SUDAN Humanitarian Situation Report
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Humanitarian Situation Report No. 19 Q3 2020 Highlights
Sudan Humanitarian Situation Report No. 19 Q3 2020 UNICEF and partners assess damage to communities in southern Khartoum. Sudan was significantly affected by heavy flooding this summer, destroying many homes and displacing families. @RESPECTMEDIA PlPl Reporting Period: July-September 2020 Highlights Situation in Numbers • Flash floods in several states and heavy rains in upriver countries caused the White and Blue Nile rivers to overflow, damaging households and in- 5.39 million frastructure. Almost 850,000 people have been directly affected and children in need of could be multiplied ten-fold as water and mosquito borne diseases devel- humanitarian assistance op as flood waters recede. 9.3 million • All educational institutions have remained closed since March due to people in need COVID-19 and term realignments and are now due to open again on the 22 November. 1 million • Peace talks between the Government of Sudan and the Sudan Revolu- internally displaced children tionary Front concluded following an agreement in Juba signed on 3 Oc- tober. This has consolidated humanitarian access to the majority of the 1.8 million Jebel Mara region at the heart of Darfur. internally displaced people 379,355 South Sudanese child refugees 729,530 South Sudanese refugees (Sudan HNO 2020) UNICEF Appeal 2020 US $147.1 million Funding Status (in US$) Funds Fundi received, ng $60M gap, $70M Carry- forward, $17M *This table shows % progress towards key targets as well as % funding available for each sector. Funding available includes funds received in the current year and carry-over from the previous year. 1 Funding Overview and Partnerships UNICEF’s 2020 Humanitarian Action for Children (HAC) appeal for Sudan requires US$147.11 million to address the new and protracted needs of the afflicted population. -
“Kankasha” in Kassala: a Prospective Observational Cohort Study of the Clinical Characteristics, Epidemiology, Genetic Origi
medRxiv preprint doi: https://doi.org/10.1101/2020.09.23.20199976; this version posted September 24, 2020. The copyright holder for this preprint (which was not certified by peer review) is the author/funder, who has granted medRxiv a license to display the preprint in perpetuity. It is made available under a CC-BY-NC-ND 4.0 International license . 1 1 Title [216/250 characters] 2 “Kankasha” in Kassala: a prospective observational cohort study of the clinical characteristics, 3 epidemiology, genetic origin, and chronic impact of the 2018 epidemic of Chikungunya virus 4 infection in Kassala, Sudan 5 Short title: [66/70characters] 6 Understanding the 2018 Chikungunya virus epidemic in Eastern Sudan 7 8 Authors: Hilary Bower1*, Mubarak el Karsany2,3*, Abd Alhadi Adam Hussein4, Mubarak Ibrahim 9 Idriss5, Ma’aaza Abasher AlZain6, Mohamed Elamin Ahmed Alfakiyousif2, Rehab Mohamed2, Iman 10 Mahmoud2, Omer Albadri,7 Suha Abdulaziz Alnour Mahmoud10, Orwa Ibrahim Abdalla10, Mawahib 11 Eldigail2, Nuha Elagib2, Ulrike Arnold1, Bernardo Gutierrez8, Oliver G. Pybus8, Daniel P. Carter9, Steven 12 T. Pullan9, Shevin T. Jacob11, Tajeldin Mohammedein Abdallah4,10#, Benedict Gannon1# , Tom E. 13 Fletcher11# 14 * Equal first authors, # Equal senior authors 15 16 Authors’ affiliations 17 1. UK Public Health Rapid Support Team, London School of Hygiene & Tropical Medicine/Public Health 18 England, London, United Kingdom 19 2. National Public Health Laboratory, Federal Ministry of Health, Khartoum, Sudan 20 3. Karary University, Omdurman, Sudan 21 4. University of Kassala, Kassala, Sudan 22 5. Laboratory Division, Kassala State Ministry of Health, Kassala, Sudan 23 6. Communicable Disease Surveillance & Events Unit, Federal Ministry of Health, Khartoum, Sudan 24 7. -
Sudan Food Security Outlook Report
