DOCSLIB.ORG

Proquest Dissertations

Total Page：16

File Type：pdf, Size：1020Kb

Download full-text PDF Read full-text
Proquest Dissertations STRATEGIC OR TACTICAL PARTNERS: A CASE STUDY EXPLORING RELATIONS BETWEEN RUSSIA AND IRAN FROM 1980 TO 2010 By Ganna Oleksandrivna White Submitted to the School of International Service of American University In Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements for the Degree of Master of Arts In International Relations Chair: Professor Mamuka G. Tsereteli /J/ g 0 /Ö r- -^ --,Jr Carole A. O'Leary ' Date LO (J^rú^ Dean Louis W. Goodman Date 2010 American University Washington, D.C 2001 AMERICAN UNIVERSITY LIBRARY ^ ^ UMI Number: 1489809 All rights reserved INFORMATION TO ALL USERS The quality of this reproduction is dependent upon the quality of the copy submitted. In the unlikely event that the author did not send a complete manuscript and there are missing pages, these will be noted. Also, if material had to be removed, a note will indicate the deletion. UMT Dissertation Publishing UMI 1489809 Copyright 2011 by ProQuest LLC. All rights reserved. This edition of the work is protected against unauthorized copying under Title 17, United States Code. ProQuest® ProQuest LLC 789 East Eisenhower Parkway P.O. Box 1346 Ann Arbor, Ml 48106-1346 Abstract This research analyses the relationship between Russia and Iran for the past thirty years. The main question of this study is whether Russia and Iran have been strategic or tactical partners during this critical period. The answer to this question is essential for understanding the geopolitical future of the wider Middle East and Central Asia region and US role there. An alliance between Russia and Iran and their possible collaboration on Iran's nuclear program would create a major problem for the United States and its allies in the region. This thesis is based on historical analysis and case study methods. Major policy papers, articles, and books on Russia-Iran collaboration were used for this research. The analysis shows that the partnership between Iran and Russia has been driven by the geopolitical balance of power. Both countries wanted to balance the influence ofthe United States and its allies in the region. The paper analyses the history of collaboration between two countries in the nuclear field, in the economic and in the energy development, as well as in the political collaboration in Central Asia. The research concludes that Russia and Iran have been tactical partners, not strategic ones. Additionally, the research predicts Russia's shift toward greater collaboration with the United States and NATO in the near future. iii Table of Contents Abstract ü Table of Contents iii Chapter 1 . Introduction 1 2. Literature Review 4 3. Theoretical Approach and Methodology 15 4. Thesis 18 Geopolitical Overview 18 Iran-Iraq War 22 War in Afghanistan 30 Collapse of Soviet Union 34 Civil War in Tajikistan 39 Gore-ChernomyrdinCommission, Bushehr deal and testing of Iranian Shahab-3 47 Putin's Era 53 Strategy of Ahmadinejad 71 Medvedev Times 80 5. Conclusion 95 Bibliography 99 iv I Introduction The main question of this research paper is "Have Russia and Iran been strategic or tactical partners for the past 30 years?" The relations between the two countries have been based on three major factors: economic relations, nuclear collaboration, and balance of power. The goal of this research is to analyze these three factors and come up with the answer to the main question. The relationship between Russia and Iran officially commenced in 1 592, with Safavids in power. Relations in the past and present between Russia and Iran have long been complicatedly multi-faceted. The two countries have a long history of economic, diplomatic; and social-political interaction. Since then, mutual relations have been both turbulent and dormant, depending on the time in history. In this research paper, I will be concentrating on Russia-Iran relations post- 1979 to present. A year before the Iran-Iraq war, the U.S. tried to convert Iran into an anti- communist block, thus ending Russia's influence on Iran. During the Iran-Iraq War, the USSR supplied Iraq with large amounts of conventional arms. After the war, especially with the fall of the USSR, the Tehran-Moscow relationship witnessed a sudden increase in diplomatic and economic relations and Iran began purchasing weapons from Russia. By the mid-1990s, Russia had agreed to continue working on developing Iran's nuclear program and finish the construction of Bushehr nuclear power plant. 