Disparate Effects in the Criminal Justice System: a Response to Randall Kennedy's Comment and Its Legacy
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UCLA National Black Law Journal Title Disparate Effects in the Criminal Justice System: A Response to Randall Kennedy's Comment and Its Legacy Permalink https://escholarship.org/uc/item/4b57c56b Journal National Black Law Journal, 14(2) ISSN 0896-0194 Author Nelson, Janai S. Publication Date 1997 Peer reviewed eScholarship.org Powered by the California Digital Library University of California Disparate Effects in the Criminal Justice System: A Response to Randall Kennedy's Comment and Its Legacy Janai S. Nelson* I. INTRODUCTION For many African Americans, the criminal justice system symbolizes an oppressive force, and yet, is a necessary institution in an increasingly lawless society. We' are at the same time its victims and beneficiaries, although various sentiments exist regarding the extent to which we are either. It is precisely this paradox, coupled with the promulgation of cer- tain criminal legislation and legal precedent which directly and, potentially, adversely affect the African-American community, 2 that inspired me to ad- dress the issues and arguments raised in Randall Kennedy's The State, CriminalLaw, and Racial Discrimination:A Comment3 and their resound- ing implications.4 In particular, this Essay focuses on two timely and controversial law enforcement issues facing the courts and the African-American commu- nity: the crack/powder cocaine distinction in criminal statutes and selective prosecution claims based on the disparity between federal and state sen- tencing schemes. I examine the experiences of our community that shape our response to these issues by addressing the constitutional claims raised by African-American defendants in two portentous criminal cases-one state and one federal-and confronting important arguments made by Kennedy in the areas of law enforcement and constitutional analysis. In * Articles Editor, UCLA Law Review; Consulting Editor, National Black Law Journal. J.D., 1996, UCLA School of Law; B.A., 1993, New York University. I would like to thank the National Black Law Journal for its quality editorship. In addition, I am grateful to the UCLA externship program for providing me the opportunity to extern in the chambers of the Honorable Judge Stephen Reinhardt where I was encouraged to explore issues of criminal justice. 1. Throughout this Essay I have chosen to part with the convention among authors of legal scholarship of not identifying themselves as a member of a group about which they write for in certain contexts, like this one, self-identification clarifies the author's perspective for her audi- ence. It should be noted that (since its inception) narrative legal scholarship has been a refresh- ing exception to this norm. 2. For an intriguing definition of "the Black community," see generally Regina Austin, "The Black Community," Its Lawbreakers, and a Politics of Identification, 65 S.Cal. L. Rev. 1769, 1769- 70 (1989). 3. 107 HARV. L. REV. 1255, 1261-70 (1994) [hereinafter Kennedy, Comment]. Randall Kennedy is a professor at Harvard Law School and a well-noted legal scholar who happens to be African American. My description of Randall Kennedy as a legal scholar "who happens to be African American" is meant to convey that legal scholars are not intrinsically of any particular race or ethnicity, e.g., white, as the term "African-American legal scholar" might suggest by its obvious distinction. 4. Kennedy's comment already has helped to persuade a circuit court to uphold the crack/ cocaine distinction in sentencing against an equal protection challenge. See United States v. Thompson, 27 F.3d 671, 678 n.3 (1994)("The severe penalties for crack offenses actually help rather than hurt law-abiding African-Americans.") (quoting Kennedy, Comment, supra note 3). NATIONAL BLACK LAW JOURNAL 223 addition, I explore briefly the implications of Kennedy's arguments in these and other like cases.5 The first case, State v. Russell,6 involves the infamous crack/powder cocaine distinction in a Minnesota criminal statute. Kennedy's Comment characterizes this case as an example of a state court's erroneous decision to equalize sentencing among crack and powder cocaine offenders in re- sponse to "misguided" claims of racial discrimination from African-Ameri- can criminal defendants and, presumably, a segment of the African-8 American community.7 In the second case, United States v. Armstrong, the Supreme Court elucidated the threshold requirements for establishing a selective prosecution claim based on allegations that African-American defendants are prosecuted more frequently in federal rather than state courts for cocaine-related offenses and are, consequently, subject to har- sher penalties. In addition, the