The Role of Religion in the Arab-Israeli Conflict

Home , Israeli Labor Party

MASARYKOVA UNIVERZITA

FACULTY OF SOCIAL STUDIES

Bachelor' s Thesis

XIN RAN XIN

Supervisor: Mgr. Vladimir Bizik, Mgr.

Deparment of International Relations and European Studies International Relations and European Politics

Brno 2021

THE ROLE OF RELIGION IN THE ARAB-ISRAELI CONFLICT

MUNI FSS

Bibliographie Record

Author: Xinran Xin Faculty of Social Studies, Masaryk University Department of International Relations and Euro• pean Studies Title of Thesis: The Role of Religion in the Arab-Israeli Conflict Degree Programme: International Relations and European Politics

Supervisor: Mgr. Vladimir Bizik Academic Year: 2021 Number of Pages: 40

Keywords: Arab-Israeli Conflict, Judaism, Islam, Jewish religi ous parties, Arab parties, Palestinian Organiza tions. Abstract

The research paper aims at identifying the role of religion in the Arab- Israeli Conflict, from the perspective of Judaism and Islam tenets, Jewish Religious parties in Israel, Israeli Arab parties, and Palestinian organi• zations. The research is based on a case study and uses qualitative data as a researching method, analyzing academic literature and work. The analysis is conducted in four separate perspectives. The research ends with the conclusion that religion did influence the Arab-Israeli Conflict to a large extent. Statutory Declaration

I hereby declare that I have written the submitted [select type of docu• ment] concerning the topic of The Role of Religion in the Arab-Israeli Conflict independently All the sources used for the purpose of finishing this thesis have been adequately referenced and are listed in the Biblio• graphy

In Brno 27 December 2020

Xinran Xin

Table of Contents

List of Terms and Acronyms

1 Introduction 7

2 Research questions and objectives 9

3 Methodology 10

3.1 Scope and limitations

4 Literature Review 12

5 Analysis 14

5.1 General Overview of the Arab-Israeli Conflict

5.2 Tenets of Islam and Judaism 15

5.3Jewish Religious Parties in Israel 20

5.4 Arab Parties in Israel 23

5.5 Palestinian Organizations 26

6 Conclusion 32

Bibliography 34

List of Terms and Acronyms

PLO Palestine Liberation Organization Hamas Islamic Resistance Movement Fatah Palestinian National Liberation Movement

PIJ Palestinian Islamic Jihad

UN United Nations Quran Religious text of Islam

Talmud Central text of Judaism

WW2 World War Two NRP National Religious Party

UTP United Torah Party 1 Introduction

The military and political conflicts between Arab countries and Israel have lasted for decades, causing casualties and regional turmoil. The par• ticularity of the conflicts is not only due to its geographic, economic, po• litical, military, but also its history, ethnicity and religion. Therefore, it is especially significant to find out and analyze the underlying reasons to solve the situation in this region. The conflicts and disputes caused by territorial issues between Palestine and Israel are important reasons that can not be ignored and usually recognized by the public. However, whether the religious reason is also an important factor in conflicts is of• ten overlooked. Academic research on related topics is also lacking. When it comes to religious topics, most of the articles are analyzed in conjunction with the news, lacking all aspects of discussion. As the holy places of Judaism and Islam, the Palestine region and Jerusalem contain special religious significance. Whether religion also influences other fields such as politics still needs to be explored. Therefore, the purpose of this article is to analyze the extent to which religion has an impact on Arab-Israeli conflicts, the later political negotiations, and the political arena of Palestine and Israel.

Four aspects will be elaborated in the thesis. First, the research focuses on the interpretation of Judaism and Islam for land sovereignly and vio• lence. If the tenets of both religions indicate the attributes of the land or support the use of violence to regain lost land, it will inevitably lead to conflicts and violence to a certain extent. Second, the status and influence of Israeli religious parties in the Israel political arena will be analyzed. Israeli religious parties are practitioners of Judaism. The strength of reli• gious parties will inevitably lead to their influence on Israel's foreign pol• icy towards Palestine and the stagnation of the land for the peace plan. Besides, the influence and status of Israeli Arab parties will also be men• tioned. As pagan parties, the status of Arab parties in the Israeli political arena precisely reflects Israel's attitude towards Islam. The analysis later shows that Arab political parties are struggling, which indicates Israel's distrust and rejection of Islam related factions. Finally, the relation be• tween the Palestinian organizations and Islam will be analyzed. Whether these organizations use Islamic tenets to justify violence is the key to prove the connection between religion and the Arab-Israeli conflict.

7 Research questions and objectives will be proposed firstly, following the Methodology part explaining the data gathering method. Subsequently previous academic literature will be reviewed and drawbacks of them will be introduced. The main analysis including four individual parts to identify religion's influence on Arab-Israeli conflict will be conducted, and the research conclusion will follow up as the end.

8 2 Research questions and objectives

The thesis focuses on the following questions:

Are tenets of Judaism and Islam justify violence and war, and the belong• ing of Palestinian territory?

Do Jewish religious political parties in Israel impede the peace process?

Are Arab parties in Israel given special treatments due to the religion?

Do the tenets of Islam influence the act of Palestinian organizations?

The objectives of the research are: To review existing academic literature and documents related to the above questions.

To evaluate to what extent does the religion factor influences both the Palestine and Israel.

9 3 Methodology

The research paper uses a case study as the research method, giving a detailed study of the research question on how religion affects Palestine and Israel. The reason why the case study was chosen as the research method is that the case study can focus on the case of the Arab-Israeli conflict specifically. When elaborating the topic with a case study re• search design, qualitative data was collected, focusing on historical and analytical structure. This kind of research method can best analyze the given questions in the paper, and can best evaluate in what field and to what extent does religion affected Palestine and Israel. It allows the re• searcher to explore key meanings of relevant cases. The thesis is mainly based on the existing literature to provide practical evidence and specific data. Primary and secondary sources will be analyzed to achieve a clearer perspective.

Qualitative data collection method using books, news articles, reports, government documents, and other literature to collect relevant informa• tion to support subsequent analysis. The literature will be selected accor• ding to the relevance of the topic. Secondary sources are given preference due to their specially and sufficient analysis, for example, academic lite• rature that is recognized by academia. Online academic literature have been gathered from JSTOR, Masaryk University's Online archive, Re• search Gate, Google Scholar, Library Genesis, and Palestine-Israel Journal. The specific primary sources concerning election results are obtained from the official website of the Israeli government such as gov.il, Knes- set.gov.il, the democracy institute. The online database such as Israel/Pa• lestine Center for Research and Information, the Carter Center, Wilson Center also provides valuable information and data.

