CEU eTD Collection In partialfulfilment oftherequirements forthe degreeofMaster of Arts B Department ofInternational Relationsand European Studies S RITISH OLVING Supervisor: Associate ProfessorAlexander Astrov P D ROBLEMS Word count(incl.footnotes):17197 IPLOMATIC Central EuropeanUniversity L ITHUANIAN Donatas Kup Budapest, Hungary Submitted to 2007 By 1920-1923 , čiūnas I NVOLVEMENT IN T ERRITORIAL CEU eTD Collection Chapter 2: The British Involvement in the Dispute Chapter 2:TheBritishInvolvementintheVilnius Diplomatic Projections Chapter 1:ThePositionoftheBalticStatesandLithuaniainBritish Introduction Bibliography Conclusion 2.2 BritishattitudetowardsthefateofVilnius 2.1 TheNatureoftheProjectedLithuanian-PolishRelationship Foreign Office 1.4 ImageofLithuaniaandLithuaniansfromtheviewpoint 1.3 ThespecialpositionofLithuania 1.2 ReasonsforIntéressement 1.1 CausesforReserve 2.7 Systeminfluxandtheleverofdejurerecognition 2.6 Theultimatefiascoofmediationefforts 2.5 Attemptedplebiscite 2.4 Theaftermathoftheoccupation 2.3 AttemptstoforestallthePolishadventure French 2.72 Theattemptstoproceedindependentlyandyetanotherbowthe 2.71 TheBritishbowtoFrance:separaterecognitionofLatviaandEstonia ...... 44 ...... 46 ...... 55 ...... 4 ...... 58 ...... 19 ...... 11 ...... 11 Table ofContents ...... 30 ...... 14 2 ...... 28 ...... 17 ...... 37 ...... 24 ...... 23 ...... 40 ...... 21 ...... 21 CEU eTD Collection eod b te bec o te uul nesadn aog h ms important most the among established powers,namely,BritainandFrance,onhowtomeettheproblem. understanding mutual the of absence the by second, and states, independent newly quarreling two the and Britain between framework, conceptual common or language, common the of lack the by first, burdened, were efforts mediation dispute the that found is It states. ‘newcomer’ of problems the in entangled becomes power established an when situation the at look to tries study the Office, Foreign British the of sources diplomatic unpublished mostly and primary the on solely Relying 1920-1923. of period the in and between dispute h suy xmns h Biih eito efrs n h Vlis territorial Vilnius the in efforts mediation British the examines study The Abstract 3 CEU eTD Collection Lithuania] Politologija 6 (1995):15. 6 Lithuania] Politologija 24. Aureus, 2007), (Vilnius: Versus 1940)] ofrne f masdr o 15 on Ambassadors of Conference essentially plagued Lithuanian-Polish relations up to the end of the 20 the of end the to up relations Lithuanian-Polish essentially plagued this of acceptance official the efforts, mediation all of failure 9 capital interim the to government its move to forced and statehood of cradle its of deprived was Lithuania except state no but time, the at Europe in disputes territorial many were there out, pointed accurately has Žalys As capital. Lithuanian ancient the Vilnius, over Poland with dispute territorial main its to referring without Lithuania interwar of problems policy foreign the of 2 1 Vilnius to rights find to was period interwar the in trajectory geopolitical Lithuanian natural the that deny to hard be would It . Nazi and Union Soviet the of diplomacy cunning the of side the in relief for look to Lithuania pushed inevitably countries, both of policy foreign the distorted dispute never-endingquarrel. a periodtotheir,asseemedbefore, put countries two the capital, historic Lithuania’s and as Vilnius acknowledging relations formally neighborly Good of treaty bilateral the of signing the with 1994, in Raimundas Lopata and Vytautas Žalys, “Lietuvos Geopolitinis Kodas,’’ [The Geopolitical Code of Code Geopolitical [The Kodas,’’ Geopolitinis “Lietuvos Žalys, Vytautas and Lopata Raimundas (1925- History Diplomatic [Lithuanian (1925-1940) Istorija Diplomatijos Lietuvos Žalys, Vytautas th of October, 1920, its subsequent annexation on 24 on annexation subsequent its 1920, October, of It is perhaps not an exaggeration to note that it is impossible to think about any tothinkaboutany tonotethatitisimpossible It isperhapsnotanexaggeration oh ihain n Pls hsoin are t es o oe hn: Vilnius thing: one on least at agree historians Polish and Lithuanian Both 2 n ta te gooiia ky i te hl Cnrl uoe was Europe Central whole the in key‘ ‘geopolitical the that and , Introduction modus videndi modus th f ac, 93 lf n nuig cr which scar, enduring an left 1923, March, of 4 1 . The Polish occupation of the region on region the of occupation Polish The . with Poland without renouncing the renouncing without Poland with th of March, 1922, and, after the after and, 1922, March, of at accompli fait th century. Only century. Only y the by CEU eTD Collection (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992), 13. Press,1992), University (Cambridge: Cambridge (Vilnius:Lietuvos History ofPoland] the Baltic indicated that in the begining of 1920s, ‘Britain ran the Baltic‘ the ran ‘Britain 1920s, of begining the in that indicated Baltic the in questions of terriorial the settlement role in and its naval presence observed, British has Hiden As important. very as considered given, was was it if word, British the and governments Polish decisions, policy foreign and their making before advice Lithuanian for British the asked Both frequently problem. the settle to help to ability and impartiality British in patheticly, even sometimes believed, the strongly and dispute, in stance pro-Polish openly her to due France distrusted the in League. as well as Powers, Allied the among significant most the far by was voice Britain‘s its powerzenite.TogetherwithFrance I, remainedin Britainstill World War of end the In its important. most the in was Britain of voice involved the respect, this another In mediation. or way one in but closely, dispute the followed only not and League the shattered confidenceinthecollectivesecuritysystem. of prestige waning the to thrust more one added dispute Vilnius border Soviet western the along materialized never has alliance defensive real the why reasons main the one be to thought is it region, the in peace to threat potential the being Despite Europe. Eastern and Central the Balticstates region, including inthe otherstates fallofthe eventually meantthe Poland, whosefall 5 4 6(1995):5-6 Politologija Communism] Fall of the and Lithuaniaafter Poland Europe: and Eastern Central in Žlugimo” [Changes 3 accompli fait e, o isac, omn ais Deo asa. ekjs soia vl 2 Gds lyrud A Playground. War World oftheSecond andtheOutbreak eds.,TheBaltic Lane, JohnHidenandThomas [God’s 2 vol. Istorija, Lenkijos Žaislas. Dievo Davies, Norman instance, for Komunizmo See, po Lietuva ir Lenkija Europoje: Rytų ir Vidurio “Pokyčiai Brzezinski, Zbygnew Given the seriousness of the matter, it is not surprising that, at least until the until least at that, surprising not is it matter, the of seriousness the Given whole the of context the in attention particular deserved dispute Vilnius was confirmed by the Conference of Ambassadors, the Allied powers Allied the Ambassadors, of Conference the by confirmed was 3 . rašytojų sąjungosleidykla rašytojų 5 4 . Furthermore, the failure to solve the solve to failure the Furthermore, . , 2002), 560. , 2002), 5 . Therefore, . CEU eTD Collection Twentieth Century (New York: Longman, 1991), 61. Longman,1991), (NewYork: Twentieth Century 6. Westview Press,1993), 99-106. 1987), (London:C.Hurst&Co., 1940 Rauch‘s discussion of the Vilnius problem Vilnius the of discussion Rauch‘s dubious some only provide period interwar generalizations andareoflittlehelpinthiscase.ThereisnothingregardVon the in states Baltic the of policy Allies foreign the the on publications general until few The period 1923. in the accompli fait the in to acquiesced is, that solved, be to chances had still dispute the when period the in dispute Vilnius the solving in involvement British the exploring was it mediation, dispute the in most do undoubtedly Britain.Andshe,indeed,did. could which power a was there if Lankas, 1997), 14. Lankas, 1997), Naujasis State](Kaunas: of LithuanianNational Evolution andDiplomacy:the Fragmentai [Politics 11 10 9 8 7 6 main mistake wasthelongrefusaltorecognizeLithuania their and that, do to responsibility and efforts lacking were they settlement, War World Second the of eve the until concern‘ ‘acute of matter the become not did and Britain from remote were problems teritorial Lithuanian that assumes dispute the of intractability the for more Lithuania blame to tended Britain Lithuania towards symphathetic were more whole the on British the that and stability, general of interests the in quarrel Polish Lithuanian- of settlement the in involved actively Britain that mentions only glasses Hiden Polish the through dispute the to look to tended France and Britain both Laurinavi Stockholmiensia 3, 1986: 114. 3,1986: Stockholmiensia John Hiden and Patrick Salmon, The Baltic Nations and Europe: , and Lithuania in the Latvia andLithuaniainthe Estonia, NationsandEurope: TheBaltic Salmon, JohnHidenandPatrick 14. HidenandLane,Outbreak, (Boulder: Relations,1938-1940 Foreign States andtheGreatPowers: TheBaltic DavidCrowe, 1917- Lithuania, Estonia,Latvia, Independence; States:theYearsof TheBaltic GeorgvonRauch, Patrick Salmon, “British Security Interests in Scandinavia and the Baltic 1918-1939,” Studia Baltica StudiaBaltica theBaltic1918-1939,” Scandinaviaand Interestsin “British Security PatrickSalmon, Česlovas Laurinavičius, Politika ir Diplomatija: Lietuvių Tautinės Valstybės Tapsmo irRaidos ValstybėsTapsmo LietuviųTautinės irDiplomatija: Politika Česlovas Laurinavičius, oee, t s upiigta a peet hr i n snl suy thoroughly study single no is there present at that surprising is it However, č u nts atog te lid oenet tid o ep n h dispute the in help to tried governments allied the although notes, ius 6 6 8 ; Crowe in his seminal book assumes that assumes book seminal his in Crowe ; , although in his other book he writes that writes he book other his although in , 11 . 9 . Salmon . 10 . As . 7 . CEU eTD Collection asv msnesadns, niil t themselves to certain of invisible victim misunderstandings’, ‘the massive was 1914 of generation the that observed century, XIXth Letusnowbrieflyconsiderwhatthis‘essentialproblem’mayreferto. among them. Lithuania with diplomacy, European in newly ‘newcomers’ hand, called other so the states, on independent and game, diplomatic the of rules the knew well who powers, established the hand, one the on between, relations the to typical was which essential problem faced the that dispute Lithuanian-Polish the involvement in its Britain in anticipate to reasonable be some would It to relations. even international or of time, laws the enduring of tendencies broader the to related be could efforts mediation the of difficulties the that guess could One history. diplomatic European 14 13 12 writers several As arena. international the ‘newcomers’ into of entry the relevant with especially become should refers Kissinger which to language common the of lack ‘subversion’’ and ‘unreasonableness’ of allegations or faith, bad of accusations and positions basic of repetitions sterile with occupied are conferences diplomatic demand, reasonable a constitutes what of agreement an of absence the In language. same the speak to ceased have they for persuade, cannot foreign of methods policy’ and aims permissible the about and arrangements workable of nature the about agreement international an than more ‘no meant Kissinger ‘legitimate order’ term the By ‘legitimate’. is which is order international negotiations, in only through possible differences of adjustment the as conceived diplomacy, (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1973), p.1. Mifflin,1973), (Boston: Houghton 4. 1989), Press, (Princeton: PrincetonUniversity 1890 Kissinger, World Restored, 1-2. Restored, Kissinger,World ofPeace,1812-22 andtheProblems Castlereagh Restored: Metternich, AWorld HenryKissinger, 1875- Relations, Franco-Russian EuropeanOrder: ofBismarck’s TheDecline GeorgeF.Kennan, 13 enn xmnn h bekpo h Ven Cnrs re i te n of end the in order Congress Vienna the of breakup the examining Kennan, this at look closer a take to tries study following The . In the absence of this, as Kissinger puts it, ‘diplomats can still meet but they meetbut ‘diplomats canstill Kissinger putsit, this, as absence of . Inthe 7 14 . Apparently, the problem of the of problem the Apparently, . 