Federalism and Interethnic Relations in Multiethnic Ethiopia (1995 – 2018)
Doctoral Thesis
Submitted by Girum Kinfemichael Gebremariam
in fulfillment of the requirements for the academic degree of Doctor of Philosophy in Law and Politics at Karl-Franzens-Universität Graz
First Reader: Univ.-Prof. Dr. Karl Stöger, MJur Institute for Constitutional and Administrative Law University of Vienna
Second Reader: Univ.-Prof. Dr. Joseph Marko Institute of Public Law and Political Sciences University of Graz
Graz, January 2020
Declaration on honor
Unless otherwise indicated in the text or references, or acknowledged above, this thesis is entirely the product of my own scholarly work. Any inaccuracies of fact or faults in reasoning are my own and accordingly I take full responsibility. This thesis has not been submitted either in whole or part, for a degree at this or any other university or institution. This is to certify that the printed version is equivalent to the submitted electronic one.
08/01/2021 Date Signature
Acknowledgements
I praise and thank God, the almighty, for giving me the courage and vigor to start and finalise this long PhD journey.
There are so many institutions and people who have in one way or another contributed to the completion of this doctoral studies.
First and foremost, I acknowledge the academic support of my supervisors: Univ.-Prof. Dr. Karl Stöger and Univ.-Prof. Dr. Josef Marko at the Institute of Public Law and Political Science, whose stimulating suggestions, productive guidance and challenging comments helped me during the research and writing of this PhD thesis. I am immensely indebted to Univ.-Prof. Dr. Stöger, the supervisor with first responsibility, who made critical remarks beginning from the early inception of this research project all the way through the final draft of the research. The successful completion of this PhD dissertation would be difficult, if not impossible, had it not been for the unwavering assistance and intellectual guidance of my generous supervisor. His friendly and brotherly approach towards his students in general and his advisees in particular is most exemplary: words fail to express all my praise, profound gratitude, appreciation and reverence for this distinguished scholar. Let me also take this opportunity to express my sincere gratefulness to Univ.-Prof. Dr. Josef Marko whose financial support was critical and made possible my stay at Eurac Research in Bolzano (Italy) to have access to relevant scholarly literature. During the study period, the Institute of Public Law and Political Science also provided me an ample environment for my PhD research including office facilities. More broadly, my special thanks go to both the academic and administrative staff members of the Institute.
iv Acknowledgements v
On this occasion, I cannot forget to express my sincere thanks and deep gratitude to Univ.- Prof. Dr. Wolfgang Benedek for his resolute moral encouragement and intellectual support in every possible way during the last four years of my doctoral studies.
I also acknowledge the support and encouragement of fellow PhD students and other colleagues at the Karl-Franzens-University of Graz. In particular, I would like to mention Dr. Stefan Salomon, Dr. Maximilian Lakitsch, Bernadette Knauder, Alma Stankovic, and Michael Kramer for their friendship, unfailing support, and words of encouragement during my doctoral studies.
My deep gratitude also goes to my colleagues at the School of Law and Federalism (SLF), who accepted the burden of additional teaching loads and encouraged me throughout my study. I am especially thankful to Dr. Tesfaye Abate, Dr. Mohammed Abdo, Dr. Mohammud Abdulahi, and Dr. Solomon Barnabas. Gedion Mezmur from SLF needs to be mentioned for his assistance in the collection of data, and for his all-round support while I was studying in Austria.
To this list of gratitude, I would like to add the Austrian Agency for International Cooperation in Education and Research (OeAD-GmbH) whose generous financial support was critical to the completion of my PhD studies. I am thankful to the Department of Higher Education and Research for International Development, especially Ms. Elke Stinnig, Programme Officer in Vienna, and Ms. Christina Düss, Regional Office Coordinator in Graz.
I am greatly indebted to several people in Addis Ababa, Dire Dawa, and the study regions for the interviews they granted me and for allowing me to have access to important documents. Particularly, my special thanks go to Tedela Elias, Negat Belete, Girma Teklmariam, Colonel Yenus Mulu, and Sisay Tessema for their unreserved help in providing me all invaluable information and ample materials for my PhD research.
vi Acknowledgements
Thanks are also due to institutions which provided me all necessary information and ample materials for my research. These include Ethiopian Civil Service Commission, Economic and Finance Bureau of regional states, Addis Ababa University, Ethiopian Civil Service University, Ministry of Finance and Economic Development (MoFED), House of Federation, House of Peoples‟ Representatives, and National Educational Assessment and Examinations Agency (NEAEA). I am grateful to all of them.
I am heavily indebted to Dr. Matebu Tadesse, Assist. Prof. in College of Development Studies, Addis Ababa University, and Dr. Christophe Van der Beken, Assoc. Prof. in College of Law and Governance Studies, Addis Ababa University, for their valuable comments on various parts of the first draft of my PhD Thesis.
I am also grateful to my friends in Ethiopia for their wholehearted moral supports while writing my PhD thesis. Great thanks to Gedion Mezmur, Melake Mihiret, Robel Woldeyes, Yodit Zenebe, and Daniel Solomon.
I am highly indebted to those Ethiopians and Austrians in the Graz city and its surroundings for their all-round support, good company, and warm hospitability. Particularly, I would like to mention Mesfin Ayele and his wife Martina Handler, Julia Galler, Birgit Roth and her family members, Semeone Mesfin, Anteneh Arayaselassie, Hanna Tesfaye, Abeba Belehu, Solomon Woldehawariat, and Biruk Tadesse. I do not even have the words to thank once again Birgit Roth who edited the final manuscript.
Last, though certainly not least, my special heartfelt thank goes to my parents, Kinfemichael Gebremariam and the late Zerifenesh Woldetensaye, who instilled in me a strong discipline and moral uprightness in my childhood. My sincere gratitude also go to my sisters and brothers, Misrak Kinfemichael, Hirut Kinfemichael, Abay Kinfemichael, Samuel Kinfemichael, Abebe Kinfemichael, Mulugeta Kinfemichael, Dawit Kinfemichael, and Biruk Knifemichael for their unwavering support and assistance, without which, it would have been completely impossible for me to pass through years of school life. I feel honoured when I dedicate this work to them all.
Acknowledgements vii
I once again am highly obliged and thankful to all those whose mention may have been missed out, but who have not been forgotten.
Finally, the findings, interpretations, conclusions and recommendations made in this PhD thesis are entirely mine and should not in any way be attributed to any of the above.
Girum Kinfemichael Gebremariam, Graz, January 2020
Abstract 1
Ethiopia has experienced a key defining moment in the arena of national politics since the early 1990s. One of the most significant political changes in the mid-1990s has been the restructuring of the country into an ethnic federation in response to the legacy of unequal ethnic relations. Ethnicity thus functioned as the basic criterion of state organization, posing both opportunities and challenges in the management of interethnic relations. This study analyses the operation and effect of federalism in Ethiopia on ethnic relations by considering three key areas that are most contentious from an interethnic standpoint. These areas are territorial reorganisation, fiscal relations, and the use of preferential policies in regulating groups‟ access to public employment and representation in the federal cabinet and institutions such as the military. The study is based on qualitative data collection and qualitative methods of analysis. This study resulted in the following major findings. First, the analysis shows that ethnic-based territorial reorganization causes violent conflicts among various ethnic groups and lays the ground for lingering ethnic tensions and conflicts. Secondly, fiscal decisions on ethno-regional units demonstrate that both budgetary and extra- budgetary resource transfers contribute to and accelerate interregional disparities in the country. Thirdly, this study finds that a sustained disproportional representation of various ethnic groups exists not only in the civil services of the federal and regional governments, but also in the federal cabinet and national armed forces. Finally, drawing on these findings, the study concludes that the Ethiopian federalism has failed to make good its main promises: ending ethnic conflicts and pacifying interethnic relationships.
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Contents 1
Acknowledgements ...... iv Abstract ...... viii Maps and Tables ...... xi Acronyms and Glossary ...... xiii
1. Introduction ...... 1 1.1. Background ...... 1 1.2. Statement of the Problem ...... 5 1.3. Objective of the Study ...... 6 1.4. Research Questions ...... 6 1.5. Methodology ...... 7 1.5.1. Sampling ...... 8 1.5.2. Methods of data collection and analysis ...... 8 1.6. Relevance of the Study ...... 12 1.7. Scope of the Study ...... 13 1.8. Organisation of the Study ...... 14
2. Federalism and Ethnic Conflict Management: Theories and Concepts ...... 16 2.1. Introduction ...... 16 2.2. Federalism and Federation: A Quest for Distinction ...... 17 2.3. Theoretical Approaches to the Study of Federalism ...... 21 2.3.1. Legal-institutional/constitutional approach ...... 22 2.3.2. Politico-ideological approach ...... 24 2.3.3. Sociological approach ...... 26 2.3.4. Horizontal federalism ...... 28 2.4. Federalism and Federation: Process and Formations ...... 29 2.5. National, Multinational and/or Ethnic Federations ...... 33 2.6. Conceptualizing Ethnicity and Ethnic Conflict ...... 35 2.6.1. The primordialist school ...... 38 2.6.2. The instrumentalist school ...... 41 2.6.3. The constructivist school ...... 44 2.7. Federalism and Ethnic Conflict Management: Exploring the Links ...... 46 2.8. Behind the Success and Failure of Federalism: Link Contextual Factors ...... 55 2.9. Conclusion ...... 58
3. Territorial Restructuring ...... 61 3.1. Introduction ...... 61 3.2. Territorial Restructuring and Ethnicity in Ethiopia ...... 62 3.2.1. Administrative subdivisions in Ethiopia: From multiethnic centralized state to ethnic federal state ...... 62 3.2.1.1.Administrative control during the imperial Menelik II era ...... 62 3.2.1.2.Administrative control during the imperial Haile Sellassie I era ...... 64 3.2.1.3.The Derg‟s half-hearted decentralization reforms: Regional autonomy at bay? ...... 69
ix x Contents
3.2.1.4.The TGE and FDRE: Ethnic-based territorial restructuring ...... 74 3.3. Boundaries and Conflict in the Ethiopian Federation ...... 81 3.3.1. New boundaries, new inter-regional conflicts ...... 82 3.3.2. New boundaries, new intra-regional conflicts ...... 92 3.4. Conclusion ...... 101
4. Fiscal Relations and Interregional Equity ...... 104 4.1. Introduction ...... 104 4.2. Fiscal Relations and Regional Development in Ethiopia ...... 108 4.3. Fiscal Relations between Federal Government and Regions ...... 111 4.4. Fiscal Transfer: Adjusting the Imbalance ...... 113 4.4.1. The federal grant formula and its criticisms ...... 115 4.4.2. Federal grants: Neither equalising nor improving regions economic efficiency ...... 122 4.4.3. Special purpose grants (Conditional grants) ...... 132 4.4.4. Revenue-sharing scheme ...... 133 4.4.5. Additional considerations: Extrabudgetary flows and influences ...... 134 4.5. Conclusion ...... 149
5. Ethnic Balancing Policies in Opportunity and Representation ...... 151 5.1. Introduction ...... 151 5.1. Preferential Policies in the Ethiopian Federalism ...... 154 5.1.1. Preferential policies in federal Ethiopia: Rectifying past wrongs ...... 154 5.1.2. The cost of ethnic balancing in the civil service of federal Ethiopia ...... 159 5.1.2.1.Federal civil service: Ethnic composition and representation ...... 161 5.1.2.2.Regional civil services: Ethnic composition and representation ...... 167 5.1.3. Representation in the federal cabinet: TPLF dominance or power sharing? .... 183 5.1.4. Representation in the national armed forces: Power sharing or political co-option? ...... 193 5.2. Conclusion ...... 196
6. Conclusion and Recommendations ...... 199 6.1. Introduction ...... 199 6.2. Conclusion ...... 199 6.3. Recommendations ...... 204 6.3.1. Territorial restructuring: The need to balance ethnic identity with other factors ...... 204 6.3.2. Fiscal decisions ...... 205 6.3.3. Ethnic balancing policies in opportunity and representation ...... 206
Appendices ...... 208 References ...... 226
Maps and Tables
Maps
Map 1.1 Regional states of FDRE Ethiopia xvi
Map 3.1 Provinces or teklay-gizats (1935-1942) under Haile Sellassie I Period 66 Map 3.2 Provinces (1960-1962) under Haile Sellassie I Period 67 Map 3.3 Provinces (1962-1974) under Haile Sellassie I Period 68
Map 3.4 Administrative divisions (1974-1986) under the Derg Regime 72 Map 3.5 Administrative regions and autonomous regions of PDRE (1987-1991) 73 Map 3.6 Provisional administrative regions of the TGE (1992-1994) 80 Map 3.7 Administrative regions and zones of FDRE (since 1995) 81 Map 3.8 Litigious territorial dispute between Tigray and Amhara regions 85
Tables
Table 3.1 PDRE Administrative and autonomous regions 74 Table 4.1 The indicators used in the federal grant formulas and their relative weight 121 Table 4.2 Formula for sharing joint revenue between federal and regional governments 134 Table 4.3 Federal government subsidy granted to regional states for selected fiscal years 141-46 Table 4.4 Trends in primary and secondary schools enrolment by region 147 Table 4.5 Distribution of large and medium scale manufacturing industries and electricity industry survey (LMMIS) by regions 148 Table 4.6 Trends in health services by regions 148 Table 5.1 Ethnic composition of the federal civil service for selected years 166 Table 5.2 Ethnic composition of the federal civil service for selected years 166 Table 5.3 Ethnic composition of the regional states‟ civil service for selected years 180 Table 5.4 Ethnic composition of the regional states‟ civil service for selected years 181
xi xii Maps and Tables
Table 5.5 Ethnic composition of Addis Ababa city civil service for selected years 182 Table 5.6 Ethnic composition of Addis Ababa city civil service for selected years 182 Table 5.7 Ethnic composition of Dire Dawa city civil service for selected years 182 Table 5.8 Ethnic composition of Dire Dawa city civil service for selected years 182 Table 5.9 Ethnic representation in ministerial and other key portfolios after general elections 192 Table 5.10 Ethnic distribution of very important portfolios (1995 - 2015) 192 Table 5.11 Ethnic distribution of less important portfolios (1995 - 2015) 192 Table 5.12 Top military positions and departments by ethnic distribution 195
Acronyms and Glossary 4
Acronyms
ALF Afar Liberation Front ANLM Afar National Liberation Movement ANDP Afar National Democratic Party APDO Afar People‟s Democratic Organisation ANDM Amhara National Democratic Movement (now ADP – Amhara Democratic Party) BGNRS Benishangul-Gumuz National Regional State BGPDUF Benishagnul-Gumuz People‟s Democratic Unity Front BPLM Benishangul People‟s Liberation Movement CSA Central Statistical Authority EC Ethiopian Calendar EHRC Ethiopian Human Rights Council EFFORT Endowment Fund for Rehabilitation of Tigray ENDF Ethiopian National Defense Forces EPDM Ethiopian People‟s Democratic Movement EPLF Eritrean People‟s Liberation Front EPP Ethiopian Prosperity Party EPRDF Ethiopian Peoples‟ Revolutionary Democratic Front ESDL Ethiopian Somali Democratic League FCSC Federal Civil Service Commission FDRE Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia GPDF Gurage People‟s Democratic Front GPDUP Gambella People‟s Democratic Unity Party HoF House of Federation HoPR House of Peoples‟ Representatives MP Member of Parliament MEDaC Ministry of Economic Development and Cooperation MoFED Ministry of Finance and Economic Development MoFedA Ministry of Federal Affairs NEBE National Electoral Board of Ethiopia HNL Harari National League IFLO Islamic From for the Liberation of Oromia OFDM Oromo Federalist Democratic Movement OLF Oromo Liberation Front OPDO Oromo People‟s Democratic Organization (now ODP – Oromo Democratic Party) ONC Oromo National Congress PCDP Pastoral Community Development Program
xiii xiv Maps and Table
PDOs People‟s Democratic Organizations PMAC Provisional Military Administrative Committee (of the Derg regime 1974-1991) PDRE People‟s Democratic Republic of Ethiopia (1987-91) PSSIDP Participatory Small Scale Irrigation Development Project RCBP Rural Capacity Building Program REST Relief Society of Tigray SLMP Sustainable Land Management Program SNNPRS Southern Nations, Nationalities and Peoples‟ Regional State SNRS Somali National Regional State SEPDF Southern Ethiopian People‟s Democratic Front SEPDC Southern Ethiopia People‟s Democratic Coalition SEPDM Southern Ethiopia People Democratic Movement SPDP Somali People‟s Democratic Party (former Ethiopian Somali Democratic League, ESDL) TDA Tigray Development Association TGE Transitional Government of Ethiopia (1991-1995) TPLF Tigray People‟s Liberation Front ULGDP Urban Local Government Development Program UNDP United Nations Development Program WPE Workers‟ Party of Ethiopia
Ethiopian Terms *
Afaan-Oromoo Oromo language Ato A title equivalent to Mister Awraja Imperial sub-provincial administrative structure made up of several weredas Dejazmach Commander or General of the Gate – a military title meaning commander of the central body of a traditional Ethiopian armed force composed of a vanguard, main body, left and right wings and a rear body Derg Literally „Committee‟; from „Provisional Military Administrative Committee‟, used of the regime of 1974-1991 Fitawrari Commander of the Vanguard – amilitary title meaning commander of the vanguard of a traditional Ethiopian armed force Gimgema Amharic word literally translated into English as evaluations Kebele The lowest tier of local government just below the wereda Kifle-hager Province (under Derg-era) Kilil Regional State, federated units since 1995 Neftegna/naftagna Literally one who owns a gun, associated with soldier settlers in southern Ethiopia to whom the government granted rights over land and people Negus King of kings, emperor
Acronyms and Glossary xv
Ras Literally head, the highest traditional politico-military title under negus Shengo Parliament Teklay-gizat Province (under imperial-era) Tiret Amharic word that denotes effort, an endowment company affiliated to the Amhara National Democratic Movement (ANDM) Tumsa (Dinsho) Endowment fund under the Oromo People‟s Democratic Organization (OPDO) Wereda District found below the zone Wendo Endowment fund under the Southern Ethiopian People‟s Democratic Movement (SEPDM) Zemene Mesafint „Era of the Princes‟, Mikhael Suhul to Tewodros, roughly 1769-1855 Zone (English) Administrative division found immediately below the regions in Ethiopia Zuria Environs
* Terms listed are Amharic unless otherwise specified.
Map 1.1 Regional States of FDRE Ethiopia
Source: Ethiopian Mapping Agency (2004, unofficial)
xvi
Introduction 1
1.1. Background Situated in the Horn of Africa, Ethiopia is one of the oldest countries in the world with a well-documented history of statehood running for at least three millennia. It is the origin of humankind and home for some of the ancient civilizations the world has ever seen. Ethiopia is also one of the two African countries that resisted European colonialism and successfully maintained its independence (Bahru, 1991).1
It is the most populous landlocked country in the world and the second-most populous nation on the African continent, after Nigeria, with over 114 million population in 2019 according to the latest estimates of UN2 and with more than eighty3 ethno-linguistic groups. Because of that the Italian historian Carlo Conti-Rossini had even hailed the country as „Un museo di popoli‟ – „a museum of peoples‟ (Levine, 1974:19-20). Despite its stunning diversity and rich history, its long political history is marked by the existence of pervasive rivalry and power struggle between diverse patrimonial kingdoms and the absence of a centralised political structure from the first century to the mid-nineteenth century (Keller, 1988).
The last quarter of the 19th century witnessed the birth of a centralised Ethiopian empire – a state that overpowered earlier regional differences. The reign of three emperors – Tewodros II4, Yohannes IV5, and Menelik II – marked the formation of a unified Ethiopia through
1With the exception of the Italian brief „occupation‟ of Ethiopia during Fascism which lasted from 1936 to 1941, the long years of survival as an independent state was inspirational for the anti-colonial struggle in many parts of Africa. 2For more details on this see „World Population Prospects 2019.‟
1 2 Chapter 1
centralisation and territorial expansion. Of the three emperors, it was Menelik II who did the most to create a centralised and unified Ethiopian state. Through conquest and diplomacy between 1890 and 1906, he managed to control vast areas of territory in the southern and eastern parts of the country.6 The beginning of the 20th century also marked the first serious attempt to curb the autonomy of the regional warlords. Because of this conquest and expansion, Ethiopia retained the geographical size it has today and dozens of ethnic groups with diverse languages and cultures were brought together under the domain of one empire. Nevertheless, his territorial expansion and centralisation continued to be sources of grievance among the ethnic elites of the South to the present day. Some analysts argue that his vigorous political practice underpinned the class and national question in the Ethiopian political landscape in the subsequent periods (Merera, 2003).
The coming to power of Emperor Haile Selassie in 1930 and the subsequent issuance of the 1931 Constitution, the first written constitution in the history of the country, pushed even further the formation of a modern and centralized Ethiopian state. This marked the beginning of the culmination of the struggle for centralization, which began with the attempt at unification by emperors during the 19th century and reached its consolidation under the absolutist rule of the Emperor (1930-74). With the consolidation of his state power, the project of nation-building was intensified through his twin policies of assimilation and centralization (Clapham, 1969). Accordingly, in many respects, the Emperor‟s administration strengthened the implementation of policies that campaigned further for the building of an all-inclusive state out of the diverse ethnic groups. This process of centralization, modernization, nation-building, or by whatever name and with what good intentions it was conducted, was not thus without consequences. Since the state failed to accommodate all
he succeeded that. The second and more noticeable attempt of centralisation and territorial expansion was to be achieved by Menelik II at the second half of the 19th century. 5Yohannes IV, who reigned from 1872 to1889, was a descendant of the Tigray ruling class and had envisioned a united Christian Ethiopia. He adopted a diverse approach in bringing the regional lords under one rule. Underlying his approach to unification was a considerable degree of tolerance to regional autonomy. Unlike Tewodros who sought to abolish regionalism, Yohannes IV was ready to recognise the regional hereditary rulers and share with them his control over the Kingdom as long as they recognized his suzerainty. He forced the nobles from Yejju, Gojjam, Wollo, Keffa, Gondar, and Shewa to recognise his suzerainty (Bahru, 2005). 6The main reasons for Menelik‟s territorial expansion included not only his ambition to create a larger Ethiopia, but also the tradition of territorial expansion by his predecessors, the desire to control the sources of lucrative long-distance trade, the need to forestall the race for territory by the colonial powers, his ability to raise a large army and his easy access to firearms (Markakis, 1974).
Introduction 3 sorts of diversities, the religious, lingual, cultural as well as political and economic dominance gave birth to the „question of nationalities.‟7
It is not surprising then that the violent opposition that came from all segments of the society and armed struggles organized chiefly along ethno-linguistic lines sprang mainly in the northern (particularly the armed struggle in Eritrea), eastern and other parts of the country, ultimately resulting in the overthrow of the last monarch through popular revolution and a coup in 1974.8
Despite its popular background, it was the military that usurped the leadership of the revolution from popular forces and filled the power vacuum (Yonatan, 2010; Bahru, 2005; Assafa, 2002). Immediately after deposing the Emperor, the Derg, which grabbed state power in the midst of the political havoc of the hastily erupted revolution, introduced some drastic measures among other things include a sweeping land reform which provided usufruct rights to the peasantry. The land reform, in as much as it eliminated centuries of social inequalities, appears to have had an enduring positive impact. Without a doubt, by doing this the Marxist military regime or the Derg was able to rob one of the causes of the 1974 Ethiopian Revolution at least in its early days (Assafa, 2002). However, the military junta, despite expressing its rhetorical commitment to resolve the long-standing problem of „question of nationalities‟, could not resolve this age-old crisis of the Ethiopian state through its top-down approach to „regional autonomy‟. As far as administrative and political autonomy is concerned, except for the change of ideology from the Solomonic bloodline to Marxism Leninism, the centralist nature of the Ethiopian state remained intact and was even bolstered 9 to a degree that far exceeded the imperial regime (Assefa, 2006a). As a result, the political
7The „question of nationalities‟ in the Ethiopian context refers to the quests by ethno-nationalist groups and political forces and/or movements to abolish ethnic domination and oppression. The national question was articulated by the Ethiopian Student Movement during the 1960s, and eventually emerged as a political agenda during the 1974 Ethiopian Revolution and ever since (Bahru, 1991; Merera, 2003). 8The 1974 Ethiopian Revolution ended the monarchic rule over the country. Because of the revolution, the Emperor Haile Selassie I (the last imperial regime of the country) who reigned for more than four decades was deposed. The military government, which ruled the country from 1974-1991, pursued a Marxist ideology and the country was closely allied during the Cold War with the countries of the former Eastern bloc (ibid.). 9Many argue that the 1974 Ethiopian Revolution was not in the real sense a revolution in terms of the impact on political power and the change in the structure of the state. True, there were some sweeping measures taken
4 Chapter 1
marginalization of the large majority of ethnic groups submerged the country into a bloody civil war for seventeen years with many of the dissident groups10 being organized along ethno-linguistic lines and claiming for ethno-linguistic rights. The conflict was finally set to an end in 1991 with a triumph of TPLF/EPRDF11 and the secession of Eritrea from Ethiopia. Soon after that, the political structure of the country has been reengineered into an ethnic federation12 with the aim of accommodating the various ethno-linguistic groups into the national politics and lessening interethnic tensions and conflicts (Alem, 2004; Abbink, 2006). The federal restructuring13 of the country could be thus considered as a response to the long- standing problem of nationality question, which gripped Ethiopia‟s politics over four decades, to reverse the legacy of „unequal ethnic relations‟ in the country (Merera, 2003:138). In doing so, the country has constitutionally adopted ethnicity as a basic criterion of restructuring of the country‟s internal administration (Abbink, 2006). On the basis of this criterion, the nine regional states were formed in 1995.14 These nine regions are Afar, Amhara, Benishangul-Gumuz, Gambella, Harari, Oromiya, Somali, Southern Nations Nationalities and Peoples‟ State (SNNPRS), and Tigray. Along with this, two chartered
like the nationalization of land that gave a relief to the tenants living in the south, but the core of the issue, that is political marginalization of the large majority of the people, was almost kept as it was (see Young, 1996). 10Indeed, dozens of ethno-nationalist movements had waged war against the Derg, namely the Eritrean People‟s Liberation Front (EPLF), the Tigray People‟s Liberation Front (TPLF), the Oromo Liberation Front (OLF) and other similar ethno-nationalist movements who preferred to define their struggle on the basis of nationality. Many of these ethnic liberation fronts declared themselves the vanguard liberation movements of their supposed ethnic constituencies/regions. 11TPLF (Tigray People Liberation Front) was founded in 1975 by the Tigrean youth to form the „People‟s Democratic Republic of Tigray‟ by seceding from Ethiopia (Young, 1998). However, dramatic changes that took place within Ethiopia and globally at the end of the 1980s required the TPLF to make several adjustments in terms of mobilisation and political orientation. At the domestic level, successive military victories over the Derg regime by the Eritrean People‟s Liberation Front (EPLF) and the TPLF made the prospect of military victory over the Derg more certain. This necessitated the TPLF to think about its future role in the national politics of Ethiopia. To play a national role, the TPLF that has had a narrow constituency, established a coalition of ethnic organisations under its tutelage in order to match its projection of military power with a politico-administrative structure (ibid.:62 and 166). Consequently, the Front changed its name to EPRDF (Ethiopian Peoples‟ Revolutionary Democratic Front) in 1989 by incorporating diverse ethnic organizations (EPDM-the Ethiopian People‟s Democratic Movement) from other ethno-linguistic groups, namely the Amhara National Democratic Movement (ANDM), the Oromo People‟s Democratic Organisation (OPDO) and the Southern Ethiopian People‟s Democratic Movement (SEPDM) (ibid.:11). 12Ethnic federation refers to a federation „in which internal boundaries have been drawn and powers distributed in such a way as to ensure that each national/ethnic group is able to maintain itself as a distinct and self- governing society and culture‟ as multinational federations (Weinstock, 2001). 13Federal restructuring refers to devolutionary processes that lead to the federalisation of a once unitary political system into a federation (ibid.). 14See Article 47 of FDRE Constitution.
Introduction 5 cities, namely Addis Ababa15 and Dire Dawa,16 which do not fall within the territory of any of the constituent states, are also made accountable to the federal government. Their status is thus less autonomous compared to the constituent states. In concrete terms, by and large, these nine regions have an ethnically very diverse population due to a long tradition of internal migration and resettlement of ethnic groups in the past (Assefa, 2006a). Ever since, the post-1991 political changes that are closely associated with the restructuring of the Ethiopian state and society along ethno-linguistic lines and/or ethnic criteria have posed sets of opportunities and challenges in managing interethnic relationships in much of the country. This study attempts to make an in-depth study of the operation of federalism and test out its effects on interethnic relations in the post-1991 Ethiopia.
1.2. Statement of the Problem Ethiopia has been experimenting with federalism as a political device to accommodate ethno- linguistic groups in the national politics and regulate interethnic relations since the early 1990s. However, in spite of some visible efforts to restructure the Ethiopian state and society, the record of federalism as to the normalization of ethnic relations in the post-1991 Ethiopia shows mixed signals. While on the one hand, it led to the provision of linguistic and cultural autonomy for marginalised ethnic groups in the country (Abbink, 2006), on the other hand, it appears to have transformed and generated localized ethnic conflicts (Aalen, 2008; Abbink 2006; Asnake, 2004; Solomon 2006a). Indeed, the ongoing debates on the effects of federalism on interethnic relations in Ethiopia, after two decades, are still diametrically polarized among politicians; but this rift extends to both academics and public spaces as well. The problem, however, is none of these arguments have provided considerable research findings to adequately support their views. It is also pertinent to note that all the reviewed studies have so far paid little or no attention to the effects of the Ethiopian federal system in terms of interethnic relations. This brings up critical questions which need a thorough investigation into the operation and effects of federal restructuring on interethnic relations in
15According to Article 49 of the 1995 FDRE Constitution, Addis Ababa is the capital city of the federal government and has the right to self-government but it is responsible to the federal government. It used to be one of the fourteen regional governments during the Transition Period (1991-1994). 16Dire Dawa is also administered directly by the federal government. There have been disagreement over the town between the Somali and Oromiya regions and since 1995 it is under the supervision of the federal government. See also Proclamation No. 256/2001 under Article 6.
6 Chapter 1
the country by focusing on three key areas17 that account for the lion‟s share of interethnic tension and contention in multiethnic federations. These are the (re)-organization of territory (the delineation of internal boundaries and creation of sub-unit), the organization of fiscal relations (collection and allocation of revenues and development resources), and the regulation of group access to state-brokered opportunity (public sector employment mainly) and representation (national decision-making institutions and other sensitive areas such as the military). This thesis thus looks into the operation and effects of Ethiopian federalism on interethnic relations in each of the three core areas that are most contentious from an interethnic viewpoint.
1.3. Objective of the Study Federalism in Ethiopia has been presented as an instrument of ending the legacy of unjust ethnic relations that prevailed in the country since the end of the 19th century (Young, 1996; Yonathan, 2008). Evidently, debates on the impacts/effects of federalism on interethnic relationships in Ethiopia remain, for much of the last two decades, normative and polarised. However, a better understanding of the effects of federal system on interethnic relations requires going beyond these polarised debates and analysing changes in interethnic relationships in the country. This study therefore examines the operation and effects of Ethiopian federal system on interethnic relations in each of the three core areas (stated above) that are most controversial from an interethnic perspective.
1.4. Research Questions As noted above, the focus of this study is to examine the operation and effects of federalism on interethnic relationships in the post-1991 Ethiopia in light of those three main areas of overriding concern to ethno-regional groups or units in multiethnic federations. With this objective in mind, the study investigates the following three key research questions for the purpose of this study. These are:
17In fact, these are not the only areas of concern to ethno-regional groups nor is this listing necessarily hierarchical. However, they account for the lion‟s share of intergroup tension, friction and contestation in multiethnic federations and are the main questions to which groups seek definitive answers in a federation.
Introduction 7
1. How does ethnic-based federalism, that has been exercised through the application of territorial reorganization, impact interethnic conflict in Ethiopia? 2. What are the effects of distributive framework of fiscal relations that followed the Ethiopian ethnic-based federalism on interethnic conflict? 3. What are the impacts of the new federal system by using preferential or ethnic balancing policies on group‟s access to identified opportunity and representation?
The above key questions help us to assess the effects of federal system in Ethiopia on interethnic relations in those three core areas. Furthermore, they also help us to raise more focused and specific research questions such as: what is the impact of the explicit use of ethnicity as the main device for territorial reorganization of the sub-units in the country? Does it reinforce the likelihood of tension and conflict over boundaries, and ultimately, adversely affect interethnic relations or improve them in some way? What are the different fiscal instruments that have been used to bridge the horizontal inequality among ethno- regional groups or units? Have these fiscal transfer means addressed the existing patterns of interethnic/interregional disparities that constitute a source of substantial contestation and tension or further worsened the situations at all? Have preferential policies substantively addressed group‟s access to such public goods as civil service employment? How far do the existing preferential policies also promote equitable representation of the diverse nationalities in the areas of national decision-making (federal cabinet) and such institutions as the armed forces? Have the existing preferential policies fared in this regard?
1.5. Methodology Methodologically, this thesis is based on a qualitative research approach. Given that previous studies had mainly been conducted in isolation (no matter how extensive they might be) and viewed the study problem from a particular perspective; and none of the studies so far at length focus on examining the operation and effects of Ethiopian federal system from the standpoint of interethnic relations, it is appropriate to employ a qualitative approach. John Creswell (2002:33), a prominent and contemporary expert in the field of mixed methods research, also reinforces this statement as follows: „One of the chief reasons for conducting a qualitative study is that the study is exploratory.‟ This means that while chiefly used in
8 Chapter 1
academic research, qualitative approach could be suitable in an under-researched and little known setting with a view to exploring, understanding, and explaining complexity of the issue under discussion (Creswell, 2002; Morse, 1991; Schonfeld and Dreyer, 2008). Moreover, this study is in line with the theoretical argument that „general understandings are furthered by case studies and experience in individual events‟ (Punch, 1998:155). What follows is a discussion of the manner of data collection.
1.5.1. Sampling Following Keith Punch (1998) and Jenny Cameron (2016), this research used a non- probability sampling procedure and adopted a purposive or judgmental sampling method to gather qualitative data. The rationale for choosing this sampling technique stem from such factors as the nature of the problem to be studied and the type of data required. Firstly, the study, as noted already above, dealt with analysing the operation and effects of federal system on interethnic relationships in Ethiopia, which requires more of qualitative exploration on the basis of interviews (coupled with personal experience of the researcher).
Secondly, and related to the first point, the research intended to gather and analyse data mainly pertaining to experiences, perceptions, and views of key informants who have been affected or influenced by the post-1991 political dynamics of interethnic relations in the country. And the principle of „qualitative research is to purposefully select informants […] that will best answer the research question (Creswell, 1994:148, emphasis in the original and ellipsis mine). This means that in a qualitative research, purposive sampling is necessary „to locate information-rich informants‟ (Punch, 1998:193). This goal can barely be attained by employing random/probability sampling, which is suitable for quantitative research (Cameron, 2016). This principle applies both to the selection of key informants and group interview participants.
1.5.2. Methods of data collection and analysis This thesis makes use of qualitative methods of data collection and analysis. As such, it employs diverse methods of data collection techniques to gather data for various chapters of the study. The combination of methods is necessary to enrich the research by diversifying the
Introduction 9 sources of data; to achieve the objective of triangulation, where findings of one method are checked against those of others; to benefit from the strengths of each method and to compensate for the weaknesses; and to establish confidence and obtain trustworthiness of the research findings. As Punch (1998:252-53) notes, „when the [research] questions, design, and methods fit together, the argument is strong and the research has validity. When they do not fit together, the argument is weakened and the research lacks validity.‟ The data for this study were collected from both primary and secondary sources.
Operationally, the methods of data collection constitute semi-structured interviews, focus group discussions, personal observations, and secondary sources. For political research in developing countries like Ethiopia, where the culture of writing is limited and most political activities occur in informal ways, the significance of interviews cannot be undervalued. The emphasis on this method also stems from the recognition that, „the interview, along with personal observation, is generally the primary means of gaining the [empirical] knowledge‟ (Briggs, 1986:61). Focus group discussions (or group interviews) were other valuable sources of primary data. Krueger views group discussions method as a „carefully planned discussion to obtain perceptions in a defined area of interest in a permissive, non-threatening environment‟(1988:18). The information and ideas that were produced through group discussions provided the researcher an opportunity to incorporate some of the features of individual interviewing and focus group discussions. It was worthwhile during the research process to observe the groups discussing the topic that most interests the participants, creating the opportunity to listen and discuss in the group interview conducted in a relatively informal setting. All along, personal observations during the fieldwork were made.
This thesis also employed a wide array of secondary sources of information. These secondary sources, which include both qualitative and quantitative data, were collected from various reliable sources. Qualitative data were collected from the minutes of the Transitional Government Council (1991/2 – 94/5), House of Peoples‟ Representatives and House of Federation (1995/6 – 2003/4); unofficial conference minutes of the regional and central ruling parties; various proclamations, government reports, NGO studies and international aid agency analyses; regional, federal and party documents mainly the ruling party; books,
10 Chapter 1
journals, newspapers, magazines, research reports, and other relevant documents. These data were used to triangulate and supplement the interviews and focus-group discussions, and to balance the consequences of both the individual as well as group interviews method employed.
Quantitative data were also gathered mainly from federal and regional agencies of finance and economic development, newspapers, research reports, World Bank annual public expenditure reports, Federal Civil Service Commission, Civil Service Bureau of both Dire Dawa and Addis Ababa City Administrations, and Regional Civil Service Bureaus. Quantitative data were collected to ascertain the strength of the qualitative information.
Key informants were identified and selected for their specific knowledge of the information needed for the study. Accordingly, my informants were federal and regionals officials, civil servants in the Federal Civil Service Commission and Regional Civil Service Bureaus, experts in the offices at federal as well as regional levels, long-time resident of some localities, ex-military officers, ex-police officer, active-duty military officers, university students, and other researchers and interested observers. Besides, in terms of the availability of potential key informants, Addis Ababa city and ECSU are central meeting points and it was possible to get access to them. Particularly, ECSU,18 the researcher‟s home base, is a key center where one can find students, and both administrative and academic staff from all corners of the country.
Based on this, the fieldwork to collect primary data was conducted in two phases. The first round of fieldwork was undertaken in order to familiarize the researcher with the selected areas and to collect information on the issues covered in this thesis. Accordingly, the researcher stayed in some selected towns of Oromiya region, Dire Dawa, Addis Ababa, and other nearby urban areas and conducted focus group discussions and individual interviews with key informants to gather the data needed for the study. It should be noted that the author has made different visits to those areas because some of the informants could not meet the
18Ethiopian Civil Service University (formerly known as Ethiopian Civil Service College) was established in 1995 and has been training civil servants from various regions of Ethiopia with the view of breaking the historic marginalization from political power and resources.
Introduction 11 arranged schedule. As several internal intermittent conflicts and security challenges had been evident in many parts of the study areas in the country, the researcher was also unable to travel to the lower level administrations and citizens of the weredas (districts) to collect the necessary data (according to the initial plan). As a result, many of my fieldwork schedules to the areas were revised and held between May 2018 and April 2019 to obtain the desired information. In fact, the first round of information-gathering task was significantly more costly than the second and final one both in terms of time and finance.
The second round of fieldwork was conducted from May 2019 to September 2019 to collect the information needed for the study at the federal and regional government levels. The fieldwork for these sections required traveling to some selected regions. With this in mind, successive interviews, informant discussions, and review of documentary and archival sources were undertaken during the fieldwork. Unlike the first-round field visit, the second- round fieldwork more or less went as planned. Despite this, I was obliged to conduct the third round of data collection to fill the data gap using qualitative interview. In doing this, a total of fifty-six interviews and two focus group discussions were conducted in the three rounds of data gathering.
Besides the obvious challenges of logistics and arranging meetings with selected informants, a major methodological limitation of this study was to collect unbiased data in the atmosphere of highly politicized ethnic difference (ethnicity) in the country. To cope with this, an attempt was made to collect data of diverse origins during the document survey. Careful use was made of personal observations and of interviews (both individual as well as group interviews) with people from diverse ethnic and professional backgrounds to complement the document survey. Certainly an equally important factor that made difficult to carry out the fieldwork as originally intended was the uncertainty and pervasive sense of insecurity challenge in many parts of the study areas. This means that limited interviews and group discussions took place in a very tense political environment. In order to overcome this shortcoming, the fieldwork, review of research findings in a wide variety of contexts, cross- examination of the cases with previous research, and extensive secondary sources provided the research with sufficient data despite the limitations. The opportunity of attending
12 Chapter 1
different public meeting as well as academic workshops have also helped the collection of data and better understanding of the subjects discussed in this thesis.
Overall, by combining individual interviews, focus group discussions (or group interviews), personal observations, and review of secondary data sources as appropriate, the approach more or less attempted to achieve the unity of purpose among the specific methods with the aim to address the research questions. As the research theme is politically sensitive, informants insisted that their names and reports be kept confidential.
1.6. Relevance of the Study The study‟s contribution and possible merit lie in the following four areas. The first argument for relevance originates in the general paucity of scholarly inquiry on a subject that is both of theoretical interest and of geopolitical importance. There are a number of single case studies in article or manuscript form on aspects of the Ethiopian federal experience. But, so far there is no comprehensive study on the effects of federalism on interethnic relationships on Ethiopia‟s more recent federal experiment, which I think requires some more in-depth inquiry. This study aims to fill that gap by drawing on the federal experiments of the Ethiopian federation from the standpoint of interethnic relations. In geopolitical terms, the experiences of this federation in the management of its own heterogeneity can be of substantial interest to other African nations for two reasons. First, lessons derived from this experiment should be of interest to other states facing similar challenges. Second, interstate relations in the sub-regions in question (the Horn) and on the continent at large would be permanently affected by the failure or fragmentation of this federal experiment.
Theoretically, given the current shortage of creative political models for multiethnic states, I hope this study will contribute in some fashion to an improved understanding of the productive and unproductive uses of the federal model in multiethnic states, of its particular strengths and constraints. Besides, the study‟s findings on federalism and the management of political diversity will, it is hoped, be relevant beyond the Ethiopian framework. The insights and larger conclusions will beg further testing in other cases (such as Indian and Nigerian federations among others).
Introduction 13
Empirically, the study will advance our knowledge of the federal polity of Ethiopia. It will seek to highlight the latent connections between the three areas under study, connections that have been recognized only infrequently or partially. It will also seek to highlight the connection between public policies and their social effects on interethnic relations. In particular, the study may add to the paucity of existing analysis on the current Ethiopian federal experiment and its ongoing evolution.
In terms of public policy, it is hoped that it will contribute to the work of government policy- makers supporting their work on political system design and implementation. It may also prove useful to those NGOs actors focusing on the management of heterogeneity or ethnic conflicts, and majority-minority relations.
Finally, this study is expected to advance our understanding of the operation and effects of the Ethiopian federalism on interethnic relations which may in turn allow for better use of federalism in harmonizing interethnic relationships in the country.
1.7. Scope of the Study The scope of this study is limited in terms of both time and coverage. It does not intend to scrutinize a host of complex political, economic, and social factors or dynamics that might have significant implications on the operation of the post-1991 federal system in Ethiopia. Rather, the research confines itself to examine the operation and effects of federalism on interethnic relationships in the country by considering three key areas that are most contentious from the perspective of ethnolinguistic group relations. These are territorial reorganization (the delineation of internal boundaries and creation of sub-unit), fiscal relations (collection and allocation of revenues and development resources), and group access to identified opportunity (civil service/public sector employment principally) and questions of group representation in national decision-making institution of the federal cabinet and other sensitive areas such as the military or armed force. This study is also limited to those developments that occurred until the end of 2018.
14 Chapter 1
1.8. Organisation of the Study The study comprises six chapters. The first chapter presents background of the study, statement of the problem, research questions, and objectives of the thesis. It also outlines the research methodology and details the methods of data collection and analysis of the thesis.
Chapter two presents the theoretical structure of the study. The literature review offers first a brief introduction to the general political theory of federalism and then moves to a more focused discussion of its specific use as an instrument for interethnic conflict management. It defines and clarifies the key concepts: ethnicity/ethnic groups, national, multinational and/or ethnic federations, and discusses the debates around the various theories over the issue of ethnicity and ethnic conflict, including federalism and ethnic conflict management. It further explores the links between federalism and conflict management.
Chapter three focuses on the organization and distribution of territory. This chapter looks at the operation and effects of federal system on interethnic relations in Ethiopia in light of territorial reorganization which is one of the most controversial issues from an interethnic perspective. It also analyses the organization of territory and ethnicity in Ethiopia. Boundaries and conflict in the Ethiopian federalism are also discussed in this chapter.
Chapter four focuses on fiscal imbalances and financial transfers under the Ethiopian federalism, with a particular emphasis on the effects on interethnic (interregional) relations across the federation. This review covers a 1994/95 – 2005/06 fiscal periods. This chapter gives a brief review of fiscal relations and regional development in Ethiopia. It also covers various issues related to the allocation of federal grants and the applicable formulas, revenue sharing scheme, the challenges to federal grants, and other forms of federal transfer.
Chapter five sets out to analyze the use of preferential policies in the Ethiopian ethnic federalism. Hence, this chapter discusses groups‟ access to public sector employment and ethnic representation in the national decision-making bodies such as the federal cabinet. This chapter also discusses (as data permits) ethnic representation in sensitive areas like the armed forces or military.
Introduction 15
Finally, Chapter six provides conclusions derived from the findings of the study and recommendations.
Fe Federalism and Ethnic Conflict Management: Theories 2 and Concepts derali
2.1. Introduction Federalism is undergoing a modest renewal as an important political device of state building after the collapse of European colonial empires in the immediate post-World War II era (Watts, 1994). After World War II, federalism gained in popularity on the strength of the prosperity of the Swiss, Canadian, American, and Australian federations. In the next fifteen years, the challenges posed by inherited colonial boundaries prompted many independence- era leaders to adopt federalism as a possible tool for bridging a reality of ethnic, linguistic and religious heterogeneity with a vision of modern nationalism. Though several of these federations failed in their formative years, the role of federalism in balancing the competing and perhaps conflicting demands for autonomy and unity in such countries as India, Pakistan, Malaysia and Nigeria could not be questioned (Rothchild, 1966). Thus, for a variety of reasons a series of federal experiments resulted across all over the world.
In the contemporary world, despite the terrible experience of interethnic tensions and conflicts following the end of the Cold War in the ex-Soviet Union and Yugoslavia federations, federalism as a political dispensation still remains popular for reconciling unity and diversity within a single political system (Blindenbacher and Watts, 2003:9;Watts, 2008:4-7).
One could add to this the resilience of the classical federations in the face of changing conditions. In spite of problems experienced over the past three decades, the oldest federations in the west as well as some emerging stable federations like India have been able to exhibit a degree of flexibility and adaptability to the changing realities in the world. The relative peace and stability along with economic wealth contributed to draw the attention of those involved in state restructuring elsewhere in the world (Watts, 2008). In ethnically
16 Chapter 2 17 divided states, the prospect is that political recognition of cultural and ethnic pluralism through federalism reduces ethnic tensions and conflicts. That is why federalism has recently been adopted in many ethnically diverse countries like Ethiopia, Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), Bosnia-Herzegovina, Iraq, and so on. There are also calls for a federal restructuring for such countries as Sri Lanka and Yemen (still in conflict) that were torn apart by years of massive civil war and/or characterized by long histories of inter-communal tensions.
2.2. Federalism and Federation: A Quest for Distinction Like any other social science concept offering a definition for federalism is not a simple task as it means different things to different people (Agnew, 1995:299; Elazar, 1987:15; Duchacek, 1977:14). However hard it may be, it is unavoidable to do so in the pursuit of this study to give some definition to federalism, for the reader would find it in some way problematic to grasp the essence of the research without a full, clear and adequate understanding of the concept.
Unlike those previous studies on the concept, currently it is very common to observe a distinction between the term federalism and that of federation (Burgess, 2006; Gagnon et al., 2015; King, 1982). Preston King (1982) in his pioneer study on the subject and following him, Watts (2008) and some others scholars (Burgess, 1993; Verney, 1995:81-87) for instance differentiate federalism from federation. In his main contribution to the theoretical discussion, Preston King made a distinction between „federalism‟ and „federation‟ as normative and descriptive terms respectively. The term „federation‟ is thus defined „as an institutional arrangement, taking the form of a sovereign state, and distinguished from other such states solely by the fact that its central government incorporates regional units in its decision procedure on some constitutionally entrenched basis‟ (King, 1982:77), whereas federalism as a political philosophy/ideology is essentially an organizing principle (ibid.:75). Along with this distinction, federalism refers to an ideology or philosophy for accommodating unity in diversity and for understanding federation (Burgess, 1993:20 and 102-113), while federation is a descriptive concept referring to the actual system of
18 Federalism and Ethnic Conflict Management: Theoretical and Conceptual Exploration
governments/institution (King, 1982:74). He thus conceived federalism from ideological and institutional perspectives.
Many other scholars have also offered different definitions to the term federalism. A further good point of departure in this respect is the definition developed by Daniel Elazar, one of the leading experts in field of federalism. According to him, federalism refers to the combination of elements of „self-rule‟ for some purposes and „shared-rule‟ for others with the aim of accommodating and promoting distinct identities within a larger political union on some constitutionally entrenched basis (Elazar, 1987:33). Here, the basic federal principle is concerned with the combination of „self-rule‟ and „shared rule‟. In the same way, federalism as an organizing principle advocates a „multi-tiered government combining elements of shared-rule through common institutions for some purposes and regional self-rule‟ for constituent units for some other purposes, thereby accommodating unity and diversity within a larger political union (Blindenbacher and Watts, 2003:9). The essence of federalism as a normative principle is the perpetuation of both union (unity) and autonomy (diversity), in the latter for accommodating, preserving and promoting distinct identities within a large political union simultaneously (Watts, 2008:8). To William H. Riker, federalism is „a government of the federation and a set of governments rule over the same territory and people and each kind has the authority to make some decisions independently of the other‟ (1964:5). Central to his notion of federalism is the concept that dual authorities rule the same land and people:
A constitution is federal if 1) two levels of government rule the same land and people, 2) each level of government has at least one area of action in which it is autonomous, and 3) there is some guarantee of the self-rule of each government in its own sphere (ibid.:11).
According to K. C. Wheare as well, federalism as a federal principle is, „the method of dividing powers so that the general and regional governments are each, within a sphere, coordinate and independent‟ (1963:11). Wheare, who gave a traditional concept of federalism, incidentally applied the following test in order to evaluate whether a constitution is federal or not.
The test which I apply for federal government is simply this. Does a system of government embody predominantly a division of powers between general and regional authorities, each
Chapter 2 19
of which, in its own sphere, is co-ordinate with the other and independent of them? If so, the government is federal (Wheare, 1963:33)
What is very clear here is that many of the above attempts at defining federalism lay emphasis on the division of constitutional powers and functions between two levels of government (Duchacek, 1970; Elazar, 1987; Riker, 1964; Wheare, 1963).
The concept of federation, on the other hand, denotes a specific form of political system in which there are several orders of government whose institutional features meet the normative principles of federalism. It embraces structures, institutions, procedures, and techniques for achieving one of the goals of federalism. It is a tangible institutional reality (Burgess, 2000:26; King, 1982:76). It is „a case of corporate self-rule, which is to say as some form of democratic or constitutional government‟ (Burgess, 2000:26).
The difference between federations as political structures and federalism as ideology should not, nevertheless, imply that the two are mutually exclusive or unrelated. Federalism as a normative principle without a doubt influences the institution established in political reality (King, 1982:74-75). Preston King has appropriately remarked that „the normative orientation affects the institutions‟ in this regard (ibid.:74). In other words, the relation between federation and federalism is expressed in the existence of a form of government where federation, as a political institution, emantes from the political ideology of federalism. Accordingly, there may be federalism without federation, but there can be no federation without some matching variety of federalism (ibid.:76, emphasis mine). Some form of federalism is always understood in any given federation. This is to mean that federalism could still be manifested, for example, in decentralized form of governments, or confederal arrangements. For instance, although the EU is not a classical federation, it has many federal features (Anderson, 2008; Watts, 2008). This point suggests to the fact that it still remains as a basic organizing principle of polities.
King further points out that federalism as ideology could reflect at least three different mobilization orientations: centralist, decentralist, and an appeal to balance (King, 1982:20- 21, emphasis in original). To begin with, centralist federalism in theory may lead to a
20 Federalism and Ethnic Conflict Management: Theoretical and Conceptual Exploration
complete integration among the states but is in practice limited to a more possible form of integration that is partial and which does not attempt to be absolute. This mainly reflects the process of „coming together‟ federations of US and Swiss. Federalism as an ideology served in the two polities to move towards a more centralized system compared to their formerly loose confederal arrangements (ibid.:20-25).
Second, decentralist federalism again initially associated with the West German federation (1949). Theoretically it refers to the opposite of complete integration: complete anarchy. But, as complete integration is a rare phenomenon so is complete decentralization. In practice, it aims at creating a less powerful center. Due to pressures from within or out, polities may decide to establish a federation from a previously single central power (Smith, 1995:5-6).
Aside from the above two, federalism has been promoted as a doctrine of balance (federalist balance). Wheare (1963) and Watts (2008) have underlined the point that in federations neither the forces of unity (share-rule) nor of diversity (self-rule) should prevail/override. More recently, Smith has also restated that federalism as a doctrine of balance aiming at finding balance between forces of centralization and decentralization (Smith, 1995, emphasis mine). In other words, federalism as an ideology serves the purpose of balancing. It strikes a balance between „self-rule‟ and „shared-rule‟, unity and diversity, centrifugal and centripetal forces and the power between the central and regional governments. To sum up, federalism is normally considered as a compromise, between autonomy and independence; unity and diversity (King, 1982:56). Therefore, any existing federation can match with at least one of the three types of federalisms-centralisation, decentralisation or balance (ibid.:22 and 74).
Coming to the case of Ethiopia, the decentralist federalism characterizes Ethiopian federalism at least in theory. The practice is, however, far from what is enshrined under the federal constitution. Bearing this characteristic in mind, the focal point of the following section is mainly confined to discussing several competing theoretical approaches to the study of federalism and federations.
Chapter 2 21
2.3. Theoretical Approaches to the Study of Federalism As far as the theoretical approaches to the study of federalism are concerned, the center of the debate revolves around the nature of federalism and its functions. In general, they fall into two main categories: normative and empirical. The normative approach in the main discusses the apparent pros and cons of federalism (Burris, 2001). For example, some relate federalism with peace, security, citizenship, and democracy at normative level. Quite the contrary, there are also those who blame federalism for contributing to regional inequalities and oppression of local minorities by local majorities (Shapiro cited in Burris, 2001). The empirical approach deals with features of federations such as constitutional division of power in a federation, changing nature of relations between the two layers of government, differences among federations on a comparative ground, mechanisms through which federal systems operate, and causes and consequences of the formation and disintegration of federal systems (ibid.).
These categorizations offer a mere differentiation between normative (theoretical) and empirical (functional) features of federalism. Nonetheless, it overlooks some of the main complexities that students of federalism wish to analyze. As one author carefully noted, „One of the most difficult problems for students of federalism arises from the vast scope of the subject matter. [...] The study of federalism leaves few aspects of political life untouched‟ (Gibbins, 1987:15, ellipsis added). Indeed, part of the explanation comes from the fact that federalism has been the subject of study of different disciplines and different scholars have been studying different aspects of the same concept.1 For instance, pertaining to the study of federalism, the law has focused on constitutional aspects of federalism while political science
1For instance, on the one hand, Wheare (1963) underscored more on the importance of the existence of commonly shared institutions among federations and his study has been criticized as too legalistic, Livingston (1952) on the other hand contended that the essential features of federalism are to be looked for, not in the shadings of legal and constitutional terminology but in the forces of economic, social, political, and cultural that have made the outward forms of federalism necessary. In a few words, federalism is a function of societies that is a territorially grouped diversity. Yet, Watts and Blindenbacher (2003) acknowledging Livingston‟s contribution point out that it is also one-sided. Both precisely argue that not only are institutions reflections of societies but also once created they influence the society that formed them. One cannot discard the fact that the 1789 US federation, the 1848 Swiss federation, and the 1995 Ethiopian ethnic federalism unquestionably were turning points in changing the political dynamic of the respective countries. In the two mature federations by transforming confederations to modern federalisms and in the latter by restructuring the state based on federalism as well as on ethnicity.
22 Federalism and Ethnic Conflict Management: Theoretical and Conceptual Exploration
has approached federalism from a structural and institutional perspective (Eckstein, 1975:xiii). Furthermore, the study of the field is still more about „explanations of federal experiments‟ than it is about a highly defined systems of an established theoretical field (Jinadu, 1979:13-25). As a result, several contending theoretical approaches to the study of federalism were expounded by scholars who have made a comprehensive study over the same subject matter. These competing theoretical approaches exhibit the diverse ways and means scholars examine key questions concerning federations. Keeping this in mind, the following sub-sections discuss some theoretical approaches of significance to this study.
2.3.1. Legal-institutional/constitutional approach This school of thought argues that a constitutional division of powers is the conceptual key to federalism (Wheare, 1963; Sawer, 1969). In his 1953 classic Federal Government, K. C. Wheare depicted on the US Constitution to define a „federal principle‟ as a „method of dividing powers so that general and regional governments are each, within a sphere, coordinate and independent.‟ The emphasis is on the division of functions and powers between the central and regional governments so that powers are divided between independent but coordinated authorities and both layers of government operate directly concerning the people. In other words, division of powers must result in their ultimate independence and co-ordinate status.