3.1 Scope and Limitations The purpose of this thesis is to analyze the extent of religion's influence on Palestine and Israel through the existing literature. The influence of Judaism and Islam on Palestine and Israel will be discussed. The other three parts focus on Israeli religious parties, Israeli Arab parties, and Pa• lestine authorities like PLO, Hamas, and PIJ. The expected contribution of this paper would be the filling of vacancy of such topic, attracting more researchers to explore this area. The author admits that this thesis has a certain degree of limitations. Due to the limited longitude and maximum

10 word limit, although Arab countries have largely influenced the Arab-Is• raeli conflicts, they have not been mentioned in this thesis. This thesis without a broader scope only focuses on Palestine and Israel. Moreover, this paper lacks comparative perspectives in examining the influence of religion on the politics in the whole Middle East region. Finally, due to the language proficiency of the author, qualitative data collected in this paper is in English, without Arabic and Hebrew perspectives.

11 4 Literature Review

Previously, research on the Arab-Israeli conflict mainly focused on com• bining facts and news to conclude whether religion has an impact on the conflict. For instance, Sabrina analyzed the impact of religious concepts through specific events in the West Bank. (Sabrina, 2002) The same goes for Anshel's research, explaining that the Arab-Israeli conflict is not only a struggle over land but also a struggle based on religion. (Anshel, 2014) Although the discussion of these two researchers involved religion, they did not conduct a multidimensional analysis based on this topic. Besides, the work published by them is full of subjective personal analysis without objective evaluations of to what extent does religion influence Palestine and Israel.

Due to the analysis was not comprehensive, the conclusions of scholars on such topics were often too absolute, which led to the phenomenon of the two camps. Scholars such as David, Benjamin, Hofman, and Aryeh all believe that religion is an important factor in the Arab-Israeli conflict. (David, 2008) They contend that both sides used religious ideology, which motivates conflict and justifies violence, for political purposes and military steps. (Hofman, 1970) And according to Benjamin, Israelis are reluctant to withdraw from occupied territories due to religious conside• rations. (Benjamin, 1973) As a result, they conclude that the Arab-Israeli conflict is more of a religious war than a territorial conflict. However, the opponent Yuli, who does not deny that religion is a determining compo• nent in the conflict, does not think it is as important as it is assumed. She believes that the Arab-Israeli conflict is based on secular nationalism. (Yuli, 2010) However, the influence of religion on the Arab-Israeli conflict can be to a certain extent, rather than the polarized conclusion drawn by the above scholars.

Besides, scholars such as Yitzhak, Stephanie, and Gemma have also con• ducted research, focusing on the relationship between religion and the Arab-Israeli conflict. In his article, Yitzhak studied the conflict of religious tenets between Judaism and Islam, and the influence of religious tenets on land sovereignty and the legalization of war. Moreover, political forces influenced by religious ideology such as Israeli religious parties and Pa• lestinian religious parties Hamas are also analyzed. (Yitzhak, 2011) However, the Arab parties in Israel and other Palestinian organizations

12 were not mentioned in his article. This is the missing part of Yitzhak's analysis. Gemma is similar to Yitzhak, exploring the extent to which reli• gion has affected the Arab-Israeli conflict. In her article, the role of reli• gion such as the tenets of Judaism and Islam, Israeli religious parties, and their influence on Israeli politics are analyzed. (Gemma, 2015) However, based on acknowledging that religion influences the conflict to a certain extent, other factors such as the role of ethnicity and foreign interests are also included in her article. This led to the lack of centralized analysis of the religious level, such as the lack of analysis of the Palestinian organi• zations, which weakened the authority of this article. Scholar Stephanie differs from the above two scholars in the way of analysis. She analyzes the influence of religion on territorial rights, interpretations in the use of deadly force and violence, the final political goal from the perspectives of Hamas and religious Zionists. (Stephanie, 2000) However, Hamas and re• ligious Zionists does not respectively represent Palestine and Israel inde• pendently. The article is not comprehensive enough to elaborate on only these two perspectives.

In general, the academic literature provides a solid foundation for the study of the Arab-Israeli conflict, but the analysis of how religion influen• ces the conflict is still lacking. As shown above, most scholars focus on facts and conclusive analysis. Therefore, my research will focus on the extent of religion influencing the Arab-Israeli conflict and analyze it from multiple aspects. In addition to exploring Islamic and Jewish interpreta• tion on land sovereignly and violence, the influence of Israeli religious parties in the Israeli political arena, the position of Arab parties in the Israeli political arena, and religious aspects of Palestinian factions will all be discussed.

13 5 Analysis

5.1 General Overview of Arab-Israeli Conflict

Palestine is located in western Asia, with Lebanon to the North, the Golan Heights in Syria to the northeast, Jordan to the east, and the Sinai Penin• sula in Egypt to the southwest. Being the birthplace of three major religi• ons which are Judaism, Christianity, and Islam, Palestine has prominent religious significance. Palestine was called Canaan in ancient times, and both Jews and Palestinians once settled there. The ancestor of the Jewish people Abraham once settled in Palestine, but his descendants were conquered by the Assyrian Kingdom, New Babylon, Persia, Macedonia, and the Roman Empire. (Nur, 2020) The Jews were forced to leave Pales• tine and began the diaspora around the world. Over time, the Arab Em• pire rose and conquered Palestine. However, the Jewish diaspora did not forget Palestine. At the end of the 19th century the Zionist movement emerged under the leadership of Theodor Herzl. Along with Zionism's proposal to return to Palestine to establish a state, Jews around the world began immigrating to Palestine.

After the First World War, Palestine was no longer ruled by the Ottoman Empire. As the mandate of Palestine, the United Kingdom divided the land into Jordan in the east and Palestine in the west. The British govern• ment issued the Balfour Declaration to eliminate the Jewish problem in Europe and allow Jews to build a home in Palestine. (Rashid, 2020) Du• ring the Second World War, European Jews suffered persecution and the idea of establishing their own country became stronger and stronger. In 1947, the UN passed Resolution 181 on the Partition of Palestine to esta• blish Arab and Jewish states respectively. The resolution stipulates that 57% of the total area of Palestine will be allocated to Jews, and the rema• ining 43% of the land will be owned by Arabs. (Rashid, 2020) However, the population of Arabs in Palestine is much larger than that of Israel. Therefore, Palestinian Arabs and the Arab countries did not accept the resolution as well as the establishment of the State of Israel. The war between the two sides began from then on.

