COUNTRY REPORT

Côte d'Ivoire Mali

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3rd quarter 1999

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Contents

3 Summary

Côte d’Ivoire

5 Political structure 6 Economic structure 7 Outlook for 1999-2000 10 Review 10 The political scene 11 Economic policy 12 The economy 13 Agriculture 15 Mining 16 Energy 16 Transport 17 Health 17 Finance 18 Foreign trade and payments

Mali

21 Political structure 22 Economic structure 23 Outlook for 1999-2000 25 Review 25 The political scene 28 Economic policy 29 The economy 31 Agriculture 31 Mining 32 Manufacturing 32 Transport 33 Foreign trade and payments

35 Quarterly indicators and trade data

List of tables

9 Côte d’Ivoire: forecast summary 12 Côte d’Ivoire: inflation 13 Côte d’Ivoire: cocoa prices

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14 Côte d’Ivoire: grinding capacity 18 Côte d’Ivoire: external trade 19 Côte d’Ivoire: Franco-Ivorian trade 24 Mali: forecast summary 25 Mali: results of municipal elections, 1998 29 Mali: proposed ESAF performance targets 30 Mali: gross domestic product 31 Mali: consumer prices 31 Mali: performance of the Sadiola mine 33 Mali: impact of a proposed free-trade area with the EU, 2005-17 34 Mali: external debt 35 Côte d’Ivoire: quarterly indicators of economic activity 35 Mali: quarterly indicators of economic activity 36 Côte d’Ivoire: foreign trade 37 Mali: foreign trade 38 Côte d’Ivoire and Mali: French trade

List of figures

9 Côte d’Ivoire: gross domestic product 9 Côte d’Ivoire: CFA franc real exchange rates 12 Côte d’Ivoire: consumer prices 13 Côte d’Ivoire: industrial production 13 Côte d’Ivoire: world cocoa prices 17 Côte d’Ivoire: BRVM 24 Mali: gross domestic product 24 Mali: CFA franc real exchange rates 30 Mali: inflation 34 Mali: external debt

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July 1st 1999 Summary

3rd quarter 1999

Côte d’Ivoire Outlook for 1999-2000: Relations between the ruling PDCI and one of its main rivals, the RDR, are likely to deteriorate in the run-up to legislative and presidential elections in 2000. However, the appearance of divisions within the opposition may encourage President Konan Bédié to make some concessions, although social unrest is still a possibility. Relations with the IMF will remain difficult. Real GDP growth should average 5% in 1999 and 2000. Subdued inflation and the unexpected weakness of the euro, to which the CFA franc is linked, will help Ivorian exports in 1999 and maintain a narrow current- account deficit.

Review: Negotiations between the government and the opposition RDR have collapsed, following President Konan Bédié’s rejection of demands for electoral reform. The RDR’s preferred presidential candidate, Alassane Dramane Ouattara, will take over the party leadership in August, but it remains uncertain whether he will be allowed to stand. Students have gone on strike, as have civil servants. Talks have resumed with the IMF. The government has agreed to several conditions for the release of further money, including an audit of public finances. Year-on-year inflation has continued to fall. The drop in world cocoa prices has prompted the government to call for more local processing. A lower coffee crop is expected for 1998/99, but sugar output will reach record levels. Falling world gold prices have slowed down the privatisation of mines, although further developments are planned. The privatisation of the national petroleum refinery SIR has been approved, and new oil and gas agreements have been signed. The government has provided support to the ailing Air Ivoire. An AIDS treatment project has been launched. The BRVM’s performance has remained subdued, despite the inauguration of a satellite link and the successful launch of a government bond. The trade surplus increased in 1998 to CFAfr828bn, while the government has promoted trade with UEMOA countries and France. Brady bonds have reportedly been bought back by the government.

Mali Outlook for 1999-2000: New efforts to promote the decentralisation of power could ease tensions between the government and the radical opposition and improve the prospects for political stability. However, recently elected local councils will have to prove themselves to be effective instruments of govern- ment. Real GDP growth is expected to remain at 5% in 1999-2000, while annual average inflation should fall below 3%.

Review: A second round of voting in municipal elections has been marred by a boycott by the radical opposition, but otherwise it passed off peacefully. The ruling Adema party has won control of most councils. A Civic Forum has been established to try to help resolve the continuing political stalemate between the government and supporters of the radical opposition. President Konaré has proposed reforms for the justice system. Regional diplomacy has featured strongly on the government’s agenda. Discussions with the IMF for a new

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funding agreement have begun, following the conclusion in March of a three-year ESAF deal. Parliament has finally adopted tax reforms, including the introduction of VAT. Real GDP growth fell to about 4.6% in 1998. Prices have remained stable since January. Rice production increased to record levels in 1998/99. The Sadiola Hill gold mine exceeded all targets in 1998, although the gold yield is expected to decline this year. Another mine at Yatela is to be developed. An EU study has found that free trade with Europe would have a negative effect on Mali. The country’s stock of external debt has remained stable since 1996 at around $3bn.

Editor: Antony Goldman All queries: Tel: (44.20) 7830 1007 Fax: (44.20) 7830 1023 Next report: Our next Country Report will be published in October

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Côte d’Ivoire

Political structure

Official name République de Côte d’Ivoire

Form of state Unitary republic

Legal system Based on the 1960 constitution and the Code Napoléon

National legislature Assemblée nationale; 175 members elected by universal suffrage for a five-year term

National elections October 1995 (presidential) and November 1995 (legislative); next elections due by October 2000 (presidential) and November 2000 (legislative)

Head of state Henri Konan Bédié, elected in October 1995

National government The prime minister and his appointed Council of Ministers; last reshuffle August 1998

Main political parties Parti démocratique de Côte d’Ivoire (PDCI)—ruling party; Rassemblement des républicains (RDR); Front populaire ivoirien (FPI)

Prime minister Daniel Kablan Duncan

Key ministers Agriculture & animal husbandry Lambert Kouassi Konan Defence Bandama N’Gatta Economy & finance N’Goran Niamien Employment, civil service & social welfare Pierre Achi Atsain Higher education & scientific research Francis Wodié Justice & human rights Jean Kouakou Brou Mining & oil resources Lamine Fadika Presidential affairs & government spokesman Paul Akoto Yao Promotion of foreign trade Guy-Alain Gauze Transport Adama Coulibaly

Ministers of state Foreign affairs Amara Essy Interior & decentralisation Emile Constant Bombet National integration Laurent Dona-Fologo Relations with institutions Timothée Ahoua N’Guetta

President of the Assemblée nationale Emile Brou

Governor of the regional central bank (BCEAO) Charles Konan Banny

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Economic structure

Latest available figures

Economic indicators 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998a GDP at market prices (CFAfr bn) 4,136 4,988 5,479 6,003 6,662 Real GDP growth (%) 1.9 7.0 5.9 6.5 6.0 Consumer price inflation (av; %) 26.0 14.3 2.5 5.6 4.7b Populationc (mid-year; m) 13.4 13.7 14.0 14.3 14.6 Exports fob ($ m) 2,896 3,806 4,282 4,183 4,397d Imports fob ($ m) 1,607 2,430 2,452 2,373 2,542 Current-account balance ($ m) –13 –493 –67 35 33 Reserves excl gold ($ m) 204 529 606 618 856 Total external debt ($ bn) 17.4 18.9 19.5 15.6 15.0 External debt-service ratio, paid (%) 29.4 21.6 26.8 27.4 21.7 Cocoa productione (‘000 tonnes) 850 1,235 1,108 1,150 1,100 Coffee productione (‘000 tonnes) 140 180 320 230 160 Exchange rate (av; CFAfr:$) 555.2 499.2 511.6 583.7 590.0b

June 23rd 1999 CFAfr636.48:$1

Origins of gross domestic product 1996 % of total Components of gross domestic product 1997 % of total Agriculture, forestry & fishing 27.6 Private consumption 64.9 Services, transport & trade 39.0 Government consumption 10.6 Manufacturing & construction 15.7 Gross domestic investment 16.1 Public sector (incl taxes) 12.7 Exports of goods & services 42.5 Energy & petroleum 4.9 Imports of goods & services –34.1 GDP at market prices incl others 100.0 GDP at market prices 100.0

Principal exports 1997f % of total Principal imports 1997f % of total Cocoa & products 35.7 Industrial input 30.2 Petroleum & products 13.0 Consumer goods 26.3 Coffee & products 9.1 Other capital equipment 24.6 Timber & products 6.7 Fuel & lubricants 18.2

Main destinations of exports 1997 % of total Main origins of imports 1997 % of total Netherlands 16.6 France 28.5 France 15.3 Nigeria 19.6 Germany 7.2 US 5.5 US 6.2 Italy 4.6 Italy 5.3 Germany 3.9 a EIU estimates. b Actual. c UN estimates. d November actual. e Crop years beginning October 18th. f Institut national de la statistique (INS) figures.

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Outlook for 1999-2000

The government will seek The acrimonious collapse in May of negotiations between the government and to divide the opposition the opposition Rassemblement des républicains (RDR) over electoral reform is likely to set the tone for campaigning in the run-up to presidential and legis- lative elections, due in 2000. The government’s strategy towards the RDR, whose presidential candidate, Alassane Dramane Ouattara, is a former prime minister and arch-rival of the head of state, Henri Konan Bédié, is likely to remain markedly more uncompromising than that towards Côte d’Ivoire’s other main opposition party, the Front populaire ivoirien (FPI). Whereas the negotiations with the FPI at the end of 1998 ended with a substantial number of concessions that seemed to satisfy both sides, the negotiations that started in early 1999 with the RDR were conducted in a more hostile manner and failed to produce any concessions from the government. This contrast has succeeded in sharpening divisions within the opposition, reducing the prospect of a united front or an election boycott that might raise political tensions and undermine Côte d’Ivoire’s image as a stable democracy. It has also prompted speculation that the government’s real intention has been to portray the RDR, whose leader could present a serious challenge to the president, as a non-consensual party that would endanger the stability of the country. Mr Konan Bédié is therefore likely to try to portray his own Parti démocratique de Côte d’Ivoire (PDCI), which has been in power since independence 1960, as the best guarantee of political stability and economic progress.

and may adopt more Having secured its own concessions, the FPI is now likely to participate in the conciliatory tactics— forthcoming elections. However, the party lacks a wide base of popular support and its leader, Laurent Gbagbo, stands little chance in the presidential contest. This may please the conservative elements around Mr Konan Bédié, although moderates believe that only a more inclusive process will deliver the kind of credibility and legitimacy Côte d’Ivoire needs in order to continue to attract foreign direct investment. This constituency believes that with the opposition divided and the economy continuing to perform reasonably well, it may now be possible for the president to adopt a more conciliatory approach towards the RDR. Supporters of a more liberal line argue that in the absence of a comprehensive opposition alliance the party will present little real threat, Mr Ouattara’s personal qualities notwithstanding, because it lacks the resources available to the PDCI. Thus, if the political environment remains favourable, Mr Konan Bédié may be tempted to change the electoral code after all, including provisions that currently bar Mr Ouattara from standing for the presidency. Although this position carries some risks for the PDCI, it would allow the party to retain the political initiative and present a suitably liberal image for domestic and international consumption.

although the potential Although such a change to the electoral code could bring about credible for unrest remains elections, the violence that marred the 1995 polls also remains a possibility. For the moment, the risk of unrest on a scale that might destabilise the process seems remote. Nevertheless, student militancy is on the increase, and it was the national students’ union, the Fédération estudiantine et scolaire de Côte

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d’Ivoire (Fesci), which played an influential part in the protests in the early 1990s that triggered the country’s first multiparty elections. Fesci is now agitating for an improvement in education conditions and a lowering of the voting age from 21 to 18, which has triggered violent unrest in the commercial capital, , and other Ivorian towns. The government’s response so far has been restricted mainly to the use of force, which carries some danger of an escalation that might bring in other groups, including civil servants.