A large number of scholars are also influenced by this approach. Birch, for instance, stated that „There must be a division of power between one general and regional governments, each of which, in its sphere, is to co-ordinate with the others; Each government must act directly on the people, each must be limited to its own sphere of action and each must within that sphere be independent of the others‟ (Neumann cited in Birch, 1968).
However, other federalism theorists seriously questioned Whear‟s definition as it does not adequately address the complexity of finding that some of the powers at each level of government are completely independent from the other while others perfectly coordinate. Further, the critics apprehend that the term, “independence” representing the relationship between the general government and the regional governments might mean isolation. But, as
Chapter 2 23 a matter of fact if a federal polity is to be a working system, neither the general government nor the regional governments can operate in isolation. K. C. Wheare‟s approach to federalism has thus widely been criticised for its „legal formalism‟ rigidity, and static power-oriented perspective due to his highly emphasis on formal division of authority and the notion that the two levels of government are „independent‟ and „coordinate‟ (Birch, 1968:15; Livingston, 1956:1, 1952) or what Riker (1975:103) calls „extreme legalism‟ in his theorisation of the federal phenomenon. That is to say the approach, it is alleged, is too legalistic to take into account the convention and usages of extra-constitutional character which shape and influence the government process in a federal system. He further countered Wheare‟s approach as it was „highly legalistic in tone and displays very little understanding of political reality‟ (Riker, 1964:157). William Livingston (1952) in this respect discarded this approach for leaving out sociological variables or the federal qualities of a people behind the adoption of federalism.
Despite its limitations, the legal-institutional approach has offered some key contributions to the conceptual understanding of federalism. One merit of each juristic definition is that it enables us to distinguish a federation from a confederation or a mere league of states brought to existence by a treaty where the common agency created remains dependent upon and subordinate to the will of the governments of the constituent units. Secondly, the juristic definition enables us to distinguish a federal polity from a unitary state. In a unitary system, unlike in a federation, the legislature of the country is the supreme law-making body in the country. It may permit other legislatures to exist and exercise their powers, but it has the right, in law, to over-rule them; they are subordinate to it (Blondel, 1969:5; Burgess 1993:17).
In general, this classical approach has a set of features and institutions like constitutional delimitation, a bicameral legislature, written constitution, an independent judiciary (supreme/constitutional court), and other constitutional „safeguards‟ (to protect language and religion) as common important feature of federal polities/conditions for a federal system (Wheare, 1963).
24 Federalism and Ethnic Conflict Management: Theoretical and Conceptual Exploration
As far as these features of federation are concerned, Ethiopia deviates from the dominant common features of federal systems at least in three respects. For instance, the Ethiopian House of Federation is unique among federal second chambers in having been assigned a role as the ultimate custodian of the constitution. It has the ultimate authority to interpret the constitution, and this indeed is its key function.
Secondly, though a bicameral legislature is considered as one of cardinal principle of federation, the other distinct feature of the Ethiopian federalism is that the second chamber, otherwise known as the House of Federation, does not have any legislative power. As a result, the constituent units upon whom sovereignty is entrusted do not have a means to influence and check the decision-making process at federal level.
Last but not least, the House of Federation, unlike many other federal second chambers,2 is composed of representatives of different ethnic groups in the country or to use the terms of the Constitution, „the nations, nationalities and the peoples.‟ This is not without implications. Barbara Thomas-Woolly and Keller (1994) have rightly pointed out that the non-inclusion of the states may pose the question of legitimacy of the federal government. Jon Abbink has also precisely stated that „the actual division of powers between the member states and the federal government as defined in the constitution “is not federal enough.” [...] the states have no role in debating policies and in proposing legislation formulated at or with the impact on the nation as a whole‟ (Abbink, 1997:168, emphasis mine). In short, if federations are strictly considered to be based on the principle of „shared-rule‟ and „self-rule‟ in the sense of requiring the participation of the states at the center, the Ethiopian federation departs from it significantly.
2.3.2. Politico-ideological approach The main thrust of politico-ideological approach in the study of federalism is the analysis of the philosophical and ideological foundations of federalism (Burgess, 2006; Riker, 1964;
2It is argued that a second chamber based on a different composition and representing the interests of constituent units, more specifically less populous states, is an institution that reflects the normative diversity inherent in federalism. It is also suggested that second chambers reflecting the entrenched representation of the constituent units distinguishes federations from other types of polities (King, 1982).
Chapter 2 25
Stepan, 1999) and the linkage between federalism and such other broader issues of politics such as democracy, liberty and freedom (Elazar, 1987; Kymlicka, 1998; Riker, 1964). In point of fact, when presenting federalism as an ideological dispensation its contribution to the promotion of self-rule for some purposes and shared-rule for other purposes or combine unity with diversity through power dispersion is highlighted (Elazar, 1979:10; Gagnon and Gibbs, 1999:85). Undeniably, Weinstock has concisely stated that the liberty argument for federalism considers that „every government is a threat to individual liberty, and thus sees the proliferation of levels of government and the counterweights so created as favoring liberty‟(2001:76). The ideological promotion of federalism as a means of safeguarding free will, liberty and democracy, nevertheless, was challenged due to the formation of different majorities and minorities both at national and sub-national levels. William Riker, for instance, observed:
Federalism cannot be a guarantee [of majoritarian freedom] but rather can actually be an impediment. The effect of allowing ultimate decision at two levels of government (which is the essence of the federal relationship) is that the losers at the national level may reverse the decision at the constituent level. Thus, the losers nationally may become the winners locally, which of course negate the national decision in at least portions of the federal nation. Thereby, of course, the freedom of the national majority is infringed upon by local majorities (1964:142).
Moreover, he suggested that federalism works against local minorities by encouraging local tyranny (ibid.:143). In several ways, the institutionalisation of ethnic federalism in Ethiopia in this respect has affected ethnic relations at regional and local levels. Categorically, what Riker (1964) called „local tyranny‟ has been a reality in many of ethnically constituted regions (Assefa, 2006a). Going beyond such skepticisms, many scholars examined the political atmosphere under which a federal system of government could provide its professed qualities of non-centralisation of power and more individual and group freedom (Duchacek, 1979; Riker, 1964; Stepan, 2001). Accordingly, scholars have in recent times been engaged in examining the political environment under which federations may genuinely operate. One of the factors that made this question pertinent was that the collapse of ex-communist federations (O‟Leary, 2001; Stepan, 1999, 2001). Today there is a firm belief that a federal system requires a liberal democratic system, open and competitive elections, and the rule of law to work genuinely. All in all, federations do not genuinely function without a democratic
26 Federalism and Ethnic Conflict Management: Theoretical and Conceptual Exploration
framework and those federations that operate in authoritarian political systems are none other than sham federations (Burgess, 2006; O‟Leary, 2001).
To what extent do these concepts explain Ethiopian ethnic federalism? Federalism in Ethiopia, like other federations, has a corresponding ideological inspiration. It has been presented as a mechanism of ending the legacy of unequal interethnic relationships. The FDRE Constitution has also decentralist overtures as it has, at least in principle, subordinated the very existence of the federation to the „will‟ of the different ethno-linguistic groups to live together. Despite the inclusion of the right to self-determination up to and including secession clause in the FDRE Constitution, like former USSR federalism, Ethiopia has so far not entertained autonomy beyond language and culture in practical terms. In short, the practice is far from what is enshrined in the new federal constitution.
2.3.3. Sociological approach The sociological approach is characterized by a clear emphasis on the federal nature of a society that gives birth to the federal political system. In his sociological approach of federalism which resulted from the loopholes in Wheare‟s legal-constitutional approach, Livingston asserted that federalism is „a function not of constitutions but of societies‟(cited in Watts, 2008:20, emphasis added). Arguing from a sociological perspective, William S. Livingston submits that:
The essence of federalism lies not in the constitutional or institutional structure but in the society itself. Federal government is a device by which the federal qualities of the society are articulated and protected (Livingston, 1956:1-2)
These federal qualities Livingston spoke of are the diversities of people in a society. More often than not, diversity exists due to differences in economic interests, religion, race, nationality, language, historical background, social, and political institutions. However, Livingston laid down one essential condition which is that diversities must be territorially grouped, so as to result finally in the formation of a federal union (ibid.:23). He elaborated on this aspect further:
Chapter 2 27
The diversities may be distributed among the members of a society in such a fashion that certain attitudes are found in particular territorial areas, or they may be scattered widely throughout the whole of the society. If they are grouped territorially, that is geographically, then result may be society that is federal if they are not grouped territorially then the society cannot be said to be federal, but in the former case only can this take the form of federalism of federal government in the latter case it becomes functionalism, pluralism or same form of corporatism (ibid.:23, emphasis added).
The federal society, according to William Livingston, is thus one which contains within its fold elements of diversity.
The sociological approach, like the other approaches of federalism, has had its fair share of criticisms. Firstly, critics point out that Livingston just spells out the various diversities, but fails to explain the factors which generate the desire among the diversities for establishing a general government within a federal framework. Secondly, there is no casual relationship between a diversified society and a federal political system. The Welsh, the Scots and the Ulster Irish are instances of diversities inhabiting distinct geographical areas; however, they co-exist under UK unitary system.
Lastly, although Livingston‟s sociological approach identified the diversities in a society as what necessitated the founding of a federation, it has failed to explain what actually compelled these diverse nations (e.g., economic advantage, security, shared problems etc…) to form a federation when they can actually opt to be an independent nation. Despite its limitations, the sociological school‟s focus on the federal process remains useful for the study of multiethnic federations (ibid.:175).
The debates around sociological approach have some implications for the Ethiopian federation. For example, Ethiopia is a federal society of more than eighty ethno-linguistic groups. Besides, the national discourse on Ethiopian federalism developed essentially on the premise of finding suitable state structure that matching with the vast diversity of the country.
28 Federalism and Ethnic Conflict Management: Theoretical and Conceptual Exploration
2.3.4. Horizontal federalism The above discussions of federalism mainly focus on vertical (and representational) relationships between federal, state, and local levels while disregarding its horizontal aspects, for the linkages it provides across ethno-regional groups or units. That is to say, formal constitutionally entrenched divisions of power considered so far are essentially stated in vertical terms, as a matter of power distribution among the different levels of government. Here, horizontal federalism, which has a central conceptual significance to this study, offers one additional theoretical contribution on the subject of federalism. Sociological approaches begin to highlight (through the notions of compact and process) a more horizontal dimension (the accommodation of ethno-linguistic groups). The greater appreciation of the reality and salience of identity-based cleavages has initiated the development of what John Paden terms „horizontal federalism‟ which denotes „a system that recognizes the political reality of various forms of sub national cleavages and establishes the state structures to accommodate, alleviate, or crosscut them …‟(Paden, 1991:413-414, ellipsis mine). Of course, the notion of equal treatment of the different sub-units in the federal system is also essential in horizontal federal arrangements. Drawing on the example of the Nigerian federation, he further notes that:
over time, federalism has shifted in practice from providing linkages between vertical levels of society – that is national, state, and local – to providing a balance between horizontal segments of society – that is the various regional and sub regional interests, most often expressed through the states system (1991:412, emphasis added).
Without doubt, vertical and horizontal dimensions are not mutually exclusive but are meant instead to stress a shift in orientation toward the notion of balance: a balance between regions, between groups, between population blocks. Built up on this notion of horizontal balance, and the distributive role federalism plays, those multiethnic states which are engulfed by identity-based cleavages have prompted to use federalism for its horizontal properties (the accommodation of groups) or to evolve their practice of it in a more horizontal direction. In doing so, developing multiethnic federations like Nigeria have in due course shifted from the practice of providing linkages between vertical levels of government – federal,state, and local – to providing a balance between horizontal (ethno-regional)
Chapter 2 29 segments of the society. The same holds true for the Indian federalism. The Ethiopian federation as well submits to this reality. In Ethiopia the distinct horizontal feature of the 1995 federation was its defining characteristic since the very beginning.
To sum up, it is important to note that the above discussion, despite the wealth of literature on federalism, evidently exemplifies how the nature of the subject matter is complex and difficult, both as an ideological disposition and institutional arrangement. The above contending approaches, however, offer some organising devices in the pursuit of this study.
2.4. Federalism and Federation: Process and Formations Federations have arisen in extremely diverse circumstances, each being the unique result of choices by political leaders and larger historical forces. Several analysts have tried to identify a single common factor that led to the formation of federations. For instance, William Riker, one of the distinguished writers on federalism, attributed a considerable external or internal threat as the factor common to the creation of all federations. However, while this factor has been crucial in a number of cases, particularly Switzerland, Canada, and Mexico, there are a number of other instances, such as Australia, where it was evidently not the major factor. Certainly, in most federations it has been a combination of factors and processes that have led to the creation of federations. Therefore, it is not easy to put forward some universal set of factors that enlighten why countries adopt a federal polity (Davis, 1978:124).
The way federations have been created is also equally significant as the polities to some degree affact the autonomy and territorial intergrity of the states. In general, federations could be formed in three different ways by aggregating of formerly separate units (coming together federation or center seeking federation), devolving power to sub-national units (holding together federation), or by a combination of these two processes. Rokkan and Urwin (1982:11) call the first two processes as organic and mechanical federalism respectively. Likewise, Weinstock (2001:75-83) denotes them as federal integration and federal restructuring in that order.
30 Federalism and Ethnic Conflict Management: Theoretical and Conceptual Exploration
Coming to the first case, formerly separate units – independent states or colonies – concluded that they had enough common interest and shared identity to join together in a federal arrangement. This is mainy because a federal structure permitted each unit to preserve some of its autonomy while pooling other aspects in the new community. A common factor for this category of federations, despite their respective peculiar political history, is the fact that some of the states predate or pre-existed the federation. The states entered into a federal bargain, negotiated and at a certain point decided to form a federal government, while retaining some degree of their autonomy (Kriek, 1992:19; Duchacek, 1970:94; Watts, 2008; Anderson, 2008). As already noted in this type of federation, the constituent states predate the federation (the center). As a result, they usually are reluctant to grant wide powers to the center. Consequently, the constituent states, at least during the initial stage of the federation, remain strong. The USA, Australia, and Switzerland fall under this group (Assefa, 2006a; Solomon, 2006b; Watts, 2008; Anderson, 2008).
A second pattern has been through devolution from a previous unitary regime. In this case, the states may have initially been formed with a unitary and highly centralized (usually dictatorial and undemocratic) structure. The ultimate choice of federalism is in response to democratic political pressures for devolution because of the country‟s multiple cultural markers-languages, religions or ethnicities, and, perhaps, major economic differences between regions (Duchacek, 1978). Typically, the constituent units in this catagory of federations are new creations of the federal bargain or even a unilateral decision of the center at later stages, rather than entities having a prior existence. Briefly, the center creates the states. The constituent states/units do not exist at the time of the bargain or if they do exist, they have little influence at all. That is why they are in a weaker bargaining position as compared to their opposite numbers in „coming together‟ federations (Dikshit, 1975:144). Those federations under this arrangement are Belgium, Germany (after the Third Reich), Nigeria and Spain (Watts, 2008).
A third pattern has been the combination of these two processes, Canada and India providing main examples. Canada emerged from the creation of Ontario and Quebec out of a formerly unitary regime and from the addition of two previously separate colonies (New Brunswick
Chapter 2 31 and Nova Scotia) as provinces of the new federation. India also combined these two processes. The union of India involved devolution to states that had formerly been provinces and and also the addition of the formerly separate princely states into the new federation (ibid.).
In contrast, more recently, Alfred Stepan has underlined the distinction between federations created by the „coming together‟of formerly separate units and those resulting from „holding together‟ regions in a formerly united polity (Stepan, 2004:34-37). After observing the inadequacy of the broad divisions indicated above, Stepan has come up with a third type of taxonomy, which he refers as „putting together‟federation along with „coming together‟ and „holding together‟ones. His main contribution in this regard is the attempt to explain the differences that exist among federations created through devolutionary process, otherwise known as „holding together‟ federation. Hence, those multiethnic federations formed through a process of democratic bargaining are refered to as „holding together‟ federations while those formed through a „heavily coercive‟effort by a nonvoluntary and undemocratic means to put as one multinational state are denoted as „putting together‟ federations. The former USSR and Yugoslavian federations can be good examples for the latter case (Stepan, 2001:320-323; 1999:22-23).
In terms of origin and manner the Ethiopian federalism comes into being, there is no clear consensus among scholars both at home and abroad. On the one hand, some contend that it is a „coming together‟ federation (Andreas, 2003:161; Fasil, 1997:51). On the other hand, scores of other scholars would like to label it as a „holding together‟ one (Assefa, 2006a:131 and 218; Solomon, 2006b:35-36; Ghai, 2000:11). And still others argue that it is a „putting together‟ federation by considering the whole federal making process in the post- 1991(Asnake, 2013; Keller, 2002).
For instance, Andreas argues that „Although Ethiopian federalism was born in the wake of a long-standing unitary state, the constitutional principles governing federalism exemplify features characteristic of „coming together‟ federalism.‟ Reinforcing his standpoint Andreas points out the process that led to the formation of Ethiopian federalism „was the result of a
32 Federalism and Ethnic Conflict Management: Theoretical and Conceptual Exploration
revolutionary overthrow of the unitary state.‟ He thus classified the new Ethiopian political order as „coming together‟ federalism (2003:161). Quite the opposite, Assefa has evidently termed the way the Ethiopian polity has evolved as a „holding together‟ federation following Stepan‟s typology of federation (2006a:131). He has also referred the adoption of federal structuring in Ethiopia basically as a means of decentralizing power, in response to an existing concentration of power at the center and equally to empower diverse ethno-linguistic groups in the country (2006a:218). In fact, both of the above observations have failed to appreciate the fact that the post-1991 political practice was/has been deeply fraught with politics of exclusion and hegemonic control by EPRDF with little or no political participation by other political forces.
In sharp contrast, Asnake identified the Ethiopian federation into a „putting together‟ variant, one of Stepan‟s categories, by considering the post-1991 political process that preserved the dominance of EPRDF in the political arena of the country (2013). Similarly, Keller reiterated that Ethiopia‟s ethnic federalism began in 1991 as „holding together‟ but transformed since 1992 into what Stepan refers to as „putting together‟ federation due to the monopolisation of the political landscape by the EPRDF (2002:24). In this sense, to quote some words of Edmond Keller in relation to the post-1991 politics of transitional process:
…Ethiopia began as what appeared to be holding together federation in 1991. […] However, when it finally took shape, Ethiopia‟s federal system was clearly of the holding together varity, having been imposed from the top, and it quicky transformed into a putting together federal exercise, where there are federal features, but little or no liberal democracy (Keller, 2002, emphasis and ellipsis added).
Indeed, the observation of Asnake and Keller about a „putting together‟ variant is fitting to the Ethiopian case. One can also barely deviate from Ottaway‟s appropriate evaluation of the last few years of the transitional period. „It is a formal process devoid of content. The spirit of the democratic transition was missing completely as democratization became purely formal exercise, the major contenders of power from the opposition missing throughout‟ (Ottaway, 1995:73 and 81-83, emphasis added).
Chapter 2 33
From the above cited views and facts, it is apparent that the whole process of constitutional engineering and the resultant Ethiopian transition into a federal polity was executed under the influence of EPRDF without having a serious debate with its counterpart political forces over many divisive political issues of the country (Ottaway, 1995; Vestal, 1997; Harbeson, 1998; Joseph, 1998). Accordingly, the end result of the federal bargain is viewed as a „new form of dictatorship‟ seeing that „power remains in the hands of those ethnic groups who occupy power because of their position in overthrowing the former regime‟ (Ehrlich, 1999:57). In relation to this, the following phrasings of Leenco Leta, prominent figure from the OLF, which was a partner in the Transitional Government in the post-1991, concured with the above views in such way: „the process has in fact now ended in the restoration of a Derg-like one-party regime instead of the pluralist democratic order that was originally envisaged‟ (ibid.:xiii). To sum up, the post-1991 political development just ensured the permanency of EPRDF hegemonic position in the reordered the Ethiopian state and society (Merera, 2003:128).
2.5. National, Multinational and/or Ethnic Federations In the contemporary world, federalism is increasingly proving to be attractive to some formerly unitary countries as well as to developing or transitional countries that are seeking a viable form of democracy. The use of federalism as a means of balancing centripetal and centrifugal forces in this respect has attracted many states particularly those conflict-riven ones to adopt some form of federalism rather than to fall apart. What follows is presenting theses different classifactions of federation.
Federations can be put into two broad categories as mono-national/territorial and multinational/ethnic federations based on their recognition of linguistic, ethnic or religious diversities, and historical and economic regional differences respectively within the federation (Burgess, 2006:104; József, 2005:246; Kymlicka, 2006:64-5; Requejo, 2001:291; Watts, 2008). In the first group, we can find national/territorial federations, such as Argentina, Austria, Australia, Germany, Mexico, and USA, where the constituent units are primarily carved out on such considerations as history, geographical, economic and administrative considerations (József, 2005:246; Anderson, 2008; Watts, 2008; Burgess,
34 Federalism and Ethnic Conflict Management: Theoretical and Conceptual Exploration
2006:104; O‟Leary, 2001:279). Most of these federations have a clearly dominant language and relatively low levels of religious or ethnic division. They can have significant regional differences, but the definition of their federal units has not been structured around managing ethnic, religious, or linguistic cleavages.
In the second category, those federations which are refered to as „multinational‟and/or „ethnic‟ federations not only recognise linguistic, ethnic or religious diversity, but also reflect them in their ideology and structures. These federations have a clear linguistic or ethnic majority (Canada, Spain, Belgium, and Russia), but with one large minority (Belgium and Canada) or several smaller minorities (Spain and Russia), while others (India, Nigeria, Ethiopia) have an exceptional number of languages, religions, and nationalities, with none constituting a national majority. Quite often ethnic, linguistic and religious cleavages cut across one another – the Swiss federation is the classic case – and this can help reduce social polarization (Anderson, 2008; Watts, 2008). In fact, the terms „multinational‟ federalism and „ethnic‟ federalism descirbes similar thing, but with different purposes. It is, therefore, very crucial to make a distinction between them in a strict sense. Scholar like Kymlicka (2006:34- 35) defines those federations „in which internal boundaries have been drawn and powers distributed in such a way as to ensure that each national group is able to maintain itself as a distinct and self-governing society and culture‟ as multinational federations, while in Leff‟s words, „ethnic‟ federalism is a system „where territorial boundaries of the constituent units conform roughly to the distribution of the most important national groups within the multinational state‟ (1999:208-209). Similarly, Roeder defines „ethnofederalism‟ as a federation in which „at least some, if not all, the constituent units of the federation are homelands controlled by their respective ethnic groups‟ (2009:204). To put it differently, „ethnic federalism‟ characterizes the principle used to define the constituent units of the federation (Kymlicka, 2006:3).
Coming to the internal re-organization of the federated units in Ethiopia, ethnic federalism takes a central place. Indeed, Ethiopia has gone further than any other country in using ethnicity as the fundamental organizing principle of the federation to creat sub-units since 1991 (Abbink, 2006). In this regard, Fasil (cited in Assefa, 2006a:237-38) firmly states that
Chapter 2 35 the type of federalism the federal constitution adopted is not a territorial but an ethnic federalism:
„To be sure, it is not as simple as all ethnic groups simply coming together to form the federation. First, the territory of the states are drawn to empower the dominant ethno- linguistic groups, then the states formed on the basis of ethnicity have then come together to form the federation‟ (emphasis added).
That is why ethnic federalism as opposed to multinational federalism is more appropriate in the Ethiopian situation. In contrast to this, those old federations, for instance, Switzerland and Canada are typically labelled as multinational as they do not employ ethnicity as the basic tool of state organisation. The issue of congruence between ethnic and boundaries are also irrelevant for them (state boundaries are not deliberately coincided with racial, linguistic or national boundaries). Similarly, the Nigerian and Indian federations do not use ethnicity alone as the principal organising tool of their federations. The absence of an explicit congruence between constitutes‟ boundaries and ethnic identites in Nigerian federation has encouraged interethnic cooperation in this regard. Thus, it avoided the overlapping of ethnic and intra-federal boundaries and divided the three dominant and competing ethnic groups into thirty-six units so as to lessen their destructive conflict to dominate the national centre (Horowitz, 1985).
2.6. Conceptualizing Ethnicity and Ethnic Conflict Academics from different fields have increasingly been using the concept ethnic and its derivative term ethnicity within particular societies in various parts of the world, particularly since the 1970s, but its precise universal meaning is yet to be agreed upon (Vanhanen, 1999). This lack of clear-cut definition for ethnicity has become one of the serious difficulties encountered by scholars in the field, mainly those who are dealing with varieties of problems in the situation of multiethnic societies. It seems that because of this lack of precision ethnicity has become an elusive, slippery and complex concept, and currently suffers from both „polysemy‟ – whereby it has multiple meanings – and synonymy – whereby it is often related to other terms in meaning such as „nation‟ and „race‟ (Green, 2006). For others, ethnicity is „very complex, elusive and often controversial [...] described in a vast literature,
36 Federalism and Ethnic Conflict Management: Theoretical and Conceptual Exploration
but no conclusive agreement on its definitions, scope and understanding exists‟ (Habtamu et al., 1997:3, ellipsis mine). Perhaps for that very reason, John Markakis has cautiously used the term „chameleon like phenomenon‟ in his attempt to explain the complex nature of ethnicity (1993:199). In this context, Merera Gudina makes an important remark on the emotive nature of ethnicity. To quote some words from this eminent Ethiopian scholar and politican:
Definition is not always easy; and „ethnicity‟ and „nationalism‟ are particularly elusive; they have continued to frustrate the development of common terms of reference. Moreover, the attempted definitions are either ideologically informed or limited to local situation and hence lack universal meaning and application (Merera, 2003:20).
Clearly, nothing close to a consensus has emerged, not only concerning the theoretical discourse on ethnicity, but also about what it is in the first place. In fact, „in both popular‟ and „academic discourse,‟ much confusion surrounds the concept of ethnicity (Ratcliffe, 1994:6). For instance, scholars like anthropologist Eriksen (1997:33-39) defines ethnicity as an aspect of communal relationships between the various groups whose fellow members consider themselves culturally distinctive and they may be hierarchically identifying themselves within a given society from other members of groups with whom they have in some way a minimum or regular contact. It should, however, be noted here that what matters is not as such the degree of contact – minimum or maximum – of an ethnic group with others. The bottom line of the matter lays in what the members of an ethnic identity feel about themselves vis-à-vis others. Cohen (1974:ix) and Oswalt (1986:331) have also conceived it as contacts, relations and interactions among members of the diverse ethnic groups.
Edwards (1985:6) is also of the opinion that ethnicity can be regarded as a sense of group identity that can be derived from actual or perceived communities including religion, language and race. In addition, many researchers like Frye (1992), Weber (1997), and Smith (1997) embrace religion as an essential characteristic of ethnicity. Nevertheless, it is difficult to presume that religion is always a component of ethnicity simply because religion may serve as an element of ethnicity for some ethnic groups but certainly not for others. To be
Chapter 2 37 precise, members of an ethnic community may belong to different religions. In Ethiopia, for instance, while religion is applicable for the Somalis or the Afars, it is not a common building block for the Oromos, Guraghes, Amharas or Tigrayans. The members of the latter ethnic identities are both Muslims and Christians. That is why religion has not been a symbol of or a mobilizing factor among the members of the Oromo, Guragh, Amhara or Tigrayan ethnic groups.
Doornbos (1998:20) has stated ethnicity as „constructed identity, is one set of multiple potential identities and itself usually [has] multiple facets and faces‟. On the other hand, Du- Toit further takes ethnicity as:
…the characteristics and attitudes of those who consider themselves and are considered by others to form a distinct ethnic group. Such a group may not satisfy empirical measures nor have any temporal permanence, but it does not have sociological importance at the ethnographic level (1978:9, ellipsis added).
Despite its diverse meanings and applications, ethnicity may refer to a state of mind emanating from a feeling of separate identity and belonging, which in turn is based on shared cultural markers (common ancestry, common language, shared historical memories, culture, religion etc…), but more importantly on the myth of common ancestry. It is central to indicate that the myth of common descent is an essential feature of an ethnic group. In other words, the subjective belief in the myth of common ancestry is the essence of an ethnic group or ethnicity (Gans, 2003:10). In clarifying an ethnic group, scholars thus underline those factors that distinguish a given group from others and embolden its internal cohesion.
What we observe from the above explanations is that there seems to be agreement on the view that ethnicity has both objective as well as subjective components. While on the one hand, ethnicity is subjective as it is an identification or a sense of belonging to a particular ethnic group (Yang, 2000); it is, on the other hand, also objective as the feeling of belonging to a particular ethnic group can only arise if it is based on objective elements like language, culture, religion, skin color and other physical characteristics (Young, 2004; Ghai, 2000).
38 Federalism and Ethnic Conflict Management: Theoretical and Conceptual Exploration
On this basis, ethnic conflict could be defined as „any form of civic clash within or across state boundaries when at least one of the warring parties is mobilized and organized along ethnic lines or on behalf of a certain ethnic group‟ (Tishkov, 1999:576). Brown‟s (1997) notion of an ethnic conflict is relatively specific and clear in that it incorporates a number of factors which contribute to the rise of this situation. As Brown views it, „an ethnic conflict is a dispute about important political, economic, social, cultural, or territorial issues between two or more ethnic communities‟ (Brown, 1997:82). Thus, the conflict is generally not about ethnic differences themselves but over political, economic, social, cultural, or territorial matters.
Despite the prevailing recognition among scholars about the terminological, political and conceptual ambiguities surrounding ethnicity and ethnic conflict, there is no scholarly agreement about the essence of concept in general. However, the various approaches on the nature of ethnicity could be considered from three broad angles. These analytical approaches are primordialist, instrumentalist and constructivist (Van der Beken, 2012:10; Young, 1993:21-3; Yang, 2000:41-42). What follows is a discussion of each of these competing views that underpin the process of conducting this study.
2.6.1. The primordialist school The primordialist approach conceives the concept of ethnicity as something given at birth, inherent in human nature, and passed on genealogically from generation to generation (Geertz, 1963; Carment and Harvey, 2001; Isaacs, 1975; Esman, 2004). For primodialists, ethnicity is static, immutable, and uniform in terms of primordial qualities3 or attachments such as birthplace, common ancestry, and shared territory, linguistic, religious and other social phenomenon (Brass, 1991:68-76). Understood in this sense, ethnicity is a biologically „given‟ or „natural phenomenon‟ (Phadnis and Ganguly, 2001:23). The primordialist view further treats ethnicity as a „constant, as an historical cultural heritage on the basis of which
3Primordial qualities/elements of ethnicity used in the definition are common language, common name and myth of descent, shared history and other inherited characteristics common to the members of the group (Poluha, 1998:32).
Chapter 2 39 an ethnic group must act‟ (Abbink, 1991:1). In short, under primordialism, ethnic identity or ethnicity as something that is fixed across time and with distinct social boundaries.
From the perspective of primordialist school, ethnic conflicts basically arise from differences in ethnic identities (Vanhanen, 1999; Esteban et al., 2012; Ghai, 2001). In this context, primordialist goes on to say:
…people are naturally emotionally attached to the ethnic and national groups to which they belong and […] that this attachment necessarily implies feelings of antagonism towards other groups that sooner or later express themselves through violence and/or, in [multi-ethnic states], in movements towards independence (Diez-Medrando, 2007:22, ellipsis mine).
However, without belittling the potency of ethnicity4 as source of conflict, a number of authors in the field persuasively argue that the mere existence of many and/or different ethnic groups does not necessarily lead to ethnic conflict (Ryan, 1990; Assefa, 2006a). Another core criticism leveled against the primordialist model is its presentation of a static and naturalistic view of ethnicity that mystifies emotion and reduces cultural and social behavior to biological drives (Eller and Coughlan, 1993:200; Kedourie, 1993:69). Ratcliffe (1994:7) has challenged this school by arguing:
although primordial ties are a key element of „ethnic consciousness‟ these are not fixed in a deterministic sense, no more than perceptions of them have a cognitive commonality. Ethnic formations at particular historical junctures retain an element of fluidity, and are subject to fractionalization on the basis of other factors such as class and gender (emphasis added).
4John Markakis in one instance, for example, wrote „ethnicity has proved to be the most potent force for political mobilization throughout Africa including the Horn‟ (1998:7). He further argues that ethnicity has become catalysts for political conflict in the Horn of Africa for two reasons: competition for scarce resources and the role the state (state policy) plays in controlling the allocation of these resources (1994:217). In trying to explain ethnic conflicts, some authors also pay attention to cultural differences. Particularly, Huntington (1993a) underlined cultural differences and proclaimed the beginning of an era of clashes between cultural entities. But, explaining these conflicts in terms of cultural differences is not quite satisfactory. Similarly, the Austrian political scientist Alber F. Reiterer also asks: “What is a cultural difference? Is it that the Slovenians sing „Gori, gori na planina‟ while the Carinthia-Germans sing a slightly different melody „In die Berg bin i gern'?” And, more important, are such differences sufficient condition/cause for such conflict? He clearly states that they are not at all. It cannot also explain the conflict that broke out and lasted for about 20 years since 1991 in Somalia, one of the most ethnically homogeneous countries in the Africa continent. As Klaus Schlichte convincingly argues, „cultural‟ differences, despite often seen as the underlying structural causes of social conflicts, are not the fundamental causes of ethnic conflict in the modern-day (Schlichte, 1994:59-65).
40 Federalism and Ethnic Conflict Management: Theoretical and Conceptual Exploration
If one looks at ethnicity from the primordialist perspective alone, however, ethnic groups appear to be only as homogenous, static and bounded entities (Poluha, 1998:32). Indeed, the limitation of the primordialist, among other things, is that by attaching ethnicity to human nature and hence making it naturally given at birth, it fails to admit those circumstances where ethnic identities can be changed through intermarriage and cohabitation by forming a mixed origin or identity. This situation might thus lead to the creation of new ethnicities (Law, 2010:78-79).
Coming to the case of Ethiopia, primordialism could reflect the growing importance of ethnicity in both academic and political discourses. In this regard, after the constitutionalisation of ethnicity as the organising principle of Ethiopian federalism, primordial qualities, particularly language plays a key role in defining the Ethiopian polity. For instance, in post-1991 federal Ethiopia, as noted already, the boundaries of the states were principally defined on the basis of language and as a result the linguistic factor became the single most important criterion for organizing the units that constitute the federation (Abbink, 1997:169). In a similar fashion, after the institutionalisation of ethnicity as an official state ideology and practice since the beginning of the 1990s, Ethiopia officially sanctioned the formation of ethnic political parties (Aalen, 2002, 2006; Abbink, 1997; Alem, 2004; Asnake, 2003). Since then different ethno-linguistic groups gave prominence to primordial elements of ethnicity to form ethnically diverse political parties5 in the country. In the same way, as contended by Mekuria Bulcha, Oromo nationalists used primordial elements such as language and descendant to hold together different Oromo groups (Mekuria, 1997:9-10).
5Several ethnic based political parties, which are affiliated to specific ethno-linguistic group in Ethiopia, have officially emerged in the post-1991 period (Solomon, 2014; Merera, 2003). To mention few of them, four major political parties in Afar (ALF, ANLM, ANLF, APDO), many parties that claim to represent Oromia (OLF, ONC, OPDO, IFLO, OFDM), many parties that claim to represent the Ethiopian Somali (ESDL, WSDP, ONDF), and some political parties claim to represent the different ethnic groups in the Southern Nations, Nationalities, and People‟s Region (SEPDF, SPDM, GPDF, OPDM, SEPDC, and so on) were formed (Assefa, 2006a; Merera, 2003). Many of them support self-determination and the federal option but there is no consensus on the issue of secession (Assefa, 2006a). As opposed to the Somali and some factions within Oromia, the SNNPRS (Southern Nations, Nationalities, and People‟s Region) has always shown willingness to be part of the larger Ethiopian state in a genuine federal set up (see Abbink, 1998; Vaughan, 2006).
Chapter 2 41
2.6.2. The instrumentalist school In reaction to the strong emphasis on primordial qualities, the instrumentalist school considers ethnicity as a social construct though not wholly invented by politicians and intellectuals for objectives of social manipulation that is related to hidden political, economic, and ideological motives (Barth, 1969; Rex, 1997; Brass, 1991; Glazer and Moynihan, 1975; Esman, 2004). For this school of thought, ethnicity is far from being biologically determined, historically rooted, and reinforced by collective myths and memories. It is rather a mere political phenomenon and may not necessarily need historical and cultural definitions, and explanations (Eriksen, 1993). In short, ethnicity is a social, political, and cultural construct and thus an elastic and highly malleable instrument to serve particular or multiple objectives. The following phrasings of Esman are very illuminative of the aforementioned statements:
Ethnicity is not a historical given at all, but in fact a highly adaptive and malleable phenomenon. In response to changing conditions, the boundary of an ethnic community collectivity can expand or contract individuals move in and out and even share membership in more than one community. The very content, symbols, and meaning of particular collective identity can and do evolve. In effect, ethnicity is dynamic, not a fixed and immutable element of social and political relations (Esman, 1994:10, emphasis added).
In a stark contrast to primordialism, instrumentalist argues differences in ethnic identities alone might not necessarily lead to ethnic conflict. Rather ethnic conflict would go off only when ethnicities are politicized or manipulated to generate political and socio-economic advantages for a particular ethnic group at the cost of excluding or marginalizing other one‟s (Collier and Hoeffler, 2004; Chandra, 2004; Ruane and Todd, 2004).
The instrumentalist approach further focuses on the malleability of ethnicity and the role of ethnic entrepreneurs/elites in the formation of ethnic identity (Ukiwo, 2005, Esman, 2004). With the prime objective of protecting and maximizing political or economic ambitions for their groups as well as themselves, according to some proponents of the school, elites instrumentalise some primordial elements of their ethnic groups whom they claim/wish to represent (Phadnis and Ganguly, 2001:26). In this process, past ethnic cultures are polished and refined through new histories and myths in response to the changing social realities.
42 Federalism and Ethnic Conflict Management: Theoretical and Conceptual Exploration
Thus, „ethnic identities are shifting and changing according to historical and social process‟ (Tegegne, 1998:119). But, it is mistaken to simplify the creation of ethnicity to the anthropologists‟ fieldwork, particularly as Thomas Eriksen argues.6
However, instrumentalism is criticized by those who argue that ethnicity cannot be willfully decided on by individuals and is instead rooted in and regulated by society collectively (Lake and Rothchild, 1998:5).
The other critique of instrumentalism is its emphasis on excessive flexibility of ethnic identities and social boundaries that define the ethnic group. One should, nevertheless, be cautious of exaggerating the mutability of ethnic boundaries or the elasticity of their cultural contents. There are limits to the process of constructing ethnic identities. Aletta J. Norval (1999:81-100) on this point adds a note of caution that though identities are socially constructed, this does not mean that they can be “picked and chosen as if from a supermarket shelf.” For instance, ethnic groups in Africa often preserved a significant portion of their pre- colonial linguistic and cultural identity (Forrest, 2004:29). In this respect, Kwesi Prah tends to support what Forrest observed in such fashion:
The overwhelming masses of Africans continue to live in fairly coherent tradition-bound communities in rural Africa […] from pre-colonial times to the present, cultural features like kinship systems, belief systems and religious practices, mythology, languages, cultural value systems and other customary usages have been real in Africa (2004:8-16, ellipsis mine).
Finally, the instrumentalist‟s approach is criticized for its exaggerated belief in the power of elite in manipulating the masses and neglecting the wider cultural environment in which elite competition and rational maximization take place (Hutchinson and Smith, 1996:9). It is true that ethnicity is highly vulnerable to ideological manipulation and political mobilization in the promotion of collective interest. But it must be noted that unless the identity element in the form of shared language or any of the cultural staffs is combined with economic and political marginalization, the elites could not effectively mobilize the masses or the masses
6As a matter of fact, the creation aspect of ethnicity ranges from those who see it as something created and recreated in the fieldwork of anthropologist (Eriksen, 1993) to those who emphasize the pragmatic response of people to changing needs of people, especially as a human shelter against domination (Roosens, 1989).
Chapter 2 43 could not be get easily mobilized. Thus, the prevalence of stronger convergence of interest between the elites and those to be mobilized seems to be very decisive.7
The Marxist view on ethnicity also matches with the instrumentalist school. Most Marxists considered the use of ethnicity in politics as a „mask behind which actors conceal their class position from each other and from themselves‟ (Barany, 2002). Marxists in this regard used the term „false consciousness‟8 to illustrate how the capitalist ruling class sought to instrumentalise the ethnic sentiments to mislead and weaken the solidarity of the proletariat and divide them by „ethnic‟ differences (Esman, 2004). Indeed, for the Marxists, ethnicity was subordinated to class interest since it has been class and class struggles that can best explain social phenomena such as state-society relations (Barany, 2002).
Considering the Ethiopian case, instrumentalism significantly influenced the perception of ethnic identity in both popular and political discourses. The ethnic regionalisation of Ethiopia since 1991 led to the overall ethnification9 of politics in the country as the government promoted ethnicity as the important instrument of political mobilisation and state organisation. As a result, various ethno-linguistic groups, which had never been mobilized before 1991 along ethno-nationalism lines, were organised themselves according to their ethnicity so as to fit into the new ethno-federal restructuring (Asnake, 2013). This phenomenon is no less evident in the ethnically diverse southern part of Ethiopia than elsewhere (Vaughan, 2003, 2006). Similarly, in several regions of Ethiopia local elites or
7It is crucial to point out that ethnicity when mobilized for some political objectives because of real or perceived injustice has to be seen in the context of state policy and action. State often defines the „national culture‟ which will have considerable implications on the citizen (Assefa, 2006a:88). In all instances, the catalytic factors are not often the primordial differences of the groups involved (see Merera, 2003:28). Conflict normally, to a certain extent, arises from more contemporary issues of domination and distribution, specific state action, perhaps conducted in the name of state-building, national integration and so on. This may create a sense of marginalization, exclusion or repression amongst particular identity groups (Assefa, 2006a). 8False consciousness is a term used by sociologists, and expounded by some Marxists, to designate the way in which material, ideological, and institutional processes in capitalist society mislead members of the working class and other class actors and consequently people are unable to see things, especially exploitation, oppression, and social relations, as they really are (Hobsbawm, 1990; Wallerstein, 1979). 9Ethnification is defined as a situation in which “the social, psychological, and political importance of ethnic identities rise relative to other identities‟‟ (Somer quoted in Blagojevic, 2009:4).
44 Federalism and Ethnic Conflict Management: Theoretical and Conceptual Exploration
ethnic entrepreneurs10 sought to instrumentalise the primordial qualities of their ethnic constituencies to secure state recognition of their separate identity (Asnake, 2013).
2.6.3. The constructivist school Although the above two completely contradictory schools present significant insights about the nature of ethnicity and ethnic conflict, they fall short in explaining the concept completely as they attempt to illustrate the complexity from mutually exclusive and divergent angles (Horowitz, 1985:139). This agony, however, can be lessened by adopting a milder instrumental version of ethnicity approach.
This position links to the „social constructivist‟ version of ethnicity to fully grasp the academic discourse on ethnicity and ethnic conflict (Lake and Rothchild, 1998:6). This school assumes ethnicity as something that is not „immutable,‟ fixed and constant. Nor „completely open,‟ fluid, flexible and malleable phenomenon (ibid.). Putting differently, the social constructivist approach emphasizes that ethnicity is „socially constructed‟ or socially manufactured in terms of its formation and is defined by the historical conditions in which they emerge (Teshale, 1995:xxi; Berman, 1998; Markakis, 1998; Lentz, 1995). In other words, ethnicity is a form of identity creation (Young, 1993).
Constructivists, unlike primordialists, tend to focus on the processes through which ethnic groups have emerged and have gained social significance (Ukiwo, 2005). As Robert Bates argues, however, the constructivist school combines elements of both the primordialist and instrumentalist approaches by saying:
In keeping with the primordialists, constructivists view ethnic identities as a cultural endowment; but in keeping with instrumentalists, they view ethnic identities as malleable. Distinguishing their position is the belief that while identities can be reshaped, they can be altered only at significant cost (Bates, 2006:5, emphasis added).
It is interesting to mention that at the heart of identity construction the so-called „cultural [ethnic] entrepreneurs who codify and standardize a language, equipping it with a written
10They refer to the „ethnic elites‟ who have „a vested interest in advancing particular agendas‟ on behalf of their ethnic groups (see Carment, 2003:31).
Chapter 2 45 form, create an ethnos-centered historical narrative, populated with internal heroes and external villains, and build a literary tradition‟ play significant role in this regard (Young, 2003:14). In many African countries, the colonial regimes played a central role in the „promotion‟, „systematization‟ and in some cases the actual „invention‟ of ethnic groups and identities (Ranger, 1983; Young, 1985). Some studies also seem to reveal how ethnicity is constructed and in the process might lead to brutal effects. Nicholas Haysom has strikingly illustrated this fact:
ethnic tension arises out of the social meaning, including mythical or fabricated meaning, of perceived difference. In this regard, both the Balkan [Bosnia] and the Central African [Rwanda] ethnic massacres compel us to address the fact that the horrible cruelties perpetrated in these identity conflicts were perpetrated by neighbors, neighbors that had once been content to go to school with […] and intermarry with their ethnic enemies. The politics of difference [based on race, ethnicity, tribe, religion, culture, language and so on] concerns the way in which the political elite manufactures and utilizes the social meaning of difference (2003:219, ellipsis added).
Similarly, Lake and Rothchild has presented a good instance of how ethnic identities are constructed and reconstructed as a response to societal developments. They mentioned during the era of the Yugoslav federation there was a development towards replacing separate Serb, Croat, Macedonian, Albanian, and Muslim categories with the overarching „„Yugoslav‟‟ identity. However, the bloody civil war and dissolution of the federation into different independent republics such as Serbia, Croatia, Bosnian, and others caused people to return to their original (Croat, Serb) identity (Lake and Rothchild, 1996).
In the Ethiopian context, scholars implicitly and explicitly used constructivism to explain inter-ethnic relations and conflicts. For example, Markakis in his fascinating article entitled „The Politics of Identity: The Case of the Guraghe in Ethiopia‟ has revealed convincingly how the Guraghe identity and its connotations developed slowly but evidently over a period of time, predominantly in the way the „others‟ define the Guraghes and in the recent years how religion and state restructuring considerably shaped the Guraghes, now divided into Guraghes and Silte11 ethnic groups (Markakis, 1998:127-146).
11The Silte peoples, whose identity question was resolved relatively in peace in 2001, were in the past considered as a sub-group of the Gurage ethnic group (Smith, 2007; Nishi, 2005; Cohen, 2006; Assefa, 2006a;
46 Federalism and Ethnic Conflict Management: Theoretical and Conceptual Exploration
Following this, Jenkins (1997:46-47) concludes that in order to better comprehend the concept of ethnicity, there is no worth in dismissing one or the other of the thoughts for depending on a number of factors as all thoughts illustrate the real nature of ethnicity. While some underline the significance of primordial feelings as the bond that keeps ethnic groups together, others have given greater emphasis to ethnicity as a site of mobilization for certain political or economic objectives. In any case, all are quite helpful to carefully put the concepts of ethnicity and ethnic conflict in their proper setting. By and large, the multiethnic federation of Ethiopia under study offers evidence of all three „personalities‟ of ethnicity at one point of another. Accordingly, for the purposes of this study, the three personalities are understood as complimentary rather than mutually exclusive. I therefore follow Young‟s practice in postulating ethnicity as a combination of the interactive primordial, instrumental, and constructivist discourses (Young, 1993).
2.7. Federalism and Ethnic Conflict Management: Exploring the Links Historically, multiethnic states have experimented with several strategies or policies for containing or eliminating ethnic conflicts aimed at ethnic homogenization. Although there is little consensus as to what constitutes the most suitable strategy for achieving peace, the predominant practice of states in the past used a variety of instruments that range from physical extermination to coercive assimilation (Kymlicka, 2001). Along with Esman (2000), John McGarry and Brendan O‟Leary (1993) in this respect sketched the taxonomy of state practices regarding macro-ethnic conflict regulation strategies that include two broad categories of eliminating and managing differences. The particular tools of eliminating differences or diversities consist of forced mass population transfer, genocide, secession and/or partition and integration/or coercive assimilation. Methods for managing ethnic diversities, on the other hand, incorporate hegemonic control, cantonisation, arbitration, federalism and consociationalism or power sharing (ibid.:1993:4).
Assefa, 2012; Vaughan, 2006).
Chapter 2 47
A number of multiethnic countries all across the world practiced some of these strategies of eliminating differences or diversities with the aim of addressing problems of ethnic diversity (McGarry and O‟Leary, 1993:6-17). For instances, western democratic states (e.g., Canada, France, Australia, and US) that traditionally refuse to recognize collective rights of ethnic minorities promoted assimilation far and wide (Smooha, 2002:423). In the case of Ethiopia, from among the strategies of eliminating differences or diversities enumerated above, the imperial régime employed an assimilation policy to promote the Amharic language as a national language. Forced mass population transfer and secession that happened during the Derg and EPRDF régimes respectively can also service as cases in point (Asnake, 2004:52). However, these days there is a growing insight that forging ethnic groups into a „homogenous nation is not a practical approach‟ (Lijphart, 1991:493). As a result, the challenges to some of strategies enumerated above are growing in number for their deficit in terms of social justice, and face serious problems, which have led some scholars, policy- makers, and statesmen to view federalism as a promising alternative. Likewise, the post-1991 Ethiopian experience has uncovered the use of some of the instruments belonging to the management of ethnic differences, among which, federalism is the principal one in containing interethnic tensions and conflicts in the country (Asnake, 2004:53). Thus, from the four strategies of managing ethnic diversities and interethnic relations aforementioned, federalism is of a particular interest in the analysis of the area under discussion.
The federal dispensation, which aims at balancing the principles of „self-rule‟ and „shared- rule‟(Elazar, 1987), remarkably has gained increasing attraction among multiethnic states, especially those in the developing world as an appropriate institutional framework for managing their ethno-linguistic differences (Harris and Reilly, 1998). Although federalism in its original form was not designed to regulate conflicts triggered by ethnic diversities, today many countries all across the world are experimenting with federalism and other forms of autonomy with the aim of accommodating ethno-linguistic communities in national political space and containing inter-communal tensions and conflicts (Aalen, 2002). The federalization of the Ethiopian state is also associated with the management of the country‟s conflict-ridden interethnic relations (Asnake, 2004:52-53). The general argument is that the system grants internal self-determination to territorially concentrated groups; makes for
48 Federalism and Ethnic Conflict Management: Theoretical and Conceptual Exploration
institutional expression of pluralism; and enhances political participation, equality, and equitable provision of services (Ebel and Vaillancourt, 2001; Inman and Rubinfeld, 1997; Kymlicka, 1995).
But federalism is also known to have grave downsides: it institutionalizes discriminatory treatment of citizens, breeds competition among ethnic groups, intercommunal tensions and conflicts and emboldens them to ask for more powers, which may end in separation (Ghai, 2000; Kymlicka, 1998; Schmitter, 2000).
Any discussion considering the utility of federalism as a means of managing interethnic tensions and conflicts, thus, presents two broad contending views. On the one hand, scores of scholars and social scientists ever more advocate the use of federalism as an option for multiethnic states, which have been besieged by interethnic tensions and conflicts (Osaghae, 1997; Watts, 1998; Young, 1994; Horowitz, 1985, 1991; Harris and Reilly, 1998; Gurr, 1994). On the other hand, a number of scholars unveil their doubts about the efficacy of the federal formula as a means of managing ethno-linguistic differences (Snyder, 2000; Nordlinger, 1972; Kymlicka, 1998; Cornell, 2002; Basta-Fleiner, 2000). What follows is a debate of each of these competing views.
In light of the diametrically contrasting viewpoints above, Horowitz (1991), McGarry and O‟Leary (1993), Coakley (2003), Hechter (2000) and Ghai (2000) are among contemporary academics who advocate federalism as an appropriate means of managing ethnic conflicts and accommodating difference in multiethnic states. Donald Horowitz, for instance, argues that federalism could be used to reduce ethnic tensions and conflicts through proliferation of „points of power,‟ particularly those aimed at controlling the national government at the center by providing political and economic resources for competing ethnic elites at regional and local levels (Horowitz, 1985). This might help the transformation of violent conflicts that contending ethnic groups engage in in their bid to control „the whole regim at the center‟ into intra-regional non-violent conflicts within sub-national units of government (Petter cited in Gagnon, 1993; Smith, 1995). Suberu reinforces the above point by arguing that the Nigeria‟s federal structure, with its multiplicity of sub-national units, promotes decentralization and
Chapter 2 49 compartmentalisation of ethno-religious and regional conflicts. This reduces the capacity of such conflicts to polarise or destabilise the whole federation (2006:65-75). The Nigerian federal experience thus demonstrates that how federalism can be innovatively used to tame and depolarize intercommunal tensions and conflicts (ibid.).
As far as far as the Ethiopian federal experience is concerned, its record regarding interethnic conflict mitigation in the country appears far from what is stated above. Unquestionably, the most noticeable change pertaining to interethnic relationships in the Ethiopia following the institutionalization of ethnic regionalisation has been the emergence or the exacerbation of localized violent ethnic conflicts at sub-national units, which induced territorial rearrangement in a number of ethnically constituted regions (Abbink, 2006; Asnake, 2004; Dereje, 2006; Merera, 2003; Solomon, 2006a; Vaughan, 2006).
Likewise, Watts (1998:16) underscores that despite some criticisms regarding the sustenance of multinational federations:
The presence for well over a century of the federation of Switzerland, where most of the cantons are distinct and internally homogenous in terms of language or religion, and the reorganization of the states within India and Nigeria along primarily linguistic and ethnic lines which occurred sometimes after federation in order to assuage internal pressures suggest that in certain conditions federations based on distinct ethnic or national units can be sustained and may help reduce tensions. Indeed, there is yet no evidence that any other form of political organization has successfully reconciled political integration and territorially based ethnic diversity for any extended length of time except by the imposition of force (emphasis added).
Along with Vincent Ostrom, Young illuminates the above position by saying that no other political organization offers better opportunities for large and culturally divided societies in the contemporary world than the federal formula (Young, 1994:13; Ostrom, 1979:81). In Canada, for instance, federalism accommodates not only linguistic diversities (Quebec) but regional interests more generally, as differences in size, wealth, and demography have created strong regional preferences and loyalties, mainly in the West (Simeon, 2004). The same is true for Russian federation. While the federal system was an inheritance from the former USSR, federalism became a means to manage regional demands from non-ethnic to
50 Federalism and Ethnic Conflict Management: Theoretical and Conceptual Exploration
ethnic regions in the 1990s. This feature of Russian federalism helped „assemble‟ the Russian regions and limit centrifugal tendencies (national mobilization and separation) (Shakhrai, 2003).
Federalism‟s role in the protection and development of minority cultures and languages could also contribute to pacify interethnic relations (Smith, 1995:19). For example, many scholars underscore that federalism in India has helped hold this vast and heterogeneous state together by embracing linguistic diversity, and thereby kept help intergroup tensions and conflicts essentially in peacefully form (Bermeo, 2004; Kohli, 2004; Ahuja and Varshney, 2005). As far as Ethiopia‟s limited federal experience is concerned, its contribution to pacify interethnic relations is far away from what is suggested here. While on the one hand, it led to the provision of linguistic and cultural autonomy for marginalised ethnic groups in the country (Abbink, 2006), on the other hand, it appears to have failed to protect the right of previously privileged ethnic groups (Aalen, 2008; Merera, 2003).
The credit of federalism as device of managing conflict could also lie in its promise of making culturally diverse political society less heterogeneous through the creation of more homogeneous sub-national units so long as the regional borders of the federative units match the boundaries of the relevant national, ethnic, religious or linguistic communities, i.e., a „federal society‟ then federal structure can be a successful harmonizing tool (O‟Leary, 2001:281). Looking at the Ethiopian case from this angle yields mixed gestures. On the one hand, after ethnic regionalisation of the country, the Silte,12 who effectively mobilised for the recognition of their separate identity from the Gurage, have succeed in establishing a separate
zonal structure within the SNNPRS (Smith, 2007; Cohen, 2006; Vaughan, 2006; Assefa, 2006a). On the other hand, formation of a separate Silte administrative structure adversely affected the relations between the two groups.
In relation to this, Aalen‟s line of argument led to the sweeping observation regarding the efficacy of federalism below:
12Ibid.
Chapter 2 51
Although federalism in its initial form (the US and Swiss model) was not designed to regulate conflicts based on ethnicity or other identity differences, it is today conceived as one of the better devices to meet conflicts among groups and between the central state and sub- national communities (2002:14, emphasis added).
Many authors believe that federalism may be a good solution for ethnically divided societies (Ghai, 1998; Bose, 1995; Young, 1998). Relevant to this, taken in light of the complex mix of Swiss society, federalism was able to develop a type of democracy that favors and enforces power sharing between Protestant and Catholic as well as the three linguistic groups. Indeed, for Switzerland, with its linguistic and religious diversity, federalism makes an important contribution to social cohesion and political stability (Watts, 2008; Bächtiger and Steiner, 2004:34-35).
Parallel claims are made in research on culturally diverse societies. For an illustration of such beliefs it is sufficient to cite Duchacek (1970:297) who points out how the reorganization of internal political borders of the post-independent India along largly with linguistic line has rescued the union from political disintegration. Without a doubt, these findings strengthen Gurr (2000), Hechter (2000), Stepan (2001), and Saideman et al. (2002) in suggesting that some sort of federal arrangements reduce the incidents of nationalist conflict by funneling ethnic collective action into forms of protest within the bounds of „normal‟ politics.