Since the establishment of Israel, a series of conflicts and wars have bro• ken out between Arab countries and Israel. In the early morning of the day after Israel announced its founding on May 14, 1948, Jordan, Iraq,

14 Syria, Egypt, and other Arab countries sent troops to attack Israel. (Da• niel, 2016) The second Middle East war was a war for the Suez Canal. Egypt broke out in a war with Britain, France, and Israel. During the third Middle East war in 1967, Israel launched attacks on Egypt, Syria, and Jor• dan, occupied the Sinai Peninsula and the Golan Heights, caused many Palestinians to become refugees and forced to live in the surrounding Arab countries and other regions. (Mark, 2009) In the Fourth War of 1973, Israel fought Egypt and Syria but both sides suffered heavy losses. After this war, Israel and Egypt signed the Camp David agreement, lea• ding the political relations finally normalized. Egypt became the first Arab country to recognize Israel officially.

The Palestinians have never stopped resisting Israel after Israel's foun• ding. Moreover, they advocate the establishment of an independent Pa• lestinian state. In 1988, Palestine announced the establishment of a Pa• lestinian state with Jerusalem as its capital. According to the agreement reached between Palestine and Israel, Palestine exercises limited auto• nomy in Gaza. Previously, the PLO refuse to recognize Israel, reconcile, or negotiate with it and aimed to eliminate it by armed forces. It was not until the 1993 Oslo Agreement that the PLO recognized Israel and began the peace process. (Ian, 2019) Since then, peace negotiations and violent conflicts between the two sides have been intertwined. Under the medi• ation of the international community the Israeli government has signed several peace agreements. However, there is always a divergence between the two sides due to the ownership of Jerusalem, the issue of Jewish settlements, and the demarcation of borders. Palestine and Israel have not yet reached a permanent peace agreement. Israel built settle• ments for Jewish immigrants in the occupied territories and was re• luctant to withdraw from the territories occupied in 1967. In 2006, the Palestinian Islamic Resistance Movement Hamas won the election of the Palestinian Legislative Council. Israel stated that Hamas is a terrorist or• ganization, and its government is a terrorist regime. Until Hamas gives up violence, disarms and recognizes Israel, and promises to abide by the Israeli-Palestinian agreement, Israel will not engage with the Palestinian government. Other militant groups in Palestine, such as Islamic Jihad in Palestine, still do not recognize Israel, calling on Muslims to wage a holy war against Israel and claiming that Palestine can only be liberated if Is• rael is eliminated.

5. 2 Tenets of Islam and Judaism

15 Palestine area occupies an important position in the religious history of Palestine and Israel. A large amount of textual research can be found in their respective religious classics: the Quran and the Old Testament. For Israel, Judaism is the national religion of the Jews. The reason why thou• sands of years of diaspora did not make the Jews assimilated by other people is that Jews rely on the faith of Judaism. Without it, there would be no Jewish nation and even Zionism, and there would be no Israel today. The Old Testament of Judaism calls Palestine the land of Canaan and has a special religious complex. (Nicholas, 2000) In history, the general area associated with present-day Palestine was also a place where Jews lived for a long time until there were expelled. Although they were expelled, the connection between Jews and this land was not interrupted precisely because of religious ties. First of all, Judaism has the concept of a privi• leged electorate, that is, the Jewish nation is a special nation selected by God. This concept makes the Jewish nation form a strong national cohe• sion. Even when it is persecuted, it can gather from all over the world to Palestine and quickly build a unified country. Second, the Jews believe that Palestine is the promised land given to them by god. According to the Bible's record, God had agreed with Abraham to give Canaan to him and his descendants. (Stephen, 2010) As part of the contract between God and the Jews, Palestine has always occupied an important place in the hearts of the Jews. Even when the Jews were dispersed, they have always longed to return to Palestine. It is precisely this deep-rooted concept of the homeland that makes territorial disputes the most important key ele• ment in the Arab-Israeli conflict. Third, the Hebrew Bible and Talmud also interpret the concept of exile and return, that is, Jews will inevitably live in other people's land, but God will eventually send messengers to lead them back to Canaan. Zionism is also calling the Jews to return to Palestine for this reason. (Solomon, 2013) Fourth, Jerusalem has a spe• cial meaning in the hearts of the Jews. During the diaspora, they prayed to Jerusalem every day and regarded the forgetting of Jerusalem as an unforgivable betrayal. (Jacob, 2006)

Judaism also legitimizes the war in the Arab-Israeli conflict, making it more difficult to resolve. The Torah has one sentence that to "blot out the remembrance of Amaleq in the cruelest way possible (Deuteronomy 25:17) Rabbi Amos Sharki says "there is a religious duty to conquer all of Greater Israel." Rabbi Eliezer Melamed says "in any concession, however small, to the enemy, there is a great danger that the power of deterrence will be underminded." (Yitzhak, 2011) Rabbi Yaakov Zisberg's explana• tion is more extreme, arguing that the Palestinians need to be eradicated.

16 The phrase in Exodus "they shall not dwell in thy land" was interpreted as the obligation that Israelis has to expel Arabs from Palestine. (Yitzhak, 2011)Even Yitzhak Shapira, an Israeli rabbi, wrote that "it is permissible for Jews to kill non-Jews (including children) who threaten the lives of the Jews." (Fahima, 2004) It is precisely because of these religious inter• pretations that the exchange of land for peace after 1967 was opposed by many Jews. They regard all the land of Palestine as a holy land and cannot be divided. The West Bank occupied in 1967 is the land promised to Abra• ham by God, and for Orthodox Jews, the occupation of the land has great religious significance. (Ezra, Matthew, 1998)

The Jewish Lo tichonem principle from Deuteronomy 7:2 is used to jus• tify that the holy land cannot be divided. It says: "when the Lord thy God, delivers them before you, and you will smite them, then you shall devote them to utter destruction; you shall make no covenant with them, nor show mercy to them." (Benjamin, 1973) Another quotation from Exodus says that "for I will deliver the inhabitants of the land into your hand, and you shall drive them out. You will make no covenant with them nor with their gods. They shall not dwell in thy land-lest they sin against me for you will serve their gods-for they will be a snare unto you." (Benjamin, 1973) However, another principle Rikuach nefesh, stating that saving of individual life is more important than a religious deed, justifies different religious explanations on the issue of withdrawing from occupied terri• tories. Although religious interpretations vary, most rabbis believe that withdrawal from any occupied land is an infringement of the Jewish prin• ciple because the conquest of the land is not a colonial act but a return.

