STRATEGIC OR TACTICAL PARTNERS: A CASE STUDY EXPLORING
RELATIONS BETWEEN RUSSIA AND IRAN FROM 1980 TO 2010
By
Ganna Oleksandrivna White
Submitted to the
School of International Service of American University
In Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements for the Degree of
Master of Arts
In International Relations
Chair:
Professor Mamuka G. Tsereteli /J/ g 0 /Ö
r- -^ --,Jr Carole A. O'Leary
' Date LO (J^rú^ Dean Louis W. Goodman
Date
2010
American University
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ProQuest LLC 789 East Eisenhower Parkway P.O. Box 1346 Ann Arbor, Ml 48106-1346 Abstract This research analyses the relationship between Russia and Iran for the past thirty years. The main question of this study is whether Russia and Iran have been strategic or tactical partners during this critical period. The answer to this question is essential for understanding the geopolitical future of the wider Middle East and Central Asia region and US role there. An alliance between Russia and Iran and their possible collaboration on Iran's nuclear program would create a major problem for the United States and its allies in the region. This thesis is based on historical analysis and case study methods. Major policy papers, articles, and books on Russia-Iran collaboration were used for this research. The analysis shows that the partnership between Iran and Russia has been driven by the geopolitical balance of power. Both countries wanted to balance the influence ofthe United States and its allies in the region. The paper analyses the history of collaboration between two countries in the nuclear field, in the economic and in the energy development, as well as in the political collaboration in Central Asia. The research concludes that Russia and Iran have been tactical partners, not strategic ones. Additionally, the research predicts Russia's shift toward greater collaboration with the
United States and NATO in the near future.
iii Table of Contents
Abstract ü
Table of Contents iii
Chapter 1 . Introduction 1
2. Literature Review 4
3. Theoretical Approach and Methodology 15 4. Thesis 18
Geopolitical Overview 18 Iran-Iraq War 22 War in Afghanistan 30 Collapse of Soviet Union 34 Civil War in Tajikistan 39 Gore-ChernomyrdinCommission, Bushehr deal and testing of Iranian Shahab-3 47 Putin's Era 53
Strategy of Ahmadinejad 71 Medvedev Times 80
5. Conclusion 95
Bibliography 99
iv I
Introduction
The main question of this research paper is "Have Russia and Iran been strategic or tactical partners for the past 30 years?" The relations between the two countries have been based on three major factors: economic relations, nuclear collaboration, and balance of power. The goal of this research is to analyze these three factors and come up with the answer to the main question.
The relationship between Russia and Iran officially commenced in 1 592, with Safavids in power. Relations in the past and present between Russia and Iran have long been complicatedly multi-faceted. The two countries have a long history of economic, diplomatic; and social-political interaction. Since then, mutual relations have been both turbulent and dormant, depending on the time in history.
In this research paper, I will be concentrating on Russia-Iran relations post- 1979 to present. A year before the Iran-Iraq war, the U.S. tried to convert Iran into an anti- communist block, thus ending Russia's influence on Iran. During the Iran-Iraq War, the USSR supplied Iraq with large amounts of conventional arms. After the war, especially with the fall of the USSR, the Tehran-Moscow relationship witnessed a sudden increase in diplomatic and economic relations and Iran began purchasing weapons from Russia.
By the mid-1990s, Russia had agreed to continue working on developing Iran's nuclear program and finish the construction of Bushehr nuclear power plant.
1 2
As confrontation between Iran and the U. S escalates, the country is finding itself further pushed into an alliance with Russia and China.
Iran like Russia views Turkey's regional ambitions and possible spread of some
form of pan-Turkic ideology with suspicion. Russia and Iran also share a common interest in limiting the political influence of the United States in Central Asia. However,
Iran-Russia ties remain to be seen tested. Iran has recently expressed its unhappiness with the repeated delays by Russia in finishing the Bushehr reactor project, as well as Russia's
stance in the Caspian Sea dispute. Russia's growing ties with Israel and its increasing role in the Arab-Israeli peace process have also been points of tension between the two
countries.
Russia is increasingly becoming dependent on its economic relations with the West and therefore gradually becoming vulnerable to western pressures in trying to curb its ties with Teheran. The great sign of Russia's rapprochement toward the West is recent
NATO Summit, where Russia has agreed to collaborate with the U.S. in Afghanistan. The answer to the question whether Russia and Iran have been strategic or
tactical partners is essential for the understanding of the geopolitical future of the wider Middle East and Central Asia region and U. S role there. The alliance between Russia and
Iran and collaboration on nuclear program of Iran would have created a major problem for the United States and its allies in the region. Therefore, understanding its relationship
with the respect to nuclear technology partnership is an essential element in understanding the world's energy and nuclear security situations. In this paper, I will argue that Russia and Iran are tactical partners, versus strategic ones. This argument will
be based on several facts such as trade and nuclear collaboration in order to maintain 3 good economic level and develop nuclear technologies (in case of Iran), and mutual diplomatic collaboration to resist the influence of the U.S. in the region. I
Literature Review
I will utilize the following five major works for my research paper: Persian Dreams by John Parker, "Russia and Iran: a Tactical Alliance" by Robert Freedman,
"Nuclear Proliferation: the Islamic Republic of Iran" by Gawdat Bahgate, "Moscow and the Middle East: Soviet Policy Since the Invasion of Afghanistan" by Robert Freedman and Russia and Iran: Ten Years ofNuclear Collaboration by Sevak Sarukhanian. In addition, I will analyze and draw on recent policy papers and scholarly analyses that examine U.S-Russian, Iran-Russian and Iran-U.S relations that relate to my research question.
In his book, Persian Dreams John Parker emphasizes that Russia and Iran have a history of engagement and cooperation even while they had serious disagreements. For example, in 1992 Russia and Iran backed different sides in the civil war in Tajikistan, yet began to negotiate the Bushehr nuclear power plant contract. In his book, Parker quotes Russian expert, Alexei Malashenko, who highlights that "for Russia engagement with Iran is a strategy, while for Iran cooperation with Russia is just a tactics."1
1 John Parker, Persian Dreams. Potomac Books Ine: 2009, 130
4 5
According to Parker, on the nuclear issue "Moscow's record under President Yeltsin was chaotic and mixed at best."2 Under Putin, Russia became more consistent in using a mixture of engagement and pressure to encourage Tehran to restrain its nuclear program. This pressure included slowing down construction of Bushehr, drawing out negotiations on agreement for the return of spent nuclear fuel and supporting of International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA)3 and United Nations Security Council resolutions critical of Iran. Since Ahmadinejad was elected in 2005, Russian tactics failed to yield results and Iran abandoned suspension and forged ahead its nuclear enrichment program. In Parker's view, "for a variety of reasons Russia over the years has not pressed Iran harder to abandon its military nuclear program."4 Russia's assessment of Iran's progress on rearmament and nuclear enrichment has been more relaxed than that of others. Russia has also been reluctant to spoil cooperation with Iran on regional issues, particularly in the Tajik peace process and pre 9/11 opposition to Taliban. Russia has also hoped for greater profits from trade with Iran. As a result, Parker argued, Tehran during the Ahmadinejad years has been more successful in using Moscow to shield Iran's
2 John Parker, Persian Dreams. Potomac Books Ine: 2009, 145 3 John Parker, Persian Dreams. Potomac Books Ine: 2009, 250 4 John Parker, Persian Dreams. Potomac Books Ine: 2009, 255 6
military nuclear program than Moscow has been in using its leverage to restrain this program.5 Despite Russia's success on softening UN Security Council resolutions on Iran, Iran's leaders declared them illegal. Russia by repeatedly protecting Iran from greater international pressure, has thus arguably contributed to increasing the odds that the Islamic Republic will eventually be able to slip out of the nonproliferation box.6 Parker thinks that the future of the Russo-Iranian relationship is nevertheless difficult to predict; greater Russian pressure on Iran can't be precluded nor can the return of a more tactical flexibility in Tehran's policies be ruled out. Robert Freedman, in his article "Russia and Iran: a Tactical Alliance," describes the events that followed the dissolution of the Soviet Union. Freedman explains how after the break of the USSR the newly independent states of Central Asia and the
Transcaucasia became a central focus for Russian policy makers. Freedman emphasizes that of all the states in the Middle East, Iran is the most important to Russia, because Iran is not only a major player in the region, it is also an important trading partner and occupies a strategic position on the Persian Gulf.7
5 John Parker, Persian Dreams. Potomac Books Ine: 2009, 278 6 John Parker, Persian Dreams. Potomac Books Ine: 2009, 280 7 Robert Freedman, "Russia and Iran: a Tactical Alliance". SAIS review. Vol. 17, # 2, 1997, 11. 7
Yeltsin regime saw in its relationship with Iran three geopolitical opportunities. First, Iran was an important market for Russian arms and nuclear technology and therefore a source of foreign exchange. Second, good relationship with Tehran gave Moscow the opportunity to demonstrate its diplomatic independence from the United States. Third, Iran looked to be an ally in Moscow's efforts to contain and control Azerbaijan and the Taliban and checking Turkish influence. The essay, "Nuclear proliferation: The Islamic Republic of Iran" by Gawdat Bahgat, examines the history of Iran's nuclear program since the late 1950s and analyzes the forces that shape the country's nuclear policy. These forces include perception of the security threats from Pakistan, Iraq, Israel, and the United States, domestic, economic, and political dynamics and national pride. The essay also discusses the European and Russian stance on Iran's nuclear ambition, as well as the International Atomic Energy Agency's (IAEA) efforts to reach a compromise that would satisfy the international community's concerns and Tehran's demands. The essay concludes with some predictions on how Iran's nuclear program is likely to evolve in the next few decades. Robert Freedman in his book, Moscow and the Middle East: Soviet Policy since the Invasion ofAfghanistan, provides an exhaustive account of Soviet policy in the Middle East from the invasion of Afghanistan in December 1979 to withdrawal from the country ten years later. Following an introductory chapter, which views the period from World War II to the invasion of Afghanistan, Robert Freedman examines policy motives land outcomes in a broadly chronological order. The author pays specific attention to 8
Soviet policy toward the Iran-Iraq war and the Arab-Israeli conflict and intra-Arab policies. Professor Freedman compares the policies of Gorbachev with those of his predecessor Brezhnev, Chernenko and Andropov.8 In the conclusion, Freedman explains that continuity characterized recent Soviet policy toward the Middle East. Sevak Sarkhanian in his book, Russia and Iran: Ten Years ofNuclear Collaboration, talks about nuclear collaboration between Russia and Iran and difficulties that the countries have been facing in this area since the mid-90s. It is known that during
the second half of the twentieth century and the beginning of the twenty-first century, leading world countries have been working together to prevent nuclear proliferation. The Non Proliferation agreement, signed in 1968, became the basis for its joint struggle. Sarakhanian says that during the Cold War period, there was a strategic and nuclear stability among the countries supporting the USSR and the United States. After the collapse of the USSR, the situation changed. The post Soviet countries were offered protection from the West and an opportunity to join NATO. The countries with communist regime were facing danger from the West and that was the reason why such countries as Iran had to develop a nuclear program for its protection purposes.
Sarakhanian believes that nuclear collaboration between Russia and Iran is one of
the most important issues in the area of international politics, because it is a determining
8 Robert Freedman, Moscow and the Middle East: Soviet Policy since Invasion ofAfghanistan, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991, 5. 9 Sevak Sarakhanian, Russia and Iran: Ten Years ofNuclear Collaboration. Norvank: 2006, 7. 9
factor of the geopolitical situation in the region and it will help to understand the reason of political crisis of international non-proliferation.1 In addition to the works mentioned above, a number of recent policy papers on Russia-U.S. relationship, Iran-U.S and Iran-Russia relationship and nuclear issues were analyzed. The main policy papers, that were used for this research are: "Reset Reloaded: The Second Phase of Obama's Russia Policy Should Now Have a Major European Component" by Emiliano Alessandri, Brookings Institute report, "America and Iran: From Containment to Coexistence" by Suzanne Maloney, Brookings Institute report, "The Iran Stalemate and the Need for Strategic Patience" by Barbara Slavin, Atlantic Council report, "Next Steps on U. S.-Russian Nuclear Negotiations and Nuclear Non- Proliferation" by Strobe Taibott, Brookings Institute report, " The Dilemma of Bushehr: Nuclear Energy and Nonproliferation" by Sharon Squassoni, Center for Strategic and International Studies(CSIS) report, " Iran: Carrots and Sticks" an interview with Sharon Squassoni, CSIS report, "Iran's Nuclear Negotiations and the West", an interview with Fariborz Ghadar, CSIS report, "Iran and Nuclear Diplomacy", an interview with Fairborz
Ghadar, CSIS report. "Reset Reloaded: The Second Phase of Obama's Russia Policy Should Now Have a Major European Component" Brookings Institute report talks about U. S.-Russia relationship during Obama-Medvedev times. It describes the new policy of Obama administration toward Russia, which eased tensions with Moscow and helped the U.S. 10 Sevak Sarakhanian, Russia and Iran: Ten Years ofNuclear Collaboration. Norvank: 2006, 9. 10
gain Russia's cooperation on key priorities outside Europe, such as Afghanistan, Iran and nuclear non-proliferation. "Next Steps on U. S.-Russian Nuclear Negotiations and Nuclear Non-Proliferation" report describes the New START treaty signed by President Obama and President Medvedev during security summit in April 2010, which suggested the ways to secure highly enriched uranium (HEU) and plutonium stocks. According to the report "the nuclear security summit produced an action plan designed to ensure that all HEU and plutonium is fully secured by 2014."l l The plan includes ways to consolidate smaller holdings and eliminate excess stocks of HEU and plutonium and to broaden participation in variety of multilateral arrangements to control nuclear materials and prevent nuclear smuggling and terrorism. "America and Iran: From Containment to Coexistence" Brookings Institute report gives a broad overview of U.S.-Iran relationship during President Kahtami time. According to the report, Washington's concerns about Iran were focused on three areas: support of terrorism; violent opposition to the Middle East peace process; and development of weapons of mass destruction.12 Iran's position was also well-established: its government had consistently rejected direct diplomatic contacts with Washington while sanctions remained in place. The report also described the new approach that the
11 Alessandri, Emiliano. "Reset Reloaded: The Second Phaze of Obama's Russia Policy Should Now Have a Major European Component". Brookings. 19 Nov., 2010
U.S. had to come up with in regards to dealing with Iran. The new U.S. approach to Iran began with a series of cautious steps that address America's primary national interests— preventing terrorism and proliferation, ensuring energy security, and promoting human rights, democratization, and regional stability "The Iran Stalemate and the Need for Strategic Patience" Atlantic Council report describes the U.S-Iran relationship after the elections of President Ahmadinejad. The author of the report, Barbara Slavin, talks about the structure of political parties of Iran during the presidency of Ahmadinejad. President Ahmadinejad is a veteran of the Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC) and Iran's first non-cleric president in twenty nice years. Under his administration, IRGC veterans assumed many key government positions and now dominate intelligence and foreign policy posts. Under Ahmadinejad, the IRGC increased its involvement in the Iranian economy, often taking advantage of the deals abandoned by foreign companies because of the sanctions.1 Iran had three decades of experience sanctions from the United Nations, the EU, foreign oil companies, and the U.S. Treasury Department. Barbara Slavin explains that "the history of U.S.-Iran is one of the missed opportunities, it has been the pattern that when Iran has appeared ready for reconciliation, the U.S. was not, and vice versa."14 The report also describes the U.S.-Iran relations during Obama administration, UN sanctions to stop Iran's uranium enrichment
13 Slavin, Barbara. "The Iran Stalemate and the Need for Strategic Patience". Atlantic Council. 8 Nov., 2010
program and Obama's new outreach to Iran which implies increasing Iranian access to the U.S. educational institutions, allowing U.S. non governmental organizations to take part in humanitarian work in Iran; and allowing Iran to continue to purchase U.S. medical and agricultural products.15 "Iran and Nuclear Diplomacy" and "Iran's Nuclear Negotiations and the West," CSIS interviews with Fariborz Ghadar describe the Iranian uranium enrichment program and recent U.S. sanctions against Iran. During the past seven years of negotiations between the Western powers and Iran, Iran has persistently claimed that its uranium enrichment and heavy water reactor facilities are aimed at producing nuclear fuel for power generation. The Western powers, however, suspect that the program is intended to develop nuclear weapons. Ghadar states that "in the United States, according to a poll conducted by CNN in October 2009, nine out often Americans believe that Iran is intent on developing a nuclear bomb."16 Iran has been subjugated to sanctions, restrictions on investments and the constant threat of attack and regime change for the past several years. While it is unclear what impact these actions have had on the Iranian regime's domestic economic challenges, they have had a major impact on Iran's hardened position on the nuclear negotiations. Recently, however, weakened by reports of fraudulent presidential elections, questions raised about regime legitimacy, Ahmadinejad's
15 Slavin, Barbara. "The Iran Stalemate and the Need for Strategic Patience". Atlantic Council. 8 Nov., 2010
government has softened its position. The United States, frustrated by the lack of progress on the nuclear issue with Iran, bogged down in Afghanistan, faced with substantial security issues in Pakistan and still engaged in Iran, expressed enthusiasm with Tehran's new position.17 Sharon Squassoni, in her interview " Iran: Carrots and Sticks", published by CSIS, talks about Iran's deal signed with Brazil and Turkey, which requires Iran to send 1 ,200 kilogram of stockpiled low-enriched uranium to Turkey. Squassoni also states that "regardless, Iran's other actions indicate it is not yet willing to comply with UN Security Council (UNSC) resolutions.18 It continues to enrich uranium at even higher levels and continues to build and improve on its centrifuge capacity. Sharon Squassoni, in her recent article "The Dilemma of Bushehr: Nuclear Energy and Nonproliferation," published by CSIS talks about functions of the Bushehr nuclear power plant. Squassoni emphasizes that "the Bushehr reactor is designed to produce electricity, not bomb-grade plutonium."1 Bushehr is inspected by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) to ensure that any material going in or out of the reactor is not diverted. In addition, Iran is obligated by an agreement with Russia to
17 Ghadar, Fariborz. "Iran and Nuclear Diplomacy" and "Iran's Nuclear Negotiations and the West" CSIS. 19 Oct., 2009
send the spent fuel back to Russia, eliminating the possibility of a buildup of plutonium that could be diverted for weapons.