It has also been argued that federalism could be used to reduce ethnic tensions and conflicts using policies that reduce regional disparities through distribution of economic resources and preferential treatment (Horowitz, 1985). For instance, many multiethnic federal states like India and Malaysia have experimented with such policies to increase ethnic representation or achieve ethnic proportionality in employment, education enrollment, and other sectors, thereby reducing disparities between ethnic groups (ibid.). In Ethiopia as well, the provision of preferential treatment to the hitherto marginalised ethno-linguistic groups is one of the positive outcomes of the institutionalization of ethnic federalism in the country. However, like many other political issues, there are controversies as regards policies and practices of resource sharing – distribution of economic resources and preferential treatment (see chapter
52 Federalism and Ethnic Conflict Management: Theoretical and Conceptual Exploration
four and five for more on this). Therefore, the track record of Ethiopian federalism on the question of sharing the „national cake‟ has so far been contestable (Asnake, 2013).
Yet while the above division of conflict literature has pointed to federalism as a means of managing ethnic conflicts that might otherwise escalate into violence, doubts have been raised about its ability – in its most elaborate form as federal government – to „solve‟ minority problems, reduce ethnic conflicts or equitably accommodate diversity (McGarry and O‟Leary, 1993; Basta-Fleiner, 2000; Cornell, 2002; Coakley, 1993).
Indeed, as succinctly observed by William Riker, the ideological promotion of federalism as a way of guaranteeing democracy and freedom is challenged due to the creation of different majorities and minorities at national and sub-national levels (1964:142). Furthermore, by working against the entrenchment of democratic values, it can lead to the transfer of power and resources to undemocratic social forces such as chiefs (Fanthorpe, 2006), or offer a sphere for domination of minority groups by majority groups at the local level (Horowitz, 1991; Suberu, 1994). Coming to Ethiopia, the post-1991 federal experience cannot escape from this reality despite its positive contribution to integrate historic minorities into the national politics. In many ways, ethnic regionalisation affected interethnic relations at sub- national and local levels. Indeed, what William Riker (1964) termed „local tyranny‟ has been visible in many of ethnically constituted regional states (Assefa, 2006a).
The inadequacy of federalism in managing ethnic conflict is also further elaborated by Walter Kälin. To quote some words:
Ethnically constituted sub-national governments in multiethnic federations exacerbate minority problems whenever they are unable to integrate or even tolerate persons on their territory who are of a different ethnic origin. Thus, decentralized forms of governance may become a danger for the individual rights and possibilities of democratic participation of persons belonging to other minorities or to the ethnic group that has the majority at the national level (Kälin, 2000:5, emphasis added).
Chapter 2 53
In Ethiopia as well, ethnic regionalisation in the post-1991 period has considerably transformed the relations between the titular13 and the non-titular (settler) groups from a nonviolent frontier one into an interethnic tension and conflict. The cases from regional states of Benishangul-Gumuz, Gambella, Oromiya, and SNNPRS in this respect demonstrate the impact of ethnic federalism on the generation and transformation of ethnic conflicts in Ethiopia (Assefa, 2006a, 2012; EHRCO, 2009; Abbink, 2006, 2011).
Aside from the plight of local minorities, the efforts to define boundaries of ethno-regional identity groups of multiethnic federations have proven problematic and could cause ethnic tensions and conflicts. This is above all true in the areas or borderlands where two or more ethnic groups converge. In the Russian federation, for instance, the arbitrary way in which internal political boundaries divide ethnic groups has been a major source of tensions (Lapidus and de Nevers, 1995:3). In Ethiopia too, several violent conflicts between neighboring ethnic groups erupted owing to contested boundaries in the post-1991 period (Lake and Rothchild, 1996; Asnake, 2004; Assefa, 2006a; Vaughan, 2006; Abbink, 2006; Cohen, 2006). For instance, ethnic conflicts surrounding regional boundaries have been observed between the Borana (Oromiya) and Gerri (Somali), the Afar (Afar) and the Issa (Somali), and the Gedeo (SNNPRS) and the Guji (Oromiya) (Assefa, 2006a, 2012; Abbink, 2006; EHRCO, 2009).
In contrast to the above narratives, federalism in Ethiopia has also remarkably transformed the relations between the Gumuz (the indigenous people or titular group) and the Amhara (the settlers) in the Benishangul-Gumuz region from a hostile frontier setting into a complex set of relations containing both conflict and cooperation (Asnake, 2013). As the research is so limited in its scope to this regional state, however, it is difficult to tell the extent to which
13The notion „titular‟ alludes to those ethnic communities entitled to exercise self-administration in their home regions in the context of the defunct Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR) (Slezkine, 1996). Likewise, in the context of this study, the concept implies those ethnic groups entitled to exercise self-administration within their ethnic homelands. For example, the Anywaa, Nuer, and Mezengir are titular ethnic group within the Gambella regional state in this regard. Whereas non-titular refers to those individuals and ethnic groups who live out of their presumed ethnic homelands and thus there are restrictions on their political role in the region. For instance, the Amhara, Kefficho, Oromo, Shekecho, and other settlers (known locally as highlanders) in the Gambella regional state are non-titular. This is one of the main features as well as limitations of the Ethiopian ethnic federalism since its inception.
54 Federalism and Ethnic Conflict Management: Theoretical and Conceptual Exploration
federalism contributed toward the normalisation of interethnic relationships in the whole country.
Several scholars argue that federalism has some degree of set backs in managing ethnic conflicts. Aalen (2002:15) reminds us that „federalism has not solved conflicts in multiethnic states because minorities are still outnumbered at the federal level.‟ Some expressed reservations on the capacity of federalism to meet the claims of multilingual societies. Still some other scholars like Monteux argue:
Indeed, federalism seems to have “one size fits all” device by the international community to “free” ethnic conflict in and to escape their responsibility in dealing with sources of the conflict, in effect allowing tensions to brew and potentially making the situation worse (2006:162).
As far as the multinational federation of the Switzerland, Canada, and Belgium experiences are concerned, unlike what is proposed above, these federations have effectively accommodated their principal ethnic, linguistic or national communities without threating particular identities (O‟Leary, 2001:63-64).
It is perhaps worth taking a look at the situation of Canadian federalism over the question of Quebec‟s independence. The country faced a serious existential challenge from the advocates of Quebec secession. The challenge has not entirely died, but it is surely much weaker than it was in the 1960s and 70s. In fact, by granting sub-national units a significant degree of autonomy, federalism in Canada, despite the potency of the separatist movement, has helped trim down conflict on potentially divisive issues and ensure that the most fundamental aspiration of Quebeckers remained non-violent and democratic (Simeon, 2004).
Federalism is also criticized for encouraging the promotion of ethnic, regional or communal identities that are antithetical to national identity. Different scholars in this regard argue that federalism when cast on the bases of ethno-linguistic difference entails the following: It institutionalizes discriminatory treatment of citizens and will tend to be anti-liberal and anti- majoritarian; prone to conflicts and disintegration, and frustrate nationwide free mobility of
Chapter 2 55 citizens (Basta-Fleiner, 2000; Watts, 1998). In Ethiopia as well, the disenfranchisement of ethnic migrants, which has relegated them to a „secondary class citizen‟ in some of regional states „with restricted rights to live and work,‟ is a testimony to the failure of the federal practice to give effect to the development of nationwide civic citizenship, which is required for deliberative democracy (Yonathan, 2008; Asnake, 2013).
In sum, the above contending views reviewed here relating to the utility of the federal devices as a means of managing ethnic diversity unveil the actual problems of designing state structures that would help manage ethnic conflicts. They also fail to offer a hint about why federalism succeeds in some multiethnic states while failing in others. The existence of such diverse federal experiences calls for the review of those factors that help in explaining as to why this is the case. In this light, the next section discusses the underlying contextual factors behind the successes and failures of federal experiments in multiethnic states.
2.8. Behind the Success and Failure of Federalism: Link Contextual Factors The main lesson to be drawn from the above divergent views on federalism is that there is no single federal formula for peace in divided societies. In order to understand the conditions under which federalism works, we need to take into account the federal arrangements themselves as well as the underlying contextual factors that explain why some federations succeed in democratically preserving their multiethnic societies, while others gloomily fall short. Obviously, as reviewed from the experiences of many federations, the success or failure of federations in handling conflicts depends on diverse contextual factors other than federalism per se. Above and beyond, these contextual factors are dynamic and the analysis of success and failure along these lines will be comparative and contingent in time and place (Burgess, 2011:194). These factors among others include the existence of a functional democratic system, the practice of constitutionalism according to the federal spirit/culture,
56 Federalism and Ethnic Conflict Management: Theoretical and Conceptual Exploration
the commitment of the citizenry and the political class to the federal system, a good tradition of rule of law, and institutional design.14
To begin with, the existence of a functional democratic system which allows open and peaceful contestation for power by some mutually agreed rules is extremely essential for successful federations. Certainly, almost all of those federations15 (e.g., Canada and Switzerland) which have been successful in promoting „self-rule‟ and „shared-rule‟ in a peaceful and democratic manner have been liberal democracies. Quite the opposite, almost all of the failed federations, for instance former USSR and Yugoslavian federation, operated under authoritarian systems. It is indeed because of the impracticality of maintaining the promises of federalism for decentralisation of power under an authoritarian/totalitarian system that many scholars call federations without democracy as sham federations. Besides, in a democratic system institution like political parties, civil society organisations and independent press constructively contribute to peaceful management of ethnic relations by creating crosscutting partnerships that surpass mere ethnic cleavages. In contrast, federalism in an authoritarian system tends to exacerbate ethnic divisions, suspicions and conflicts.
The record of Ethiopian federalism on this point has been challenging. Despite the constitutional promise for a multiparty political system, what has emerged is a massive power structure under the EPRDF. Consequently, there is no levelled playing field for all the political parties in the country.
14After a careful review of a comparative survey of federalism, scholars have offered some factors that contribute to the success or failure of federations: whether the federal system is imposed or the result of genuine dialogue from within; the presence or absence of centralizing tendency (one man, one party, military or otherwise) as opposed to the federal feature of dispersion of constitutional power; the prevalence of federal political culture – the commitment to the federal principle, spirit of compromise and accommodation as opposed to doctrinaire rigidity and uniformity; the presence of common political and economic interests, i.e., shared federal goals that slightly predominate local interests; the existence and degree of symmetry and asymmetry among the units of the federation. The specific value for which each specific federation is set up also matters (Elazar, 1987, Hicks, 1978, Franck, 1968). 15When we take a look at the experience of Belgium, the federation since 1993 has helped evade violent but also fueled the centrifugal tendencies of territorial conflict. But, the overall effect of the federal restructuring has so far been encouraging. Territorial disputes have reduced and the Belgian identity has ceased to fade (Watts, 2008; Hooghe, 2004). Similarly, after the adoption of the 1978 Constitution, which does not define itself as explicitly federal one, Spain granted progressively to each region its own statute of autonomy tailored to its particular situation. Thus, Spain is a federation in all but name, with the 17 Autonomous Communities possessing constitutional authority for a considerable degree of self-rule. Spain is now one of the most decentralized countries in Europe (Watts, 2008; Beramendi and Máiz, 2004).
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Second, federalism has been reasonably successful in those countries where there is a good tradition of rule of law. In contrast, in countries where the gap between constitutional principles and practice is wide, both federal stability and conflict management will be at risk. In fact, lack of rule of law was one of the main factors that accounting for the collapse of most of the ex-communist federations in the east block (Seroka, 1994:208). As with the question of democracy, Ethiopia does not have a good track record about the rule of law.
Third, the degree of demographic trends and ethnic balance within multiethnic states may influence the political stability of federations. Brendan O‟Leary in this regard surveyed all those federations, which have a „staatsvolk‟, „that have been durably democratic for more than thirty years‟ (2001:285). The term „Staatsvolk‟ refers to an ethnic/national group whose population size is well above 50 percent of the overall population of a given multiethnic federation and controls the state through democratic elections (ibid.).
Multiethnic states like Ethiopia that does not have a „Staatsvolk,‟ as stated by O‟Leary, is not likely to survive long if it remains as a majoritarian democratic federation (ibid.:287). Similar concerns exist elsewhere (Swiss and Indian multicultural federations, if religion and language are taken as fault lines respectively) yet in the two federations, it is counter-balanced by adopting consociational model16 (Lijphart, 1977). This is mainly due to the fact that a majoritarian electoral system tends to hamper some of the contending ethnic groups from sharing political power. O‟Leary then suggested that although of course its existence is by no means guaranteed, if such multiethnic federation is to survive, it needs as a minimum some consociational arrangements rather than a majoritarian institution (ibid.:286-7). It seems it is from this standpoint that some have suggested that in the Ethiopian context the electoral law which is mainly based on majority system should be substituted by a proportional one to
16According to Lijphart (1991:491), the leading theorist of consociation, in terms of its institutional arrangements, consociationalism has four elements. First, a grand coalition – there is a government consisting of representatives of all the segments. The dividing line could be religion, nationalism, ethnicity, ideology or a combination of them. This is also called elite accommodation as it is the elites of the segments who come together at the center to resolve their disagreement. Second, proportionality – there is electoral proportional representation system and proportional presence of the different segments of the society in representative government institutions, civil service, and the proportional allocation of public funds. Third, segmental autonomy – the different communities must have some degree of autonomy either through a territorial government in a federation or some form of decentralization. Fourth, mutual veto – there is the provision of veto whereby each of the segments can veto government decisions in areas of vital interest to it.
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share political power among the competing elites of the majority of the ethnic groups at the center.
Finally, but perhaps most significantly, while the need to respond to demands of ethno- linguistic groups for political representation and self-government is generally acknowledged, the „elevation of ethnicity to the level of the sole […] principle of political organization‟ has also become matter of serious concern among scholars (Olukoshi, 2001:31, ellipsis added). This stems from the fact that equating ethnicity with citizenship does not only impede the development of a nationwide civic citizenship and solidarity, it also yields new rounds of ethnic tensions and conflicts.
2.9. Conclusion On the basis of the literature on federalism, this chapter discussed contending approaches to federalism, ethnicity and ethnic conflict. Taking into account this analysis, the following general conclusions are plausible. First, although federalism signifies different things to different people depending on historical and cultural context, there are useful definitions that offer guidance to this study. Of particular significance in this regard is King‟s attempt to distinguish ideological and institutional aspects of federalism. This distinction provides an analytical basis for studying federations (institutions), federalisms (ideologies) and their interactions.
Second, this chapter demonstrated several factors that motivate the formation of federations. The normative basis for establishing federalism relates to its ideological dispensation towards centralisation, decentralization, and balance. In the context of managing ethnic conflicts, the role of the federalist ideology of balance between the principle of shared-rule and self-rule is more important.
Third, the different approaches to the study of federalism outlined in this chapter exhibit the complexity and richness of the subject matter of federalism. However, one crucial point is noticeable from this review – that is the difficulty of finding a general theory for federations when one makes a quick review of the track record of successful and failed
Chapter 2 59 multicultural/national federations. For example, the former USSR and the former multiethnic communist federations of Eastern Europe like Yugoslavia, were multinational federations but under hegemonic control of a highly centralized communist parties. Multinational federations in the west, contrastingly, function under a democratic pluralism. This clearly illustrated that finding commonality between federal systems, save in terms of formal constitutional division of power, is still a difficult task.
Fourth, this chapter revealed that ethnic conflicts, despite the absence of consensus about the nature of ethnicity and ethnic conflicts, are a global phenomenon. This chapter also underscored neither primordial differences (differences in ethnic identities or mere existence of many and/or different ethnic groups) nor mere political manipulations cause ethnic conflicts.
Last but not least, as has been discussed in this chapter, the responses of several multiethnic states to ethnic diversity and conflict have always been diverse and unique. Some multiethnic states have experimented with several strategies for eliminating diversities or differences with the aim of addressing problems of ethnic diversity, while others attempt to use some of the instruments belonging to the management of ethnic diversities. Today there is a growing global trend to use autonomy and federal arrangements as an instrument of managing ethnic conflicts. The interface between federalism and ethnic conflicts lies in the ability of the former to deliver a balance between self-rule and shared-rule. The use of federalism as a device of managing ethnic conflicts, however, has both its adherents and opponents. It is true that as can be observed from the federal experiences of other multiethnic states (discussed above), some federations fail while others succeed. As a result, it raises the question as to why this is so. What can be stated as a general conclusion from the experiences of multiethnic federations is that the success or failure of multiethnic states in managing ethnic conflicts, despite having some common institutional features, hinges on several contextual factors other than federalism per se, including but not limited to functional democratic system, rule of law, and institutional design in this regard.
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In sum, the different perspectives and explanations reviewed in this chapter provide conceptual and theoretical insights into the potential utility of federalism as a political tool for managing interethnic relations in the wider context of the realities of Ethiopia. For the purpose of this study, therefore, a synthesis of some of the above analytical explanations and arguments on the utility of federalism will be used to analyze the operation and effects of Ethiopian federalism on interethnic relationships. The chapters on the research findings will assess the feasibility of applying federalism as a credible device in regulating interethnic relations in the country as well.
Territorial Restructuring 3
3.1. Introduction In any initial or periodic exercise in the national devolution, territorial reorganisation is a central feature. What is sometimes called the „territorial approach‟ to interethnic conflict settlement consists in using boundaries and administrative units to give greater protection to small groups. This method involves the revision or alteration of existing regional or local administrative boundaries and sometimes the creation of entirely new sub-units having some levels of autonomy and self-administration at sub-national level. The approach seeks to reduce interethnic conflict within regional units by sub-dividing them and creating new territorial configurations. This also gives a group access to new political power and economic resources that accompany regional status. In so doing, federalism could be used to mitigate ethnic tension and conflict because it makes use of territorial reorganisation to accommodate group demands. At this point, it is important to bear in mind what comes about when a central place is given to ethnicity in terms of territorial reorganisation of a state. What are the repercussions of giving territorial form to the ethno-linguistic characteristics of a state? Does this process create interethnic tension and conflict that did not previously exist? Does it affect preexisting conflicts over land use and resources? Do different patterns emerge, i.e., an improvement in interethnic relations at the national or regional level, but a worsening at the local level? What does the Ethiopian federal experience reveal about territorial reorganisation in this respect? All these necessitate a thorough investigation into the operation of federalism in the multiethnic state of Ethiopia.
This chapter, therefore, looks at the operation and effect of federal system on interethnic relations in Ethiopia in light of territorial reorganisation which is one of the most controversial issues from the perspective of interethnic relations. With this background, the next section analyses the organisation of territory and ethnicity in Ethiopia. The third section
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focuses on boundaries and conflict in the Ethiopian federalism. The final section offers a set of concluding thoughts.
3.2. Territorial Restructuring and Ethnicity in Ethiopia Ethiopia has a history of periodic territorial reorganization in the modern era under Menelik II, Haile Sellassie I, the Italians1, and the Derg. For the purposes of this study, I will focus mainly on the territorial reorganization carried out by the Transitional Government of Ethiopia (TGE) and the Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia (FDRE) in the post-1991. It is, however, most useful to consider this reorganization in the context of other earlier recurring attempts. To properly understand what one scholar (Alemseged cited in Asmelash, 1997:23) calls the „big bang approach to decentralization‟2 launched in 1991-1992, one must above all review the Derg‟s earlier flirtations with ethnic devolution and reorganization. This is true even if the pre-1992 territorial reorganizations (including the autonomy attempts of the late 1980s) were, in the words of Paul Brietzke, „…all pretence and no substance…‟ (1995:26, ellipsis added). In order to understand the broad-spectrum of these territorial reorganization trends in the country, what follows is discussing each of these periods.
3.2.1. Administrative subdivisions in Ethiopia: From multiethnic centralized state to ethnic federal state 3.2.1.1. Administrative control during the imperial Menelik II era The second half of the 19th century witnessed the birth of a centralised Ethiopian state that overcame earlier regional differences. The reign of three emperors – Tewedros II, Yohannes IV and Menelik II – marked the creation of a unified Ethiopia through centralisation and
1During the brief occupation, Italy revised the 1908 administrative division of the country and divided the country into Amhara, Harar, Oromo-Sidamo, and Shewa while Tigray and Eritrea were administered as one (Andargachew, 1993; Markakis, 1974). 2Decentralisation reforms which comprise major decisions on political, administrative and fiscal as a single package when implemented in a single initiative over a relatively short period of time would constitute a „big bang approach to decentralization‟. This approach has two main features: 1) it entails comprehensive and integrated approach of the three main components of decentralisation (political, administrative and fiscal); and 2) it is rapidly implemented over a short period. One of the main objectives of this approach is to ensure that main measures to implement these three main components of decentralisation will be adopted as a single package, without missing components, and that „all pieces of the puzzle fit together – i.e., the desired balance in autonomy and accountability is achieved while providing incentives for cost efficiency‟ (Shah and Thompson, 2004:19-20).
Territorial Restructuring 63 territorial expansion. Menelik II (1889-1913) who managed to control the imperial throne after Yohannes‟s death pursued the twin imperial policies of modernisation and centralisation. Of the three emperors, he played a pivotal role in creating a centralised and unified Ethiopian state. The process of creating the modern Ethiopian state involved territorial expansion and centralisation. In fact, Menelik‟s territorial expansion started even before he became emperor. In 1876 and 1877, he conquered rulers of Wollo and Gojjam in the north. Through conquest and diplomacy between 1890 and 1906, he controlled an increasing amount of territory in the southern and eastern parts (the Ogaden, Bale, Sidamo/Sidama, Welayta, Keffa, Illubabor, and other sovereign polities) of the country.3 As a result, in 1908, for the first time, the country witnessed the establishment of the first ministerial form of government and division of the country into thirty-four administrative units based on ethnic distribution and geographic position. Traditionally, the major provincial units in northern Ethiopia were Tigray, Welkait, Semien, Begemidir, Wag, Lasta, Gojjam, Amhara, and Shewa. The demarcation of the southern provinces following their conquest was more arbitrary (Andargachew, 1993; Markakis, 1974; Assefa, 2006a).
Menelik‟s centralised administration relations with these administrative units were not uniform. Three categories of relations can be identified on the basis of historical relationships and the form of resistance waged by communities during the expansion. Firstly, in the central and northern regions, particularly Amhara and Tigray, regional nobles were autonomous; Menelik‟s involvement was minimal. Secondly, some regions in the south that submitted peacefully (Jimma, major parts of Wellega, including some groups in the present region of Benishangul-Gumuz, some parts of Gojjam and Awasa/Hawassa) were autonomous but were required to pay a fixed annual tribute to the center. Lastly, other regions in the south that resisted the incorporation (Arsi, Keffa, Welayta, and part of Shewa, some parts of Wellega, Borana, Illubabor, and Harrar) were placed under the jurisdiction of Menelik‟s most trusted war generals, who were chiefly responsible for tax collection and military control on behalf of the Emperor. These regions constituted the largest administrative divisions of the empire.
3The major reasons for Menelik‟s territorial expansion included not only his ambition to create a larger Ethiopia, but also the tradition of territorial expansion by his predecessors, the desire to control the sources of lucrative long-distance trade, the need to forestall the race for territory by the colonial powers, his ability to raise a large army and his easy access to firearms (see Markakis, 1974).
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Indeed, because of this conquest and expansion, Ethiopia acquired the geographical size it has today and dozens of ethnic groups with diverse languages and cultures came under the domain of one empire. The battle of Adwa (1896) in which Ethiopian forces defeated the Italians led to international recognition of the boundaries of the country (Bahru, 1991). However, Menelik‟s expansion and centralisation of the Ethiopian polity continue to be a source of grievance among the ethnic elites of the south to the present day. Some scholars like Merera (2003) argue that Menelik‟s administrative and political practice underpinned the class and national question in the Ethiopian political system in the ensuing periods.
3.2.1.2. Administrative control during the imperial Haile Sellassie I era After the creation of a centralised Ethiopian state through territorial expansion by his predecessor, Emperor Haile Sellassie pushed the formation of a modern and centralised Ethiopian state. On the eve of Italy‟s invasion of Ethiopia (1935), Haile Sellassie‟s empire was a highly centralized structure comprising 32 teklay-gizat/provinces or governorates general.4 In 1941, after the defeat of the Italians, the Emperor recovered his throne and rekindled his twin policies of centralisation and modernisation. To this end, he introduced a new administrative Decree No. 1 of 1942, which was the first regional administration reform, established a four-tier administrative system and consolidated the 32 pre-war units into 12 teklay-gizat.5 These 12 provinces were Arsi, Begemder, Gamu-Gofa, Gojjam, Hararghe, Illubabor, Kaffa, Shewa, Sidamo, Tigray, Wellega, and Wollo. When Eritrea was federated with Ethiopia in 1950, it remained a separate entity and did not become another Ethiopian teklay-gizat. However, in 1960, the Hararghe province or teklay-gizat was split and Bale province was created from the South Western section, bringing the total number to 13 (see Map 3.2). By 1961, there were 87 awrajas, 387 weredas, and 1,086 mikitle weredas (sub- districts). Additionally, there were a number of boundary adjustments between units during
4These were 1) Eritrea and Tigre, 2) Amhara (Begemidir, Wollo, Gojjam, North Shewa), 3) Galla and Sidama (southern provinces), 4) Addis Ababa/Shewa, 5) Harar (Aris, Bale, Sidamo), and 6) Somalia (Italian Somaliland and Ogaden). The governorates were subdivided into District Commissionerships or Commissariato, and Residencies or Residenzas. For a more detailed account of this (see Daniel, 1994:98). 5These were in turn subdivided into 60 awrajas (zones), 339 weredas (districts), and 1176 mikitle weredas (sub- districts). For the administrative reorganization of the empire (see Decree No. 1 of 1942). Between 1942 and the promulgation of Decree No. 6 of 1946, the system was maintained but with different names: awrajas (first level), weredas (second level), wana mislenes (third level), and mikitle mislenes (fourth level). Decree No. 6 of 1946 changed the names to tiklay-gizats, awrajas, weredas, and mikitle weredas respectively (see Decree No. 6/1946).
Territorial Restructuring 65 this period. When the Eritrean Assembly voted unanimously for the abolition of the federal arrangement in 1962, Eritrea was incorporated, brought the total number of teklay-gizat or provinces to 14 (see Map 3.3).6 Additionally, two awrajas (Ogaden, and Geleb/Hamer Bako) were declared special administrative regions under the central government. In the late 1960s, the number of awrajas and weredas increased gradually (to 101 and 547 respectively) while the fourth and lowest level (localities) was entirely abandoned. The same decree specified above had both administrative and political impact. Administratively, it deconcentrated the central government and established a complex network of field agents representing the vari- ous ministries in the capital (Keller, 1988).7 Politically, it deprived the traditional elites, who had previously served as provincial administrators, of their enormous discretionary power (ibid.).
6Additionally, by this point there were 99 awrajas, 444 weredas, and 1,328 mikitle weredas. 7The provincial administrators were accountable for execution of directives issued by cabinet of ministers, especially the Ministry of the Interior. All public servants were appointed and paid by the center (see Keller, 1988).
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Map 3.1: Provinces or teklay-gizats (1935-1942) under Haile Sellassie I Period
Source: https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:Provinces_of_Ethiopia,_before_1935.svg
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Map 3.2: Provinces* (1960-1962) under Haile Sellassie I period
*13 provinces after Bale split from Hararghe in 1960.
Source: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Provinces_of_Ethiopia
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Map 3.3: Provinces* (1962-1974) under Haile Sellassie I Period
*14 provinces after annexing Eritrea in 1962.
Source: https://kids.kiddle.co/Image:Provinces_Ethiopie.png
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3.2.1.3. The Derg’s half-hearted decentralization reforms: Regional autonomy at bay? The socialist military regime of Derg who deposed Haile Sellassie I in 1974 officially declared the National Democratic Revolution (NDR) Program in 1976 with its ultimate objective of the setting up of the People‟s Democratic Republic of Ethiopia (PDRE) which came out later in 1987. In a radical departure on the simmering of the nationalities question, this political document recognized the right of self-determination of all nationalities, and advocated self-government. The program of the NDR of Ethiopia which was the basic political guiding document until the promulgation of the new Constitution and the formulation of WPE read:
Given Ethiopia‟s existing situation, the problem of nationalities can be resolved if each nationality is accorded full right to self-government. This means that each nationality will have regional autonomy to decide on matters concerning its internal affairs. Within its environs, it has the right to determine the contents of its political, economic, and social life, use its own language and elect its own leaders and administrators to head its internal organs (Provisional Office for Mass Organization Affairs, 1977:13-14, emphasis added).
The issue was very controversial within the Derg, and, as a result, no further decentralization steps were taken until the late 1980s.8 Additionally, in a move to satisfy its peasant base and advance the revolution, the Derg abolished farmer tenancy, and nationalized all Ethiopian land.9 As a result, by the early 1980s the 14 kifle-hagers, 105 awrajas, and 577 weredas were supported by up to 20,000 new kebeles (the lowest unit of administration) or peasant associations (PA‟s) (see Map 3.4). However, by the late 1980s, sectional, ethnic-based armed resistance to the Derg had crystallized into a full-scale civil war in northern Ethiopia and pockets throughout the rest of the country.
As a result, in the late 1980s, the Derg attempted a set of timid and incomplete devolutionary reforms aimed at solving the long overdue issue of „nationalities‟ problem. The military
8In a mainly cosmetic gesture toward the nationalities, the Derg switched from the old teklay-gizats (governorates general) to kifle-hager (Administrative Region), and carried out a series of name changes to existing regions and districts. The pejorative Galla was replaced with Oromo; the spelling of Tigre was changed to Tigray; Wellamo awraja was renamed Wellayita; Beghemdir and Simen became Gondar, Arussi became Arsi; and Gemu-Gofa became Gamo and Gofa. 9See Proclamation No. 31/1975.
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regime established the Institute for the Study of Ethiopian Nationalities (ISEN) in 1983. Its objectives were twofold – to collect information and undertake studies on the different communities and nationalities of Ethiopia; and to undertake studies leading to the drafting of a national constitution and the restructuring of the central and regional organ of government based on the experiences of the Eastern Bloc (Hailu, 2003). Some 83 nationalities were recognized. The most original and perhaps the most controversial contribution of the Institute to the new republic was the reorganization of administrative regions of Ethiopia constituting five special autonomous regions and twenty-five administrative regions. It is also contended that this study has served as a background for the post-1991 state restructuring (ibid.).
Finally, Derg endorsed the Constitution of the People‟s Democratic Republic of Ethiopia (PDRE) in 1987. The PDRE Constitution had affirmed Ethiopia as a unitary state and recognised regional self-government and autonomy. In line with the PDRE Constitution, Proclamation No.14/1987 established five autonomous regions and twenty-five administrative regions (see Map 3.5 and Table 3.1).10 This proclamation offered an asymmetrical regional autonomy to those five provinces which were affected by ethnic/regional insurgency. These reforms incorporated mainly territorial and administrative reorganization11 as a means of appealing to the „nationalities‟ and undercutting the national liberation movements. These five special autonomous regions were Eritrea but without its Afar inhabited areas, Tigray, Asseb for the Afars, Dire Dawa for the Issas, and Ogaden.12 Eritrea was provided with more autonomy than the other autonomous regions. In contrast, the military regime divided the rest of the country into twenty-five administrative regions.13 The new regions were drawn using some combination of ethnicity, culture, and language with the intent (not always realized) of creating single-group regions. The rezoning or redrawing of
10Proclamation No.14/1987. This decree particularly dealt with the establishment of administrative and autonomous regions in the country. 11The impetus behind territorial reorganization in Ethiopia originated as far back as the disaffected ethnic „nationalities‟ of the imperial period. Indeed, such reorganization has been resisted by major groups or power stakeholders (Assefa, 2006a). 12Article 2 of Proclamation No.14/1987. This proclamation was not basically decreed to solve the problem of self-administration, rather to solve the problem of peace and order and to secure the unity and stability of the country. This can be evidenced by the fact that regions which were given the autonomous status were unstable regions in the country. 13Article 3 of Proclamation No.14/1987. According to this proclamation, the other provinces were divided into 25 administrative regions.
Territorial Restructuring 71 the regions was cautious, however, and revealed again the regime‟s fear of regional based ethno-nationalist movements. Several of the larger nationalities (notably the Oromos, Amharas and Somalis) were subdivided into several regions.14 Thus, this effort at reorganization of administrative units, while taking account of ethno-linguistic criteria, is not comparable to the purely ethnic reorganization that followed in the post-1991 period. However, a political solution to the crisis was never whole-heartedly pursued. Political will on the part of the actors was also clearly absent (Clapham, 2002). At the end, the military regime‟s attempt in dealing with regional autonomy did not offer any hope in terms of reconciliation for peace with the different ethno-nationalist liberation fronts and thus failed to create a new social and political basis for the country (Clapham, 1994). Hence, the reconstruction of the Ethiopian state and society was left in the hands of the EPRDF that assumed political power after its military victory over the Derg in May 1991.
14These were subdivided into 354 awrajas while the next level (weredas) was abandoned in favor of the Peasant Associations (PAs) (see Kumera, 2007:111-112).
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Map 3.4: Administrative divisions (1974-1986) under the Derg Regime
Source: http://www.ethiopians.com/Views/Negussay_NaturalSeaShores.htm
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Map 3.5: Administrative regions and autonomous regions of the PDRE (1987-1991)
Source: https://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/3/34/Ethiopia_-_Administrative_regions_1987-1991.png
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Table 3.1: PDRE administrative and autonomous regions
5 Autonomous Regions 25 Administrative Regions Asseb Addis Ababa East Gojjam East Harerge East Shewa Gambella Dire Dawa Arsi Ilubabor North Omo South Gondar Wellega Eritrea Asosa Keffa North Shewa South Omo West Gojjam Ogaden Bale Metekel North Wollo South Shewa West Hararghe Tigray Borana North Gondar Sidamo South Wollo West Shewa
Source: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Provinces_of_Ethiopia
3.2.1.4. The TGE and FDRE: Ethnic-based territorial restructuring Following its military victory over the Derg in May 1991, the EPRDF/TPLF reconstructed the Ethiopian state. Soon after, the July 1991 Peace and Democracy Conference convened by the EPRDF/TPLF adopted a Transitional Period Charter of Ethiopia, an interim constitution, which legalized EPRDF‟s positions on Eritrea‟s secession and incorporated the right of national self-determination up to and including secession. Following the conference, the Transitional Government of Ethiopia (TGE) was established. By the time the National Conference of July 1991 launched the Transitional Government of Ethiopia, there was an elite backing within the EPRDF (namely the TPLF leadership) of the concept of ethnic-based federalism. Once the notion of an ethnic federation was identified, it created substantial opportunities and incentives for groups to unite, organize and begin making demands.
A bewildering collection of nationality governments instantly sprang up in order to claim the opportunities which the new structure of government provided. By late 1991, there were over 60 of them, 29 of which had representatives in the council…This process of fragmentation immediately evoked demands for new territorial divisions corresponding to each of the nationalities, and for nationality citizenships which would determine rights to public allocations within each of the national subdivisions (Clapham, 1996:246).
This Transition Period Charter actually echoed the language of the Derg‟s 1975 Program on the „question of nationalities‟. In an attempt to address this „question of nationalities‟, the Charter affirmed the right of all nationalities to self-determination, the preservation of national identities of each group and the right of each nationality to govern its own affairs within their own defined territory.15 The interim constitution and the proclamation unequivocally provided that the boundaries of the territorial regions to be defined on the
15See Article 2 of the Transitional Period Charter of Ethiopia, hereinafter called the Charter.
Territorial Restructuring 75 basis of nationality in order to ensure the nationalities the right to self-administration.16 With it, the concepts of boundary and territory changed. The EPRDF and the OLF (Oromo Liberation Front), the main architects of the Charter, came to an agreement on 18th October 1991, and a new national map was submitted a few months later to the Council of the TGE and approved (Walle, 1994:177). Regional boundaries were drawn using ethnicity as the key organising device of the Ethiopian state in order to create regional administrations dominated by a single identifiable group after whom the regions were named (Cohen, 1995:11; National Democratic Institute for International Affairs and African-American Institute [NDI], 1992:69). Based on the Charter, the country‟s internal administration underwent restructuring with the formation of fourteen regional states along ethno-linguistic lines in 1992 (see Map 3.6).17 In this regard, Daniel Gamachu argues that in Ethiopia, ethno-linguistic group distribution has always been one of several relevant criteria for the delimitation of administrative sub-divisions. He, therefore, finds the recent administrative divisions of the EPRDF „neither new nor surprising.‟18 He concludes that the difference „does not lie in the basic criteria used but rather in the political aims and motives used in creating the divisions and in the administrative modalities employed‟ (Daniel, 1994:83-84, emphasis mine). Yet, many years later (the remarks were made early on in the devolutionary project, in 1993- 1994), this position is difficult to entirely accept. In fact, the Ethiopian state exhibits histories
16The EPRDF/TPLF as a „defender‟ of the national self-determination of nationalities in a bid to liberate them from „national oppression‟ interprets the Ethiopian state crisis as something resulting from national oppression. It reflects the political, economic and cultural factors as something resulting from national oppression. It considers the previous two regimes that have defined the much broader notion of Ethiopian nationalism narrowly, structured the state accordingly and left the others at their mercy. Therefore, the centralization of power and economic resources at the center is viewed as a secondary rather than fundamental cause of the state crisis. Based on this thesis, the EPRDF/TPLF defined its struggle as a nationalist one. It believed that emphasizing the nationality question was the right approach to rally the oppressed people. It is from this that the argument for national self-determination of nationalities and structuring the state based on ethnic federalism that grants at least the major nationalities their own constituent states comes out (Young, 1996:531-534). This implied that nationality has replaced class as the official basis of politics in the post-1991 Ethiopia (Paul, 2000:188). However, some argued that „No discussion was held on the proposal for fundamental and complex restructuring of the Ethiopian state on the basis of nationality‟ (see Vaughan, 1994:58). Others stated that the „conference went beyond the mandate of transitional government: the division of Ethiopia into 14 kilils or reservation is perhaps the most undemocratic act imaginable and particularly absurd coming from a transitional government‟(see Getachew, 1993:26). It also recognized the rights of ethnic groups („nationalities‟) to self-determination but made no decisions regarding the restructuring of the Ethiopian state along ethnic lines (McWhirter and Melamede, 1992, emphasis mine). 17See Proclamation No. 7/1992. 18In particular, the role the central government plays in the administration of the provinces and the degree of autonomy it allows have varied substantially throughout the history of the Ethiopian state. For details on this (see Daniel, 1994).
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of flirtation with the concept of identity-based territorial organization despite the fluctuation of regime and state ideological orientation. But the post-1991 regime, however, started with a resilient ideological commitment to a complete territorial reorganization along ethno- linguistic lines and what has come to be called an „ethnic federalism‟ (Asnake, 2013; Vaughan, 2003; Abbink, 1997). Aalen who has done extensive research on Ethiopian federalism further reinforces this assertion as follows:
„many African states have introduced territorial and nonterritorial measures to accommodate their ethnically diverse population, ranging from federalism in Nigeria, to the moderate regional devolution in South Africa, and the unbalanced union of Zanzibar and Tanganyika in Tanzania. It seems, however, that Ethiopia has gone further than any of those countries in promoting ethnic diversity through a federal system which is explicitly based on ethnicity‟ (2006:243, emphasis added).
Thus, an explicit ethnic-centered ideology has been applied to boundary delimitation in the post-1991 Ethiopia. The FDRE Constitution thus misses an opportunity to respond to ethnic concerns without freezing ethnicity as an exclusive political identity. This is in sharp contrast with the two previous regimes. It is for this reason that I suggest it is the primacy given for ethnicity that accompanies it that makes the post-1991 territorial reorganisation so exceptional. As Christopher Clapham also notes, it actually changed the very concepts of boundary and territory.
Whereas sub-national units within Ethiopia had hitherto been defined primarily in terms of territory, and all comprised peoples of several different ethnic groups, they were now defined in terms of nationality, and their boundaries had to be drawn to coincide with the settlement patterns of each particular group (Clapham, 1996:245, emphasis mine).
As Jon Abbink concluded later, the EPRDF is actually „executing the second phase of the Ethiopian revolution with its emphasis on national self-determination‟ (1997:165). Indeed, the FDRE Constitution grants the nations, nationalities and peoples the right to self- determination. The same constitution also insists that there must be some congruence between the nation, nationality and territory they live. As a consequence of this fact, the constitution delimits the constituent states on „the basis of settlement patterns, language,
Territorial Restructuring 77 identity and consent of the people concerned.‟19 While this provision does not in so many words express that regional states are formed along ethno-linguistic lines, practice thus far makes it clear that the basic factor in delimiting the regional states seems to have emphasized largely on language criteria (Brietzke, 1995:19-20). The identification of ethnicity is somewhat imprecise, but in practice seems to be primarily based on language.20 Accordingly, the Constitution recognized nine self-governing ethno-linguistic regional states and one autonomous self-governing city administration (see Map 3.7).21 The regional states are hierarchically divided into zones, special-wereda (special district), wereda (district) and kebele (village). However, all these levels of government are not recognized by the FDRE Constitution.
With coming into effect of the Constitution, Articles 47 and 48 deal with regions and their boundaries. The procedure for new regional states is relatively straightforward. The initial demand must secure a two-thirds vote in the wereda or zonal council of the nation, nationality, or people concerned; it is then submitted to the council of regional state, which organizes a referendum in the regional state. If the demand secures a majority in the referendum, the regional state council must transfer the relevant powers to the group in question. The new state automatically becomes a member of the federation. By contrast, border disputes where the concerned states cannot agree are referred to the House of Federation22 (Second Chamber-made up of representatives of every nations, nationalities and peoples in Ethiopia), which must return a final decision.23
19Article 46 (2) of the FDRE Constitution. 20Article 39 of the FDRE Constitution defines a nation, nationality, or people as „a group of people who have or share a large measure of a common culture or similar customs, mutual intelligibility of language, belief in a common or related identities, a common psychological make-up, and who inhabit an identifiable, predominantly contiguous territory.‟ 21According to Article 49 of the 1995 FDRE Constitution, Addis Ababa is the capital city of the federal government and has the right to self-government but it is responsible to the federal government. It used to be one of the fourteen regional governments during the Transition Period (1991-1994). 22FDRE Constitution states each ethnic group has at least one member in the House but each ethnic group is represented by one additional representative for each one million of its population. 23Article 62(6) of the FDRE Constitution stipulates resolving inter-regional territorial disputes as House of Federation power. Proclamation No. 251/2001 also provided key procedures that the HoF uses when it deals with questions regarding contested inter-regional boundaries and such self-determination questions as secession, recognition of separate ethnic identity and formation of a new ethnic region out of existing ones.
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Zones are the main instruments for adjusting boundaries to match ethnicity. Neither Proclamation No.7/1992 nor the constitution provided for zones, but regional states have come to use zones or other similar administrative layers (such as nationality zone or special district/special wereda) as „a necessary administrative bridge between regional state and wereda.24 The logic behind zones and special weredas is to 1) help cut up large regional states and 2) give minority groups some measure of developmental/administrative autonomy.25
Yet, the territorial reorganization has not produced homogenous regional states. The special city-regions are particularly heterogeneous because they attract economic migrants. For example, according to the 2007 census, of the roughly 183,415 inhabitants of Harari regional state (mainly Harar City and environs), the Oromo (56.41 percent), Amhara (22.77 percent), Gurage (4.34 percent), Somali (3.87 percent), Tigray (1.53 percent), Argobba (1.26 percent), and only (8.65 percent) are Harari (CSA, 2008). Even the more monolithic regional states have not managed to escape their own multiethnicity. Somali (the most homogenous of the regions, 95 percent Somalis) has Oromo, Amhara, and Gurage populations within its borders (CSA, 2008). Tigray (the second most homogenous of the regions, 94 percent Tigrayans) has Amhara, Saho, Erob, Oromo, and Kunama populations within its borders (ibid.). The state of Amhara has a number of Agaw, Oromo and Argoba peoples along with the dominant Amhara. Oromiya regional state comprises a large number of Amhara, and a number of ethnic groups belonging to the SNNPRS. Nevertheless, the major regional states do have a clear predominant ethno-linguistic group (Tigray 94 percent, Somali 95 percent, Amhara 91 percent, Afar 92 percent, and Oromiya 85 percent) (CSA, 2008). This compares considerably with such heterogeneous regional states as Gambella and Benishangul-Gumuz, not to mention the fifty-six26 ethnic groups of the mingled SNNPRS.27 While there are no precise figures available, there is no regional state in the federation that is 1) completely homogeneous (i.e., devoid of smaller „minority‟ communities), and 2) heterogeneous to the
24See regional state constitutions of the Ethiopian federation. 25Interview with former Speaker of the second chamber of the SNNPRS, Adama, March 2019. 26As one author reveals, the SNNPRS is the homeland of fifty-six ethnic groups (see Semahagen, 2014:23). 27In 1994 five of these regional states, namely Omo, Sidama, Keffa, Welayta, and Gurage-Hadiya-Kembata coalesced into the Southern Nations, Nationalities, and Peoples‟ Region – SNNPRS (Assefa, 2006a).
Territorial Restructuring 79 point where a single numerically „dominant‟ group or groups cannot be identified.28 This intermixing is a product of long-standing patterns of human settlement (groups have been neighbors for centuries), intermarriage, mass relocations, internal economic migrations and so on overtime. Groups of all sizes tend to approach territorial reorganization from their own particularistic perspective. Their chief (sometimes exclusive) concern centers on how it will affect them and their interests. As a result, a degree of difference and fluidity in the attitudes of groups to particular instances of territorial reorganization is observed.
28The notable exception here is, of course, the SNNPRS of Ethiopia that comprises some fifty-six small ethnic groups.
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Map 3.6: Provisional administrative regions of the TGE (1992-1994)
Source: Derived from a map in Ethnicity and Conflict in the Horn of Africa by Katsuyoshi Fukui and John Markakis (eds.), 1994. Based on unofficial maps from Bulletins of the Election Commission.
Territorial Restructuring 81
Map 3.7: Administrative regions of FDRE (1995- present)
Source: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Regions_of_Ethiopia#/media/File:Regions_of_Ethiopia_EN.svg
3.3. Boundaries and Conflict in the Ethiopian Federation Jon Abbink (1997:172) emphasises enough that, by canonising ethnicity, the FDRE Constitution „has tried to reify, to freeze something which is by nature fluid and shifting‟. Likewise, other scholars like Lincoln argue that the „“use of ethnicity at the national level as a criterion for territorial reorganization reinforces the likelihood of tension”‟ and that „“ethnic arithmetic has a point of marginal return beyond which it begins to harm the system”‟ (cited in Nishi, 2005:158). And doing so, another local observer concludes, „runs the risk of
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interethnic friction and conflict, a risk that has already materialized in much of southern Ethiopia‟ (Walle, 1994:178). Undeniably, despite the use of the 1974 boundaries, many remain contested as a result of the post-1991 territorial reorganisation, particularly in the east and west of the country where the highlands and lowlands meet. Internal boundaries are so explosive subject that so far, there is still no official administrative map of Ethiopia (emphasis mine).
In a study on the rural response to the 1991 change of regime, Dessalegn Rahmato makes a distinction between the peasant-based violence that accompanied the downfall of the Derg in 1990-1991 and the interethnic violence that marked the initial 1991-1993 period of the EPRDF/TPLF. The 1990 and 1991 rural peasant violence was aimed at agrarian socialism regime and at the Derg itself. The violence never turned personal or ethnic, in sharp contrast to „„the harassment, expulsion and massacres of one ethnic group by another in several provinces beginning early in 1992, which were instigated by the „ethnic parties‟, or were a by-product of ethnic policy‟‟(Dessalegn, 1994:243). In fact, in the post-1991epoch frequent conflicts among diverse ethnic groups have already led to loss of life and destruction of property far and wide in the country. For instance, recently (in 2018) a large number of Amharas were evicted from the southwest to the Amhara region. This and other similar precarious cases have arisen in the last two decades and have remained as yet unsettled. With this backdrop, the next two sections set out to examine the effect of territorial restructuring on interethnic relationships in the Ethiopian federalism from two broad angles. First, it considers inter-regional border conflicts that emerged in the post-1991 period. Second, it looks at intra-regional conflicts in different regional states.
3.3.1. New boundaries, new inter-regional conflicts In redrawing geographical boundary of the regional states, the issue of where the physical border between ethnic groups should be drawn has caused huge concern in the federal Ethiopia. The cases to be discussed below prove the complexity of the problem. A substantial proportion of the conflicts has created or exacerbated by territorial restructuring in the post- 1991 Ethiopia are interregional in nature. Like in many multiethnic federations, boundary delimitation has created substantial implementation problems on the ground in the country.
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Indeed, interregional tensions which resulted from the 1992 ethnic regionalisation of the country29 have significantly affected the borders of the largest and most centrally located regional state, Oromiya, and other regions in the federation such neighbors as Benishangul- Gumuz, Amhara, Somali, Afar, Gambella, and SNNPRS.
For instance, the Oromiya-Somali border is contested in a number of spots. In the southern portion of the Oromiya-Somali border, former Borana awraja was split into north and south between the two regional states, prompting continued problems from the inhabitants of the former awraja.30 Along the central part of the Oromiya-Somali border, the border town of Moyale is divided between Oromiya and Somali regional states which later led to Borana (Oromo) and Garre (Somali) conflict31 after the new regional boundaries favored the Somalis. Because of the territorial dispute between the two regions, there has been a dual Oromo and Somali administrative structure in Moyale town. The town also serves as the capital of two competing wereda – Moyale Oromiya wereda for the Borana and Moyale Somali wereda for the Garre. Due to the presence of two competing weredas and municipal administrations within one town, there are dual authorities for almost all government activities at the wereda level. For example, there are Oromiya and Somali police stations, courts, public prosecutor, finance, health, education and other offices with overlapping and competing jurisdictions. The continued impasse between the two regional states led to the worsening of relationships between the two clans. As a result, there have been recurrent tensions and conflicts within the town for decades.32 Undeniably, as noted by some informants, „there are three non-functional governments in Moyale town, namely the federal
29Following the introduction of the Transitional Period Charter of Ethiopia, the country‟s internal administration underwent territorial restructuring with the creation of 14 ethnically constituted regional administrations along ethno-linguistic lines in 1992 (see Proclamation No. 7/1992). 30The district was split into two Oromiya weredas (Arero and Liben) and three Somali weredas (Liben, Moyale, and Dolo Odo) (Interview: Researcher and long-time resident of Borana zone and currently a lecturer at private college, Addis Ababa, December 2019). 31Though competition over resources existed for long between the Borana (Oromo) and the Gari, who identified themselves as Somalis in the post-1991 political development, the traditional tension over resources, now coinciding with the boundary issue between the two regional states, seems to change the dimension of the conflict. 32Interview: Ex-police officer and presently an Oromiya kebele Official, Dire Dawa, November 2018.
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government, the Somali and Oromiya regional governments resulting in much confusion and uncertainty.‟33
The federal government attempted to resolve the conflict through both political and legal instruments but without success. However, most recently with a view to restoring peace to these conflict-ridden localities, the newly established Ministry of Peace has taken the initiative and organized a Peace Conference on the 20th of January 2019 at Hawasa, capital of SNNPRS. This Conference brought together people from different sections of society from Borana and Dawa zones, and eastern Guji and Liben zones of Somali and Oromiya regional states respectively. In particular, it brought elders and influential personalities. This fresh reconciliation enterprise might positively contribute to peaceful management of the dispute between the Borana (Oromo) and the Garre (Somali) over Moyale town.34 In the North, there has been considerable fallout from the reallocation of territory in the area around the Awash river where the new Somali regional state has lost a part of the old Hararghe administrative region to Oromiya and Afar. The recent problem also includes the claim of control over Babile,35 a town between Oromiya and Somali regional states; Welisso/Welkite area border trouble that is between the Oromiya regional state and Gurage zone in SNNPRS. Other borders remain without being defined, such as those between Gambella and Oromiya regional states. Oromiya regional state with its geographically stretched territory and neighboring numerous regional states has many border conflicts.
Elsewhere, some long-running disputes have arisen since the change of the Derg regime in 1991 and the introduction of new ethnic-based regional states in the country. For example, a portion of the population of Walqait or Welkait of the former Gondar province objected to
33Interview: Long-time resident of Moyale and a trader from the Burji ethnic group, Dire Dawa, November 2018. 34For a very recent account on this see unpublished document (in Amharic) prepared by Ministry of Peace, January 2019. 35The two regional governments share more than 1,000 kilo meters border area. In the border areas inhabited by nomadic people, the tension between communities over grazing land and water predates the present federal set up. But with the introduction of the state restructuring after 1991, mobility was somehow restricted which intensified resource competition. For more on the conflict regarding Babile (see Ahmed, 2003:96-112).
Territorial Restructuring 85 being included in Tigray regional state rather than Amhara.36 The other tension-ridden territorial readjustment was also a transfer of the lowland plains of Humera from the same Gondar area (Amhara region) to Tigray (Asnake, 2013).
Map 3.8: Litigious territorial dispute between Tigray and Amhara regions
Source: https://passportparty.ch/2020/11/11/tigrays-border-conflicts-explained/
In short, Tigray region has annexed fertile lands from the adjacent region of Amhara particularly from Wollo and Gondar areas in line with the plans set forth in the TPLF manifesto of 1976.37 These seized fertile territories from the neighboring region of Amhara
36When they sent a delegation of elders in 1994 to Addis Ababa to petition the federal government, they were simply thrown in jail. For a more detailed account of this matter (see Abbink, 1995:153). 37After the collapse of the military regime in 1991 and the seizure of state power by the TPLF/EPRDF, Tigray region has successfully seized fertile lands from the adjacent region of Amhara particularly from Wollo and Gondar areas in line with the plans stated in the TPLF manifesto of 1976, otherwise known as the „Republic
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include Walqait or Welkait, Tselemeti, Tsegede, and Kafta-Humera from north Gondar zone, and Raya and surroundings from north Wollo zone (see also Map 3.8 above).38
The borders of Benishangul-Gumuz regional state are particularly troubled with Oromiya in the south and southeast and Amhara in the north and northeast. The formation of Benishangul-Gumuz, which is a multiethnic region of several minorities, has indeed transformed relations between the Gumuz and their neighbors. One significant aspect of these relations is the process of making inter-regional boundaries, which is fraught with tension. This is particularly important for the emerging relations between the Benishangul- Gumuz and Oromiya regions. The making of the boundaries of Benishangul-Gumuz with its Oromo neighbors incited interethnic and inter-regional conflicts. The boundaries the region shares in the south and southeast with the Oromiya region has remained poorly defined.
Initially, upon its formation as a region in 1992, the Benishangul-Gumuz region was declared to have a boundary with the Gambella region in the south. However, the Oromiya region contested this. Specifically, there was a territorial dispute between the two regions over the town Beggie, which used to be one of the weredas (districts) of the Assosa awraja of the former Wellega province. To resolve this dispute, the TGE organised a referendum in 1994. As the majority of voters decided for joining the Oromiya regional state, the administration
of Greater Tigrai‟, which delineates the boundaries of „Greater Tigrai‟ to comprise lands to the west inside of Gondar, lands to the south inside of Wollo, and lands to east inside the Eritrean regions of Burie and the port city of Assab, previously occupied by the Afar communities. These annexations received little newsflash and have been frozen for many years as the territories are populated primarily by poor farmers and the TPLF dominated local politics. As a result of these actions, Ethiopian administrative maps have showed an „enlarged‟ Tigray region that borders the Sudan and incorporates land within Eritrea (McCracken, 2004). 38The population of Walqait or Welkait-Tegede traditionally has been closer to the Amharic-speaking area of Gonder than to Tigray, but both Amharic and Tigrinya languages are used in daily life. Prior to 1991, all four weredas (Walqait or Welkait, Tselemeti, Tsegede, and Kafta Humera) were part of Amhara-dominated North Gondar kifle-hager or Administrative Region (1987-1991). When the EPRDF/TPLF controlled the country, the areas were attached to Tigray regional state. Since then, many Tigrayan settlers have arrived to the area, mainly to Humera town, changing the ethnic balance. Similarly, prior to 1991, Raya-Azebo belonged to Tigray province while Raya-Kobo was part of North Wollo kifle-hager or Administrative Region (1987- 1991), where Amharic language dominated. In the post-1991 period while the territory of Raya-Azebo remained within the boundaries of Tigray, Raya-Kobo was divided between Tigray and Amhara regional states. This means that Tigray‟s borders shifted southwards, at the expense of Amhara regional state. As a result, several Amharic-speaking towns and villages in Raya became part of Tigray. Ethnic tensions around these areas have played a decisive role in the recent protests in the country (Interview: Ex-military officer of Amhara National Democratic Movement (now Amhara Democratic Party – ADP), Addis Ababa, February 2019).
Territorial Restructuring 87 of Beggie transferred to Oromiya in 1994. This has definitely brought changes in the map of the Benishangul-Gumuz regional state. That is to say, the entire long strip of land between Benishangul-Gumuz and Gambella regions now belongs to the Oromiya regional state.
