History by the Numbers: Applying Cliodynamic Theories to Republican Egypt Abstract Cliodynamics is a recently developed field which seeks to describe long term patterns in history using rigorous computation and “big data”. Quantitative explanations in history are not new, yet the popularity of Cliodynamics and similar quantitative efforts cannot be disregarded. In this piece, I test three quantitative stability models—the Structural-Demographic model, the Global Conflict Risk Index, and the Selfish Elite Model—by applying them to two instances of instability in Republican Egypt: the 1977 Bread Riots and the 1986 Conscripts Riots. I then provide my own qualitative account for these events, utilizing secondary sources, economic data, and articles from the Egyptian and Western press. I conclude that the Structural- Demographic and Selfish Elite models inform the understanding of the two riots by providing a framework which instances of instability can be generally understood. The Global Conflict Risk Index fails to anticipate the two riots. I argue further that the 1977 Bread Riots were, in addition to the quantitative conditions described in the models, a result of a failure of Egyptian government to uphold its “moral economy”. Similar public sentiment fueled the Conscripts Riots, along with economic anxiety and national humiliation. Keywords: Cliodynamics, Structural-Demographic Model, Global Conflict Risk Index, Selfish Elite Model, 1977 Bread Riots, 1986 Conscripts Riots, Infitah, Moral Economy History by the Numbers - 2 Introduction It happened again. The arrogance of humanity, knowing no bounds, have led a group of scholars to attempt to describe social phenomena, history, and the human narrative in terms of law-like or patterned explanations. Again. Cliodynamics is the emerging field of quantitative history. By using “big data”, rigorous computation, and new developments in social evolutionary theory, cliodynamic scholars hope to provide models, equations, and not-quite-laws to inform the field of history. A seemingly dubious endeavor, the field has its own dedicated journal, producing sensational articles such as “Complex Societies Precede Moralizing gods throughout World History” (Whitehouse, et al. 2019) and “Quantitative historical analysis uncovers a single dimension of complexity that structures global variation in human social organization.”1 As historians, we cannot disregard this umpteenth endeavor of law-like explanations in history. It is crucial to confront this field sooner, rather than later, to identify it as sensationalist or revolutionary. The implications of cliodynamics are tremendous. The purpose of this thesis is to qualify three cliodynamic or quantifiable models: the Structural- Demographic model, the Global Conflict Risk Index (GCRI), and the Selfish Elite model. Each of these models offer some argument regarding the causal forces to instances of instability, such as protests, riots, revolutions, or civil wars. I aim to accomplish this by applying these models to two instances of instability during Republican Egypt: the 1977 Bread Riots and the 1986 Conscripts Riots. These two events are critically understudied in English-language scholarship. I anticipate that the role which cliodynamic methods provide is one of helping focus the “noise” of an event. In other words, cliodynamics assists in deciphering what are the fundamental causes of the event 1 https://www.pnas.org/content/115/2/E144 Burgos-Herrera - 3 when an investigation remains in the preliminary stages. I also chose these events because they are worth examining in their own right. I found that the Egyptian Bread Riots directly shifted President Anwar Sadat’s (served 1970 – 1981) economic and security policies, shaping those of his successor, Hosni Mubarak (served 1981 – 2011). This thesis is organized into three chapters. First, I will outline the methodology and apply each of the three quantitative techniques. We will go in largely “blind,” without a deep understanding of the riots, in order to see how well the models anticipate instability without my own bias of the event. Thus, we will only have a brief description of each event following this paragraph. I conclude that the Structural-Demographic and Selfish Elite models inform the understanding of the two riots by providing a framework which instances of instability can be generally understood The next chapter then provides qualitative analysis of the 1977 Bread Riots. I will compare extant theories by Adel Abdel Ghafar, Hossam El-Hamalawy, and Marsha Pripstein regarding the causes of the event, qualifying them with primary source data. I find that Pripstein’s “moral economy” hypothesis explains the Bread Riots more powerfully than El-Hamalawy and Ghafar’s work. Finally, the