The literature I have analyzed describes the relationship between two countries in chronological order for the past 30 years and shows us advantages and disadvantages that the countries have gained from the relations during this period of time. What remains to be explored in a more detailed way is the relationship between Russia and Iran and the U.S. during Medvedev's times and prospects for the future.
Squassoni, Sharon. "The Dilemma of Bushehr: Nuclear Energy and Nonproliferation". CSIS. 10 Ill
Theoretical Approach and Methodology This research paper is limited to the analysis of 30 years of Russia-Iran collaboration. The year of 1980 will be the starting point of the research. This year was very significant in history of Iran; it was the end of the Iranian revolution and the
beginning of the epoch of Islamic Republic of Iran. With the fall of the Shah in 1979, the prominent Iranian religious and political leader Ayatollah Khomeini became the country's Supreme Leader.21 Khomeini called himself "champion of Islamic revival." He strongly opposed close relationship with either Eastern or Western Bloc nations (including the U.S.), believing the Islamic world would converge into a single unified power. Khomeini viewed Western culture as being inherently decadent and corrupting influence upon youth. Khomeni's politics was completely different from pro-American politics of the Shah. His new anti-Western propaganda impacted the relationship with the U.S. and definitely changed the relationship with Russia, which is very important for the
"Ruhollah Khomeini". Wikepedia. < http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Ruhollah Khomeini>.
15 16
further research and conclusion. Balance of power theory is the International Relations theory that will be used for the analysis of the Russia-Iran relations. Some theorists believe that balance of power is part of realist theory and others argue that it belongs to neorealist theory. Balance of power theory has been used by many theorists as a concept explaining important aspects of international behavior. However, there is a slight disagreement among writers on the subject that a fundamental objective of creating a system of balance of power is to protect the security of the participant nations.22 Given this objective, there is a step to the next principle that "no single entity within the system be allowed to gain predominance over the others."23 Zinnes argues that "a balance of power involves a particular distribution of power among the states of the system so that no single state and no existing alliance has an overwhelming or preponderant amount of power."24 Zinnes also believes that balance of power is part of realism. The idea of no predominance is the essential core of the classical balance of power theory. The idea of equilibrium is closely related to the concept of a balance.
Others have argued that "a condition of equilibrium will be achieved in a balance of power system if each actor follows certain rules of rational behavior." 25For example,
22 Brougham, Heeren and Vattel in Gulick, E.V. Europe's Classical Balance ofPower. Cornell University Press. 1955:30. 23 Chatterjee, Partha. "The Classical Balance of Power Theory." Journal of Peace Research. 1972:51. 24 Zinnes, D.A. "An Analytical Study of the Balance of Power Theories." Journal of Peace Research. 1967:270-80. 25 Chatterjee, Partha. "The Classical Balance of Power Theory." Journal of Peace Research. 1972:51. 17
Morgenthau describes these rules in his principals of political realism. Kaplan gives more compact formation of the same theory by defining the balance of power system in terms of six rules. All six rules are based on the idea that there is no predominant actor.26 Spykman, for instance, believes that "the dynamics of balance of power politics leads each nation to see constantly to increase its own capabilities." This process will lead to some sort of equilibrium, which will only be unstable.
Kenneth Waltz, on the other hand, thinks that balance of power belongs to neorealist theory. Neorealism was Waltz's response to what he saw as the deficiencies of classical realism. Although the terms are sometimes interchangeable there are some differences. The main distinction between two theories is that classical realism puts human nature at the center of its explanation of war, while neorealism stakes no claim on human nature and argues the pressures of anarchy shape outcomes regardless of human
28 nature.
Case study and historical analysis will be the basic methods of research of the paper. For this purpose, I will examine the primary source documents such as interviews with President Putin and Medvedev, interviews with experts from institutions like Brookings, CSIS etc. In addition to this, secondary source documents will be used for the research, such as books, articles in Russian and English languages.
Kaplan, M.A. Variants on Six Models. International Politics and Foreign Policy Free Press N.Y. 1969:291. 27 Spykman, N. America's Strategy in World's Politics. Harcourt, Brace, N.Y. 1942:21. 28 Waltz, Kenneth. "Realist Thought and Neorealist Theory." Journal of International Affairs. No 44. Spring-Summer 1990:21-37. IV
Thesis
Geopolitical Overview It is very important to know the diplomatic interaction between Russia, Iran, and Turkey in order to understand the geopolitical situation in the region. The knowledge about the geopolitical situation in the region will be helpful to draw the correct conclusion whether Russia and Iran are strategic or tactical partners. Turkey has a very important role in the geopolitical situation in the region. Throughout the early stages of the Cold War, Turkey was a loyal member of NATO sending troops to help the United States in the Korean War. Relations between Moscow and Ankara however began to warm up in the 1970s and in the middle of 1980s the two countries negotiated an important natural gas agreement. Since the end of 1991, when the Soviet Union was dissolved, Russian-Turkish relationship has gone through three stages: the first period between 1991 and 1995 saw a mixture of economic cooperation and geopolitical confrontation, the second period was between 1996 and 1998 witnessed an increase in geopolitical confrontation and the third period was between 1998 and 2003 following the economic crisis in Russia saw the relationship transformed into a more friendly and more cooperative one. In the first period, trade and military cooperation were the primary factors fostering the relationship. During this period the competition between two countries was increasing as well. With the collapse of the USSR, Moscow feared inroads into Central Asia and Transcaucasia.
18 19
Reinforcing this concern were Turkish efforts to promote the Baku-Tbilisi- Ceyhan oil pipeline route for Caspian Sea oil that would rival Moscow's Baku- Novorosskiysk route. During this time in history, Turkey also complained about Russian military in Armenia and Georgia, about ecological dangers posed by Russian oil tankers going through the straits and Russian aid to Kurdish rebels. Relations between Russia and Turkey deteriorated in 1 996 when Russian Foreign Minister, Yevgeniy Primakov, who wanted to create a pro-Russian group of states such as Greece, Armenia, Syria and Iran to outflank Turkey. In addition to this, Moscow stepped up its diplomatic support for the Kurdish rebellion allowing Kurdish conferences to be held in Moscow.29 The only bright spot in the relationship between the two countries was when the Blue Stream agreement was signed in 1997, which increased the amount of natural gas Turkey would import from Russia. Following the Russian economic crisis of summer 1998, confrontation gave way to cooperation in the Russian-Turkish relationship. It happened for a number of reasons. Primakov's idea to build an alignment of Iran, Armenia, Syria, and Greece against Turkey failed and Greece and Turkey had a major rapprochement. Second, the economic crisis of 1998 weakened Russia so much that it did not have the economic resources to implement the multipolar diplomatic strategy proposed by Primakov.30
29 Oku, Asim. " Turkey-Russia Relations Dynamics" Global Challenge Research 5 Dec. 2005
The consequences for Russia-Turkey relationship were almost immediate, as
Russia began to treat Turkey as economic partner instead of confronting it as geopolitical rival. Thus in the fall of 1998, Russia refused to grant diplomatic asylum to Kurdish rebel
o 1 leader, Abdullah Ocalan and then Moscow indicated it would not oppose the Baku- Tbilisi-Ceyhan pipeline and finally, Moscow stepped up its efforts to find external funding for the Blue Stream gas pipeline. This change in policy direction toward Turkey was reinforced in 2000, after Vladimir Putin became the president and in 2001, at the United Nations, Russia and Turkey signed an action plan for Turkish-Russian cooperation in Eurasia. Tensions remained over Kurdish and Chechen issues and over Russian military deployments in Transcaucasia. However, in 2003, even with Islamists heading Turkish government, the Russian-Turkish relationship was surprisingly stable.
Despite the disagreements in the past, relations between Turkey and Russia improved and became exceptional under Russian President Dmitriy Medvedev. During the official visit of Dmitriy Medvedev to Turkey in May 2010, several deals were signed, such as the lifting of visa requirements. In addition, both countries found a mutual interest in shoring up large investments between the two states, especially in energy sector where Russia has shown a great interest. Russia and Turkey also signed a multi-billion dollar nuclear power
31 "Russia-Turkey Relations." Wikipedia .14 July, 2010-1 1-2010
plant which will be built by Russian private company Atomstroyexport. It will be Russia's first built and owned power plant.
The border between Turkey and Iran is one of the oldest in the world and has stayed almost since the Battle of Chaldiran in 1514.33 The beginning of the 20th century was marked by the signing of several friendship agreements between Turkey and Iran. A period of coldness started after the 1979 Iranian Revolution which caused major changes in Iran and the Middle Eastern status quo. Today Iran and Turkey cooperate in a wide variety of fields that range from trade, terrorism, drug trafficking and promoting stability in Iraq and Central Asia. The Turkish Republic's ties with Israel caused various minor economic and bilateral disputes between the nations; however, Turkey's neutral stance in the disputes between Israel and Iran has helped these disputes to die down. In May 2010, Turkish Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan visited Tehran to make an agreement to outscore Iranian uranium enrichment to Turkey to avoid further sanctions on Iran. From geopolitical overview of Russia, Iran, and Turkey, it is obvious that mostly the relationship between three countries have been based on economic collaboration. If the relationship between Russia and Iran get sour, Iran can always turn toward Turkey for economic cooperation.
32 Oku, Asim. " Turkey-Russia Relations Dynamics" Global Challenge Research 5 Dec. 2005
Iran-Iraq War During the Iran-Iraq war, Soviets were providing military support to Iraq, which tremendously undermined Moscow-Tehran relationship. Only after the war, the relationship between two countries started to improve based on economic collaboration. From Moscow's point of view, the major problem in the relation with Iran during the 1980s was not Afghanistan, but Iran's pursuit of the Iran-Iraq war which upset Moscow's diplomatic strategy in the Middle East. After Baghdad's attack in 1980, Iran was totally focused and absorbed in fighting Iraq. When after a period of increasing border tension, the Iraqi army invaded Iran in 1980, Moscow had little choice, but to remain neutral, "an almost equally good case could have been made in Kremlin for assisting either Iran or Iraq."34 The Soviet dilemma was compounded by the inconvenient timing of the war, since Moscow was deeply involved in Afghanistan. Moscow was linked to Baghdad by a Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation and the Soviets had long been Iraq's main supplier of military weaponry. In addition, the Soviets saw Iraq as 'objectively' a major regional anti-Western force; but there was also a very good case for supporting Iran. The Islamic revolution had detached Iran from its close alignment with the U.S., thereby striking a major blow at the U.S. position in the region.
1 Jacobsen, Carl, Soviet Foreign Policy: New Dynamics. New Themes .Martin's Pres: 1989, 165.
Parker, John, Persian Dreams. Potomac Books Ine: 2009, 165. 23
The Soviet policy shifted its position from being neutral toward the Iran-Iraq war to supporting Iraq between 1986-1987. This turn created difficulties in Moscow's relations with both Baghdad and Tehran and led to the strengthening of the U.S. Navy in the Indian Ocean and inflicted economic loss by hampering soviet cooperation with both countries.
The Iran-Iraq War permanently altered the course of Iraqi history. It strained Iraqi political and social life and led to severe economic dislocations. Viewed from a historical perspective, the outbreak of hostilities in 1980s was in part another phase of the ancient Persian-Arab conflict that had been fueled by twentieth century border disputes. Many observers however believe that Saddam Hussein's decision to invade Iraq was a personal miscalculation based on ambition and a sense of vulnerability. Saddam Hussein, despite having made significant strides in forging an Iraqi nation-state, feared that Iran's new revolutionary leadership would threaten Iraq's delicate Sunni-Shia balance and would exploit Iraq's geostrategic vulnerabilities. The Iran-Iraq War was multifaceted and included religious schisms, border disputes, and political differences. Conflicts contributing to the outbreak of hostilities ranged from centuries-old Sunni versus Shia and Arab versus Persian religious and ethnic disputes, to a personal animosity between Saddam Hussien and Ayatollah Khomeini. Above all, Iraq launched the war in an effort to consolidate its rising power in the Arab world and to replace Iran as the dominant Persian Gulf state.
36 Vassiliev, Alexei, Russian Policy in the Middle East: From Messianism to Pragmatism. Ithaca Press: 1993,272. 24
Iraq claimed territories inhabited by Arabs, as well as Iraq's right over Shatt el- Arab. Iran and Iraq had engaged in border clashes for many years and had revived the
TO dormant Shatt al Arab waterway dispute in 1979. The Iraqis also perceived revolutionary Iran's Islamic agenda as threatening to their pan-Arabism. Khomeini bitter over his expulsion from Iraq in 1977, after fifteen years in An Najaf, vowed to avenge Shia victims of Baathists repression. As the Baathists planned their military campaign, they had every reason to be confident. Not only did the Iranians lack cohesive leadership, but the Iranian armed forces, according to Iraqi intelligence estimates were poorly equipped and exhausted, Baghdad, on the other hand, possessed fully equipped and trained forces.
Despite the Iraqi government's concern, the eruption of the 1979 Islamic Revolution in Iran did not immediately destroy the Iraqi-Iranian rapprochement that had prevailed since the 1975 Algiers Agreement.39 The fall of the moderate Bazargan government in late 1979, and the rise of the Islamic militants preaching an expansionist
foreign policy soured Iraqi-Iranian relations. The principal events that touched off the rapid deterioration in the relations between two countries occurred during the spring of
1980. In April, the Iranian supported Ad Dawah attempted to assassinate Iraqi foreign minister Tariq Aziz. Shortly after the failed grenade attack on Tariq Aziz, Ad Dawah was
j7 The Southwestern oil-producing province of Iran, Khouzestan. 38 Iraq claimed the 200 kilometer channel up to the Iranian shore as its territory, while Iran insisted that the thaw leg - a line running down the middle of the waterway, negotiated last in 1975, was the official border. 39 Karsh, Efraim, The Iran-Iraq War 1980-1988. Osprey Publishing: Ltd: 2002, 123. 25 suspected of attempting to assassinate another Iraqi leader, Minister of Culture and Information Latif Nayyif Jasim.40 In September 1980, border skirmishes erupted in the central sector near Qasr-e Shirin, with an exchange of artillery fire by both sides. A few weeks later Saadam Hussien officially abrogated the 1975 treaty between Iraq and Iran and announced that the Shatt al Arab was returning to Iraqi sovereignty. Iran rejected this action and hostilities escalated as the two sides exchanged bombing raids into each other's territory, beginning what was to be a protracted and extremely costly war. At the beginning of the war, Iraq seemed to make a lot of progress toward the victory over Iran, but Iran may have prevented a quick Iraqi victory by a rapid mobilization of volunteers and deployment of loyal Pasdaran and Basij forces41 to the front. They were ideologically committed troops that fought bravely despite inadequate armor support. Iran's resistance at the outset of the Iraqi invasion was unexpectedly strong, but it was neither well organized nor equally successful on all fronts. Iran's first major counterattack failed. For political and military reasons, President Bani Sadr was engaged in a power struggle with key religious figures and eager to gain political support among the armed forces by direct involvement in military operations. Lacking military expertise, he initiated a premature attack by three regular armored regiments without the assistance of the Pasdaran units. Despite Iraqi success in causing major damage to exposed Iranian ammunition and fuel dumps in the early days of the war, the Iranian air force prevailed initially in the air war. One reason was that Iranian
40 Karsh, Efraim, The Iran-Iraq War 1980-1988. Osprey Publishing: Ltd: 2002, 180. 41 What Khomeini called the "Army of Twenty Million" or People's Militia. 26 airplanes could carry two or three times more bombs or rockets than their Iraqi counterparts and Iranian pilots demonstrated considerable expertise. In March 1982, Tehran launched its Operation Undeniable Victory, which marked a major turning point in the history of Iran-Iraq War as Iran penetrated Iraq's "impenetrable" lines,42 and split Iraq's forces, which made Iraqis to retreat. After this victory, the Iranians maintained the pressure on the remaining Iraqi forces and President Saddam Hussein announced that the Iraqi units would withdraw from Iranian territory. Saddam ordered a withdrawal of the international borders, hoping that Iran would agree to end the war. Iran did not accept this withdrawal as the end of the conflict and continued the war into Iraq. Throughout 1983, both sides demonstrated their ability to absorb and to inflict severe loses. By the end of 1983, an estimated 120,000 Iranians and 60,000 Iraqis had been killed. Despite these losses, in 1983 Iran held a distinct advantage in the attempt to wage and eventually to win the war of attrition. In the beginning of 1984, Iraq's military goal changed from controlling Iranian territory to denying Tehran any major gain inside Iraq. Furthermore, Iraq tried to force Iran to the negotiating table by various means. First, President Saddam Hussein wanted to increase the war's manpower and economic cost to Iran. For this purpose, Baghdad purchased new weapons, mainly from the Soviet Union and France. Second, Iraq turned to diplomatic and political mean. In April 1 984, Saddam Hussein proposed to meet Khomeini personally in a neutral location to discuss peace negotiations, but Tehran rejected this offer and restated its refusal to negotiate with
Hiro, Dillip, The Longest War: Iran-Iraq Military Conflict. Routledge New York: 1994: 122. 27
President Hussein. Third, Iraq sought to involve the superpowers as a means of ending the war such as USSR and the United States.