12 s isne generalized, Kissinger As . er incognita terra in CEU eTD Collection xet elc te tiue o, epe wt dfeet n icmail unspoken incompatible assumptions’ and different with peoples of, attitudes the reflect extent some to therefore and widely govern, they and other; each from reference of frames in different working are ‘governments noted, Watson As interaction. international in misunderstanding of chances the increased development of level and traditions not were i.e., language, common the cultural assumptions,political accustomed totheprevalentworldorder.Differencesin speak not did ‘newcomers’ the of most but Second WorldWartherewasanunprecedentedexpansionofinternationalsociety, the after process decolonization the with out, point tradition school English the of 16 15 Britainat betweenFranceand in general, therelations not asecretthat concerned, itis is point latter the as far As ‘newcomers’. of problems the meet to how on France, and Britain namely, powers, established important most the among understanding mutual the of absence the by second, and states, independent newly quarreling two the and Britain between framework, conceptual common or language, common the of lack The ‘newcomers’. of problems by the first, burdened, efforts were mediation the dispute the that made be can hypothesis in entangled becomes power established ofsocializingthenewactors. similar structure,capable no was there but ‘newcomers’, of range the emerged also there period, interwar the in War. However, the Cold existed during field, which gravitational bipolar the strong of presence the by appeased was situation complex a such decolonization, of epoch inelasticity to leads turn in what view, comprehensive the its in problem each individuality, andthustendtogrouptheproblemsstatestogetherinorderretain with deal to able less become society, international of view Ibid, 164. Ibid, 163. Routledge, 1991), York: States(New Dialoguebetween the AdamWatson,Diplomacy: h floig td, hrfr, il r t lo a te iuto we an when situation the at look to try will therefore, study, following The 15 . Technically, established powers, which were used to a comprehensive used to which were powers, . Technically,established 8 16 eetees n the in Nevertheless, . CEU eTD Collection policy course foreign the on disagreements fundamental no were there and relationship balanced a had George Lloyd Minister Prime and Curzon Lord Secretary Foreign that held interests British the in be would alliance announced publicly and strong circumstances, war post- theimmediate admitted thatin he after sometime France’, although the futureis fear in to havemost from whomwe great power thatthe seriously afraid telling: ‘Iam Versailles of treaty the compliance of German of observance the as Allies the to challenges diplomatic fundamental such in problems’even and thorny personal dislikes by ‘frustrations, prejudiced the timewere 20 19 18 17 The Lithuania. of position special the on emphasis particular with the period, in given diplomacy British the in states Baltic the of position general the at looking foreign policy’ of British implementation making and the in decisive, influence ‘exercised enormous,sometimes frequently observed,seniorForeignOfficediplomats is it as period, interwar the in that added be may it although justification, particular any need not does analysis of object the as Foreign Office the of choice the study, the of matter subject the Given before. Kew, published not were in sources the of Kingdom Most London. United the of Archives National the from sources diplomatic regard totheLithuanian-Polishdispute,whatinturnburdenedmediationefforts. Reassessment,” Diplomacy and Statecraft 11 (2000): 50. Statecraft 11(2000): and Reassessment,” Diplomacy 47. 12 (2001): andStatecraft Diplomacy Policy,” Interwar BritishForeign Influenceon Power andTheir 121 14(2003): andStatecraft Diplomacy Relations 1918-25,” 432. (2005): Gaynor Johnson, “Curzon, Lloyd George and the Control of British Foreign Policy, 1919-22: A Policy, BritishForeign theControlof Georgeand “Curzon,Lloyd GaynorJohnson, theBalance of Viewsof Conflicting and‘Punch-Bag’: “‘Ideal’ McKercher, M.L.RoiandB.J.C. Anglo-French anglaispartit…’: finit, Soldat “‘ApreslaGuerre KeithJeffery, AlanSharpand 16 andStatecraft Diplomacy 1919-1923,” of Versailles, oftheTreaty “The Enforcement AlanSharp, h is catro h suywl poie h cnet o h icsin by discussion the for context the provide will study the of chapter first The Office Foreign British primary on solely based is study following The 18 . As it will be seen, similar Allied misunderstandings were common with common were misunderstandings Allied similar seen, be will it As . 20 . 17 . Curzon’s words, expressed in 1918, are quite are 1918, in expressed words, Curzon’s . 9 19 . Itis . CEU eTD Collection the futureresearchontopic. suggestions for findings and the main conclude with will thestudy mediation. Finally, jure de of dispute lever the in employ to the tried unsuccessfully Britain which Lithuania, to of recognition given be will attention Special perspective. theoretical aforementioned the from problem the approaching 1922, in fiasco ultimate their until dispute Vilnius the in efforts mediation British the analyze to try will chapter second 10 CEU eTD Collection international trade international and ’s European of Livonian third one than more for Estonian, outlet an providing provinces Courland then of ports the empire, Russian the of part significant a as territories those see to accustomed was Britain War, World First the of end the 1.1 CausesforReserve 23 22 21 ofthe Baltic theaspirations the approaching in as adeterminingfactor was seen states byRussia of reabsorption of possibility the Therefore, Russia. reconstituted with war the in Allies the involve would members, its for guarantees territorial provided which League, the to admission subsequent their and states Baltic the of recognition them regain to opportunity first the take would which and importance, vital of are ports Baltic the which for Russia, and Allies the between hostility of feeling persistent a create could states Baltic the political internal her her’ weaken to of permanently condition advantage taken had Powers Allied the that conviction do to not recommend from the arising feeling ofbitterness deep withany Office, ‘leaveRussia anything whatcould Foreign the by 1919 in issued guidelines, Policy states. Baltic reviving three the approached Britain way the on implications major had belief This term. short the in ‘normal’ become will Russia that view prevailing (TNA): FO 608/196: 31 (TNA): FO608/196: Ibid memorandum. 12 ForeignOfficeconfidential 3. HidenandLane,Outbreak, Chapter 1:ThePosition oftheBaltic StatesandLithuania in Generally, Britain’s interests in the Baltic couldn’t be described as vital. Till vital. as described be couldn’t Baltic the in interests Britain’s Generally, 21 the BritishDiplomatic Projections . Just after the Bolshevik turmoil in Russia, Britain adhered to the to adhered Britain Russia, in turmoil Bolshevik the after Just . 23 I te atr niiain aeilzd the materialized, anticipation latter the If . 22 th . From this point of view, the recognition of recognition the view, of point this From . January, 1919. The National Archives oftheUK TheNational January,1919. 11 CEU eTD Collection contemplating tohisLatviancolleaguethat these which for late asinJanuary1921,onemonthbeforerecognizingLatviaandEstonia,wasfrankly states Baltic three the as Curzon Lord Secretary Foreign importance. direct most with the of were considerations also but Finland, and Poland as states with only not openly them share to hesitate not did Britain Office. Foreign states Baltic weak the than debtor credible more and Powers the for ally future better far states Baltic 27 26 25 24 turn in being unity that within relationships political the unity, economic with single independence a cultural to pointed <…> forming future ‘the stated, Gregory as As unit. economic Russia and Poland states, Baltic the treated and hinterland, referred tointheArticle10ofLeagueCovenant the of These werethereasonsonwhichCurzongroundedhisrefusaltoconsiderquestion < of theLeagueNations,” “The Covenant shallbefulfilled’.See which thisobligation themeansby ‘advise upon themselvesto threat ofitcommitting aggression or Members’, incaseof independence ofall political integrityandexisting the territorial externalaggression preserve asagainst 241. 2 Latvia andLithuania” www.yale.edu/lawweb/avalon/leagcov.htm League covenant in article 10 contained the clause that the members ‘undertake to respect and torespectand members ‘undertake thatthe containedtheclause inarticle10 Leaguecovenant 61. TNA:FO371/6720: 1921. (Riga),6thJanuary, Mr. Dewhurst EarlCurzonto (1943): 37 Law International of Journal American The Latvia,” of Recognition “The Laserson, Max forEstonia, ‘dejure’recognition Governmenttowards Majesty’s Gregory, “AttitudeofHis J.D. 25 de jure de . hs cnieain dd o ol apa o te ofdnil iue i the in minutes confidential the on appear only not did considerations These rti ws f h ve ta te atc s cnmcly id o h Russian the to tied economically is Baltic the that view the of was Britain Poland, in impossible’ difficult,but might notonlybe which done circumstances in date had future some they at states those as for fight themselves, to obligation an find in involved might Powers bent the was that leanings, and imperialistic recovering, upon developed increasingly and principles Communist its shed it as Government Soviet the which Empire, Russian old the to belonged they and that power population, in small were they that forget not could we it, maintaining in succeed would they that we hoped as and earnestly for independence, with theirdesire we sympathized ‘warmly as 24 . ‘Normal’ Russia, restored to its old western borders, seemed to be the be to seemed borders, western old its to restored Russia, ‘Normal’ . eonto o h atc tts eiaig o aete responsibilities the take to hesitating states, Baltic the of recognition nd November, 1920. TNA: FO 371/5373: 58. FO371/5373: 1920.TNA: November, > 12 26 . 27 . CEU eTD Collection needn Bli sae ws o atgte rld u i te rts diplomatic British the the in projections of out ruled collapse altogether economic not was self-contained states Baltic the independent of scenario the Besides, return. this obstruct could which responsibilities take to avoiding and Russia, reconstituted the to return prospective their projecting states, Baltic the of existence independent different colors,whatinturnhandicappedtheBritisheffortstodealwiththem. slightly in world the see ‘newcomers’ the that clear became it eventually however, states; established newly the from behavior rational instrumentally similar expect andto systemicterms the followingchapters,itwastypicalforBritaintothinkinsuch about twentyyears for only last would states Baltic the of existence the that forecast precise surprisingly culture’ and interest common of basis a determined on 32 31 30 29 28 and states those between hostilities of event the in States Baltic war the of to form material the in support material afford to not obliged Britain 1921 March in can survive whether theBalticstates testing’ and ‘waiting while recognition, jure de the of delay the mentioned, already and ‘amicably place take could arrangement federative of form the in ‘reabsorption’ voluntarily’, imagined this that believe to TNA: FO 371/5374: 76. TNA: FO371/5374: 371/6726: 20. 371/6726: 371/5374: 36. 371/5374: Foreign Office memorandum “The Polish-Lithuanian Question”, 11 Question”, memorandum “ThePolish-Lithuanian ForeignOffice minute, 17 LordCurzon 1920. November Memorandum, League ofNations”, andthe “TheBalticProvinces G.E.Tallents, memorandum. 12 ForeignOfficeconfidential Lithuanians”, 23 with threeLeading Interview Gregory, “Recordof J.D. n u, rti dd’ pt o mn hps n h praec o the of permanence the in hopes many too put didn’t Britain sum, In ntrso cnrt oiis teaoeetoe apoc en, si was it as meant, approach aforementioned the policies, concrete of terms In 30 . All in all, in 1921 Curzon together with his Danish colleague made a made colleague Danish his with together Curzon 1921 in all, in All . 31 . th February, 1921. TNA: FO 371/6720: 197. FO371/6720: 1921.TNA: February, 32 . By signing the Anglo-Soviet TradeAgreement theAnglo-Soviet . By signing th January, 1919. TNA: FO 608/196: 31 TNA:FO608/196: January,1919. 13 29 . Clearly, as it will be seen from seen be will it as Clearly, . 