However, the Benishangul-Gumuz region rejects this change. Indeed, the 2002 Benishangul- Gumuz region revised Constitution under Article 3 still claims that the region shares a boundary with the Gambella region in the south (BGNRS, 2002). Furthermore, officials of the Benishangul-Gumuz region interviewed in Addis Ababa stressed that the territory which appears to have merged with the Oromiya region is well beyond the limits of the Beggie referendum and belong to the Mao and Komo ethnic communities and inter alia to Benishangul-Gumuz. They also maintain that there was neither regional consultation nor consent to this major change of borderline.39 Hence, for more than two decades, territorial disputes between the two regions, despite its non-violent nature, somehow has remained unsettled. The situation has, however, in recent times further deteriorated. Currently, there are tensions and occasional violent outbursts between the Gumuz and their Oromo neighbors. For instance, there was widespread violence in November 2018 in Yaso district along the contested border between the Oromiya and the Benishangul-Gumuz regions.40 This shows how the ethnic regionalisation has spurred boundary disputes between the Gumuz and the Oromo and has affected their interethnic relationships.41
Regarding Gumuz-Amhara relations, in the pre-federal period, the Amhara ethnic dominance over the Gumuz and other ethnic minorities characterized the interactions between the two groups. The formation of Benishangul-Gumuz region has effectively changed the frontier nature of their relationships in several ways. One significant aspect of this change has been
39Interview: Officials of Benishangul-Gumuz region, Adama, January 2019. 40Organized groups armed with guns and knives killed several civilians based on their ethnicity in Yaso district of Benishangul-Gumuz region on 23rd of November 2018. Oromo and Amhara ethnic groups living in a cluster of villages found in Yaso, on the border with Haro Limu district of East Wellega zone were targeted by mobs of Gumuz people. The alleged Benishangul-Gumuz region‟s security personnel and local administrators were involved in carrying out the attacks. The region has a large presence of ethnic Oromo, Amhara and Tigriayan, who are at times labelled as “foreigners”. In the past, there have been conflicts between residents of Haro Limu district of Oromiya and Yaso district of Benishangul-Gumuz over competition over farmland and grazing land, border disputes, cultural and political grievances (Focus Group Discussion: Young intellectual and Expert, Oromiya region, Borders‟ Affairs Bureau, Bishoftu, March 2019). 41Focus Group Discussion: Students from both localities, ECSU, Addis Ababa, April 2019.
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the forming of a regional boundary. The prevalence of a wide gap in the boundary imaginations of the Gumuz and their Amhara neighbors has affected this process. For example, the Gumuz believe that all the hot bamboo growing lowlands, which were their ancestral homelands, should be recognised as theirs and assigned to the newly established Benishangul-Gumuz regional state (Berihun, 2004). It is, however, problematic to translate this view of boundary into interregional boundaries as there are both Amhara and Oromo settlements on these territories. Besides, the Amharas do not acknowledge this Gumuz notion of boundary. In fact, during the early days of Transition Period, there were conflicts between the two groups around Menetawuha, a small frontier town that links the Amhara and the Benishangul-Gumuz regions. However, these conflicts came to an end after elders of both groups conducted reconciliation. Despite such conflicts, there was no major outstanding boundary issue in the relations between the Benishangul-Gumuz and the Amhara regions during the same period.42
When the Benishangul-Gumuz region was initially formed in 1992, it was indicated that it would border in the north with the Tigray regional state. It meant the new regional map was supposed to include the Metema and Qwara wereda (district) of the former Gonder kifle- hager (province), which has some Gumuz populations. With reference to this political map, the 1996 Benishangul-Gumuz regional Constitution specified that the region shares a borderline in the north with Tigray (BGNRS, 1995). However, this map was quietly changed because of a reported deal between the top leadership of the Amhara and the Benishangul- Gumuz regions. Accordingly, the Benishangul-Gumuz region dropped its claim over Qwara and Metema weredas. Therefore, the regional state, in line with the revised Constitution of 2002, presently shares a border in the north only with the Amhara region instead of Tigray regional state (BGNRS, 2002). In this manner, ethnic regionalisation has dramatically transformed the relationships between the two ethnic communities from hostile frontier relations into new forms of interaction that include conflict and cooperation. Hence, relations between the two communities have been steadily improving until the last few years.43 However, just recently repeated incidents of attacks by armed vigilantes from ethnic Gumuz
42Supra note 39. 43Interview: Ex-official and member of Amhara Regional Council, Addis Ababa, February 2019.
Territorial Restructuring 89 individuals targeting people mainly of Amhara but also of Oromo and Agaw origin have been reported in Benishangul-Gumuz region. These situations not only worsen the region‟s growing security predicament but also may exacerbate overlapping inter-regional territorial claims and conflict with Amhara region.44
In terms of territorial reorganization, SNNPRS is by far the most complicated regional state in Ethiopia. Its inter-regional boundary making process with Oromiya also led to a violent conflict45 between the Gedeo46 (SNNPRS) and the Guji47 (Oromiya) ethnic communities (Abbink, 2006; Asebe 2007; Girum, 2014). These ethnic groups have a long history of neighborly relations and both were within the former Sidamo province before 1992. After territorial reorganisation of the country in the post-1991, most parts of the Guji were incorporated into the Borana zone of Oromiya regional state while Gedeo remained under Gedeo zone of SNNPRS. While several dozens of Gedeo inhabited in Borena zone, there were also significant numbers of Guji living in Gedeo zone (CSA, 2008). Like anywhere else in the country, the new inter-regional boundary divided the two ethnic groups into SNNPRS and Oromiya regional states in 1992. What followed, after a disastrous referendum to
44See the newsflash on „Benishangul-Gumuz unrest complicates Ethiopia‟s crisis.‟
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demarcate the boundary of the two regions, was an interethnic territorial dispute between two adjoining ethnic groups. When we consider specifically this case in light of some of the theoretical propositions about the role of federalism in managing ethnic conflicts through territorial reorganization, as outlined in chapter 2, the reality on the ground undoubtedly shows the failure of federalism making ethnic and administrative boundaries congruent. It appears that the two communities are thus still at loggerheads since the problem of defining border has not yet been settled as it should be and a sustainable resolution to the conflict remains elusive, which in turn deteriorates interethnic relationships between the two ethnic communities (Girum, 2014).
Lastly, the Afar-Issa conflict48 is a lingering territorial conflict that has been going on for many decades before the country adopted a federal structure. However, ethnic regionalisation has transformed age-old resource conflicts between the two contiguous ethnic groups into interregional border conflicts by bringing in new actors. At the beginning of the Transitional Period, there was a feeling among the Afar and Somali politicians within the new government could amiably resolve the conflict.49 This enthusiasm did not last long and the conflict continued after the establishment of the regions with increased intensity and geographic area (Getachew, 2001:30). The continued Afar-Issa conflict has almost made the drawing of inter-regional boundaries between the two regions impossible. In fact, in a situation where there is an active territorial expansion between neighboring ethnic groups, creating ethno-regional boundaries acceptable to both parties, is problematic, if not impossible. This means the two regional states now take part in this otherwise old and protracted conflict as both parties to the conflict and agents of conflict management.
Despite the fact that ethnic regional states have been given central importance by the FDRE Constitution concerning the resolution of border conflicts, the two regional governments
48On top of the competition over resources between the Afar and Issa which is more or less the same case as with the case of the Borana and the Garre, the tension between the Afar and Issa becomes more complex because it is very much interlinked with the geopolitics of the Horn of Africa. Situations in Djibouti, now Ethiopia‟s only access to the sea in which Issa have the political upper hand, and the minority position of the Afar in Djibouti, intervention by neighboring Somalia, complicate the traditional conflict between the two ethnic groups. For more on this (see Markakis, 2003:445-453). 49Interview: Former Afar government official, Adama, February 2019.
Territorial Restructuring 91 have so far futile to produce an agreeable framework that would help properly resolve their boundary conflicts. On the contrary, regional and local officials of the two ethnic regional states either directly or indirectly play a part in the conflict (Tronvoll and Vaughan, 2003a; MoFedA, 2003). Consequently, the federal government has made attempts to find a resolution to these boundary conflicts in the post-1991 Ethiopia (Michaelson, 2000:5; SNRS, 2004:11). However, those attempts have offered little hope for the federal government to maneuver a compromise between the two groups (MoFedA, 2003:4). This is mainly due to the immense polarity that exists between the two conflicting parties. That is to say, the Afar regional state reiterates the impracticability of using a referendum to offer a just and lasting solution to territorial questions.50 In contrast, their Somali counterparts advocate a referendum (that is, settlements on the contested territories) for the resolution of the border dispute to provide stability for those in the contested border areas to decide freely and democratically which regional state they would like to join (SNRS, 2004:17). In short, despite such efforts, the inter-regional boundary problem of the two regions has not yet shown any improvement in terms of interethnic relations at local and regional levels. Besides, there is tension and a minor recent incident51 involving Issa and Afar groups might incite another major violence between the two groups.
From the above discussion it is clear that defining the boundaries of ethnically constituted sub-national units of federal Ethiopia has proven problematic and caused ethnic tensions and conflicts among various ethnic groups, thereby affecting their interethnic relations at regional and local levels. This is particularly true in ethnic borderlands where two or more ethnic groups converge. This occurs despite the fact that interethnic conflict mitigation is the main objective of such territorial reorganisation. As a matter of fact, Connor pointed out the practical problem of fixing boundaries that emerged in microcosm when multiethnic states
50Interview: Afar regional officials, Adama, February 2019. 51In a fresh round of violence that erupted last December 2018 four people are said to have lost their lives and 13 severely injured in what was a relatively calm region: the Afar regional state, I have learnt from my informant. According to this man from the area, the clash which erupted in a small kebele of Endefo alongside the border of Afar and Somali regional states involved a group of armed individuals and special police of the Afar region. Furthermore, he said that there were also demands to include this small kebele under the Somali regional government. The small kebele, which belongs to Afar regional state, in addition to other ethnic groups, is also inhabited by Issa Somalis clan (Interview: Long-time resident of Semera and a trader from the Oromo ethnic group, Adama, February 2019).
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like Ethiopia carried out state restructuring based on federalism (1973:11). That is why Coakley calls for attention to this practical challenge in the following words:
The capacity of territorial restructuring to resolve ethnic tensions should not be overestimated. Ethnic boundary lines are rarely clearly drawn. Certain tensions in a polyethnic state may be resolved by dissolution into units corresponding to the component ethnic groups, but there tend to be problems in principle and in practice. The problem of principle is that the new units appeared typically polyethnic, and conflicts have been simply moved to a different level and multiplied, with the original conflict possibly being reproduced in microcosm (2003:311-12).
In short, the above federal experience of Ethiopia exhibits how in ethnic federations created through devolution, unlike in mature federations (e.g., Switzerland, the US, and Canada) where the constituent units predate the federal union with defined boundaries, making borders of the new sub-units is prone to interethnic tensions and conflicts.
To sum up, the centrality of ethnicity in the territorial reorganisation process and particularly the desire for matching ethnic and administrative boundaries, brought inter-regional boundary conflicts in the Ethiopian federalism. The analysis indicated above therefore evidently illustrates how the process of boundary making following ethnic regionalisation since 1992 has generated violent conflicts among different ethnic groups, which in turn led to changes in interethnic relationships, thereby placing application of federalism as a credible device of ethnic conflict management using territorial reorganisation under question.
3.3.2. New boundaries, new intra-regional conflicts Even if the FDRE Constitution promised a symmetrical federalism, where every nation/nationality of the country would exercise equal self-determination right52 to form a separate state of its own, the translation of this constitutional rule has led to asymmetrical federalism in which the larger ethnic groups were given their own ethnic regions and the smaller were either lumped together to form multiethnic regions or attached as ethnic minorities to the bigger ethnic regions. This geographical configuration of the new federal
52As a matter of principle, the idea of granting to the nations/nationalities their own „mother‟ states as enshrined in the FDRE Constitution under Article 47(2) entitles each nation/nationality the right to form their own sub- national unit at any time. In theory, therefore, every nation/nationality can have its own sub-national unit and thus we can assume more than eighty ethno-regional units in the country.
Territorial Restructuring 93 dispensation in Ethiopia has thus not created completely ethnically homogenous sub-national territorial units. That is to say, in several of ethnically constituted regional units, there are ethnic minorities which inhabit the midst of the empowered regional majorities, albeit indigenous to the area they reside. As expounded by some scholars like O‟Leary (2001), the assumption that federalism as device of ethnic conflict management would make an ethnically heterogeneous political society less heterogeneous through the creation of more homogenous sub-units does not hold true in Ethiopia in this regard. As a result, all multiethnic regions such as Gambella, Benishangul-Gumuz, and SNNPRS faced violent interethnic conflicts over a range of issues including sharing of political power and economic resources (Solomon, 2006a; Vaughan, 2006; Dereje, 2006). In fact, such conflicts, though less intense in contrast to the intra-regional conflicts that have been violent and more widespread in those multiethnic regions mentioned above, also happened in those regions where a single titular ethnic group constitutes the majority of the regional population such as Amhara53 and Oromiya.54 What follows is a brief discussion of each of these multiethnic regions, namely Gambella, Benishangul-Gumuz, Harari city-state, and SNNPRS.
To begin with, ever since its formation, the Gambella regional state,55 which is a multiethnic regional state, has faced a fatal mix of two-dimensional conflicts. There are conflicts between the titular ethnic groups of the region (the conflict between the Anywaa and the Nuer ethnic groups who emerged as the major titular ethnic groups in the newly established Gambella region) and violence mars interethnic relations between the titular ethnic groups (particularly the Anywaa) and the highlanders56 (Abbink, 2006; Dereje, 2006; Vaughan, 2006; Young,
53The conflict between ethnic Kemants and Amharas in North Gondar zone had been growing since mid-2018 related to claims for self-administration by the Kemant ethnic group. Dozens of deaths and and displacement have been reported particularly since November 2018. See the news on „Ethiopia – Ethnic Violence and Forced Displacement in Amhara Region.‟
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1999). According to the 2007 census, out of the region‟s total population of 306,916, the largest communities are the Nuer constituting 46.65 percent and Anuwak 21.17 percent (together constituting more than half of the population). In addition, there are smaller indigenous communities or titular ethnic groups of Majangir (4 percent), Komo (0.07 percent), and Opo (0.32 percent). Secondly, the region has Amhara (8.42 percent), Kefficho (5.05 percent), Oromo (4.83 percent), Shekecho (2.27 percent), Tigrayan (1.32 percent) and other nationalities together approximately constituting 30 percent of the population in the region. None of the titular ethnic groups constitutes more than 50 percent of the region‟s population.
The Anywaa who collaborated with the EPRDF in the 1980s in the struggle against the Derg regime assumed the political upper hand with the blessing of the EPRDF when the Gambella regional state was established in 1992 (Young, 1999). Thus, the Anywaa/Anuak political class managed to seize the attendant political and economic resources, which the formation of the new region brought. Although attempts were made to fairly distribute regional power among the groups living in the region, it later transpired that the Anuak, despite being second in numbers in the regional state, controlled the executive and consequently the Nuer57 who felt that they were excluded from the power structures of the new region began to press for equitable representation (Young, 1999:332). The two groups locked in a struggle over the allocation of power and resources, use of local language for education, and citizenship.
The abysmal divisions and mutual uncertainties that prevailed between the two belligerent groups led to a cyclic conflict that caused death to human life and destroyed property on several occasions (Medhane, 2007:13). Despite such horrific experience of interethnic conflicts, it has been reported that a consensus was reached in 2003 to fairly allocate power and resources between the two and ethnic based zones were to be set up with the help of the federal government, but this was not put into practice. The Anuak saw this trend as an
extracted from the Oromo and the Amhara nationalities. The number of „highlanders‟ augmented over time due to forced resettlement of peasants from the highland regions during the 1980s and the migration of people for economic opportunities. 57The Nuer even had to ask to go to Badme, northern part of Tigray regional state (the flash point of border conflict between Ethiopia and Eritrea), to prove that they are as Ethiopian as the Anuaks/Anywaa, so as to earn proportional representation in the Gambella regional state.
Territorial Restructuring 95 attempt by the federal government to shift its alliance with the Nuer and resisted its implementation. This has lastly led to a political standstill (Dereje cited in Asnake, 2013).
The second aspect of the crisis in Gambella region is between the indigenous groups on the one hand and the highlanders on the other. The relations between the Anywaa and the politically excluded highlanders were also characterized by stubborn conflicts. The conflict seems to have changed its dimension in 2003 when some of the highlanders joined by the federal army massacred hundreds of Anywaa in an apparent revenge for the killings of some highlanders (Medhane, 2007:16). In any case, the regional state has not yet fully stable.
The tension in Benishangul-Gumuz region, like that of Gambella, has two dimensions. Certainly, there is an interesting parallel between the two regional states. One between the Gumuz and Berta and the other between the indigenous ethnic groups (largely Berta, Gumuz, Shinasha, Komo, and Mao) and highlanders. According to the 2007 census, the ethnic composition of the indigenous ethnic groups in the region looks like: Muslim Berta (25.90 percent), Gumuz (21.11 percent), Shinasha (7.59 percent), Mao (1.90 percent), and Komo (0.96 percent) while Amhara (21.25 percent), Oromo (13.32 percent), and Tigrayan (0.68 percent) and other ethnic groups which are all considered as highlanders or settlers roughly account for about 42.54 percent of the total population of the region (CSA, 2008).
When the EPRDF came to power in May 1991, it initially allowed the political ascendancy of the Berta dominated BPLM (Benishangul People‟s Liberation Movement) in the Benishangul-Gumuz region. However, after the 1996 Gimgema (evaluation) under the stewardship of EPRDF cadres, the entire Berta dominated regional government was sacked. Since then power seems to have shifted to the Gumuz. As a result, the Berta complained that this has to be overturned (Young, 1999). The Berta simply saw the post-1995 political development as a shift of alliance by the federal government from Berta to the Gumuz (ibid.). In this context, political contention and friction between the Gumuz and the Bertha at times degenerated into violence. It was under this situation, the HoF had to deal with the tension between the two. After some negotiation, the HoF secured an agreement between the Bertha and the Gumuz dominated regional government. It appears that a political reconciliation was
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concluded between the Gumuz and the Berta, which lastly led to a proportional representation of all the groups in the regional council and the executive committee of the regional government (Assefa, 2006a). Despite all these endeavors, the Bertha ethnic entrepreneurs failed either to control presidential post in region or to form their own regional state. Undeniably, the absence of transparent means for power sharing among the various contenders in the region could re-ignite conflict.
The second dimension of the conflict between the indigenous groups and the highlanders has also produced a hostile political situation in the region. The formation of the new regional state not only embraced the historically marginalized indigenous groups warmly but also allowed them to use its structures to advance their political and economic interests at the expense of the highlanders in a number of instances (Gebre, 2004). Quite the opposite, the settlers „felt that they were treated as second-class citizens with restricted rights to live and work‟(ibid.:63). As argued by Walter Kälin (2000:5, emphasis added), the notion that ethnically defined sub-national units in multiethnic federations „exacerbate minority problems whenever they are unable to integrate or even tolerate persons on their territory who are of a different ethnic origin‟ seems to make some sense, at least so far, in Benishangul-Gumuz given the region‟s existing situation. In this context, there has been a scene of the politics of the „son of the soil‟ in the region. As a result, the new political class of the indigenous groups in the regional state seeks to restrict the role of these economic migrants or the highlanders. There are thus tensions in the relationships between the two groups.
One can also witness similar tensions to the Benishangul-Gumuz and Gambella regional states cases in the Harari regional state,58 in which large sections of populations are prohibited from running for office despite their numerical majority. According to the 2007 census, ethnic groups in the region with a total population of 183,415 include the Oromo
58According to many critics, the most serious abnormality in the state structure is the Harari city-state. The historic Harari state, a „melting pot‟ in eastern Ethiopia, was the administrative center for the Hararghe region where the bulk of the population was Oromos and Somalis (see Merera, 2003:139). It has also has a numerous number of Amharas, Guraghes, and Tigrayans (CSA, 2008). As a commercial center, it has also attracted thousands of people outside the region, particularly Amhara and Guraghe. The city continues to display the historic imprint of the Hararis (Aderes) (Merera, 2003).
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(56.41 percent), Amhara (22.77 percent), Harari (8.65 percent), Gurage (4.34 percent), Somali (3.87 percent), Tigray (1.53 percent), and Argobba (1.26 percent) (CSA, 2008). From among the several ethnic groups that are found in the region, only the Harari and the Oromo were declared as co-owners of the regional state or „owners‟ of the „mother state‟ and thus the region has been under a coalition government of the ODP (formerly OPDO) and the EPRDF affiliated Harari National League (HNL). Thus, currently only Hararis are eligible to run for key offices such as the president and the secretary of the regional administrative council while in the rest of the regional state ethnic Oromo can elect and be elected to public office and share power as junior partners. However, power sharing between the two ethnic based organisations has remained asymmetrical.
Notwithstanding the multicultural character of the Harari regional state and the apparent numerical majority of the non-Harari, no practical measures have so far been taken to secure political participation and representation of the non-Harari and non-Oromo residents of the region.59 Consequently, large sections of the residents in the region are seemingly disenfranchised from meaningful participation in the running of the affairs of their regional state. The Harari region then did not seem to have considered resolutely the city‟s multiethnic character. This also reveals the point that a numerical minority has the dominance over a numerical majority at regional level making the threat of local tyranny more noticeable. In this connection, it is important to mention that despite the widely held view of federalism‟s contribution to the maintenance of individual and communal liberty through power diffusion (Elazar, 1979:10; Gagnon and Charles, 1999:85), the ideological promotion of federalism as a way of guaranteeing democracy and freedom in Ethiopia is far from convincing due to the formation of minority tyranny over majority in the multiethnic region of Harari. Unquestionably, other ethnic regions (such as Gambella and Benishangul- Gumuz) in the country as well submit to this reality despite their multiethnic fabrics. Hence, there are tensions in the relationships between the Hararis who dictate the structure of the new regional state and the non-titular groups. Without some sort of mitigation, this
59See Article 26 and 29 of the Harari State Constitution. Only the Hararis and Oromos can participate in the region‟s politics.
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democratic deficit/serious structural constraints may engender violence (Asnake and Hussein, 2007; Assefa, 2006a).
Lastly, ever since the introduction of ethnic federalism, despite its promise and claims to bring solutions to ethnic problems, the most frequent and deadly conflicts have been in the SNNPRS. The SNNPRS60 was formed in 1994 by EPRDF‟s political surgery that has lumped together several dozen diverse ethnic groups more for political expediency. It is estimated that more than fifty-six61 nationalities amount to around 15,042,531 million people. The main ethnic groups comprise the Sidama (19.38 percent), Welayta (10.59 percent), Hadiya (7.98 percent), Guraghe (7.54 percent), Kafficho (5.44 percent), Silt‟e (5.37 percent), Amhara (4.10 percent), Gedeo (4.90 percent), Kambata (3.82 percent), and many others (CSA, 2008). In this region, unlike the case in Amhara, Oromiya, Afar, Somali, and Tigray regions, there is no single numerically dominant ethnic group. The region, like other multiethnic regions in the country, faced interethnic conflicts that emerged over a number of issues ranging from territory, borders, representation, sharing of resources, identity62 to control of local administrative structures.63 For instance, in terms of political representation, in almost all ethnically delimited zonal and wereda Administrations in the SNNPRS a significant proportion of people who do not belong to specific titular ethnic groups, despite living in the
60Assefa, supra note 27. 61Semahagen, supra note 26. 62After ethnic regionalization in the SNNPRS, the Silte, who effectively mobilised for the recognition of their separate identity from the Gurage, have succeeded in establishing a separate zonal structure within the SNNPRS (Assefa, 2006a). However, the formation of a separate Silte administrative zone adversely affected the relations between the two groups. 63The status of Hawassa town in the SNNPRS was a source of conflict in 2002. A demonstration staged by some members of the Sidama ethnic group to oppose speculated changes in the status of the Hawassa town was violently crushed by the police causing loss of life on both sides. There are different accounts about what actually triggered the security forces to use force and about the number of causalities. The Sidama people felt that they were about to lose control over their ethnic territory and an emerging urban center. This led to an intense mobilization of the Sidama who live in Hawassa and the adjoining kebeles to oppose the decision under the slogan Hawassa will not be sold. Some blame the regional authorities for the conflict as they made decisions concerning the status of the town without adequate consultation and the consent of the Sidama people. However, the regional executive body argued that the people were wrongly provoked by the Sidama local elite who propagated that the change in the status of Hawassa was to undermine the interests of the Sidama people. The case illustrates how changes in the geographic jurisdiction of ethnically constituted administrative units may cause conflict. In fact, the conflict over a change in the administrative status of the city, too, is part of the ethnic tension between the Sidama ethnic group who claims exclusive control over the city and the rest of the ethnic groups living the region who want to see the city as regional capital as well as home to all ethnic groups (Interview with former Public Communication officer of SNNPRS, Addis Ababa, January 2019).
Territorial Restructuring 99 areas for generations, are marginalized due to an exclusive control of these titular communities in the constituencies. Such discriminations are not only limited to depriving electoral rights but also include denying access to equal public employment and other similar rights.64
It is also interesting to note that in some cases, on the one hand, ethnic entrepreneurs65 who seek to control the meager resources made available at regional and local levels engage in the politics of ethnic entitlement, on the other hand, some ethnic groups seek to separate from the existing multiethnic region and form their own ethnic regions using the constitutional provision66 for internal statehood. In this regard, one scholar has illuminated that „…the creation of more and more subunits was partly the result of ethnic groups – or rather local elites – attempting to gain a greater share of the national budget‟ (Vaughan cited in Assefa, 2006b:136, emphasis mine). Just to add one recent instance, though long-standing demands for regional status have always been suppressed by the previous TPLF-dominated federal government, the requests for regional status have recently multiplied, with the Welayta already demanding statehood, as are the Keffa, Gurage, Gedeo, Hadiya, and Kembata zones in the wake of the Council of SNNPRS approval of Sidama67 statehood request.68 In fact, those demands have, over relatively short periods of time, translated into political pressure that neither federal nor regional governments have been willing or able to ignore.
64Discussions with senior civil servants, Hawassa, September 2019. 65They refer to the „ethnic elites‟ who have „a vested interest in advancing particular agendas‟ on behalf of their ethnic groups (see Carment, 2003:31). 66See Article 47 of the FDRE Constitution. 67Ethiopia‟s Sidama people have voted in favor of autonomous rule by a huge margin in the recent referendum. Out of the total voters, 98.51 percent voted in favor of forming new regional state and the remaining 1.48 percent voted against it, according to preliminary results of the referendum announced by the National Electoral Board of Ethiopia (NEBE). As a result, the Sidama zone has become Ethiopia‟s 10th regional state, with its own regional constitution and regional council, enjoying a degree of sovereignty enshrined in the FDRE Constitution. See the news on „Sidama Becomes the 10th Ethiopian Regional State.‟
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From what has been described so far, even though the attractiveness of federalism as an effective harmonizing device lies in its potential „where the boundaries of the states match the boundaries of the main concentration of the relevant ethnic, religious or language groups…‟(Agnew, 1995:297, ellipsis mine), one could argue that the desire of making ethnic and sub-regional boundaries congruent in the SNNPRS has been disappointing at least so far and so does managing ethnic conflict. As a result of these overall phenomena, zones and weredas boundaries throughout the region have been, and will be subject to conflicting claims and redefinition. This is mainly due to the fact that boundary making has its „own internal dynamics creating new realities, and affecting the lives of people and groups who reside within proximity to the boundary…‟(Newman, 2003:123, ellipsis added). These certainly will continue to engender tensions and conflicts in the regional state unless a detailed study is underway to map out new administrative divisions.
In the light of the above discussion, it can be stated that the institutionalisation of ethnic federalism in Ethiopia has failed to make the premise of matching ethnic and administrative boundaries congruent. Simply, the process has not resulted in homogeneous sub-national territorial units despite the attempt to grant a mother state to some of the dominant nationalities. This has engendered tensions and conflicts in the relationships between local/regional majorities and minorities in several multiethnic regions. That is why Alan Cairns proposed that „federalism can contribute to inter-ethnic harmony and civility only when the ethnic groups in question are territorially concentrated and thus capable of escaping from each other…‟(1992:112, emphasis added). This is not, however, the case in federal Ethiopia. Instead, ethnic regionalisation or state restructuring since 1992 has affected interethnic relations at sub-national level in several ways. Indeed, what William Riker (1964) called „local tyranny‟ has been observed in many of ethnically constituted administrative units in Ethiopia.69 In light of this, the application of federalism as an instrument of ethnic
69Admittedly, from more than two decades of federal experience, one major challenge the federal dispensation in Ethiopia is facing relates to the problem of local tyranny at sub-national level. Particularly precarious cases have arisen in the last two decades in Benishangul-Gumuz, Harari, Gambella, SNNPRS, and partly in Oromyia regional states. In the first three constituent units, the state of affairs is somewhat different from the other regional states. What is exceptional in these three sub-national units is the fact that the tyranny arises from a minority against the majority.
Territorial Restructuring 101 conflict management through territorial reorganisation in accommodating the various ethno- linguistic groups‟ demand has so far not been encouraging in the country.
In short, similar to the discussion in the preceding section, the above discussion has also shown that ethnic-based territorial reorganisation has caused intra and interethnic conflicts and laid the ground for protracted interethnic tensions and conflicts in almost all the regions.
3.4. Conclusion This chapter examined the operation and effect of federal system on interethnic relations by focusing on territorial restructuring in the post-1991 federal Ethiopia. It discussed inter- regional and intra-regional tensions and conflicts within the country.
The 1995 FDRE Constitution endorsed a restructuring of the country‟s internal boundaries with the formation of regional administrations along ethno-linguistic lines. It has empowered the diverse marginalised national groups in the country to exercise their linguistic and cultural autonomy and political representation (Abbink, 2006:395). As a result, it brought some improvements in interethnic relationships at the national level by opening up the long- suppressed identity issue. The establishment of regional states was also the most visible political step ever taken to integrate peripheral communities in the country. Although federalism was presumed to end ethnic conflicts and pacify interethnic relations in Ethiopia, after more than two decades, its track record, mainly from the background of its promises, remains worrying. In fact, the federal restructuring carried out by dismantling the old unitary state structure led to inter-regional and intra-regional territorial and border disputes. When we examined boundary delineation, the process of drawing inter-regional boundaries with the premise of matching ethnic and politico-administrative boundaries has not been smooth. As a result, ethnic regionalisation transformed age-old resource conflicts into inter-regional border conflicts. This boundary making process also resulted in new conflicts between communities that had not a lingering territorial conflict in the past. In short, the processes of inter-regional boundary making in the Ethiopian federalism impelled inter-ethnic and inter-regional territorial conflicts.
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Likewise, the ethnic regionalisation of Ethiopia since 1992 also led to the emergence of intra- regional conflicts over a range of issues such as territory, and sharing of political power and resources in almost all regional states. In several ways, it affected interethnic relations at regional and local levels. In those constituent units where a single titular ethnic group makes up the majority of the regional population (such as Tigray, Afar, and Amhara) intra-regional and intra-ethnic conflicts have been less intense. In contrast, intra-regional and interethnic conflicts have been violent in the multiethnic regional states (such as the SNNPRS, Gambella, and Benishangul-Gumuz). These appear to have been contrary to some of the theoretical propositions about the role of federalism in reducing ethnic tensions and conflicts. In fact, as precisely noted by one author, federalism „by proliferating points of power‟ (decentralization of authority) tends to make the administrative organ of sub-units objects of competition by providing political and economic resources for competing ethnic elites and thereby reduce violent interethnic conflicts (Horowitz, 1985:598). This could help transform intense conflicts that contending ethnic groups undertake in their bid to control the political centre to intra-regional non-violent conflicts within sub-national territorial units (Petter cited in Gagnon, 1993:23; Smith, 1995:16-17). Other scholars also suggested that federalism could be an instrument of ethnic conflict management because of its ability to make a multiethnic society less heterogeneous through the creation of more homogenous sub-units (O‟Leary, 2001:281; Agnew, 1995:297). If one follows these theoretical propositions on federalism, the reality in the Ethiopian federalism is far from convincing. Certainly, the most discernible change pertaining to conflicts following the federal restructuring of Ethiopia has been the emergence of localised violent conflicts in several ethnic regions.
In sum, federal restructuring in Ethiopia was presented as an innovative model that would resolve ethnic tensions and conflicts. Nevertheless, more than two decades after its introduction, the track record of Ethiopia‟s federalism, mainly from the background of its promises, remains troublesome. At this juncture, it would be worthwhile to recall what Samuel Huntington called for caution in the early 1990s after the formation of „ethnic-based regions‟ whose boundaries coincided with some of the major nationalities or ethno-linguistic groups by saying:
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Drawing regional boundaries on ethnic lines […] supplements what is unavoidable with what is undesirable. […] The combination of ethnic territorial units and parties, however, cumulates cleavages and can have a disastrous effect on national unity and political stability (1993b:16, emphasis and ellipsis added).
Neverthelss, while political stability has so far proven elusive for the Ethiopian federalism, it is not yet entirely out of reach. Whether those problems can be sorted through leading to some kind of stability will depend chiefly on the federal government‟s endeavors.
Fiscal Relations and Interregional Equity 4
4.1. Introduction Since the early l980s many African countries have experienced decentralisation as an effective method of both political governance and economic development (Brosio, 2000). Particularly in multiethnic states, it is seen as a means of allowing increased self- development, reducing interethnic disparities, and increasing national unity. Despite its theoretical attractiveness, few states have engaged in substantive decentralization (the devolution of fiscal, administrative and political power from the center to sub-national governments) that goes beyond the cosmetic. A general reluctance of the state to surrender central control over both political decision making and economic life is observable throughout the continent. Where decentralization has occurred, it most often takes the form of deconcentration (decentralizing implementation) rather than devolution (decentralizing decision making itself) (Nellis et al., 1983). A federation like Ethiopia is among those states that have at least attempted devolution.
This chapter focuses on the economic dimension of interregional tension and contention. It attempts to understand the contribution of public-side economics to conflicts between ethno- regions1 in multiethnic federations. Fiscal relations, otherwise known as fiscal federalism2, include financial matters between federal and sub-national levels of government, particularly questions of control over national resources, revenue collection (including taxation mainly) and allocation. It is concerned with matching expenditure responsibilities and the ability to finance them. In a federation, the main fiscal questions center on which levels of government should perform which specific tasks, and collect which taxes and revenues? Most
1In this thesis, unless otherwise explicitly stated, the usage of the term ethno-regions refers to ethnic-based regional units or ethnically constituted administrative units. That is to say, geographical regions populated primarily by a specific ethnic group. 2Fiscal federalism is essentially about the distribution of expenditure responsibilities and the allocation of taxation power with the concomitant intergovernmental revenue transfers for adjusting fiscal imbalances between the tiers of government (Solomon, 2006b).
104 Chapter 4 105 importantly, what kinds of fiscal transfers should be made between which levels, and according to what rationality?
Why must fiscal issues become a source of contention and conflict in federations? Milica Bookman makes use of the concept of discontinuous (read uneven) development, characterized by discontinuities (differences) across space (between regions) and over time (relative positions change). These variances can have political repercussions including resentment and conflict: „where there is high spatial discontinuity (as well as an effort to correct it) popular perceptions of that reality can give rise to popular resentment and intolerance that manifests itself in various forms of interregional tension and conflict.‟ Under certain conditions, discontinuous (differences) development may thus generate or heighten conflict among regional states (Bookman, 1991:19-29).3 The consequences include a greater involvement of regional states in the economic sphere generally, an added dimension of interregional economics, and in ethnic federations, a perceptual framework of macroeconomics, development issues, public finance, and fiscal questions that are fundamentally colored by ethnic based sectionalism. Where fiscal relations are concerned, perception appears to play a significant role. Interregional inequalities themselves (i.e., relative poverty) do not cause conflict per se, but popular perceptions of economic discrimination breed popular bitterness that in turn fuels the possibility of tension and conflict of some kind. In federations that are developing economies, the prominence of these subjects is grown because development constitutes both the primary business of government and the primary expectation of political constituencies. Therefore, public finance, fiscal transfers, and regional development are chiefly sensitive and complex issues in multiethnic federations like Ethiopia (as opposed to those of Canada and Switzerland for example) (UNDP, 2019).4
3Bookman offers four hypotheses: secessionist aspirations and regional viability (ability to survive alone) are positively related to 1) Relative economic status (i.e., wealth), 2) Net-outflows (more resources flow out to help others than in), 3) Regional decentralization (learns and perceives that it can function independently), and 4) Low trade dependency on the nation (few links and benefits from the nation) (see Bookman, 1991:19-29). 4Ethiopia is the second-most populous country of Africa after Nigeria with substantial developmental challenges. It ranks 173th out of 185 states in UNDP‟s 2019 Human Development Report (UNDP, 2019).
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This brings us to the specific reason why economics and fiscal relations in particular can play an aggravating role in federations. In any federation, substantial regional variations are likely to exist between constituent units or regional governments in terms of their capacity to raise revenue and their expenditure responsibilities. This general phenomenon creates the need for fiscal transfers within the federal systems. While these can take the form of direct region-to- region transfers, they are usually channeled through the federal government itself:
intergovernmental transfer, in principle, involves not only a vertical flow of resources from the center to lower level governments, but also a reverse vertical transfer from surplus regions to the center, and horizontally from wealthier to poorer regions. For various reasons, however, both political and economic, central governments usually have greater revenue raising capacity than lower level governments (Kibre, 1994:9).
In those federations where regional states are associated with particular ethnic groups (as in the Ethiopian ethnic federalism case), this process of allocations, transfers, and bargaining, can potentially take on a particularly acrimonious and sectarian character.
This chapter contends that distributive decisions over fiscal issues in multiethnic federations can adversely affect interethnic relations. The normal fiscal tasks of revenue collection and allocation can, under the impact of politicized heterogeneity, become a battleground for identity-based sectarian contestation. Two possible patterns of contestation emerge. First, the vertical imbalance that characterizes the Ethiopian federalism (the distribution of revenue between levels of government) sometimes undermines political devolution and makes the control of the revenue-rich federal center a paramount objective for large ethnic groups (hence increasing contention at the center). Second, the existence of horizontal imbalance (between different constituent units or regionals states within the same level) can create perceptions of economic injustice and preferential treatment by the federal government. The choice of allocation grant formula, and the relative weights assigned to them, become deeply political and generate disagreement and political wrangling. The criteria of population, income generation, development index, and others will be discussed closely for the disruptiveness tendency they generate in multiethnic federal systems.
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The other three factors increase the possibility of sectarian conflict over public finance as well. First, the existence of substantial regionally concentrated wealth requires a set of decisions related to financial flows that are particularly controversial and can embitter interethnic or interregional relations across the federation as a whole. “The quantity and quality of outflows from a region is a most sensitive issue to populations and governments of dissatisfied regions [...] it becomes the „aggravation factor‟‟‟ (Bookman, 1991:225, ellipsis added). Second, the use of discretionary grants-in-aid by the federal government as tools of reward and control exacerbates the sense of injustice and worsens the intensity of the next round of interregional struggle for such benefits. Third, the existence and similar use of „extra-budgetary‟ (non-official budgetary transfers) flow to favored regions compounds the perception (and often the reality) of uneven development and regional inequality.
Throughout the analysis that follows in this chapter, it is worth keeping in mind the contradiction between the goals of interethnic parity and efficiency. Development policies that focus on forming equity between regional states involve substantial interregional transfers to hasten development in some areas rather than others. But, this often means shifting money away from more efficient sectors of the national economy (usually in developed regions), from the shortest route to improving the nation‟s output, and thereby the total national average developmental level (ibid.:227-28). As Paul Henze warns in the Ethiopian ethnic federalism case, „excessive attention to ethnic demands can distort key priorities in economic development‟ (1994:124; emphasis mine). Indeed, in a context of identity-based factionalism, the decisions behind federal fiscal flows can offer an additional field on which the ethno-regional contest is played out. Mainly in federations where the federal government has assumed a considerable role in the national economic realm, control of political government means control of economic decision making, which is itself an essential prize (Joseph, 1983:21-38). Those same economic decisions become aggravating factors in interethnic relations: they are perceived as part of the overall ethno-regional competition.
Within this context, this chapter examines fiscal imbalances and financial transfers under the Ethiopian federalism, with a particular emphasis on the effects on ethno-regional
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(interregional) relations. This review covers a 1994/95 - 2005/06 fiscal periods, which has repercussions for the trends observed. The emphasis all the way through is on the effect of fiscal decisions on interethnic relations or interregional relations across the federation. With this in mind, the next section gives a brief review of fiscal relations and regional development in Ethiopia. The third sections focus on fiscal relations between federal and regional states in Ethiopia. The fourth section deals with fiscal transfers in the Ethiopian federalism. It covers various issues related to the allocation of federal grants and applicable formulas, revenue sharing scheme, those challenges to federal grants, and other forms of federal transfer. The final section offers a set of concluding thoughts.
4.2. Fiscal Relations and Regional Development in Ethiopia After WWII, Emperor Haile Sellassie I sought to transform what was a partially decentralized system (the Ethiopia of the 1930s) into a highly centralized and efficient modem state. Beginning with this period, regional demands for a fair share of national resources emerged as a major theme of the modem Ethiopian state. Despite this centralizing trend, the Haile Sellassie I government did embark on occasional local decentralization experiments like the Awraja self-administration project in 1966 but parliamentary resistance defeated its implementation (Cohen, 1974). The centralization generated a variety of forms of regional resistance: tax revolts in Gojjam, demands for self-rule in Tigray, demands for land reform and autonomy in Bale, secessionist agitations in Eritrea (Asmelash, 1987). This was articulated as a center-periphery problem with a parallel urban-rural axis, and often having an ethnic character.
Under the Derg socialist regime, regional disparities and the nationalities question became more closely intertwined.5 The three main developmental challenges of that period were rural/urban inequalities, interregional disparities, and the excessive size of Addis Ababa relative to other urban centers. The socialist regime pursued several relatively successful development programs in the areas of literacy, primary education, and basic health care. However, „opposition‟ regions were not included, widening the interregional gap considerably (Mulatu, 1994a). Overall, the socialist regime‟s initiative to address the economic problems of minority nationalities did not
5Politicised ethnicity started during the last days of the Haile Sellassie regime, but it proliferated after the Derg seized absolute control of power.
Chapter 4 109 help them whatsoever, however, it raised the expectations of many of the smaller ethnic groups‟ (ibid.).
Under the 1987 territorial and administrative restructuring, regional parliaments (Shengos) were to assume responsibility for planning and implementing economic development.6 While the 1987-1991 decentralization managed to highlight both the „nationalities‟ problem and raise sectarian consciousness, in substance the program never embarked on meaningful regional decentralization, fiscal or otherwise.7 Besides, because it eliminated the lowest level (wereda) of administration, grassroots decision making faded away.8 As a result, both economic disparities and ethnic comparative consciousness increased during the Derg period.
Wealthier provinces like Keffa, Sidamo, and Wellega came to oppose the government based partially on the perception of unfair drainage of resources from their provinces. Finally, less developed regions like Tigray, Bale, and Gamu-Gofa resented a perceived government bias in favor of other regions (Mulatu, 1994a).9 Thus, many of the problems that finally toppled the Derg were partially (though not exclusively) economic in character and arose out of a reality of inequitable development.
In the post-1991 period, Ethiopia has matched its new federal restructuring with an ambitious program of economic and developmental decentralization (Cohen and Peterson, 1999:148).10 To engage in one of these alone would have been remarkable given the many constraints; to seek to do both at once is nothing short of unprecedented. Yet, this dual approach originates in the recognition of the danger inherent in doing either one without the other. It is also born of an understanding that the two processes are actually mutually dependent: „in post-civil war Ethiopia, a major rationale for regionally autonomous and ethnically organized government
6For more on this see chapter four. 7This proclamation was not basically decreed to solve the problem of self-administration, rather to solve the problem of peace and order and to secure the unity and stability of the country. This can be evidenced by the fact that regions which were given the autonomous status were unstable regions in the country. See Chapter four of mine for more details. 8See chapter four for more. 9In the case of Tigray and some parts of Bale, there were armed insurgency movements. 10Cohen argues that the new constitution and government proclamations have created a de facto hybrid pattern, part deconcentration, part devolution. While the Government‟s final aim is devolution, both political and administrative, there is a general recognition that this remains a gradual process that will require years of work.
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entities is the diffusion of ethnic tensions by reducing interregional economic and social disparities‟ (Mishra, 1995:10).
As stated earlier, a unique political ideology was at the genesis of the political decentralization of the Ethiopian state and its new federal restructuring11 along ethno- linguistic lines. This same political ideology of the state instills the basis of the state‟s economic decentralization as well, with substantial consequences for both the responsibilities of regional states, and for federal-regional fiscal relations. Following the restructuring of the country‟s internal administration and the formation of regional governments along ethno- linguistic lines, the decentralization process that followed centered on the goals of 1) reduced interregional disparities (moving toward equity, especially after a long and devastating civil war) and 2) accelerated development and growth. A third objective can perhaps be extracted from the first: reversing the developmental neglect of the „periphery‟ relative to the urban centers.
It is crucial to note that the EPRDF government is not simply dealing with inherited interregional inequities. Evidently, there were such interregional inequities in the old system. However, these were less (some argue far less) significant than those that have resulted from the new ethno-federal system.12 Put simply, the new ethnically constituted regions are more unequal than the old (non-ethnic) ones are. The conclusion then is that the new federal system‟s problems are at least partially of its own making. Nevertheless, we must reverse this judgment if the old system of non-ethnic regions simply disguised or hidden substantial interethnic inequities that have come to light following the federal restructuring of the country along ethno-linguistic lines and/or ethnic criteria. If so, then the problems are not really of the EPRDF government‟s own making after all. But, even in this case, the current regime in power is not free of responsibility. If the new regime‟s central objective was to reduce inherited interethnic inequalities, we must ask if doing so in non-ethnic states would
11Federal restructuring refers to devolutionary processes that lead to the federalisation of a once unitary political system into a federation (Weinstock, 2001). 12Scholar like Leff defines „ethnic‟ federalism or ethno-federal system as a system „where territorial boundaries of the constituent units conform roughly to the distribution of the most important national groups within the multinational state‟ as ethnic federalism (1999:208-209).
Chapter 4 111 not have been more productive and less controversial or problematic. In other words, the choice of forming ethno-regional states in the post-1991 Ethiopia has compounded and politicized the problem they sought to resolve. Such a choice seems to indicate either a calculation that reducing interregional inequities in the old regions would not succeed, or a conviction that ethnic regional states were so important a political goal of their own that this developmental risk was worth taking. With this background, the next sections discuss fiscal relations between federal and regional governments in Ethiopia.
4.3. Fiscal Relations between Federal Government and Regions In the review of the Ethiopian federal experiment, John Cohen remarks that „at the heart of the coming struggle between the federal government and the regions for definition of structure, organization, tasks, and roles will be the revenue and budget system‟ (Cohen, 1999:47). The FDRE Constitution under Article 94(1) dictates that the federal government and states „shall respectively bear all financial expenditures necessary to carry out all responsibilities and functions assigned to them by law.‟ Though the arrangement for allocation of center-state taxing powers can be made with many considerations in mind, in most cases it does not come up with a balance between expenditure responsibilities and revenue sources at the state level. Those areas of taxation that are most substantial and lucrative are in the hands of the center. The Ethiopian federal system cannot be an exceptional case in this regard. The dominant and lucrative sources of revenue are reserved for the federal government under its exclusive authority or through the concurrent powers on the basis of which it has the decisive power to levy and collect the tax. Thus, the main sources of revenue, which account for a lion‟s share of the revenue generated in the country, are placed under the sole jurisdiction of the federal government. On the other hand, tax sources, which generate only a limited amount of financial resources, have been allocated to the regional states. These revenues held by the regional states neither generate a considerable amount of taxes nor reveal signs of growth relative to the total revenue and expenditure needs (Solomon, 2006b; Ghebrehiwet, 2014; Eshetu, 1994). A collection of Ethiopian economists and development specialists in this respect argue that there is an imbalance between the responsibilities given to the regional governments and the revenue-sharing arrangements provided in the FDRE Constitution (Eshetu, 1994; Befekadu, 1994; Bulti,
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1994; Asmelash, 1997). There is thus a mismatch between the revenue means and the constitutionally assigned expenditure responsibilities of regional states. In other words, there is a pronounced vertical imbalance – the mismatch between the revenue generated and public services provided by regional governments. For example, according to the 1999/00 fiscal year, the lowest percentage of revenue compared with their own expenditure was documented in Afar (6.43 percent), Benishangul-Gumuz (9.22 percent), Gambella (8.33 percent), and Somali (8.33 percent). As a result, these four weakest regional states have to rely on federal subsidies or grants for an overwhelming amount of their revenue with 93.57 percent, 90.78 percent, 91.67 percent, and 91.67 percent respectively. On the other hand, the two city administrations, namely Addis Ababa (94.6 percent) and Dire Dawa (55.9 percent) manage to finance a substantial part of their expenditure responsibilities through their own revenue: they rely on outside funding for only 5.4 percent and 44.1 percent correspondingly. Relatively developed regional states like Oromiya (57.3 percent), Tigray (71.2 percent), SNNPRS (72.47 percent), Amhara (76.1 percent), and Harari (78.9 percent)13 are still very reliant on federal grants. In terms of regional dependency (without including the two city administrations) on actual federal subsidies, the regional average is 80.41 percent.14
Regional states in Ethiopia also do not have equal revenue capacity to provide a comparable level of public goods and services to their citizens live in their territory although they are assigned the same financial resources. Since they usually have different tax bases and capacities to collect them, the amount of revenue that regions accrue from their sources broadly varies (Solomon, 2006b; Ghebrehiwet, 2014). Therefore, in addition to fixing vertical imbalance, there is also the need to address the fiscal imbalance which is related to the financial disparities between the regional states, usually known as a horizontal fiscal imbalance. Indeed, larger regional states in Ethiopia like Amhara, Oromiya, and SNNPRS manage to secure more revenues than do smaller, weaker, and more impoverished regions like Gambella, Benishangul-Gumuz, Somali, and Afar regional states. For instance, the share of revenue collected by each region compared to own expenditure during the 1999/00 fiscal
13The percentage does not include foreign direct aid and grants. 14Computed from data available from Ministry of Finance and Economic Development, „Federal Government of Ethiopia Countrywide Budgetary Revenue and Expenditure for Fiscal Years 1999/00,‟ (MoFED Archive, Unpublished).
Chapter 4 113 year, the Oromiya regional state (excluding Addis Ababa) has generated the highest percentage of revenue (42.7 percent) when compared with other smaller regions such as Afar (6.43 percent), Gambella (8.33 percent), Somali (8.33 percent), Benishangul-Gumuz (9.22 percent), and Tigray (28.8 percent).15 Despite these disparities among regions, all regional states still depend substantially on the federal government for federal subsidies (grants), mainly because the regional governments are not efficient at tax collection.
In general, the discussion on fiscal imbalances in Ethiopia uncovers federal government dominance over the regions‟ revenue assignment and the weak capacity of regions to finance their expenditure from their own revenue sources. The practice for the last two decades has clearly shown that the extent of vertical fiscal imbalance is indeed significant (HoF 2007 and 2012; Solomon, 2014). On average, states were able to cover only 19 percent of their total expenditure while the rest was covered through federal grants. During the same fiscal period stated above, all the regional states have fiscal deficits and also have widely divergent revenue-raising capacities. The fiscal disparity between the regional states is also high ranging from just 9 percent expenditure to more than 29 percent (ibid.). This situation calls for a system of revenue transfer principally to address the existing fiscal imbalances. The next section presents the various fiscal transfer tools which have been employed to address these fiscal gaps.
4.4. Fiscal Transfer: Adjusting the Imbalance As noted already, the constitutional division of revenue sources between the federal government and the regional states does not create a balance between the responsibilities and revenue sources at the state levels. While most of the major revenue sources lie with the center, regional states remained with limited sources. Furthermore, on the one hand, the regional states undertake the bulk of expenditure responsibilities such as education, health, and social services, but on the other, their revenue-raising capacity does not exhibit significant improvement (Solomon, 2006b). Certainly, the trend in many federal systems, including Ethiopia can be described by what John Kincaid (1995:328) rightly calls „revenue
15Ibid.
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concentration and expenditure decentralization.‟ The regional states are thus totally dependent on a sizeable amount of fiscal transfer coming from the center. In anticipation of these imbalances, fiscal transfer is recognized at the outset in the Ethiopian Constitution and plays a major role in determining the financial capacities of the regional states. Provisions for fiscal transfer concerning revenue sharing16 and allocation of grants17 have been included in the FDRE Constitution. As a result, the federal government has been trying to correct these imbalances through revenue transfer during the past two decades by using different fiscal instruments, namely allocation of federal grants (block grants, which in practice have both unconditional and conditional elements) and revenue sharing (sharing of joint revenues collected by the federal government). Although the revenue portions of regional states have several sources such as revenue generated from their own sources, revenue from shared taxes, and revenue distributed from the federal pool as general grants, the principal source of revenue for regional states is still federal grants/subsidies. Thus, the allocation of federal grants on a formula basis has been found to be the major revenue transfer tool in Ethiopia since its adoption in the 1994/95 fiscal year. This fiscal transfer instrument will be the main emphasis here as it is by far the largest and most important type of transfer, though the use of grants-in-aid or conditional grants (usually specifically earmarked, and awarded by the federal government for particular projects) and revenue sharing will be discussed briefly as well. Formally, the formula aims at filling the fiscal gap and bridging the horizontal inequality as well as narrows the gap in per capita income among regional states (Solomon, 2006b). Before discussing thoroughly the operational reality of the fiscal transfer system in Ethiopia by focusing on the allocation of federal grants (both block and conditional ones), the revenue sharing, and other forms of transfer, it is important to gain an insight into the decision-making process and content of the transfer formula since 1994/95 which came under increasing criticisms.
16Article 98 of the Federal Constitution stipulates concurrent power to tax profits and sales and levy excise taxes on jointly established enterprises; to tax profits and sales of companies and dividends; and to levy income taxes and royalties on large-scale mining, petroleum and gas operations. In 1998, the House of Peoples‟ Representatives and regional state councils revised Article 98 as it did not provide a formula for tax sharing besides the provision to jointly levy, collect and share the proceeds. 17See Article 62 (7) and 94 of the FDRE Constitution.
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4.4.1. The federal grant formula and its criticisms The grant formula employed in the Ethiopian federalism has been reviewed on several occasions and the search for alternate methods of calculation continues.18 The following summary presents a clear insight into the nature of the grant formula adopted since 1994/95, the indicators (variables) used, their relative weight, and the controversies and problems inherent in the system. At the outset, the formula for official budgetary transfer was constructed, on behalf of the House of Federation (HoF), by the Ministry of Economic Development and Cooperation (MEDaC).19
The 1994/95 capital budget allocations to regions made use of five factors, namely population 30 percent, I-distance 25 percent (a proxy for development), regional tax effort 20 percent, previous year budgeted capital expenditure 15 percent, and geographical size 10 percent. The I-distance indicator measured the degree of underdevelopment in each regional state. The calculation was complex and covered the length of rural roads, share of rural population to total population, per capita industrial production, per capita crop production, density of telephone lines, number of post offices, hospital beds per head of population, and number of pupils in primary school per head of population. Tax effort was measured by the ratio of the regional government‟s own revenue to its expenditure. Recurrent expenditure grants (to cover government operation) were determined independently on the basis of the number of zones and weredas (districts) in the regional states, structure of the bureaus, number of public servants, expenditure needed for maintenance of rural roads, and the 1992/93 recurrent expenditure (MEDaC, 2000).
The 1995/96 grant formula merged capital and recurrent budgets and included three factors
18The federal government has so far been conducting a set of studies aimed at improving the formula. The I- distance in particular, has been criticized as unwieldy, inaccurate, non-transparent, and too complicated. As a result, in 1996/97 the I-distance was calculated on the basis of only five indicators or variables and renamed the „Development Index‟. Recurrent and Capital grants were merged as well into a single lump payment to give regions greater autonomy and flexibility. 19Under Article 62(7) of FDRE Constitution, the House of Federation (HoF) has responsibility for determining the formula (but only the formula, not the amounts allocated by the federal government, an important distinction) for subsidies or budget allocations to regional governments.
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each weighted at 33.3 percent: population, I-distance (an aggregate of eight 20 variables), and budgeted state revenue. The first two indicators were meant to address horizontal imbalances and the third to provide an incentive for regions to generate more own revenue. The process of preparing and approving the transfer proposal was similar in all cases: after MEDaC used the formula to determine the regional subsidies, the Council of Ministers endorsed it (Solomon, 2006b).
In 1996/97, the same formula was applied but the I-distance was calculated on the basis of only five21 indicators or variables and renamed the „Development Index‟. Recurrent and Capital grants were merged as well into a single lump payment to give regions greater autonomy and flexibility. The MEDaC used the modified formula to prepare the proposal, the Council of Ministers approved it, and both the HoF and House of Peoples‟ Representatives (HoPR) debated and endorsed it. During the approval process, some members of the HoF demanded an improved formula; the MEDaC responded that the formula was being revised but lack of adequate data on the regions was hindering the process. Some members of the HoPR also expressed doubts about the validity and trustworthiness of the information used to determine the grant. They observed that the 1994 national population census had not covered all the regions, particularly Somali regional state, and had been manipulated by the federal political leadership; the data on regional revenue collection were imprecise; the decision-making process for determining the subsidies and preparing the proposal was not transparent; and the application of the budget offset system, which subtracted a region‟s own revenue from its subsidy, was inappropriate. However, members of the Council of Ministers responded that the HoPR could not challenge the allocation decisions because the House of Federation, which had the constitutional mandate to decide the allocations, had already approved them. After the debate, the subsidy was accepted without changes.22 In general, the decision-making process and the calculations
20The calculation was complex and covered the length of rural roads, share of rural population in total population, per capita industrial production, per capita crop production, density of telephone lines, number of post offices, hospital beds per head of population, and number of pupils in primary school per head of population. 21These covered roads density, electricity consumption, number of telephone lines, health clinics, and number of primary schools. 22„Minutes of the 30th Regular Meeting of the House of Peoples‟ Representatives‟, Addis Ababa, June 1996.
Chapter 4 117 used to limit regional subsidies attracted a lot of criticism and objections after regional states were officially formed.
