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This Is the Beginning of Mur # Z37 FEDERAL ELECTION COMMISSION WASHINGTON. D.C. 20463 THIS IS THE BEGINNING OF MUR # Z37 D~ATE FILMED CAMERA, NO. ___ C -MRAA 0 9 PUBLIC RECORD INDEX - RUR 2395 1. Memo, 17 Mar 87, John D. Gibson (Reports Analysis Division) to Lawrence M. Noble (Acting General Counsel), subJ: Referral of Drexel Burnham Lambert Political Action Committee, w/atch (RAD Referral Pkge). 2. First General Counsel's Report, 20 Apr 87. 3. Certification of Commission Action, 23 Apr 87. 4. Ltr, 4 May 87, Scott E. Thomas (Chairman, FEC) to Doris C. Lindbergh (Treas., Drexel Burnham Lambert Political Action Committee), w/atch (Factual and Legal Analysis). 5. Ltr, 9 Jun 87, Paul A. Merolla (Senior V.P. & Deputy General Counsel, DBL-PAC) to Scott E. Thomas. 6. General Counsel's Report, 17 Jul 87. 7. Certification of Commission Action, 17 Jul 87. 8. Ltr, 22 Jul 87, L.M. Noble to P.A. Merolla. 9. General Counsel's Report, 11 Dec 87. 10. Certification of Commission Action, 16 Dec 87. 11. Ltr, 22 Dec 87, L.M. Noble to P.A. Merolla w/atch (executed conciliation agreeement). -END- NOTE: In preparing its file for the public record, O.G.C. routinely removes those documents in which it perceives little or no public interest, and those documents, or portions thereof, which are exempt from disclosure under the Freedom of Information Act. 87NF-61 THROUGH 87NF-75 *0 p FEDERAL ELECTION COMMISSION WASHINGTON. 0 C 463 Match 17, 1987 LAWRENCE K. NOB ACTING GENE S THROUGH: STAFFJOHN C.DIRE SU 0N . JOHN D. GIBS FROM: ASSISTANT S F IRECTOR REPORTS AN YS1 DIVISION SUBJECT: 30 DAY POST-GENERAL REPORT NON-FILER REFERRALS OF UNAUTHORI ZED COMMITTEES Attached is a listing of fifteen (15) unauthorized committees which failed to file the 1986 30 Day Post-General Report within thirty (30) days of the date of the Non-Filer Notice. In accordance with Standard 3 of the 1985-1986 RAD Review and Referral Procedures for Unauthorized Committees, further examination is required by your office. On September 29, 1986, prior notification was sent to all unauthorized committees informing them that all committees, regardless of election activity, must file the 30 Day Post- General Report by December 4, 1986 (Attachment 16). Each committee which failed to submit a report covering the post- election reporting period was sent a Non-Filer Notice on December 23, 1986 (Attachment 17). The attached printout lists the name, address and treasurer for each committee being referred. Any telephone conversations are referenced under Contacts with Filers. The Summary Pages of late-filed reports and/or letters of explanation are included under Reports Filed/Response(s). In addition, a OC" index accompanies each committee. In a few instances, the aggregate receipt and disbursement figures may be inflated because reports were submitted covering portions of the same reporting period. If you have any questions, please contact Lisa J. Stolaruk at 376-2480. Attachments 7ff C00151480 Drexel Burnham Lambert Political 87UP-64 Action Comittee (DBL-PAC) 0 DRUXEL BURMW LAISERT POLITICAL ACTION COIUITTU (DBL-PAC) (Attachments 4a - 4c) q~~4 0 ~ 7 4 7 7 7 I N C,M M 1 t1JjA PAGE 2 •- ---q q 0 4 0 % ,- C6Mt i I'ILL LtUCuM L1>. ;T; RELLI D ISl U R'I, EN )C I OF MICROFILM COVERAGE DATES PAGES LOCATION TYPE OF FILER Lz'' L, BUhirNHAn L, I-."' "-uJLI , LTiON C o 'jll Li'L-PA ? ID #00151480 NON-PARTY CUN ELlLLILL L. Lk . , L:rLALL -,i a L(! iLN, - I rnt. QUALIFIED 43, 150 IJAN85 -30JUN85 YEAR-END L--- 85PEC/384/1293 1,407 91,930 YEAR -END 1JUL85 -31DEC85 86FEC/401/5524 - 1JUL85 -31DEC85 REQUEST FOR ALD'ITIOI.AL NFORM(,'IIUN 86FEC/406/2929 1836 APRIL QUARTERLi ,30.384 IJUL85 -31DEC85 86FEC/404/1413 4, I00 1JAN86 -31MAR86 JOiLY QUARTERLY il396 86FEC/421/2370,086FEC/411/4528 OCTOBER a3C,8a10 IAPR86 -30JUN86 QUARTERLY 1,083 69,300 PRE-GENERAL IJUL86 -30SEP86 86FEC/442/467 10,500 9.000 -15OCT8G POST-GENERAL 1OCT86 86FEC/442/4634 ('9,399 34,000 16OCT86 -24NOV86 87FEC/456/0459 POST-GENERAL - AtIEN1DmENT 0 G; .399 34,000 16OCT86 -24NOV86 NOTICE OF FAILURE TO FILE 87fEC/460/5056 24NOV8, 86FEC/452/1389 YEAR-EN1 9,585 10,500 25NOV86 YEAR-END - AMENDML:47 -31DEC86 87FEC/456/0477 O 9,585 10,500 25NOV86 -31DEC86 1'ST LETTER INFORMATIuNAL NOTICE 87FEC/460/5047 1987 MISCELLANEOUS NOTICE FROM FEC 25NOV86 -31DEC86 87FEC/460/1582 27JAN87 87E3C/455/4158 • TOTAL 446,279 0 391,190 173 TOTAL PAGES All reports have been reviewed. M !! Ending cash-on-hand as of 12/31/86: $75,308 .15 rt Debts owed by the Committee as of 12/31/86: $0 Debts owed to the Committee as of 12/31/86: $0 n Attachment 4b'6 JAN42 P141 bad Yorkmz toy ispO& Wk. .jIw D. Gdbina Asisan s~ff 9 86e PAPCUosA Dwjs C. LiI mVlo the 30 Day Pos a1dSwywCofW~ s this int not filud a aqla Ac~ as1 i0Inta not gmWte by 1 X"ata caused you. U o nowo togth, N b--lmd filing with alm nfMa X9Yar the ftdka1 rqctmprzt cr18 M IWry truly yaw*, Pmal A. olia c-c. Wb. Michael outtiprfjeJ - U / "060"r Me @sift i ftfa. Attachment 4c loef"mula--no-:'im mr Um -, IfJMV P 1: 401 I 4 V~WW~ - _4rwDam' MONO r 0 l NJSreet -0 .,- 0 - 0 .. .... MOewlIInwf Danowav o oftw 60 Mtl8 Mostb no Ou-11Mgll M MM ... -be pew 1ork. U! 1"4 Il-- mo m E- 0MMIW______ ! U11 -- C.150 a ]U O 4231wZ~4 rNMO I A m nmuma L-:-+ ~ ... dri& INGO..