SUDAN Food Security Outlook February to September 2019 Deteriorating macroeconomic conditions to drive high levels of acute food insecurity in 2019 KEY MESSAGES • Food security has seasonally improved with increased cereal Current food security outcomes, February 2019 availability following the November to February harvest. However, the macroeconomic situation remains very poor and is expected to further deteriorate throughout the projection period, and this will drive continued extremely high food and non-food prices. The negative impacts of high food prices will be somewhat mitigated by the fact that livestock prices and wage labor are also increasing, though overall purchasing power will remain below average. A higher number of households than is typical will face Crisis (IPC Phase 3) or worse outcomes through September. • Between June and September, the lean season in Sudan, Crisis (IPC Phase 3) outcomes are expected in parts of Red Sea, Kassala, Al Gadarif, Blue Nile, West Kordofan, North Kordofan, South Kordofan, and Greater Darfur. Of highest concern are the IDPs in SPLM-N controlled areas of South Kordofan and SPLA-AW controlled areas of Jebel Marra, who have been inaccessible for both assessments and food assistance deliveries. IDPs in these areas are expected to be in Source: FEWS NET FEWS NET classification is IPC-compatible. IPC-compatible analysis follows Emergency (IPC Phase 4) during the August-September peak key IPC protocols but does not necessarily reflect the consensus of national of the lean season. food security partners. • The June to September 2019 rainy season is forecasted to be above average. This is anticipated to lead to flooding in mid-2019 and increase the prevalence of waterborne disease. -
Sudan's Spreading Conflict (II): War in Blue Nile
Sudan’s Spreading Conflict (II): War in Blue Nile Africa Report N°204 | 18 June 2013 International Crisis Group Headquarters Avenue Louise 149 1050 Brussels, Belgium Tel: +32 2 502 90 38 Fax: +32 2 502 50 38 [email protected] Table of Contents Executive Summary ................................................................................................................... i Recommendations..................................................................................................................... iii I. Introduction ..................................................................................................................... 1 II. A Sudan in Miniature ....................................................................................................... 3 A. Old-Timers Versus Newcomers ................................................................................. 3 B. A History of Land Grabbing and Exploitation .......................................................... 5 C. Twenty Years of War in Blue Nile (1985-2005) ........................................................ 7 III. Failure of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement ............................................................. 9 A. The Only State with an Opposition Governor (2007-2011) ...................................... 9 B. The 2010 Disputed Elections ..................................................................................... 9 C. Failed Popular Consultations ................................................................................... -
The Economics of Ethnic Cleansing in Darfur
The Economics of Ethnic Cleansing in Darfur John Prendergast, Omer Ismail, and Akshaya Kumar August 2013 WWW.ENOUGHPROJECT.ORG WWW.SATSENTINEL.ORG The Economics of Ethnic Cleansing in Darfur John Prendergast, Omer Ismail, and Akshaya Kumar August 2013 COVER PHOTO Displaced Beni Hussein cattle shepherds take shelter on the outskirts of El Sereif village, North Darfur. Fighting over gold mines in North Darfur’s Jebel Amer area between the Janjaweed Abbala forces and Beni Hussein tribe started early this January and resulted in mass displacement of thousands. AP PHOTO/UNAMID, ALBERT GONZALEZ FARRAN Overview Darfur is burning again, with devastating results for its people. A kaleidoscope of Janjaweed forces are once again torching villages, terrorizing civilians, and systematically clearing prime land and resource-rich areas of their inhabitants. The latest ethnic-cleans- ing campaign has already displaced more than 300,000 Darfuris this year and forced more than 75,000 to seek refuge in neighboring Chad, the largest population displace- ment in recent years.1 An economic agenda is emerging as a major driver for the escalating violence. At the height of the mass atrocities committed from 