Joint Force Quarterly

C1 net 9/20/96 10:46 AM Page 1 JFQJOINT FORCE QUARTERLY

Unified Endeavor ’95 The American Revolution in Military Strategic Affairs Performance Logistics in Wargaming

Forces for Engagement 96 Winter95

D-Day Veracruz

A PROFESSIONAL MILITARY JOURNAL JFQC2 9/19/96 11:12 AM Page C2

C2 JFQ / Autumn 1995 JFQPre 9/19/96 11:14 AM Page 1 JFQ

AWord from the Chairman

U.S. Air Force (Edward Littlejohn) Crossing the Sava, December 31, 1995.

Recently I testified for the third time before both the House National Security Committee and the Senate Armed Services Committee on the posture and readiness of the Armed Forces, as well as on this year’s defense budget. This annual event provides the Secretary of Defense and myself an opportunity to keep Congress informed, a necessary first step in the fulfill- ment of their constitutional responsibilities for the national defense. We also get their ideas and concerns firsthand, which is valuable for us in managing the force. (continued on page 4)

Winter 1995–96 / JFQ 1 JFQPre 9/19/96 11:14 AM Page 2

■ CONTENTS

■ OUT OF JOINT 25 New Forces for Engagement Policy 1 A Word from the Chairman by William W. Mendel by John M. Shalikashvili ■ ■ FROM THE FIELD AND FLEET 30 On Strategic Performance by Colin S. Gray 8 Letters to the Editor

■ JFQ FORUM ■ 11 U.S. Atlantic Command and 37 The American Revolution Unified Endeavor ’95 in Military Affairs JFQby John J. Sheehan by William A. Owens 39 War in the Information Age by Thomas G. Mahnken

44 Acoustics on the 21st Century Battlefield by Marvin G. Metcalf

16 Joint Operations: The Marine 48 Joint Warfare and Military Perspective Dependence on Space by Thomas C. Linn by Jeffrey L. Caton

20 The Impact of Nationalism 56 Time: The New Dimension on Joint Force Planning in War by George W. Price by Ajay Singh 62 An Ecstasy of Fumbling: PHOTO CREDITS Doctrine and Innovation The cover features amphibious assault vehicles in Kuwait by Kenneth F. McKenzie, Jr. (U.S. Marine Corps/Michael J. Anglin); the front cover insets (from top) show joint information bureau for Unified Endeavor (U.S. Air Force/Randy S. Mallard), 69 Leaving the Technocratic German POWs taken at Anzio (U.S. Navy), crewman Tunnel releasing cargo sling of CH–46 Sea Knight on board USS Theodore Roosevelt (U.S. Navy/Darin Osmun), F–16 by Gary W. Anderson and Terry C. Pierce Fighting Falcon during Joint Task Force 95–3 (U.S. Air Force/Mike Reinhardt), and American forces landing at 76 War, Politics, and RMA— Veracruz in 1847 (Eyewitness to War). The front inside cover includes (clockwise) M1A1 The Legacy of Clausewitz Abrams tank on maneuvers in Kuwait (U.S. Air Force/ Tracy Hall-Leahy), B–117 Stealth fighters (U.S. Air Force/Marvin Lynchard), by Antulio J. Echevarria II 105mm howitzer for Roaring Lion (U.S. Air Force/Chris Putman), HC–130N/P Combat Shadow during Foal Eagle ’93 (U.S. Air Force/Mike Reinhardt), Marine 81 The 1995 RMA Essay Contest: sniper training (Military Photography/Greg Stewart), and USS Carl Vinson (U.S. Navy/David C. Lloyd). A Postscript The table of contents photos are (from top) ranger preparing to jump with by Andrew W. Marshall combat load (U.S. Army/Daniel Hart), B–1 bomber (U.S. Air Force/Brett Snow), and night operations on carrier deck (U.S. Navy). The inside back cover captures F–15 Eagle during Cobra Gold ’95 (Joint Combat Camera Center/Raymond T. Conway). The back cover shows a Navy tanker in transit through the Panama Canal (U.S. Navy).

2 JFQ / Winter 1995–96 JFQPre 9/19/96 11:14 AM Page 3

WINTER 95–96 / NUMBER 10

102 D-Day Veracruz, 1847— A Grand Design by Paul C. Clark, Jr., and Edward H. Moseley

116 Canadian “Jointery” by Jeremy R. Stocker

119 Improving Force Closures by George A. Rollins

■ OF CHIEFS AND CHAIRMEN 121 Maxwell Davenport Taylor

■ THE JOINT WORLD 122 Organization, Doctrine, Education, and Periodical ■ Literature 82 Tuning the Instruments of National Power ■ OFF THE SHELF by Hans Binnendijk and 125 Mogadishu Duet— Patrick L. Clawson Two Book Reviews by Robert B. Oakley and 89 Change and the Operational Jonathan Stevenson Commander by Jay M. Parker 128 Of Arms and Men: A Book Review 97 Logistics in Wargaming: by Shawn C. Whetstone An Initial Report by John B. LaPlante, David P. Garner, JFQ129 Setting the Record Straight: and Patricia Insley Hutzler A Book Review by James J. Tritten

Joint Force Quarterly

Hans Binnendijk JFQ is published for the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff The editors invite articles and other contributions on joint Editor-in-Chief by the Institute for National Strategic Studies, National De- warfighting, interservice issues that support jointness, and top- Patrick M. Cronin fense University, to promote understanding of the integrated ics of common interest to the Armed Forces (see page 132 for employment of land, sea, air, space, and special operations details). Please direct all editorial communications to: Executive Editor forces. The journal focuses on joint doctrine, coalition warfare, Editor Robert A. Silano contingency planning, combat operations conducted by the Joint Force Quarterly Editor unified commands, and joint force development. ATTN: NDU–NSS–JFQ Martin J. Peters, Jr. The opinions, conclusions, and recommendations ex- Washington, D.C. 20319–6000 pressed or implied within are those of the contributors and do Production Coordinator not necessarily reflect the views of the Department of Defense Telephone: (202) 685–4220 / DSN 325–4220 Calvin B. Kelley or any other agency of the Federal Government. Copyrighted FAX: (202) 685–4219 / DSN 325–4219 Senior Copy Editor portions of this journal may not be reproduced or extracted Internet: [email protected] without permission of copyright proprietors. An acknowledg- The Typography and Design Division of the U.S. Government ment to Joint Force Quarterly should be made whenever mate- This publication has been approved by the Secretary of Printing Office is responsible for layout and art direction. rial is quoted from or based on its contents. Defense.

ISSN 1070–0692 February 1996

Winter 1995–96 / JFQ 3 JFQPre 9/19/96 11:14 AM Page 4

Joint Force Quarterly ■ A WORD FROM THE CHAIRMAN

GEN John M. Shalikashvili, USA (continued from page 1) Publisher While a number of articles in this issue of ADVISORY COMMITTEE JFQ focus on the revolution in military affairs, which is a vitally important matter for the Armed Lt Gen Ervin J. Rokke, USAF ■ National Defense University Chairman Forces in the long term, we must also remember that the future force begins with today’s budget. BG David A. Armstrong, USA (Ret.) ■ Office of the Chairman Accordingly, my presentation to Congress, which Col John W. Brooks, USAF ■ Air Command and Staff College is summarized below, dwelt on the budget as well

Brig Gen Roger E. Carleton, USAF ■ Armed Forces Staff College as recent operations. With regard to operations we have marked MG Richard A. Chilcoat, USA ■ U.S. Army War College two milestones lately. First, two months ago at A. Denis Clift ■ Joint Military Intelligence College Guantanamo Bay we held a closing ceremony for

Col K.A. Conry, USMC ■ Marine Corps Command and Staff College JTF–160, the organization that for the previous 20 months had superbly handled a delicate refugee MG John S. Cowings, USA ■ Industrial College of the Armed Forces crisis in the Caribbean. This task force plucked COL (P) Robert F. Dees, USA ■ The Joint Staff some 60,000 refugees from the ocean, built 15

Col Paul V. Kelly, USMC ■ Marine Corps War College huge camps to house, feed, and care for them, and provided safe and humane conditions until ■ Lt Gen Walter Kross, USAF The Joint Staff the refugees were either repatriated or admitted RADM Michael A. McDevitt, USN ■ National War College into the United States. Throughout the operation,

BG David H. Ohle, USA ■ U.S. Army Command and General Staff College JTF–160 handled these refugees with great com- passion and understanding, attending to their ■ Maj Gen D. Bruce Smith, USAF Air War College needs with unequaled efficiency. The mission ac- RADM James R. Stark, USN ■ Naval War College complished, the camps have been closed and the task force returned home. The other milestone occurred on February 7 EDITORIAL BOARD in Haiti when René Préval was inaugurated as Hans Binnendijk ■ National Defense University president to succeed Jean-Bertrand Aristide, who Chairman stepped down. This was the first time in Haitian Richard K. Betts ■ Columbia University history that power passed from one freely elected

COL William D. Bristow, Jr., USA ■ U.S. Army Command and General Staff College leader to another. The forces which were sent to that troubled nation in September 1994 are now Eliot A. Cohen ■ The Johns Hopkins University coming home, having accomplished their mis- COL Robert A. Doughty, USA ■ U.S. Military Academy sion superbly, on time, and with utmost care for

Aaron L. Friedberg ■ Princeton University their own safety. The results speak for themselves. Out of the original 23,000, there are only 800 ser- Col Robert J. Garner, USMC ■ Armed Forces Staff College vicemen and women remaining in country today. Alan L. Gropman ■ Industrial College of the Armed Forces By April 15, all remaining U.S. forces will be out Col Douglas N. Hime, USAF ■ Naval War College of Haiti and we will shift to periodic exercises with engineering troops, much like those that we William T. Hodson ■ Information Resources Management College conduct with other countries in the region. Mark H. Jacobsen ■ Marine Corps Command and Staff College Last December we began to deploy, together Thomas L. McNaugher ■ The RAND Corporation with our NATO allies and other partners, to oversee the Bosnian peace accord. In the brief interval William H.J. Manthorpe, Jr. ■ Joint Military Intelligence College since then, our presence has proven to be pivotal, CAPT Rosemary B. Mariner, USN ■ National War College both in forging the coalition and in maintaining John J. Mearsheimer ■ The University of Chicago momentum toward peace. We have helped to ad- minister the withdrawal of warring factions from Col Philip S. Meilinger, USAF ■ Air Command and Staff College zones of separation as well as to physically sepa- LTG William E. Odom, USA (Ret.) ■ Hudson Institute rate former combatants for subsequent with- James H. Toner ■ Air War College drawal from the territories to be transferred. While there are still problems to overcome—such LtGen Bernard E. Trainor, USMC (Ret.) ■ Harvard University as pockets of banned foreign forces, the full ex- LTG C.A.H. Waller, USA (Ret.) ■ RKK, Limited change of prisoners of war, and the occasional in- COL Lawrence B. Wilkerson, USA ■ Marine Corps War College transigence by various factions—the overall operation is proceeding better than nearly all of the COL Terry J. Young, USA ■ U.S. Army War College critics predicted.

A PROFESSIONAL MILITARY JOURNAL

4 JFQ / Winter 1995–96 JFQPre 9/19/96 11:14 AM Page 5

Shalikashvili

F–16 refueling during Provide Comfort. U.S. Air Force (Gudrun Cook) U.S. Air Force

In Bosnia, as in Haiti, we have seen the great threats, working with regional allies to strengthen benefit of thorough preparation, adherence to the the readiness of our coalitions and enhancing our mission that we set out to perform, and the main- prepositioning programs. Since the Gulf War, we tenance of well trained, highly have made significant gains in our ability to re- ready forces. Our commanders spond rapidly to aggression in this vital region. correctly identified the threats: Meanwhile, the 36,000 men and women stain Bosnia, as in Haiti, mines, lone snipers, weather, tioned in Korea have remained vigilant and are we have seen the great and dangerous road conditions. keenly aware of deteriorating conditions to their By a combination of sound pre- north where the potential for instability, fueled by benefit of well trained, cautions and good training, severe food and energy shortages, continues to in- highly ready forces they have so far minimized ca- crease. Our forces and those of South Korea have sualties. During three visits to not forgotten that they serve in the most danger- the area since the operation ous corner of the world, one where we must con- began, I have seen nothing but superb leadership, tinually improve our posture. Given force mod- high morale, and complete determination on the ernization, efforts at increasing interoperability part of the roughly 20,000 men and women in with allied forces, and improvements in preposi- Bosnia, and the several thousand more support- tioning programs over the past two years, we have ing them from adjacent countries. In our remain- made substantial strides in improving our deter- ing months in Bosnia, we must ensure that our rent and defensive posture in South Korea. forces are as ready, alert, and resolute on the last The operations I have described only involve day as they were on the first. That is the best a small part of our overall force. The balance has guarantee to the success of the mission and the been actively engaged in other operations, in safety of the force. training and maintaining readiness to respond to There are also some 23,000 members of the wartime missions. But there is an important point Armed Forces deployed in the Persian Gulf re- to stress about operations over the last year and gion, preserving peace, enforcing U.N. sanctions the ready state of our forces. We have conducted against Iraq, protecting the Kurds in northern a series of successful military operations. There Iraq, and deterring further aggression by Bagh- dad. At the same time we are continuing to improve our ability to respond to unexpected

Winter 1995–96 / JFQ 5 JFQPre 9/19/96 11:14 AM Page 6

■ A WORD FROM THE CHAIRMAN

USS Kauffman with Haitian ship in tow. U.S. Navy (Scott Gureck)

have been none of the problems that we experi- Proof of this is not hard to find. Judging by enced in the 1970s and early 1980s. Part of our last year’s enlistment data—which showed that success can be attributed to Goldwater-Nichols, over 96 percent of initial recruits were high school legistation which improved command and con- graduates—we are continuing to attract and retain trol as well as the prospects of unified action in the kind of men and women America needs in complex contingency operations. Above all, how- uniform. As far as equipment goes, a hidden bene- ever, our success is a tribute to the courage, skill, fit of the drawdown has been that it allowed us to and dedication of our people and their leaders. discard the oldest equipment in our inventories Another factor in our successful operations and to redistribute the newest and most modern has been the high readiness of our force which, in within our remaining force structure. turn, is based on the sup- But we have paid a price. Preserving readiness port of Congress and the and force structure has come at the expense of we must commit ourselves American public. On be- modernization and equipment replacement. We to a procurement goal of coming Chairman two and have recently undergone a procurement hiatus to a half years ago, I asked the extent that our procurement account has actu- approximately $60 billion that Congress keep readi- ally shrunk to just below $40 billion, the lowest annually to remain ready ness our top priority and level since before the Korean War. For years this that we not allow it to hiatus was acceptable, but it cannot be sustained erode or atrophy, as hap- indefinitely. We soon will no longer be able to rely pened so often in past upon what was built in the 1980s. We must com- drawdowns. The benefits of that support for the mit ourselves, sooner rather than later, to a pro- readiness of our Armed Forces are clearly evident. curement goal of approximately $60 billion annu- Next year will mark the end of the massive ally, if our force is to remain as ready tomorrow as drawdown begun when the Cold War ended. We it is today. I am becoming concerned that, if we have been through the deepest cut since the end do not commit ourselves to that target in the near of the Vietnam War while not undermining the term, we may never meet it. excellence of our people or equipment. For once we have got it right; we have broken the cycle of feast and famine in military budgeting. The result is a sustained, high quality force.

6 JFQ / Winter 1995–96 JFQPre 9/19/96 11:14 AM Page 7

Shalikashvili

Of course, the CINCs, service chiefs, and I Defense Procurement must also continue to make hard choices and create new efficiencies in the way we fight. In the past two years, we have devised new joint processes to examine the most efficient and effective ways to improve joint warfighting, and to look for and reduce unnecessary redundancies and combat systems that have marginal benefits. With these processes in place, I am better able to offer the Secretary of Defense recommendations from a joint warfighter’s perspective on programmatic and budgetary issues. Through the Joint Require- ments Oversight Council (JROC) and its supporting processes, I have already offered specific recommendations to the Secretary of Defense in the past year, and I intend to continue to strengthen this process. In all, we have the finest and the most ready military force in the world. That force has just en- All amounts are shown in fiscal year 1996 dollars. gineered the most successful post-war drawdown in American history. We have protected our readiness, our ranks continue to be filled with men and women who are the envy of every other military That $60 billion will go a long way toward in the world, and we have simultaneously accom- both protecting existing military structure and plished a series of successful operations all over enhancing its capabilities. We must sustain our the globe. These achievements will continue if we strategic lift improvements by passing, this year, bring our procurement up to $60 billion per year. the multi-year procurement for the C–17 trans- Following this course will enable us to have the port aircraft. We must also make more progress in same ready force tomorrow that we are blessed meeting our sealift objectives. Furthermore, we with today. must not forget that prepositioning initiatives are an essential part of strategic lift solutions. Now JOHN M. SHALIKASHVILI that we are more and more an expeditionary Chairman force, strategic air and sealift, complemented by of the Joint Chiefs of Staff prepositioning initiatives, must be our number one warfighting priority. Other priorities are also pressing. We need to continue with improvements in command, control, communications, and computers, and in intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance systems. We must maintain our emphasis on the readiness of the fifteen enhanced National Guard brigades. And we must continue to field the long- range, precision munitions and systems that give us such a decisive edge. The challenge, of course, is to maintain readiness, support the current force structure, procure enhancements for our force, and to push ahead with recapitalization of the force, all within the current top line of the defense budget. Acquisition reform and base realignment and closure savings will move us in the right direction, but we must also move forward with privatization and outsourcing, take another look at further reducing our infrastructure, and continue to find savings in reduced redundancies and increased jointness.

Winter 1995–96 / JFQ 7 JFQLtr 9/20/96 1:10 PM Page 8

■ FROM THE FIELD AND FLEET

capabilities are rightly constrained by the require- such. That is why both officers and NCOs are paid Letters... ments of other coercive means as well as a host of more—they must know what to do when a non-text- political considerations that affect the nature of the book challenge arises. OPERATIONS OTHER military operation. What is more, the grouping suggests that THAN WAR Regardless of the terminology finally selected there are absolutes in military operations: combat, To the Editor—Ann Story and Aryea Gottlieb for categorizing operations other than war, it is in- noncombat, and others which may be either. While argued in their recent article (JFQ, Autumn 1995) sufficient to make a distinction based on the pres- some operations start as combat, others do not but that doctrine for operations other than war is a ence or absence of combat. Instead categories can turn to combat, in which case we must be able hodgepodge of terms that lacks a unifying structure. should be delineated by the purpose for which force to deal with them. The issue here is that the purpose They propose to reorganize doctrine by distinguish- is used, since purpose determines operational of conducting an operation is not whether it involves ing between combat and noncombat operations. method and, by extension, doctrine. Three cate- combat, use of force, non-violence, or relief. The While their distinction is clear and simple, it is inad- gories that should be distinguished are: operations purpose of each operation is to achieve a specified equate as a review of the military operational frame- where no adversary is present and thus force is not endstate that supports a political objective. work derived from it suggests. required, operations where limited force is used as The grouping advanced does not address Under combat operations, the authors list war, part of a coercive process calculated to alter political mission types that may or may not be defined by retaliatory actions, and operations to restore order. relationships, and operations in war where force is combat. In fact, with a few exceptions, an argument While these categories involve combat, the latter two used to achieve strategic military objectives by de- can be made that there are mission types that simply are fundamentally different from war. Under both stroying enemy forces and taking terrain. Doctrine do not fit neatly under any category. The article iden- military force is subject to a host of political con- based on these distinctions will help to dispel the tifies two new types which are termed operations to straints that would not apply in war. The retaliatory confusion that the authors rightly note permeates restore order and retaliatory actions (vice strikes and strike that is cited, Eldorado Canyon, is a perfect ex- doctrine today. raids) and places them on a level with war under the ample. Political considerations dictated even the —BG Thomas E. Swain, USA heading of combat operations. This categorization weapons to employ. Similarly, when restoring order Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for ignores the fact that missions such as peace en- it is political considerations that determine every as- Special Operations and Low-Intensity forcement and enforcing sanctions may involve only pect of military operations, even tactics, because Conflict (Policy and Missions) a threat of force. Also, strikes and raids may be small unit actions can have a strategic impact as ex- preemptive, a type of operation for which the article plicitly noted in Joint Pub 3-07. Such examples To the Editor—As one of the authors of Joint offers no term of art. suggest why the distinction between combat and Pub 3–07, Joint Doctrine for Military Operations Story and Gottlieb place missions that may noncombat is inadequate to describe the different Other Than War, I want to comment on the article, involve combat under the rubric of noncombat oper- ways force can be used. “Beyond the Range of Military Operations,” by ations. One example of this type of operation is the The same inadequacy is apparent in the non- Ann Story and Aryea Gottlieb. airlift of humanitarian aid to Bosnia, which was combat part of the operational framework which in- Even though the framework contained in Joint termed a humanitarian assistance mission. But the cludes shows of force. While we do not intend to use Pub 3–0, Doctrine for Joint Operations, and Joint threat from the ground was so high that the aircraft force in such cases, we must be prepared to use it, Pub 3–07 may not be the best, Story and Gottlieb were equipped with defensive systems. This is inter- and the fact that force is considered implies that an have failed to make a convincing argument for re- esting since similar aircraft flew in two wars without enemy is at hand. This distinguishes these opera- placing it. The 3–0/3–07 framework is not that hard such systems. So even humanitarian assistance may tions (and, one might add, insurgency and coun- to understand. While war is described and not de- involve combat. terinsurgency support as well as some counterdrug fined in the pubs, most of us have a good notion of Many controversial aspects of Joint Pub 3–07 operations) from other noncombat operations such what war is. MOOTW is comprised of those things have been overcome in recent years, although some as disaster relief. that war is not. Moreover, Joint Pub 3–07 explains remain even after its approval in June 1995. Its most While a distinction between combat and non- that MOOTW includes combat and noncombat situa- important achievement was to begin to clarify combat operations is important, it is inadequate be- tions. So the argument that MOOTW is principally MOOTW. While not perfect, it must be kept intact cause it does not focus on why military force is noncombat is invalid. long enough to examine its framework. But one being used, which is the decisive question. The The framework found in the article is flawed. point is certain: a framework for military operations warfighting mission is to destroy the ability of an Most attempts to categorize or group military opera- cannot rely upon a combat/noncombat model. Dis- enemy to resist. Military objectives should take tions risk oversimplifying them and frequently are tinguishing between combat and noncombat will be precedence over almost every political consideration wrong. No matter how Story and Gottlieb qualify increasingly difficult in the future. Nonlethal tech- because unless military objectives are achieved po- their framework, it creates added confusion and mis- nologies may offer more potent means, a develop- litical goals will not be realized. The military also is understanding. A model that rests on describing ment that will pose challenges for defining a military used in situations where there is no struggle with an mission types as either combat or noncombat is operations framework in the 21st century. enemy but where the special capabilities of the patently wrong. The Armed Forces are organized, trained, and Armed Forces can nevertheless be applied. What The categories offered by Story and Gottlieb equipped to conduct a range of operations in times Story and Gottlieb have called support and assis- serve no purpose. They do not meet the why or so of war or any time that the Nation calls. In this sense tance operations and truce-keeping are in this cate- what test. If one accepts this grouping as a way to all operations are military operations. gory. Finally, in cases that fall between warfighting more easily memorize mission types, the result is —Maj Russell S. Hall, USAF and non-adversarial military operations, force or oversimplification. Seemingly simple operations are Army-Air Force Center for other appropriate means may be used. Here combat complex undertakings and should not be trivialized. Low Intensity Conflict Each situation is unique and must be understood as

8 JFQ / Winter 1995–96 JFQLtr 9/20/96 1:10 PM Page 9

FROM THE FIELD AND FLEET ■

SOMALIA LESSONS OUR ROLES AND While the raison d’être is obvious internally, it is important to note that military experience is lacking To the Editor—I was interested to read the MISSIONS among most members of the executive and legisla- article by COL Kenneth Allard entitled “Lessons To the Editor—The Armed Forces have tive branch and can be expected to decrease even Unlearned: Somalia and Joint Doctrine” in your last reached a critical juncture in their evolution. Al- further with the passage of time. issue. However, I was surprised by his statement that though our mission is to fight and win the Nation’s This reasoning may appear limited and self- “there were three de facto chains of command, wars, we are in danger of doctrinally and rhetorically ish, but it is the bottom line. There is, however, an- namely, the United Nations, U.S. Central Command, writing ourselves out of a job. This was apparent in other reason for an expanded role. In a period when and U.S. Special Operations Command.” As com- recent foot dragging and quibbling over roles and there is a lot of talk about “challenges” and “taking mander in chief of U.S. Special Operations Com- missions on a range of issues including counternar- action,” there are not many organizations who are mand at the time of TF Ranger operations, I did not cotics, counterproliferation, peacekeeping, peace- actually willing to do something. While our national have real or de facto operational command of special making, and nationbuilding. Instead of embracing an security may not be at stake (at least presently), if operations forces (SOF) deployed to Somalia. expanded view of roles and missions within the the United States is going to take the lead in world Under the Goldwater-Nichols Act, comman- broad terms of national interests and security, we affairs, someone will have to be tasked to walk the ders in chief of theater unified commands have com- seem to be content to hide behind the shield of proverbial “point.” batant command (COCOM) of all forces employed in “mission creep” and a probability of fighting con- But doesn’t this run risks? Are the lives of our their areas of operations. This principle of law and ventional conflicts together with coalition partners soldiers worth it? This is a volunteer force. Although joint doctrine held true for operations in Somalia. against some convenient bogeymen. most servicemembers enlist for either educational GEN Joseph P. Hoar, CINCCENT, exercised COCOM The traditional threats to what is broadly ref- benefits or job security, the chance to be involved in of all forces in Somalia, to include those that made ered to as national security are not so much chang- operations that can benefit oppressed, beleaguered, up TF Ranger. Specifically, the task force comman- ing as our response to them is undergoing a trans- or impoverished people presents a real opportunity der reported directly to GEN Hoar and not to me. He formation. On the Korean peninsula, a future conflict to serve in the finest sense of the word. Moreover, also fully coordinated and deconflicted all opera- probably will be a come-as-you-are affair. Lacking deployed forces have better safety records and lower tions with the commander of U.S. Forces Somalia. It concrete attack indicators, it is likely that we will mortality rates than non-deployed forces. Even in the was through this latter relationship that TF Ranger fight and win with South Korean and American Persian Gulf War, more soldiers died as a result of called for the quick reaction force composed of U.S. forces that are available rather than having the lux- traffic accidents than in combat. and U.N. forces on October 3. Moreover, the com- ury of a long build-up period. Greater military involvement does not mean mander of U.S. Forces Somalia had operational On the Arabian peninsula, a build-up in the running carelessly down a darkened alleyway. More command of all other SOF assigned to his JTF, face of a credible threat is more probable, but again interaction and liaison between the Armed Forces which included special forces, psychological opera- the outcome will be a foregone conclusion provided and other governmental agencies as well as non- tions, and civil affairs personnel. we have the necessary political and moral will. How- governmental organizations will ensure that military Allard has also published a longer study on ever, analysts such as Lawrence Korb have even dis- capabilities are presented to policymakers and that which this article is based—Somalia Operations: counted the probability of fighting a two-front war our senior officers have a voice in the decisionmak- Lessons Learned. Interestingly, that work better de- under current conditions. ing process. As impartial participants members of fines the command relationships in Somalia by cor- Against the background of vacuous—albeit the Armed Forces can help to define its roles and rectly pointing out that the commander of TF Ranger well defined—threats comes the risk of further cuts missions of the future. reported “directly back to USCENTCOM without in the defense budget. Since the political and eco- Wider roles and missions for the military will going through either U.S. or U.N. channels.” nomic fallout of eliminating high dollar (and indus- require a shift in the focus of training. While there While there are indeed many lessons learned trially important) weapons systems is enormous, it will be requirements for new assets and training re- from our Somalia experience, we must ensure that is clear that cuts can and must occur in the force sources, what it really required is greater mental they—and any conclusions which we draw from structure. The argument will be advanced, absent agility. This will be facilitated by educated soldiers. them—are based on fact. overseas missions (the Bosnia operation is sched- They will have the knowledge to shift gears when as- —GEN Wayne A. Downing, USA uled to end later this year), that such a large force is sessing the situation and dealing with an opponent Commander in Chief, Special unnecessary. in a nonlethal situation. Operations Command Quite frankly, the time has come for the mili- The military faces a choice. We can stay the tary to justify its existence at current levels, lest we course and argue against doing anything but fight- run the risk of enduring an extensive drawdown. ing the Nation’s wars. But here we run the risk of further drawdowns and loss of public confidence. Furthermore, there is a danger of not preparing for operations that we may be directed to conduct and put your pen to paper . . . not being ready. The alternative is to be proactive— involved in the decisionmaking process, preparing for nontraditional missions, and undertaking them. JFQ welcomes your letters and comments. Write or FAX The payoff for the Nation and the Armed Forces will your correspondence to (202) 685–4219/DSN 325–4219. be immense. We have a chance to make a difference and help to shape the world of the 21st century. We Internet [email protected] should not allow this opportunity to elude us. —CPT Stewart W. Bentley, USA Joint Military Intelligence College

Winter 1995–96 / JFQ 9 JFQLtr 9/20/96 1:10 PM Page 10

■ FROM THE FIELD AND FLEET

BACK ON TERRA FIRMA? Those are only a few points. The letter also we have joint warfare. Each service has unique capa- makes several other errors highlighted below: bilities that complement the others, which is even To the Editor—After reading the letter from LT Hokanson in your last issue (JFQ, Autumn 95), I Submarines are the most viable leg of the out- more important as forces are pared down. concluded that it would be difficult to refute his evi- dated strategic triad; therefore the Navy should be in When the Air Force is scrapped, redundancy dence and argument—that the Nation does not need charge of all long-range strategic bombing. The rein transport, nuclear weapons, tactical air, long- an Air Force—since his case was incoherent. But his dundant nature of the triad remains viable and neces- range strike, et al. would be eliminated. Can carrier opinions, generalizations, and factoids pointed to a sary. The manned bomber is still a player, in part battlegroups produce the requisite fighter sorties to more basic problem that deserves a response. because of its flexibility. Once employed it is the only mount a Desert Storm-type campaign? Are there I have faith in the statesmen and visionaries leg of the triad that is recallable. B–2s can penetrate enough carriers? Does the Navy have transport air- who established the three military departments, and air defenses and strike anywhere (naval weapons craft to haul the people, weapons, and materiel? No. I believe that the role of each service is vital to na- notwithstanding) within a day of execution. B–52s are And what about space? Using a similar argument, tional security. Moreover, I am convinced that team- old, but they are not outdated as Hokanson claims. couldn’t we disband the Marine Corps? After all, the work and trust among the services are essential to While unable to penetrate modern air defenses on a Army has performed more amphibious landings than victory in war. General Dwight Eisenhower said, “We long-range nuclear strike profile, they can launch the Marines. Even better, can’t we justify eliminating have got to be of one family, and it is more important standoff weapons with similar capabilities. the Navy since the Army has more ships? That today than it ever has been.” Since U.S. Strategic Command is headed by a would greatly reduce redundancy. Stationing Air As I was growing up, my younger sister naval officer it would be easy to turn it from a joint Force P–3s armed with Harpoons at strategic points sometimes got more attention, knew things that I into a Navy command. Perhaps it would, but not too around the globe could maintain sea control. It didn’t know, and did things that I couldn’t do. I sup- smart. It presupposes transforming the triad into a would also save money because there would no pose that when I see her now we could spend our uniad. The Air Force could argue that when the next longer be a need to maintain all those ships. time rehashing childhood jealousies. But we don’t. CINC is appointed (who will come from its ranks) it The Navy is built around the strength of air- We talk about the future and what we can do to- will be only a small step to turn this joint command power projection and, as the on-call air arm, would gether. We’ve grown up. over to the Air Force. permit the elimination of the Air Force. Presidents Tomahawk cruise missiles give the Navy a may ask “where are the carriers?” but are they in the —Maj W. Eric Herr, USAF long-range strike capability—within a thousand right place? Probably not. They are not as flexible as School of Advanced Airpower Studies miles of any coast—and the Navy should thus get our Navy brethren would have us believe. In the right the long-range bombing role. Tomahawks offer a place, carriers are effective tools of national policy. —The trouble with the letter by To the Editor valuable power projection capability in theater. But Even if the Navy is built around airpower, it is not LT Hokanson in the Autumn 1995 issue is that it re- will the Navy have sufficient numbers to visit as air-minded. Of course, the Navy relies upon sea- veals a history instructor at the Naval Academy who many targets as manned systems bombed, with the going capabilities for airpower projection. The Air is a historical revisionist. He makes several histori- same precision as during the Gulf War? Is Toma- Force—air-minded—lives and breathes strictly with cal errors and emotional arguments in proposing to hawk flexible enough to change tasking at the last the projection of air and spacepower in mind. We eliminate the Air Force. Let me set the record minute like a manned system? No, on both counts. need a service focused on the projection of airpower. straight. What about targets more than a thousand miles in- Each service has unique capabilities. While First, General McPeak did not declare that the land? (Hokanson claims TLAM has a range of a some seem redundant, overlapping functions are ac- Air Force would be willing to give up major mis- thousand miles, yet I’m told it is more like 650–700 tually complementary—the means to project power sions to the Army and naval air arm, except for long- miles, including the distance from launch platforms in theater or elsewhere vary. Never stoop to faulty range bombing. None of my colleagues here at the to shore.) And long-range bombing? Will targets far- historical or emotional arguments when debating Air Force Doctrine Center remember any such com- ther inland be hit by Navy B–1s, B–2s, or B–52s? roles and missions. ment from our former chief of staff. He did allow that Oops, I forgot, they are outdated. So much for tar- the Air Force might cede close air support to the —Lt Col Wade McRoberts, USAF gets beyond the littorals. Army and the Army might yield air defense to the Air Air Force Doctrine Center Lack of coordination in long-range strike war Force. can be solved if the Air Force is phased out and the Hokanson wrongly claims that the Air Force Navy is given all long-range bombing missions. was a creature of the Cold War. The idea for a sepa- Makes sense! The fewer the players, the easier the rate air service was conceived long before the Cold coordination. Fortunately, doctrine and procedures for War and resulted from the decisive role that airpower JFACCs and their staffs provide coordination among played during World War II. While the Cold War is the services and coalition partners. Actually, coordi- over, airpower is still decisive in joint warfighting as nation simply becomes an intraservice rather than invalidated by Desert Storm (which is not to say that terservice problem in Hokanson’s little world. Air war, airpower won the war as some argue—but it was the regardless of the players, involves immense coordi- reason for a short, low-casualty ground campaign). nation within an air arm and with other components. The Air Force, not the Navy, is the principal projector The Navy can fulfill much of the long-range of airpower. This does not mean that the naval air and strategic bombing mission. Oops! That is true, arm is an unimportant part of joint force air compo- but “much” won’t do. Hokanson undercuts his argu- nents. However, there is no way in which the Navy ment against the use of joint airpower. This is why can supplant the Air Force in power projection strategy by appropriating long-range bombing.

10 JFQ / Winter 1995–96 JFQShe 9/19/96 11:17 AM Page 11

U.S. Atlantic Command and Unified Endeavor ’95 U.S. Navy (Kenneth J. Riley)

By JOHN J. SHEEHAN

hough volumes have been written on The current environment has forced us to the lessons of the Persian Gulf War, find other ways of preparing for and responding many analysts overlook what is per- to crises around the world. Training JTFs and Thaps the most important point: an their component staffs to operate as coherent enemy should not give the United States and its units prior to deployment overseas is our goal. coalition partners six months to prepare for bat- ACOM has been improving the capabilities of tle. It is unlikely that an enemy will afford us as CONUS-based forces since its establishment in much time in the future to get command and 1993. In the area of field training exercises, feasi- control structures and logistics systems in place ble service exercises have been modified to en- before an attack. It is more likely that the com- compass joint mission essential tasks. We believe mander of a joint task force (JTF) and his forces that joint warfighting capabilities can be en- will have to arrive in-theater ready to fight as a hanced the most by focusing on JTF comman- joint team. How can we assure that the forces ders, components, and staffs. These command which forward supported CINCs receive can fight post exercises will incorporate the strides made in jointly? What is the most effective and efficient computer assisted exercises as well as modeling way to train JTF staffs? How can we best leverage and simulation. technology in joint training? U.S. Atlantic Com- Unified Endeavor (UE) exercises use an exist- mand (ACOM) is working on the answers to these ing three-star service component commander and and other important questions. his staff and train them to form and operate a JTF. From January to April 1995, the Army’s III Corps General John J. Sheehan, USMC, is commander in chief, was the core element for one of these exercises, U.S. Atlantic Command, and Supreme Allied Commander Unified Endeavor ’95. Atlantic. Prior to assuming his current position, he served as director for operations (J-3), Joint Staff.

Winter 1995–96 / JFQ 11 JFQShe 9/19/96 11:17 AM Page 12

■ UNIFIED ENDEAVOR

Background Phase IA was three days and taught commanders Unified Endeavor ’95 represented the first and principal staff members the fundamentals of ACOM developmental, simulations-based JTF staff joint operations. It ended with the opportunity to training exercise. It was divided into an academic obtain the commander’s guidance on operational training phase, an operation order (OPORD) de- concepts. Phase IB was a day-long seminar imme- velopment phase, and a plan execution phase. diately preceding phase II and was designed to re- Each phase focused on a period when JTF opera- focus principal staff planners on the exercise sce- tions are the most critical to mission success and nario and commander’s intent for the campaign. spread out to allow the commander and his staff This phase dealt with JTF formation and joint to train to task in a manageable yet realistic fash- planning procedures. Phase IC was also one day ion, given the busy world of operations tempo of seminars prior to phase III. It was designed to and commitments. refocus the entire staff on the exercise and cen- The scenario was set in Southwest Asia and tered on functional tasks and preparing staff sec- envisioned a notional JTF–780 made up of an tions and personnel for their responsibilities. Army reinforced heavy division, an Air Force rein- ACOM developed seminar outlines (lesson plans) forced composite wing, a Marine expeditionary for each seminar. force forward (MEF), a carrier battlegroup and an Phase II—OPORD Development Exercise. This amphibious ready group, and special operations phase, which lasted a week, emphasized JTF staff forces. The opposing force (OPFOR) fielded seven planning procedures and the application of joint combined arms divisions. The exercise was a dis- doctrine and JTTPs to the commander’s concept tributed training and technical success as well as of operations. Participants included the sup- a proof of principle for the joint training plan ported theater staff (U.S. Central Command) as (JTP)-driven JTF training initiative. well as the supporting CINC (ACOM), Joint Intel- ligence Center, JTF commander and staff, and Phased Training component staffs. The Chairman was the princi- The objectives of each phase of UE ’95 were pal trainer, with the ACOM staff and JTF training aimed at a particular audience. Unlike some exer- team helping to meet the objectives. The senior cises, it had a goal of reducing cost in time, per- observer mentored the Chairman and staff. sonnel, and operations and maintenance funds. In this phase, the JTF planning staff, includ- Fundamentally, it ing component liaison teams and augmentees, as- UE ’95 offered focus, control, and sought to add value to sembled at the JTF home station to build staff training the JTF staff procedures and working relationships. In the near flexibility unattainable in large and supporting com- future, at the option of the JTF commander, this scale field exercises ponent staff members. phase may be hosted at the ACOM Joint Training, Without a major de- Analysis, and Simulation Center (JTASC) in Suf- ployment of forces to folk, Virginia, to afford a self-contained exercise drive the actions of the staff, the exercise offered environment free of daily obligations at home a degree of focus, control, and flexibility unat- stations. Component planning staffs will nor- tainable in large scale field training exercises. mally remain at their home stations to reduce th Phase I—Academic Training. Seminars led by cost and retain realism. During UE ’95, the 8 Air key members of the ACOM staff were held for the Force commander deployed his JFACC planning core element of each designated JTF and compo- staff to Fort Hood. Based on the operational situa- nent staff, plus selected augmentees. This training tion, the Navy component commander remained focused on the roles of JTF commanders and their at his home station as did the commander of II staffs, staff procedures, joint planning, joint doc- Marine Expeditionary Force. This second phase trine, and joint tactics, techniques, and proce- helped in team building and in developing and dures (JTTPs) with the commander acting as prin- validating procedures. After the introduction in cipal trainer. He set the objectives and provided phase IB, the JTF staff was presented with a crisis guidance to the chief of the JTF training team situation based on a real world scenario. They (JTT), ACOM J-72, before the exercise. Then JTT then developed an OPORD, complete with sup- designed and executed training with constant porting component orders as well as a time feedback from the JTF commander. A senior ob- phased force deployment data list (TPFDL). The server (a former CINCSOC) served as mentor to JTF commander’s course of action development the JTF commander and staff which enhanced and wargaming efforts were supported by various the experience of the exercise. modeling and simulation capabilities. The com- The first phase took place over five days in pleted OPORD was reviewed by key members of the battle simulation center at Fort Hood, which all staffs and groomed for execution during the was the JTF home station. The seminars were con- next phase. ducted at the executive and action officer levels.

12 JFQ / Winter 1995–96 JFQShe 9/19/96 11:17 AM Page 13

Sheehan U.S. Air Force (LeeU.S. Air Force E. Rogers)

Joint Information Bureau, UE ’95. U.S. Air Force (Russ Pollanen) U.S. Air Force Fort Hood—site of Unified Endeavor ’95. Phase III—OPORD Execution Exercise. This Exercise Design and Support week-long phase, which was held as soon as feasi- With developmental help from the Joint ble after phase II, also included both the sup- Warfighting Center, the aggregate level simulation ported and the supporting CINC staffs, Joint In- protocol (ALSP) confederation of models replaced telligence Center, JTF commander and his staff, deployed warfighting personnel and equipment as and components. the driver for staff training in the UE ’95 phase III The entire head- distributed simulation architecture OPORD execution exercise. The distributed simu- quarters staff assem- lation architecture allowed the JTF commander as allowed commanders to take part bled at Fort Hood, well as most of his component commanders to an excellent site from home stations take part from their home stations to replicate the with the infrastruc- separation of an actual contingency and realize ture to support a ro- savings by minimizing deployments. The ALSP bust but realistic JTF headquarters environment. confederation was used because it accommodates This phase focused on execution procedures, de- two-echelon training audiences, offers a compre- cisionmaking, and applying joint doctrine and hensive intelligence package, reduces simulation JTTPs to operations. The JTF commander, ACOM cost and risk by employing existing service mod- staff, JTF training team, and senior observer els, and adds value for component participants by played the same roles as in phases I and II. Fol- making JTF training meaningful for service and lowing IC, JTF–780 executed the plan developed joint communities. in phase II in a simulations-driven wargame JTF Training Division (J-72) at ACOM, which against a “thinking” and reactive OPFOR. This has overall responsibility for the conduct of train- phase used a sophisticated confederation of ser- ing, gathers data on real world operations to pro- vice simulation models to exercise a broad range vide an after action review and discern lessons of joint warfighting skills and fully tax the train- learned for the commands involved. J-72 recently ing audience. concluded such a mission supporting the JTF in

Confederation Models Used in Unified Endeavor ’95

Model Warfare Area Corps Battle Simulation (CBS) Ground Air Warfare Simulation (AWSIM) Air Research, Evaluation, and Systems Analysis (RESA) Naval Air, Surface, and Subsurface Tactical Simulation Model (TACSIM) Intelligence Electronic Warfare Simulation (JECEWSI) Joint Electronic Combat/Electronic Warfare

Winter 1995–96 / JFQ 13 JFQShe 9/19/96 11:17 AM Page 14

■ UNIFIED ENDEAVOR

Operation Uphold Democracy in Haiti. It also JTF command/principal staff level and action offi- manages joint doctrine issues for ACOM, devel- cer/NCO level) and the JTF commander’s exercise ops and promulgates ACOM JTTPs, develops JTF report. As trainers, O/Ts lead most of the academic standard operating procedures, and assists in the training seminars and provide on-the-spot train- design and evaluation of CONUS joint exercises ing throughout the exercise. Emphasis is placed and training. To this end, teams, groups, and doc- on helping JTF members get over their initial uments were developed and successfully em- growing pains in JTF operations and thereby learn ployed during UE ’95. They included: more throughout the drill. Training Teams. All three J-72 teams consist Control Group. The mission of the joint exer- of operational-level, joint warfighting subject cise control group (JECG) is to establish and main- matter experts from each service. JTF training tain a realistic operational backdrop through simu- teams (JTTs) develop, execute, and maintain the lation, role-playing, and scripts to foster and guide phase I academic training program. They also the training audience in meeting training objec- lead the design, planning, and execution of tives. Under J-72, the JECG staff is formed around phases II and III. During execution, teams are a nucleus from various ACOM directorates who augmented as needed by functional (intelligence, have first-hand knowledge of the exercise plan. logistics, public affairs, et al.) subject matter ex- Other members are drawn from those ACOM com- perts from the ACOM staff and supporting agen- ponents and supporting agencies with the subject cies. JTTs work closely with the designated JTF matter expertise needed to meet role-player and commander to tailor the basic training program controller requirements. The First Brigade, 87th Di- to meet the JTF commander’s training objectives vision (Exercises), of the Army Reserve served as and operational requirements. the UE ’95 interactive OPFOR, a professionally Observers/Trainers. In phases II and III of UE staffed, task-organized unit which can represent exercises, JTT assumes the role of the joint ob- the actual capabilities, structure, and doctrine of server/trainer (O/T) group which consists of both real world threat forces. JTT and operational analysts. As observers, O/Ts Academic Training. To date a total of 52 war- provide feedback to the JTF commander and his fighting and peace operations seminars have been staff on actions during the exercise. This is accom- developed. After evaluations of UE ’95 are complished mainly through after-action reviews (at pleted, the seminar outlines and graphics will be made available to all users of the Joint Electronic Library (JEL).

Commands Involved in Unified Endeavor ’95

Joint Communications Support Element for UE ’95.

Command Training Role Training Location U.S. Atlantic Command CINC Norfolk, Virginia III Corps CJTF Fort Hood, Texas CCDG 12 NAVFOR Portsmouth, Virginia II Marine Expeditionary Force MARFOR Camp Lejeune, North Carolina III Corps (–) RFOR Fort Hood, Texas 8th Air Force AFFOR/JFACC Barksdale, Louisiana/Fort Hood, Texas SOCACOM JSOTF Fort Hood, Texas 1st PSYOP Battalion JPOTF Fort Hood, Texas 1st Brigade, 87th Division OPFOR Birmingham, Alabama U.S. Air Force (RandyU.S. Air Force S. Mallard)

14 JFQ / Winter 1995–96 JFQShe 9/19/96 11:17 AM Page 15

Sheehan

Training Plan. The JTF headquarters mission UE ’96–2 in the summer of 1996, just as have III training plan (MTP) is developed from the univer- Corps and II MEF. sal joint task list (UJTL) which identifies tasks that a JTF headquarters may have to perform Value Added from formation of the JTF headquarters to rede- While UE ’95 could have been mounted ployment. The plan was used in UE ’95 and the more effectively and efficiently, it cost 95 percent feedback was positive. After coordination with less than Agile Provider (AP) ’94 and involved just the services and CINCs, ACOM will provide it to over 4,000 personnel, half of whom received JTF the Joint Warfighting Center for inclusion in the staff training applicable throughout the world. joint publications system. These officers and service members are just the Operating Procedures. ACOM has drafted JTF first in a cadre capable of forming the backbone headquarters standing operating procedures of any JTF. On the other hand, AP ’94 required (SOP) for joint operations. Although designed for nearly 45,000 personnel to accomplish many of the ACOM AOR, there was a deliberate effort to the same goals with little cohesive JTF staff train- make it similar to other SOPs such as EUCOM ED ing. Because of the nature of JTF missions, the 55–11. The draft was tested in UE ’95 and, like ACOM JTF training program is designed to offer the MTP, feedback was incorporated into the SOP comprehensive education across a range of to improve it prior to release. warfighting requirements. This is especially important due to the many and varied regional Future Events CINCs who ACOM supports. JTASC is a state-of-the-art simulation and The computer model let us specifically focus training center which supports the ACOM joint on several doctrinal issues, including the roles of training mission. It will contain the computer and the joint force fires coordinator (JFFC), Joint Tar- communication ca- geting Coordination Board (JTCB), and Joint Mu- UE ’95 involved just over 4,000 pacity for advanced nitions Board (JMB). For the first time we incorpo- personnel, half of whom received distributed simula- rated realistic battle damage assessment and the tion, distance learn- implications of logistics limitations in real time JTF staff training ing, and video tele- and with good fidelity. Our computer modelling conferencing with capability will improve significantly when JTASC’s ACOM components as well as for on-site com- full capacity is on-line. Eventually, the facility will puter exercises and training. JTASC will provide a offer CONUS-based and possibly even forward de- JTF commander and his staff with the means to ployed forces the full range of exercise and opera- conduct all phases of JTF training in one location tional rehearsal support for any contingency. using actual C4I facilities in exercise spaces. Dur- Finally, all the participants agreed that working a visit to JTASC, the Vice Chairman, Admiral ing together as a JTF staff against a “thinking” William Owens, noted that “For the first time, the OPFOR and under realistic conditions was the ex- JTASC will allow the commander and all the peo- ercise’s greatest benefit. Members of all services ple who support the joint task force to come to- learned from each other and confirmed the truth gether . . . though they were virtually participating that the American way of war today really is team together in war.” By FY97, JTASC will routinely warfare. As forces shrink and commitments in- host two JTF staff training cycles per year, conduct crease, we must take full advantage of joint train- JTF mission rehearsals to support crisis action ing to be more effective. As joint force integra- preparation, and provide simulation support for tor/trainer, ACOM will continue to leverage Tier 2 field training exercises. technology as well as develop new solutions to The Marine Corps, and specifically II MEF, training problems. was the centerpiece of UE ’96-1 in late 1995. For UE ’96-1, the MEF will provide the commander Unified Endeavor ’95 demonstrated the chal- and the core of the JTF staff for a EUCOM-based lenges as well as benefits of team warfighting. It scenario, while the 347th Wing from Moody Air pushed the envelope of joint operations in ways Force Base will stand up as the Air Force compo- that confirmed the value of doctrine and tested nent to JTF. The details of UE ’96–1 are currently concepts to improve how we will fight in the fu- under development but promise an even more ture. It focused on the actions of JTF and service challenging training period for all concerned. 8th component staff members without deploying Air Force will participate as the JTF core unit for sizeable numbers of supporting forces. UE ’95 was a major step in refining joint training and exercises and making them more effective and efficient. Only team warfare can guarantee the Na- tion’s preeminent military position. JFQ

Winter 1995–96 / JFQ 15 JFQLin 9/19/96 11:18 AM Page 16

■ JOINT OPERATIONS: The Marine Perspective By THOMAS C. LINN

No other nation can match our ability to combine

commentary forces on the battlefield and fight jointly. —John M. Shalikashvili

Orchestrating land, sea, and air operations in joint that the JTF commander would not in- terfere with a subordinate comman- warfare is demanding and contentious at times. der’s conduct of the mission. Nobody knows this better than the Marines—a The Marine Tentative Landing Oper- ations Manual paralleled JAAN. Issued joint land-sea-air team. Many contemporary issues in 1934, it was the foundation of am- regarding the relationship of military arms have phibious doctrine—the oldest interservice doctrine. After studying Gallipoli, been hotly debated within the Marine Corps, in its authors recognized that such opera- some cases for over half a century. The lessons tions could readily founder on jurisdic- tional authority. Land, sea, and air in- learned remain relevant today. volvement would inevitably lead to a question of “who’s in charge.” This situation would be further aggravated by Who’s in Charge? The necessity for unity was recog- interservice rivalry. Accordingly, it Technology in this century pro- nized in 1935 by the Joint Board, fore- vested command of these arms in one vided the tools for joint operations. As runner to the Joint Chiefs of Staff. It individual—the naval attack force Rudolph Winnacker observed, “During published Joint Action of the Army and commander—largely because overseas the 19th century . . . Army and Navy Navy (JAAN) which mandated that one expeditions were seen as extensions of missions seldom overlapped and... commander would be responsible for naval campaigns. However, this ap- such problems as arose in the field had joining forces from the services into a proach turned out to be an oversimpli- to be resolved in the field. . . .” But joint task force (JTF). Command would fied solution. The Navy commander after World War I, technological ad- be given to an officer from the service did not always have the expertise or vances, particularly in aviation, ex- with paramount interest in the mis- interest in operations ashore to per- panded service capabilities. Forces in sion who would assign missions and form this role. Still, it was a start in one medium could influence events in objectives to component commanders joint operations. another. It was seldom clear whether and exercise coordinating control in a Achieving unity of command is one service should claim a monopoly given operation. But this joint com- an evolutionary process. Initially, dual- in technology. Rancorous debates mand would not infringe on the ad- hatted commanders orchestrated mili- erupted over which military arm domi- ministrative and disciplinary authority tary arms. It worked, though not al- nated. Today, technology is expanding of subordinate component comman- ways well. On Guadalcanal, all forces capabilities faster, and many of the ders. JAAN recognized the separation ashore came under the commander of same debates are recurring. of joint and service duties and stated 1st Marine Division, Major General Alexander Vandegrift. Not only did he control 1st Division’s subordinate units, but another Marine and two Army di- Lieutenant Colonel Thomas C. Linn, USMC, is assigned to the visions, and a collection of aviation Strategic Concepts Branch, Plans Division, at Headquarters, units. This entailed integrating air and U.S. Marine Corps.