1 2 As confrontation between Iran and the U. S escalates, the country is finding itself further pushed into an alliance with Russia and China. Iran like Russia views Turkey's regional ambitions and possible spread of some form of pan-Turkic ideology with suspicion. Russia and Iran also share a common interest in limiting the political influence of the United States in Central Asia. However, Iran-Russia ties remain to be seen tested. Iran has recently expressed its unhappiness with the repeated delays by Russia in finishing the Bushehr reactor project, as well as Russia's stance in the Caspian Sea dispute. Russia's growing ties with Israel and its increasing role in the Arab-Israeli peace process have also been points of tension between the two countries. Russia is increasingly becoming dependent on its economic relations with the West and therefore gradually becoming vulnerable to western pressures in trying to curb its ties with Teheran. The great sign of Russia's rapprochement toward the West is recent NATO Summit, where Russia has agreed to collaborate with the U.S. in Afghanistan. The answer to the question whether Russia and Iran have been strategic or tactical partners is essential for the understanding of the geopolitical future of the wider Middle East and Central Asia region and U. S role there. The alliance between Russia and Iran and collaboration on nuclear program of Iran would have created a major problem for the United States and its allies in the region. Therefore, understanding its relationship with the respect to nuclear technology partnership is an essential element in understanding the world's energy and nuclear security situations. In this paper, I will argue that Russia and Iran are tactical partners, versus strategic ones. This argument will be based on several facts such as trade and nuclear collaboration in order to maintain 3 good economic level and develop nuclear technologies (in case of Iran), and mutual diplomatic collaboration to resist the influence of the U.S. in the region. I Literature Review I will utilize the following five major works for my research paper: Persian Dreams by John Parker, "Russia and Iran: a Tactical Alliance" by Robert Freedman, "Nuclear Proliferation: the Islamic Republic of Iran" by Gawdat Bahgate, "Moscow and the Middle East: Soviet Policy Since the Invasion of Afghanistan" by Robert Freedman and Russia and Iran: Ten Years ofNuclear Collaboration by Sevak Sarukhanian. In addition, I will analyze and draw on recent policy papers and scholarly analyses that examine U.S-Russian, Iran-Russian and Iran-U.S relations that relate to my research question. In his book, Persian Dreams John Parker emphasizes that Russia and Iran have a history of engagement and cooperation even while they had serious disagreements. For example, in 1992 Russia and Iran backed different sides in the civil war in Tajikistan, yet began to negotiate the Bushehr nuclear power plant contract. In his book, Parker quotes Russian expert, Alexei Malashenko, who highlights that "for Russia engagement with Iran is a strategy, while for Iran cooperation with Russia is just a tactics."1 1 John Parker, Persian Dreams. Potomac Books Ine: 2009, 130 4 5 According to Parker, on the nuclear issue "Moscow's record under President Yeltsin was chaotic and mixed at best."2 Under Putin, Russia became more consistent in using a mixture of engagement and pressure to encourage Tehran to restrain its nuclear program. This pressure included slowing down construction of Bushehr, drawing out negotiations on agreement for the return of spent nuclear fuel and supporting of International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA)3 and United Nations Security Council resolutions critical of Iran. Since Ahmadinejad was elected in 2005, Russian tactics failed to yield results and Iran abandoned suspension and forged ahead its nuclear enrichment program. In Parker's view, "for a variety of reasons Russia over the years has not pressed Iran harder to abandon its military nuclear program."4 Russia's assessment of Iran's progress on rearmament and nuclear enrichment has been more relaxed than that of others. Russia has also been reluctant to spoil cooperation with Iran on regional issues, particularly in the Tajik peace process and pre 9/11 opposition to Taliban. Russia has also hoped for greater profits from trade with Iran. As a result, Parker argued, Tehran during the Ahmadinejad years has been more successful in using Moscow to shield Iran's 2 John Parker, Persian Dreams. Potomac Books Ine: 2009, 145 3 John Parker, Persian Dreams. Potomac Books Ine: 2009, 250 4 John Parker, Persian Dreams. Potomac Books Ine: 2009, 255 6 military nuclear program than Moscow has been in using its leverage to restrain this program.5 Despite Russia's success on softening UN Security Council resolutions on Iran, Iran's leaders declared them illegal. Russia by repeatedly protecting Iran from greater international pressure, has thus arguably contributed to increasing the odds that the Islamic Republic will eventually be able to slip out of the nonproliferation box.6 Parker thinks that the future of the Russo-Iranian relationship is nevertheless difficult to predict; greater Russian pressure on Iran can't be precluded nor can the return of a more tactical flexibility in Tehran's policies be ruled out. Robert Freedman, in his article "Russia and Iran: a Tactical Alliance," describes the events that followed the dissolution of the Soviet Union.