For the next three fiscal years 1997/98 – 1999/00, the same formula was retained but the weightings adjusted: population almost doubled to 60 percent, the Development Index fell to 25 percent, and the regional revenue-to-budget ratio was cut in half to 15 percent. The Development Index for each region was calculated on the basis of six factors: education level, health level, road density, electricity consumption, water coverage, telephones per 1000 people. The federal executive justified the continuation of the same formula without modification on the grounds that it would be costly to change the formula each year and promised a new formula for the coming year which would address regional concerns about enhancing the development level of the emerging regional states and increasing the pace of development of the relatively developed regional states.23 In fact, the following matters were raised during the debates in the HoF and HoPR:
. Regional state representatives demanded diverse approaches. Benishangul-Gumuz, which has a smaller population and revenue collection capacity than Amhara and Tigray regional states, rejected weights attached to population and revenue. Amhara regional state, which is relatively better off, criticised the weight attached to the development index. Tigray regional state, which has better development, but a relatively small population, felt that both the variables were to its disadvantage. While Amhara and Tigray regional states opted for the exclusion of the sub-indicators for telephone lines, electricity consumption and asphalt roads, Benishangul-Gumuz opted their inclusion.
. Representatives of the federal executive, especially the MEDaC, gave the following responses: regions that were disadvantaged in terms of population would be compensated by the development index; indicators for poverty and food security had not been included because those problems were caused by natural disasters and required central intervention; indicators for electricity consumption, telephone lines and asphalt roads had been included to measure the degree of development in a region; and
23„Minutes of the 3rd Year, 2nd Regular Meeting of the House of Federation‟, Addis Ababa, April 1998.
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population had been assigned more weight to maintain equity in national resource distribution. The then Minister for Economic Development and Cooperation (MEDaC) told the HoPR that data from federal bureaus had been used to determine the grant as the figures submitted by the regional states were unreliable. He went on saying: „in 1996/97 regions were once asked to report the regional population and when the figure was summed the country‟s population was found to be 110 million while it was expected to be 55 million.‟
. Certain members of the HoPR questioned the fairness and objectivity of the fiscal transfer system and demanded clear information on the decision-making process. The then premier responded that „the owner of the issue is the House of Federation and there is no need to debate on the same‟. He told these members, „before questioning the fairness of the formula it will be better to look into the inefficient and corrupt use of budget subsidies in some regions.‟ He referred to a case where a 10-year-old boy had reportedly been paid a monthly salary as a regional official. The misuse of resources, he said, included the construction of lavish office buildings with luxurious furnishings, per diems for officers and other expenditure that reflected local capture.24
In short, the 1997/8 grant formula satisfied neither „less developed states‟- otherwise known as „emerging states‟ nor the relatively developed regions, but was accepted as there were no options.
In 2000/01 – 2002/03 fiscal years a revised formula was introduced after immense criticism by the member of the HoF against the previous grant formula. It used four variables: population (55 percent), level of poverty (10 percent), level of development or expenditure needs (20 percent), and revenue-raising effort and sector performance (15 percent). The last variable was further subdivided into revenue-raising capacity (11 percent) and sector performance (4 percent). The major modifications were: adjustment of the level of development or expenditure needs – omission of some indicators (electricity consumption, telephone lines and asphalt roads) and addition of new indicators (difference in recurrent
24Supra note 22; „Minutes of the 2nd year, 2nd Regular Meeting of the House of Federation‟, Addis Ababa, March 1997.
Chapter 4 119 expenditure needs, rural roads and unit cost of construction) while retaining others (education, health, water); introduction of the poverty index to reflect food insecurity; and sectoral output performance indicator (changes in primary school participation rate, number of health centers and length of rural roads). Formally, the formula is expected to cover a portion of regional expenditure needs, address horizontal imbalance (maintaining equity), provide an incentive to raise own revenues, and improve fiscal performance (efficiency). The HoF debated and approved the subsidies.25 During the debate, members raised various regional concerns included complexity of the formula; unreliability of the information based on population, health, education and potable water26; the poverty index27; the disproportionate weight attached to equity (96 percent) and efficiency (4 percent); exclusion of the three indicators (electricity consumption, telephone lines and asphalt roads), and exclusion of regional government executives and councils from the decision-making process. Members questioned the inclusion of the new sectoral performance indicator (education, health and rural roads).
Nevertheless, the explanations for the inclusion and exclusion of indicators were confusing. As chronicled above, in 1997/98 – 1999/00 electricity consumption, telephone lines and asphalt roads were included as indicators in the formula because the federal government considered them to be good benchmarks of the level of regional development; but in 2000/01-2002/03, it excluded them as they were not expenditure responsibilities of the regional governments. The poverty index was excluded from 1997/98 – 1999/00 fiscal years on the assumption that poverty is mostly caused by the vagaries of nature, but it was included in 2000/01 - 2002/03 fiscal years.
25„Minutes of the 5th year, 1st and 2nd Regular Meetings of the House of Federation‟, Addis Ababa, 2000. 26Some members said the data on potable water had been collected before 1994 and could not reflect the current situation (ibid.). 27The surveys used to determine the poverty index excluded non-sedentary populations in the regions and was based on information gathered from household surveys, in which respondents usually exaggerate their family size with the expectation of getting more food aid (ibid.).
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For 2003/04 and 2004/05 fiscal years a revised interim formula was revealed. The Ministry of Finance and Economic Development (MoFED)28, proposed a sort of transitory grant formula which comprised three variables or factors: population (65 percent), level of development (20 percent) and revenue raising and sectoral performance (15 percent). The MoFED revised the earlier formula due to its failure to address differences in sectoral per capita expenditure, questions raised by regional states, recurrent budget requirements for existing infrastructure, and potential differences in revenue capacity. The key revisions in the new formula included reduction of the four variables to three, modification of the weights assigned to the variables, removal of the poverty index variable, and revision of the development index to include an additional indicator for people exposed to natural and man made disasters.
The revised formula was debated in the HoF. As in the earlier debates, members raised a number of concerns such as inadequacy of data, complication of the formula, and inappropriate assignment of weights to variables, precisely population. Some members questioned the new variables for people exposed to natural and man-made disasters, pointing out that such calamities required an emergency fund or other special grant arrangement. They also demanded increased weight for recurrent expenditure, as regional states could not entirely cover salary costs, particularly after the deployment of more civil servants to the weredas. The debate on the exclusion of indicators for access to electricity and telephone service was intense. In fact, experts and officials in Tigray, Amhara, Gambella, SNNPRS, and Benishangul-Gumuz regional states confirmed these problems to the author.29 In consideration of strong criticism of the weights for the variables, the HoF made minor adjustments to those weights, particularly for level of development (from 20 percent to 25 percent) and revenue-raising and fiscal performance (from 15 percent to 10 percent). In conclusion, the HoF agreed to the preparation of new formulas for 2004/05 based on the Australian model, which takes into account both fiscal need and fiscal capacity (see Table 4.1 below for a more details).
28This new ministry (MoFED) was formed in 2002 by combining the earlier Ministry of Economic Development and Cooperation, and Ministry of Finance. 29Interviews with experts in the Regional Bureaus of Finance and Economic Development (Mekelle, June 2019; Bahir Dar, June 2019; Assosa and Gambella, August 2019; Hawassa, September 2019.
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Table 4.1: The indicators used in the federal grant formulas and their relative weight
Fiscal year Indicators or variables Weight in % Population 30 I-distance (a proxy for development) 25 1994/5 Revenue-generating effort 20 Capital expenditure allocated in 1993/4 15 Landmass/geographically size 10 Population 33.3 1995/6 I-distance (aggregate of eight indicators) 33.3 Revenue-generated in 1994/5 33.3 Population 33.3 1996/7 Development Index (with five indicators) 33.3 Revenue-generated in 1995/6 33.3 Population 60 1997/8 Development Index (with six indicators) 25 Revenue-generated in 1996/7 15 Population 60 1998/9 Development Index (with six indicators) 25 Revenue-generated in 1997/8 15 Population 60 1999/00 Development Index (with six indicators) 25 Revenue-generated in 1998/9 15 Population 55 Level of poverty 10 2000/01 Level of development or expenditure needs 20 Revenue-generating effort and sector performance 15 Population 55 Level of poverty 10 2001/02 Level of development or expenditure needs 20 Revenue-generating effort and sector performance 15 Population 55 Level of poverty 10 2002/03 Level of development or expenditure needs 20 Revenue-generating effort and sector performance 15 Population 65 2003/4 Level of development or expenditure needs 25 Revenue-generating effort and sector performance/execution efficiency 10 Population 65 2004/5-2007 Level of development or expenditure needs 25 Revenue-generating effort and sector performance/execution efficiency 10
Source: House of Federation, The Federal Budget Grant Distribution Formula, 2007.
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4.4.2. Federal grants: Neither equalising nor improving regions economic efficiency As noted already, there have so far been several modifications to the grant formulas30 particularly from 1994/95 to 2005/06 fiscal years due to the disagreement over some of the grant formulas‟ variables as well as the relative weight attached to them. The other issues which triggered the debates have been the lack of direct participation of regional governments in the decision-making process for the distribution pool, lack of transparency, increased weight assigned to population, and others.31 This shows the controversies that accompany the politics of resource sharing in the post-1991 Ethiopian federalism. In fact, the author‟s rationales for dealing with the above-selected fiscal years mainly emanate from two factors. First and foremost, given the newly introduced grant formulas (2012/13 – 2016/17 and 2017/18 – 2019/20) have quite recently been operationalised in the country, it may be too early to assess with adequate data about the implications of these formulas on national resource distribution among the ethno-regional states, and secondly they are relatively less controversial in comparison with the previous grant formulas. Thus, the main concern of this section is to examine some of the controversies revolved around the federal grants (official budgetary transfer) that have implications on national resource distribution among the ethno- regional states based on the selected fiscal periods indicated above.
To begin with, as regional population figures vary considerably in Ethiopia, the growing importance attached to this factor is worth examining due to its consequences on sharing the „the national cake‟ among regional states. As can be expected, there has been disagreement between the three larger regions (Oromiya, Amhara, and SNNPRS) and smaller regions (Tigray, Afar, Somali, Harari, Benishangul-Gumuz, and Gambella) on the weight given to population size in the revenue sharing formula in different occasions. Naturally, states have tended to favor those principles that improve their own fiscal position relative to that of other states, and to resist those principles favorable to others. No principle proposed or employed has been free of such controversy. It is no surprise then that the larger regions complained
30Since the adoption of formula based federal grant in 1994/95, the HoF revised the grant formula in 1994/95, 1995/96, 1997/98, 2000/01, 2003/04, 2006/07, 2009/10, 2012/13, and 2017/18 with several minor and major changes (HoF, 2017). The current formula was adopted in 2017 for two year period (2017/18 – 2019/20). 31Interviews with officials and senior experts in the House of Federation, Addis Ababa, July 2019.
Chapter 4 123 about the amount of grant they receive per capita was significantly much lower than the smaller regions (see Table 4.3 [1-12]). This can be also observed in the debate on the grant formula proposed for the 2003/04 and 2004/05 fiscal years with 65 percent weight attached to the population size. Regions with a larger population argue for greater weight to be attached to population since the per capita grant previously allocated to them was considerably smaller than regions with smaller population sizes.32 Further, they consider the relatively less developed regions as excessively benefiting from the revenue generated by the relatively developed and populous regions. In contrast, the smaller regions argued that fiscal transfer mechanisms to the regions should consider their marginalization in terms of social and fiscal infrastructure. In fact, the larger percent (the weight attached to the population has boosted from 30 to 65 percent) weight attached to population places small population regions at a relative disadvantage (particularly, Benishangul-Gumuz, Gambella, Tigray, and Afar). Somali also suffers from this distribution because of its large size but sparse population (it is logistically more challenging and therefore more expensive to achieve uniform levels of development in such regions). Members of the House from regions with smaller population size proved adamant on one crucial factor demanded by those from regions with larger population – the 65 percent allocated to population – so that the HoF did not come up with an agreed formula at least until the beginning of 2005/06 fiscal year.33 This indeed surfaces some of the controversies of resource sharing that could have implications on the economic development of the constituent units in particular and the well-functioning of the federation as a whole in general.
Besides this unprecedented division between them over the controversial grant formula, some critics of the regime accused the TPLF-dominated federal government of using a politically biased mechanism of resource allocation to benefit its home regional state, Tigray. Merera‟s critic in this regard has inclined to press the point that the federal subsidies (budgetary allocation of resources to the regions) consistently favored the Tigray regional state. For
32See those tables of federal grants paid to regional states as published in the budget proclamations. It should be paid attention that allocating a higher percentage to population size does not necessarily mean that the regional states with a larger population size have a higher per capita subsidy than the others. Rather, it means the existing gap in per capita will be reduced and the gross amount of subsidies to be allocated them will increase. 33Supra note 31.
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instance, when using the statistics for twelve consecutive fiscal years from 1994/95 to 2005/06 (see Table 4.3 [1-12]: Federal government subsidy granted to regional states), the data clearly reveals that Afar, Somali, Tigray, Harari, Benishangul-Gumuz, and Gambella regional states received more federal subsidy on per capita basis than such other regions as Oromiya, Amhara, and SNNPRS. Because of the controversy it generated, the weight attached to the population size steadily grew from 30 percent in 1994/95 to 65 percent in the 2005/06 fiscal year (Solomon, 2006b; Ye Federation Dimits, 2005). The emphasis on population thus exacerbated the division between the Ethiopian core and the periphery (eastern and western pockets) as already noted above.
In fact, a closer scrutiny of the available data for the selected years from 1994/95 to 2005/06 on regional allocation from government-controlled sources noticeably demonstrates the uneven distribution of national resources. To make clearer the implication of the data, the Oromiya region and SNNPRS, which above all else are known for their production of coffee (both account for 97 percent), which contributes more than 60 percent to the country‟s foreign exchange earnings, get a clearly visible disproportionate share in return from the national treasury. As can be seen from Table 4.3(1-12), the Tigray region‟s per capita share of the total federal subsidy is consistently higher than the regions of Oromiya, Amhara, and SNNPRS, which cover more than 80 percent of the country‟s population. The same is true for central treasury per capita as well as foreign loans and aid per capita. Furthermore, the Somali regional state – whose population is greater than Tigray – has been receiving proportionally far less than Tigray regional state (with the exception of three successive fiscal years from 1997/98 to 1999/00 when it shortly joined the favored regions‟ club), which makes the percentage of the disfavored (less-favored) population more than 86 percent of the country‟s total population prior to 1997/98. In fact, external or foreign aid per capita for Tigray regional state is almost twice greater than Oromiya, Amhara, and Somali regional states taking each separately. A more glaring discrepancy that can be inferred from the same Table 4.3(1-12) is that of the Oromiya, which, in relative terms, is considered to be a powerhouse of Ethiopia‟s economy,34 receives disproportionately the least from the national
34Oromiya regional state contains some of the country‟s most productive farmland and provides much of the countries cash crops (coffee and tea) (see Cohen, 1995).
Chapter 4 125 coffers. Population size has also an impact on other variables. For instance, when the poverty level was measured in terms of the population suffering from extreme poverty weighted by the regional population size, those regions with the largest population size (e.g., Amhara, Oromiya, and SNNPRS) received a less per capita grant although they have a large poverty- stricken population in the country (MEDaC, 2000).35 Comparing only the data (see Table 4.3[1-12]) for Oromiya and Tigray regional states, without taking into account those for Amhara regional state and SNNPRS, contending political elites accuse TPLF/EPRDF of ethnic patronage or favoring the Tigray regional state. Such naked discrepancies have served the Oromo movements as a significant political weapon in mass mobilization and are also breeding resentment among the ethnic elites (Merera, 2003:175). The recent anti-government protests that began in November 2015 could be also seen as an accumulation of years of frustration of ethnic groups particularly from the Amhara and Oromiya regional states who had been decrying about economic marginalization and systemic exclusion at the hands of the resilient TPLF-dominated federal government.36
Another problem related to the lopsided policy of the ruling elite is the difficulty of defending it by any objective yardsticks such as productivity or the Tigray region‟s contribution to the national treasury. Seen in light of such criteria, the Oromiya region and the rest of the southern region as a whole are relatively wealthier than their northern counterparts and contribute more to the country‟s national economy. According to Tegegne (1998:50) the government has been using criteria such as „population, level of socio- economic development, regional income and expenditure, project and program implementation capacity, areal size and environmental protection.‟ These magically framed criteria, while some of which seem practical, do not convince the contending elites in an
35As the data revealed on the selected federal grant formula indicator (i.e., level of poverty) distribution in the regions (1997/98), the number of poor people in the Amhara, Oromiya, and SNNPRS regions were 32.26, 27.17, and 24.83 per cent, respectively, in percentage compared to the total number of poor people in the country whilst the smaller regions like Afar, Harari, Benishangul-Gumuz, and Gambella, when taken them together, accounted for only 3.54 per cent (MEDaC, 2000). The general understanding is that the least developed regional states have been historically marginalized (relatively low level of development) and, therefore, they have a higher expenditure need. However, this comparison is problematical since the total number of people living in extreme poverty in those three large regional states is far higher than the total size of the population inhabiting in the remainder the regions. 36BBC NEWS (16 February 2018) „Ethiopia declares national state of emergency.‟
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atmosphere of heightened ethnic rivalry or contention. Additionally, the politics of exclusion, lack of transparency, accountability and secrecy in the business of operating the Ethiopian state apparatus doubt even the more objective principle of allocating more resources to the less developed regional states (Merera, 2003). The reason is that the peripheral regions like Afar, Somali, Gambella, and Benishangul-Gumuz are being ruled by the ruling party‟s affiliates and arguably political considerations overshadow the other criteria in the allocation of resources (Solomon, 2006b).
Another interesting disparity can be observed when we make comparison even among those peripheral regions indicated above. Though the grant formula reveals that the focus has been to create equitable resource distribution between the regions, it presents a confusing picture. Put differently, this argument does not apply evenly to these least developed regions. We can thus observe that Somali and Afar regional states did not have a fair proportional per capita grant or federal subsidy when compared to their counterpart of Gambella and Benishangul- Gumuz regions (see Table 4.3 [1-12]). Moreover, the criterion runs into trouble as the Somali regional state, which by all standards is a more peripheral area than the Tigray regional state, which is a relatively developed region, was getting less than half of the federal subsidy to Tigray until 1998 – in spite of its population being slightly greater than that of Tigray. It is also difficult to comprehend why the anomalous Harari regional state, which is not a periphery, at least compared to the Somali, Afar, Gambella, and Benishangul-Gumuz regional states, is getting proportionally more. The possible explanation for the lop-sided policy is political patronage, as the regional states favored by such criteria are the regions outside the direct control of the TPLF/EPRDF (the brain behind the policy) ruled by affiliated regional political parties.37
It is also worth mentioning that the implication of unequal ethnic gains – real or imagined – in resource allocation that leads to ethnic grievances and resentments in the post-1991 Ethiopia. The post-1992 fiscal system, despite its positive developments by devolving power to the regions in general and the hitherto marginalized periphery in particular, has been
37Interviews with senior experts in the House of Federation and Ministry of Finance and Economic Development (MoFED)-Fiscal Policy Directorate, respectively (Addis Ababa, July 2019).
Chapter 4 127 challenged in terms of equitable distribution of resources as the federal grant system targets only the revenue capacity of ethnic groups with regional status. That is to say, the amount of financial resources that a given ethnic group (administrative unit) receives from the federal distribution pool depends on its location on the administrative hierarchy. However, it does not suffice to use a system which is only applicable to interstate financial relations, because the focal point of the FDRE Constitution is the sovereignty of nations, nationalities and peoples, most of which are not essentially represented at region level. In other words, in ethnic federalism revenue allocation becomes more than the relations and interests of ethnic groups at regional level, but also between ethnic blocs of the population at large – the grant system has to equalize not only regional states, but also ethnic groups. As a result, ethnic groups with regional status receive a relatively larger amount of federal subsidy than those with a lower level administrative unit. A comparison of fiscal capacity of one ethnic group with another helps appreciate this problem (Solomon, 2006b:224). For instance, a comparison of the Gambella region that had an estimated population of 306,916, and the Sidama who were given a zonal status within the SNNPRS with an estimated population of 2,776,928 gives us a grossly unequal distribution of federal funds. The Gambella region for the 2006/07 fiscal year received a subsidy of 186,530,000 Ethiopian Birr (ETB) (about € 15,544,000) from the coffers of federal government while Sidama zone (in the SNNPRS) received a federal subsidy of 30,756,000 ETB (about € 2,563,000) for the same fiscal year.38 Such a variance in the allocation of resources fuels demands for a higher level of administrative unit. This party explains the persistent demand of the Welayta, Gurage, and other ethnic groups of the southern region for a regional status. Such ethnic groups can claim their right to stathood on the ground that they will become directly party to the bargaining process at the federal levels; their allocation of budget will likely to be proportional, and they can benefit from the decentralised decision-making power. That is what mainly triggered the 2002 crisis in SNNPRS as almost each ethnic group wanted to form its own regional state or
38The figures for population were taken from the 2004 Population Outlook of the Central Statistics Authority, the amount of money allocated to the Gambella region was derived from the 2006/07 Federal Government Budget proclamation, while the sum for the Sidama zone was found from the document on SNNPRS‟s block grants to zones and wereda in the same fiscal year. Both documents are available at http://www.mofaed.org.; Interviews with experts of the Bureau of Finance and Economic Development in SNNPRS, Hawassa, September 2019.
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a sub-state unit while such move was not hailed by the regional government as well as federal officials (Assefa, 2006a).
The grant scheme may even be more problematic if we compare the fiscal capacity of most of the regional states with those lower administrative units in Amhara and Oromiya currently identified as zones which were previously designated as provincial administrations in the pre- 1991 period (Solomon, 2006b). In another comparison, the Bench-Maji zone (in the SNNPRS) which, in line with a report submitted to the HoF, has a comparable level of development to that of Gambella regional state, received a considerably lower amount of grant than the latter. The Gambella regional state, which had a population of 220,000, received around 143 million ETB (about € 12,257,142) grant for the 1998/99 fiscal year. In contrast, the Bench-Maji zone with a population of 323,000 received around 33 million ETB (about € 2,828,571) grant for the same fiscal year.39 When we compare Harari with its neighbor Dire Dawa, which has almost the same geographical size and socioeconomic conditions with the former, the same situation can be observed. For instance, Harari with an estimated population of 154,000 secured a federal grant of 86,652,500 ETB (about € 7,427,357) whilst Dire Dawa, a population of 284,961, received almost half of the grant allocated to Harari regional state, i.e., about 39,139,800 ETB (about € 3,354,839) during the same fiscal period. It seems that those at the state level benefit from a relatively greater per capita grant (see Table 4.3 [1-12]). Thus, one of the challenges to the transfer system in Ethiopia is the equity implications which are subject not only to interstate but also to interethnic relations. This approach, nevertheless, is not in line with the principle of fiscal federalism which chiefly deals with the fiscal relations between the constituent units of a federation. Stated differently, the fiscal system is principally maintaining relations between the constituent units and not between as many ethnic groups as possible. The means for allocating grants in the ethnic-based federal system thus illustrates a degree of complexity owing to the problems in accommodating the interests of all ethnic groups. In this regard, the imbalance in financial capacity between ethnic groups who have formed their own regional
39Interviews with officials and experts in the SNNPRS Bureau of Finance and Economic Development, Hawassa, September 2019.
Chapter 4 129 states and those at sub-regional level could have adverse implications for the economic and political development of the country.
The officially available data on health facilities and education also reflects the pattern of the resource flow. The data (see both Table 4.4 and 4.6 below) show not only the existence of discrepancy among the regional states as well as the City Administrations, but also the lack of significant change during the period. For instance, Oromiya and Amhara are usually considered as relatively developed but, although the total number of students in these regional states is higher than the others, their education participation ratio revealed a lower percentage compared to some of the least developed regional states such as Benishangul- Gumuz and Gambella. Indeed, the share of both health facilities per population and primary and secondary students‟ enrolment per population in several regional states including the two administrative cites – Addis Ababa and Dire Dawa – marginally increased with some variations in their growth rate while Tigray regional state performed far better in which its share is above the national average and higher than each of the major areas of the country: Oromiya, Amhara, Somali, and Addis Ababa, which constitute 69 percent of the country‟s population (see Table 4.4[1-3] and Table 4.6[1-2]). Furthermore, there is a general understanding that some regional states are less developed than the others, but there are doubts regarding whether the federal grant formula also measures the discrepancy among ethnic groups or nations, nationalities, and people to use the words of FDRE Constitution.
The final, but nevertheless striking discrepancy among regional states is related to the unfairly distributed manufacturing industries in the country (see Table 4.5). Without a doubt, when we look at the industrial policy trajectories of Ethiopia, it demonstrates that the driving forces that underpin the location of industries are dictated by the doctrine of efficiency though the incumbent regime claims that maintaining inter-regional industrial equity is also its priority (Eshetu, 2004; Mulatu, 1994b). Nevertheless, in practice, this idea has proved very hard to move forward. The distribution of manufacturing firms is highly skewed when disaggregated by the administrative units of the country. It should be noted that the disparity in the regional distribution of firms is not a new phenomenon since it was also observed in the pre-1991 era. However, the skewness has become more acute in the post-1991 period as
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revealed by higher percentage increases in the number of newly established firms in some regional states than others when we are taking the data from 2010/11 (2003 E.C.) to 2015/16 (2008 E.C.) as the base years. For example, the average percentage of large and medium scale manufacturing establishments is steadily growing in Oromiya and Tigray regional states from 23.72 percent to 27.92 percent (from 506 to 1004) and from 9.22 percent to 14.07 percent (from 200 to 506), respectively while the average share of Amhara regional state and SNNPRS in percentage have declined from 11.06 percent to 8.43 percent and from 10.78 percent to 8.7 percent respectively despite their share increase in number during the same period as the Table 4.4 demonstrates.
A closer observation of the available data from the same table also clearly exhibits the uneven distribution of large and medium scale manufacturing industries in parts of the country most commonly referred to as „underdeveloped regions‟, namely Afar, Somali, Benishangul-Gumuz, and Gambella. While the number of large and medium scale manufacturing industries is marginally rising in Somali from 13 to 23 (from 0.60 percent to 0.64 percent) and Benishangul-Gumuz region from 2 to 6 (0.09 percent to 0.17 percent), the share of Gambella regional state has shockingly declined from 1 to 0 (from 0.05 percent to 0 percent) in the same fiscal period. In Afar regional state neither entry nor exit took place leaving the share unchanged with 8 manufacturing industries.
From what has been discussed so far, two important observations can be made based on the available data. First, the four regions, which are commonly labeled as „underdeveloped regions‟ and have been the focal points of most political rhetoric, have remained either worse off (e.g., Benishangul-Gumuz and Gambella) or have become marginal beneficiaries (e.g., Somali and Afar) of the post-1991 political and economic milieu as compared to those „developed regions.‟ In fact, this is what we have seen over the last two decades particularly in those regional states despite the fact that the regime in power firmly upheld that it is committed to ease the pattern of inequality between regions, thereby bringing industrial development in the „peripheral‟ regions of the country.
Chapter 4 131
Second, the distribution of manufacturing firms does not seem to correspond to the regional distribution of population, which is basically the primary financier of firms as well as major consumers of the firms‟ products (relatively large consumers), and labor force scales. A simple comparison of the existing distribution of manufacturing firms of the two top populous regions in the country (Oromiya and Amhara) with Tigray regional state, which is distant from Addis Ababa and consists of relatively small consumers, could reflect this reality. In fact, as was pointed out earlier, the latter with only nearly 6 percent of the country‟s population, has seen its manufacturing firms dramatically increased from just 200 in 2010/11 by a sheer 506 in 2015/16, registering a staggering 153 percent rise within 6 years, which is far greater than the combined percentage increases in Oromiya (98 percent) and Amhara (26 percent). Given that the pre-1991 government policies which stifled private investment in the country in general and the 17-year civil war waged in Tigray region in particular, one may wonder as to why the manufacturing sector in this region has registered such an unprecedented high growth rate, which surpasses the net percentage increases in other regions of the country. This implicitly links with the huge influence of TPLF-led central political leadership for selection of specific regions and Tigray (its home province) particularly based on political considerations for industrial locations along with the role of the TPLF-owned large economic enterprises (for example, Endowment Fund for Rehabilitation of Tigray – EFFORT) and party-owned non-government organisations which are active in the regional economy of Tigray (Sarah and Mesfin, 2009; Kindeye, 2014). It appears that these parapartals40 (TPLF-owned and managed businesses) are given preferential access to federal government capital and other economic opportunities. As a result, for the last two decades EFFORT has been successful in running large manufacturing and service sectors operating in the region, which are masked as „endowment funds‟, or party-owned businesses (Paulos cited in Asnake, 2013; Solomon, 2006b).
The author‟s interviews in 2019 with selected senior and civil servants, and experts also asserted that the Tigray regional state benefited more from the distribution of manufacturing
40According to the sources, the parapartals denote those businesses or large economic organisations owned and managed by the EPRDF‟s four member parties. The business companies thus controlled by personnel from these parties can be characterized as parapartals instead of parastatals, which are owned and managed by the state (Davies, 2008; Tewodros, 2014).
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firms by the TPLF-dominated federal government than other regions.41 To further strengthen the above points, the Ethiopian Economic Association (2000/1:126) reveals that Tigray regional state considerably increased its share of both value added and employment in the manufacturing sector five-fold between 1995/6 and 1998/9, which is essentially explained by the activities of the party-owned manufacturing and service sectors operating in the region.
4.4.3. Special purpose grants (Conditional grants) In addition to the above budgetary resources, the federal government also distributes grants for specific purposes42 through Line Ministries (World Bank, 2006). The conditional grants are attached to specific sector development programs/projects where the national government sets the priority. The main ones comprise Ethiopian Social Rehabilitation and Development Fund (ESRDF), the Road Fund, funds for HIV/AIDS prevention and control, Food Security, Water Harvesting, and so on. There is no information exchange and effective coordination between the agencies responsible for releasing the funds and the Ministry of Finance and Economic Development. In many cases the eligible regional states are selected at the discretion of the federal Line Ministries and many of the conditional grants are disproportionately arranged to some regional states. Only a few conditional grants such as ESRDF, Public Sector and Capacity Building (PSCAB), and Health Sector Development Program (HSDP) were applicable to all regional states.43 These grants lack openness and transparency since the selection standards for entitlement are determined by the political choice of the federal government, obviously, with the consent of the foreign funding agencies (Ghebrehiwet, 2014). Due to this, the regional states have no idea of how the transfer of specific-purpose grants works, which is typical of the secretive nature of the regime. This issue has caused growing tension with emerging regional states like Benishangul-Gumuz, Gambella, Afar, Somali, and other regions as well.44 These funds from conditional grants are not included in the annual budget subsidy and thus are not accounted for by the federal and regional treasuries. That is why this chapter mainly focuses and analyses transfers that are
41Supra note 37. 42The FDRE Constitution stipulates allocation of conditional grants under Articles 89 (3 & 4) and 94 (2). 43For instance, ULGDP, PCDP, PSSIDP, RCBP, and SLMP target specific regional governments. 44Interviews with experts in the Bureaus of Finance and Economic Development (Gambella and Assosa, August 2019; Afar, June 2019; Somali, September 2019).
Chapter 4 133 officially regarded as „block grants‟ and are accounted for and transferred through formal government arrangements.
4.4.4. Revenue-sharing scheme Revenue sharing in this context denotes the sharing of joint revenues collected by the federal government with the regional states on a certain principle. The arrangement is set to distribute revenue generated from concurrent taxes as follows: direct taxes from companies in the proportion of 50:50 and indirect taxes in the proportion of 70:30 between the federal and the regional states respectively. Similarly, direct taxes from large-scale mining and petroleum operations are allocated in proportion of 50:50, whereas royalties are divided in proportion to 60:40 (see Table 4.2 below for more on this). The HoF, which has the power to regulate the division of revenues derived from joint federal and state tax sources, debated and decided on the formula in March 2003.45 Since then revenue sharing arrangement has been employed to the revenue generated under Article 98 of the FDRE Constitution.46 This arrangement follows a „derivative principle‟ which is understood as transferring revenue to the regional state authority „where the taxpaying or collecting company is registered‟ (Solomon, 2006b).
The regional governments, however, have never received their share of joint revenue. During the last decade, there have been no published reports of tax revenue collected from jointly established enterprises as well as large-scale mining and petroleum operations in the country. According to the Ministry of Finance and Economic Development (MoFED), however, the revenue collected from companies between 1996/97 and 2002/03 was only 54 million ETB (nearly € 5 million).47 The MoFED attributed the failure to share the revenue to three grounds: that regional governments get their share indirectly as part of their annual subsidies;
45See „Minutes of the 2nd year, 2nd ordinary Meeting of the House of Federation‟, Addis Ababa, March 2003. 46FDRE Constitution under Article 98 stipulates concurrent power of taxation between the two levels of government. Accordingly, the federal government and the states jointly levy and collect profit, sales, excise and personal income taxes on enterprises they jointly establish; they jointly levy and collect taxes on the profits of companies and on dividends due to shareholders; and they jointly levy and collect taxes on incomes derived from large-scale mining and all petroleum and gas operations, and royalties on such operations. 47„Minutes of the Discussion Among Members of the House of Federation, Representatives from Regional Governments and Federal Government Officials‟, Organized by the House of Federation, Addis Ababa, January 2003.This data was given by the Ministry of Finance and Economic Development (MoFED).
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that revenue collected from joint sources is small – only 54 million ETB (about € 5 million), as there are no jointly established enterprises and large-scale mining, petroleum and gas operations; and that the MoFED was not administratively equipped and capable of calculating the share of regional states.48 As a result, the federal government has so far unable to pay the regional states their share of taxes as per its own formula despite demanding their revenue-share back.
Table 4.2: Formula for sharing joint revenue* between federal and regional governments
Type of Tax Federal Share (%) Regional Share (%) 1. Profits of jointly owned enterprises As per contribution As per contribution Profit taxes 50 50 Service, sales (VAT), and excise taxes 70 30 2. Profits from private companies Tax on dividends 50 50 profits of large-scale mining, Tax on profits 50 50 3. petroleum and gas operations Royalties 60 40
Source: „Minutes of the 2nd year, 2nd Regular Meeting of the House of Federation‟, Addis Ababa, March 1997. *As there are no jointly owned enterprises, direct or indirect tax sharing from this source is not presently applicable.
4.4.5. Additional considerations: Extrabudgetary49 flows and influences The existence of extra-budgetary transfer (non-official transfer) contributes to or accelerates interregional disparity in the Ethiopian federalism as well. In addition to the federal subsidies, independent regional revenue, loans, and foreign aid discussed above, there have so far been non-formal transfers between the EPRDF government and certain regions, and Tigray (its home base) particularly. These financial transfers occur through para-party development associations (many of which originated during the struggle against the Derg), off-budgetary resources (funds), and non-transparent federal government infrastructure allocations to regions (Solomon, 2006b; Paulos cited in Asnake, 2013).
To start with, TPLF owns large businesses, which are managed under a giant umbrella organisation, the Endowment Fund for Rehabilitation of Tigray (EFFORT); and party owned
48Ibid. 49Extrabudgetary („off-budgetary‟) resources denote the resources which might actually be utilized by a government administration but are not accounted for by a regional state budget law and not officially accounted for by the regional state. Budgetary resources mean resources and expenditures included and accounted for in the regional state‟s budget (World Bank cited in Solomon, 2006b).
Chapter 4 135 non-government organisations, which are managed by the Tigray Development Association (TDA), Dedebit Microcredit, and Relief Society of Tigray (REST). EFFORT manages the large manufacturing and service organisations operating in Tigray, which are masked as „endowment funds‟, or party-owned businesses. As stated by Bogale (2004), Tronvoll and Vaughan (2003b), and Addis Standard (2017), TPLF-owned business enterprises have a total authorised capital of over 3.5 billion ETB (roughly € 320 million). Indeed, it started with an initial capital of around US$100 million (around € 89.8 million) (Addis Standard, 2017). Some of the major businesses are Almedan Garment Factory, Mesfin Industrial Company, Mesob Cement Factory, Almeda Textiles Manufacturing Sc., Sur Construction Co., Trans- Ethiopia Sc., Addis Pharmaceutical Production Sc., Ezana Mining Development, and Sheba Tannery Factory. The TPLF claims that these business companies were established by investing capital contributed by the Tigray people during the struggle against the Derg. It looks that these parapartals are given preferential access to national government finance and other economic opportunities. The anonymous report (2003) reveals that the above organisations had borrowed a total of roughly 6.2 billion ETB (€ 563 million) from the three government-owned banks, namely Commercial Bank of Ethiopia, Development Bank and Construction Bank. These businesses are headed by prominent party members. As they are located in Tigray, they generate more than 47,000 employment opportunities and improve the lives of members of that ethnic group (Addis Standard, 2017). Although the Tigrayan political elite claims that such achievement in Tigray has been related to the relatively better efficiency and institutions in Tigray, it becomes very difficult for many Ethiopians to believe such claims. Rather, unconvinced by the claim of Tigrayan political elite, many Ethiopians link the relative success in Tigray with the predominant position of TPLF in controlling economics and politics in the Ethiopian state in the post-1991period. It is not also possible for the Tigrayan political elite to prove otherwise. Theodore Vestal in this matter brings up critical questions, which need thorough investigation: „[H]ow did the Front, an armed movement with a narrow social base in a devastated area of a poor country, accumulate such capital in a relatively short time?‟(cited in Berhanu, 2007:146). John Young further reinforces the above arguments in the following way:
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When compared with other Ethiopian provinces, Tigray has experienced disproportionate economic growth and development since 1991. Soon after coming to power, the EPRDF established the Endowment Fund for the Rehabilitation of Tigray [EFFORT] with a considerable amount of Ethiopian capital. Through the EFFORT program, the TPLF/EPRDF has diverted large quantities of government resources and international aid to Tigray. As a result, Tigray has experienced radical commercial growth while other regions of Ethiopia have stagnated (cited in McCracken, 2004:185-86, emphasis added).
In fact, other ethnic groups in the country suspect the Tigrayans of using the process of ethnic federalism and decentralization not just to right the wrongs and neglect of the civil war in their home area, but to unfairly promote Tigrayan development and consolidate their regional position. This impression has been strengthened by the rapid proliferation of private companies in transport, distribution, and construction with links to the EPRDF and Tigrayan groups, and their ability to secure lucrative regional government contracts („Ethiopia‟, 1995). It is a naked truth that TPLF‟s dominant political power in Ethiopia‟s ethnic federal arrangement is the main factor behind such advancement in Tigray region, although the greater benefit has been channeled to the few Tigrayan elite who have close ties with the TPLF (Merera, 2003).
In Amhara regional state, the ruling Amhara National Democratic Movement (now Amhara Democratic Party – ADP) has also the Amhara Endowment Fund, better known by its Amharic name Tiret, although on a small scale. The endowment has several businesses under it that runs subsidiaries including Tikur Abay Transport, Ambasel Trading House, Bahir Dar and Kombolcha Textile share companies, Zeleke Agricultural Mechanisation, Dashen Brewery, and Gondar Malt Factory. Their estimated total capital is 350 million ETB (€ 32 million). Their access to government capital is also limited. Even though the anonymous report (2003) states that only Ambassel Trading House has borrowed from a government owned bank, to the tune of 500 million ETB (€ 45 million), Tiret secured 56.7 million ETB (roughly € 1,767,530) loan from the Development Bank of Ethiopia for the project in the fiscal year 2011 (Addis Fortune Newspaper, 2011).50 According to Vaughan and Mesfin
50Addis Fortune Newspaper (2011) „Amhara Endowment Gets Loan for Phone Assembly‟.
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(2011), Tiret and its companies, for instance, employ only 2,800 staff, as compared with the more 14,000 permanent employees or 34,000 contract staff of EFFORT and its companies. Similarly, in Oromiya regional state, Dinsho endowment was established in early 1992 and was renamed as Tumsa Endowment for Development of Oromiya in 2001. It is the third largest business organization of the TPLF/EPRDF regime. It is led by top officials of the OPDO (now ODP), the party representing the Oromiya region within the EPRDF coalition. Some of the major businesses which are included under its umbrella are Dinsho Agro- Industry PLC, Dinsho Transport Service, Dinsho Trading, and Dinsho-Biftu Trading. Dinsho PLC had become the core holder of conglomerates of companies by the end of 1990‟s. Its subsidiary named as Dinsho Trading PLC has monopolized the import and distribution of mineral fertilizers to peasants of Oromiya regional state. Dinsho became one of the shareholders of the Wegagen Bank and the Oromiya Credit and Saving Institute Sc. (OCSI) of the regime in 1997. Since 1999 it entered into joint ventures of Ethiopian Highland Roses PLC with Israeli and Italian investors (Zakaariyaas, 2010). Dinsho is presented as an endowment of Oromo people; but in reality, it is under the total control of hired cadres of the TPLF in Oromiya. The businesses of the regime under OPDO were lacked governance competence that reflects the colonial political strategies of the TPLF.
And lastly, in Southern Nations Nationalities and People‟s Regional State (SNNPRS), Wondo Trading was formed with capital of 6 million ETB (about € 185,596) in 1994 and is led by senior officials of SEPDM, the party representing the region within the ruling EPRDF. It was formed with the assistance of ANDM and TPLF to expand its regime business empire in Southern Ethiopia (Vaughan and Mesfin, 2011). It is heavily involved in the business of agricultural commodities like „Chat‟ and coffee trade, and mineral fertilizer distribution through governmental agricultural extension programs. However, its growth is kept deliberately at a very low profile to limit its competence (Zakaariyaas, 2010).
Whilst this study does not intend to explore in detail the three regional endowment funds which own businesses in Amhara (Tiret), Oromiya (Tumsa Endowment-formerly Dinsho), and the SNNPRS (Wondo), they operate along similar organizational lines to EFFORT, albeit on a considerably smaller scale. In other words, none of them plays as important a relative
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economic or social role in their respective region as EFFORT does in Tigray regional state51 and only Tiret appears to have a considerable investment in manufacturing plant (Vaughan and Mesfin, 2011). And the other poorest regional states of Ethiopia, namely the Somali, Afar, Benishangul-Gumuz, Gambella and other regions do not have even a single „endowment companies‟ of their own to help them rehabilitate their respective regions, although they are politically administered by EPRDF‟s sister parties. Beyond doubt, like Tigray region (formerly province), these regions of the country have also suffered significant social and economic devastations during the 17 years civil war in the country before it came to an end in 1991 (Addis Standard, 2017).
The second means is the transfer of non-official form of finance through off-budget funding which manifests itself in the arbitrary assignment of donor-funded projects to regions. It is difficult to document the number and characteristics of bilateral donors and NGOs working in the different regions, but there is no doubt that they differ in size, mode of operation and the amounts of cash they make available to the regions. The following survey in the Benishangul-Gumuz and Tigray regional states reflects this reality. Besides the basic budgetary resources, both regional states benefit from extra-budgetary resources being made directly accessible to sector bureaus by bilateral donors, UN agencies, NGOs, and federal institutions. This survey in Benishangul-Gumuz regional state found that off-budget donor funding over five fiscal years between 1996/97 and 2000/01 was only 70.34 million ETB (nearly € 6.4 million) (African Development Bank, 2001; Solomon, 2006b). Whereas the review of extrabudgetary resources of Tigray clearly illustrates that how important they have become in the economic development of the region. The „off-budgetary‟ resources that made available to the region during the five fiscal years 1998/99 - 2000/01 was almost equal to the regional government‟s budgetary resources, i.e., 340 million ETB (around € 30 million). It made twofold the total resources (680 million ETB or around € 60 million) flows during the same fiscal period (European Union, 2001). The amount of extra-budgetary resources made
51The Ethiopian Economic Association Report reveals that Tigray regional state considerably increased its share of both value added and employment in the manufacturing sector five-fold between 1995/96 and 1998/99, which is mainly explained by the activities of the party-owned manufacturing and service organisations operating in the regional state. The backward region such as Benishangul-Gumuz has no manufacturing enterprises because it is historically disadvantaged, politically marginalised and incapable of attracting investment to establish a manufacturing sector (2000/1).
Chapter 4 139 available to the region was extremely high amount, almost 68 million ETB (about € 6 million) per year, compared with 15 million ETB (about € 1.32 million) of Benishangul- Gumuz region per year (ibid.).
Regional states also lack information on agreements made between the donor countries and the federal government and the criteria upon which donors single out particular regions. As stated by informants in Benishangul-Gumuz, the federal political leadership of the EPRDF (until recently the TPLF controlled central political leadership of the EPRDF) influences donors‟ selection of regions.52 The informants identified Irish Aid, GTZ, and Italian Aid as being among the international NGOs that have contributed significantly to the Tigray‟s regional state economy. In contrast, informants confirmed that there are few and financially weak NGOs in Benishangul-Gumuz. As a result, the limited information on the distribution of off-budget funding facilitated favouritism towards Tigray regional state by the central political leadership.
The last tool for transfer of non-budgetary resources is the non-transparent allocation of federally funded infrastructure in sectors such as transport, telecommunications, electricity, roads, aviation facilities, universities, and energy. There are no formal documents that specify the amounts spent per annum by the federal government on infrastructure in the different regions. Neither does the national government clarify such issues to members of the HoF and HoPR, and the public at large. The regional states also have no knowledge of the procedures and criteria used by the federal government to select locations (regional states) for such big infrastructural projects. The federal government simply dominates a large share of external loans and assistance for financing such projects, which have significant implications for regional economic development. For instance, informants in HoF told the author that members of HoF lack information on how the Ethiopian Civil Aviation Authority selects specific regions to build such big infrastructural project – airport. The same authority does not clarify such issues to members of the HoF and HoPR. Except in some cases, regional state officials do not overtly discuss such issues as well. Another notable example,
52Interviews with experts in the Benishangul-Gumuz Regional Bureau of Finance and Economic Development, Assosa, August 2019.
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when the HoPR undertook its 55th regular plenary deliberations in June 1997, one member of federal parliament candidly asked the late premier: why the federal government was transferring more funds to build infrastructure in Tigray than other regions. The late premier Meles Zenawi neatly avoided the question by replying: „for individuals who consider a given ethnic group as an enemy, justice and equality is a bitter pill to swallow.‟53 He also said that the government was doing its best to distribute resources on the basis of various socio- economic considerations (ibid.). Despite this, it is an open secret in the country that the TPLF/EPRDF, the ruling party, has piped a larger amount of federal funds to Tigray regional state than to the other regions under the pretext of post-war reconstruction. This non- transparent distribution of projects and decision-making about donor aid are the Ethiopian variant of „pork-barrel‟ (political patronage) politics. In short, the nonexisence of transparency in allocation of federally funded major infrastructure facilities and donor funds to the different regional states illustrates the secretive nature of the regime.
The above evidence sheds light on „non-official forms of patronage network‟ that TPLF/EPRDF has employed to channel „non-budgetary resources‟ to its allies (certain regions) and Tigray (its home base) in particular. Whilst it is difficult to document the extent of economic development disparity among ethno-regions, such „non-official forms of patronage‟ contributes to or worsens horizontal imbalances among ethno-regional states in the country.
53„Minutes of the 55th Regular Session of the House of Peoples‟ Representatives‟, Addis Ababa, June 1997.
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Table 4.3 (1-12): Federal government subsidy granted to regional states for selected fiscal years (in millions Birr)
1: Federal government subsidy granted to regional states - 1994/1995 (1986 E.C.) Per capita Federal Grants Total Total Central Foreign Loan Federal Federal Central Foreign Aid Regions Population Treasury and Foreign Aid Grants Grants Treasury & Loan Tigray 3,203,000 156,400,000 24,000,000 180,400,000 56.32 48.83 7.49 Afar 1,079,000 61,000,000 27,500,000 88,500,000 82.02 56.53 25.49 Amhara 14,128,000 204,000,000 89,000,000 293,000,000 20.74 14.44 6.30 Oromiya 19,158,000 214,600,000 152,500,000 367,100,000 19.16 11.20 7.96 Somali 3,249,000 63,700,000 23,100,000 86,800,000 26.72 19.61 7.11 B-G 470,000 33,400,000 26,500,000 59,900,000 127.45 71.06 56.38 SNNPRS 10,627,000 192,500,000 68,200,000 260,700,000 24.53 18.11 6.42 Gambella 185,000 37,300,000 17,200,000 54,500,000 294.59 201.62 92.97 Harari 135,000 11,000,000 3,300,000 14,300,000 105.93 81.48 24.44 A.A. 2,157,104 76,300,000 109,700,000 186,000,000 86.23 35.37 50.86 D.D. 258,161 5,000,000 5,400,000 10,400,000 40.28 19.37 20.92 Total 54,649,265 1,055,200,000 546,400,000 1,601,600,000 29.31 19.31 10.00
2: Federal government subsidy granted to regional states - 1995/1996 (1987 E.C.) Federal Grants Per capita Total Total Central Foreign Aid & Federal Federal Central Foreign Loan Regions Population Treasury Foreign Loan Grants Grants Treasury & Aid Tigray 3,299,000 261,500,000 41,000,000 302,500,000 91.69 79.27 12.43 Afar 1,106,000 136,700,000 20,400,000 157,100,000 142.04 123.60 18.44 Amhara 14,552,000 715,900,000 78,600,000 794,500,000 54.60 49.20 5.40 Oromiya 19,779,000 862,600,000 94,900,000 957,500,000 48.41 43.61 4.80 Somali 3,332,000 124,100,000 25,900,000 150,000,000 45.02 37.24 7.77 B-G 483,000 101,400,000 11,800,000 113,200,000 234.37 209.94 24.43 SNNPRS 11,001,000 517,800,000 115,000,000 632,800,000 57.52 47.07 10.45 Gambella 190,000 83,900,000 11,800,000 95,700,000 503.68 441.58 62.11 Harari 139,000 37,000,000 1,100,000 38,100,000 74.10 266.19 7.91 A.A. 2,220,000 4,200,000 120,600,000 124,800,000 6.22 1.89 54.32 D.D. 264,615 4,400,000 7,200,000 21,600,000 81.63 54.42 27.21 Total 56,365,615 2,859,500,000 528,300,000 3,387,800,000 60.10 50.73 9.37
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3: Federal government subsidy granted to regional states - 1996/97(1989 E.C.) Federal Grants Per capita Total Total Central Foreign Foreign Federal Federal Central Foreign Foreign Regions Population Treasury Loan Aid Grants Grants Treasury Loan Aid Tigray 3,396,000 261,500,000 10,700,000 30,300,000 302,500,000 89.08 77.00 3.15 8.92 Afar 1,133,000 1,367,000,000 12,100,000 8,300,000 1,387,400,000 1,224.54 1,206.53 10.68 7.33 Amhara 14,980,000 715,900,000 29,700,000 48,900,000 794,500,000 53.04 47.79 1.98 3.26 Oromiya 20,409,000 862,600,000 54,000,000 40,900,000 957,500,000 46.92 42.27 2.65 2.00 Somali 3,420,000 124,100,000 23,700,000 2,200,000 150,000,000 43.86 36.29 6.93 0.64 B-G 495,000 101,400,000 11,200,000 600,000 113,200,000 228.69 204.85 22.63 1.21 SNNPRS 11,376,000 517,800,000 42,500,000 72,500,000 632,800,000 55.63 45.52 3.74 6.37 Gambela 195,000 83,900,000 10,800,000 1,000,000 95,700,000 490.77 430.26 55.38 5.13 Harari 145,000 37,000,000 600,000 500,000 38,100,000 262.76 255.17 4.14 3.45 A.A. 2,266,620 -4,200,000 83,300,000 37,300,000 116,400,000 51.35 (1.85) 36.75 16.46 D.D. 271,230 14,400,000 6,700,000 500,000 21,600,000 79.64 53.09 24.70 1.84 Total 58,086,850 4,081,400,000 285,300,000 243,000,000 4,609,700,000 79.36 70.26 4.91 4.18
4: Federal government subsidy granted to regional states - 1997/98(1990 E.C.) Federal Grants Per capita Total Total Central Foreign Foreign Federal Federal Central Foreign Foreign Regions Population Treasury Loan Aid Grants Grants Treasury Loan Aid Tigray 3,494,000 255,655,200 4,731,420 32,790,160 293,176,780 83.91 73.17 1.35 9.38 Afar 1,160,000 225,794,400 3,846,970 7,846,780 237,488,150 204.73 194.65 3.32 6.76 Amhara 15,412,000 725,046,100 8,328,400 34,444,140 767,818,640 49.82 47.04 0.54 2.23 Oromiya 21,046,000 826,190,700 8,591,050 74,510,310 909,292,060 43.20 39.26 0.41 3.54 Somali 3,510,000 282,213,100 34,232,690 10,304,280 326,750,070 93.09 80.40 9.75 2.94 B-G 509,000 161,115,200 4,525,570 6,476,200 172,116,970 338.15 316.53 8.89 12.72 SNNPRS 11,753,000 554,145,300 21,727,500 66,972,530 642,845,330 54.70 47.15 1.85 5.70 Gambela 200,000 126,090,200 3,153,370 2,866,030 132,109,600 660.55 630.45 15.77 14.33 Harari 150,000 77,011,900 1,178,870 2,167,810 80,358,580 535.72 513.41 7.86 14.45 A.A. 2,354,000 - 40,183,170 14,635,530 54,818,700 23.29 - 17.07 6.22 D.D. 278,011 32,000,000 1,073,100 2,387,470 35,460,570 127.55 115.10 3.86 8.59 Total 59,866,011 3,265,262,100 131,572,110 255,401,240 3,652,235,450 61.01 54.54 2.20 4.27
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5: Federal government subsidy granted to regional states - 1998/99(1991 E.C.) Federal Grants Per capita Total Total Central Foreign Foreign Federal Federal Central Foreign Foreign Regions Population Treasury Loan Aid Grants Grants Treasury Loan Aid Tigray 3,593,000 248,168,000 14,793,100 48,063,800 311,024,900 86.56 69.07 4.12 13.38 Afar 1,188,000 237,809,100 7,876,265 9,586,335 255,271,700 214.88 200.18 6.63 8.07 Amhara 15,850,000 786,718,600 19,691,900 43,458,900 849,869,400 53.62 49.64 1.24 2.74 Oromiya 21,694,000 910,179,900 28,807,800 52,794,900 991,782,600 45.72 41.96 1.33 2.43 Somali 3,602,000 304,874,800 43,194,179 13,127,221 361,196,200 100.28 84.64 11.99 3.64 B-G 523,000 164,418,000 3,841,000 16,726,700 184,985,700 353.70 314.37 7.34 31.98 SNNPRS 12,132,000 629,063,800 35,211,300 39,043,800 703,318,900 57.97 51.85 2.90 3.22 Gambella 206,000 130,577,500 7,504,733 5,108,667 143,190,900 695.10 633.87 36.43 24.80 Harari 154,000 80,311,100 5,459,700 881,700 86,652,500 562.68 521.50 35.45 5.73 A.A. 2,424,000 - 201,095,900 35,528,200 236,624,100 97.62 - 82.96 14.66 D.D. 284,961 32,940,300 3,910,400 2,289,100 39,139,800 137.35 115.60 13.72 8.03 Total 61,650,961 3,525,061,100 371,386,277 266,609,323 4,163,056,700 67.53 57.18 6.02 4.32
6: Federal government subsidy granted to regional states - 1999/2000 (1992 E.C.)