16 JFQ / Winter 1995–96 JFQLin 9/19/96 11:18 AM Page 17

Linn

ground operations ashore as well as headquarters, to be collocated with II The blueprint for this integration linking them with those at sea, a major MEF at Camp Lejeune. was amphibious doctrine. Initially, the challenge for one commander. Tentative Landing Operations Manual An overarching command struc- How Do We Fight? laid out how the military arms would ture was developed for operations after The coming of amphibious opera- be organized and employed. Moreover, Guadalcanal. The Marine amphibious tions was a milestone for joint warfare. it recognized one constant in joint op- corps presided over ground, air, and lo- It was the first time in history that all erations: not only does each operation gistics units and connected the fleet to three military arms converged on a vary, but each may vary from phase to operations ashore. The structure was common point—the shoreline. They phase. Mission therefore determines used again by the 1st Marine Brigade readily interacted and mutually sup- task organization, which also must be (Provisional) early in the Korean War. ported each other on the tactical level. flexible to accommodate operational Naval gunfire and air assisted changes indicative of amphibious war- achieving unity of command is an ground forces in getting to the fare. Initially, these operations were evolutionary process beach. Once ashore, ground more naval in character while moving

forces secured land bases for air- to objective areas. The emphasis commentary craft which supported land, sea, shifted as they came ashore. The man- Despite its success, marines argued and air operations. As Richard Franks ual saw the need for task forces com- over the effectiveness of this arrange- wrote of Guadalcanal, “No other cam- prised of at least two components, a ment. Many believed a division head- paign in World War II saw such sus- naval support group and a landing quarters could do the job. However, tained violence in all three dimen- force. Within the Marine Corps the air-ground operations became more sions—sea, land, and air.” This was fleet marine force was established in complex with the advent of the heli- largely possible because of technology. 1933 and made up of ground, air, and copter and also increased lethality of It expanded the capabilities of each logistics units from which task orga- fixed wing aviation. In 1983, the Ma- military arm. While the resulting over- nized landing forces were provided to rine Corps formed permanent com- laps cause contention, they are vital to the fleet. mand elements for Marine air-ground joint operations. They enable the oper- Combining arms at the tactical task forces consisting of ground com- ation’s emphasis to transition from level is never easy. Components within bat, air combat, and combat service one medium to another. the amphibious task force were orga- support elements. This recognized that By contrast, consider deep strike nized functionally. But integrating the optimum coordination of military proposals that would prevent overlaps these functions requires practice and arms is not done on an ad hoc or addi- and interaction: land forces would established procedures, especially be- tional duty basis. fight up to the fire support coordina- tween ground and air arms, as marines The leading lesson for those who tion line, naval forces would stay at learned on Guadalcanal. Close air sup- advocate dual-hatting JTF commanders sea, and air forces would control every- port was impeded largely by inade- is that joint and service duties are too thing beyond. This is segregation, not quate command and control. The demanding to be assumed by one joint operations. headquarters. They must be separated to prevent operational and logistics bottlenecks. JTF command must bridge the strategic and tactical levels. More- over, orchestrating military arms requires the complete attention of one conductor, an overarching command. In this regard consider the incorporation of sophisticated systems such as JSTARS, AWACS, and AEGIS into operations. In humanitarian assistance military actions must be integrated with the actions of government and non- government organizations. Ironically, these lessons were relearned the hard way in Somalia when the Marine expeditionary force commander was assigned as JTF commander. This made the division commander the overall Marine forces commander: Guadal- canal revisited. As a result, the com- mandant directed on July 1, 1995 the Bouganville, 1943. establishment of a deployable JTF Naval Historical Center

Winter 1995–96 / JFQ 17 JFQLin 9/19/96 11:18 AM Page 18

■ JOINT OPERATIONS

ground side lacked control measures The other side of this tug of war initial adaptive joint force packaging that were eventually resolved on believed that the air function should be deployments could be disastrous. Bougainville. The air side lacked over- centralized on the operational level. On the operational level, JTFs all direction—or a joint force air com- Throughout much of World War II, the have shown that they can organize ponent commander. The air compo- Navy dominated Marine aviation units. functionally, which was arguably the nent was a loose collection of But the more the Navy and Marines op- case on Okinawa. The commander of squadrons from each service until a X Army was overall landing marine, Brigadier General Roy Geiger, joint attempts to replicate tactical force commander (or joint force assumed responsibility for the “Cactus land component commander) Air Force” September 3, 1942. Yet opti- organizations could be disastrous with the marines of III Amphibi- mum air-ground operations did not re- ous Corps reporting to him. This ally happen until Marine Air Group 12 erated together, the more control of this worked because tactical aviation was supported 1st Cavalry Division’s famed function shifted to the landing force, as integral to the organization, and tacti- dash for Manila in 1945. it did on Okinawa. But between 1951 cal measures for its integration re-

commentary Combining arms also means over- and 1953 in the Korean War, Marine mained in place. But in Korea, func- coming conceptual differences. aviation was centralized under Fifth Air tional organization did not work and Marines have often found themselves Force. Response times for air support re- this tactical integrity was denied. in a tug of war over air—sometimes quests took as long as 80 minutes. Only Operations will vary, which makes with the Navy but more often with the a third of air support sorties were dedi- joint organization situation-dependent. General Dwight Eisenhower used a functional organization in North Mogadishu, 1992. Africa after January 1943 which consisted of Allied Naval Forces, Allied Air Forces, and Allied Ground Forces. In Europe, he discarded strict trilateral organization for functional or area organizations: army groups (south, center, and north); tactical air forces (1st, 2d, and 9th); naval, airborne, and logistics components; and two strategic air components. Finally, functional organization requires experienced participants. Sometimes for the sake of expe- diency it is easier to organize JTFs by

Joint Combat Camera Center service component. Joint operations are never easy. Air Force. Essentially, the Marines be- cated to ground forces. So bad was this However, we have learned many lieve that air plays a critical role at the centralized control that the Army X lessons. Interestingly enough, very few tactical level (and other levels) and Corps commander, Major General Ed- rules apply. First and foremost, one should thus be part of a tactical team ward Almond, repeatedly complained person must be in charge and this which enables them to more readily and the 1st Marine Division comman- should be a primary duty. Second, tac- integrate air with other functions. Air der, Major General Gerald Thomas, re- tical organizations are inviolate; they and ground marines plan and even ex- fused air support unless it was provided must serve as building blocks. Third, ecute shoulder-to-shoulder, all playing by the Marines. the one constant is that each operation by the same rules. They also rely upon The lesson for JTFs is that organiz- is different, and so is its organization. well-established integration systems, ing by functions is easy while integrat- Flexibility, not rigidity, is a virtue. If we the fire support coordination center ing functions is hard. It requires more ignore these lessons, we make joint op- system and the air command and con- than doctrine. It takes practice and erations much harder. JFQ trol system. At Pusan this teamwork time-tested procedures, especially on was epitomized by the 1st Provisional the tactical level—the foundation for Marine Brigade. Often with a 15- higher level operations. The services minute response time, Marine air have already created tactical organiza- strikes devastated North Korean de- tions for this purpose. Their integrity fenses and mobile formations near the should be preserved when incorpo- critical Naktong River line. rated into JTFs, each of which, after all, is a system of systems—an operational level organization. Joint attempts to replicate tactical organizations such as

18 JFQ / Winter 1995–96 JFQLin 9/19/96 11:19 AM Page 19

ANNOUNCEMENT

Joint Force Quarterly ESSAY CONTEST ON THE Revolution in Military Affairs

o encourage innovative thinking on how the Armed Forces can remain at the forefront in the conduct of war, JFQ is pleased to announce the second annual “Essay T Contest on the Revolution in Military Affairs” sponsored by the National Defense University Foundation, Inc. The contest solicits innovative concepts for oper- Contest Rules ational doctrine and organizations by which the Armed 1. Entrants may be military personnel or civilians Forces can exploit existing and emerging technologies. (from the public or the private sector) and of any Again this year, those essays that most rigorously nationality. Essays written by individual authors or groups of authors are eligible. address one or more of the following questions will be 2. Entries must be original and not previously considered for a cash award: published (nor under consideration for publication elsewhere). Essays that originate from work carried ▼ The essence of an RMA is found in the magnitude of out at intermediate and senior colleges (staff and change compared with preexisting warfighting capabilities. war colleges), service schools, civilian universities, How might emerging technologies—and the integration of and other educational institutions are eligible. 3. Entries must not exceed 5,000 words in length such technologies—result in a revolution in conducting and must be submitted typewritten, double-spaced, and in triplicate. They should include a wordcount warfare in the coming decades? What will be the key at the end. Documentation may follow any standard measures of that change? academic form of citation, but endnotes rather than ▼ Exploiting new and emerging technologies is depen- footnotes are preferred. 4. Entries must be submitted with (a) a letter dent on the development of innovative operational concepts clearly indicating that the essay is a contest entry and organizational structures. What specific doctrinal together with the author’s name, social security account number (or passport number in the case of concepts and organizations will be required to fully realize non-U.S. entrants), mailing address, telephone the revolutionary potential of critical military technologies? number, and FAX number (if available); (b) a cover sheet containing the contestant’s full name and ▼ How might an adversary use emerging technologies essay title; (c) a summary of the essay which is no in innovative ways to gain significant military leverage more than 200 words; and (d) a brief biographical sketch of the author. Neither the names of authors nor against U.S. systems and doctrine? any personal references should appear in the text (including running heads). Contest Prizes 5. Entries must be mailed to the following address Winners will be awarded prizes of $2,000, $1,000, and $500 (facsimile copies will not be accepted): RMA Essay Contest, Joint Force Quarterly, ATTN: NDU–NSS–JFQ, for the three best essays. In addition, a special prize of $500 Washington, D.C. 20319–6000. will be awarded for the best essay submitted by an officer 6. Entries must be postmarked no later than August 31, 1996 to be considered in the contest. candidate or a commissioned officer in the rank of major/ 7. JFQ will hold first rights to the publication of lieutenant commander or below (or of equivalent grades). all entries. The prize-winning as well as other essays A selection of academic and scholarly books dealing with entered may be published in the journal. 8. Winners’ names will appear in JFQ and prizes various aspects of military affairs and innovation will also be will be presented at an appropriate ceremony in presented to each winner. JFQ Washington, D.C.

Winter 1995–96 / JFQ 19 JFQPrc 9/19/96 11:20 AM Page 20

■ The Impact of NATIONALISM ON JOINT FORCE PLANNING By GEORGE W. PRICE

Nationalism has emerged as a powerful force in the post-Cold War world. Far from the end of history as presaged by Francis Fukuyama, there has been a re- turn to history in gory detail. In much of Africa and Asia the contest between the two superpowers was a convenient mechanism for garnering economic aid and security assistance at a discount, but it was largely irrelevant in the context of regional politics. For example, in the Middle East, Arab/Israeli differences continued to fester independently of the superpowers, which became patrons of the opposing sides.

Perhaps the most dynamic changes have taken dynamics of nationalism will remain critical to re- place in areas once dominated by the Soviet gional security affairs and joint force planning. Union. Germany has been reunited, the Baltic states have reappeared, and numerous new na- Planning Implications tions, most without any independent existence in Tension results from the struggle between the modern era, have been established. In Yu- two important contending forces in international goslavia, a bloody war has carved states out of a politics, a political structure that equates the sov- multiethnic nation. Similar changes are occurring ereign state with the highest form of organiza- around the world. Palestinians are negotiating tional entity, and the desire of ethnic groups to with Israel for an autonomous state. U.N. forces establish and protect their national identities. Be- protect Kurds in northern Iraq. In Africa, tribal cause the world has 183 sovereign states there is very little territory for new ones. Consequently, the end of the Cold War restored a multipolar world as ethnic groups seek to create national identities they compete with existing states, which is a increasingly driven by nationalist rivalries major cause of international instability. During the Cold War this dynamic was not appreciated, differences threaten to reshape the political land- largely because of the bipolar nature of interna- scape from Liberia to Somalia. Even in Western tional relations. Lesser powers cooperated in vary- Europe, traditional Flemish/Walloon friction has ing degrees with the United States or the Soviet been revived in Belgium while Basque separatists Union. But the reality was more complex. Rather continue to harass the Spanish government. than remaining bipolar, with the expectation that Thus nationalism has reemerged as a critical a unipolar international system would later factor in restructuring the international political emerge, the end of the Cold War restored a multi- scene in the post-Cold War era. Understanding the polar world increasingly driven by contentious nationalist rivalries. This trend is seen in the collapse of empire George W. Price is a senior intelligence officer and reemergence of national components from assigned to the Office of National Security Issues within. The Soviet Union fragmented into fifteen at the Defense Intelligence Agency.

20 JFQ / Winter 1995–96 JFQPrc 9/19/96 11:20 AM Page 21

Price

nations. Yugoslavia broke into three with a fourth into the Baltic states and Balts were moved out to still evolving. This duality between self-determi- the eastern Soviet Union. Stalin used similar relo- nation and sovereignty has become a fundamen- cations to blur national identities. Following in- tal source of instability in international politics. It dependence in India and Pakistan hundreds of forces international actors to balance aspirations thousands of people moved from one nation to of national groups against the reality of an exist- the other to avoid becoming minorities in the ing structure of recognized sovereign states. Joint new national entities that replaced the rule of the planners who look at regional crises must wrestle British raj. Such actions have tremendous individ- on the horns of this dilemma. ual costs as well as economic and social consequences, and they are not necessarily successful National Struggles as is evidenced by the continued friction between The world is replete with examples of the India and Pakistan. quest for national status run amok. Oppression of Highly organized ethnic nationalist groups minority rights is often the first restriction on may resort to civil war to establish their claims. In emerging ethnic national groups. This includes the late sixties an effort by the Ibo minority of outlawing native language, discouraging trade, Nigeria failed to establish Biafra as a new state. and even relocating minority groups. Numerous The current constitutional crisis in Nigeria sug- cases of repression of minority rights exist in gests that renewed ethnic conflict could occur in Africa and Asia as competing ethnic national the most populous nation in Africa. Bosnia is the groups seek power. In Burundi, majority Hutus best contemporary example of a civil war between are locked in sporadic conflict with minority Tut- rival national groups, Bosnian Moslems and Bosn- sis. The assassination of President Doe of Liberia ian Serbs. Because of the intense ethnic hatreds, pitted his ethnic Krahn group in a civil war an agreement eluded diplomats for years during against the rebel Charles Taylor whose supporters which time human suffering grew steadily worse. are primarily ethnic Gio and Mano. In Bhutan Irredentist claims serve as a means for out- thousands of ethnic Nepalese have suffered under side nations to support conationals who live as government oppression. In Indonesia long-term minorities in other states. The war between the repression in East Timor has resulted in the death Soviet successor states of Armenia and Azerbaijan of nearly a third of a population of 600,000. illustrate this problem. The Armenian enclave of The second manifestation is the creation of Nagorno-Karabakh inside Azerbaijan has become refugee populations. The Arab-Israeli dispute is a source of conflict. Because Azerbaijan does not one example. Jewish refugees from World War II, share a border with Armenia, either supporting or in the spirit of Zionism, fueled the creation of the annexing this territory has been impossible. In- state of Israel in 1948. The end to their Diaspora, stead, using Soviet arms, each side has sought to however, began one for Palestinians, who were break the will of the other through military ac- driven from their homes and ultimately resettled tion. The result has been an effective destruction in U.N.-sponsored camps. Recently, the horrors in of the territory with no resolution by the groups Yugoslavia have generated a million refugees, not involved. The Armenians are seeking access only Moslems, but also Croatians and Serbs, as through a narrow corridor to create a territorial each group seeks the safety of its fellow nationals. linkage which has not been achieved by force or Terrorism is used as a tool by national groups diplomacy. which are frequently disaffected minorities. Not The Soviet breakup offers similar opportuni- only Zionist and Palestinian organizations engage ties for irredentist claims, the most important of in terrorism; such action is employed around the them involving Russians left in newly established world to garner publicity for national move- states. Significant Russian minorities remain in ments. The Provisional Irish Republican Army, for the new Baltic states whose policies regarding mi- example, has no consistent program to drive the nority rights are not encouraging. Estonia, for ex- British out of Northern Ireland, but the bombing ample, has enacted measures that have an ad- campaigns in both Ulster and Britain have verse impact on the remaining Russian demonstrated the virulence that moves national- population. These especially pertain to use of the ist groups to indiscriminate acts of violence. Estonian language and rights to employment, Forced expulsion (repatriation) is another schooling, and public services. Formerly the ma- tool used by majority national groups to elimi- jority in the Soviet Union, the Russians resent nate or adjust population boundaries. Stalin used such changes; yet they continue to view the land this to control national minorities in the Soviet where they have lived for generations as their Union. Volga Germans were relocated thousands home. This may lead to pressure for Russia to in- of miles from their homes to ensure that they tervene in support of its conationals, who have would not create a fifth column in support of the become a minority. Nazis during World War II. Russians were moved

Winter 1995–96 / JFQ 21 JFQPrc 9/19/96 11:20 AM Page 22

■ NATIONALISM

Much of the instability that arose in the Division between Issues post-Cold War world can be explained in terms of ethnic nationalism and competing groups which Self Determination are asserting their power and authority. Coming Nontraditional Military Minority Oppression to terms with these dynamics will challenge joint Missions Refugees force planners into the next century. Forced Expulsion Terrorism Responding to Nationalism

LEVEL OF VIOLENCE Joint force planning recently has been en-

Civil War tangled in nationally derived conflicts. Opera- Irredentist Claims tions Desert Shield/Desert Storm responded in part to national expansion. The U.N. Protection National Expansion Traditional Force (UNPROFOR) went to the Balkans in 1992 Military Interstate Conflict Missions to check a conflict between Serbs and Croats, and Sovereignty the NATO Implementation Force (IFOR) now has been deployed in Bosnia under the Dayton ac- cords. The accompanying figure lists traditional missions and nontraditional missions on a verti- Similar problems exist in Eastern Europe. cal axis. The former refer to warfighting and re- Hungarian minorities in the Transylvania region lated operations while the latter refer to areas of of Romania have been a source of friction since humanitarian assistance, civic action, and low in- the Treaty of Trianon after World War I awarded tensity conflict that were peripheral concerns to this primarily Hungarian region to Romania. Hun- planners during the Cold War. The broad red garian minorities in the Vojvodina portion of Ser- band indicates the divide between self-determina- bia represent another possible irredentist claim for tion and sovereignty that creates a conceptual Budapest. Thus far the Hungarians have not been firebreak. It suggests that ethnic national conflict caught up in the ethnic conflict between the Serbs can be categorized into (1) early efforts at self-de- and Croats, who are their neighbors. But if con- termination, (2) a murky level of direct chal- flict resumes and Vojvodina is involved, Budapest lenges to sovereign states by ethnic national may act to protect the Hungarian minority. groups, and (3) conflict arising among sovereign Often expansionist conflicts are justified as states over ethnic national issues. efforts to regain territory to which nations have The interaction below the band in the figure historic claims. Iraq’s invasion of Kuwait was ra- occurs between sovereign nations. This type of tionalized on such grounds. The Iraqis appealed to conflict is easily understood since the alternatives British colonial maps that dated to World War I. are relatively clear cut. Whether to intervene and A resurgence of Russ- which state to support remain difficult decisions. ian nationalism may It means siding with one national element or an- much instability can be explained lead to the use of force other. In the Gulf War, the United States and most in terms of ethnic nationalism to reclaim territories other nations supported Kuwait over Iraq. This lost after the collapse type of conflict tends to have straightforward of the Soviet Union. post-conflict objectives. The main objective in the Claims against weak states like Tadjikistan or Gulf was restoration of Kuwaiti sovereignty. Georgia might succeed absent a response from the Such conflicts will not present serious plan- international community. Military action to re- ning problems in the future. The current major gain Ukraine may be more difficult, given the size regional contingencies (MRCs) on which the and resources of that new nation and its solid na- United States has decided to focus are of this tional identity. Macedonia is another state that type. The first sees Iran or Iraq seeking to estab- could disappear as a result of Serb, Greek, or Bul- lish itself as regional hegemon in Southwest Asia. garian claims to portions of its territory. These actions fit the category of wars of national Finally, interstate conflict can be driven by expansion and interstate conflict described above. national rivalries. The Indo-Pakistani conflicts of The second focuses on the Korean peninsula. the Cold War and the Chad-Libya border dispute Here, two sovereign states are competing to repre- are examples. Serbia and Croatia have settled into sent the national will of the Korean people. Other an uneasy truce resulting from exhaustion and the possible conflicts of this type, such as a war be- diversion of the war in Bosnia. The conflict could tween Russia and Ukraine, pose significant re- reemerge as both parties reassess their relative po- source implications for joint planners but do not sitions. In the Middle East, rivalry between Israel represent serious conceptual challenges in terms and its neighbors is another case of interstate con- of traditional planning. flict driven in part by ethnic nationalism.

22 JFQ / Winter 1995–96 JFQPrc 9/19/96 11:20 AM Page 23

Price

Kuwaitis entering their capital.

Graves at Olympic complex in Sarajevo. U.S. Air Force (MichaelU.S. Air Force J. Haggerty)

American arrival in Haiti.

Kurdish guard in northern Iraq. Combat Camera Imagery (Val Gempis)

DOD

Similarly, actions Commissioner for Refugees also has provided in- above the band are rel- ternational experience in dealing with these prob- atively well under- lems, primarily in Israel and Palestine as well as stood. U.S. Special Op- in India and Pakistan. Although they pose chal- erations Command has lenges to execute, such operations do not repre- Combat Camera Imagery (Theodore J. Koniarea) hundreds of individu- sent a major departure. Thus, the military must als involved in human- be equipped to plan and execute operations in- itarian assistance operations worldwide. They volving ethnic conflict at the extremes of the self- provide low level, nonintrusive support to im- determination/sovereignty axis. prove the professional skills of foreign military Joint force planners have the greatest diffi- organizations. Similar objectives are achieved by culty dealing with ethnic nationalism in the the international military education and training murky area where efforts to achieve self-determi- (IMET) program. The Coast Guard conducted op- nation run into direct conflict with established erations in the Caribbean to deal with refugees sovereign states. This is because of the fundamen- from Haiti and Cuba. During the Cold War the tal dichotomy between nation and state in the in- Armed Forces helped thousands of Hungarians ternational political system. It is in this arena who fled after the 1956 uprising. The U.N. High that forced expulsions, terrorism, and civil wars occur. While international norms recognize the right of self-determination, it is only when these efforts succeed and the ethnic national group

Winter 1995–96 / JFQ 23 JFQPrc 9/19/96 11:20 AM Page 24

■ NATIONALISM

achieves sovereign statehood that the interna- new qualitative assessment is necessary to plan tional community can deal with a new nation. It for the future. The resurgence of ethnic national- is precisely this unease that exists in Provide ism helps explain changes in the international Comfort in northern Iraq, which has protected political system. In the wake of the collapse of the Kurds from the Iraqis and enabled them to re- the Soviet empire and turmoil generated in Asia turn home. However, it has not supported Kur- and Africa by the residual arbitrary impact of dish efforts to establish a sovereign state that colonialism, the basic organizational structure would reach across the borders of Iran and will be that of the ethnic nation. Moreover, this Turkey. In addition, planners have responded to ethnic nationalism will seek to establish itself refugee flows resulting from oppression of mi- through sovereignty. To the extent that this norities, including the exodus after the victory by process is not peaceful—and it normally is not— the Tutsi minority in the Rwandan civil war the United States and other nations seeking to where foreign troops had to deal with more than encourage peaceful change will be challenged to a million Hutu refugees. intervene. This will necessitate some type of military operation, often in combination with diplo- Projecting Neutrality matic and economic actions. The bombing of the Marine barracks in Depending on the level of conflict, a deci- Beirut showed the difficulties which foreign sion to respond can be relatively straightforward. troops face when they are identified as taking If sovereign states use force, the international sys- sides in ethnic nationalist conflicts. Lebanese tem has established mechanisms with which to Moslems saw American forces as supporting the respond. But when situations fall into the area Christian dominated Lebanese forces. Clausewitz generally regarded as the internal affairs of na- declared that a commander must understand the tion-states, planning becomes more complex. But type of war he is en- even there, military forces offer various options it is virtually impossible for forces gaged in and not such as education and training, humanitarian as- make it something it sistance, blockades to support economic sanc- to be both effective and neutral is not, advice which tions, and antiterrorist capabilities to redress is critical in ethnic crises which result from the excesses of national- conflict. Decisionmakers can agree to deploy ists. This is not to suggest that outside interven- forces in a neutral fashion but in practice this is tion is required in all disputes. Far from it. That achieved rarely if at all. International forces may would greatly exceed available defense and eco- try to achieve that goal, but those with whom nomic resources, not to mention the political they deal may not allow them to play a neutral will, of any major power. role. General Aideed did not view U.N. forces as Understanding ethnic nationalism allows for impartial in the struggle among rival Somali war- prioritization within a common framework and lords, and Bosnian Serbs did not see UNPROFOR demonstrates that not everything has changed. as neutral during the siege of Sarajevo. When a Many operational capabilities of the Armed decision is made to use military means in ethnic Forces are well suited to the challenges of ethnic national conflicts, planners should insist that any nationalism along the sovereignty/self-determina- mission statement clearly reflect whether forces tion axis, from humanitarian relief on one hand should support the sovereign state or protect ef- to conflict between sovereign states on the other. forts by a minority to achieve self-determination. It is in the gray area where ethnic national groups Plans designed only to reduce violence or suffer- threaten existing states that both planning and ing are doomed to fail. operational difficulties occur. Civil wars, terrorist The initial success of Restore Hope in Somalia acts, mass expulsions, and irredentist claims are and Desert Storm in Iraq demonstrate that the complex problems in which competing ethnic Armed Forces can undertake such ventures suc- national groups represent diametrically opposed cessfully. It is virtually impossible for forces placed viewpoints. U.S. forces cannot operate effectively in such situations to be both effective and neutral. on a tightrope between the two. Planners must If the decision is made to employ military forces incorporate mission statements supporting one in terrorist, civil war, or irredentist types of con- objective or the other, not necessarily exclusively, flicts, the forces should go in with a clear mission but in terms of operational objectives that can be statement. Choosing sovereignty or self-determi- achieved by the military. Anything short of that nation compels decisionmakers to have a clear ob- places such forces, either national or interna- jective when employing military forces. tional, in an untenable position. JFQ

To cope with post-Cold War challenges, joint force planners must understand the dynamics that are transforming the international order. A

24 JFQ / Winter 1995–96 JFQMen 9/20/96 12:55 PM Page 25

New Forces for Engagement Policy

By WILLIAM W. MENDEL

he premise of U.S. strategy is that we 1993, for instance, the Bush administration stated must counter an array of challenges to in the National Security Strategy of the United States: our interests: the proliferation of Foremost, the United States must ensure its secu- T weapons of mass destruction (WMD), rity as a free and independent nation, and the protec- regional conflicts, militant nationalism, deterioration of its fundamental values, institutions, and peo- tion of political and economic reform in the for- ple. This is a sovereign responsibility which we will mer Soviet Union (FSU), and transnational (gray not abdicate to any other nation or collective organi- area) phenomena such as terrorism, warlordism, zation. refugees, narcotrafficking, environmental crises, and famine. Our national security strategy em- By contrast, the Clinton administration’s na- phasizes transnational threats to nation-states by tional security strategy provides different guidance: non-state actors as well as non-governmental The U.S. government is responsible for protecting processes and organizations which are viewed by the lives and personal safety of Americans, maintain- many analysts as far more probable than general ing our political freedom and independence as a na- war involving WMD. tion, and providing for the well-being and prosperity Additional challenges are weapons prolifera- of our nation. No matter how powerful we are as a tion (including black market transfers of nuclear nation, we cannot secure these basic goals material or WMD by rogue states, terrorists, or unilaterally....Therefore, the only responsible U.S. criminals), conflict over resources, environmental strategy is one that seeks to ensure U.S. influence over issues, spread of serious diseases, transnational and participation in collective decisionmaking in a links of drugtrafficking and other criminal activ- wide and growing range of circumstances. ity with terrorism and insurgency, illicit elec- Thus global engagement is a core belief in tronic capital movement, illegal immigration, our national security strategy. It portends the crit- and areas in megacities and the icality of effective military interaction in multia- countryside where government global engagement is a gency and multinational operations. Events will control has eroded. Uncon- core belief in our national show how closely the administration follows strained by borders and interna- these policy guidelines. Certainly there has been security strategy tional protocols, such dangers disillusionment with the United Nations since threaten nation-states used to the Somalia debacle. On the other hand, Ameri- state and alliance systems. But our doctrine and can leadership sought U.N. rather than congres- force structure are based on concepts of over- sional support to enter Haiti by force. whelming force to achieve decisive victory against states—hardly a formula for coping with Peacetime Military Roles these new threats. How will the military instrument be used to Collective Decisionmaking support national security strategy? The goals of sustaining security interests and promoting The linkage of the active engagement vision democracy abroad suggest a wide range of mili- and the extended range of security threats is a shift tary roles. These goals and related military objec- of emphasis in defending the Nation. In January tives will be achieved mostly by overseas presence and operations other than war (OOTW). The Na- tion will maintain the forces to win two nearly si- Colonel William W. Mendel, USA (Ret.), is an analyst with the Foreign multaneous major regional contingencies (MRC) Military Studies Office at the U.S. Army Combined Arms Center. He is in concert with regional allies. It will engage in the author of Interagency Cooperation: A Regional Model for Overseas Operations.

Winter 1995–96 / JFQ 25 JFQMen 9/20/96 12:55 PM Page 26

■ OUT OF JOINT

Amphibious assault, Agile Provider ’94.

Searching for weapons in Haiti. U.S. Navy (Robert N. Scoggin) Combat Camera Imagery (Val Gempis)

arms control, nonproliferation, and counterpro- During the summer of 1993—one year before liferation. It will retain strategic nuclear forces the administration issued a national security strat- sufficient for deterrence. Engagement around the egy—then Secretary of Defense Les Aspin con- world will involve overseas presence, disaster re- ducted the Bottom-Up Review (BUR) to define force lief, fighting terrorism and drug trafficking, con- structure, modernization programs, industrial base ducting peace operations, and providing nation concerns, and the infrastructure to counter new assistance to counter insurgency, lawlessness, and dangers. subversion. How well does the BUR recommendation To promote democracy abroad, the United match the President’s national security strategy? States will assist countries that affect its security Can it counter such diverse perils as WMD, re- interests, such as those with large economies, crit- gional war, deterioration in the former Soviet ical geostrategic locations, nuclear forces, and the Union, and transnational (gray area) phenomena? potential for refugee flows. Russia and the states of Central and Eastern Europe are examples, as Strategic Forces for New Threats are the democracies of the Asia-Pacific region. Deterrence, nonproliferation (prevention Given these roles, are the Armed Forces struc- with political and economic instruments backed tured to support the national security strategy? by force), and counterproliferation (efforts to This is an important consideration since, before a combat proliferation) are WMD concerns. The national security policy was formulated, the Pen- Nation is reducing its nuclear arsenal under the tagon had determined a force structure for the START treaties, but the process will take a decade, next century. The process used to define that assuming it stays on track. Given the uncertainty force, however, was not carried out in a vacuum.

26 JFQ / Winter 1995–96 JFQMen 9/20/96 12:55 PM Page 27

Mendel

in Russia, Kazakhstan, and Ukraine, and the po- A conventional war with Russia is now virtu- tential for unfriendly nuclear states in other really inconceivable since its military is in great dis- gions, programmed strategic force seems neces- array and represents little threat to the United sary and capable of its deterrence and warfighting States and its allies. America is not well equipped missions—at least in the traditional sense. How- to tackle instability or gray area phenomena in- ever the utility of strategic forces for deterrence side FSU, but these are possible threats to stabil- has been diminishing as suggested by the advo- ity. Should the failure to reform result in a break- cates of a revolution in military affairs (RMA) down of the Russian or an East European which stresses dramatic effects of new military government, the scope of a relief effort may be and civilian technologies. The consequences of too large for the Western allies. Military opera- RMA, such as information and intelligence domi- tions other than war (such as Bosnia) will be the nance, nonlethal weapons, and precision standoff most likely application of U.S. military resources. strike systems, may offer more for deterrence and It makes little sense to send combat divisions and countering proliferation than strategic forces and, air wings, but who else would do the job? in turn, may lead to the marginalization of nuclear weapons. Danger in the Gray Areas It is not clear how strategic nuclear forces While general purpose forces are designed will affect WMD use by rogue states with little to for warfighting, the military instrument of na- lose or terrorists and international criminal tional power must be appropriate for countering groups. It has also been suggested that prolifera- transnational threats and gray area phenomena. tion is all but inevitable and the task is to hedge The administration has stated that its emphasis against increased risks and exploit available op- on engagement, prevention, and partnership portunities. Another means that U.S. forces are more likely to be in- U.S. forces are more likely to be challenge is counterpro- volved in operations short of declared or intense involved in operations short of liferation, which is war. But in spite of repeated use of conventional aimed at controls on fis- force structure and doctrine to accomplish such declared or intense war sile material, increased missions, there have been few clear successes, as support for inspection our experiences in Panama and Somalia have il- teams under the International Atomic Energy lustrated. Agency, intelligence to locate and destroy nuclear Panama provided an opportunity to employ weapons programs, and forces to operate against overwhelming force to achieve decisive victory a WMD-armed enemy. which culminated in the apprehension of Manuel U.S. strategic forces are not capable on their Noriega. Perhaps American military leaders were own of countering proliferation and the kinds of captives of the traditional conflict paradigm: that gray area threats seen today. This requires new is, reliance on correlation of forces and firepower, concepts for using technology, intelligence, and faith in technological solutions and quantification, units specially trained to operate in a cooperative need for an eminent cause, and thinking that war multiagency and international environment. One suspends politics. In Somalia, U.S. forces led Uni- place to look for new capabilities may be in the fied Task Force (UNITAF) to provide security for the conventional force structure advanced in BUR. delivery of aid and transferred command to U.N. The force structure recommended in the Bot- Operations for Somalia (UNOSOM II) to help peace tom-Up Review for funding in the future year de- enforcement create stability. The mixture of forces fense program (forces extant in 1999) was de- and international, interagency, and nongovern- signed by the current administration to sustain ment organizations, each with its own viewpoints two nearly simultaneous major regional contin- and operating methods, contributed to operational gencies, peace operations, overseas presence oper- risk and the eventual erosion of political will to ations, and operations to counter gray area support the Somalia mission. threats, although not all simultaneously. The Finding the proper blend of doctrine, strat- need for a force structure to fight two MRCs egy, and forces for military operations other than nearly simultaneously has been challenged. Hold- war is fundamental to engagement and enlarge- ing forces in reserve to deter a second regional ment. But as Secretary Aspin advised about forces threat does not square with our experience in for peace operations, “these capabilities could be Korea, Vietnam, and Iraq, which were one-war provided largely by the same collection of general events. Moreover, the two-MRC force may not purpose forces needed for MRCs, so long as the be structured to leverage new technologies and forces had the appropriate training.” This conflict concepts to counter the global dangers as stressed paradigm got the United States in trouble in by RMA. Southeast Asia. The Army pursued counterinsur- gency in 1965–66 by deploying combat formations to destroy North Vietnamese divisions and

Winter 1995–96 / JFQ 27 JFQMen 9/20/96 12:55 PM Page 28

■ OUT OF JOINT

main force Viet Cong units. The American mili- liaison representatives from interagency, private, tary worked from the top down, while commu- and non-government organizations. It would be nists conducted a range of social, political, and tasked to support regional CINCs with JTFs military actions from the village level up. When trained and deployed according to regional strate- asked to explain their operations, U.S. officers gies. Such a joint engagement command (JEC) lo- gave the textbook answer, to close with and de- cated in the United States would either report di- stroy the enemy. rectly to the national command authorities or serve as a subunified command of U.S. Special At a Crossroads Operations Command. It could operate in an in- A national security strategy of engagement ternational and multiagency environment by and enlargement demands forces and concepts virtue of its access to the joint planning commu- for OOTW, but the force is said to be designed for nity, multiservice design, and unique mission. fighting two MRCs. The global environment of Joint Pub 3-08, which addresses interagency coor- transnational threats and gray area phenomena dination, points to the need for a functional com- already challenge U.S. interests. Can our military mand for engagement. capabilities to meet these dangers be improved? This standing joint force would be organized Civilian agencies cannot handle OOTW tasks functionally to integrate diverse capabilities of because they lack organizational and logistical as- the services. The Reserve components would play sets for large-scale operations, especially when se- a major role: for example, a nation assistance ele- curity is a dominant concern. Moreover, they ment would include engineer, medical, and civil affairs assets, all areas of Reserve exper- a few uniquely organized units could train for long-term and tise. Security police also would con- indirect approaches to achieving U.S. objectives tribute to joint force operations as well as training assistance to host nation military and police units. Logistics and clearly cannot exercise the upper hand in con- transportation assets would provide air and tested situations when ascendant military power ground transportation and a staff deployment is needed. In the gray area environment it is not planning function, and signal assets would sup- always clear where civilian responsibilities end port command and control for multiple deploy- and military tasks begin. Once again it is time to ments around the globe. A security assistance or- address the doctrine and force structure for sup- ganization would oversee military support to porting national security policy. What kind of CINC security assistance initiatives. Finally, a spe- forces could help to counter WMD proliferation, cial mission element would be largely built incipient causes of regional war, aspects of insta- around special operations forces with additional bility in FSU, and transnational phenomena? psychological operations and military intelli- One answer is a standing military staff for gence units. Each service would share the burden OOTW. If we intend to enhance participation in by providing forces. collective decisionmaking in a growing range of Some JEC missions would need combat units circumstances, a specially organized joint plan- to provide force security, maintain escalation ning staff is needed with apportioned forces to dominance, or even close with and destroy optimize military support of security policy. A enemy forces. For this reason, joint force pack- joint command should be trained and ready to ages of combat units could be apportioned by the join with government, non-government, and in- Joint Staff for planning and operations with JEC. ternational organizations in tackling transna- This is not an issue of creating more force tional threats or supporting OOTW tasks. The structure, but of better organizing what is now on permanence of such a command could develop hand. There are advantages of a joint force for expertise on the interagency and international peacetime engagement operations. It would free environment. Ready to go into action unilaterally conventional units from tasks which degrade or with partners, it could add a new dimension of combat readiness. The units apportioned to JEC deterrence to conflict short of war. While such a for planning and deployment would be mainly specially designed force might detract from the support units that could quickly be reassigned to conventional force structure, it would be cost-ef- a force deployment troop list for an MRC. While fective for engagement strategy. Significantly, it assigned units would train to meet command will protect the readiness of conventional combat standards for joint mission essential tasks, units forces by relieving them of most OOTW missions. in functional commands would not have to be To support engagement strategies, a joint situated with a joint headquarters. Primary task command should be established on a functional lists would support peacetime engagement opera- basis without regard to a specific geographic area tions, but JEC units would be available for con- of responsibility. Its headquarters would include ventional contingency operations. By assigning

28 JFQ / Winter 1995–96 JFQMen 9/20/96 12:55 PM Page 29

Mendel

Aviano Air Base, Italy. U.S. Air Force (LynnU.S. Air Force Walters)

Destroyers off San U.S. Navy (J.P. Guzman) Clemente Island.

specific units to the command, other service units these threats if the traditional way of war is ap- would be free to concentrate on conventional plied to OOTW. This is not the time to discard combat training. Clausewitz and the operational art, but there is JEC would go a long way toward solving a room for innovation in structuring forces for the long-standing problem: the American proclivity 21st century. Perhaps RMA will offer opportunities for satisfying political decisions by using conven- not only through technological innovation but tional forces to produce effects that are foreign to also through new operational concepts and orga- them. Under JEC, a few uniquely organized units nizational adaptation. Success in operations other could train for missions requiring long-term and than war will depend on adjusting to the new se- indirect approaches to achieving U.S. objectives. curity environment. One certain catalyst for The Armed Forces could remain unbedeviled by change would be the creation of a new military OOTW missions, free to concentrate on training organization for engagement operations—a joint for decisive battles of annihilation. engagement command. The Armed Forces may Among the most critical dangers facing the then be able to advance beyond new technologies United States are gray area phenomena such as for fighting old wars, to reshape our doctrine and conflicts over scarce resources, ethnic and reli- force structure for engagement and enlargement. gious conflict, transnational crime (with its link- JFQ age to terrorism and insurgency), migration and illegal immigration, famine, and nations on the A longer version of this article appeared in Low Intensity verge of collapse. But the military instrument of Conflict and Law Enforcement, vol. 4, no. 2 (Autumn 1995), pp. 202–22. national power will not be effective in countering

Winter 1995–96 / JFQ 29 JFQGry 9/19/96 11:23 AM Page 30

■ On Strategic Performance By COLIN S. GRAY

It has become almost a commonplace to observe that in the two world wars of this century the Germans proved to be good at fighting but not very good at waging war.1 A similar judgment applies to the French and American experiences in Indochina. Lyndon Johnson, Robert McNamara, and William Westmoreland—to name but three of the One of the better works on the latter con- more culpable parties—neither read nor under- cluded that the plight of the United States stood, let alone adhered to, the wisdom of that long dead Prussian soldier-theorist, Carl von “was a failure of understanding and imagi- Clausewitz, who wrote: nation. American leaders did not see that The first, the supreme, the most far-reaching act of judg- what for them was a limited war for lim- ment that the statesman and commander have to make is to establish by that test [of war as an instrument of ited ends was, for the Vietnamese, an un- policy] the kind of war on which they are embarking; limited war of survival in which all the neither mistaking it for, nor trying to turn it into, some- most basic values—loyalty to ancestors, thing that is alien to its nature. This is the first of all strategic questions and the most comprehensive.3 love of country, resistance to foreigners— He also advised: 2 were involved.” No one starts a war—or, rather, no one in his senses ought to do so—without first being clear in his mind what he intends to achieve by that war and how he intends to conduct it. The former is its political purpose; the latter its operational objective. This is the governing principle which will set its course, prescribe the scale of means and effort Colin S. Gray is director of the Centre for required, and make its influence felt down to the Security Studies at the University of Hull. His smallest operational detail.4 books include The Leverage of Sea Power: The Strategic Advantage of Navies in War.

30 JFQ / Winter 1995–96 JFQGry 9/19/96 11:23 AM Page 31

Gray

learnt from failure than success, one should not be biased in favor of the study of failure. More- over, even when failure dominates the page, one must seek empathy with the people and organizations committed to generate strategic effectiveness in the face of real-world friction. Indeed, it is the very difficulty of providing consistently high strategic performance that yields much of the interest in this subject. If scholars are to have anything to say that merits attention in the world of practice, they must understand the constraints of that world.5 The Meaning of Strategy The virtue of Clausewitz’s definition of strategy is that it is crystal clear on the distinction between its subject and other matters. Specifically, strategy is “the use of engagements for the object of the war.” Having defined tactics as “the use of armed forces in the engagement,” 6 the distinction could hardly be more clear. Without exception, well meaning attempts to improve upon Clausewitz’s definition of strategy have not proved successful. For example, a well regarded military theo- retician, writing in a no less well regarded series of quasi-official textbooks, invites acceptance of “strategy as the planning for, coordination of, and concerted use of the multiple means and resources available to an alliance, a nation, a political group, or a commander, for the purpose of gaining ad- 7 DOD vantage over a rival.” The theorist at fault here Paddy fields of seems not to appreciate that there is merit in par- Vietnam. simony, that clarity in definition depends on an In the cases above, somewhat inchoate vi- uncluttered identification of the claimed essence sions of what was politically desirable inspired of the subject at issue, and that speculation on the scarcely more orderly sets of high policy goals purpose of the subject is irrelevant at best and which had to serve as dim and swaying guiding misleading at worst. His definition is not without lights for military effort. In each, political ambi- some merit, but quite needlessly it muddies water tion exceeded the military means and the strate- that was clear in its Clausewitzian formulation. gic skill available. Germany, France, and the Beyond argument, that definition is not an im- United States lacked the myriad assets necessary provement on Clausewitz. for an approximation of political success. Nonetheless, that definition shines by com- Whether or not a plausible parison with one offered by Martin van Creveld facsimile of victory was at- strategy is the meaning of which is rather casual and distinctly unhelpful. He tainable in any of these speaks of “strategy, the method by which those what forces do for the course cases is distinctly debatable. armed forces [the military organization created by What is not in question is 8 and outcome of a conflict the state] wage war.” Lest there be confusion, “the that the countries involved method by which those armed forces wage war” is all faltered strategically. the realm of tactics or even of doctrine. Doctrine is Each failed to wage war in such a manner or to guidance on how to fight, tactics is what forces do, such a degree that the more important of its pol- and strategy is the meaning of what forces do for icy goals were secured. the course and outcome of a conflict. One should be sensitive to, but not cowed What may be called the strategy test applied by, the charge that too much is revealed through to behavior reduces usefully to the question “so hindsight. Also, it is not to be denied that much what?” Tactical discussion should focus on what in the history of U.S. statecraft is strategically ad- force, or the threat of force, did or might have mirable. America’s victory in the Cold War was a done. Strategic discussion, by contrast, should success for strategy of which any polity could be consider what difference the use, or threat of use, proud. Although there is usually more to be of force would make to the course of events.

Winter 1995–96 / JFQ 31 JFQGry 9/19/96 11:23 AM Page 32

■ STRATEGIC PERFORMANCE

There is a sense in which all levels of conflict laws.” 14 Also he expresses the unexceptionable have strategic features, as Edward Luttwak states opinion that “a certain grasp of military affairs is persuasively.9 But the Clausewitzian approach is vital for those in charge of general policy.” 15 Given preferable. To avoid pedantry, the terms naval his continentalist Prussian strategic culture, it is strategy, airpower strategy, space strategy, and not surprising that Clausewitz might err on the even nuclear strategy may be tolerated, but only side of assuming a unity of purpose between policy with particular and consistent meaning. For exam- and strategy. It might be more accurate to state ple, naval strategy refers to the use of naval en- that he elected not to dwell on the divergent paths gagements for the object of war at sea; that object that policy and strategy could pursue. As an inter- has to be the right to use the sea at will, or the preter of Napoleonic warfare and staff officer ability to deny its use to an enemy. Maritime strat- trained to revere Frederick the Great,16 it was un- egy, by contrast, refers to the use of prowess at sea likely Clausewitz would be drawn to any friction for the course of events in a conflict as a whole.10 that could imperil the subordinate relationship of Provided that the means-ends reasoning strategy to high policy that was theoretically nec- which is the core of the meaning of strategy is essary. When the duties of head of state, head of not forgotten, common sense and a little care government, and principal field commander all preclude the need for undue precision of usage. devolve on one person, prospects for harmony be- Scholars are good at making distinctions. Indeed tween policy and military action are maximized. distinctions are crucial in generating theory that Had Clausewitz been geostrategically broader in should help explain, even understand, events. his education, he might have learnt from the But drawing distinctions must be complemented British experience how a maritime polity can have by the recognition of important connections. difficulty coordinating political, economic, and military interests.17 A Holistic Approach A holistic approach does not require fool- Strategic theory, reasoning, or planning con- ishly embracing a strictly nominal coordination nects activities which otherwise are liable to be of political intent and military action. It recog- treated as autonomous realms.11 Lacking a holistic nizes that political goals and military capabilities approach to conflict assisted by the central idea may be poorly matched. Clausewitz was con- of strategy, the universe of possible concern ex- strained by prescribing what ought to be. A holis- hibits a series of often disconnected loose ends. tic approach is correct. A vision of a politically In the absence of a strategic framework of instru- desirable condition should inspire policy choices mental thinking and planning, how should de- supported by a strategy that makes good use of fense be governed? People fight on land, at sea, operational competence founded on tactical ex- and in the air; they wage low-intensity, mid-in- cellence. In practice, tactical performance will be tensity, and even high-intensity conflict; and, in less than excellent, operational skills may be slim, geopolitical terms, they deter or fight in places and strategic plans may lack political guidance such as Korea, Vietnam, the Falklands, the Per- worthy of the name.18 As for the political vision sian Gulf, et al. Of these classifications, the first that should propel the entire process, it may lack (the dimension) is inadequately exclusive, the practical connection to behavior in the field (for second (the intensity of the conflict) is unhelp- example, in the case of a united Ireland for the fully vague, and the third (the regional context) is Irish Republican Army). Holism captures the perilously specific for planning purposes. whole, but it does not assume a perfect coordina- A strategic mindset accommodates hypothet- tion of the whole. Clausewitz’s advice on the rela- ical action or threat of action in all geographical tion between political ends and military means environments, at all levels of intensity, and was not invalidated by the events of 1914–18 against all foes for all political purposes. As a which, to the contrary, demonstrated just how practical matter, a defining aspect of strategy,12 important it is for high policy and its military in- the strategist is anything but indifferent to the strument to be mutually empathetic. character and content of the policy in question. A holistic approach operates vertically and To harken back to Clausewitz yet again, if the ob- horizontally. Seen vertically, strategy includes all ject of the war is truly heroic politically, while aspects of peace and security from political vision friendly forces are able to perform only modestly to tactical military performance. Horizontally in engagements that the strategist must use, then considered, it includes the application of power strategic failure is all but certain.13 on land, at sea, in the air, and in space, together Clausewitz exaggerates slightly, but only with strategic nuclear and special operations slightly, in observing, “The conduct of war, in its forces. It is important that this dual-axis apprecia- great outlines, is therefore policy itself, which takes tion should be accepted before challenges in de- up the sword in place of the pen, but does not on tail are offered. that account cease to think according to its own

32 JFQ / Winter 1995–96 JFQGry 9/19/96 11:23 AM Page 33

Gray

Americans and Russians on the Elbe, April 1945. U.S. Army

Those who seek simple solutions to complex not fear to assert the identity and strategic rele- problems are pejoratively called reductionists. The vance of a key force. Notwithstanding the com- advocates of various types of military power will plexity of an issue, there is likely to be a particu- argue that landpower, seapower, airpower, (would- lar kind of power, probably military, most be) nuclear deterrence, or appropriate to a specific context.20 special operations forces It is well to be suspicious of reductionism or one should not fear to assert “can do it.” They reduce the essentialism.21 Also it is well to be open to the the identity and strategic strategic problem at hand to suggestion that one or another kind of power relevance of a key force a task that their favored ca- should attempt to function as the cutting edge of pability can purportedly ful- policy. To say that airpower was the key force in fill. It is not necessarily re- the Gulf War of 1991 is not to be reductionist, it ductionist in a pejorative sense to recognize that is to be sensible. Similarly, to claim that the there are conflicts in which a geographically or threats implicit in U.S. nuclear forces were key to functionally specific key force is strategically most the frustration of Soviet policy over Germany in appropriate. For example, Northern Ireland is as 1948–49 and 1958–61 again is not to be reduc- obviously a special ops, low-intensity conflict case tionist, but rather to be realistic. To recognize ge- as the Falklands was a maritime problem.19 ographical and functional variety in strategic Northern Ireland is reduced to a complex po- matters is (ipso facto) to recognize the possible va- litical problem as well as an irregular form of war- riety of key elements. fare, but it can be difficult to delineate between an analysis that penetrates to the heart of the Why Strategy Is Difficult problem (that is, the key elements) and one that As the great man wrote, “Everything in strat- reduces a complicated reality to an oversimpli- egy is very simple, but that does not mean that fied, more manageable reality-as-task. One should everything is very easy.” 22 Though it should be useful to recognize why strategy is difficult, it is

Winter 1995–96 / JFQ 33 JFQGry 9/19/96 11:23 AM Page 34

■ STRATEGIC PERFORMANCE

scarcely less useful to recognize why the explana- Now, however, military and political careers tend tion need not contribute to the practical solution. to be very distinctive, even exclusive in many cul- By analogy, the more mechanistic aspects of strat- tures. There is little in the training of soldiers or egy, like art, can be taught, but people cannot be politicians to equip them for strategic responsibil- taught reliably how to be great strategists any ities. Military professionals tend to learn how to more than great artists. There is latitude, indeed a fight and then, as they are promoted, how to or- need, for creativity in both professions that defies ganize others to fight in ever larger, militarily pedagogical programming. Intellectual mastery of more inclusive formations. The soldier is not purportedly permanent principles of strategy is taught how engagements should be used “for the probably helpful but no guarantee of success.23 object of the war.” Similarly, rising politicians are Why is strategy difficult to achieve, let alone promoted based on seniority and maturing politi- sustain? With some grateful borrowing and adapta- cal skills. At no point in an outstanding career is tion from Clausewitz, I find six connected reasons. there likely to be anything resembling explicit First, competence in strategy requires mas- training in strategy for the politician. tery of a challenging complexity. Strategy, after Fourth, strategy is extraordinarily difficult to all, is the bridge connecting the threat and use of conduct with consistent excellence because of the force with policy or politics. The strategist needs unique physical and moral burdens it puts on to understand what is tactically and operationally would-be strategists. The demands of command possible in all geographical environments, what in crisis and war can age a person as surely as a success or failure in each environment (or func- disease. Comparing film footage of Adolf Hitler in tional dimension) contributes to performance in 1939 with 1944 or of Jimmy Carter in 1976 with the other environments, what that means for mil- January 1981 illustrates this point. It was with itary performance writ large, and what general good reason that Clausewitz emphasized impedi- military performance means for policy (and vice ments to strategic performance imposed by dan- versa). Moreover, whereas strategists had only to ger, fatigue, and anxiety born of uncertainty. The master the combined meaning of surface forces burden of command increases with the growing on land and sea in 1900, their counterparts must level of responsibility. As people are promoted master the synergistic meaning of land, sea, air, from tactical, through operational, to strategic and space (and nuclear) forces today. realms of responsibility, the potential physical Although more complex than before, strat- and moral hindrances to sound performance in- egy has not altered at its core. It is still about “the crease as well. uses of engagements for the object of the war,” Fifth, it is worth citing what Clausewitz or—if you prefer, for a modern translation—about termed friction, although the previous point can the threat and use of force for political reasons. be seen as encompassing aspects of this phenom- As the character of the possible uses of forces has enon. He advised that “friction, as we choose to diversified, so the task of the strategist has grown call it, is the force that makes the apparently easy ever more difficult in practice. so difficult” 26 and observes that “friction is the Second, by its nature strategy is more de- only concept that more or less corresponds to the manding of the intellect and perhaps imagina- factors that distinguish real war from war on tion than any structurally more simple activity— paper.” 27 Friction is not unique to the strategic policy, operations, tactics, or logistics for realm, but it is likely to be uniquely pervasive and prominent examples. Excellence in strategy re- debilitating in its cumulative effect in that realm. quires the strategist to transcend simple cate- As modern chaos theory suggests, initially small, gories of thought. The task is not to create wise unpredicted, and unwanted changes of state can policy or successful schemes of military action, have massive, non-linear consequences later.28 but rather to build and repair the bridge connect- Clausewitz argues that “everything in war is ing the two. On the one hand, policy will be wise very simple, but the simplest thing is difficult. only if it proves feasible (in this case, militarily). The difficulties accumulate and end by producing On the other, brilliant military schemes can be ir- a kind of friction that is inconceivable unless one relevant or worse if they promise to achieve polit- has experienced war.” 29 So many and potentially ically inappropriate objectives. synergistic are the sources of friction in war and Third, it is extraordinarily difficult to train preparation for war, that it is little short of amaz- competent strategists, let alone outstanding ones. ing that great military enterprises can be orga- It is very well for Clausewitz to claim glibly and nized and carried out at all.30 One has to remem- misleadingly that “war is simply a continuation ber that friction impedes all parties in war. of political intercourse, with the addition of other means,” 24 or to argue that “in the highest realm of strategy . . . there is little or no difference between strategy, policy, and statesmanship.” 25

