Armies and Influence: Public Deference to Foreign Policy Elites Tyler Jost⇤ and Joshua D. Kertzer† Last modified: January 20, 2021 Abstract: When is the public more likely to defer to elites on foreign policy? Existing research suggests the public takes its cues from co-partisans, but what happens when co-partisans disagree? Drawing on research on the social origins of trust, we argue that the public prioritizes information from elites who signal expertise through prior experience. However, di↵ering social standing of government institutions means the public values some types of experience more than others, even when the experience lies outside the policy domain of the cue. Using a conjoint experiment, we show that the American public defers to cue-givers with experience — but that it is especially deferential towards military experience, even on non-military issues. We replicate our findings in a second conjoint experiment showing that the same dynamics hold when considering partisan candidates for cabinet positions. The results have important implications for the study of public opinion, bureaucratic politics, and civil-military relations. ⇤Assistant Professor, Department of Political Science, Brown University. Email: tyler
[email protected]: http://www.tylerjost.com †Professor of Government, Department of Government, Harvard University. 1737 Cambridge St, Cambridge MA 02138. Email:
[email protected]:http://people.fas.harvard.edu/˜jkertzer/ In January 2017, three nominees for senior positions in the Trump administration — James Mattis, Rex Tillerson, and Mike Pompeo — publicly testified before Congress. On issues ranging from the Iran deal, to the ban on immigrants from a set of Muslim-majority countries, to US defense policy toward Russia, the nominees o↵ered policy assessments and recommendations that not only di↵ered from President Trump, but also from one another.1 Long after these confirmation hearings ended, commentators continue to note that the Trump cabinet has been filled with an array of dissenting voices.