Relations with the IMF will In earlier times the government might have been able to buy off such dissent. remain difficult However, its margin for manoeuvre will remained constrained by the demands of the IMF, which holds the key to the disbursement of foreign assistance. The Fund, which has given the government no leeway with regard to policy implementation and performance targets in the run-up to next year’s elections, has delayed the release of the second tranche of a three-year enhanced structural adjustment facility (ESAF) since 1998. There are suspicions in government that the IMF’s lack of flexibility might reflect the influence of Mr Ouattara, who, in addition to his opposition credentials, will remain the deputy managing director of the IMF until he returns to take over the RDR leadership in August.

Indeed, earlier in the year President Konan Bédié delivered an angry outburst against the IMF which was widely interpreted as an expression of frustration at the Fund’s perceived political bias. While there seems little real substance to the government’s concerns, many of the reforms proposed by the IMF do go against the interests of a powerful, politically well-connected elite. Never- theless, the financial constraints operating on the government have prompted it to accede to a list of IMF demands, including an audit of public finances. The implementation of such measures may prove more difficult, however, and this could further postpone the disbursement of the second ESAF tranche.

Real GDP growth should Despite the government’s fiscal problems, the EIU continues to forecast a real average 5%— GDP growth rate of 5% in 1999-2000. Although world market prices for Côte d’Ivoire’s main commodity exports, cocoa and coffee, are expected to be weak, with relatively flat production over the forecast period, efforts by the government to encourage local processing are already adding value to cocoa and coffee exports, while oil exports will benefit from rising world prices. Growth will also be fuelled by continued strong investment, not only in agri- businesses and the energy sector, but also in construction. In addition, privatisation of several major companies, such as the national petroleum refinery company, the Société ivoirienne de raffinage (SIR), is likely to attract interest. Investment in infrastructure and pre-election spending will, however, help to push up imports, which are forecast to increase to $2.7bn in 1999 and $3bn in 2000, up from an estimated $2.5bn in 1998. Consumption is expected to remain high, particularly in the run-up to the 2000 elections, although public expenditure may be at least partially constrained by the demands of the IMF programme.

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—while the slide of the Ivorian exports are likely to benefit in 1999-2000 from subdued inflation and euro will benefit exports the unexpectedly weak performance of the euro, to which the CFA franc is pegged at CFA655.96:¤1 since its introduction in January. Inflation is now expected to average 4% in 1999, thanks to the constraints on public expenditure imposed by the IMF programme, before increasing slightly to 5% in 2000. The strength of the US economy and economic difficulties in the EU will contribute to an expected fall in the value of the euro, and therefore of the CFA franc, from an average of CFAfr590:$1 in 1998 to CFAfr632:$1 in 1999, although stronger growth in Europe in 2000 should contribute to a slight recovery to CFAfr623:$1 in 2000. This more competitive currency position should help boost exports, which are forecast to reach $4.25bn in 1999 and $4.3bn in 2000. Although the invisibles balance will continue to be burdened by debt repayments resulting from the 1998 agreement with the London Club of commercial creditors and growing outflows of workers’ remittances, the current-account deficit will widen only modestly to $50m in 1999 and to $100m in 2000.

Côte d’Ivoire: forecast summary ($ m unless otherwise indicated)

1997a 1998b 1999c 2000c Real GDP growth (%) 6.5 6.0 5.0 5.0 Consumer price inflation (av; %) 5.6 4.7a 4.0 5.0 Merchandise exports fob 4,183 4,397a 4,250 4,300 of which: cocoa & products 1,477 1,489 1,400 1,400 oil products 537 411 450 700 timber & products 276 290 280 270 coffee & products 375 415 400 300 Merchandise imports fob 2,373 2,542 2,700 3,000 Current-account balance 35 33 –50 –100 Exchange rate (av; CFAfr:$) 584 590a 632 623

a Actual. b EIU estimates. c EIU forecasts.

Côte d'Ivoire: gross domestic product Côte d'Ivoire: CFA franc real exchange % change, year on year rates (c) 1990=100 7 Côte d'Ivoire 130 Africa Naira:$ 6 120

5 110

4 100 3 90 2 Cedi:$ 80 1 70 0 1996 97 98(a) 99(b) 2000(b) 60 CFAfr:$ (a) EIU estimates. (b) EIU forecasts. (c) Nominal exchange rates adjusted for changes in relative consumer prices. Sources: EIU; IMF, International Financial Statistics; World 1990 91 92 93 94 95 96 97 97 98 98 99(b) 99 2000(b) 2000 Economic Outlook.

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Review

The political scene

Negotiations between Talks between the government and the opposition Rassemblement des the government and républicains (RDR) broke up in early May without an agreement on the the RDR fail conduct of presidential and legislative elections due in 2000. The RDR had demanded the establishment of an independent electoral commission, a more transparent ballot process and a lowering of the voting age from 21 to 18. Discussions focused in particular on regulations that would bar the RDR’s favoured presidential candidate, Alassane Dramane Ouattara, a former prime minister and currently the deputy managing director of the IMF, from standing (2nd quarter 1999, page 9).

Despite the unfavourable outcome of the talks, the RDR announced that it would name Mr Ouattara as president of the party at a special congress to be held in August. If the government fails to make further concessions, particularly with regard to residence requirements for presidential candidates which would disqualify the Washington-based Mr Ouatarra, the RDR may choose to boycott the elections. However, Côte d’Ivoire’s other main opposition party, the Front populaire ivoirien (FPI), reached its own agreement with the government on electoral reform in December (1st quarter 1999, page 11) and is therefore unlikely to follow suit.

Students take to After a lull of several months the powerful students’ union, the Fédération the streets— estudiantine et scolaire de Côte d’Ivoire (Fesci), has launched protests demanding improved access to scholarships, easier academic requirements and better accommodation. The student unrest started in the middle of March, prompting the government to close two universities in Abidjan and Bouaké. This failed to prevent further violence: a Malian retailer accused of abusing female students was lynched by a mob, a grenade exploded in the room of Fesci’s secretary-general, and in April looting took place in poorer neigh- bourhoods of Abidjan. Fesci condemned these acts, which it blamed on non- students. Violence subsided, however, when the government offered to set up another general consultation on education, similar to the one held in 1997, and talks began in May.

—as labour unrest spreads Prison wardens went on strike in April to protest against poor working conditions. Faced with a crumbling security environment, they accused the Ministry of the Interior of selling vehicles, which they argued were needed to transport prisoners. In May Abidjan’s dustmen spilled litter on the city’s streets and began an indefinite strike over their wage arrears. Protests of this kind have been prompted by the rising Treasury problems faced by the government, which have resulted in the late or non-payment of salaries to many public- sector employees (see Economic policy).

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The government claims In an effort to pre-empt criticism from the IMF of the government’s record on success in the war poverty alleviation, in April the planning minister, Tidjane Thiam, announced on poverty that efforts to reduce the rate of absolute poverty in Côte d’Ivoire from 36.7% in 1995 to less than 30% in 2000 were on track and had already yielded significant results. Mr Thiam pledged further investment in education, health, housing and job creation. He disclosed details of a public works programme for 1999 that will include the drilling of 1,848 wells in rural areas, the extensions of mains water supply to 24 new localities in urban areas and the rehabilitation and upgrading of 60,000 km of roads. The planning minister pointed out that in the 1999 budget spending on education increased by 9.7% to CFAfr343.5bn ($545.2m), while health expenditure rose by 12% to CFAfr88.3bn. Nevertheless, an IMF mission in May found fault with many elements of the government’s strategy. The IMF reported that barely half the 1,027 new classrooms and only four of 35 dispensaries promised by the government had actually been built.

Economic policy

Talks resume with Efforts have been made by the government to repair relations with the IMF the IMF— after a difficult period earlier in the year. A dispute arose when the president, Henri Konan Bédié, questioned the professionalism of Fund staff and implicitly accused the IMF of supporting the political agenda of his rival, Mr Ouattara, after the leaking of a confidential Fund report (2nd quarter 1999, page 12). The report criticised the slow progress made towards the implementation of policy reforms agreed as part of the SDR285m ($386m) three-year IMF enhanced structural adjustment facility (ESAF) in March 1998. While the source of such a politically damaging leak remains a matter of conjecture, the government’s financial reliance on the Fund is such that Mr Konan Bédié made formal apologies to the IMF’s managing director, , in April.

—and an agreement The IMF sent another mission to Abidjan in early May and the government is found— agreed to several measures (see box), including an audit of public finances. While the implementation of such measures will prove difficult, especially as elections approach, the incentives offered by the IMF are considerable, including the release of the second tranche of ESAF funding, $3.1bn in official aid ($1.2bn in debt rescheduling and $1.9bn from official bilateral and multilateral sources) and further debt relief.

—but political constraints In spite of its pledges to cut public expenditure, the government has recently remain announced measures which appear to be aimed more at appeasing the electorate than at complying with IMF requirements. On May 1st President Konan Bédié announced civil service salary increases ranging from 3.5% to 7% and the creation of 100,000 permanent jobs in next two years in the public sector. These pledges followed indications of increasing unrest in the public sector (see The political scene). However, the government is likely to find it hard to reconcile such commitments with its obligations to the IMF to reduce public expenditure and to meet debt-servicing requirements.

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Côte d’Ivoire: measures agreed with the IMF

• Increased compliance with agreed spending limits, by respecting a monthly ceiling of expenditure and strengthening procedures for checking and monitoring expenditure measures. At the same time, however, spending on health and education is to be increased.

• Improved revenue collection, by imposing a 5% customs duty on imports connected with projects governed by the investment code, recovering money owed to the state by operators in the cocoa and coffee sectors and cracking down on fraud in the oil products sector.

• An audit of the commercial operations of the state commodity marketing board, the Caisse de stabilisation des prix agricoles (Caistab) for the 1996-99 period is to be completed by the end of July. Caistab is being wound up in its present form, as the cocoa sector is to be liberalised in October 1999.