*- lepwftzzRlb '' &wolmb 4ffw .. ft,. ............................ n+ -LU 1W IW@A a Um* dt 811 e oPnwOU t .................. ' S e o M l M ............................ .. WSOMI l towg AMON &"adeJ~ Nm OMM A Nd ............. 4W- 1P.Tow D4h l bso umlLiane.............................. I~~~~~24- iniO;61110.~ iLCOOd asl ft"Mi COs, ftwlw Ill WawagllL "lmI lo unew'mIIt.... 74o222.33 t -a _ , ,_o.,.,_,...+.,,,-0-,,,,.................... I--- .W s 0 wy1, " OeM US -,,rMU gIqilqmt SWC 7" Z 7 gms I l VI %40%l ______________________________ mw~in~dW wmwm roln[ -t IL . t - I L_.-. -1--1AI I A . -~ 0 bSITIVE FEDERAL ELECTION COmISSION ) c~') ISTw 6333311. CO0Ll WS 33WOW1 .- RAD Referral. 87NF-6l STAFF: AWelsse--i SOURCE OF MUR: INTERNALLY GENERATED RESPONDENTS': Drexel Burnham Lambert Political Action Committee (DBL-PAC) and Doris Lindbergh, as treasurer; RELEVANT STATUTE: 2 U.S.C. S 434(a) (4) (A) (iii) INTERNAL REPORTS CHECKED: Public Records FEDERAL AGENCIES CHECKED: None 2a - 2- I. GM11TX OW NAITIR On Iarcb 17, 1987. the Reports Anaysis Division (o'AD*) referred the following 15 unauthorized political committees to the C*ffice of the General Counsel for failure to file the 1986 Post-General Election Report timely: / "- Drexel Burnham Lambert Political Action Committee (DBL-PAC); II. FACTUAL AMD LMGAL ANALYSIS (A) The Facts On September 29, 1986, notification was sent to all unauthorized political committee advising that regardless of / The 1986 Post-General Election Report must disclose all financial activity from the close of books of the last report, or the date of registration (whichever is later), through November 24, 1986. 2/ The fifteen committees discussed in this report were referred to this Office as a group by the Reports Analysis Division. Each referral in which the Commission decides to open a MUR will be assigned a separate MUR number and handled by the staff person indicated in the attached notification letters. 2 6m4 4. ze ul ambert Political Action Comittee On Jaouary 27, 1997, the 1986 Post-General Election Report was filed disclosing receipts of 69,399 and disbursements of $34,000. The report was filed 54 days late. i 7T -7 -- " ",7 7 - 7 -7- (B) The Applicable Law Pursuant to 2 U.S.C. S 434(a) (4)(A) (iii), all political committees other than the authorized committees of a candidate K shall file a post-general election report, which shall be filed no later than the 30th day after the general election and which shall be complete as of the 20th day after such general election. (C) Application of the Law to the Facts The record in this matter demonstrates that the 15 political committees discussed on pages 3 - 7 above were required to file the 1986 Post-General Election Report by December 4, 1986. The above committees, however, failed to file the report in a timely manner. In consideration of this circumstance it is the recommendation of this office that the Commission open a Matter Under Review and find reason to believe that a violation of 2 U.S.C. S 434(a)(4)(A)(iii) occurred with respect to the late filing of the 1986 Post-General Election Report by: Drexel Burnham Lambert A Political Action Comittee (D5L-PAC) -9- Me!RZCOZMENDATIONS 1. Open Matters Under Review with respect to each of the following: a) b) c) d). Drexel Burnham Lambert Political Action Commitee PAC) (DBL- e) and Doris Lindbergh, as treasurer f) 9) h) i) j) k) 1) m) 2. Find reason to believe those political committees individuals and listed in recommendation one above violated 2 U.S.C. S 434(a) (4) (A) (iii). - 10- 4. 5. Approve the ittached letters and Factual and Legal Analyses. Acting General Counsel Attachments 1. RAD Referral 2. Letters (14) and Analyses (14) DIFORI THE FEDENAL ELECTION COI31SSIO In the Matter of ) ) RAD R~f.SUNF.61 through 87NF-75 ) ) ) Drexel Burnham Lambert Political Action Committee (DBL-PAC) and Doris Lindbergh, as treasurer; CERTIFICATION I, Marjorie W.
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