Federal Grants Per capita Total Total Central Foreign Foreign Federal Federal Central Foreign Foreign Regions Population Treasury Loan Aid Grants Grants Treasury Loan Aid Tigray 3,694,000 182,310,000 30,100,000 29,490,000 241,900,000 65.48 49.35 8.15 7.98 Afar 1,216,000 175,970,000 17,920,000 5,700,000 199,590,000 164.14 144.71 14.74 4.69 Amhara 16,295,000 536,530,000 84,210,000 68,790,000 689,530,000 42.32 32.93 5.17 4.22 Oromiya 22,354,000 612,550,000 111,790,000 42,720,000 767,060,000 34.31 27.40 5.00 1.91 Somali 3,698,000 234,400,000 46,830,000 3,960,000 285,190,000 77.12 63.39 12.66 1.07 B-G 537,000 120,380,000 12,950,000 1,680,000 135,010,000 251.42 224.17 24.12 3.13 SNNPRS 12,515,000 440,000,000 93,660,000 38,760,000 572,420,000 45.74 35.16 7.48 3.10 Gambela 211,000 97,580,000 10,570,000 930,000 109,080,000 516.97 462.46 50.09 4.41 Harar 160,000 58,600,000 6,580,000 150,000 65,330,000 408.31 366.25 41.13 0.94 A.A. 2,495,000 - 38,000,000 17,800,000 55,800,000 22.36 - 15.23 7.13 D.D. 292,085 16,640,000 3,010,000 1,440,000 21,090,000 72.21 56.97 10.31 4.93 Total 63,467,085 2,474,960,000 455,620,000 211,420,000 3,142,000,000 49.51 39.00 7.18 3.33
144 Fiscal Relations and Interregional Equity
7: Federal government subsidy granted to regional states - 2000/2001(1993 E.C.) Federal Grants Per capita Total Total Central Foreign Federal Federal Federal Foreign Foreign Regions Population Treasury Loan Foreign Aid Grants Grants Subsidy Loan Aid Tigray 3,797,000 238,704,309 71,390,000 50,140,000 360,234,309 94.87 62.87 18.80 13.21 Afar 1,243,000 181,214,262 38,090,000 18,210,000 237,514,262 191.08 145.79 30.64 14.65 Amhara 16,572,015 675,231,806 173,140,000 81,510,000 929,881,806 56.11 40.75 10.45 4.92 Oromiya 23,023,000 905,930,531 215,420,000 93,770,000 1,215,120,531 52.78 39.35 9.36 4.07 Somali 3,797,000 265,075,035 65,110,000 22,810,000 352,995,035 92.97 69.81 17.15 6.01 B-G 551,000 135,162,138 30,190,000 13,670,000 179,022,138 324.90 245.30 54.79 24.81 SNNPRS 12,903,000 493,102,734 188,150,000 99,520,000 780,772,734 60.51 38.22 14.58 7.71 Gambela 216,000 107,593,301 20,830,000 8,910,000 137,333,301 635.80 498.12 96.44 41.25 Harari 164,160 50,287,133 12,260,000 4,540,000 67,087,133 408.67 306.33 74.68 27.66 A.A. 2,547,395 - 67,140,000 50,680,000 117,820,000 46.25 - 26.36 19.89 D.D. 299,387 24,098,751 8,610,000 7,633,000 40,341,751 134.75 80.49 28.76 25.50 Total 65,112,957 3,076,400,000 890,330,000 451,393,000 4,418,123,000 67.85 47.25 13.67 6.93
8: Federal government subsidy granted to regional states - 2001/2002(1994 E.C.) Federal Grants Per capita Total Total Central Foreign Federal Federal Central Foreign Foreign Regions Population Treasury Loan Foreign Aid Grants Grants Treasury Loan Aid Tigray 3,901,000 213,500,000 50,598,000 107,132,000 371,230,000 95.16 54.73 12.97 27.46 Afar 1,272,000 206,200,000 23,727,000 14,858,000 244,785,000 192.44 162.11 18.65 11.68 Amhara 16,853,739 709,800,000 101,701,000 146,834,000 958,335,000 56.86 42.12 6.03 8.71 Oromiya 23,704,000 1,003,950,000 119,017,000 129,227,000 1,252,194,000 52.83 42.35 5.02 5.45 Somali 3,898,000 301,300,000 39,379,000 23,112,000 363,791,000 93.33 77.30 10.10 5.93 B-G 565,000 147,000,000 19,296,000 18,213,000 184,509,000 326.56 260.18 34.15 32.24 SNNPRS 13,293,000 503,800,000 125,048,000 175,734,000 804,582,000 60.53 37.90 9.41 13.22 Gambela 222,000 121,700,000 13,250,000 6,586,000 141,536,000 637.55 548.20 59.68 29.67 Harari 168,428 57,000,000 7,556,000 4,611,000 69,167,000 410.66 338.42 44.86 27.38 A.A. 2,600,890 - 50,663,000 124,317,000 174,980,000 67.28 - 19.48 47.80 D.D. 306,872 75,650,000 4,884,000 7,379,000 87,913,000 286.48 246.52 15.92 24.05 Total 66,784,929 3,339,900,000 555,119,000 758,003,000 4,653,022,000 69.67 50.01 8.31 11.35
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9: Federal government subsidy granted to regional states - 2002/2003(1995 E.C.) Federal Grants Per capita Total Total Central Foreign Federal Federal Central Foreign Foreign Regions Population Treasury Loan Foreign Aid Grants Grants Treasury Loan Aid Tigray 4,006,000 377,600,000 59,900,000 47,600,000 485,100,000 121.09 94.26 14.95 11.88 Afar 1,301,000 249,000,000 39,500,000 31,400,000 319,900,000 245.89 191.39 30.36 24.14 Amhara 17,140,252 974,900,000 154,500,000 122,900,000 1,252,300,000 73.06 56.88 9.01 7.17 Oromiya 24,395,000 1,274,100,000 201,900,000 160,500,000 1,636,500,000 67.08 52.23 8.28 6.58 Somali 4,002,000 370,100,000 58,700,000 46,600,000 475,400,000 118.79 92.48 14.67 11.64 B-G 580,000 187,700,000 29,700,000 23,700,000 241,100,000 415.69 323.62 51.21 40.86 SNNPRS 13,686,000 818,600,000 129,700,000 103,200,000 1,051,500,000 76.83 59.81 9.48 7.54 Gambela 228,000 144,100,000 22,800,000 18,100,000 185,000,000 811.40 632.02 100.00 79.39 Harari 172,807 70,300,000 11,100,000 8,900,000 90,300,000 522.55 406.81 64.23 51.50 A.A. 2,655,509 - 36,300,000 155,100,000 191,400,000 72.08 - 13.67 58.41 D.D. 314,544 89,400,000 14,200,000 11,300,000 114,900,000 365.29 284.22 45.14 35.93 Total 68,481,112 4,555,800,000 758,300,000 729,300,000 6,043,400,000 88.25 66.53 11.07 10.65
10: Federal government subsidy granted to regional states - 2003/2004 (1996 E.C.) Federal Grants Per capita Total Total Central Foreign Federal Federal Central Foreign Foreign Regions Population Treasury Loan Foreign Aid Grant Grant Treasury Loan Aid Tigray 4,223,000 376,180,000 43,170,000 38,800,000 458,150,000 108.49 89.08 10.22 9.19 Afar 1,359,000 192,840,000 16,430,000 15,720,000 224,990,000 165.56 141.90 12.09 11.57 Amhara 17,431,637 1,095,820,000 96,160,000 143,070,000 1,335,050,000 76.59 62.86 5.52 8.21 Oromiya 25,817,000 1,659,490,000 91,030,000 96,090,000 1,846,610,000 71.53 64.28 3.53 3.72 Somali 4,218,000 310,900,000 31,000,000 30,140,000 372,040,000 88.20 73.71 7.35 7.15 B-G 610,000 150,730,000 14,140,000 12,640,000 177,510,000 291.00 247.10 23.18 20.72 SNNPRS 14,490,000 1,001,960,000 92,070,000 44,890,000 1,138,920,000 78.60 69.15 6.35 3.10 Gambela 240,000 116,620,000 8,300,000 5,660,000 130,580,000 544.08 485.92 34.58 23.58 Harari 177,300 72,740,000 2,880,000 1,900,000 77,520,000 437.23 410.27 16.24 10.72 A.A. 2,711,275 - 16,680,000 105,840,000 122,520,000 45.19 - 6.15 39.04 D.D. 322,407 78520000 4,940,000 2,450,000 85,910,000 266.46 243.54 15.32 7.60 Total 71,599,619 5,055,800,000 416,800,000 497,200,000 5,969,800,000 83.38 70.61 5.82 6.94
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11: Federal government subsidy granted to regional states - 2004/2005(1997 E.C.) Federal Grants Per capita Total Total Central Foreign Federal Federal Central Foreign Foreign Regions Population Treasury Loan Foreign Aid Grants Grants Treasury Loan Aid Tigray 4,223,000 407,880,000 15,280,000 62,800,000 485,960,000 115.07 96.59 3.62 14.87 Afar 1,359,000 217,500,000 6,700,000 16,540,000 240,740,000 177.14 160.04 4.93 12.17 Amhara 17,727,975 1,242,380,000 61,110,000 146,230,000 1,449,720,000 81.78 70.08 3.45 8.25 Oromiya 25,817,000 1,781,840,000 81,800,000 126,550,000 1,990,190,000 77.09 69.02 3.17 4.90 Somali 4,218,000 351,570,000 28,660,000 36,810,000 417,040,000 98.87 83.35 6.79 8.73 B-G 610,000 165,790,000 8,160,000 11,290,000 185,240,000 303.67 271.79 13.38 18.51 SNNPRS 14,490,000 1,102,550,000 41,290,000 40,920,000 1,184,760,000 81.76 76.09 2.85 2.82 Gambela 240,000 121,100,000 4,220,000 2,740,000 128,060,000 533.58 504.58 17.58 11.42 Harar 181,910 77,230,000 2,940,000 1,410,000 81,580,000 448.46 424.55 16.16 7.75 A.A. 2,768,211 - 3,280,000 103,530,000 106,810,000 38.58 - 1.18 37.40 D.D. 330,467 87,960,000 4,080,000 2,060,000 94,100,000 284.75 266.17 12.35 6.23 Total 71,965,563 5,555,800,000 257,520,000 550,880,000 6,364,200,000 88.43 77.20 3.58 7.65
12: Federal government subsidy granted to regional states - 2005/2006(1998 E.C.) Federal Grants Per capita Total Total Central Foreign Federal Federal Central Foreign Foreign Regions Population Treasury Loan Foreign Aid Grants Grants Treasury Loan Aid Tigray 4,335,000 500,810,000 8,600,000 51,950,000 561,360,000 129.49 115.53 1.98 11.98 Afar 1,389,000 294,020,000 4,800,000 12,310,000 311,130,000 224.00 211.68 3.46 8.86 Amhara 18,029,351 1,519,400,000 13,870,000 217,540,000 1,750,810,000 97.11 84.27 0.77 12.07 Oromiya 26,553,000 2,334,030,000 28,200,000 151,790,000 2,514,020,000 94.68 87.90 1.06 5.72 Somali 4,329,000 475,150,000 2,600,000 23,310,000 501,060,000 115.74 109.76 0.60 5.38 B-G 625,000 206,890,000 5,170,000 9,850,000 221,910,000 355.06 331.02 8.27 15.76 SNNPRS 14,902,000 1,363,610,000 17,220,000 63,340,000 1,444,170,000 96.91 91.51 1.16 4.25 Gambela 247,000 143,750,000 1,510,000 1,510,000 146,770,000 594.21 581.98 6.11 6.11 Harar 186,640 98,500,000 1,200,000 2,680,000 102,380,000 548.54 527.75 6.43 14.36 A.A. 2,826,344 - 11,300,000 140,250,000 151,550,000 53.62 - 4.00 49.62 D.D. 338,729 119,640,000 73,000 3,130,000 122,843,000 362.66 353.20 0.22 9.24 Total 73,761,064 7,055,800,000 94,543,000 677,660,000 7,828,003,000 106.13 95.66 1.28 9.19
Source: Compiled from Ministry of Finance and Economic Development (MoFED) and regional Bureaus of Finance and Economic Development. All computations are my own. Notes: A.A.= Addis Ababa; D.D.= Dire Dawa
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Table 4.4 (1-3): Trends in primary and secondary schools enrolment by region 1: Trends in Primary and Secondary Schools Enrolment by Region-2014/15 (2007 E.C.) Students per population % Region Population Primary Secondary Total Primary Secondary P+S Tigray 4,960,000 1,114,645 192,212 1,306,857 22.47 3.88 26.35 Afar 1,678,429 202,684 11,282 213,966 12.08 0.67 12.75 Amhara 20,020,000 4,282,001 499,038 4,781,039 21.39 2.49 23.88 Oromiya 32,816,000 6,997,983 676,009 7,673,992 21.33 2.06 23.39 Somali 5,307,000 808,876 56,160 865,036 15.24 1.06 16.30 B-Gumuz 976,000 220,362 25,811 246,173 22.38 2.62 25.00 SNNPRS 17,836,000 4,325,443 448,684 4,774,127 24.25 2.52 26.77 Gambella 396,000 113,647 21,331 134,978 28.49 5.35 33.84 Harari 226,000 41,336 6,940 48,276 17.57 2.95 20.52 A.A. 3,194,000 515,915 147,713 663,628 16.15 4.62 20.77 D.D. 427,000 68,325 11,782 80,107 16.00 2.76 18.76 Total 87,836,429 18,691,217 2,096,962 20,788,179 21.28 2.39 23.67
Source: Ministry of Education, Education Statistics Annual Abstract, 2014/15 (2007 E.C.).
2: Trends in Primary and Secondary schools Enrolment by Region-2015/16 (2008 E.C.) Students per population % Region Population Primary Secondary Total Primary Secondary P+S Tigray 5,055,000 1,138,898 213,021 1,351,919 22.96 4.29 27.26 Afar 1,723,000 195,404 13,215 208,619 11.64 0.79 12.43 Amhara 20,400,000 4,346,469 596,600 4,943,069 21.71 2.98 24.69 Oromiya 33,692,000 7,792,886 763,642 8,556,528 23.75 2.33 26.07 Somali 5,452,000 889,443 51,268 940,711 16.76 0.97 17.72 B-Gumuz 1,005,000 229,147 29,655 258,802 23.27 3.01 26.28 SNNPRS 18,276,000 4,632,024 550,271 5,182,295 25.97 3.09 29.05 Gambella 409,000 117,399 26,776 144,175 29.44 6.71 36.15 Harari 232,000 44,317 7,232 51,549 18.84 3.07 21.92 A.A. 3,272,000 519,870 155,460 675,330 16.27 4.87 21.14 D.D. 440,000 71,584 14,023 85,607 16.76 3.28 20.05 Total 89,956,000 19,977,441 2,421,163 22,398,604 22.21 2.69 24.9
Source: Ministry of Education, Education Statistics Annual Abstract, 2015/16 (2008 E.C.).
3: Trends in Primary and Secondary Schools Enrolment by Region-2016/17 (2009 E.C.) Students per population % Region Population Primary Secondary Total Primary Secondary P+S Tigray 5,151,000 1,167,162 212,315 1,379,477 23.53 4.28 27.81 Afar 1,678,000 199,747 18,325 218,072 11.90 1.09 12.99 Amhara 20,771,000 4,501,030 618,645 5,119,675 22.48 3.09 25.57 Oromiya 34,575,000 8,027,171 807,783 8,834,954 24.46 2.46 26.92 Somali 5,599,000 893,051 52,311 945,362 16.83 0.99 17.81 B-Gumuz 1,035,000 250,176 32,456 282,632 25.41 3.30 28.70 SNNPRS 18,720,000 4,989,498 622,061 5,611,559 27.97 3.49 31.46 Gambella 422,000 115,761 24,752 140,513 29.03 6.21 35.23 Harari 238,000 45,947 7,175 53,122 19.53 3.05 22.58 A.A. 3,353,000 515,785 150,372 666,157 16.15 4.71 20.85 D.D. 453,000 77,750 12,982 90,732 18.21 3.04 21.25 Total 91,995,000 20,783,078 2,559,177 23,342,255 22.59 2.78 25.37
Source: Ministry of Education, Education Statistics Annual Abstract, 2016/17
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Table 4.5: Distribution of large and medium scale manufacturing industries by regions
Distribution of LMMIS by regions 2010/2011 2011/2012 2012/2013 2013/2014 2014/2015 2015/2016 Regions Total % Total % Total % Total % Total % Total % Tigray 200 9.22 191 7.79 211 7.95 214 7.76 212 6.73 506 14.07 Afar 8 0.37 13 0.53 18 0.68 10 0.36 8 0.25 8 0.22 Amhara 240 11.06 311 12.68 314 11.83 320 11.6 341 10.18 303 8.43 Oromiya 506 23.32 640 26.1 782 29.45 815 29.55 1018 32.32 1004 27.92 Somali 13 0.60 23 0.94 29 1.09 29 1.05 30 0.95 23 0.64 B-Gumuz 2 0.09 5 0.2 9 0.34 10 0.36 6 0.19 6 0.17 SNNPRS 234 10.78 287 11.7 302 11.37 336 12.18 314 9.97 313 8.7 Gambella 1 0.05 2 0.08 1 0.04 ------Harari 22 1.01 23 0.94 30 1.13 33 1.2 37 1.17 20 0.56 A.A. 874 40.28 897 36.58 882 33.22 901 32.67 1093 34.7 1307 36.35 D.D. 70 3.23 60 2.45 61 2.9 90 8.26 91 2.89 106 2.95 Total 2170 2452 2639 2758 3150 3596
Source: Compiled from CSA Annual Reports on Distribution of LMMIS by regions in Ethiopia - 2010/2011 - 2015/2016
Table 4.6 :( 1-2): Trends in health services by regions
1: Trends in Health Services by Regions-2015/16 (2008 E.C.) Per capita Region Population Health post Health center Hospital Health post Health center Hospital Tigray 5,055,000 712 205 38 7,099 24,658 133,026 Afar 1,723,000 325 96 6 5,301 17,947 287,166 Amhara 20,400,000 3392 857 57 6,014 23,803 357,894 Oromiya 33,692,000 6519 1,411 65 5,168 23,878 518,338 Somali 5,452,000 1096 203 9 4,974 26,857 605,777 B-Gumuz 1,005,000 391 51 2 2,570 19,705 502,500 SNNPRS 18,276,000 3849 748 47 4,748 24,433 388,851 Gambella 409,000 133 33 2 3,075 12,393 204,500 Harari 232,000 30 8 2 7,733 29,000 116,000 A.A. 3,272,000 - 100 11 - 32,720 297,454 D.D. 440,000 33 15 2 13,333 29,333 220,000 Total 89,956,000 16480 3727 241 5,458 24,136 373,261
Source: Ministry of Health, Health Sector Transformation Plan-I, Annual Performance Report, 2016.
2: Trends in Health Services by Regions-2016/17(2009 E.C.) Per capita Region Population Health post Health center Hospital Health post Health center Hospital Tigray 5,151,000 712 213 39 7,235 24,183 132,077 Afar 1,678,000 325 94 6 5,163 17,851 279,667 Amhara 20,771,000 3342 841 68 6,215 24,698 305,456 Oromiya 34,575,000 6797 1,441 78 5,087 23,994 443,269 Somali 5,599,000 1,026 204 12 5,457 27,446 466,583 B-Gumuz 1,035,000 402 40 2 2,575 25,875 517,500 SNNPRS 18,720,000 3874 742 78 4,832 25,229 240,000 Gambella 422,000 118 28 4 3,576 15,071 105,500 Harari 238,000 30 8 2 7,933 29,750 119,000 A.A. 3,353,000 - 98 11 - 34,214 304,818 D.D. 453,000 34 15 2 13,324 30,200 226,500 Total 91,995,000 16660 3724 302 5,522 24,703 304,619
Source: Ministry of Health, Health Sector Transformation Plan-I, Annual Performance Report, 2017.
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4.5. Conclusion This chapter examined the effect of fiscal decisions on regions that are associated with particular ethnic groups in Ethiopia. The fiscal transfer system in Ethiopia has taken some major steps towards resolving the problem of historically marginalized regions, the introduction of formula-based transfers and the use of variables to measure variations of developmental levels. The design and implementation of a transfer system to reach solutions to regional imbalances are also significant steps. However, what is critical is to pinpoint the problems and weaknesses that needed to be fixed before it becomes too late to make the necessary adjustments. First, despite having revenue distributed from the federal pool as general grants, the controversies which revolved around the grants formula and the relative weights attached to them have already had an adverse effect on the distribution of the national resources among ethno-regional states. Besides, the use of allocation grants based on political considerations to benefit specific regions has so far overshadowed the other criteria in the distribution of resources.
Secondly, the federal government also distributes grants for specific purposes. These grants, despite aiming to enhance equitable socio-economic developments across ethno-regions, also have not been a defect-free instrument as the selection criteria for eligibility are determined by the federal government on the basis of political considerations. Such politically biased mechanism of resource allocation has caused growing tension with historically backward regions like Benishangul-Gumuz, Somali, Afar, and Gambella.
Finally, besides official budgetary resources, there are informal parallel transfers between the EPRDF/TPLF and certain ethno-regional states, and Tigray (its home base) particularly. Such extra-budgetary transfers are maintained through non-official forms of patronage system which includes parapartals, off-budget funding, and non-transparent ways of distributing federally funded infrastructure to certain regions. Even though it is problematic to document the extent of economic inequality among ethno-regions, such „non-official forms of fiscal transfer‟ have created horizontal imbalances among ethno-regional states in the country. In fact, the existence of these funds has just tended to reinforce the general perception of injustice arising out of the official budgetary process.
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All the points raised above send a clear warning signal that the situation could further aggravate existing patterns of interethnic or interregional disparities, thereby creating suspicion of ethnic favoritism and hence undermining the development of nation-wide solidarity, which is immensely significant for the development of federalism as an institution of interethnic bargaining and compromise. Indeed, federalism does not encourage a situation in which poor regions become poorer and rich regions become richer and does not tolerate any form of inequality between the regional states. Therefore, it rests on the federal government to make a rigorous effort to bring them to a comparable fiscal competence by implementing transparent and impartial fiscal transfer tools.
mmmmmmmmmmmmmmmmmmmmmmkkkkkk Ethnic Balancing Policies in Opportunity and 5 Representation
5.1. Introduction When ethnically divided states initiate a package of devolution, they usually inherit substantial preexisting inequities in different groups‟ access to higher education, public sector employment, and representation in the national decision-making bodies. Federalism can contribute to the reduction of tensions and contentions through policies that mitigate ethnic disparities through the distribution of economic resources and preferential treatment in this regard (Horowitz, 1985). Preferential policies1 or ethnic balancing policies in light of this are critical in the political life of multiethnic federal systems. This is mainly because, in principle, they ensure that the benefits of development and state spending will be shared in a more proportionate manner, and those past inequities, historical injustices, and underrepresentation will be redressed. Consequently, multiethnic federations make use of preferential policies or ethnic balancing policies to rectify such inequalities and prevent „partisan control of the state‟ in the conviction that this will boost interethnic relations and consolidate a sense of national unity and cohesion in the country. In the same way, the Ethiopian federalism has made use of such policies primarily in access to higher education, public employment (both federal and regional) and representation in the national political decision-making institutions and other sensitive areas such as the armed forces or military. In developing economies like Ethiopia and in a context of a relative scarcity of opportunity, higher education and public employment are prized benefits. Higher education offers the promise of socio-economic development and vertical mobility or advancement. And, in a statist economy (as in the Ethiopian case) access to public sector employment is a highly
1In this thesis, I use the terms preferential policies or ethnic balancing policies interchangeably. Besides, I borrow the term preferential policies from Horowitz (see Horowitz, 1985). Preferential policies normally imply actions taken with the aim of helping and supporting a certain group, although other groups might be treated less advantageous. One common explanation, among others, used to justify this action is often that preferential policies would encourage ethnic and cultural diversity in ethnically divided societies (Bruhagen, 2006). They are common in racially divided societies, but they typically differ in scope, formality, and explicitness. Some extend to both public and private sector opportunities, while others are limited to public sector only.
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valued good. Likewise, balanced or equitable representation becomes chiefly important in those functional classes that control the fortunes of the country, usually the national decision- making institutions indicated above.
This chapter examines the operation and effect of ethnic balancing policies in the multiethnic federation of Ethiopia by considering groups‟ access to such public goods as public employment and their representation in the area of the national decision-making institutions. In a multiethnic setting, ethnic balancing policies seek to give certain groups greater access to identified opportunity areas such as higher education, public employment, or others. Through the use of tools like quotas and proportional targets, such policies aim to distribute opportunity (and representation) more fairly among diverse ethnic groups in a country. They may be in this context used to promote equitable access to state resources as in the Ethiopian case, where a „controversial nationwide experiment in government and administration‟2 has been underway in the post-1991 period, one that appears to aim at rectifying of the historical patterns of injustices in the multiethnic state of Ethiopia.
Yet, over and above the extent to which such policies are productive or successful in their stated aims, they can generate very mixed outcomes and yield substantial inequity and bitterness of their own. The final cost/benefit analysis of such measures is far from clear. They tend to create more equal access to basic services and yield more balanced representation, thereby producing increased equality in systems often marked by shaky patterns of inequity. Simultaneously, such measures can produce accentuated politicization (in areas like education and civil service that have sought to stay free of its influences), and increase the salience or importance of existing identity markers. The use of non-economic or non-merit based decision factors tend overtime to subside integrity, professionalism, and educational standards, as well as debilitate or weaken transparency in hiring and general openness.3
2(see Abbink, 1993:675). 3Critics counter (often convincingly) that the system was never merit-based nor efficient to begin with because its discrimination against particular groups precluded true merit and economic efficiency.
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The use of ethnicity as the main criterion in such decisions can possibly legitimize and install it as a major factor of public life, and cause considerable acrimony and deterioration in interethnic relations. Employing ethnicity once as a factor for a particular hiring decision, and it can rarely be ignored again. Instead of promoting unity and national solidarity, such measures can reinforce existing interregional or interethnic tensions and frictions, creating an ultimate „backlash‟ effect that undesirably affects the very groups the measures were intended to benefit. While preferential policies are generally conceived as short-term adjustment mechanisms, they seem to be extremely resilient once implemented. In the Ethiopian federalism, there are fears that the discrimination such measures produce will become a permanent rather than temporary feature of the political landscape (as will be illustrated later in section 6.2.2).
This chapter argues that preferential policies are generally not conducive to improved interethnic relations in the short to medium term, and explores some of the troubles and distortions inherent in such policies as they have been used in the Ethiopian multiethnic setting. Preferential policies involve particular displacement and „pain‟ for those groups that have benefited so far from access patterns (whether it is access to higher education or control of the civil service) which they consider „fair‟ and others claim „discriminatory‟. Such policies time and again produce new pockets of ethno-linguistic opposition to the government and its social or developmental programs. On a national scale, they can increase the sense of equal citizenship, provide more equitable access to public goods and services of the state, and redress historical inequities. At the same time, they appear to produce additional interethnic confrontation and conflict and lead to charges of „reverse discrimination‟ or reprisal. They may produce two paths of distortion in the longer-run. They can transform into a more permanent form of discrimination that may marginalize targeted groups and induce centrifugal or divergent behavior. Or, once employed in the pursuit of equity, such policies can develop into a system of ethnic arithmetic4 or a question of „national
4Ethnic arithmetic is concerned about the distribution of benefits and the sharing of burdens. In its broad sense of the term, it implies: “the assigning of an ethnic label for everything from a piece of territory to a particular office or job, from a functional area of private enterprise to an admission spot in a university. Ethnic arithmetic also includes the controversial „counting of groups‟; the quantitative formulation that seeps into all aspects of life, and the endless bickering over the rational and merits of particular policies. It tends to reinforce the existing stereotypes and even foster new ones” (Lincoln cited in Solomon, 2006b:53).
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cake‟ sharing that becomes a prevailing and often uncompromising feature of the political system.
With this backdrop, this chapter, as noted already, sets out to analyze ethnic balancing polices in the Ethiopian ethnic federalism. The first section discusses those rationales and debates beyond having ethnic balancing polices in the post-1991 Ethiopia. The second section focuses on ethnic balancing policies in public employment at both federal and regional levels. The third section explores ethnic representation in the realm of the federal cabinet which is an area of the national political decision-making institution. This chapter also discusses ethnic representation in sensitive areas like the armed forces or military. The last section gives a concluding remark.
5.1. Preferential Policies in the Ethiopian Federalism 5.1.1. Preferential policies in federal Ethiopia: Rectifying past wrongs After toppling the socialist military regime, otherwise known as Derg, in 1991, the TPLF/EPRDF leadership declared a reform comprising, among other things, a decentralised ethnic-federal system. The initial impetus for the post-1991 Ethiopian ethnicity-based decentralisation reform is rooted in the country‟s history and politics. It claimed that since the formation of the centralised and modern Ethiopian state in the last quarter of the 19th century, the Amhara ethnic group governmental system, culture, and language had dominated the other ethnic groups in the country (Aalen, 2006; Merera, 2003; Young, 1997). It contended that the three successive regimes of King Menelik II, Emperor Haile Selassie I, and the Derg had been dominated by members of the Amhara ethnic group, had established highly centralised administrations that denied regional autonomy, and had marginalised the other ethnic groups in the country (ibid.). Many even contend that the Ethiopian Revolution of 1974 was not in the real sense a revolution in terms of its major ramifications on political power and change in the structure of the state. Indeed, there was an ample historical record of marginalization of the large majority of the people from political power and economic resources in the country. The political and economic denial seems to be the deliberate
Ethnic Balancing Policies in Opportunity and Representation 155 consequence of the Shewan ruling elite attempt to hold its rival at bay (Assefa, 2006a). One author in this regard notes that:
We know the actual diversity in Ethiopia and the enduring problem of ethno-regional disparity in education, infrastructure, development and representation in leading administrative positions at the level of the central state. Both the large Oromo population and the many minority groups in Ethiopia, if looked at proportionally, were unrepresented in all major domains. Many groups which were incorporated or conquered by Minilik II in the late 19th century remained marginal to the polity, the economy and the exercise of administration. (Abbink, 1997:164).
As a result, the national oppression interpretation was presented as the main explanation for the persistent struggle for state power and resources between the ethnic political elites and became the foundation for the 1991 Provisional Charter of the Transitional Government of Ethiopia (TGE), which introduced decentralisation reform in the country. The Transitional Charter, which came into force on 22nd July 1991, states in its preamble:
Whereas the military dictatorship was, in essence, a continuation of the previous regimes and its demise marks the end of an era of subjugation and oppression thus starting a new chapter in Ethiopian history in which freedom, equal rights and self-determination of all peoples shall be the governing principles of political, economic and social life and thereby contributing to the welfare of the Ethiopian Peoples and rescuing them from centuries of subjugation and backwardness;
Whereas peace and stability, as essential conditions of development, require the end of all hostilities, the healing of wounds caused by conflicts and the establishment and maintenance of good neighborliness and cooperation; (emphasis added).5
It is interesting that the Preamble of the Federal Constitution also clearly reflects this fact. Exactly the same way, one could observe that in the Preamble an express statement is made to the effect that the federal system aims at redressing historical injustices in the country in the following manner:
Our common [Ethiopian] destiny can best be served by rectifying historically unjust relationships and by further promoting our shared interests (FDRE Constitution, 1995:1, emphasis added).
5See Preamble of the Transitional Period Charter of Ethiopia No. 1, Negarit Gazeta, 50th Year No. 1, Addis Ababa, 22nd July 1991, hereinafter called the Charter.
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The EPRDF‟s further justification for presenting the decentralisation reform was the need to reordering of the Ethiopian state and society along ethnic line so that it could accommodate the political demands of the various ethno-linguistic groups in the country, which are different in terms of economic activity, geography, social and cultural values, and political history. This clarification was on the basis of TPLF/EPRDF‟s conception of an ethnic group in Ethiopia as a separate entity that could be identified through objective cultural markers (culture, language, religion, and other factors) and deserved the right to self-determination.
The EPRDF‟s thinking on the distinctive nature of Ethiopian ethnic groups is akin to the primordial approach of ethnicity, where ethnic groups are considered to be culturally distinctive entities with little interaction between them and ethnicity is viewed as something naturally innate, fixed, and immutable. The late premier reaffirmed the EPRDF‟s thinking in 1994, when he described the civil war all over the country as a struggle by nationalities for the right to administer themselves, to use their own language and to develop their own culture (Aalen, 2002). The two corroborations of TPLF/EPRDF for introducing ethnic-based decentralisation reform are thus cessation of the Amhara-dominated centralised state administration and accommodating ethno-linguistic diversity in the country.
In response to such historical injustices and other related political demands, the TPLF/EPRDF regime has implemented ethnic balancing policies aimed at improving multiethnic equity in the post-1991 period. Ethiopia has thus a „federal character‟6 policy of its own, incorporated in the FDRE Constitution and has been supplemented by the subsequent proclamations, though that policy seems to have been undermined by a basic flaw between the equality of citizens and the commitment to assist particular regional states in the federation.7 Broadly speaking, the provision of preferential treatment to the hitherto
6The term “federal character” principle, which has been enshrined in Nigeria‟s Constitution since 1979, refers to fair allocation of posts and resources among the several ethnic groups considering the linguistic, ethnic, religious, and geographic diversity of the country (Edwin, 2019). Similarly, in the context of this thesis, the concept is referred as a policy measure to ensure fair and equitable representation and participation of various ethnic groups in higher education, civil service employment and national decision-making institutions in the context of Ethiopian federalism. 7Article 89 (2 & 4) of FDRE Constitution under Chapter Ten reads: 2) „Government has the duty to ensure that all Ethiopians get equal opportunity to improve their economic conditions and to promote equitable
Ethnic Balancing Policies in Opportunity and Representation 157 marginalised ethno-linguistic groups is one of the positive outcomes of the federal restructuring of the country. The federal government delivers preferential treatment in public employment, promotion, and higher education admission to members of minority ethnic groups. The justification for this policy is to redress the disproportionately low level of participation of such historically marginalized groups in government institutions and higher educations (Asnake, 2013). Additionally, in line with the policy of affirmative action, the federal government provides preferential treatment to the four peripheral regions such as Afar, Somali, Gambella, and Benishangul-Gumuz in terms of budget allocation and enrolment in higher education (MoFedA, 2004:54). Therefore, the attempt of both the federal and regional governments to upsurge participation of previously marginalized ethnic groups in higher education and civil service sector appears to be rational. As one observer of Ethiopia has noted the post-1991 political development of the country:
…many of the nationalities who in the past were looked down upon and marginalized from all civic and developmental activities have been embraced in the new polity and their pride have been restored. They no longer consider themselves as neglected subjects, but instead regard themselves as groups who have a say in the reconstruction of a new Ethiopia based on voluntary union (Asmelash, 1997:22, ellipsis added).
In sharp contrast, some perceive this policy as a terrible attempt to inflict historical reprisal upon the Amhara ethnic group. This view contends that such retribution is not only unacceptable in of itself, but groundless as well.8 The relatively underdeveloped nature of the Amhara region in general and the poverty of its peasantry in particular are offered as evidence.9 Its proponents draw a distinction between the use of Amharic as a national language and the assumption of any „political privilege nor [sic] any economic advantage to the majority of the Amhara group‟ (Walle, 1994:175). In a similar manner, Christopher Clapham (1990:228, emphasis added) maintains that the Ethiopian central government, „far from being the Amhara preserve, as the mythology of the opposition movements claims,
distribution of wealth among them. 4) „Government shall provide special assistance to Nations, Nationalities, and Peoples least advantaged in social and economic development.‟ 8It would not be far from the truth to contend that no one nationality group ever had the exclusive control of national political life in Ethiopia. Contrary to the perception that the Amhara had been the dominant group in Ethiopia, a close evaluation of the past and present political and socio-economic status of each of the country‟s ethnic groups may prove otherwise (see Walle, 1994:175). 9(see also Lewis, 1993).
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readily provides position of power for Oromos, Gurages, Aderes, Wollaytas or Kambattas.‟ Clapham further illustrates that some non-Amhara joined the ruling circles both before and after the 1974 Ethiopian Revolution.
It is true that the process of state-building which made Amharic the national language was the result of the intermingling of many ethno-linguistic groups, it is also true that in some of the historical moments other groups have joined hands in palace politics. In particular one should note that a significant size of the Oromo elite of Shewa region played a crucial role in the making of Ethiopian history. In that regard, among Menelik‟s top generals who took part in the building of the empire, those of Oromo origin from Shewa surpassed those from other ethnic communities. For instance, Ras Gobena and Ras Mekonnen (father of Haile Selassie I and cousin of Menelik II), Fitawrari Gebeyehu and Fitawrari Habte-Giorgis, Dajazmach Balcha, and even emperor Haile Selassie I were all prominent Oromo political figures in the empire-building project (Merera, 2003). A sizable Oromo population in northern Ethiopia and elites of Oromo extraction had also become part of the ruling houses of Gojjam, Gondar, and Wollo (Teshale, 1995; Bahru, 1991). Ras Ali and Empress Taitu (Menelik II wife) of Gondar, Ras Adal (Takle-Haymanot) of Gojjam, and Mohammed Ali (Negus Michael) of Wollo were good instances of Oromo elite who had a role in the making of the empire (Teshale, 1995). Judged by his close reviews, Clapham concludes that „the system is not ethnically exclusive‟ and „considers the cries of the opposition that they have been dominated by the Amhara to be just a stick with which to beat the regime‟ (Clapham cited in Young, 1993:159). Gahsaw (1993:142) has also the same observation. He upholds that „the Ethiopian ruling classes cannot be identified with a particular ethnic group‟ as they are a „multi-ethnic group whose only common factors are that they are Christians, Amharic speakers, and claim lineage to the Solomonic line.‟ In his attempt to explain over the same issue, Teshale Tibebu differently avows that only in the southern part of the country can one speak of „Amhara domination‟ owning to the triple merger of language, religion and nationality in the person of the Neftegna.10 At the national level, nevertheless, no special economic as well as political benefit accrued to the Amhara ethnic communities different from other nationalities and
10Literally „gun-carrier‟, associated with soldier settlers in southern Ethiopia to whom the government granted rights over land and people.
Ethnic Balancing Policies in Opportunity and Representation 159 therefore „national oppression‟ is just reduced to linguistic oppression (1995:174 and 180). In this view, the historical role of a small privileged Shewan ruling elite is a unique feature of Ethiopia‟s modern political development, and has been misrepresented ex post facto as an early example of the ethnic contest that currently counteracts ethno-regional blocks one against the other.
There appears to be some truth to all of these points. Prior to the 1970s, Ethiopian politics was not firmly defined by ethnicity and conceived in terms of competition between ethno- regional blocks as in the 1990s. Rather, as many argue, and appropriately so, the Amharic- speaking people in the northern part of the country principally categorize themselves in terms of their respective regions.11 This was, at least, the case prior to the introduction of ethnic federalism in the post-1991 period (Yohnatan, 2010). Whether or not the Amhara elite played the „game‟ and did benefit is highly contestable and ultimately irresolvable. It illustrates the difficulty inherent in normative judgments as a basis for preferential policies.
Whatever the outcome of these debates, the TPLF-dominated regime has made some effort at ethnic balancing and ethnic diversification in the area of national decision-making institutions, higher education, and civil service (public sector) using preferential policies so as to (officially) improve the overall ethnic balance that must characterize any multiethnic state. With this background, the next section discusses the application of preferential policies in public employment both at federal and regional levels.
5.1.2. The cost of ethnic balancing in the civil service of federal Ethiopia Following the seizure of state power in 1991, the TPLF/EPRDF regime inherited both a highly centralized and ideologically driven civil service system and a set of wide disparities in terms of the administrative and institutional capacities of what became the various regions (Collins, 1993; Olowu, 1999). During this period, there was only one national civil service,
11A sizable number of people of Amhara background in the northern Ethiopia would prefer to identify themselves as Welloye, Gondare, or Gojjame – the historical territorial divisions predominant in the Ethiopian Empire – and not as Amhara. This does not mean they are not ethnically Amhara, however. The historical circumstances in the Abyssinian Kingdom were such that regional identities played significant role in state politics.
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and the size of the government labor force was relatively small numbering a little bit more than 200,000 civil servants of various categories, and was largely ethnically diverse (Meheret, 1998). It also inherited, as soon became apparent, a certain amount of bureaucratic resistance to its devolution package (Cohen, 1997).12 Since the beginning of the 1990s, the EPRDF has taken various measures to reform its public sectors. A first priority of the central government was to reorganize (through retrenchment) the national civil service, decentralize it and relocate a significant portion of civil servants, i.e., about 2,096 public servants to the newly established regional states (Civil Service Commission, Personnel Statistics, 1992). The national government also, as part of a retrenchment policy, carried out redeployment of 453 employees in federal bureaus, early retirement of 3,961 employees, and removal of 10,511 of civil servants and employees of public enterprises (Atkilt, 1998). Through the use of incentive packages, a number relocated though the local language requirement and diminished creature comforts of the regional states caused a number of Amhara civil servants (the great majority of the civil service – account for 56.8 percent of the country‟s civil service in 1992)13 to take early retirement, special compensation packages or other opportunities. It is important to note that the application of preferential policies14 in the civil service through retrenchment/restructuring has created in its wake a pool of ex-civil servants (usually Amhara ethnic group) resentful of the government, its federal experiment and policies. This resentment has been magnified by two anxieties: 1) such policies will be permanent and exclusionary, and 2) they are employed not to secure the equitable multiethnic future of the country, but simply to install a new political order in Ethiopia around the centrality of the Tigrayan elite in the place of the old Shewa-Amhara one. Indeed, the Amhara elites have unswervingly labeled it as „ethnic apartheid‟ (Merera, 2003). This retrenchment policy also resulted in the removal of qualified personnel who were apparently associated with the former socialist Derg regime and was used to settle political scores; it further eroded the limited administrative capacity of the public sector and created a climate of
12Cohen details those factors in both the new leadership and in the existing senior civil servants that generated this internal resistance. Insofar as the civil service was essential to the successful execution of the devolutionary program, a shake-up became inevitable. 13For details on this (see Federal Civil Service Commission, 1992). 14In Ethiopia, preferential policies in both higher education and the civil service are not based in the FDRE Constitution but appear to derive directly from its formulation of ethnic federalism, from its commitment to redress „historically unjust relationships‟ and from the particular configuration of ethno-regions that have evolved. To that end, it has been supplemented by the subsequent proclamations, the „Higher Education Proclamation No. 650/2009‟ and „Federal Civil Servants Proclamation No. 1064/2017‟ respectively.
Ethnic Balancing Policies in Opportunity and Representation 161 uncertainty in the public sector in the country (Paulos, 2001). This reform measure has thus come at a high price in terms of lost efficiency, development, professionalism, and legitimate devolution.
By 1997, about 85 percent of the „new‟ national (federal) civil service was regional in origin (265,000 civil servants out of a total of 309,000). Among the regional states, Afar, Somali, Gambella, and Benishangul-Gumuz all experienced lacking skilled human resource relative to such regional states as Amhara, Tigray, Oromyia, and SNNPRS (Meheret, 1998).15 Thus, the capacity-poor regions were understaffed in terms of the corpus of civil servants essential to their economic and social development. This existing imbalance has been further aggravated by the evolving state practice of using local language and ethnic background as criteria in the hiring of civil servants (although some regional states continue to work in Amharic for the time being). Some have chosen to employ only members of their own dominant ethnic group.16
In general, over the last decade and particularly following the onset of ethnic federal restructuring of the country, the number of civil service personnel had dramatically risen to more than 1.7 million federal and regional employees in 2017/18. Of these, the number of federal civil servants was 158,617, and that of regional civil servants was 1,583,787 representing a little more than 9 percent and 91 percent respectively (Federal Civil Service Commission [FCSC], 2018). What follows is an examination of the ethnic composition of federal and regional civil services one after the other.
5.1.2.1. Federal civil service: Ethnic composition and representation The federal restructuring of Ethiopia along ethno-linguistic lines has resulted in a significant increase in the civil service population due to the unprecedented expansion of the state apparatus both at federal and regional levels (Meheret, 2018). The main difference between the pre-1991 period and the current civil service system is that the former was ethnically diverse while the latter was more homogeneous, more so at regional state levels.
15These latter four regions command 84 percent of the nation‟s (federal) civil servants during the period (see Meheret, 1998). 16Interviews with regional civil service experts in Afar, Somali, Gambella, and Benishangul-Gumuz (Addis Ababa, August 2020).
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Notwithstanding these, the ethnic composition of the federal civil service can be said to be relatively multiethnic as compared with several of the ethnically constituted regional states in the post-1991 federal Ethiopia (ibid.). This does not mean, however, that the ethnic composition of the federal public service strictly reflects the prevailing ethnic diversity of the country in terms of fair representation and participation at the national level when we observe the actual practice of the Ethiopian ethnic federalism in light of the objectives and the principles set forth under Article 39(3)17 of the FDRE Constitution and the subsequent Proclamation No. 1064/2017 under Article 50(1) and (2).18 When we look at particularly the same proclamation, which expressly stipulates a „fair representation of nations and nationalities‟ and preferential treatment in a government institution, the objectives have in practice been demonstrated very hard to move in the right direction. This is essentially borne out by the fact that the ethnic composition of the federal civil service has thus far been unvaryingly dominated by specific ethnic groups and tends to be more and more homogeneous and monolithic at least for the last two decades (see Table 5.1 below and Appendix 1 for details). Indeed, a closer examination of the FCSC data for the selected years clearly reveals this reality. For example, taking the formative years of Ethiopian federalism based on four years of data (1994/95, 1995/96, 2001/02 and 2002/03), the average number of civil servants of Amharas (55.96 percent), Oromos (18.49 percent), Tigrayans (8.1 percent), and Gurages (5.12 percent), which have comparatively significant population size in the Ethiopian context, covered around 87.67 percent of the country‟s federal civil service population, while the average share of Welayta, Sidama, Gamo, Hadiya, Afar, and Somali ethnic groups was 0.99 percent, 0.38 percent, 0.37 percent, 0.3 percent, 0.14 percent, and 0.095 percent respectively, leaving their share in the federal civil service population
17The FDRE Constitution Article 39(3) states: „Every Nation, Nationality and People in Ethiopia has the right to a full measure of self-government which includes the right to establish institutions of government in the territory that it inhabits and to equitable representation in state and Federal governments‟ (FDRE Constitution, 1995). 18Article 50 of Federal Civil Servants Proclamation No. 1064/2017 under section five reads: 1) The placement of personnel in a government institution shall take into account fair representation of nations and nationalities. 2) Nations and nationalities having lesser representations within a government institution shall be given the advantage of affirmative actions in recruitment, promotion, transfer, redeployment, education and training.
Ethnic Balancing Policies in Opportunity and Representation 163 insignificant.19 In fact, when all the latter were taken together, they constituted just 2.28 percent of the total federal civil service functionaries (see Table 5.1 below).
Even when we consider the recent statistics for the last four consecutive years from 2014/15 to 2017/18 (see Table 5.2 below), the data has till now evidently shown little or no sign of improvement in terms of the number of employees from those under-represented nationality groups in the federal public service, making their fair representation within government institutions a wishful thinking. For instance, during the four-year period, 42.18 percent of the federal civil service is accounted for Amharas, 18.98 percent for Oromos, 6.88 percent for Tigrayans, and 3.03 percent for Gurages, in total constituting 71.07 percent of the country‟s federal civil service population, whilst the share of Welaytas, Sidamas, Gamos, Hadiyas, Afars, and Somalis, taken as a whole, accounted for only 4.11 percent on the average, leaving their portion in the federal civil service population almost unchanged at least for some time. A more glaring discrepancy that can be inferred from both tables (Table 5.1 and Table 5.2 below) is that of the Oromo, which as the largest ethnic group in Ethiopia, secured disproportionately far less representation in the federal civil service population. Also, a large section of hitherto marginalized people, if looked at proportionally, was unrepresented in the same domain during the eight-year period (see Appendix 2 for details). This is certainly not in line with the general national demographic figures. It is actually at this point that informants from the FCSC explained to the author the reason why (although it is not the only reason) those members of nationalities could not secure their „fair representation‟ in the federal public sectors:
It is undeniable that the proficiency of the working language of the federal government, Amharic, is a criteria to secure public employment in the federal public sectors. In whatever way our potential candidates fulfill the required profession and knowledge from the universities, all recruitment processes and procedures of hiring them for the federal public institutions are conducted in Amharic language except for limited offices. Indeed, this
19Despite attempts by the federal government to diversify the Amhara-dominated civil service, 56.96 percent of the federal civil servant was still Amhara in origin, with other groups trailing considerably 18.49 percent Oromo, 8.1 percent Tigrayan, and 5.12 percent Guraghe as the above four years of data (1994/95, 1995/96, 2001/02, and 2002/03) indicated.
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prevents those graduates who lack Amharic language competence in practice from obtaining access to key resources or positions of authority at the federal public offices.20
A former long-serving public servant from Somali region further reinforces the above statements: „It is easier for those under-represented national minorities who do not speak the Amharic language to pass through the eye of the needle than to enter the magic circle of privilege in the federal government bureaucracy.‟21 Apart from the above-mentioned linguistic factor, according to the informants from the same civil service commission, the prevalence of a negligible number of professionals from those nationalities in the federal civil service can be partially explained by their limited access to education, especially access to quality education as well as their failure to perceive education as offering favorable livelihood outcomes and a key path to economic independence and the main routes out of poverty.22 Due to this ethnic imbalance in the federal civil service population, the government has taken a further set of preferential formulas to recruit more professionals from these under-represented national groups in the government institutions of civil service while they are applying for the public employments. However, despite such preferential treatment for civil servants coming from such national groups, there is still an acute shortage of professionals from the same groups in the federal bureaucracy. And this situation has not yet seen any substantial improvement as the preferential formulas or measures produce just a feeling of inferiority among many of those under-represented nationalities. This in turn causes an insufficient number of applicants from the same nationalities when vacancies are open for all qualified candidates.23
This unveils how the question of equitable participation of a number of nationalities in the federal public sectors is adversely affected by, among other things, the linguistic factor, failure to appreciate education as the key to a successful future, and limited access to education, which is often of poor quality. This weak representation of members of national minorities in the federal bureaucratic machinery could lead to serious challenges to the
20Interviews with officials and senior experts of Federal Civil Service Commission (Addis Ababa, August 2020). 21Interviews with former long-serving civil service employee in Somali region (Addis Ababa, August 2020). 22Interviews with senior experts of Federal Civil Service Commission (Addis Ababa, August 2020). 23Ibid.
Ethnic Balancing Policies in Opportunity and Representation 165 state‟s stability and its claim to legitimacy. In this connection, Gagnon and Turgeon contend that „…under-representation of national minorities in government administrative positions can be a major source of conflict and resentment since such positions are often considered desirable because of the salary or benefits they guarantee‟(2013:407, ellipsis and emphasis added). Indeed, for instance, the decades of systematically denying the Afaan-Oromo language the status of a working language of the federal government, coupled with a long- standing economic and political marginalisation, has produced simmering anger among the Oromo communities which sometimes boiled over into social unrest and protests. However, the Council of Ministers of Ethiopia only recently promoted (decision on the issue though still pending the final approval of federal parliament) four regional languages including Afaan-Oromo to the status of working languages of the federal government.24 Even if many believe that the decision to elevate the four regional languages to the status of working federal government languages would play a significant role in uniting the nation, additionally enhancing cultural ties amongst Ethiopians and perhaps most significantly securing „fair representation‟ of those under-represented nationalities in the federal public sectors, some of the informants expressed their doubts about the execution of the brand new languages coverage and the way it is going to be put into practice in the country.25
Although this glimmer of hope is welcome certainly for those under-represented national minorities in the federal public sectors, only very few ethnic groups so far happen to share the greater part of the „federal cake‟ or the federal public resource, which somewhat reflects a lack of fair public resource sharing and interethnic equity. Implying ethnic balance in the federal civil service is an unsettled issue in the multiethnic state of Ethiopia though the rationale for preferential policy is to redress the disproportionately low level of participation of those under-represented ones in the government institutions of civil service. Assefa
24Quite recently, the Council of Ministers of Ethiopia announced that it had elevated four regional languages to the status of working federal government languages. The four are: Afaan Oromo (spoken by the most populous Oromo group), Tigrinya (used by the Tigray nationality group), Somali and Afar (spoken by the Afar people). Until now, Amharic is the only working language of the federal government. For a more detailed account of this see the information on „One to five: Ethiopia gets four new federal working languages.‟
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strongly warns that „the gap between constitutionally proclaimed principles of federalism and political process is a serious concern‟ in Ethiopia‟s federal arrangement in this respect (2006b:158). In short, the nature of ethnic composition in the federal civil service appears to cause some concern for the present and the future legitimacy of the Ethiopian federal dispensation.
Table 5.1: Ethnic composition of the federal civil service for selected years
1994/95 (1987) 1995/96 (1988) 2001/02 (1994) 2002/03 (1995) Total 1994 No. of civil No. of civil No. of civil No. of civil Average Ethnicity Population servant % servant % servant % servant % % Afar 979,367 76 0.17 74 0.17 54 0.1 53 0.12 0.14 Amhara 16,007,933 26,880 58.48 24,487 59.9 22,846 52.8 23,964 52.65 55.96 Gamo 719,847 115 0.25 111 0.26 205 0.5 214 0.47 0.37 Gurage 2,290,274 2,597 5.65 2,250 5.32 2,069 4.8 2,148 4.72 5.12
Hadiya 927,933 136 0.30 127 0.30 122 0.3 136 0.30 0.3 Oromo 17,080,318 8,876 19.31 8,056 19.05 7,670 17.7 8,149 17.9 18.49 Sidama 1,842,314 166 0.36 151 0.36 171 0.4 175 0.38 0.38 Somali 3,160,540 37 0.08 34 0.08 47 0.1 53 0.12 0.095 Tigrayan 3,284,568 3,948 8.59 3,676 8.69 3,278 7.6 3,423 7.52 8.1
Welayta 1,269,216 439 0.96 413 0.98 437 1.0 464 1.02 0.99 Total 47,562,310 43,270 94.15 39,379 95.11 36,899 85.3 38,779 85.2 89.95
Source: Compiled from FCSC (various years). All computations are my own. See Appendix 1 for details.
Table 5.2: Ethnic composition of the federal civil service for selected years
2014/15 (2007 E.C.) 2015/16 (2008 2016/17 (2009 E.C.) 2017/18 (2010 Total E.C.) E.C.) Average 2007 No. of civil No. of civil No. of civil No. of civil % Ethnicity Population servant % servant % servant % servant % Afar 1,276,372 190 0.1 258 0.2 512 0.3 553 0.3 0.23 Amhara 19,867,817 54,295 42.1 56,083 42.2 64,949 42.1 67,124 42.3 42.18 Gamo 1,107,163 935 0.7 1,159 0.9 880 0.6 975 0.6 0.7 Gurage 1,867,350 3,652 2.8 3,985 3.0 4,823 3.1 5,060 3.2 3.03
Hadiya 1,284,366 883 0.7 956 0.7 1,058 0.7 1,079 0.7 0.7 Oromo 25,488,344 22,446 17.4 23,974 18.1 30,992 20.1 32,264 20.3 18.98 Sidama 2,966,377 351 0.3 389 0.3 425 0.3 469 0.3 0.3 Somali 4,581,793 69 0.1 114 0.1 430 0.3 433 0.3 0.2 Tigrayan 4,483,776 8,857 6.9 8,867 6.7 10,621 6.9 11,077 7.0 6.88
Welayta 1,707,074 2,507 1.9 2,614 2.0 3,058 2.0 3,135 2.0 1.98 Total 64,630,432 94185 73 98399 74.2 117748 76.4 122169 77 75.18
Source: Compiled from FCSC (various years). All computations are my own. See Appendix 2 for details.
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5.1.2.2. Regional civil services: Ethnic composition and representation As has been repeatedly pointed out in the preceding paragraphs, a restructuring of the country‟s internal administration and the formation of regional administrations along ethno- linguistic lines has also resulted in a significant increase in the civil service population at regional level. In line with the principles of ethnic regionalisation, nine ethnic-based regional governments and two autonomous and multiethnic city administrations have been designated as self-governing entities of the federation, and thus have established autonomous civil service systems to manage the regional administrations, provide public goods and services, and carry out overall activities in the regions. Consequently, it can be observed from the available data that the population of regional civil services has shown a more than six-fold increase over the past two decades (FCSC, 1996, 2018). In fact, taken from the angle of the most marginalized regional states, mainly the Afar, the Somali, the SNNPRS, and even of the Oromiya (both these last two regional states have been the subject of marches of one type or another by different regimes), Gambella and Benishangul-Gumuz, the most neglected and peripheral areas, the institutionalization of ethnic federalism has created a new political space and institutional design to promote ethnic empowerment in terms of redistribution of administrative powers and public employments in the new regional bureaucracies. Within this context, as one author precisely pointed out, the Ethiopian state has „delivered at the periphery‟ (Dereje, 2006:219). Despite such positive contributions of the new federal dispensation, however, these unprecedented expansions of the new state apparatus and composition of the labor forces at sub-national level could neither secure an even distribution of civil service population nor realize a fair ethnic representation in the public service sector of ethnically defined regional states. Thus, as far as the practices of civil service system at regional level is concerned, there are three general trends that one may distinguish when looking at the available statistical data of regional states‟ civil service population from the Tables indicated below.
To begin with, the three regional states of Amhara, Oromiya, and Tigray with having clear dominant nationality groups in their respective regions not only have dictated the political process but have also overwhelmingly outweighed their respective civil service populations and anyone other than them has a limited role to play in keeping the regional bureaucracies‟
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arrangement alive. Other ethnic groups in each of these regional states are, therefore, under- represented in the public service sector. For example, when we are taking a closer look at Table 5.3 based on four years of data (1995/96, 2000/01, 2001/02 and 2002/03), the total average share of Tigrayan, Amhara, and Oromo nationalities (nationality groups) in their respective regional civil services was 97.05 percent, 82.93 percent, and 70.20 percent respectively while the average share of other ethnic groups taken as a whole in Tigray, Amhara, and Oromiya regional states was 2.96 percent, 17.07 percent, and 29.8 percent respectively, leaving their shares in the respective regional civil services negligible. Interestingly, for the last four consecutive years from 2014/15 to 2017/18, the distribution of civil service populations in the three regions (Amhara, Oromiya, and Tigray) also yields pretty much similar result as compared with the available data covering a four-year period (1995/96, 2000/01, 2001/02, and 2002/03). As shown in Table 5.4, on average, the Tigrayans‟ share is 98.52 percent whilst Amharas and Oromos nationalities get 88.54 percent and 93.04 percent respectively within their respective regional civil services, showing a significant increase in percentage (see Appendices 3-6 and 7-10 for details). Sadly, the average shares of other ethnic groups in the civil service of the same regional states have further declined despite their shares slightly increase in number over the period under discussion. It is for this reason that I earlier noted the federal civil service is relatively more diverse than the regional ones.
The above discussion demonstrated that the actual practices of civil service under these regional states retain the existing disproportional representation of various nationalities in the sector. Such disparity that existed during the formative years of the regions in the post-1991 Ethiopian federalism has not shown any substantial improvement, but in fact the same trend has sustained over the years (see Tables 5.3 and 5.4).
While there may be several reasons that contribute to perpetuating the same trend over the last two decades, some of the informants in the regional civil services told the author that politicisation of the bureaucracy is limiting the opportunity of other ethnic groups (other than the „owners‟ of the „mother state‟) to secure a job as civil servants in the three regional states
Ethnic Balancing Policies in Opportunity and Representation 169 despite speaking the local languages.26 One manifestation of this politicisation has been the excessive use of political and/or ethnic criteria for recruitment, appointment, and promotion of civil servants, which has so far generated adverse effects on other ethnic groups (outsiders) working in the regions. Indeed, the existing professionals from other ethnic groups working in the regions have little feeling of belonging and lacked responsiveness to the needs and concerns of constituents. For instance, some informants, especially middle- level and lower-level civil service employees in Oromiya regional state, severely criticise high-level political leaders of ethnic patronage in recruitments, appointments, and promotions. In fact, it is apparent that other citizens of different ethnic background or those who do not like to associate themselves with any ethnic group have virtually no place, which certainly contradicts the revised constitution27 of the region that stipulate the right to work in any public or government office so long as a non-Oromo resident can speak the working/official language of the regional state.28 Informants who are middle-level and lower- level civil service employees in Amhara and Tigray regional states also point the finger at senior political leaders of favoritism, based not only on ethnicity but also on particularistic territorial divisions within the regional states.29 This politicisation of the bureaucracy has also been already confirmed by the late Premier Meles Zenawi. In his speech on the 4th EPRDF Congress he notes: „Deployment of human resources was based on networking. People were demoted or promoted depending on the wishes of the power that be‟ (EPRDF, 2001b:15). He also points out that „Our political leaders were involved in areas of management that clearly demanded professional know how [sic]. By doing so we failed to recognize the necessary professions and at the same time prevented the professional from discharging their responsibilities‟ (ibid.:21). Moreover, a government report on the Ethiopian civil service reform program confirms the above state of affairs (Office of the Prime Minister, 1998). Thus, the administrative environment, which is plagued by political and ethnic patronage, is
26Interviews with middle-level public servants in civil service bureau in Amhara, Oromiya, and Tigray (Addis Ababa, August 2020). 27The 2001 Revised Constitution of Regional State of Oromia Article 33 reads: „Any Ethiopian resident in the region and who speaks the working language of the region has the right to be elected or employed to any public office in the region.‟ 28Interviews with middle-level and lower-level civil service employees in bureau of civil service in Oromiya region (Addis Ababa, August 2020). 29Interviews with middle-level and lower-level civil service employees of regional civil service bureaus in Amhara and Tigray (Addis Ababa, August 2020).
