DOCSLIB.ORG

A Transactional Genealogy of Scandal: from Michael Milken to Enron to Goldman Sachs

Total Page：16

File Type：pdf, Size：1020Kb

Download full-text PDF Read full-text
A Transactional Genealogy of Scandal: from Michael Milken to Enron to Goldman Sachs University of Pennsylvania Carey Law School Penn Law: Legal Scholarship Repository Faculty Scholarship at Penn Law 2013 A Transactional Genealogy of Scandal: From Michael Milken to Enron to Goldman Sachs William W. Bratton University of Pennsylvania Carey Law School Adam J. Levitin Georgetown University Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/faculty_scholarship Part of the Accounting Commons, Accounting Law Commons, Business Administration, Management, and Operations Commons, Business Law, Public Responsibility, and Ethics Commons, Business Organizations Law Commons, Corporate Finance Commons, Law and Economics Commons, and the Securities Law Commons Repository Citation Bratton, William W. and Levitin, Adam J., "A Transactional Genealogy of Scandal: From Michael Milken to Enron to Goldman Sachs" (2013). Faculty Scholarship at Penn Law. 1515. https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/faculty_scholarship/1515 This Article is brought to you for free and open access by Penn Law: Legal Scholarship Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in Faculty Scholarship at Penn Law by an authorized administrator of Penn Law: Legal Scholarship Repository. For more information, please contact [email protected]. A TRANSACTIONAL GENEALOGY OF SCANDAL: FROM MICHAEL MILKEN TO ENRON TO GOLDMAN SACHS WILLIAM W. BRATTON* ADAM J. LEVITIN† ABSTRACT Three scandals have reshaped business regulation over the past thirty years: the securities fraud prosecution of Michael Milken in 1988, the Enron implosion of 2001, and the Goldman Sachs “ABACUS” enforcement action of 2010. The scandals have always been seen as unrelated. This Article highlights a previously unnoticed transactional affinity tying these scandals together—a deal structure known as the synthetic collateralized debt obligation involving the use of a special purpose entity (“SPE”). The SPE is a new and widely used form of corporate alter ego designed to undertake transactions for its creator’s accounting and regulatory benefit. The SPE remains mysterious and poorly understood despite its use in framing transactions involving trillions of dollars and its prominence in foundational scandals. The traditional corporate alter ego was a subsidiary or affiliate with equity control. The SPE eschews equity control in favor of control through preset instructions emanating from transactional documents. In theory, these instructions are complete or very close thereto, making SPEs a real-world manifestation of the “nexus of * Deputy Dean and Nicholas F. Gallicchio Professor of Law; Co-Director, Institute for Law & Economics, University of Pennsylvania Law School. † Bruce W. Nichols Visiting Professor of Law, Harvard Law School; Professor of Law, Georgetown University Law Center. Our thanks go to William Birdthistle, Erik Gerding, Mike Knoll, Reed Shuldiner, Lynn Stout, Andrew Tuch, Charles Whitehead, and Chuck Yablon, and to participants at faculty workshops at the Cardozo, Cornell, Georgetown, and University of Pennsylvania law schools, and at the University of Miami Business Law Review Symposium. 783 784 SOUTHERN CALIFORNIA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 86:783 contracts” firm of economic and legal theory. In practice, however, formal designations of separateness do not always stand up under the strain of economic reality. When coupled with financial disaster, the use of an SPE alter ego can turn even a minor compliance problem into a scandal because of the mismatch between the traditional legal model of the firm and the SPE’s economic reality. The standard legal model looks to equity ownership to determine the boundaries of the firm: equity is inside the firm, while contract is outside. Regulatory regimes make inter-firm connections by tracking equity ownership. SPEs escape regulation by funneling inter-firm connections through contracts, rather than equity ownership. The integration of SPEs into regulatory systems requires a ground-up rethinking of traditional legal models of the firm. A theory is emerging, not from corporate law or financial economics, but from accounting principles. Accounting has responded to these scandals by abandoning the equity touchstone in favor of an analysis in which contractual allocations of risk, reward, and control operate as functional equivalents of equity ownership—an approach that redraws the boundaries of the firm. Unfortunately, corporate and securities law hold out no prospects for similar responsiveness. Accordingly, we await the next alter-ego-based innovation from Wall Street’s transaction engineers with an incomplete menu of defensive responses. TABLE OF CONTENTS I. INTRODUCTION ................................................................................. 