Zionism, proposed by Herzl as a secular political ideology, is the ideolog• ical foundation of Israel. This kind of Zionism is equivalent to nationalism for Jews. However, many religious groups opposed Zionism in the early days and believed that Jews could only create their country when the Messiah came. (Shlomo, 1984) Until then, it's God's trial for his chosen people to live scattered across the world. Therefore, Israel was founded mostly by left-wing seculars instead of religious Jews. (Walter, 2003) Jews around the world refuse to return to Israel after the founding of Is• rael due to the above reasons. Religious Jewish groups in Israel are also treated specially by the government for example the exemption of joining the army. But almost from the very beginning of the Zionism movement, religious Zionism went parallel with secular Zionism at the same time. One of the most prominent thinkers of religious Zionism was Orthodox

17 Rabbi Abraham Isaac Kook, who founded religious-nationalist philo• sophy. (Yotav, 2018) His son and the main authority in modern Israeli ra• dical right, Zvi Yehuda Kook, followed up and added the element of poli• tical fundamentalism in the ideology. (Alex, 2019) Religious Zionists and later on also nationalist Haredim groups participated in the founding of Israel to a certain extent. Moreover, the settlement movement is in part inspired by religious Zionist ideology. Even nowadays, religious Zionism is a very important movement in Israel and isn't as strange and contra• dictory as it was in the beginning.

For the Arab world, Islam is the state religion of almost all Arab countries. Secularism is a concept with little support in the tenets of Islam, and na• tional laws and regulations in these countries are based on the Quran to a large extent. The government's responsibility is to, therefore, ensure that these laws and regulations are effectively protected. The relation• ship between religion and politics in Arab states is in sharp contrast with western secular politics. The government also usually uses religion to increase its legitimacy, and sometimes uses religious officials to justify some policies. For example, Anwar Sadat signed a peace treaty with Israel through religious officials issuing a statement declaring that the peace treaty is in line with the principles of Islam. (Mark, Jodi, 1998) Islam is closely related to politics and foreign policy. For Arabs living in Palestine, Palestine is their roots. Allah often sends prophets to there to spread the teachings. Even the first holy temple in Muslim history was also esta• blished in Jerusalem.

After Islam came into being, it quickly became the national belief of the Arab nation. In the following history, any attempt by infidels to control Palestine was intolerable by Muslims. Arabs once fight with European Crusaders for hundreds of years to defend Palestine. Islamic identity is irreversible for both Muslims and Muslim territories. So if the land is occupied by infidels, all Muslims are obliged to take back the occupied territories. (Shmuel, 2008) This obligation is as important as the other five pillars and has even become the sixth pillar. If a Muslim fails to do so, he will fall into hell. This notion leads to a belligerent mentality and also brings difficulties to the theory of deterrence. These beliefs are usually typical of radical Islamic ideologies and are deeply rooted in Orthodox Islam. Almost all Arabs believe in Islam, and their ethnicity and religion are almost integrated. Therefore, the protection of Palestine is not only to defend sovereignty at the territorial level but also to fulfill religious obligations. Besides, there are chapters in the Quran that call on Muslims

18 to spread Islam around the world through war. If infidels do not follow Islam, they must be resolved by force.

The concepts of war and jihad are deeply implanted in the hearts of Mus• lims and are also recorded extensively in the Quran. This is also the basis for the reason why Muslims struggle with Israel. Jihad, meaning struggle, has two types: one is spiritual, and the other is about the struggle of the body against the enemy. This second type includes war. (Michael, 2006) Even the Quran mentions war repeatedly. One Quranic passage com• mands Muslims to "fight," "slay," and "expel" in the course of just two sen• tences (2:190-91), while another says that fighting is "pre• scribed ...though it be hateful to you" (2:216) (Stephen, 2010) War and killing are important themes in the Quran and Islamic law. Although the Quran also condemns suicide attacks: "Do not kill yourselves" (4:29) To those who kill women or children or civilians, they point out that the Quran condemns mass murder (5:32) and insists on proportionality (2:194). However, 70% of Muslims in the Palestinian believes thatsuicide attacks meet their standards of justice. (Stephen, 2010) The Quran has detailed descriptions of heaven and hell and has repeatedly warned those who refuse to obey Allah. At the same time, the Quran asks believers to fight with unbelievers: "O believers, fight the unbelievers who are near you" (9:123) These fragments in the Quran not only provide justification for war but also call on believers to wage war. "Here war is allowed in self-defense "(2:190;22:39) Allah is looking at people all the time, he can be terrible or merciful, for unbeliever Allah will show his terrible side to punish them. (Richard, 2003)

Furthermore, the principle of Islam has been misinterpreted by some ex• tremists and given new definitions. Islamism, which is a radical form of politicized Islam bringing the Martyr tradition in a deadly new direction, emerged. Islamism as a new kind of anti-European and anti-U.S. is used by several extremist organizations such as the Taliban in Afghanistan, Hezbollah in Lebanon, Hamas in Palestine, and Al-Qaeda in the political field. Israel is bad and suicides are heroes that can be transported to heaven are ideas of Islamism. Even though many Islamic scholars con• demn terrorist acts, they have not reached a consensus on the reasons for condemning them. Politically, the financial support of Jihad is correct for Muslims. Although many Muslims condemned terrorism, donating money for jihad has not been condemned because people are unwilling to risk betrayal accusations. (Shmuel, 2008) This thinking also leads to many Muslim regimes unwilling to suppress radical organizations.

19 5. 3 Israeli Jewish Parties and their Influence

Throughout Israel's political history, religious parties have existed for a long time and their strength has gradually grown, which not only affects the domestic political landscape but also affects Israel's foreign policy. Israeli political environment has experienced the Labor parly's domi• nance to the rivalry between the Likud and the Labor party then to the transformation of the big parly's decline and the small parly's rising. Re• ligious parties have gone from weak to strong from the initial defense to the final offensive position. As a typical multi-party country, Israel's par• liamentary elections implement a proportional representation system, that is, a system in which parliamentary seats are allocated according to the number of votes obtained by the participating parties. Under this sys• tem, no party will receive a majority of seats in the parliament. They all need to seek the support and participation of small parties to go through fierce cabinet negotiations. Because of the relatively fixed voters and re• latively stable organizational structure, the religious parties in Israel have become the preferred goal for big parties during cabinet negotiati• ons. "Taken together, Israel's religious parties have over the years gene• rally commanded from 15 to 18 seats in the Knesset or about 12 to 15 percent of the Knesset."(Helen, 1988) Israel's Jewish characteristics are the logical premise for religious parties to play an important role in the political arena. It is also because of Israel's Jewish characteristics that Arab parties are usually excluded from the ruling coalition. Religious par• ties exert a strong influence on the political level of Israel.