Between 1984 and 1987, both sides were carrying enormous losses and were economically and militarily exhausted. In 1985, Iraq began aircraft attacks, long-range artillery attacks and surface-to surface missile attacks on Tehran and other major Iranian cities. The Iraqi Air Force's first real strategic bombing campaign aimed at breaking civilian morale and disrupting military targets.43 Iraq's efforts from 14 March to 7 April and 25 May to 1 5 June were reportedly effective. Opposition from the Iranian Air Force was negligible to nonexistent as the Iraqis hit air bases and military and industrial targets all over Iran. In 1986, Iran conducted several major offensive attacks in Mehran, Basra and the final offensive captured the town of Duayji and inflicted 20,000 casualties on Iraq
and 65, 000 casualties on Iran.
In late May 1987, just when the army seemed to have reached a complete
stalemate on the southern front, reports from Iran indicated that the conflict was intensifying on Iraq's northern front. As the war continued, Iran was increasingly short of spare parts for damaged airplanes and had lost a large number of airplanes in combat. As a result, by late 1987, Iran had become less able to mount an effective defense against the
resupplied Iraqi air force. Four major battles were fought between April and August 1988, in which the Iraqis routed or defeated the Iranians. In the first offensive called Blessed Ramadan, Iraqi Republican Guard and regular army units captured the Al-Faw peninsula. The 36-hour battle was conducted in a military sophisticated manner. In the battle, the Iraqis
43 Hiro, DiIHp, The Longest War: Iran-Iraq Military Conflict. Routledge New York: 1994, 125. 28
effectively used chemical weapons, using nerve and blister agents against Iranian command and control facilities, artillery positions and logistics points. Three subsequent operations followed the same pattern, although they were less complex. The Iran-Iraq War lasted almost eight years from September 1980 to August 1988. It ended when Iran accepted United Nations Security Council Resolution 598, leading to a cease fire on August 20, 1988. By the end of the Iran-Iraq War, Iran had over a million casualties, it spent between $74, and $91 billion to wage war, and the direct and indirect costs of the conflict to Iran was $627 million.44 Moscow had been pursued by the better relation with Iran for a long time; therefore it was in its interests to encourage Iran to conclude the war with Iraq. The Iran's pursuit of regime change in Iraq had complicated the important role of Soviet diplomacy the Middle East. With the end of Iran-Iraq War in 1988 and Soviet withdrawal from Afghanistan in 1989, Moscow hoped that its role in the Middle East would improve. At the same time, the Soviet economy was declining and Moscow was considering reviving economic relations with Iran and even concluding a contract for military goods. From Iran's point of view, buying arms from the Soviet Union would be a quick way to revive weaken Iranian military. The Iran-Iraq cease fire and Soviet withdrawal from Afghanistan helped advance the revival of Soviet-Iranian ties.
In June 1989, the new President of Iran, Rafsanjani visited Moscow, where he and President Gorbachev signed a joint declaration on the principles of relations and friendly cooperation between the USSR and the Islamic Republic of Iran and a long-term program
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for economic, commercial, scientific and technical cooperation to the year 2000.45 Ministers from both sides also signed a commercial agreement and an agreement for the construction of a railway line from Mashhad in Iran across the border at Sarakhs to Tejen in Turkmenistan. In addition to this, Gorbachev and Rafsanjani also made a side agreement on arms sales, but it was not heavily advertised. Military contract was a payoff to Iran for ending the Iran-Iraq War so that Soviet diplomacy could get back on track in the Middle East. The arms sale agreement would help Moscow salvage its declining economy and therefore it was happy to become a major arms supplier to Iran. After Rafsanjani's visit, Iran and the Soviet Union concluded four major weapons, spare parts, munitions, and military technical assistance contracts in the following years. The imbalance after the Iran-Iraq War was staggering, even after the buying spree. The Islamic Republic's military would still be smaller than the shah's at the end of the reign. Moscow did not object to this imbalance, it actually supported it by restricting its arms supplies to Iran after 1982, while continuing to supply them to Iraq. The Khomeini regime had insisted on pursuing the war which had hampered Moscow's diplomacy in the Middle East. At the end of the war, Iran was exhausted on all fronts. Only military and new military contracts were a payoff to Iran for ending Iran-Iraq War so that Soviet diplomacy could get back on track in the Middle East.46 Moreover, these contracts opened the prospect of improving the Soviet Union's presence in Iran itself, which would help to keep the United States boxed out. There was also a hope from
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Moscow's side, of continuing to elicit de facto Iranian neutrality toward the Najbullah regime in Afghanistan.
In short, Moscow for years had been bogged down in Afghanistan and Iran had been bogged down in Iraq. Moscow needed to revitalize its diplomacy, improve its geopolitical situation in the Middle East, and progress its economy. Teheran needed
weapons to rebuild its military standing and deterrence capability in the region. Iran's cease of fire in the Iran-Iraq war helped Moscow to better its position in the Middle East
and economic and arm trade agreements with Moscow helped Iran to revive its destroyed
economy.
War in Afghanistan
The Russian motive to enter Afghanistan was different than past war strategies. Russia feared that if they did not enter the country, they would lose control. If Russia did not attempt to subdue Afghanistan, they feared the Afghans would take control and thus they would lose control of Central Asia. Russia was also fearful of the U.S. and how they might impact Afghanistan. When Mikhail Gorbachev came to power in March 1985, Soviet policy in the Middle East was in crisis. This was mostly due to the USSR's intervention in Afghanistan and USSR's flagging military and strategic competition with the West.47 The Afghan war was a nine-year conflict where Soviet Union forces were supporting the
Vassiliev, Alexei, Russian Policy in the Middle East: From Messianism to Pragmatism. Ithaca Press: 1993, 268. 31
Marxist People's Democratic Party of Afghanistan government against the mujahedeen
resistance.
The First Deputy Foreign Minister Georgi Korniyenko wrote in his memoirs that
"the Soviet invasion was motivated by security concerns fed by the fear of loosing Afghanistan." This fear was stimulated by the concern that the United States would
move to Afghanistan to establish itself after loosing Iran. Moscow's prospective was that
after the United States lost its bases in Iran, it would relocate to Pakistan and then to
Afghanistan and rearm the country. The Afghans would take advantage of the rising nationalism in the Soviet republics across the Soviet Union's southern border and as a
result it would impossible for Moscow to keep Central Asian countries under control of Soviet Union. Moscow saw Hafizullah Amin' s murder of Afghan Communist party Chief Nur Mohammad Taraki as counter-revolutionary coup that the United States and Pakistan could use to pursue its goals against Soviet Union.49 When the Soviet power was to start war in Afghanistan, none of the top Soviet
leaders had any idea about the Afghanistan theater of military operations, the possible reactions of the Afghan population or of the prevailing social conditions in the country.
None of them turned to Russian history to recall how many decades it took Russian Empire to conquer Dagestan. "Afghanistan is an equivalent of 15 Dagestan's with wilder
and higher mountains that effectively reduce the attacking party's military and technical
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Parker, John, Persian Dreams. Potomac Books Ine: 2009, 25. 32 superiority in tanks and artillery and even in aircrafts and helicopters." No one even had taken into the consideration the consequences of attempt to conquest the Northern Caucasus, where the majority of the population was hostile to Christian Russia and the tsar and had cost hundreds thousand casualties among the Russian troops. But by the middle of the war in Afghanistan, Soviet Minister of Foreign Affairs, Andrei Gromyko, was the first Soviet leader to realize that "Soviet invasion of Afghanistan was a mistake of catastrophic dimensions."51 In 1980, Gromyko together with Safronchuk, a career Soviet diplomat and an advisor to Afghan Foreign Ministry, were talking about possible ways of "extricicating Soviet Union from Afghanistan adventure using diplomacy." The real steps were not taken until 1986 when Mikhail Gorbachev gave Soviet military a year to finish the job in Afghanistan and get out. As Gorbachev maneuvered to extricate the Soviet military out of Afghanistan, Iran was the most worrisome factor in terms of activities inside the country. The Soviet occupation was a fundamental obstacle, for Teheran to closer relationship to Moscow, but Iran tried to keep a neutral position during the war. Iran did not put a lot of resources to helping Mujahedeen fight against Soviets in Afghanistan and it did not do anything to provide any help to Moscow either. Involved for centuries in Afghanistan, Iranian military resistance to the Soviet army was overshadowed by Pakistan. According to Safronchuk, "Pakistan supported 80 percent of Mujahedeen and Iran supported just 20 percent," although Iran was 100 percent against
50 Vassiliev, Alexe/. Russian Policy in the Middle East: From Messianism to Pragmatism. Ithaca Press: 1993,254. 51 Parker, John. Persian Dreams. Potomac Books Ine: 2009, 25. 52 Parker, John. Persian Dreams. Potomac Books Ine: 2009, 25. 33
Soviet occupation at the beginning of the war." Iran's dilemma was while they were fighting Soviet troops, Mujahedeen were backed by the United States and Pakistan, with whom Iran did not want to coordinate. As a result of this dilemma, Iran had an insignificant involvement in activities of other outside powers. It was mostly concentrated on the minority of Shia Hazaras and those forces willing to take guidance from Teheran. Parker states that "Iranian support was stingily compared to what Pakistan and Saudi Arabia were giving to the commanders and political parties they backed." Iran seemed to be more interested in expanding Khomeni's power in Afghanistan than fighting Soviets. During the nine years of war, Iran did not participate in any negotiation with Kabul. Iran just wanted Soviet troops to leave Afghanistan and then prepared to resume its relationship with Moscow. The Soviet diplomat, Ivan Kozyrev stated that "Iran's aim throughout the conflict was to make sure that part of Afghanistan would remain under its sphere of influence, therefore its support of mujahedeen was limited."55 It is obvious that Moscow's invasion of Afghanistan was mostly motivated by its fear to lose Afghanistan and that the U.S. would spread its influence to Afghanistan and
Pakistan. During the war, Iran seemed to keep a neutral position because it wanted to maintain good diplomatic relationship with Moscow and did not want to support the mujahedeen forces backed by Pakistan and the United States.
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Collapse ofSoviet Union After the collapse of Soviet Union, Iran was trying to spread its influence to the Former Soviet Republics in Central Asia and support the opposition in the Tajik Civil War, but both countries managed to maintain diplomatic relationship based on the balance of power factor. Russia needed Iran to avoid the spread of NATO influence to the former Soviet Republic and Iran needed Russia to protect it from the invasion of the U.S. In December 1991, several months after the August coup attempt against Gorbachev, at a meeting near Brest in Belarus, Russian leader Boris Yeltsin and his Ukrainian and Belarusian counterparts decided to end the USSR and form the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS). A week later, the leaders of Central Asian states requested membership in the CIS when they met in Ashgabat, Turkmenistan. The fall of communism opened up new prospects for Tehran to spread the vision of Ayatollah Khomeini of theocratic state in the newly independent post Soviet territories where Muslim citizens were the majority. When the Iranian leadership accepted fait accompli of the Soviet collapse, it appeared to view independent Central Asia and Caucasus as a mixture of dangers and opportunities that required immediate attention. Parker says "Iran's activism was both an attempt at damage limitations against perceived Turkish and American inroads, and a forward-leaning effort to spread its own influence by emphasizing common Islamic identities while submerging Sunni-Shia sectarianism."56 Historically, Central Asia was Sunni and the majority of Azéris were Shia, but the brutalities and oppression from the Soviet power had reduced most inhabitants of the
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region to theological ignorance about their Islamic roots. In this situation, Iran's concern
was that Central Asia's awareness of their ties to the Sunni and prejudice against Shia
Iran would revive.
With Russian influence declining, Iran moved to Central Asia and Caucasus and started to establish its presence. In areas, such as Azerbaijan and Tajikistan, it had been spending millions of dollars on religious, cultural, and political proselytizing. But the disappearance of the Soviet state also created dangers for Iran in the sense that the U.S. and Turkey raced with it to cultivate the relations with all new states on Iran's northern border. Russia and Iran's historically troubled relationship with Turkey predisposed them to view Turkey as competitor no matter how good the ties actually were. According to Bruneis, "Turkey's competition with Iran was a constant factor in Russia-Iran relations."58
The Soviet collapse filled Turkey with enthusiasm for spreading Turkish economic, cultural, and political influence in Turkic Azerbaijan and Central Asia.
Encouraged by the United States, Turkey was launching a myriad of initiatives across the region: opening embassies, broadcasting TV, sending emissaries, and opening schools.
For Iran, the move by its historical rival Turkey into the Caucasus and Central Asia posed a sectarian challenge in addition to geopolitical one. Sunni Turkey and Shia Iran, with their different cultures, histories, languages, and national aspirations had been an
Parker, John. Persian Dreams. Potomac Books Ine: 2009, 41.
Parker, John. Persian Dreams. Potomac Books Ine: 2009, 43. abomination for each other. Most of the former Soviet Union's Muslim population was Hanafi Sunni, the sect of Ottoman Empire and spoke Turkic languages.59 In the past, Iran's attempts of expansion into the Caucasus and Central Asia had
created suspicion about Iran's intentions. By the end of the nineteenth century, the prevailing stereotype of Iranian's, especially in Sunni parts of the region, was negative.
After the Soviet collapse it was debatable whether Iranian hopes for influence in Central Asia were handicapped by Sunni's prejudice. More than 70 years of Soviet power, seclusion and secularization had done so much to erase pre-Soviet knowledge of theological distinctions between Shia and Sunni sects. Azéris and Central Asian seemed
to know very little about their own Shia and Sunni beliefs.
In its methods of expansion into Caucasus and Central Asia, Iranians were trying to downplay Shia and approached the Central Asians as fellow Muslims, not sectarian Shias. ° But experts like Umnov, cautioned that "the strengthening of Islam in the Caucasus and Central Asia could rekindle Sunni-Shia disputes and further estrange even Farsi-speaking Tajikistan from Iran."61 Looking back, Gudimenko62 did not think that top Soviet leaders gave much thought to the impact that the Sunni-Shia differences might have on Iranian missionary contacts and theocratic proselytizing.63.