Court articulated the evidentiary showing necessary to entitle such defendants to discovery. Armstrong offers an op- portunity to examine the implications of Kennedy's arguments in shaping rules that affect the discovery of evidence, and, by consequence, a defend- 5. In a perceptive analysis published after this Essay was written, Professor David Cole has set forth arguments similar to many of those raised here. See David Cole, The Paradox of Race and Crime: A Comment on Randall Kennedy's "Politics of Distinction",83 GEO. L.J. 2547 (1995). This Essay has since been edited to include case developments and additional citations. Professor Kennedy has responded thoughtfully to Cole's arguments. See Randall Kennedy, A Response to Professor Cole's "Paradoxof Race and Crime", 83 GEO. L.J. 2573 (1995) [hereinaf- ter Kennedy, A Response]. However, Professor Kennedy's response fails to address the flaws in his critique of the Russell court's rationality review analysis. See infra pp. 8-13. Furthermore, Kennedy argued that more consideration should be given to the viewpoints of Black congressper- sons and the opinions expressed in the Black and Latino caucuses on issues of law enforcement, which he contends, might support the idea of increased law enforcement. Kennedy, A Response, supra, at 2574-75. However, as I argue in Part II, the underlying premise of Kennedy's suggestion that only legislation that is facially discriminatory or proven to be discriminatory by direct evidence of discriminatory intent should be subject to Equal Protection challenge because certain members of the African-American community, including our elected representatives, might favor increased law enforcement legislation is entirely inconsistent with the constitutional fundament that the Equal Protection Clause applies to classes in their entireties and not particular segments of a class. Indeed, the alleged benefit that increased law enforcement via harsher sentencing of Afri- can-American drug offenders confers upon law-abiding African-Americans is insufficient to out- weight the burden. Moreover, it is incapable of withstanding constitutional challenge on that rationale that it benefits a subgroup of a protected class consitutionally. Thus, this Essay seeks to invite discussion on how to meld interests in law enforcement and equal protection as they have been juxtaposed in Kennedy's Comment. In addition, this Essay explores Kennedy's arguments in an equally controversial area of criminal law-selective prosecution based on the federal/state sentencing disparity. 6. 477 N.W.2d 886 (Minn. 1991). 7. See Kennedy, Comment, supra note 3, at 1261-70. 8. 116 S. Ct. 1480 (1996). 224 NATIONAL BLACK LAW JOURNAL ant's ability to prove discriminatory intent,9-a crucial element in estab- lishing a prima facie case of racial discrimination. 10 Accordingly, Part II sets forth Kennedy's arguments regarding race and law enforcement presented in his Comment." I critique and examine several weaknesses in Kennedy's theories in Part III and highlight impor- tant counterarguments that he either failed to address or addressed insuffi- ciently. Finally, in Part IV, I test the consistency and application of Kennedy's arguments in cases such as Armstrong and conclude by develop- ing Kennedy's community-oriented approach into a paradigm that is not so fundamentally hostile to racial discrimination claims based solely upon dis- parate impact. II. THE STATE, CRIMINAL LAW, AND RACIAL DISCRIMINATION: KENNEDY'S COMMENT In a provocative comment on criminal law, law enforcement, and ra- cial discrimination, Randall Kennedy challenges contenders on both sides of the debate with his refutation of discrimination claims that is paired with a condemnation of the criminal justice system for denying African Ameri- cans equal protection in the area of criminal law.' 2 Kennedy bases his ar- guments in the context of the crack/powder cocaine distinction. He asserts that disparate sentencing for possession of these different substances is, if not appropriate, 13 certainly nondiscriminatory. This assertion has serious implications not only in respect of the crack/ powder cocaine distinction, but in most other instances where African Americans are disparately and adversely impacted by criminal law enforce- ment. The state/federal prosecution distinction is another example that il- lustrates the difficulty of proving racial discrimination in disparate impact contexts and offers an opportunity to explore what rules will provide dispa- rately impacted communities the next best available recourse aside from per se invalidation of suspect laws or practices. In this light, this section examines Kennedy's general arguments and their implications in the crack/ powder cocaine and state/federal prosecution contexts. 9. In stating that discriminatory intent is necessary to invalidate