• An audit of government finances by two independent auditors, which will focus on the arrears and liabilities owed by the state, is to be completed by June. At the same time, internal and external arrears are not to be accumulated.

The economy

Inflation continues to fall Although prices for basic foodstuff increased by up to 30-35% in January- February (2nd quarter 1999, page 14), year-on-year inflation has continued to Côte d'Ivoire: consumer prices (a) decline and even fell below zero, to –0.6% in April on the Harmonised % change, year on year Consumer Price Index (IHPC). The fall was even more pronounced on the low- 12 income African workers’ index, the Indice des prix à la consommation (IPC),

10 where year-on-year inflation fell to –3.7% in March. This may indicate an

8 easing of the food shortages, and hence food prices, which account for a large

6 share of the index. This will make the government’s objective of bringing inflation down to 3% this year, compared with 4.7% in 1998, more attainable. 4

2 Côte d’Ivoire: inflation 0 (IHPC: 1996=100; IPC: 1992/93=100) a b -2 IHPC IPC

-4 Index % change Index % change Apr May Jun Jul Aug Sep OctNov Dec Jan Feb Mar 1998 99 1998 (annual average) n/a 4.7 167.5 6.4

(a) African workers' index. Jan n/a n/a 160.9 0.7 Source: Institut national de la statistique. Feb 109.0 1.3 159.7 –1.6 Mar 108.8 0.5 159.2 –3.7 Apr 108.9 –0.6 n/a n/a

a Indice harmonisé des prix à la consommation (new composite consumer price index). b Indice des prix à la consommation (index used is for African workers). Source: Institut national de la statistique.

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The government is The government has recently extended the build-operate-transfer (BOT) extending BOT schemes initiative to local, smaller-scale projects, which have usually been funded by the government or donors. BOT schemes were hitherto applied to more Côte d'Ivoire: industrial production important projects, which require the expertise of major international groups, 1984-85=100 particularly under the government’s “12 works” initiative. Such projects 180 include the development of electricity interconnectors to Guinea and Mali, the 170 construction of a highway from to Bouaké, the development of

160 an urban light rail network for Abidjan, as well as the construction of a toll

150 highway to Ghana. The Marcory toll bridge in Abidjan is already under construction by Bouygues, a French public-works company. 140

130 As far as the smaller projects are concerned, the government has identified 20 projects, most of them in provincial towns, which could be managed by BOT 120 schemes. The projects include the building of industrial zones, craft centres,

Feb Mar Apr May Jun Jul Aug Sep Oct NovDec Jan housing, car parks, urban waste treatment centres, sewerage systems and water 1998 99 distribution schemes. The government hopes that BOT initiatives will help to Source: Institut national de la statistique, Indices de production industrielle. reduce public spending and further strengthen the private sector. With elections approaching, investors are presently not overly keen to submit pro- posals. However, if the electoral process is completed without undue controversy, and as the terms of reference for the projects become more clearly defined, interest is likely to increase.

Agriculture

The price of cocoa, Côte d’Ivoire’s main commodity export, has fallen Côte d'Ivoire: world cocoa prices Cents/lb significantly on world markets since the beginning of the year, as production

80 has risen more rapidly than sluggish demand. The International Cocoa Organisation (ICCO) expects this trend towards depressed prices to continue 75 for another two years.

70 Côte d’Ivoire: cocoa prices (cents/lb) 65 1997 1998 1999 2000

60 Price 73.4 76.0 66.3 62.0 Sources: International Cocoa Organisation (ICCO); EIU.

55 1996. . . 97 . . . 98 . . .99(a). .2000(b) . ...

(a) Figures for 1999 are estimates. (b) Figures for 2000 The forecast fall in prices has important implications for Côte d’Ivoire, which are forecasts. Sources: ICCO; EIU, World Commodity Forecasts. produces some 40% of total global output and is the largest cocoa producer in the world. Indeed, it has been the consistent rise in prices and intensification of production since 1994 that has spurred Côte d’Ivoire’s impressive economic recovery in recent years.

Falling cocoa prices prompt The fall in cocoa prices has underlined the importance for Côte d’Ivoire of calls for more local guaranteeing sources of export revenue other than non-processed cocoa beans, processing— which accounted for 37% of exports in 1998. To mitigate the impact of the volatility of prices on global commodity markets, government policy is to raise the share of the annual cocoa crop (about 1m-1.2m tonnes) which is processed locally to at least 50% by end-2000. Prices for semi-finished cocoa products are more stable, as supply and demand trends are relatively stable, offering a more reliable source of earnings. Progress so far has been slow, and Côte d’Ivoire’s

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current grinding capacity is only 246,000 tonnes, prompting the prime minister, Daniel Kablan Duncan, to offer tax incentives in April to companies willing to increase their local processing. The government has also sought to improve quality control. The new Caisse de stabilisation des produits agricoles (Caistab) has already preselected two foreign companies, Société générale de surveillance and Kernelder, to ensure the quality control of Côte d’Ivoire’s cocoa and coffee production.

Côte d’Ivoire: grinding capacity (‘000 tonnes unless otherwise indicated) 1995/96 1996/97 1997/98 1998/99 Worldwide 2,916 2,711 2,683 2,707 Côte d’Ivoire 140 160 205 240 % share of total 4.8 5.9 7.6 8.9 Source: ICCO.

—which is increasing Although it is unlikely that the government will meet its target for 2000, exports of semi-finished cocoa products are increasing significantly, and in March 1999 they were 19% higher than a year earlier. Since 1994/95 total production has increased by over 70%. In addition to government incentives, cocoa companies are increasingly interested in processing cocoa beans locally to reduce production costs. Two companies have already laid their plans. Cargill has begun construction of a new plant, due for completion by 2000, which will add another 65,000 tonnes of processed cocoa beans to Côte d’Ivoire’s total production. Cargill has also expressed interest in Tropival (the Ivorian affiliate of one of the larger trading houses, ED&F Mann), which exports 84,000 tonnes of cocoa per year. In a further indication of the move towards more local value added in the cocoa sector, Callebaut (controlled by a Swiss group, Klaus Jacobs), which already processes 100,000 tonnes locally, intends to invest an additional $15m over a two-year period to increase its local grinding capacity.

A lower coffee crop A number of factors have prompted a sharp downward revision to the is expected government’s initially optimistic forecast for the 1998/99 coffee crop, which had been for 250,000 tonnes, to just 160,000 tonnes. First, an unexpected drought during the flowering season will reduce output. Second, coffee prices have been on a downward trend since 1997 as a result of stagnant world demand, which has deterred small producers from growing coffee crops this year and prompted them to switch instead to cocoa, which is a less demanding type of crop. Third, the quality of Ivorian coffee beans has been decreasing, pushing down the demand for coffee from this source; indeed, one of the main coffee buyers, Nestlé, has lowered its prices to producers while discarding more than 25% of its coffee purchases. This downturn is likely to have a significant impact on the economy. Côte d’Ivoire is the third largest coffee producer in the world, and coffee represents 9% of the country’s total exports by value.

EIU Country Report 3rd quarter 1999 © The Economist Intelligence Unit Limited 1999 Côte d’Ivoire 15

Sugar prospects look much Sugar production is expected to reach a new peak this year, increasing from a brighter— low of 110,000 tonnes in the 1997/98 season to 140,000 tonnes in 1998/99— the best figure for seven years, but still some 20,000 tonnes less than average annual consumption. Assuming normal weather patterns, output is likely to increase further, as ambitious development programmes by the country’s two privatised sugar companies take shape. Sucrivoire has a two-year plan to increase production from currently 70,000 tonnes/year (t/y) to 90,000 t/y, while Sucaf aims to increase output from 67,000 t/y to 110,000 t/y over the same period. If these targets are met, Côte d’Ivoire will become a net exporter of sugar by 2001.

—highlighting the success The forecast increase in sugar production highlights the success of the of privatisation privatisation of the former state-owned monopoly, Sodesucre, in August 1997. Two companies emerged from this privatisation, Sucrivoire and Sucaf. Sucrivoire’s two owners are the main cocoa and coffee exporter Sifca (29.5%) and a Mauritian company, Harel Frères (25.5%). The state still holds 25% of Sucrivoire’s capital, while the remaining 20% is to be sold on the local stock exchange by 2000. Sucaf is owned by the French group, Castel BGI. Sucrivoire has invested CFAfr13bn ($22m) since 1997 in the implementation of a better irrigation system and the purchase of modern equipment, while Sucaf has spent another CFAfr18bn. If this year’s crop is as successful as current forecasts indicate, Sucrivoire hopes to balance its budget by September 1999. Sucaf, however, which inherited older plants, will still have a deficit amounting to CFAfr850m in 1998/99.

Mining

Falling gold prices slows Falling prices for gold on world markets and the associated decline in investor privatisation of mines interest have contributed to the postponement of the proposed privatisation of Côte d’Ivoire’s two state-owned mining companies, Sodemi and Société des Mines d’Ity (SMI). In order to facilitate privatisation, the government now plans to break Sodemi’s service division into three new affiliates in which private partners can acquire stakes. These new affiliates are Cilab (analysis of mineral samples); Sagax Afrique (mining geophysics and hydrology) and Siemines (funding of small-scale mining industry). The sale of SMI remains on ice, following a lack of interest in the initial offer in late 1997 and a subsequent discounted offer in August 1998.

though further Other developments in the mining sector have been more positive. An developments are on Australian company, Hargraves Resources, has outlined a development the way programme for the 1,203 sq km Agbaou gold concession near Yamoussoukro, launching a take-over bid in late January for Agbaou’s owner, Diversified Mineral Resources. If the bid is successful, Hargraves plans to conduct an A$3m (US$2m) feasibility study on the prospects for opencast and underground mining on the concession, with potential production provisionally forecast at 120,000 oz/year, starting in 2001.

EIU Country Report 3rd quarter 1999 © The Economist Intelligence Unit Limited 1999 16 Côte d’Ivoire

Energy

The privatisation of SIR is The privatisation of the state-owned oil refinery, the Société ivoirienne de approved raffinage (SIR), is now scheduled for October 1999. Of the 30 companies that had been earmarked for privatisation in 1999-2000 (2nd quarter 1999, page 13), SIR is the largest. The privatisation of SIR will entail the sale of 37% of the state’s 48.6% share in the company. The main future shareholder will be asked to organise a rights issue of a further 8-10% of the company’s equity on the Abidjan-based regional stock exchange, the Bourse régionale des valeurs mobilières (BRVM). The remaining 1-2% of the shares are to be sold to SIR’s employees. Burkina Faso already holds 5.4% of SIR’s equity and the remaining 46% is shared between Total, Elf, Mobil, Shell and Texaco.

as the company escapes As the government was issuing details of the privatisation, on May 13th a disaster major fire broke out at a fuel storage facility in Abidjan belonging to the Gestion des stocks pétroliers de Côte d’Ivoire (Gestoci), adjacent to SIR in the Vridi port area of Abidjan. While facilities at the refinery were not damaged, the response to the incident reflects weaknesses in the industry’s emergency preparedness, which are likely to come under further close scrutiny in the course of the privatisation process. The fire took five days to bring under control and required the deployment of a specialist team from France. SIR appeared to lack an emergency plan and the necessary equipment for dealing with such a crisis.