34 JFQ / Winter 1995–96 JFQGry 9/19/96 11:23 AM Page 35

Gray

The fundamental reason why friction can be 1941.31 As well as luck and bigger battalions, suc- so damaging at the strategic level is because, by cess in strategy typically requires, among other definition, that level must accommodate, inte- things, constitutional fortitude (physical and grate, and direct all the activities mental),32 a sophisticated grasp of political essen- success in strategy calls that comprise war. The strategist tials, and an ability to make and stick to judg- for a quality of judgment will encounter the effects of fric- ments in the face of gross uncertainty. Education tion from the world of policy and should help, but there is truth in the claim that that cannot be taught the geographically and function- strategists are born rather than made. Westmore- ally specialized forces which per- land could be trained to direct troops efficiently form tactically, logistically, and operationally. in the field but not to perform with strategic ex- Stated bluntly, at the strategic level of perfor- cellence in the wise conduct of an unusually diffi- mance there is more that can go wrong. cult war. Finally, success in strategy calls for a quality of judgment that cannot be taught. Although there is Strategic performance is inescapable. The quip certainly scope for individual genius at the tactical that “you may not be interested in strategy, but and operational levels of war, sound training for strategy is interested in you,” refers to an enduring consistently superior military performance at those truth. The only alternative to good strategic perfor- levels—friction permitting—can be provided. Stra- mance is fair or poor strategic performance, not no tegic excellence cannot be taught the same way or strategic performance. Engagements of all kinds, to anything like the same degree. Strategy inher- conducted by various types of forces, impact on ently requires understanding of the terms of the the conduct and outcome of a conflict; that is, relationship between military power (perhaps en- they have a strategic effect or generate some quan- gagements, after Clausewitz, or more loosely the use tity of strategic effectiveness. That is how strategy and threat of force) and political purpose (the object works. Because some polities at certain times be- of the war or policy). In addition, strategy requires have as if strategy and strategists were an option in understanding of how very different kinds of force fighting, and since strategy from its origins (the art can generate the effectiveness to yield politically of the general) implies purposeful and skillful di- useful consequences. While these necessary truths rection, the true ubiquity of the phenomenon of about strategy are almost too easy to state, they strategic effect can evade notice. can be abominably difficult to put into consis- Unplanned or ill-conducted engagements tently successful practice. must have some influence on a general progress, Many apparently well educated officers have or lack of progress, registered on behalf of the ob- lacked the qualities needed for success in high ject of the war. Not only do the tactical and the command. There was General George McLellan in operational levels of war implement strategy, but the Civil War and, in the British army, Field Mar- even when there is no strategic direction worthy shal Ian Hamilton at Gallipoli in 1915 and Gen- of the name, tactical and operational behavior eral Archibald Wavell in the Western Desert in has strategic effect, albeit undirected centrally. This is not to downplay the significance of strategy, but to claim that strategic performance can only rest on tactical performance. One need not, Tank maneuvers in indeed should not, endorse all of Clausewitz’s ar- France, 1918. gument to accept the strength of his claim “that only great tactical successes can lead to great strategic ones,” or that “tactical successes are of paramount importance in war.” 33 Whether or not the enemy is actually destroyed or comprehensively defeated, indeed whether or not success at- tends our forces, tactical activity must have strategic effect. JFQ

NOTES

1 For example, H.P. Willmott, The Great Crusade: A New Complete History of the Second World War (New York: The Free Press, 1989), p. xi. 2 Ronald D. Spector, After Tet: The Bloodiest Year in Vietnam (New York: The Free Press, 1993), p. 314. U.S. Army Military History Institute History Military U.S. Army

Winter 1995–96 / JFQ 35 JFQGry 9/19/96 11:23 AM Page 36

■ STRATEGIC PERFORMANCE

3 Carl von Clausewitz, On War, edited and trans- 19 The geography of the Falklands as a theater man- lated by Michael Howard and Peter Paret (Princeton: dated a maritime strategy, but the style of the British re- Princeton University Press, 1976; first published 1832), conquest had the general character of “a commando pp. 88–89. operation writ large.” Edward N. Luttwak, Steven L. 4 Ibid., p. 579. Canby, and David L. Thomas, A Systematic Review of 5 See Colin S. Gray, “New Directions for Strategic “Commando” (Special) Operations, 1939–1980 (Potomac, Studies? How Can Theory Help Practice?” Security Stud- Md.: C and L Associates, May 24, 1982), p. P–2. ies, vol. 1, no. 4 (Summer 1992), pp. 610–35. 20 Acknowledging the need for jointness and capabil- 6 Clausewitz, On War, p. 128. ities in all geographical environments is not to be blind 7 John I. Alger, Definitions and Doctrine of the Military to a maritime or continental tilt in strategic culture. I Art Past and Present (Wayne, N.J.: Avery Publishing, developed these thoughts in The Navy in the Post-Cold 1985), p. 5. War World: The Uses and Value of Strategic Sea Power 8 Martin van Creveld, Nuclear Proliferation and the (University Park, Pa.: Pennsylvania State University Future of Conflict (New York: The Free Press, 1993), p. 1. Press, 1994), chapter 4. 9 Edward N. Luttwak, Strategy: The Logic of War and 21 See Gray, War, Peace, and Victory, pp. 323–24; and Peace (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1987), p. 69. David Hackett Fischer, Historians’ Fallacies: Toward a 10 See Julian S. Corbett, Some Principles of Maritime Logic of Historical Thought (New York: Harper and Row, Strategy (Annapolis: Naval Institute Press, 1988; first 1970), pp. 172–75. published 1911), pp. 10–11. Distinctions between naval 22 Clausewitz, On War, p. 178. and maritime strategy are exerted, developed, and ex- 23 Allegedly “immutable principles of strategy” are ploited admirably in Jan S. Breemer, “Naval Strategy Is presented in Antoine Henri de Jomini, The Art of War Dead,” U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings, vol. 120, no. 2 (London: Greenhill Books, 1992, reprint of 1862 edi- (February 1994), pp. 49–53. Breemer argues that naval tion), pp. 327–35. strategy is dead for the United States because for the 24 Clausewitz, On War, p. 605. next few years, at least, there is no other navy in the 25 Ibid., p. 178. world capable of menacing American sea control. 26 Ibid., p. 121. 11 For an earlier raid on this topic, see Colin S. Gray, 27 Ibid., p. 119. War, Peace, and Victory: Strategy and Statecraft for the Next 28 See Alan Beyechen, “Clausewitz, Nonlinearity, and Century (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1990), chapter the Unpredictability of War,” International Security, vol. 10, “Seeing the Problem Whole.” 17, no. 3 (Winter 1992/93), pp. 59–90; and David Nich- 12 “Strategic thinking, or ‘they’ if one prefers, is olls and Todor D. Tagarev, “What Does Chaos Theory nothing if not pragmatic. Strategy is a ‘how to do it’ Mean for Warfare?” Airpower Journal, vol. 8, no. 3 (Fall study, a guide to accomplishing something and doing it 1994), pp. 48–57. efficiently. As in many other branches of politics, the 29 Clausewitz, On War, p. 119. question that matters in strategy is: Will the idea work? 30 For a wonderful case study of friction and over- More important, will it be likely to work under the spe- coming it, see John France, Victory in the East: A Military cial circumstances under which it will next be tested?” History of the First Crusade (Cambridge: Cambridge Uni- Bernard Brodie, War and Politics (New York: Macmillan, versity Press, 1994), who concludes that it was the 1973), p. 452. “growth of the coherence and experience of the cru- 13 Consider France’s political goals in Indochina in sader host as a whole which was the key to their mili- relation to its political-military assets. The grim story tary success.” may be approached most usefully via Bernard Fall: Street 31 Unlike McClellan, who was in over his head, Hamil- Without Joy (New York: Schocken Books, 1964); and Hell ton and Wavell were able soldiers trapped in contexts unin a Very Small Place: The Siege of Dien Bien Phu (Philadel- forgiving of error, weakness, and plain bad luck. On phia: J.B. Lippincott, 1967). Hamilton, see E.K.G. Sixsmith, British Generalship in the 14 Clausewitz, On War, p. 610. Twentieth Century (London: Arms and Armour Press, 15 Ibid., p. 608. 1970); and Eliot A. Cohen and John Gooch, Military Mis- 16 See Peter Paret, Clausewitz and the State (New York: fortunes: The Anatomy of Failure in War (New York: The Oxford University Press, 1976). Free Press, 1990). Ian Beckett, “Wavell: Field-Marshal Earl 17 Like modern Israel, Prussia was awkwardly shaped Wavell,” in Churchill’s Generals, edited by John Keegan and lacked robust natural frontiers. The influence of (New York: Grove Weidenfeld, 1991), is fair and persua- Prussia’s distinctly continentalist geostrategic situation sive. on Clausewitz has yet to receive adequate recognition. 32 Clausewitz believed that the determination needed For example, Christopher Bassford, Clausewitz in Eng- for success flows more from a strong than brilliant lish: The Reception of Clausewitz in Britain and America, mind; intelligence, even knowledge, and strength of 1815–1945 (New York: Oxford University Press, 1994), character are not synonymous. is generally excellent but fails to consider the lack of a 33 Clausewitz, On War, p. 228. maritime dimension to his theorizing. 18 Colin S. Gray, Weapons Don’t Make War: Policy, Strategy, and Military Technology (Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 1993), chapter 4.

36 JFQ / Winter 1995–96 JFQOwen 9/19/96 11:25 AM Page 37

THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION in Military Affairs

By WILLIAM A. OWENS

We use the term revolution in military affairs (RMA) the specific technologies are those that allow us to gather, process, and fuse in- a lot today. It comes up in briefings at the Penta- formation on a large geographical area gon. Journalists and academics write about it. We in real time, all the time; that allow us to transfer that information—call it discuss it within the Armed Forces and with mili- knowledge—to our forces with accu- tary leaders from other nations. That is as it should racy and speed; and that provide us the capacity to use force with speed, be, for RMAs can be disturbing. They demand con- accuracy, precision, and great effect siderable debate and dialogue if we are to master over long distances. Moreover, there is them. So what is the current RMA? Where does it agreement on their interaction. We have decided to build what some of us stand today? And where will it go? call the system of systems; namely, interactions that will give us dominant As the essays in this issue of JFQ Like every other revolution, the battlespace knowledge and the ability suggest, the revolution is alive, American RMA involves big changes— to take full military advantage of it. healthy, growing, and stirring the de- changes that occur or can be recognized The evidence of this collective bates, insights, and passions which ac- suddenly and that spread across institu- agreement is in the defense budget, the company rapid and significant innovations, doctrine, and the way we think recommendations of the Chairman’s tion, especially in the United States. about the use of force. What makes rev- Program Assessment, and in what the Indeed, the world will increasingly olutions disturbing, of course, is not the services state in white papers, staff refer to the “American” RMA, for while scope, speed, and extent of innovation studies, and battle laboratories. Funds military thought outside this country as much as what must be given up to allocated for the programs that will consummate them. give us the system of systems are grow- RMA involves changes across institutions, The problem with ing at rates considerably higher than deep, fast, and ram- the overall DOD budget. The Chair- doctrine, and the use of force pant innovation is not man’s Program Assessment recom- getting people to ac- mended this, an idea generated largely reflects some aspects of what is under- cept the new but to surrender the old. by intense, in-depth discussion among way, it is here that the discussion is Most will flirt with the future, but few senior military leaders and work in the deepest and the technologies that want to embrace it at the expense of a last two years of the Joint Require- drive the revolution are most robust. comfortable present. ments Oversight Council (JROC). And And it is here that the integration of In some respects, this is an apt whether it is found in Army XXI, For- those technologies with each other commentary on the state of the cur- ward...From the Sea, the Sea Dragon and with military organization and rent revolution. We now have a pretty initiative, or Global Presence, the basic doctrine has already begun. good idea that the American RMA argument is similar, reflecting the stems from the way several particular commitment to radically improved sit- technologies will interact. Most senior uational awareness, agile communica- military and civilian leaders agree that tions, and precision weaponry. So the decisionmakers inside the Admiral William A. Owens, USN, is vice chairman of the Joint Pentagon agree on the path of the fu- Chiefs of Staff and author of High Seas: The Naval Passage ture. Deciding to take this revolution- to an Unchartered World. ary course was not easy, for in a period

Winter 1995–96 / JFQ 37 JFQOwen 9/19/96 11:25 AM Page 38

■ JFQ FORUM

when our budget will not rise appre- suggest that the need to build units in It is no wonder, then, that we ciably, reallocating resources in favor reserve on the tactical and operational have not reached a consensus on the of the system of systems means starv- levels will become an anachronism? doctrinal and structural implications of ing programmatic pets in order to And surely there is a subtle relationship the revolution. Yet, as in deciding to nourish the new arrivals. Yet that is between the kind and the size of logis- embark on the revolution, we have our decision. tics structures needed and the precise, committed ourselves to working them There is less agreement on how real time logistics data we will have on out. This effort, too, is probably irrevo- fast to go down this path—on how tactical requirements and material cable, and our willingness to think se- much to accelerate the system of sys- flows. In short, the American RMA sug- riously about such things will increase tems—and what should be given up in gests a range of force structure issues our revolutionary lead. that have yet to be re- In dealing with these questions, RMA suggests a range of force structure solved. We sense collec- we must also address the equally com- tively that they loom pelling issue of what this RMA means issues that have yet to be resolved just over the horizon. in terms of foreign policy. Even if it But the status of this di- lives up to its military promise of un- the process. But the commitment on mension of the revolution remains unequaled potency, that will not neces- direction is clear and, I believe, irrevo- clear, with little firm agreement as to sarily make achieving our goals easier, cable. As a result, the United States will what is to be done. particularly in building a stable, just, be the first nation to emerge in the Part of this ambiguity reflects the and free world. The disparity in mili- post-revolutionary era equipped with profound challenge which the Ameri- tary power which RMA offers the proficiencies that will perhaps change can RMA posits to the Clausewitzian United States presents a dilemma: how the character of warfare as it has been idea of war, the notion of the “fog and can we use this power to deter and known for centuries. friction” of conflict. Clausewitz proba- compel—that is, to convince other na- While we are now moving down bly articulated as well as any other the- tions that they cannot prevail against the revolutionary path and have ac- orist what experienced warriors sense us—without frightening them into at- cepted the prospect of large scale inno- to be true—that the clash of military tempting to counter our power? We vation—which occurs relatively forces is so complicated as to seem have not agreed on an answer. We quickly and spreads across institutions, chaotic, so ambiguous that even the have hardly examined the question. doctrine, and thought—not everything simplest plans and actions are difficult, Where does this American RMA is settled. We currently lack a firm con- so uncertain as to form an impenetra- stand as we near the next millennium? sensus on two dimensions of this ble fog that obscures predictability. It is in full swing. We are embarked on American revolution. The first is what First stated at the outset of the 19th cen- a revolutionary path, the system of it means, more specifically, for military tury, these ideas have underpinned mil- systems is emerging, and importantly organization and doctrine. The second itary thinking in the United States and we have accepted the promise and the is what it means for U.S. foreign policy elsewhere throughout this century. risk of innovation. We have not, how- and our role in the world. Today we find them in doctrine (“fog ever, reached agreement on how fast to Most of us inside the Pentagon be- and friction” as inherent to opera- traverse this course nor exactly what lieve our institutions will change, per- tions), structure (units in reserve as a the journey will entail. While under- haps dramatically. But we have come to hedge against the “inevitable” fog and way, the revolution is not yet consum- this deductively, not from empirical, friction of war), and the design of com- mated. It is time for discussion, debate, detailed assessments and experiments mand and control systems (redundancy and insights—appropriate for the con- that must be done. Still, the kind of in- assuring the transmission of informa- tributions in this JFQ Forum. JFQ formation-empowered, dominantly tion in the face of unexpected delays). knowledgeable forces in our common In fairness, the architects of the vision call for flattened, less hierarchi- American RMA have never claimed to cal organizations. The concept of being be able to completely dissipate the fog able to see a large battlefield with great of war nor fully eliminate the friction fidelity raises intriguing possibilities. of conflict. However they have argued For instance, if we know where enemy that the revolution can introduce such forces are and what they are doing—in a disparity in the extent to which fog detail as well as real time—and engage and friction apply to each side in war them with highly accurate, reliable, as to give one unprecedented domi- and effective longer range weapons, nance. Notwithstanding that impor- why would we require the kind and tant nuance, this revolution challenges size of close air support forces that exist a vital assumption about our thinking today? Indeed, does not that capability on the use of force—and the attitudes and institutions resting on that assumption. This is ultimately what makes it a true revolution.

38 JFQ / Winter 1995–96 JFQMahn 9/20/96 10:40 AM Page 39

The strategic force commander sat in a dimly-lit subter- NORAD/SPACECOM ranean command center, waiting for the battle to start. Each Command Center, Cheyenne Mountain. of his component commanders was settled in front of a lu- minescent screen which displayed aspects of an ongoing situation half a world away. Green icons marked positions of enemy command and control nodes as electronic lightning flickered across the displays revealing traffic over networks. The war had begun three weeks ago when the President U.S. Air Force (CarolU.S. Air Force Floyd) approved the infiltration of enemy information networks. Since then information warfare teams had worked hard to compromise enemy command and control systems. They saw themselves as commandos of the information age who moved unnoticed through information networks, searching out and mapping the sinews that bound the enemy together. Some they would destroy; others they would leave alone. Thousands of miles away, the first strike began exactly at midnight. Fingers of light arced into the dark sky off the enemy coast as semi-submersible arsenal ships launched wave after wave of ballistic missiles. High overhead stealthy aircraft released their deadly payloads, cruise missiles armed with electromagnetic-pulse warheads designed to short-circuit electronic systems. Nearby, a wing of penetrating aircraft carrying precision-guided munitions peeled away and began bombing runs. In space above them, a constellation of small satellites began to de-orbit payloads of heavy-metal rods capable of destroying the hardest targets known to man. The commander watched the attack take shape from his underground sanctuary. A network of satellites and unmanned air vehicles began to provide the command center with battle damage assessment data as the attack was still underway. The objective of the strike had been to blind the enemy by dismembering his command and control system, and initial reports showed that it had been largely successful. A red stain spread across the situational displays indicating that the initial waves of ordnance had ripped holes in enemy command and control networks. But other nodes remained functional. Here and there other green lights started to flicker, indicating the presence of previously unknown nodes only now coming to life in the wake of the first attack. The automated battle manager had already evaluated the initial results of the attack and was formulating the next strike. A list of weapon-target pairings appeared on a screen in front of the commander. He deleted several targets, withholding them for later, then sent the list forward to his component commanders for execution. He looked over at his theater force commander, seated at another screen across the room. Only time War would tell whether his men would be needed in the Information Age to bring this conflict to a close. By THOMAS G. MAHNKEN

Winter 1995–96 / JFQ 39 JFQMahn 9/20/96 10:40 AM Page 40

■ JFQ FORUM

ver the next few decades, The most far-reaching effect of the infrastructure. Some see the informa- the growth of microprocess- information revolution is the ability to tion revolution as the dawning of a ing and information tech- integrate a myriad of systems into what new, bloodless age of conflict domi- nology will create a revolu- the Vice Chairman, Admiral William nated by “netwar” and nonlethal tech- O 2 4 tion in military affairs (RMA) that Owens, calls a “system of systems.” nologies. More modestly, it is likely to transforms the tools, conduct, and The network’s sensors could sweep the expand the options available to deci- eventually the nature of war.1 The battlefield in search of an enemy, with sionmakers for waging lethal war. emergence of long-range precision data processing systems fusing sensor strike and information warfare may inputs into a single coherent picture The Dawn of Shock Warfare usher in an era of conflict based on and disseminating it to units world- The increasing range and accuracy paralysis and shock rather than attri- wide. Individual weapon systems could of weapons will enable us to mass ex- tion. While no panacea, concepts and use this information to “bid” on tar- tremely lethal fires at will. Rather than organizations for waging war in the in- gets, much as traders bid on stocks, closing on an enemy, we may be able formation age may offer us decisive ad- with an automated battle manager de- to engage and destroy it at long range. vantages over a range of regional ene- termining optimum weapon-target Moreover, the advent of information mies as well as leverage against a peer combinations. Data from space-based warfare may allow us to disrupt those competitor, should one emerge. sensors might, for example, be used to networks that allow an enemy to act in The development of systems target aircraft dropping precision- a coordinated manner. In combina- which collect, process, evaluate, and guided munitions, while special operation, long-range precision strike and distribute information is already chang- tions forces deep behind enemy lines information warfare capabilities may ing the way we plan and conduct mili- might be called on to identify targets provide the means to focus our tary operations. Advances in sensor for long-range ballistic or cruise missile strengths against enemy weaknesses strikes. During and and thus crush its will to resist. The re- the most far-reaching effect is the ability after strikes networked sult is likely to be a new paradigm of sensors would gather, warfare, based not on attrition but on to integrate a myriad of systems evaluate, and dissemi- the ability to paralyze and shock. A nate battle damage as- fundamental tenet of attrition warfare technology and data processing will sessment (BDA) much more rapidly is that victory can be achieved through allow us to gather and interpret an ex- than has heretofore been possible.3 the progressive destruction of an traordinary amount of information The effectiveness of long-range enemy. In the end, it is the threat of about our forces, those of prospective precision strike systems will be decided further punishment that causes surren- enemies, and the battlefield itself. Sen- by a game of hide-and-seek played by der. Shock warfare, by contrast, com- sors operating across the electromag- our sensors and enemy targets. If ad- pels an enemy to follow the course netic spectrum will locate targets as in- vances in stealth, deception, and mo- that we desire by foreclosing options formation processors fuse data from bility outpace the ability of sensors to which we deem undesirable. disparate sensors into a single coherent acquire targets, then long-range preci- A campaign combining strategic picture. They will enable us to under- sion strike systems will be ineffective. information attack and long-range pre- stand where force can be decisive as If, on the other hand, information fu- cision strike could afford us substantial well as offer greater control over its use. sion renders the battlefield transpar- leverage against a future enemy. The Robust command, control, and com- ent, long-range precision strikes will be initial phase would seek to disorient or munications (C3) systems will help dis- lethal. Where we end up on this con- paralyze an enemy by disrupting its seminate the resulting information in tinuum will shape the character of war decision cycle. This may, in turn, un- seconds, while stealthy precision strike in the information age. dermine its confidence by creating un- systems will attack an enemy discrimi- As the ability to gather, fuse, and certainty about controlling the course nately at long range. Advanced guid- disseminate information becomes and outcome of a conflict. It may also ance technology, including data from more central to military affairs, infor- increase our capacity to surprise an global positioning system (GPS) naviga- mation networks may themselves be- enemy. Strikes on hostile command tion satellites, will let us strike targets come critical targets. Thus information and control systems, for example, with an accuracy of feet from standoff warfare, by which a state denies or ma- could hamper enemy ability to employ distances. As a result, we may be able to nipulates the intelligence available to forces effectively by interfering with destroy virtually any enemy target that an enemy, may permeate all levels of the leadership’s ability to collect, can be identified. conflict, from sophisticated tactical process, and disseminate information.5 electronic warfare to strategic attacks Should the initial operation prove against civil and military information insufficient to break enemy will, we might destroy its capability to resist by Ensign Thomas G. Mahnken, USNR, is assigned to the Office massive, coordinated strikes on a range 6 of Naval Intelligence and is currently a national security of key target networks. Leverage could fellow in the John M. Olin Institute for Strategic Studies at accrue from the ability both to achieve Harvard University. greater battlespace awareness than an

40 JFQ / Winter 1995–96 JFQMahn 9/20/96 10:40 AM Page 41

Mahnken

enemy and to exploit that advantage by operating faster than an enemy can Mobile communications react. terminal. The effectiveness of such a strategy will depend in part on our ability to collect, assess, disseminate, and exploit information. There is, within reasonable bounds, a relationship between our level of battlespace awareness and the effectiveness of our forces. At a relatively low level of awareness, for example, we may be able to identify discrete targets but unable to understand their relationship. As awareness increases, we may understand how targets form systems and identify key nodes within each system. That may allow us to employ our forces more efficiently.7

One way to increase U.S. Army the effectiveness of our forces in war will be to develop a sophisticated understanding of potential enemies in peace. Intelligence to support information warfare and long-range precision strike will, however, be a major challenge.8 We will like a chess match between grand mas- need not only to identify ters, each maneuvering while waiting individual targets with pre- for the other to make a mistake. By cision but to understand contrast, decisive outcomes are likely to how they fit into networks. Global positioning result from situations where one side In addition, we must under- system. enjoys a marked information advan- stand which nodes and net- tage, as the United States did during works are vulnerabilities.9 the Battle of Midway and the Gulf War. Highly centralized target U.S. Army A future war may thus begin with systems such as national an information suppression operation leadership may be vulnerable to a rela- studies of an enemy’s society and cul- aimed at reducing our enemy’s battle- tively small number of well-placed ture to determine the most effective field awareness while we protect our strikes. By contrast, highly distributed ways to shatter its will and in-depth own. Achieving information domi- systems such as cellular communica- analyses of its target networks to iden- nance against a peer competitor with tion networks might be much more re- tify vulnerabilities. distributed and redundant sensor and sistant to disruption. Furthermore, we communication net- must understand the effect of our decisive outcomes are likely where one works is likely to be strikes upon an enemy’s capacity and difficult. Gaining an will to wage war. This will require not side has a marked information advantage information advan- only the ability to view an enemy as a tage will depend on coherent system, but insight into its The shape of future warfare will how well we can identify and destroy values and strategic culture. One way largely depend on achieving an infor- the key nodes of an enemy’s informa- to improve our understanding of po- mation advantage. One can imagine a tion infrastructure. The level of success tential enemies might be to constitute situation in which neither side pos- required of such an operation will, multidisciplinary teams of analysts sesses a high battlespace awareness. In however, depend on our overall objec- with expertise in intelligence, informa- such circumstances, neither would be tives. It may be unnecessary, for exam- tion systems, targeting, and weapons able to conduct decisive operations. ple, to sever all links from enemy lead- effects. Such teams could conduct both Such a battle might resemble a duel be- ership to its forces. It may be sufficient tween blind swordsmen. A conflict in to disrupt the timing and coherence of which both sides enjoy a high level of its military operations for a period. battlespace awareness might look more

Winter 1995–96 / JFQ 41 JFQMahn 9/20/96 10:40 AM Page 42

■ JFQ FORUM

The information suppression op- systems will depend on the character forces to defeat any remaining pockets eration could include attacks on com- of an enemy and our overall objec- of resistance in detail. At a minimum, mand and control networks, civil tives. The scope and duration of the it might disorient an enemy, reducing telecommunications, and even mili- operation will depend on an enemy’s its ability to oppose the insertion of tary and civilian leaders. Long-range sophistication and retaliatory capabil- theater forces. ballistic missiles with high-explosive ity as well as our ability to identify and The combination of weapons of and earth-penetrating warheads, for swiftly strike its target systems. Against mass destruction and long-range preci- example, could be used against leader- a relatively unsophisticated enemy sion weapons will make the future bat- ship targets, including hardened facili- with a limited infrastructure such an tlefield extremely lethal. To credibly ties, while cruise missiles armed with operation may be relatively straightfor- project power abroad, we must develop electromagnetic-pulse warheads dis- organizations that fight effectively rupted information networks. Some the ability to disrupt enemy in such an environment. This may targets may be fixed and others mo- information networks may deter include the means to insert and bile. Coordinating such an operation extract forces rapidly. Once in- would include deciding which net- aggression serted in a theater, ground forces works should be infiltrated and ex- may have to disperse, reduce their ploited and which ones destroyed. ward; against a peer competitor it signature, and move rapidly.14 They However extensive prewar prepa- could involve the integrated use of may, in fact, come to resemble the Pen- rations, we are unlikely to ever enjoy tens of thousands of precision-guided tomic division, designed to operate on perfect information about an enemy.10 munitions over hours or days. In any the nuclear battlefield.15 In the words of Jomini: event, our capacity to inflict shock will From Theory to Practice [While it] is unquestionably of the highest im- depend on an ability to strike vital tar- portance to gain [perfect] information, so it is a get systems in parallel over a short pe- No single concept of warfare can thing of the utmost difficulty, not to say impos- riod.12 In essence this was the ap- address the entire spectrum of conflicts sibility; and this is one of the chief causes of proach of air planners prior to the Gulf we may face. The type of campaign de- the great difference between the theory and the War: rather than rolling back Iraqi air scribed above, for example, will have practice of war.11 defenses before attacking strategic tar- limited utility at the low end of the We may fail to identify key nodes in get systems, networks were bombed warfare spectrum, though intelligence, an enemy’s infrastructure or be unable from the outset of the war.13 surveillance, and reconnaissance capa- to destroy those we attack. Nor will an Strategic air and missile defenses bilities may be useful in such contin- enemy stand by passively as it is pum- are a prerequisite to strikes against gencies. The combination of long- meled. Rather, it will attempt to repair vital assets. Without them, an enemy range precision strike and information individual targets, reestablish old net- could credibly threaten retaliation warfare may instead provide our deci- works, and build entirely new ones. against U.S. forces and allies for strikes sionmakers with expanded options to Success will ultimately depend on de- upon its homeland. Defenses could deter and wage war against regional stroying enemy information networks protect friendly forces and reduce an powers or a peer competitor. The faster than they are rebuilt. Conduct- enemy’s confidence in achieving its demonstrated ability to disrupt enemy ing rapid battle damage assessment objectives by long-range strikes. More- information networks, for example, and formulating and launching follow- over, the combination of long-range may deter aggression. Threats against on strikes before an enemy reacts may precision strike and strategic defense command and control systems could therefore be a key source of leverage. may convince an enemy that continu- render an enemy unable to direct its An information suppression oper- ing to employ offensive systems is fu- forces should war occur, while destruc- ation could shatter an enemy’s will to tile. An enemy may instead decide to tion of the civil telecommunications fight and force it to sue for peace. If so, retain its forces for postwar bargaining. system could disrupt its economy. we may achieve Sun Tzu’s ideal of vic- A strategic campaign of the sort Moreover, in authoritarian states tory without combat. Even should an outlined above could prove insuffi- which rely upon repression for politi- information suppression operation fail cient to force an enemy to capitulate cal control, such strikes could lead to to bring victory, we may hamper an in and of itself. In such a case, we may civil unrest. The acquisition of long- enemy’s capability to anticipate and need to deploy ground forces to defeat range precision strike and information react to our actions by disrupting its an enemy in the field. Long-range pre- warfare may also provide options for means of collecting and processing in- cision strikes may acquire a role as a non-nuclear extended deterrence of ag- formation. Moreover, we may reduce precursor to theater power projection gression against our friends and allies. its capacity to transmit timely and co- operations, just as naval gunfire has While the emerging RMA is unlikely to herent orders, thereby limiting its abil- preceded amphibious landings. Such provide a risk-free option for waging ity to coordinate its forces. an operation could dismember an strategic warfare against a nuclear- Having suppressed enemy infor- enemy’s ability to command and con- armed enemy, at least without robust mation-gathering, we could attack ca- trol its forces, allowing our theater pabilities that are vital to military operations. The selection of target

42 JFQ / Winter 1995–96 JFQMahn 9/20/96 10:40 AM Page 43

Mahnken

strategic air and missile defenses, long- The President might, for example, pre- 5 In some ways, the Gulf War repre- range precision strike and information clude the Armed Forces from infiltrat- sented the first attempt to implement such warfare could accomplish some of ing an enemy’s networks for fear that a strategy. Coalition air campaign planners those missions heretofore reserved for discovery of such activities could pro- hoped to strike at Iraq’s central nervous sys- nuclear weapons. voke a conflict. Or it might preclude in- tem by attacking the leadership, telecommunications, and electric power systems to We cannot, however, expect po- formation warfare attacks on networks paralyze the regime in Baghdad. See tential enemies to sit idly by as we carrying both civilian and military data Thomas A. Keaney and Eliot A. Cohen, Gulf amass the means to dismember them. for fear of collateral damage. War Air Power Survey, volume I, Planning and They may take any number of steps to The emerging military revolution Command and Control (Washington: Gov- reduce our ability to bring long-range will not eliminate Clauzewitzian fric- ernment Printing Office, 1993), pp. 109–11. precision strike and information war- tion. Nor will it usher in a new age of 6 A similar strategy was favored by an- fare assets to bear upon them. Perhaps bloodless conflict. It may, however, cient Chinese generals who viewed opera- the best way to deter us from employ- offer us leverage against a range of ene- tions as the interaction of ordinary force ing shock warfare would be to acquire mies in peace, crisis, and war. Long (cheng) and extraordinary or unconven- nuclear weapons. An enemy may also range precision strike and information tional force (ch’i). The former fixed and made an enemy vulnerable to unconven- use camouflage, concealment, and de- warfare capabilities may deter a poten- tional force, a flanking maneuver that dis- ception to reduce our ability to iden- tial enemy and offer coercive leverage rupted enemy strategy and forced capitula- tify and target key nodes in its infra- to resolve crises and conflicts in our tion. See the discussion in Sun Tzu, The Art structure. Or it could move them favor. Should we fail to exploit the of War, translated by Samuel B. Griffith underground. Over time, an enemy emerging RMA, however, we may well (London: Oxford University Press, 1963), might even attempt to eliminate all find ourselves at the mercy of another pp. 42–43. key nodes. Centralized switched tele- power who has mastered it. JFQ 7 Conversely, lacking reconnaissance, phone networks could be replaced by surveillance, and data processing, an enemy distributed cellular networks, and na- NOTES may be able to make up for a relatively low tional power distribution could be re- level of information by employing its forces 1 See, for example, A.J. Bacevich, “Pre- en masse. placed by local networks. An enemy serving the Well-Bred Horse,” The National 8 See Edward A. Smith, Jr., “Putting It could also use information warfare Interest, no. 37 (Fall 1994), pp. 43–49; Mary Through the Right Window,” U.S. Naval In- techniques to disrupt our command C. FitzGerald, “The Russian Image of Future stitute Proceedings, vol. 121, no. 6 (June and control networks. War,” Comparative Strategy, vol. 13, no. 2 1995), pp. 38–40. Nor may we be free to conduct (April–June 1994), pp. 167–80; James R. 9 See John A. Warden III, “The Enemy as long-range precision strikes and infor- FitzSimonds and Jan M. van Tol, “Revolu- a System,” Airpower Journal, vol. 9, no. 1 mation warfare based on military effec- tions in Military Affairs,” Joint Force Quar- (Spring 1995), pp. 40–55. tiveness criteria alone. In the future as terly, no. 4 (Spring 1994), pp. 24–31; An- 10 Kenneth F. McKenzie, Jr., “Beyond drew F. Krepinevich, Jr., “Keeping Pace with today, the use of force will be limited Luddites and Magicians: Examining the the Military-Technological Revolution,” Is- by political considerations. We may, for MTR,” Parameters, vol. 25, no. 2 (Summer sues in Science and Technology, vol. 10, no. 4 1995), pp. 17–19. example, be constrained from striking (Summer 1994), pp. 23–29; and Andrew F. 11 Baron de Jomini, The Art of War, trans- an enemy homeland, especially if it Krepinevich, “Cavalry to Computer: The lated by G.H. Mendell and W.P. Craighill possesses the means to threaten us with Patterns of Military Revolutions,” The Na- (Philadelphia: J.B. Lippincott & Co., 1862), weapons of mass destruction. Future tional Interest , no. 37 (Fall 1994), pp. 30–42. p. 245. wars could come to resemble not the 2 William A. Owens, “The Emerging Sys- 12 For a cogent critique, see Richard Gulf War, where our Armed Forces were tem of Systems,” U.S. Naval Institute Proceed- Szafranski, “Parallel War: Promise and Prob- free to strike virtually any military tar- ings, vol. 121, no. 5 (May 1995), pp. 35–39. lems,” U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings, vol. 3 get they wanted, but the Korean War, Implementing such a concept puts a 121, no. 8 (August 1995), pp. 57–61. premium on the ability to gather, correlate, 13 where concern over potential Chinese Keaney, Gulf War Air Power Survey, vol- interpret, and transmit information much and Soviet responses restricted our ac- ume I, chapter 1. more rapidly than previously possible. This 14 Gordon R. Sullivan and James M. Dubik, tions and created a sanctuary from then poses daunting challenges to data fu- Land Warfare in the 21st Century (Carlisle Bar- which enemy forces operated with im- sion, high-data-rate communications, and racks, Pa.: Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. punity. Or our dependence on space inexpensive precision munitions. See James Army War College, 1993), pp. 12–25. systems for navigation, communica- R. FitzSimonds, “The Coming Military Rev- 15 See, for example, A.J. Bacevich, The tion, and intelligence collection may olution: Opportunities and Risks,” Parame- Pentomic Era: The U.S. Army Between Korea translate into a reluctance to launch at- ters, vol. 25, no. 2 (Summer 1995), p. 34. and Vietnam (Washington: National Defense 4 tacks against an enemy’s space systems See John Arquilla and David Ronfeldt, University Press, 1986), chapters 3 and 5. for fear of retaliation. The use of infor- “Cyberwar is Coming!” Comparative Strat- egy, vol. 12, no. 2 (April–June 1993), pp. mation warfare may likewise be re- 144–46; and Alvin and Heidi Toffler, War stricted, especially during peacetime. and Anti-War: Survival at the Dawn of the 21st Century (New York: Little, Brown and Com- pany, 1993).

Winter 1995–96 / JFQ 43 JFQMetc 9/19/96 12:47 PM Page 44

■

At 0248 hours, eight Apache helicopters pushed into enemy territory, flying fifty feet above the ground at 120 mph. Lieutenant Colonel Johnson, the Black Team commander, assigned the lead aircraft the primary mission of navigation. Each relied on a TADS/PNVS suite, enabling them to fly and fight at night in bad weather. For operational security, the team flew at high speed and low altitude with navigation lights blacked out and total radio silence, a dangerous combination. They were going in to strike a newly detected critical mobile target, a concentration of surface-to-surface missiles (SSMs) which had just deployed in the deep battle area. Suddenly the sky, hills, and ground below were surreally lit by a blinding flash as the lead helicopter exploded. As night vision devices returned to normal, trailing crews detected incoming missiles. Several of the Apaches fired their 2.75 inch (70mm) Hydra rockets in the direction of the attackers. The team then went to ground, hovering Acoustics low in any covered or concealed position that was available. The rear- most Apache had time to detect and hit an enemy Mi–28 Hokum heli- on the copter with a well-placed Longbow Advanced Hellfire missile. Attackers and defenders hovered in effective hide positions. Luckily st for the Black Team, the attack seemed to be a chance engagement 21 Century rather than a prepared ambush. The ensuing battle, during which both sides maneuvered for position, was like a firefight between two infantry Battlefield patrols with troops dodging from rock to tree as their teammates tried to pick off any enemy soldiers who happened to expose themselves to fire. By MARVIN G. METCALF Johnson knew that time was on the side of the enemy, whose ground forces, surface-to-air weapons, and perhaps attack helicopter reinforcements would soon arrive. Disengaging would be difficult. So he gave the order to use his unit’s new weapon system: “Fire acoustic missiles!” Each helicopter fired two missiles which rose to an altitude at which discriminating sensors could quickly detect, locate, and identify enemy Hokum helicopters. The Hokums hovered out of sight behind tree stands, hills, and buildings, but to no avail. Within seconds the missiles pitched over and homed in on their targets. They fell straight down through the rotor blades destroying all six of the remaining Hokums. U.S. Army Colonel Johnson played it safe. After counting the six explosions, he was fairly certain that the acoustic missiles had destroyed all or nearly all the engaging enemy helicopters. He then cautiously began to maneuver his team out of the area. Within moments, the Black Team was again en route to the target area. This mission was critical: the enemy SSMs had to be destroyed.

44 JFQ / Winter 1995–96 JFQMetc 9/19/96 12:47 PM Page 45

Metcalf

re there really acoustic mis- is necessarily lost trying to find the aerial movements. Although surpris- siles that can detect, iden- specific bandwidths or locations of ingly effective, these devices were soon tify, and home in on likely targets. It is somewhat like scan- overtaken by the new technology of enemy targets? Even flying ning a large crowd for a particular indi- radar. A vidual through a straw. Medieval armies dug tunnels to targets like Hokums? This may be technology of the future, but it is just Unlike existing sensors, an penetrate fortifications. Sophisticated around the corner. A prototype acoustic acoustic sensor is wide open, searching tunnel detectors still are used along homing sensor system is being tested as across all frequencies and angles. Also, the demilitarized zone in Korea. Sol- the brilliant anti-tank (BAT) submuni- it is very low in background noise. Its diers have always sought an effective tion for the Army tactical missile sys- wide-open, simultaneous acquisition means of detecting underground tem (ATACMS) or for the tri-service of all incoming signals means it is a sounds, the seismic subset of acoustic stand-off attack missiles (TSSAM). much more efficient sensor, especially technology. To stay ahead of the power curve, when complemented by a “soda-straw” In Vietnam unattended ground commanders should anticipate high- sensor that can be pointed at the target sensors (UGS) included the air-deliver- tech weapons such as acoustic missiles. for added data collection or terminal able seismic intrusion detection system Many technologies will emerge, prof- guidance. (ADSIDS) and the remotely monitored fering more opportunities for high- The potential of acoustic technol- battlefield sensor system (REMBASS), tech battlefield applications. The oper- ogy was recently dramatized by apply- which included seismic, acoustic, mag- ational commander of the 21st century ing it to anti-armor munitions in the netic, and infrared sensors to detect must understand, integrate, and apply the movement of people innovative capabilities to find, fix, commanders throughout history have and vehicles. These were fight, and finish enemy forces. used sound to pierce the fog of war tactically placed to track troops along the DMZ, Ho Targets and Sensors Chi Minh Trail, and else- Acoustics exemplify emerging form of BAT munitions. However, this where. Current wide area mine systems technologies with great potential for development is merely an extension of (WAMS) and artillery-delivered ground the high-tech battlefield. The acoustic- the traditional military ear for listening sensors also use seismic sound to de- based seekers are ideal as wide area tar- to sounds on and around the battlefield. tect target movements. get acquisition sensors. Coupled with Even so, acoustics technologies Sound Across the Ages st terminal guidance sensors, they can emerging on the 21 century battle- find and kill targets. That such preci- Commanders throughout history field offer the prospects of a major leap sion strike weaponry—acoustic or oth- have used sound to pierce the fog of forward from contemporary UGS and erwise—is the wave of the future even war—or maintain it to their advantage, WAMS-type systems, just as the minié impressed the public during the Per- as in muffling cannon wheels. This ball rifle of the Civil War surpassed the sian Gulf War. century has seen greater scientific in- Brown Bess smooth-bore musket of the More accurate sensors require terest in sound. Flash and sound rang- Revolutionary War. The new BAT sub- smaller warheads which offer econom- ing equipment was perfected during munition is just the tip of the acoustics ical trade-offs. These warheads reduce World War I to direction find (DF) iceberg. BAT represents only an initial logistical requirements as well as inflict enemy artillery. Sophisticated elec- step in the development of future less collateral damage and fewer civil- tronic sensors such as the Italian pas- acoustics sensor capabilities. ian casualties. Such technological ad- sive acoustic location system (PALS), Seeking Acoustic Signatures vances will yield several significant Swedish sound ranging system-6 gains for future warfighting. The supe- (SOARS-6), and Russian standard The distinctive aspect of the revo- riority of acoustic sensors for wide area SCHZ-6 acoustic artillery ranging sys- lution in 21st century battlefield target acquisition is derived from the tem are being employed to triangulate acoustics is not found in acoustics tech- technology itself. Various electromag- and locate enemy batteries. nology itself, but in advances in other netic (radio/radar) or electro-optic (EO) Early in World War II, air defend- unrelated, parallel technologies. Specifi- sensors in general use today are able to ers on both sides of the English Chan- cally, it comes from synergistic applica- receive only very narrow bandwidths. nel used simple airplane noise detec- tions of developments in miniaturized, For instance, EO sensors can usefully tors, like giant stethoscopes aimed at high-tech data processing capabilities picture only small, specific areas. the sky, to locate, track, and even iden- which have appeared recently. Though scanning techniques can be tify aerial targets and the direction of Earlier uses of acoustics amplified used to broaden the field, a lot of time our natural sense of hearing by me- chanical means. Later technology added sophisticated electronic amplifi- cations of sound waves. However, this Lieutenant Colonel Marvin G. Metcalf, ARNG, is executive process was limited to simply making officer of the 1st Brigade, 40th Infantry Division. He completed ambient sound audible to human ears this article while attending the U.S. Army War College. so that people could respond. In the

Winter 1995–96 / JFQ 45 JFQMetc 9/19/96 12:47 PM Page 46

■ JFQ FORUM

Operating acoustic sensors from a Firing aerial rocket flying platform has challenged design- from Apache attack helicopter. ers and engineers. If ground noise was

McDonnell Douglas undistinguished from platform noise, the system simply could not differenti- ate the sounds of various targets. Acoustics pioneers thus devised methods to distinguish platform or engine noise, in part by borrowing techniques and fancy signal data processing from radar. Using on-board microcomputers to manipulate noise parameters such as amplitude and phase, they could fil- ter out self-noise from even high- speed, flying platforms like BAT. Once designers produced flying acoustic sensors that worked, various battlefield applications became readily apparent.

global positioning is bolstering the accuracy and effectiveness of high-tech weaponry

Taking practical advantage of acoustic weapons combined with the reconnaissance vehicles required the simultaneous, parallel development of microcomputer processing, including advanced miniaturization, that provided on-board computers with significant processing power and memory. The on-board computer facilitates the signal processing and acoustic signature matching. It also handles on- Launching unmanned board mission planning and naviga- aerial vehicle from tion systems for autonomous USS Shreveport. operations of potential unmanned aer- U.S. Navy (Robert Scoggin) ial vehicles (UAVs) applications of acoustic sensor technology. case of listening posts, audio detectors, high-flying, sensor-fused submunitions The increasingly ubiquitous global remote seismic detectors, and other de- to find and destroy them. Yet these positioning system (GPS) is bolstering vices, sound was detected and moni- systems only detect noise and respond the accuracy and effectiveness of tored by humans or electronically re- to it. emerging, high-tech weaponry. Most ported to have occurred, such as using The distinction between current missile and unmanned vehicle systems remote UGS. systems and BAT technology is simple. of the next century will be designed to Recently developed artillery rang- Assisted by high-tech, miniaturized, function with GPS-based navigational ing systems and acoustic sensor muni- high-speed, high-capacity, on-board systems and follow-on generations of tions have only been incremental im- data processing, the BAT acoustics sys- this technology for convenience, accu- provements. Sounds detected by tem not only hears a target but ana- racy, and effectiveness. sensitive directional microphones that lyzes sound waves. Using differentiat- Ears to the Ground are used in the PALS system are coming characteristics, BAT filters all puter-processed to provide data read- sounds which its wide-open sensors ac- The most significant aspect of outs for its operators. When seismic quire to focus on and attack selected synergistically developed acoustic sensors detect approaching targets, targets. Moreover, as difficult as such weapons will be an ability to find and WAMS mines automatically dispense target discrimination can be from a discriminate among targets using dis- static ground platform, BAT sensors de- tinctive acoustic signatures. BAT sub- tect it from an air vehicle moving at munitions launched from ATACMS or high speed. multiple-launch rocket system (MLRS)

46 JFQ / Winter 1995–96 JFQMetc 9/19/96 12:47 PM Page 47

Metcalf

munitions employ relatively simple ca- Next, a system must identify dis- mid-term is that the sensors are pas- pabilities to detect and home in on en- criminating characteristics that distin- sive. A column of tanks with its engine noises from enemy tanks. More guish the sound being monitored: gines off may avoid detection by an sophisticated applications, such as frequency, harmonic frequency rela- overflying acoustic missile. Yet the acoustic anti-helicopter missiles de- tionships, amplitude, and changes in next generation of R&D may address scribed earlier, use acoustic-based sen- frequency and amplitude. Such charac- this handicap through a refinement of sors to detect and select a given target teristics can identify a class of targets, a acoustic technology: active acoustic for which a missile is programmed. target type, or an individual target. sensors. Operating like an aerial sonar, Once a target is selected, the missile Comparisons of incoming sound sig- sending out pings and detecting re- homes in and destroys it. nals are made literally hundreds of turns from desirable targets, they could Missiles on reconnaissance, sur- times per second against unique char- yield a greater magnitude of collection veillance, and target acquisition (RSTA) acteristics of recorded targets. If a and accuracy capability to acoustic sys- missions will be able to detect and match does not occur, the unmatched tems. An advanced WAMS could use identify targets that it has been pro- target sensing is dropped, and the acoustic sensors to locate, identify, and grammed to recognize, report their lo- computer continues to seek matches select targets. Another potential cations to J-STARS or ground station for other signals. Given such a massive acoustic system might employ a net- modules, and perhaps cue sensor plat- computational requirement, the im- work of active acoustic sensors seeded forms to commence an attack or initi- portance of powerful, on-board com- across an enemy rear area to report on ate more detailed intelligence gather- puters is evident. movements and activities. ing. This technology will turn Another advantage of seeking Future commanders must antici- precision strikes into ultra-precision acoustic signatures to locate and iden- pate uses of more advanced technolo- strikes. The added accuracy and target tify potential targets is that it adds yet gies, especially missile delivery systems another dimension to a linked to acoustic technology which many targets cannot operate without threat. Like our own identifies, selects, and finds critical tar- generating a detectable signature forces, an enemy can hide gets. Conversely, operational comman- from visual detection be- ders must be able to defend against hind camouflage nets or comparable capabilities. discrimination made possible by ad- more substantial cover. Similarly Acoustic science is just one area of vanced sensor systems will transform enemy forces can hide from infrared emerging high technology with appli- surgical operations into arthroscopic detectors and remotely locate their an- cations for the next century. Analysis surgical operations. tennas as well as use emission control of its potential reveals rapidly develop- The first step in the process of tar- to protect radio frequency emitters. ing trends and battlefield applications get acquisition, identification, and des- that such discoveries may offer or even ignation is to screen out ambient Sending Out Pings impose. No nation can afford to ignore sounds. Acoustic receivers are always Countermeasures will be at- the accelerating march of such militar- wide open and thus hear everything. tempted, but an enemy must hide its ily applicable technology. Europe, Filtering ambient background noises acoustic signature. Many targets can- Japan, and certain Third World nations makes it possible for further specific not operate without generating a de- have the skilled scientists and techni- noise filtering and wave analysis. The tectable signature. For example, tanks cians who may discover the next war- self-noise generated by a vehicle en- cannot move without running acousti- winning technology. In the wake of gine and air turbulence created by cally distinctive engines or making the Gulf War, the Russians have ac- movement of a vehicle is filtered out acoustically distinctive track noises. knowledged the importance of win- and identified during reception. On the future battlefield acoustic fac- ning the information war and estab- Remaining sounds are isolated by tors may become the proverbial straw lished information as a “fourth realm” factors such as frequency and amplitude that breaks the camel’s back when an of warfighting doctrine (after land, sea, with detectable acoustic signatures plot- enemy attempts to conceal its assets. and air). ted like visual graphics in a voice-based Target files, developed and prepro- The most successful commanders lie detector. The acoustic signature of a grammed in the mission computer of on the battlefield of the future will un- target type such as the T-80 tank, like an acoustic missile, can be updated as derstand and apply integrated systems human voiceprints, is distinctive—at required. The missile can be proof advanced technology. Our most crit- least sufficiently for targeting purposes. grammed to respond only to specific ical training mission is to ensure that For example, consider the success that target sets. On the other hand, RSTA our leaders understand and anticipate the Navy had in the 1970s and 1980s missions may require that an entire the potential and complexity of near using underwater microphones (or hy- target list be left wide open in order to future warfare. JFQ drophones) to collect the unique acous- identify the full range of targets which tic signature of submarines. a reconnaissance mission might encounter and report. One constraint on acoustic-sensor weapon systems envisioned for the

Winter 1995–96 / JFQ 47 JFQCatn 9/19/96 12:50 PM Page 48

JOINT WARFARE and Military Dependence on Space U.S. Air Force Computer generated composite map of Port-au-Prince using multispectral imagery Retaining the current international character of space will from LANDSAT (inset). remain critical to achieving national security goals. —National Security Strategy, July 1994

By JEFFREY L. CATON

After thirty-five years, space systems remain an integral part of national security. Desert Storm—which some regard as the first space war—represented the first widespread use of military space systems by common soldiers, sailors, marines, and airmen. It was also a harbinger of future military operations in which dependence on space-based force enhance- ment will continue to grow. This dependence by the Armed Forces on space systems reveals a vulnerability that an enemy with knowledge and expertise could exploit and con- centrates on an ignored threat: countries with little or no space capability. The exploitation of space dependency can greatly benefit an Major Jeffrey L. Caton, USAF, is assigned to the Space Standardization and Evaluation Division, Cheyenne unsophisticated foe by dramatically Mountain Operations Center, U.S. Space Command. degrading our efficiency in combat.