785 II. MYTHIC ORIGINS: MICHAEL MILKEN AND JUNK BONDS ..... 794 A. JUNK BONDS AND S&LS ........................................................... 795 B. THE FIRST COLLATERALIZED BOND OBLIGATIONS .................. 798 1. Imperial Savings ................................................................. 801 2. First Executive .................................................................... 805 C. SUMMARY ................................................................................. 811 III. THE FULCRUM: BISTRO ................................................................ 812 A. MOTIVATIONS ........................................................................... 813 B. BISTRO BREAKTHROUGH .......................................................... 816 C. SUMMARY ................................................................................. 819 IV. THE ILLEGITIMATE CHILD: ENRON’S SWAPS......................... 821 A. ASSET LIGHT FROM WALL STREET TO MAIN STREET .............. 821 B. A BISTRO OPENS IN HOUSTON .................................................. 825 1. Chewco and LJM ................................................................ 826 2013] TRANSACTIONAL GENEALOGY OF SCANDAL 785 2. Bistro Inferno ...................................................................... 828 C. IMPLICATIONS ........................................................................... 831 V. THE STILLBORN SCANDAL: THE SIVS ....................................... 832 A. STRUCTURED INVESTMENT VEHICLES ...................................... 836 B. THE SIV PANIC .......................................................................... 841 C. REVENGE OF THE SIV: THE NON-SCANDAL ............................. 843 D. ENRON REDUX? ........................................................................ 846 VI. THE RIGHTFUL HEIR: GOLDMAN SACHS’S SYNTHETIC CDOS .............................................................................................. 847 A. THE ABACUS 2007-AC1 TRANSACTION ................................. 849 1. The SPE .............................................................................. 850 2. The Credit-Linked Notes .................................................... 852 3. The Credit Default Swap and the Portfolio Selection Agent.................................................................................. 853 4. The Super Senior Swaps ..................................................... 854 B. THE HITCH ................................................................................. 855 C. THE RECKONING ....................................................................... 858 D. CONTRACT OR FIDUCIARY? ...................................................... 859 VII. CONCLUSION: THE NATURE OF THE FIRM AND REGULATION BY SCANDAL .................................................... 863 I. INTRODUCTION Three scandals fundamentally reshaped the structure of business regulation over the past thirty years. First came the 1988 securities fraud prosecution of Michael Milken and his firm, Drexel Burnham Lambert,1 which generated the junk bonds that financed the takeover wars of the 1980s.2 The prosecution marked the end of the takeover wars,3 but not before Milken’s junk bonds had poisoned the balance sheets of many savings and loans, leading to their failures.4 The takeover wars reshaped Delaware corporate law,5 while the savings and loan debacle resulted in 1. JAMES B. STEWART, DEN OF THIEVES 461, 478–510 (1992) (providing the details of the prosecutions of Drexel, Milken, and others). 2. See infra Part II.A. 3. ROBERT B. THOMPSON, MERGERS AND ACQUISITIONS: LAW AND FINANCE 235 (2010) (detailing how the prosecution of Milken may have prevented the appeal to the Delaware Supreme Court of City Capital Assocs. Ltd. P’ship v. Interco Inc., 551 A.2d 787 (Del. Ch. 1988), in which the Delaware Chancery Court had ordered a poison pill withdrawn). 4. BENJAMIN J. STEIN, A LICENSE TO STEAL: THE UNTOLD STORY OF MICHAEL MILKEN AND THE CONSPIRACY TO BILK THE NATION 1–2 (1992). 