DOCSLIB.ORG

Fédération De Russie : Les Principales Forces Politiques

Total Page：16

File Type：pdf, Size：1020Kb

Download full-text PDF Read full-text
Fédération De Russie : Les Principales Forces Politiques Division de l’information, de la documentation et des recherches – DIDR 25 mai 2021 Fédération de Russie : Les principales forces politiques Avertissement Ce document, rédigé conformément aux lignes directrices communes à l’Union européenne pour le traitement de l’information sur le pays d’origine, a été élaboré par la DIDR en vue de fournir des informations utiles à l’examen des demandes de protection internationale. Il ne prétend pas faire le traitement exhaustif de la problématique, ni apporter de preuves concluantes quant au fondement d’une demande de protection internationale particulière et ne doit pas être considéré comme une position officielle de l’Ofpra. La reproduction ou diffusion du document n’est pas autorisée, à l’exception d’un usage personnel, sauf accord de l’Ofpra en vertu de l’article L. 335-3 du code de la propriété intellectuelle. Fédération de Russie : Les principales forces politiques Table des matières Table des matières .................................................................................................................................. 2 1. Evolution du système politique russe .............................................................................................. 4 1.1. Les années 1990 : la genèse du système politique russe ...................................................... 4 1.2. Années 2000 : un encadrement législatif des partis politiques et des élections ..................... 4 1.3. Années 2000-2010 : la réorganisation de l’opposition ............................................................ 6 2. Russie Unie : le parti au pouvoir...................................................................................................... 7 3. L’opposition parlementaire .............................................................................................................. 9 3.1. La Parti Communiste de la Fédération de Russie ................................................................. 10 3.2. Le Parti Libéral-Démocrate de Russie .................................................................................. 11 3.3. Rodina ................................................................................................................................... 12 3.4. Russie Juste .......................................................................................................................... 12 3.5. Plateforme citoyenne ............................................................................................................. 13 4. Les autres principaux partis d’oppositions déclarés ou ayant été déclarés auprès du ministère de la Justice ................................................................................................................................................ 13 4.1. Iabloko ................................................................................................................................... 13 4.2. Parti de la liberté du Peuple (Parnas) ................................................................................... 14 4.3. Cause Juste puis Parti de la Croissance ............................................................................... 15 4.4. L’Initiative citoyenne .............................................................................................................. 16 4.5. Les partis sociaux-démocrates et l’Alliance des Verts .......................................................... 17 4.6. Front de gauche..................................................................................................................... 18 4.7. Les Communistes de Russie ................................................................................................. 19 4.8. Le Parti écologiste russe « Les Verts » ................................................................................. 19 4.9. L’Union nationale russe ......................................................................................................... 19 4.10. De nouveaux partis proches du pouvoir ................................................................................ 19 5. Les principales forces politiques non-déclarées : « l’opposition de rue » ..................................... 20 5.1. Les mouvements libéraux : .................................................................................................... 20 5.1.1. Solidarnost ..................................................................................................................... 21 5.1.2. Le mouvement Alternative Démocratique ou Da ! ....................................................... 22 5.2. Les mouvements écologistes ................................................................................................ 22 5.3. Le Fond de lutte contre la Corruption d’Alexeï NAVALNY .................................................... 23 5.4. Les mouvements nationalistes .............................................................................................. 25 5.4.1. Le mouvement « Les Russes » ....................................................................................... 25 5.4.2. Le Parti National-Bolchévique ....................................................................................... 26 5.4.3. Artpodgotovka ............................................................................................................... 26 5.5. Les mouvements antifascistes et anarchistes ....................................................................... 