According to the content of the declaration of independence, Israel should be a secular modern democratic country. However, Judaism is the state religion of Israel, and Israel's religious parties also have a strong penetration and interference in the country's political life. Israeli reli• gious forces and political parties played an important role in the Zionism movement and the founding of the nation. The Jewish Rabbi Karishel was the first to envision returning to the holy land in Palestine. In the Zionist movement, the Jewish religion was divided into two major factions: reli• gious Zionist Mizrachi and anti-Zionist Orthodoxy Agudat Yisrael. Mizra- chi emphasizes the importance of the Jewish spirit, supports the Zionist plan, and actively participates in this undertaking. Unlike Agudat Yisrael, Mizrahi believes that we should not wait for the savior to come, and the establishment of a state in Palestine will not violate Jewish principle and tenet. (David, Tamar, 2020) After the founding of the country, the party

20 also actively participated in political activities. It united with Hapoel Ha- Mizrachi, which was split from Mizrachi, and renamed the National Reli• gious Party.

Agudat Yisrael party firmly upholds the concept in the Bible and opposes the Zionist movement. This faction believes that only when the savior comes, the Jews can be redeemed. Any effort to return Palestine and res• tore the country before this is against the doctrine and will of God. During WW2, the anti-semitic wave in Europe and Hitler's genocide caused the faction's attitude to be reversed. It no longer opposed Zionism but only refused to recognize Zionism. In 1984, Sephardic Jews in Agudat Yisrael opposed Ashkenazi Haredim's possession of excessive rights and discri• mination against eastern Jews. As a result, Shas was founded. (Daniel, 2020) Agudat Israel and Degel HaTorah jointly established the United To- rah Judaism party. In the later Israeli political arena, Shas, United Torah Judaism, and National Religious Party (Jewish Home) remain active. (Da• vid, 2020) Sometimes these religious parties also form their coalitions such as United Religious Front and Torah Religious Front.

From the founding of Israel in 1948 to the ninth parliamentary elections in 1977, the Labor Party dominated Israel's political arena, during which it formed a coalition with religious parties. However, the role of religious parties at this time was very weak. Mapai party from the first to the eighth parliament elections respectively got 46 seats, 45 seats, 40 seats, 47 seats, 42 seats, are in an absolutely dominant position, with no politi• cal party can compete with. (The Israel Democracy Institute) In this po• litical arena, although the Labor party needs to seek the support of small parties in the process of forming a government, it has a lot of initiative. The seats all religious parties got are 16 seats, 15 seats, 17 seats, 18 seats, 18 seats. (The Knesset) At this time, the choosing target for the Labor party is not only religious parties. It is just due to the negotiable of policy between the Labor party and religious parties, and the costs for the Labor party to unite with religious parties is relatively low. Uniting with secular parties cost more, and religious parties in this period mostly focus on the religious issues instead of foreign policy.

In 1965, Mapai and Labor Unity formed the Alignment. In 1968, these two parties and Rafi merged into the Israeli Labor Party. The status and power of the religious parties in Israel gradually became stronger after the 1967 war. It was also based on the influence of Israel's policy changes

21 towards Arab countries. After 1967, there were differences in Israel's do• mestic disposal of Arab territories: hawk and doves respectively repre• sent tough and moderate position. However, Israel as a whole is in a right- leaning political environment. The deep-rooted promised land concept of religious parties provides a legal basis for the occupied territories, which is exactly what the right-wing radical parties needed. Israel's spe• cial historical background and the parliamentary democratic system has made religious parties the united targets of the big parties. Since the 1966 parliamentary elections and the direct election of the prime minis• ter, the big parties have become weaker and weaker, the power of smaller parties has increased and even reached its peak. (Gary S, 2018) From the 1966 parliamentary election to 2009, religious parties won 23 seats, 27 seats, 22 seats, 27 seats, and 18 seats respectively. (The Knesset) In the 1999 parliamentary election, the Shas party won only two seats less than that of Likud. And since 1996, the Shas party had maintained its position as the third or fourth largest party in Israel.

In the 1977 parliamentary election, Likud became the largest party in the parliament and for the first time as a ruling party. The Labor Alignment and Likud gradually became two evenly rivalry parties in the parliament. 1977 to 1996 was a period of competition between the two major politi• cal parties, and during this period the religious parties' effect is signifi• cant. After the 1967 war, Israel form hardliners and moderates. Religious parties have become an important force in strengthening the right-wing camp. It is also because of this the union between the Labor party and religious parties is no longer stable. (Peter, 2010) In this evenly matched political struggle, religious parties that had relatively fixed voters and stable parliamentary seats have become the targets of the two major par• ties. The support of religious parties is a key element for a smooth cabi• net formation. Because the status and influence of religious parties du• ring this period is significant, in return the big party of the coalition government needs to pay a high price to attract the religious party to form a cabinet. For example, to obtain the support of the religious party, the Begin government has implemented a broader and in-depth religious policy, therefore the influence of religious parties had been substantively strengthened. (Steven, 2019)

The religious parties in Israel exert great influence on the occupied terri• tories. Judaism has a special meaning for Israeli society, and the Israel religious parties influence the government's policy towards Arabs. After the 1967 war, secular parties hold different opinions on the treatment of

22 the occupied territories. However, the National Religious Party moves more and more to the political right and refuses to form a coalition with parties that advocate withdrawal from the occupied territories. (Ezra, Matthew, 1988) The National Religious Party believes that the occupied territories, especially the West Bank, are land given to the Jews by God and should not be returned to the Palestinians. Therefore, it strongly op• poses the exchange of land for peace. (Itamar, 2018) The National Reli• gious Party even believes that forming a government cabinet should "Make Coalition decisions on primarily doctrinal grounds."(Ezra, Matthew, 1988) After the successful election of the Labor Party in 1992, the National Religious Party did not join the Labor Party-led government because it was unable to accept the peace process led by the Labor Party. In addition to the NRP, the UTP also refused to ally with the Labor Party because of its opposition to Rabin's peace plan. (Kopelowitz, 2001) The Religious Party as a whole supports the Greater Israel Project. The Jews began to illegally settle in the so-called places mentioned in the Bible and resisted the government to reclaim the land. Likud publically supported the settlement after it came to power and Begin approved the plan in the West Bank. With the support of the Likud government, an offshoot of the National Religious Party the Block of the Faithful, began to establish va• rious settlements in the West Bank. The NRP also clearly proposed to support the Likud Group in return. Religious parties' obsession with land even led them to oppose the Oslo Agreement and hinder the process of land-for-peace. Religious parties have a huge influence on Israeli politics, and Israel is currently dominated by right-wing coalitions. In 2018, the Nationality Basic Law even provides Israel a stronger definition as the Jewish nation. Right-wing religious parties still played a decisive role in the second national election in 2019. They get about one-fifth of the vote and seats in the Knesset. (David, Tamar, 2020) Religious parties have an unprecedented impact on Israel's domestic politics and foreign policy.