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not taking seriously those principles of the proclamation set forth above and the FDRE Constitution as far as the less represented nationalities in the regional civil services are concerned.
There is another reason, too, that makes the existing disproportional representation of nationality groups in the above regional civil services to sustain over the years. Since these regional states have adopted their local languages as working language ones at regional state levels, it has so far been uneasy for other professionals with a different ethnic background to work in these regions particularly in Tigray and Oromiya.30 As already noted earlier, Tigray, Amhara, and Oromiya are among the regional states which have a single dominant ethnic group in numerical terms and the regions are named following their own ethnonyms (for more on this point see chapter three). This numerical strength definitely has also noticeable implications on the ethnic composition of regional civil services when we are taking into account the regional civil service populations in terms of ethnicity. These could provide possible reasons for their lop-sided numerical superiority in their respective regional civil services that were observed following the ethnic regionalisation of the country in the post- 1991 period.
We now turn to the consideration of the second trend which pretty much expounds ethnic composition of civil services of Gambella, SNNPRS, Benishangul-Gumuz, Harari, Afar, and Somali, otherwise known as „emerging states‟ (with the exceptions of Harari and SNNPRS), or „less developed states‟, which stand out for their poor levels of social and economic infrastructure, less-skilled labor, historical political marginalization, and other features of underdevelopment. A closer inspection on the basis of available data remarkably shows a relatively high average percentage of several ethnic groups‟ representation in the respective regional civil services (for details on this see Appendices 3-6 and 7-10). For instance, when we survey Table 5.3 during the four-year period (1995/96, 2000/01, 2001/02 and 2002/03), the total average share of non-indigenous (outsiders) people taken as a whole (other than the „owners‟ of the „mother state‟) in Benishangul-Gumuz and Harari regions accounted for
30Interviews with experts of regional civil service bureaus in Amhara, Oromiya, and Tigray (Addis Ababa, August 2020).
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81.83 percent and 75.76 percent respectively while their shares in Afar, Somali, and Gambella were 55.19 percent, 73.61 percent, and 57.95 percent respectively over the period considered. In another way, a four-year total average share of the indigenous people who are considered as the „owners‟ of the „mother state‟31 in their respective regional civil services was low with the exception of Harari nationality. As an illustration, the total average share for Afars and Somalis nationalities (all considered as the „owners‟ of the „mother state‟) was 44.81 percent and 26.39 percent respectively whilst those in Gambella and Benishangul- Gumuz accounted for 42.05 percent and 18.17 percent, respectively, and played a marginal role in each of the respective regional civil services for the same period (see Table 5.3 below).
In the case of Harari nationality, given its small population size, which accounted for only 8 percent of the total population of the Harari regional state, its 24.24 percent share in its regional civil service population cannot be underestimated, that is to say, this is nearly in proportion to the regional demographic figure.32 In general, this showed that ethnically diverse non-indigenous public servants contributed the lion‟s share of the regional civil service populations unlike the case in Amhara, Oromiya, and Tigray regions (see Appendices 3-6 and 7-10 for details). The reason, as explained by some of the author‟s informants, who are experts of regional civil service bureaus in those „emerging states‟, seems to relate to the lack of adequate and well-skilled administrative personnel at regional levels. Solomon (2006b) and Assefa (2006a) also corroborated this assertion. In fact, it must be noted that the federal system was introduced after the fall of a highly centralized regime that neglected the
31Following the introduction of the new federal dispensation in Ethiopia, by placing „sovereignty‟ over the ethnic groups introduced a new system of entitlement. Hence, those who live in their designated ethnic homelands became titular, whereas those who for different reasons find themselves out of their designated ethnic homelands became non-titular. The narrowing of regional and local citizenship to the level of primordial ethnicity as has been pursued in the Ethiopian federalism reduces not only new economic migrants but also people who lived out of their formally proclaimed ethnic homelands for many generations into new minorities. Not surprisingly, this led to interethnic tensions and conflicts in several ways between the titular and non-titular groups as discussed in chapter three of this thesis. 32According to the 2007 census, of the roughly 183,415 inhabitants of Harari multiethnic regional state (mainly Harar City and environs), the Oromos (56.41 percent), Amharas (22.77 percent), Gurages (4.34 percent), Somalis (3.87 percent), Tigrayans (1.53 percent), Argobbas (1.26 percent), and only (8.65 percent) are Hararis (CSA, 2008:103-05). While the Harari nationality, which is numerical minority in the region, dominates the local political process, the regional civil service is highly dominated by the Oromo and Amhara nationalities (For a more detailed account of this statistics about the ethnic composition of Harari regional state civil service see Appendices from A to H).
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bulk of the ethno-linguistic groups. Thus, from inception most of the regional states lacked skilled manpower and resources to run the newly established local institutions. There were only a few hundred experts in Afar, Somali, Gambella, and Benishangul-Gumuz in 1995/96 and the situation remained the same until the Ethiopian Civil Service College (now Ethiopian Civil Service University) took the duty of training civil servants for these regions with a view to breaking the historic marginalization from political power and economic resources (Solomon, 2006b; Assefa, 2006a). For instance, the Afar regional state was not able to exercise the right to use the Afar language until 2011 due to a lack of skilled manpower and resources (Assefa, 2012). In fact, it was during their formative years that the federal government urged these regional states to use professionals outside the regions to run bureaus and other offices that need qualified and trained public servants. Towards this end, the non-indigenous ethnic groups secured the majority of professional works in the bureaucracies of these regional states.33 Particularly, the employment of these non- indigenous people – „outsiders‟ – in the regional civil service of Benishangul-Gumuz was, however, formally stated as a temporary and short-lived job opportunity owing to ethnic biases and discourses.34 In this regard, strangely enough, one official of Benishangul-Gumuz region is quoted to have said „we want them [the non-indigenous people] just for a time being because we do not have our blood kin professionals, but we will throw them out sooner when we train our kin professionals.‟35 Indeed, these non-indigenous civil servants know that they are in the offices for a short-term period and also know that they would be replaced right away if ethnically fit indigenous bureaucrats are available in the job market (Berhanu, 2006).
From the above discussion, it is not difficult to understand that of the aim is not to attain a „fair representation of nations and nationalities‟ in the bureaucracy of regional states to fulfill the objectives and the principles of proclamation set forth above and the Constitution of FDRE, but, rather, to keep the regional governments‟ political and administrative machinery afloat. For instance, in 1998 approximately half of Benishangul-Gumuz‟s bureau heads were non-indigenous (outsiders) and only 17 out of 225 appointed professionals were indigenous
33Supra note 22. 34Interviews with former civil service employees in Benishangul-Gumuz regional state (Addis Ababa, August 2020). 35Ibid.
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(Young, 1999:338). By the same token, in 1994 the non-indigenous (outsiders) people supplied more than 50 percent of the skilled labor force in the civil service of Gambella regional state (Dereje, 2006). The same is true in Afar, SNNPRS, and Harari regions. Since these regional states (except Afar36 and Harari) officially use Amharic language, the federal working language, as a working language in the government structures, it has been relatively easier for many professionals to work in these regions. For instance, in Benishangul-Gumuz regional state, where Amharic is adopted as the working language, the dominance of ethnic migrants in the civil service sector cannot be ignored. The ethnic-migrants are still the largest contingent of employees in the civil sector (see Table 5.3 and 5.4 below).
It is interesting to compare the above results, after decades, with what happened at least in the last four consecutive years (from 2014/15 to 2017/18) in the same regional states as far as the ethnic composition of their respective civil services is concerned. The analysis of data covering a four-year period reveals that these regional states are showing much improvement in raising highly skilled public servants from members of their own ethnic groups. As demonstrated in Table 5.4, during the period concerned the total average share of civil service population in terms of ethnicity in these regions (Gambella, Benishangul-Gumuz, SNNPRS, Harari, Afar, and Somali) is in sharp contrast to what was actually found from the available data during the four-year period (1995/96, 2000/01, 2001/02 and 2002/03) (see Table 5.3 below). That is to say, when using the figures between 2014/15 and 2017/18, the study found that a four-year total average share of the „owners‟ of the „mother state‟, otherwise known as indigenous people, in Gambella and Benishangul-Gumuz was 72.13 percent and 33.37 percent respectively, whereas Afar, Somali, and Harari nationalities got 57.64 percent, 92.21 percent, and 22.79 percent respectively within their respective regional civil services. Strangely enough, however, despite their predominance, covering a total average around 68.87 percent of the skilled workforce in the regional bureaucracies in the four-year period (1995/96, 2000/01, 2001/02 and 2002/03), the average shares of these non- indigenous people taken as a whole in the civil service of the regions have sharply dropped to 44.37 percent over the period under consideration (from 2014/15 to 2017/18) due to a
36Since 2011 the Afar regional state has started using its local language – Afar language – as working language one at regional state level (Assefa, 2012).
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combination of reasons. Despite such an increased level of participation of indigenous ethnic
groups in the above regional civil services, however, there is, for instance, still an acute shortage of professionals in the Benishangul-Gumuz bureaucracy from the titular ethnic groups (see Table 5.4).
Certainly, there are concrete reasons as to why this high proportion share of the non- indigenous people in the bureaucracy of the regional states has abruptly fallen. The first reason related to an increase in the number of indigenous civil servants in the emerging regions following the establishment of the Ethiopian Civil Service College (now Ethiopian Civil Service University – ECSU) which aimed at filling up the new political and administrative vacancies made available at local and regional levels because of the new federal restructuring. With that in mind, informants from emerging regions told the author that the number of middle-level civil servants holding both BA and MA degrees in the regional civil services has increased.37 The opening of new public universities and various local academic institutions in those regions have also over the years contributed towards increasing the number of local professionals working in the emerging regions. There are other tertiary training institutions and programs that were formed jointly by donors and the federal government of Ethiopia to support regional states. A case in point is the Master‟s Program on Regional and Local Development Studies at Addis Ababa University, which was established by the Institute of Social Studies, The Hague. These training programs have further increased the number of educated personnel in the regions as well.38 For instance, the
37Supra note 16. For instance, since 1995 the then Ethiopian Civil Service College (now Ethiopian Civil Service University – ECSU) has graduated over 35,000 civil servants in different programs aimed at building the capacity of federal and regional civil services. It yields skilled professionals in the fields of public administration, law, economics, business management, accounting and municipal administration. It also supports emerging regions by providing in-service training, consultancy, research, distance learning, and other assistance. For details account of this see the information on „Ethiopian Civil Service University Graduates Students.‟
Ethnic Balancing Policies in Opportunity and Representation 175 number of BA holders from the various local academic institutions in Benishangul-Gumuz rose from 127 in 1995/96 to 361 in 2000/01 (FCSC, 2004).
We now turn to the second important factor contributing to the issue at stake. Ethnic federalism in Ethiopia, despite its positive impacts on the empowerment of communities at local/regional levels, by putting into effect ethnic entitlement to local territory and other resources in the designated or delimited ethnic constituencies or homelands has become an obstacle for intra-regional and interregional citizens‟ movement (Asnake, 2013; Berhanu, 2006). Put differently, in the Ethiopian context, „voting with feet‟ has been impossible due to the policy of ethnic federalism, which contains ethnic groups within their limited domains. Thus, in addition to political and ethnic patronage, the situation in those regional states is further complicated by ethnicity-based decentralisation, which inhibits the movement of employees from one region to another because of their ethnic labels. During the interviews conducted for this study, the author was told that regional political leaders tend to employ low-skilled civil servants from members of their own indigenous ethnic groups rather than better-qualified ones from other ethnic groups. The existing professionals from other ethnic groups working in the regions have little feeling of belonging and are prepared to leave their positions provided that they get the chance to do so.39 Shimeles (2005:238) describes the country‟s human resource system and the ethnicity-based decentralisation well in this sense:
…the Ethiopian scheme of decentralisation that took the form of ethnic federalism, which fully allows regions/local authorities to work in their own respective languages resulted in a political economy regime that is in most instances governed by ethno-linguistic considerations instead of by economic logic. The fact that a person‟s ethnic group instead of his/her competence governs his/her employment created tremendous obstacles to the free mobility of factors of production such as labour. There were reports of qualified professionals who were expelled form[sic] some federal regions on account of their ethnic group even when they have proved to have a proficiency in the working language of these regions resulting in under-utilisation of talent (ellipsis and emphasis added).
In this context, the risk is that in those regional states the dominant and/or indigenous ethnic groups consider themselves „owners‟ of the „mother state‟ whilst all people whose ethnicity is unclear, complicated, mixed, or unrecognized have almost no place, leading to ethnic
39Supra note 16.
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exclusion, or restricting of free movement of those who wish to work in a place of their choice which undoubtedly contradicts the FDRE constitutional provisions that stipulate the right to work and live in a place of one‟s choice.40 Indeed, one could argue that in Ethiopia at present, the regional states are not even able to take care of the bulk of human rights provisions enshrined in the FDRE Constitution let alone to translate a fair representation of several nationalities in the bureaucracy of their own into political realities.41 As a consequence, so far it appears that regional states have in concrete terms engaged in partisan or unjust practices or created a hostile environment for all those outside their „home‟ area, particularly toward local Amhara and other native-settlers (for detailed see chapter three) even if those provisions, as stated by Fasil Nahum (1997:64), imply that regional states cannot discriminate against non-indigenes.42 This is not without implications. It is not difficult to perceive that the repercussions of „regionalisation‟ of the civil service on interregional migration and mobility in this respect. Where ethnicity is the operating principle, all people whose ethnicity is different from local „ethnic‟ communities or unrecognized can ultimately become virtual „second-class citizens‟ as their rights and livelihood are at the mercy of these regional and local „ethnic‟ communities (Asnake, 2013).
To sum up, what is actually happening in those regions is that the past-inflicted stereotypes have now brought the expected reciprocal mistreatment and discrimination of the non- indigenous ethnic groups in their respective regional states. To many observers of the Ethiopian political scene, this trend appears to be tantamount to a practice of favoring victims of past discrimination and discriminating against those favored in the past or to use the terms of Currie and De Waal, „reverse discrimination‟ (2005). This clearly makes sense, at least so far, in Gambella, Benishangul-Gumuz, Harari, SNNPRS43 and partly in Oromiya where a
40See Article 41(1), (2) and (3) of the FDRE Constitution. Apparently Article 41(1) stipulates that „every Ethiopian has the right to engage freely in economic activity and to pursue a livelihood of his choice anywhere within the national territory‟ while Article 41(2) underlines that „every Ethiopian has the right to choose his or her means of livelihood, occupation and profession.‟ Article 41(3) also states that „every Ethiopian national has the right to equal access to publicly funded social services.‟ 41Article 50(1) and (2) of Proc. No. 1064/2017, supra note 18. 42According to this view, the fact that Ethiopians are free to choose a profession means that the regional states cannot discriminate in their hiring practices (see Fasil, 1997). 43In the absence of adequate data on the status of civil service of the region, there is no way to clearly discuss about it. However, some creditable data at Zonal levels could be cited below. In almost all ethnically delimited Zonal and wereda Administrations in the SNNPRS a considerable proportion of people who do not
Ethnic Balancing Policies in Opportunity and Representation 177 significant number of people from different ethnic backgrounds are treated like „guest workers‟ for not being their ethnic homelands („son of the soil‟). Dereje calls these „guest workers‟ as the „inconvenient minorities‟ (2006:215). The new federal dispensation in Ethiopia has thus simply opened more public employment opportunities for the „son of the soil‟ – majority of the civil services in these regional states or local governments are occupied by indigenous ethnic groups or „owners‟ of the „mother state‟ of the region where they are serving.
The third and final trend illustrates the ethnic composition of Addis Ababa and Dire Dawa City Administrations‟ civil services. To begin with, Addis Ababa city government44 civil service, as can be seen from the available data based on a four-year period (1995/96, 2000/01, 2001/02 and 2002/03), a high proportional representation in terms of ethnicity in the civil service is extremely skewed in favor of a few ethnic groups. This would mean that when we review Table 5.5, the total average share of a bureaucrat of Amharas (61.41 percent), Oromos (18.22 percent), Tigrayans (9.59 percent), and Gurages (3.55 percent) covered almost 92.77 percent of the city‟s total civil service population, while the average share of other nationalities, when all taken together, constituted only 7.23 percent of the total functionaries of the city civil service.
One could also simply observe a remarkable similarity between findings of the two periods under discussion when we are using Tables 5.5 as the baseline and comparing it with Table 5.6. As shown in Table 5.6 below, the total average of Amhara and Oromo population in the
belong to the dominant ethnic groups are living in the areas for many generations, but they are disenfranchised due to an exclusive control of a dominant ethnic group in the constituencies. These marginalized people are not only those identified as coming from „out of the regional state‟, or „settlers‟ but also it includes a sizeable population of the regional state who are coming from the adjacent territories due to a movement of people for generations. For instance, in Hadiya Zone 20 per cent of the Zonal populations are coming from the adjacent territories like from Silte, Sodo-Guraghe and Kembata, but since the Zone is designated as Hadiya ethnic group homeland, these people coming from the same regional state are counted as „strangers‟ or „outsiders‟ and thus disenfranchised. The same challenge has been happening in other Zones Such as Kembata-Timbaro Zone, Bench-Maji Zone and Shaka Zone in the region. The discrimination is not only limited to depriving electoral rights, but it includes also denying access to equal public employment and other similar rights (Interviews with senior civil servants, Hawassa, September 2019). 44Addis Ababa is the capital city of the federal government and has the right to self-government but it is responsible to the federal government (Article 49). It used to be one of the fourteen regional governments during the Transition Period (1991-1994) but not under the FDRE Constitution of 1995. It is a heterogeneous city as it is inhabited by economic migrants with different ethnic backgrounds.
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civil service of Addis Ababa city are respectively about 42.46 percent and 24.14 percent whilst Tigrayans and Gurages share 8.71 percent and Gurages 5.65 percent respectively. In contrast, the average share of other ethnic groups in the civil service has shown a marginal increase in percentage from 7.23 in (1995/96, 2000/01, 2001/02 and 2002/03) to 19.04 in (2014/15 to 2017/18) period while the share of the four ethnic groups in the civil service accounted for 80.96 percent in aggregate, showing a slight decrease of their share across time. Notwithstanding the above encouraging sign of boost for the former, Tables 5.5 and 5.6 show that there was no significant improvement in raising a proportional or fair representation of other ethnic groups in the city civil service population during the eight years covered. To put it another way, during the period, those four ethnic groups, namely Amhara, Oromo, Tigrayan, and Gurage who are commanding the federal bureaucracy workforce (discussed above), also maintain the lion‟s share of the city‟s civil service population.
While there may be several reasons for the low level of participation of several other ethnic groups disproportionately in the city‟s civil service population, at least two reasons are provided for its happening according to the informants. Primarily, it is interesting to mention that the under-represented nationalities in the civil service of Addis Ababa administration have the additional burden of having to speak Amharic language in order to be employed by the same civil service. While this linguistic factor is one of the reasons that contribute to the numeric weakness of these nationality groups in the city civil service population, the other reason as stipulated by informants seems to relate to the absence of a sufficient number of applicants from the same nationalities who meet the minimum requirements of the vacant posts when public employments are open for all qualified candidates.45
Finally, Dire Dawa city administration46 civil service, similarly to the federal and Addis Ababa city ones, has experienced pretty much the same results when one makes a comparison between the available data covering the two periods under consideration in terms of ethnicity distribution in its civil service population. On the basis of data covering for a
45Supra note 22. 46Dire Dawa is administered directly by the federal government. It has a multicultural feature like Addis Ababa city.
Ethnic Balancing Policies in Opportunity and Representation 179 period of four years (1995/96, 2000/01, 2001/02 and 2002/03) and taking Table 5.7 as a point of reference, of the total average civil service workforces, 64.56 percent were Amharas, 24.57 percent were Oromos, 3.64 percent were Tigrayans, and 3 percent were Gurages, in total constituted around 95.77 percent of the city civil service labor force, whilst the average share of other ethnic groups taken as a whole was 4.23 percent, leaving their shares in the city civil service labor force quite negligible in proportion.
When we are analyzing figures of the past four years from 2014/15 to 2017/18 period (see Table 5.8), the data, despite a slight decrease of their share over a period, have still shown the numerical superiority of those four nationalities (mentioned above) in the civil service population that we have already observed in Table 5.7. It means that the total average share of Amhara and Oromo nationality groups in the civil service was 44.40 percent and 37.24 percent respectively, while 4.61 percent for Gurages and 3.37 percent for Tigrayans, in total constituting 89.62 percent of the city total civil service population. By contrast, the average share of other ethnic groups in the civil service has shown a slight increase in percentage from 4.23 in (1995/96, 2000/01, 2001/02 and 2002/03) to 10.38 in (2014/15 to 2017/18) period. Despite the above positive sign of upsurge for the latter, both Tables 5.7 and 5.8 show a considerable upper hand for the former (four nationalities) and still a further loss for the latter. The explanations for such sustained disproportionate representation of various national groups in the above stated civil service are as follows. In an interesting similarity with what happened in the civil service populations of the federal and Addis Ababa city government, the same could be said as far as the civil service of Dire Dawa city administration is concerned during the period under review. In this regard, it has been said that the linguistic factor and absence of a good number of applicants from the same national groups who fulfill the minimum requirements of the positions are among the reasons that contribute to the existence of a sustained asymmetric representation of various ethno-linguistic groups in the civil service of Dire Dawa city.47
47Supra note 22.
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In short, the existing lop-sided representation of several ethnic groups in the city civil service that witnessed at the beginning of the Ethiopian decentralization reform has been sustained without showing any meaningful improvement so far.
Table 5.3: Ethnic composition of the Regional States’ civil service for selected years
Year 1995/96 (1988 E.C.) 2000/01 (1993 E.C.) 2001/02 (1994 E.C.) 2002/03 (1995 E.C.) Total No. of civil No. of civil No. of civil No. of civil Average Regions Ethnicity servant % servant % servant % servant % % Tigrayans 16,956 97.78 22,739 96.70 23,658 96.08 25,151 97.62 97.05 Tigray Others 382 2.22 776 3.3 965 3.92 613 2.38 2.96 Afars - - 2,550 38.47 3,318 ↑ 47.98 3,318 ↑47.98 44.81 Afar Others - - 4,079 61.53 3,598 52.02 3,598 52.02 55.19 Amharas 45,380 76.47 52,599 76.03 64,395 89.43 73,149 89.80 82.93 Amhara Others 13,965 23.53 16,581 23.97 7,611 10.57 8,309 10.2 17.07 Oromos 54,911 64.10 78,305 72.23 78,305 72.23 82,137 72.23 70.20 Oromiya Others 30,749 35.9 30,105 27.77 30,105 27.77 31,577 27.77 29.80 Somalis 3,165 59.05 604 15.50 604 15.50 604 15.50 26.39 Somali Others 2,195 40.1 3,293 84.5 3,293 84.5 3,293 84.5 73.61 Owner 342 11.12 1,360 ↑ 18.13 1,877 ↑ 22.07 1,935 21.35 18.17 *B-Gumuz Others 2,733 88.88 6,141 81.87 6,629 77.93 7,128 78.65 81.83 SNNPR SNNPR ------Others ------Owner 1,005 39.82 2,035 ↑ 41.37 2,252 ↑ 42.91 2,218 ↑44.10 42.05 *Gambella Others 2,884 2,996 2,811 57.95 Hararis 589 21.83 838 ↑ 24.60 988 ↑ 24.89 1,008 ↑25.64 24.24 Harari Others 2,109 2,568 2,981 2,923 75.76 *Addis Dominate G. 18,736 93.83 25,785 93.97 26,006 91.64 26,006 91.64 9 .77 Ababa Others 1,233 6.17 1,654 6.03 2,372 8.36 2,372 8.36 7. 3 Dominate G. 1,823 89.89 2,587 94.69 2,911 97.68 3,269 97.58 94.96 *Dire Dawa Others 205 10.11 145 5.31 69 2.32 81 2.42 5.04 Total 196,478 257,628 264,933 281,500
Source: Compiled from FCSC (various years). All computations are my own. See also Appendices 3-6 for details.
*Gambella:„owner of the mother state‟ are five ethnic groups, namely Opo, Nuer, Komo, Anuwak, and Mezenger according to the regional Constitution while the „Others‟ imply all ethnic groups other than the „owner of the mother state‟.
*Benishangul-Gumuz:„owner of the mother state‟ are five ethnic groups, namely Berta, Mao, Komo, Shinasha, and Gumuz nationalities according to the regional Constitution while the „Others‟ imply all ethnic groups other than the „owner of the mother state‟.
*For both Addis Ababa and Dire Dawa: for the purpose of the study „Dominate Group‟ denotes the four nationalities in terms of their population size in the civil service, namely Amhara, Oromo, Tigrayan and Gurage while the „Others‟ symbolize all nationalities other than these four major ethnic groups.
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Table 5.4: Ethnic composition of the regional states’ civil service for selected years
Year 2014/15 (2007 E.C.) 2015/16 (2008 E.C.) 2016/17 (2009 E.C.) 2017/18 (2010 E.C.) Total No. of civil No. of civil No. of civil No. of civil Average Regions Ethnicity servant % servant % servant % servant % % Tigrayans 80,581 98.42 85,257 98.56 91,354 98.39 98,888 98.72 98.52 Tigray Others 1,290 1.58 1,249 1,499 1,285 1.48 Afars 13,416 56.78 10,817 33.12 24,755 ↑ 70.31 25,079 ↑ 70.33 57.64 Afar Others 10,211 21,847 10,455 10,579 42.36 Amharas 269,084 88 295,417 89.42 306,932 87.43 327,975 89.29 88.54 Amhara Others 36,707 34,940 44,130 39,326 11.46 Oromos 385,311 92.01 418,441 92.55 456,411 93.63 484,577 93.98 93.04 Oromiya Others 33,472 33,677 31,046 31,047 6.96 Somalis 50,006 86.05 63,397 ↑93.93 65,578 ↑94.72 67,458 ↑ 94.15 92.21 Somali Others 8,110 4,095 3,658 4,189 7.79 Owner 7,230 29.91 7,844 ↑30.19 8,382 ↑30.65 12,938 ↑42.73 33.37 *B-Gumuz Others 16,944 18,138 18,964 17,340 66.63 ------SNNPR48 Others ------Owner 13,578 71.94 13,578 71.94 15,322 ↑71.82 16,292 ↑72.83 72.13 *Gambella Others 5,297 5,297 6,011 6,077 27.87 Hararis 1,387 21.63 1,554 23.11 1,441 ↑22.66 1,523 ↑23.75 22.79 Harari Others 5,025 78.37 5,169 76.89 4,917 77.34 4,889 76.25 77.21 *Addis Dominate G. 55,778 64.90 78,153 85.53 90,568 87.41 99,167 85.98 81.89 Ababa Others 30,164 35.1 13,227 14.47 13,044 12.59 16,167 10.27 18.11 Dominate G. 6,977 91.74 7,146 89.72 7,924 96.41 8,177 96.25 93.53 *Dire Dawa Others 628 8.26 819 10.28 295 3.59 331 3.75 6.47 Total 1,031,196 1,120,062 1,202,686 1,273,304
Source: Compiled from FCSC (various years). All computations are my own. See also Appendices 7-10 for details.
*Gambella:„owner of the mother state‟ are five ethnic groups, namely Opo, Nuer, Komo, Anuwak, and Mezenger according to the regional Constitution while the „Others‟ imply all ethnic groups other than the „owner of the mother state‟.
*Benishangul-Gumuz:„owner of the mother state‟ are five ethnic groups, namely Berta, Mao, Komo, Shinasha, and Gumuz nationalities according to the regional Constitution while the „Others‟ imply all ethnic groups other than the „owner of the mother state‟.
*For both Addis Ababa and Dire Dawa: for the purpose of the study „Dominate Group‟ denotes the four nationalities in terms of their population size in the civil service, namely Amhara, Oromo, Tigrayan and Gurage while the „Others‟ symbolize all nationalities other than these four major ethnic groups.
48It is the homeland of more than forty-five ethnic groups with a combined population of more than 13 million.
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Table 5.5: Ethnic composition of Addis Ababa city civil service for selected years
Year 1995/96 (1988 E.C.) 2000/01 (1993 E.C.) 2001/02 (1994 E.C.) 2002/03 (1995 E.C.) Total No. of civil No. of civil No. of civil No. of civil Average Ethnicity servant % servant % servant % servant % % Amhara 12,149 60.84 16,748 61.04 17,558 61.87 17,558 61.87 61.41 Gurage 946 4.74 1,367 4.98 632 2.23 632 2.23 3.55 Oromo 3,434 17.20 5,048 18.40 5,290 18.64 5,290 18.64 18.22 Tigrayan 2,207 11.05 2,622 9.49 2,526 8.90 2,526 8.90 9.59 Total 18,736 93.83 25,785 93.91 26,006 91.64 26,006 91.64 92.77
Source: Compiled from FCSC (various years). All computations are my own. See also Appendices 3-6 for details.
Table 5.6: Ethnic composition of Addis Ababa city civil service for selected years
Year 2014/15 (2007 E.C.) 2015/16 (2008 E.C.) 2016/17 (2009 E.C.) 2017/18 (2010 E.C.) Total No. of civil No. of civil No. of civil No. of civil Average Ethnicity servant % servant % servant % servant % % Amhara 23,616 27.48 42,293 46.28 50,170 48.42 54,983 47.67 42.46 Gurage 5,347 6.22 3,084 3.37 6,927 6.69 7,270 6.30 5.65 Oromo 18,592 21.63 23,736 25.98 25,522 24.63 28,039 24.31 24.14 Tigrayan 8,223 9.57 9,040 9.90 7,949 7.67 8,875 7.70 8.71 Total 55,778 64.9 78,153 85.53 90,568 87.41 99,167 85.98 80.96
Source: Compiled from FCSC (various years). All computations are my own. See also Appendices 7-10 for details.
Table 5.7: Ethnic composition of Dire Dawa city civil service for selected years
Year 1995/96 (1988 E.C.) 2000/01 (1993 E.C.) 2001/02 (1994 E.C.) 2002/03 (1995 E.C.) Total No. of civil No. of civil No. of civil No. of civil Average Ethnicity servant % servant % servant % servant % % Amhara 1,376 67.85 1,717 62.85 1,980 66.44 2,047 61.10 64.56 Gurage 65 3.21 90 3.29 83 2.79 91 2.72 3 Oromo 340 16.77 670 24.52 770 25.84 1,043 31.13 24.57 Tigrayan 107 5.28 110 4.03 78 2.62 88 2.63 3.64 Total 1,888 93.11 2,587 94.69 2,911 97.69 3,269 97.58 95.77
Source: Compiled from FCSC (various years). All computations are my own. See Appendices 3-6 for details.
Table 5.8: Ethnic composition of Dire Dawa city civil service for selected years
Year 2014/15 (2007 E.C.) 2015/16 (2008 E.C.) 2016/17 (2009 E.C.) 2017/18 (2010 E.C.) Total No. of civil No. of civil No. of civil No. of civil Average Ethnicity servant % servant % servant % servant % % Amhara 3,493 45.93 3,540 44.44 3,600 43.80 3,694 43.42 44.40 Gurage 342 4.50 360 4.52 394 4.79 394 4.63 4.61 Oromo 2,882 37.90 2,971 37.30 3,020 36.74 3,149 37.01 37.24 Tigrayan 260 3.42 275 3.45 273 3.32 279 3.28 3.37 Total 6,977 91.75 7,146 89.71 7,287 88.65 7,516 88.34 89.62
Source: Compiled from FCSC (various years). All computations are my own. See also Appendices 7-10 for details.
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5.1.3. Representation in the federal cabinet: TPLF dominance or power sharing? Federalism in Ethiopia led to granting „mother states‟ (self-rule) to some of the major nationalities to exercise self-administration in their geographic regions, to enjoy their culture, and to use their language. But the recognition and promotion of diversity as can be observed from the federal experiences of other countries49 do not stop there. In this regard, it is crucial the emphasis on „self-rule‟ to be complemented by some form of proportional representation, among other things, in the executive domain for guaranteeing shared functions (share-rule) to the different nationalities at the federal level. After all, federalism is not only about „self-rule‟ but also about „shared-rule‟. Thus, as can be expected, there have been some efforts at ethnic balancing in the post-1991 Ethiopia in the area of national decision-making institutions as a representation of the diverse ethno-linguistic groups in the national institutions is a constitutional requirement following the federal restructuring of the country. To that end, Article 39(3) of the FDRE Constitution stipulates „equitable representation‟ of the various nationalities in state and federal governments.50 Two key points in this context can be distinguished from this constitutional requirement. First, equitable representation is not only limited to the federal government but it also obliges regional governments to ensure equitable representation in their institutions. Second, equitable representation of various nationalities is not only limited to the executive branches of the federal and state governments. The FDRE Constitution rather makes reference to equitable representation with respect to state and federal governments in general, thus, covering representation beyond the executive to both
49For instance, as can be observed from the Swiss federal experience, its federal system does not emphasize only on „self-rule‟ principle. This is coupled by proportional representation of population in parliament, government, courts and other organs. Swiss political culture emphasizes proportionality in political representation, and this tendency applies to both political parties and languages. The results may be seen in the federal public service, the Supreme Court, and most prominently in the executive government itself. The executive (Federal Council) is a collegial body elected by the Swiss federal legislature for a fixed term and composed of seven councilors among whom the presidency rotates annually (Watts, 2008). Since 1959 the seven member federal council has been based on an unchanging four party coalition proportionate to the four leading parties in parliament. An unwritten rule states that two of the members of the Federal Council should be of French and one of Italian-speaking origin (Linder, 1994). The population representation in parliament, government, courts and almost all political authorities is another consequence of the conviction that legitimacy cannot be reached by simple majority. It needs consensus of important parts of society (Fleiner and Basta, 1996). 50Article 39(3) of the FDRE Constitution reads: „Every Nation, Nationality and People in Ethiopia has the right to a full measure of self-government which includes the right to establish institutions of government in the territory that it inhabits and to equitable representation in state and Federal governments.‟
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the legislative and judicial arms of both layers of government. The same Constitution also mandates the federal government to guarantee the representation of all nationality groups in the national armed forces (as will be discussed in the next section).51 It follows that, in the words of Fasil Nahum, the constitutional requirement of equitable representation „would permeate the whole government in all its branches‟ (1997:156). However, the analysis of this section is limited to discussing equitable ethnic representation in the key portfolios of the Ethiopian Federal Cabinet during the 24-year period (1995-2018), because of the enormous complexity of examining the multifarious tendencies of the same at sub-national level.
As noted above, despite some efforts at ethnic balancing, critics maintain that multiethnic representation is cosmetic in nature only. As one author eloquently describes that what is represented is all EPRDF except for a few independents who are allowed to coexist as they pose no threats (Merera, 2003). This implies that the government has been firmly in the hands of the EPRDF, a coalition of four ethnic-based organisations, of which the TPLF (Tigrayan People‟s Liberation Front) formed the ideological core until very recently.52 This would entail that the EPRDF dominated Ethiopia‟s political landscape through member and affiliate parties. As a matter of practice, the member and affiliate parties, despite TPLF‟s formally attesting their political autonomy and independence, did not have equal leadership
51Article 87(1) of the FDRE Constitution reads: „The composition of the national armed forces shall reflect the equitable representation of the Nations, Nationalities and Peoples of Ethiopia.‟ 52After full control of its home province, Tigray, coupled with the successive military victories, the TPLF made the prospect of military triumph over the Derg more certain. This necessitated the TPLF to mobilize other nationalities in its attempt to control political power at the center. To play a national role, the TPLF that has had a narrow constituency first created an alliance with the EPDM (Ethiopian People‟s Democratic Movement – group composed of mainly EPRP factions, was later changed to the Amhara National Democratic Movement – ANDM in 1994), a small armed group that was waging war against the military government in parts of the Amhara region. As the battle against the military junta proceeded to what is today Oromyia, the TPLF established the Oromo People‟s Democratic Organization (OPDO) in 1989 to represent the Oromo people, largely formed from amongst Oromo prisoners of war held by the TPLF in Tigray or who used to belong to the EPDM. It was, by and large, these three groups that came together to form the EPRDF in 1989. And, the last to join EPRDF was the coalition member representing the South, Southern Ethiopian People‟s Democratic Front (SEPDF) in 1994. The SEPDF (now SEPDM) comprised members from the 23 ethnic political groups in the southern part of the country. The original members of these groups were prisoners of war captured by the TPLF during the armed struggle with the dictatorial socialist junta (see Young, 1997). Since then, EPRDF has become a dominant front and an umbrella political organisation for the above indicated four regional ethnic political parties that claim to represent the four large regions of the country, namely ANDM (now ADP – Amhara region), OPDO (now ODP - Oromiya region), TPLF (Tigray region) and SEPDM (SNNPRS). In a similar way, under the complete guidance of TPLF, EPRDF facilitated the formation of affiliate political organisations in Afar, Somali, Harari, Benishangul-Gumuz and Gambella. In other words, they were organised, re-organised and guided by the TPLF/EPRDF (see also Clapham, 1995).
Ethnic Balancing Policies in Opportunity and Representation 185 status within the EPRDF as TPLF controlled the leadership structure in both the state and ruling party structure (EPRDF, 2001a). Concisely, the three other members (ANDM, OPDO, and SEPDM) and affiliate parties have been largely subservient to the TPLF, which imposed its vision, dogma, and policies on the front, and thus the country. Indeed, the following discussions could further substantiate the above claims or arguments when we analyze the nature and ethnic composition of the federal cabinet using the 1995, 2000, 2005, and 2015 general election results as a baseline.
To begin with, following its victory in the 1995 first general election53, the TPLF-led EPRDF formed a 17-member federal cabinet which composed of four Amharas, five Oromos, two Tigrayans, and three from SEPDM.54 Another feature of the composition of the cabinet in this period was the paucity of representation of Somali, Afar, and Harari nationality groups, each had one ministerial post (Hunter, 1996). The federal cabinet, which was formed after the 2000 second general election55, was more or less the same in terms of ethnic diversity with the 1995 federal cabinet of ministers (Council of Ministers) that preceded it. Led by a Prime Minister from Tigrayan, a 17-member federal cabinet was composed of four Amharas, five Oromos, two Tigrayans, and one each from Somali, Afar, and Harari ethnic groups while five collectively from SEPDM (Turner, 2002). This, however, did not mean that other ethnic groups were entirely excluded from such government, only that they played an essentially supportive role to the main players. The largely ceremonial presidency was given to an Oromo ethnic group.
53According to National Election Board, of the 547 seats at the federal level, EPRDF member parties took 493 (90.1 percent), affiliate parties took 40 (7.3 percent) and independent candidates won 14 (2.6 percent). 54The SEPDF, ruling party in the SNNPRS and also a member of the EPRDF, was originally a coalition of some twenty ethnic fronts operating in the South. It has now been transformed into one party (movement), the Southern Ethiopia People‟s Democratic Movement (SEPDM) in 2002 (see Asnake, 2013). 55National Election Commission (2001) records that in the House of Peoples‟ Representatives, the EPRDF and its affiliate parties won 521 seats (95.2 percent), the opposition 13 seats (2.4 percent) and independent candidates 13 seats (2.4 percent). At the regional level, EPRDF member parties took all the regional council seats in Tigray and Amhara. In Benishangul-Gumuz, of the 80 regional council seats, the Benishangul - Gumuz Democratic Unity Front, an EPRDF affiliate, won 71 seats and independent candidates took nine seats. In the other regions, too, the EPRDF and its allies took an overwhelming majority of the seats (see Addis Alem, 2003:186)
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Likewise, based on the 200556 and 201057 general elections, during which the incumbent party secured a victory, the number of ministerial representation (appointment) was marginally rising for Somali from one to two, while Oromo dropped from six to five in the same period. Amhara and SEPDM had each five ministerial portfolios and the share of Tigrayan and Afar was three and one respectively, leaving their share unchanged. And a new political practice was appeared with the appointment of one non-party member based not on factors such as ethnicity but on professional expertise in the federal cabinet. It was also for the first time since 1995 that a non-Tigrayan premier was designated following the sudden death of then Ethiopian PM Meles Zenawi in August 2012 who had been receiving medical treatment abroad. As a result, his deputy, Hailemariam Desalegn from SEPDM, one of the four ethnic organisations which make up the ruling coalition of EPRDF, became premier until elections due in 2015. While many believed that Hailemariam‟s dramatic succession could lead to a fresh start in the national politics, however, the reaction from the TPLF leadership was extremely hostile. Juneydi Saaddo, who served at different federal ministerial portfolios in the past and was also a former president of Oromiya regional state, encapsulated the situation quite well as follows:
[…] . They [TPLF] perceived the idea of a new transition as a conspiracy to push them aside. They appointed a non-Tigrean – Hailemariam Desalegn – to be Meles‟ replacement, but this gesture was totally disingenuous as they simultaneously took swift measures to cripple the new PM‟s power. […] They reduced the prime minister‟s control over ministries by increasing the number of deputy prime ministers from one to three, with each ministry having to report to these deputies rather than the PM himself. […] And while most of the hardline TPLF members who were pushed out in 2001 began to work covertly with the system again, those in government opposed to the increasing one-party monopoly were either demoted or,
56The NEBE announced final election results on September 5, 2005, with the ruling EPRDF winning 327 seats (60 percent of the total vote), government affiliated parties (Somali People‟s Democratic Party - 23, Afar National Democratic Party - 8, Gambela People‟s Democratic Movement - 3, Benishangul-Gumuz People‟s Democratic Unity Front - 8, and Harari National League - 1) claiming an additional 45 seats (8 percent of the total vote) and opposition parties winning 174 seats (32 percent of the total vote). The CUD alone won 20percent of the vote. Opposition parties rejected the results, citing the various irregularities and the flawed complaints review process (The Carter Center, 2009). 57On 21st of June 2010, the NEBE released the final election results, in which the EPRDF won 499 of the 547 available parliamentary seats, opposition (Ethiopian Federal Democratic Unity Forum - Medrek) and independent candidates won 2 seats, and EPRDF-allied parties won 45 seats. The opposition filed appeals with the election board and the Ethiopian Supreme Court, but both appeals were rejected. See the news on
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as in my case, purged (ellipsis and emphasis added).58
Following the ruling EPRDF and its affiliate parties59 had achieved a landslide victory in the questionable general election of 201560, winning every single parliamentary seat, the party‟s members voted unanimously for PM Hailemariam to serve a second term in the office. The premier‟s first move was to re-shuffle his cabinet, though 9 of 29 ministers retained their posts. Along with the minor cabinet reshuffle, the composition and size of the cabinet changed dramatically, largely because the number of ministries has been increased from 22 in 2010 to 29 in 2015. Yet again, the share of Tigrayan and Afar were three and one respectively, their share remained unchanged over the period. In contrast, the representation of larger ethnic groups in the cabinet increased. This was particularly the case with Amhara (eight). Apart from Amhara predominance, there were also a large number of Oromo ministers (seven) during the period under review. By the same token, the SEPDM continued to have a large number of ministers (seven), while the poor representation of the Somali (one) sustained. However, there was no minister from Harari nationality. Nor did a single nationality group from Gambella and Benishangul-Gumuz regions has a chance to be appointed. Surprisingly enough, the latter two regions which are ruled by EPRDF‟s affiliate parties have not so far secured a single post within the echelons of the federal cabinet. Finally, other than ethnicity as a criterion for the distribution of cabinet portfolios, the two non-party members‟ ministers were appointed for their professional expertise. However, as a matter of practice, the compositions of federal cabinet as well as other high-level positions
58See the article „Behind the Ethiopia protests: A view from inside the government.‟
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take into account ethnic as well as religious diversity (Assefa, 2006a). In Ethiopia, preferential policies in national decision-making institutions like the federal cabinet take the form of informal agreements or efforts at providing ethnic representation. This is a trend to reflect ethno-regional interests in the federal cabinet formation, but it is far from formal (ibid.).
In summary, therefore, from Table 5.9 we can see that in quantitative terms, there have been periods of Oromo (twenty-nine) domination of the federal cabinet, the Somali (six) and SEPDM (twenty-four) have been, by and large, underrepresented. The Harari (two) and Afar (five) have found some representation in the last two decades. In fact, there have been times that Tigrayan (twenty-three) have been overrepresented. The Amhara (twenty-four) have been relatively represented for most of the period under study. A more glaring discrepancy that can be inferred from the same Table is that of the SEPDM – a coalition of 23 ethnic political groups in the southern – has only a marginal difference (greater than only by one ministerial portfolio) with the Tigrayan. It is for this reason that some argue that while portfolios, in general, were widely shared across ethnic boundaries and between major groups and smaller ones, in the aggregate, the Tigrayans held a preponderant share of them. And a small number of portfolios did develop an ethnic affiliation. This clearly corroborates that the member and affiliate parties did not have equal status within the EPRDF and the higher echelons of the federal government. The TPLF has been an overwhelmingly resilient political force in both structures and controls state power and resources for more than two decades and only recently its political hegemony has ended in 2018, but power struggle with the new ruling coalition61 emerging from the EPRDF‟s ashes, which is re-branded itself as
61In November 2019, the unification of the EPRDF was heralded, which is rebranded as the Ethiopian Prosperity Party (EPP). It brings together three of the four ethnic-based parties that make up the ruling EPRDF coalition and five other smaller parties that were previously condemned to the periphery of the country‟s political scene. These five Parties that had never been allowed to join the EPRDF - the ruling parties in the Afar, Benishangul-Gumuz, Harari, Somalia and Gambella regions - were relegated to the status of partner parties; these regions have been excluded from the decision-making process at the national level for almost three decades. The TPLF is the only founding members of Ethiopia‟s ruling coalition that is opposed to the new party. Other ethno-nationalist politicians also strongly opposed the new EPP. These dissenters want to maintain the old party structure and ideology and are unlikely to join the new Prosperity Party. Nevertheless, many Ethiopians appear to be pleased with the merger, seeing it as an opportunity to unite the country and resolve its many deep-rooted problems. See the news on „Ethiopia‟s prime minister wants to change the ruling coalition. Who‟s getting left out?‟
Ethnic Balancing Policies in Opportunity and Representation 189 the Ethiopian Prosperity Party (EPP) under the leadership of Abiy Ahmed, who is from Oromo ethnic, is just beginning.62
Qualitatively, however, the distribution of actual governmental political powers might be varied from the quantitative distribution of federal cabinet portfolios. Some have pointed out that the proportion of Tigrayans in the upper echelons of ministerial portfolios has been qualitatively asymmetrical as compared with the posts the other ethnic groups occupy (Merera, 2003; Berhanu, 2007). Even though one accepts that the federal cabinet is taking into account ethnic diversity, some others equally argue that individuals belonging to the Tigrayan ethnic group till recently controlled significant ministerial and other key posts in the federal cabinet. This has strengthened the perception that the federal government was dominated by TPLF. On the basis of the research findings, of course, the Tigrayans consistently retained the „control portfolios‟ of the chief minister, ministry of foreign affairs, and security and immigration authority (see Table 5.10 below). The findings provide some confirmation of the above views in this regard. This conclusively suggests that the Tigrayans have been at the helm of affairs for a disproportionately long period (for about 25 years at least).
Another qualitative adjustment to our quantitative analysis is to consider the power of patronage and the political sensitivity attached to different cabinet portfolios. Based on these
62Apparently, after the new prime minster taking office in April 2018, there has been an effort at reducing the number of Tigrayans in the higher echelons of government, an attempt to develop greater transparency, and a more willing recognition of mistakes and limitations. New institutions are also beginning to test their new roles and boundaries, and internal debate is on the rise. All of these are slow forms of progress though, and the government (the Prime Minister‟s office in particular) has maintained its commitment to the reforms. In fact, his rise to power not only has positioned the Oromo at the center of Ethiopian politics but also has enabled the ODP under his leadership to enjoy immense power in the federal government. As the anecdote implies, despite very much a work in progress, some reports and political commentators actually fear that Abiy‟s new government and his party (ODP – formerly OPDO) have no commitment to genuine democratization but are only interested in replacing the old hegemony of the TPLF, with a new form of Oromo dominance. Ultimately, the truth of what is happening inside Ethiopia is very hard to get at impartially. Is Abiy‟s „Oromo- dominated‟ (as some argue) government seeking to redress a long overdue inequity and grievances of the past two decades? Or is it rather engaged in weeding out the disproportionate amount of Tigrayan from the ranks of the national professional elite in order to replace them with an equally disproportionate number of the new Oromo elite? Accusations fly both ways. Time will tell if Abiy‟s government can carry the full burden of satisfying the expectations of Oromos as a result of his rise while also remaining credible enough among other ethnic groups who fear an increasing Oromo dominance after decades of authoritarian rule of TPLF lost its federal power in 2018.
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two criteria, we can identify three broad sets of federal cabinet portfolios: the very important, the in - between, and the less important. I am interested in looking at the ethnic distribution of the four very important and four less important portfolios as shown in Tables 5.10 and 5.11, which suggest that there is an overrepresentation of the Tigrayan ethnic group (65 percent) in the very important portfolios and, conversely, its non-representation in the less important portfolios. On the other hand, the southern ethnic groups (under the coalition of SEPDM) (10 percent) and the Oromo (25 percent) seem to be underrepresented in the very important portfolios and relatively represented in the less important portfolios. Quite surprising, despite their stand second and third largest nationalities in the country in terms of population size respectively, both Amhara and Somali could not secure a single post in the very important portfolios in the federal cabinet. The two ethnic groups did not have even satisfactory or sufficient representation in the less important portfolios as compared to Afar (25 percent) and Oromo (25 percent). Thus, the numerical balance of ethnicities in the various federal cabinets has to be interpreted in the context of this distribution of real political power therein.
On the basis of the above discussion, four observations can be made while taking ethnic representation in the federal cabinet into account:
First, when we observe the ethnic composition of the federal cabinet for the last two decades, it has been solely dominated by a coalition of four ethnic organisations of EPRDF and its affiliate parties to some extent. In such an atmosphere, one of the key promises of federalism, to mediate „self-rule‟ and „shared-rule‟ has been futile because of EPRDF‟s unwillingness to share power with all of those concerned in the process of national decision-making. In other words, the application of power-sharing, which is inherent to federalism, so far is limited within the coalition of the ruling party (that is a coalition of parties from different nationalities) and thus it fails to absorb the main contenders of power into the political process.63
63For instance, the OLF and other opposition fronts left the political process after the flawed 1992 regional and local elections. Indeed, these elections gave the earliest indication about EPRDF‟s unwillingness to share power with other political parties through elections.
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Secondly, there has at least so far been a disproportionate ethnic representation in the federal cabinet among the four members of the coalition of EPRDF in both qualitative and quantitative terms let alone incorporate the major contenders of power in some manner into the political process. From the very outset, as noted above, the member and affiliate parties did not have equal status within the EPRDF, where the TPLF has been a dominant political force until recently while the remaining members were treated as a junior partner.
Thirdly, when one takes a closer look at Tables 5.9 and 5.10, it can be seen that, in quantitative terms, a highly skewed ethnic representation in the federal cabinet between EPRDF‟s four member and the other affiliate parties representing those regions which had a historical record of marginalization from political power and economic resources in the past. The so-called affiliated parties representing ethnic regions such as Somali, Benishangul- Gumuz, Gambella, Afar, and Harari have so far less representation and little role in the national political decision-making process.
Finally, when analyzing the composition of the federal cabinet in general and how the coalition unfolded in particular, one could thus pose a question in the first place on the representativeness of the members of the federal cabinet in the eyes of the very people they claim to represent. Here, it is important to note that the three ethnic-based orgnisations of Amhara, Oromo, and Southern ethnic groups are not locally and independently initiated political groups but TPLF-created „peoples democratic organisation‟ for control of non- Tigrayan ethnic groups of the country. As a result, from the very outset, the so called „peoples democratic organisation‟ are regarded as a puppet for the TPLF and lack large body popular support from their respective ethnic communities they are supposed to represent. This study contends that the translation of the constitutional mandate into practice is far from constitutional rhetoric as far as the „equitable representation‟ of nationalities in the national cabinet is concerned at least for a while.
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Table 5.9: Ethnic representation in ministerial and other key portfolios after general elections
General Election Years Ethnicity/Ethnic Coalition 1995 2000 2005 2010 2015 Total % Afar 1 1 1 1 1 5 4.31 Amhara 3 3 5 5 8 24 20.69 Harari 1 1 - - - 2 1.72 Oromo 5 5 6 5 8 29 25 SEPDM/ethnic coalition 3 3 5 5 8 24 20.69 Somali 1 1 1 2 1 6 5.17 Tigrayan 4 4 5 5 5 23 19.83 Non-members 1 1 - 1 - 3 2.59 Total 19 19 23 24 31 116 (100%) 100%
Source: Compiled from the statesman‟s yearbook (various years) and other sources. All computations are my own.
Table 5.10: Ethnic distribution of very important portfolios (1995 - 2015)
Very important portfolios Afar Amhara Harari Oromo SEPDM Somali Tigrayan Total Prime Minister 0 0 0 0 1 0 4 5 Minister of Foreign Affairs 0 0 0 0 1 0 4 5 Minister of Finance & Economic Development 0 0 0 5 0 0 0 5 Security & Immigration Authority 0 0 0 0 0 0 5 5 Total 0 0 0 5 2 0 13 20 % 0 0 0 25% 10% 0 65% 100%
Source: Compiled from the statesman‟s yearbook (various years) and other sources. All computations are my own.
Table 5.11: Ethnic distribution of less important portfolios (1995 - 2015)
Less important portfolios Afar Amhara Harari Oromo SEPDM Somali Tigrayan Total Minister of Labor and 3 0 0 0 0 2 0 5 Social Affairs Minister of Culture 5 and Tourism 2 0 0 2 0 1 0 Minister of Agriculture 0 3 0 0 2 0 0 5 Minister of Mines and 5 Energy 0 0 2 3 0 0 0 Total 5 3 2 5 2 3 0 20 % 25% 15% 10% 25% 10% 15% 0 100%
Source: Compiled from the statesman‟s yearbook (various years). All computations are my own.
*As per the Constitution, every five years after general elections the appointments of new federal cabinet members take place in Ethiopia. All the above points are thus calculated in considering the last five years general elections which held in 1995, 2000, 2005, 2010, and 2015.
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5.1.4. Representation in the national armed forces: Power sharing or political co-option? Shared rule can also get practical expression through the representation of different ethnic groups or to use the terms of the FDRE Constitution, nations, nationalities and the peoples in other important national decision-making institutions, what political scientists call power sharing practices in the center. In this respect, it is interesting to discuss the representation of various ethnic groups in such sensitive national institutions as the national armed forces or the military in the post-1991 federal Ethiopia. Immediately after seizing state power, the TGE, led by the TPLF/EPRDF, founded a commission that was charged with a complete demobilization of the Derg army. A huge demobilization program was quickly developed and a year between July 1991 and January 1992 about 455,000 former Ethiopian national army were disbanded (Coletta et al., 1996:44). In 1993, the TGE founded the Ethiopian National Defense Forces (ENDF) as the new national force. Fundamentally, this meant that the rebel soldiers, largely the TPLF, who until then had served as a substitute national security forces for the country, were reconstituted as the Ethiopian national army (Luckham, 2002:259). When the ENDF was founded, 6,000 former Derg soldiers with special technical skills were incorporated into the new national army although the general idea of integrating a substantial number of Derg military forces was always discarded by the TPLF/EPRDF (Coletta et al., 1996:45 and 69; Luckham, 2002:259-260). This transition took several years. Ever since, despite the promise TPLF officials, including the late premier Meles Zenawi made to gradually diversify the national army in terms of ethnic composition, we have seen, at least until recently, a more deepened and ethnically purified monopoly of military power by ethnic Tigrayan led by TPLF elites.64 Consequently, unlike any other time in the history of the country, minority ethnic Tigrayans comprising no more than 6 percent of the total population (about 100 million) of the country took a lion‟s share of all key military positions in the national defense forces until quite recently.65 To make the situation even worse, in the past 25 years of TPLF‟s dominated political landscape in Ethiopia, incompetent army officers who were loyal and ethnically related to TPLF-led Tigrayan elites also held almost
64For a more detailed account of this see on „TPLF‟s Minority Ethnic Monopoly of the Armed forces in Ethiopia‟
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all important positions in the military domain.66 Though while the very first statement of Article 87 of the FDRE Constitution and the other two subsequent decrees67 such as Proclamation No. 691/2010 and Proclamation No. 916/2015 affirm that „the composition of the national armed forces shall reflect the equitable representation of the nations, nationalities and peoples of Ethiopia‟, the issue of fair and proper representation of the diverse ethno- linguistic groups in the national armed forces were forgone in favor of the Tigrayan ethnic so much that a good number of other national groups (mainly from other coalition members of the EPRDF) had limited access to those top military leadership echelons as compared to the former.68 Despite the TPLF-dominated EPRDF regime‟s denies such claims, the numbers speak for themselves when we simply take into account the available data below on national army forces‟ composition in terms of ethnicity at various levels of seniority.69 This stunning level of monopoly over national military power and institutions was, however, exhibited more deliberately in the composition of the leadership of the armed forces than perhaps elsewhere in the civilian administrative sphere.70 To illustrate this, a closer look at Table 5.12 reveals that among the total of 62 topmost military echelons in five military categories in the country, 40 (64.52 percent) of them are Tigrayans, 7 (11.29 percent) Agews, and 1 (1.61 percent) are from Kafficho ethnic, while the remaining number of Amharas, Oromos, and Kembatas are 8 (12.90 percent), 5 (8.06 percent), and 1 (1.61 percent) respectively (for a more detailed account of this statistics see Table 5.12 and Appendices 11.1-11.5).