Load more

Recommended publications
  • Russia's Hybrid Warfare
    Research Paper Research Division – NATO Defense College, Rome – No. 105 – November 2014 Russia’s Hybrid Warfare Waging War below the Radar of Traditional Collective Defence by H. Reisinger and A. Golts1 “You can’t modernize a large country with a small war” Karl Schlögel The Research Division (RD) of the NATO De- fense College provides NATO’s senior leaders with “Ukraine is not even a state!” Putin reportedly advised former US President sound and timely analyses and recommendations on current issues of particular concern for the Al- George W. Bush during the 2008 NATO Summit in Bucharest. In 2014 this liance. Papers produced by the Research Division perception became reality. Russian behaviour during the current Ukraine convey NATO’s positions to the wider audience of the international strategic community and con- crisis was based on the traditional Russian idea of a “sphere of influence” and tribute to strengthening the Transatlantic Link. a special responsibility or, stated more bluntly, the “right to interfere” with The RD’s civil and military researchers come from countries in its “near abroad”. This perspective is also implied by the equally a variety of disciplines and interests covering a 2 broad spectrum of security-related issues. They misleading term “post-Soviet space.” The successor states of the Soviet conduct research on topics which are of interest to Union are sovereign countries that have developed differently and therefore the political and military decision-making bodies of the Alliance and its member states. no longer have much in common. Some of them are members of the European Union and NATO, while others are desperately trying to achieve The opinions expressed are those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the opinions of the this goal.
    [Show full text]
  • S/PV.7886 Maintenance of International Peace and Security 21/02/2017
    United Nations S/ PV.7886 Security Council Provisional Seventy-second year 7886th meeting Tuesday, 21 February 2017, 10 a.m. New York President: Mr. Klimkin/Mr. Yelchenko ....................... (Ukraine) Members: Bolivia (Plurinational State of) ..................... Mr. Arancibia Fernández China ......................................... Mr. Liu Jieyi Egypt ......................................... Mr. Aboulatta Ethiopia ....................................... Mr. Alemu France ........................................ Mr. Delattre Italy .......................................... Mr. Cardi Japan ......................................... Mr. Bessho Kazakhstan .................................... Mr. Vassilenko Russian Federation ............................... Mr. Iliichev Senegal ....................................... Mr. Seck Sweden ....................................... Ms. Söder United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland .. Mr. Rycroft United States of America .......................... Mrs. Haley Uruguay ....................................... Mr. Rosselli Agenda Maintenance of international peace and security Conflicts in Europe Letter dated 3 February 2017 from the Permanent Representative of Ukraine to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General (S/2017/108) This record contains the text of speeches delivered in English and of the translation of speeches delivered in other languages. The final text will be printed in the Official Records of the Security Council. Corrections should be submitted to the original
    [Show full text]
  • General Assembly Official Records Seventy-First Session
    United Nations A/71/ PV.72 General Assembly Official Records Seventy-first session 72nd plenary meeting Tuesday, 21 March 2017, 10 a.m. New York President: Mr. Thomson ......................................... (Fiji) The meeting was called to order at 10.15 a.m. the theatre of diplomacy, Ambassador Churkin was a giant, a deep and eloquent intellectual with a sharp wit Tribute to the memory of His Excellency and a disarmingly approachable manner. He served his Ambassador Vitaly Churkin, Permanent country with passion and pride. As the Ambassador of Representative of the Russian Federation to the the Russian Federation to the United Nations for more United Nations than a decade, he became the longest-serving member The President: Before we proceed to the item of the Security Council. Ambassador Churkin’s quick on our agenda, it is my sad duty to pay tribute to intelligence was admired by all, his grasp of the the memory of the