48 JFQ / Winter 1995–96 JFQCatn 9/19/96 12:50 PM Page 49

Caton

studies concentrated on satellite vul- Figure 1. Criteria for Evaluating Space System Vulnerability nerabilities, it is important to look at Ability to Influence vulnerabilities in joint surface forces Criteria U.S. Forces Enemy Forces (including air forces) that result from Types of Space Systems Force Structure Concentrate Attacks to dependence on space. The extent of our space dependency link is based on in Use Increase Specific three criteria: the types of space sys- Availability/Quality of Dependence tems vital to ongoing operations, the Alternate Means extent of their use among our forces, and an enemy’s ability to affect system Extent of Space System Force Structure Cannot Influence performance (see figure 1). Application Both the United States and its ad- Training versaries can influence the first criterion—the importance of a given space system to ongoing operations. We may Enemy Means to Affect Protection Attack Ground Systems affect it in our selection of force struc- System Performance ture which, in turn, dictates the avail- Countermeasures Electronic Warfare ability and quality of alternate means of performing system tasks. Since these ASAT Attacks alternate means may include assets from other countries, dependence on space systems extends to coalition operations. At least eight U.S. and coalition civilian satellites were called upon Dependence The dependence on a specific during Desert Storm to augment U.S. 5 Military space operations were ex- space system is linked not only to the systems. It can be expected that such tensive as early as 1963.1 Both the availability of alternate means of per- systems would be “fair game” for United States and the Soviet Union forming system tasks, but also to the enemy antisatellite (ASAT) efforts dur- 6 used space capabilities to observe effectiveness and efficiency of those ing wartime. 3 strategic weapon systems, and that means. Since space systems and their An enemy can influence these cri- helped provide for a stable nuclear de- alternate means can be affected by out- teria by conducting operations that in- terrence strategy. The use of space by crease dependence on a the military has not been limited to at least eight coalition civilian satellites given space system. This strategic nuclear applications but has may include physically covered the conflict spectrum. A sci- were called upon during Desert Storm destroying alternate ence adviser to President Reagan noted means of task perfor- that “even in a very limited war, we side forces, however, military depen- mance or simply concentrating their would have an absolutely critical de- dence on space—the so-called space de- efforts to increase U.S. use of satellites. pendence on space today.” 2 Indeed, pendency link—is dynamic in a combat The second criterion—scope of space systems have played a crucial environment; that is, subject to con- application—is influenced only by the role in a number of limited operations: stant change in its magnitude. United States. Once again, our force El Dorado Canyon (Libya, 1986), structure is the key player since it dic- Vulnerability Earnest Will (the Persian Gulf, 1988), tates the amount of surface-based and Just Cause (Panama, 1989), to The ultimate objective of military equipment that is acquired and the name a few. space operations is the effective em- level at which it is used. Space systems Probably the best known military ployment of space capabilities in are well ingrained in our forces, as il- use of space occurred during Desert support of land, sea, and air opera- lustrated by three applications from Shield/Desert Storm, when it greatly tions to gain and maintain a combat Desert Storm: communications, navi- enhanced coalition effectiveness. Space advantage throughout the operational gation, and intelligence. Over a thou- systems provided support for naviga- continuum and across the three levels sand single-channel, manportable tion, weather, missile defense, commu- of war. satellite radio units were issued at nications, reconnaissance and surveil- —Joint Pub 3–14, Space Operations small unit level. All told, satellites provided 85–90 percent of intratheater lance, and target acquisition. As we Two studies conducted by the face increasing global responsibilities and intertheater communications. Ford administration in 1976 concluded Also, thousands of global positioning with smaller forces, our ability to ac- that the United States was growing de- complish military missions will de- system (GPS) receivers were used by pendent on satellites for various func- coalition ships, planes, and ground pend ever more on such force-enhanc- tions, with little provision for satellite ing support from space. survival during wartime.4 While the

Winter 1995–96 / JFQ 49 JFQCatn 9/19/96 12:50 PM Page 50

■ JFQ FORUM

troops to navigate in unfamiliar and Figure 2. High Altitude Nuclear Tests, 1958–62 featureless terrain. Finally, each service supported an ongoing initiative called Test Series/Date Test Name Warhead Yield Explosion Altitude Tactical Exploitation of National Capa- bilities (TENCAP), which allowed joint- HARDTACK force tactical units to receive and sort 21 Aug 58 Teak megaton range ~ 48 miles intelligence data directly from space.7 12 Aug 58 Orange megaton range ~ 27 miles The third criterion—enemy ability ARGUS to affect system performance—can be 27 Aug 58 Argus 1 1–2 kiloton 125–300 miles influenced by both ourselves and ad- 30 Aug 58 Argus 2 1–2 kiloton 125–300 miles versaries. The United States can affect 26 Sep 58 Argus 3 1–2 kiloton 125–300 miles the enemy’s ability to attack friendly space systems by using countermea- FISHBOWL sures for satellites.8 These protective 29 Jul 62 Starfish Prime 1.4 megaton 248 miles measures fall under the “space control” 20 Oct 62 Checkmate submegaton tens of miles mission area. The objective is defend- 26 Oct 62 Bluegill Tripleprime submegaton tens of miles ing friendly space assets and denying 21 Nov 62 Kingfish submegaton tens of miles an enemy use of his own. Currently, the popular view of space control em- Source. Defense Nuclear Agency. phasizes its role in the larger category of “information warfare.” As such, space control strategies are geared apply even to systems that have open particular interest was the “argus ef- more toward the protection and denial access, such as GPS. Simply put, if the fect,” named for the shell formed of satellite data than physical attacks enemy cannot use space or must use it around the earth by beta particles after on space system assets.9 at a disadvantage, he can only gain by a nuclear detonation. Trapped radia- An enemy might weigh the vul- knocking space systems out. tion from the test explosion with the nerability of a space system to deter- The equipment and tactics re- largest yield, Starfish Prime which had a mine if the U.S. space dependency link quired for attacks on ground systems 1.4 megaton warhead, inadvertently could be impacted. How can an enemy by conventional, special operations, damaged at least three satellites. take advantage of such vulnerabilities? and terrorist forces are readily available. The equipment for cer- ballistic missiles can optimize the Exploitation tain ground-based, air-based, and apogee for ASAT effectiveness [Satellites] would be so valuable to sea-based electromagnetic jam- the overall order of battle that any op- ming also is obtainable from ponent would have to take them into many countries, especially the former The overall ASAT system concept account in his overall battle plan and Soviet Union (FSU). Methods of attack was proven by the 10th Aerospace De- try to exploit any possible weakness.10 against the space segment include di- fense Squadron at Johnston Island in rect ascent and coorbital weapon sys- 1964–1975.14 Successful operation of Attacking our space systems could tems and directed energy beams that this unit required years of research and provide an enemy with excellent lever- can disrupt or destroy satellites.12 FSU testing. The many challenges for an age by degrading our combat efficiency has demonstrated several types of ASAT enemy to develop and operate such a and effectiveness. An enemy who is systems, and this technology may be- system can be divided into three areas: not dependent on space systems (civil come available to aggressor nations. tracking and targeting, delivery, and or military) can target ours with no warhead. fear of retaliation in kind. In such a Feasibility of Attack Tracking and targeting a satellite is case no space deterrence exists for the One method of electromagnetic often considered an expensive process United States. disruption is the high-altitude detona- that requires an immense infrastructure Enemies with no space capabili- tion of nuclear devices. Three series of and highly qualified technical person- ties can lease them. America may con- high-altitude nuclear tests conducted nel. However, the Kettering group, an duct diplomatic space control by en- by the United States between 1958 and informal network that monitors space couraging states not to provide space 1962 (see test summary in figure 2) activities, has proven that it can be support to foes. This occurred during demonstrated electromagnetic phe- done using common and inexpensive Operation Desert Shield when France, nomena that affected space operations: electronics with minimal training. For working in collaboration with the widespread ionization, electromagnetic example, in 1978 a 12-year-old student coalition, agreed not to sell SPOT mul- pulse (EMP), and artificial auroras.13 Of at Kettering Boys School, with the aid tispectral imagery data to Iraq.11 But of his physics teacher (a Kettering cutting off access to space data may group member), predicted within a 24- make the targeting of U.S. space assets hour range when the Cosmos 954 satel- more attractive to an enemy. This may lite would reenter the atmosphere. The

50 JFQ / Winter 1995–96 JFQCatn 9/19/96 12:50 PM Page 51

Caton

group also was credited with discover- ing the then-secret Soviet launch facil- Titan IV with MILSTAR ity at Plesetsk in 1966 as well as track- communications ing Soviet spy satellites that were satellite. observing the 1967 Arab-Israeli War.15 In both cases the tracking was done without modern calculators and personal computers. Today, an enemy can purchase commercial software packages to calculate orbital mechanics and can access the computer Internet to obtain U.S. Air Force the orbital parameters of satellites. Using this information, tracking and targeting a nuclear ASAT within its effective radius (usually measured in miles 16) is certainly feasible. Once a target is selected, a delivery vehicle must place the warhead in a given effect radius. Not including countries with established missile pro-

grams (namely, the United States, U.S. Air Force countries of the former Soviet Union, France, China, and Great Britain), there are at least 22 states with active ballistic missile programs.17 Ballistic missiles can be developed to optimize the apogee for ASAT effectiveness. Technological hurdles to the development of missile systems may be overcome with the help of FSU workers for hire: NPO Energomash, Russia’s leading developer of liquid-fueled rocket U.S. Air Force engines, lost much of its experienced staff in September 1993.18 Hiring expertise could also help develop space hardware for the final guidance and control of warheads. But generating a satellite bus was another Employing space-based task accomplished by a group of ama- systems (from top), teur radio enthusiasts who designed, for missile warning, constructed, and operated six satellites. weather, communica-

Built mostly in their garages, the first tions, and navigation. U.S. Air Force orbiting satellite carrying amateur radio equipment (OSCAR 1) was launched in December 1961. The design and performance of the OSCAR series have improved over time, yet the majority of the work is still done by amateurs using their own resources. The final challenge to operating a nuclear ASAT is acquiring a warhead. Though difficult, developing or procur- ing nuclear weapons is feasible enough that our national security strategy lists their proliferation as a major concern. A recent Air Force study estimated that in 1993 as many as 10 countries were capable of producing nuclear weapons. U.S. Air Force

Winter 1995–96 / JFQ 51 JFQCatn 9/19/96 12:50 PM Page 52

■ JFQ FORUM

This could increase to 25 by 2003.19 A separate probe by a government prolif- NORAD/SPACECOM eration study team estimated that Cheyenne Mountain Operations Center. eight third world countries would be added to the list by 2000.20 Effects Spending billions in space makes little sense if the assets are unusable in wartime.21 An attack on our space assets could impact every element of national power—political, diplomatic, economic, and military. During conflict, a priority of any commander is to prepare the battlespace 22 for combat operations—that is, to “stack the deck” to his advantage. An enemy has much to gain by exploiting the dependency

link between our terrestrial forces and (Carol Floyd)SPACECOM force-enhancing space systems. An assault on U.S. military space systems is plans an offensive with the high-alti- given areas on earth are heavily popu- a force multiplier for an enemy. tude nuclear environment in mind (for lated by satellites. This “bunching” If prepared, the Armed Forces example, EMP, atmospheric ioniza- could allow secondary satellite kills could probably operate in remote the- tion), it can opt to outfit troops with through debris fratricide. This could aters without the aid of space systems. low-tech equipment and procedures have a cascading effect as new colli- However, based on the increasing that would be unaffected by such an sions create more debris.25 The bottom strength of space dependency links, attack. Devices such as signal flags, line is that an enemy need not possess they would have problems operating compasses, and presurveyed attack space forces to be a space threat. under the immediate and unexpected routes could be turned into enemy The use of any nuclear device is loss of critical space support, which force enhancers that exploit GPS navi- likely to have significant political im- would give at least temporary advan- gation and satellite communication plications. While it may be acceptable tage to an enemy. That edge could in- links that are suddenly severed. An to direct such a device at inanimate ob- crease by synchronizing attacks on enemy could thus strengthen the syn- jects, the indiscriminate nature of ASAT space systems with assaults on terres- ergistic synchronization effects of his may not be acceptable to neutral coun- trial forces. While this may not enable terrestrial attack. tries whose space systems and related an enemy to triumph militarily, it may A nuclear ASAT can destroy or economic links may be impacted. But cause loss of life and materiel sufficient damage satellites in its kill radius. As a faced with an enemy who has a low re- to bring our withdrawal. consequence of the inadvertent satel- gard for world opinion (a Saddam Hus- Bang for the Buck lite damage caused by the Starfish sein or Mu’ammar Qadhafi), these fac- Prime nuclear test, it was obvious that tors may have little effect on enemy The most effective and least de- nuclear ASATs would have limited use- strategy. Given that reality, how can we fendable method of attack against fulness because of unavoidable collat- best prepare against such a threat? space systems is the high-altitude deto- eral damage they would inflict on nation of a nuclear device.23 Depend- other U.S. satellites.24 While such dam- Countermeasures ing on the yield of the warhead, a nu- age may concern us, it is of great bene- In considering countermeasures clear ASAT could attack multiple fit to a country which is not space de- against threats to space systems, the satellite systems with one detonation. pendent. Without penalties—indeed objective is to assess all elements of a Such an attack would have temporary with benefits—for collateral damage, system for vulnerabilities and provide and permanent effects on U.S. forces. an enemy can pursue indiscriminate survivability measures. Proliferation Depending on the design and operat- area targeting that allows less sophisti- and reconstitution measures can then ing radio frequency of the target, tem- cated targeting and delivery systems be added to ensure continuous capabil- porary effects could last minutes, for its ASAT. ity on all levels of conflict. hours, or days. These effects can be The permanent damage to satel- As microelectronics become more used to great advantage. If an enemy lites may introduce secondary damage sophisticated, they are more vulnerable mechanisms that would benefit an to radiation. The radiation level needed enemy. Even though space is vast, many of the useful orbits to support

52 JFQ / Winter 1995–96 JFQCatn 9/19/96 12:50 PM Page 53

Caton

to produce instantaneous failure in cir- conducting operations which normally 12 Jelen, “Space System Vulnerabilities,” cuits today is two orders of magnitude include space dependency links. pp. 91–95. less than in the 1970s. Worse, domestic 13 Samuel Glastone and Philip J. Dolan, vendors who produce radiation-toler- The military use of space is a dou- editors, The Effects of Nuclear Weapons, third ant semiconductors fell from twenty in ble-edged sword with strengths as well edition (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1977), pp. 45–48, 71–77, 461, 487, 1990 to four in 1995. DOD investment as vulnerabilities. Faced with growing 518–23; F.R. Gladeck et al., Operation Hard- in radiation-hardening technology also responsibilities and decreasing forces, tack I–1958, DNA report 6038F (Washing- dropped, from $50 million in 1989 to our ability to accomplish missions will ton: Defense Nuclear Agency, December 1, $20 million in 1995.26 depend more and more on force-en- 1982), pp. 257–73; C.B. Jones et al., Opera- hancing support from space. tion Argus 1958, DNA report 6039F (Wash- reconstitution through space launch The resulting vulnerability ington: Defense Nuclear Agency, April 30, may be affected by both the 1982), pp. 58–72. offers promise as a countermeasure United States and a potential 14 Curtis Peebles, Battle for Space (New enemy. Developing counter- York: Beaufort Books, 1983), pp. 85–94. 15 Equipment hardening and auton- measures to threats against our space Doug Stewart, “Satellite Sleuths,” Air and Space, vol. 5, no. 2 (June/July 1990), pp. 27–34. omy can reduce electromagnetic and systems may enable us to avoid a need- 16 Peebles, Battle for Space, pp. 88–91. The radiation interference from ASAT at- less loss of lives and equipment on the reported satellite killing radius for the 10th tacks. However, hardening counter- battlefield of the future. JFQ Aerospace Defense Squadron was five miles. measures would offer little protection During two CEL tests the ASAT simulated from blast and debris damage. Also, NOTES warhead passed within 0.89 and 2.019 nautical miles, both highly successful. the ability to maneuver may be of little 1 Paul B. Stares, The Militarization of 17 Thomas A. Torgerson, Global Power use since there would be only a few Space, U.S. Policy, 1945–1984 (Ithaca, N.Y.: Through Tactical Flexibility: Rapid Deployable minutes for ground operators to ob- Cornell University Press, 1984), p. 240. Space Units, Airpower Research Institute Re- serve the ASAT launch, assess intent, 2 Quoted in Paul B. Stares, Space and Na- search Report no. AU–ARI–93–6 (Maxwell Air determine its target, and command the tional Security (Washington: The Brookings Force Base, Ala.: Air University Press, 1994). target satellite to avoid the impact Institution, 1987), p. 46. 18 Jeffrey M. Lenorovitz and Boris Rybak, 3 Stares, Space and National Security, p. 47. area. But such maneuver capability “Engineers Flee Low-Paying CIS Jobs,” Avia- 4 Stares, The Militarization of Space, pp. may be useful for an untargeted satel- tion Week and Space Technology, vol. 139, no. 169–70. lite to avoid a fratricide threat resulting 13 (September 27, 1993), p. 53. 5 Peter Anson and Dennis Cummings, from a successfully targeted satellite. 19 Headquarters, U.S. Air Force (AF/XOXI), “The First Space War: The Contribution of briefing entitled “Countering Weapons of The use of on-orbit spares (prolif- Satellites to the Gulf War,” RUSI Journal, vol. Mass Destruction Proliferation” (1993), p. 5. eration) confronts the enemy with 136, no. 4 (Winter 1991), p. 49. 20 Torgerson, Global Power, p. 16. more potential targets. However, since 6 Stares, The Militarization of Space, p. 21 Giffen, “Space System Survivability,” some of these spares may have to be in 248. Also see George F. Jelen, “Space System p. 100. orbits similar to the target satellites to Vulnerabilities and Countermeasures,” in 22 Battlespace is replacing battlefield in be effective, they may also be vulnera- National Interests and the Military Use of military lexicons and is taken to be the logi- Space, William J. Durch, editor (Cambridge, ble to fratricide. cal extension of battlefield into all dimen- Mass.: Ballinger Publishing Co., 1984), p. 90. Reconstitution through space sions and media of operation. 7 David A. Fulghum, “Talon Lance Gives launch offers promise as a countermea- 23 Stares, Space and National Security, p. 77. Aircrews Timely Intelligence from Space,” sure. As one analyst observed, “reconsti- 24 Stares, The Militarization of Space, p. 108. Aviation Week and Space Technology, vol. 139, 25 Canavan, “Military Space,” p. 12. tuting essential space assets after hostili- no. 8 (August 23, 1993), p. 70. 26 R.C. Webb et al., “The Commercial ties begin may be the only method of 8 Robert B. Giffen, “Space System Sur- 27 and Military Satellite Survivability Crisis,” ensuring that critical systems survive.” vivability: Strategic Alternatives for the Defense Electronics, vol. 27, no. 8 (August While reconstitution would not be ef- 1990s,” in International Security Dimensions 1995), pp. 21–25. fective in preventing an enemy’s initial of Space, Uri Ra’anan and Robert L. Pfaltz- 27 Giffen, “Space System Survivability,” operations, it would allow for satellites graff, Jr., editors (Medford, Mass.: Archon p. 92. to be reintroduced into the battlespace, Books, 1984), pp. 87–92, discusses satellite possibly in support of U.S. counterof- countermeasures. 9 fensive operations. Robyn A. Chumley, “Supporting the Warfighter,” Airman, vol. 38, no. 11 (No- Finally, one of the best counter- vember 1994), p. 35. measures, training, is not directly re- 10 Gregory H. Canavan and Simon P. lated to space systems. Future joint Worden, “Military Space in the Next Cen- and coalition training should insert tury,” lecture to Air University Spacecast unexpected interruptions of space sys- 2020 Team, Air War College, Maxwell Air tems support. Our forces should iden- Force Base, Ala., 1993, p. 10. tify and practice alternate means of 11 Patricia Gilmartin, “Gulf War Rekin- dles U.S. Debate on Protecting Space Sys- tems Data,” Aviation Week and Space Technol- ogy, vol. 134, no. 17 (April 29, 1991), p. 55.

Winter 1995–96 / JFQ 53 JFQRma 9/19/96 12:51 PM Page 54

■

he JFQ “Essay Contest on the adopting new operational and organi- forces. Emerging sensors will reveal far Revolution in Military Af- zational concepts. A few essays pre- more about the battlespace as weapons fairs” was conceived in late sented an alternative view that the rev- strike with greater accuracy and lethal- T1993 to encourage innovative olution is an essentially socio-political ity at virtually unlimited ranges. Sur- thinking and writing on serious changes phenomenon which will be character- vivability will require speed, stealth, in the conduct of war that many ana- ized by the predominance of low-in- and mobility. Only one essay predicted lysts predict for the coming decades. A tensity conflict and non-nation-state that vastly improved battlefield de- total of 70 essays were forwarded to a enemies. fenses might effectively nullify long- panel of judges. Both the number of en- Most contestants saw the revolu- range precision strike. tries and the range of contributors re- tion as an expanded opportunity Span of conflict in the next century flected a much wider and deeper interest rather than a growing risk. Their as- will increase demands on the Armed in RMA than anticipated. This initial sumption was that the Nation can Forces to deal with an ever wider spectrum of threat, ranging from operations other than war to wholly new types of high tech, high intensity combat. The essays entered in the contest reflect a divergence of opinion regard- THE 1995 ing whether a common force structure exploiting RMA technologies will be able to deal with both types of conflict, or whether very different kinds of RMA ESSAY forces will be needed for each threat. Time as reflected in an improved information flow will result in vast increases in the tempo of operations, CONTEST which will lead to faster command cycles. One result will be to merge the strategic, operational, and tactical lev- success has led to a decision to conduct maintain a significant technological els of war as sequential operations give a second contest in 1996 (see the an- lead over prospective enemies and also way to simultaneous or parallel opera- nouncement on page 19). leverage this lead to profound military tions. Some predict that wars of attri- effect if it so chooses. On the other tion will be reduced to a short series of The Contestants hand, a number of authors took the engagements. A total of 75 individuals, includ- significant future threat to be the in- Information domination will be in- ing 69 men and 6 women, were au- creasing availability of high-tech mili- creasingly critical for battlefield suc- thors or coauthors of the essays (three tary capabilities to less-developed na- cess. Many foresee the predominance submitted multiple entries). Of this tions. In their view, there is a real of information operations over strike number, 59 were members of the danger that states with conflicting val- and maneuver. To some, the cyber- Armed Forces: 44 active, 9 Reserve, and ues may exploit U.S. and Western vul- world will become an independent 6 retired. Among these military contes- nerabilities using highly lethal sys- theater of warfare. One writer even tants were 28 active and Reserve offi- tems. Such potential enemies may be predicted the possibility of future cers or officer candidates in the grade less concerned about casualties, collat- “bloodless” victories through battle- of O4 and below including enlisted eral damage, or conflict escalation. field cyberwar, while several envi- personnel from each service. The over- Some essays addressed new tech- sioned prospects of bloodless strategic all breakdown, both active and Re- nologies—such as microsystems and defeat for the Nation resulting from serve, was 16 Army, 16 Navy, 24 Air biotechnology—but a majority focused the vulnerabilities of an information- Force, and 3 Marine Corps. Of the 14 on operational and organizational is- based society. civilian entrants, 6 were DOD employ- sues emanating from information and Space control will be increasingly ees. Moreover, two foreign officers long-range precision strike systems. critical to battlefield success. Some see were among the contestants. These and other themes on the future American dominance in space offering of warfare were articulated in the essays. relative advantages over the long The Essays term, while others see an asymmetric The 70 essays reflected a broad Operational Issues U.S. reliance on space as a critical vul- range of RMA-related issues. Most sup- Strike effectiveness through long- nerability. The emerging importance ported the contest’s major supposi- range precision strike and information of space may result in its becoming an tions: that we are in the midst of a technologies will greatly increase the independent theater of warfare. technology-based military revolution future vulnerability of large signature and that the key to military leverage is

54 JFQ / Winter 1995–96 JFQRma 9/19/96 12:51 PM Page 55

Organizational Issues Virtual organizations. Information The entries in the 1995 contest of- Smaller and lighter: Information technology—especially vast increases fered much food for thought and, in and strike technologies will provide in communication bandwidths—will many critical areas, reflected a wide di- much greater combat effectiveness to allow real-time networking of many vergence of opinion on the dominant smaller systems and units. This capa- units and individuals, regardless of aspects of the future of warfare. These bility, and the need to reduce unit sig- physical location. Traditional com- essays as a group also posed a number natures, will result in smaller, lighter, mand hierarchies may prove too cum- of intriguing theoretical questions: and more mobile forces—with more bersome for system requirements. We ■ Assuming a tech-based RMA, can we flexible organizational requirements. may see the growth of virtual organiza- choose our future? What are our deterrence Function over form: RMA operations—especially reconnaissance strike and warfighting goals? What specifically tional needs will result in less service- complexes—that define themselves by can we achieve through this revolution? specific and more function-specific ap- function and capability instead of se- ■ To what extent will technology itself determine future change? Where will it proaches such as standing joint niority and service relationships. One lead us? commands on the tactical level. Joint- of the essays advocated complete elimination of formal battlefield hierar- ■ Will our enemies be the first to ness and the traditional view of indi- achieve an RMA by using technologies that chies, allowing the networked system vidual services will become outmoded. exploit our vulnerabilities? If so, will they In their place functionally based com- itself to naturally define the most effi- redefine warfare? mands will focus on space, informa- cient future organizational structures. tion, strategic operations, mobility, etc. A number of the essays focused The Winners Increased automation of traditional on the need for more innovation in The judges included officers of all command and control functions will the military to deal with the chal- services as well as senior civilian offi- be required because of the faster tempo lenges of RMA. One made a case for a cials. Each judge was familiar with the of battlefield operations. New roles will process of evolutionary development broad range of historical and recent is- have to be found for decisionmakers in while another saw a necessity to skip a sues and literature surrounding RMA. a system that processes information generation and leap into RMA. Still A blind judging process was used. The more quickly than it can be assimi- others centered on institutionalizing editor of JFQ masked the identities of lated and acted upon. the process of innovation as well as entrants before their essays were dealing with cultural impediments to passed to the panel and the names organizational change. were not revealed until a determination on the prize winners had been finally reached. RMA Essay Contest Award Ceremony The contest rules stipulated three questions that were to be “rigorously addressed.” While no entries that met The Vice Chairman, Admiral the basic contest rules were dismissed William A. Owens, presented out of hand, the judges looked for awards to winners in the first quite compelling arguments in consid- annual JFQ “Essay Contest on the ering essays that departed from the an- Revolution in Military Affairs” in a nounced contest parameters. The en- ceremony held at the Pentagon on tries that fared best and were January 11, 1996. Cosponsored by considered competitive (including the National Defense University many that were not selected) tended to Foundation and the Office of Net Assessment, the contest meet two criteria: solicits innovative concepts for ■ They offered clear guidance on link- operational doctrine and ing RMA theory with real choices and deci- organization by which the Armed sions that will need to be made in the fu- Forces can exploit emerging ture. (While these were some intriguing technologies. (MamieJoint Chiefs of Staff M. Burke) theoretical pieces, they did not fare as well Prizes of $2,000, $1,000, and $500 were awarded for the three Award ceremony as the more practical approaches.) top entries. The cash awards were made possible by contributions participants: Caton, ■ They tended to be focused on long- to the National Defense University Foundation from Northrop Metcalf, Mahnken, and range change, particularly concepts and or- Grumman and SAIC. First prize was presented to Ensign Thomas G. Owens. ganizations for exploiting technology. Mahnken, USNR, for “War in the Information Age” (in addition, he Although only three prize winners won a $500 prize for the best essay by a junior officer). Lieutenant Colonel Marvin G. Metcalf, ARNG, took second place for “Acoustics were named, a number of other entries on the 21st Century Battlefield.” Finally, Major Jeffrey L. Caton, USAF, were considered highly competitive, received the third prize for “Joint Warfare and Military Dependence two of which appear herein. on Space.” All three essays are published in this issue. JFQ JFQ

Winter 1995–96 / JFQ 55 JFQSng 9/19/96 12:53 PM Page 56

■

The New Dimension in War

By AJAY SINGH Success and failure in war—as in most human endeavors—rests on the ability or failure to create and exploit asymmetries in capabilities and action. These asymmetries result from a process of technological revolution and evolution, based on microrevolu- tions, and generalship that exploits them in time and space. Methods of warfighting undergo changes through microrevolu- tions that are usually driven by innovations such as the stirrup, crossbow, gunpowder, steamship, wireless, et al. A revolution in military affairs (RMA) occurs when there are essential changes in the nature of war requiring a reassessment of the way we plan and conduct warfare. This revolution displays a shift in the center of gravity of military activity. The common denominator is a growth in either mobility or firepower, or both, that increases the premium on time and space. Throughout history time and space have been played against each other to gain advantage in battle. With the passing of the years, time has gradually been compressed Squadron Leader Ajay Singh, Indian Air Force, is a fighter while space has expanded. pilot assigned to Air Headquarters in New Delhi.

56 JFQ / Winter 1995–96 JFQSng 9/19/96 12:53 PM Page 57

Singh

The pace of war has changed little IDA Cycle in “T time” over the centuries, and therefore warriors did not really experience the compression of time. With the advent of airpower, warfare expanded into a third dimension, and the process of Action? creating asymmetry was lifted to a new dimension. Airpower thus constituted Action an RMA, the impact of which started to be felt with the end of World War I. Today we are at the threshold of new Information technologies which promise to enlarge We They the battlefield even more and shrink the time available for decisionmaking and action to critical levels. Their net Decision effect—whether long-range weapons or information warfare technologies—will be to tighten the decision loop until Decision an asymmetry created in time proves

to be decisive. This new revolution can Note: The continuous line in the figure represents “T time” which is the time to complete the cycle. For an therefore be termed the advent of the enemy, the time to complete the cycle is “T plus time” which leads to a time differential that causes a lag fourth dimension—time. in its response with resulting adverse asymmetry. Two-Dimensional Warfare For centuries war was confined to The Industrial Revolution height- two dimensions, breadth and depth. Third Dimension ened the pace as well as intensity of Combat at sea and on land remained The advent of airpower extended combat, which led to greater lethality limited to these two dimensions even warfare into the third dimension, mak- and to the industrialization of war. The as the area of battle expanded. Subsur- ing it possible to target a nation—and tank, introduced in World War I, in- face warfare at sea did not alter the its will—directly and thus conquer ter- cluded elements of enhanced mobility basic dimension, although it did ex- ritory without destroying enemy and firepower in a single vehicle, al- pand conflict in space. Advances in forces. That began with the aerial bom- though its real significance was not rec- military technology primarily con- bardment from Austrian balloons dur- ognized until World War II when com- tributed to increased mobility and fire- ing the siege of Venice in 1849 which bat became even more violent. power in terms of depth and breadth. led to calls for a permanent ban “on Armored warfare, however, was con- Many technological advances led to an the discharge of any kind of projectile impact on the methodology of or explosive from balloons or by simi- warfighting and thus can be called mi- airpower extended warfare lar means” at the Hague in 1899.2 While the ban was not adopted, de- crorevolutions. Their effect enhanced into the third dimension, speed and lethality in battle, though struction from the air clearly heralded the results were spread over time, per- making it possible to target a fundamental change in military af- haps centuries. a nation directly fairs. Ten years before the flight of the One early microrevolution was Wright brothers, J.D. Fullerton of the the expansion of the battlefield by cav- British army’s Royal Engineers spoke of fined to the dimensions of breadth and alry. With enhanced mobility, forces a “revolution in the art of war” where depth, and continued to require the could engage at longer ranges more “the chief work will be done in the air, forces of one nation to defeat those of quickly. This was the way in which and the arrival of the aerial fleet over another to impose its will. Though Mongol cavalry swept across Asia. An- the enemy’s capital will probably con- many developments had taken place 3 other microrevolution was the stirrup, clude the campaign.” Other strategists over the centuries, warfare remained giving horsemen enhanced firepower such as Douhet and Mitchell elabo- tied physically to the surface (either on on the move.1 The English longbow rated on the concept later, but they land or at sea), and was hence two-di- 4 and 10th century crossbow also caused were more prophets than strategists. mensional. It was the acceleration of changes in tactics. Gunpowder in the Although forerunners of the third technological changes beginning in the 15th century further increased fire- dimension recognized the impact air- 20th century that led to a major revolu- power, while the grooved rifle which power would have on war, technology tion in the nature of warfighting. was fielded during the Civil War in- did not mature in the earlier decades creased accuracy and further expanded to a level where it had a revolutionary the battlefield, although within exist- effect. It was a case where doctrine ran ing limits of time and space. ahead of technology, giving rise to

Winter 1995–96 / JFQ 57 JFQSng 9/19/96 12:53 PM Page 58

■ JFQ FORUM

misgivings and skepticism. Much of the problem in understanding air- AWACS. power even today is due to the fact that landpower and seapower doctrine is based on centuries of experience while airpower is only a hundred years old. But if our understanding of airpower has been clouded for these reasons, Fullerton’s vision of the third dimension as a revolution in warfare has been amply vindicated over the last century.5 Airpower had developed sufficiently by World War I that it could be employed in combat. Between wars, it matured enough to contribute substan- tially in World War II, and warfare in the surface medium (including subsurface) could not keep pace with changes in the third dimension. The maturing of technology in World War II facili-

tated use of doctrine envisioned in ear- U.S. Air Force lier years. One classic example of the revolutionary impact of airpower was of the electromagnetic spectrum and a was not that airpower failed as some the Blitzkrieg concept, where dive move toward more accurate aerial claim; it was an ill-defined threat com- bombers leading panzer thrusts rapidly weapons profoundly affected warfight- bined with unclear political objectives destabilized and disrupted defenses ing. Though the electromagnetic spec- that fettered the third dimension. Air- into defeat.6 The Battle of Britain trum was significant during World War power remained critical as seen in the changed the course of the war itself, II, its exploitation matured in Vietnam defense of Khe Sanh or in Linebacker II. resulting in the cancellation of Ger- when precision guided munitions Around the same time, the Arab- man plans for the invasion of England. (PGMs) made an operational appear- Israeli war proved that airpower had The ability of airpower to target surface ance. The maturing of electronic war- the potential to decide the outcome of forces from the third dimension was fare is a microrevolution in military af- surface war. In the 1982 Bekaa Valley an influence on the surface battle, es- fairs and a subset of the third operations, Israel used the third dimen- pecially in the North African cam- dimension since it is primarily con- sion in a decisive manner.11 This was paign.7 Besides its offensive employ- ducted through, for, and against activi- repeated by the U.S.-led coalition in ment for destruction, the third ties in the third dimension.9 While the Persian Gulf War, albeit on a larger dimension airlifted troops and mater- PGMs provide greater accuracy and scale. This was also perhaps the first iel, thus enhancing the mobility of sur- timeliness, they must be backed war when information was employed face forces by air transport or airborne through reconnaissance, surveillance, extensively to create conditions con- operations. Creating major asymme- and target acquisition (RSTA) technolo- ducive to victory. Satellites provided tries in time and space by exploiting gies to be effective. Increased military real-time information to operational the third dimension literally lifted tra- use of space has led to a scenario of commanders. U.S. Space Command as- ditional two-dimensional warfare to space-based weapons and defenses. A sets were critical for cuing Patriot bat- nonlinear dimensions. The struggle to move toward continuous asymmetry teries. Time was of importance in such control the third dimension itself be- above the earth was evident in the SDI missions and all efforts were made to came a major military aim.8 Strategic technology of the Reagan era.10 obtain real-time information, whether bombing may not have achieved the The last hundred years of warfare for targeting Scud launchers or battle- expected objectives, but the atomic in the third dimension has clearly field targets. This war was the first bombing of Hiroshima finally estab- shown that airpower (including space) where real-time information was a real- lished what the prophets had forecast. has fulfilled its promise of being a true ity, and the results indicated that the The intensity of the revolution revolution. It is dominant in combat; time had come for it to play a crucial continued into the nuclear age, with and while it may not achieve victory role in combat. While the coalition significant advances in levels of tech- alone, airpower is nevertheless essential benefitted from compressed time-cy- nology. The most obvious fallout in to winning a war. Even in Vietnam it cles, Iraqi time-cycles had distended to the post-war era was a total shift in the such a degree that they became totally currency of power to the third dimen- irrelevant. This war was for all practical sion through nuclear weapons that purposes a combination of the potency were air deliverable. The increased use

58 JFQ / Winter 1995–96 JFQSng 9/19/96 12:53 PM Page 59

Singh

of the third dimension and the use of Although time has always been a task is the sum of the time required to sophisticated technology to shrink the factor in war, technology has never complete each of the subcycles and the time for decision-action synergy. To been at a stage where it could play an overall cycle itself. that extent, this war was the overlap in independent and dominant role in Some tasks may call for complet- which signs of another RMA could be shaping conflicts. The slow pace of war ing a number of cycles before the ac- seen—the advent of the fourth dimen- when it was confined to two dimen- tion reaches finality. The time dimension of war. sions also meant that the human decision will then be that much more sionmaking loop was never pushed to dilated compared to single-cycle tasks. Fourth Dimension its time limits by the demands of bat- The IDA cycles required for a particular The nature of the battlefield is un- tle management. It was not that time task, such as neutralizing a target sys- dergoing transformation. Fully auto- did not play a key role; rather, the ad- tem, depend on the nature of that sys- mated warfare may be technologically vantage offered by timely information tem—the vulnerability and recuper- feasible in the next twenty years.12 Air- was often overshadowed by the rela- ability of subsystems, and the accuracy power has provided a dynamic plat- tively large time required to act on it. and effectiveness of one’s own decision form for change. Its early signs were Notwithstanding this, time has always and action components of the IDA apparent in the Bekaa Valley where been crucial to surprise.13 cycle. The probability of a single-cycle nonlinearity from technological ad- task is very low, considering that some vances helped to destroy Syrian forces Reorienting the IDA Cycle cycle overrun would be needed for a at the front and to stop the Syrian 3d With the inherent mobility and reasonable degree of assurance of task Armored Division in its tracks before it firepower of airpower, the expansion achievement. But the objective clearly reached the battle. The doctrine was of war to the third dimension largely must be the reduction of the number incorporated in the AirLand Battle changed the factor of time. The dimen- of cycles required for a particular task, concept, which spoke of an extended sion of time began to be recognized as as close to unity as possible, along with battlefield where airpower would en- more important, and conscious efforts compression of each cycle (time), since gage follow-on forces and enemy tar- were made to reduce the time required the total term taken would be the sum to gather information, of all cycles. time promises to envelop the other disseminate it, make a de- One method of achieving this cision, and follow it up would be identifying the weak links in dimensions of war as a force multiplier by action. In the 20th cen- the IDA cycle, then incorporating ap- tury, rapid technological propriate solutions to strengthen the advancement has reduced cycle, or in other words reducing the gets in depth. During the Gulf War the the span needed to know, decide, and subcycle or cycle time. The solution se- indications were much clearer that fu- act with the result that time has been lected could, depending on the prob- ture conflict would involve extensive shrinking, while space (the extent of lem area, be based on improving pro- use of technology to conduct the bat- the battlefield) has been expanding. cedures or technological modifications tle at extended ranges and compressed This may lead to a state of seamless or innovations. The rule of the chain time. With further advances in tech- space, where borders become even less applies here—that is, the strength of nology, the battlefield can be expected relevant in the conduct of war, and the cycle in terms of time will often be to expand even more. Hitting targets time assumes the form of boundaries. only as strong as the weakest link of at long range with precision RSTA This border of time will be the decisive the cycle (again in terms of time). De- technologies is critical and translates factor of war and will call for orienting lays in one segment, therefore, may into the accuracy and time sensitivity the information-decision-action (IDA) well be the deciding factor. Conversely, of information. While accuracy is a cycle in terms of time. degradation of hostile IDA cycle, based matter of acquisition and guidance The IDA cycle is a basic element of on identifying weak or vulnerable posi- sensor technologies, time on the ex- the dimension of time in military af- tions of the cycle and attacking it at a panded battlefield needs greater atten- fairs and represents a set of activities re- faster pace than it can recuperate, tion. Technologies of the future may quired in all of them. The size of the could prove decisive in one’s favor. For provide highly accurate information loop is a demonstration of the time example, targeting Saddam’s command which satisfies needs on all levels of taken to achieve a specific task. The and control functions led to an asym- war, although if it is not timely it faster this cycle is completed, the metry where his IDA cycle was totally could be worthless. The result will be a greater the compression of time. The degraded in the early hours of the war, new dimension—time—which prom- aim, when operating in this dimension, and he was incapable of responding in ises to envelop the other dimensions is to shorten the cycle as much as pos- a meaningful time-frame, though of war as a force multiplier and coun- sible and thereby retain the advantage other components of military power terforce divider. of time over an enemy. It is important were available. Another example is to understand that each component of planning airfield denial missions by the cycle has its own subcycles and, ac- designing their frequency to stay cordingly, the time needed for a given within an enemy’s airfield rehabilita- tion ability in terms of time. A striking

Winter 1995–96 / JFQ 59 JFQSng 9/19/96 12:53 PM Page 60

■ JFQ FORUM

case of time versus time is the frequency-hopping technique used by M–1 Abrams. radars as an electronic counter-countermeasure in a race in the fourth dimension, against the effects of hostile electronic countermeasures. Of the advances underway, the most significant are in the information segment of the cycle. In fact, this segment is technologically more dependent than the others, and thus the payoffs are likely to be much greater. This has been recognized by many experts, some of whom have called information a new revolution in war. While the role of information in the time dimension deserves special attention, it must be recalled that information is merely a means to an end, not an end in itself. It must be seen as part of the overall IDA cycle, although a critical component of the fourth dimension. Information warfare involves using information to one’s advantage and also U.S. Army denying its benefits to an enemy. Under close scrutiny, therefore, infor- Targeting Time Cycles even if the means exist. Tightening the mation entails degrading, delaying, Had Saddam Hussein thought in cycle beyond reasonable human con- and disrupting information to confuse the fourth dimension, he might have trol was no doubt a major factor that an enemy and increase response time. realized that the only chance that Iraq led to the intermediate nuclear force The greatest change in the information had of success was the disruption of treaty since vulnerabilities on both campaign over the years has been the the coalition build-up during Desert sides increased inversely to the tight- expansion of the quantum of informa- Shield, which offered a window of vul- ening of the cycle dictated by the mis- tion which can be made available and nerability as the allies mobilized. The siles. The first step in defending the contraction of processing time (a point was not whether Iraq could have against the missile threat thus lies in microrevolution in itself). defeated the coalition in battle, but the fourth dimension as any anti-mis- The speed and volume of informa- recognition that the war would have sile defense system designer must rection, although an asset in the fourth followed a different course if the ognize. SDI did this by developing dimension, can create vulnerabilities. fourth dimension had been exploited. technologies that promised to reduce Even with reduced processing time, The coalition did control and exploit it the time needed for early warning and there is a possibility of information to a certain extent, as seen in the inter- boost-phase/mid-course interception. overload, creating congestion and deception of Scud missiles, which would The Soviet objections to SDI also re- lays in using information. Thus there otherwise have been extremely diffi- sulted from the implicit adverse asym- will be an inescapable need for the in- cult. It is worth noting that after the metry of the relative IDA cycle. formation to be time-sensitive. The war the Pentagon initiated programs As airpower demanded airpower amount of data processed will be such as the Joint Precision Strike to counter it, so will the new dimen- greater than the processing power of Demonstration Task Force (JPSDTF) to sion of time require its war to be the information system and, therefore, reduce sensor-to-shooter timelines. fought in the fourth dimension. Just as information technology application in The goals of JPSDTF include reducing air superiority was a prerequisite to combat has become more susceptible timelines, now measured in hours, to successful warfare in the third dimen- to the time factor. And since it is actu- two minutes.14 This is a clear recogni- sion, freedom of action and control of ally a subset of the IDA cycle, it is cor- tion of the impact of the fourth di- the fourth dimension will become nec- rect to term the advances in informa- mension in warfighting. In fact, the essary to operate on future battlefields. tion technology as incremental to the question of ballistic missiles being a This will lead to the targeting of time criticality of the time dimension, has- destabilizing factor is essentially linked cycles to degrade an enemy cycle, tening the advent of the fourth dimen- to the fourth dimension, as these mis- while safeguarding one’s own from sion as a true RMA. siles, especially short range ones, do enemy interference. The objective of not give the IDA cycle of the defender causing an asymmetry in this dimen- adequate time to mount a response sion will demand thought and action to create a time differential where the

60 JFQ / Winter 1995–96 JFQSng 9/19/96 12:53 PM Page 61

Singh

IDA cycle for an objective on any level In the future a number of coun- NOTES of war starts and finishes before the re- tries are likely to reduce their IDA cy- sponse time or enemy IDA cycle. If one cles, enabling them to fight in the 1 R. Ernest Dupuy and Trevor N. Dupuy, completes the cycle in “T time,” forc- fourth dimension. It is hard to see a se- The Encyclopedia of Military History (London: ing an enemy to complete its cycle in rious challenge to the United States on McDonald, 1970), p. 137. 2 Jasjit Singh, “Evolution of Politico-Mili- “T-plus time,” one creates a time differ- the global level for the next quarter tary Doctrines,” in Jasjit Singh and Vatroslav ential. In other words, to conduct time century. Only Japan has the requisite Vekaric, editors, Non-Provocative Defence technological strength. But (New Delhi: Lancer Press, 1990), pp. 17–18. the side that controls time will be in intent is another matter al- 3 David MacIsaac, “Voices from the Cen- together. Although Russia tral Blue: The Air Power Theorists,” in Peter a superior position to conduct war in now lags in fourth dimen- Paret, editor, Makers of Modern Strategy: From all dimensions sion technology compared Machiavelli to the Nuclear Age (Princeton: to the United States and Princeton University Press, 1986), p. 627. 4 Japan, it can be expected to Giulio Douhet, The Command of the warfare one must stay within the catch up. At the regional level, how- Air, translated by Dino Ferrari (New York: Coward-McCann, 1942), pp. 11–16. enemy IDA cycle, thus gaining control ever, the key question that U.S. forces 5 Tony Mason, Air Power: A Centennial of the fourth dimension. Only with will confront is whether they have suf- Appraisal (London: Brassey’s, 1994). control of time can one exploit this di- ficient power in place to counter a bel- 6 Harold Faber, Luftwaffe: An Analysis by mension and subsequently fight in ligerent able to exploit the fourth di- Former Luftwaffe Generals (London: Sidgwick other dimensions. If control of time is mension. If not, they may be and Jackson, 1979), p. 165. lost it is likely to pass on to the other threatened by the dynamics of the IDA 7 J.F.C. Fuller, The Second World War, side, and the side which loses the race cycle before reinforcements can be de- 1939–1945: A Strategical and Tactical History for control of the fourth dimension ployed. Between other states, the con- (New Delhi: The English Book Store, 1969), will find itself continuously sliding flict would be shaped by the relative pp. 220–59. 8 down in its time cycles. Recovery may capabilities of sides in the fourth di- Jasjit Singh, Air Power in Modern War- fare (New Delhi: Lancer International, be made difficult by a domino effect mension and how these are exploited. 1985), pp. 1–33. influencing current and future cycles. Of all emerging technologies, the 9 Some regard electronic warfare as The side that controls time will be in a most significant impact on the fourth the fourth dimension; Ibid., pp. 122–37. superior position to conduct war in all dimension may be the trans-atmos- 10 Simon P. Warden, SDI and the Alterna- dimensions. pheric vehicle (TAV). This technology tives (Washington: National Defense Uni- Centuries of conflict have proven will make it possible to rapidly launch versity Press, 1991), pp. 159–60. that offensive action provides the small satellites to provide cover of an 11 Eliezer “Cheetah” Cohen, Israel’s Best greatest control in any dimension of area in the event of the regular sensors Defence, translated by Jonathan Cordis warfare, and time is no exception. In being incapacitated through antisatel- (New York: Orion Books, 1993), p. 468. 12 fact, considering the potentially desta- lite warfare, which is expected to in- Frank Barnaby, The Automated Battle- field (London: Sidgwick and Jackson, 1986), bilizing nature of time warfare, the crease as reliance on the sensors grows p. 141. fourth dimension favors the offensive to cut down the IDA cycle. TAV can 13 Richard E. Simpkin, Race to the more than any other dimension. Tradi- also be employed in an antisatellite Swift: Thoughts on 21st Century Warfare tional military organizational struc- role since it will provide a highly accu- (London: Brassey’s Defence Publishers, tures may require redefinition to suit rate, flexible, and low-IDA cycle option 1985), pp. 182–84. demands of war in the new dimension with on-board directed and kinetic en- 14 John Boatman, “Army Plans Two- to pass the litmus test of a small IDA ergy weapons. Thus the impact of the Minute Warning,” Jane’s Defence Weekly cycle. Plans must ensure that nodal fourth dimension is likely to increase (June 17, 1995), p. 27. 15 points, vulnerable to enemy interfer- exponentially based on the capability Carl von Clausewitz, On War, Anatol ence, are kept to a bare minimum. of TAV which, flying at a speed of Rapoport, editor (London: Penguin Books, 1968), pp. 164–67. Hardening organizational structures Mach 30, will be able to target a point against interference should be done on the surface of the earth from its This article was submitted as an entry in the using physical and software solutions ground station in thirty minutes. It 1995 RMA Essay Contest. to provide counterforce dividers. At will therefore become virtually impos- the same time, the ability to create fric- sible to think without operating in the tion must exist to degrade enemy IDA dimension of time when planning and cycles.15 Integrating technologies—arti- conducting war. JFQ ficial intelligence, JTIDS, JSTARS, AWACS, et al.—is fundamental to the reorientation of military structure.

Winter 1995–96 / JFQ 61 JFQMcK 9/20/96 6:43 AM Page 62

■

Gas! Gas! Quick, boys! An ecstasy of fumbling Fitting the clumsy helmets just in time But someone still was yelling out and stumbling And floundering like a man in fire or lime —Wilfred Owen, Dulce et Decorum Est

U.S. Army Military History Institute

cautious, and self-regu- An Ecstasy lating. To effectively link doctrine and technology one must combine the of Fumbling: dynamism of scientific inquiry and the caution of military culture (see Doctrine and Innovation figure 1). This is not a condemnation of the By KENNETH F. MCKENZIE, JR. military mind. Soldiers are innately cautious because the stakes in their profession are high. The outcome of war is critical he information explosion is about to field complex systems that to national survival. Success or failure beginning to influence that will deluge users under mountains of is measured in human lives. most conservative of institu- trivial data attached to easily thwarted Operational doctrine and organiza- T tions, the Armed Forces. strike technologies. What we can be tions must be flexible enough to em- Professional journals from Parameters sure of is that we are on the verge of brace new capabilities that arise from to Proceedings are awash with articles an explosion in ideas as well as sys- research and applications far removed on RMA and military technical revolu- tems that promises to change the way from military requirements. Taking tion (MTR).1 Depending on their tech- war is fought. In fact, RMA is nothing practical battlefield advantage of new nological or ideological bent, these ar- more than the military application of ideas is the responsibility of doctrine. ticles either hail new developments as ideas from a global revolution in tech- To do this, the military culture must be a shining path to the future or nology brought about by advanced prepared to leap forward with technol- gloomily decry the shortcomings, both computerization techniques. ogy and establish meaningful para- real and perceived, of emerging con- digms for practical soldiers from tech- cepts and hardware. Thus it is difficult Two Cultures nological starting points that may to tell if we are entering an era in Technological innovation is un- appear unreachable at first. At the same which perfect knowledge—that is, in- ruly, spasmodic, and to a certain extent time, the culture must be discerning formation dominance—will be coupled uncontrollable—the opposite of devel- enough to reject irrelevant or unneces- to perfect strike capabilities or if we are oping force structure and doctrine sary capabilities. This is a tall order for which tends to be highly predictable, cautious minds forced to deal with explosive opportunities, but the alternative is disaster. An inability to accommodate ideas or, more likely, a tendency Major Kenneth F. McKenzie, Jr., USMC, is executive officer to misapply concepts will be paid for in st th d of the 1 Battalion, 6 Marines, 2 Marine Division, and opportunities lost in combat. previously was assigned to Headquarters, U.S. Marine Corps.