26 DIDR – OFPRA 2 25/05/2021 Fédération de Russie : Les principales forces politiques 6. Les tentatives d’union de l’opposition ............................................................................................ 28 7. Chronologie politique ..................................................................................................................... 30 7.1. L’Effondrement de l’Union Soviétique ................................................................................... 30 7.2. La présidence de Boris ELTSINE (1991-1999) ..................................................................... 31 7.2.1. La crise constitutionnelle ............................................................................................... 31 7.2.2. La première guerre de Tchétchénie et la réélection d’ELTSINE .................................... 32 7.2.3. Des tensions au sommet de l’Etat ................................................................................. 35 7.2.4. Des accusations de corruption ...................................................................................... 36 7.3. La première présidence de Vladimir POUTINE (2000-2012) : .............................................. 37 7.3.1. Le lancement de la seconde guerre de la Tchétchénie et la prise de pouvoir de Vladimir POUTINE (1999-2000) ..................................................................................................... 37 7.3.2. Le premier mandat de Vladimir POUTINE (2000-2004) ................................................ 38 7.3.3. Le deuxième mandat de Vladimir POUTINE (2004-2008) ............................................. 41 7.4. La présidence de Dmitri MEDVEDEV (2008-2012)............................................................... 43 7.5. La deuxième présidence de Vladimir POUTINE (2012- ) ..................................................... 45 7.5.1. Le troisième mandat de Vladimir POUTINE (2012-2018) : ............................................ 46 7.5.2. Le quatrième mandat de Vladimir POUTINE (2018-2024) : .......................................... 50 Annexe 1 : Liste des partis politiques enregistrés auprès du ministère de la Justice russe au 7 avril 2021 ............................................................................................................................................................... 53 Bibliographie .......................................................................................................................................... 54 Résumé : Dans les années 2000 et 2010, la vie politique russe est dominée par le parti au pouvoir, Russie unie, fondé en 2001, pour soutenir le président russe Vladimir POUTINE. Les autres partis politiques représentés au Parlement forment principalement une opposition loyale et tolérée par le régime russe. De nombreuses autres forces politiques, opposées au régime de Vladimir POUTINE, sont de facto exclues du jeu électoral, qu’il s’agisse de partis d’opposition déclarés ou d’une opposition de rue. Abstract : In the 2000s and the 2010s, Russian political life was dominated by the ruling party, United Russia, founded in 2001, to support Russian President Vladimir PUTIN. The other political parties represented in Parliament mainly form a loyal opposition tolerated by the Russian regime. Many other political forces, opposed to the regime of Vladimir PUTIN, are de facto excluded from the electoral game, whether they are registered parties or street opposition. Nota : La traduction des sources en langues étrangères est assurée par la DIDR. DIDR – OFPRA 25/05/2021 3 Fédération de Russie : Les principales forces politiques 1. Evolution du système politique russe 1.1. Les années 1990 : la genèse du système politique russe Le système partisan russe se construit à la fin de l’URSS, puis dans les années 1990 durant la présidence de Boris ELSTINE. Lors de son premier mandat, Boris ELTSINE lance une importante libéralisation de l’économie et de la société russe, avec l’appui des forces politiques libérales, provoquant une
Load more

Recommended publications
  • Russia's Silence Factory
    Russia’s Silence Factory: The Kremlin’s Crackdown on Free Speech and Democracy in the Run-up to the 2021 Parliamentary Elections August 2021 Contact information: International Partnership for Human Rights (IPHR) Rue Belliard 205, 1040 Brussels, Belgium [email protected] Contents I. EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 4 II. INTRODUCTION 6 A. AUTHORS 6 B. OBJECTIVES 6 C. SOURCES OF INFORMATION AND METHODOLOGY 6 III. THE KREMLIN’S CRACKDOWN ON FREE SPEECH AND DEMOCRACY 7 A. THE LEGAL TOOLKIT USED BY THE KREMLIN 7 B. 2021 TIMELINE OF THE CRACKDOWN ON FREE SPEECH AND DEMOCRACY 9 C. KEY TARGETS IN THE CRACKDOWN ON FREE SPEECH AND DEMOCRACY 12 i) Alexei Navalny 12 ii) Organisations and Individuals associated with Alexei Navalny 13 iii) Human Rights Lawyers 20 iv) Independent Media 22 v) Opposition politicians and pro-democracy activists 24 IV. HUMAN RIGHTS VIOLATIONS TRIGGERED BY THE CRACKDOWN 27 A. FREEDOMS OF ASSOCIATION, OPINION AND EXPRESSION 27 B. FAIR TRIAL RIGHTS 29 C. ARBITRARY DETENTION 30 D. POLITICAL PERSECUTION AS A CRIME AGAINST HUMANITY 31 V. CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS 37 I. EXECUTIVE SUMMARY “An overdose of freedom is lethal to a state.” Vladislav Surkov, former adviser to President Putin and architect of Russia’s “managed democracy”.1 Russia is due to hold Parliamentary elections in September 2021. The ruling United Russia party is polling at 28% and is projected to lose its constitutional majority (the number of seats required to amend the Constitution).2 In a bid to silence its critics and retain control of the legislature, the Kremlin has unleashed an unprecedented crackdown on the pro-democracy movement, independent media, and anti-corruption activists.