late Permanent Representative intricacies of international political affairs undisputed. of the Russian Federation to the United Nations, His His mastery of negotiation and due process commanded Excellency Ambassador Vitaly Churkin, who passed respect from all quarters. But it is the passing of the away on Monday, 20 February 2017. I am joined for man himself that we mourn — the loss of his dry wit, the tribute this morning by members of his bereaved his knowing looks, eye to eye, his smiling dismissal of family, Mrs. Irina Churkin, wife of the late Ambassador, and Mr. Maksim Churkin, their son. On behalf of the nonsense, and his wide cultural reach into literature, General Assembly, I would like to extend to them our theatre and film.
    [Show full text]
  • Putin's Syrian Gambit: Sharper Elbows, Bigger Footprint, Stickier Wicket
    STRATEGIC PERSPECTIVES 25 Putin’s Syrian Gambit: Sharper Elbows, Bigger Footprint, Stickier Wicket by John W. Parker Center for Strategic Research Institute for National Strategic Studies National Defense University Institute for National Strategic Studies National Defense University The Institute for National Strategic Studies (INSS) is National Defense University’s (NDU’s) dedicated research arm. INSS includes the Center for Strategic Research, Center for Complex Operations, Center for the Study of Chinese Military Affairs, and Center for Technology and National Security Policy. The military and civilian analysts and staff who comprise INSS and its subcomponents execute their mission by conducting research and analysis, publishing, and participating in conferences, policy support, and outreach. The mission of INSS is to conduct strategic studies for the Secretary of Defense, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and the unified combatant commands in support of the academic programs at NDU and to perform outreach to other U.S. Government agencies and the broader national security community. Cover: Admiral Kuznetsov aircraft carrier, August, 2012 (Russian Ministry of Defense) Putin's Syrian Gambit Putin's Syrian Gambit: Sharper Elbows, Bigger Footprint, Stickier Wicket By John W. Parker Institute for National Strategic Studies Strategic Perspectives, No. 25 Series Editor: Denise Natali National Defense University Press Washington, D.C. July 2017 Opinions, conclusions, and recommendations expressed or implied within are solely those of the contributors and do not necessarily represent the views of the Defense Department or any other agency of the Federal Government. Cleared for public release; distribution unlimited. Portions of this work may be quoted or reprinted without permission, provided that a standard source credit line is included.
    [Show full text]
  • Russian Strategic Narratives on R2P in the 'Near Abroadr
    Nationalities Papers (2020), 1–19 doi:10.1017/nps.2020.54 ARTICLE Russian Strategic Narratives on R2P in the ‘Near Abroad’ Juris Pupcenoks1* and Eric James Seltzer2 1Department of Political Science, Marist College, Poughkeepsie, New York, USA and 2School of Law, St. John’s University, Queens, New York, USA *Corresponding Author. Email: [email protected] Abstract This article assesses Russian strategic narratives towards its interventions in Georgia (2008) and Ukraine (2014–16) based on a new database of 50 statements posted on the websites of the Russian Mission to the United Nations and the President of Russia homepage. By looking more broadly at Russian strategic narratives aimed at persuading other global actors and publics abroad and at home, this article identifies how Russia attempted to develop a story that could win global acceptance. This analysis shows that contrary to traditional Russian emphasis on sovereign responsibility and non-intervention, Russia supported claims for self-determination by separatist groups in Georgia and Ukraine. Russia used deception and disinformation in its strategic narratives as it mis-characterized these conflicts using Responsibility to Protect (R2P) language, yet mostly justified its own interventions through references to other sources of international law. Russian strategic narratives focused on delegitimizing the perceived opponents, making the case for the appropriateness of its own actions, and projecting what it proposed as the proper solution to the conflicts. It largely avoided making any references to its own involvement in the Donbas at all. Additionally, Russia’s focus on the protection of co-ethnics and Russian-speakers is reminiscent of interventions in the pre- R2P era.