2003 to 2005, the Sudanese regime’s strategy appeared to be driven primarily by the counterinsurgency objectives and secondarily by the acquisition of salaries and war booty. Undeniably, even at that time, the government could have only secured the loyalty of its proxy Janjaweed militias by allowing them to keep the fertile lands from which they evicted the original inhabitants. Today’s violence is even more visibly fueled by monetary motivations, which include land grabbing; consolidating control of recently discovered gold mines; manipulating reconciliation conferences for increased “blood money”; expanding protection rackets and smuggling networks; demanding ransoms; undertaking bank robberies; and resum- ing the large-scale looting that marked earlier periods of the conflict. -
North Darfur II
Darfur Humanitarian Profile Annexes: I. North Darfur II. South Darfur III. West Darfur Darfur Humanitarian Profile Annex I: North Darfur North Darfur Main Humanitarian Agencies Table 1.1: UN Agencies Table 1.2: International NGOs Table 1.3: National NGOs Intl. Natl. Vehicl Intl. Natl. Vehic Intl. Natl. Vehic Agency Sector staff staff* es** Agency Sector staff staff* les** Agency Sector staff staff les FAO 10 1 2 2 ACF 9 4 12 3 Al-Massar 0 1 0 Operations, Logistics, Camp IOM*** Management x x x GAA 1, 10 1 3 2 KSCS x x x OCHA 14 1 2 3 GOAL 2, 5, 8, 9 6 117 10 SECS x x x 2, 3, 7, UNDP*** 15 x x x ICRC 12, 13 6 20 4 SRC 1, 2 0 10 3 2, 4, 5, 6, UNFPA*** 5, 7 x x x IRC 9, 10, 11 1 5 4 SUDO 5, 7 0 2 0 Protection, Technical expertise for UNHCR*** site planning x x x MSF - B 5 5 10 0 Wadi Hawa 1 1 x 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 8, Oxfam - UNICEF 9 11, 12 4 5 4 GB 2, 3, 4 5 30 10 Total 1 14 3 1, 3, 4, 5, 6, 8, 9, UNJLC*** 17 x x x SC-UK 11, 12 5 27 8 Technical Spanish UNMAS*** advice x x x Red Cross 3, 4 1 0 1 UNSECOORD 16 1 1 1 DED*** x x x WFP 1, 9, 11 1 12 5 NRC*** x x x WHO 4, 5, 6 2 7 2 Total 34 224 42 Total 10 29 17 x = information unavailable at this time Sectors: 1) Food 2) Shelter/NFIs 3) Clean water 4) Sanitation 5) Primary Health Facilities *Programme and project staff only. -
Soil and Oil
COALITION FOR INTERNATIONAL JUSTICE COALITION FOR I NTERNATIONAL JUSTICE SOIL AND OIL: DIRTY BUSINESS IN SUDAN February 2006 Coalition for International Justice 529 14th Street, N.W. Suite 1187 Washington, D.C., 20045 www.cij.org February 2006 i COALITION FOR INTERNATIONAL JUSTICE COALITION FOR I NTERNATIONAL JUSTICE SOIL AND OIL: DIRTY BUSINESS IN SUDAN February 2006 Coalition for International Justice 529 14th Street, N.W. Suite 1187 Washington, D.C., 20045 www.cij.org February 2006 ii COALITION FOR INTERNATIONAL JUSTICE © 2006 by the Coalition for International Justice. All rights reserved. February 2006 iii COALITION FOR INTERNATIONAL JUSTICE ACKNOWLEDGMENTS CIJ wishes to thank the individuals, Sudanese and not, who graciously contributed assistance and wisdom to the authors of this research. In particular, the authors would like to express special thanks to Evan Raymer and David Baines. February 2006 iv 25E 30E 35E SAUDI ARABIA ARAB REPUBLIC OF EGYPT LIBYA Red Lake To To Nasser Hurghada Aswan Sea Wadi Halfa N u b i a n S aS D e s e r t ha ah raar a D De se es re tr t 20N N O R T H E R N R E D S E A 20N Kerma Port Sudan Dongola Nile Tokar Merowe Haiya El‘Atrun CHAD Atbara KaroraKarora RIVER ar Ed Damer ow i H NILE A d tb a a W Nile ra KHARTOUM KASSALA ERITREA NORTHERN Omdurman Kassala To Dese 15N KHARTOUM DARFUR NORTHERN 15N W W W GEZIRA h h KORDOFAN h i Wad Medani t e N i To le Gedaref Abéche Geneina GEDAREF Al Fasher Sinnar El Obeid Kosti Blu WESTERN Rabak e N i En Nahud le WHITE DARFUR SINNAR WESTERN NILE To Nyala Dese KORDOFAN SOUTHERN Ed Damazin Ed Da‘ein Al Fula KORDOFAN BLUE SOUTHERN Muglad Kadugli DARFUR NILE B a Paloich h 10N r e 10N l 'Arab UPPER NILE Abyei UNIT Y Malakal NORTHERN ETHIOPIA To B.A.G. -
The Fall of Al-Bashir: Mapping Contestation Forces in Sudan