62 JFQ / Winter 1995–96 JFQMcK 9/20/96 6:43 AM Page 63

M C Kenzie

The interaction between emerging Figure 1. The Scientific and Military Worlds technologies (together with the weapons and capabilities that ensue) Scientific Culture Military Culture and doctrine—the way land, sea, and air Driven by discovery; non-hierarchical Driven by knowledge; hierarchical forces fight—will be the fundamental dynamic in determining whether new Embraces the unknown Avoids the unknown ideas are digested and used properly. In Externally directed Internally directed short the question is whether we can Long term orientation Short term orientation translate technological concepts into Outcomes are secondary Outcomes are paramount battlefield advantage.2 That is a crucial step, because technological advances, regardless of their inherent brilliance, must be harnessed to a coherent model systems and technologies that we have approach. Doctrine changed as the to be employed for decisive advantage. not requested and that have not been technology arrived. Many other exam- New technologies must be integrated validated by any concept-based de- ples come to mind. Royal Navy battle- with tactical organization, techniques, mand, which is uncomfortable and in- cruisers during World War I were de- and procedures. This is easy to under- evitable. Increasingly, the origin of a signed and built for a high-speed stand but difficult to accomplish. It re- capability will become less important. scouting role, yet they were eventually quires managed, directed interaction of The only criterion will be its advantage forced to lie in the line of battle, scientific and industrial methods with a in battle. largely because they looked like battle- military culture that must deal with the New ideas and technologies intro- ships—which had disastrous results at realities of the battlefield. These two duce potentialities, Jutland. The process of melding tech- some self-generated, nologies and doctrine is difficult be- translating potential into functional others externally cre- cause both are “moving targets.” purpose dictates the pace of ated. Cumulatively, When new technology only mod- they shape the expecta- ifies an existing paradigm for the con- organizational and doctrinal integration tions for the new idea. duct of war, it can be readily subsumed What is this thing sup- and digested. It may also be misap- posed to do? How can we measure its plied. The disastrous fielding by the worlds may be far apart, but they can success? Some expectations, such as French of the Mitrailleuse in 1870 is an eventually be merged. Avoiding an “ec- the Manhattan Project, are obvious, example (this early machine gun was stasy of fumbling” over integration can others less so. Translating potential employed as an indirect fire weapon provide the margin of victory over an into functional purpose, articulating and kept so secret that its users were opponent who is struggling with the an end state, can destroy a project be- unfamiliar with its capabilities). Con- same problems. fore it reaches fruition, regardless of versely, some technologies establish Chicken or Egg? technical feasibility. Expectations can entirely new paradigms—the tank, air- be set too high or low. Either extreme plane, and radar, for example (though Requirements may be driven from is counterproductive. The ability to de- it should be remembered that the tank the bottom up based on combat imper- termine a reasonable and attainable was initially misused as a pillbox, the atives, or from the top down based on end state for new technology dictates airplane as a horse that flew, and radar a concept for employment. Ideally, re- the pace of organizational and doctri- as a pair of binoculars). The creation of quirements are identified, then di- nal integration. This can be difficult, revolutionary new paradigms like rected technological advances provide because relationships of this nature are these is relatively rare. Most new tech- capabilities to answer the need. This neither linear nor static. Instead, the nologies only modify existing meth- almost never happens—and in an era interactions are dynamic—expecta- ods, although even incremental modi- of exploding ideas, requirements are tions change as technologies mature. fications eventually may greatly vastly outpaced by burgeoning techni- At the same time, existing doctrine change an operational paradigm. cal capabilities. This means that many and organizational patterns are not ideas emerge from a growing external frozen. They, too, are responding to ex- Germany and Chemical Warfare base, offering exponential advances internal stimuli. The German attempt to integrate creasingly dislocated from a conserva- The development of the XB–70 as the technology of gases in World War I tive internal approach to require- a high-altitude supersonic penetrating is a telling case of the difficulties in ments. In some cases this means that bomber in the late 1950s is a case in harnessing technology to military pur- the requirements system is being point. Despite technical feasibility that poses. No clear requirement generated wrung inside out. We are examining was demonstrated, the improvement the capabilities inherent in gas; instead the relevance and utility of advanced in Soviet air defenses forced a shift in Air Force strategic bombing doctrine, away from high altitude to a low-level

Winter 1995–96 / JFQ 63 JFQMcK 9/20/96 6:43 AM Page 64

■ JFQ FORUM

chemical assets emerged almost with- great maneuver battles on the Western Ypres out regard to requirements. Gas war- Front at the beginning of World War I In the winter of 1914 the Ger- fare began as a technological initiative had not been decisive. Out of broken mans experimented with gas in two of the German chemical industry. It is plans came the establishment of static small-scale attacks, but it did not affect the story of the translation of an ex- positions which yielded slowly but in- enemy troops. In October 1914, at perimental concept into integrated evitably to trench warfare. This re- Neuve Chapelle in France, tear gas (di- doctrinal and organizational accep- flected a strategic stalemate that char- aniside chlorosulphate) was delivered tance. The final adoption was ulti- acterized the conflict until 1918. by primitive artillery projectiles.3 In mately expressed in approved tactics, Strategic mobility, made possible by January 1915, at Bomilov in Russia, ar- techniques, and procedures, all part of railroads and theater logistics, enabled tillery-delivered xylil bromide was a coherent doctrine for employment. both sides to shift reserves to prevent used, but an attack designed to take The cost of achieving this integration local successes from becoming break- advantage of the presumed effect of was time—time lost that could never throughs. At the same time, on the tac- gas was a costly failure. Extreme cold be recovered. tical level, fire dominated the battle- weather dissipated the effects of the German experience with offensive field. The limited offensive tactical gas. Problems were encountered in chemical warfare is particularly rele- mobility of foot-mobile infantry, horse- matching gas projectiles with high ex- vant today because it clearly illustrates drawn artillery, and primitive battle- plosive shells.4 Despite these setbacks the difficulty of integrating developing field logistics systems could not over- German scientists and soldiers re- technology and existing doctrine. In come the defensive supremacy of fire. mained interested in gas. Certainly the many ways, it parallels the broad yet It was virtually impossible to generate Allied newspaper articles claiming new second-order technology of informa- opportunities for operational maneuver and ominous French gases were a spur tion management as related to the bat- beyond the depth of enemy trenches to German chemical enthusiasts. tlefield. Unlike the tank or airplane, gas before the latter could redeploy suffi- Fritz Haber of the Kaiser Wilhelm was not developed as an independent cient forces to reestablish his defenses. Institute for Physical Chemistry in weapon. It did not alter the paradigm The Germans endeavored to break Berlin observed these failures and of- of ground combat in World War I. In- this static front on both the strategic fered an alternative gas and delivery stead its effects were distributively felt and tactical levels. The strategic re- means. He proposed using chlorine, a and essentially supportive. By 1918 course included the ill-fated 1916 Ver- lethally toxic gas to be delivered by these effects were evident across all as- dun offensive, an attempt to bleed the cloud. Large quantities of commercial pects of German tactical doctrine, but French army to death that inexorably chlorine were readily available. Gas as an enabling force rather than a cen- bled both armies white. After this, the cylinders would be transported to the terpiece. This makes the study of these correlation of forces drove the Germans trenches and opened. Favorable winds German attempts to integrate gas use- to the strategic defensive. Thus, they would move the cloud over no man’s

French 340mm (13.9 inch) gun.

ful in examining new technologies developed a doctrine of elastic defense land to Allied trenches. With enough today that must be linked to doctrine in depth, designed to minimize Allied cylinders, a lethal concentration could and organizational architecture not artillery superiority. In 1917 victory be achieved. Because the gas dispersed only directly, but more often indirectly. over the Russians allowed them once rapidly, an exploiting infantry attack again to shift their forces westward would not be slowed. Expectations Strategic Framework where they could attempt to achieve a were relatively low. Scientists saw gas Like most wartime marriages of decision before the weight of American as simply a casualty producer. Concur- technology and tactics, German gas arms could be brought to bear. rently, it might reduce the demand for warfare was driven by military neces- high explosive projectiles. For German sity. By late 1914 it was clear that the war planners, a shortage of helium

64 JFQ / Winter 1995–96 JFQMcK 9/20/96 6:43 AM Page 65

M C Kenzie

(HE) was a real possibility. No opera- turned down requisitions for supple- and while one can criticize the Ger- tional requirement had been set forth mentary artillery ammunition.5 mans for wasting an opportunity in an for gas. Once started, late in the afternoon insignificant localized operation, this General Erich von Falkenhayn, of April 22, 1915, things went better is hindsight. All the Germans expected chief of staff and de facto supreme than even the most sanguine gas en- of gas was that it would produce casu- commander, took Haber up on his thusiast could have hoped. The brunt alties. Gas had been effective against offer. He decided to employ gas on the of the attack was borne by Algerian unprepared forces, but such surprise Western Front as part of a limited at- troops who broke and ran. A gap of could be achieved only once. The suc- tack at Ypres that did not heighten ex- some four miles appeared in Allied cess of Ypres was not exploited, so thus pectations for using gas. Ypres would lines. Thirty minutes after the gas dis- it was irrelevant and meaningless. The test gas as an offensive weapon and charge, German troops advanced four shock effect of the new technology was cover redeployment to the eastern the- not matched by tactics for a ater, where the main effort for 1915 gas seemed to slow the advance of fleeting opportunity. Even if was planned. The failure of earlier the Fourth Army had been chemical experiments was duly noted. the attackers almost as much as the better prepared to continue There was no attempt to consider ex- fire of the defenders the attack, given the limita- actly how gas might change the tacti- tions of artillery mobility and cal balance of power. logistics, it is difficult to be- Duke Albrecht’s Fourth Army had and a half miles until encountering a lieve that it could have been translated emplaced over 5,700 large and small rag-tag cordon of Canadians. The as- into an operational success. chlorine cylinders. Two infantry corps saulting infantry, tired and perhaps Chemical warfare was primitive were prepared to follow the cloud this having lost their edge in the month- and unable to produce the ideal gas for would generate, overrunning the Al- long wait for proper winds, could not maneuver support, one of high toxic- lied positions. But a complication break the line. There were no German ity but not persistent. Such develop- arose. The prevailing winds were from reserves to throw in, so the momen- ments (nerve agents) rested in the fu- west to east, which was bad both in tary gap disappeared. ture. The gas used by the Germans, the long and short term for German Subsequent gas attacks over the particularly when limited to cloud at- gas cloud operations. The Fourth Army next 48 hours were unfruitful, al- tacks, could produce casualties but waited over a month before the though they caused over 5,900 Allied were too blunt to shape the battlefield weather was adequate. To planners, the casualties, a ratio of over two Allied decisively. Their net effect was simply Western Front had become a support- soldiers to each German.6 In the con- to add more friction to a situation that ing action. Falkenhayn’s attention had text of most engagements, this was a was already frightful enough. Gas was swung east to Galicia. Thus, on April heartening statistic for the Germans. a two-edged sword that worked against attackers as well as defenders, and it was not lethal enough to be used as an independent bludgeon. Without maneuver, it could not produce enough attrition to alter the balance of power. The basic problem, which would haunt the Germans for three years, was the relation of gas to maneuver. Failure to Integrate Over the next two years, the Ger- mans used various gases and delivery systems against the Russians and Ital- ians and on the Western Front. Results were generally favorable but not deci- U.S. Army Military History Institute sive. One problem with gas attacks was 10, 1915, Falkenhayn made it clear to Interestingly, the gas seemed to slow the lack of reliable means for assessing General Ilse, chief of staff of Fourth the advance and depress the ardor of results which plagued the Germans Army, that it was “more important to the attackers, who feared its unknown throughout the war. Professor Haber launch the gas cloud as soon as possi- effects almost as much as the fire of was placed in charge of the German ble than it was to obtain a deep pene- the defenders.7 There were positive chemical warfare effort. Eventually, he tration.” As if to emphasize his point, technical and tactical aspects of Ypres. served as the link among science, indus- Falkenhayn refused the Fourth Army The ratio of casualties was favorable, try, and the high command. It was not request for an additional division to and a gap opened in the French lines. exploit possible success and also Unfortunately, there was no plan for taking advantage of the penetration,

Winter 1995–96 / JFQ 65 JFQMcK 9/20/96 6:43 AM Page 66

■ JFQ FORUM

Meuse-Argonne, 1918.

an altogether successful linkage. The chemical weapons into persistent and simply added to the coefficient of fric- military distrusted scientists to some de- nonpersistent agents. The recognition tion on a battlefield already over- gree, but a reasonable amount of coop- of this duality started the interpreta- whelmed with obstacles to maneuver eration was achieved by Haber. The Ger- tion of chemical warfare technology and casualty-producing systems. Be- mans consciously decided to make their and conventional artillery tactics. cause it proved difficult to link gas to effort self-contained “on account of the With this came a heightened set of ex- maneuver, by late 1915 chemical oper- special nature of the work, the need for pectations for chemical weapons. They ations had become dislocated from of- secrecy, and the desirability of avoiding could perhaps do more than create fensive maneuver. any delay with a weapon that was de- deadly friction and fear in friend and The goal of German chemical at- veloping so rapidly.” 8 The industrial foe alike. This blunt, deadly weapon tacks had nothing to do with attempts production of gases and delivery sys- could be sharpened. at a breakthrough. Instead they sought tems was generally adequate. Over time, With this technical interpenetra- simple attrition. The nadir of this of- the problem became less one of scien- tion, artillerymen began to apportion fensive chemical employment was typ- tific research and industrial manufac- chemical targets in two categories. Tar- ified at Verdun in 1916 where massive ture than tactical application. The gases gets attacked by infantry received non- amounts of diphosgene were fired on could be produced; but what were they persistent agents, and those attacked French artillery positions in barrage supposed to do? by fire only, suppressed, or denied, re- operations which were not linked to The introduction of phosgene, a ceived persistent agents. This split was, ground maneuver to take advantage of more potent agent, was accompanied and remains today, a pillar of offensive success.10 Despite the development of a by improved artillery and projectiles as chemical warfare doctrine.9 For the technical architecture for targeting, a the principle delivery technique for Germans it began—but only began—to broad doctrine and a vision for opera- German chemical weapons. Artillery provide the structure for a coherent ap- tional integration were lacking. From added depth to gas, making it less replication of chemical weapons. Despite 1915 to autumn 1917, the German liant upon weather. Diphosgene (green these technical advances, it was clear chemical warfare effort, regardless of cross) gave German gunners a potent, that offensive chemical warfare alone how relatively advanced it was, would in-depth offensive chemical capability. would not break the tactical stalemate be without a framework for employ- By mid-1915 German offensive chemi- in the West. The opportunity proffered ment. This diffusion of purpose pre- cal thought began to embrace a con- at Ypres, combining German surprise vented gas from being used in an inte- cept which has become basic to chemi- and Allied unpreparedness, defied grated combined arms effort. cal warfare: the division of offensive replication. In fact, if the machine gun was the essence of infantry, then gas remained the essence of attrition. It

Figure 2. German Chemical Warfare Development, 1914–18

Time Illustrative Battles Expectations Effects Doctrine

1914–15 Bomilov, Nueve Chapel, Ypres none mixed none 1915–17 Verdun low indecisive, attritive technical only, not linked to maneuver 1917 Riga, Caporetto moderate successful, attritive informal technical and operational; linked to maneuver 1918 Michael high very successful formal technical and operational; linked to maneuver

66 JFQ / Winter 1995–96 JFQMcK 9/20/96 6:43 AM Page 67

M C Kenzie

as lungs. In the German Michael offensive of 1918, mustard agent was fired as a barrier to deny the flanks of attacking formations and against targets that were not to be assaulted by infantry. Nonpersistent agents such as chlorine and diphosgene were fired against targets to be carried by the Ger- man infantry. It was a sophisticated approach: lachrymatory gases, or throat irritants, were mixed with other

U.S. Army Military History Institute gases to force defending infantry to re- move their masks, thus rendering them vulnerable to lethal agents. As Changing Expectations The Attack in Position Warfare. This doc- the 1918 offensives ground themselves out and reached an end, the Germans A doctrinal development reflect- ument set out the German approach to discovered the utility of mustard agent ing organizational and tactical changes breaking the tactical stalemate of as a defensive weapon. It proved a brought gas to the fore as a tool to trench warfare. It reflected the lessons highly effective barrier break the tactical deadlock: the intro- weapon and ultimately duction of infiltration tactics. These the technological advantage afforded by was more successful in tactics put a premium on short, high- industry was not matched in doctrine or the defense than in the intensity hurricane artillery barrages attack. Had the war re- that gas projectiles could enhance. In organizational concepts mained mobile, mus- October 1917, artillery-delivered chlo- tard agent—available to rine and phosgene were fired against both sides by 1918—might have served Italian positions on the Isonzo River at of Riga, Caporetto, and Cambrai. Gas to slow the tempo of the fight yet Caporetto, coupled with an attack led was a key element, both because of its again by denying vast areas to maneu- by infantry trained in infiltration tac- “disruptive characteristics” and be- ver forces.15 tics. The Italians were unprepared for cause it gave artillery greater effectiveness over shorter times.13 For rapid sup- both the gas and Stosstrupen and were The Lessons routed.11 It was one of the most compression, gas was far more economical. The hinge of history turned at plete successes for gas in the war and Excellent suppression, particularly Ypres, but the Germans were unpre- served as a model for subsequent at- against enemy artillery, could be ob- pared. The technological advantage af- tacks in the West. This action, coupled tained with far fewer gas than conven- forded by industry was not matched in with similar success at Riga in Septem- tional HE shells. doctrine or organizational concepts. ber 1917, were harbingers of an in- In infiltration tactics, speed of at- Ironically, initial German conservatism creasing role for gas in German offen- tack was critical, and artillery-delivered toward gas was sparked by earlier sive thinking.12 Another was the gas heightened the shock and force of small-scale failures.16 It would not be German counterattack at Cambrai. In indirect fire without requiring the long until late 1917 that offensive chemical November 1917 a short artillery prepa- preparatory fires typical of both British warfare again played a significant com- ration preceded the infantry infiltra- and French tactics at this period. To- bat role. For the Germans, systematic tion-style attack. A large percentage of ward that end, by the close of the war success with offensive chemical war- the shells were chemical, which disori- the basic load of German artillery units 14 fare finally occurred when it was used ented the British defenders as much as was 50 percent gas shells. In certain in a totally integrated operational con- caused injury. The use of gas in such operations the ratio of gas to conven- cept, when the strengths of gas war- cases was aimed at suppression, not de- tional rounds fired was three to one. fare—suddenness, shock, and variable struction, and greatly reduced the time Driven by a slowly awakening doc- persistencies—were linked to a broad, required for the German artillery to trine, technological advances were thorough tactical scheme: infiltration achieve effect on target. being integrated into organizational tactics. This interpenetration of tech- The Germans developed a vision practice and tactics. The expectations nology and doctrine yielded a coher- for effective, coherent offensive chemi- were shifting, with chemical warfare ent framework for employment. Gas cal doctrine in early 1918, when infor- techniques being integrated into a was the junior partner in 1918, one of mal procedures of the previous two larger tactical calculus. the key supporting tools for infiltra- years were superseded by a compre- An important development was tion tactics; a means, not an end. In hensive work released by the high technological, the widespread adop- this case, the shifting paradigm of in- command on January 1, 1918 entitled tion of mustard gas, or yellow cross. Mustard was lethally toxic and persis- fantry and artillery combat for the Ger- tent; it could kill up to 72 hours after mans absorbed the capabilities pro- exposure and acted against skin as well vided by gas and gave them useful

Winter 1995–96 / JFQ 67 JFQMcK 9/20/96 6:43 AM Page 68

■ JFQ FORUM

expression. Before the linkage of gas to a coherent plan for employment. Suc- 11 Patrick T. Stackpole, “German Tactics infiltration tactics, chemical warfare cess will largely be a function of how in the Michael Offensive, March 1918” (MA was a clumsy, balky killer; after the quickly we mesh them operationally. thesis, School of Advanced Military Studies, linkage it became a lethal accomplice. As we enter the next century, the Fort Leavenworth, Kans., 1993), pp. 35–41. 12 As shown in the accompanying Armed Forces must accommodate sig- Ibid., pp. 28–34. 13 T.T. Lupfer, The Dynamics of Doctrine: figure, German offensive chemical war- nificant changes in alliance structures The Changes in German Tactical Doctrine dur- fare ultimately helped to break the tac- and political direction, and soldiers, ing the First World War (Fort Leavenworth, tical deadlock on the Western Front, sailors, marines, and airmen must con- Kans.: U.S. Army Command and General but the long gap between first use in sider how best to cope with new Staff College, 1981), p. 41. 1915 and coherent employment in weapons and technologies. Not every 14 Stackpole, German Tactics, pp. 49–53. 1918 blunted its contributions. Despite decision about these weapons and 15 Stockholm International Peace Re- the best of intentions, the Germans technologies—and, importantly, how search Institute, The Problem of Chemical and were unable to rise above the lure of we think about them—will have an Biological Warfare: Vol. 1, The Rise of CB simple, direct attrition and to effec- immediate tactical effect, but as the Weapons (Stockholm: SIPRI, 1971), p. 140; tively link chemical warfare to maneu- Germans learned in World War I, an Heller, Chemical Warfare, pp. 24, 27. 16 McWilliams and Steel, Gas, p. 214. ver until 1918. By then it was too late. “ecstasy of fumbling” about how to integrate a new idea can cost dearly in The German experience offers im- both the short and long runs. Thus we portant lessons. The inability to fully should think critically about how ideas exploit offensive chemical capabilities have been integrated into military or- was linked to the dynamic nature of ganizations in the past and should not war. New weapons may have enor- hesitate to apply the lessons to current mous shock value but also operate situations. JFQ under a principle of rapidly diminishing returns. We must plan for their ini- NOTES tial use with maximum effect. If capa- 1 Andrew F. Krepinevich, in “Cavalry to bilities are either misunderstood or Computer: The Pattern of Military Revolu- unappreciated, they will be misused— tions,” The National Interest, no. 37 (Fall or, as with gas, underused. The chance 1994), p. 30, defines MTR as “what occurs for decisive action can disappear be- when the application of new technologies cause the opposition will compensate, into a significant number of military sys- often at a fraction of the original cost. tems combines with innovative operational Weapons and technologies which concepts and organizational adaptation in a are becoming available today, particu- way that fundamentally alters the character and conduct of conflict.” larly those related to information man- 2 Michael T. Mazarr et al., The Military agement, represent only part of a larger Technical Revolution: A Structural Framework global revolution in technology. On (Washington: Center for Strategic and In- the operational level, we must exploit ternational Studies, 1993), p. 18. fleeting advantages that even imma- 3 Charles E. Heller, Chemical Warfare in ture, incomplete technologies offer. World War I: The American Experience, 1917– This involves recognizing that new 1918 (Fort Leavenworth, Kans.: Combat ideas may well bring new vulnerabili- Studies Institute, 1984), p. 6. 4 ties. Time is a key consideration in Guy Hartcup, The War of Invention: Sci- using new technology, for action de- entific Development, 1914–1918 (London: Brassey’s, 1988), pp. 95–96. ferred may be success denied. At the 5 J.L. McWilliams and R.J. Steel, Gas! same time, the casual, unconsidered The Battle for Ypres, 1915 (St. Catherines, use of immature technology, while lo- Ont.: Vanwell Publishing Co., 1985), p. 26. cally successful, may prevent a subse- See also Basil Liddell Hart, A History of the quent coordinated application of its ul- World War, 1914–1918 (Boston: Little, timate strategic significance. But there Brown and Co., 1935), p. 248. is no formula for success. Each oppor- 6 Heller, Chemical Warfare, p. 31. tunity must be weighed against the po- 7 Liddell Hart, History, p. 248. 8 tential cost. Our goal must be to reduce Hartcup, War of Invention, p. 105. 9 the period of fumbling, the time in Edward M. Spiers, Chemical Warfare (Ur- bana: University of Illinois Press, 1986), p. 23; which we try to mesh capabilities with Edward M. Spiers, Chemical Weaponry (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1989), pp. 26–27. 10 Ibid.; Bruce I. Gudmundsson, Storm- troop Tactics: Innovation in the German Army (New York: Praeger, 1989), pp. 67–68.

68 JFQ / Winter 1995–96 JFQAnrn 9/19/96 1:15 PM Page 69

Leaving the Technocratic

By GARY W. ANDERSON and TERRY C. PIERCE

There is an emerging consensus that the success of Revolutions A profound change that sweeps exotic weapons in the Persian Gulf War and aside old ways and imposes new ones promise of high-tech gadgetry marked the begin- generally qualifies as a revolution. ning of a military revolution. It is believed that Most military revolutions have been enabled by technologies such as the such stunning technology has ushered in a new longbow, gunpowder, and internal era of warfare by combining long-range precision combustion engine. But these innovations did not constitute a revolution in strike with powerful overhead sensors and high- themselves. Real revolutions such as tech equipment. Unfortunately, being mesmerized Blitzkrieg and amphibious warfare came from outside the military. Only by technology may result in a narrow view of later did the doctrine and organiza- RMA. Admittedly something profound and per- tions needed to integrate the technology develop.2 Ultimately, however, a haps catastrophic is occurring. Sweeping changes revolution is too powerful and wide- are underway that could totally transform war. spread for a military institution to direct or influence profoundly. The mili- But the common view of RMA—the system of sys- tary does not drive a revolution; a tems that gathers near-perfect information to lo- revolution drives the military. cate and destroy every target in an oddly specific Why do the proponents of a system of systems which is made possible area of two hundred square miles—does not cap- by the information revolution vaunt it ture the far-reaching implications of a revolution.1 as a genuine RMA? A glance into the recent past sheds light on this stand- point. During the Cold War, the Na- tion preserved a commanding technical lead in crucial military systems such as ballistic nuclear missiles and precision-guided weapons. These sys- Colonel Gary W. Anderson, USMC, commands the tems largely depended on technologies 3d Surveillance, Reconnaissance, and Intelligence Group; that were essentially military-exclusive. Commander Terry C. Pierce, USN, serves as a special assistant Thus, it was easy to gain a technologi- to the Chief of Naval Operations and is the prospective cal monopoly on such military systems commanding officer of USS Whidbey Island.

Winter 1995–96 / JFQ 69 JFQAnrn 9/19/96 1:15 PM Page 70

■ JFQ FORUM

because the government had the eco- military. As a result potential adver- is not a cure-all. At first, people were eu- nomic means and political will to pur- saries have excellent, if not equal, ac- phoric about the potential of sulfanil- sue and sustain R&D. This Cold War cess to emerging information technol- amide. But before long the unprece- perspective has been carried into the ogy, and they will likely use it in dented success of such drugs brought information age. As a result, RMA ad- clever ways to gain military leverage new problems that we were previously herents envision that we will experi- against U.S. systems and doctrine. spared, such as cancer and other ail- ence an easy revolution brought on While the information revolution ments of a longer-lived population. has only begun to af- A similar euphoria surrounds the RMA adherents tend to think in terms of fect the military, we information revolution. Some propose cannot escape it. It that information technology will lift wonder weapons with magical properties will drag us into the the fog of war, give liberal democracies future whether we a permanent military advantage over solely by a similar kind of technical su- want to go or not. We must thus find a tyrannies, and provide a foolproof con- premacy which will translate into a way to adapt. Because the information ventional counter to nuclear weapons, profound military edge. But this brief revolution is essentially technical, dis- thus rendering them irrelevant.5 We era of military-exclusive technology is cussion of this vision of RMA has are urged not to consider whether this quickly ending. The dominant techno- tended to take us on a technocratic trip vision is plausible, much less feasible, logical development now is the so- through the narrow tunnels of academe but rather to let our imaginations leap called information revolution, and it with only occasional intimations that to ideal battle outcomes such as preci- has arisen outside the military. larger truths lie outside. This is reminis- sion strike, dominating maneuver, and It is important to distinguish here cent of an earlier revolution in medi- information dominance. Proponents between information warfare and infor- cine in which a benign transformation argue that these outcomes will emerge mation revolution. The former repre- occurred more or less automatically by more or less automatically from a sents “The struggle between two or the discovery of a wonder-drug. In 1933 properly designed system of systems, more opponents for control of the in- sulfanilamide (an antibiotic) cured a producing a military revolution. formation battlespace.” 3 The latter is German child who was dying of a As generally conceived, system of much broader and consists of the bloodstream staphylococcal infection systems RMA is essentially a revolution technical and economic upheaval and began a period of profound change in firepower. We therefore fall into the caused by disproportionate growth in in medicine. The revolution was so old trap of seeking technological solu- processing power and accessibility to great that within a lifetime whole tions to warfighting problems just as individuals and small groups. Again, classes of infections ebbed from the in- the French did with the Maginot Line.6 we must realize that the information dustrialized world. Our thinking is still in an initial revolution is occurring outside the Like their medical counterparts, utopian phase with the sort of vision- RMA adherents tend to think in terms ary optimism that accompanied the of wonder weapons with magical prop- early part of the Industrial Revolution. erties.4 However, even the greatest cure

USS Mount Whitney off Haiti. U.S. Navy (John Sokolowski)

70 JFQ / Winter 1995–96 JFQAnrn 9/19/96 1:15 PM Page 71

Anderson and Pierce

Consequently, we are not seeing possi- would cause entirely new ones of un- oversight. Their objective was to syn- ble problems information could spur. dreamt magnitude. chronize movement and maximize In the last century many in- firepower, just as an industrial plant formed people believed mechanization Military Implications synchronized production to maximize would overcome poverty and social Armies and navies adapted to the output. Most militaries are still orga- ills, enabling civilized countries to Industrial Revolution by mimicking or- nized in this way and, not surprisingly, sweep away barbarism and usher in ganizations that had proven successful they experience difficulty in adapting permanent peace. It was hard for them in industrial mass production: a hierar- to chaos and the complexity of the in- to imagine that industrial technology chy designed to support highly cen- formation age. Indeed, the exponential would not completely abolish in- tralized decisionmaking and close growth in information tends to over- tractable problems, much less that it whelm them, a phenomenon that Martin Van Creveld calls “information pathology.” 7 This is an important concept because it emphasizes the difference between the industrial and information age, namely, how to deal with uncertainty. The industrial model can be described as a centralized detail-control mindset that is derived from a desire for certainty, order, and precision. The information model can be characterized as a decentralized mission-control mindset that stems from an acceptance of uncertainty, disorder, and friction as

maneuver warfare recognizes that complex information systems—like war—are chaotic

inherent aspects of war. Supporters of detail-control—that is, system of systems RMA adherents—believe that the information revolution will eventually lift the fog of war, giving commanders an omniscient view of battlespace. This is a pipe dream because war is inherently chaotic and, as a complex information network with many inter- connections and feedback loops, it has an intrinsic chaos that will hobble centralized power structures. As military information architectures become more complex, they must follow the lead of Internet which empowers distributed nodes and also demands independent action. A centralized structure simply cannot direct events in such an Inserting troops during environment or even hope to keep Cobra Gold ’95. track of them. In other words, just as computers have flattened corporate organizational structure, the military will likewise have to restructure and flatten out its hierarchy and rely more on decentralized control. A good example of advances in information technology forcing decentralization of controls in the civilian sector is the new “free flight” concept Joint Combat Camera Center (Steve Thurow)

Winter 1995–96 / JFQ 71 JFQAnrn 9/19/96 1:15 PM Page 72

■ JFQ FORUM

Harrier flying over give us a false sense of mastery and dis- landing craft. courage real thinking. Second, we can look dispassionately at dominant trends. We should note that although technology has long tended to encourage more decentralized decisionmaking, there seems to be a trend in the military for more centralization. Finally, we can encourage innovative intellectual and organizational tendencies that appear most likely to accord with those trends, for example decentralized decisionmaking and a maneuver warfare approach in military leadership. Maneuver Warfare How ready is the military to wield the new information technology that lies at the heart of RMA? With few exceptions, the Armed Forces are essentially industrial-type organizations that stress process and control and, as a result, use centralized planning and di- Unloading Marine main rection. Unfortunately, it is “increased battle tank. operational complexity, compressed factors of time and space, and rapidly Military Photography (Greg Stewart) changing situations of a nonlinear, fluid battlefield” that make a centralized, industrially-organized military incapable of meeting the stress and chaos of modern combat.9 Yet the standard interpretation of RMA tends to ignore the organizational implications of information technology and seeks to directly integrate existing military organizations still attuned to the industrial model. The danger lies in implementing a system of systems U.S. Navy (Jeff Elliot) using an inadequate organizational concept that cannot operate in an era of the Federal Aviation Administration framework being developed on the of information dominance. In many (FAA). With growing demands to save battlefields of the 20th century that ways this is what the Soviets adopted as time and fuel, FAA wants to scrap de- promises to be the most effective solu- battlefield doctrine: maneuver warfare tailed positive control in favor of tion for the next century. It is the doc- organized under a highly centralized changing air traffic control to manage- trine of maneuver warfare, which rec- detail-control style. This systematic, ment. With new information tools, ognizes that complex information linear, and quantifiable mindset is in- free flight would give pilots the free- systems—like war—are chaotic. Ma- compatible with the frictional, chaotic, dom to fly when, where, and how they neuver warfare is designed to operate and fluid battlefield. So the real ques- choose, with both pilots and con- in and exploit that chaos. tion is what the military must do to trollers sharing responsibility for safe We are only a few decades into the adapt to the new information technol- aircraft separation. In effect, the infor- information revolution, roughly where ogy. The answer is simple: take the sys- mation revolution is about to cause the industrial revolution stood in 1840. tem of systems and adapt it from an or- the broadest change to the U.S. air traf- What can we perceive at this point, and ganizational paradigm of centralization fic control system since radar.8 what can we do about it? First, we can to one of decentralization. For warfighters, adapting to the appreciate the magnitude of the prob- The Navy-Marine Corps team is information revolution will require lem and eschew utopian solutions that well positioned to take advantage of equally radical change. Fortunately, this paradigm shift. Neither service is there is a doctrinal and organizational tied to the industrial era concept of

72 JFQ / Winter 1995–96 JFQAnrn 9/19/96 1:15 PM Page 73

Anderson and Pierce

mass and both have traditionally em- Chain of Command during Operation Desert Storm phasized placing mass at a small and decisive point. Moreover, naval forces understand war as inherently chaotic XXXX and recognize the potential of maneu- CINCCENT ver warfare, a framework of doctrine and organization developed by the Germans in response to the stalemate of trench warfare.10 XXXX XXX Ground Special Air Force Naval Like war, complex information Combat Operations Army Component Component Component systems are also inherently chaotic. Commander Forces Commander Commander Thus, we must take a much broader view of the implications of the information revolution and revamp organizational and doctrinal structures. Effec- 7th 4th 5th tive adaptation to the principles of Army Marine Fleet MEB MEB Component Component maneuver warfare means divorcing Commander Commander fighting organizations from the mechanistic, centralized control of the in- Dual Hatted Operational Control MEU dustrial model, which has always been Command better attuned to the rigid order of the Marine Corps Interoperability old assembly line than to the chaos of battle. We must seek instead a decentralized type of organization compatible with both the battlefield and the component and four Marine airpower-projection forces in a relatively information revolution—less focused ground task forces (MAGTFs) of two seamless manner. on the highly efficient production of expeditionary brigades (MEBs) and two A littoral component is truly a firepower and more on the will of an expeditionary units (MEUs) assigned to functional component. Land, sea, and enemy to resist. This is the spirit em- his naval component. While the sailors air componency can more accurately bodied in littoral componency. and marines of Desert Storm per- be described as elemental componency. formed magnificently, their command Naval forces operating ashore, includ- Potential for Change relationships can be most charitably ing in sustained operations, are best The concept of littoral compo- described as confusing. Had the employed along the coast. This was the nency captures this potential for real marines ashore linked up with change. Not only is it designed to har- those afloat their only common the biggest adjustment in littoral superior would have been CINC- ness the military potential of informa- operations may be among the tion technologies—system of systems CENT (see figure). Current com- wonder tools—but more importantly, mand relationships in Korea are naval services themselves it is a change in doctrine and organiza- more convoluted. If amphibious tion that is needed to adapt to the in- operations were attempted, the formation revolution. result would more likely be a similar case before Forward...From the Sea cod- It has been over three years since exercise in confusion. Simply put, ified the focus on littoral operations. the Navy and the Marine Corps CINCs in an ideal world should not When a Marine commander wants to drafted...From the Sea indicating their have to referee naval matters, but the make a helicopter landing, he should intent to adopt a mutual littoral ap- reality is that they must. There is a bet- not have to go up the chain to a CINC proach as an overall contribution to ter way. to “borrow” helicopters from another joint warfare. That vision was updated The concept of littoral compo- MAGTF or rely on an ad-hoc arrange- in Forward...From the Sea. Now it is nency is simple. All naval forces re- ment between the naval component the time to translate that strategy into quired to project power ashore and commander and ground component an operational concept, littoral com- support shore-based naval forces oper- commander (GCC). From a CINC’s per- ponency, and into a tactical concept, ating along a littoral should come spective, one call should get it all. Sea Dragon. under a single commander who an- To make this concept operational, The Navy-Marine team can pre- swers directly to a CINC. This provides we must discard some old thought pat- sent a challenge to a warfighting CINC a single point of contact as well as a terns. An MEF, oriented along a lit- as seen in Operation Desert Storm. The powerful tool for exploiting naval toral, is most effective—even in sus- commander in chief, U.S. Central tained operations ashore—when it can Command (CINCCENT), had to con- work in seamless conjunction with sea- tend with one Marine expeditionary force (MEF) assigned to the ground

Winter 1995–96 / JFQ 73 JFQAnrn 9/19/96 1:16 PM Page 74

■ JFQ FORUM

based aviation, logistics, and naval sur- give the flexibility needed in littoral yond the sanctity of the amphibious face fire support (NSFS). The current operations. objective area (AOA) and inviolability wisdom is that an MEF ashore in sus- Ironically, the biggest adjustment of the airspace control therein. Both tained operations should be a GCC in conducting littoral operations may the amphibious objective area and am- asset. Littoral componency argues that be among the naval services them- phibious command relationships were Navy-Marine contributions should be selves. For this concept to succeed, the a compromise. These constructs were power projection forces with their own littoral component staff must be an in- the best agreement possible in fighting zones which include land-based tegrated Navy-Marine effort with offi- through service rivalries in the past, marines and the sea space required to cers of both services rotating com- but they may not be in the future. support them in areas of responsibility mand. If a marine commands, then a The key to grasping littoral com- belonging to CINCs or JTF comman- Navy officer should be chief of staff ponency will be to change the view of ders. In some cases, either the ground and vice versa. Some Navy officers are littoral operations. In the past am- or air component commander (ACC) still uncomfortable with a marine di- phibious operations were seen as a will be a CINC’s main effort; in others, recting movement of a naval task horizontal penetration of a coast. Once including most short-term military op- force, but they need to realize that the an assault force seized a lodgment, erations other than war, it would be precedent was established in both Op- heavy Army mechanized forces would the littoral component commander. erations Sea Angel and Restore Hope, come in to relieve them and a GCC The littoral component comman- where a Marine JTF commander func- would be established to continue the der battlespace is truly three-dimen- tioned as a littoral commander in all land operation. But how often will sional. The attitude that everything but name. The Marines, on the other there really be a sustained land opera- that flies must be controlled by a hand, must adjust their thinking be- tion? That is the key challenge to the CINC-level joint forces air component conventional wisdom. Military analy- commander (JFACC) will simply not sis since the Cold War has indicated that such campaigns will comprise only about 7 percent of future warfare, and even that estimate may be high. USS Wasp during The logistics needed to support a Support Democracy. mechanized force such as that required for Desert Storm could be vulnerable to nuclear, biological, and chemical weapons of mass destruction (WMD). In military operations other than war (MOOTW) the threat might be insurgency or ethnic nationalism. By August 1993, the coalition force logistics lodgment in Somalia had become a virtual hostage of General Aideed’s gunmen. Accordingly, much of the effort was directed at protecting this lifeline rather than accomplishing the mission. Visionaries foresee a time when the Navy-Marine team bases most of the littoral component commander’s fire support assets—such as the Navy’s arsenal ship concept—as well as logistics at sea, allowing the littoral component to maneuver seamlessly up and down the coast to accomplish military objectives without a large footprint ashore.11 Naval fire support and aviation assets also can be seamlessly transferred ashore when necessary. In most situations, a ground component in the conventional sense might not be needed at all. Therefore we may need to start picturing joint operations vertically rather than horizontally. In this paradigm Navy and Marine forces move up U.S. Navy (John Sokolowski)

74 JFQ / Winter 1995–96 JFQAnrn 9/19/96 1:16 PM Page 75

Anderson and Pierce

and down the coast with no perma- means of a combination of tactics, main open to new ideas and develop- nently fixed lodgment that an enemy techniques, and procedures roughly ments, such as littoral componency could target. If a fixed lodgment is grouped under Sea Dragon: a view of and Sea Dragon, and move out of the needed for heavy Army and Air Force naval combat in which platoon-sized narrow tunnels of technocratic think- operations, it could be provided via groups from the sea range over a bat- ing by making decisions based on logic other sea or air assets. tlefield, bringing down accurate fire on and experience. This will ultimately be The littoral component comman- an enemy in unprecedented volumes. a source of strength and ensure that der controls the coastal regions while The object is to make platoons as capa- any potential enemy who ventures GCC moves inland if necessary. ble as battalions once were. If we near the littorals will become a victim, Boundary adjustments are made by achieve this vision with sea-based fire not a victor. JFQ support and ship-to- our fascination with technology has led objective logistics, we NOTES can create a genuinely 1 us to believe that we are driving RMA William Owens, “The Emerging Sys- different approach to tem of Systems,” Military Review, vol. 75, warfighting. By elimi- no. 3 (May–June 1995), pp. 15–19, and simple movement of component nating large formations in one place to “Breakthroughs Could Give Forces Total boundaries instead of establishing and dominate the battlespace, we can fight Command of Future Battlefield,” Inside the disestablishing AOAs. Should ACCs smarter, more economically, and with Navy (January 23, 1995), p. 3. 2 have their own areas? This is debat- fewer casualties. Earl Tilford, Jr., The Revolution in Mili- tary Affairs (Carlisle Barracks, Pa.: U.S. Army able. If so, the areas should be suffi- The Sea Dragon initiative calls for War College, 1995), p. 12. ciently far from the littoral component a radically new, decentralized style for 3 U.S. Department of the Navy, Coperni- commander and GCC front lines to our landing forces which will have eyes cus...Forward, C4I for the 21st Century allow these commanders to shape the everywhere but will present large fixed (Washington: Government Printing Office, battlefield as they see fit. targets nowhere. What they can see, 1995), p. 7. How can the Navy and Marine they can kill. Their battlefield will be a 4 Kenneth F. McKenzie, Jr., “Beyond the Corps drive this vision? It may mean a distributed one where to mass is to die. Luddities and Magicians: Examining the radically different approach to naval In Marine forces ashore, sergeants will MTR,” Parameters, vol. 25, no. 2 (Summer warfare. Placing Army tactical missile do what captains did previously; lieu- 1995), p. 15. 5 or multiple launch rocket systems tenants will command battlespace once Michael Mazarr, The Revolution in Mili- tary Affairs: Framework for Defense Planning aboard Navy ships would be a major covered by lieutenant colonels. Any- (Carlisle Barracks, Pa.: U.S. Army War Col- step. Advanced precision guided tech- thing big and slow will become a target lege, 1994), pp. 30–31. nology is on the horizon; and distrib- and will be destroyed on sight. Tradi- 6 Ralph Peters, “After the Revolution,” Pa- uted, shop-to-consumer, sea-based lo- tional artillery, tank formations, and rameters, vol. 25, no. 2 (Summer 1995), p. 8. gistics which eliminate large supply massed armored infantry will become 7 Martin Van Creveld, Command in War dumps is possible. Tanks may be obso- liabilities rather than advantages. (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, lete by 2020 because of precision 1985), pp. 248–49. guided munitions. The MV–22 and The way wars are fought is going 8 Bruce D. Nordwall, “Cultural Shift Key CH–53E (or its successor), combined through a dramatic transformation. to New Concept,” Aviation Week and Space with carrier-based air and RMA Though not without merit, the system Technology, vol. 143, no. 5 (July 31, 1995), pp. 40–41. weaponry, may render conventional of systems concept—composed of preci- 9 Terry C. Pierce, “Taking Maneuver land-based, tube artillery obsolete sion strike, dominating maneuver, Warfare to Sea,” U.S. Naval Institute Proceed- within 300 miles of the coast. The day space and information warfare, and ings, vol. 121, no. 4 (April 1995), p. 74. might also come when JFCs only need such—does not in and of itself consti- 10 U.S. Department of the Navy, Naval a littoral component commander and tute a revolution. Our narrow fascina- Doctrine Publication 1, Naval Warfare ACC for an operation. tion with technology has led us to be- (Washington: Government Printing Office, The current concern over roles lieve that we are driving RMA. But 1994), pp. 31–34. and missions should not be focused on nothing could be farther from the truth, 11 Pierce, “Taking Maneuver Warfare to whether naval forces should have and we cannot afford such technical ar- Sea,” pp. 74–77. tanks or fixed-wing manned aircraft. rogance. We must realize that we do not Both in fact may be sunset systems, a have a monopoly on new technology. This article was submitted as an entry in the 1995 RMA Essay Contest. point that remains open to debate. Consequently, we must creatively adapt One should not defend any capability both doctrine and organizations to without considering the future of war. these innovative technologies. The real debate should be over new In the long run we must recognize concepts to guide new paradigms. that revolutions only indicate the direction in which we are heading. These Enter Sea Dragon trends should not be regarded as the U.S. forces could implement the definitive future of war. We must re- vision of littoral componency by

Winter 1995–96 / JFQ 75 JFQEch 9/19/96 1:02 PM Page 76

War, Soldiering. Politics, and RMA— DOD The Legacy of Clausewitz By ANTULIO J. ECHEVARRIA II

ver the last few years practi- older forms of war will continue to co- tioners and students of war exist with newer ones, RMA, when alike have debated the na- complete, will mean that future war Oture and impact of the revo- will differ fundamentally from wars of lution in military affairs (RMA) on fu- the past. It will include more intelli- ture war, especially with its emphasis gent warriors, knowledge-oriented on speed, precision, and intelligence weaponry, a five-dimensional battle- rather than the mass production and field (namely, breadth, depth, height, target saturation so characteristic of in- space, and time—the ability and subse- dustrial-age warfare. Moreover, analysts quent need to act within an enemy’s have pondered the impact of RMA on decision cycle), global envelopment, the structure and philosophy of the capabilities to attack simultaneously Army of the 21st century, conflicts short and precisely on the tactical, opera- of war, and information warfare. All of tional, and strategic levels, and an ex- these observers agree that even though plicit “civilianization of war” in terms of increased direct and indirect public Major Antulio J. Echevarria II, USA, is operations officer of participation. In addition, RMA will the 3/6 Cavalry Regiment and formerly taught history at the likely challenge statecraft as diplomats U.S. Military Academy. adapt to the flow of real-time data, its

76 JFQ / Winter 1995–96 JFQEch 9/19/96 1:02 PM Page 77

Echevarria

effect on public opinion, and the un- the last century. Eberhard Kessel ar- certain political capabilities and limits gued, for example, that for Clausewitz of future war. Politik consisted of subjective and ob- Given the extent of such change, jective elements. The former related to does the thought of Carl von Clause- choices by political leaders about the witz, developed one hundred and sev- type of war to wage and the specific enty years ago, offer anything to aims to pursue. The latter involved warfighters of the future? Indeed, some dominant ideas, emotions, and politi- say that Clausewitz’s funeral rites are cal interrelationships unique to a given overdue: “[Future] war will be fought time and place.5 not to pursue national interests, but to In fact, Clausewitz’s varied use of kill enemy leaders, to convert oppo- Politik and the context in which he nents....Thus the core of Clausewitz’s wrote indicate that he signified three philosophy of war—that states wage things with the term. First, it meant pol- wars using armies in pursuit of politi- icy, the extension of the will of the state, cal objectives—will disappear.” 1 Some the decision to pursue goals, political or think that nuclear weapons, transna- otherwise. Second, it meant politics as tional constabulary warfare, anti-ter- an external state of affairs—strengths rorism, counter-narcotrafficking, and and weaknesses imposed by geopolitical

position, resources, NDU Library Special Collections treaty, etc.—and as a Karl Philipp Gottlieb von Clausewitz. despite technological changes from RMA process of internal inter- his conception of war remains valid action between key decisionmaking institutions and the personali- Political Forces greater compartmentalization among ties of policymakers. Last, it meant an The final three books of On War— political and military leaders render historically causative force, providing an on defense, attack, and war plans— obsolete the Clausewitzian definition explanatory framework for examining contain the majority of Clausewitz’s of war as an act of policy and his tri- war’s various manifestations over time. mature ideas pertaining to the influ- partite concept of war.2 Moreover, the The first definition appears princi- ence of politics on war. They also dis- relevance of On War 3 appears suspect pally in the first chapter of On War close that his military thought was be- for not addressing war as a cultural which discusses the nature of war. A coming increasingly historicist. He phenomenon: it not only fails to ex- prefatory note indicates that Clausewitz sought to interpret historical epochs on plain why wars occur, it views war considered only this chapter to be in their own terms and understood that from the perspective of the Western final form. But one must resist the temp- those who lived and fought in past nation-state paradigm.4 However, such tation to read no further, for while it wars were governed by institutions, val- arguments fundamentally misunder- might appear that the essence of Clause- ues, and beliefs unique to a specific stood what Clausewitz meant by poli- witz’s message can be grasped in 15 time and place. In “The Scale of the tics. In fact, despite technological pages rather than 600, this is not the Military Objective and of the Effort To changes introduced by RMA—as well case. As one authority observes, strong Be Made,” Clausewitz broadens his as those brought about by nuclear though circumstantial evidence suggests concept of Politik to encompass the first weapons—his conception of war re- that the note was written when On War and second definitions mentioned mains valid. was closer to completion than generally above. He refers to policymaking, for believed.6 Thus, individuals seeking a example, as more than a mere act of in- In Search of Politik “genuine understanding of Clausewitz telligence or product of pure reason: It Clausewitz’s description of war as cannot escape the task of actually read- is “an art in the broadest meaning of a “continuation of politics (Politik) by ing On War.” 7 Indeed, one should read the term—the faculty of using judg- other means” is well known but unfor- his other works as well. For example, his ment to detect the most important and tunately is often interpreted to mean notes on history and politics and the decisive elements in the vast array of that war is merely an act of state policy essay on “Agitation” (Umtriebe) reveal facts and situations.” This judgment, in aimed at achieving political aims. Part that his ideas were continually evolving. turn, was highly subjective, affected by of this confusion stems from the ambi- The hefty tome On War constitutes “qualities of mind and character of the guity of the term Politik, which means barely a third of them.8 Clausewitz is men making the decision—of the both policy and politics. But Clause- often clearer when read in German, but rulers, statesmen, and commanders, witz also deserves some blame for ne- the prerequisites for understanding this whether these roles are united in a sin- glecting to define in simple language great theorist are really patience and a gle individual or not.” States or soci- how this multivalent term was to be will to reflect. eties were not limited in form to understood. German scholars and sol- monarchies (constitutional or abso- diers alike have puzzled over that since lutist) and semi-rigid social hierarchies

Winter 1995–96 / JFQ 77 JFQEch 9/19/96 1:02 PM Page 78

■ JFQ FORUM

characteristic of his day, but “deter- While the Tartar system of formu- and chameleon-like, composed of sub- mined by their times and prevailing lating policy appears less sophisticated jective as well as objective natures. The conditions.” A state, for instance, can than that of Frederick the Great or former consist of war’s means. Since be a united, sovereign entity, a “person- Napoleon Bonaparte, it proved no less they vary over time and place, Clause- ified intelligence acting according to decisive in developing strategies and witz dubbed them subjective. The lat- simple and logical rules,” or merely “an directing military force in pursuit of ter, on the other hand, embrace ele- agglomeration of loosely associated political objectives. As seen in this ex- ments of violence, uncertainty, chance, forces.” Hence, the definition applies ample, Clausewitz’s use of Politik af- and friction; and while embodying equally to feudal rulers, drug cartels, or fords both a transhistorical and tran- many varieties and intensities, they re- terrorist groups. Even numerous Euro- scultural perspective on war, one that main a constant part of war despite pean military institutions (for instance, at the same time respects historical time and place. Moreover, because war armies and command structures) have and cultural uniqueness. Thus the ele- is not an autonomous activity but a so- “differed in the various periods.” In ments that shape policy are both situa- cial and human event, it has two ten- fact, in his later books Clausewitz uses tional and cultural, objective and sub- dencies, escalation and reciprocation. the term military to mean all institu- Absent the moderating influence tions, procedures, philosophies, and technological advances affect the of policy and debilitating force of values of the military as a community. friction, these tendencies push Clausewitz employed several his- grammar of war, not its logic warfighting toward a violent ex- torical examples to show how policy treme. Thus, for Clausewitz war and political forces have shaped war jective (or rational, nonrational, and might change color like a chameleon, from antiquity to the modern age. His irrational according to political-scien- but its essential nature remains con- chapter “The Scale of the Objective” tific models).12 “The aims a belligerent stant—violent, unpredictable, and includes vastly different yet pro- adopts, and the resources he employs, prone to escalation. foundly similar wars of conquest and will be governed by the particular Technology, in fact, resides in all plunder carried out by semi-nomadic characteristics of his own [geopolitical] elements of the trinity without altering Tartars and those of expansion prose- position; but they will also conform to their inter-relationship. Military tech- cuted by Napoleon’s armies. Selecting the spirit of the age and to its general nology, for example, might be defined the Tartars as an example of politics di- character.” as any technology used by a nation’s recting war is significant, for some forces for military purposes. While would claim that their “tribal soci- Technology and the Trinity items such as missiles fall in the mili- eties” fall outside the Western nation- With a more complete understand- tary corner of the trinity, their compo- state paradigm.9 Tartar tribes origi- ing of what Clausewitz meant by Politik, nent technologies (such as microchips) nated in Central Asia along with other we can examine his tripartite concep- usually originate in the private sector. Turkic peoples. In the 12th and 13th tion of war in some detail. This “remark- Indeed, technologies related to com- centuries they were overtaken by Mon- able or paradoxical trinity,” as it has munications and transportation have gols and mixed with them. They par- been called, is Clausewitz’s framework, broad application in all branches of ticipated in Mongol invasions of east- or model, for understanding the change- the trinity, thereby defying pat labels. ern Europe and the Middle East.10 They able and diverse nature of war. The The point is that the interdependency eventually converted to Islam and forces that comprise it—blind emotion, of various components of the trinity joined in Ottoman Jihads (holy wars of chance, and politics—function like will remain unchanged despite techno- conversion) against the West. Tartar “three different codes of law, deeply logical advances. The evolving infor- bands even raided Prussia in 1656–57, rooted in their subject and yet variable mation and communication technolo- burning hundreds of villages, killing in their relationship to one another.” gies of RMA will simply expand the 23,000, and enslaving 34,000.11 They They, in turn, correspond to three repre- immediacy—by shortening response thus fought for booty, to convert infi- sentative bodies—the character and dis- times and heightening sensitivity—for dels, to kill enemy leaders, and for position of the populace, skill and each component in its interaction with entertainment—all motives for future prowess of the military, and wisdom and the others.14 war as cited above. Yet, such motives, intelligence of the government. Information technology will cer- as Clausewitz knew, were shaped by re- Despite revolutionary advances in tainly demand increases in the intelli- sources available to the Tartars, their technology, this trinity remains rele- gence levels of military personnel and geopolitical role as a composite of vant to future war. Technology does civilians alike, or at least oblige them to Turkish and Mongol nations located in not require adding a fourth component process more information in less time. Central Asia, their nomadic culture to the trinity, squaring the triangle, as But it will not change the fact that rul- and traditions, and the religious influ- has been suggested.13 Technological ad- ing bodies—legitimate governments, ence of Islam. These factors all fell vances will not alter the framework of revolutionary cells, terrorist gangs, or under the rubric of political forces in war since they affect the grammar of drug cartels—will make decisions on Clausewitz’s mind. war, not its logic. In other words, new technologies change only war’s form, not its nature. War is multidimensional