28 . Somehow the British tended British the Somehow . th October, 1920.TNA:FO October, rd February, 1921. TNA: FO TNA: February,1921. CEU eTD Collection hrceiig uh biain a a bak hqe, h cs o wih ol be could which of Poland’s conflictwiththereconstitutedRussia cost the cheque’, ‘blank a as obligations such vividly characterizing involved’, it which consequences the British on reflection the ‘mature Latvia, recommended towards obligations defense assuming on Polish advice the for to inquiry response In same. the doing from Finland and Poland discouraged Russia 35 34 33 were they As self-determination. of principle the ‘suited’ completely peoples Baltic the report, FO the in outlined was it As end. this achieve to ways the of one as seen projected the join was independence them to giving Strangely, voluntarily. states Russian the of federation expected were before, mentioned was as states, Baltic the war, the of winners the by endorsed and fashionable was ‘self-determination’ called so principle of periodwhenthe favorable. Inthe Baltic stateswas independence ofthe 1.2 ReasonsforIntéressement taxpayers British the of expense the at states London, those support in cannot Britain states that ruled Treasury Baltic the of conference economic the of opening the support to refusing thus and hopes’ false the ‘raise to hesitating 1920, of end the In states. Princeton University Press, 1972), 474-478. 474-478. Press,1972), Princeton University The British Government gives a similar particular undertaking to the Russian Soviet Government Government Soviet Russian the to undertaking particular similar a gives Government or British direct The propaganda official any <…> borders respectively Republic Soviet Russian the own or Empire British the its of institutions the against of indirect outside conducting from and other the against independent become now have which and Empire Russian former the of part formed which countries the of respect Treasury to Foreign Office,15 TreasurytoForeign 30 toForeignOffice, P.Loraine undertakings or hostile action from refrains ‘each party Agreement, the of the preamble to According 33 Nevertheless, having in mind these reservations, Britain’s attitude towards the towards attitude Britain’s reservations, these mind in having Nevertheless, Baltic the support to rush not did Britain view, of point financial the From rti nt ny vie aydfne biain i te atc ein but region, Baltic the in obligations defense any avoided only not Britain . 35 [emphasis added - D.K.]. See Richard H. Ullman, The Anglo-Soviet Accord (Princeton: Accord Anglo-Soviet The Ullman, H. Richard See D.K.]. - added [emphasis . th October, 1920. TNA: FO 371/5376: 7. 1920.TNA:FO371/5376: October, th October, 1920. TNA: FO 371/5373: 45. 1920.TNA:FO371/5373: October, 14 34 . in CEU eTD Collection needne s og s osbe Tee netvs a b body iie into divided geopoliticalandidealistic. broadly economic, be can incentives These possible. as long as independence their support to incentives notable several had Britain temporary, is existence their that conviction the Notwithstanding increased. interests British the in states Baltic independent the of significance the stay, to there going is Russia in regime Bolshevik region the of realities geopolitical the given anticipation, an more but policy, British the not was Russia reconstituted over whomRussia’sclaimforbenevolentprotectoratewouldstand races’ ‘backward as treated be couldn’t they people, Russian the of majority the than educated more and intelligent more way every in and non-Russian, entirely ethnically 41 40 39 38 37 36 and Rotterdam Amsterdam through outlet an finding Dutch trade than German more prevented ‘any independence interests vital Russia’s obstruct the not way could this in independence and free, ports Baltic the making by appeased be could interests Russia with trade a British the for for ground’ possibilities ‘jumping offered good Liepaja and Ventspilis Riga, Tallinn, of ports Baltic the the region in sectors communications and insurance banking, in involved successfully be could enterprise and trade British the for good opening as

371/5376 :90. 371/5376 Foreign Office confidential memorandum, 12 ForeignOfficeconfidential 20 ofTildenSmith Question”, minute “Summary ForeignOffice Lithuania”,19 Reporton Wilton,“Economic EarlCurzon,23 MaxMullerto 13 ForeignOffice, MaxMullerto memorandum, 12 ForeignOfficeconfidential ie tee osdrtos te eno o te atc tts ih the with states Baltic the of reunion the considerations, these Given Economic. 39 41 . In addition to significant resources of timber, flax and agricultural goods, flaxand significant resourcesof timber, Into addition . ’. Independent and economically stable Baltic states were considered were considered Baltic states economically stable Independent and rd March, 1921. TNA: FO 371/6730: 39. TNA:FO371/6730: March,1921. th March, 1921. TNA: FO 371/6730: 24. TNA:FO371/6730: March,1921. 37 . As it was getting more and more clear that the that clear more and more getting was it As . th th th May, 1921. TNA: FO 371/6725: 163. TNA:FO371/6725: May,1921. January, 1919. TNA: FO 608/196: 33. TNA:FO608/196: January,1919. 32. TNA:FO608/196: January,1919. 15 38 . It was observed that the British the that observed It was . th October, 1920.TNA:FO October, 40 . It was held that Russian that held was It . 36 . CEU eTD Collection supported by Britain ‘by any means short of actual employment of British troops’ British of employment actual of short means any ‘by Britain by supported were states Baltic 1918-1919, in Bolsheviks the against wars their In West. the to 46 45 44 43 42 the of creation the to favorably looked Britain apart. revisionists two the keep to Russia’ with trade for Germany by held advantage geographical immense the ‘counteract to supposed was belt This ‘belt’. or barrier, of that – function geopolitical another yet states Baltic the gave together coming Russia, Bolshevik and Germany outsiders, diplomatic after-war two of possibility frightening The ‘heartland’. Russian the into penetration its preventing and Germany, of containment the undoubtedly that ofanyothercountry as well as Bolshevik than higher ousting ranked Baltic the in prestige British the fact this in to Due forces. Bermondt decisively contributed which time, the at sea the Baltic in British Navy the of the presence due to large part existence in owed their and German combat to possible whatever Bolshevik influence’ do ‘to and armies their reorganize to help to states Baltic the to sent was mission military British reason, same the For the of function the were serving states they had lost’ they had what recover to countries these between nature some of union a be would there and go, would Russian pink or black red, white, communist, of distinctions all boat, same the in are Russia and Germany ‘as observed, rightly Ulmanis minister Prime Latvian J.Y. Simpson to J.D. Gregory, 28 J.D. Simpson J.Y.to 15 toEarlCurzon, G.E.Tallents 71. FO371/6723: Office.TNA: CounciltotheForeign TheArmy Council, 21 to theArmy theSecretary ForeignOfficeto Foreign Office confidential memorandum, 12 Foreign Officeconfidential Geopolitically On the other hand, the vital British (and also French) interest at the time was time the at interest French) also (and British vital the hand, other the On 46 . Britain perfectly realized that, and the belt was one of the ways to try to ways the one of was the belt and realized that, Britainperfectly . 43 , from the beginning of the Bolshevik rule in Russia the Baltic the Russia in rule Bolshevik the of beginning the from , . It is perhaps not an exaggeration to claim that the Baltic states the Baltic claim that to an exaggeration perhaps not Itis . 44 . th th December 1920. TNA: FO 371/5379: 107. 371/5379: TNA:FO December1920. December 1920. TNA: FO 371/6719: 242. TNA:FO371/6719: December1920. Cordon Sanitaire Cordon th January, 1919. TNA: FO 608/196: 33. TNA:FO608/196: January,1919. 16 st February, 1921. TNA: FO 371/5378: 190. FO371/5378: 1921.TNA: February, agaist the Bolshevik advance Bolshevik agaist the 45 As . 42 . CEU eTD Collection impulse isemphasizedateverystage’ our of emotional understoodunlessthis properly neverbe Conferencewill and victory. TheParis sufferings our for we justification whom the as nations instinct, new maternal the with regarded, fortify and create to aspiration fervent a was ‘there time, the at stance British the described retrospectively Nicolson diplomat British British the with region that in interests competing busy’ ‘get will it eventually and trade, export Baltic the for ‘by nature’ destined Germany is location, geographical its to due stated, report intelligence British secret one As Bolsheviks. the of threat the than less not probably Bolshevik aggressionanddiminishtheGermaninfluence the against front common provide could which states, Baltic three the of union Baltic 50 49 48 47 be would they later or sooner position geopolitical peculiar their to due and Russia, teasing are seashores their concerned, are Estonia and Latvia Lithuanian as far his so colleagues, to stance British the explained frankly Gregory Under-Secretary othertwocounterparts.As Foreign fromthatofher British pointofviewwasdifferent 1.3 ThespecialpositionofLithuania though anticipatingthatsomeformofcoexistenceinthisregardwasinevitable there, Germany of influence the of growth the possible as far so prevent to directed Hiden and Lane, Outbreak, 13. HidenandLane,Outbreak, 25 ofTrade, Gregory totheBoard J.D. “Germany”,2 Report SecretPolitical toEarlCurzon,14 E.C.Wilton Last but not least, it seems that the that seems it least, not but Last Office Foreign the worried Baltic the in influence German that seems It ih ead o epltcl rvtto, h psto o Ltuna rm the from Lithuania of position the gravitation, geopolitical to regard With 48 . Some of the British commercial schemes in the Baltic were Baltic the in schemes commercial British the of Some . th May 1921. TNA: FO 371/6734: 164. FO371/6734: May1921.TNA: nd December 1920. TNA: FO 371/5379: 117. TNA:FO371/5379: 1920. December th October, 1920. TNA: FO 371/5376: 95. 1920.TNA:FO371/5376: October, 50 . 17 idealistic motives were also at play. As play. at also were motives 47 . 49 . CEU eTD Collection oih niy, iig o nue ihai t gaiae o tef r Russia or itself to gravitate to Lithuania induce to aiming enmity’, Polish Lithuanian- workingtoformentthe ‘quietly butsteadily trade penetration,Germanyis peaceful addition to in indicated, Intelligencereport As Military Russia. Germany and connecting path the on directly lied Lithuania Geopolitically, states. Baltic two other particular in deserved than Lithuania in higher far is influence German here the that observed was It attention. Lithuania of position the states, Baltic the in Germany believed, wasanaturalone,intimateintermsofreligion,cultureandhistory Gregory as which, neighbor, southern the only remained there herself, orientation Russian the off’ shaken ‘deliberately Lithuania as and Germany, to turn to suggest not British ofcoursedid or Poland.Asthe – Germany,Russia powers surroundingher three the from choose) but way other no be to seemed (there ‘choose’ to possibility a had she second, and Russia, for of vital so not was she position first, – different was the Lithuania Gregory, to According Russia’. on lean always must they future, their ‘whatever it, put Gregory has As her. with relationship some into enter forced to 54 53 52 51 were banks the as trade, British the of handicap the in resulted controlled German was Lithuania in bank important every that fact the Moreover, currency. German the Lithuania in Allies the of work the in interfere and economically Lithuania on hold a obtain to try who intelligence, German the by hired were whom of some ministries, Lithuanian all in Germans of lot a were there that reported intelligence British the concerned, paety Cro as sae ti view this shared also Curzon Apparently, the Military Handbook of Lithuania”, 10 ofLithuania”, the MilitaryHandbook 371/5376 :96. 371/5376 371/6726: 20. 371/6726: Secret Political Report, “Lithuania”,21 Report, SecretPolitical 20 ofTildenSmith Question”, minute “Summary ForeignOffice of inthecompilation natureforuse andsemi-military ofamilitary “Generalinformation R.Partiger, Lithuanians”, 23 with threeLeading Interview Gregory, “Recordof J.D. With regard to the above mentioned Britain’s uneasiness with the influence of influence the with uneasiness Britain’s mentioned above the to regard With 54 . Until the introduction of the Litas, until the end of 1922 Lithuania used Lithuania 1922 of end the until Litas, the of introduction the Until . th st January 1921. TNA: FO 371/6724: 138. FO 371/6724: TNA: January1921. November 1920. TNA: FO 371/5379: 155. FO371/5379: TNA: November1920. 