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As the Soviet Union broke up, observers thought that Iranian influence would be much greater in Azerbaijan than in Central Asia, not only because of the common Shia ties but also because of the Soviet-Iranian agreements that had endorsed several contracts across Araks River.64 In addition, during Gorbachev times Iran had an opportunity to trade and spread religious work in Azerbaijan. By contrast, the Soviet regime controlled Turkish access to the Caucasus and Central Asia much more carefully and Ankara's policy was not to do anything to annoy the USSR. When the Soviet Union collapsed, under pressure from nationalists at home and in Azerbaijan, Turkey recognized Azerbaijan on November 9, 1991. It was the first country to do so almost two months before the USSR's collapse. Turkey's early recognition of the independence of Azerbaijan was the demonstration that Turkey more than Iran had its finger on the pulse of events in Azerbaijan and eagerly welcomed Azeri independence. Iran was much faster than the United States and Western powers to establish embassies in the newly independent states. The popular appeal of Iran's opening of an embassy in Baku in early 1992 was soon undermined by Tehran's early support of Armenia in the conflict over Nagorno-Karabakh. Parker remarks "this provoked a sharp shift in attitudes toward Iran by Azéris, who were not alone in pointing out the irony of Iran's support of Christian Armenia against Shia Azerbaijan."65 A couple of years later, Tehran tilted toward Armenia and Russian policy on the conflict over Nagorno-Karabakh. As a result, Azerbaijan and Turkey imposed a tighter blockade on commerce with Armenia and Iran
in turn became Armenia's critical trade partner.
64 Parker, John. Persian Dreams. Potomac Books Ine: 2009, 48. 65 Parker, John. Persian Dreams. Potomac Books Ine: 2009, 49. 38
Iran was the first county to establish an embassy in Tajikistan. Aleksandr Umnov emphasized that a Farsi-speaking government in Tajikistan was important for Iran, given all the Turkic-speaking Sunni republics in the region. According to Umnov "the Iranian ambassador to Baku, when asked why Tajikistan was so important for Iran, explained that Tajikistan meant as much to Iran as Azerbaijan meant to Turkey."66 Many in Tehran saw in Tajikistan a country whose territory and people formed a part of "Greater Iran" until the fifteenth century, beginning under the Samandins. Under the Samandins, the
Ghaznavids, Bukhara, and Samarkand had begun to glitter as cultural centers of the Islamic world. Therefore Tajiks and Iranians found a common heritage when the Soviet
Union collapsed. Irina Zviagelskaya of the Oriental Institute recalled that "along with the Turks, Iranian presence in Central Asia became much more visible toward the collapse of the Soviet Union."67
From the facts presented in this paper, it is obvious that after the collapse of the Soviet Union, Iran was very anxious to spread its influence in Central Asia. However,
Iran tried to do it with caution not to upset its geopolitical partner, Russia. By supporting Russia's position in the conflict ofNagorno-Karabakh, Iran showed that it put its relations with Russia above the support of its Shia fellows. At that time in history, Iran needed Russia as strong partner to stabilize its geopolitical situation in the region and to resist the spread of influence from Turkey and the United States to the Central Asia.
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Civil War in Tajikistan In 1992, a newly elected president of the Russian Federation, Boris Yeltsin, was facing a lot of challenges with the newly independent Russia and post-Soviet states. One of the most challenging tasks of this time was Tajikistan. In 1992, civil war broke out in Tajikistan when ethnic groups from the Garam and Gorno-Badakhshan regions, which supported President Nabieyv and the Old Guard Communist Party, rose up against the national government of President Rahmonov. 68The outbreak of the civil war in the region became a major challenge to Moscow and Tehran in managing their relationship. They had lost the common land border and shared the mixture of competing and common interests in newly independent states in between their borders. The challenge they faced was mostly focused in Tajikistan but was blurred by the forays into the country by Pakistani-backed radical Islamists mujahideen, who contested both Russian and Iranian interests.69 In addition to the Soviet Union collapse, the consequences of the long and catastrophic Soviet war in Afghanistan had a great impact on developments in Tajikistan. According to Tajik Foreign Minister, Lakim Kayumov, "there had been mujahideen incursions into Tajikistan, and if Islamic fundamentalism is very high in Afghanistan then it is natural it will influence Tajikistan also." For Iran, Tajikistan was a door to Central Asia. Radicals in Iran pushed aggressively to support the Islamic opposition in Tajikistan when they saw new
68 Vassiliev, Aleksandr. Srednaya Aziya I Kazakhstan: Ploiticheskiy spekt. Informatsionno-ekspertnaya gruppa: 2008, 234. 69 Parker, John. Persian Dreams. Potomac Books Ine: 2009, 58. 70 Parker, John. Persian Dreams. Potomac Books Ine: 2009, 58. 40
revolutionary opportunities in the region after the Soviet Union's disappearance. For Russia, the fate of 400,000of ethnic Russians in a war-torn region was an important and warning matter. As the conflict in Tajikistan generated into a civil war, hundreds of
Russians lives were in danger. Although a pro-Moscow regime took over in Dushanbe in December of the same year, Iran for years thereafter with other forces and outside powers active in Afghanistan helped to keep the Tajik opposition afloat. Nevertheless, Tajik war was primarily a domestic matter of Tajikistan, not of Iran, Afghanistan, or Pakistan, although the ambitions of all these countries did feed the conflict.
Russia and Iran formally adopted neutral stances while the outcome was uncertain, but then displayed where their sympathies lay as first one side then the other took the upper hand.71 For Russia it meant the side that oriented itself toward Moscow. For Iran it meant when the Islamic Republican Party (IRP)-led opposition ousted Nabiyev in September 1 992 and briefly appeared to have triumphed. But then the situation changed, after the old guard Popular Front militia retook Dushanbe in late 1992. Russia and Uzbekistan assisted it in pushing the armed opposition into Tajikistan's hinterlands and across the border into Afghanistan. Iranian policy toward Tajikistan in the wake of Soviet collapse was very complex, with unknown mixture of coordination and competition between various camps. Throughout these tumultuous events, Iran had at least two lines—cautious and pragmatic versus go-for-broke and deeply committed to the Islamic opposition.72 Iran's official line
71 Parker, John. Persian Dreams. Potomac Books Ine: 2009, 59. 72 Parker, John. Persian Dreams. Potomac Books Ine: 2009, 69. 41
was that the crisis was an internal conflict with disturbing regional consequences. It appreciated the new opportunities for Iran in Central Asia and sought to expand Iran's influence in the region with high level visits and commerce. Revolutionary Tajikistan seemed to increasingly rife with opportunities for Iran. Events in other parts of Central Asia and Afghanistan were threatening to move in the opposite direction. In Kabul, predominantly Pakistani-backed mujahideen got rid of President Najibullah in April
1992. His downfall shocked Moscow and its allies in Central Asia and also had unpleasant consequences for Tehran's interests.73 Given the alternative of Pakistani dominance in Afghanistan, Tehran had seemed to view the Moscow-backed Najibullah regime as offering Iran the best hope for influence through the parties it sponsored. Moscow had its concern over Tehran's role in the tumultuous politics of Tajikistan in 1992. Yevgeny Bazhanov at the Diplomatic Academy stated that "in September and October 1 992 it was absolutely clear to Moscow that Iran was directly supplying weapons and money to the Tajik opposition."74 There was great fear and unhappiness over Iranian actions. According to Irina Zvigelskaya at the Oriental Institute, "Iran had supplied the Tajik opposition with money, literature, weapons, and military training during the conflict."75 Although Iran had been helping Tajikistan, Moscow did not accuse Iran in participating directly in Nabiyev's ouster in September. At that time it
Parker, John. Persian Dreams. Potomac Books Ine: 2009, 69. Jawad, Nassim, "Tajikistan: A Forgotten Civil War". Minority Rights Group: 1995, 5. Parker, John.. Persian Dreams. Potomac Books Ine: 2009, 74. 42 was clear to Moscow that Nabiyev did not have any support and his political career was over.
The year of 1993 saw a fundamental transition in Russian-Iranian dealings over Tajikistan and by extension Afghanistan. Russian envoys paralleled efforts to encourage good behavior by Iran in Tajikistan with diplomacy focused on elevating the status of overarching Russian-Iranian relations. As Popular Front rolled to victory in Tajikistan in late 1992, Moscow was openly supporting it and its leader, Emomali Rahmonov. Iran, meanwhile was trying to keep combatants from Islamic Republican Party (IRP) and its allies alive to fight another day.76 First Deputy Foreign Minister, Anatoliy Adamishin, recalls that "some of what Iran was up to in Tajikistan could be qualified as state-supported terrorism, but it did not worry Russian policy makers much."77 Russia new that Iranian policy was influenced by domestic political debate and there were arguments in Iran over what line to pursue in Tajikistan. At first Iran took a more aggressive side when the fundamentalist reactionaries won out, but then when the opposition rolled back in late 1992, Iran changed its tactics because it saw it did not have enough tactics to install a new Islamic
government. Nevertheless, Iran's policy was a complex mix operating along multiple tasks, meaning despite the situation Iranian circles and agencies favoring a more aggressive posture continued to provide aid to Tajikistan's militant opposition.
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The visit of the special Russian envoy, Yevgeniy Primakov, to Kabul and Tehran successfully advanced the idea of Tajik peace talks. Even as Moscow reinforced its own military presence in Tajikistan, Tehran continued helping the Tajik opposition. Besides the interest in Tajikistan, Iran was open to close relations with Russia partly in reaction to renewed U.S. efforts to contain and isolate Iran. Iran also had interest in working with
Russia to frustrate the continuing ambition of Pakistan and Saudi Arabia in Afghanistan and Tajikistan. Russia, on other hand, had its own reasons for pursuing closer cooperation with Iran. In early 1993, the first signs ofNATO expansion promoted anti-U.S. feelings and consequently greater interest in Moscow to cooperate with Iran, Afghanistan, and Tajikistan. As Russia felt pressed by the West to turn neo-imperialism, Kremlin tried to lead Russia's policy toward near abroad, including Tajikistan. In addition, Moscow was willing to cooperate with Iran, despite Iran's involvement in terrorism in Beirut, Berlin and event Dushanbe. Iran in its turn began playing on the first signs of souring relations between post-Soviet Russia and the United States. In Moscow in October 1992, two diplomats made progress on a draft of a new political treaty. According to the treaty, Russia and Iran pledged "not to let force or the threat of force against each other, not to let their territories be used in launching aggressions."79 Moscow pointed out that it would give Tehran the right to protest the Russian behavior in Tajikistan and vice versa. Kozyrev and Velayati also signed a
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protocol on regular consultations between their two ministries and memorandum on visa- free diplomatic and official business travel.
Meanwhile, from the Russian prospective the war seemed to be almost over until the bloody attack by Tajik rebels (reinforced by Afghan mujahideen) in July 1993 killed over dozen Russian border guards. This attack provoked a major crisis in Russian-Iran relations.80 This incident promoted Russian aircraft and artillery retaliatory strikes across the border into northern Afghanistan. By the end of the month, Russian diplomats were working on re-establishing contacts with Kabul, Tehran, and the Tajik opposition in order to get national reconciliation talks going. Moscow two-track policy going into two different directions showed that Moscow in reality had no policy at all. Yuri Fedorov of the USA Institute of wrote at the time that "Moscow's half-baked diplomacy and its
Ol # effort to balance military and mediation tracks would not lead to success." Russia was pushing Rahmonov to compromise with its opponents, while at the same time threatening these opponents with military force. Moscow finally understood that what was going on in Tajikistan was fundamentally a struggle of regional clans for economic resources including control of the narcotics traffic. Whatever the reason was, the attack had wide ramifications in
Russia itself. Public opinion was still reeling from after-tremors of the Soviet collapse and its impact on co-ethnics. Ethnic Russians in all newly-independent non-Russian states were struggling with national identities, challenged political status and uncertain future in the Baltic, Caucasus and Central Asia even including tolerant Kazakhstan and
80 Parker, John. Persian Dreams. Potomac Books Ine: 2009, 88. 81 Parker, John. Persian Dreams. Potomac Books Ine: 2009, 87. 45
Kyrgyzstan. These circumstances were made even more painful by the economic collapse affecting the entire post-Soviet space. All this provoked resentment in some parts of Russia against both the leaders of the newly independent states and the outside foreign powers. According to Fedeorv "massacre on the Tajikistan border was a fundamental turning point in Russia's policy in July 1993."82 Protecting the Russians abroad was a major strategic foreign policy task for the government of Russia. As Russians began to feel more strongly about their country's loss of status as a greater power, anti-U.S. feelings rose and pro-Iranian sentiment grew. Russia's growing differences with the West coincided with Iran's growing interest in cooperation with Moscow. The first steps toward peacemaking talks in Tajikistan were made in January 1993 during the summit of Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) leaders (which included five Central Asian countries). During the summit, CIS leaders declared support for the new Rahmonov leadership in Dushanbe and its call for introduction of a collective peacekeeping force into Tajikistan. Despite several summits that took place in the next several months, the January's decision on sending the peacekeeping forces to Tajikistan remained unimplemented. Only in September 1993, at the CIS summit in Minks, Russia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Uzbekistan and Tajikistan finally managed to sign an agreement to establish and support the Collective Peacekeeping Force (CPF) in Tajikistan. According to Russian Deputy Foreign Minister Adamishin, "Russia could not quit and leave Tajikistan-despite arguments by some that by variety of reasons it should. Tajik's border was the back door into the CIS; if Russia abandoned it, there was nothing
82 Ahmed Rashid, Jihad: The Rise ofMilitant Islam in Central Asia. Yale University: 2002, 45. 46 to stop drugs, Islamist extremism and other threats from sweeping north through Uzbekistan, Kyrgyzstan and Kazakhstan into Russia. In addition, Russia had also economic interest in Tajikistan; the courtly was very rich at mineral resources." But whatever the situation in Tajikistan or elsewhere in Central Asia, Russia had to maintain good relationship with Iran. The two countries were neighbors and if the relations deteriorated, Russia would lose hope it might have of working with elements in Tehran to staunch the flow of Islamist extremism. By improving its relationship with Russia, Iran made a wise choice. The United States was continuing to push Iran in the corner and Iranians regarded the Gulf War as an example of what the United States would like to do with them and concluded the United States would never forgive the Islamic regime. As a result, Iranians behaved themselves much better in Tajikistan then could have been expected because they felt they really needed Russia. According to Irina Zviagelskaya "all this came before the rise of the Taliban in Afghanistan, which only further reinforced Iran's movement toward Moscow."84
In sum, the outbreak of the civil war in Tajikistan drastically challenged the relationship between Moscow and Tehran. Iran's policy in Tajikistan was a mixture of coordination and competition between various camps. But despite this, Iran needed Russia to aggravate the ambition of Pakistan and Saudi Arabia in Tajikistan and Afghanistan. Russia, in its turn, needed Iran to resist the U.S. idea ofNATO expansion to the Former Soviet Republics.
83 Parker, John. Persian Dreams. Potomac Books Ine: 2009, 101. 84 Parker, John. Persian Dreams. Potomac Books lnc: 2009, 102. 47
Gore-Chernomyrdin Commission, Bushehr deal and testing ofIranian Shahab-3 Yeltsin Era started with the promising two-track policy between Russia and the U.S. on nuclear collaboration with Iran, which did not last long since Russia would find every possible way to collaborate with Iran on nuclear issues. At that time in history, Russian economy was chaotic and it needed Iran as receiver of its arm supplies and nuclear technology. Despite the conditions of the Gore-Chernomyrdin Commission, Russia signed a deal with Iran for construction of the Bushehr power plant. During Yelatsin period, the relationship between Russia and Iran was based on economic and nuclear collaboration.
Far from the turbulent events in Central Asia, Moscow in 1989 began to develop a robust and potentially troubling arms trade with Iran. After the collapse of USSR, sales from Russia to Iran expanded beyond state control to include illicit nuclear and missile technology transfers that worried Washington. To manage its contending American and Iranian ties, the Yeltsin government by 1993 developed a two-track policy. Russia would continue doing what it regarded as legitimate and commercially defensible deals with Iran but it would agree to discuss security issues of particular concerns with Washington. In Vancouver in 1993, President Bill Clinton and Yeltsin established an Intergovernmental Commission on Economic and Technological Cooperation within this
or commission Gore-Chernomyrdin Commission was created. The goal of the Gore- Chernomyrdin Commission was to shield growing political and economic relations with
85 Commission was named after the U.S. Vice President Allen Gore and Russian Prime Minister Chernomyrdin. 48
Iran. It was designed to protect its domestic flanks against accusations of catering Washington and its foreign flanks against charges of irresponsibility toward nonproliferation obligations.86 The Commission was meeting every six months and it quickly became an important venue for discussing American complaints about Russian proliferation of nuclear and weapon technology. Over the years, Russia's two-track policy made neither Washington nor Tehran happy and led to pretensions by both toward Moscow. Washington claimed some credit for encouraging Moscow to police its trade with Tehran more carefully but was never fully satisfied that Russia was effectively cutting off proliferation of dangerous technologies and materials to Iran. Tehran continued to find its relationship with Moscow useful, though Iran eventually became disappointed by Russia's reluctance to sell it the most sophisticated conventional weapons.87 At a regular Commission's meeting in June 1995, Vice President Gore and Prime Minister Chernomyrdin signed a memorandum in which Russia pledged not to sign any more arm deals with Iran and to discontinue implementing existing contracts for armaments and military hardware after the end of 1999. In August 1995, Russia joined the Missile Technology Control Regime(MTCR), which was established in 1987 to restrain the transfer of equipment, materials and technology contributing to the development of "missiles with ranges over three hundred kilometers and payloads over five hundred kilograms."88 In December 1995, Russia became one of 28 charter members
86 Parker, John. Persian Dreams. Potomac Books Ine: 2009, 1 14. 87 Parker, John. Persian Dreams. Potomac Books Ine: 2009, 1 14. 88 Parker, John. Persian Dreams. Potomac Books Ine: 2009, 117. 49
of the Wassenaar Arrangement, aimed at limiting destabilizing transfers of conventional arms and dual-use goods and technologies. In August 1996, Yeltsin signed a decree aimed on restricting the export of dual-use military items and technologies, intended to bring Russia in compliance with Wassenaar agreement. Russia's export control decrees and legislation were effective only to the extent that there was a will to enforce them and resources to do so. Russian administrators never gave nonproliferation efforts the priority they needed to shut down the troubling transfers completely. Thus Iran could still find Russian institutions which would be willing to sell it forbidden arms and materials.