5. See Revlon, Inc. v. MacAndrews & Forbes Holdings, Inc., 506 A.2d 173, 182 (Del. 1986) (requiring directors to maximize short-term value once they have decided to dismantle a company); 786 SOUTHERN CALIFORNIA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 86:783 major banking law reforms, culminating in the Financial Institutions Reform, Recovery, and Enforcement Act of 19896 and the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation Improvement Act of 1991.7 The second scandal was Enron’s accounting and securities fraud in 2001, which quickly led to the enactment of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act (“SOX”).8 More recently, the securities fraud scandal surrounding Goldman Sachs (“Goldman”) and its ABACUS 2007-AC1 transaction provided needed momentum to the passage of the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act.9 Each of these scandals
Load more

Recommended publications
  • THE WALL STREET JOURNAL. © 1990 Dow Jones & Company, Inc
    THE WALL STREET JOURNAL. © 1990 Dow Jones & Company, Inc. All Rights Reserved. VOL CXXII NO. 66 WESTERN EDITION WEDNESDAY, APRIL 4, 1990 RIVERSIDE, CALIFORNIA 50 C E N T S By DAVID J. JEFFERSON originally set for $25 million, was to have been more attuned to the needs of small clients than is the Wall Street firms still generally neglect the Staff Reporter of THE WALL STREET JOURNAL co-managed by Drexel Burnham Lambert Inc. Wall Street. “The regionals are closer to the middle market. “The result is that we’ve had a Wall Street’s biggest investment bankers are But Drexel's parent, Drexel Burnham Lambert businesses that are doing the transactions, not wide-open field,” Mr. Greene says of the writhing after the collapse of junk bonds and Group Inc., filed for bankruptcy-law protection only geographically but also in temperament,” regionals. megamergers, but many regional investment Feb. 13 and has said it plans to liquidate its says Richard Himelfarb, executive vice president firms are on a roll. And that’s good news for assets. of Legg Mason Wood Walker Inc., a Baltimore Improving Staffs entrepreneurs who rely on the regionals to “We were able to go back to the client and concern that does transactions in the $10 million arrange and finance acquisitions and other say we’d like to continue to perform on this,” to $100 million range. Moreover, as Wall Street lays off investment strategic deals. Allen Weintraub, Advest's president, says. The top people at regional firms routinely bankers in droves, many of the regional firms are Not long ago, Wall Street investment bankers “That’s proof that things can be done regionally, pay personal attention to clients.
    [Show full text]
  • Drexel Burnham Lambert Archival Finding Aid
    MUSEUM OF AMERICAN FINANCE Drexel Burnham Lambert Archival Finding Aid Museum of American Finance 11/17/2014 Notable Subjects: Drexel Burnham Lambert, I.W. Burnham II, Frederick Joseph, Robert E. Linton, Michael Milken, investment banking, high yield bonds, junk bonds, bankruptcy. Historical Significance Drexel Burnham Lambert was a prominent Wall Street investment bank forced into bankruptcy in 1990. It was founded as a small brokerage firm, Burnham and Company, in 1935 by I.W. “Tubby” Burnham. In 1973 Burnham and Company merged with Drexel Firestone to form Drexel Burnham, and in 1976 it merged with the American arm of the Belgian firm George Bruxelles Lambert and was renamed Drexel Burnham Lambert. By the mid 1980’s DBL was ranked among Wall Street’s top investment banks, employing over 10,000 people. Its success was fueled by its creation of a market for first-issue junk bonds, allowing low-credit companies to raise capital by issuing bonds rather than having to offer their stock. In 1986 DBL came under investigation by the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission involving insider trading and other illegal trading practices. Under extreme pressure from the government and a subsequent decline in DBL’s business, the company filed for bankruptcy in February of 1990. Scope and Content: The Drexel Burnham Lambert collection at the Museum of American Finance consists of internal company memoranda and correspondence; financial statements of the firm; consolidated income statements; info about profit sharing; info about health care and retirement benefits for employees; DBL Exposure, issues of a publication for employees; settlement with the SEC; Chapter 11 bankruptcy material; DBL Liquidating Trust material; journals and newspaper articles about DBL; DBL objects including banners, t-shirts, buttons, etc.
