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Captain Confirms Attack in Tonkin 'A Very Nice Day' Continued From Page 1, Col. 7 e were cruising in our as- CAPTAIN CONFIRMS sage made public this week by signed patrol track in the vicin- Senator Wayne Morse, Demo- ity Of Hon Me island," Captain Hertick said. "It was mid-day. crat of Oregon, was an order to A mery nice day. Personnel ATTACK IN TONKIN his ships. were topside sunbathing and The message, as published by enjoYing themselves/ Mr. Morse, said: "The above We got a repor of a radar Commander of 2 Destroyers patrol will (A) clearly demon- contact, I think t ree PT-boats strate our determination to con- and a all o r is what it Denies Any Provocation appeared . They proceeded tinue these,operations. (B) Pos- south. We paid them very lit- in the 1964 Incidents sibly draw NVN (North Viet- tle mind. We expected both I. 44 Fed 4ff namese Navy) PGMS. (patrol Navy and junk traffic up there." He said that an _hour or two By United Press International boats) to northward away from area of 34A-OPS. (C) eliminate later the boats appeared to be WASHINGTON, Feb. 23—The on an "intercept course" at commander of the two United De Soto patrol interference with speeds of 40 to 50 knots. The States destroyers in the 1964 34A-OPS." Maddox sounded general quar- Gulf of Tonkin incident said The designation "34A-OPS" ters and got up more steam. • tonight that his ships were def- referred to South Vietnamese "They continued to close. naval bombardment of some We began to surmise that their initely attacked by the North intent was hostile." Vietnamese and he denied that North Vietnamese islands. The Maddox radioed the air- the attacks were provoked. Senator Morse said on The Tonkin incident led to Wednesday the cable had been sent by Admiral Thomas H. the first United States bombing Moorer, then United States raids against North Vietnam naval commander in the Pacific, and an overwhelming Con- to the Maddox. gressional approval of a reso- But Captain Herrick and Ad- lution requested by President ministration. officials said Ad- craft carrier Ticonderoga, which Joy astern. The lead boat kept Johnson in support of his war miral Moorer had actually sent dispatched planes. 1closing. They got into range it -to his superior, Adm. U. S. Captain Herrick authorized around 6,000 yards. They made policy. -Grant Sharp, . comander of all a sort of button-hook turn away Critics of the war, particular- the skipper of the Maddox to United States forces in the Pa- fire a warning shot if the boats from the Turner Joy. The ly the Senate Foreign Relations cific area. came within 10,000 yards. They Turner Joy was convinced she Committee, have questioned the There had been a suggestion did and the warning was fired, was under torpedo attack and Administration version of what after the Maddox incident Aug. he said. commenced firing at the boat." happened. 2 that the destroyer patrols The Maddox at this time "They continued in without picked up torpedo noises on Senator J. W. Fulbright, Ar- should leave the area. Admiral hesitating at all, and we com- Moorer's cable recommended to her sonar. For what seemed "a kansas Democrat who is chair- Admiral Sharp that the patrols menced fire to hit." number of hours"—he no longer man of the committee, has ac- The captain said torpedoes recalls exact times — Captain be moved in location but that observed cused the Administration of they be continued for the three were fired and "we- Herrick said the boats "seemed suppressing information that purposes he outlined. one that passed close to the to make multiple attacks." He Maddox." He said that the boats said sonar heard "a number of casts doubt on whether the de- Officials said the message had turned under the destroyer's stroyers were attacked. Others been sent by Admiral Sharp to torpedoes." . the Joint Chiefs of Staff, who stern and fired machine guns. Defense Secretary Robert S. have said that the destroyers did not approve it. They said The planes from the Ticondero- McNamara has -described in tes- provoked the North Vietnamese it never became an order. ga were authorized to open fire timony before Senator Ful- into attacking them. and did, Captain Hevrick said, bright's committee how naval Informational Message and the incident ended with one `No Doubt' of Attack authority ashore had some Copies of the message were boat apparently dead in the doubt about the validity of the Capt. John J. Herrick, 47 sent for informational purposes water, and another of the boats sonar contacts and sought con- years old, of Warren, Minn., to both the Maddox and Turner apparently towing-the third.- firmation. who was aboard the destroyer Joy. Captain Herrick said he Headed Into Gulf Captain Herrick said that as Maddox and in command of her did not really remember receiv- far as he was concerned the ing it and he would not have Captain Herrick said the Aug. only doubts were "as to number and the destroyer Turner Joy, been impressed by it since it 4 incident began late in the —I had no doubts of the initial said in an interview that there was not an order. day. The ships had been patrol- ones and I had no doubts that could be "no doubt" that his The captain said there was ling along the coast and were r imerous ones were torpedoes." never any doubt aboard the heading out into the center of ships were attacked. the Tonkin Gulf, he said. They The captain said the Maddox Captain Herrick denied a ships that sonar reports showed entered the Gulf of Tonkin the torpedo firings. The only doubts, intercepted the radio message charge by Senator Wayne indicating a planned attack. previous July 31. He said the he said, were over how many primary mission was "surveil- Morse, Democrat of Oregon, torpedoes had been fired. They picked up radar contacts, which seemed to be some boats lance of North Vietnamese that the mission of the ships He also said it "never oc- junks and any other naval or was to "stimulate" North Viet- curred" to him that he was `:waiting to spring a trap on us after nightfall." merchant traffic in the area." 1 namese radar or radios into ac- acting as a "decoy" or luring He said another purpose was I North Vietnamese boats north, The same precautions were tivity. and had denied he was. He said taken—general quarters and to "conduct passive intercepts" I. "I don' ow how yo would he had heard the term "34 firing up additional boilers to of radio and radar emissions stimu e an electronic reac- Alpha," which was used to de- make more steam, and the from North Vietnamese. tion,' he said. He said his ship scribe South Vietnamese naval ships change course. Before starting the mission, "We wanted to determine if he said, the Maddox took on carrie only "passive" radio bombardment of North Viet- board_additional radios, so that equipme h coul, y lis- namese islands "but I had no these people were just sitting prior knowledge of what they there or if they were going to she would be able to monitor ten, he said. did." follow us." more frequencies. The naval officer, now sta- Did his ships ''provoke" at- Darkness was falling and it The patrols, he said, were tioned in the Norfolk, Va., area, tacks on thernsel. became a cloudy, overcast night. routine and dull. denied that a secret Navy mes- "No," the e. ptain said. "As From here 6n, what Captain "You had a track to follow, a matter o act it started out Herrick observed weer through a slow track. You would do it Continued on Page 4, Column 3 as a sor of a Sunday cruise. the eyes and Pears of radar and all at seven or eight knots. You People ere waving at junks sonar, have time to loll around. We as th went by. Everything "As we, changed the course probabl had a was • rene until the afternoon the boats repositioned, or swi mg .party over and if of th second of August." closed on , us, and we tracked it [the Aug. 2 incident] adn't T s was the day of the first them on in. There seemed 'to happened." atta involving only the Mad- be some boats which tracked dox un to 40 knots and others far- ther away at slower speeds. "(Owl two ships were ap- nroximatelv in column, with the Maddox ahead and the Turner .
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