    [Show full text]
  • Analyzing Russian Framing of the Syrian Intervention
    The Gatekeeper of Sovereignty: Analyzing Russian Framing of The Syrian Intervention By Nikkon Balial Submitted to Central European University Department of International Relations In partial fulfilment of the requirements for the degree of Master’s in International Relations. Supervisor: Dr. Erin K. Jenne CEU eTD Collection Budapest, Hungary I Acknowledgement I am grateful to the IR Department of the Central European University for providing me the opportunity to write my thesis even in such extreme circumstances of COVID-19. My supervisor, Dr. Erin K. Jenne for her constant support towards my idea changes, fluctuating working schedules and for encouraging me and my randomness constantly. My parents and my sister who listened to me over numerous video calls, supported me and kept believing in me even when I did not believe in myself. My CEU friends who are my family away from home now, my best friend Hiten, who was there, sometimes loudly and sometimes in silence. Lastly, Ushmayo for staying by me through thick and thin. CEU eTD Collection II Table of Contents Introduction .......................................................................................................................... 5 Russian Defense for Syria .................................................................................................. 9 The Art of Framing Narratives through Political Messages ......................................... 10 Instances of Political Framing by Leaders............................................................. 12 New Media
    [Show full text]
  • Security Council Distr.: General 8 April 2013
    United Nations S/2013/221 Security Council Distr.: General 8 April 2013 Original: English Report of the Security Council mission to Africa (Ethiopia, the Sudan and Kenya), 19 to 26 May 2011 I. Introduction 1. In his letter dated 18 May 2011 (S/2011/319), the President of the Security Council informed the Secretary-General that the Council had decided to send a mission to Ethiopia, the Sudan and Kenya from 19 to 26 May 2011. The mission was composed as follows: Ambassador Ivan Barbalić (Bosnia and Herzegovina) Ambassador Maria Luiza Ribeiro Viotti (Brazil) Counsellor Tian Lin (China) Ambassador Néstor Osorio (Colombia) Ambassador Gérard Araud (France) Ambassador Nelson Messone (Gabon) Ambassador Peter Wittig (Germany) Ambassador Hardeep Singh Puri (India) Ambassador Nawaf Salam (Lebanon) Ambassador Raff Bukun-Olu Wole Onemola (Nigeria) Ambassador João Maria Cabral (Portugal) Ambassador Vitaly Churkin (Russian Federation) Ambassador Baso Sangqu (South Africa) Ambassador Mark Lyall Grant (United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland) Ambassador Susan Rice (United States of America) II. Visit of the Security Council to Ethiopia A. Meeting with the Prime Minister of Ethiopia, Addis Ababa, 21 May 2011 2. On 21 May, the members of the Security Council met the Prime Minister of Ethiopia, Meles Zenawi. They thanked him for the role that Ethiopia had been playing to help resolve conflicts on the African continent. They discussed with him the relations between Ethiopia and Eritrea and asked him about his views on the situation in Somalia, the Sudan and Libya. The Prime Minister welcomed the 13-28438 (E) 190413 *1328438* S/2013/221 Security Council and noted that its presence in Africa and in Addis Ababa, in particular, was an honour and a privilege.