18 53 A fr s cnmc nlec is influence economic as far As . th October, 1920.TNA:FO October, rd February, 1921. TNA: FO TNA: February,1921. 51 . 52 . CEU eTD Collection n de o e mncn cnlc wt Pln, h ws eiiey h most the definitely was she Poland, with ‘interesting’ countryofthethreeattimebeing. conflict menacing her to due and diplomacy British in stability on insistence traditional the given concerns, security wide-enough raising one, serious very a as Britain by regarded an influx oftheBritishcapital by ameliorated be only could affairs of state unsatisfactory this that minute suggested Office Foreign The firms. British the to credit give to refusing reportedly 57 56 55 once Curzon shortcomings. its notice to hesitate not did diplomats British diplomacy, Office 1.4 ImageofLithuaniaandLithuaniansfromtheviewpointForeign port such have not facilities did she as Latvia, than important less as Britain by seen was Kaunas, to Wilton. commissioner British separate the send to and Riga in representative Britain’s of competence the from Lithuania detach to decided was It States’. Baltic forittobetreatedseparatelyfromtheother capital importanceastomakeitnecessary such of now is Lithuania of attitude ‘the that convinced was Curzon coup, Vilnius 1965,” Diplomacy and Statecraft 14(2003). Diplomacy andStatecraft 1965,” M. Clark minute, 23 M.Clark 1865- Policy, inBritishForeign “Power andStability McKercher, andB.J.C. SeeErikGoldstein minute, 21 ForeignOffice s t a aray etoe i te nrdcin te inu dsue was dispute Vilnius the introduction, the in mentioned already was it As bevn n vlaigtefrtseso h ul-rmsrth Lithuanian built-from-scratch the of steps first the evaluating and Observing Lithuania standpoint, commercial a from looking although that seems it Thus, 57 and had a lower level of industrialization, from a geopolitical point of view geopolitical point froma of industrialization, lower level had a and rd November 1920. TNA: FO 371\5378: 120. FO371\5378: 1920.TNA: November st April 1921. TNA: FO 371/6725: 120. TNA:FO371/6725: April1921. 55 . 19 56 . In the eve of the of eve the In . CEU eTD Collection rsiue i ofca psto t oti fmnn favors’ feminine obtain to position official his prostitute will who man a applaud rather but condemn not does society their loose: decidedly are morals their people: uncultured coarse, are counterpart, ‘Lithuanians that British observed his Wilton of one of adventures feminine the reporting of occasion Poland’ in does he than provinces Baltic the in alien less instinctively feels and culture in lacking are and administrative experience<…>sensitivetoanysuspicionofsupercilioustreatment’ minded, narrow and ‘self-centered are classes Lithuanian middle thought that Wilton Parliament ‘sample’, the generalizing from but , Latvians or unfavorably with compare not Lithuanians do observed that Wilton backward’ and ‘stupid as Lithuanians described 63 62 61 60 59 58 intelligence the to suited not are Lithuanians that noted Wilton Lithuania, in services Estonians the or Latvians the than with’ deal to ‘easier are and Russians the reported, to closer are Tallents temperament by As Lithuanians character. stable more their by Poles the from and energy, greater by Russians from distinguished are Baltic people the that observed report One te hn h i o sud pyiu, hemtc pritn, n cpbe f great of endurance ofhardships’ capable and persistent, phlegmatic, physique, sturdy of is he hand other the on but ‘fire’, of deficient and brain, of slow uneducated, is He material. fighting good make led, properly if should, peasant ‘Lithuanian class, officer an of shortage the was army Lithuanian the in problem biggest the although that noticed intelligence the Military Handbook of Lithuania”, 10 ofLithuania”, the MilitaryHandbook R. Partiger, “General information of a military and semi-military nature for use in the compilation of inthecompilation natureforuse andsemi-military ofamilitary “Generalinformation R.Partiger, Gregory, 29 toJ.D. E.C.Wilton FO419\1:9. TNA: November1919. Baltic Provinces, onthe ForeignOfficeNotes toEarlCurzon,12 S.G.Tallents toEarlCurzon,11 E.C.Wilton minute, 17 LordCurzon th March 1922. TNA: FO 371\8058: 48. FO371\8058: TNA: March1922. 63 . Observing the active work of the German and Soviet secret Soviet German and of the work active . Observingthe th th March 1921. TNA: FO 371\6721: 3. TNA:FO371\6721: March1921. th December 1920. TNA: FO 371\6721: 113. 371\6721: TNA:FO December1920. August 1920. TNA: FO419\2:84. August1920. th January 1921. TNA: FO 371/6724: 137. FO 371/6724: TNA: January1921. 60 . Interestingly, it was noted that ‘an Englishman ‘an that noted was it Interestingly, . 20 58 Biih ersnaie n Kaunas in representative British . 62 Biih military British . 61 . On the On . 59 . CEU eTD Collection ihain oe, hc wr bsd n ifrn asmtos Such assumptions. different to mediate thePolish-Lithuaniandispute. on efforts British the impaired significantly based seen, be will it were as misunderstandings, certain which the behind moves, rationale the Lithuanian recognize not did simply sometimes that indicate Britain also may remarks slating British these that seems it and But justified opportune. often was graduates Oxbridge British the by diplomacy Lithuanian reason forthatistheirhonestyofcharacter the that think themselves they but dullness’, ‘natural their to due potentially work 66 65 64 first’ house own their set ‘should Poles the that believed was it and concerned, was Europe in peace the as far as desirable not was this minutes, Office Foreign the in marked was it As Britain. supported by was not model theAustro-Hungarian unionon integration orthe intimate complete the relationship, the this of form the to As projected countries. two the between relations and gravitate, should Lithuania which towards direction 2.1 TheNatureoftheProjectedLithuanian-PolishRelationship idiotic’ something be to sure is it be should this and choice, good a not was Poland with relationship a into Lithuania 371/5374: 40. 371/5374: Foreign Office memorandum “The Polish-Lithuanian Question”, 11 Question”, memorandum “ThePolish-Lithuanian ForeignOffice E.Oveyminute,28 toEarlCurzon,29 E.C.Wilton hpe :TheBritish Involvement intheVilniusDispute Chapter 2: s t a aray etoe bfr, rti sw oad s h natural the as Poland saw Britain before, mentioned already was it As theLithuaniansdo Office onceobserved,‘whatever the Foreign As Ovey from 66 th August 1922. TNA: FO 371\8069: 32. TNA:FO371\8069: August1922. Bsds fr ihe Biih ilmc raie ta forcing that realized diplomacy British sighted far Besides, . th January 1921. TNA: FO 371\6728: 162. TNA:FO371\6728: January1921. 65 . Undoubtedly, the critique devoted to the young the to devoted critique the Undoubtedly, . 21 64 . th October, 1920.TNA:FO October, CEU eTD Collection TNA: FO 371/5374: 76. TNA: FO371/5374: hne f osn Vlis Geoy tesd ht h mte i i te ege and League the Britain hasnointentiontowithdrawthatquestionfromthere in is matter the that stressed Gregory Vilnius, loosing of the chance and plebiscite the escaping Poland, with union’ of form ‘some into Lithuania drive to intending terms, to come to Lithuania press could Britain whether Gregory Sapieha asked Foreign Minister the Polish policy. When British the actual reflected in brought into a close alliance leading up to federation’ to up leading alliance close a into brought be could Poland, of part the on statesmanship and patience little very bring theideaoffederationintobeing.AsForeignOfficememorandumstated,‘witha attainment’ easy of relatively be and obstacles serious no encounter ‘would it of realization the project, such to blessing its gave Britain only if that believed Sapieha Foreign Minister Polish relations. precarious their of problem the to solution the provide could countries two the between understanding’ close very or ‘union that Britain impress to tried always agree’ to Lithuanians the get to remain only principle in should really ‘it federation, Lithuanian-Polish of idea the welcomed all Britain and Sapieha Pilsudski, of form the in Poland and Lithuania pressure by direct achieve it to trying instead of time left to 71 70 69 68 67 Lithuania, for choice voluntary thus and inevitable rational, a as projected view, of point global its from Britain, What Lithuania. of rationality’ ‘geopolitical the second, and Poles, the of ‘statesmanship’ of potential the first, overestimated, here Britain 371\6734: 250. 371\6734: Foreign Office memorandum “British Policy in States”,12 theBaltic Policy memorandum “British ForeignOffice Gregory minute,11 J.D. 16 Gregory toMaxMuller, J.D. P. Loraine to EarlCurzon,7 P. Loraineto G. E. Tallents, “The Baltic Provinces and the ”, Memorandum, November 1920. 1920. November Memorandum, Nations”, of League the and Provinces Baltic “The Tallents, E. G. oee, rti fvrby okd oad mr ale rltos between relations allied more towards looked favorably Britain However, 70 . Indeed, initially Britain imagined that it would be not so hard to so hard not would be that it imagined initially Britain Indeed, . th November 1920. TNA: FO 371\5380: 53. FO371\5380: TNA: November1920. th October 1920. TNA: FO 371\5373: 187. 1920.TNA:FO371\5373: October th February 1921. TNA: FO 688\10\12: 299. TNA:FO688\10\12: February1921. federation 22 . According to Gregory, as the French, the as Gregory, to According . 71 . However, as it will be seen, be will it as However, . th 67 June 1921. TNA:FO June1921. 68 . This predisposition waspredisposition . This . 69 Poland . CEU eTD Collection tl se a te uhrttv boundary authoritative the as seen still was line Curzon The Polish. not was region surrounding the greater, was town the in inhabitants Polish of percentage the that fact the despite because Lithuania, to belong to region Vilnius the for ‘wiser’ be would it that out pointed memorandum Office to thenatureofVilniusdisputeingeneral. and Vilnius of fate the to approach their from discerned be could operated Lithuania 2.2 BritishattitudetowardsthefateofVilnius spoke inquiteadifferentlanguage. Lithuania as non-negotiable, was country latter the of view of point the from looking 74 73 72 3, Lithuania’s to compared divisions 39 had Poland that colleague Lithuanian his to armistice, signedjustbeforetheVilniusoccupation. Tellingly,Wiltononcementioned Suwalki the Polish non-observanceof -the the dispute sideof legal importance onthe a be would deadlock the otherwise certainty because obscure, so is problem the when politics’, practical of sphere the outside quite ‘are considerations ethnographic and Lithuania, notPoland is Vilnius for food of source natural the that fact the - argument earth to down very a by caught was eye British the elaborations, historical Vilnius, sentimental for wide including claim its for support in side Lithuanian the by presented arguments, 371/5374: 38. 371/5374: Max Muller to Foreign Office, 21 ForeignOffice, MaxMullerto minute, 2 ForeignOffice 11 Question”, memorandum “ThePolish-Lithuanian ForeignOffice Britain approached Vilnius problem very differently from Lithuania. Foreign Lithuania. from differently very problem Vilnius approached Britain and Britain which in frameworks conceptual different the of existence The 74 Mroe, o te rts, t emd ht ihai pae to much too places Lithuania that seemed it British, the for Moreover, . 73 nd . British Minister inWarsawMullernotedthatallthehistorical BritishMinister . March 1921. TNA: FO371\6725:9. TNA: March1921. st March 1921. TNA:FO688\9\3:80. March1921. 23 72 oial eog, u o al lengthy all of out enough, Comically . th October, 1920.TNA:FO October, CEU eTD Collection any widerstandpoint’ from matter their to unable quite seem they and friends; big their not and best, their been have we that unaware fanatic be to seem Lithuanians ‘the observed, once rivalry of kind this in win always would Poles the and situation, the change not would rifles thousand few that commentating export, the allow to refused Office Foreign attack, Polish the of case in itself defend to able be to order in arms purchase to request Lithuanian occasion of to position a in been had Lithuania if attention more byPolandcouldhaveattracted theviolationofarmistice and hintedthatthefactof 78 77 76 75 mutual understandingamongBritainandFrance onhowtomeettheproblem. the of the lack forestallthe observe could one to dispute, the of pre-stage tried this at Already British adventure. the occupation, the before weeks last the in clearer 2.3 AttemptstoforestallthePolishadventure something differentfromwhatshereallywas. as Britain imagined Lithuania rationality, geopolitical of terms own its in think to Britain in belief’ ‘pathetic the as to referred British the what generated turn in beliefs Lithuanian Such stance. to anti-Polish strong the claim assume should Vilnius, unquestionable its and woes Lithuanian the understanding while which and intrigues, Polish and French the above was which power, Allied principal the Britain as Lithuania saw It seemsthat be. itto Lithuaniaimagined different fromwhat Lord Curzon minute, 27 LordCurzon FO419\1:9. TNA: November1919. Baltic Provinces, onthe ForeignOfficeNotes minutes, 2 ForeignOffice 12 toLordCurzon, E.C.Wilton As the intentions on behalf of the Polish side to occupy Vilnius were getting were Vilnius occupy to side Polish the of behalf on intentions the As 78 th February 1921. TNA: FO 371\6726: 31. 