There were ups and downs under Yeltsin in dealing with Washington on nuclear and military sales to Iran. From 1992 to 1995, Moscow was about to start negotiations with Iran for a contract worth $800 million for the construction of the Bushehr nuclear power plant. The Russian leadership was convinced that Western power would take initiative if Russia did not. Iran, negotiations on a contract for a nuclear power station at Bushehr went forward despite American objections. Bushehr was a particularly useful political device to assert and make a show of standing up to the United States.89 The feeling in Moscow was that Russia would deal with Iran on its own terms no matter what
America said. Russia would deal with Iran on its own terms no matter what America would say and no matter how difficult it would be to deal with them. In 1995, the Bushehr deal was
Parker, John. Persian Dreams. Potomac Books Ine: 2009, 1 19.
Parker, John. Persian Dreams. Potomac Books Ine: 2009, 109. 50 signed. This aroused concerns among American political circles. President Bill Clinton saw the necessity to have another summit with Russian leaders. The major topic at the summit was the Iran issue. Yeltsin cut the discussion short by announcing that he had banned the centrifuge deal and imposed new controls on nuclear cooperation with Iran. Yeltsin's ban on the transfer of Russian centrifuges to Iran balanced the negative impact of the Bushehr contract as well as shield it from America's pressure.
From 1995 to 1997, proliferation to Iran worsened even as Yeltsin's administration began to work with Washington to put in place some barriers stopping unauthorized exports. This was a period of economic and political chaos in the country and under this cover head of MinAtom,91 Viktor Mikhaylov was able to take advantage of the situation using the massive construction project at Bushehr as a cover under which he conducted a number of negotiations for dangerous technology sales to Iran, like gas centrifuges that could be used to produce weapons-grade uranium. Post-Soviet Russia presented easy pickings for Iranian procurement agents. Defense-related Russian factories were in financial ruin and ready to work any possible partner ready to pay cash. Besides, there was a widespread perception that Iran would buy the technology from someone else if Russia was not willing to deal. Former Security Council staffer Vladimir Lebedev in an interview pointed out that "the period form 1 992 to 1995, immediately after the USSR's collapse was the worst economic situation in the
Ministry of Atomic Energy 92 Vishniakov, Viktor. "Russian-Iranian Relations and Regional Stability". International Affairs, No. 1, Vol.45, 1999,165. 51 country. Institutes fell into poverty and their directors looked anywhere for saviors." Arm sales to Iran were especially easy and undemanding for Russian factories because they did not require technological or physical plant innovation. At its core, the Russian desire to sell Iran conventional arms and to contract to build the Bushehr nuclear power plant was commercial. Since NATO and other technologically advanced countries would not buy weapons form Russia, it had no alternative but to sell arms to Iran and other less demanding customers. According to the analysis of foreign relations expert Nodari Simonia, "during the Soviet era 80 percent of the military industrial complex's production stayed at home, while 20 percent was exported, after the Soviet Union collapse, the reverse became the case."94 Arm sales to Iran highlighted the "independence" of Russian foreign policy in the face of American objections. There were other incentives for arms and technology sales to Iran besides money, domestic politics, and East-West politics. By 1993-94, Iran had clearly acknowledged Russia's dominance in Tajikistan and Russia began to see Iran as potentially helpful on new post-Soviet regional issues. By making the access to Russian weapons and technology easy for Iran, Russia was keeping Iran on the same page as Russia on critical regional issues. Russia could not be sure how the weapons it was supplying to Iran would be used by Tehran and it was not an idle issue since Iran shared CIS borders to the north and the Persian Gulf and Middle East were well-known for their instability. Nevertheless at this time in history, Russian economy needed the income. If Russia pulled back other
93 Shlapentokh Dmitriy. "Russian Elite Image of Iran: From the Late Soviet Era to the Present." International Relations and Security Network. September 2009, 35. 94 Shlapentokh Dmitriy. "Russian Elite Image of Iran: From the Late Soviet Era to the Present." International Relations and Security Network. September 2009, 37. 52
arms suppliers would simply jump in, and the only way to guarantee the security of the southern CIS border was a Russian policy of good-neighbor relations with Iran. By 1998, on top of concern over the leakage of nuclear technology from Russia to Iran, another concern arouse after Iran's first tested its 1,000-1,300 kilometer-range Shahab-3 ballistic missile.95 The wariness towards Iran's intentions and concern over the implications for Russia's own security increased after the first test of the Shahab-3 and subsequent publicity about Iranian plans to move on to development of Shahab-4 and Shahab-5 with ranges up to 1 0,000 kilometers.96 Two years after the first Shahab test, former Security Council official, Vladimir Lebedev, asserted that "Russian officials had complained directly to Iranian counterparts that Shahab-3 posed a security threat to Russia."97 He also claimed that "three heads of the Security Council of Russia. ... had warned Iran about the Shahab-3, but while the Iranians had reacted with feigned understanding, they continued to seal Russian know-
QO how materials and Moscow continued to catch and punish them." As a result of these events, Russia began to pay more attention to its own security of its dual-use technology sales to Iran. The intense phase of Russian-American cooperation on the nonproliferation front did not last long. It was interrupted when the ruble collapsed and currency devaluation forced Yeltsin to fire many young reformers in August 1998. This period saw a change of direction in Russian policy toward Iran that
95 Parker, John. Persian Dreams. Potomac Books Ine: 2009, 124. 96 Parker, John. Persian Dreams. Potomac Books Ine: 2009, 125. 97 Parker, John. Persian Dreams. Potomac Books Ine: 2009, 126. 98 Parker, John. Persian Dreams. Potomac Books Ine: 2009, 127. 53
Vladimir Putin later reinforced when he succeeded Yeltsin at the end of 1999. Despite the non-proliferation agreement with the U.S., Russia would still deal with Iran on its own terms, because it needed Iran as its economic and geopolitical partner.
Putin 's Era
Of all the nations of the Middle East, Russia's closest relationship is with the
Islamic Republic of Iran. During this time in history, despite the obstacles in the relationship of two countries, Russia and Iran were maintaining strong relationship based on economic and nuclear collaboration factors."
On December 31, 1999, Vladimir Putin, the Prime Minister of Russian Federation under Yeltsin, became acting president. Putin had previous experience working in the administration and knew all the ways Kremlin functioned. With time, his insider's knowledge made him qualified to have an impact on Russian nonproliferation policy and its implementation. Putin kept a hold of Bushehr deal and did a way with the 1995 Gore- Chernomyrdin understanding on phasing out arms sales to Iran. He also began to take a more careful approach to new arms and technology contracts with Tehran and tighten it up on nonproliferation policy enforcement.100 Putin faced a major problem in Iran when he first took office, the problem was in his decision to invade Chechnya following a series of bombing incidents in Russia that were blamed on Chechens who were seeking their independence form Russia. Chechnya
99 When Putin became President of Russia, there was a significant increase in arms sales and missile technology to Iran. 100 Luzyanin, S.G. " Vostochnaya Politika Vladimira Putina". ACT: 2007, 117. 54
was a predominantly Muslim republic of Russian Federation and the Russian army began to kill thousands of Muslim Chechens. Iran could not tolerate these actions and a war of words between Moscow and Tehran began. However, state interests took precedence over Islamic ideology in Tehran as the ruling classes of Tehran downplayed the conflict as an internal problem of Russia. This was the case primarily because Iran needed Russia as a secure source of sophisticated arms supplier and as a diplomatic counterweight to the
United States. This demonstrates that Islam, as an ideology, can take a back seat to state interests, much as international communism often took a back seat to the state interests of the USSR.101
Perhaps as a reward for Iran's low profile on Chechnya, Putin unilaterally
abrogated the Gore-Chernomyrdin agreement of June 30, 1995. This decision risked U.S. sanctions, ranging from a ban on the use of Russian rockets for satellite launches to the
discouragement of U.S. investments to Russia, to U.S. pressure on the International Monetary Fund (IMF) not to reschedule Russian debts. While improving the Russia-Iran
relationship, the decision to abrogate the Gore-Chernomyrdin agreement clearly hurt the
U.S.-Russian relations.
In 1998, Russian-Iranian relations began to turn. July was a signal month in the
evolution toward a more pessimistic approach to Tehran. It was a time when Iran tested the Shahab-3 missile. At the same time, Washington laid down sanctions against Russia for providing missile technology to Iran. Missiles test conducted by India and Pakistan at
Robert, Freedman. "Russia and Iran: a Tactical Alliance". SAIS review. Vol. 17, No.2, 1997, 9. 55 the same time provoked debates in Moscow over its transfers of arms and technology to
Iran.
One of the most striking aspects of the Putin presidency was his ability to bring quasi-independent players in Russian domestic and foreign policy of the Yeltsin-era under much tighter centralized control. Putin has eliminated the political influence of oligarchs such as Boris Berezovsky, Vladimir Gusinsky, and Mikhail Khodorkovsky and took over their news media outlets.
By 2000, Putin appeared to be a big booster of MinAntom, Russia's main contractor on the Bushehr nuclear power station in Iran and a promoter of renewed arm sales to Iran.102 In March 2001, Putin organized a summit with President Mohammed Khamati. Shortly after the summit, Putin replaced MinAtom's boss, Adamov with
Aleksandr Rumyantsev. By this move, Putin tried to show a move against corrupt officials whose dealings with Iran went over the line. Non-official sources claim that "removing Adamov was Putin's first move to discipline headstrong over independent capitalistic ministers inside Russia's structure." Before long, Putin's discipline campaign extended beyond state institutions and government officials to political and economic actors who under Yeltsin got accosted to acting independently from Kremlin guidance. Putin's move against Adamov had important implication on policy towards Iran. With these events happening, it was obvious that Putin was beginning to bring a new stage in the relations between Moscow
Parker, John. Persian Dreams. Potomac Books Ine: 2009, 117.
Parker, John. Persian Dreams. Potomac Books Ine: 2009, 130. 56 and Tehran, not just ousting a corrupt head of MinAtom. Washington supported moves of the new administration.
Putin greatly emphasized improving Russia's economy not only through the sale of arms, oil, and natural gas but also by selling high tech goods such as nuclear reactors and by expanding Russia's business ties abroad. Indeed, business interests have played an increasingly significant role in Putin's foreign policy. Overall, Putin's central foreign policy aim was to strengthen the Russian economy in the hope that in the not too distant future, the country will regain its status of a great power. In the interim, he was looking to create 'arc of stability' on Russia's frontiers so that economic development can proceed as rapidly as possible.104 This was one of the reasons Putin embraced an improved relationship with Turkey and ended Russian opposition to the Baku-Ceyhan pipeline. In theory, Putin's goal would appear to require a policy of increased cooperation with the economically advanced West and the United States. At that time in history, Russian foreign policy seemed like it was seeking to create the "multipolar" world by trying to cooperate with both Iran and the United States. The fact that Russia was trying to cooperate with the U.S. but also competing with it clearly impacted the Russian-Iranian relationship. The cooling of the relations between Russia and Tehran over weapons and nuclear and dual technology sales was complicated by growing differences over how to delimit the Caspian Sea and regulate the exploitation of its oil and gas resources. After Russia broke with Iran and started to work with Kazakhstan to delimit their joint seabed, Iran
104 Freedman Robert, "Russian policy toward the Middle East under Putin: the impact of 9/1 1 and the war in Iraq". Alternatives: Turkish Journal of International Relations. Vol. 2., 5 Nov., 2003
Caspian issues. Putin co-opted Gazprom and Lukoil' s policy and rewarded those oligarchs who were eager to work with him and the Russian state.107 Those who were not trying to work according to Kremlin rules, Putin destroyed, like Youkos's Mikhail Khodorkovsky. Having established control of Gazprom's board of directors in June 2001, Putin unveiled his initiative to put together a "Eurasian alliance of gas producers." The
105 Parker, John. Persian Dreams. Potomac Books Ine: 2009, 148. 106 Parker, John. Persian Dreams. Potomac Books Ine: 2009, 148. 107 Like Lukoil's Vagit Alekperov 58
project aimed at a Gazpom monopoly on Central Asian natural gas exports, in order to greatly increase Gazprom's profit margins in European markets. Putin's Gazprom-led alliance cemented Russia's position as dominant supplier of natural gas to Europe and blocked Iran from any attempt to move in and cut down Russia's market share. Although Russia and Iran began to drift apart over Caspian and nonproliferation issues at the end of the 1 990s, other developments kept them close in touch. In March 2001, President Khatami visited Moscow. The Caspian Sea dispute, along with military cooperation was high on the visit's agenda. Meanwhile, U. S.-Russian relations had deteriorated sharply as the new Bush administration had called for abrogation of the Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty and for expansion ofNATO to into the Baltic States. Soon after taking office, the administration had angered Moscow by bombing Iraqi anti-aircraft installations and by expelling a number of alleged Russian spies. During Kahatami's visit, Putin formally announced the resumption of arms sales. Former Russian Foreign Minister and Prime Minister, Yevgeny Primakov called it "the biggest event in the history of relations between Tehran and Moscow."110
The treaty which emerged from the meeting ("The Treaty on Foundations of Relations and Principles of Cooperation") merely stated that "if one of the sides will be exposed to an aggression of some state, the other side must not give any help to an
Parker, John. Persian Dreams. Potomac Books Ine: 2009, 149. 109 Robert, Freedman. "Russia and Iran: a Tactical Alliance". SAIS review. Vol. 17, No. 2, 1997, 12. 110 Freedman, Robert. "Russia, Iran and the nuclear Question: The Putin record" Strategic Studies Institute. 6 December, 2006
Freedman, Robert. "Russia, Iran, and the nuclear Question: The Putin record". Strategic Studies Institute. 6 December, 2006< http://www.strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/pubs/display.cfm?pubid=737 >.