third chapter will apply Pripstein’s “moral economy” hypothesis to the 1986 Conscripts Riots and reconstruct the event utilizing the Egyptian press.2 On January 17th, 1977, the People’s Assembly of Egypt was presented with the yearly budget, which proposed the rescinding of subsidies on cereals, sugar, cooking oil, and other primary goods. On January 18th, the entire country of Egypt took to the streets in protests numbering in the tens of thousands. Rioting continued into January 19th, when the Central Security Force (CSF)— Egypt’s anti-riot paramilitary—and conventional military wrestled back control of Cairo, 2 Throughout this piece, I translate the Arabic newspapers Al-Jumhuriya and Al-Ahrar. I accomplished this by using my own knowledge of Arabic and validating such with the Hans Wehr English-Arabic Dictionary and finally Google Translate. History by the Numbers - 4 Alexandria, and the whole of Egypt. For two days, President Anwar Sadat was at the mercy of the people, and the food subsidy would remain in place for decades to come. On February 25th, 1986, 17,000 CSF conscripts attacked hotels, nightclubs, and private vehicles, outraged at a rumor that their three-year long, mandatory conscription was to be extended by a fourth year, without any additional compensation or pay raise. Again, urban centers throughout Egypt saw vandalism and arson, though this time at the hands of the government’s own CSF. Military intervention had to be called in to quell the demonstrations. While the rumor proved false, the conditions which the CSF conscripts worked and lived under were deplorable, and following the riots, President Hosni Mubarak made efforts to improve their lifestyle, though not without laying off tens of thousands of conscripts. Burgos-Herrera - 5 Chapter 1: Quantitative Modelling On Law-like Explanations in History and Social Science Qualifying a cliodynamic model involves satisfying two concerns. First, the result of the theory must reflect the real world. Second, the cliodynamic theory itself, the cause and effect relationship it purports, must also reflect the real world. By this I mean that each “step” or “part” of the theory tracks a real-world event. Whether or not the two riots were expected in such and such time and place (the result) is not the only determinant of the theory’s value. Its inductive prowess is only half of the benefit. The theory acts also as an argument. Cliodynamic theories argue what factors are more critical for historians to consider, or what is sufficient in explaining some subject. The Structural-Demographic model for instance, predicts a range of years within which a society experiences demographically driven tension and thus a propensity for conflict.3 That is valuable if true. The Structural-Demographic model also describes a step-by-step process to identify a pattern in history. This is valuable particularly in the field of history, wherein the narrative preceding an event is just as important as the event itself. If an early portion of the cliodynamic theory obtains, such as the escape from the Malthusian trap which the Structural-Demographic model describes, then historians have an intuition towards the next “step” in the narrative before it is even examined. This is the ultimate ambition of any law-like explanation: prediction and induction.4 3 Throughout the paper, I will use “state” and “society” interchangeably. 4 There are other scrutable elements of a cliodynamic or quantitative model, however they are beyond the scope of this piece. History by the Numbers - 6 Structural-Demographic Model The first model I will examine is the Structural-Demographic model as presented by Andrey Korotayev. This model argues that, when a state industrializes, its demographic structure develops in a way which foments conflict within that state. Figure 1 illustrates the cliodynamic theory of the Structural-Demographic model. Figure 1. The cliodynamic theory which relates proxies for industrialization to a period of likely violent conflict. (Korotayev, Zinkina and Kobzeva 2011) Part one of the model roughly describes a society escaping the “Malthusian Trap”: when a society moves from high birth and death rates, to a logistically growing population. This is a well-accepted process in the field of human geography. The second part connects the state of industrialization to Burgos-Herrera - 7 the agent and the climate of structural-demographically driven conflict: the youth and the stressed urban center. The Structural-Demographic model states that, as the population grows, a “youth bubble” develops (a generation significantly larger than the ones directly preceding and following it). Improved agricultural productivity, which drove population growth, undermines the labor market in rural