    [Show full text]
  • United States of America V. Ivan Boesky
    UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK ) UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, ) ) Plaintiff, ) ) v. ) ~-~8T~ CR 378 (MEL)­ ) IVAN F. BOESKY, , ) ) Defendant. ) --------------~--------------------) DEFENDANT' S SUPPLEMENTAL MEMORANDUM OF LAW IN SUPPORT OF MOTION FOR REDUCTION OF SENTENCE PURSUANT TO RULE 35(b) Ivan F. Boesky renews, and requests a prompt resolution of, his pending motion for reduction of sentence pursuant to Rule 35(b).!1 For the reasons set forth below and in the original Rule 35 Motion, Mr. Boesky requests that his sentence be reduced to the time he has served -- approximately twelve months. !I The motion was filed April 15, 1988, but Mr. Boesky requested the Court to defer action on the motion until at least October 1988 so that the fruits of Mr. Boesky's cooperation might become more apparent. See United States v. Ellenbogen, 390 F.2d 537, 543 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 393 U.s. 918 (1968); United States v. Friedman, No. 86 Cr. 591 (MJL) (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 14, 1987) (1987 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 9276). I. THE PUBLIC BENEFITS FROM MR. BOESKY'S UNPRECEDENTED COOPERATION ARE NOW DRAMATICALLY CLEAR. The true fruits of Ivan Boesky's unsurpassed cooperation with the Government are now for the first time -- dramatically, fully, and publicly known. As the Court recognized at sentencing it was impossible for the public or the press to understand the incalculable value of Mr. Boesky's cooperation because the secrecy of the grand jury process precluded any public recitation of the value of the information that he had provided to the government.~/ Public "blood lust" was brought to bear on the sentencing procesS and could" not be effectively countered, at least in public, with the social and law enforcement benefits of early, thorough, and extensive cooperation.
    [Show full text]
  • Glass-Steagall: Lest We Forget
    Florida State University Law Review Volume 11 Issue 1 Article 5 Spring 1983 Glass-Steagall: Lest We Forget Lawrence F. Orbe III Follow this and additional works at: https://ir.law.fsu.edu/lr Part of the Banking and Finance Law Commons Recommended Citation Lawrence F. Orbe III, Glass-Steagall: Lest We Forget, 11 Fla. St. U. L. Rev. 163 (1983) . https://ir.law.fsu.edu/lr/vol11/iss1/5 This Comment is brought to you for free and open access by Scholarship Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in Florida State University Law Review by an authorized editor of Scholarship Repository. For more information, please contact [email protected]. COMMENTS GLASS-STEAGALL: LEST WE FORGET* LAWRENCE F. ORBE III I. INTRODUCTION In response to the Great Depression, federal legislation was en- acted to separate commercial and investment banking. However, the gradual sophistication of the banking industry and the creation of a plethora of new financial services offered by banking institu- tions have blurred this statutorily mandated division. This com- ment will trace the history of this legislation and delineate the principle actors responsible for its formulation. Next, an analogy * For earlier discussions of the Banking Act of 1933 (Glass-Steagall Act) and related issues, see Beatty, What are the Legal Limits to the Expansion of National Bank Services? 86 BANKING L.J. 3 (1969); Beatty, The Incidental Powers of National Banks, 4 NAT'L BANKING REv. 263 (1967); Chase, The Emerging Financial Conglomerate: Liberalization of the Bank Holding Company Act, 60 GEO. L.J. 1225 (1972); Clark and Saunders, Glass- Steagall Revised: The Impact on Banks, Capital Markets, and the Small Investor, 97 BANKING L.J.
    [Show full text]
  • One of Wall Street's Most Recognized Experts Joins Trinity Financial Board
    Peter Grandich, Managing Member 219B Morris Avenue, Spring Lake, NJ 07762 [email protected] DATE: February 1, 2016 CONTACT: Peter Grandich 732-642-3992 [email protected] One of Wall Street’s Most Recognized Experts Joins Trinity Financial Board SPRING LAKE, NJ - Trinity Financial Sports & Entertainment Management Company, a division of Peter Grandich & Company, announced today that Guy Adami has joined the firm’s Corporate Advisory Board. “While he may not score points on the gridiron, in my opinion Guy Adami is one of the very few Wall Street experts who scores a touchdown whenever he speaks,” said Peter Grandich, founder and managing member of Trinity Financial. “In a sea full of highly biased and more-wrong- than-right investment advice, Guy Adami is a refreshing breeze of prudent, humble investment insight. I urge our clientele to make Guy’s commentary apart of their research.” Grandich explains that the purpose of Trinity Financial Advisory Board is to provide guidance to the firm’s unique niche clientele. Through their own life experiences, faith-filled advisory board members can help guide athletes and entertainers through many of the challenges that celebrity can often bring. Adami adds, “I’m truly honored that Peter Grandich feels I can assist his clientele. I’ve been a long-time admirer of Peter’s work and consider him a close, personal friend.” About Guy Adami: Guy is an original member of CNBC’s Fast Money. He is currently the Director of Advisor Advocacy at Private Advisor Group in Morristown, New Jersey. Private Advisor Group is comprised of a network of nearly 500 advisors with assets approaching $16B.