Oil agreements are signed In late March Petroci-gaz, the state-owned gas production company, signed an agreement with the US-based Enron to set up a joint-venture company specialising in the construction of oil and gas pipelines. At the same time, Petroci-exploitation signed an agreement to create a joint-venture company with Galaxie West Africa, a consortium of companies specialising in the installation and maintenance of oil platforms and logistic bases. The Ivorian minister of mining and petroleum resources, Lamine Fadika, has announced an ambitious target to raise oil production from a current level of just 20,000 barrels/day to 200,000 b/d by 2005. This massive increase assumes early success in discovering large oil deposits in Côte d’Ivoire’s so far unproven deepwater sector. Despite some encouraging signs and pledges of development work by operators, there is—at least for the moment—relatively little evidence to support such an assumption, and the government’s target appears highly ambitious.

Transport

Air Ivoire receives a Following the failure of efforts last year to privatise the national airline, Air face-lift and Abidjan’s Ivoire (1st quarter 1999, page 17), a new initiative has been launched to airport expands increase the attractiveness of the debt-ridden company, which has 200 employees but only two aeroplanes, both of which are leased, and a very limited number of routes. In April the government announced that it would write off debts worth CFAfr8bn ($12.8m) owed by Air Ivoire to the state and to state-owned companies, and said that the airline would also be able to operate

EIU Country Report 3rd quarter 1999 © The Economist Intelligence Unit Limited 1999 Côte d’Ivoire 17

some routes presently allocated to Air Afrique, the regional airline in which the state also holds a stake. Later in May the government made available CFAfr250m to allow Air Ivoire to pay back part of the CFAfr748m owed to the Indonesian companies that own the planes, and said that it would try to reschedule the remaining part of the debt.

Also in May, the airline’s management introduced a number of cost-cutting measures, including a reduction in the frequency of flights on less profitable routes, the closure of several offices inside the country, and the slashing of budgets and privileges for Air Ivoire offices abroad. While these measures may improve efficiency, potential investors are likely to adopt a wait-and-see approach before displaying serious interest in the company.

The annual capacity of Abidjan’s international airport should increase from 1.2m passengers to 2m when a redevelopment programme is completed in October 2000. The total cost is expected to be CFAfr21bn ($33m) and is being financed by the airport’s French management company—which is an affiliate of the Marseilles airport management company—the Agence française de développement, the European Investment Bank and the Banque ouest-africaine de développement. Abidjan’s airport already handles much of the air traffic in the region, and further expansion will consolidate its position.

Health

An AIDS treatment project In May France and Côte d’Ivoire presented a joint initiative to the UN World is launched Health Organisation (WHO) for the prevention and treatment of HIV/AIDS in developing countries. In 1997 the two countries set up a solidarity fund, which seeks not only to prevent the spread of the disease but also to offer available therapies to countries that cannot otherwise afford them, with priority accorded to pregnant women. Côte d’Ivoire was one of the first countries to benefit from the new fund. In April 1999, 500 people were selected to receive anti-retroviral treatment for a period of two years. Côte d’Ivoire has the highest recorded HIV infection rate in West Africa, according to UNAIDS, the UN agency co- ordinating the fight against the disease, with an estimated 10% of the adult population carrying the virus in 1997. The number of people with tuberculosis, Côte d'Ivoire: BRVM Composite index; end-week which is often associated with the earlier stages of HIV infection, also increased

115 from 7,000 in 1988 to 14,200 in 1997; of these, 50% are HIV positive.

110 Finance

105 The long-awaited satellite-link between the Bourse régionale des valeurs

100 mobilières (BRVM) and its affiliates in six other member countries of the Union économique et monétaire ouest-africaine (UEMOA) was finally established at 95 the end of March. Since the BRVM opened in September 1998, brokers outside its Abidjan headquarters have had to fax orders over unreliable land lines,

Sep Oct Nov Dec Jan Feb Mar Apr May Jun while the data were then fed manually into the BRVM’s electronic pricing 1998 99 system. The satellite system enables brokers in the exchange’s seven member Source: Marchés tropicaux et méditerranéens. states to see orders arriving in real time and act accordingly. The installation of

EIU Country Report 3rd quarter 1999 © The Economist Intelligence Unit Limited 1999 18 Côte d’Ivoire

the satellite system has given a temporary boost to trading volumes, as did the listing of a new company, the Ivorian industrial gases company (SIVOA), which is partly owned by the French company, Air Liquide. BRVM officials hope that the satellite system will eventually bring more activity, liquidity and transparency to the fledgling market, which has struggled to regain the 100-point mark at which it began trading in September 1998.

Government bonds are The government launched a public bond offer of CFAfr15bn ($24m) on the launched on the BRVM BRVM in May. It was the first fixed-income offer on the BRVM and was oversubscribed, reaching an amount of CFAfr22.2bn. The bond pays 8% net annual interest over three years and is to finance public investment. The government had already successfully issued this type of bond three years ago on the BRVM’s predecessor, the Bourse des valeurs d’Abidjan (BVA). By offering the bond on the BRVM, the government hopes to attract investors from other members of the UEMOA and, more immediately, to solve its current financing difficulties, which have been compounded by delays in the disbursement of the second tranche of the IMF’s enhanced structural adjustment facility (ESAF) loan (see Economic policy).

Foreign trade and payments

The trade surplus increased According to figures released by the Institut national de la statistique (INS), the in 1998 merchandise trade surplus increased by 1.8% to CFAfr828bn ($1.3bn) in 1998, from CFAfr813m in 1997. Cocoa exports rose by 12.3% to CFAfr969m, as average cocoa prices were up by 18.8% over the year, offsetting a 5% fall in the volume exported, according to the INS. Altogether, cocoa and coffee earnings increased by 11% to CFAfr1.2trn, equivalent to 46.4% of total exports. Oil was the second biggest export after cocoa, but fell by 18.9%, in line with world prices to CFAfr254bn.

Côte d’Ivoire: external trade 1997 1998 CFAfr bn % share CFAfr bn % share % change Total exports (fob) 2,413.2 100.0 2,592.6 100.0 7.4 of which: cocoaa 862.2 35.7 968.5 37.4 12.3 oil 313.7 13.0 254.4 9.8 –18.9 coffee 218.8 9.1 234.5 9.0 7.2 timber 160.8 6.7 183.2 7.1 13.9 tuna 124.2 5.1 119.4 4.6 –3.9 Total imports (cif) 1,599.8 100.0 1,764.6 100.0 10.3 of which: industrial input 482.9 20.0 578.1 22.3 19.7 capital goodsb 393.9 16.3 426.2 16.4 8.2 consumer goods 352.5 14.6 420.1 16.2 19.2 food & beverages 293.9 12.2 346.2 13.4 17.8 fuel & lubricants 291.2 12.1 260.4 10.0 –10.6 Trade balance 813.4 828.0 1.8 – –

a Processed and unprocessed. b Including transport equipment. Source: Institut national de la statistique, Tableau de bord, Abidjan.

EIU Country Report 3rd quarter 1999 © The Economist Intelligence Unit Limited 1999 Côte d’Ivoire 19

Imports grew more quickly, by 10.3% to CFAfr1.8bn, while volumes increased by 21.8 %. This reflects sustained economic activity, as imports of industrial inputs rose by 19.7% to CFAfr578m, while imports of consumer goods increased by 19.2% to CFAfr420bn. Last year’s drought also increased food and beverage imports, by 17.8% to CFAfr346bn, but the fall in world oil prices resulted in a 10.6% drop in fuel imports to CFAfr260bn.

The government is urged to The Salon de l’industrie ivoirienne (SALI), held in March in Abidjan, brought promote trade within together 70 companies from all major industrial sectors. At the fair the govern- UEMOA ment reiterated its desire to develop the manufacturing sector and bring the sector’s contribution to GDP to 30%, from 20% in 1997 and only 13% in 1993. Since the Ivorian market is relatively limited, the Fédération nationale des industries et services de Côte d’Ivoire (Fnisci), which brings together 270 companies, has lobbied the government actively to encourage exports to other African countries, particularly UEMOA countries. Fnisci wanted to accelerate the process of integration into a UEMOA common market by establishing common external tariff rules, the co-ordination of economic policies, the facili- tation of the free circulation of goods, people, and capital, and the introduction of an efficient system against fraud, which is a major threat to integration.

and France In June President Konan Bédié led a delegation comprising representatives from industry and Caistab to a trade fair in the French industrial city of Lyon. By increasing Côte d’Ivoire’s participation at such events, Mr Konan Bédié hopes to promote his country’s exports, particularly exports of finished and semi-finished products, such as processed cocoa and coffee. In 1998, 90% of total French imports from Côte d’Ivoire were food products, of which 48% were processed, against 41% in 1997. France is still Côte d’Ivoire’s main trading partner and has traditionally run a trade surplus with its former colony. Unofficial figures indicate that the surplus increased nearly fivefold in 1998. While this imbalance will provide further impetus to the government’s initiative, there are few indications of a fundamental realignment of trading patterns in the short to medium term.

Côte d’Ivoire: Franco-Ivorian trade (FFr m unless otherwise indicated) 1997 1998 % change French exports to Côte d’Ivoire 4,590 5,366 16.9 French imports from Côte d’Ivoire –4,523 –4,980 10.1 Balance 67 386 476.1 Source: Marchés tropicaux et méditerranéens.

Brady bonds are In May the Reuters news agency reported that the Ivorian government has bought back repurchased Brady-style bonds issued as part of the 1998 restructuring agreement with the London Club of commercial creditors. Details of the new deal have remained shrouded in secrecy. According to one report quoting an unnamed official at the Ivorian ministry of finance, around $300m of the bonds were bought from one or two institutions. However, secondary market traders have said they have seen no movement in the market to suggest that the Ivorian government had been buying back Brady bonds of that size, while

EIU Country Report 3rd quarter 1999 © The Economist Intelligence Unit Limited 1999 20 Côte d’Ivoire

donors maintain that the government does not have the funds to conduct such a buyback. A spokesman for the Banque Nationale de Paris (BNP) in Paris, which was the lead bank in the London Club negotiations, said that he was not aware of the operation, although such a buy-back and cancellation was possible under the 1998 agreement.

Aid news • Japan has disbursed CFAfr5.2bn ($8.3m) as part of a CFAfr14bn grant signed in 1997 to build a total of 390 classrooms. Most are to be built in the poorer neighbourhoods of Abidjan.

• China has granted CFAfr780m to the Institut national polytechnique Félix Houphouët-Boigny (INP-FHB) in Yamoussoukro to develop an important agro- industrial research unit, which will sustain the training, research and production activities of the students from the agronomy school, the Ecole supérieure d’agronomie. This centre represents the largest Chinese educational investment in Africa.

