving the reproductive health tions that came out of the 1994 meeting, agenda to meet donor rather than people and as a result, cooperation between non- needs. governmental organizations (NGOs) and Concluding chapters on donors and the government has improved. Addition- lessons learned from the case studies high- ally, the government’s efforts to improve light how complex a problem reproductive health services for women in poorer areas health is for both donor and recipient have increased. However, donor and BOOK countries, and how important it is to in- recipient’s fears that “reproductive health vest in this field despite the many obstacles. will replace family planning, with grave Overall, the book provides a well-re- consequences for rates of population searched and comprehensive look at how growth and overall development” is ham- the seven countries analyzed in the case pering further progress in reproductive studies have benefited from implementing health. the ICPD agenda, and what improvements The reproductive health debate in Indonesia, as need to be made to fully achieve the goals set out in analyzed by Terence Hull and Meiwita Iskandar, is be- Cairo. ing hijacked by a pernicious debate on topics such as abortion and the spread of STDs (sexually transmitted Simona Wexler is Program Associate in the Environmental diseases). Stern resistance to “sex education, counseling, Change and Security Project, and is Senior Editor of the and contraceptive services for unmarried people” is com- Environmental Change and Security Project Report. She monplace. Indonesia’s reproductive health problems have is also Coordinator for the Nonproliferation and been endemic for sometime and were not caused, the Information Technology Projects. authors conclude, by the severe economic crisis of the late 1990s. ! For more information on the Center for International Mexico’s political establishment strongly favored Cooperation, please visit their website at: http:// implementing the Cairo agenda, and in 1997, repro- www.nyu.edu/pages/cic/. ductive health language was introduced for the first time in Mexico’s Health Law. As in the case of Egypt, com- ...... mitment to the ICPD platform has generated productive cooperation between NGOs and the governmental or- Population and the World Bank: ganization. The research conducted by the authors of Adapting to Change this study, Yolanda Palma and Jose Luis Palma, concludes that despite sustained public funding of Mexico’s repro- Washington, DC: World Bank, 1999. 52 pp. ductive health care programs, reduced support by international donors may cause problems in certain ar- Reviewed by Clair M. Twigg eas such as “testing of innovative strategies.” Barbara Klugman, Marion Stevens, and Alex van Population and the World Bank: Adapting to den Heever outline South Africa’s reproductive health Change a part of the World Bank’s Health, Nutrition, program. Although the authors describe South Africa as and Population (HNP) Series, was written to provide a “one of the most progressive countries in the world from clear and concise overview of the current application of a policy point of view,” its precarious overall health care the 1997 HNP Strategy. This briefing is a discussion of system is stymieing access to available reproductive health World Bank efforts in these fields and was designed to care services. However, the authors are optimistic about inform the World Bank’s board of directors and staff, South Africa’s future as its government is still working and the general public about the Bank’s ongoing activi- toward a post-apartheid system. ties. Its specific objective is to focus on the ways in which Tanzania, the last country analyzed in the book, the Bank “is responding to the new approaches to popu- appears to have had the most problems implementing lation called for by the 1994 International Conference
ENVIRONMENTAL CHANGE & SECURITY PROJECT REPORT, ISSUE 6 (SUMMER 2000) 145 New Publications
on Population and Development (ICPD) and to the addition, the report’s pointed examples and final ap- changing demographic realities in borrower countries pendices give the reader both a context and statistical on which ICPD is based.” The discussion is of current platform from which to work. This report is an excel- trends and efforts in dealing with population dynamics lent summation of a larger set of activities. and reproductive health initiatives. In the roughly thirty years that the World Bank has Clair M. Twigg is Project Assistant at the Environmental been working in population-related fields, it has made Change and Security Project. extensive investments in education, health, and family planning with much success. Although its initial objec- ...... tive was simply to halt the growth of population, a result of declining global mortality, the current status of the world’s people, and the ways in which many organiza- Coastal Waters of the World: Trends, tions approach human development have changed Threats, and Strategies dramatically. Despite increases in life expectancy and Don Hinrichsen child survival rates, and some decreases in maternal Washington, D.C.: Island Press, 1998. 