Freedman, Robert. "Russia, Iran, and the nuclear Question: The Putin record". Strategic Studies Institute. 6 December, 2006< http://www.strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/pubs/display.cfm?pubid=737 >. 60 between Turkey and Iran.1 13 As a result, Iran's threats gave Turkey and the U.S. a pretext for enhancing their strategic presence in the Caspian Sea region. Putin's decision to draw closer attention to the United States after 9/1 1 events, particularly his acquiescence in the deployment of U.S. troops in Central Asia, was viewed dimply by Iran. A second problem in post-9/1 1 Russian-Iranian relations dealt with the Caspian Sea, when due to Iranian obstinacy, the April 2002 Caspian summit failed, Putin moved to assert Russian authority in the Caspian. This took three steps: first was a May 2002 agreement with Kazakhstan to develop jointly the oil fields lying in disputed waters between them. Second a major Russian naval exercise took place in the Caspian in August 2002 with 60 ships and 10,000 troops; both Kazakhstan and Azerbaijan participated and Putin called the purpose of the exercise "part of the war against terrorism."114 Third, in September 2002, Putin and Azeri leader Gaidar Aliev signed an agreement dividing the seabed between them and holding the water in common.115
Overall, the relationship between Russia and Iran were tense during this time in history, but both countries managed to overcome the obstacles and maintain the diplomatic relationship. Despite Russia's increased interest in collaboration with the U.S. and Turkey at this time in history, Russia needed Iran as economic partner and Iran
Moscow also did not and does not want any other military power to be able to act unilaterally in the Caspian, particularly if it threatened another member of the CIS. 114 Freedman, Robert."Russia, Iran and the nuclear Question: The Putin record" Strategic Studies Institute. 6 December, 2006< http://www.strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/pubs/display.cfm?pubid=737 >. 115 Freedman, Robert. "Russia, Iran and the nuclear Question: The Putin record" Strategic Studies Institute. 6 December, 2006 < http://www.strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/pubs/display.cfm?pubid=737 >. 61
needed Russia as major arms and nuclear technology supplier and counterweight to the Unites States. Between the years of 2002-2005, Russia seemed to be balancing its forces between collaboration with the U.S.., European Union (EU), and Iran. Putin's new policy was targeting collaboration with the West, and at the same time, Russia did not want to loose Iran as its established nuclear and economic partner. While Russian-Iranian tension rose over the Caspian Sea, Russian nuclear reactor sales and arms sales continued. In July 2002, a few weeks before the major military exercises on the Caspian, Moscow announced that "not only would it finish Bushehr (despite U.S. opposition) but also stated that it had begun discussions on building on five additional reactors for Iran." 116As Moscow increased its nuclear sales to Iran, the United States sought to discourage Russia through a carrot-and-stick approach, threatening on the one hand to withhold $20 billion in aid for the dismantling of the old Soviet military arsenal, while also promising $10 billion in additional aid for Moscow.117 There were four major reasons for Moscow's unwillingness to cooperate with Washington on the nuclear issue. First, the sale of reactor earns hard currency for Russia; second once the first reactor began operating, Iran hinted repeatedly to Moscow it would purchase a number of additional reactors; third, Bushehr reactor and the factories in Russia which supply it employ a large number of Russian engineers and technicians and thus help keep Russia's nuclear industry alive; fourth by standing firm on Bushehr, Putin
116 Robert, Freedman. "Russia and Iran: a Tactical Alliance". SAIS review. Vol. 17, No. 2 , 1997, 14. 117 Freedman, Robert. "Russia, Iran and the nuclear Question: The Putin record" Strategic Studies Institute. 6 December, 2006< http://www.strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/pubs/display.cfm?pubid=737 >. 62
could demonstrate to a domestic audience Russia's independent policy vis-à-vis the United States.1 18 Such policy helped Moscow to alienate the United States, despite constant Russian protestations that the Bushehr reactor would only be used for peaceful purposes. In addition, Moscow ran the danger that either the United States or Israel might
attack the Bushehr reactor.
Following the initial success in the Iraq war, the U.S. stepped up its pressure on Russia to halt the Iranian nuclear weapons program. In response, Russian Foreign Minster Igor Ivanov noted on an Interfax interview that "Russia wanted all Iranian nuclear programs to be under supervision of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA)."119 Then, following the Bush-Putin talks in St. Petersburg in June 2003, when President Bush was at the height of his international influence following the fall of Baghdad, Putin asserted that "the positions of Russia and the United States on Iran were closer than people thought."120 By June 2003, the U.S. was making two demands on Russia regarding the Bushehr reactor. First, it demanded that Moscow should not supply any nuclear fuel to the Bushehr reactor unless Iran agreed to send all the used fuel back to Moscow. Second, Moscow should also withhold the nuclear fuel until Iran signed an additional protocol with the IAEA permitting that agency unannounced visits to all Iranian nuclear facilities. Both G-8 and the EU pressured Iran on the latter issue. The question was not only how far Iran would go to comply, but how far Russia would go to
1,8 Robert, Freedman. "Russia and Iran: a Tactical Alliance". SAIS review. Vol. 17, No 2, 1997, 19. 119 Freedman, Robert. "Russia, Iran and the nuclear Question: The Putin record" Strategic Studies Institute. 6 December, 2006< http://www.strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/pubs/display.cfm?pubid=737 >. Freedman, Robert. "Russia, Iran and the nuclear Question: The Putin record" Strategic Studies Institute. 6 December, 2006< http://www.strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/pubs/display.cfm?pubid=737 >. 63 pressure Iran. Russian Foreign Ministry spokesman, Alexander Yakovenko stated that
"Moscow would only freeze construction on the Bushehr plant if Iran refused to agree to return all spent nuclear fuel to Russia and that Iran was not required to sign the protocol
because the protocol is an agreement that is signed on a voluntary basis." Meanwhile, to deflect some the U.S. pressure, Minatom Minister Alexander Rumyantsev announced
on June 3, 2003 that "the Bushehr reactor would be completed in 2005, not in 2004 as was originally planned."122 Then on September 12, 2003, the IAEA (of which Russia is a member) gave Tehran a deadline of October 31, 2003 to provide full information about its nuclear program to show it was not building nuclear weapons secretly. IAEA also
urged Iran to freeze its uranium enrichment program. In September, a dispute between Russia and Iran had broken out over who would pay for the return of the spent fuel from the reactor, with Iran demanding that Russia pay for it and Moscow refusing.
During Putin's visit to the United States in late September 2003, President Bush was unable to get Putin to agree to cease construction on the Bushehr reactor. The ball was taken out of Moscow's hands by the EU, which sent a delegation to Tehran in late
October 2003. The delegation succeeded in extracting from Iran in return for a promise of high-tech cooperation, an agreement to stop enriching uranium temporally and to sign the additional protocol as a to inform the IAEA of its past nuclear activities. Taking this into consideration, Putin announced that now Iran was in full compliance with IAEA and
Russia and Iran would continue their nuclear cooperation.
121 Freedman, Robert. "Russia, Iran and the nuclear Question: The Putin record" Strategic Studies Institute. 6 December, 2006
In part because of Russian and EU pressure, the Board of Governor of the IAEA decided not to refer Iran's nuclear program to the UN Security Council. The United States took a tougher stance, warning that the U.S. was ready to use all options against rogue states believed to be developing weapons of mass destruction. This skepticism was soon proved to be well-taken because two months later revelations about Pakistan's nuclear proliferation policies, including Iran, led IAEA Chief Mohammed ElBaradei to warn about the collapse of the nonproliferation system.124 In addition, IAEA inspectors found that Iran had hidden among other things an advanced P-2 centrifuge system that
could be used for enriching uranium, along with a program for producing polonium 2010, which could be used as a neutron initiator for nuclear weapons. Alexander Rumyantsev called the situation "extremely unpleasant" and added that "Russia along with other countries was going to give active consideration as to whether work on the establishment of national fuel cycles should be terminated in non-nuclear countries." Consequently,
the central factor in Russian-Iranian relations in 2004 was the question as to when Russia would complete the Bushehr nuclear reactor. Even the division of the Caspian Sea seemed to be put on hold during this period. Moscow's dilemma was two-fold. Throughout 2004, either the IAEA continued to find that Iran was hiding information about its nuclear activities or Iran was breaking a promise on agreements it already had
made with IAEA and the EU-3 (Germany, France, and England). This in return brought
Robert, Freedman. "Russia and Iran: a Tactical Alliance". SAIS review. Vol. 17, No. 2, 1997, 22.
Robert, Freedman. "Russia and Iran: a Tactical Alliance". SAIS review. Vol. 17, No.2, 1997, 22. Robert, Freedman. "Russia and Iran: a Tactical Alliance". SAIS review. Vol. 17, No. 2, 1997, 23. 65 heavy U.S. pressure on Russia to hold off supplying nuclear fuel to the Bushehr reactor project. In November 2004, almost a repeat of the events of the fall of 2003 occurred when the IAEA urged Iran to freeze its enrichment program and allow IAEA inspections and the EU-3 followed up with negotiations that led to agreement with Tehran to promise to stop enriching uranium temporally in return for a promise of trade cooperation. On November 15, 2004, a preliminary agreement was reached to this effect only to have Iran attempt to back off from it by asserting its right to keep 20 centrifuges for research. At the end of November, however, Iran dropped this demand and signed an agreement with EU-3 to suspend all enrichment and related activities on "a voluntary basis." This included the manufacture and import of gas centrifuges and their components; the assembly, installation and testing of gas centrifuges and undertaking any plutonium separation installation. The goal of EU-3 was to have Iran permanently suspend its enrichment activities and end its nuclear fuel cycle program. EU was prepared to offer Iran guarantee of fuel supply and management for Iran's nuclear power program. Throughout 2004, as Iran was seeking to wiggle out of its commitments to the IAEA and EU-3; Moscow decided to take an increasingly tough tone with Tehran on
nuclear issues. Thus, in June 2004 Putin threatened that "Russia will halt its work at Bushehr if Iran refuses to behave in an open manner and fails to comply with the IAEA's demands."128 When the agreement was reached at the end ofNovember 2004 and the
126 Robert, Freedman. "Russia and Iran: a Tactical Alliance". SAIS review. Vol. 17, No. 2, 1997, 24. 127 Robert, Freedman. "Russia and Iran: a Tactical Alliance". SAIS review. Vol. 17, No 2, 1997, 25. 128 Robert, Freedman. "Russia and Iran: a Tactical Alliance". SAIS review. Vol. 17, No 2, 1997, 26. 66 subsequent IAEA report took a tough stand against Iran, Deputy Foreign Minister Sergey Kislyak told Interfax that "not only did Russia praise the IAEA resolution as 'well balanced' but we also temporally welcomed Iran's decision to freeze all uranium enrichment programs. This is a voluntary, trust building measure. We hope this decision will be reliably fulfilled."129 Moscow's sharp decisions toward Iran's uranium enrichment program began to fade in 2005, as Putin had suffered a number of embarrassing failures at the end of 2004. The debacle in Beslan demonstrated that Putin was not capable of normalizing the situation in Chechnya and the pro-Western Orange Revolution in Ukraine indicated the defection of Russia's most important CIS neighbor. All these factors underscored the weakness of Russia's foreign policy. Nonetheless, Putin was still determined to show both his own and Russia's importance in the world by asserting Russia's role in the Middle East and reinforcing its alliance with Iran. To do this, Russia invited Iran to join the Shanghai Cooperation Organization as an observer and also invited it to join the Caspian Sea security organization. Iran and Russia stepped up their planning for a North- South transportation corridor through Azerbaidzhán. In addition to this, Moscow launched a satellite for Iran and discussed the possibility of the sale of submarine- launched missiles with a range of 200 kilometers. Should the sale go through, it would
129 Freedman, Robert. "Russia, Iran and the nuclear Question: The Putin record" Strategic Studies Institute. 6 December, 2006< http://www.strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/pubs/display.cfm?pubid=737 >. 67 complicate the activities of the U.S. fleet in the Persian Gulf and the Indian Ocean and be a major crack in the U. S.-Russia relationship. While all these developments demonstrated reinforced Russian-Iranian ties, the nuclear issue was the most important aspect in the relationship. In early 2005, Iran was increasingly becoming critical of the delay of Russia's completion of the reactor. Putin realized that to cement the relationship with Iran he had to finalize the nuclear fuel agreement. In February 2005, Russia signed a final agreement for the supply of nuclear fuel to Bushehr reactor.131 Under this agreement, all spent fuel was to be returned to Russia, thus preventing its diversion into atomic weapons. This agreement came after a
Bush-Putin summit in which the U.S. and Russia pledged to work together against nuclear proliferation. In response to this, Iran's chief nuclear negotiator, Hassan Rowhani, warned that "Iran would never cease enriching uranium permanently and if the United States sought sanctions at the UN Security Council, the security and stability of the region would become a problem." There are several hypotheses as to why Moscow proved willing for such an extended time not only to forego substantial U.S. economic aid but also arouse the ire of the U.S. because of its supplies of nuclear equipment and technology. First, Moscow is ken to develop its nuclear reactor industry, which employs thousands of top-grade Russian scientist and Iran pays hard currency for the reactors. Second, the sale of such
130 Freedman Robert, "Russia, Iran and the Nuclear Question: The Putin record" Strategic Studies Institute. 6 December, 2006< http://www.strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/pubs/display.cfm?pubid=737 >. 131 Berman Ilan, "Russian Marriage of Convenience" Washington Times. 24 May, 2002
Russia, Moscow also seeks to avert a possible U.S. attack on Iran, something that would have posed another painful choice for Putin. In 2003, the U.S. began hardening its position against Iran. Thus, the U.S. pressured Halliburton and ThyssenKrupp to restrain their operations in Iran and was preparing a blacklist of foreign companies investing in Iran's energy industry. Looking at these circumstances, Iran was concerned that it could be next on the list of the U.S. after Iraq. By 2003, Iran's attention began to shift from Afghanistan to Iraq, where it's political and security equities outweighed its stakes in Afghanistan. Russia also had its focus on Iraq. Although united in their opposition to Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF) launched by the United States, Russia and Iran had different stakes in opposing the shattering of the status quo in Iraq. In Iran, the prospects of successful U.S. effort against Saddam aroused
Parker, John. Persian Dreams, Potomac Books Ine: 2009, 82. 69 fears that Iran itself could be Bush's next "axis of evil"134 target. For Moscow, unilateral American move into Iraq despite Russia's opposition would further undermine Russia's world power status. After OIF overthrew Saddam Hussein, Russian and Iranian core objectives in Iraq continued to differ. Russia's goals remained above all economic and geopolitical with an emphasis of the geopolitical on revived influence in the UN Security Council. Iranian goals were primarily political and regional, focused on increased influence in Iraq by virtue of its Shia majority. Iranian political goals were also affected by Washington's approach and the timeline for turning severity over to the Iraqis, as well as by the actions of the UNSC, where Russia played a critical role. Because of the publicity garnered by the clashes between Washington and Moscow over tactics, Russia's own security interests toward Iran were always overlooked and underappreciated. Moscow did not like the idea of Iran's emergence as a military nuclear power. In September 2003, Presidents Vladimir Putin and George Bush met at Camp David, to confirm that they were both opposed to Tehran's detection of nuclear weapons and called on Iran to cooperate fully with IAEA.136 But after the Camp David meeting, the situation showed that it was Russia and America that were strategic partners, not Russia and Iran.
Nevertheless, Russia continued to defend its work on the Bushehr nuclear power station, even as it slowed down final approval of a protocol on the return of spent fuel
134 Parker, John. Persian Dreams. Potomac Books Ine: 2009, 224. 135 Parker, John. Persian Dreams. Potomac Books Ine: 2009, 225. 136 International Atomic Energy Agency 70 from Iran to Russia. Russian political figures believed that "they still had time before having to make a fateful choice on whether to deliver fuel to Busherh.137 In any event, the Busherhr project's completion date was constantly pushed back because of technical difficulties.
At the same time, Russian frustration with Iranian behavior grew. The new administration of President Ahmadinejad abandoned Iran's voluntary pledge to IAEA to suspend temporarily nuclear activities. As a result, Russia supported the IAEA's suggestion to move discussion for the Iranian nuclear issue to the UN Security Council. In Tehran, relations with Russia were the subject of renewed debate. The issue was whether Iran could count on Russia to repel sanctions if the Iranian nuclear file were referred to the UN Security Council. In March 2006, according to Parker, "Russia's endorsement of the file's placement on the UNSC agenda gave ammunition to those who argued the limits of Russian trustworthiness and protection." In sum, in looking at the factors influencing Russian policy toward Iran, it would appear that arms and nuclear reactor sales, as well as the desire to demonstrate Russia's independence from the U.S., were the primary basic aspects of the relationship between two countries. Also Russia rapprochement with the U.S. at this time in history is a very
important fact for this research.
137 Parker, John. Persian Dreams. Potomac Books Ine: 2009, 248. 138 Luzyanin, S.G., Vostochnaya Politika Vladimiro Putina. (Eastern Politics of Vladimir Putin). Moscow: AST, Vostok-Zapad: 2007, 155. 71
Strategy ofAhmadinejad With the elections of new president, Iran took a tougher approach toward EU and the U.S. The new president, Mahmood Ahmadinejad, was very critical of EU's proposition on nuclear matters. Russia, in its turn, had an ongoing dilemma in dealing with Iran. While Moscow did not want Iran to acquire nuclear weapons; it also did not want sanctions brought against one of its closest allies. As the United States increasingly became bogged down in Iraq, it appeared to back off somewhat from its confrontation with Iran over the nuclear issue. Thus in mid-
March 2005, the U.S. agreed to join the EU in offering economic incentives to Iran if it gave up its nuclear program. At the same time, an Iranian presidential campaign was underway. Both the U.S. and the EU-3 hoped that the winner would be former Iranian President Hashemi Rafsanjani, whom they thought they could make a deal with. To their surprise, the Islamic hard-liner, Mahmud Ahmadinejad, the Mayor of Tehran, was elected president. When EU-3 presented its proposal to Ahmadinejad's government on August 5, 2005, it was rejected as a "joke." The proposal called for a long term EU-Iranian relationship, which combined security and economic incentives. It also included giving Iran access to international technologies for light-water reactors. In return, Iran would agree not to withdraw from the nuclear nonproliferation treaty and keep all Iranian nuclear facilities under IAEA safeguards. Emboldened Iran, led by its hard-line president, not only rejected the EU proposal but also announced it was resuming work at the uranium conversion plant at Isfahan,
139 Robert, Freedman. "Russia and Iran: a Tactical Alliance". SAIS review. Vol. 17, No. 2, 1997, 75. 72 where it would transform uranium into nuclear fuel.140 After this event, international pressure on Iran grew with French President Jacques Chirac warning that Iran would face censure by the UN Security Council if it did not reinstate a freeze on sensitive nuclear activities.141 Russia, on the other hand, was opposed to reporting Iran to the UN Security Council. Nonetheless, following a heated debate, Russia (along with 1 1 other countries) chose to abstain on an IAEA resolution, which "called on Iran to re-suspend conversion of uranium at its Isfahan plant and asked Tehran to return to negotiations with EU- 3."142Russia was a very good customer, buying not only Bushehr nuclear reactors but military equipment as well. Consequently, since the IAEA resolution did not call for sanctions explicitly, Moscow could claim a victory. At the same time it did not alienate the EU-3, with which it was seeking increased economic and political cooperation. By this time, the U.S. was again seeking sanctions against Iran. U.S. Secretary of State, Condoleezza Rice traveled to Russia in October 2005 to try to gain Russia's support for sanctions. During Rice's visit, Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov stated that "Russia wanted to pursue negotiations in the IAEA rather than go to the UN Security Council,"143 noting that "We think that the current situation permits us to develop this issue and do everything possible within the means of IAEA without referring this issue to other organizations so far."