EIU Country Report 3rd quarter 1999 © The Economist Intelligence Unit Limited 1999 Mali 21

Mali

Political structure

Official name République du Mali

Form of state Unitary republic

Legal system A new constitution was approved by referendum in January 1992

National elections April 1997 (legislative), later annulled and re-run in July-August 1997. May 1997 (presidential). Next elections (legislative and presidential) due in 2002

Head of state President, currently Alpha Oumar Konaré, elected by universal suffrage

National government The prime minister and his appointed Council of Ministers; the current government, appointed in September 1997, is dominated by Adema

Main political parties Alliance pour la démocratie au Mali (Adema, the ruling coalition). Other parties represented in the cabinet include the Parti de la renaissance nationale (Parena); Rassemblement national pour la démocratie (RND); Parti pour la démocratie et le progrès (PDP); Union pour la démocratie et le développement (UDD). The main opposition alliance is the Collectif des partis politiques de l’opposition (COPPO). It includes the Mouvement patriotique pour le renouveau (MPR); Rassemblement pour la démocratie et le progrès (RDP); Union soudanaise-Rassemblement démocratique africain (US-RDA); Congrès national d’initiative démocratique (CNID); Mouvement pour l’indépendance, la renaissance et l’intégration africaine (MIRIA)

Prime minister Ibrahim Boubacar Keïta

Key ministers Armed forces & veterans Salia Sokona Culture & tourism Anata Dramane Traoré Economy, planning & African integration El Madani Diallo Employment, works & civil service Ousmane Oumarou Sudibé Environment Mohamed Ag Erlaf Finance Soumaïla Cissé Foreign affairs & Malians abroad Commandant Modibo Sidibé Industry, commerce & handicrafts Fatou Touré Haïdara Justice Amidou Diabaté Mining & energy Yoro Diakité Primary education Adama Samassékou Public works & transport Ibrahim Siby Rural development & water Modibo Traoré Secondary & higher education, & scientific research Younouss Hamèye Dicko Territorial administration & security Lieutenant-Colonel Sada Samaké Governor of the regional central bank (BCEAO) Charles Konan Banny

EIU Country Report 3rd quarter 1999 © The Economist Intelligence Unit Limited 1999 22 Mali

Economic structure

Latest available figures

Economic indicators 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998a GDP at market prices (CFAfr bn) 978 1,187 1,321 1,432 1,599 Real GDP growth (%) 2.3 6.4 4.0 6.7 4.6b Consumer price inflation (av; %) 23.2 13.4 6.8 –0.4 4.0b Populationc (mid-year; m) 8.83 9.01 9.19 9.37 9.79 Exports fob ($ m) 335 442 434 562 590 Imports fob ($ m) 449 557 552 552 600 Current-account balance ($ m) –163 –284 –273 –178 –125 Reserves excl gold ($ m) 219 319 426 410 398b Total external debt ($ m) 2,694 2,957 3,006 2,954 2,986c External debt-service ratio, paid (%) 17.0 13.2 18.1 10.5 n/a Cotton productiond (‘000 tonnes) 293 406 452 561 522 Exchange rate (av; CFAfr:$) 555.2 499.2 511.6 583.7 590.0b

June 23rd 1999 CFAfr636.48:$1

Origins of gross domestic product 1998 % of total Components of gross domestic product 1998 % of total Agriculture 46.1 Private consumption 74.7 Industry 13.7 Government consumption 10.7 Manufacturing 7.2 Gross domestic investment 24.0 Services 33.0 Exports of goods & services 24.0 GDP at factor cost 100.0 Imports of goods & services –33.3 GDP at market prices 100.0

Principal exports 1997 $ m Principal imports 1997 $ m Raw & lint cotton 256 Machinery 199 Gold 174 Petroleum products 66 Livestock & products 48

Main destinations of exports 1997e % of total Main origins of imports 1997e % of total Thailand 20.3 Côte d’Ivoire 19.0 Italy 20.1 France 17.0 China 8.9 UK 3.7 Brazil 5.1 Belgium-Luxembourg 3.7 a EIU estimates. b Actual. c Government estimate. d Raw cotton; crop years beginning in calendar years. e Based on partners’ trade returns; subject to a wide margin of error.

EIU Country Report 3rd quarter 1999 © The Economist Intelligence Unit Limited 1999 Mali 23

Outlook for 1999-2000

Decentralisation may alter Prospects for political stability may improve following the successful the political landscape— completion of a second round of municipal elections, which took place in two stages in May and June. Although the radical opposition, grouped together under the banner of the Collectif des partis politiques de l’opposition (COPPO), decided to boycott the elections, many other parties chose to participate and won nearly 40% of the almost 10,000 council seats contested. This has helped to enhance the legitimacy of the process, despite the victories scored in most areas by the ruling Alliance pour la démocratie au Mali (Adema). The strong showing by the relatively minor, poorly resourced opposition parties that did take part may also encourage the radical opposition, which could hope to do even better, back into the constitutional fray. The relatively smooth organisation of the poll, free from the logistical difficulties, controversy and incident that have marred recent elections, will also enhance the credibility of the constitutional process. The municipal elections may, in addition, herald a shift away from Mali’s hitherto centralised political scene, dominated by the capital, Bamako, to a system that is more representative of such a geographically large and diverse—and still predominantly rural— country. However, it will take some time before the new local councils are able to operate properly, especially given the financial constraints most of them will face. Nevertheless, if the decentralisation process is successful, Mali will have a new layer of elected administration, which should strengthen its political structures and also improve the delivery of services in many isolated areas.

—and ease the political The municipal elections may also have the added benefit of easing the political impasse impasse that has developed in recent years between the government and COPPO. There is no doubt that COPPO’s member parties have been relatively marginalised by the success of the elections, since they now have no representation in either the parliament or in the local councils. Not only has the boycott deprived them of a legislative support base, but it has also severely restrained their ability financially to sustain themselves. Since the next legislative elections are not due before 2002, some parties belonging to COPPO may now be tempted to resume some sort of dialogue with the government. This is what a breakaway faction of the Union soudanaise-Rassemblement démocratique africain (US-RDA; one of COPPO’s main member parties) already did before the elections. In a further indication of the new potential for resolving the current impasse, a new political organisation, the Civic Forum, which includes members of both the opposition and the ruling alliance, has been set up. In addition, the success of the municipal elections may prompt the government to consider political reforms, which may meet some demands made by COPPO and present an opportunity for genuine dialogue.

The outlook for real GDP The government’s political difficulties are likely to be eased further by the growth is encouraging prospect of continued economic growth over the next few years. Negotiations are currently under way with the IMF for a new three-year enhanced structural adjustment facility (ESAF), which should be agreed before the end of 1999. However, the government’s target for real GDP growth in 1999 of 6% assumes

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highly favourable weather conditions, and for the moment the EIU maintains a more cautious forecast of an annual 5% real GDP growth in 1999-2000. Cotton export earnings are forecast to increase after a relatively disappointing performance in 1998, reflecting higher production, a recovery in world prices and a slow shift towards local processing. Although gold export earnings should increase only slightly in 1999-2000, the development of new sites, such as Iamgold’s Yatela, will attract more foreign direct investment (FDI) to the sector. Additional momentum to the government’s privatisation programme should also help promote FDI. Consumption will benefit from the government’s continued public investment programme and from robust growth in the agricultural sector in 1999/2000. This will also reduce inflationary pressures on food prices, and average year-on-year inflation is now set to fall from 4% in 1998 to 3% in 1999-2000.

Mali: forecast summary ($ m unless otherwise indicated)

1997a 1998b 1999c 2000c Real GDP growth (%) 6.7 4.6a 5.0 5.0 Consumer price inflation (av; %) –0.4 4.0a 3.0 3.0 Exports fob 562 590 640 640 of which: cotton 256 250 260 270 gold 174 220 230 240 Imports fob 552 600 650 700 Current-account balance–178 –125 –80 –60 Total external debt 2,954 2,986d 2,900 3,000 Average exchange rate (CFAfr:$) 584 590a 632 623

a Actual. b EIU estimates. c EIU forecasts. d Government estimate.

Mali: gross domestic product Mali: CFA franc real exchange rates (c) % change, year on year 1990=100 7 130 Mali Naira:$ 6 Africa 120

5 110

4 100

3 90

2 80

1 70 Cedi:$ 0 1996 97 98(a) 99(b) 2000(b) 60 CFAfr:$ (a) EIU estimates. (b) EIU forecasts. (c) Nominal exchange rates adjusted for changes in relative consumer prices. Sources: EIU; IMF, International Financial Statistics; World Economic 1990 91 92 93 94 95 96 9798(a) 98 99(b) 99 20002000(b) Outlook.

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Review

The political scene

The municipal elections are With the exception of a few minor incidents of violence in some rural areas held peacefully— and a boycott by the radical opposition coalition, the Collectif des partis politiques de l’opposition (COPPO), the second round of Mali’s municipal elections, which took place in two stages in May and June, proved peaceful and relatively problem-free. The municipal elections were the backbone of the government’s decentralisation programme, and the second round had been repeatedly delayed in the hope that COPPO would agree to participate. COPPO’s member parties boycotted the first round, which took place in June 1998 (3rd quarter 1998, page 26) in Mali’s 19 main cities, in protest at the government’s failure to meet demands for a re-run of the controversial legis- lative election in 1997 and the adoption of a number of reforms to the electoral code. With the government stalling on reform and refusing to review the 1997 election, COPPO again chose not to take part. However, with 682 smaller communal districts at stake, many non-COPPO opposition parties decided to participate. This made the results more credible, particularly since there were few of the problems that had marred Mali’s previous elections. Voter turnout remained low, although it increased slightly from 38.5% in the first stage to 43.3% in the second stage and was higher than in the previous local elections in 1992.

Mali: results of municipal elections, 1998 First stage (May) Second stage (Jun) Total Seats % Seats % Seats % Adema 4,193 58.8 1,740 69.0 5,933 61.5 Other parties 2,931 41.2 783 31.0 3,744 38.5 Total 7,124 100.0 2,523 100.0 9,677 100.0 Voter turnout 38.5 – 43.3 – 39.7a –

a EIU estimate. Source: Reuters.

—and were unsurprisingly The first stage of the elections was held in May for 492 municipalities in the won by Adema southern regions of Kayes, Koulikoro, Sikasso and Ségou, which together have 3m voters, about three-quarters of Mali’s total electorate. The ruling Alliance pour la démocratie au Mali (Adema) obtained 59% of the seats, which, although a substantial victory, must nevertheless have prompted some concern on the part of the government, given the absence of its main rivals.