    [Show full text]
  • Insider Trading, SEC Decision-Making, and the Calculus of Investor Confidence Spencer Derek Klein
    Hofstra Law Review Volume 16 | Issue 3 Article 5 1988 Insider Trading, SEC Decision-Making, and the Calculus of Investor Confidence Spencer Derek Klein Follow this and additional works at: http://scholarlycommons.law.hofstra.edu/hlr Part of the Law Commons Recommended Citation Klein, Spencer Derek (1988) "Insider Trading, SEC Decision-Making, and the Calculus of Investor Confidence," Hofstra Law Review: Vol. 16: Iss. 3, Article 5. Available at: http://scholarlycommons.law.hofstra.edu/hlr/vol16/iss3/5 This document is brought to you for free and open access by Scholarly Commons at Hofstra Law. It has been accepted for inclusion in Hofstra Law Review by an authorized administrator of Scholarly Commons at Hofstra Law. For more information, please contact [email protected]. Klein: Insider Trading, SEC Decision-Making, and the Calculus of Investo NOTE INSIDER TRADING, SEC DECISION-MAKING, AND THE CALCULUS OF INVESTOR CONFIDENCE [T]he Commission and staff have long been proud of their work in carrying out Commission responsibilities. They know, more than anyone else, that disclosure to investors, detecting fraud and preventing it where possible, promoting fairness in the market- place, ensuring that those who handle other people's money ad- here to proper standards and give accurate and adequate accounts of their stewardship, and encouraging high standards of business conduct all combine to build public confidence in the nation's se- curities markets. Being able to provide continued confidence is the bulwark of the SEC's charter.' Securities and Exchange Commission Orientation Handbook [MIany falls from grace must be ignored by the legal system in an imperfect world.2 Professor Michael P.
    [Show full text]
  • New Jersey State Bar Association -- Dictum, the Newsletter of The
    Is your corporate branding exposing you to corporate liability? Food for thought on the use of strobe lights in fitness classes By Jordan B. Doppelt rom the cars we drive to the toothpaste we panic, confusion, a spinning sensation, seizures and/or purchase, consumers have an abundance of loss of consciousness.4 F choices. Choices are a good thing. They force Given the above, fitness facilities, from the owners companies to compete with one another, and that to the managers and instructors, need to be aware of competition rewards consumers with the best possible the risks and hidden dangers that strobe lights pose to prices, quantity and quality of goods and services. their members and staff. There is not much New Jersey However, with so much competition, corporate case law on point. In fact, there’s none. However, issues marketers are forced to come up with new and will inevitably arise, and the following areas of law are innovative ways of capturing consumers’ business. One subject to litigation. particularly competitive industry is physical fitness. Many like to stay in shape, others use it as a form of Negligence stress relief, some do both. This means big business. But Under negligence theories of recovery, members of how are fitness centers to set themselves apart from their fitness facilities are classified as “invitees.”5 Business competition? owners owe to invitees a duty of reasonable or due care If you search for a new fitness center to join, you will to provide a safe environment for doing that which is see that many have carved out unique brand images.