66Ex-military officers, supra note 65; see also for more details on „TPLF‟s Minority Ethnic Monopoly of the Armed forces in Ethiopia‟
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Table 5.12: Top military positions and departments by ethnic distribution
Ethnicity Highest Military Rank Categories Agew Amhara Kafficho Kembata Oromo Tigrayan Total Command Chiefs and Heads of Main Departments 1 1 - - - 8 10
Heads of Army Commands (Six Cores) 1 - - - 1 3 5 Heads of Army Command Divisions 3 4 1 2 10 20 HQ Combat Service and Combat Support Staff Commanders 2 2 1 - 9 14 Military Training Center Commanders - 1 - - 2 10 13 Total 7 8 1 1 5 40 62 Total Average % 11.29 % 12.90 % 1.61 % 1.61 % 8.06 % 64.52 % 100 %
Source: Ginbot 7 Movement for Justice, Freedom and Democracy (2014) but the data subject to revision by both serving members of high-ranking military officers and ex-army officers of the ENDF.
Such a survey reflects the general public perception in Ethiopia and is not limited to a few individuals. For example, although the author was unable to obtain concrete data from the Ethiopian national army on their staffing, some of the author‟s informants also reaffirmed a broadly shared perception that the top ranks of the military forces remain dominated by the powerful minority Tigrayans origin because of their ethnic affinity with the TPLF.71 Words of Juneydi Saaddo, who was an ex-cabinet minister in the Ethiopian federal government and former president of Oromiya regional state, in this respect substantiates the above views by stating that „…They [TPLF] appointed some 37 generals, almost all of them Tigreans, before the new Prime Minister [Hailemariam Desalegn] took office…‟(Juneydi, 2016; ellipsis and emphasis added). Undeniably, informants and documents generally acknowledged TPLF dominance of the top military ranks while the national defense forces of Ethiopia features a significant level of ethnic diversity in their lower and to some extent in the middle ranks.72 However, with a number of interviewees evidently taking the view that the last twenty five years following the adoption of the FDRE Constitution should have been long enough to ensure rough proportionality of ethnic representation at all levels, minority Tigrayans dominance at the top military echelons did appear to be reflective of the interests of the
71Ex-military officers, supra note 65. 72Given the lack of publicly available data on forces‟ composition in terms of ethnicity at various levels of seniority, it is difficult to produce more concrete and details findings. The information included for this research is based on interviews conducted with those ex-military officers cited here in the thesis. One author also discusses the level of ethnic diversity both at the top ranks of the military forces and lower and middle ranks levels of the Ethiopian national army within the context of the nature and organization of state security in Ethiopia (see van Veen, 2016).
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minority Tigray-led regime.73 This is, even more, an anomaly as the TPLF claims that it fought to champion ethnic equality in Ethiopia.
In short, as already noted, despite the apparent inclusion of Article 87(1) in the FDRE Constitution which stipulates equitable representation various ethnic groups in the national armed forces, for more than two decades, the overwhelming majority of the top military brass of the national armed forces was made up of members of the TPLF – Tigrayans ethnic origin, with a sprinkling of other ethno-linguistic groups mainly from coalition members of the EPRDF.
5.2. Conclusion This chapter analysed the operation and effect of ethnic balancing polices in the Ethiopian ethnic federalism by considering group‟s access to such public goods as civil service employment both regional and federal levels and their representation in the realm of the federal cabinet which is an area of the national political decision-making institution. This chapter also discussed ethnic representation in sensitive areas like the armed forces or military. It further examined those debates and political justifications of the TPLF/EPRDF behind having ethnic balancing polices in the post-1991 Ethiopia. Ethnic balancing polices in Ethiopia have led to some major steps towards resolving the problem of historically marginalized section of the people. The design and execution of the policies to reach solutions to ethnic imbalances are also significant steps. The chapter has shown how Ethiopian federalism faced difficulties in delivering its objectives of ethnic balancing aimed at improving the overall ethnic equality that must characterize any multiethnic federation. What is of paramount importance is to identify the problems that needed to be addressed before it becomes too late to rectify them.
73Ex-military officers, supra note 65. In this regard, it is interesting to share my eyewitness account in this manner: during the higher education conference meeting with then federal government officials at Addis Ababa Convention Center, one participant of the conference raised the question as to why the Tigrayan ethnic origin so far entirely dominated the top military positions and demanded clear explanation on the matter. The then top TPLF official, Abay Tsehaye, responded that „this is a very sensitive area that needs well experienced military generals to which only TPLF‟s veteran military officers well suited to the post for the time being.‟ This has been said as if 25 years was not sufficient enough to recruit or to have well-trained high military officers from other ethnic background.
Ethnic Balancing Policies in Opportunity and Representation 197
First, it is clear from the above discussion that whilst the civil service populations of the federal and two city administrations, Addis Ababa and Dire Dawa, have so far been increasingly outweighed by specific ethnic groups (Amhara, Oromo, Tigrayan, and Gurage), the „owners‟ of the „mother state‟ (owner nationalities of the region) in ethnically defined regional states have more and more been dominating their respective civil service labor forces. What is indeed missing here is the political expression of diversity74 – institutions of the civil service that promote a proportional representation of various ethnic groups in their own domains. In general, even if the goal has been to have employment in the public sector mirror the ethnic diversity of the population, the results of this study confirmed that this is still far from the reality. Hence, what is certain is that the existence of imbalanced representation of various nationality groups in the civil services of federal and regional states, at least for the last four years.
Secondly, preferential policies in the federal cabinet, which take the form of informal agreements, have been put into practice to provide ethnic representation in the post-1991 federal Ethiopia. The TPLF leaderships, the dominant force within the EPRDF till in recent times, however, seemed to be tempted to engage in ethnic sharing or cooperation but to reserve for themselves and defend key areas of control such as premier, foreign affairs, security and immigration authority, and fiscal operation of the federation.
And last but not least, the other critical and sensitive area of overwhelming importance when it comes to equitable representation of the diverse nationality groups at the national level in the post-1991 federal Ethiopia concerns the national armed or military forces. Under the regime, although while Article 87(1) of the FDRE Constitution stipulates that the make-up of the national armed forces shall reflect the equitable representation of the diverse ethno- linguistic groups of the country, the issue of fair and proper representation of these diverse
74Federalism is about sharing power and resources. In the context of multicultural societies, it is also a means for accommodating diversity and for enhancing peaceful coexistence of diverse groups at different levels. Seen from this angle, the emphasis on self-rule should be complemented by, among other things, proportional representation in the civil service, in the executive, in the judiciary, and other organs. For instance, as can be observed from the Swiss federal experience, its federal system is also coupled by proportional representation of population in different government organs. The results may be seen in the federal public service, the Supreme Court, and most prominently in the executive government itself (Watts, 2008).
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nationality groups in the national armed forces has been disregarded and subject to harsh criticism. Regrettably enough, for more than two and half decades the TPLF has disproportionately retained the „control portfolio‟ of national defense forces, which goes contrary to the spirit of the FDRE Constitution. It is evident that the TPLF-led regime had consistently retained the portfolios of the chief of the defense staff, federal security apparatus, and high-ranking military positions until losing out its grip on federal power in 2018. In the end, the incumbent regime not only promoted the centralisation of power around itself, but also followed policies that negate the very nature of federalism, „a democratic polity…built upon a matrix of constituent institutions that together share power‟ (Elazar, 1996:2, ellipsis added). If one looks at further the theoretical debates, scholars like Donald Horowitz argue that federalism can contribute to reducing contestations through policies that mitigate ethnic disparities using the distribution of economic resources and preferential treatment (1985:599). The view of other scholar on the subject also suggests that „Federalism is a governmental solution to intercommunity conflicts‟ as it is able…to minimize the danger of the partisan control of the state by dominant sections of socially plural nations‟ (Ekeh, 1989:20, ellipsis and emphasis added). Nevertheless, when we consider the above case in light of the two propositions, the experience has so far not been encouraging in the Ethiopian federalism, thereby placing application of the theory in question.
What is notable in the Ethiopia‟s federal system is that a large portion of ethnic groups has so far been apparently excluded from meaningful participation in the running of the public institutions both at federal and regional levels. There exists a clear disparity between what is stated under the FDRE Constitution, the proclamations and practice. These patterns of preferential policies will have serious long-term repercussions for the evolution of interethnic relations within the multiethnic state of Ethiopia.
Conclusion and Recommendations 6
6.1. Introduction The federal restructuring of Ethiopia was aimed at managing the complex ethno-linguistic diversity of the country and reducing interethnic tensions and conflicts. It has enabled the various marginalised ethnic groups in the country to exercise their linguistic and cultural autonomy and political representation (Abbink, 2006:395). As a result, it brought some improvements in interethnic relations at the national level by opening up the long-suppressed identity issue. The formation of regional states was also the most visible political step ever taken to integrate peripheral communities in the country. Despite such positive contributions of the new federal system, after more than two decades, its track record, as analysed against the background of its promises, remains worrying. This chapter first attempts to draw some conclusions about the operation and effect of Ethiopian federalism on interethnic relationships in the light of the three main areas which are controversial from interethnic perspective. The final section offers a set of recommendations in a series of points which we arrange under three headings.
6.2. Conclusion The study focuses on the effects of federalism on interethnic relations in Ethiopia by considering three key areas that account for the lion‟s share of interethnic tensions and contentions in multiethnic federations. These are territorial reorganization (the delineation of internal boundaries and the creation of sub-units); distributive framework of fiscal relations (the collection and allocation of revenue and development resources); and use of ethnic balancing policies in regulating group‟s access to opportunity (higher education and public employment) and representation in national decision making (federal cabinet) and other sensitive areas (the military). Bearing these three core areas of focus in mind, in this concluding chapter, let me try to restate some brief answers pertaining to the three key research questions that were set at the beginning of this research.
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To begin with, this thesis examined the operation and effects of federal system on interethnic relations by focusing on territorial restructuring in the post-1991 federal Ethiopia. In fact, the federal restructuring carried out by abolishing the old unitary state structure, led to inter- regional and intra-regional territorial and border disputes. When we examined boundary delineation, given the centrality of ethnicity in the post-1991 territorial restructuring process and particularly the desire for matching ethnic and politico-administrative boundaries, the process of redrawing inter-regional boundaries has not been smooth. As a result, ethnic-based regionalisation transformed the age-old resource conflicts into inter-regional boundary conflicts. This boundary-making process also resulted in new conflicts between communities that did not have an incessant territorial conflict in history.
Similarly, the assessment of the post-1991 federal experiences in Ethiopia also confirmed that ethnic-based territorial reorganization led to the emergence of intra-regional conflicts over a range of issues such as territory and sharing of political power and resources in almost all regional states. It has also affected interethnic relations at local and regional levels in several ways. In those constituent units where a single titular ethnic group makes up the majority of the regional population (such as Tigray, Amhara, and Oromiya), intra-regional and intra-ethnic conflicts have been less intense. In contrast, intra-regional and interethnic conflicts have been violent in the multiethnic regional states (such as the SNNPRS, Gambella and Benishangul-Gumuz). In a word, we found that ethnic-based territorial reorganization has generated violent conflicts among various ethnic groups, and in turn has led to changes in interethnic relationships. It has laid the ground for protracted intergroup tensions and conflicts in nearly all the regional states as well. From this vantage point, the thesis concluded that territorial reorganization in the post-1991 Ethiopia has failed to end ethnic conflicts and pacify interethnic relationships – which had been its key promises.
The study is also dealing with the effect of fiscal decisions on regional states that are associated with particular ethno-linguistic groups in Ethiopia. Certainly, the fiscal transfer system in Ethiopia has exhibited some major steps towards resolving the problem of historically marginalized regions, the introduction of formula-based transfers and the use of variables to measure variations of developmental levels. The aim and application of transfer
Conclusions and Recommendations 201 system to reach solutions to regional imbalances are also significant measures. However, the fiscal transfer system has some critical limitations that need to be fixed before it becomes too late to resolve. First, despite having financial resources distributed from the federal transfer pool as general grants, the controversies which revolved around the grants formula and the relative weights attached to them have already jeopardized the logic of sharing the national cake among ethno-regions (ethnically defined administrative units). The use of political considerations for allocating grants to benefit specific ethno-regional states has also so far undermined the other criteria in the distribution of national resources during the period under consideration. Secondly, as far as special purpose grants are concerned, in many cases the eligible regional states have been selected at the discretion of the federal government on the basis of political considerations for distributing such grants (conditional grants). This is happening despite the fact that such grants are meant to be enhancing equitable socio- economic developments across ethno-regions. Such a partisan or politically biased grant allocation tool has already caused growing tension with historically marginalized regions like Benishangul-Gumuz, Somali, Afar, and Gambella. Finally, but perhaps most significantly, in addition to federal/region subsidies, independent regional revenue, loans, and donor grants, there have been informal (non-official) parallel transfers between the EPRDF/TPLF and certain ethno-regional states, and Tigray (its home base) particularly. These extra-budgetary (off-budgetary) transfers are maintained through non-official forms of patronage including, but not limited to, parapartals, off-budget funding, and non-transparent ways of distributing federally funded infrastructure to certain regions. The non-inclusion of these funds in the normal channels and the manner of their administration, award, and disbursement all suggest a reality of clientelism for the purposes of self-perpetuation. In fact, the existence of such non-statutory grants and other non-formal transfer funds has just tended to reinforce the general perception of injustice arising out of the official budgetary process. Although all these budgetary and „off-budgetary‟ (non-official) transfer systems are aimed at addressing existing patterns of interethnic or horizontal imbalances among ethno-regional states, we found that they have rather contributed considerably to or accelerated interregional disparities in the country at least over the period considered. All the points raised above, therefore, send a strong message that the circumstances could further worsen the existing pattern of interethnic or interregional disparities, thereby creating suspicion of ethnic
202 Chapter 6
partiality and hence subverting the development of a nation-wide cohesion. Beyond doubt, federalism does not encourage a situation in which poor regions become poorer and rich regions become richer and does not endure just any form of socioeconomic disparity among the regions as well.
Finally, in terms of addressing the concern of the various ethno-linguistic groups in the country, ethnic balancing polices in Ethiopia by considering groups‟ access to such public goods as civil service employment and in their representation in national decision making and such institutions as the armed forces have exhibited some major steps towards resolving the problem of historically marginalized section of the people. The intention and execution of the policies to reach solutions to ethnic imbalances are also significant endeavors. The study has shown how the Ethiopian federal system faced difficulties in delivering its objectives of ethnic balancing aimed at improving the overall ethnic equality that must characterize any multiethnic federation. What is of paramount importance in this regard is to pinpoint the impediments that need to be addressed.
First, it is clear from the findings that whilst the civil service populations of the federal government and the two city administrations, Addis Ababa and Dire Dawa, have so far been increasingly outweighed by specific ethnic groups (four nationality groups), the „owners‟ of the „mother state‟ (owner nationalities of the region) in ethnically defined regional states have more and more been dominating their respective civil service labor forces. What is certainly missing here is the political expression of diversity – institutions of the public service that promote a proportional representation of various ethnic groups in their own domains. Generally speaking, although the goal has been to have employment in the public sector mirror the actual ethnic diversity of the state, results of this study confirmed that this has been far from reality. What is apparent, therefore, is the existence of a sustained disproportional representation of various ethno-linguistic groups not only in the federal and regional states civil service but also in the two city administrations of Addis Ababa and Dire Dawa, at least for the last four consecutive years from 2014/15 to 2017/18.
Conclusions and Recommendations 203
Secondly, and perhaps most significantly, preferential policies in the federal cabinet, which take the form of informal agreements, have been put into practice to provide ethnic representation in the post-1991 Ethiopian federal system. The TPLF leaderships, the dominant force within the EPRDF till recent times, however, seemed to be tempted to engage in ethnic sharing or cooperation but to reserve for themselves and defend key areas of control.
Last, but certainly not least, the other key and sensitive area of doubtlessly paramount importance when considering the issue of equitable representation of the diverse ethno- linguistic groups at the federal level in the post-1991 Ethiopia is the national armed or military forces. Under the TPLF-led EPRDF regime, although while the very first statement of Article 87 of the FDRE Constitution specifies that the composition of the national armed forces shall reflect the equitable representation of the different national groups in the country, the subject of fair and proper representation of these various ethnic groups in the national military forces has not been taken into consideration and has been subject to severe criticism. What is even more disappointing is the fact that ethnic Tigrayans led by TPLF unduly held the „control portfolio‟ of the national military establishment in the country. This confirmed that TPLF dominated Ethiopia‟s ruling coalition for nearly three decades, despite representing an ethnic minority, had consistently retained all key military portfolios in the national armed forces until it lost its federal hegemony control in early 2018. What is minimally salient in the post-1991 period is, despite its promise to take into account the question of addressing the fair representation of various nationalities who have a lesser representation within government institutions, a significant number of ethnic groups have so far apparently been excluded from meaningful participation in the running of the government institutions both at national and sub-national levels. There thus remains a huge gap between constitutional principles and operational reality in the post-1991 federal Ethiopia.
All the above discussions convey a clear signal that the situation will have grave long- standing repercussions for interethnic relationships in the Ethiopian multiethnic federation, thereby undermining the development of nation-wide solidarity, which is crucial for the development of federalism as an institution of interethnic bargaining and compromise.
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6.3. Recommendations To make the operation of the Ethiopian federal system effective from an interethnic perspective, we submit for consideration the following set of recommendations, which focus on territorial reorganization (the delineation of internal boundaries and the creation of sub- units); distributive framework of fiscal relations (the collection and allocation of revenue and development resources); and use of ethnic balancing policies in regulating groups‟ access to such public goods as civil service employment, and in their representation in national decision-making (federal cabinet) and such institutions as the armed forces.
6.3.1. Territorial restructuring: The need to balance ethnic identity with other factors As has been discussed in the previous chapters, the use of ethnicity alone as a key instrument for the territorial organisation in the Ethiopian federation not only reinforces territorial claims and counter-claims by competing ethnic groups, but also contributes to ethnic tensions and conflicts. In several ways, the institutionalization of ethnic-based territorial reorganization affects interethnic relations at local and regional levels. Indeed, this demonstrates one of the inadequacies of using ethnicity as the sole criterion for the formation of ethnic regions in Ethiopia. With this in mind, it is recommended to include other criteria to balance the ethnic factor. In this way, the formation of new territorial sub-units without imperiling interethnic relationships can be achieved by including other factors that are relevant in the geographical configuration of a federation. In other words, the territorial division of multiethnic states should not simply rely on the demographics of the country but should also take into account the political and historical relevance of these demographics. In the Ethiopian case, for instance, provincialism is one element of diversity that defines the Ethiopian society. This would mean that one can still consider the notion of provincialism in a federal setting, while maintaining the ethno-linguistic criteria as it exists. As a result, although several ethnic groups organized in a regional state speak the same language, they have historically existed within different provinces. Besides, there is also intra-ethnic diversity among the Amharas, Oromos and Somalis (Mesfin, 1999). Taking these factors into consideration in the geographical configuration of the federation would have discarded putting together of the
Conclusions and Recommendations 205
Amhara or the Oromo nationality group into one region and recognised the historically and politically relevant regional divide among the Amhara or the Oromo. Bahru Zewde (2004), a great Ethiopian historian, argues that the new regional states, though they exhibit ethno- linguistic unity, are bereft of historical basis and administrative rationality. Save for a short while during the medieval period, when a region called Amhara was apparent around present-day southern Wollo and northern Shewa, there has never been a region designated by that name. Historically Amharic-speaking regions (provinces) have originally been Gondar, Gojjam, Wollo, Shewa etc… Similarly, there has never been previously a region as extensive as today‟s Oromiya. What we had were Bale, Arsi, Jimma, Leqa, and others. From the standpoint of administrative convenience, too, it does not make sense to embrace within one unit the Amhara stretching from Ankober (northeast Shewa) to Armachiho (northwest of Gondar) or the Oromiya from Ginir (southeast Bale) to Gidami (southwest Wellega). In doing so, both ethnicity and regionalism could have been used to demarcate the internal boundaries of sub-units of the Ethiopian federation. This would have further diluted the status of ethnicity as the sole criterion for territorial organisation. In short, such territorial configuration, it is believed, has not only the capacity to diffuse tensions and conflicts, but also positively influenced federalism‟s capacity in pacifying interethnic relationships.
6.3.2. Fiscal decisions Formula-based general (block or unconditional grants) grants are meant to ensure all regional states to provide the basic services within their administrative capacity at a comparative level of the revenue. The system is aimed at distributing financial resources equitably among the regions. But, it has so far itself caused many problems such as the controversies that revolved around the grants formula and the relative weights attached to them, the use of political considerations for allocating such grants and other. The general grant transfer system, therefore, should be framed to secure improvement in terms of equitable distribution of financial resources among regions, but must avoid any disincentive effects. Lastly, but perhaps most considerably, securing transparency and accountability could assure the provision of basic public goods and services.
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Besides official budgetary transfer, the federal government also distributes grants for specific purposes which include the Road Fund, ESRDF, funds for HIV/AIDS prevention and control, food security, and so on. These specific purpose grant transfers are intended to ensure the provision of a minimum national standard of public services at comparable tax effort. We found that regional states have no idea of how the transfer of specific-purpose grants, otherwise known as conditional grants, works. As discussed in Chapter Five, the study also revealed that in many cases the eligible regional states are selected at the discretion of the federal government and thus many of the grants are asymmetrically arranged to some regional states. Consequently, these grants are less transparent and do (did) not include all the regional states. It is, therefore, recommended to take into consideration both transparency and equity issue (equitable distribution) seriously while allocating and transferring specific-purpose grants.
Despite the federal government policy to combine all foreign aid, NGOs contributions, and other extra-budgetary sources so that they can be used for an equitable distribution of financial resources, there are still extra-budgetary sources in some regional states which are not included in the annual budget subsidy and thus are not accounted for by the federal and regional treasuries. The finding of the study showed that regional states have significant differences in drawing on extra-budgetary or „off-budgetary‟ sources. As a result, the variation in the extra-budgetary flows to the regional states has been considered as one of the key factors in the financial resource disparities among the regional governments. Thus, account should be taken of the existing extra sources of aid, federal spending, NGOs contributions, and similar other sources from multilateral institutions in the process of distributing the entire national resources impartially to the regional states. This should be considered not only at the federal level, but also in the transfer and allocation of the budget within the regional states.
6.3.3. Ethnic balancing policies in opportunity and representation As noted in the last chapter, this thesis examined the effect of ethnic balancing policies on interethnic relations in Ethiopia by taking into account groups‟ access to such public goods as public employment at both regional and federal levels, and their representation in national
Conclusions and Recommendations 207 decision-making institutions (federal cabinet) and the armed forces (the military). The study found the existence of a sustained asymmetrical or unjust representation of various ethno- linguistic groups not only in the civil services of federal and regional governments but also in the federal cabinet and national armed forces at least for the period under review. Finally, a fair representation of the diverse nationality groups, who have a lesser representation and have also so far seemingly been excluded from meaningful participation in the running of the government institutions both at federal and regional levels, should be given a critical consideration so as to mirror the ethnic diversity of the country in those public institutions. In short, there should be a commitment on the part of both authorities (federal and regional) to constitutionally proclaimed precepts „after taking diversity seriously‟.
Appendices 7
Appendix 1: Federal Civil Service by Ethnicity
Year 1994/95 (1987 E.C.) 1995/96 (1988 E.C.) 2001/02 (1994 E.C.) 2002/03 (1995 E.C.) Total Total Total Total Ethnicity Number % Number % Number % Number % Afar 76 0.17 74 0.17 54 0.1 53 0.12 Agew 46 0.10 46 0.11 51 0.1 53 0.12 Amhara 26,880 58.48 24,487 59.90 22,846 52.8 23,964 52.65
Anuak - - - - 16 0.0 17 0.04 Argoba - - - - 10 0.02 Dawro - - - - 155 0.4 158 0.35 Dorzie 44 0.10 42 0.10 24 0.1 25 0.05 Gamo 115 0.25 111 0.26 205 0.5 214 0.47 Gedeo - - - - 54 0.1 56 0.12 Goffa 28 0.06 28 0.07 40 0.1 42 0.09 Gurage 2,597 5.65 2,250 5.32 2,069 4.8 2,148 4.72 Hadiya 136 0.30 127 0.30 122 0.3 136 0.30 Harari 107 0.23 94 0.22 64 0.1 67 0.15 Kambata 315 0.69 286 0.68 225 0.5 239 0.53 Keffa 116 0.25 115 0.27 130 0.3 132 0.29 Oromo 8,876 19.31 8,056 19.05 7,670 17.7 8,149 17.90 Sidama 166 0.36 151 0.36 171 0.4 175 0.38 Silte - - - - 71 0.2 50 0.11 Somali 37 0.08 34 0.08 47 0.1 53 0.12 Tigrayan 3,948 8.59 3,676 8.69 3,278 7.6 3,423 7.52
Welayta 439 0.96 413 0.98 437 1.0 464 1.02 Werji ------30 0.07 Yemisa - - 53 0.13 81 0.2 87 0.19 Mixed 478 1.04 421 1.00 318 0.7 321 0.71 Others 205 0.37 197 0.47 30 0.1 31 0.07 Not Stated 933 2.03 1,273 3.01 4,997 11.6 5,337 11.73 Total 45,963 100 42,290 100 43,240 100.0 45,514 100.0
Source: Compiled from FCSC (various years). All computations are my own. N.B.: only those ethnic groups whose total numbers are above 10 in federal civil service are listed.
208 Appendices 209
Appendix 2: Federal Civil Service by Ethnicity
Year 2014/15(2007 E.C.) 2015/16(2008 E.C.) 2016/17(2009 E.C.) 2017/18(2010 E.C.) Total Total Total Total Ethnicity Number % Number % Number % Number % Afar 190 0.1 258 0.2 512 0.3 553 0.3 Agew 161 0.1 182 0.1 252 0.2 255 0.2
Anuak 24 0.0 34 0.0 42 0.0 43 0.0 Alaba 40 0.0 42 0.0 58 0.0 60 0.0 Amhara 54,295 42.1 56,083 42.2 64,949 42.1 67,124 42.3 Argoba 29 0.0 32 0.0 42 0.0 41 0.0 Ari 16 0.0 20 0.0 22 0.0 26 0.0 Bench 255 0.2 318 0.2 425 0.3 419 0.3 Berta 23 0.0 22 0.0 28 0.0 31 0.0 Burji 13 0.0 13 0.0 27 0.0 26 0.0 Dasenech 10 0.0 10 0.0 11 0.0 16 0.0 Dawro 173 0.1 188 0.1 312 0.2 30 0.2 Dizi 21 0.0 28 0.0 25 0.0 25 0.0 Dorzie 44 0.0 ------Gamo 935 0.7 1,159 0.9 880 0.6 975 0.6 Gedeo 19 0.0 23 0.0 32 0.0 51 0.0 Goffa 68 0.1 - - 374 0.2 362 0.2 Gumuz 14 0.0 15 0.0 22 0.0 22 0.0 Gurage 3,652 2.8 3,985 3.0 4,823 3.1 5,060 3.2 Hadiya 883 0.7 956 0.7 1,058 0.7 1,079 0.7 Harari 148 0.1 172 0.1 107 0.1 116 0.1 Kambata 423 0.3 444 0.3 510 0.3 529 0.3 Keffa 346 0.3 380 0.3 494 0.3 476 0.3 Koira 24 0.0 29 0.0 43 0.0 46 0.0 Konso 24 0.0 25 0.0 42 0.0 43 0.0 Konta 8 0.0 10 0.0 10 0.0 12 0.0
Nuer 16 0.0 20 0.0 20 0.0 20 0.0 Oromo 22,446 17.4 23,974 18.1 30,992 20.1 32,264 20.3 Shaka 52 0.0 55 0.0 65 0.0 65 0.0 Shinasha 61 0.0 76 0.1 100 0.1 103 0.1 Sidama 351 0.3 389 0.3 425 0.3 469 0.3 Silte 526 0.4 496 0.4 582 0.4 592 0.4 Somali 69 0.1 114 0.1 430 0.3 433 0.3 Tigrayan 8,857 6.9 8,867 6.7 100 0.1 11,077 7.0 Tambaro 17 0.0 27 0.0 33 0.0 40 0.0
Welayta 2,507 1.9 2,614 2.0 3,058 2.0 3,135 2.0 Werji 39 0.0 ------
210 Appendices
Yemisa 139 0.1 ------Yemi - - 147 0.1 229 0.1 238 0.2 Mixed 108 0.1 ------Others 320 0.2 417 0.3 - - - - Not Stated 31,601 24.5 31,148 23.5 32,655 21.2 32,368 20.4 Total 128,976 100.0 132,812 100.0 154,362 100.0 158,617 100.0
Source: Compiled from FCSC (various years). All computations are my own. N.B.: only those ethnic groups whose total numbers are above 10 in federal civil service are listed.
Appendices 211
Appendix 3: Regions’ Civil Service by Ethnicity - 1995/96 (1988 E.C.)
Regional States Addis Dire Ethnicity Tigray Afar** Amhara Oromiya Somali* B-G SNNPRS Gambela Harari Ababa Dawa Ari - N.A - - - - 22 - - - - Afar - N.A 2 ------Agew 4 N.A 2,308 17 - 217 - - - 15 - Alaba - N.A - - - - 19 - - - Amhara 313 N.A 45,380 23,873 1,356 1,285 2,317 596 1,564 12,149 1,376 Anuak - N.A - 11 - - 853 - - - Basketo - N.A - - - - 24 - - - - Bench - N.A - - - - 142 - - - - Berta N.A - 151 Burji - N.A - 105 - - 73 - - - - Dawro - N.A 390 - - 154 - - - - Derashe - N.A - - - - 31 - - - - Dizi N.A - - - - 47 - - - - Dorze - N.A ------42 - Irob 17 N.A ------Gamo - N.A - 10 - - 525 - - 28 - Gedeo - N.A - - - - 267 - - - - Goffa - N.A - 15 - - 163 - - - Gurage 2 N.A 217 2,308 131 42 841 65 54 946 65 Gumuz N.A 11 - 27 - - - - Hadiya - N.A 10 159 - 10 554 - - - - Harari N.A 21 - - 589 - - Kafficho - N.A - 275 - 152 - - 29 Kambata - N.A 42 543 34 12 390 12 - 177 23 Koira N.A - - 22 - - - - Koore - N.A - 12 - - 49 - - - - Komo - N.A - - - - 10 - - - Konso - N.A - 30 - - 42 - - - - Malie N.A - - - - 15 - - - - Mao 8 Mejenger - N.A - - - - 26 - - - Oromo 14 N.A - 54,911 325 1,093 768 729 381 3,434 340 Qemant N.A 50 ------Nuer - N.A - - - - - 116 - - - Shekecho - N.A - 26 - - 169 12 - - - Shinasha - N.A - - - 156 - - - - Sidama - N.A - 164 - - 821 - - 12 - Silte - N.A - 15 - - - - 10 - Somali - N.A - 36 3,165 - - 8 - - Tembaro - N.A - - - - 41 - - - Tigrayan 16,956 N.A 2,395 1,755 325 68 162 59 72 2,207 107 Welayta 1 N.A - 346 24 - 985 15 - 197 - Werji - N.A - 37 - - - - 14 - Yem - N.A - 325 - - 111 - - - Zeyese - N.A - 23 - - - - - Mixed - N.A - 21 - - - - 581 - Unknown - N.A 6,809 51 - - 34,226 - - 105 27 Total 17,338 4,067 59,345 85,660 5,360 3,075 43,362 2,524 2,698 19,969 2,028 % 97.78 76.47 64.10 59.05 11.12 39.82 21.83 93.83 89.89
Source: Compiled from FCSC (various years). All computations are my own. *Data from Somali has taken from June 1995 Report. **Data from Afar has taken from February 1995 Report. N.B.: only those ethnic groups whose total numbers are above 10 in the regions civil services are listed.
212 Appendices
Appendix 4: Regions’ Civil Service by Ethnicity - 2000/01 (1993 E.C.)
Regional States Ethnicity Addis Dire Tigray Afar Amhara Oromiya Somali B-G* SNNPRS Gambella Harari Ababa Dawa Afar 2,550 2 - - - 1 1 1 Agew 1 2,741 22 - 541 - 13 1 29 1 Amhara 657 1,158 52,599 24,213 237 3,0473,298 - 1,213 1,690 16,748 1,717 Anuak 5 - - 1,673 Argoba 53 34 - 3 - Bench 11 - Berta - - 533 - Burji 117 - Dawro 368 3 - 1 Dorze 9 - - 22 1 Irob 39 - - - Gamo 2 38 - 6 - 79 2 Gedeo 17 - Gurage 6 26 228 2,123 4 124 - 121 74 1,367 90 Gumuz 3 - - 220 - 1 Hadiya 2 15 117 - 14 - 9 4 74 26 Harari 7 12 2 - - 838 41 35 Kafficho 3 273 - 2 - 4 2 Kambata 3 5 14 437 - 33 - 45 6 112 16 Koira 27 - Komo - 11 Konso 38 - 3 Kunama 6 - Mao - - 22 - Mejenger - - - 57 Oromo 51 36 2,025 78,305 93 2,225 - 1,285 724 5,048 670 Qemant 11 - - - 2 Nuer - - - 294 Shekecho 11 - - 22 Shinasha 1 - - 585 - 1 Sidama 13 121 - 2 - 1 2 17 3 Silte 2 12 - - 4 4 2 Somali 26 604 - 9 4 37 Tigrayan 22,739 114 1,688 1,249 10 104 - 104 53 2,622 110 Welayta 5 6 37 323 - 9 - 12 1 148 10 Werji 33 - 1 - 1 2 Yeme 1 361 1 - 5 Zeyese 25 - Mixed 9 - 36 Others 207 - - - 9 104 1 Unknown 2,678 9,575 29 2,948 - 2 Total 3 5 5 6 6 9 69 8 8 4 3,897 7 5 4,919 3 4 6 7 439 2,732 % 96.70 38.47 76.03 72.23 15.50 18.13 41.37 24.60 93.97 94.69
Source: Compiled from FCSC (various years). All computations are my own. *Somali and Oromiya regions‟ data have taken from June 2001 Report (June 1993 E.C). N.B.: only those ethnic groups whose total numbers are above 10 in the regions civil services are listed.
Appendices 213
Appendix 5: Regions’ Civil Service by Ethnicity - 2001/02 (1994 E.C.) Regional States Ethnicity Addis Dire Tigray Afar* Amhara Oromiya* Somali* B-G* SNNPRS Gambella Harari Ababa Dawa Afar 3,318 - - - Agew 3,387 22 - 549 - 16 Amhara 802 1,897 64,395 24,213 237 3,298 - 1,131 1,804 17,558 1,980 Anuak 5 - - 1,771 Argoba 63 34 - - Bench 11 - Berta - - 672 - Burji 117 - Dawro 368 - Dorze 9 - - 18 Irob 48 - - - Gamo 38 - - 20 Gedeo 17 - Gurage 9 25 174 2,123 4 130 - 97 94 632 83 Gumuz - - 401 - Hadiya 117 - 24 - 14 23 11 Harari 24 - - 988 19 20 Kafficho 273 - - 50 Kambata 31 437 - 40 - 49 147 13 Koira 27 - Komo 7 Konso 38 - Mao - - 44 - Mejenger - - - 45 Oromo 75 40 1,997 78,305 93 2,433 - 1,333 951 5,290 770 Qemant 25 - - - Nuer - - - 429 Shekecho 11 - - 26 Shinasha - - 760 - Sidama 121 - - 9 Silte 12 - - 17 Somali 26 604 - 14 25 Tigrayan 23,658 176 1,068 1,249 10 125 - 102 99 2,526 78 Welayta 34 323 - 11 - 21 62 Werji 33 - - 15 Yeme 361 - Zeyese 25 - Mixed 9 - Others 850 - - - 1,897 Unknown 1,373 29 2,948 - 145 Total 24,623 6 9 6 7 6 8 4 3,897 8,506 - 5,248 3,969 28,378 2,980 % 96.08 47.98 89.43 72.23 15.50 22.07 42.91 24.89 91.64 97.68
Source: Compiled from FCSC (various years). All computations are my own. *Somali and Oromiya regions‟ data have taken from June 2001 Report (June 1993 E.C). N.B.: only those ethnic groups whose total numbers are above 10 in the regions civil services are listed.
214 Appendices
Appendix 6: Regions’ Civil Service by Ethnicity - 2002/03 (1995 E.C.)
Regional States Ethnicity Addis* Dire Tigray Afar* Amhara Oromiya Somali* B-G SNNPRS Gambella Harari Ababa Dawa Afar 3,318 - - Agew - 3,184 23 - 575 - 16 Amhara 392 1,897 73,149 25,397 237- 3,596 - 1,098 1,727 17,558 2,047 Anuak - - - 1,607 Argoba 63 35 - - Bench - 11 - - Berta - - 683 - Burji - 123 - - Dawro - 386 - - Dorze 18 Gamo - 40 - - 20 Gedeo - 18 - - Gurage 25 313 2,227 4 129 - 113 95 632 91 Gumuz - - 413 - Hadiya - 109 123 - 29 - 13 23 15 Harari - 12 25 - - 1,008 19 21 Kafficho - 65 287 - - 49 Kambata - 458 - 42 - 51 147 14 Koira - 29 - - Komo - 44 - Konso - 40 - - Mejenger - - - 43 Mocha - 14 - - 31 Oromo 55 40 2,044 82,137 - 2,589 - 1,315 966 5,290 1,043 Qemant - 168 93 - Nuer - - - 568 Shinasha - - 795 - Sidama - 127 - - 9 Silte - 12 - - 17 Somali - 27 604 - 11 31 Tigrayan 25,151 176 1,184 1,310 10 139 - 94 98 2,526 88 Welayta - 338 - - 21 62 Werji 15 Yemisa - 379 - - Zeyese - 26 - - Others 153 - 1,224 35 - - 1,897 Unknown 1,373 35 2,948 - 568 Total 25,764 6,916 81,458 113,714 3,897 9,063 63,454 5,029 3,931 28,378 3,350 % 97.62 47.98 89.80 72.23 15.50 21.35 44.10 25.64 91.64 97.58
Source: Compiled from FCSC (various years). All computations are my own.
*Afar region‟s data has taken from June 2001 Report (June 1994 E.C.)
*Somali region‟s data has taken from June 2000 Report (June 1993 E.C.)
*Addis Ababa‟s data has taken from June 2001 Report (June 1994 E.C.)
N.B.: only those ethnic groups whose total numbers are above 10 in the regions civil services are listed.
Appendices 215
Appendix 7: Regions’ Civil Service by Ethnicity - 2014/15 (2007 E.C.)
Regional States Ethnicity Addis Dire Tigray Afar Amhara Oromiya Somali B-G SNNPRS Gambella Harari Ababa Dawa Ari
Afar 13,416 21 3 2 1 Agew 6 19,116 4 960 5 6 Alaba 37 10 6 Ale
Amhara 427 5,652 269,084 25,201 5,530 5,354 1,515 2,048 23,616 3,493 Anuak 2 5,584 Argoba 360 30 64 4 Basketo 1 Bena Bench 6 15 Berta 2,977 Burji 434 5 Dasenech Dawro 8 227 21 117 Derashe 5 Dime Dizi 2 1 Dorze 17 3 Donga 4
Gamo 32 9 12 26 4 1 1,041 8 Gedeo 103 5 Gedicho Goffa 13 Gurage 4 55 165 1,979 25 342 287 166 5,347 342 Gumuz 4 8 2,039
Hadiya 41 26 190 53 74 96 4 533 39 Hamer
Harari 1 10 45 23 37 1,387 136 25 Irob 767
Kafficho 232 18 59 224 4
Kambata 41 55 1,248 111 173 4 336 25 Kara Kebena Koira 4 Komo 79 183 Konso 119 Konta 1 9 Kunama 19 Kusumie Malie Mao 210 Mareko Me‟enite Mejenger 481 Mocha Mossiye Mursi Nyanegato me Oida
Oromo 69 394 9,730 385,311 2,242 1,891 1,983 2,660 18,592 2,882 Qemant 1,291
216 Appendices
Nuer 7,330 Shekecho 518 56 3 Sheko Shinasha 30 3,964 Sidama 2 126 29 37 3 76 14 Silte 42 7 245 8 494 Somali 5 113 50,006 27 426 Surma Tembaro Tsemay Tigrayan 80,581 1,742 3,960 1,284 103 618 733 96 8,223 260
Welayta 67 51 343 4 55 187 1 718 33 Werji 48 9 Yem 420 1 23 Yemisa Zeyese 45 Others 2 4 446 114 3 68 3 Unknown 1,714 2,076 26,471 31 Total 8 87 23,627 3 5 79 418,783 58,116 4 74 8 875 6 4 85 94 7,605 % 98.42 56.78 88 92.01 86.05 29.91 71.94 21.63 64.90 93.93
Source: Compiled from FCSC (various years). All computations are my own.
N.B.: only those ethnic groups whose total numbers are above 10 in the regions civil services are listed.
Appendices 217
Appendix 8: Regions’ Civil Service by Ethnicity - 2015/16 (2008 E.C.)
Regional States Ethnicity Addis Dire Tigray Afar Amhara Oromiya Somali B-G SNNPRS *Gambela Harari Ababa Dawa Ari ------1,585 - - - -
Afar - 10,817 18 3 7 - 4 - - 37 1 Agew - 6 17,369 7 - 1,048 14 - - 9 8 Alaba - 39 - 4 - - 1,630 6 - 6 - Ale ------421 - - - -
Amhara 417 16,747 295,417 25,982 1,213 5,812 26,053 1,515 2,117 42,293 3,540 Anuak - - - 112 - - - 5,584 - - - Argoba - 362 43 63 - - 4 - 4 - - Basketo - 1 - - - - 970 - - - - Bena ------221 - - - - Bench - - - 4 - - 2,461 15 - - - Berta - - - - 3,215 - - - - - Burji - - - 426 - - 1,183 - - 2 - Dasenech ------26 - - 2 - Dawro - 8 - - - - 9,069 21 - 26 - Derashe 1,643 - - 5 - Dime ------53 - - - - Dizi 421 - - - - Donga 416 - - - -
Gamo - 39 4 25 - 34 16,586 4 1 1,148 8 Gedeo - - - 81 - - 9,674 5 - 5 - Gedicho ------103 - - 10 - Goffa ------6,179 - - 42 - Gurage 4 55 132 1,832 44 345 18,575 287 173 3,084 360 Gumuz - 4 3 - - 2,374 - - 6 -
Hadiya - 42 21 142 81 78 24,110 96 4 533 62 Hamer - - - - - 61 - - 104 -
Harari 1 10 186 24 61 - 11 - 1,554 - 25 Irob 774 ------
Kafficho - - - 235 - 15 13,648 59 - 151 4
Kambata - 41 21 244 - 117 13,075 193 4 382 25 Kara ------12 - - - - Kebena ------602 - - - - Koira - - - 107 - - 1,312 - - 3 - Komo - - - - - 79 - 183 - - - Konso - - - 105 - - 2,172 - - - - Konta - 1 - - - 9 1,293 - - - - Kunama 13 ------Kusumie ------26 - - - - Malie ------809 - - - - Mao - - - - - 213 - - - - - Mareko ------767 - - - - Me‟enite ------321 - - - - Mejenger ------16 481 - - - Mocha ------Mossiye ------161 - - - - Mursi ------12 - - - - Nyanegato ------199 - - - - -me Oida ------752 - - - -
Oromo 37 412 8,699 418,441 873 5,520 6,850 1,983 2,728 23,736 2,971 Qemant - 4,062 ------Nuer ------7,330 - - -
218 Appendices
Shekecho - - - 146 - - 2,353 56 - 3 - Sheko ------279 - - - - Shinasha - - 22 - - 4,337 5 - - 8 - Sidama - 3 - 97 - 30 39,191 37 3 321 14 Silte - 45 2 190 - - 7,643 - 8 562 33 Somali - - 4 115 63,397 - 5 - 27 - 561 Surma ------109 - - - - Tembaro ------2,164 - - - - Tsemay ------41 - - - - Tigrayan 85,257 2,001 - - - - 2,030 733 96 9,040 275
Welayta 2 74 44 286 9 56 34,660 187 1 1,000 44 Yem - - - 492 - 1 1,704 23 - 22 - Yemisa ------Zeyese - - - 90 - - 256 - - 15 - Others 1 - 118 - 86 2,067 7 68 3 - - Unknown - 1,955 4,192 2,845 1,721 631 269 - - 5,965 31 Total 86,506 3 664 330,357 452,118 67,492 25,982 254,435 18,875 6 7 3 91,380 7 965 % 98.56 33.12 89.42 92.55 93.93 30.19 71.94 23.11 85.53 93.31
Source: Compiled from FCSC (various years). All computations are my own. *Gambella‟s data has taken from June 2015 Report (June 2007 E.C.). N.B.: only those ethnic groups whose total numbers are above 10 in the regions civil services are listed.
Appendices 219
Appendix 9: Regions’ Civil Service by Ethnicity - 2016/17 (2009 E.C.)
Regional States Ethnicity Addis Dire Tigray Afar Amhara Oromiya Somali B-G SNNPRS Gambella Harari Ababa Dawa Ari 1,611
Afar 24,755 21 11 1,048 49 Agew 27,288 12 36 Alaba 46 176 1,904 Ale 5,968 522
Amhara 445 7,534 306,932 23,889 643 5,812* 25,698 2,037 2,106 50,170 3,600 Anuak 6,848 Argoba 616 65 123 Basketo 1,072 Bena 216 Bench 3,543 2,692 Berta 3,215* Burji 1,320 Dasenech 28 Dawro 263 11,006 75 18 Dime 53 Erbore 17
Gamo 72 20,061 25 1,701 Gedeo 105 10,867 Gedicho 78 126 Goffa 15 2,522 6,888 Gurage 62 2,023 61 19,472 157 121 6,927 394 Gumuz 35 345
Hadiya 67 40 154 35 26,966 135 80 460 87 Hamer 62
Harari 13 90 72 1,441 29 25 Irob 986 17
Kafficho 15 14,364 247 201 11
Kambata 51 45 117 14,628 171 12 500 37 Kara 14 Kebena 719 Koira 1,403 Komo 81 47 Konso 2,694 Konta 1,458 Kunama 27 Kusumie 47 Malie 855 Mao 218 Mareko 904 Me‟enite 412 Mejenger 59 673 Mocha Mossiye 128 Mursi 11 Nyanegato 212 me Oida 630
Oromo 35 308 9,190 456,411 45 4,523 7,889 489 2,400 25,522 3,020 Qemant 4,075 Nuer 7,754 Shekecho 4,057 100
220 Appendices
Sheko 333 Shinasha 19 4,523 Sidama 66 30 46,950 291 24 Silte 13 203 9,245 30 755 33 Somali 56 110 65,578 76 637 Surma 72 Tembaro 2,240 32 Tsemay 43 Tigrayan 91,354 1,499 3,045 1,127 2,664 631 1,871 389 82 7,949 273
Welayta 183 34 230 10 56 37,685 64 1,395 44 Yem 457 2,009 13 Zeyese 88 453 Others Unknown 175 873 117 2,350 58 2,046 7,548 34 Total 92,853 35,210 35 6 487,457 69,236 27,346 282,944 21,333 6,358 103,612 8 9 % 98.39 70.31 87.43 93.63 94.72 30.65 71.82 22.66 87.41 93.09
Source: Compiled from FCSC (various years). All computations are my own. N.B.: only those ethnic groups whose total numbers are above 10 in the regions civil services are listed.
Appendices 221
Appendix : Regions’ Civil Service by Ethnicity - 2017/18 (2010 E.C.)
Regional States Ethnicity Addis Dire Tigray Afar Amhara Oromiya Somali B-G SNNPRS Gambella Harari Ababa Dawa Ari 2,431
Afar 25,079 15 48 56 52 Agew 24,444 11 1,291 32 45 Alaba 46 315 1,701 22 Ale 601
Amhara 299 7,528 327,975 22,861 859 9,369 28,239 1,896 1,935 54,983 3,694 Anuak 67 6,777 Argoba 617 30 67 17 Basketo 1,535 17 Bena 182 Bench Berta 4,098 3,560 Bodie 31 Burji 562 1,470 Chara 27 Dasenech 166 Dawro 202 11,101 74 23 Derashe 2,245 25 Dime 235 Dizi 548 Donga 438 Erbore 31
Gamo 11 15 20,211 44 1,667 10 Gedeo 917 1,371 10,978 Gedicho 188 Goffa 14 7,567 Gurage 62 55 1,676 102 107 20,715 175 64 7,270 394 Gumuz 17 3,251 12
Hadiya 67 67 287 22 74 28,487 52 515 94 Hamer 129
Harari 37 60 123 10 1,523 31 32
Kafficho 174 18,229 258 123 11
Kambata 51 21 272 122 14,854 408 543 37 Kara 13 Kebena 648 Kore 16 3,432 26 Komo 357 47 62 Konso 3,396 Konta 1,854 Kunama 24 Kusumie 34 Mao 296 967 Mareko 910 Mashola 28 Me‟enite 578 Majangir 56 858 Mossiye 169 Mursi 12 Nao 11 Nyanegato 188 -me Oida 588
Oromo 32 307 9,323 484,577 188 5,962 7,812 2,253 2,731 28,039 3,149
222 Appendices
Qemant 1,968 Nuer 8,595 Shekecho 130 3,141 64 Sheko 620 82 Shinasha 26 5,246 13 Sidama 28 83 51,573 38 4,319 24 Silte 13 252 10,924 13 817 33 Somali 56 67,458 14 661 Surma 137 104 Tembaro 2,410 10 26 Tsemay 74 Tigrayan 98,888 1,621 2,613 1,141 2,505 348 1,924 552 55 8,875 279
Welayta 189 40 374 33 26 40,372 183 1,486 44 Yem 461 2,200 12 Yemisa Zeyese 85 314 Others Unknown 623 51 309 53 6,393 34 Total 100,173 35,658 367,301 515,624 71,647 30,278 310,419 22,369 6,412 115,334 8,496 % 98.72 70.33 89.29 93.98 94.15 42.73 72.83 23.75 85.98 96.11
Source: Compiled from FCSC (various years). All computations are my own. N.B.: only those ethnic groups whose total numbers are above 10 in the regions civil services are listed.
Appendices 223
Appendix 11: Top Military Positions and Departments by Ethnicity
Table 11.1: Command chiefs and heads of main departments
Ethnicity No. Military Position Military Rank Agew Amhara Tigrayan Total 1. Armed Forces Chief of Staff General - - 1 1 2. Head of Training Lt.-Gen. - - 1 1 3. Head of Logistics Maj.-Gen. - - 1 1 4. Head of Intelligence Brig.-Gen. - - 1 1 5. Head of Campaign Lt.-Gen. 1 - - 1 Head of Defense Force Infrastructure and 6. Construction Sector Maj.-Gen. - - 1 1 7. Chief of Air Force Maj.-Gen. - 1 - 1 8. Head of Defense Industry Sector Brig.-Gen. - - 1 1 9. Head of Mission Force Commander Lt.-Gen. - - 1 1 10. Head of Special Security Force Brig.-Gen. - - 1 1 Total 1 1 8 10 Total Average % 10 % 10 % 80 % 100%
Table 11.2: Heads of army command
Ethnicity No. Command Rank Agew Oromo Tigrayan Total 1. Central Command Maj.-Gen. - - 1 1 2. Northern Command Maj.-Gen. 1 - - 1 3. Western Command Maj.-Gen. - 1 - 1 4. Eastern Command Maj.-Gen. - - 1 1 5. South Eastern Command Maj.-Gen. - - 1 1 Total 1 1 3 5 Total Average % 20% 20% 60% 100%
Table 11.3: Heads of army command division Table 11.3A: Central command
Ethnicity/Ethnic Coalition No. Command Division Rank Agew Amhara Tigrayan Total 1. 8th Mechanized Division Brig.-Gen. - - 1 1 2. 31st Army Division Brig.-Gen. - - 1 1 3. 35th Army Division Brig.-Gen. 1 - - 1 4. 24th Army Division Brig.-Gen. - 1 - 1 5. 22nd Army Division Brig.-Gen. - - 1 1 6. 33rd Army Division Brig.-Gen. - 1 0 1 Total 1 2 3 6 Total Average % 16.67% 33.33% 50 % 100%
224 Appendices
Table 11.3: Heads of army command division Table 11.3B: Northern Command
Ethnicity No. Command Division Rank Agew Amhara Oromo Tigrayan Total 1. 14th Army Division Brig.-Gen. - - 1 - 1 2. 21st Army Division Brig.-Gen. 1 - - - 1 3. 11th Army Division Brig.-Gen. - 1 - - 1 4. 25th Army Division Brig.-Gen. - - - 1 1 5. 22nd Army Division Brig.-Gen. 1 - - - 1 6. 4th Mechanized Division Brig.-Gen. - - - 1 1 Total 2 1 1 2 6 Total Average % 33.33% 16.67% 16.67% 33.33% 100 %
Table 11.3: Heads of army command division Table 11.3C: Western command
Ethnicity No. Command Division Rank Oromo Kafficho Tigrayan Total 1. 23rd Army Division Brig.-Gen. - - 1 1 2. 43rd Army Division Brig.-Gen. 1 - - 1 3. 26th Army Division Brig.-Gen. - - 1 1 4. 7th Mechanized Division Brig.-Gen. - 1 - 1 Total 1 1 2 4 Total Average % 25% 25% 50% 100%
Table 11.3: Heads of army command division Table 11.3D: South eastern command
Ethnicity No. Command Division Rank Amhara Tigrayan Total 1. 19th Army Division Brig.-Gen. 1 - 1 2. 13th Army Division Brig.-Gen. - 1 1 3. 32nd Army Division Brig.-Gen. - 1 1 4. 6th Mechanized Division Brig.-Gen. - 1 1 Total 1 3 4 Total Average % 25 % 75 % 100 %
Appendices 225
Table 11.4: defense HQ combat service and combat support staff commanders
Ethnicity No. Department/Section Rank Agew Amhara Kafficho Tigrayan Total Defense Research and 1. Development Brig.-Gen. - - - 1 1 Defense Communication 2. Department Brig.-Gen. - 1 - - 1 3. Defense Industrial Sector Brig.-Gen. - - - 1 1 4. Defense Indoctrination Center Brig.-Gen. - - - 1 1 5. Defense Justice Service Brig.-Gen. - - - 1 1 Defense Foreign Relations 6. Department Brig.-Gen. - - 1 - 1 Information Network Security 7. Agency (INSA ) Brig.-Gen. - - - 1 1 Defense Administration 8. Department Maj.-Gen. - - - 1 1 Defense Ethics and Discipline 9. Directorate Director Brig.-Gen. - - - 1 1 10. Defense Purchasing Department Brig.-Gen. 1 - - - 1 11. Defense Industries Coordination Brig.-Gen. - - - 1 1 Defense Administration and 12. Security Department Col. - - - 1 1 Defense Inspection General 13. office Brig.-Gen. 1 - - - 1 Defense Peace Keeping 14. Operation Maj.-Gen. - 1 - - 1 Total 2 2 1 9 14 Total Average % 14.29 % 14.29 % 7.14 % 64.29 % 100 %
Table 11.5: Military training academy commanders
Defense Training Ethnicity No. Academy/Station Rank Amhara Oromo Tigrayan Total 1. Defense Command & Staff College Brig.-Gen. - - 1 1 2. Hayelom Araya Academy Brig.-Gen. - - 1 1 Wourso Basic Infantry Military Training 3. Center Brig.-Gen. - 1 - 1 Awash Arba Mechanized Military Training 4. Center Brig.-Gen. - - 1 1 5. Blate Special Force Military Training Center Brig.-Gen. - - 1 1 6. Defense Engineering College Brig.-Gen. - - 1 1 7. Military Health Science Academy Maj.-Gen. - - 1 1 8. Mulugeta Buli Technical College Brig.-Gen. - - 1 1 9. Defense Logistics College Brig.-Gen. - - 1 1 10. Defense Intelligence College Brig.-Gen. - - 1 1 11. Defense Resource Management College Brig.-Gen. - 1 - 1 12. Birr Sheleko Military Training Center Brig.-Gen. - - 1 1 13. Mekelle Hibret Military Academy Brig.-Gen. 1 - - 1 Total 1 2 10 13 Total Average % 7.7% 15.38% 76.92% 100%
Source: Ginbot 7 Movement for Justice, Freedom and Democracy (2014) but the data subject to rigorous revision by both serving members of high-ranking military officers and ex-army officers of the ENDF. Notes: Maj.-Gen. = Major General, Brig.-Gen. = Brigadier General, Col. = Colonel, Lt.-Gen. = Lieutenant General.
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M.A. in Federal Studies, Institute of Federal Studies, Addis Ababa University, Ethiopia. This thesis has not been submitted to any university for a degree or any other award.