140 Robert, Freedman. "Russia and Iran: a Tactical Alliance". SAIS review. Vol. 17, No. 2, 1997, 76. 141 Luzyanin, S. G., Vostochnaya Politika Vladimira Putina. (Eastern Politics of Vladimir Putin). Moscow: AST, Vostok-Zapad: 2007, 176. 142 Robert, Freedman. "Russia and Iran: a Tactical Alliance". SAIS review. Vol. 17, No. 2, 1997, 83. 143 Robert, Freedman. "Russia and Iran: a Tactical Alliance". SAIS review. Vol. 1 7, No 2, 1997, 84. 144 Robert, Freedman. "Russia and Iran: a Tactical Alliance". SAIS review. Vol. 17, No 2, 1997, 85. 73
With this statement, Russia had come down strongly on the side of Iran in its conflict with the EU-3 and the United States, because without the threat of sanctions, there would be little incentive for Iran to change its policy. Tehran's decision to reprocess another batch of uranium at its Isfahan nuclear facility further complicated Iran's position as the IAEA meeting was approaching. As this situation developed, Moscow continued to oppose referring Iran to the UN Security Council. Moscow also sought to defuse the crisis by working out a proposal with the EU-3, which would enable Iran to convert uranium domestically into uranium hexafluoride gas, which is the precursor to making
enriched uranium. The enrichment itself however would be done in Russia. Even though the compromise defused the situation and Iran was not referred to the UN Security Council, it remained unclear how long Iran would enjoy its interval. At the time of the IAEA meeting, Iran not only did not accept the EU-3-Russia compromise agreement but many Iranian officials continued to demand the right to develop a full fuel cycle.146 Members of the EU warned Iran that its time to accept the compromise was not
unlimited. Following the IAEA meeting, Russia moved much closer to Iran by signing a $1 billion arms deal with them, which included $700 million for surface-to-air missiles that could be deployed to protect Iran's nuclear installations. Such an air defense system when installed could inhibit a possible U.S. or Israeli attack. By moving to help Iran to protect its nuclear installations, Moscow sent a clear signal that it would stand by Iran whatever
145 Robert, Freedman. "Russia and Iran: a Tactical Alliance". SAIS review. Vol. 17, No 2, 1997, 94. 146 Freedman Robert, "Russia, Iran and the Nuclear Question: The Putin record" Strategic Studies Institute. 6 December, 2006< http://www.strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/pubs/display.cfm?pubid=737 >. 74 its nuclear policies were.147 Iran prepared for renewed talks with the EU-3 in the aftermath of the Russian arms deal, which strengthened Iran's position and appeared to reinforce Russian commitment to Iran.
As tensions between Iran and NATO rose, the IAEA met in early February 2006. Because of Iran's unwillingness to provide inspectors with the necessary information about its nuclear program, IAEA voted to refer Iran to the UN Security Council in March if Iran failed to "restore the international community's confidence in its nuclear program."148 While Russia voted for the resolution, the additional month before referral to the Security Council was aimed at giving Moscow time to win Iran to its plan to enrich Iranian uranium in Russia. While Russia was seeking to persuade Iran to agree to its nuclear enrichment plan, Iran was taking a hard line. In response to the IAEA decision to refer Tehran to the UN Security Council, Iranian President Ahmadinejad ordered industrial level nuclear enrichment, stopped surprise visits by the IAEA to its nuclear installations, and ordered the IAEA to remove seals and surveillance equipment on some of the Iranian nuclear facilities. Russia-Iran talks in early March collapsed, primarily because Iran continued to demand the right to enrich uranium domestically. The failure of the talks placed Iran in further diplomatic isolation, and perhaps for this reason, Iran tried again to negotiate with EU-3. The negotiations failed again because Iran was unwilling to stop enriching uranium. As the time for UN Security Council
147 Freedman Robert, "Russia, Iran and the Nuclear Question: The Putin record" Strategic Studies Institute. 6 December, 2006
deliberations on Iran approached, Russian Foreign Minister Lavrov expressed an idea "of letting Iran do a limited amount of nuclear enrichment domestically, while the bulk of the enrichment would be done in Russia."150 The idea was killed by the U.S. opposition. Being in diplomatic isolation, Iran tried another ploy, which was to offer to engage the United States in talks on the rapidly deteriorating security situation in Iraq.151Iran thought that by demonstrating flexibility in this area, it could delay action against it in the Security Council and give Russia diplomatic ammunition to postpone any sanctions. Meanwhile, Russia relapsed to its traditional policy of criticizing Iran publicly
for its actions and its unwillingness to support serious actions against Iran. Thus on the eve of the UN Security Council debate, Lavrov was very critical of the Iranian behavior during its talks with Russia. Despite criticism, Russia took a strong stand against the possible imposition of sanctions against Iran during the Security Council talks. The end result was a non-binding resolution, which did not contain any threats of sanctions and only asked for ElBaradei to report back on Iranian compliance within 30 days. Matters stood, until the surprise announcement by Ahmadinejad on the eve of the visit by ElBaradei to Iran, to ascertain Iran's compliance with the Security Council resolution that Iran had succeeded in enriching uranium and "joined the club of nuclear
150 Freedman, Robert. "Russia, Iran and the Nuclear Question: The Putin record" Strategic Studies Institute. 6 December, 2006< http://www.strategicstudiesinstitute.anny.mil/pubs/disp]ay.cfm?pubid=737 >. 151 Freedman, Robert. "Russia, Iran and the Nuclear Question: The Putin record" Strategic Studies Institute. 6 December, 2006< http://www.strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/pubs/display.cfm?pubid=737 >. 152 Freedman, Robert. "Russia, Iran and the Nuclear Question: The Putin record" Strategic Studies Institute. 6 December, 2006 < http://www.strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/pubs/display.cfm?pubid=737 >. 76
1 S^ countries" by putting into successful operation a cascade of 1 64 centrifuges. In addition to this, Iran's Atomic Energy Organization's Deputy Director, Mohamed Saeedi, said that "within a year the number of centrifuges in operation would be 3,000 and in the future Iran would bring 54,000 centrifuges on line."154 Then to make the situation more tense, Iran announced it was testing the sophisticated P-2 centrifuge. If successful the use of P-2 centrifuges would enhance Iran's enrichment capability significantly. These developments put pressure on Russia to react. But Moscow continued to promote a diplomatic solution and oppose sanctions with Lavrov asserting that "We are convinced that neither sanctions nor the use of force will lead to a solution of this problem."155 U.S. patience with Russian policy towards Iran was running out, U.S. Deputy Secretary of State Nicholas Burns called for Russia to stop providing weapons to Iran and to end assistance to the Bushehr nuclear project. These demands were rejected immediately by Russian officials who stated the project would go on unless the UN Security Council imposed sanctions, an unlikely possibility taking into consideration Russian opposition to sanctions.156
153 Freedman, Robert. "Russia, Iran and the Nuclear Question: The Putin record" Strategic Studies Institute. 6 December, 2006. < http://www.strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/pubs/display.cfm?pubid=737 >. 154 Freedman, Robert. "Russia, Iran and the Nuclear Question: The Putin record" Strategic Studies Institute. 6 December, 2006 < http://www.strategicstudiesinstitute.anny.mil/pubs/display.cfm?pubid=737 >. 155 Berman, Ilan. "Russian Marriage of Convenience" Washington Times. 24 May, 2002
The IAEA report that came out on April 28, 2006 was highly critical of Iran and its uranium enrichment program. Following the report, the United States and its European allies pushed for sanctions against Iran. As in the past, while calling for Iran to provide the necessary information to the IAEA, Russia continued to resist sanctions while also opposing any kind of military actions against Iran. Russia's new UN representative, Vitaly Churkin, made this point clear following a debate on policy toward Iran at the UN Security Council. He stated, "We are convinced that there is no military solution to the problem, however, complicated and difficult it may be, a political and diplomatic solution to this problem needs to be sought."157 Meanwhile in an effort to persuade Russia not to support the sanctions resolution, Iran dangled a major economic incentive — the chance to be the preferred bidder on two additional nuclear reactors, a development that would not only earn Russia vulnerable hard currency but would also fit nicely into Putin's high- tech economic program.158 In sum, the IAEA report of 2006 and Russia's reaction to it provided a useful point of departure for drawing some conclusions about Russian policy toward Iran's nuclear program under Putin. Nevertheless, Ahmadinejad continued to exploit ties with Russia to gain time for Iran's nuclear program to advance. In June 2006, Tehran resisted and then attempted to bargain over the terms of a call by France, UK, Germany, the United States, China and Russia(known as P5+1)159 for Iran to suspend its fuel cycle development in return for negotiations on a new package of economic incentives. In July, Russia joined the UN
157 Robert, Freedman. "Russia and Iran: a Tactical Alliance". SAIS review, Vol. 17, No. 2, 1997, 122. 158 Robert, Freedman. "Russia and Iran: a Tactical Alliance". SAIS review. Vol. 17, No. 2, 1997, 123. 159 Parker, John. Persian Dreams. Potomac Books Ine: 2009, 250. 78
Security Council in approving resolution 1737, which required Iran to freeze all its nuclear enrichment activities by August 3 1 or face the beginning of sanctions. As August 31 approached, Iran's leaders were confident that they could reject the demand to suspend all nuclear activities. Underlying Tehran's unwillingness to pull back meant that any push for serious economic measures would collapse because of lack of support from major world powers, including Russia. In February 2007, IAEA inspectors reported that Iran had finished installing its two 1 64 centrifuge cascades at Natanz. Around this time, Russia also slowed down work on the Bushehr nuclear power plant. Igor Ivanov, Russian National Security Council secretary, delivered an ultimatum to Iran — "Russia would not deliver fuel for Bushehr unless Iran suspended uranium enrichment."160 After charging Tehran with falling behind on its payments, Moscow sited technical disruptions in explaining further delay in the target date for completion of Bushehr. 161 In June 2007, Putin sprung another surprise on Iran. For months Russia had been complaining about American plans to install radars in the Czech Republic and missiles interceptors in Poland to defend against missiles from
Iran. On June 1, 2007 Putin threatened to target the new facilities if the United States went ahead with its missiles defense plan. But a few days later, at the G-8 Summit in
Germany, Putin made a proposal to President Bush that "Russia and America share real- time data from the Qabala radar installation Russia leased from Azerbaijan."162 There was no sign the Russian president had consulted in advance with Tehran on the Qabala
160 Parker, John. Persian Dreams. Potomac Books Ine: 2009, 303. 161 The completion date has been shifted to fall 2008 162 Parker, John. Persian Dreams. Potomac Books Ine: 2009, 304. 79
radar offer, even while Putin claimed to have done that with Azerbaijan president Iilam
Aliyev. There were charges proposed by Iran that "Russia will proceed easily to the brink of officially declaring hostility against countries with which it has friendly relations."
In the meantime, on October 16, 2007, after years of "polite brush-offs," Putin was the first supreme Kremlin leader to visit Tehran for the Caspian Summit, since Joseph Stalin.
At the summit, neither the Caspian nor the bilateral summit documents broke any significant ground. The agreement for regular meetings of foreign ministers and presidents of five Caspian leaders to discuss and resolve complicated issues in the region was concluded. As to the Russian-Iran bilateral statement for agreement in long term plan for the development of "trade and economic, industrial, scientific and technical cooperation and an agreement on facilitating and protecting capital investment"164 it was apparently dropped after 2003 when an earlier draft had been initialed at the deputy minister level by both sides. At the end of 2007, Moscow was faced with Iran who had a large scale fuel cycle in development- something Moscow was opposed for years. Putin finally calculated that an outside pressure no longer stood a fair chance of reversing the Iranian accomplishment and he was not willing to sacrifice Russian interests in Iran to do so. In January 2008, Foreign Minister Lavrov joined his P5+1 counterpart in Berlin, where they finally agreed on the draft of the third sanctions resolution, which they had been negotiating since 2007.
Parker, John. Persian Dreams. Potomac Books Ine: 2009, 304.
Parker, John. Persian Dreams. Potomac Books Ine: 2009, 305. 80
The same day, Resolution 1 803 was approved. The resolution authorized a further expansion of international sanctions against the Iranian nuclear program-related activities. President Ahmadinejad, however, rejected the resolution and stated that "it was of no importance or prestige."1 5 In May 2008, Iranian leadership would have more reasons to take satisfaction from developments in the region after the Iranian-supported Shia-based Hizbullah, deployed armed militias in Beirut, and won veto power in the future Lebanese government. During this time in history, Russia was dealing with an ongoing dilemma.
Moscow did not want Iran to acquire anymore nuclear weapons, but at the same time did not want sanctions to bring against Iran, one of its closest allies and strategic partner. It is obvious that the relationship between the two countries was built on nuclear collaboration.
Medvedev Times
During Medvedev's administration, Russia has developed a new foreign policy targeting closer collaboration with the U.S. and EU in order to improve its weak economy. In the past few years, Russia has supported minor sanctions proposed by the UN Security Council and EU, against Iran's nuclear enrichment program. It also has kept delaying the construction of the Bushehr power plant in order to manipulate Iran in its decision to move forward with the nuclear enrichment program. At the same time, Russia
165 Mikhailov, Viktor. Nuclear Cooperation with Iran: the Viewfrom Ordynka.Priroda: August, 1995, 185. l66Luzyanin, S.G., Vostochnaya Politika Vladimira Putina. (Eastern Politics of Vladimir Putin). Moscow: AST, Vostok-Zapad: 2007, 204. 81
has never supported tougher sanctions against Iran, because it needs Iran as economic and nuclear partner. In June 2009, French president Nicolas Sarkozy represented the P5+1 (the permanent five members of the UN Security Council plus Germany) in a meeting with
Iranian Foreign Minister Manouchehr Mottaki to encourage Iran to resume diplomatic negotiations that were contingent upon Iran suspending its nuclear enrichment for the
duration. Iran presented its own proposal for negotiations to the P5+1, while appealing for wide-ranging talks it rejected the decision of the three UNSC resolutions and made no pledge to suspend uranium enrichment. Despite voting in favor of UNSC resolutions in 2006, 2007 and 2008, Russia blocked further punitive action against Iran in September 2008, even after the IAEA
condemned the Islamic Republic's lack of cooperation. Russia also refused to participate in a P5+1 meeting in 2008 to discuss leveling additional sanctions against Iran. Russia has publicly supported Iran's right to peaceful nuclear technology and has helped supply the materials and expertise to build the Bushehr nuclear plant. The United States presidential administrations of both former President Bush and
current President Obama have encouraged Russia to put pressure on Iran to halt its nuclear enrichment and cooperate with IAEA. In March 2009, Russian President
Medvedev claimed that he would work with President Obama on the Iranian nuclear
issue. Yet in February 2009, Russia also discussed negotiating a 10-year fuel supply deal
167 Naumkin, Vitaly. "The Russian-Iranian Relations: Present Status and Prospects for the Future" Journal of International Affairs. Vol. 3. No. 1. March-May 1998
with Iran to fuel the Bushehr nuclear power plant. Russian Energy Minister Sergey Shmatko stated in July 2009 that "it is much better to cooperate with Iran in construction of nuclear power plants in order to ensure the transparency of Iran's nuclear program." Shmatko also added that "Iran's nuclear energy sector represented a significant market for Russia."168
At the September UN meeting, Ahmadinejad said that Iran was willing to buy nuclear fissile material from the U.S. At the same meeting, Russia also stated it would back more extensive sanctions if Iran did not abide by its Non-Proliferation Treaty duties by the October 1, 2009 meeting with the U.S., Russia, China, Britain, France, and Germany. In October 2009, United States Secretary of State, Hilary Clinton held talks in Moscow with Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov in a bid to press Russia to support international efforts to restrict Iran's nuclear program. Clinton proposed that Iran ships its uranium to Russia for enrichment.
