Kenya The case against six prominent Kenyans at the ICC continued to dominate the headlines, as political leaders sought to manipulate the proceedings for their own benefit ahead of the next elections. Towards the end of the year, the government’s decision to invade Somalia, and the threat of reprisals by al-Shabaab, transformed Kenya’s foreign affairs. Relations between the government and Kenya’s own Muslim population subsequently deteriorated and the popularity of separatist groups in Coast Province increased. However, despite consistent reports of corruption and a dip in tourist numbers following a series of high- profile abductions close to the Somali border, the power-sharing government managed to deliver economic growth and relative political stability. Domestic Politics Domestic political developments continued to be overshadowed and shaped by the ICC investigation into six prominent Kenyans accused of crimes against humanity. The charges stemmed from the role they were alleged to have played in the post-election vio- lence, which left over 1,000 people dead and 660,000 internally displaced in early 2008. The clashes, triggered by the controversial re-election of President Mwai Kibaki in late 2007, pitted state forces and gangs aligned to Kibaki’s Party of National Unity (PNU) 344 • Eastern Africa against militias allegedly organised by members of the Orange Democratic Movement (ODM), an opposition alliance led by Raila Odinga. To end the violence, a power-sharing government was established in February 2008. The political settlement allowed Kibaki to retain the position of president and created the post of prime minister to accommodate Odinga. In May 2008, the Committee of Investigation into the Post-Election Violence, better known as the Waki Commission, was established to investigate the violence. Fear- ing that the government would whitewash the report, the Commission gave an envelope containing the names of six high-profile suspects to former UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan, who in turn promised to give the envelope to the ICC unless a credible domestic tribunal was established. Following the failure of the Kenyan government to make signifi- cant progress towards the arrest of the suspects, the ICC publicly named the accused and made an application for summonses to be issued against them on 15 December 2010. To avoid politicising the process, the list was designed to include an equal number of individuals from each political camp. The accused therefore included three allies of Kibaki – Deputy Prime Minister Uhuru Kenyatta; Permanent Secretary to the President and Secretary to the Cabinet Francis Muthaura; and Mohammed Hussein Ali, former police chief – along with three allies of Odinga – former minister for industrialisation Henry Kosgey, former education minister William Ruto, and Joshua Arap Sang, a radio executive. However, much had changed since the chaotic days of early 2008. Most nota- bly, having realised that both of their names were on Annan’s list, Uhuru Kenyatta and William Ruto had formed a new ‘anti-prosecution’ alliance. This unlikely back- door coalition between two former rivals was widely believed to have the backing of Kibaki and to have enlisted the services of Vice President Kalonzo Musyoka. The main short-term consequence of this political realignment was a rapid deterioration in relations between Odinga and Ruto and the collapse of the ODM. Following the formation of the informal ‘KKK’ alliance – so-called because Kenyatta, Musyoka and Ruto were leaders from the Kikuyu, Kamba, and Kalenjin communities, respectively – Odinga and Kibaki began to adopt very different approaches to the ICC process. The ‘anti-prosecution’ camp around Kibaki became increasingly strident in its criticism of the ICC, seeking to halt the international process in favour of domestic court cases that it could more easily control. On 23 December 2010, Isaac Ruto, a close ally (but not a relation) of William Ruto, introduced a motion in parliament to withdraw Kenya from the ICC’s Treaty of Rome. The motion was passed but was ultimately an empty gesture for two reasons. First, actually removing Kenya from the Treaty would involve complicated constitutional changes that would have required significant time and energy to effect. Second, active ICC cases were not halted when a country voted to leave the Treaty. Nonetheless, the vote sent a clear signal that Kibaki and Kenyatta intended to use their positions within the government to fight the proceedings. In January, the KKK alliance redoubled its efforts. Kalonzo Musyoka was dispatched by Kibaki to build support around Africa for an appeal to defer the investigation for .