    [Show full text]
  • The Hundred Russian Whistleblowers the Subject Referring to Protection Of
    Report of the International Human Rights Group Agora The hundred Russian whistleblowers The subject referring to protection of individuals who reveal information about violations to the public gets more and more topical not only in Russia, where the whistleblowers are regularly subjected to retaliation, including murders, violence, prosecution and imposing of disciplinary measures, but also in the rest of the world. The questions relevant to protection of whistleblowers have become subject to discussions in the UN, OSCE, Council of Europe, OECD, the bodies of the European Union and the G20. Up to date the national legislations of more than 60 countries envisage various measures aimed at guaranteeing of security and protection from retaliation of individuals who objectively act in favor of society by revealing of inaccessible information. The review of the subject relevant to protection of whistleblowers shall include the existing materials in the field. Mainly the Project on basic principles of laws on reporting of facts about corruption and illegal activities1 realized by Transparency International and the report of experts of this organization published in 2012 on ‘Corruption Reporting and Whistleblower Protection’2 describing in details the existing international and foreign approaches that may be used at elaboration of mechanisms for protection of individuals who report violations of greater size. The assurance of access to information is one of the problems closely related to the protection of whistleblowers. According to a report of Team 29 ‘The right to know’ the practice in Russia when it comes to assurance of access to information is not always in conformity to the international requirements and often contradicts to these requirements3.
    [Show full text]
  • Committee of Ministers Secrétariat Du Comité Des Ministres
    SECRETARIAT / SECRÉTARIAT SECRETARIAT OF THE COMMITTEE OF MINISTERS SECRÉTARIAT DU COMITÉ DES MINISTRES Contact: Zoë Bryanston-Cross Tel: 03.90.21.59.62 Date: 07/05/2021 DH-DD(2021)474 Documents distributed at the request of a Representative shall be under the sole responsibility of the said Representative, without prejudice to the legal or political position of the Committee of Ministers. Meeting: 1406th meeting (June 2021) (DH) Communication from NGOs (Public Verdict Foundation, HRC Memorial, Committee against Torture, OVD- Info) (27/04/2021) in the case of Lashmankin and Others v. Russian Federation (Application No. 57818/09). Information made available under Rule 9.2 of the Rules of the Committee of Ministers for the supervision of the execution of judgments and of the terms of friendly settlements. * * * * * * * * * * * Les documents distribués à la demande d’un/e Représentant/e le sont sous la seule responsabilité dudit/de ladite Représentant/e, sans préjuger de la position juridique ou politique du Comité des Ministres. Réunion : 1406e réunion (juin 2021) (DH) Communication d'ONG (Public Verdict Foundation, HRC Memorial, Committee against Torture, OVD-Info) (27/04/2021) dans l’affaire Lashmankin et autres c. Fédération de Russie (requête n° 57818/09) [anglais uniquement] Informations mises à disposition en vertu de la Règle 9.2 des Règles du Comité des Ministres pour la surveillance de l'exécution des arrêts et des termes des règlements amiables. DH-DD(2021)474: Rule 9.2 Communication from an NGO in Lashmankin and Others v. Russia. Document distributed under the sole responsibility of its author, without prejudice to the legal or political position of the Committee of Ministers.
    [Show full text]
  • THE WARP of the SERBIAN IDENTITY Anti-Westernism, Russophilia, Traditionalism
    HELSINKI COMMITTEE FOR HUMAN RIGHTS IN SERBIA studies17 THE WARP OF THE SERBIAN IDENTITY anti-westernism, russophilia, traditionalism... BELGRADE, 2016 THE WARP OF THE SERBIAN IDENTITY Anti-westernism, russophilia, traditionalism… Edition: Studies No. 17 Publisher: Helsinki Committee for Human Rights in Serbia www.helsinki.org.rs For the publisher: Sonja Biserko Reviewed by: Prof. Dr. Dubravka Stojanović Prof. Dr. Momir Samardžić Dr Hrvoje Klasić Layout and design: Ivan Hrašovec Printed by: Grafiprof, Belgrade Circulation: 200 ISBN 978-86-7208-203-6 This publication is a part of the project “Serbian Identity in the 21st Century” implemented with the assistance from the Open Society Foundation – Serbia. The contents of this publication are the sole responsibility of the Helsinki Committee for Human Rights in Serbia, and do not necessarily reflect the views of the Open Society Foundation – Serbia. CONTENTS Publisher’s Note . 5 TRANSITION AND IDENTITIES JOVAN KOMŠIĆ Democratic Transition And Identities . 11 LATINKA PEROVIĆ Serbian-Russian Historical Analogies . 57 MILAN SUBOTIĆ, A Different Russia: From Serbia’s Perspective . 83 SRĐAN BARIŠIĆ The Role of the Serbian and Russian Orthodox Churches in Shaping Governmental Policies . 105 RUSSIA’S SOFT POWER DR. JELICA KURJAK “Soft Power” in the Service of Foreign Policy Strategy of the Russian Federation . 129 DR MILIVOJ BEŠLIN A “New” History For A New Identity . 139 SONJA BISERKO, SEŠKA STANOJLOVIĆ Russia’s Soft Power Expands . 157 SERBIA, EU, EAST DR BORIS VARGA Belgrade And Kiev Between Brussels And Moscow . 169 DIMITRIJE BOAROV More Politics Than Business . 215 PETAR POPOVIĆ Serbian-Russian Joint Military Exercise . 235 SONJA BISERKO Russia and NATO: A Test of Strength over Montenegro .
