Toxic Famine Research and How It Suppresses Its Critics
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Munich Personal RePEc Archive Toxic famine research and how it suppresses its critics Bowbrick, Peter 21 July 2020 Online at https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/101970/ MPRA Paper No. 101970, posted 23 Jul 2020 02:05 UTC TOXIC FAMINE RESEARCH And how it suppresses its critics Peter Bowbrick1 ABSTRACT Bad economic theory can cause famines or stop governments from taking appropriate action to prevent famines. This can kill millions. Amartya Sen’s theory of the cause of the Bengal Famine, which is the inspiration for his ‘entitlement approach’, has been refuted again and again, in different ways, by economists of different theoretical persuasions and by statisticians expert in this area. Sen has been shown to systematically misrepresent the evidence, to make repeated, elementary, theoretical mistakes, and to use and misuse ‘meaningless’ statistics. No attempt has been made by anyone to challenge these refutations: they are incontrovertible. Sen has not retracted his theory, or any of it, which implies fraud. Yet Sen’s work is widely believed and used in famine situations. His ‘entitlement approach’, based largely on his theory of the Bengal famine, is the basis of a research programme. This paper examines how the research programme suppressed the criticisms, ignoring the normal requirements of academic and professional research and integrity. It also produced new falsehoods. Q11, Q13, Q18, O12, N5, H56, H84 1 [email protected] www.bowbrick.org.uk Edinburgh, 2020 TOXIC FAMINE RESEARCH And how it suppresses its critics2 INTRODUCTION ‘But what a weak barrier is truth when it stands in the way of an hypothesis.’ (Mary Wollstoncroft, 1792, p. 10) Applying bad economics to food crises or to famines can kill millions. This paper examines how a widely quoted famine research programme has been manipulated to suppress criticisms and propagate bad economics, ignoring the standard approaches of scientific method, economic method and integrity, as used by professional and academics. Researchers have repeatedly shown that Amartya Sen’s theory of the cause of the Bengal famine of 1943 is based on false evidence, false statistics and wrong or non- existent theory, that, in fact it is refuted on many grounds – and a refutation is not just a routine difference of opinion between academics: it is on another plane altogether. Any one of these refutations is fatal to the research programme as a whole, discrediting it. Neither Sen nor anyone else has attempted to contest these refutations. None of his work has been retracted. Sen and his followers continue to quote the refuted theory decades later. There is a flourishing research programme on ‘Sen and famine’ which suppresses the refutations. It may be argued that researchers who choose to ignore unchallenged refutations are acting fraudulently. This paper shows some ways in which a large number of well-meaning people who are passionate about tackling famine are manipulated into adhering to a research programme is fraudulent. The academic analysis of famine has become so value-loaded, and so political, that I start by setting out my values and beliefs and the economic tradition I work in. I have spent most of my life working in 38 countries, trying to make the system work 2 I would like to thank Mark Tauger and Tim Dyson for their helpful comments. I should also like to thank Denis Segal for his help over the years, providing me with the fruits of years of research in the British Library, finding key documents that were unknown to academia, and his vivid descriptions of delivering food to the starving when working with the Gurkhas in 1943. better, to benefit producers and consumers – and in many of these countries, both producers and consumers are close to starvation even in normal times. I am constantly aware that if I do bad work, it is likely to cause destitution, hunger and death. And I am squeamish. I work in agricultural economics, which is the oldest economic tradition, and which has concentrated on hunger and famine from the beginning. It covers all stages of the food market from production, including the sociology of production, to consumption, including the sociology of consumption, and it includes subsistence production and consumption. It has produced a vast amount of theory, based on experience, to tackle real world problems. Even as late as the 1980s or 1990s, one tenth of the world’s economists were agricultural economists, and the first professors of marketing, in Britain and Europe at least, were agricultural economists. Agricultural economics treats famine as a normal market under extreme conditions: markets still operate, but more people struggle to buy food, and more people die because they cannot buy enough food. The label ‘famine’ is irrelevant to