78 JFQ / Winter 1995–96 JFQEch 9/19/96 1:02 PM Page 79

Echevarria

when, where, how, and why to apply force. Their decisions will be influenced by political forces such as power relationships linked to alliances and treaties (either perceived or real), the effectiveness of key institutions involved in decisionmaking, and general assumptions, beliefs, and expectations held by decisionmakers. Events surrounding the Cuban Missile Crisis and October 1973 War reveal that even in the modern age misperceptions continue to create and/or exacerbate crises.15 Technology will speed the transmission of information (already approaching real time), even provide it in new forms (such as satellite imagery), and may, depending on the scenario, reduce or expand the time for making decisions. But decisionmakers will continue to receive a vast quantity of information through subjective filters; thus, their decisions will remain largely a matter of judgment, and that judgment will be shaped by USS Cape St. George political forces. firing SM–2 standard missile. Paradoxically, new technology in-

creases and decreases violence, chance, U.S. Navy (Johnny Wilson) uncertainty, and friction in unforeseen and uneven ways. New weapons systems enable both sides to observe and as some claim.18 His dictum that “war The destructive power of nuclear strike simultaneously throughout the is the continuation of Politik by other weapons, prospect of runaway escala- depth of a battlefield, thus eliminating means” is as valid in a nuclear conflict tion, and concept of superconductiv- safe areas. The five-dimensional battle- as in conventional war. The evolution ity—the elimination of friction by re- field means that operational comman- of nuclear strategy from massive retali- ducing the chain of events between the ders must consider defeating either an decision to launch and the actual attack or a counterattack from various launch of a strike—will reduce or directions at any time. A general “lack Clausewitz’s thought does not negate the influence of policymakers of immunity” will prevail as units at all insist that warfare serves a on nuclear war should it occur.20 Obvi- echelons of command and control en- ously, until the technology is devel- dure greater risk.16 Precision-guided purely rational aim oped to harmlessly disarm nuclear weapons and munitions do increase weapons in flight, the possibility of the certainty of a hit or kill, but the ation in the 1950s to flexible response aborting or down-scaling nuclear war weak link will be supplying reliable in the early 1960s, for instance, shows after a launch is minimal. But such re- and timely target data.17 Enemies will how Politik affects war even in the nu- alities are merely products of the times take measures and countermeasures clear age.19 Since 1945 policymakers and constitute what Clausewitz, in his against this, and tactics will change as have duly responded to changing situ- historicist approach, would have con- a result. Thus new technology alone ations, growing strike and counter- sidered the subjective elements of war will not prove decisive in future war; it strike capabilities, and the will of the —means selected for its prosecution— will require a harness of sorts—a flexi- populace by determining that, because that distinguish nuclear war from other ble, comprehensive doctrine that inte- of attendant risks, nuclear war did not forms of conflict in the nuclear age. It grates the tactical, operational, and suit national objectives; hence, other might be an exaggeration to claim that strategic levels of war. The objective more conventional forms of war re- such means are the ultimate expression nature of Clausewitz’s concept of war ceived more attention while nuclear of the remarkable trinity in terms of ab- will remain relevant. weapons assumed a deterrent role. Pol- solute war, but not by much. icy and politics have patently con- Again, Clausewitz’s mature thought The Nuclear Factor spired to force the avoidance of nu- does not insist that warfare serves a Even the development of nuclear clear war. purely rational political aim. In any arms, the so-called absolute weapon, event, the definition of a rational politi- has not meant the death of Clausewitz, cal aim is largely subjective. A terrorist

Winter 1995–96 / JFQ 79 JFQEch 9/19/96 1:02 PM Page 80

■ JFQ FORUM

group can launch suicide bombings that 4 John Keegan, A History of Warfare 19 The history of nuclear strategy did not it considers completely rational. Indeed, (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1993). end there. Strategies of the early 1960s gave the current world order advances the 5 In its polemics with Hans Delbrück, rise to mutual assured destruction, mutual possibility of a limited nuclear exchange the German great general staff argued that agreed assured destruction, Carter’s counter- between states or groups which have rel- war was indeed subordinate to politics, but vailing strategy, Reagan’s strategic defense that political forces had changed since initiative, etc. Donald M. Snow, National Se- atively small arsenals.21 Far from restrict- Clausewitz’s day. They saw politics as a so- curity: Enduring Problems in a Changing De- ing the influence of Politik over war, cial-Darwinistic struggle for national exis- fense Environment, 2nd edition (New York: St. such a climate is likely to increase it, tence that demanded war be waged to the Martin’s Press, 1991); Henry S. Rowen, “The while admittedly reducing the time poli- utmost. Evolution of Strategic Nuclear Doctrine,” in cymakers have to react to a strike. 6 It also appears in Azar Gat, The Origins Strategic Thought in the Nuclear Age, edited Nuclear weaponry does not render of Military Thought from the Enlightenment to by Laurence Martin (Baltimore: The Johns irrelevant the intelligence of the gov- Clausewitz (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1989), Hopkins University Press, 1981), pp. 131– ernment, skill of the military, and pp. 255–63. 56; and Fan Zhen Jiang, “Is War Obsolete? A 7 emotive force of the populace as some Christopher Bassford, Clausewitz in Chinese Perspective,” in Essays on Strategy believe. Rather, the advent of such English: The Reception of Clausewitz in Britain VI, edited by Thomas C. Gill (Washington: and America 1815–1945 (New York: Oxford National Defense University Press, 1989), weapons and attendant strategies re- University Press, 1994), p. 7. pp. 189–201. veals that each component of the trin- 8 These and other essays are found in 20 Stephen J. Cimbala, Force and Diplo- ity changes over time. Diplomacy is Carl von Clausewitz, Historical and Political macy in the Future (New York: Praeger, 1992); more aware that military action of any Writings, edited and translated by Peter and Richard N. Lebow, “Clausewitz and Cri- sort might generate unintended conse- Paret and Daniel Moran, (Princeton: Prince- sis Stability,” Political Science Quarterly, vol. quences and runaway escalation, and ton University Press, 1992). 1 (Spring 1988), pp. 81–110. it has developed systemic checks and 9 Keegan, A History of Warfare, pp. 11– 21 Jerome Kahan, Nuclear Threats from precautions to prevent that. The mili- 40; van Creveld, The Transformation of War, Small States (Carlisle Barracks, Pa.: U.S. tary has gradually altered its warrior pp. 33–62. Army War College, Strategic Studies Insti- 10 ethos to prize rather than eschew intel- Douglas S. Benson, The Tartar War tute, 1994). (Chicago: Maverick Publishing, 1981). ligence and technical expertise. The 11 F.L. Carsten, The Origins of Prussia (Ox- public has also changed, becoming ford: Clarendon Press, 1954), p. 208. more educated and politicized, and 12 See Bassford’s discussion in Clausewitz, growing more sensitive to the fact that pp. 22–24, and “John Keegan and the the future rests in the hands of a few Grand Tradition of Trashing Clausewitz: A chosen officials. Such developments do Polemic,” War in History, vol. 1, no. 3 not invalidate Clausewitz’s trinity but (1994), pp. 319–36. speak instead to its lasting durability 13 Michael Handel, “Clausewitz in the and intrinsic dynamism. Age of Technology,” in Clausewitz and Mod- Of course, not all of Clausewitz’s ern Strategy, edited by Michael Handel (Totowa, N.J.: Frank Cass, 1986), pp. 58–62. military thinking remains relevant. His 14 See also David Jablonsky, “U.S. Mili- vision of war did not include the eco- tary Doctrine and the Revolution in Mili- nomic, air, sea, and space dimensions, tary Affairs,” Parameters, vol. 24, no. 3 (Au- for example. But his conception of war, tumn 1994), p. 34. his remarkable trinity, and his grasp of 15 Robert B. McCalla, Uncertain Percep- the relationship between Politik and war tions: U.S. Cold War Crisis Decision Making will endure as long as states, drug car- (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, tels, warrior clans, and terrorist groups 1992). 16 have a mind to wage war. JFQ Avraham Rotem, “The Land Battle of the 1990s,” in Technology and Strategy: Future Trends, edited by Shai Feldman (Jerusalem: Jaf- NOTES fee Center for Strategic Studies, 1989), p. 56. 1 Steven Metz, “A Wake for Clausewitz: 17 Shai Feldman, “Technology and Strat- Toward a Philosophy of 21st Century War- egy: Concluding Remarks,” in Technology fare,” Parameters, vol. 24, no. 4 (Winter and Strategy, p. 130. 1994–95), pp. 126–32, here p. 130. 18 Sheppard, “Is Clausewitz Still Rele- 2 John E. Sheppard, Jr., “On War: Is vant?” pp. 88–91; and Martin van Creveld, Clausewitz Still Relevant?” Parameters, vol. Nuclear Proliferation and the Future of Conflict 20, no. 3 (September 1990), pp. 85–99; Mar- (New York: The Free Press, 1993), pp. 43–64. tin van Creveld, The Transformation of War (New York: The Free Press, 1991), pp. 33–62. 3 Carl Von Clausewitz, On War, edited and translated by Michael Howard and Peter Paret (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1976).

80 JFQ / Winter 1995–96 JFQMar 9/19/96 1:22 PM Page 81

The 1995 RMA Essay Contest: A POSTSCRIPT By ANDREW W. MARSHALL

As the preceding articles demonstrate, there is a Although there are service initiatives to deal with RMA, none have fo- serious debate today over whether we are going cused on stimulating critical thinking within the broad population of poten- through a period of revolutionary change in war- tial innovators. This highlights the im- fare and what that change may be. Many of those portance of initiatives like the Joint Force Quarterly RMA Essay Contest. who have studied this question believe that we Such a competition offers a rare incen- tive for individuals concerned with are indeed in the initial stages of a revolution in military affairs to depart from near- military affairs (RMA) that will result in dramatic term operational issues and focus on long-range visions which portend pro- conversions in the character of war. found change. This year’s entries made it clear that the contest achieved its purpose of stimulating such thinking. The current era resembles the While there appears to be a grow- The backgrounds of the entrants—es- decades of the 1920s and 1930s when ing consensus that major changes in pecially heavy active duty and junior major shifts occurred in land, sea, and warfare are underway—similar in scope officer participation—was particularly air warfare. Several lessons emerged to those of the interwar period—a co- encouraging. from that interwar period, including herent vision of how warfare might The 1995 contest has established a the fact that the military organizations look by the year 2015 and beyond solid basis for theoretical discussion. that performed best in World War II seems lacking. Desert Storm provided a Nevertheless, we undoubtedly have a were those which innovated most suc- glimpse of some likely systems and good way to go in thinking through all cessfully in the interwar era. The most technologies; but the operational con- the implications of this ongoing RMA. critical factor to success was not tech- cepts and organizations to fully exploit It is likely to take many years of con- nological surprise but the adoption of them have yet to be developed. Pro- certed effort, through many initiatives, innovative operational concepts and found innovation appears more chal- to generate the breadth and depth of organizations to exploit commonly lenging today than in the 1920s since thought needed to deal with the mili- available systems. Perhaps the most critical aspects of future warfare may tary challenges of the 21st century. important aspect of successful innova- center less on tangible platforms than In addition to generating ideas, tion was the articulation of a clear and on concepts—especially those related the contest served to expose officers to compelling vision of warfare early in to command and control, which are new concepts and the need for the process of change. The origin of difficult to envision, model, and simu- change—especially those who will lead Blitzkrieg, aircraft carrier strike forces, late. At the same time, the rapid pace the Armed Forces when this RMA cul- amphibious warfare, and long-range of technological change may demand minates. Thus it is important that this airpower theory can be traced to the a much faster rate of innovation than competition of ideas continue with years immediately after World War I, a we have ever experienced. maximum participation. Those of us in critical period in theoretical work and the business of long-range thinking experimentation. look forward to the entries in next year’s contest. JFQ Andrew W. Marshall is director of the Office of Net Assess- ment within the Office of the Secretary of Defense.

Winter 1995–96 / JFQ 81 ■

theTUNING Instruments of NATIONAL POWER By HANS BINNENDIJK and PATRICK L. CLAWSON

There has been a marked realignment since the end of the Cold War of the instruments of national power which are available to the United States in pursuing its interests around the world. Because of resource constraints and new threats, some former mainstays of defense and foreign policy—such as strategic nuclear forces and foreign aid—are less central today. At the same time, the U.S. Government is developing new techniques to deal with changing circumstances which rely more on coalition partners, high technology, the private sector, and additional roles for the Armed Forces.

The Strategic Setting Russia and China are somewhat cooler as they re- In the modern world, the changes related to sist further reform and seek to strengthen their geostrategy, information, and government are so international position. Among the powers, the sweeping that they may be regarded as revolu- United States is by far the strongest. Nevertheless tions. One common characteristic of these the world has not become unipolar as some pre- changes is that they are transforming the world dicted a few years ago. into a more fast-paced and diverse place in which Another aspect of the geostrategic scene has a more tailored and coordinated approach to pol- been the triumph of market democracy. While not icymaking is required. They also increase the always practiced, it is nearly universally regarded means that are available to the United States in as the model approach. From this vantage states exercising its power and influence. can be divided into three groups: those successful Geostrategy. The most apparent multidimen- at implementing market democracy, those in tran- sional changes are geostrategic. In the area of re- sition from authoritarianism towards that goal, lations among major powers—long the focus of and troubled states that fall behind the rest of the world politics—superpower confrontation was re- world while often struggling against ethnic or reli- placed by cooperation in the initial rush of en- gious extremism. The most likely sources of con- thusiasm after the Cold War. Now relations with flict are troubled and transitional states. Some rogues may divert attention from their domestic ills by external aggression aimed at imposing re- This article is a topical summary of a recent publication, gional hegemony. The proliferation of weapons of Strategic Assessment 1996: Instruments of U.S. Power mass destruction (WMD), particularly nuclear (see advertisement on page 131).

82 JFQ / Winter 1995–96 Binnendijk and Clawson

Marine anti-terrorism team during Valiant Thunder ’95.

U.S. Navy (Lou Caporaletti)

arms, makes confrontations with rogues especially global communication is creating new avenues dangerous. Conflicts are likely in troubled states, for American values, culture, and interests to radi- and in some cases they will fail—ceasing to func- ate overseas and vice versa. Still another is that tion and degenerating into soci- information is perhaps the single most important perhaps the most striking etal chaos. Though the United factor in deciding the outcome on the battlefield. aspect is the explosion of States will not always intervene, it The Nature of Government. After an era of in- has developed capabilities to con- creasing state activity, central governments are in transnational problems duct humanitarian and peace op- retreat. Power is devolving as more control is erations when they are required. ceded to the regional or local level. Central gov- Perhaps the most striking aspect of the ernments are shedding functions, in part to cut geostrategic scene is the explosion of transna- budget deficits. Governments are privatizing tional problems that do not stem from the poli- state-owned enterprises, relying on markets to cies of governments. International crime, terror- boost growth, and the power of international ism, mass migration, and environmental threats firms has grown. Moreover, less concern is di- transcend national boundaries and often are not rected to projecting power overseas and more at susceptible to traditional tools of statecraft de- domestic issues, especially the economy. In many signed for relations among sovereign states. countries the argument is made that a strong Information Technology. Advances in informa- economy is the only means of sustaining an action technology are increasing tenfold every five tive international role. years. Computers, facsimile machines, fiber op- In the United States, domestic concerns have tics, satellites, and the like speed information caused a decline in resources which support de- across frontiers, reinforcing political trends to- fense and foreign programs. From FY85 to FY95, ward open societies. No one can foretell how this funding for defense fell 34 percent in real terms, technology will alter traditional means of na- and funding for international programs fell 46 tional power, but certain useful themes are percent. Administration and congressional mid- emerging. One is that access to technology is a 1995 projections for defense and international prerequisite for economic growth, at least in de- spending both showed a continued reduction in veloped states. Another is that the ubiquity of real terms from 1996 to 2000. For defense they agreed on a 7 percent reduction. For international programs the White House projects a 23 percent Hans Binnendijk and Patrick L. Clawson are, respectively, director and cut while the concurrent budget resolution pro- senior research professor in the Institute for National Strategic Studies jects a 43 percent cut. Furthermore, pressure to at the National Defense University.

Winter 1995–96 / JFQ 83 ■ INSTRUMENTS OF POWER

balance the budget while protecting domestic three colleagues in Bosnia attests, the life of the programs may push reductions for defense above diplomat is becoming increasingly dangerous. the levels projected in mid-1995 by the adminis- Information. American Cold War ideology— tration or Congress. The lower resource levels will marked by emphasis on freedom, democracy, and pose a serious challenge for exerting our influ- marketplace—has triumphed, although it has not ence over a range of issues and at a level of lead- been fully practiced in transitional or troubled ership that U.S. interests require and that Ameri- states. Public diplomacy is therefore evolving cans expect. from the battle over hearts and minds to cam- Impact of the Revolutions. While the basic paigns to persuade foreign governments and characteristics of the present strategic environ- publics to support specific national policies. In ment are uncertainty and change, historical expe- this effort the U.S. Information Agency plays the rience suggests that the new world system may be principal role, presenting our perspective to a more malleable now than it will be in a few years. world saturated by commercially produced infor- International systems have typically had a life mation and supplementing it, as required, with cycle in which relations among the major powers government assets. start out flexible then become more rigid. The way Nonstate Actors. The United States uses inter- the system is shaped tends to determine whether national and private voluntary organizations these powers remain at peace. If that analogy more often today and in more ways than during holds, then there is an urgency to resolving the the Cold War. The military works more directly domestic debate on what the United States wants with them, requiring both sides to adapt, given from the new world order and maximizing the in- the obvious differences in their respective cultures struments of power available to policymakers. (such as command structures versus webs of inde- Although changes in the instruments of pendent actors that rely on consensus-building). power have generally been driven by develop- The government not only uses international orga- ments in the international environment—revolu- nizations in responding to disasters and the effects tions in geostrategy, infor- of ethnic strife, but in mitigating the threat to mation technology, and vital national interests from rogue states. the nature of govern- Economics. As in other fields, the trend in ment—much is the result economic affairs is away from the commitment of of conscious decisions budget resources. Foreign aid is shifting from di- made in Washington. The rect bilateral budget assistance to new ways of United States is reinvent- mobilizing multilateral resources for vital na- ing the ways in which it tional interests; for example, creation of the Ko- operates in order to reduce rean Peninsula Energy Development Organiza- costs, taking advantage of tion. But the larger story is that as security threats changing circumstances to have declined, the Nation has used existing eco- shed functions and institu- nomic instruments (such as trade retaliation) vig-

Combat Camera Imagery (Yvette Walden) Combat Camera Imagery (Yvette tions that are no longer orously against its allies, which may endanger al- The Chairman and needed while making liances in the long term. But often economic Ambassador Albright greater use of new opportunities. As reinvention instruments have little impact, in part because in Croatia. continues the challenge will be to make more ef- the United States does not commit sufficient re- fective use of varied instruments which the United sources to make instruments such as foreign aid States has at its disposal. These instruments can be effective. In other cases the collateral impact of grouped into three general categories: non-mili- these instruments is too great; that is, they have tary, political military, and military. broad consequences that inflict unacceptable political damage, such as when the threat to with- Non-Military Instruments draw China’s most-favored nation status resulted Diplomacy. The nature and tools of diplo- in a deterioration of relations across the board. macy are changing rapidly. In the more fluid situ- When America is prepared to inflict heavy collat- ation of the 1990s, negotiations are shifting from eral damage, a coercive economic tool such as formal to ad hoc arrangements. Attention is being sanctions can have a discernible effect. Witness given to merging elements of a diplomatic struc- how sanctions weakened Baghdad’s ability to ture which was created for a different age. Global threaten its neighbors and Belgrade’s support to affairs have been given new prominence at the ethnic Serb forces in Bosnia. State Department. Our embassies abroad are less the province of the State Department and more a site of interagency functions under the looser leadership of the ambassador. And as the loss of

84 JFQ / Winter 1995–96 Binnendijk and Clawson

Intelligence. As the focus of national security other strife-torn areas of the world. Despite this policy shifted away from the Soviet Union, intel- diversification of effort, Russia remains indispens- ligence activities have been diffused. The debate able to arms control. Its support is vital to supple- continues about what intelligence is needed and menting the Treaty on Conventional Armed which areas are appropriate for analysis. For in- Forces in Europe, solidifying the emerging system stance, ethical and methodological questions to control dangerous weapons and dual-use tech- have arisen over the collection and nology, and dismantling the legacy of nuclear the role of alliances is dissemination of economic intelli- arms, including the cooperative threat reduction gence on U.S. allies. In those areas program for greater security of nuclear material to shifting as they become where policymakers want intelli- forestall proliferation dangers. the cornerstones of gence, the information explosion Defense Engagement in Peacetime. Cold War has yielded vast amounts of open- interaction with foreign militaries other than al- ad hoc coalitions source data. Some have estimated liance partners often meant providing developing that 80 percent of the information countries with equipment at favorable prices, so used by the intelligence community is now de- as to shore up their ability to meet Soviet-inspired rived from open sources. Policymakers are likely subversion or outright aggression. By contrast, to get their first report of fast-breaking events the 1990s have seen a drop in arms deliveries, from CNN. The intelligence community is ac- and a shift in the focus of defense engagement to cordingly devoting attention to what consumers interaction, such as professional education and want and how to package and deliver that infor- combined military exercises, and high-level de- mation quickly. Greater priority is being given to fense diplomacy, such as quasi-diplomatic trips analysis of the large flow of available informa- by regional CINCs. This engagement has ex- tion, and less to collecting it. panded to nearly every country in the world, including military-to-military contacts with govern- Political-Military Instruments ments leery of U.S. policies. But at the same time, Productivity and Technology. Little attention is there has been a decrease in the number of sol- given today to industrial mobilization and main- diers, sailors, marines, and airmen with foreign- taining an engineering lead (such as jet engines or area expertise, as well as a reduction in forces armor). That results partly from changes in politi- which are likely to take part in foreign military cal environment, but perhaps more from the prior- interaction programs (such as engineers, military ity given to information technology instead of police, and medics). The challenge is to make bet- metal industries. Contrary to concerns that pro- ter use of declining resources. ductivity and technological power are in decline, Security Relationships and Peacetime Deploy- the United States is the leader in information tech- ment. The core of U.S. security policy in the Cold nology, especially in the critical area of software. War was its alliances for collective defense against America’s technological base along with its pro- the external threat from the Soviet Union. The duction capacity constitute as potent an instru- post-Cold War role of alliances is shifting as they ment of national power as ever. To be sure, the way become the political and military cornerstones of in which that power will be applied to defense pro- ad hoc coalitions. Such arrangements are the duction is changing. More cutting edge research is likely way the United States will fight in the fore- being done in the private sector and less by the seeable future. The NATO combined joint task government. As more money goes into electronics, force (CJTF) concept is the most telling example and as the production of major weapons platforms of the new role of alliances; but delays in imple- shrinks, more collaboration among businesses, in- menting it illustrate the difficulty in re-directing cluding foreign firms, will be required for the sur- Cold War institutions, even where there is clear vival of core capabilities (such as building carriers military utility (in this case, for crisis response be- and nuclear powered submarines). yond NATO’s borders). While alliances like NATO Arms control. The agenda of arms control has provide the military nucleus for an ad hoc coali- shifted to the nonproliferation of nuclear, biolog- tion, there may well be political utility in includ- ical, and chemical (NBC) weapons and missiles, ing many states, even if some contribute little building on the indefinite extension of the Treaty militarily. Coalitions that include uncertain part- on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons. ners require a delicate balance. Meanwhile, as Mutually reinforcing measures—nuclear-free force structure declines and support at home as zones, a comprehensive test ban treaty, and a fis- well as in host countries for large overseas bases sile-material production-cutoff treaty—offer becomes more open to question, dependence on promise for strengthening non-proliferation. pre-positioned equipment ashore and afloat will Meanwhile, conventional arms control models and confidence-building measures implemented with the former Warsaw Pact have relevance for

Winter 1995–96 / JFQ 85 ■ INSTRUMENTS OF POWER

Oklahoma City, antagonistic toward one side. The task is to con- April 21, 1995. tain or end fighting while not becoming a party to the conflict or assuming responsibility for nation-building. The prognosis for expanded operations of this sort is uncertain. The United Nations admittedly lacks the capability to manage such missions, which means that they are likely to occur successfully only when Washington opts to lead a coalition. Military Instruments Unconventional Responses. U.S. interests may be challenged by indirect means such as terrorism, subversion, narcotics trafficking, and sudden flows of refugees. Some kinds of threats are useful ways for the weak to attack the strong. Lately, they have become more salient because of the demise of the Soviet Union and the trend toward a more open world economy and the freer movement of people. Ultimately, regional powers intent on system- atically challenging our national interests may mount unconventional threats. Responses to them will include an enhanced role for law enforcement agencies. Unconventional military re-

Air National Guard (MarkAir National Guard A. Moore) sponses offer options to decisionmakers who are reluctant to resort to costly measures; and they can minimize collateral damage. However, uncon- continue to increase, and there may be a place for ventional instruments are politically sensitive. new approaches such as mobile offshore bases. Limited Military Intervention. In recent Humanitarian and Peace Operations. The typi- decades insurgencies were essentially ideological cal peace operation in the past was patrolling a and the United States supported one side. Today cease fire line. With the end of superpower rivalry insurgencies and civil wars are more often fought peacekeeping operations have generally been fo- among ethnic groups, and the U.S. goal is peace cused on resolving conflicts within states rather between two sides, one of which is usually the in- than on cross-border aggression. Such missions ternationally recognized government. While in- are more complicated and controversial, as there terethnic conflicts may become frequent events, is less control over armed elements and, in some Americans may not always support involvement cases, virtually no organized government to work in them, since they often occur in regions where with. The most critical elements to the success of geostrategic interests are slight, although chal- complex peace operations can be the right mix of lenges to our values (such as genocide) may be military and civilian agencies as well as private high. When the United States does become in- voluntary organizations, and properly coordinat- volved, its goals may be very limited. In light of ing their actions in the field. In more complicated the record of the United Nations, especially in So- settings, involvement can make the difference be- malia and Bosnia, the decision to intervene will tween success and failure because of the skills of depend on the objectives, command and control, the Armed Forces, from C3I to special operations contributions by like-minded nations, and dura- forces (including civil affairs and psychological tion and cost. operations), and leadership and managerial abili- Classical Military Power. While the United ties. While accepting its role, the Nation resists States is much more capable than any potential the assumption that it will automatically play a enemy, strategic assets such as airlift and sealift dominant part in every situation, instead prefer- would be strained in the event of two nearly si- ring to concentrate on how to succeed with lim- multaneous major regional contingencies. Also, ited U.S. participation. The record of success is since the overseas presence of our ground and air mixed at best in operations where no peace ac- forces was reduced by half between 1986 and cord exists and the peace force is perceived to be 1995, there is less margin for error in deploying our remaining forces. And given that weapons systems last decades and relatively little is being procured, the Nation will be fielding equipment designed for use against the Soviet Union for the

86 JFQ / Winter 1995–96 Binnendijk and Clawson

Somali women drawing water. U.S. Navy (Joe Gawlowicz)

foreseeable future and must adapt it to new types caution: the effective use of emerging instru- of warfare. Unless spending on procurement is ac- ments requires protecting military information celerated, the military could face bloc obsoles- and other systems to avoid retaliation in cyber- cence of equipment in space. Although there is considerable interest in more important than equipment fifteen to twenty information war, it is not clear how vulnerable is doctrine: knowing how to fight years. Perhaps more potential adversaries may be, especially those that important than equip- are not heavily dependent on modern computer ment is doctrine: technology. It is clear that we are vulnerable. knowing how to fight. Each service has updated Countering WMD. The end of the Cold War its doctrine during the past few years, and now was punctuated by new threats from regional the focus must shift to the development of more powers. Rogue states with NBC capabilities are joint doctrine. dangers that must be considered despite programs Emerging Military Instruments. Information to prevent proliferation. Thus attention is being technology offers the best opportunity for the devoted to countering WMD. The first choice is Armed Forces to develop new instruments in the deterrence, but that may be difficult to achieve mid-term. But to benefit from these capabilities, regionally. A rogue with NBC capabilities may use through a military technological revolution, in- them as weapons of choice, whereas previously novative operational concepts and organizations that may have been a last resort. Moreover, it are required, namely, a revolution in military af- may not be credible to threaten a nuclear re- fairs. We are on the verge of integrating systems sponse against a chemical attack. Because of prob- into what the Vice Chairman, Admiral William lems in deterring regional states, more emphasis Owens, refers to as a system of systems. This super- is being put on defensive measures. Some are pas- system could see all key enemy assets on a battle- sive, like intelligence and NBC protection. Active field (through “dominant battlefield knowl- defenses, such as theater high-altitude area de- edge”), communicate this information instantly fense, become more important as ballistic and to combat units, and strike with unprecedented cruise missiles become more widely available. accuracy. With insightful leadership and hard work this will provide a high degree of control Some Conclusions over global security through a capability to inter- There has been an understandable tendency vene quickly, effectively, and economically. In to put greater emphasis on domestic concerns of some cases that intervention will be done by the late, resulting in calls for cuts in the budgets of Armed Forces directly, whereas in others it will be most instruments of national power, as well as for achieved by providing real-time intelligence, systems expertise, and software to our allies. One

Winter 1995–96 / JFQ 87 ■ INSTRUMENTS OF POWER

reorganization or fundamental reform of many peace. As the private sector grows in former state- foreign policy institutions. Five conclusions can dominated economies, and American firms oper- be drawn about applying U.S. power in this new ate in a global market, the Nation has increasing environment. opportunities to exert its influence. But there are New Ways of Applying Power. Enhancing our limits. Firms doing business abroad cannot de- ability to exert influence abroad does not neces- fend national interests. The pervasiveness of pop- sarily mean buying more of the same old thing. ular culture—music, sports, and designer names— The national security establishment evolved and the strength of high-tech industries— largely out of the Cold War. New ways of doing computer software and aerospace—can contribute business are being developed to draw on untapped to national power, but it is not a basis for leader- strengths of existing organizations while shifting ship in national security. Regardless of the extent resources from areas that are no longer relevant. to which economy and culture are globalized, tra- For instance, transnational threats are becoming ditional governmental activities remain key to de- more critical relative to con- fense and foreign affairs. the Armed Forces face the cerns over aggressive desta- Applying Instruments to Limited Ends. Past bilizing states, which de- competition with the Soviet Union meant that challenge of adapting rapidly mands a greater role for most international events involving U.S. interests advancing commercial Federal law enforcement came into play as part of a global chess game. In a agencies that have tradition- multipolar world of uncertainty and ambiguity, technologies ally kept a relatively low the Nation is likely to be engaged to promote lim- profile abroad. Another ex- ited interests. Given the stakes, it may not be ample is the information revolution in which credible for Washington to threaten to use the technological innovation is driven by commercial full range of instruments at its disposal even if capital rather than government investment. The warranted. There will no doubt be cases when a military will no longer be the principal sponsor of small commitment may be made but without the technological innovation and, consequently, the public will to enlarge that commitment. Armed Forces face the challenge of adapting Coordinating Among Instruments. While coor- rapidly advancing commercial technologies. dinating government agencies has always been a Phasing Down Use of Some Instruments. As the problem, the challenge is growing for several rea- United States diversifies its instruments, reliance sons. During the Cold War, coordination among on some that were central in the past is declining. agencies and policy instruments was simplified For example, America is foregoing the capability by the overwhelming priority given to containing to retaliate in kind against chemical or biological Soviet communism. In the post-Cold War era, weapons, has drastically reduced its reliance on there is less clarity about which goals are central tactical nuclear weapons, and is dismantling and which are peripheral. And because a wider much of its inventory of strategic arms. It has array of policy instruments is being used, there also effectively ended military aid (save to Israel are more agencies among which policy has to be and Egypt), other than minuscule amounts for coordinated. education and training. The United States once As foreign policy goals become more com- carried out functions for which it no longer has plex and a greater variety of instruments are adequate resources to have substantial impact. brought to bear on any one problem, interagency For instance, the goverment is no longer a key coordination and clear policy direction become actor in international radio broadcasting and eco- all the more important. Close coordination nomic development, although it still funds some among agencies and consultation between the broadcasting (especially the Voice of America) administration and Congress are potent force and some foreign aid. multipliers. To this end, attention is being given Working with the Private Sector. Government to drawing lessons from earlier complex crisis will need to rely more on the private sector in its management efforts. conduct of national security policy. Voluntary organizations often provide humanitarian relief Despite resource constraints, the Nation has more effectively than governments. Sometimes an impressive array of instruments of national an eminent private citizen can explore ideas with power and influence that are being adapted to rogues, without the Nation extending legitimacy changing circumstances. While there may be de- by direct contact. Businesses, acting out of self-in- fects in how the United States uses those instru- terest and without governmental intervention, ments, it has succeeded in achieving many of its can often advance U.S. goals, as when investors goals, and the efficiency of such capabilities con- stimulate economic growth that, in turn, rein- tinues to improve steadily. If the resources con- forces market democracy or that cements a fragile tinue to be cut, however, this optimistic assessment could be reversed. JFQ

88 JFQ / Winter 1995–96 JFQPrkr 9/19/96 1:24 PM Page 89

CChhaannggee and the Operational Commander By JAY M. PARKER

Everything old is new again. Throughout our history the military has faced the impact of technology, international upheaval, and domestic imperatives. The horse gave way to the tank and airplane, and a continental military became a forward deployed superpower. Guns and butter were replaced by the peace dividend. Now cold warriors are asked to serve as peacekeepers.1 This has significant implications for operational commanders. U.S. Navy (Ted Salois)U.S. Navy (Ted

Lieutenant Colonel Jay M. Parker, USA, is an academy professor and director of the international relations program in the Department of Social Sciences at West Point.

Winter 1995–96 / JFQ 89 JFQPrkr 9/19/96 1:24 PM Page 90

■ OPERATIONAL COMMANDER

Commanders from theater level down serve decision is an authority decision, made by the se- at the crossroads of change. They perform the key nior leadership and requiring action by subordi- role of identifying the need for change and advis- nates, regardless of their opinion on the man- ing the senior leadership on how to respond. But dated change.5 The subsequent decision by most importantly, they ensure those responses subordinates to implement the leadership’s deci- are then implemented. To do this, commanders sion also is, strictly speaking, an authority deci- introduce innovative doctrine and technology. sion. It differs from the first in that the subordi- They must adapt the existing force to new mis- nate (in this case an operational commander) sions, organizations, and equipment while offer- must implement decisions, though he remains ing timely and accurate feedback to superiors. somewhat autonomous. They must grow the future force and its leader- Another analyst derived six major motives ship. Finally, as warfighters, they must face the for change in the military, namely, technology, ultimate test of leading the force in battle.2 budgeting, interservice rivalry, leadership, intra- Commanders must swim against the tide— organizational group conflict, and the impact of both individual and institutional—that has often the international security environment.6 But frustrated those who attempt to adapt forces to these motives are normally above a commander’s the challenges of a new era. The personal stakes level of control; he mainly affects change are high, but the cost of failure is much greater. through advisory input to policymakers. Com- At Manassas and Pearl manders are, however, responsible for initiating commanders are responsible for Harbor, in Korea as well contingency decisions to ensure the diffusion of 7 initiating decisions to ensure as Desert One, we paid innovation. the price for being un- The force modernization initiatives in the the diffusion of innovation prepared. Although 1970s and 1980s illustrate both how this occurs many studies chart how and its consequences. With new systems came the military responds to change at the macro changes in force structure, maintenance, logistics, level, the following article deals with the opera- and contingency planning. The Abrams tank and tional level, using theories of organizational be- Bradley fighting vehicle significantly enhanced havior, communication, and psychology to ascer- the firepower available to heavy task force com- tain the barriers and how to overcome them.3 manders. The ability of armored forces to shoot on the move and the arrival of an improved anti- Understanding Change armor standoff capability for mechanized infantry Two facts serve as competing forces in the were matched by force structure changes at unit process of change. The first is that change is the level that upgraded the concentration and control only true constant. The second is that individuals of firepower on the battlefield. They were also and organizations routinely deny this reality in complimented by the modernization of field ar- the belief that the status quo is permanent and tillery, air defenses, attack helicopters, and other desirable. The inertia of this denial must contend capabilities, as well as combat, combat support, with the impetus of change. Also debate over and combat service support assets. change is often misdirected. At issue is not But with the new technologies and organiza- whether change should occur. Ultimately, no ef- tions came challenges. Simple systems became fective barrier exists. There are, however, many complex, and complex systems required complex barriers to effective change. The difference is maintenance and repairs. Both the Abrams and found in the outcome. Organizations in general Bradley required a logistics capability that could and the military in particular either emerge refit and refuel forward while keeping up with stronger or are defeated and replaced. the new high speed vehicles. Task force comman- Two social scientists who surveyed the body ders, who once might have focused only on the of literature on innovation, communication, and low technology of infantry riflemen and tanks individual and organizational dimensions of that had changed little since World War II, had to change distilled definitions that help to probe the train, maintain, sustain, and fight a complex role of operational commanders as implementors array of weapons and support systems.8 of change. First, they defined social change as The Gulf War further illustrated the demands “the process by which alteration occurs in the changes place on operational commanders. structure and function of a social system.... Viewed as a triumph of technology and force re- Change occurs when a new idea’s use or rejection building, this conflict also showed the limitations has an effect.” 4 Compared with the description of of some changes. For example, the flood of infor- detailed change types, the two step contingent de- mation available complicated the commander’s cision requiring prior innovation decision is the most suited to change in the military. The initial

90 JFQ / Winter 1995–96 JFQPrkr 9/19/96 1:24 PM Page 91

Parker

task and had unintended consequences by dimin- single order will suffice.11 Implementing such ishing control. “The constant pressure of the data change at their level means understanding, initi- stream,” Eliot Cohen has observed, “together ating, and following through on a range of com- with the growth of nighttime operations, means plex actions. These changes are not without that leaders try to keep on top of events at the precedent. The Soviet military was decimated by cost of sleep and acuity.” It also complicates Stalin’s purges and suffered defeat early in World readiness and training. Overdependence on futur- War II. But it was rebuilt in the midst of war and istic capabilities and detailed information risks then overcame powerful German forces.12 At the the inability to operate without them. The high- same time, the French military—badly demoral- tech Goliath could be easy prey for a low-tech ized and almost vanquished in World War I—was David. “Future warriors,” Cohen noted, “may transformed into one of the largest and most paradoxically find themselves all the more at a modern forces. Yet it was crushed in a matter of loss when the real world differs sharply from a fa- weeks in 1940.13 If the motives for change are pre- miliar cyberworld.” 9 sent, and if failing to implement effective re- While on the surface it is possible to isolate sponses to change risks national disaster, why do individual elements such as technology which militaries not implement effective change and lead to change, seemingly distinct elements of how much of this failure is the responsibility of change are frequently interrelated. For example, commanders? the defense buildup that made the Abrams and the Bradley possible was related to the Soviet in- The Individual vasion of Afghanistan and other international Admiral William (“Bull”) Halsey was a vi- shifts. Increases in defense spending since the sionary. When other surface warriors balked at late 1970s enabled the Armed Forces to keep up the idea of naval airpower, he saw it as part of the with technology. At the same time, interservice future. A qualified aviator, he gambled his career rivalry took a turn. Pressures to increase interop- on carrier warfare. His subordinates at Midway erability mounted after the failure of Desert One, feared the cost of his absence and worried that the hostage rescue mission in Iran, and escalated surface warrior Raymond Spruance would not unin the wake of Urgent derstand how to best employ this new weapons Halsey demonstrates one of the Fury, the Grenada inva- system.14 But at Leyte Halsey’s instinct was that of greatest barriers to change— sion. Confused planning a traditional surface warrior, not an aviator. He as well as incompatible left the invasion force behind and went on in personal beliefs and instincts communication and fire search of a battleship engagement. His experience support systems led demonstrates one of the greatest barriers to Congress to mandate a series of initiatives in change—personal beliefs and instincts. joint doctrine, planning, training, and personnel Often the most difficult task is discarding the policies.10 frameworks that we create to explain and deal Commanders—burdened by dramatic with daily life. As Walter Lippmann wrote: changes in weaponry—had greater responsibility The real environment is altogether too big, too com- for integrating the capabilities of other services plex, and too fleeting for direct acquaintance. We are into planning and operations. The competition not equipped to deal with so much subtlety, so much to find quality officers for their units was compli- variety, so many permutations and combinations. cated by requirements to assign those same indi- And although we have to act in that environment, we viduals to crucial joint billets. Outstanding offi- have to reconstruct it on a simpler model before we cers could no longer secure their futures by can manage it.15 following the path of their parent service. Budget fluctuations have also brought chal- Lippmann’s argument is at odds with the clas- lenges of downsizing units and limited training sic “rational actor” view of decisionmaking. That funds. Traditional military leadership has been theory contends that rational decisions can be stressed by dramatic changes in the social made by objectively bringing all relevant informa- makeup of the force. Over the last twenty years, tion to bear on the problem and comparing, first, leaders have had to adjust their units to the all- the “relative effectiveness of alternative means for volunteer force, more married personnel, greater achieving the goal,” then “effects on values other opportunities for women, and a change from tra- than those that would be fulfilled by achieving the ditional war on isolated battlefields to humanitar- immediate end,” and finally by alternative ends in 16 ian assistance under the scrutiny of television light of costs “in terms of other values.” This effi- cameras. cient model provides an optimal outcome; but stu- Operational commanders cannot defer re- dents of the process of decisionmaking side with sponsibility for making initial authority decisions to the senior leaders. Nor can they assume that a

Winter 1995–96 / JFQ 91 JFQPrkr 9/19/96 1:25 PM Page 92

■ OPERATIONAL COMMANDER

Lippmann more than with the rational actor major general and command of the 82d Airborne model. The post World War II “cognitive revolu- Division in 1944. Like many of his contempo- tion” in social psychology resulted in a wide range raries, he was an outstanding leader who success- of studies illuminating human behavior in general fully implemented changes needed to transform and decisionmaking in particular. Some detail the the small, outdated regular Army of the 1930s obstacles which operational commanders must into the complex, modern force which triumphed overcome in their own decisionmaking and in that during World War II. One of the first officers to of their subordinates. volunteer for airborne duty, he was responsible Individuals do not usually approach deci- for developing airborne doctrine, training embry- sionmaking objectively and comprehensively. onic airborne units, and then leading them in People are limited in the amount of information battle from Sicily to Berlin.20 Later, serving on the they can process. They develop sometimes naive Army Staff, he continued to be an innovator. He theories based on experience and longstanding initiated the development of helicopter tactics, beliefs. When decisions arise, particularly crises, modern missile artillery, and space age technol- these theories are an individual’s default setting. ogy. He was also an early critic of American mili- Such cognitive shortcuts are a means of making tary operations in Vietnam.21 Gavin and many inferences and decisions with minimal time and members of his generation who advocated and energy.17 implemented change exhibited many of the posi- Individuals interpret specific situations in tive characteristics of innovators and “early light of more general stored knowledge. They adopters.” They had intelligence and a favorable make judgments about events, people, or objects attitude toward risk and change, and also sought by quickly placing them into a priori categories. information about innovation, pursued educa- These economical verdicts guide the retrieval and tion, and were far less dogmatic.22 storage of mental infor- There are notable exceptions, but the non- militaries are subject to unique mation and fill in missing rigidity of these officers might have resulted from or ambiguous data with the fact that many were junior and had seen little constraints when they attempt “default values.” In brief, or no combat in World War I. The experiences and to institute changes information is processed analogies of that war had limited value for them. from the top down based Those like Patton, who had been in combat, fo- on preconceived theories structured to organize cused on the innovations that might have broken and explain the world rather than the harsh reali- the bloody stalemate on the Western Front.23 ties of new data.18 In the face of barriers, change is Eisenhower’s goal in Europe was to avoid “the slow and incremental at best. Individuals may go long, dreary, and wasteful battles that bled Europe so far as to shut down the evaluation process and white in World War I.” 24 Gavin’s recognition of come to premature mental “closure” rather than barriers to change and his skills as an innovator contend with complex decisions. were not always sufficient. In the 1950s he and What does this mean for operational com- others faced opposition from the senior civilian manders and their subordinates? When faced and military leadership.25 Once commanders on with a crisis decision, existing beliefs and theories the operational level overcome barriers, they must will take over as they did in Halsey’s case at Leyte challenge the collective and interactive responses Gulf. The results can be positive. Arguably, from other quarters within their organizations. MacArthur’s bold move at Inchon was the result of invoking his long held and consistently exer- The Organization cised theories about maneuver warfare. By the The task of changing an organization de- same token, his failure to grasp post-World War II pends on its type. Militaries are best understood realities led to his inability to understand the as bureaucracies. The word bureaucracy conjures global political dimensions of the Korean War images that are antitheses of precision, efficiency, and his confrontation with Truman. and professionalism in an ideal military. Yet virtu- “We professional soldiers are traditionally ally every definition of bureaucracy refers to the laggard in facing and adopting changes,” James makeup and operation of the military. When Max Gavin wrote in 1947, “especially radical changes Weber wrote his classic work on bureaucracy, he that upset proven methods and the ways in selected the military as his model. As bureaucra- which we have been doing things for years cies, militaries are subject to unique limitations past.” 19 Lieutenant General Gavin was clearly an and constraints on large, hierarchical organiza- exception to his own rule. Tapped for future tions when they attempt to institute changes.26 greatness, Gavin rose from captain in 1941 to “Organizations, like individuals, are reluctant to accept any change in their environments—whether good or bad—as permanent,” notes Anthony Downs, “if such acceptance would

92 JFQ / Winter 1995–96 JFQPrkr 9/19/96 1:25 PM Page 93

Parker

USS Wisconsin firing Tomahawk missile.

B–2 stealth bomber. U.S. Navy

organizations react by closing ranks and seeking U.S. Air Force refuge in longstanding procedures. They thus reinforce a shared reluctance to confront information that contradicts the organization’s norms require them to make a significant alteration in and beliefs.29 At the same time, the organization their customary behavior patterns.” 27 This bu- is faced with powerful external demands to re- reaucratic inertia is not only understandable, it is form and restructure. In democracies, these come beneficial. A bureaucracy is, by definition, a gov- from the civilian leadership that funds military ernment agency with a public trust. Success or operations. The pressures accelerate in the wake failure has a broader public impact than the prof- of a major mission failure (actual or perceived) by its or losses of a private corporation. Thus stabil- the organization. Following a major success, how- ity mitigates risk. Risk for the military is literally a ever, the organization is more risk averse, prefer- life and death proposition. But the reverse can ring to rely on proven tactics, techniques, force also be true; failure to change increases risk. The structures, and technologies. Thus, after such vic- consistent refusal of the British to realize the po- tories as World War II, the Persian Gulf War, or tential of mechanization and naval airpower the end of the Cold War, the military has proven jeopardized their readiness during the 1930s. De- itself and is reluctant to accept change regardless spite experiences of cavalry against tanks in of how little relation future challenges may have World War I, Britain continued to cling to the to the past.30 Therefore, the military proves un- horse cavalry until early in World War II.28 prepared for a limited war like Korea or for mod- Viewed in a larger context and over time, ern peacekeeping and peace-enforcement. most changes are evolutionary; but their defining moments are often associated with dramatic events. These milestones lead to contradictory forces that affect bureaucratic organizations. First,

Winter 1995–96 / JFQ 93 JFQPrkr 9/19/96 1:25 PM Page 94

■ OPERATIONAL COMMANDER DOD

There is some truth in the cliché that armies extreme, elimination from military service. In prepare to fight the last war. Victory constrains Britain, J.F.C. Fuller and Basil Liddell Hart were rather than frees the victor, and complacency be- shunned and condemned by mainstream soldiers comes the rule. “In theory,” Norman Dixon for advocating mechanization. It was the endorse- stated, “a major war should confer benefits on the ment of outsiders such as Winston Churchill that armed forces of the victor. New lessons have been kept these ideas in the forefront even when Fuller learned, new technologies developed, and new was forced to retire.33 confidence found. Thus equipped, they should Brigadier General William (“Billy”) Mitchell have a head start on preparations for the next war. was an airpower prophet without honor. Like his In practice, the reverse seems to be the case.” 31 doctrinal mentor, Giulio Douhet, he faced court It would appear that without external pres- martial. American airpower gained ascendancy sures, the military will normally only overcome because of an overwhelming tide of events and inertia and move toward change after failures like political pressure, combined with the realization Korea or Vietnam. Even in by the Army and Navy that both would benefit. education can provide an such cases, the type of Mitchell did not live to see this.34 Liddell Hart change needed may only be wrote that even success of a new idea ultimately understanding of innovations resolved by external politi- costs its advocates. A wall of “obstruction com- and their full implications cal pressure. But the impe- pounded of resentment, suspicion, and inertia” tus for change is not lim- builds up to block the advocates of new ideas. “As ited to the debate among national security the wall finally yields to the pressure on the new decisionmakers. In most contemporary cases, the idea it falls and crushes him.” 35 civilian leadership has capitalized on proposals This cannot be blamed on individuals. It is made by officers on the operational level. The rise the collective pressure of military organization and of Special Forces is frequently credited to President bureaucratic norms. “It seems quite possible,” one Kennedy. Early Special Forces doctrine and force critic noted, “that, as well as being agents of structure resulted from a clash in the 1950s that change, modern complex organizations are equally operational level officers had with the prevailing well suited and disposed toward suffocating it.” 36 doctrine of massive retaliation. Special Forces, it Such barriers have been countered by leadership was argued, was an essential element for reacting and support on levels above the operational com- to challenges all along the conflict spectrum.32 mander. The recovery of the military from Viet- In the interwar years junior officers on the nam was largely due to leadership initiatives at the operational level proposed changes in doctrine, highest levels. This is consistent with research force structure, and technology. Despite some initial success, those who argued for change after victory often suffered isolation, discredit, and in the

94 JFQ / Winter 1995–96 JFQPrkr 9/19/96 1:25 PM Page 95

Parker

which shows militaries generating reform inter- 1950s and 1960s.41 Fourth, as leaders at the cross- nally in the wake of failure.37 But the success of roads of innovation, operational commanders can Grenada and Panama did not hinder force mod- also help to mitigate obstacles presented by organi- ernization that led to success in the Gulf War. zational limitations. Nurturing ideas and mentor- There are lessons to draw from America’s in- ing those willing to adopt and advance them are terwar experience. While Mitchell suffered for his the responsibilities of operational commanders. advocacy, some survived. George Patton, Dwight The leaders who set the command climate can de- Eisenhower, and others championed many of the termine the success or failure of innovation. ideas in America which Fuller and Liddell Hart Finally, in a profession that requires risk to advanced in Britain. The period between the wars life and limb, risk to professional status can be no was marked by slow promotions and dismal as- less acceptable. The patience needed to have the signments, but when war came they appreciated mainstream accept important innovations may the value of their earlier vision.38 They benefitted require falling off the usual path of success. For from innovative study at staff and war colleges, every Gavin or Patton there is a Fuller or Liddell opportunities to write, and mentors like Major Hart. Had it not been for World War II (and the General Fox Conner, the Army chief of staff dur- retirement of his arch rival, Douglas MacArthur), ing World War I. Not all achieved wartime promi- George Marshall might have capped his career as nence. But America had an able cadre of innova- a colonel advising the Illinois National Guard.42 tive officers to assign as operational commanders In the final analysis, the effective implementation when World War II broke out.39 of change starts with the recognition that the op- Organizational barriers can be overcome, but erational commander does not train, plan, lead, not without costs. The recurring patterns for suc- and fight to ensure the success or failure of any cessful change include: tactic, doctrine, or weapon system. His mission is to prepare and use the Nation’s military in the ■ willingness by the innovator to take professional risks optimal manner to ensure the defense of vital national interests. JFQ ■ awareness of the need for bureaucratic mentors and allies NOTES ■ awareness of, and involvement in, innovation initiatives by higher military and civilian 1 For an overview of the recurring transformation of leadership the American military, see T.A. Heppenheimer, “Build- ■ patience with organizational inertia on the Down,” American Heritage, vol. 44, no.8 (December part of those advocating change 1993), pp. 34–46. 2 ■ patience with those advocating innovation Operational commanders lead units that con- on the part of the bureaucracy. duct—and train others to conduct—operational level warfare. For operational commanders there are several 3 Relevant works include Andrew F. Krepinevich, Jr., imperatives for ensuring effective change. First, The Army and Vietnam (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins they must understand their psychological University Press, 1986); Barry R. Posen, The Sources of strengths and limitations as well as those of their Military Doctrine (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, subordinates. Contending with individual barriers 1984); and Jack Snyder, The Ideology of the Offensive to change requires not only knowing obstacles (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1984). 4 Everett M. Rogers and F. Floyd Shoemaker, Com- that exist but how to overcome them. While traits munication of Innovations: A Cross Cultural Approach such as openness and risk acceptance are not eas- (New York: The Free Press, 1971), p. 7. ily learned at an advanced age and career status, 5 Other types are optional decisions (those reached education can provide an understanding of inno- regardless of the decisions by the social system) and col- vations and their full implications. Second, it is lective decisions (those made by consensus). See Rogers not enough to master mainstream doctrine and and Shoemaker, Communication, pp. 36–38. practices. The school solution must be constantly 6 Rick Waddell, “The Army and Peacetime Low In- challenged. Ideas that threaten an operational tensity Conflict, 1961–1992: The Process of Peripheral commander’s own domain may provide the best and Fundamental Military Change” (unpublished opportunities for success. Patton declared that his paper, 1992). 7 Rogers and Shoemaker, Communication. saddest moment was the day his cavalry unit gave 8 40 A thorough study of this period is found in Chris up its horses. His personal dismay, however, did C. Demchak, Military Organizations, Complex Machines: not stop him from embracing armored warfare. Modernization in the U.S. Armed Services (Ithaca, N.Y.: Next, openness must be renewed. Innovators in one generation may be the obstacles to the next. Many officers who benefitted as subalterns This article is based on a longer essay entitled “Into the from the favorable innovations of the late 1930s Wind, Against the Tide: Change and the Operational and early 1940s were obstacles to innovators in the Commander” which was cited for distinction in the 13th CJCS Strategy Essay Competition.