Adema, however, increased its share of the vote in the second stage, which was held in June in 190 municipalities in the northern regions of Mopti, Gao, Timbuktu and Kidal. Altogether, Adema won 62% of the 9,647 seats that were contested. Although a substantial share of the non-Adema vote went to parties represented in government, such as the Parti de la renaissance nationale (Parena), the Parti pour la démocratie et le progrès (PDP), and the Union pour la démocratie et le développement (UDD), several parties from the moderate

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opposition also made some gains. These parties included a faction of the Union soudanaise-Rassemblement démocratique africain (US-RDA), which broke away from the COPPO-aligned party in July 1998 (4th quarter 1998, page 26), and the Parti soudanais progressiste (PSP), which was excluded from COPPO in February after participating in a forum organised by the president, Alpha Oumar Konaré (2nd quarter 1999, page 27). None of the opposition parties, however, was able to gain more than 10% of the seats, confirming the extent of the divisions within the opposition. Indeed, until there is greater discipline within the opposition, the potential threat to the government is likely to remain relatively modest.

A Civic Forum is set up The current political stalemate between the government and COPPO has prompted a former minister of culture, Issa Ndyagne, to establish a new political organisation, the Civic Forum, to fight corruption and the “betrayal of the ideals” that had prompted the popular demonstrations leading up to the overthrow of the dictatorial regime of the former president, Moussa Traore. To emphasise the point, the Civic Forum was established in March on the eighth anniversary of the events in 1991. The forum has brought together repre- sentatives not only from civil society and the opposition, but also from the ruling alliance, and sees itself as a pressure group to influence political decisions and consolidate the democratisation process. Mr Ndyagne has been joined in the forum by a former prime minister who served in the transitional

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government of 1991-92, Soumana Sacko. Both are well-respected personalities, which should give the new organisation a certain credibility. The establishment of the Forum has already prompted the government to propose its own forum to discuss revisions to the constitution to help strengthen the democratic process.

President Konaré calls Only a few days later President Konaré opened a forum on the reform of for revisions to the Malian justice. The forum was attended by about 500 delegates from Mali, justice system— other African countries, France and Canada. Under the 1992 constitution the judiciary is an independent branch of government, giving it powers that have sometimes been used against a visibly irritated executive. In 1997, for example, the Supreme Court cancelled the results of a controversial legislative election, and more recently it has passed death sentences on the former president, Moussa Traoré, and his wife (1st quarter 1999, page 24). President Konaré used the forum to attack corruption in the justice system, saying that delays in judicial decisions has resulted in overburdened prisons and people taking the law into their own hands.

—and reforms are proposed Mr Konaré suggested a thorough overhaul the entire justice system, a call that was later endorsed by the minister of justice, Amadou Diabaté. At the end of the forum the government announced that land tenure, which has been at the source of numerous clashes in rural areas in recent years, would be reformed; that a national debate on the death penalty would be launched, although President Konaré remains opposed to it; and that the concept of mediation will be introduced. The government also announced that a watchdog on corruption would be established. These measures should go some away towards improving judicial proceedings in Mali, which have again been criticised by the US Department of State in its latest annual Country Report on Human Rights Practices. However, there are also fears that the government will use the opportunity to reduce the powers of courts, given the tense relationship between the two branches of government.

The coup in Niger is The military coup in neighbouring Niger in early April, in which the president, strongly condemned Ibrahim Barre Mainassara, was killed, has prompted an unusually strong reaction from the Malian government. Although several other countries in the region also strongly condemned the assassination, Mali went a step further by calling it a “heinous act” and appealing directly to the people of Niger to safeguard that country’s “democratic principles”. This reaction reflects the government’s declared commitment to democracy and civilian rule, and the close ties that had developed in recent years between Mr Konaré and Mainassara—despite the fact that the latter himself acceded to power through a coup in 1996. President Konaré went on to oppose Niger’s presence at a subsequent regional summit in Libya (see below), while the Malian delegation walked out of a Franc Zone meeting in the Senegalese capital, Dakar, later in April in protest at Niger’s participation. However, the government stopped short of taking any further measures, such as imposing a trade embargo on Niger, which may reflect swift pledges from the country’s new leader, Daouda Malam Wanké, to hold fresh elections as soon as possible.

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The government Previously cautious relations between Mali and its northern neighbour, Libya, strengthens ties with Libya have begun to improve, following the limited lifting of UN sanctions against Libya in April. Until then Mali had been anxious to avoid antagonising the US, one of its main aid donors, which had lobbied for the embargo in order to press for the extradition of two Libyan nationals in connection with the 1989 bombing of a US airliner over Lockerbie in Scotland. After the issue was settled, President Konaré was quick to travel to Libya for a meeting in April of the Community of Sahel and Saharan States (Comessa), established in 1997 and comprising Libya, Chad, Niger, Mauritania and Mali. He visited the Libyan capital, Tripoli, again in May, signing several co-operation agreements and praising the commitment of the Libyan leader, Muammar Qadhafi, towards Africa. The agreements include the restoration of direct airlinks between Tripoli and Bamako, a $4m project for the extension of Mali’s national television network, and $25m for the development of tourism and industry.

Mali’s foreign military As part of international efforts to promote a disciplined, professional, involvement is in the multinational African peacekeeping capacity, in May Malian soldiers spotlight participated in a six-week training exercise in Côte d’Ivoire which also brought together units from the host nation, the US and Ghana. The exercise was part of the US-supported programme to establish an African Crisis Response Initiative to intervene in the kind of emergency situations on the continent for which Western powers no longer have any enthusiasm. A common training centre is currently being established in Côte d’Ivoire. Since the beginning of the year (2nd quarter 1999, page 28) Malian troops have served with the Nigerian-dominated Economic Community of West African States Monitoring Group (Ecomog) peacekeeping force in Sierra Leone. In May, despite moves towards negotiations and a peace agreement, rebels claimed to have captured several Malian soldiers in an ambush. The financial costs of the intervention are being met by the Netherlands, but the operation remains politically controversial and has prompted fierce criticism from the opposition.

Economic policy

Another ESAF is on After the expiry in March of Mali’s three-year enhanced structural adjustment the way— facility (ESAF), a joint IMF- mission visited the country in May to begin discussions on a new facility, covering the period 1999-2002. According to the Ministry of Finance, the focus of the new adjustment programme will be poverty alleviation and reforms in the education and health sectors, priorities which had already been identified by the IMF’s deputy managing director, Alassane Dramane Ouattara, when he came to Bamako in March (2nd quarter 1999, page 29). At the end of the visit the mission declared its satisfaction with Mali’s economic performance and the government’s new macroeconomic targets, which include an average annual real GDP growth rate of 6%, a reduction of average annual inflation to 2-3%, and a fall in the budget deficit to 4.6% of GDP by 2002. Achieving these objectives should be facilitated by the debt relief that Mali is expected to obtain by the end of 1999 under the World Bank’s heavily indebted poor countries (HIPC) initiative, details of which have yet to be released.

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Mali: proposed ESAF performance targets

1998a 1999-2002 Real GDP growth (%) 5.0 6.0 Inflation (av; %) 3.1 2.0-3.0b Budget balance (% of GDP) –7.0 –4.6c

a Government estimate. b Target. c By 2002. Sources: Ministry of Finance; Reuters.

—and specific objectives are Details of the more specific objectives under the ESAF programme have also spelled out— been released. The privatisation process will remain a priority (1st quarter 1999, page 27). The government has apparently agreed to launch a tender for the electricity utility, Energie du Mali (EDM) by November; for the airports company, Aéroports du Mali (ADM) by December, and for the telecoms utility, the Société de télécommunications du Mali (Sotelma), by September 2000. The government will also proceed with the restructuring of several state-owned banks, such as the Banque internationale du Mali and the Banque malienne pour le commerce et le développement (BMCD), as well as of pension and social security funds. Other specific objectives include the development of an action plan for the cotton sector, where reform has proved highly controversial (1st quarter 1999, page 28), the easing of administrative hurdles for foreign investors, and the reform of the justice system and the civil service.

—while tax reforms are After the IMF urged the government in March to implement tax reforms, implemented including the adoption of a value-added tax (VAT—1st quarter 1999, page 26), the relevant law was finally gazetted at the beginning of April, after lengthy debates in parliament and no fewer than 52 amendments. In place of the old sales tax of 12%, the new VAT will be charged at 18%. In addition, income tax will now be withheld at source, as will tax on capital gains. These measures should help the government to widen its tax base, a necessary step towards the achievement of the new ESAF’s objectives, but also to compensate for the lowering of customs duties on January 1st, as part of the move towards a free- trade area in the Union économique et monétaire ouest-africaine (UEMOA).

The economy

New data indicate more In a report released in April the IMF provisionally estimated real GDP growth modest growth in real GDP in 1998 at 4.6%, down from 6.7% in 1997. The report provided a detailed analysis of GDP growth, which shed an interesting light on the performance of Mali’s economy since the devaluation of the CFA franc in January 1994. The sectors that have performed best are mining, which grew by 244% in 1994-98, principally as a result of investment in new facilities; commercial crops (primarily cotton), which benefited from a more competitive pricing structure; and the construction sector, which enjoyed strong growth as a result of renewed consumer confidence and the government’s public works programme. The performance of other sectors, such as manufacturing, trade and transport, which were expected to benefit more from the devaluation, has been disappointing, reflecting an underlying lack of competitiveness and the slow

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impact of the process of structural reforms, which are only now beginning to trickle down. Reflecting the government’s attempt to curb public spending, public administration grew by less than 1% in the period. Altogether, total real GDP grew by 23% between 1994 and 1998; given Mali’s high rate of popu- lation growth, this translates into an 11% increase in average incomes.

Mali: gross domestic product (constant prices unless otherwise indicated)

1994 1998a CFAfr bn % of total CFAfr bn % of total % changeb Primary sector 328 48.2 385 46.1 17.4 of which: food crops 143 21.0 151 18.1 5.6 livestock 93 13.7 103 12.3 10.7 cotton & other industrial crops 44 6.5 78 9.3 77.3 Secondary sector 115 16.8 175 20.9 52.2 of which: industry 48 7.0 60 7.2 25.0 mining 14 2.1 48 5.8 242.9 construction & public works 36 5.2 47 5.6 30.5 Tertiary sector 238 35.0 275 33.0 15.5 of which: trade 117 17.1 138 16.6 17.9 transport 32 4.8 40 4.8 25.0 public administration 38 5.6 38 4.6 0.0 GDP at constant prices (factor prices) 681 100.0 834 100.0 22.5 Population (‘000) 8,832 – 9,790 – 10.8 Real GDP per head (CFAfr)c 80,720 – 89,370 – 10.7 Memorandum item GDP at current prices 1,029 – 1,599 – 55.5 a Estimates. b 1998/94. c At market prices. Source: IMF, Mali: Selected Issues and Statistical Appendix, April 1999.