analysis: a situation where people starve may be labelled ‘a famine’, ‘a food crisis’, or ‘food riots’ by the press, by governments or by international organizations: often it is ignored or concealed. I am one of the very few economists who combine practical experience with a record of publishing in academic journals – for some years I was a top academic publisher in my field. As a professional economist working on agricultural policy and marketing in poor countries, I have expected that my reports would be reviewed by perhaps a dozen economists, including local economists and economists from the international agencies and bilaterals, as well as by local agriculturists and administrators and politicians, any of whom may have information or analysis that refutes the report and leads to its rejection, while academics only have to get their work past the referees of one journal. I have worked at all levels from national food and agricultural policy to small local markets and firms, I have worked in India, Pakistan, Sri Lanka and Nepal, in the sub- continent, but also in countries in Africa with similar climates and crops, and a similar level of development to 1943 Bengal. My book, The Economist’s Tale (which was written under the nom de guerre Peter Griffiths, as I was whistleblowing against the World Bank) gives the only insider’s report of an economist tackling a famine situation, and the international, national and institutional politics involved. SEN’S THEORY The orthodox view on famines up to Sen was that famines can be caused by sudden falls in supply, increases in demand or other changes in demand. Supply may fall because of crop failures, due to drought, flood, locusts, disease etc. Wartime blockades and transport failures have a similar effect. Exporting, perhaps to get a higher price, perhaps as an act of war (e.g. Greece in 1942 or Vietnam in 1944) can reduce the supply. Governments, speculators, or hoarders could remove food from the market, reducing supply. Demand changes could be as devastating: occupation by an army, friend or foe, was one of the four horsemen of the apocalypse. A sudden influx of refugees could strain existing supplies. A boom industry might have a similar effect. Countries which had relied on imports sometimes find that they no longer have the money to do so. The collapse of an industry may mean that its employees can no longer buy food. Macroeconomic policies often mean that some groups of people or the country as a whole cannot buy food. A wave of famines and food crises hit Africa as a result of IMF/World Bank structural adjustment programmes, which had effects on supply and demand. It was recognized that the shock of a crop failure, for instance, had knock-on effects on supply and demand throughout the sector – economists always analyse supply and demand at the same time. The accepted ways of dealing with a famine, of either sort, included that of the Indian Famine Code from the 1870s, which was, first, for the government to ensure that there was enough food available in the affected area, and then to make food available to people who could not buy it, giving it as relief or supplying it through food-for-work programmes. Rationing was also effective. All these might include government controlling stocks. It was expected that, regardless of the facts, much of the populace would not interpret high prices as being the result of a shortage, but as evidence that greedy grain traders had chosen to put up the prices when there was plenty of food available. Again, some would believe that the only reason that they could not get food was because a group of people – perhaps the rich, perhaps people of another religion or caste – were eating far more than usual. It was understood that governments sometimes acted on such beliefs, with disastrous effects. Accordingly, the consensus was that, in practice, a famine was more likely to be triggered by a reduction in supply than by a reallocation of demand, or, at least, that it was wise to start with this premise. The post-famine consensus was that the Bengal Famine of 1943 was triggered by the failure of the December 1942 rice crop, which was some 40% less than normal because of drought, then a cyclone, then a major fungus outbreak. Burma, which had supplied most of the rice for Bengal’s urban population, was captured by the Japanese in early 1942. Large rice exports in 1942 were significant. Demand factors included population increases, army requirements, and the influx of perhaps 300,000 refugees from Burma. The crisis was handled very badly by the governments, notably the Government of India, the Government of Bengal, the governments of surplus provinces and the Government of the United Kingdom. Corruption was a problem. The Report of the Famine Inquiry Commission (1945) gives details. Sen’s theory of the cause of the 1943 Bengal famine is very different.