    [Show full text]
  • Detecting and Quantifying Insider Trading and Stock Manipulation in Asian Markets∗
    Detecting and Quantifying Insider Trading and Stock Manipulation in Asian Markets∗ Gishan Dissanaike University of Cambridge Judge Business School Trumpington Street Cambridge CB2 1AG, UK [email protected] Kim-Hwa Lim University of Cambridge Judge Business School Trumpington Street Cambridge CB2 1AG, UK and Penang Institute 10 Brown Road 10350 Penang, Malaysia [email protected], [email protected] Abstract This paper focuses on insider trading, where the perpetrators exploit market sensitive information to earn profits or avoid losses. The paper’s objectives are as follows. First, we seek to examine whether we can detect possible insider trading and stock manipulation and react in almost real time, even though insider trading activity is intended to be evasive. Second, we also estimate the extent of il- licit profits (or loss avoidance) that might have been earned. Finally, we analyze, if detection is possible, the appropriate response for regulators and other market participants. We do not restrict our study to cases where corporate events have materialized, as we hope to capture insider trading surrounding market rumors and failed corporate events. Because insider trading is executed with the aim of being evasive and undetected, it is impossible to conclude with certainty. Nevertheless, using a hypothe- sized model based on how insiders and stock manipulators trade, we detect price patterns that are consistent with their objective to maximize profits and at the same time be evasive. 1. Introduction “Greed, for lack of a better word, is good.” —Gordon Gekko, the main antagonist of the 1987 film Wall Street The film mentioned in the epigraph revolves around insider trading and securities ma- nipulation by Gordon Gekko, a fictional character modeled loosely after Ivan Boesky and ∗ We are grateful to Donald Hanna, Naoyuki Yoshino, and Iikka Korhonen for their helpful comments.
    [Show full text]
  • Requiem for a Market Maker: the Case of Drexel Burnham Lambert and Below-Investment-Grade Bonds* By
    Working Requiem for a Market Maker: The Case of Drexel Burnham Lambert and Below-lnvestment-Grade Bonds Paper Elijah Brewer III and William E. Jackson III Series Working Papers Series Issues in Financial Regulation Research Department Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago December 1997 (WP-97-25) FEDERAL RESERVE BANK OF CHICAGO Requiem for a Market Maker: The case of Drexel Burnham Lambert and Below-Investment-Grade Bonds* by Elijah Brewer III Research Department, 11th Floor 230 S. LaSalle Street Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago Chicago, Illinois 60604-1413 and William E. Jackson III Kenan-Flagler Business School Campus Box 3490 McColl Building University of North Carolina Chapel Hill, North Carolina 27599-3490 JEL Classification Numbers: Gl, G2, G21, G28, L8 [Please Do not Quote without permission from Authors] December 1997 ’We thank Jennifer Conrad, Jason Greene, Gail Greenfield, Anil K. Kashyap, George G. Kaufinan, Randall S. Kroszner, Richard McEnally, Kathryn Moran, Richard Rendleman, Clifford Smith, Henri Servaes, Daniel Sullivan, participants at UNC-Chapel Hill’s Finance Area Summer Seminar Series, Federal Reserve Banks of Atlanta and Chicago Seminar Series, and the Western Economics Association 1997 meetings, for valuable comments and suggestions. The research assistance of Jeffrey P. Ballou, Justin L. Brewer, Timothy M. Mumane, Peter Schneider, Budhiphol Suttiratana, and Nancy E. Waddington is greatly appreciated. The views expressed here are those of the authors and do not represent the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System or the Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago. Requiem for a Market Maker-. The Case of Drexel Burnham Lambert and Below- Investment-Grade Bonds ABSTRACT In this article we add to both the financial intermediation and market microstructure literature by examining the market reactions surrounding the withdrawal of a major financial intermediary and market maker from a specific securities market.
    [Show full text]
  • SEC News Digest, 01-10-1985
    ~est Issue 85-7 NOnCE OF COMMISSIONMEEl.aS Following is a schedule of Commission meetings which will be conducted pursuant to provisions of the Government in the Sunshine Act. In general, the eo.ission expects to follow a schedule of holding closed meetings on Tuesdays, and open meet- ings on Thursday morning. Meetings on Wednesday, and if necessary On Thursday afternoons, will be either open or closed according to the requirements of agenda iteme under consideration. The COmmission will not normally meet on MOndays or Fridays. Visitors are welcome at all open meetings, insofar as space is available. Meetings will be held in the Commission Meeting Room, Room 1C30, at the Commission's headquarters· building, 450 Fifth Street, N.W., Washington, DC. Persons wishing to photograph or videotape commission meetings must obtain permission in advance from the Secretary of the Commission. Persons wishing to tape record a Commission meeting should notify the Secretary's office 48 hours in advance of the meeting. CLOSED MEETING - TUESDAY, JANUARY 15, 1985 - 10:00 a.m. The subject matter of the January 15 closed meeting will be: Formal orders of inves- tigationr In~titution of administrative proceedings of an enforcement natureJ Settle- ment of administrative proceedings of an enforcement natureJ Institution of injunctive actionsJ Opinion. OPEN MEETING - TUESDAY, JANUARY 15, 1985 - 3:00 p.m. The subject matter of the January 15 open meeting will be: The commission will meet with representatives from the American Society of Corporate Secretaries to discuss matters of mutual interest including, among other things, bene- ficial ownership disclosure rules, tender offer regulation and shareholder ~unica- tions.