275 pp. mortality, many challenges remain, including the high number of ill-timed pregnancies, high maternal mortal- Reviewed by Karin Mueller ity, the high risk of infection of HIV/AIDS, and inadequate access to reproductive services. “Two-thirds [of the planet’s population] live One of the benefits of this report is that the over- within 400km of a coast. Nothing more dramati- view of Bank activities in the HNP sector is broad and cally illustrates that fact than a satellite photograph comprehensible for many. As such, it is easy to see the of the earth taken at night. Viewed from space, different problems that arise in application of popula- an uninterrupted river of light flows around the tion activities. Different cultural obstacles such as the world’s coastlines.” lack of access to education for some girls and the inad- Don Hinrichsen, 1998 equacy of maternal health care facilities are just a few of the many problems that plague the areas in which the In the interest of placing coastal area concerns higher World Bank is working. The three HNP goals, “ensur- on the list of government priorities and furthering bet- ing that investments improve outcomes for the poor, ter management of these areas, Don Hinrichsen has with particular attention to vulnerable groups; enhanc- written Coastal Waters of the World: Trends, Threats, and ing the performance of health care systems by promoting Strategies. In his book, Hinrichsen states that no matter equitable access to preventive and curative services; and where we live, we are all still interconnected to the world’s securing financing for services including reproductive oceans through watershed drainage systems and rivers. health and family planning,” are broad and somewhat Because we are dependent on coastal areas for our very vague. existence, Hinrichsen asserts that safeguarding these ar- What is new in this report is the emphasis on the eas is one of the planet’s most challenging management desire to increase effectiveness of HNP activities by un- jobs. dertaking the following: examining the link between To better understand the threats facing these areas demographic changes, not necessarily population and the challenges coastal water management presents, growth, and the effects they have on health, education, Coastal Waters of the World explores three themes: 1) and other aspects of social development and the envi- population growth and pollution; 2) development and ronment; the need for policies and action to be adaptable the conversion/destruction of coastal resources; and, 3) to different countries with different problems; the need lack of effective and implemented coastal management to understand and take into account cultural factors plans. It is notable that Hinrichsen fails to discuss rising which affect local sentiments on population and health sea levels as a threat to coastal areas. However, his expla- issues; the Bank’s ability to implement plans and sup- nation for this omission is convincing given the port them over a long period of time; and, continued immediacy of the three threats on which he focuses. staff development so they maintain the skills essential To illustrate the problems of population growth and to continue succeeding. pollution, development trends, and ineffective manage- In sum, this publication appropriately meets its ment strategies in specific ways, Hinrichsen provides mission of informing a wide audience about the current fourteen case studies from each of the world’s regions. state of World Bank activities in the HNP sector. In While each case study is unique, the three themes listed
146 ENVIRONMENTAL CHANGE & SECURITY PROJECT REPORT, ISSUE 6 (SUMMER 2000) New Publications above, serve as a common thread. Each study details effective and should be a useful resource to practitio- how increased population, pollution, development, and ners, policymakers, and academics alike. It illustrates to poor management has affected the area. policymakers the complexity and urgency Hinrichsen also provides excellent insight of coastal water management and provides into the differing issues facing each particu- tangible examples of how areas within lar coastal body of water, and discusses the each region have resolved the problems region’s history relevant to coastal waters, specifically. Hinrichsen’s case studies and any treaties, governing strategies, and should be particularly useful for anyone management plans currently in effect. If conducting general research on coastal available, he follows with an example of BOOK water management or research in any one how one group, organization, or country of the regions his case studies cover. in the area has been successful at coastal water management. He concludes each case Karin Mueller is an Editorial Assistant for study with a list of important issues to be the Woodrow Wilson Center’s Environment- considered in that region. al Change and Security Project (ECSP) and The examples provided by Hinrichsen’s is Production Editor of all ECSP Publica- fourteen case studies illustrate that the same trends and tions. She is also Editorial Assistant for the Cold War Inter- problems face coastal communities around the world. national History Project and Web Editor for both projects. Overfishing, untreated sewage and industrial waste, pes- ticides, runoff pollution, deforestation of upland and ...... coastal forests, clearing mangrove swamps and wetlands, mining, and runaway urbanization are just some of the Life Out of Bounds: Bioinvasion in a common themes found in each case study. However, Hinrichsen shows how each region must find its own Borderless World unique solution to coastal water management problems. Chris Bright For example, in Ecuador shrimp ponds are now being The Worldwatch Environmental Alert Series built adjacent to the mangrove swamps, resulting in less New York: W.W. Norton. 1998. 