Winter 1995–96 / JFQ 95 JFQPrkr 9/19/96 1:25 PM Page 96

■ OPERATIONAL COMMANDER

Cornell University Press, 1991), pp. 41–61, 164–66. 32 One of the few published accounts of the little Based on the author’s experience in Europe, 1980–84. chronicled “colonels’ revolt” is found in David Halber- 9 Eliot A. Cohen, “The Mystique of U.S. Air Power,” stam, The Best and the Brightest (New York: Random Foreign Affairs, vol. 73, no. 1 (January/February 1994), House, 1972), pp. 573–79. Personal reflections by two pp. 114–15. key participants are in Maxwell D. Taylor, Uncertain 10 Wayne Maynard, “The New American Way of Trumpet (New York: Harper Brothers, 1960), pp. 23–79; War,” Military Review, vol. 73, no. 11 (November 1993), and Matthew B. Ridgway, Soldier: The Memoirs of pp. 6–8. Matthew B. Ridgway (New York: Harper and Brothers, 11 “As any seasoned hand well knows, the crystal- 1956), pp. 266–73, 286–94. clear so-called military model—give an order and get in- 33 Dixon, Incompetence, pp. 112–14. stant compliance—doesn’t even hold for the military.” 34 Russell F. Weigley, The American Way of War: A His- Thomas J. Peters and Robert H. Waterman, Jr., In Search tory of United States Military Strategy and Policy (Bloom- of Excellence: Lessons from America’s Best-Run Companies ington: Indiana University Press, 1977), pp. 223–41. (New York: Harper and Row, 1982), pp. 90–91. 35 Dixon, Incompetence, p. 114. 12 Norman F. Dixon, On the Psychology of Military In- 36 Robert Presthus, The Organizational Society (New competence (New York: Basic Books, 1976), p. 346; York: St. Martin’s, 1978). Dwight D. Eisenhower, Crusade in Europe (Garden City, 37 Posen, Sources, pp. 221–28; Waddell, “The Army.” N.Y.: Doubleday, 1948), pp. 467–69. 38 Joseph I. Greene, editor, The Infantry Journal Reader 13 Posen, Sources, pp. 105–40. (Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday, 1943) includes works by 14 T.B. Buell, The Quiet Warrior (Annapolis: Naval In- Patton, Stillwell, Chennault, Marshall, and others writ- stitute Press, 1987), pp. 132–66; William F. Halsey and J. ten when they were young company and field grade of- Bryan III, Admiral Halsey’s Story (New York: McGraw- ficers between the wars. Hill, 1947). 39 Halberstam, Best and Brightest, pp. 390–91. 15 Walter Lippmann, Public Opinion (New York: Mac- 40 Dixon, Incompetence, p. 118. millan, 1922/1960), p. 16. 41 See Krepinevich, Vietnam, pp. 4–7. 16 Roger Hilsman, The Politics of Policy Making in De- 42 William Manchester, American Caesar (Boston: fense and Foreign Affairs: Conceptual Models and Bureau- Litle, Brown and Company, 1978), p. 157. cratic Politics (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, 1987), pp. 45–46. 17 Robert Jervis, “Political Decision Making: Recent Contributions,” Political Psychology, vol. 2, no. 2 (Sum- mer 1980), pp. 98–100; Deborah Larson, Origins of Con- tainment: A Psychological Explanation (Princeton: Prince- ton University Press, 1985), pp. 50–52. 18 Larson, Origins. 19 James M. Gavin, Airborne Warfare (Washington: In- fantry Journal Press, 1947), p. 140. 20 James M. Gavin, On to Berlin (New York: Bantam, 1979). 21 Gavin, Airborne, pp. 140–60; see also Gavin’s War and Peace in the Space Age (New York: Harper Brothers, 1958) and Crisis Now (New York: Random House, 1968). 22 Rogers and Shoemaker, Communication, pp. 347–85. 23 John Toland, No Man’s Land: 1918, The Last Year of the Great War (New York: Ballantine Books, 1980), p. 130. 24 Eisenhower, Crusade, p. 449. 25 Gavin, Space Age, pp. 155–57. 26 In addition to Weber, most other students of bureaucracy use the military as an example of this organizational type. See James Q. Wilson, Bureaucracy: What Government Agencies Do and Why They Do It (New York: Basic Books, 1989), pp. 3–6, 15–18. 27 Anthony Downs, Inside Bureaucracy (Boston: Little, Brown, 1967), p. 174. 28 Dixon, Incompetence, pp. 111–18. 29 Irving L. Janis, Groupthink: Psychological Studies of Policy Decisions and Fiascoes (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1982), pp. 174–77. 30 Waddell, “The Army.” 31 Dixon, Incompetence, p. 110.

96 JFQ / Winter 1995–96 JFQLaP 9/19/96 1:26 PM Page 97

C–130 picking up cargo for forces deployed in Haiti.

Logistics

in Wargaming— Combat Camera Imagery (Frank Oplanic) An Initial Report

By JOHN B. LAPLANTE, DAVID P. GARNER, and PATRICIA INSLEY HUTZLER

he Joint Staff has been concerned avoid focusing on how the presence—or ab- about analyzing logistics capabilities in sence—of logistic support affects campaign plan- an operational context for some time. ning. Wargaming models largely ignore the logis- T Two recent events deepened that con- tic impact on operations, making it difficult to cern. First, the Secretary of Defense charged the quantify specific logistic needs, support require- Chairman with carrying out wargames to validate ments for meeting those needs, and evaluate the the two nearly simultaneous major regional con- implications of not meeting them. In most cases flict (MRC) strategy using the Bottom-Up Review experts qualitatively assess possible constraints update force structure. Second, he called for real- on operations. istic evaluations in support of the joint warfight- In the past year the incorporation of logistics ing capabilities as- as an integral part of wargames has improved warfighters have come to see sessment (JWCA) communication between warfighters and logisti- process. This led to cians. The former have gained an appreciation of logistics in an operational context the adoption of gam- the critical role of logistics in operations and the ing as a means of un- latter have come to see logistics in an operational dertaking joint assessments of critical logistics is- context. Now, at the conclusion of many games, sues. Wargames are unique, low-cost ways to the representatives of regional CINCs characterize examine issues in an operational setting. constraints on logistics as operational rather than Logistics analyses are often conducted with- narrow logistics issues. out the participation of warfighters. Moreover, logistics is normally seen as an operational con- Developing a Strategy straint in wargames. As a result, wargames tend to Using wargames to assess logistics required a strategy. Global ’94, a game conducted at the Naval War College, introduced us as logisticians to the joint wargaming environment and also Vice Admiral John B. LaPlante, USN, is Director for Logistics (J-4), Joint served as the testbed for developing a strategy. Staff; Colonel David P. Garner, USMC (Ret.), and Patricia Insley Hutzler Based on wargames in the last year, this strategy are both members of the Logistics Management Institute.

Winter 1995–96 / JFQ 97 JFQLaP 9/19/96 1:26 PM Page 99

LaPlante et al.

Joint Staff to assess near- and mid-term capabili- maintenance, and regeneration of ordnance, as ties to win two nearly simultaneous MRCs against well as command and control. ORDWAR also forecasted threats. The game illustrated the bene- stressed entwining Navy and Marine require- fits of pre-game coordination between the Joint ments and capabilities with those of the other Staff and services. It was a watershed for under- services, for example, using common facilities for standing both the capabilities and limitations of in-theater reception and onward movement of theater-level campaign analysis, especially logis- munitions. The requirement for greater participa- tics assessments. Nimble Dancer ’95 indicated the tion by the munitions community in TPFDD de- direction that modeling must take to integrate lo- velopment was one of the major outcomes. gistics in theater-level analyses and highlighted Naval Total Force ’94 (TF–94)—This game fo- strategic mobility, adequacy of support forces, cused on readiness, availability, adequacy, and ac- and the apportionment of preferred munitions. cessibility of the Reserve, and the capabilities of Naval Ordnance Game (ORDWAR)—This game the naval force structure to meet two-MRC re- was the first to focus on ordnance as well as requirements. TF–94 sought to develop a model for lated logistics issues. Co-sponsored by the Navy Selected Reserve readiness categories based on ex- and Marine Corps, ORDWAR assessed one MRC pected call-up times, address the Secretary of the set in 1995 and then expanded to a two-MRC sce- Navy’s Naval Reserve issues, review roles and mis- nario. In addition to combat consumption, it ad- sions, and play the Naval Reserve master mobi- dressed outload, transportation, industrial base, lization plan. A major accomplishment of TF–94 was developing a means for categorizing Reserve units to flag activation requirements and desig- nate unit readiness goals. Moreover, it expanded Cobra being loaded the definition of enabling forces to include de- aboard USS Capella ploying forces with responsibilities other than for after Desert Storm. movement and reception of forces. U.S. Army (Robert Reeve)

USS Tripoli being refueled by USS Sacramento off Somalia. Combat Camera Imagery (Jeff Brady)Combat Camera Imagery (Jeff

Winter 1995–96 / JFQ 99 JFQLaP 9/19/96 1:26 PM Page 101

LaPlante et al.

instances where the models support logistics is- Keys to Success sues—such as munitions consumption—the oper- One major lesson has been to identify, de- ative assumptions and variables inherent in the scribe, and analyze issues before a game, and to do model are not apparent. Thus, model results re- it early. Because it is imperative that CINCs, ser- quire careful analysis and interpretation to fur- vices, and Joint Staff fully participate, new man- nish meaningful support in games. Professional agement tools have been developed. Central judgment by subject area experts provides the among them is the joint monthly readiness review critical qualitative assessments needed to comple- to identify logistics readiness concerns of CINCs ment model results. and examine service budgets and FYDP issues. Data requirements and turnaround time often Include joint and coalition support issues. War- limit models in gaming. Many models used in gaming can increase knowledge of common sourc- campaign analysis are resource-intensive, requiring ing and employment of logistics as a force multi- extensive preparation for each run. Moreover, they plier. This requires an expanded use of joint can provide details on the conduct of campaigns. logistics capabilities. Moreover, it means consider- These characteristics emphasize pre-game modeling the logistics impact on coalition partners in ing runs and severely restrict excursions in real terms of requirements and potential support. This games. But improvements have been made and, as is important in depicting implications of host na- a result, models for Global ’95 supported two tion support in games. An improved means of ana- moves a day. Nonetheless, much remains to be lyzing joint and coalition requirements is needed. done on model development to increase the value Involve general and flag officers. To focus staff gained for logisticians from gaming. performance, especially in the pre-game phase, Variations among wargames limit the ability continuous participation by senior leaders is criti- to replicate results. Each addresses particular con- cal. Flag-officer IPRs, as conducted in the Naval cerns. They are expensive, so duplication must be Logistics Game, are very effective. While this managed. Varied timeframes, objectives, and orga- process requires a considerable investment of nization contribute to their unique character. In time, the benefits of flag officer involvement addition, the dynamic nature of wargames where have been demonstrated. At a minimum, periodic players influence the conduct of a campaign limit flag-level briefings are needed to apprise senior the ability to compare the results of games. From leaders of the relevant issues and their status. an assessment perspective, we must treat each Develop effective logistics models and data match as an individual data point rather than as bases. The weakness in gaming—particularly lo- providing a complete answer. However, a string of gistics—is modeling and simulation. Models and similar data points results in a trend; and soon a data bases that produce quantifiable results at possible impact of an issue on operations becomes useful levels of detail are key to improving con- clearer, as does the likely solution. sideration of logistics in campaign-level analysis. A recurring problem has been a lack of syn- Many defense analysts are currently embarked on chronization among wargames. As mentioned, ambitious efforts to develop the next generation varied timeframes, objectives, and purposes make of joint campaign-level models. Representing lo- it difficult to achieve consistent results, although gistics impacts will be part of this capability. a greater harmonization is being realized. Re- cently, the scenario of two nearly simultaneous The success of wargaming logistics has influ- MRCs has become the standard gaming scenario, enced the Chairman’s Program Assessment by with excursions done primarily with regard to lo- working through logistic operational issues in a cation, size, and timing of associated OOTWs. scenario-based assessment. It has also signifi- Last year the naval series as well as Global ’95 cantly improved dialogue among joint logisti- were set in 2003. Each iteration of a standard sce- cians, developed a process for including logistics nario contributes to our understanding of logis- issues in wargames, and expanded attention to tics problems. such issues through new management mecha- Joint participation varies. We are at the em- nisms. Although gaming has genuine limitations, bryonic stage in assessing logistics issues from a it offers valuable insights to the joint logistics and joint perspective. Many issues are analyzed using operations communities. We have a sound basis a stovepipe approach. Linkages among issues are on which to build relationships that will con- not clearly identified. Joint requirements are not tinue to grow. JFQ solidly established and complementary service capabilities are not being maximized. Nonetheless, we are aware of these shortfalls. In an era of dwindling resources, a combined, integrated effort is necessary to support the warfighter.

Winter 1995–96 / JFQ 101 JFQClrk 9/19/96 1:28 PM Page 102

D-Day Ver a A Gr

Landing at Veracruz on March 9, 1847.

Naval Historical Center

102 JFQClrk 9/19/96 1:28 PM Page 103 y Veracruz,1847– Mexican spy company (S.J.N. Windisch A Grand Design Graetze).

By PAUL C. CLARK, JR., and EDWARD H. MOSELEY

In his last message to Congress, delivered on Decem- ber 5, 1848, President James K. Polk described the magnificent efforts that had led to victory in the war with Mexico. He praised those civilians who had directed the military in “a vast extent of territory, hundreds and even thousands of miles apart from each Special Collections NDU Library other.” He took special pride in the cooperative efforts of the Army and Navy: “Both branches of the service performed their whole duty to the country....There was concert between the heads of the two arms of the service....By this means their combined power was brought to bear successfully on the enemy.” 1

103 JFQClrk 9/19/96 1:28 PM Page 104

■ VERACRUZ

under General Stephen Kearny. General Zachary Taylor’s campaign in northern Mexico was highly dependent upon a supply line across the Gulf of Mexico and up the Rio Grande, kept open by the Navy. In May 1846, the Navy landed 500 sailors and marines to reinforce Taylor at Fort Polk on the Brazos Santiago when “Old Rough and Ready” was fighting the first major battle of the war a few miles away at Palo Alto.2 Most significant, however, was the landing and siege of Veracruz, a joint operation which took place March 9–27, 1847. That landing, largely unknown to all but students of the Mexi- can War, was the first major amphibious operation in American history and the largest one conducted until the North African campaign in 1942. The War’s Background In a war message to Congress in April 1846,

Naval Historical Center Polk charged Mexico with aggression against U.S. Night battle at territory. He stressed the defensive nature of Veracruz. American military operations in the first weeks Behind Polk’s idealistic and laudatory state- after Congress declared war. In keeping with that, ment was a much more complex and somewhat naval forces established a blockade from the sordid reality. The development of national strat- mouth of the Rio Grande to the Yucatan Penin- egy during his administration was often marred sula and along the Pacific coast of Mexico. It soon by personal and political struggles, competition became clear, however, that the President had among officials with large egos, and a jealous much broader objectives. In answering the call of chief executive insecure in his own strategic Manifest Destiny, he was committed to a strategy thinking and overly concerned with tactical de- that would expand the Nation into New Mexico tails better left to his subordinates. A prolonged and California. To accomplish this, he decided on debate about the expansion of slavery blocked a an aggressive campaign that took U.S. ground major military appropriations bill in Autumn forces from the southwest borderlands deep into 1846, delaying critical supplies to the Army in the the Mexican interior.3 field. Suspicion and intrigue poisoned relations From May to September 1846, Zachary Taylor between the President and his two senior Army won a series of hard fought battles in Texas and commanders, and at times between those officers. Northern Mexico. Despite these Mexican defeats, Despite such difficulties—and petty bickering— it became apparent that the occupation of Mex- Polk was justified in feeling a sense of accom- ico’s northern provinces would not force that gov- plishment for historic victories. In citing the close ernment to agree on a settlement acceptable in cooperation between the Army and Navy, he Washington. Polk held preliminary cabinet meet- highlighted jointness as a significant dimension ings in June 1846 about a new strategy calling for of the U.S. achievement. And one of the war’s a second front along Mexico’s east coast. In antici- most successful joint operations was the landing pation of this action, Secretary of the Navy George at Veracruz. Bancroft directed the commander of the Home To place this operation in context, it is im- Squadron, Commodore David Conner, to furnish portant to note that there were numerous inci- information on defenses at Mexican gulf ports, es- dents of interservice cooperation during the Mex- pecially Tampico and Veracruz (including the lat- ican War. It was evident in far-flung actions along ter’s fortress, San Juan de Ulúa), and on routes the California coast, where sailors under Com- from the coast inland to Mexico City.4 modore Robert F. Stockton fought bravely on Conner considered the smaller port of land to rescue a small, ill-equipped Army force Tampico useful as a staging base for an operation against Veracruz. The latter was the more important location because it gave access to the Camino Nacional (national road) to Mexico City. In his re- Paul C. Clark, Jr., teaches history and diplomacy at the Armed Forces ports, Conner outlined a strategy for ground and Staff College and Edward H. Moseley is professor of history at the naval forces to reduce Veracruz by investing it University of Alabama. This article is drawn from their research for a from the rear. Besides recommending Tampico as forthcoming book on the Mexican War. a staging base for U.S. forces en route to Veracruz,

104 JFQ / Winter 1995–96 JFQClrk 9/19/96 1:28 PM Page 105

Clark and Moseley

Mexican War: Theater of Operations, 1846–47

Sutter’s Fort UNORGANIZED San Francisco (July 9, 1846) (YERBA BUENA) TERRITORY Westport Fort Leavenworth Monterey (June 16—29, 1846) (July 7, 1846) Arkansas MEXICO River Bent’s Fort (July 28, 1846) Colorado Santa Barbara (August 9, 1846) River Santa Fe Canadian Las Vegas River Los Angeles (August 18—September 25, 1846) Fort Smith (August 13, 1846) (August 5, 1846) Albuquerque (July 29, KEARNY Red Socorro River 1846) San Diego Gila (December 12, 1846) (November 22, 1846) River TEXAS Tucson

El Paso (February 5, 1847)

Rio

Grande Nueces

Naval Historical Center Pacific Ocean (September 26, 1846) River Commodore David San Antonio Chihuahua River Conner. (March 1—April 28, 1847) DONIPHAN WOOL Corpus Christi

Monclova TAYLOR (December 5, (November 16, 1846) 1846) Parras Fort Brown MEXICO Mier Monterrey QUITMAN Buena Vista (February 14, 1847) Gulf Mazatlan of Mexico Occupied by Navy Victoria (November 11, 1847) PATTERSON 1846 Campaigns San Luis Potosi Tampico 1847 Campaigns Occupied by Navy (November, 14 1846) Battle Site

SCOTT Jalapa Mexico City (September 14, 1847) Puebla Veracruz (May 15, 1847) (March 29, 1847)

Sources: The West Point Atlas of American Wars (New York: Praeger, 1959); Adrian George Traas, From the Golden Gate to Mexico City: The U.S. Army Topographical Engineers in the Mexican War, 1846–1848 (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1993).

he recommended Antón Lizardo, an anchorage Secretary of War William Marcy and Secretary of ten miles below Veracruz, as a safe roadstead for a the Navy Bancroft (who was replaced by John rendezvous prior to an amphibious assault. Fi- Mason in September 1846) as a kind of “opera- nally, Commodore Conner cautioned that a ditional plans” division. The War Department, rect naval assault against San Juan de Ulúa would which was larger than the Navy Department, had be an extremely high-risk operation.5 virtually no staff to support planning, and con- In August Polk first broached the idea of a sisted of only nine clerks, two messengers, and a major operation at Veracruz to the cabinet, and handyman. The President’s decision to take mat- for the next three months, during numerous dis- ters of strategy into his own hands, despite a lack cussions with his staff, he discussed the notion of of military experience, was partially motivated by an amphibious landing. Though reports from the distrust of the senior Army commander, the gen- theater were usually a month old, the President eral in chief Winfield Scott. Polk claimed that demonstrated a zeal and tenacity regarding both Scott’s actions and attitude were “recklessly vin- strategic and operational issues and demanded dictive” toward his administration, and doubted that he be informed of practically every detail. him because he was an outspoken Whig. In fact, Strangely, Polk did not include the Nation’s top Polk’s relations with senior officers reflected his military officers in these sessions. It became clear that he had every intent of being his own chief of staff and would use cabinet members, especially

Winter 1995–96 / JFQ 105 JFQClrk 9/19/96 1:28 PM Page 106

■ VERACRUZ

insecurity about military strategy, an uncertainty introduce artillery early to support the landing. made worse by jealousy. He was equally suspicious Scott called for an invasion early in 1847 since a and contemptuous of the other top officer, Gen- delay beyond then would risk mounting the oper- eral Zachary Taylor, another Whig sympathizer.6 ation in an unhealthy season of the year along Polk continued his strategy sessions into Au- the coast where the dreaded vómito negro (yellow tumn 1846. When he decided on October 20 to fever) could strike his troops.9 have Taylor go on the defensive in northern Mex- ico, it appeared that he was moving cautiously to- A Second Front ward some type of an operation along the gulf The President agonized over approval for the coast. His private statements and diary entries, expedition. The conflict was at a stalemate. Taylor however, indicated that he was uncertain about had won great victories on the northern battle- the course of the war and feared the political fields, but strategically they had little meaning. costs of enlarging it. Polk feared a public backlash if the war were greatly expanded. He began to speak of going on Veracruz and Its Castle the defensive, even writing into a draft of his an- Although Scott was still out of favor with nual message to Congress a passage which called Polk and had not been invited to participate in for a policy of “inactive occupation” of territory the deliberations, Marcy kept the general in chief already conquered. A great frustration was beginning to set in among members of his admin- Scott’s strategy was based on Jominian principles of war istration and Congress. Daniel Webster remarked that “Mexico is an ugly enemy, she will not fight—and will not treat.” Yet Polk informed. Scott, sensing that a final decision on knew that Veracruz meant a full-scale campaign the expedition was near, maneuvered for com- into the heart of a foreign land, that it would mand of the Veracruz operation.7 He prepared transform the conflict into a war of conquest and plans that outlined his views on seizing the port subjugation, and that many Americans were op- and on a subsequent march on Mexico City. In posed to their Army occupying the capital of an- late October, he forwarded a written proposal to other nation.10 Marcy entitled “Veracruz and Its Castle.” Two At this point of indecision, the President weeks later he revised this study to reflect an ex- came under the persuasion of his friend and fel- panded campaign into the heartland of Mexico.8 low Democrat (and favorite military advisor), the Scott’s strategy for the seizure of Veracruz influential Senator Thomas Hart Benton of Mis- and follow-on thrust into the interior was surely souri. Benton met with Polk almost daily in this influenced by Conner’s reports. It was also based period and they frequently discussed the war. Al- on Jominian principles of war. Realizing that the though initially against involvement, the senator war was controversial and that public opinion was now a war hawk. Benton opposed Polk’s in- was dangerously divided, he understood that war clination to revert to the defensive, contending policy would not be an unqualified extension of that it would only “prolong the war and ruin the political will. Resources would be limited; the Na- Democratic Party.” He argued for an aggressive tion would only partially mobilize to support a strategy that called for a bold strike against Vera- campaign. His strategy included blockades and cruz followed by a “rapid crushing movement” sieges, employed de- against Mexico City. The President, at last conception and diplo- vinced, announced his approval of the Veracruz macy when possible, expedition to the cabinet.11 and substituted ma- Polk now had to pick a commander for the neuver for superior new theater. Realizing the commanding general numbers and com- could become a national hero and thus a political bat. Following Jo- challenge, Polk wanted a Democratic ally, while mini, Scott recog- the two senior men in uniform, Taylor and Scott, nized the inherent were Whigs. He discussed the command issue dangers of an am- with Benton who readily concurred with the par- phibious invasion of tisan opinion that Taylor was “a brave officer but Naval Historical Center Naval bombardment of a foreign land and not a man of capacity enough for such a com- Veracruz (lithograph the imperative to seize a fortified harbor through mand.” 12 When Polk raised Scott’s name, the sen- by N. Currier). which to invade—or to retreat if necessary—and ator replied that he had no confidence in him, a to secure a beachhead where a large force could view that must have pleased the President. Ben- be disembarked. His plan recognized the need to ton then suggested that the President ask Con- gress to create the grade of general of the Army, a rank above that of both Taylor and Scott, the

106 JFQ / Winter 1995–96 JFQClrk 9/19/96 1:28 PM Page 107

Clark and Moseley

After Veracruz: Scott’s Six-Month March on Mexico City

Gulf of Mexico Piedras Negras Cruz Blanca TIERRA

Perote Texcoco It is 265 miles from Veracruz to Mexico City along a route known as the Camino Nacional— L (22 April) Corral Falso PLATEAU A the ancient path of invasion. Jalapa T (18 April)

N Gerro Gordo

E Puente National Ayotla (12 August) Tlaxcala I R Toloma O Santa Fe El Pinal San Bartolome MEXICO CITY San Luis E R Mata Gordera (August 12—September 15, 1847) OF D VERACRUZ A Mt. Orizaba (March 9—27, 1847) M (15 May—7 August) Puebla Cuernavaca A CALIENTE R Mt. Popocatepetl R Orizaba E 01020 30 I S ANAHUAC Scale of Miles

Source: The West Point Atlas of American Wars (New York: Praeger, 1959).

Army’s general in chief. The officer holding this Scott took full advantage of the broad mis- rank could then be given command of the new sion statement. Before arriving in the gulf, he Army. The great Missouri senator, never accused communicated with Conner, requesting details of modesty, then suggested that he was willing to on staging areas, anchorages, defenses at Vera- accept the command himself. Polk, revealing a cruz, Mexican troop strengths, potential landing tendency to place politics first—and showing his beaches, and roads to the interior. Conner, echo- innocence of military affairs—enthusiastically ing his earlier report to Bancroft, recommended backed the idea and immediately lobbied Con- that Scott use Tampico, 200 miles north of Vera- gress for support. After briefly attempting a politi- cruz, as an intermediate staging area for ground Naval Historical Center cal coup (the House of Representatives favored and naval units, and that Antón Lizardo serve as Secretary of the Navy the idea), Polk was convinced of its futility by his a final safe anchorage and rendezvous point prior George Bancroft. friends in the Senate. He then turned again to to the assault. Much of Conner’s information in Scott, the logical choice and Marcy’s recommen- this period was the basis of Scott’s operational dation. Secretary of State Buchanan, Secretary plan for the landing. Scott also wrote to Taylor at Mason, and the remainder of the cabinet—even Monterrey, informing him that he would have to Senator Benton—eventually fell in line to support stay on the defensive and furnish most of his reg- the general in chief who was the author of the ulars for this expedition. Some troops in forward plan to open a second front that the administra- positions around Monterrey would go overland tion had already agreed upon. Winfield Scott to Tampico; units still in Taylor’s rear area on the could now pursue his grand design.13 border would rendezvous at the Brazos Santiago (referred to as “the Brazos”), north of the mouth Scott and Joint Warfare of the Rio Grande on off-shore islands along the The mission was only generally defined by gulf coast. Drawing off Taylor’s best troops embit- Scott’s command authorities. Marcy indicated that tered the old soldier, causing a permanent rift Polk had ordered him to “repair to Mexico, to take with Scott.15 command of the forces there assembled, and par- Scott’s demand for sea transport and naval ticularly to organize and to set afoot an expedi- support was both large and unique for that era. tion to operate on the gulf coast.” He assured For the largest amphibious assault in American Scott of the full support of the administration and history, he requested 50 ships of 500 to 750 tons promised no interference from either himself or each to lift approximately 15,000 men and a large the President on operational questions. Some siege train to the area of operations.16 These trans- have argued that the mission was purposely broad ports would be sail as well as steam-powered and to ensure that if “grief came to the expedition the under Army command. Since amphibious opera- blame would rest on Scott’s Whig shoulders.” 14 tions of this type and scale were unprecedented, the landing craft did not exist. Scott wanted small assault boats to put his troops ashore and gave

Winter 1995–96 / JFQ 107 JFQClrk 9/19/96 1:28 PM Page 108

■ VERACRUZ

the requirement to his resourceful logistician, attempt to “summon an army,” he remained at Army quartermaster general Thomas S. Jesup. the Brazos during January 1847. While there, he These surfboats were the first specially con- communicated again with Conner, who constructed for an American amphibious assault. firmed that Lobos Island would be an appropriate Scott’s specifications called for flat-bottomed, rendezvous point. Restless with inactivity and agi- double-ended, broad-beamed rowboats; and 141 tated by the laborious process of gathering troops were ordered at $795 each. They would carry a and supplies, Scott—now resigned that his target platoon of forty men plus a crew of eight sailors, date would slip—left Brigadier William Worth to with a naval officer in command. The contract complete the embarkation at the Brazos and de- was negotiated with a Philadelphia builder by parted for Tampico in the middle of February. Jesup’s agent, Captain Robert F. Loper of the Scott found some 6,000 soldiers at Tampico Army, but the boats were designed by a naval offi- on February 19 waiting for transportation to Vera- cer, Lieutenant George M. Totten.17 cruz. Reaching the port city was a triumph for Scott. He was greeted in grand style ashore Scott’s demand for naval support was unique for that era by the strains of the Army band from Gover- nor’s Island. Many senior officers who had been fighting with Taylor were there to greet When Scott departed Washington for the Bra- him. After conferring overnight, Scott steamed zos on November 26, 1846, he planned to have south and arrived at Lobos Island, now the main his entire force afloat in gulf waters by February 1 rendezvous for the Army, on February 21. at the latest. In New York, he engaged the diplo- Scott spent a week at Lobos drilling available mat Francis Dimond to go to Cuba to recruit two troops and waiting impatiently for the rest of his intelligence agents to operate inside Mexico. Con- force. Good winds finally came, bringing most of tinuing from New York on the 30th, head winds the regiments under General Worth, along with a and rough seas in the gulf delayed his arrival in few units from Tampico and troops directly from New Orleans until December 19, where he dined home “coming down before the gale like race with Henry Clay. The venerable old statesman and horses.” The roadstead at Lobos Island became, in orator, who opposed an aggressive policy toward the words of one soldier, “a wilderness of spars and Mexico as a presidential candidate two years be- rigging.” Although all his troops had not arrived, fore, would lose a son, Lieutenant Colonel Henry the restless Scott, fearing the approach of the yel- Clay, Jr., at Buena Vista within two months. While low fever season, decided to go with the forces on in the Crescent City, Scott was also advised by hand. On March 3 the commanding general de- shipmasters that Lobos Island, a sandy coral for- parted, his blue flag flying from the maintruck of mation between Tampico and Veracruz, offered USS Massachusetts. Always a man of spectacle and safe anchorage and a good rendezvous location. drama, the imposing six-foot-five Scott stood bare- Due to limited space in the Tampico anchorage, headed on the deck of his flagship. As it moved Scott chose Lobos and sent a message from New among the transports, he acknowledged the shouts Orleans advising all forces to rendezvous there be- from his men. Morale was high; troops cheered fore continuing to Antón Lizardo. their general, and sailors sang: Scott then moved on to the Rio Grande, hop- We are now bound for the shores of Mexico ing to discuss the exact breakout of forces for the And there Uncle Sam’s soldiers we will land, hi, oh! new campaign with Taylor. But Taylor was in no The fleet stood away. Winfield Scott and his army mood to converse with the general in chief and were off to Veracruz.18 failed to appear, so Scott decided which units to Driven by fair winds, the armada arrived take along. The troops were ordered to gather at March 5. Commodore Conner sent a ship under the Brazos for movement to Lobos Island. Con- Captain John Aulick to an offshore island, Isla cerned about undercutting Taylor’s command au- Verde, to meet the fleet and guide it through the thority, Scott was careful to send him copies of all shoals to Antón Lizardo. The next day—Sunday, movement orders. He discovered that many of March 6—Conner arranged for a reconnaissance Taylor’s units had not arrived at the Rio Grande, of the landing site by Scott and his principal and that Jesup, whose headquarters had been commanders and staff, who left at 0900 on the moved to the Brazos, was having trouble getting small steamer Petrita. Aboard were Scott’s three the transports and accompanying trains (includ- division commanders and all the officers he ing surfboats) from the east coast. Scott became called his “little cabinet.” This group essentially increasingly concerned that he would not meet acted as a general staff and was made up of Army the February 1 launch date for the invasion. In an officers. Among them were Lieutenant Colonel Ethan Allen Hitchcock, the inspector general; Scott’s son-in-law, Captain Henry Lee Scott (who

108 JFQ / Winter 1995–96 JFQClrk 9/19/96 1:28 PM Page 109

Clark and Moseley

The Investment of Veracruz, March 9—27, 1847

Vergana Gallega Reef Fort Concepción to Mexico Fort San City Juan de Ulúa Twigg Gate of Mexico The “Castle” at Veracruz: Fort San Juan de Ulúa Fort Santiago VERACRUZ Point Hornos Verde Island Fort Santa Barbara Gate of Mercy Mosquito Fleet to Cordoba Army Batteries Naval Battery

Patterson Gulf of Mexico Sacrificios Island Malibran Worth C olla do B e to Antón Lizardo (10 Miles) a c N h

to Alvarado General Scott's 0 1 mile Headquarters (Fort Washington)

Sources: K. Jack Bauer, Surfboats and Horse Marines: U.S. Naval Operations in the Mexican War, 1846–48 (Annapolis: U.S. Naval Institute, 1969); West Point Atlas of American Wars (New York: Praeger, 1959).

acted as staff coordinator); the chief engineer, landing as an all-Army effort—with troops simply Colonel Joseph Totten; and five engineers: Major moving from Army transports to surfboats and as- John L. Smith, Captains Robert E. Lee and Joseph saulting the beach. But Conner argued that the E. Johnston, First Lieutenant P.G.T. Beauregard, roadstead between Collado Beach and Sacrificios and Second Lieutenant Zebulon B. Tower. Conner Island was too limited to hold all the Army trans- showed Scott a potential landing site. Known as ports and that it would be more effective to move Collado Beach, it lay behind Sacrificios Island, most of the assault force from Antón Lizardo in two and a half miles below Veracruz. It was a large Navy ships. Scott agreed. Army transports slightly curving stretch of beach with a gentle were put temporarily under the command of slope. The site, just beyond the range of the guns Conner who was given authority to organize of the city and fort, was an excellent choice.19 As loading on Salmedina Island—adjacent to Antón Lizardo—and carry out ship-to- the plan was simple compared to modern amphibious operations shore movement. Scott planned to hit the beach in three waves: Worth’s division of regulars Petrita turned in front of the fortress San Juan—at would go in first, with Major General Robert Pat- a distance of less than a mile—Mexican batteries terson’s volunteers following, and Brigadier Gen- opened fire and bracketed the ship. Ten rounds eral David Twigg’s regulars landing last. On the exploded beyond, short of, and over the com- evening of the 7th, Scott announced the landing mand group, but none struck the little steamer, would take place the next day. and it returned safely to Antón Lizardo.20 On the 8th, the weather broke stormy. Scott, Scott and Conner used Monday, March 7, to fearing a “norther,” the dreaded gulf storm of the organize the forces in loading units. The plan was winter season, postponed the landing a day. On simple compared to modern amphibious operations. Scott had apparently first thought of the

Winter 1995–96 / JFQ 109 JFQClrk 9/19/96 1:28 PM Page 110

■ VERACRUZ

the 9th, Scott later recalled, “the precise day when ashore (naming the encampment Fort Washing- I had been thirty years a general officer—the sun ton) and began subduing the city and fort. This dawned propitiously on the expedition.” Another required a large supply build-up on Collado officer present observed, “If we had the choice of Beach and troop deployments over difficult ter- weather, we could not have selected a more pro- rain to invest Veracruz, efforts delayed by pitious day. The sun shot forth his brilliant rays “northers” over the next two weeks. Unloading in a cloudless sky. . . .” The first real D-Day in supplies, however, continued at Collado. To dis- American history had arrived. At Salmedina, boat tract the Mexicans during the troop movement, crews under Captain French Forrest launched Conner sent Commander Josiah Tattnall with surfboats from designated positions on the beach Spitfire close in to the shore to fire on San Juan de and used them to move the troops from Army Ulúa on March 10. The bombardment did little transports to naval vessels. The largest ships, the damage but allowed Patterson to pass through frigates USS Raritan and USS Potomac, each loaded Worth’s troops and position his division to the 2,500 men; the smaller ships, such as the sloops west. Within two days, Scott had most of his Albany and St. Mary’s, each loaded about 1,000 12,000-man army—including a Marine company men; and other still smaller vessels loaded fewer in the assault phase, soon augmented by a 400- men. Ten Navy sailing ships, four Navy steamers, man battalion—on Mexican soil. and five Army steamers were used for the move The formation consisted of Worth’s division from Salmedina to Sacrificios.21 deployed from Collado Beach southeast of the Discarding signals which had been prepared city, west and northwest to a position at about for an all-Army operation, Scott and Conner seven o’clock. Patterson’s volunteers occupied worked out a set for supporting fires, loading surf- roughly the center of the half moon encirclement boats, and assaulting the beach. The movement on the west. Twigg’s regulars, passing through took most of the day. At 1530 hours, Scott Patterson’s division, completed the investment hoisted red, yellow, and red-and-white flags from on March 13 when they closed on the village of the mainmast of USS Massachusetts, a preparatory Vergana at the entrance to the national road on signal for Worth’s division to reload the surfboats. the coast north of Veracruz. The line of invest- After some initial confusion, Worth pulled them ment ran about seven miles from shore to shore. abreast behind Princeton, anchored about 400 From reconnaissance on horse the first day, yards off shore. As Potomac moved behind Sacrifi- Scott realized that his plan to reduce the city cios its band struck up “Yankee Doodle,” “Hail through siege would take patience. Conner’s ear- Columbia,” and “The Star Spangled Banner.” At lier reports had convinced him that Veracruz and this time Mexican cavalry were spotted on hills San Juan were formidable and strongly defended. behind the beach. Although the enemy disap- He understood there were 3,000 well-supplied peared when the schooner Tampico fired one vol- troops (including 1,000 militia) in the city of ley in its direction, anxiety rose as the assault 15,000. The city was encircled by a 15-foot cur- troops expected opposition on landing. At 1730 tain wall with redans and nine forts. The defend- the troops cheered as Scott fired a gun and raised ers set thick clusters of prickly pear in front of the a fourth flag to his mast. It signalled the first wall and dug a line of trous de loup, conical holes wave: assault the shore! It was a moment of great with sharpened stakes to impale anyone who Naval Historical Center tension and excitement since no one knew what stepped on them. On the seaward side loomed Commodore Matthew lay beyond the beach. In minutes a gig sped out the fortress of San Juan de Ulúa, solidly con- C. Perry (portrait by John Beaufain from the left side of the line of boats and an offi- structed on the submerged Gallega Reef. It was, Irving, Jr.). cer jumped waist-high into the surf, general’s and remains today, an awesome structure. gold braid reflecting the bright sun. The gallant Mounted along and within its walls were over William Worth was leading the 6th Infantry Regi- 100 cannons and 1,000 men. Scott noted that in ment ashore.22 March 1847 the fort “had the capacity to sink the To Worth’s surprise, his division landed es- entire American Navy.” 23 sentially unopposed—there was only sporadic fire During the first week on shore some of from San Juan de Ulúa—and the remaining two Scott’s officers questioned his siege strategy and assault waves came ashore by 2200 hours. By wanted to take Veracruz by infantry assault. The midnight Conner had landed 10,000 men with- general called a meeting in his tent and argued out one life lost. Over the next few days, under that an assault would be “an immense slaughter intermittent harassing fire from Mexican batteries to both sides, including noncombatants—Mexi- and occasional fire from cavalry patrols behind can men, women, and children.” Besides, he the sandhills, Scott established his headquarters claimed, such an assault could mean the loss of 2,000 to 3,000 of “our best men...and I have received but half the numbers promised me.” How, Scott contended, “could we hope to penetrate the

110 JFQ / Winter 1995–96 JFQClrk 9/19/96 1:28 PM Page 111

Clark and Moseley

General Winfield Scott. Naval Historical Center

Naval Historical Center Perry’s heavy guns, March 24 and 25 (painting by Lieutenant interior?” He admitted to his officers that the Na- Despite storms and problems with the logis- Henry A. Walke, USN, tion would hardly acknowledge a victory “unac- tical build-up on the beach, the operation to from drawing on stone companied by a long butcher’s bill” (referring to choke off Veracruz continued apace. The Army by Pfau). praise Taylor’s bloody victories had earned in the tightened its line of investment, all the roads States), but he would forego “loud applause and were secured, and the water supply for the city aves vehement,” and “take the city with the least and fort was cut. American troops were under possible loss of life.” Scott’s arguments carried the constant fire, and while work on battery positions was accomplished mostly at night, there one critical aspect was constructing positions for siege guns were casualties around construction sites. Casualties also resulted from skir- mishes with Mexican irregulars who day—the siege continued with renewed support were patrolling the perimeter. Scott sent a letter from his commanders and staff.24 to the Spanish consul in Veracruz on the 13th One critical aspect of the operation was con- with an offer of safe passage out of the city for structing battery positions for siege guns, a task foreign consuls, adding ominously that “a bom- Scott gave to Totten. “Northers” that blew after bardment or cannonade, or assault, or all” of landing delayed construction as well as unloading these possibilities could occur soon. He later re- the mortars and heavy guns into position. Totten called that the diplomats “sullenly neglected” his used both regular and topographical engineers as proposition. supervisors and infantrymen for the spade work.25 Lacking sufficient heavy guns on shore, Scott Though discouraged at receiving only a small feared his coming bombardment would not be ef- portion of the requested artillery, Scott nonethe- fective on Veracruz’s fortifications. Conner of- less wrote to Marcy and expressed appreciation fered to bring naval guns ashore from the fleet for the help of the Navy: “Commodore Conner’s and emplace them in land batteries under con- squadron is indefatigable in assisting us.” 26 struction. The commanding general delayed accepting the offer but did inform Conner on the

Winter 1995–96 / JFQ 111 JFQClrk 9/19/96 1:28 PM Page 112

■ VERACRUZ Naval Historical Center Bombarding Veracruz and Fort San Juan Ulúa (engraving by W. Roberts).

Naval Historical Center Rendevous at Island of Lobos on February 9, 1847 (drawing by 19th that Army batteries—prepared in Worth’s sec- emplacement. Lee immediately had a problem Lieutenant Charles tor less than a mile south of the city—were al- with some sailors. Although eager for combat Crillon Burton, USN). most ready and would open fire the next day. He ashore, they could not see the need for labori- requested that Conner join in bombarding Vera- ously reinforcing the naval position when they cruz with his ships offshore. Scott delayed the were a mile from the fort. Later, when the firing bombardment order, however, and on the 21st de- began, they were grateful for the sturdy fortifica- cided to accept the earlier offer of naval guns. tions. On the 22nd, before the naval battery was When Conner came ashore Scott was surprised to ready, Scott decided to begin the bombardment see him accompanied by Commodore Matthew with the three Army batteries. He issued a de- C. Perry, who had arrived the previous day to take mand for surrender; when the Mexicans refused, command of the Home Squadron. Even though firing began at 1600 hours. the change of command was clearly inopportune, The batteries that opened fire on March 22 Scott apparently took it in stride and reiterated did little damage to the fortification but wrecked that he wanted the naval guns.27 havoc on civilian structures in the city. More ef- Scott asked Perry to send six guns ashore and fective fire came from the naval guns offshore. At said Army artillerymen would operate them. 1800 hours, Perry ordered the fleet to join in the Perry balked, then calmly replied, “Certainly, bombardment. Once again he sent Tattnall of the General, but I must fight them.” While Scott small steamer Spitfire in close to fire on the fort. wanted the Army to get credit for manning the This time Tattnall took another steamer with guns that he thought would reduce the city, he him, Vixen, and five schooners, Falcon, Reefer, Pe- recognized the Navy’s prerogative and agreed. trel, Bonita, and Tampico). Tattnall moved in and Perry arranged for double naval crews to man the dropped anchor in the lee of Point Hornos, a guns, and several hundred Army troops helped promontory south of the city less than a mile drag them across the dunes. Robert E. Lee, almost from San Juan de Ulúa. He opened up with every killed the previous night by an American at- gun in his flotilla of light ships, remaining in po- tempting to desert, was in charge of preparing the sition for eighty minutes under heavy counterfire. The guns from Spitfire were especially accurate, some rounds reaching Veracruz’s central plaza. Although Tattnall had to withdraw after

112 JFQ / Winter 1995–96 JFQClrk 9/19/96 1:28 PM Page 113

Clark and Moseley

expending his ammunition, the brave exploit of Mexicans had quit the fight. This was not quite his gunboats boosted morale among soldiers and true, because in a few minutes they briefly opened sailors alike. fire again. But the battle was over. Mexican fire On the 23rd, Scott opened fire with a fourth ceased, and foreign consuls sent out word that Army battery after three 24-pounders arrived at they now desired safe passage and also requested Collado Beach, and Perry brought in the huge that the women and children be allowed to leave. ship-of-the-line USS Ohio, to train its heavy guns Scott quickly refused, reminding them that they to bear on San Juan de Ulúa. And that morning had had their chance and stating that he would Perry again ordered Tattnall to take his guns back now treat only with General Morales. His terms in under Mexican fire to engage the fort. The two were complete surrender. Morales feigned sickness (apparently to save face) and appointed together Army and Navy batteries had a devastating impact General Juan Landero to negotiate a surrender with Scott’s representatives. The negotiations took most of a day, and men had a strained relationship—Tattnall had terms were reached late on March 26. On the never cared for Perry and did not mind express- morning of the 28th, the Mexican garrisons of ing his opinion. The gallant commander now had Veracruz city and San Juan de Ulúa marched out another chance to excel, however, and immedi- to military honors and stacked their arms in front ately asked the commodore exactly where he of the assembled Americans. should position his gunboats. Perry replied, “Where you can do the most execution, sir!” Tatt- The capitulation marked the end of a re- nall went in closer, opened up his guns, and markable event in the annals of American mili- withstood a withering response from San Juan. Fi- tary history. While Veracruz represented the nally Perry called him back. Tattnall did not see largest U.S. amphibious operation prior to World the signal (or ignored it) and stayed on station for War II, it was completed with relatively few casu- another hour. At last Perry sent out Captain Isaac alties on either side. This was due partly to the Mayo to order the reckless Tattnall to retire, and baffling Mexican decision not to resist the assault he reluctantly did so to cheers from soldiers on on the beach, where even modest opposition the beach, sailors of the Home Squadron, and could have brought high casualties, and partly neutral British, French, and Spanish ships observ- due to Scott’s strategy of siege warfare vice in- ing the action. Though Tattnall’s conduct bor- fantry assault. He would later comment that it dered on insubordination, Perry felt compelled to was an “economy of life, by means of head- ask his commanders to “express to the crews his work.” Mexican casualties vary by accounts from sense of their gallantry.” 28 200 to 1,000 killed, but most claims are in the Lee had the naval battery—which some lower range. Scott lost 13 killed in action and 55 maps denote as “battery no. 5”—ready by the wounded. The landing of over 10,000 troops 24th. The six guns Perry furnished, according to ashore in wooden boats in the span of five hours one historian, were the heaviest “ever before without any losses was remarkable in itself. The mounted in siege.” Three were long thirty-two operation surely suffered in the planning phase, pounders which fired 32-pound solid shot. The adversely affected by Polk’s indecision and parti- others were Paixhans, a French 8-inch gun which san politics. Even the selection of a commander delivered accurate horizontal fire with a 68- was done in an unprofessional, roundabout man- pound exploding shell. Lee transferred the bat- ner. But in the event the best man got the job. He tery to Captain John Aulick of the Navy and it came up with a solid plan, much of it joint in na- went into action on the morning of the 24th. The ture. Scott consulted Conner’s reports—both the joint artillery bombarded Veracruz until the naval intelligence and recommendations on the land- battery expended its ammunition at 1500 hours. ing, siege, and campaign to the interior— Army fire continued. Since the naval battery had throughout his strategic and operational plan- attracted much of the counterfire from the Mexi- ning for Veracruz. The landing and siege can guns, it had to be repaired and supplied over operations were clearly joint, from the position- night. Before first light on the 25th, Perry sent ing of the Army and Navy ships, to the reconnais- Mayo to relieve Aulick with a new crew and re- sance, to the landing, and finally to the Army- sume firing.29 Navy bombardment itself. Together, the Army and Navy batteries had a Scott was not reluctant to give credit to the devastating impact on the city and fort. Large Navy. On March 30, he issued General Order gashes appeared in the city’s walls (although not Number 80: “Thanks higher than those of the the fort’s), and at midafternoon of the 25th Mayo observed many Mexican gunners leaving their positions. He rode back to tell Scott he thought the

Winter 1995–96 / JFQ 113 JFQClrk 9/19/96 1:28 PM Page 114

■ VERACRUZ

4 Polk, Diary, vol. 2, p. 16; Marcy to Polk, June 13, 1846, Senate Document 392: 29th Cong., 1st sess., vol. 18. 5 Conner’s reports are in Bauer, Surfboats and Horse Marines, pp. 9, 15–43. 6 For Polk’s attitude toward Scott, see Diary, vol. 1: pp. 407–18, and Ivor Debenham Spencer, The Victor and the Spoils: A Life of William L. Marcy (Providence: Brown University Press, 1959), p. 141. His opinion of Taylor grew increasingly hostile as the general’s national popu- larity grew after the Battle of Monterrey in September 1846. By November, Polk was beside himself with distrust of the new national hero. On the 14th, he recorded that Taylor was “unfit for command” of the expedition and was a “bitter political partisan.” On the 22nd, he noted that Taylor “is a narrow-minded, bigoted partisan, without resources and wholly unqualified for the command he holds...anyone would do better than

Naval Historical Center Taylor.” By January 1847 Polk was lambasting Taylor as Army leaving the “wholly incompetent.” See Paul H. Bergeron, The Presi- Gulf Squadron with dency of James K. Polk (Lawrence: University Press of Veracruz in back- general in chief have also been earned by the en- Kansas, 1987), pp. 92, 255, 257; Polk, Diary, vol. 2: pp. ground (drawing by tire Home Squadron, under the successive orders 236, 250, 307. For an excellent account of relations J. M. Ladd; lithograph of Commodores Conner and Perry, for prompt, among the major political and military figures of the by N. Currier). cheerful, and able assistance from the arrival of Mexican War, see John S.D. Eisenhower’s “Polk and His Generals,” in Essays on the Mexican War, edited by the Army off this coast.” Douglas W. Richmond (Arlington: University of Texas Years after the war, Scott praised the Navy Press, 1986), pp. 34–35. and interservice cooperation. His views were rein- 7 Polk had earlier offered Scott command of all the- forced by President Polk and Secretary Mason, ater forces but had withdrawn the offer when Scott who remarked in his report to Congress that the wrote a letter critical of the administration and Polk’s “entire operation, from the landing of the troops leadership. After May 1846 their relationship disinte- to the surrender brought the Army and Navy into grated into mutual distrust. See Polk, Diary, vol. 1, pp. the closest contact.” The “courage and skill dis- 396–421, especially the entry for October 22, 1846. 8 played,” the Navy Secretary stated, “were not The first paper is in found U.S. Congress, House, th st more honorable to both than the perfect har- Executive Document 60, 30 Cong., 1 sess., pp. 1268–70; the second paper is at pp. 1270–74. mony which prevailed.” 30 9 On Scott as a disciple of Jomini, see James W. th Veracruz was the Normandy of the 19 cen- Pohl’s “The Influence of Antoine Henri de Jomini on tury. The landing opened the way for great victo- Winfield Scott’s Campaign in the Mexican War,” South- ries from Cerro Gordo to Mexico City, battles that western Historical Quarterly, vol. 77, no. 4 (Winter, 1973– “conquered a peace” and brought vast new terri- 74), pp. 85–110. A recent discussion of Scott as a strate- tory to the Nation, forever changing the relation- gist is found in James R. Arnold, Presidents Under Fire: ship between the United States of America and the Commanders in Chief in Victory and Defeat (New York: Republic of Mexico. It was also a watershed cam- Orion Books, 1994), pp. 113, 121. Scott’s principal biog- paign in the development of jointness. JFQ rapher, Charles Winslow Elliot, discusses his strategic thinking and the Veracruz plan in Winfield Scott: The Soldier and the Man (New York: Macmillan, 1937), pp. NOTES 90, 436–37, as does T. Harry Williams in The History of 1 Message of the President to Congress, December 5, American Wars from 1745 to 1918 (New York: Alfred A. 1848, Senate Executive Documents, House (vol. 537), 30th Knopf, 1981). Cong., 2d sess., 1847–48, pp. 5–6. 10 Fletcher Webster, The Writings and Speeches of Dan- 2 Two studies of Navy and Marine Corps efforts in iel Webster, 18 vols. (Boston: National Edition, 1903), the Mexican War are K. Jack Bauer’s excellent Surfboats vol. 16, p. 465. and Horse Marines: U.S. Naval Operations in the Mexican 11 Bauer, Surfboats and Horse Marines, p. 64; Charles L. War, 1846–48 (Annapolis: U.S. Naval Institute, 1969), Dufour, The Mexican War (New York: Hawthorn Books, and Gabrielle M. Neufeld Santelli, Marines in the Mexi- 1968), p. 159; Elliot, Winfield Scott, p. 437; Polk, Diary, can War (Washington: History and Museums Division, vol. 2, pp. 233–38; Otis A. Singletary, The Mexican War Headquarters, U.S. Marine Corps, 1991). (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1960), p. 111. 3 Message of the President, May 11, 1846, in Senate 12 Polk, Diary, vol. 2, p. 227. Document 337, 29th Cong., 1st sess., 1845–46. Early debates over war policy are found in James Knox Polk, The Diary of James K. Polk During His Presidency, edited by Milo Milton Quaife, 4 vols. (Chicago: A.C. McClurg, 1910), vol. 1, April to June 1846.