    [Show full text]
  • Toward a More Prosperous Future
    Toward a More Prosperous Future Goldman Sachs 2013 Global Macro Conference New York May 15, 2013 Michael Milken Chairman, The Milken Institute Milken Institute Global Conference • Finance • Industries • Regions • Education • Human Capital April 28 – May 1, 2013 • Philanthropy • Health www.milkeninstitute.org • Climate/Energy • Government • Media Milken Institute Global Conference • 165 panels • 620 speakers • 3,700 attendees www.milkeninstitute.org April 27 – 30, 2014 Investing in African Prosperity Tony Blair Bill Gates H.E. Paul Kagame Rhonda Zygocki Strive Masiyiwa Michael Milken Former Prime Minister Co-Chair and Trustee President Executive Vice Chairman and Founder, Chairman, Great Britain and Bill & Melinda Gates Republic of Rwanda President, Econet Wireless Milken Institute Northern Ireland Foundation Policy and Planning Chevron What is the most powerful force the world has ever produced? y=Cekt #4 – “Compound interest.” A=Pert a = Future Value P = Original Principal r = Rate t = Time Towards a More Prosperous Future • Things We Know for Sure • Things That Will Change the World Rate of Return Concerns How to Save $1-Million in 40 Years $25,000-a-year @ 0% $6,642-a-year @ 6% $1,304-a-year @ 12% (or a one-time investment of $10,747) Towards a More Prosperous Future • Things We Know for Sure • Things That Will Change the World Percent of Population Owning a Passport 100% 75% 75% 50% 25% 20% U.S. U.K. Sources: U.S. State Dept.; U.K. Parliament Expansion of balance sheets of major central banks Central bank total assets (% of GDP) 35 BoJ 30 ECB 25 BoE 20 Fed 15 10 5 0 Q1 2006 Q1 2007 Q1 2008 Q1 2009 Q1 2010 Q1 2011 Q1 2012 Source: Bloomberg.
    [Show full text]
  • 2013 ANNUAL REPORT Structuring for Success a MESSAGE from the NATIONAL BOARD CHAIR Structuring for Success
    2013 ANNUAL REPORT Structuring for Success A MESSAGE FROM THE NATIONAL BOARD CHAIR Structuring for Success Spark supporters, Every year is filled with unique challenges and opportunities and 2013 was no exception. Through the ebbs and flows of the year, the organization at both regional and national levels celebrated important growth milestones and began to structure for bigger changes in 2014 and a promising future. Most notable in 2013 was the transition of Spark’s co-founder from an active leadership role as the Chief Executive Officer, to a distinguished National Board Member. Chris Balme led Spark for nine years and grew the organization from serving a handful of students in the San Francisco Bay Area to serving more than 2,000 students nationwide. With the launch of each new region, Chris and his team created a positive, hard-working culture for growing staff, introduced new partners to a unique way of giving back and changed the trajectories of students’ lives. As we look toward a new era for Spark under equally visionary leadership, I am enthusiastic about our future. Jason Cascarino, Spark’s new Chief Executive Officer, will elevate our proven program model with national audiences and engage in the high school readiness policy discussion to ensure that workplace-based learning opportunities are an integral part of the plan to keep middle grades students on track for success in high school. I have tremendous gratitude for all of Spark’s volunteer mentors, teachers and school partners, generous donors and numerous other committed stakeholders. Our program would not be what it is today, and we would not have the potential for such a bright future under new leadership, without this tremendous support from so many.
    [Show full text]