1921.TNA:FO371\6726: February nd . It appears that while Britain unreasonably expected Lithuania Britain unreasonablyexpected that while . Itappears March 1921. TNA: FO 371\6728: 181. TNA:FO371\6728: 1921. March th 76 August 1922. TNA: FO 371\8063: 87. TNA: FO371\8063: August1922. Sc pamtc n raitc rts attd was attitude British realistic and pragmatic Such . 24 enforce the armistice the 77 . As Curzon As . 75 . On the On . CEU eTD Collection the states who have created a free Poland’ free a created have who states the from sympathy desire they if glories, military and adventure all aside ‘put to Poland urged Times’ ‘The Lithuania. against adventures fresh undertake to not Poles the warning was press French and British both occupation, Vilnius the before month one ey i efc o te oih plans’ Polish the on effect big very ‘a have could measures Allied energetic that and believed advance, Polish prevent the whole’ a as Europe of peace the also but Poland, of independence only ‘not threatened and Bolsheviks, with peace of making the impaired front, Bolshevik Polish- the weakened neighbors its at directed adventures military Polish scale, larger the on worries, British the behind motives significant the be to seemed Poland and 83 82 81 80 79 Vilnius, capital her of possession the of Lithuania ensure to question reason political the and loyalty is it that stated note polite very The government. British the to it French the jointnoteand submitted Leygues preparedthetextof foreign ministerGeorges day same the on and immediately, between agreed in France arising Paris’, questions and the London all as well as war, the by raised problems, big the addressing in Entente two-power ‘close the to attached France which importance fundamental the Emphasizing him. to note warning British-French joint the submit to France Britain offered 1920 6 on October adventure, Pilsudski’s anticipate Marshal to Vilnius on march to intentions their of secret no make (obviously, authorities’ military ‘certain Pilsudski) of endorsement the with Polish regiments certain by prepared is main’ de ‘coup that signals received Office Foreign R. Pargiter Report, 10 R.Pargiter 7 toForeignOffice, P.Loraine Gregory,9 toJ.D. CountTyszkiewicz 1 Report, WarOfficeFortnightly 7 Gregory toTreasury, J.D. lhuh rtcig ihai ad nuig ecfl oxsec bten it between coexistence peaceful ensuring and Lithuania protecting Although 82 , and military intelligence reported that officers and soldiers on the front the on soldiers and officers that reported intelligence military and , th October 1920. TNA: FO 371\5374: 45. FO371\5374: October1920.TNA: th October 1920. TNA: FO 371\5374: 187. TNA:FO371\5374: 1920. October th October 1920. TNA: FO 371\5373: 159. 1920.TNA:FO371\5373: October st October 1920. TNA: FO 371\5377: 40. 1920.TNA:FO371\5377: October th October 1920. TNA: FO 371\5373: 175. FO371\5373: 1920.TNA: October 81 Svrl as eoe h Vlis occupation Vilnius the before days Several . 25 80 . Lithuania was actively urging Britain to Britain urging actively was Lithuania . 83 . Having enough information enough Having . 79 . As early as As . CEU eTD Collection entire accordance with Britain entire accordancewith in act to will the praising and instructions the obey to representative French the make to promising Pilsudski, to note the present to refused Panafieu Poland to Minister bythe BritishrepresentativeinWarsaw independently the Polishgovernment press to right its reserves Britain that French the to indicated Curzon time, same the At colleague. French the instructed with together note French the Curzon present to Warsaw in Loraine Vilnius, to advance their renounced moment the at authorities military Polish that dispatch Loraine’s by convinced being However, adventures. ‘certain was reactions whichcancompromisethesituation’ non-compliance of case in French the by suggested ‘threat’ explicit only the and development, internal its on concentrate to urged was of Poland Pilsudski. and public general Polish of sentiments revisionist the spurs apparently which 86 his to belonged 85 what interests, 84 Lithuanian after looking of instead Zeligowski general advising Reboul Vilnius in commissioner French the that observed diplomat the that Russian (sic). wrote pressure French the to due British, undoubtedly resulted Vilnius of occupation the by intercepted the somehow to dispatches were secret which his Narkomindel, in Axelrod time. Soviet the the at of Lithuania observations in the representative consider to relevant be may it Here doubtful. is and moderate so being note, the that opinion the of was Curzon Britain be. should as it enough, suggested initially serious not was Poland to message projected French the that accompli Lord Derby to Foreign Office, 11 toForeignOffice, LordDerby memorandum, 8 LordCurzon notetoBritain,6 TheFrench rncly ee sc a ot oe i nt eev is drse tl the till addressee its receive not did note soft a such even Ironically, indicated he reply In note. French the with satisfied not was clearly Curzon . Officially, the British were informed in a regrettable fashion that the French fashionthatthe in aregrettable theBritishwereinformed . Officially, courtois wl nt e be o isae h Pls rm e military new from Poles the dissuade to able be not will , th th October 1920. TNA: FO371\5373:155. 1920.TNA: October October 1920. TNA: FO371\5373:194. 1920.TNA: October th 86 October 1920. TNA: FO 371\5373: 214. TNA:FO371\5373: October1920. . Whether the latter intention of the French was true,it of theFrenchwas latter intention . Whetherthe 26 84 . 85 . fait CEU eTD Collection thinking thattheideaoffederationwouldsuittheirinterestsaswell Poland, into couldn’t Lithuania of incorporation complete he the projecting is France that believe but them, in truth some is there that acknowledged Gregory reports, competence 91 90 89 88 87 the approach to camp Allied Lithuanian-Polish dispute. the non- in the framework common – clear see the to of want existence didn’t or yet see didn’t British the what noticed he that Lithuania save to efforts their in everything do who British the annoy’ ‘seriously eventually will Lithuania towards France of policy the that view the took later but Baltic, the in entanglement her to acquiescing by France weaken to wanted British the that speculating initially British, the by protest formal to capitulate the Lithuania on press would French and the Lithuania, into further forces booty, Polish the of advance a as Allies the by Poland to given was Lithuania that suggest to far so went representative Soviet The exploit. could they which sea, to sea from state Polish big the create to was helping Axelrod, in to according might’, their all diplomacy ‘with Poland French the of motive the east, the from Germany separate to Aiming agents. 100 nearly comprising espionage network, dense the has and house Lithuanian government the compromise could which material collecting actively is Lithuania the fresh attack on Lithuania in the near future. Lithuania inthenear the freshattackon Sovietsarenotcontemplating Britishtobelievethat thispassageledthe Perhaps whole ofLithuania’. the made tooccupy then graduallybe would IsubmitthatthePoles use ofitand would makegreat they what wearedoing(sic!), will gettoknow ‘ifthey was convincedthat Axelrod sovietize Lithuania. to Sovietattempts failure oftheearly theunderstandingof addto whichcould interesting comment, J.D. Gregory minute,11 J.D. Tchicherin,8 Axelrodto Tchicherin,23 Axelrodto Tchicherin,8 Axelrodto Tchicherin,15 Axelrodto Indeed, although Axelrod’s insights could have been a bit overstated, it seems it overstated, bit a been have could insights Axelrod’s although Indeed, 88 87 89 codn t Aerd Fac otn cs n ihai a i is own its in as Lithuania in acts often France Axelrod, to According . in mission military French the that obvious was it Axelrod For . . Axelrod was puzzled with the fact that Polish adventure evoked only a withthefactthatPolishadventureevoked only Axelrodwaspuzzled . th th th November 1920. TNA: FO 371\5380: 53. FO371\5380: TNA: November1920. November 1920. TNA: FO 371\5380: 73. TNA:FO371\5380: 1920. November rd made another 73.Axelrod TNA:FO371\5380: 1920. November th October, 1920. TNA: FO 371\5380: 58. TNA:FO371\5380: 1920. October, October 1920. TNA: FO 371\5380: 61. TNA:FO371\5380: 1920. October 27 90 Cmetn o Axelrod’s on Commenting . 91 . CEU eTD Collection conclusion is that we that is conclusion game isworthtryingforthesakeofpeaceinEasternEurope’ machinery League the involving before withdrawal, Polish a ensure to order in exercised be should pressure cannot economic even and possibly diplomatic and that Allies fait accompli, the Polish acquiesce to the that emphasized was It policy. agreed the imposing of chances reasonable the ensure would Poland in had France which and Lithuania in had she still which authority the that believed Britain and matter, the in unity settlement Allied the on counting territorial Teschen successful the Remembering own. their on disputants leavethe not to disputeand inthe cut policy a clear present the Alliesto 2.4 Theaftermathoftheoccupation 96 95 94 93 92 the which delays, intentional the explains Vilnius on attack the that indicated report it while secretlysupporting the plan, openly disavow going to is Warsaw that received was information the operation the before Well Office. Foreign them. Theywillneverdoitthemselves’ them’ upon imposed be must settlement a themselves: Lithuanians the and Poles the between reached be ever will settlement satisfactory no certain that quite seems ‘it minute, Office Foreign 371/5374: 40. 371/5374: J.D. Gregory minute,16 J.D. Gregory, 9 toJ.D. E.C.Wilton Colonel Ward to Foreign Office,8 toForeign Colonel Ward minute, 13 Foreign Office 11 Question”, memorandum “ThePolish-Lithuanian Foreign Office Just after the Vilnius occupation, Foreign Office memorandum recommended memorandum Office Foreign occupation, Vilnius the after Just h rc f h ioeineo te eea Zlgwk i nt mrs the impress not did Zeligowski general the of disobedience the of trick The the in put was it As mediation. the in lead the take to decided British The 94 [emphasis original – D.K.] must settle the whole business for business whole the settle must D.K.] – original [emphasis th 92 . Gregory was of the same view as his colleagues in FO: ‘the FO: in colleagues his as view same the of was Gregory . October 1920. TNA: FO 371\5373: 198. 1920.TNA:FO371\5373: October th . As Wilton once observed, ‘both parties are tiresome, but the but tiresome, are parties ‘both observed, once Wilton As . October 1920. TNA: FO 371\5374: 13. 1920.TNA:FO371\5374: October th February 1921. TNA: FO 371\6724: 200. FO371\6724: TNA: February1921. th October 1920. TNA: FO 371\5373: 167. 1920.TNA:FO371\5373: October 95 . 28 th October, 1920.TNA:FO October, 93 . 