    [Show full text]
  • Visit of Security Council Delegation to Africa
    3 June 2011 No. 1 VISIT OF SECURITY COUNCIL DELEGATION TO AFRICA EXPECTED COUNCIL ACTION The visit to Nairobi was designed Côte d’Ivoire On Monday 6 June the Council is ex- to enable members to reiterate the Somalia pecting a briefing on the visit to Africa Council’s grave concern about the Sudan which Council members took from 19 continued inability of the Somali 2. Strengthening of Methods of Work to 26 May. The trip consisted of the fol- Transitional Federal Institutions (TFI) and Cooperation lowing segments, and their respective components to work constructively 3. Consideration and Adoption of the leaders or co-leaders will be the brief- with each other or the UN. A related Draft Joint Statement ers: AU headquarters in Addis Ababa part of the message was reaffirm- (led by Council President Ambassador ing support for the work of Special The discussions on Libya took the Gerard Araud of France); Sudan (co- Representative of the Secretary- longest and lasted over two hours. led by Ambassador Vitaly Churkin of General Augustine Mahiga, and Several of the PSC members were Russia and Ambassador Susan Rice urging the TFIs to engage fully, con- sharply critical of the Council’s ap- of the US) and a Somalia-focused structively and without further delay in proach and of what they considered visit to Nairobi (co-led by Ambassador the consultative process facilitated by a misinterpretation of the language Baso Sangqu of South Africa and the Special Representative. of resolutions 1970 and 1973. A Ambassador Mark Lyall Grant of the particularly sensitive issue was the UK).
    [Show full text]
  • Russia's Policies Towards NATO
    Working paper Research Unit Russia/CIS Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik German Institute for International and Security Affairs Hannes Adomeit Inside or Outside? Russia’s Policies Towards NATO Paper Delivered to the Annual Conference of the Centre for Russian Studies at the Norwegian Institute of International Affairs (NUPI) on “The Multilateral Dimension in Russian Foreign Policy,” Oslo, October 12-13, 2006, Revised December 20, 2006 FG 5 2007/01 January 2007 Working papers are papers in the subject area of a Research Unit which are not officially published by SWP. These papers are either preliminary studies that later become papers published by SWP or papers that are published elsewhere. Your comments are always welcome. INSIDE OR OUTSIDE? RUSSIA’S POLICIES TOWARDS NATO “Russia closely follows the process of NATO transformation and counts on the complete removal of direct and indirect components of its anti-Russian orientation from military planning and the political declarations of the member countries of the alliance.” (Russian Defense Ministry.)1 “We are concerned over the process of NATO expansion. This organization has been and remains a military and political bloc with all the set of threats that any formation of this type involves.” (Putin.)2 “Is it possible that Russia will ever join NATO?” Putin: “Why not? I do not rule out such a possibility. I repeat, on condition that Russia's interests are going to be taken into account, if Russia becomes a full-fledged partner.”3 The problem at issue can be stated very simply: Can Russia’s
    [Show full text]
  • Ukraine and Russia People, Politics, Propaganda and Perspectives 
    EDITED BY i AGNIESZKA PIKULICKA-WILCZEWSKA & RICHARD SAKWA Ukraine and Russia People, Politics, Propaganda and Perspectives This e-book is provided without charge via free download by E-International Relations (www.E-IR.info). It is not permitted to be sold in electronic format under any circumstances. If you enjoy our free e-books, please consider leaving a small donation to allow us to continue investing in open access publications: http://www.e-ir.info/about/donate/ i Ukraine and Russia People, Politics, Propaganda and Perspectives EDITED BY AGNIESZKA PIKULICKA-WILCZEWSKA & RICHARD SAKWA ii E-International Relations www.E-IR.info Bristol, England First published 2015 New version 2016 ISBN 978-1-910814-14-7 (Paperback) ISBN 978-1-910814-00-0 (e-book) This book is published under a Creative Commons CC BY-NC 4.0 license. You are free to: • Share — copy and redistribute the material in any medium or format • Adapt — remix, transform, and build upon the material Under the following terms: • Attribution — You must give appropriate credit, provide a link to the license, and indicate if changes were made. You may do so in any reasonable manner, but not in any way that suggests the licensor endorses you or your use. • NonCommercial — You may not use the material for commercial purposes. Any of the above conditions can be waived if you get permission. Please contact [email protected] for any such enquiries. Other than the license terms noted above, there are no restrictions placed on the use and dissemination of this book for student learning materials / scholarly use.