287 pp. pollution and preserving the mangroves for water filtra- tion and habitat. On the Tiny Apo Island in Southeast Reviewed by Joseph P. Dudley Asia, officials have preserved a portion of its coral reef, which has allowed dwindling fish stocks to recover and This book summarizes the problems caused by the the local tourism industry to thrive in a sustainable way. proliferation of non-native species of plants and ani- In Singapore, sewage lines and treatment plants were mals in ecosystems throughout the globe. Biological built to treat wastewater and farms were moved away invasions of the earth’s terrestrial and aquatic ecosys- from riverbanks to reduce pollution entering streams tems by non-indigenous species of organisms have and the oceanfront. become a major threat to agricultural productivity and Coastal Waters concludes with a chapter on “lessons global biological diversity. Weedy, exotic species of plants learned” from past management experiences and offers and animals (most introduced or established through ideas on how to make coastal management more sus- human intervention) now dominate vast areas of the tainable. As Hinrichsen states in his endnotes, the ideas earth’s surface. Economic losses directly or indirectly presented in this section are an amalgamation of work attributable to biological invasions may be on the order from many institutions and individuals. Hinrichsen of thousands of billions of U.S. dollars, annually. highlights the need for an interdisciplinary, coordinated This book is a highly readable overview of the many effort by all stakeholders to work together toward a com- problems and issues associated with the invasive effects mon set of goals. He also points out the importance of of non-native species on biological systems. The author continued political support and leadership; mandating presents sufficient summary data and examples from the one national institution to have authority over manage- primary literature to keep scientists and specialists en- ment of coastal areas; and, building support on the local gaged, while not overwhelming his general audience with and national level for management plans. Hinrichsen technical jargon or statistical evaluations. The endnotes concludes by suggesting a list of nine priority actions, provide an excellent vehicle for entry to the source lit- which he admits could be expanded indefinitely. erature for those interested in further study of this The presentation of Hinrichsen’s research is quite important topic.
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Global Environmental Change and Human Security Project Web Site
The Global Environmental Change and Human Security Project (GECHS) has recently overhauled its web site to include new links and updates. An interdisciplinary research project that strives to advance research and policy efforts in the area of human security and environmental change, GECHS is a core project of the International Human Dimensions Programme on Global Environmen- tal Change (IHDP). Directed by Steve Lonergan, a geographer at the University of Victoria, the basic objec- tives of the project are threefold: 1) to promote research activities in the area of global environmental change and human security; 2) to promote dialogue and encourage collaboration among scholars from around the world; and 3) to facilitate improved communication (and coopera- tion) between the policy community, other groups, including nongovernmental organizations and the research community.
Different publications such as AVISO, a public-policy briefing series and a collaborative effort of GECHS and the Environmental Change and Security Project, are available on-line at the GECHS web site. The U.S. Agency for International Development through a cooperative agreement with the University of Michigan Population Fellows Programs, the Canadian International Development Agency, and the University of Victoria all generously support the AVISO series.
Visit GECHS’ web site at: http://www.gechs.org
The author provides numerous historical examples, The ongoing global proliferation of virulent, pesticide- and a tremendous range of recent and modern examples, resistant pests and diseases, and our current dependence of the profoundly disruptive effects that biological in- on a narrow range of genetically homogenous lineages vasions may have on both natural and agriculture of a few staple food crops (e.g. corn, wheat, rice, pota- ecosystems. The author emphasizes the often overlooked toes, cassava), point to an increasingly high probability fact that many, if not most, biological invasions are of a future Malthusian crisis in world food production. mediated or facilitated by human interventions. The increasing homogenization of global landscapes by do- Joseph P. Dudley is a Diplomacy Fellow of the American mesticated or human-adapted species of plants and Association for the Advancement of Science at the Secretariat animals (cultivars as well as commensals1) is described, for the United States—Asia Environmental Partnership at and discussed in terms of both modern and historical the U.S. Agency for International Development. " contexts. The security implications of breakdowns in food production systems or disease outbreaks caused or pro- NOTES moted by biological invasions are noted with reference to particular examples (such as fisheries collapses in the 1 A cultivar is an organism of a kind originating and persis- African Great Lakes), but does not form a central focus tent under cultivation. A commensal relates to two kinds of of the discussion. Nonetheless, this book will be a valu- organisms in which one obtains food or other benefits from able resource for those interested in the effects of present the other without damaging or benefiting it. or future “environmental scarcities” on human welfare.
148 ENVIRONMENTAL CHANGE & SECURITY PROJECT REPORT, ISSUE 6 (SUMMER 2000) ECSP Meeting Summaries
ECSP MEETING SUMMARIES
1 June 1999 Preserving the Atmosphere as a Global Commons
MARVIN S. SOROOS, PROFESSOR OF POLITICAL SCIENCE AND PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION, NORTH CAROLINA STATE UNIVERSITY