5.4 Arab Political Parties in Israel

Although the Arabs living in Israel obtained citizenship after the founding of the state of Israel, they remained in a state of isolation for a long time. It was not until the election law promulgated in 1959 that all Israeli citi• zens who had reached the age of 18 had the right to vote regardless of religion, race, and gender. Citizens over the age of 21 had the right to be elected. (Ilan, 2011) From then on, Israeli Arab citizens and Jewish citi• zens have the same right to vote and be elected. Before the 1970s, Israel did not have a real Arab political party. The Labor Party as the dominant

23 party in the political arena, guided Arab elites to build Satellite Lists to obtain support from Arab voters. (As'ad Ghanem, 2010) Before, 1969, Sa• tellite Lists were usually able to obtain the support of 40-50% of Arab voters. (Uzi, 2004) After the third Middle East war, the Arabs' sense of national identity increased and they started to express dissatisfaction and demands for inequality. In the 1973 election, the Rakah party, a poli• tical party that defended the interests of Arabs won 37% of Arab votes and 4 seats. (Adam, 1997) Some powerful parties began to recruit Arabs to win Arab votes. Later, during the competition between the Israeli La• bor party and the Likud group, the Arabs in Israel supported parties that defended their interests. For example, the Hadash party (The Democratic Front for Peace and Equality), which was formed by Rakah, Black Panthers, several left-wing parties, and the League of Arab parties, parti• cipated in the election in 1977. The party won the support of 50% of Arab voters and 5 seats. (The Israel Democracy Institute) Hadash supported the idea of two states for two people as the solution to the conflict, the return of occupied territories, and the equality between Israeli Arabs and Jews. In 1984, The Progressive List for Peace, which was jointly formed by Jews and Arabs to represent and protect the interests of Arabs, was established. In the election that year, it won nearly 20% of Arab voters' votes and 2 parliamentary seats. (As'ad Ghanem, 2010) In 1988, Labour MPs formed the Arab Democratic Party.

Then Arab political parties appeared one after another, Balad, Ra'am, and Ta'al were all established in 1996. (Don Peretz, 1997) It is worth menti• oning that Ra'am (The United Arab List) is the southern political branch of the Islamic movement of which the northern branch was banned in 2015. A certain form of coalition has also appeared among Arab political parties, of which typical representatives are the Ra'am Ta'am alliance af• ter 2006, and the Joint List formed by four Arab political parties in 2015. In the 2015 parliamentary election, the Joint List won 13 seats and be• came the third-largest party in the Knesset. Its influence has been unpre- cedentedly improved. In the 2019 general election, the Joint List won 15 seats. (The Israel Democracy Institute) The number of seats held by Arab political parties in the Knesset has gradually increased from the initial 2- 5 seats to 15 seats in the 2019 election. However, due to the systematic suppression of Arab parties by the Israeli political system, the effective• ness of their political participation is still very limited. Although the nu• mber of seats of Arab political parties in the parliament has increased, they have never participated in the formation of a government cabinet in the history of Israel, nor have they entered the government. Even after

24 Arab political parties have achieved remarkable results, the various Je• wish parties will draw a clear line from them, and will not unite with them to form a cabinet, some even openly express hostility. (Asher, 2004) This seems to indicate that no matter how Arab parties change and grow, they will all be opposition parties in the Knesset. Because Israel defines itself as a Jewish democratic state, the unite with Arab political parties will shake Israel's Jewish attributes.

Reasons of why the development of Israeli Arab parties got hindered: Due to historical issues and the long-lasting impact of the Arab-Israeli conflict, Israeli Arabs have distinct characteristic which is the dual iden• tity of Israelis and Palestinians. (Yoav, 1992) The resulting contradictions and conflicts have a negative influence on their political participation and the development of Arab political parties. Senators of Arab political par• ties must recognize their Israeli citizenship, which is a manisfestation of Israeli identity. But at the same time, their identity as Palestinians is also very obvious. They support the Palestine Liberation Movement and seek Palestinian national rights. It is also because of these that Arab parties can obtain votes and support from Israeli Arabs. Whenever the Arab-Is• raeli conflict breaks out, the standpoint of Arab parties will be very em• barrassing. (Sammy, 1989) It is precise because of the standpoint and identity of Arab parties that mainstream parties are reluctant to coope• rate with them. Arab parties are therefore in a development dilemma. There have always been moderates and radicals within Israeli Arab par• ties. For example, radical parties such as Balad believe that only by resol• ving the occupied territories and changing Israel's Jewish status can the equal status sought by Arab citizens be truly realized. (Ahser, 2004) However, this radical stance not only fails to change Israel's Jewish status but also makes Arab parties more marginalized in the parliament, which is not conducive to Arab parties' realization of their political goals.

The standpoint of Israel's Jewish state and the strengthening of its right- wing dominance in recentyears have compressed the development space of Arab political parties. Because Israeli Jews cherish the Jewish nature of the country, Arab political parties will naturally be resisted and vigi• lant. (Asher, 2000) During a political debate in the 2015 election, the le• ader of Israel Our Home Party questioned why the leader of The Joint List had to run in Israel instead of Gaza or the West Bank. (Elhanan, 2015) After the assassination of Rabin in 1995, the golden period of coopera• tion between Arab political parties and the government ended. At the end of 1995, only 6.8% of Israeli Arab citizens opposed the existence of Israel,

25 and the number climbed from 2003 to 24.5% in 2012. (Sammy, 2013) Generally speaking, the ruling of the left-wing parties in Israel is more beneficial to the development of Arab parties. On the issue of the Arab- Israeli conflict and the status of Arab citizens in Israel, the left-wing par• ties have a more moderate position that advocates negotiations and con• cessions. Left-wing parties are also willing to improve the status of Arab citizens. This was evident during the Rabin administration. But since the Likud victory over the Labor party in 1977, most of the cabinets of Likud have been far-right, Jewish nationalist parties. This is a major obstacle to the two main political goals of Arab political parties: the pursuit of Pales• tinian national rights and equal rights of Israeli Arab citizens. Right-wing governments even introduced new laws to prevent Arab political parties from participating in politics. In 2014, the right-wing Jewish party in or• der to weaken other leftist small parties and Arab parties to strengthen itself, passed a bill to raise the parliamentary entry threshold from 2% to 3.25%. Some Arab parties that are originally marginal parties may not be able to get seats in parliament after the pass of this bill, because their votes are between 2-4%. (Brent, 2016) Members of Arab political parties are often subject to investigation, prosecution, and even disqualification.