In October, U.S., Russia, and France signed a multilateral nuclear fuel deal with Iran stipulating that Iran would export more than 1,200 kg of its 3.5 percent low-enriched uranium to Russia for refining to 20 percent purity to fuel a Tehran reactor, and France would then turn it into fuel rods.169 In late October, Tehran announced that the deal needed further negotiations and demanded changes to the deal hinting that they only wanted to export the fuel in small batches while simultaneously importing high-grade
168 Karp, Aaron. "Lessons of Iranian missile program for U.S nonproliferation policy." Nonproliferation review Spring-Summer 1998: 27. 169 Naumkin, Vitaly, "The Russian-Iranian Relations: Present Status and Prospects for the Future" Journal of International Affairs. Vol. 3. No. 1. March-May 1998
fuel. This is a clear contradiction to the fuel deal between France, Russia, the U.S., and
Iran.
In November 2009, Obama met Medvedev at the Asian-Pacific summit in effort to secure Moscow's backing to break the argument over Iran's nuclear ambitions. After the meeting, the two presidents announced that "they hope to strike a new arm control deal by December 2009 to replace the expired Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty.170 Consequently, Russia announced that the delayed $1 billion Iranian reactor Moscow is building at Bushehr will not begin operations in 2009. Russia insisted that this delay was technical and not motivated by political concerns. Later in November, Russian spokesman Andrei Nesterenko said "we are counting on quick, positive response from Tehran concerning the plan to enrich Iranian uranium abroad under IAEA supervision."171 This action makes us believe that Russia's decision to delay the building the reactor is defiantly a politically motivated step. In late November 2009, the IAEA passed a rebuke of Iran for building a second enrichment plan in secret; Russia, which had been unwilling in the past to take a hard line against Iran for its enrichment activities, supported the resolution. A Russian diplomatic source responded "We would rather have Iran cooperating more openly and consistently
170 Naumkin, Vitaly, "The Russian-Iranian Relations: Present Status and Prospects for the Future" Journal of International Affairs. Vol. 3. No. 1 . March-May 1998
with the IAEA and showing clear steps to lift concerns, than introducing sanctions against Iran."172
In early January 2010, Iranian Foreign Minister Manouchehr Mottaki warned the West that it had one month to accept Iran's counterproposal to the UN offer, after which it means that Iran will enrich its stockpile of low enriched uranium to 20 percent.173 In mid-January 2010, the P5+1 agreed that the Iranian response to proposals to alter its nuclear development program had been inadequate and warranted consideration of further measures by UNSC. Soon thereafter, Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov said "his country regrets Iran's apparent rejection of the U.N-backed proposal, adding he could discuss sanctions but he did not commit to supporting them."174 In February 2010, the head of International Affairs committee in Russia's Lower
House of Parliament Konstantin Kosachev expressed concern "over Iran's latest rocket test and its defiance of international demands for it to stop uranium enrichment." Later that month, Foreign Minister Lavrov said that "Russia would consider supporting sanctions tailored to prevent the spread of nuclear weapons, though it would be against any paralyzing sanctions that are aimed not at nonproliferation but at pushing Iran to
Sestanovich, Stephen. "What has Moscow done?" Council on Foreign Relations: Foreign Affairs. November-December 2008< http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/64603/stephen-sestanovich/what-has- moscow-done>. 173 Legvold, Robert. "The Russia File" Council on Foreign Relations: Foreign Affairs. July-August 2009
1 7R high level of purity, which is higher than levels permitted by international law. Also in May 2010, chief of Russia's State Nuclear Energy Corporation, Sergey Kiriylenko, announced that "after many delays and technical setbacks, the Bushehr nuclear plant is set to begin operating in August of 2010 and any sanctions against Iran would not further delay or abandon this schedule."179 In late 2009, Russia said "the nuclear power station it has been building at Bushehr will not be completed by the end of 2009 as it was planned." Energy minister Sergey Shamatko said "the delay in launching the plant, which will have two pressurized reactors, was for technical reasons."181 But western countries believe that Russia's decision to delay the opening is clearly political. BBC's reporter in Moscow, Richard
176 Sestanovich, Stephen. "What has Moscow done?" Council on Foreign Relations: Foreign Affairs. November-December 2008< http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/64603/stephen-sestanovich/what-has- moscow-done>. 177 Farrar-Wellman, Ariel. "Russia-Iran Foreign Relations" Iran Tracker. 2 Aug., 2010
182 "Iran Increases Uranium Enrichment-IAEA" BBC News. 10 Aug., 2010
The compromises suggested by the Western community were again ignored by Iran. Iran's government appeared to think that it is strengthened internally by external confrontation. In addition, President Ahmadenejad stated that "there will be an expansion of the nuclear power in Iran and that he is threatening to enrich uranium higher than the
1 ?/? level needed for nuclear fuel, for potential use in a medical reactor." Iran's criticism and unwillingness to work with other countries was an obvious sign that the UN sanction
would be on their way. The IAEA resolution, criticizing Iran's secret construction of uranium enrichment plant near Qom, was supported by Russia and China. This did not mean they would join a new round of international measures against Iran, but that Iran could not count on them for diplomatic support. By the end of 2009, the UN Security Council approved three rounds of sanctions, covering trade in nuclear material, as well as travel and financial restrictions aimed at Iranian organizations and individuals. In June 2010, the UN Security Council voted to impose a fourth round of sanctions on Tehran for failing to halt its nuclear enrichment program. The earlier three rounds of UN sanctions blocked the trade of "sensitive nuclear materials,"187 froze the financial assets of those involved in Iran's nuclear activities, banned all of Iran's arms export and encouraged scrutiny of the dealings of Iranian banks. The new UN resolution includes measures to prohibit Iran from buying heavy weapons such as missiles and helicopters. The Security Council voted in favor Brazil and Turkey voted against, while
186 Ghattas, Kim. "A Russian Policy Shift on Iran?" BBC News . Oct. 13, 2009
Lebanon abstained. Turkish Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan said that "the imposition of the latest sanctions was a mistake."188 Although the measures were not as tough as the U.S. wanted, President Barak Obama was certain that they sent an unmistakable message about the determination to stop the spread of nuclear arms. However, President Ahmadinejad said "the UN's resolutions were like a used handkerchief which should be thrown in the dust bin."189 The last resolution would toughen rules on financial transaction with Iran banks and increase the number of Iranian individuals and companies that were targeted by asset freezes and travel bans. Most importantly, it would create a legal basis to restrict the supply of goods that Iran wanted for its alleged nuclear missile program. Russian President Dmitry Medvedev seemed to confirm that Kremlin was ready to support new sanctions against Iran over its nuclear plans. In his recent interview to BBC, Medvedev stated "Of course sanctions are a bad thing, because they rarely produce results, but when all other means have been exhausted, why not?"190 The volume of trade between Iran and Russia now stands about $3 billion a year, almost 10 times less than between Iran and China. Vladimir Sazhin, a senior fellow at the Institute of Oriental Studies of the Russian Academy of Science stated "historically, Iran has favored Western rather than Russian technologies."191 Also, oil is an important factor in trade between Iran
188 ^un votes for New Sanctions on Iran over Nuclear Issue." BBC News. June 9, 2010
191 US Expands Sanctions against Iran." BBC News. 16 June, 2010
Medvedev and elites around him believe that an essential condition for maintaining power is the success of Russia's economy. This requires closer relations with the United States and the West. This desire incentivizes Russian leaders to accept at least some of the demands that Washington and its allies have put to Moscow, including with regard to Iran's nuclear program. Kayhan Barzegar, a scholar at the Iran's Islamic Azada University thinks that "by drawing closer to the West, these leaders can improve Russia's economic and strategic reach to the world."197 Russian Deputy Prime Minister Sergey Ivanov, during his visit to Washington in May 2010, expressed his content over the Obama administration's decision to revive the "123 nuclear cooperation agreement with Russia, which could set up Russia for significant new international business opportunities in the civil nuclear arena." For the time being, Russia seems to need the United States more these days since it has been trying to retrieve its economy, and given that "the Obama administration plays less
196 "Medvedev Meets Obama: Russian-Iran Relations should be Re-Examined." The Race for Iran. 24 June, 2010
attention to the post-Soviet neighbors" to need Iran less. Of course, Russia retains a significant interest in preserving cooperative ties to Iran. Likewise Iran retains an interest in preserving the most productive relationship with Russia. Barzegar points out that "there is still logic of mutual need between the two countries. Russia remains an important strategic actor and a permanent member of the Security Council with veto power; moreover Iran has a continued interest in cooperation with Russia on nuclear energy and access to advanced defensive weapons."200 The structural limits of Russian willingness to cooperate strategically with Iran have been underscored. As Barzegar noted "the interest of Russia elite in establishing an
701 independent national strategy and global position for Russia is a long-term goal."
Barzegar also noted that "Russia, like the veto-wielding permanent members of the Security Council, felt threatened by the Joint Declaration which Brazil and Turkey
909 negotiated with Iran in May 2010." Russia's willingness to move ahead in the Security
Council with sanctions reflected its interests in defending what Russian elites sees as their country's great power prerogatives. Russian officials were uncomfortable with the
199 Medvedev Meets Obama: Russian-Iran Relations should be Re-Examined." The Race for Iran. 24 June, 2010 < http://www.raceforiran.com/reexamining-iran%E2%80%99s-relations-with- russia%E2%80%94and-a-strategic-opportunity-for-the-united-states>. 200 Medvedev Meets Obama: Russian-Iran Relations should be Re-Examined." The Race for Iran. 24 June, 2010
Iran-Turkey-Brazil deal because the Joint Declaration represented a potential weakness of the political monopoly that the recognized nuclear weapons states exercise with regard to what is described in the United Nations Charter as matters of "international peace and security."
In July 2010, EU adopted new sanctions against Iran that put sharp limits on new oil and gas investments and curbed financial links with Iran. Russia, as a veto-wielding member of the UN Security Council has signed on to four rounds of sanctions against
Iran, but did not wish to take a harder line. Moscow said "the EU' s tough new sanctions were counter-productive and worked at cross-purposes with a six-nation effort, which include Russia, to resolve the dispute over Tehran's nuclear program."203 Russia supported weak UN sanctions approved in June to pressure Iran over its nuclear program, but it strongly objected to tougher sanctions added individually by the United States, EU and four other countries. It fears those sanctions may end up hurting Russian companies that do business with Iran. Although, Tehran insists it is interested in generating electricity, the U.S. and many other countries believe Iran's nuclear program is aimed at trying to build a bomb. Iran denies the changes saying that "it is pursuing a civilian atomic program designed to meet energy needs."204 Meanwhile the U.S. and its European allies are coming up with a revised fuel swap proposal to Iran. Under the old offer rejected by Teheran, Iran was to ship out 2,650 pounds of uranium to be enriched. In return, it would get higher-grade fuel for a medical
203 "Iran Nuclear Sanctions by EU Unacceptable says Russia." BBC News. 27 July, 2010
research reactor. Iran would also be required to stop all production of nuclear fuel it is enriching to 20 percent. The revised offer is partly designed to show that the Obama administration is fulfilling its promise to keep negotiating even as it ups the pressure on Teheran.205 According to BBC recent report " Iran's reaction may also help to assess whether the fourth round of UN sanctions imposed past summer are having an impact and pushing Iran's leadership to be more flexible." Russia's position on the nuclear issue underscores a bigger reality. Moscow is uneasy about Iran's emergence as a genuine regional power on the borders of the Russian Federation and other parts of 'Post Soviet' space. While there is belief that China is becoming a more substantial strategic option for Iran, a critical mass of Iranian political elites continue to recognize that their country has basic national security and foreign policy needs, which can be only met through rapprochement with Russia. It is obvious that in recent years, Russia is more willing to cooperate with the U.S. to restrict Iran's uranium enrichment program, but at the same time it is working with Iran on the continuation of the construction of Bushher nuclear power plant. These facts show that Russia wants to maintain good diplomatic relationship with the U.S. and at the same time, keep Iran as its strong economic and geopolitical partner.
205 Iran Agrees to Resume Nuclear Talks in November." BBC News. 29 October, 20 1 0
Conclusion
Since the end of the Cold War and the dissolution of the Soviet Union, the Islamic Republic has worked hard to cultivate a strategic partnership with post-Soviet Russia. From an Iranian prospective, Russia is the great power that has been mostly intending to find ways to counter-balance American hegemony in the post-Cold War world—an important strategic consideration given ongoing U.S. hostility toward Iran. From a Russian prospective, Iran has been a market for sales of conventional weaponry and civil nuclear technology. Iran has been a constructive partner for Russia on regional security issues in Central and South Asia, taking what could be described as "Pro-Russian" positions on a number of regional conflicts such as Tajikistan, Nagorno- Karabakh, Chechnya etc. since the early days of the post-Cold War period. In addition, Russia has sought to present itself as a potential partner in the development of Iran's energy security resources. In 1997, Russia's state-owned Gazprom became one of the first foreign energy companies to invest in the development of South Pars gas field. After Vladimir Putin became President of Russia, Gazprom, and the Islamic Republic's Ministry of Petroleum formed a joint committee to coordinate Iranian gas exports with Russia.
94 95
Just a few years ago, Russian-Iranian relations seemed to be headed toward a closer strategic relationship. For example, in 2007, Putin became the first non-Muslim head of the state or government to be received by the Islamic Republic's Supreme
Leader, Ayatollah Ali Khameni. But since Dmitry Medvedev replaced Putin as President of Russia, the limits on Russia's willingness to act in strategic partnership with Iran have become increa Ayatollah Ali Khameni. But since Dmitry Medvedev replaced Putin as President of Russia, the limits on Russia's willingness to act in strategic partnership with Iran have become increasingly apparent.
Only when Dmitry Medvedev became President of the Russian Federation, Russian foreign policy started to shift toward the West and the United States in particular; a good example of this shift can be the meeting between President Obama and President Medvedev, which took place on June 24, 2010. The Lisbon Summit with participation of Russia and the U.S. shows that the U.S. and NATO are seeking more constructive relationship with Russia. Russia's foreign minister Sergei Lavrov thinks that it is time to end the era of mistrust between two countries.1 He underlined the new era of cooperation is a growing list of mutual interests.
At the top of this list is Afghanistan. Moscow is just as concerned as NATO to see the
Taliban quelled and Afghanistan stabilized so the country can't be used as a base for Islamic militant groups. Russia also wants to stem the flow of opium pouring out of
1 "NATO and Russia promise 'fresh start' at Lisbon summit." BBC Report. 19 Nov., 2010
Afghanistan, much of which has ended up in Russia, causing an epidemic of heroin addiction.
There have also been negotiations about expanding military supply routes running through Russian territory to NATO bases in Afghanistan. Dimitry Suslov, a military expert from the Council on Foreign and Defense Policy in Moscow, highlights that
"Afghanistan is where NATO needs Russia." In return, Russia wants to be no discussion of further NATO expansion to the countries of former Soviet Union. Secondly, that NATO support some of Russia's interests in the European security field, such as limiting the expansion of U.S. military infrastructure into Eastern Europe and limiting the deployment of U.S. or NATO missile defense system in Eastern Europe. . According to experts, the Lisbon Summit can be an important step forward in the relationship between Russia and NATO. NATO needs Russia and Russia needs NATO. Earlier this year, U.S.
Secretary of State, Hilary Clinton told the alliance's Strategic Concept seminar that "while Russia faces challenges to its security, NATO is not among them. We want a cooperative NATO-Russia relationship that produces concrete result and draws NATO and Russia closer together."5
2 "NATO and Russia promise 'fresh start' at Lisbon summit." BBC Report. 19 Nov., 2010
Based on the multiple examples given in this paper, I can make a conclusion that Russia and Iran have been tactical partners for the past thirty years based on balance of power, economic and nuclear collaboration. It is obvious that as soon as either Iran or Russia got a better deal, they would go after it, disregarding the existing relationship between each other. For example, after the dissolution of USSR, Iran was very active in Muslim Republics of Former Soviet Union and supportive of the opposition during the Tajik civil war. In case of Russia, it has had multiple occasions throughout history to cooperate with the U.S. With the new administration, it has become more collaborative with the U.S. and NATO; and has supported multiple sanctions against Iran and it uranium enrichment program.
On the ground of multiple examples, I can predict that Russia might be tilting toward closer collaboration with the West and the U.S. to fight Iran and its nuclear proliferation; and will become a tactical partner of the U.S. based on military and economic/business collaboration. VI
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