Prices remain stable Price levels have remained remarkably stable since the beginning of the year, with consumer prices in April 0.2% below those in January, while year-on-year Mali: inflation (a) inflation fell to –0.5%. The Direction nationale de la statistique et de % change, year on year l’informatique (DNSI) has pointed to the stability of food prices, citing a better 8 1998/99 food crop as the principal factor behind the low inflation. According

6 to the DNSI, the relatively poor harvest in 1997/98 had contributed to average inflation of 3.1% in 1998 (the IMF puts the figure at 4%), compared with the 4 1997 figure of –0.4%. This year there was still pressure on the price of the two main staple cereals, maize and millet, as market supplies were lower than 2 average, but these pressures were generally limited, except in the western

0 region of Kayes, where farmers have increasingly switched to growing cotton. There were also small rises in the price of fruits, as well as increases in water -2 and electricity charges. The government hopes to be able to contain average May . Jul . Sep . Nov . Jan . Mar . 1998 99 inflation at 2.5% in 1999, particularly now that better crops in neighbouring (a) Indice harmonisé des prix à la consommation. Source: Direction nationale de la statistique et de countries have reduced their demand for Malian food products, which had l'informatique. contributed to an increase in inflationary pressures in 1998.

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Mali: consumer prices (1996=100) IHPC Index % change year on year 1998 n/a 3.1 Jan 100.4 2.3 Feb 99.3 1.0 Mar 100.1 0.6 Apr 100.2 –0.5 Source: Direction nationale de la statistique et de l’informatique (DNSI).

Agriculture

Rice production is up Government figures indicate that rice production in the 1998/99 season reached 420,170 tonnes, an increase of more than 80% on the previous year’s crop and above the country’s domestic consumption requirements, which are estimated at 417,780 tonnes. This confirms that Mali has become increasingly self-sufficient in rice production in recent years. This year’s good performance was attributed by the Ministry of Agriculture to better rains—groundwater levels are at their highest in 20 years—an improvement in marketing and the spread of the more efficient technique of rice bedding. The latter has contributed to a rise in average yields in the areas managed in the south by the state rice marketing company, the Office du Niger, from four tonnes per ha in 1992/93 to six tonnes per ha in 1997/98.

Mining

Sadiola Hill is above target Details of last year’s performance of the Sadiola Hill gold mine, operated by in 1998— Canada’s Iamgold, show that the mine exceeded almost every target set by the company at the beginning of 1998 (2nd quarter 1999, page 30). The amount of ore treated exceeded the objective by 13%, reaching 5m tonnes. Cash costs were also 7% lower, at $104/ounce (oz), while costs including government taxes were 5% below the target, at $126/oz, and were 10% lower than in 1997, when the mine entered production. The company attributed the better than expected performance to lower fuel, power and water costs. However, the rate of grams of gold per tonne of ore recovered was more disappointing at 3.3g/tonne, 11% lower than forecast, resulting in only a slight increase of gold output to 506,133 oz, 2% higher than the target. Compared to 1997 (when the production run was only nine months), gold output increased by 123%.

Mali: performance of the Sadiola mine 1998a 1997 budget outturn % changeb 1999c 2000-07c Ore treated (‘000 tonnes) 2,413 4,400 4,955 105.3 5,200 5,200 Gold produced (oz; ‘000) 227 496 506 123.0 450 445 Direct cash cost ($/oz) 115 112 104 -9.6 132 137 Costs incl govt tax & fees 140 133 126 -5.2 153 158

a Forecast. b 1998/97. c On outturn. Source: Iamgold.

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—and plans are spelled Iamgold has nevertheless remained relatively cautious about the mine’s future out for 1999— production potential, taking into account the lower than expected yield of gold per tonne mined. While the amount of ore treated has been forecast at 5.2m tonnes in 1999, the amount of gold produced is expected to fall to 450,000 oz. At the same total costs are expected to increase to $132/oz and $153/oz, reflecting higher capital costs—the power generators, which have proven to be unreliable, were to have been replaced by June—and higher government taxes. The company has, however, extended Sadiola Hill’s lifespan to 2007, and until then it expects the mine to continue performing at the levels forecast for 1999. Iamgold’s cautious attitude was borne out by the results for the first quarter of 1999, which showed that gold production, at 116,149 oz, was 12% lower than for the same period in 1998, despite the fact that the amount of ore treated was 3.4% higher. In addition, the company may have to worry increasingly about security issues, as the western Kayes region remains relatively volatile. This was again highlighted in April, when several people were killed in ethnic clashes in the region.

—and for Yatela In June Iamgold also released the results of the pre-feasibility study for the Yatela mine, 25 km north of Sadiola Hill. The final feasibility report is expected in September 1999. Total recoverable reserves at Yatela were estimated at some 19.7m tonnes, yielding a total of 1.25m oz of gold. The lifespan of the mine is expected to be five years—or six, if the Alamoutala deposit halfway between Sadiola Hill and Yatela is included. Total investment is forecast at $71m, and commercial production is expected to start in January 2001. Total cash costs are forecast at $185/oz, higher than at Sadiola Hill but still profitable at current gold prices of around $260/oz.

Manufacturing

A new cotton factory is The Malian government signed an agreement in March with a foreign to open consortium that includes a Japanese company, Omiken, and a Brazilian company, Zillo Lorenzetti, to establish a cotton factory in the central town of Fana in the heart of Mali’s cotton-growing area. Ownership will be divided between Omiken (40%), the state-owned Compagnie malienne pour le développement des textiles (CMDT) (30%), Lorenzetti (15%) and private Malian operators (15%). Investment costs were placed at CFAfr16.7bn ($26.7m). The factory is expected to produce 6,000 tonnes of cotton lint per year, 80% of which is to be exported to European and Asian markets as well as to Brazil. The factory, which will be only the third in Mali, reflects the govern- ment’s objective of developing the local processing of cotton, 98% of which is currently exported in raw form.

Transport

Roads are being improved As part of the government’s programme to improve the lacklustre state of Mali’s road network, the EU agreed in March to provide ¤85m ($82.2m) for road projects to open up three isolated regions in the north—Kayes, Mopti and Timbuktu. About 700 km of roads are to be tarred or rehabilitated, including

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the road from Bamako to Kayes. The project will be complemented by an additional $5.5m loan provided by the OPEC Fund for International Development to tar the Nioro-Aioun El Atrouss road, which links Mali with Mauritania. In addition, talks are under way with Algeria to revive the Saharan highway project, which has suffered from the insecurity in the north of Mali and the civil conflict in Algeria. Such a project will benefit from plans to build a bridge across the Niger river in Gao, which has currently only a ferry service. The Banque ouest-africaine de développement (BOAD) also agreed in March to provide a CFAfr2.7bn ($4.3m) loan to upgrade roads in urban areas, few of which are tarred.

Foreign trade and payments

Mali: impact of a proposed free-trade area with the EU, 2005-17 (% change year on year unless otherwise indicated)

Imports from the EU 6.2 Imports from rest of the world –4.1 Imports from UEMOA –0.5 Local production –0.2 Loss of fiscal revenuea (% of revenue) –6.8 Loss of fiscal revenue (% of GDP) –0.2 Gain for consumers (% of GDP) 0.4

a Based on 1997 figure. Source: Centre d’étude et de recherche sur le développement international, Etude sur l’impact économique de l’introduction de la réciprocité dans les relations commerciales entre l’Union Européenne et l’UEMOA et le Ghana.

A new study suggests free Mali would be adversely affected by a proposed free-trade area between the EU trade with Europe would and the West African region, according to a study recently completed by the hurt Mali European Commission. The study was undertaken because the current Lomé trade agreements, which give preferential access for African, Caribbean and Pacific (ACP) countries to the EU’s common market, are to be renegotiated and replaced with reciprocal agreements to comply with the demands of the World Trade Organisation(WTO). The Commission found that for the region’s poorer countries, such as Mali, free trade with Europe would lead to higher imports, while these countries would be unable to increase their exports to the EU significantly in the period considered (2005-2017).

Mali would see its imports from the EU grow by 6.2% per year, while local production would fall by 0.2%. For Mali, the progressive elimination of taxes would result in an average revenue loss of 6.8% per year. However, the total gains for consumers would offset the loss in revenue associated with the elimination of taxes. The study suggests the maintenance of the present arrangements for countries such as Mali, which are exempt from WTO regulations because of their status as least developed countries (LDCs).

EIU Country Report 3rd quarter 1999 © The Economist Intelligence Unit Limited 1999 34

Mali’s external debt According to new figures released by the World Bank in its latest annual Global is stable Development Finance, Mali’s stock of total external debt fell slightly from $3bn in 1996 to $2.95bn in 1997. This reflects a small drop in Mali’s public medium- Mali: external debt and long-term debt stock owed to official creditors, as total disbursements, at $ m $147m, were 21% down on 1996. The fall in public medium- and long-term 3.1 debt, which represents 91% of the total debt stock, was to some extent offset 3.0 by slight increases in IMF credit to $176m and to $83m for short-term debt,

2.9 partly because interest arrears rose substantially. However, the debt-service ratio fell from 18.5% to 10.5%, reflecting the growth in exports in 1997, thanks to 2.8 the jump in gold exports from Sadiola Hill and a 33% drop in debt service to 2.7 $78m. The stock of external debt remained stable in 1998, at CFAfr1.7trn

2.6 ($3bn), according to figures from the Ministry of Finance, but this should fall again in 1999, as Mali is expected to benefit from a $250m debt write-off under 2.5 the HIPC initiative. 2.4 1993 94 95 96 97 Mali: external debt Source: World Bank, Global Development Finance. ($ m unless otherwise indicated)

1996 1997 % change Public medium- & long-term debt to official creditors 2,762 2,687 –2.7 IMF 165 176 6.7 Short-term 79 83 5.1 of which: interest arrears to official creditors 33 43 30.3 Total external debt 3,006 2,945 –2.0 Total debt service, paid 116 78 –32.8 Debt-service ratio, paid (%) 18.1 10.5 – Debt/GNP ratio 115.7 119.2 – Source: World Bank, Global Development Finance, 1999.

EIU Country Report 3rd quarter 1999 © The Economist Intelligence Unit Limited 1999 Quarterly indicators and trade data 35

Quarterly indicators and trade data

Côte d'Ivoire: quarterly indicators of economic activity

1997 1998 1999 1 Qtr 2 Qtr 3 Qtr 4 Qtr 1 Qtr 2 Qtr 3 Qtr 4 Qtr 1 Qtr Agriculture Annual totals Coffee production '000 tonnes ( 279 ) ( 332 ) n/a Qtrly totals Cocoa exports '000 tonnes 463 115 36 328 456 126 54 n/a n/a Industrial production Monthly av General 1995=100 132 138 107 130 146 156 118 143 147a Prices Consumer prices 1995=100 106.5 108.0 109.3 109.1 111.9 115.9 114.0 111.5 109.9 change year on year % 5.8 4.8 5.7 6.1 5.1 7.3 4.3 2.2 -1.8 Money & banking End-Qtr M1, seasonally adj CFAfr bn 1,158.3 1,016.3 964.4 927.8 1,237.6 1,108.8 1,059.4 1,060.1 n/a change year on year % 18.6 15.2 15.3 11.3 6.8 9.1 9.9 14.3 n/a Discount rate % 6.25 6.25 6.00 6.00 6.00 6.00 6.25 6.25 5.75b Foreign trade Qtrly totals Exports fob CFAfr bn 707.1 540.7 466.6 700.6 772.0 609.8 533.3 677.1 n/a Imports cif “ 370.2 388.0 419.0 422.2 451.6 425.6 433.5 453.4 n/a Exchange holdings End-Qtr Goldc $ m 11.9 11.6 10.9 10.3 9.9 10.1 9.2d n/a n/a Foreign exchange “ 877.4 731.5 587.6 618.1 865.7 707.2 691.2 855.0 n/a Exchange rate Market rate CFAfr:$ 564.4 587.8 593.3 598.8 618.5 611.7 561.6 562.2 610.7e

Note. Annual figures of most of the series shown above will be found in the Country Profile. a January only. b End-April, 5.75. c End-quarter holdings at quarter's average of London daily price less 25%. d End-July. e End- April.