96 . British intelligence . British CEU eTD Collection n ta ti wl rnw upcos f oih oiia ambitions political Polish of suspicions renew will this that and Allies’ its towards position embarrassing most a in put be would Government Polish o fi t big bu srie rltos ewe Pln ad e Ale ad to and Allies her and importance toPoland issues ofessential prejudice anumberofother Poland between relations strained about bring to fail not ‘could pretext whatever under Vilnius of occupation Polish that remarked and force’, by question Vilnius solve to attempt any of results ‘deplorable Sapieha on impressed Fiume another if arise would which GeneralStaffwith‘serioussituation military representativetowarnthechiefofPolish to refusal their continue thedemarcationline,seekingtoensureitstroopsfreedomofmaneuver by negotiations armistice Suwalki at instigating was side Polish 101 100 99 98 97 manner’ oddest the in it achieving about setting certainly are they have: Poles the that idea any about be to seems It union. less still rapprochement Polo-Lithuanian a of think to difficult ever than more be now clearly would ‘it that concluded action, Polish fresh the on commenting minute, Office Foreign The force. to resorted Poles couldnot understandwhyhavethe Lithuania, andexpectinghertobehavereasonably, the tacitapprovalofFrenchfortheiractions. not is It essential. had seemingly, Poles, the as was failure to doomed were efforts British the that surprising pressure Allied concentrated powerful the succeed, to attempts such For failed. action reverse its to Poland press to attempts British first the its grounded Poland Obviously, frameworks. conceptual different quite in operated disputants the and Britain that assumption the supports well remark this Actually, i.e.protectorate P. Loraine to Foreign Office, 9 ForeignOffice, P. Loraineto Gregory,8 toJ.D. Count Tyszkiewicz Foreign Office minute, 12 Foreign Office 10 ForeignOffice, P. Loraineto British Minister in Warsaw Loraine instructed the second in command British command in second the instructed Loraine Warsaw in Minister British Britain, knowing the general wish of Poland to conclude the federation with federation the conclude to Poland of wish general the knowing Britain, th October 1920. TNA: FO 371\5373: 186. 1920.TNA:FO371\5373: October th October 1920. TNA: FO 371\5373: 197. 1920.TNA:FO371\5373: October th October 1920. TNA: FO 371\5373: 181. 1920.TNA:FO371\5373: October th November 1920. TNA: FO 371\5376: 123. TNA:FO371\5376: November1920. 98 wr o e rae tVlis lklho that likelihood Vilnius, at created be to were 29 100 99 Lrie also Loraine . ’. Nevertheless, 101 97 . . CEU eTD Collection common languageamongtheactorsconcerned. the of lack the by prejudiced being cease not did efforts British the seen, be will it as settlement, dispute the of stage that At satisfactory understanding. the to sides both the accepting not still but afterwards, action its reverse to Poland induce to and adventure Polish the prevent to failing Thereby rationality. expected British the from different motives the on action 102 controlled and monitored territory, disputed the in referendum the convey to Hymans Minister Foreign Belgian the of suggestion the accepted and act to started League the in situation the with connection French Vilnius in the measures with no consultation take to the decided after government, Mantoux, Political the League of the chair The of line. department French different the the following However, League. again the were by apparently considered be would matter the troops, its withdraw refuses to Poland case that in member, and as a Poland of the obligations to contrary was Vilnius of occupation the that representative, Polish the on impress the for chances the diminished mediation tosucceed. turn in what matter, the to approach consistent have the not did Allies the that but the disputants, with British communication case of in framework conceptual common of lack the only not was there that hypothesis the 2.5 Attemptedplebiscite Vaga, 2001), 51. Vaga, 2001), (Vilnius: 1917-1996] Border Lithuanian-Polish DisputeConcerning theNeverending [Vilnius Conflict: Sture Theolin, Vilniaus Konfliktas: Begalinis Konfliktas:Begalinis StureTheolin,Vilniaus 102 s h mte wn t te ege i ws rti wo re te ege to League the urged who Britain was it League, the to went matter the As confirm expressly plebiscite by dispute the solve to attempts unsuccessful The . Only on October 28 October on Only . fait accompli fait th , more than two weeks after the Vilnius occupation, Vilnius the after weeks two than more , , British diplomacy looked for a way to bring to way a for looked diplomacy British , Ginčas dėl Lietuvos ir Lenkijos Sienos Lietuvos irLenkijos Ginčas dėl 30 1917-1996 1917-1996 CEU eTD Collection expression with Zeligowski still in Vilnius would be a farce’ a be would Vilnius in ‘public still Zeligowski with expression observed, Wilton As place. the in stayed favor forces would Polish results the the case that in Poland doubted one no Accordingly, favor. own their in be to results genuine the expected dispute the of sides both Interestingly, League. the by 105 104 Lithuanian 103 and very not as British colleague Lithuanian the his deemed Curzon of say, to heads Needless diplomacies. the of encounter post-coup first very the from evident was This problem. the of solution international the to skeptically looked Britain Initially, dispute. the of parties the from plebiscite the for support the expect to reasonable very not then was it stance, British ambiguous an such given Naturally, League’s the of authority the decisions strengthen to and interference Bolshevik of risk to the minimize to withdrawal), after ground Lithuanians by Vilnius of reoccupation the suspect a had Poland (otherwise troops Polish the of withdrawal the ensure to necessary was presence military international the arguments, the summarized Loraine As plebiscite. the of implementation proper the ensure to needed be would forces vote forPoland to subjected be will or voting from abstain either they that presence military Polish the by terrorized so the were that the and doubt Poland, for no opt would had population itChristian Lithuania, to loyalty its showing paper’ ‘on Although occupation. Vilnius the by created situation ‘unenviable’ the avoid to trying prestige, its safeguard to wants only League the Vilnius, in plebiscite a for declaring by that Narkomindel to reported He plebiscite. the on especially pessimistic was Lithuania in Axelrod to Tchicherin, 2nd November 1920. TNA: FO 371\5380: 68. FO371\5380: TNA: 1920. Tchicherin,2ndNovember Axelrodto Gregory, 3 toJ.D. E.C.Wilton P. Loraine to EarlCurzon,10 P. Loraineto t a b osre ta Bians oiin oad te lbsie fluctuated. plebiscite the towards position Britain’s that observed be can It international obviously, district, the from troops its withdrew Poland case In 105 . 104 . th rd January 1921. TNA: FO 688\09\3: 193. TNA:FO688\09\3: January1921. November 1920. TNA: FO 371\5380: 54. FO371\5380: TNA: November1920. 31 103 . Soviet representative Soviet . CEU eTD Collection or onr, cuty f etitd eore, cuty ih neemnt and indeterminate with country a resources, restricted of country a country, poor a country, small a was freedom, her defended energetically and won, gallantly had she ‘though Lithuania colleagues, Lithuanian his to referred Curzon As neighbors’. her with Lithuania of relations future whole the involving question, larger ‘much of that but transaction’, ‘Vilnius the of merely not was question the that view the of the case In voting. of time the at place the securing for troops available the find would Allies the region, the from Poland troops its that evacuates somehow supposed that, thinking hardly plebiscite, the of appropriateness the in believe not did Curzon practicability. its questioned herself Britain guarantor, its as withBritain reliable system being a extent there to some least Lithuania believedat situation’ existing the of difficulties real the grapple with to than phrases and platitudes indulge in to inclined ‘more him found League, Curzon the for respect the and Britain in confidence the Poles, the by committed wrongs the the to point’ adhere to or questions, definite answer to one any persuading in difficulty greater experienced half-an-hour in rarely have I but excuse; an constitute to held be Minister’s Lithuanian the Curzon,situation,may ofthe as thecomplexities aswell ‘comparative youthandinexperience, to the According of problem relations. the on Lithuanian-Polish take intelligent the having not and diplomacy in skilled 108 107 106 systemic on the framework, based different the very and Vilnius in the issue put thoughts, Curzon Puricki’s leave in ‘practical line’ the of lack observing the to forces Polish the ordering of responsibility the take should drawn be would troops its source what from imagine not could Curzon task, the undertake Earl Curzon to Colonel Ward, 26 Colonel Ward, EarlCurzonto Ibid 26 Ward, Earl CurzontoColonel 106 108 . After Purickis expressed the woes of Lithuania, the ambitions of its people, its of ambitions the Lithuania, of woes the expressed Purickis After . . While implicitly detesting Puricki’s tendency to assume that someone else someone that assume to tendency Puricki’s detesting implicitly While . th th October 1920. TNA: FO 371\5374: 52. TNA:FO371\5374: October1920. 52. TNA:FO371\5374: October1920. 32 realpolitk 107 . Here, it seems that while that seems it Here, . considerations. He was considerations. League re to tried CEU eTD Collection o gnrl elwhp f ain wih ol ecue oiia ad economic and political rivalry’ exclude would which nations of fellowship general a to give way was universallyhoped,to andwasgoing, it ‘belonged topre-wardiplomacy, it, put Galvanauskas as and, stronger, the of interests the to weaker the subordinated only economically schemes Such peace. permanent the ensure to ways the not were alliances and federations that stated Galvanauskas federation, of idea the Opposing that drawingLithuaniaawayfromthePolishorbitwouldbedisadvantageous observing view, same the of was Gregory Poland. with relations intimate about more in and rhetorically almost diplomacy disciplining fashionaskedhisLithuaniancolleague: British of chief The frontiers’. disputed 113 112 111 110 the saw really Lithuania 109 whether doubtful course of is It plebiscite. attitude the skeptical towards more adopt to Lithuania induce to fail not could stance British consequences the for responsible not is Britain plebiscite, the from withdraws Lithuania if that threatened government Lithuanian the to note his in Curzon plebiscite, the of question the enough seriously took League Europe Eastern the of Balkanization the avoid to needed are unions various and world’, imperfect still a in realities with dealing are ‘we present 419\3: 8. J. Purickis speech at the session of Seim,4 atthesession J. Purickisspeech Ibid 23 Leading Lithuanians”, withthree “Record ofInterview J.D. Gregory, minute, 15 J.D. Gregory Ibid Apparently, Lithuanians approached the matter from the different dimension. different the from matter the approached Lithuanians Apparently, plebiscite, and the about less think should Lithuania clear – was hint the Thus, of desires and ambitions the lay direction what in so, Lithuania?’ were this If ensue? probability in must all incorporation or federation of form some that foreseen had statesmen neighbors, Lithuanian these the not of either with adopted be might that cooperation of form the Whatever other? the on Poland of or irresistible hand one the an on Russia of be direction the in there either move to not tendency Would neighbors? powerful in more existence its independent from an detachment maintain complete permanently could unit a such that anticipate he ‘Did 111 I rpy rgr osre ta atog ti i a oeu iel bt at but ideal, hopeful a is this although that observed Gregory reply In . 109 . th November 1920. TNA: FO 371\5374: 75. FO371\5374: TNA: November1920. th February 1921. TNA: FO 371\6724 :176. 1921.TNA:FO371\6724 February 33 113 Sc ucran n changing and uncertain Such . rd 112 February, 1921. TNA: FO TNA: February,1921. Hwvr fe the after However, . 