In general, since the founding of the country in 1948 the Arab political parties in Israel have continued to grow and have achieved certain results in seeking equal rights for Israeli Arab citizens and safeguarding the rights and interests of the Palestinian nationality. The establishment of The Joint List in 2015 has made Arab political parties unprecedented. Their political participation had entered a new era. However, the develo• pment of Arab political parties had been facing many obstacles. Among them, the standpoint of the Jewish state has had a profound impact on the identity and policies of Arab political parties. Especially in recent years, Israel has strengthened its Jewish state attributes. Factors such as the continuous control of government by right-wing parties have seve• rely restricted the development and political participation process of Arab parties, causing them to face more severe institutional obstacles and a deteriorating external political environment.

5. 5 Palestinian Orgnizations

The Palestinian national liberation movement can be divided into two major factions. The mainstream of the PLO, lead by Arafat's Fatah, is in favor of solving the Arab-Israeli issue through political means. This faction is also recognized by the international community. The extremists

26 represented by Hamas and Islamic Jihad Movement in Palestine advocate violence to wipe out Israel and regain the occupied territories. This section mainly analyzes the relationship between the above factions and religion, the root causes of the contradictions between Fatah and Hamas. The Islamic movement in Israel will also be mentioned.

Since the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) was established in 1964, the goal is to lead the Palestinian people to liberate Palestine, re• gain the land and establish a Palestinian state. The PLO mainly includes 10 organizations such as Fatah. These organizations retain their organi• zational system on the premise of abiding by the Palestinian National Charter. After its establishment, the PLO quickly became the backbone of the Palestinian struggle against Israel and gained support from the Arab world. (Yodfat&Yuval, 1981) Fatah, founded by Yasser Arafat, is the most powerful organization within PLO. Unlike Hamas, Fatah and PLO are secular organizations. In the early days of Fatah's establishment, Arafat believed that revolutionary violence was the only way to liberate Pales• tine. Therefore, Fatah engaged in guerrilla warfare against Israel in the occupied territories. At the fourth PLO National Committee meeting in 1968, Fatah and other organizations advocating armed struggle were do• minant in the system. They revised the Palestinian National Charter, highlighting the ideology of armed struggle, and clearly stated that armed struggle is the only correct way to liberate Palestine. In the national char• ter adopted by PLO, Article 9 and 15 encourage violent policy toward Is• rael. (Shadi, 2016) This reflects the determination of Fatah led by Arafat to oppose Israel. When Arafat founded Fatah, the goal was to eliminate Israel and establish a Palestinian state. In 1967, Fatah, led by Arafat, fight against Israel in the occupied territories. In the Fourth Middle East War, Arafat also led the Palestinian armed forces to cooperate with the front lines in Egypt and Syria.

However, at the 12th Palestine National Committee meeting PLO stated that there are other ways to obtain the national liberation of the Palesti• nian people besides armed struggle. This is also based on Arafat's stance towards Israel becoming more moderate. Since the 1980s, Arafat had gradually changed the standpoints of Fatah and PLO in armed struggle. (Efraim, 2007) After accepting the UN Resolution in West Bank and Gaza in 1988, Arafat formally renounced any form of terrorist policy. Arafat began to recognize the existence of Israel and peacefully settle the Arab- Israeli conflict based on the principle of land for peace. The negotiations, based on a two-state solution, between Israel and Palestine developed

27 such as the 1993 Oslo Accords and 2000 Camp David Summit. (Becker, 2014) It can be seen that the secular attributes make Fatah and PLO easier to change their attitude towards Israel because they are more fo• cused on secular interests rather than Hamas, which requires adherence to religious principles. This is the reason why Arafat can negotiate with Israel.

Islamic Resistance Movement (Hamas) is a radical Islamic religious orga• nization with a strong Islamic religious ideology and is deeply influenced by Islamic fundamentalism. It evolved from the Muslim Brotherhood in Gaza strip. The traditional Muslim Brotherhood is an apolitical Organi• zation, mainly engaged in religious propaganda. However, Hamas is a re• ligious, political, and military faction. (Jonathan, 2008) After the Gulf War, Hamas became the most active militant organization in Palestine. Hamas advocated the elimination of Israel through jihad and the liberation of entire occupied Palestinian territories to achieve the goal of establishing a Palestinian state with Jerusalem as its capital. (Khaled, 2006) Hamas refused to recognize Israel's right to exist. The main forms of military action accepted by Hamas are attacks on Israeli military targets and civi• lian facilities, terrorist bombings, and the kidnapping of Israeli hostages. Its members have launched a large number of suicide attacks.

Hamas is highly religious and believes in Islamic doctrines and laws. The Hamas Charter embodies its strong religious and uncompromising stand for struggle. Its basic contents are as follows: 1. Hamas is an integral part of the world Islamic movement. Islam is the source of Hamas's guiding ideology. "The prophet is its example, the Quran is its constitution, and jihad is its way. Devotion to God is the noble ideal of Muslims." (Ziad, 1994) 2. It is believed that the entire Palestinian land is a religious pro• perty passed down by Islam for generations, and its integrity cannot be violated. Any international conferences and programs on the Palestinian issue are betrayals of Islam. (Khaled, 2006) 3. Jihad is the obligatory duty of every Muslim who should eliminate Israel through jihad and liberate all Palestinian territories. "There is no solution to the Palestinian pro• blem except by jihad." (Frode, 2014) 4. Respect the PLO and recognize its status, but firmly oppose the secularism advocated by the PLO, and be• lieve that the future Palestinian state should be a theocratic state based on Islam tenets. "The land of Palestine is an Islamic Waqf consecrated for future Moslem generations until Judgement Day. No one can renounce it or any part, or abandon it or any part of it. (Article 11)" (Maciej, 2011) This ideology is completely contrary to that of PLO and Fatah. From the

28 Palestinian election to the formation of the cabinet after the victory, ob• vious changes have taken place in Hamas's political strategy. Political stance has been significantly loosened. The slogan of jihad is rarely men• tioned, and the claim to recover the entire Palestinian land has been abandoned. Hamas has adjusted its strategy greatly, but the guiding ide• ology in the early 1988 charter already had a profoundly negative effect on the settlement of the conflict between Palestine and Israel, and made Israel and the United States have a deep prejudice against Palestinian po• litical factions.