Sources: FAO; ICCO, Quarterly Bulletin of Cocoa Statistics; Institut national de la statistique, Bulletin trimestriel; IMF, International Financial Statistics.

Mali: quarterly indicators of economic activity

1996 1997 1998 4 Qtr 1 Qtr 2 Qtr 3 Qtr 4 Qtr 1 Qtr 2 Qtr 3 Qtr 4 Qtr Prices: Bamako Monthly av Consumer prices 1995=100 106.7 105.2 106.6 107.9 106.0 105.7 110.3 114.9 111.9a change year on year % 0.7 3.1 –1.1 –2.5 –0.7 0.5 3.5 6.5 5.6 Money End-Qtr M1, seasonally adj: CFAfr bn 252.0 262.5 268.1 266.8 268.7 269.1 263.1 259.9 280.3 change year on year % 21.6 15.6 16.6 14.3 6.6 2.5 –1.9 –2.6 4.3 Foreign tradeb Qtrly totals Exports fob $ m 47.1 70.0 91.0 57.2 44.6 74.3 86.3 n/a n/a Imports cif “ 298.3 282.2 285.9 261.2 296.5 295.3 317.4 n/a n/a Exchange rate End-Qtr Official rate CFAfr:$ 530.4 571.5 595.3 600.9 606.4 626.3 619.5 568.8 569.4c

Note. Annual figures of most of the series shown above will be found in the Country Profile. a Figure for January 1999, 107.4. b DOTS estimates, figures are subject to revision. c End-1 Qtr 1999, 610.7, end-April 1999, 619.0.

Sources: IMF, International Financial Statistics; Direction of Trade Statistics, quarterly.

EIU Country Report 3rd quarter 1999 © The Economist Intelligence Unit Limited 1999 36 Quarterly indicators and trade data

Côte d'Ivoire: foreign trade

CFAfr m Jan-Dec Jan-Dec Jan-Dec Jan-Dec Jan-Dec 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 Imports cif Dairy products 16,484 14,854 22,573 Fish & products 30,119 54,312 69,176 } 237,900a 293,900a Rice 28,497 44,002 66,777 Wheat 8,156 18,112 29,246 Petroleum products 130,085 203,661 234,548 331,600b 291,200b Chemicals 33,064c 95,591 165,667 n/a n/a Paper 15,382 29,135 52,217 n/a n/a Base metals 14,797 29,925 46,041 n/a n/a Machinery incl electric 53,589 108,796 172,503 167,300 234,900 Vehicles 18,288 35,985 83,316 146,000 159,000 Total incl others 561,321 1,018,171 1,469,768 1,440,700 1,599,800 Exports fob Fish products 20,084 64,923 108,163 108,100d 124,200d Pineapples 11,313 18,992 21,402 29,200 28,900 Bananas 18,333 30,803 40,103 44,900 40,000 Coffee 61,015 110,726 187,591 151,800 218,800 Cocoa 257,474 490,717 603,334 813,600 862,200 Rubber, crude 15,411 38,159 56,025 47,200 27,700 Wood, logs & sawn 53,419 141,169 153,670 161,900e 160,800e Petroleum, crude 0 0 n/a 335,900 313,700 Palm oil 21,035 32,965 37,677 31,800f 25,900f Cotton, raw 30,666 64,254 68,970 58,700 76,900 Total incl others 747,282 1,530,361 1,860,921 2,189,100 2,413,200

$ m $ m Jan-Dec Jan-Dec Jan-Dec Jan-Dec Jan-Dec Jan-Dec Jan-Dec Jan-Dec Exports fob 1994 1995 1996 1997g Imports cif 1994 1995 1996 1997g France 499 747 721 702 France 588 930 705 864 Germany 199 208 935 330 Nigeria 303 372 533 592 US 114 163 349 285 US 128 165 166 166 Netherlands 404 537 713 270 Italy 61 126 131 139 Belgium-Luxembourg 119 108 120 246 Belgium-Luxembourg 57 88 83 128 Italy 209 308 242 244 Germany 72 143 162 118 Mali 108 151 184 203 UK 40 69 82 108 Spain 114 162 184 185 China 42 56 51 102 Ghana 59 92 123 136 Netherlands 58 93 96 97 Burkina Faso 84 94 101 111 Spain 66 103 80 84 Total incl others 2,829 3,728 4,996 4,283 Total incl others 1,961 3,038 2,909 3,054 a Food, beverages and tobacco. b Mineral fuels. c Pharmaceuticals only. d Tuna. e Includes other wood and manufactures. f Total oils. g DOTS estimates.

Sources: Institut national de la statistique, Bulletin trimestriel; IMF, Direction of Trade Statistics, yearbook, quarterly.

EIU Country Report 3rd quarter 1999 © The Economist Intelligence Unit Limited 1999 Quarterly indicators and trade data 37

Mali: foreign trade

$ m $ m Jan-Dec Jan-Dec Exports fob 1993 Imports cif 1992 Cotton 139 Food 71 Live animals 108 Petroleum products 37 Total incl others 339 Intermediary products 44 Machinery 212 Total incl others 690

CFAfr bn CFAfr bn Jan-Dec Jan-Dec Jan-Dec Jan-Dec Exports fob 1989 1990 Imports cif 1989 1990 Côte d'Ivoire 21.83 47.86 France 26.60 37.16 France 3.87 23.98 Côte d'Ivoire 21.79 29.72 7.91 16.99 Senegal 7.61 15.28 Switzerland 3.61 6.68 Germany 7.39 9.13 Total incl others 78.78 97.68 Total incl others 108.47 164.02

$ m $ m Jan-Dec Jan-Dec Jan-Dec Jan-Dec Jan-Dec Jan-Dec Jan-Dec Jan-Dec Exports foba 1994 1995 1996 1997 Imports cifa 1994 1995 1996 1997 Italy 7 16 38 57 Côte d'Ivoire 119 166 203 223 Thailand 30 44 65 48 France 105 192 219 199 Taiwan 1 10 40 32 Belgium-Luxembourg 33 34 33 49 China 8 33 12 25 UK 18 42 42 43 Brazil 11 20 7 15 Senegal 45 49 53 41 Portugal 10 20 25 12 US 21 26 20 29 Canada 2 6 2 10 Italy 10 11 18 25 Spain 4 8 8 7 Hong Kong 26 29 23 22 France 7 7 5 7 Germany 16 17 27 22 Belgium-Luxembourg 26 18 12 6 Spain 6 12 15 18 Total incl others 174 235 282 265 Total incl others 717 1,017 1,153 1,125 a DOTS estimates.

Sources: UN, International Trade Statistics, yearbook; IMF, Direction of Trade Statistics, yearbook, quarterly.

EIU Country Report 3rd quarter 1999 © The Economist Intelligence Unit Limited 1999 38 Quarterly indicators and trade data

Côte d'Ivoire and Mali: French trade

($ '000)

Côte d'Ivoire Mali Jan-Dec Jan-Dec Jan-Dec Jan-Dec Jan-Dec Jan-Dec Jan-Dec Jan-Dec 1995 1996 1997 1998 1995 1996 1997 1998 French exports fob Dairy products 10,419 13,384 13,911 12,348 6,951 8,402 11,498 13,874 Fish & preparations 60,508 56,162 63,883a 81,556a 10 11 2a 4a Cereals & preparations 40,984 27,540 49,204 57,600 4,754 6,141 7,487 6,576 Beverages & tobacco 10,368 8,395 8,492 12,159 559 682 934 1,213 Mineral fuels 3,403 17,388 9,128 24,768 2,129 1,489 1,852 2,016 Chemicals 174,114 180,912 180,181b 187,973b 24,474 26,220 24,821b 34,617b Paper etc & manufactures 27,268 28,865 24,804 21,405 3,138 4,468 4,615 3,314 Non-metallic mineral mnfrs 16,706 23,356 14,897c 15,867c 2,197 1,726 2,113c 2,662c Iron & steel 12,574 14,722 30,510d 45,246d 1,885 2,850 7,139d 5,164d Non-ferrous metals 9,276 6,991 11,483d 13,444d 1,358 540 1,618d 2,659d Metal manufactures 28,365 28,631 8,287e 10,344e 8,040 11,193 2,560e 3,230e Machinery & transport eqpt 412,060 266,352 248,648 291,932 88,664 102,647 91,527 91,182 of which: road vehicles 72,185 63,950 53,602f 52,001f 23,136 30,173 26,398f 25,207f aircraft 158,129 2,220 1,704 1,122 139 379 4,497 845 Scientific instruments etc 25,529 22,339 20,231 22,280 4,306 5,856 4,147 5,090 Total incl others 937,414 801,414 786,174 911,171 173,737 197,670 182,035 201,101 French imports cif Fish & preparations 236,763 221,279 188,800 217,135 0 0 1 0 Fruit & vegetables & preps 192,709 186,995 194,197 180,844 2,702 2,598 2,975 2,931 of which: bananas 97,265 94,327 95,833 93,368 0 61 0 0 pineapples 79,321 82,224 82,787 74,300 17 49 4 1 Coffee 130,755 86,581 71,581 67,417 0 0 0 0 Cocoa 182,140 178,979 200,163 269,156 0 0 0 0 Rubber, crude 26,107 21,226 17,936g 18,104g 000 0g Wood & cork & manufactures 80,488 45,563 36,871 34,376 52 33 69 29 Cotton, raw 59 770 n/a n/a 1,550 475 n/a n/a Animal & vegetable oils 424 464 595 220 3 9 0 0 Textile yarn, cloth & mnfrs 16,767 19,258 27,300h 26,291h 42 116 2,065h 682h Total incl others 915,196 813,961 775,380 844,819 7,560 5,491 7,881 5,083

Note. Prior to 1997, SITC basis. From 1997, Harmonised System. Figures are not strictly comparable. a Excluding preparations. b Including crude fertilisers and manufactures of plastics. c Including precious metals and jewellery. d Including scrap and manufactures. e Tools etc and miscellaneous metal manufactures. f Including tractors. g Including manufactures. h Including fibres.

Source: UN, External Trade Statistics, series D.

EIU Country Report 3rd quarter 1999 © The Economist Intelligence Unit Limited 1999