110 . CEU eTD Collection only in some Polish occupied districts to the east of the Curzon line the Curzon of to theeast occupied districts Polish only insome held be could referendum – will popular the of expression additional any for need no is there and default by her to belongs Vilnius that sure was Lithuania capital, ancient its for claim just and indisputable its in always, as believing, and Poland, join and fatherland the from secede to will their expressed never have Vilnius of inhabitants the that Arguing (sic!). district surrounding the of parts large the in and Vilnius of its study. from city general, the in the referendum implement to willing not was Lithuania failure in its till initiation of referendum of hypothesis idea the the supporting confirms although Paradoxically, further what Britain, by anticipated different fromthatofBritain. definitely was view world her evidently but prism, idealistic such through matters 114 of point the From bluff. a as them of treatment and nature such of statements Soviet the of disregard complete the meant this practice In cage. the in bear the keep to and Soviets the with deal to not disposition Western general the with accordance in acted it cases such in concerned, is Britain as far As Russia. to menace a be would territory disputed the in forces international ‘anti-soviet’ Poland, of introduction and the that Lithuaniathreatening the both of to settlement protests the the prevent addressed to dispute, Lithuanian-Polish seeking purposes own its for Russia, Soviet 1920, December In it. do to failed but observe, to expected naturally was standpoint, on whatwasdefinitelythecruxofdispute. the reservation makes same time the Lithuania at of referendum, by themeans dispute the settle to agreeing in – ridiculous than less no was situation the Britain, of view of Theolin, Vilniaus Konfliktas,78. Theolin,Vilniaus h bhvo o Ltuna a cery o i acrac wt te pattern the with accordance in not clearly was Lithuania of behavior The hs a nt h ol rl wih ihai,jdig rm h British the from judging Lithuania, which rule only the not was This 34 114 . From the point . From CEU eTD Collection There isnosignofthishavingtakenplace’ group. the new in weak point constitutes the omission whose Lithuania, to possible as reasonable be as Baltic statesto theotherthree would beratherpressedby that Poland hoped had ‘I matter: the on wondered Office Foreign the from Leeper cooperation, a punishmentforsuchLithuanianmisdemeanor even was Purickis displeasure’. her Lithuania non-recognition of confident thatthe of brunt the to exposed and Russia Soviet to proximity close in state small a Lithuania, for concern real very a was, still and been, had menace ‘Bolshevik that Simultaneously noting stance, referendum. Lithuanian such the justified Purickis to connected points vital other excluding where time conference, League the at at thesame note, threatening Bolshevik prominencetothe Lithuanians gavetheundue representatives Lithuanian the by tactics adopted wrong the for excusing was Purickis Minister Foreign Lithuanian Wilton, with meeting his In different. very was attitude Lithuanian However, Lithuania. from stance same the expected probably Britain that was here problem The reasonable. completely be to seemed attitude an such power, established an as Britain of view 117 116 Polish the interpreted Muller 115 As fulfilled. not were expectations their again, and anxieties’ existing Lithuania’s to the add would Vilnius of apprehension possession the which problems political considerable ‘with views without he that Meierovics Wilton Minister telling was Foreign hesitation Latvian the instance, For not is materializing. states Baltic the of unity anticipated the that surprised was Britain Britain. R.C. Leeper minute, 10 R.C.Leeper toEarlCurzon,28 E.C.Wilton E.C. Wilton to Earl Curzon,9 E.C. Wiltonto At thesametime,Britishexpectedsimilarly rational behaviorfromPoland, of expectations the from different way a in behaving was Lithuania only Not 116 . After Finland, Poland, Estonia and Latvia signed the protocol of deeper of protocol the signed Latvia and Estonia Poland, Finland, After . th August 1921. TNA: FO 371\6730: 118 TNA:FO371\6730: August1921. th th 174. 1921.TNA:FO371\6724: February September 1921. TNA: FO 371\6737: 154. 371\6737: 1921.TNA:FO September 35 117 . 115 de jure . in the previous conference was conferencewas in theprevious CEU eTD Collection mainly from a strategic point of view, and it is not unnatural that she should do so’ should that she not unnatural is and it of view, point a strategic mainly from things upon looks present at Poland Dwinsk. corridor to ridiculous the up give to also and go Vilnius let to wise be would Poles the that clear ‘fairly is it continued, Muller failed, attempt this After her. crushing first after federation the into Lithuania induce to aim its with scheme’ ‘wild-cat rather a was Vilnius of occupation the intentions, 119 118 dispute successful the to settlement. obstacle the was conceptual what common interaction, or their language, in common framework the lacking were hand other the on Poland and Lithuania and hand one the on Britain that observations supposition the to point again These information. reliable the disregarded misinterpretation this to misinterpreted thePolishdisposition,anddue correct, andtheBritish,atleastinitially, will intolerable’ position become and League of prestige of Commission’s loss to the point of Circumstances impartiality. suspicion strong Lithuanian obtain the to intensify Failure Poles. will the evacuation by fooled being is ‘Commission that of Burt message General the in believe not did Loraine withdrawal. the prevent to Zeligowski with together working were Government the of rest the with Sapieha and Pilsudski that and forces Zeligowski evacuate to all at intentions no had Poland that stating intelligence military British the by submitted information the believe could nohow Loraine Warsaw in predecessor Muller’s considerations, similar on relying Probably E.C. Wilton to P. Loraine, 4 toP. E.C.Wilton Max Muller to Foreign Office, 21 ForeignOffice, Max Mullerto 119 Ide, s ie hwd ti ifrain a completely was information this showed, time as Indeed, . th January 1921. TNA: FO688\9\3:204. January1921.TNA: st March 1921. TNA:FO688\9\3:81. March1921. 36 118 . CEU eTD Collection willing or able to remove those troops, Lithuanians troops, those remove to able or willing both is state no as and army, Polish the of hands the in is Vilnius as that observed proposals’ Council’s to reception favorable give to governments two the induce to power their in anything do ‘to Warsaw in Muller and Lithuania in Wilton to instruction an sent Curzon that fact the despite 1921, of end the in results without ended which League the of auspices the under negotiations subsequent the in Lithuania with terms to come to pressure moderate British the to succumb not did Poland fiasco. ultimate its till settlement 2.6 Theultimatefiascoofmediationefforts 122 121 of feeling 120 the In Poland. with vivendi modus some find and acquiesce to decision rational a make to Lithuania compel would situation unfortunate the that believed Britain Poland, to territory the of annexation formal the for Seim Polish the to appeal successfully and undoubtedly would Diet elected the that 1921 of end the in region happened afterwards. powerlessness its to due prestige of loss the suffers League and Russia, or Germany of influence the to falls Lithuania of Vilnius, possession remains inthe Poland impasse – fails, arrive at Britain will League the in settlement the if situation: the of peculiarity the realized well 1 the on Commentating dispute. the of parties the of se b te oe: eeain r uooy f h Vlis atn n Lithuanian in canton state Vilnius the of autonomy or federation Poles: the by asked Max Muller to Lord Curzon, 19 LordCurzon, MaxMullerto 19 LordCurzon, MaxMullerto 5 Muller, LordCurzontoMax 121 . However, neither Lithuania, nor even Poland accepted such a bargain. Muller bargain. a accepted such Poland even Lithuania, nor However, neither . iia msnesadns n msnepeain bree te dispute the burdened misinterpretations and misunderstandings Similar Even after it became clear with the Polish announced elections in the Vilnius the in elections announced Polish the with clear became it after Even 120 122 . Again, Britain expected too much rationality from the part the from rationality much too expected Britain Again, . th Ufruaey ti ws h peie oeat f what of forecast precise the was this Unfortunately, . th th 91. TNA:FO688\9\3: March1921. April 1921. TNA:FO688\9\3:44. April1921. TNA:FO688\9\3:41. April1921. 37 must be prepared be must st ege rpsl Muller proposal, League to pay the price the pay to CEU eTD Collection March 24 March assembles diet Vilnius the when Poland with negotiations starting and pride its swallowing by job’ bad a of best the ‘make and Vilnius at something secure only can Lithuania that ofLithuania’ secure someconsiderationfortherightsandinterests believing that‘perhapsatalaterstagewemaybeabletobringourinfluencebear course, their take things let to suggested Muller Vilnius, in elections hold to French the approval of the tacit have Poles that the and suspecting press Poland, incapacity to 126 125 124 123 the to acquiesce to Curzon recommended Muller way, any in situation the change to impasse the Facing Poland. with terms of Vilnius’ annexation the sanctions Diet the if produced be would that effect unfortunate ‘most of Poland to warning Curzon’s the despite However, Lithuania. with understanding future the preclude not would view, its in what, sovereignty, Polish the under Vilnius of status autonomous the achieve to least at wanted Britain Poland, regards As back. Vilnius get to hopes the keeping of sake the for independence her risk to even her of thestrongerpower’.However,Mullerbelieved, claims the of assertion successful the by solved been has issue ‘the recalcitrant, were Max Muller to Lord Curzon, 20 LordCurzon, MaxMullerto 25 Muller, LordCurzontoMax 25 ForeignOffice, MaxMullerto Gregory, 30 J.D. MaxMullerto ht e itrss i i floig h eape f e Bli nihos n i rahn a reaching in and neighbors Baltic her of example the inEasternEurope’ theprincipalpower with<...> friendly understanding following in lie interests find her will Lithuania that that and forgotten any be will disappointment shows the that anyone prospect some as is there long so ears, sympathetic moon no are there that clear is the it once but woe, of for tale their to listen to disposition cry to continue will government ‘Lithuanian th 124 125 , 1922. Even in such a situation, Muller expected Lithuania to come into come to Lithuania expected Muller situation, a such in Even 1922. , . However, Lithuania was acting on different assumptions, which allowed which differentassumptions, was actingon . However,Lithuania , Poland officially and unconditionally annexed the occupied territory on occupied territory annexed the andunconditionally officially , Poland th th th April 1922. TNA: FO 688\12\3: 108. TNA:FO688\12\3: April1922. 267. TNA:FO688\11: February1922. November, 1921. TNA: FO 688\9\3: 20. TNA:FO688\9\3: November,1921. th November, 1921. TNA: FO 688\9\3: 108. TNA:FO688\9\3: November,1921. 38 at accompli fait , hinting that as both parties both as that hinting , 123 126 . Mullerbelieved . CEU eTD Collection eoadm ttd ht ihai wud vnuly eocl t te os of loss FO the to The reconcile Office. Vilnius eventually Foreign would The Lithuania in that shared stated were memorandum views Muller’s that seems It 127 Apparently, thiswasthe caseintheLithuanian-Polishdisputesettlement. teachers. their outmaneuver to expect to players new the for left is possibility the and sense, little make power established the of demands the itself, flux’ ‘in is system the major the withholding of disputewithPoland– British levervis-à-visLithuaniainthelatter’s how show to proceed will part next The Britain. vis-à-vis Lithuania in influence for rivalry French sighted short and standards double by characterized was regard this in approach the Instead, ‘newcomers’. the socialize and approach to how on light the throw framework could which France, and Britain powers common allied major the by agreed no was actually, there, that was regard this in failed British the why reasons the of One problems. Lithuanian with dealing in significantly Britain impeded less no which and now, until upon touched slightly only problem was another which was there Yet efforts. mediation British the impaired framework with theSovietmilitarybasesin1939. pregnant became Vilnius to love its to due manner, caricatural a in put sometimes is it as but, 1938, in ultimatum latter’s the until period interwar whole the throughout Poland with relations diplomatic any have to refused only not Lithuania that high so was significance This capital. ancient her as Lithuania to Vilnius of significance the time underestimating atthesame the existinggeopoliticalsituation, think accordingto jure Foreign Office memorandum, 5 ForeignOffice recognition–wasuselessinseekingtocommit Lithuania tounderstanding.When 127 biul, l ti msnesadn n lc o cmo conceptual common of lack and misunderstanding this all Obviously, to ability and rationality Lithuanian the overestimated British the However, . th July 1922. TNA: FO 371\8063: 27. FO371\8063: July1922.TNA: 39 de CEU eTD Collection oad n h Vlis ipt. eod te lid eua o eonz Lithuania recognize to refusal Allied the Second, dispute. Vilnius vis the in a Poland vis position legal inferior in it put Lithuania of non-recognition all, of First Office. the Foreign to Lithuanian notes the numerous in were outlined grounds, which early the Lithuania, 2.7 Systeminfluxandtheleverofdejurerecognition 129 128 