Bawader, 12th April 2019 The Fall of al-Bashir: Mapping Contestation Forces in Sudan → Magdi El-Gizouli Protests in Khartoum calling for regime change © EPA-EFE/STR What is the Sudanese Professionals Association (SPA) anyway, perplexed commentators and news anchors on Sudan’s government-aligned television channels asked repetitively as if bound by a spell? An anchor on the BBC Arabic Channel described the SPA as “mysterious” and “bewildering”. Most were asking about the apparently unfathomable body that has taken the Sudanese political scene by surprise since December 2018 when the ongoing wave of popular protests against President Omar al-Bashir’s 30-year authoritarian rule began. The initial spark of protests came from Atbara, a dusty town pressed between the Nile and the desert some 350km north of the capital, Khartoum. A crowd of school pupils, market labourers and university students raged against the government in response to an abrupt tripling of the price of bread as a result of the government’s removal of wheat subsidies. Protestors in several towns across the country set fire to the headquarters of the ruling National Congress Party (NCP) and stormed local government offices and Zakat Chamber1 storehouses taking food items in a show of popular sovereignty. Territorial separation and economic freefall Since the independence of South Sudan in 2011, Sudan’s economy has been experiencing a freefall as the bulk of its oil and government revenues withered away almost overnight. Currency depreciation, hyperinflation and dwindling foreign currency reserves coupled with the rise in the prices of good and a banking crisis with severe cash supply shortages, have all contributed to the economic crisis. -
How to Implement Sudan's New Peace Agreement
The Rebels Come to Khartoum: How to Implement Sudan’s New Peace Agreement Crisis Group Africa Briefing N°168 Khartoum/Nairobi/Brussels, 23 February 2021 What’s new? A peace agreement signed on 3 October 2020 paves the way for armed and unarmed opposition groups in Sudan to join the transitional government, dra- matically expanding representation of the country’s peripheries during the interim period before elections. The two most powerful rebel movements remain outside the accord, however. Why does it matter? Clinching the agreement was necessary for the country’s transition but implementation poses challenges. The agreement risks bloating the military and sets up a prospective political alliance between the rebels and Sudanese security forces, which could further sideline the government’s civilian cabinet and threaten to bury its reform agenda. What should be done? The interim government should negotiate with holdout rebels to bring them into the transition. Sudan’s international partners should press for security sector reform that decreases the size and political dominance of a newly expanded military while funding and supporting the authorities’ spending commit- ments in the peripheries. I. Overview Sudan’s October 2020 peace agreement, involving the interim government and rebel movements in Darfur and the Two Areas, among others, is an important step in the country’s transition after the ouster of former President Omar al-Bashir. The deal allows for representatives from armed groups in the country’s peripheries to take government posts and for significant public money to go to these areas. It is a way to rebalance the Nile Valley elites’ decades-long domination of Sudan’s political system. -
SUDAN: West Darfur State UNHCR Presence and Refugee & IDP Locations
A A A SUDAN: West Darfur State UNHCR presence and refugee & IDP locations As of 18 Sep 2019 Ardamata #B A #BEl Riad Tandubayah BAbu Zar Sigiba El Geneina#C# #BAl Hujaj Girgira #BJammaa #BKrinding 1 & 2 Mastura\Sania WEST DARFUR #BKrinding 2 Dankud #B Kaidaba KULBUS Falankei Wadi Bardi village #B Kul#bus Abu Rumayl #B Bardani NORTH DARFUR Selea #B Istereina Aro Shorou Taziriba Hijeilija#B Gosmino #B Manjura A #B JEBEL MOON Ginfili Ngerma Djedid Abu Surug SIRBA #B Sirba Melmelli Armankul Abu Shajeira #B B # Bir Dagig Hamroh #B Kondobe #B Kuka WEST DARFUR A Kurgo CHAD Sultan house Birkat Tayr Kawm Dorti #B Abd Allah El RiadAro daBmata Abu #Zar A Jammaa B #B #Krinding 1 & 2 Al Hujaj #BC# #BBB Kaira Krinding 2## Derjeil El Geneina Kreinik EL GENEINA #B KREINIK A Geneina Goker #B DogoumSisi Nurei #B Misterei A #B A Kajilkajili Hagar Jembuh Murnei Kango Haraza Awita #B o #B A Ulang ZalingeiC# EGYPT SAUDI BEIDA Chero Kasi ARABIA LIBYA Zalingei Tabbi Nyebbei HABILA R Kortei e d S Red Sea e Arara a Beida town