    [Show full text]
  • Received by NSD/FARA Registration Unit 06/30/2021 10:06:39 AM
    Received by NSD/FARA Registration Unit 06/30/2021 10:06:39 AM 06/29/21 Tuesday This material is distributed by Ghebi LLC on behalf of Federal State Unitary Enterprise Rossiya Segodnya International Information Agency, and additional information is on file with the Department of Justice, Washington, District of Columbia. US Coast Guard Considering Arctic ‘FONOPS’ to Counter Russian Presence at North Pole by Morgan Artvukhina The US needs to expand its operations in the Arctic to counter Russia’s presence there, the head of the US Coast Guard said on Monday. That could include “freedom of navigation operations” (FONOPS) like the US uses to challenge maritime claims of other nations of which it does not approve. “Presence equals influence in the Arctic. And right now ... we're woefully lacking as a nation in terms of our capacity,” US Coast Guard Commandant Adm. Karl Schultz toldthe conservative think tank the Brookings Institution in Washington, DC. The region is home to considerable natural resources, including an estimated $1 trillion worth of minerals, one-third of the world’s liquefied natural gas (LNG), and rich fishing grounds - much of which has remained untapped due to the harsh climate, permafrost and sea ice. It also holds great travel potential as an alternative to the Suez Canal or Cape of Good Hope. As climate change increases the region’s average temperatures and sends the ice into retreat, global powers are looking to the Arctic as the next place to make their claims - or head off the claims of others. "What we're concerned about is how [Russia] conducts in this space - the same concerns we have about rules-based international order and adherence, modern maritime governance,” Schultz told the think tank, which exerts major influence on US policy-making.
    [Show full text]
  • Matt Hancock
    2021.06.13 - Opinion Headlines thursday 10 june 2021 2021.06.10 - Coronavirus 2021.06.10 - Spotlight 2021.06.10 - Opinion 2021.06.10 - Around the world Headlines friday 11 june 2021 2021.06.11 - Coronavirus 2021.06.11 - Spotlight 2021.06.11 - Opinion 2021.06.11 - Around the world Headlines saturday 12 june 2021 2021.06.12 - Coronavirus 2021.06.12 - Opinion 2021.06.12 - Around the world 2021.06.13 - Opinion Harassment of girls at school just reflects back the world of adults It’s impossible to keep politics out of sport. And that’s just as it should be The Observer view on Boris Johnson’s stance over Ireland at the G7 summit The Observer view on Iran’s rigged presidential election New York’s Little Island includes a message about the Thames garden bridge Can women rely on the Parole Board getting it right if it frees men like Colin Pitchfork? What were some of the collateral effects of lockdowns? May I have a word about enjoying a spot of sabrage instead of being a sillytonian? Not that Noel Gallagher’s looking back in anger. Well, not much Letters: how your medical data can save lives For the record In waging culture wars, Boris Johnson can count on a cabinet of mercenaries | Next | Section menu | Main menu | OpinionPornography Harassment of girls at school just reflects back the world of adults Barbara Ellen Half the population watches porn so it’s no surprise that it has installed itself in our children’s lives too Harassment and online sexual abuse of schoolchildren is so routine they barely bother reporting it.