noticeably has she as such coast, Baltic the on foothold a securing for plan French a the of also part is but scheme, Polish a Tallents, merely not Baltic ‘is the advance towards Polish to According Poland. of attitude the reading by Baltic the in policy French British the disclose to The possible is obscure. it that maintained were Tallents Riga general in Commissioner in region Baltic whole the and Lithuania to note British the to replying not by the matter consider to However, Francerefused this question. with approached France alliance intheBaltic,andfurtheredgeneraldiplomaticisolationofLithuania thorough the making of possibility the precluded recognized, were states Baltic other two the after especially Lithuania, of recognition non the Third, outcome. its affected obviously have could propaganda such region, disputed the of self-determination projected the of light the In Bolsheviks. to Lithuania left have Allies that claiming jure rti a rbn h psiiiis orcgiealtreBli states Baltic three all recognize to possibilities the probing was Britain 1920, June in as early As grounds. moral and economic geopolitical, the on states R. Lindsay to Earl Curzon,4 R.Lindsayto 10 toForeignOffice, M.Narusevicius ae oad re ad n pedn te rpgna n h ocpe region, occupied the in propaganda the spreading in hand free Poland gave Lithuania approached Britain with numerous requests for its recognition. For recognition. its for requests numerous with Britain approached Lithuania s a mnind eoe fr rti i ws sfl o eonz te Baltic the recognize to useful was it Britain for before, mentioned was As e jure de th November 1920. TNA: FO 371\5379: 203. FO371\5379: TNA: November1920. eonto ws lie t b iprat n several on important be to claimed was recognition th 129 March 1921. TNA:FO371\6725. March1921. . The interests of France and Poland with regard with Poland and France of interests The . 40 de jure de 128 and . de CEU eTD Collection h sal tts n epcal te atc tts ad s te a a rde o its to bridge a Poland against as North the in dominance them use and states, Baltic the especially and states small the subjugate to wanted she throne: Polish the thwart to order in incrementally working was ‘Britain that believed and matter the in dominance British the detested League, the suspected the representative in the French Hannotaux, the Baltic. dominate aspiring to apparently British of they – order reversed the in although similarly, almost Lithuania and Latvia both invade to Poland instigating secretly was France to sources, Polish-French according certain that coup the after intelligence military the by informed was Office Finland and Estonia Latvia, Poland, between alliance military a of prospects the furthering for and Windau, and Libau Riga, of ports the in position its ensuring of purpose the for action’, direct by secure to failed Istorija LI (2002): 31. LI(2002): Istorija RealPolitics] BetweenIllusionsand Question(1920-1923): andtheLithuanian Politikos,“ [France 132 131 130 it as Britain, For guarantees. 10 article involved thus and League, the to admission the consider not that did fear the Britain was time why the at reason recognition first The such. as perceived not was states Baltic the of situation the 1920 of half second the in However, ‘ripe’. seemed to and Poland strengthen to ‘integrate’ herintotheBaltic. sought always Britain aspirations, territorial vast its contain to trying by contrary, the On Poland. against Baltic the dominate to sought British the that years, three of period the of analysis correspondence diplomatic the from judging least at evidence, no is there – Britain of intentions the misinterpreted France appears that terms, it in these who thought diplomat standing French only high Tallents to Lord Curzon,19 TallentstoLord Julien Gueslin, “ JulienGueslin, toEarlCurzon,16 M.Dewhunt rti ws rprd o eonz te atc tts s on s h situation the as soon as states Baltic the recognize to prepared was Britain Prancūzija i Prancūzija 131 . Paradoxically enough, it seems that the French were thinking were French the that seems it Paradoxically enough, . th r Lietuvos Klausimas (1920-1923 m. (1920-1923 r LietuvosKlausimas October 1920. TNA: FO 371\5373: 27. FO371\5373: 1920.TNA: October th November 1920. TNA: FO 371\5379: 85. TNA:FO371\5379: November1920. 132 41 ’. If we assume that Hannotaux was not the not was Hannotaux that assume we If ’. e jure de 130 . It should be mentioned that Foreign that mentioned be should It . eonto i patc mat the meant practice in recognition ): Tarp Iliuzijų ir Realios IliuzijųirRealios ): Tarp CEU eTD Collection Finland giving from states other the dissuade to tried conflict the 10presupposed the Article regard towhich the of anticipation the was it above, part the in referred was 138 137 136 135 134 133 disinterested’ less and grudging ‘more but British the to similar was 1920, of end the in reported hesitation British the of cause the eliminating thus Assembly, the of meeting the next as in as soon the Covenant of the Article 10 the probably ‘eliminate’ League will that sure was he recognition, the regarding remarks Curzon’s glooming quite to reply In language. different a quite in spoke country, ‘newcomer’ a of Minister Foreign the Meierovics, that mention to relevant be may it security-flavored Here seriously. collective clause this approach to Britain of part the from uncommon too not perhaps was it formed, was League the time the from year a after Just states. Baltic three the of situation international peculiar to due arise could which league’ ne-lid icsin n h League the in discussion inter-Allied the for question this leaving recognition, in delay the favored Britain region, the in the lacked really common ground. interlocutors two the that seems it Wilson, by covenant’ the of ‘the heart League, called the about main thing was the article that this mind Having in Latvia and Lithuania” 2 Latvia andLithuania” 371/5374: 37 371/5374: P. Loraine to Foreign Office, 30 toForeignOffice, P.Loraine Office,25 KidstontoForeign 11 Question”, memorandum “ThePolish-Lithuanian ForeignOffice P. Loraine to Foreign Office, 4 toForeignOffice, P.Loraine forEstonia, ‘dejure’recognition Governmenttowards Majesty’s Gregory, “AttitudeofHis J.D. 6 Mr. Dewhurst, EarlCurzonto In sum, although seeking to satisfy Baltic aspirations and stabilize the situation In sum,althoughseekingtosatisfyBalticaspirationsandstabilizethesituation 134 and Poland and 138 . nd November, 1920. TNA: FO 371/5373: 58. FO371/5373: 1920.TNA: November, 135 were suggested to think about ‘the grave responsibility tothe grave responsibility about ‘the think suggested to were th th 22. FO371\5373: 1920.TNA: October th December 1920. TNA: FO 371\5373: 116. 371\5373: 1920.TNA:FO December th January 1921. TNA: FO 371\6720: 45. TNA:FO371\6720: January1921. October, 1920.TNA:FO371\5373 October, 137 42 Te oiin f h Fec, s Loraine as French, the of position The . de jure de recognition to the Baltic states. Baltic the to recognition 133 . For similar reasons, Britain . Forsimilar th October, 1920.TNA:FO October, : 47. reconstituted Russia in Russia 136 . CEU eTD Collection uh discrimination a such otherwise that thought and for sound reasons be produced,therebeingno position would ‘anomalous andabsurd’ exception, an be should Latvia why grasp couldn’t 141 140 139 efforts own our useless render to be would on, decided is others the for recognition if recognition, from Lithuania exclude ‘to policy option, opposite the of effects negative the observed minute Office Foreign As simultaneously. recognized be should states insist, to important is it that position the holding were and recognition, for case their supporting arguments Lithuanian Lithuania’ respecting Nations League of the with clear understanding a at arrived have they until according by dispute Vilnius the of settlement possible any impair would Lithuania ‘ethnographic’ only recognizing that be would and aside, it Lithuania leaving Estonia, that and Latvia Poland recognize to warned invidious’ ‘decidedly Britain states, Baltic the of all of recognition the to regard with state Baltic any of case the distinguish to to difficult be would response it that maintained Curzon in alone, her recognize to Tellingly, request Latvia’s states. Baltic three the recognizing in ‘non- discrimination’ of policy the adopted reasonably Britain initially Nevertheless, settlement. preferable of kind some towards Lithuania press to arise would need the if lever, a as open question recognition the keep to decided Vilnius it words, other the In settled. was dispute until recognition, of question the postpone to convinced was Britain Curzonminute,19 Gregory minute,19 J.D. 6 Mr. Dewhurst, EarlCurzonto inu ocpto o 9 on occupation Vilnius 141 Tu, t em ta te rts udrto a lat oe f the of some least at understood British the that seems it Thus, . de jure de th October 1920. TNA: FO 371\5373: 11. TNA:FO371\5373: 1920. October recognition to some but not to others of the Baltic States <…> States Baltic the of others to not but some to recognition 140 th 139 October 1920. TNA: FO 371\5373: 11. 1920.TNA:FO371\5373: October . Curzon insisted against ‘further complicating the situation the complicating ‘further against insisted Curzon . Smlry epn is nitne n h simultaneous the on insistence its keeping Similarly . th January 1921. TNA: FO 371\6720: 45. TNA:FO371\6720: January1921. th f coe srntee te rts hesitation. British the strengthened October of especially vis a vis France vis a vis especially 43 de jure de , that all three Baltic three all that , rcgiin He recognition. CEU eTD Collection 2.71 TheBritishbowtoFrance:separaterecognitionofLatviaandEstonia the causeofsuchaninstantchangeBritishposition? was Estonia. What and Latvia only recognize League to the conference of the 1921 in way’ reasonable a in Poland with dispute the settle to League the of those and 143 142 Poles’ by treated badly very been had ‘she that view the of was he as Lithuania, recognizing not for regrets his expressed George Lloyd Allies. the the of with wish general disagree cannot they that considered but states, those recognizing from Britain which precluded for caution’ ‘reasons reminded the Curzon and Lloyd George decisive. was voice British the and states, Baltic all of were recognition the Italians to favorable dispute. Vilnius the of settlement the until impossible as Lithuania of recognition the considered Berthelot However, French. the by raised was Georgia 26 meeting ofJanuary Council Supreme the At aside. Lithuania leaving Estonia, and Latvia of recognition Interestingly, thisstatementwasmade5daysbeforeitdecidedon26 rne n Pln i frig e it te oih eeain ad il encourage will and federation, Polish the into her forcing is Poland and France intensifyLithuaniansuspicionsthat verdict toleaveLithuaniaaloneunrecognizedwill the that Lithuania from reported decision, the by surprised Wilton, day, next the on Indeed, if adopted. settlement easier the dispute made have could possibly French and the of those to contrary were which matter, the on views own her and position allied theunified to maintain herwill caught between France. Britainwas the solidaritywith of the sake Lithuania for of the case sacrificed Britain point this at seems that Thus, it Lord Hardinge to Foreign Office, 26 toForeignOffice, LordHardinge minutes, 21 ForeignOffice It seems it was France who took the initiative at this time and insisted on the on insisted and time this at initiative the took who France was it seems It th , 1921, the decision to recognize the Baltic states together with together with to recognizetheBalticstates , 1921,thedecision st January 1921. TNA: FO 371\6720: 102. FO371\6720: TNA: January1921. th January 1921. TNA: FO 371\6720: 117. FO371\6720: January1921.TNA: 44 th ofJanuary, 142 143 . . CEU eTD Collection rtss n ofrn o goete, rt: I ae oe y et o osl Mr. console to best my done have ‘I wrote: them, Lithuanian ignore to such offering and commentating protests while Gregory, Tellingly, card. recognition the her got she time the at Poland precisely, More Poland. recognizing from Allies the preclude not did fact this non-recognition, Lithuanian for reason official a as put is borders south-eastern Lithuanian unsettled of the fact the although pointed out, accurately London Narusevicius representative in Poland’ with federation or rapprochement a towards slight, however tendencies, any checked grant subject’ to refusal the the that on concluded touch to even delicate is it – today dead is federation> of idea to regard