Northern Beida #B #B Arara AlwadiHabila Madares Nur Al Huda village River Nile #BBC# CHAD Al Salam# North A UNHCR office Darfur Khartoum Kassala Habila North ERITREA Kordofan Refugee Sites Futajiggi West El Gazira Darfur White Gedaref Sala + Lor CENTRAL DARFUR Nile POC IDP camp/sites Central West Sennar #B Darfur Kordofan Blue #B South Nile C# Refugee settlement South East Kordofan Darfur Darfur ETHIOPIA D Crossing point SOUTH SUDAN Main town Secondary town Seilo o Airfields FORO BARANGA SOUTH DARFUR Boundaries & Roads Mogara International boundary Foro Burunga State boundary #BC# Goldober Locality boundary Foro Baranga Primay road A Secondary road 5km The boundaries and names shown and the designations used on this map do not imply official endorsement or acceptance by the United Nations. -
Sudan (Annual Programme)
Sudan (Annual programme) Main objectives UNHCR's main objectives in Sudan were to pursue recognition of refugee rights through strengthening of the asylum sys- tem; ensure protection and assistance to urban and camp-based refugees; seek Sudan durable solutions for refugees by facilitat- ing voluntary repatriation; resettle those who cannot be locally integrated; reha- bilitate the infrastructure and the envi- ronment in and around closed and vacated camps and improve livelihoods of refugees and host communities; pro- mote gender equality among refugees, returnees, and within host communities; and implement policy priorities on the needs of women, older refugees, and chil- dren including adolescents. Impact • As a result of capacity building and training provided to the Office of the Commissioner for Refugees (COR) and local authorities, 95 per cent of asylum applications were processed without delays; there was a sharp fall in the number of reported cases of refoulement; and the regional COR office in Kassala assumed management of the asylum reception centre as well as responsibility for refugee between the host population and the remaining status determination (RSD) processing in eastern refugee groups. Sudan. • Provision of food, basic medical and other services in refugee camps kept malnutrition, morbidity and mor- Working environment tality rates at minimum levels. • With no prospect of local integration, 508 people The context were resettledin Australia, Canada and the Netherlands. In 2005, UNHCR continued to work in a politically vola- • Two refugee camps (Wad Hileau and Um Ali) were tile environment in eastern Sudan. The opposition par- closed, rehabilitated and handed over to state author- ties in the eastern states of Sudan felt excluded from the ities. -
The Sudan Flood Impact Rapid Assessment
The Sudan 2020 Flood impact rapid assessment September 2020 A joint assessment with the Government of the Sudan The boundaries and names shown and the designations used on the map(s) in this information product do not imply the expression of any opinion whatsoever on the part of FAO concerning the legal status of any country, territory, city or area or of its authorities, or concerning the delimitation of its frontiers and boundaries. Dashed lines on maps represent approximate border lines for which there may not yet be full agreement. Cover photo: ©FAO The Sudan 2020 Flood impact rapid assessment September 2020 A joint assessment with the Government of the Sudan Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations Rome, 2020 Assessment highlights • Torrential rains and floods combined with the historical overflow of the River Nile and its tributaries caused devastating damages to agriculture and livestock across the Sudan. In the rainfed agriculture sector, around 2 216 322 ha of the planted area was flooded, representing 26.8 percent of cultivated areas in the 15 assessed states. • The production loss due to the crop damage by floods is estimated at 1 044 942 tonnes in the rainfed areas. Sorghum – which is the main staple food in the country – constitutes about 50 percent of the damaged crops, followed by sesame at about 25 percent, then groundnut, millet and vegetables. • The extent of the damage to planted areas in the irrigated sector is estimated at 103 320 ha, which constitutes about 19.4 percent of the total cultivated area. The production loss is under estimation.