In the 2006 election of the second Palestinian Legislative Council, Hamas won the right to form a cabinet. Hamas had been out of the PLO regime, and now it is moving towards the political frontier of Palestine through the general election. Fatah refused to recognize the election result. As a result, armed conflicts broke out between the two sides. In 2007, Hamas seized Gaza strip, and Fatah retreated to West Bank. (Jonathan, 2008) A competitive trend formed between Hamas and PLO. Especially after the peace process started, Hamas strongly opposes the Oslo Agreement. The differences in ideology, struggle goals, and methods between the two si• des have led to the deepening of contradiction. The contradiction af• terward led to the instability of the Palestinian political arena and the impossibility of political diplomacy's carry out. (Jonathan, 2008) With Hamas' governance, the differences between the two became more in• tense. The contradiction between the two is about the distribution of power, but more of it is a problem of ideology. From the perspective of power distribution, Fatah used to control internal affairs, diplomacy, economy, etc. "The secular PLO led by Fatah has traditionally been the hegemon in Palestinian politics ." (Frode, 2014) Now that Hamas has replaced Fatah as the largest party, Fatah has difficulty accepting this si• tuation. From an ideological point of view, the two sides have different ideologies. Fatah wants to establish a nation-state, but Hamas wants to establish an Islamic theocracy. Fatah advocates abandoning violence to negotiate and resolve the Arab-Israeli conflict on the basis of dialogue. However, Hamas refuses to negotiate and does not agree to abandon ar• med struggle. Huge differences exist in the way the two sides fight, ma• king coexistence hard to realize.

From an international perspective, Hamas is not recognized by the inter• national community. Israel regards the ever-growing Hamas as an enemy and resorts to various means to retaliate against it. In addition to arres-

29 ting and expelling Hamas members, Israel also carried out assassinati• ons. After the Al-Aqsa Uprising broke out, Israel has recognized more than 100 assassinations against Hamas leaders, and small-scale military operations are countless. (Khaled, 2004) Especially after Hamas came to power, the United States, Britain, and other European Union countries had not accepted its ruling reducing the possibility that Hamas can nego• tiate with Israel effectively. Even if Hamas changed the charter, it cannot be more secular. Because it is precisely the religious nature that makes Hamas successful in the Palestinian political arena.

Islamic Jihad Movement in Palestine (PIJ), which is a radical Islamic ex• tremist organization, is also affected by religion. Members of it are Pales• tinian radicals in the Gaza Strip. Its founders are a group of Palestinian students who studied in Egypt and were influenced by the Islamic revo• lution in Iran. PIJ's goal is the same as that of Hamas and is heavily influ• enced by religious beliefs. It desires to establish an Islamic Palestinian state with a pre-1948 Palestine border and rejects any two-state political solution, nor does it recognize the existence of Israel. Based on this con• cept, PIJ, Hamas, and six other factions established the Alliance of Pales• tinian Forces against the Oslo Agreement. (Ilan, 2019) Besides, PIJ carries out military strikes in Israe and therefore Israeli civilians have suffered multiple attacks. A suicide attack on a bus in 1989 resulted in the death of 16 civilians. (Joel, 1989) In 2002, a suicide bombing at Megiddo junction killed 17 civilians. (Jerrold, 2002) In 2003, another suicide bom• bing at the Maxim restaurant in Haifa killed 22 civilians. (Holly, 2008) PIJ attacks on Israel almost every year and most of the victims were civilians. Because of this, PIJ was regarded as a terrorist organization by the United States and Western countries. Both PIJ and Hamas denied the existence of Israel. However, Hamas stopped conducting suicide bombings in Israel and ceased fire with Israel. PIJ, on the contrary, claimed that it would con• tinue. (Ilan, 2019) The conflict between radical extremist organizations such as PIJ and Israeli Jews is not only caused by territories but also caused by differences in religious beliefs. Attacks carried out by PIJ have largely hindered the peace process between Israel and Palestine.

In addition to the Islamic Jihad Movement in Palestine, Israel also has Is• lamic Movement. The Palestinian and Israeli Islamic Movements are two unrelated factions, but both advocate for Islam. Islamic Movement in Is• rael is divided into Southern Branch and Northern Branch. (Adam, 2016) When the Islamic Movement in Israel participated in the parliamentary election in 1996, the northern branch strongly opposed this political

30 secularization. (Lawrence, 2015) The southern branch is not as radical as the northern branch. Instead, the southern branch supported the po• litical secularization of organizations and established the United Arab List party afterward. However, some members of the Islamic Movement influenced by Islam beliefs have the goal of establishing the Arab Islamic state in Palestine. Moreover, the northern branch strongly opposes the Oslo Accord. (Adam, 2016) In 2015, the northern branch was banned due to the close connections with Hamas and the Muslim Brotherhood. It can be seen that the Islamic movement in Israel not only hindered the peace proces but also had close ties with extremist organizations in Palestine due to religious beliefs.

31 6 Conclusion

The Arab-Israeli conflict has lasted for a long time and has always been one of the hot spots in the international arena. Analyzing the roots hid• den behind the conflict is a key element in resolving this conflict. Reli• gious factors as an important root cause are mentioned by many scholars in their articles and research. This article also attempts to analyze the influence of religion in the Arab-Israeli conflict. The goal is to identify the extent to which religion affects both Palestine and Israel by answering the research questions.

The research first analyzes the claims of land ownership and justification of war in Islamic and Jewish tenets respectively. The conclusion drawn in this section is that the tenets of both religions have confirmed land ownership and legalized war. It can be seen that Judaism and Islam have largely affected the people of both Palestine and Israel, leading to the further escalation of the conflict and the stagnation of the peace process. The second part analyzes the status of Israeli Jewish religious parties in the Israeli political arena. The party status will directly affect its ability to influence political decisions. Through the analysis of various evidence, it can be seen that the religious parties have an extraordinary influence in the Israeli political arena. The growth of religious parties therefore will directly affect the foreign policy of Israel, especially those involving the occupied territories. The opposition of religious parties to return the occupied territories undoubtedly hinders the development of the Pales• tinian-Israeli peace process. The third part focuses on the Arab political parties in Israel. The development of Arab political parties in Israel's po• litical arena can verify Israel's acceptance of Islam. However, the author draws the conclusion that Arab political parties have been repeatedly frustrated and suppressed among Israeli parties. Israel's domestic doubts and distrust of Islamists can be seen. Moreover, it implies Israel's distrust of Arab countries, the distrust undoubtedly hinders the peaceful settlement of the conflict. The last part focuses on the Palestinian orga• nizations. Palestine does not have a relatively stable political situation. On the contrary, multiple organizations compete with each other. Altho• ugh PLO is relatively secular and does not associate political goals with religious beliefs, Hamas and PIJ are extreme religious organizations. Being hostile to Israel, both Hamas and PIJ link political goals with reli• gious goals and attempt to regain the entire Palestinian area. The insta-

32 bility of the Palestinian political situation makes Israel distrust the pro• mise made by Palestine. Since the PLO can not fully control the place where it belongs, it is naturally unable to make a trustworthy commit• ment for the entire country. The peace process of the Arab-Israeli conflict cannot continue. Based on the above analysis, it is not difficult to see that religion does play a counterproductive role in the Arab-Israeli conflict. Whether in the tenets of two religions or the Israeli and Palestinian poli• tical arenas, religion or religious forces have aggravated the conflict and stalled the peace process.

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