    [Show full text]
  • ENGLISH Original: RUSSIAN Delegation of the Russian Federation
    PC.DEL/1002/13 29 November 2013 ENGLISH Original: RUSSIAN Delegation of the Russian Federation STATEMENT BY MR. ANDREY KELIN, PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVE OF THE RUSSIAN FEDERATION, AT THE 974th MEETING OF THE OSCE PERMANENT COUNCIL 28 November 2013 In response to the report by the OSCE Representative on Freedom of the Media Mr. Chairperson, We thank Ms. Dunja Mijatović for her informative report on the work of her Office over the past six months and its future plans. We note that, according to our observations, the Representative on Freedom of the Media endeavours to take a generally balanced approach to the fulfilment of her existing mandate, which covers the entire OSCE region. However, this is not evident from the report that has been distributed. Attention continues to be focused on the situation regarding freedom of the media and freedom of expression in the countries to the east of Vienna and in the Balkans. We do not share the view that this is simply due to cases involving the violation of the aforementioned freedoms in specific countries. In our opinion, the worrying situation regarding pressure on the media and the journalistic community against the backdrop of cases of systematic violation of privacy by certain OSCE countries deserves no less serious consideration by the OSCE Representative on Freedom of the Media. We were astonished by the fact that just yesterday an interview on CNN with the Russian Permanent Representative to the United Nations, Mr. Vitaly Churkin, regarding the Syrian problem was censored. We would ask Ms. Mijatović to bring this to her Office’s attention.
    [Show full text]
  • The United Nations, I Want To
    UNITED NATIONS YEAR IN REVIEW 2016 RT: 15’57” VIDEO AUDIO NARRATION CONFLICT COLLAGE 2016 - the hottest year on record ever. While some countries felt the direct threat of Climate Change, the Paris Climate ALEPPO FOOTAGE Agreement became the fastest UN treaty ever to enter into force. (13) PEACE TALKS NEW YORK 2016 – Yet Another year of challenges for the UN. With the Syria Conflict in its 6 th year, a FOOTAGE AIR DROPS, ENDS polarised Security Council and other VIEW OF AIR DROP FROM protracted conflicts, the UN tried to ease the PLANE, HATCH CLOSING plight of refugees and the ones left behind= 816: By the en. of the year, a quarter of a million UNICEF STORY JUDY “FEAR people were trappe. in Aleppo, while Syrian IN ALEPPO” government forces an. their allies bombe. JUDY ON WAY TO SCHOOL, rebel stronghol.s. Peace talAs seeme. to KIDS IN SCHOOL, LOUD lea. nowhere, not even to a humanitarian SHELLING NOISE, pause in the shelling. The Worl. Foo. Program an. its partners sent supplies to more than four million people insi.e Syria, even to har.-to-reach areas. Yet there has been little access to Aleppo since July. An estimate. 100.000 chil.ren still live in the 1 VIDEO AUDIO city ; where walAing to school can be a traumatiBing Courney. 834: BAN KI-MOON IN GENERAL At the Opening of the General Assembly, ASSEMBLY, OPENING OF GA Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon hel. member states accountable for the trage.y: 8E: BAN KI-MOON ON CAMERA UN SECRETARY-GENERAL BAN KI-MOON 8ENGLIS : 8In English: "Powerful patrons that keep feeding the war machine also have blood on their hands.
    [Show full text]