    [Show full text]
  • POP PARADE and Characters from Films, Computer Games and Comic Strips
    NO. 43 (1835) САНКТ-ПЕТЕРБУРГ-ТАЙМС WEDNESDAY, OCTOBER 29, 2014 WWW.SPTIMES.RU NIKOLAY SHESTAKOV / FOR SPT / FOR SHESTAKOV NIKOLAY A contestant in the AVA Expo annual festival of popular culture, which was held at the Lenexpo exhibition center last weekend. Fans of popular culture dressed up as superheroes POP PARADE and characters from films, computer games and comic strips. The winner was Alexandra Pankova, who won 50,000 rubles ($1,190) for dressing up as anime character Black Lotus. NATIONAL NEWS NATIONAL NEWS ARTS & CULTURE Looking to Europe Putin Points the Finger Gromyka: Back in the U.S.S.R. Russian president hits out at U.S., accusing it Petrozavodsk group models style on Soviet Politburo. Pro-European parties win in of making the world a more Page 9. Ukraine. Page 3. dangerous place . Page 4. News www.sptimes.ru | Wednesday, October 29, 2014 ❖ 2 Zenit Returns to Form Against Mordovia First Building By Gus Peters of a spot in the knockout stages of the Of New Prison THE ST. PETERSBURG TIMES tournament. The loss to Leverkusen Five second-half goals from Russian was Zenit’s first loss in any competi- Premier League leaders Zenit St. Pe- tion since the end of July. Completed tersburg swept aside Mordovia Saransk Sunday’s match also marked the on a cold Sunday evening in Petrovsky return of Zenit’s hardcore fans to the By Irina Titova Stadium during Zenit’s first home game Virazh, the curved sector of the sta- THE ST. PETERSBURG TIMES in nearly a month. dium behind the southern goal that ST.
    [Show full text]
  • Now Is Night
    Undead Soldiers The medical commission said A little prayer to their maker, Which done, they dug with a holy spade The soldier from god’s little acre, When the doctor examined the soldier gay 01/15 Or what of him was left, He softly said: This man’s 1-A, He’s simply evading the draft. – Bertolt Brecht, “Legend of the Dead Soldier,” 1918 I found out that there was a war on between Oxana Timofeeva Russia and Ukraine at a small gas station, where I met some Ukrainians who, like me, were traveling across Europe by car. Neither Russian Now Is Night nor European nor American media had made any mention of a real military encounter between our countries, and so it was hard to believe these agitated women when they told of atrocities committed by Russian occupants on Ukrainian soil. They seemed like yet another element of brainwashing, just like the reports of Ukrainian Nazi atrocities that flooded the Russian media against the backdrop of the annexation of Crimea, only now with a Ukrainian accent – a mirror image of aggressive propaganda from the other side of the conflict. Ours was a meeting on neutral territory, so to speak, somewhere in the middle of a generic Europe. The women’s tone toward me was unfriendly, even accusatory – as if being Russian automatically made me guilty of the atrocities they were describing. At some point it even seemed that they were screaming at a me. Yet their stories of welded-shut zinc coffins v e e returning “from the East” etched themselves into f o my mind.
    [Show full text]
  • Russian Resurgence, Dating Back Several Years Before It Became a Fait Accompli
    RUSSIA’S RESURGENCE: Return of a Superpower? D e c e m b e r 2 0 0 4 - S e p t e m b e r 2 0 0 8 1 ABOUT STRATFOR Stratfor is the world’s leading online publisher of geopolitical intelligence. Our global team of intelligence professionals provides our Members with unbiased, nonpartisan insights into political, economic and military developments to reduce risks, identify opportunities and stay aware of happenings around the globe. Stratfor provides special printed reports as well as breaking intelligence 24/7/365 on our Web site www.stratfor.com. Corporate, academic and government/military Membership options are available by emailing [email protected] or calling 512-744-4300. Individual Memberships are available at www.stratfor.com/join. Stratfor provides three types of intelligence products: • Situational Awareness. News is a commodity that you can get anywhere on the Internet. Situational awareness is knowing what matters, and an intelligence professional’s responsibility -- Stratfor’s responsibility -- is to keep you apprised of what matters without wasting your time with clutter. We provide near real-time developments from revolutionary movements to military invasions. Celebrity arrests and mudslinging in Washington and Brussels don’t make the cut. • Analyses. Stratfor tells its Members what events in the world actually mean. We also tell you when events are much ado about nothing. Oftentimes the seemingly momentous is geopolitically irrelevant and vice versa. We discern what’s important objectively -- without ideology, a partisan agenda or a policy prescription. • Forecasts. Knowing what happened yesterday is helpful; knowing what’s going to happen tomorrow is critical.
    [Show full text]
  • Nationalism As Opposition in Russia - a Historical Comparison
    Nationalism as opposition in Russia - a historical comparison Erika Hellsing Rydergård Institutionen för slaviska och baltiska språk, finska, nederländska och tyska Examensarbete 15 hp Ryska Ryska, kandidatkurs (30 hp) Vårterminen 2017 Examinator: English title: The nationalist opposition in Russia – an historical comparison Nationalism as opposition in Russia - a historical comparison Erika Hellsing Rydergård Abstract During the 19th century, nationalism was generally connected to ideas of democratisation and the contestation of power and status quo. In Russia, there was an ongoing struggle between Official Nationalism, aimed at preserving the empire, and cultural nationalism. This essay is an inquiry into the differences and similarities between how the 19th century Slavophiles and contemporary Russian national democrats, exemplified by Aleksej Naval’nyj, view the Russian nation. The focus is on how the Russian nation is defined, how the two nationalist visions relate to competing views of the Russian nation, and how the idea of a Russian nation is used as part of a vision for social and political change. The essay finds that although “the Other” against which the Russian nation is defined differs in the two historical cases, the use of nationalism to frame an opposition against the regime and to advocate for social and political change is persistent across time. However, because of its excluding tendencies, in the cases studied here cultural nationalism is found to be wanting as a basis on which to build a democratic form of government.
    [Show full text]
  • Lebanese Man Dies of Wounds As Troops and Protesters Clash US Aid for Palestinian Refugees Won’T Cover Shortfall: UN
    Friday 13 International Friday, January 29, 2021 Lebanese man dies of wounds as troops and protesters clash US aid for Palestinian refugees won’t cover shortfall: UN TRIPOLI: A man died of his wounds yesterday in Lebanon after clashes between security Russia detains forces and protesters angered by the combined impact of a severe economic crisis and a coron- avirus lockdown. Navalny allies after Omar Tayba sustained a bullet wound late Wednesday when protests in the northern city of Tripoli turned violent for the third night run- apartment raids ning, his brother Ahmad told AFP. “My brother was in Tripoli watching the MOSCOW: Several allies of jailed Kremlin critic protests when he was hit,” he said. “He was Alexei Navalny were taken into custody early yes- transferred to hospital and died this morning. terday after police raided their apartments and of- The 29-year-old man, who was employed in a TRIPOLI: Lebanese mourners attend the funeral of Omar Tayba, who died during clashes between fices ahead of planned demonstrations. The searches bakery, became the first fatality-reported also were connected to a criminal probe launched by the by local media-of the protests that erupted ear- anti-government protestors and security forces the previous night, in the northern port city of Tripoli yesterday. — AFP interior ministry over alleged violations of coron- lier this week in Tripoli. avirus restrictions during protests last week, According to the National News Agency, a Navalny’s aides said. The opposition has called for total of 226 people received treatment Wednes- be enough to cover a shortfall.
    [Show full text]
  • Dinara Podgornova Budapest, Hungary Submitted To
    GAY-BASHING AND SLUT-SHAMING ONLINE: EXAMINING DIGITAL MORAL ACTIVISM OF ‘OCCUPY PEDOPHILIA’ AND ‘CHECK YOU’ By Dinara Podgornova Submitted to Central European University Department of Gender Studies In partial fulfillment for the degree of Master of Arts in Gender Studies. Supervisor: Associate Professor Erzsébet Barát Second reader: Assistant Professor Hadley Zaun Renkin CEU eTD Collection Budapest, Hungary 2014 Abstract This thesis explores two projects of digital moral activism taking place on the pages of the Russian social network VK, namely, ‘Check You’ and ‘Occupy Pedophilia’. Both communities are involved in self-identified moral crusades against marginal sexual practices and stigmatize the ‘transgressors’: young women agreeing to engage in casual extramarital heterosexual sex for money, and men arranging a date with male adolescents allegedly to lure them into intergenerational homosexual sex, respectively. I situate these projects within the context of state-led discourses on panicking about homosexuality, pedophilia, cyberspace and other imagined threats to childhood and national security as well as in the context of the current crackdown on civil society and digital oppositional activism in Russia. I analyze the official statements, web pages and videos of the two communities. People crossing the boundaries of accepted erotic conduct are presented by moral activists as threats to societal values. Their wrongdoing is exposed through internet pranks organized by activists, and subsequently punished through the regimes of online exposure where ‘folk devils’ are assigned the affectively charged categories of ‘whores’ and ‘pedophiles’. This thesis explores the contradictions within the logic of the moral activists, as well as the ways in which both projects evolve around the question of irredeemability of ‘folk devils’, which as I shall argue eventually undermines the whole correctional ethos of this activism.
    [Show full text]