114 JFQ / Winter 1995–96 JFQClrk 9/19/96 1:28 PM Page 115

Clark and Moseley

13 Arnold, Presidents Under Fire, pp. 99, 100; Polk, 22 Participant accounts of the landing are in Black- Diary, vol. 2, pp. 244–46; Singletary, The Mexican War, wood, To Mexico with Scott, pp. 113–14; Myers, Diary of p. 120. George B. McClellan, pp. 53–54, and Richard F. Pourade, 14 Mission statement is in Merrill L. Bartlett, Assault The Sign of the Eagle (San Diego: Union-Tribune Publish- from the Sea: Essays on the History of Amphibious Warfare ing Co., 1970), pp. 71–74 (the latter being letters of (Annapolis: Naval Institute Press, 1983), p. 75; quote Lieutenant John James Peck). from The Mexican War, 1846–1848 (Lincoln: University 23 A detailed description is contained in a pamphlet of Nebraska Press, 1974), p. 237. by P.S.P. Conner, The Castle of San Juan de Ullóa and the 15 Elliot, Winfield Scott, p. 444; James M. McCaffrey, Topsy Turvyists (Philadelphia: n.p., 1897). Also see Free- Army of Manifest Destiny (New York: New York Univer- man, R.E. Lee, vol. 1, p. 227; McCaffrey, Army of Mani- sity Press, 1992), p. 166; Singletary, The Mexican War, fest Destiny, p. 168; Scott, Memoirs, vol. 2, p. 422. pp. 72–73. Polk had earlier ordered Taylor through 24 Elliot, Winfield Scott, pp. 458–59; Scott, Memoirs, Marcy to halt his advance at Monterrey and go on the vol. 2, pp. 425–26. defensive; Scott’s order reinforced this directive. But 25 Major John Smith, Captain R.E. Lee, and Lieu- Taylor ignored it, even after his forces were drawn off by tenants P.G.T. Beauregard and George McClellan were Scott, and he advanced south of Saltillo where he en- with Totten as regular engineers (Corps of Engineers). gaged the much larger army of Santa Anna at Buena Among those at Veracruz in the Corps of Topographical Vista. That famous victory in February 1847 greatly en- Engineers were Major William Turnbull; Scott’s chief hanced his stature as a war hero and carried him to the “topog,” Captain Joseph E. Johnston; and Lieutenant White House in the following year. George G. Meade. See Adrian George Traas, From the 16 Scott’s force estimates are in studies prepared for Golden Gate to Mexico City: The U.S. Army Topographical Marcy. See House Executive Document 60, pp. 1268–74. Engineers in the Mexican War, 1846–1848 (Washington: 17 Surfboat specifications are found in William G. Government Printing Office, 1993), pp. 5, 6, 182–84. Temple, “Memoir of the Landing of the United States Also see Gustavus W. Smith, “Company A Engineers in Troops at Veracruz in 1847,” addendum to Philip Syng Mexico, 1846–1847,” The Military Engineer, vol. 56, no. Physick Conner, The Home Squadron Under Commodore 373 (September–October 1964), pp. 336–40. Conner in the War with Mexico, Being a Synopsis of Its Ser- 26 Bauer, Surfboats and Horse Marines, pp. 86–87; vices, 1846–1847 (n.p., 1896), pp. 60–62. Morison, “Old Bruin,” p. 211; John S.D. Eisenhower, So 18 Emma Jerome Blackwood, editor, To Mexico with Far from God: The U.S. War with Mexico, 1846–1848 (New Scott: Letters of Captain E. Kirby Smith to His Wife (Cam- York: Random House, 1989), pp. 261–62. bridge: Harvard University Press, 1917), pp. 108–09; Du- 27 Scott, Memoirs, vol. 2, p. 427; Smith, The War With four, The Mexican War, p. 201; Elliot, Winfield Scott, p. Mexico, vol. 2, p. 27. 451; Douglas Southall Freeman, R.E. Lee: A Biography, 4 28 Morison, “Old Bruin,” p. 218. vols. (New York: Charles Scribner’s Sons, 1934), vol. 1, 29 Eisenhower, So Far From God, p. 263; Don E. Hous- pp. 220–23. ton, “The Superiority of American Artillery,” in Odie B. 19 Retracing Scott’s campaign in 1993, the authors Faulk and Joseph A. Stout, Jr., editors, The Mexican War: visited Veracruz and San Juan de Ulúa and inspected the Changing Interpretations (Chicago: The Swallow Press, beach from Antón Lizardo to the city. Part of the wall 1973), p. 106; Elliot, Winfield Scott, pp. 458–59. still can be found and the massive fort (now connected 30 Scott, Memoirs, vol. 2, p. 429; U.S. Congress, “Re- to the mainland) is quite intact and a tourist attraction. port of the Secretary of the Navy,” December 6, 1847. The beach is largely unchanged and the visitor will Senate Document 1, 30th Cong., 1st sess., 1847–48, pp. come to agree with most commentators on the Mexican 945–58. War that the site chosen by Scott and Conner for the amphibious landing was superb. 20 Scott does not mention arriving at Antón Lizardo or the Petrita incident in his memoirs. Events on March 5 and 6 are in the following participant accounts: Ethan Allen Hitchcock, Fifty Years in Camp and Field (New York: G.P. Putnam’s Sons, 1909), p. 237; George Meade, The Life and Letters of George Gordon Meade, Major-Gen- eral United States Army, 2 vols. (New York: Charles Scrib- ner’s Sons, 1913), vol. 1, p. 187; and William Starr Myers, editor, The Mexican War Diary of George B. Mc- Clellan (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1917), p. 52. Also see Elliot, Winfield Scott, p. 455; Freeman, R.E. Lee, vol. 1, pp. 223, 226. 21 Samuel Elliot Morison, “Old Bruin”: Commodore Matthew C. Perry, 1794–1858 (Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1967), p. 210, and Winfield Scott, Memoirs, 2 vols. (New York: Sheldon and Company, 1864), vol. 2, p. 419.

Winter 1995–96 / JFQ 115 JFQStkr 9/19/96 1:30 PM Page 116

■ Canadian “Jointery”

Fighter group operations center during Amalgam Warrior 96–1. Combat Camera Imagery (Greg Suhay) Combat Camera Imagery (Greg

By JEREMY R. STOCKER About the only real growth today in Canada’s defense establishment is in the area of joint operations. Canada is certainly far from unique in this regard. Where it differs from other nations is that since February 1, 1968 it has not had a separate army, navy, and air force. On that date, the Canadian Army, Royal Canadian Navy, and Royal Canadian Air Force were amalgamated into the Canadian Forces (CF), which poses a difficulty in terminology. While joint operations are generally understood to involve elements of more than one service, Canada in theory has only one service with land, sea, and air elements. But, in practice, joint operations in Lieutenant Commander Jeremy R. Stocker, Royal Navy, is an Canada as elsewhere can be defined anti-air warfare specialist assigned to the staff of the School of Maritime Operations. He recently served on an exchange as involving operations in more than tour at the Canadian Forces Maritime Warfare Centre. one environment.

116 JFQ / Winter 1995–96 JFQStkr 9/19/96 1:30 PM Page 117

Stocker

Since Canada has had unified conducting joint operations, Canada chief operations officer, assisted by the forces for nearly thirty years, one might has unashamedly drawn on the experi- Chief of Staff (COS) J-3 and a perma- think that “jointery” is second nature. ences and practices of its allies, the nent Joint Operations Staff at National Its military institutions, support struc- United States and the United Kingdom Defence Headquarters (NDHQ) in Ot- tures, and much of the training system in particular, adapting ideas where ap- tawa. J-3 issues operational tasking to are unified, with the advantages in propriate to its own much smaller meet programmed and emergency re- forces with their unique quirements. The staff is responsible for Canada, although belatedly, determined needs and concerns. It planning, conducting, and coordinat- is worth noting that it ing operations on the strategic level that jointness was the way of the future seems inevitable that and provides a JFC with a single point future joint operations of contact at NDHQ. Command on the rationalization and economy of forces undertaken by Canada will also be strategic level is retained by CDS while such synergism implies for a small-to- combined operations. his other subordinates (namely, the medium sized power. Actual opera- Together with its allies, Canada Vice Chief of the Defence Staff, com- tions, however, were a different matter foresees that joint operations will be manders, and civilian assistant deputy altogether until recently. Unification controlled by a joint force commander ministers) provide forces which are was, for various reasons, institutional (JFC) and his staff, but that deployed ready to be deployed and advise on and bureaucratic, but not operational. forces will be contributed by the three their use but are not in the operational The army—Land Forces Command— existing environmental commands. chain of command. even managed to retain a British-style Forces will be controlled by their re- Command of a joint force on the regimental system. spective component commanders or, in operational level is exercised by JFCs In terms of its commitment to smaller operations, a JFC directly. Sup- who of course have their own headquar- NATO this distinction between institu- porting elements such as communica- ters staff. Two types of joint force head- tional and operational arrangements tions, logistics, and medical units are quarters (JFHQ) are employed. A forma- made some sense for Canada in the provided in unified form, although the tion-based JFHQ serves for operations in Cold War. Maritime Command and individual members wear army, navy, and around Canada and for limited in- Maritime Air Group of Air Command or air force uniforms. The joint head- ternational operations. It is situated at were fully committed to their special- quarters can operate as a Canadian na- one of four Land Force area headquar- ized role of anti-submarine warfare in tional headquarters, with responsibility ters or at either Atlantic or Pacific mar- the North Atlantic. The army, with for a sector or task in a wider alliance itime coastal headquarters. An air for- supporting air elements, was commit- or coalition operation. Alternatively, el- mation headquarters could also be ted to the central front in Germany. ements and individuals for more inte- designated a JFHQ. Such headquarters Moreover, in addition to supporting grated combined joint command struc- would normally remain static in their other commands, Air Command tures also can be contributed. existing facilities but conceptually played a major role with the U.S. Air Canadian doctrine for conducting could be deployed. Force under the bilateral North Ameri- joint and combined operations is For more complex operations, a can Air Defense (NORAD) agreement. evolving, a process that is likely to deployable JFHQ is established, based These prime tasks proceeded in almost continue indefinitely, and is contained on the headquarters of the 1st Cana- total isolation of one another, reflect- in a publication known as the “key- dian Division and augmented with ap- ing a degree of national specialization stone manual.” An entire family of propriate cross-environmental staff. in the alliance. Even contributions to publications dealing with different Normally based in Kingston, Ontario, peacekeeping operations, in which facets of joint operations is derived the division’s headquarters remains a Canada has a long tradition and takes from this manual, many of which are Land Force unit; but in a joint opera- much pride, tended to be single-envi- still under development. This hierar- tion it answers directly to the Joint ronment. Thus Canada has gained far chy of doctrine closely mirrors the sys- Staff at NDHQ. JFCs are appointed by more experience in combined than tem of joint pubs in the U.S. Armed CDS for particular operations and joint operations. Forces. Prominent in this doctrine are drawn from the environment most ap- The end of the Cold War and di- terms familiar to all: principles of war, propriate to the task. This deployable minishing defense resources are com- operational level of war, command and JFHQ, though based on an army head- mon to every military establishment. control, et al. Canadian joint doctrine quarters, has permanent dark- and Canada, although more belatedly than is fully in accord with allied practices light-blue augmentees who wear only some of its allies, determined that and NATO doctrine. J hats, whereas the army staff tends to jointness was the way of the future. All operations are directed on the wear both G and J hats. The continen- This reflects a determination to get strategic level by the Deputy Chief of tal staff system employing G, N, or J more bang for the buck as well as a the Defence Staff (DCDS) who, in turn, designations (1 through 6) is used recognition that operational needs re- is responsible to the Chief of the De- across all headquarters in Canada. quire much closer links among differ- fence Staff (CDS). DCDS acts as the ent warfare environments. In formulating doctrine for planning and

Winter 1995–96 / JFQ 117 JFQStkr 9/19/96 1:30 PM Page 118

■ CANADIAN “JOINTERY”

Component commanders of a The list of available forces (see figure) List of Available joint force can be part of the JFHQ staff that can be deployed for a particular Canadian Forces but may well be in separate headquar- operation is clearly identified, each ters. A land component commander, part supported by an OPLAN. This list ■ deployable joint force headquarters

for example, can be a brigade comman- is by no means the full range of Cana- ■ mechanized brigade group der with his own staff and headquar- dian forces, but it indicates the force —up to three infantry battalions ters. A naval component commander is size that could conceivably be available —armored regiment likely to be a commander task group for given operations. During the Per- —artillery regiment (CTG) at sea, though he could be sian Gulf War, for example, Canada de- —combat engineer regiment ashore. The concept of the joint force ployed a naval task group and CF–18 —other brigade-level forces (low-level air air component commander (JFACC) is fighters but not ground troops. Current defense, military police, intelligence, part of Canadian joint doctrine, but on operations outside Canada, almost all ambulance, and service battalion units) a modest scale. Of the component U.N. peacekeeping missions, involve ■ naval task group 3,500 out of a total of —Iroquois-class anti-air warfare/command doctrine for planning joint operations 60,000 personnel. Most destroyer are in the Adriatic or the —up to three Halifax-class anti-submarine on the strategic level is well advanced former Yugoslavia and warfare frigates —AOR (auxiliary) others in Rwanda and commanders, JFACCs are the most Haiti. A few serve in places as far apart ■ wing (two squadrons) of CF–18 Hornet likely to be collocated with JFCs. as Cambodia, Sinai, and Mozambique. fighters Given that any significant de- In this Canadians are no different from ■ tactical helicopter squadron ployed force will almost certainly be any other nation, though it is probably ■ Aurora maritime patrol aircraft detachment part of a wider alliance or coalition, CF fair to say that the range and size of ■ support group may operate in a distinct national area their commitment to U.N. operations is of responsibility, with operational con- without parallel for a country with its ■ medical group trol of forces remaining under a Cana- resources. The army, in particular, feels dian JFC. Alternatively, control of one the familiar “overstretch,” with some or more components may be passed to soldiers having served three or four a separate coalition headquarters tours in Bosnia or Croatia. (which probably would have some Ca- The development of Canadian Canadian ships, and related command nadian content), with a more limited doctrine for planning joint operations and control is becoming progressively national JFHQ to address unilateral on the strategic level is well advanced. more complex and ambitious. concerns. Command on the tactical On the operational level staffs are fast “Jointery” is alive and well and is level is exercised by JTF commanders, gaining knowledge and experience. On fast maturing in Canada. Structures when appointed, and by the separate the tactical level doctrine is rather may differ, but the concept is much component commanders. more patchy. In some important areas the same as in other countries. Signifi- Key to the Canadian concept of Canada has not developed doctrine cantly, joint is only half the equation, jointness is the joint operations plan- and procedures that enable forces from and combined features just as much in ning process (JOPP). This is now rou- different environments to operate to- Canadian defense thinking. JFQ tinely employed in exercises as well as gether. For example, although there is real-world operations as, for example, some experience with army low-level in Operation Cobra, the plan for with- air defense attachments being de- drawing Canadian forces from the for- ployed on board ships, such assets mer Yugoslavia. So far as possible, JOPP have yet to be fully integrated into utilizes pre-existing contingency oper- overall task group air defense proce- ation plans (COPs), thus reducing re- dures. In other areas, however, things liance on ad hoc planning in a contin- are doing better. NATO coordinated gency. Plans provide for establishing air-sea procedures have been adapted joint headquarters and deploying front to fit the Canadian region of NORAD. line forces and supporting elements. Comparatively few modifications were Canadian planning is generally needed. Voice and data links with the capability-based, working with force Sector Operations Control Centre at levels that realistically might be avail- North Bay, Ontario, are standard for able. This represents something of a shift from the Cold War when commitment-based planning was the norm.

118 JFQ / Winter 1995–96 JFQRlns 9/19/96 1:31 PM Page 119

Improving Force Closures By GEORGE A. ROLLINS

he term improving force closures (IFC) can cause con- The Army “fleet.” sternation at first blush. For T those unfamiliar with it, IFC might suggest a reduction in personnel or the elimination of an installation; but it is actually a significant feature of military strategy. As defined in Joint Pub 1–02, Department of Defense Diction- ary of Military and Associated Terms, a force closure means “The point in time when a supported commander determines that sufficient personnel and equipment resources are in the assigned area of operations to carry out assigned tasks.” This article discusses the importance of, and actions taken with regard to, the future role of IFC. First, to understand IFC one must fracture several military paradigms. The most prevalent is the ever-present propensity to identify requirements, set objectives to achieve them, and institute timetables. This standard military approach is beyond the realm of IFC, which involves all aspects of DOD strategic mobility. Because of the inherent complexity of strategic mobil- services, longshoremen’s unions, Fed- missions. As the only remaining super- ity, a strict orchestration of objectives eral and state highway regulations, and power, the United States is increasingly or timetables is an improbable under- most importantly our national strat- called upon to provide forces for a taking at best. A review of the details range of operations, includ- of mobility supports this point. Strate- we must be able to deploy on shorter ing humanitarian, peace- gic mobility includes, in reverse order notice and over greater distances to keeping, and peace enforce- from a potential combat area, host na- ment missions. This tion agreements and treaties, host na- perform a wider range of missions demands addressing smaller tion facilities, harbors, sealanes to the conflicts in many locations. area, transport ship and aircraft pro- egy. Each involves continuous evolu- Accordingly, we must be able to deploy curement and maintenance, American tion which complicates forming quick on shorter notice and over greater dis- port and airport facilities along with or simply understood procedures. tances to perform a wider range of mis- highways and railways to them, mer- Reductions in force, combined sions than before. Many operations in- chant marine ships, commands and with global insecurity, have dramati- volve building coalitions with other cally changed the way we carry out nations and working with nongovernmental organizations. Most future deployments of our forces are likely to be Lieutenant Colonel George A. Rollins, ARNG, is Reserve a part of a joint operation involving force advisor to the Director for Operational Plans and both active and Reserve component Interoperability (J-7), Joint Staff. forces.

Winter 1995–96 / JFQ 119 JFQRlns 9/19/96 1:31 PM Page 120

■ FORCE CLOSURES

Attendant to such deployments Navy beach group will be the requirement to transport a constructing large force. Most of our combat power, temporary pier. particularly heavy ground forces, are now in the contiguous forty-eight states. Shipping is the most credible method of transporting bulky forces across the globe. Airlift, though the swiftest mode of transport, has severe weight limitations and thus is mainly used to supplement shipping. It is primarily employed for moving personnel and light equipment whereas shipping by sea is more suitable for hauling ammunition and heavy equipment. Rapidly projecting forces from North America requires a system with fewer personnel and less Ready Reserve Fleet equipment, especially in the area roll-on/roll-off ships of strategic mobility. This is the rationale for IFC, which has the sole purpose of ascertaining ways DOD to improve the Nation’s ability to transport large forces. IFC is chartered to develop, logistics over the shore, fort-to-port, implement, and monitor initia- port-to-port, and port-to-foxhole. DOD tives that improve force closure to To gain a better perspective on the include recommendations arising specific components within their do- from findings of the Mobility Require- and innovative procedures for execut- main, IFC members visited the Hamp- ments Study: Bottom-Up Review Update ing national strategy. The IFCFE effort ton Roads area in April 1995, where (MRS BURU). A general officer steering showed potential for expanding IFC to many of the assets integral to IFC are other global and regional situated. The tour included Navy Beach IFC was mandated to enhance U.S. OPLANs. Thus, in 1990, IFC was Group–2 at Little Creek Amphibious Base, Ready Reserve Force roll-on/roll- capabilities to respond to global mandated to develop recommendations to enhance U.S. ca- off ships at Norfolk and Hampton and regional contingencies pabilities to respond rapidly, ef- Roads, and 7th Transportation Group fa- fectively, and efficiently to cilities and ships at Fort Eustis. This off- committee is charged with coordinating global and regional contingencies. In site visit provided a better appreciation and guiding IFC activities. It is com- 1992, IFC received the additional task of the challenges facing IFC. prised of representatives of unified com- of addressing recommendations of the mands, services, and relevant agencies Mobility Requirements Study and later The continuing relevancy of IFC and co-chaired by the Director for Oper- from MRS BURU. In 1993 and again in stems from its ability to address most ational Plans and Interoperability (J-7) 1994, IFC members unanimously voted strategic mobility issues. As our na- and the Director for Logistics (J-4), Joint to extend the charter, and their recom- tional military strategy is redefined and Staff. The committee meets three times mendation was approved by the Direc- becomes more efficient, IFC is assisting a year to discuss current mobility and tor of the Joint Staff. in this complicated process. The gen- logistical issues. The Joint Staff coordi- Since its inception IFC has ad- eral officer steering committee recently nates inputs through several action offi- dressed topics involving sealift, airlift, refined the purpose of IFC as a sound- cer-level meetings at which members prepositioning, force structure, and ing board, forum, and reference for rec- may raise pertinent issues. warfighting requirements. Specific items ommendations or proposals involving IFC came into being in 1989 as a include Army prepositioning, strategic force closures. This will provide an av- means of improving force closures for lift issues raised by CINCs as well as the enue for sharing information among all Europe (IFCFE). The initial results of individual services, strategic sealift, components to improve our overall IFCFE made it obvious that significant Ready Reserve Force, maritime preposi- force closure capability. JFQ reinforcement efficiencies are attain- tioning force, joint exercises, West Coast able through intensive OPLAN analysis ammunition ports, in-transit and total asset visibility, berth availability, host nation status, Reserve mobilization, MRS BURU implementation, and joint

120 JFQ / Winter 1995–96 JFQJtW 9/19/96 1:33 PM Page 121

OF CHIEFS AND CHAIRMEN ■

General Maxwell Davenport Taylor (1901–1987) Chief of Staff, U.S. Army Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff

VITA orn in Keytesville, Missouri; graduated from Military Academy (1922); served in corps of engineers, then transferred to field artillery (1922–27); studied in Paris and taught French at West Point (1927–32); Field Artillery School (1933); Command and General Staff School (1935); American Em- bassy, Tokyo, and military attaché in Peking (1935–39); Army War College (1940); War Plans Divi- Bsion on defense mission to Latin America (1940); commander, 12th Field Artillery Battalion (1940–41); office of the secretary, General Staff (1941–42); chief of staff, and artillery commander in Italy, 82d Airborne Divi- sion (1942–44); commander, 101st Airborne Division, at Normandy and in European campaigns (1944–45); superintendent, Military Academy (1945–49); chief of staff, European Command (1949); commander, U.S. forces in Berlin (1949–51); assistant chief of staff for operations and then deputy chief for operations and administration (1951–53); commander, Eighth Army in Korea (1953–55); commander in chief, Far East Command (1955); chief of staff, U.S. Army (1955–59); retired (1959); recalled as military representative of President (1961–62) and Chairman, Joint Chiefs (1962–64); ambassador to Republic of Vietnam (1964–65); chairman, President’s Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board (1965–69); and president, Institute for Defense Analyses (1966–69); died at Washington, D.C.

[President Kennedy] assured the Joint Chiefs that he did not regard them as narrow military specialists but as men of wide international experience who could help him in evaluating the broad context of many situations, particularly those requiring a combined input from many sources within govern-

ment. To give his opinion lasting official status, this historic statement of the U.S. Army Center of Military History advisory role of the Joint Chiefs was incorporated in a National Security Portrait by Memorandum, which was continued in effect throughout the Johnson ad- Bjorn Peter Egeli. ministration and...revalidated by President Nixon.

—From Precarious Security by Maxwell D. Taylor

Winter 1995–96 / JFQ 121 JFQJtW 9/19/96 1:33 PM Page 122

■ THE JOINT WORLD

plane (SIOP), or other strategic missions Organization as directed. Doctrine By law the plan is reviewed periodi- UCP CHANGES cally by the Chairman. The most recent JOINT DOCTRINE review was concluded early last year and The Secretary of Defense announced the Chairman’s recommendations were WORKING PARTY changes on February 7, 1996 to the uni- submitted to the Secretary of Defense th fied command plan (UCP) which allo- The 16 meeting of the Joint Doc- who then forwarded them to the Presi- cates responsibilities among combatant trine Working Party was hosted by the dent who approved the new UCP Decem- commands. This plan provides guidance Joint Warfighting Center at Fort Monroe ber 28, 1995. JFQ to unified combatant commanders; es- on October 24 and 25, 1995. The center tablishes their missions, responsibilities, is an integral part of the Directorate for and force structure; delineates geographic Operational Plans and Interoperability areas of regional combatant comman- STANDING JTF (J-7), Joint Staff, and assists the Chair- ders; and specifies the responsibilities of man, service chiefs, and CINCs by devel- functional commanders. The five re- HEADQUARTERS oping and assessing doctrine for joint and multinational operations as well as gional commands are U.S. European When confronted by a pending cri- Command (EUCOM), U.S. Pacific Com- by providing support for joint and multi- sis that requires military action, the prin- national training and exercises. mand (PACOM), U.S. Atlantic Command cipal response is to form a joint task force (ACOM), U.S. Southern Command At the meeting, the Chairman com- (JTF) under ad hoc headquarters. Unfor- mended working party members for their (SOUTHCOM), and U.S. Central Com- tunately, this method of standing up JTF mand (CENTCOM); the four functional achievements but stressed the need to re- headquarters precludes quick attainment fine doctrine through high-level debate, commands include U.S. Space Command of staff efficiency and effectiveness, both (SPACECOM), U.S. Special Operations specifically recommending JFQ as an of which are critical to crisis action plan- ideal forum in which to conduct an ex- Command (SOCOM), U.S. Transporta- ning. To eliminate these problems, the tion Command (TRANSCOM), and U.S. change of ideas. He also emphasized that Marine Corps established the core of a warfighting must be based on joint doc- Strategic Command (STRATCOM). standing JTF headquarters in December The Americas. The SOUTHCOM area trine and that senior leaders must be- 1995. Formally designated Standing Joint come more involved in the joint doctrine has been expanded to include the waters Task Force Headquarters (SJTF HQ), Ma- adjoining Central and South America process. Joint pubs, the Chairman said, rine Forces Atlantic, and located at Camp must be living documents that test the and the Gulf of Mexico, formerly ACOM Lejeune, it is being organized and responsibilities. This will enhance inter- validity of joint doctrine in operations equipped to rapidly respond to crises and exercises. Moreover, he indicated action between SOUTHCOM and the anywhere along the world’s littorals. navies of Central and South America as that doctrine development must be disci- The core of SJTF HQ was formed plined yet flexible to take advances in well as assign control of all U.S. military around 49 marines and sailors with joint activities in the Caribbean basin and technology into account. experience and is scheduled to expand In a follow-up to this meeting, the Central and South America to one uni- the nucleus to include nearly 200 mem- fied commander. This transfer is being Chairman approved a “Joint Doctrine bers drawn from every service. While the Awareness Action Plan” to keep joint implemented in distinct phases. The first, JTF headquarters will be able to execute a which shifted responsibility for the wa- doctrine at the forefront of military af- lesser regional contingency for combat- fairs. The plan will inaugurate a series of ters adjoining Central and South Amer- ant commanders, its primary focus will ica, occurred on January 1. The second professional products to enhance joint be on military operations other than war doctrine awareness throughout the phase, to be implemented by the Secre- (MOOTW). tary not earlier than June 1, 1997, will Armed Forces. SJTF HQ is currently undergoing ini- The next meeting of the Joint transfer an additional portion of the At- tial staff training and identifying long- lantic Ocean, the Caribbean Sea and its Doctrine Working Party will be held on term equipment and support needs. The April 16–17 in Norfolk, Virginia. JFQ island nations, and the Gulf of Mexico to target date for achieving a fully capable, SOUTHCOM (a map of the region will joint nucleus with expeditionary C4I accompany the JFQ Forum on “The Secu- capabilities is August 1997. Thereafter, Education rity of the Americas” in the next issue). the unit will continue to refine its tactics, The Gulf Region. The boundary be- techniques, and procedures and to NEW PEACEKEEPING tween the PACOM and the CENTCOM increase its operational expertise through areas has been adjusted to assign respon- follow-on training and exercises. The CENTER sibility for the Arabian Sea and part of inaugural exercise deployment is slated Founded by the Canadian govern- the Indian Ocean to CENTCOM. This for September 1996 when it will serve as ment, the Lester B. Pearson Canadian In- transfer moved the boundary away from the combined JTF headquarters under ternational Peacekeeping Training Centre choke points in the region and provides U.S. Southern Command for Fuerzas began its activities in April 1995. The CENTCOM with the land, sea, and air Aliadas Riverine ’96. centre offers programs on every aspect of battlespace needed to conduct joint oper- For additional information, the peacekeeping to intermediate and senior ations and training. Standing Joint Task Force Headquarters leaders including interdisciplinary coop- Strategic Reconnaissance. The mission may be contacted at (910) 521–8581/ eration, negotiation and mediation of STRATCOM has assumed responsibil- DSN 484–8581. JFQ ity for the conduct of global airborne re- techniques, personal support for peace- connaissance in support of strategic oper- keepers, the maritime dimension of ations, the single integrated operation

122 JFQ / Winter 1995–96 JFQJtW 9/19/96 1:33 PM Page 123

THE JOINT WORLD ■

peacekeeping, human rights in peace- should focus on combat readiness in a keeping, refugees and displaced persons, joint context—persuasive discussions of Periodical Literature investigating atrocities and crimes tactics, strategy, weaponry, combat train- Gary W. Anderson, “Campaign Planning against humanity, the legal framework of ing, force structure, doctrine, operations, for Operations Other Than War,” peacekeeping, military operations, and organization for combat, interoperability, Marine Corps Gazette, vol. 80, no. 2 administrative and logistical problems of or other issues involving two or more ser- (February 1996), pp. 45–47. peacekeeping missions. vices. Submissions from both military Henry A. Black, “The Service Component The Peacekeeping Management, personnel and civilians are welcome but Command,” Marine Corps Gazette, vol. Command, and Staff Course is the cap- must be postmarked on or before April 1, 80, no. 1 (January 1996), pp. 49–51. stone activity and aims to develop an in- 1996. The three best essays will be Randall G. Bowdish, “The Revolution ternational, multidisciplinary group of awarded cash prizes of $2,500, $2,000, in Military Affairs: The Sixth Genera- leaders capable of assuming positions in and $1,000 and published in the Proceed- tion,” Military Review, vol. 75, no. 6 their respective organizations. This ings. Contest rules and further details are (November–December 1995), seven-week course includes field trips to available by writing the U.S. Naval Insti- pp. 26–33. U.N. headquarters in New York as well as tute, 118 Maryland Avenue, Annapolis, Robert J. Bunker, “Rethinking OOTW,” to the peacekeeping mission in Haiti. Maryland 21402–5035, or by contacting Military Review, vol. 75, no. 6 (Novem- Of particular interest is a visiting Valry Fetrow at (410) 268–6110. JFQ ber–December 1995), pp. 34–41. scholar program open to experts from Eliot A. Cohen, “Airpower, the Next War, around the world which has attracted and the Marine Corps,” Marine Corps scholars from Japan, Italy, and the United Gazette, vol. 79, no. 11 (November States. Moreover, a Korean officer recently AIR FORCE HISTORY 1995), pp. 38–44. became the first fulltime international SYMPOSIUM John M. Collins, “Military Intervention: faculty member. The centre has hosted A Checklist of Key Considerations,” military and civilian participants from The Air Force History and Museums Parameters, vol. 25, no. 4 (Winter more than forty countries and is forging Program has issued a call for papers to be 1995–96), pp. 53–58. ahead with a number of activities in the given at a two-day symposium, entitled R.L. DiNardo and Daniel J. Hughes, areas of research, education, and training. “Aim High: History of the U.S. Air Force, “Some Cautionary Thoughts on For further details, write: Pearson 1947–1997,” to be convened in Washing- Information Warfare,” Airpower Journal, Peacekeeping Centre, Cornwallis Park, ton during either April or May 1997 to vol. 9, no. 4 (Winter 1995), pp. 69–79. P.O. Box 100, Clementsport, Nova Scotia commemorate the 50th anniversary of the Peter Fromm, “War and OOTW: BOS 1E0; telephone: (902) 638–8611; service. For particulars write: Dr. Jacob Philosophical Foundations,” Military FAX: (902) 638–8888. JFQ Neufeld, ATTN: AFHSO/HOX, 110 Luke Avenue (Suite 405), Bolling Air Force Review, vol. 75, no. 5 (September– Base, Washington, D.C. 20332–5113; or October 1995), pp. 57–62. FAX: (202) 767–5527. JFQ Ken Given, “A Revolution in Military STRATEGIC Affairs—The Stuff of Fables?” Australian Defence Force Journal, no. 116 LANDPOWER ESSAY (January–February 1996), pp. 5–10. CONTEST William R. Hittinger, “Making the Joint For 100 years, the New York Public Readiness Training Center a Real Joint The U.S. Army War College and the Library has been a haven for read- Exercise,” Marine Corps Gazette, vol. 80, U.S. Army War College Foundation have ers. It is also a research center and no. 2 (February 1996), pp. 35–37. announced the first annual “Army War a refuge for writers. F.M. Lorenz, “Forging Rules of Engage- College Strategic Landpower Essay Con- —The New York Times ment: Lessons Learned in Operation test.” The topic of all entries must be United Shield,” Military Review, vol. 75, related to the advancement of profes- no. 6 (November–December 1995), sional knowledge of the strategic role of pp. 17–25. landpower in joint and multinational op- James F. Miskel, “Observations on the erations. A cash prize of $1,000 will be Role of the Military in Disaster Relief,” awarded for the best essay. Entries must Naval War College Review, vol. 49, no. 1 be postmarked on or before May 1, 1996. (Winter 1996), pp. 105–14. For more information write to COL John James T. Quinlivan, “Force Requirements Bonin, USA, ATTN: DMSPO, U.S. Army in Stability Operations,” Parameters, War College, Carlisle Barracks, Pennsyl- is only in its third year vol. 25, no. 4 (Winter 1995–96), vania 17013, or telephone (717) of publication, but you’ll pp. 59–69. 245–3435/DSN 242–3435. JFQ JFQ find the journal in the David A. Smith, “Who Needs the Secre- periodical reading room at the New tariats,” U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings, York Public Library. Does your agency vol. 121, no. 12 (December 1995), JOINT WARFIGHTING or institution subscribe to America’s pp. 42–44. joint professional military journal? William G. Welch, “We’re Still Not Joint,” U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings, ESSAY CONTEST Why not tell your librarian about vol. 122, no. 2 (February 1996), JFQ so that your colleagues don’t miss The U.S. Naval Institute is inviting pp. 59–61. JFQ entries in the annual “Colin L. Powell what you’ve come to expect each Joint Warfighting Essay Contest.” Essays quarter.

Winter 1995–96 / JFQ 123 JFQOTS 9/19/96 1:34 PM Page 124

UPCOMING SYMPOSIA

INSTITUTE FOR NATIONAL STRATEGIC STUDIES NATIONAL DEFENSE UNIVERSITY

Joint Warfare in the 21st Century: Where Have We Been and Where Are We Going The third annual joint operations symposium will be held on August 13–14, 1996 at the Armed Forces Staff College in Norfolk, Virginia.

The Goldwater-Nichols DOD Reorganization Act: A Ten-Year Retrospective The annual topical symposium will be held on December 3–4, 1996 at the National Defense University in Washington, D.C.

For details on future symposia or registration material on the above events, please contact: National Defense University ATTN: NDU–NSS–SY Fort Lesley J. McNair Washington, D.C. 20319–6000 Telephone: (202) 685–3857/DSN 325–3857 Fax: (202) 685–3866/DSN 325–3866 Internet: [email protected]

Further information on upcoming events, recent publications, et al. is available to Internet users via the National Defense University World Wide Web server. Access any Web Browser (for example, Mosaic or Netscape) by addressing http://www.ndu.edu. Symposia programs and registration material are normally posted on the server 90 days prior to events. U.S. Marine Corps

124 JFQ / Winter 1995–96 JFQOTS 9/19/96 1:34 PM Page 125

OFF THE SHELF ■

well as the numerous anecdotes and cita- Clinton administrations, nor in com- MOGADISHU DUET tions found in the book make it easy to mand on the ground. UNOSOM, UNITAF, read, fast-paced, and colorful. and UNOSOM II were totally different in [PART ONE] Losing Mogadishu is divided into concept, mandate, and implementa- eleven chapters which bear titles as lively tion—not a continuum, despite the fact A Book Review by as the author’s style and reflect a pen- that they occurred in succession. ROBERT B. OAKLEY chant for drawing general conclusions: This author’s approach, however, “Dissemblance as Ethos,” “Building the gives him greater flexibility in drawing Perfect Beast,” “High-Concept Foreign conclusions from the “living laboratory” Losing Mogadishu: Testing Policy,” and “Moral Compulsion in For- and pursuing the Vietnam analogy, mak- U.S. Policy in Somalia eign Policy.” One chapter, which explic- ing it easier to generalize about the series by Jonathan Stevenson itly enumerates seven lessons, poses a of events. Unfortunately, in so doing, Annapolis: Naval Institute Press, 1995. most pertinent question about the basic some details are overlooked or omitted, 217 pp. $19.95 efficacy of outside intervention in situa- which would raise doubts about the va- [ISBN 1–55750–788–0] tions such as Somalia or Rwanda. The lidity of the conclusions. One is the fact final chapter discusses the proper rela- that U.N. Special Representative tionship between the United States and Jonathan Howe at no time had control n the introduction to Losing Mogadishu, the United Nations. These are issues over or gave orders to Task Force Delta IJonathan Stevenson spells out his aim: which remain alive and well today in po- which mounted the ill-fated Ranger as- to “extract lessons” about American in- litical debates within the administration sault in October 1994. The thesis that the volvement and explain “the psychology and Congress over U.S. policy on Haiti, Clinton administration turned over our of American decisionsmaking.” He views Bosnia, and the United Nations. policy and forces to the United Nations is our experience in Somalia as analogous Unfortunately, Stevenson’s overrid- inaccurate, though they were very much to that in Vietnam and as “a veritable ing interest in conclusions (for instance, in parallel. laboratory of American military policy, about Somalis or President Bush’s motive But Stevenson is careful to present U.S. foreign policy in the Third World, for intervening) lead him to fluctuate be- views which do not always accord with and Washington’s proper relationship tween a chronological, factual account of his own to the point where he sometimes with the United Nations.” He puts his events and numerous generalizations appears to reach alternative conclusions

Americans in Mogadishu boarding C–5 for home. U.S. Air Force (JamesU.S. Air Force Mossman)

finger squarely on what has emerged dur- that he derives from them. Each chapter on the same events in different places. ing the Clinton administration as a criti- tends to cover the entire period from the Since any number of conclusions can be cal and hotly debated aspect of foreign authoritarian rule of Siad Barre during drawn about Somalia, this approach is policy: where to intervene and when. He the Cold War to the chaotic early 1990s valid and makes the book more lively also focuses on important questions that as the United States intervened through even if the end result is a bit confusing. arose during the period of active U.S. and Operation Restore Hope (UNITAF), result- One example is the claim that U.N. involvement in 1992–95 and draws ing in a repetition of events. On occasion George Bush thought that Somalia exem- several conclusions from them, including he juxtaposes in one paragraph events plified “the concept of the world order” parallels with Vietnam. The narrative as which took place at different times, and a prototype for dealing with Third under dissimilar circumstances, pursuant World problems. There is no evidence to to assorted administration policies and support such a sweeping conclusion, and various mandates from the Security the author is careful in other places to Council. This gives the impression of point out that Bush was intent (albeit Ambassador Robert B. Oakley served as continuity that did not exist in the special envoy to Somalia under Presidents thinking, objectives, and actions to im- Bush and Clinton. plement the policies under the Bush and

Winter 1995–96 / JFQ 125 JFQOTS 9/19/96 1:34 PM Page 126

■ OFF THE SHELF

unrealistically) on completing a relief- resulted in a surprisingly low number of assessment of resources needed for both only mission by January 1993. The Presi- casualties. the U.S.- and U.N.-led operations was dent and his national security team saw The net effect of the Restore Hope much more realistic than in Somalia, and Restore Hope as limited in scope and du- approach was to largely avoid conflict the transition to U.N. peacekeeping far ration, a one-time affair. Moreover, in a with the warlords while removing most better coordinated. There was close coop- press conference on December 4, 1992, of their fighters and weapons from the eration between U.S. civilian and military then Secretary of Defense Dick Cheney streets; to maintain excellent cohesion, leadership, and with the U.N. representa- explicitly rejected the idea that it could command, and control over the 25-coun- tive once he took over. Even though the be completed by January 20. try military coalition; and to establish ef- Clinton administration and other players The President, Secretaries Cheney fective coordination between the coali- may be disappointed that their plans for and Eagleberger, and General Powell tion and over eighty international and democracy and economic revitalization were very clear on the limited mission of nongovernmental organizations. This in Haiti have not been fully realized or UNITAF in public statements, orders to put a temporary end to three years of in- are running behind schedule, there has U.S. military and civilian leadership in tensive civil war as well as mass death been a willingness to adapt to the local the field, and discussions with troop con- from famine and disease within six weeks realities and settle for less—rather than tributing nations and the Secretary Gen- even if it did not end all political vio- insisting on the forceful imposition of eral. Such long-term projects as disarma- lence. It also enabled the United Nations values and political institutions con- ment and other elements of what, as a to facilitate a broad set of political agree- ceived by outsiders on recalcitrant and result of Somalia, have come to be ments that were signed by all 15 Somali potentially hostile local power groups, as termed mission creep and nationbuilding factions at the March 1993 conference in occurred in Somalia. were to be avoided. Larger policy and op- Addis Ababa, even if subsequent events The Haiti episode has taken place erational issues would be properly left to precluded their implementation. within the context of a more limited, the incoming Clinton administration, A series of decisions made by newly- pragmatic view of the United Nations the newly-elected Congress, and the Se- elected President Clinton and his advis- and the concept of peacekeeping by the curity Council when it decided on the ers was indeed of the general, long-term Clinton administration and Congress. mandate for a new peacekeeping opera- visionary nature described by Stevenson On the other hand, in December 1995 tion to succeed the U.S.-led operation. (though erroneously attributed to the the administration undertook a peace op- While Stevenson recounts the con- Bush team). So were the views of the Sec- eration in Bosnia under a coalition that is straints put on Restore Hope, he implies retary General and the resolutions by the much larger and more complex than that they were due to a failure of vision Security Council establishing the man- those in Somalia or Haiti, albeit under by the Bush administration. He seems to date of UNOSOM II. Their ideas on what NATO rather than U.N. command. It has not recognize that the limitations were should and could be done, and the re- the potential for making wrong turns, due in part to lessons already learned sources needed to achieve those sweep- which Stevenson evoked in examining during the Reagan-Bush years (sometimes ing objectives, failed to recognize Somali Somalia, though the Bosnian operation the hard way as in Lebanon, Grenada, realities. The result, as the author indi- has been marked by careful planning, and Panama) and in part to the Presi- cates, was a disaster for the United States cautious implementation, overwhelming dent’s lame-duck status. Most of the and the United Nations, and for force used with restraint, and constant lessons found in chapter 7 of Losing Mo- prospects of political reunification and dialogue with all parties. JFQ gadishu were applied during Restore peace in Somalia. Like Vietnam these Hope. This included using military inter- events indeed had a major impact on the vention as the last resort. It took place administration and Congress, raising only after the sequence of other events grave doubts about peace operations else- accurately reported by Stevenson, includ- where, the utility of the United Nations, ing the sacking of the effective U.N. ne- and the will of the Nation to run any gotiator Mohamed Sahnoun, led to more risks abroad. than 300,000 Somalis dead and many But the Clinton administration others facing death without immediate seems to have subsequently relearned help. Only a relatively massive, well-or- many lessons found in chapter 9 of Losing ganized military-humanitarian operation Mogadishu and applied in Somalia under could remedy this situation. And it did. the Bush administration. In deciding to Moreover, famine has not returned to So- intervene in Haiti, we undertook a major malia three years after UNITAF. Other U.S.-led, Security Council-approved peace lessons which the author cites, such as operation analogous to Restore Hope. It “know your enemy” and “let soldiers be was followed, as in Somalia, by a full- Missing soldiers,” were applied. U.S. forces did fledged, U.N.-commanded operation in an Issue? not underestimate Aideed or guerilla which the United States was the major Copies of back numbers of JFQ are fighters during Restore Hope. They dis- troop contributor. The initial action in played a capability to hit back hard if Haiti was notable for the restrained appli- available in limited quantities to necessary and avoided being taken by cation of overwhelming force by the members of the Armed Forces and surprise and, at the same time, exercised Army and Marine Corps. The analysis of institutions. Please send your restraint in using force and maintained a local conditions, choice of objectives, and request to the Editor at the address constant dialogue with Aideed, other or FAX number listed on the warlords, and a broad cross-section of So- masthead. JFQ mali society. This minimized conflict and

126 JFQ / Winter 1995–96 JFQOTS 9/19/96 1:34 PM Page 127

OFF THE SHELF ■

replaced Oakley’s more mediative and of cohesion in command and control of MOGADISHU DUET nonpartisan approach. UNOSOM II is confined largely to a tren- On the other hand, Hirsch and Oak- chant footnote. Elsewhere in a footnote [PART TWO] ley’s analysis of Operation Restore Hope they uncritically recount an unpublished itself—that is, the initial U.S. intervention report by an adviser to Howe which con- A Book Review by on December 9, 1992, and the ensuing cluded that Aideed should be prosecuted JONATHAN STEVENSON four and a half months—does contain a by an international or local court. This trace of defensiveness. During this period, transparently dubious option appears to the United States, through the Unified have been seriously contemplated. Obvi- Somalia and Operation Restore Task Force (UNITAF), enjoyed command ously it never panned out, but it would Hope: Reflections on Peacemaking of all forces in Somalia. Through early have been interesting to hear the au- and Peacekeeping March 1993, Oakley was the highest- thors’ opinion on how feasible it was ab initio, and whether any legalistic ap- by John L. Hirsch and Robert B. Oakley ranking U.S. civilian on the ground. Ac- Washington: cording to the authors, UNITAF’s tenure proach to peace enforcement in failed U.S. Institute of Peace Press, 1995. was marked by a firm if limited approach states has a prayer of bearing fruit. 208 pp. $26.95 to disarmament. In fact, there was a de- The tic of Somalia and Operation Re- [ISBN 1–878379–41–0] gree of vacillation in UNITAF’s weapons store Hope is that it parades UNITAF policy which gave Somali gunmen a win- achievements and minimizes its short- dow of opportunity. Similarly, the authors comings. Despite an expressed wish not omalia and Operation Restore Hope is an point out that merely establishing “points to assign blame, the authors skew their Sinformative and basically sincere con- of security” was insufficient during the presentation to ascribe the ultimate inad- tribution to the slow, incremental debate U.S. airlifts that preceded Restore Hope equacy of the Somalia intervention over the proper criteria and execution of but do not mention that UNITAF’s “areas (which they do not directly deny) to the “humanitarian intervention.” While the of positive control” were limited in size. United Nations—or at least to friction be- book contains little that can be labeled UNITAF did not really pacify Somalia. tween it and the United States. This is controversial or provocative, it has an as- Overt clan problems in Kismayu, the simplistic for a number of reasons. First, siduously clinical and nonspeculative ap- southern port, were ongoing from no other single power can match Amer- proach that reveals a great deal about the February 1993 forward. ica’s military capability, and it is unrealis- idiom of American foreign policy and The authors confer perhaps inordi- tic at this point to ask any piecemeal how it is found wanting. nate promise on what few rudiments of U.N. force to do so. Second, to the Third Even though U.S. special envoy civil government did develop in Somalia World, American involvement portends Robert Oakley was the key player during under UNITAF. A police force and court largesse and vicarious power. When a so- the early stages of U.S. involvement in system (which the disarmament policy ciety is ex hypothesi divided, as in Soma- Somalia, and John Hirsch was his adviser, was meant to inspire) did begin to operate lia, U.S. partisanship inevitably becomes the book is not a whitewash of the Amer- but lost vitality when the U.N. took over a bone of contention no matter how ican role. President Bush’s authorization and the lawless among the Somalis took hard diplomats like Oakley try to stay of the intervention, they suggest, was advantage. The “transitional national impartial. Finally, Washington exercises premised on a combination of expedi- council” plan, conjured by Somali fac- plenary control in the Security Council ence in public relations: “a definable mis- tions at the U.N.-sponsored conference in and should generally be estopped to sion had emerged” and “the goodwill to Addis Ababa in March 1993, was far less deny it when a U.N. operation spear- be gained from helping out in Somalia genuine—and thus less salutary—than headed from the start by the United might help offset criticism that the Hirsch and Oakley suggest in their unin- States goes bad. United States was dilatory in responding flected account of events. The notion was None of these points is rejected by to aggression in Bosnia.” The authors in fact cobbled together by the groups to Hirsch and Oakley, but neither are they admit that the United Nations and Wash- salvage Somalia’s global image after highlighted or developed. With what ap- ington erred in demonizing General Mo- Aideed’s threat to abort the meeting be- pears to be false modesty, they downplay hamed Farah Aideed while remaining ob- cause of an attack in Kismayu by Siad the intrinsically disruptive impact of any durately blind to his charismatic power. Barre loyalists. It was toothless almost by U.S. presence. “The mandate [of political They intimate that these mistakes led ul- design. Consequently, the author’s con- arbiter],” they write, “in fact belonged to timately to the October 3, 1994 firefight clusion that the Somalis “were given every the United Nations, and both the Bush in which 18 Americans were killed, 78 opportunity” to rebuild their country may and Clinton administrations were careful were wounded, and the U.S. Government be overstated. They probably needed some not to take it on.” Yet they concede that was humiliated. And they gently impli- overarching development plan that was Aideed, in particular, was immovably cate Admiral Jonathan Howe, the U.N. not forthcoming from UNOSOM II. But hostile to U.N. efforts and responded special envoy from March 1993 until the larger point, that ultimately the re- only to American cajoling. In other February 1994, and later U.N. Secretary sponsibility for Somalia’s welfare rests words, by virtue of U.S. preeminence, its General Boutros Boutros-Ghali, as the with Somalis, is surely correct. diplomats on the ground could not help purveyors of the “peremptory, intrusive Some of Hirsch and Oakley’s most but to assume the mantle of political ar- attitude” toward Somalis that lamentably incisive and important points are cast as biter. At the same time, Hirsch and Oak- afterthoughts. The authors acknowledge ley do assert that whoever is at the helm, that Americans often failed to grasp So- the military, political, and humanitarian mali culture—with operational conse- aspects of a peacekeeping mission must Jonathan Stevenson is a journalist who quences—but do not elaborate. The lack be coordinated and centralized—a salient has covered Somalia for Newsweek and The Economist.

Winter 1995–96 / JFQ 127 JFQOTS 9/19/96 1:34 PM Page 128

■ OFF THE SHELF

Medical civic action in Somalia. OF ARMS AND MEN A Book Review by SHAWN C. WHETSTONE

Firepower in Limited War by Robert H. Scales Novato, Calif.: Presidio Press, 1995. 336 pp. $24.95. [ISBN 0–89141–533–5]

he American way of war places a pre- T mium on taking objectives with a minimum loss of life. In enduring the horrors of war while allowing planners to move arrows on their map boards, our infantrymen suffered the most casualties in the wars of this century. Firepower in Limited War focuses on these soldiers and

U.S. Navy (Terry Mitchell) U.S. Navy (Terry how firepower, particularly an overwhelming amount of it, can be substituted for lives if judiciously applied. This book is a good example of and nicely observed lesson of the Soma- that the bold isolationism which using case studies to draw out lessons for lia experience. emerged in some quarters of the United future actions. It reviews the evolution of In general, what deprives the book States after the October 3, 1994 debacle is firepower doctrine and experiences in of diagnostic and prescriptive power is a an inadequate response to the challenge five limited wars to offer insights on disinclination by the authors to extend posed by political and humanitarian tradeoffs between firepower and lives. their analyses beyond what actually hap- problems abroad. Although they are in a The author, Robert H. Scales, Jr., is an pened to the hypothetical—that is, what uniquely informed position, the authors Army general officer who has com- could have happened, or what might do not try to provide any comprehensive manded a field artillery battalion and happen in future scenarios. They extol answers. What they have done is to pro- been an assistant division commander. In the Weinberger-Powell doctrine of over- vide a lucid insiders’ account of an un- addition, he is principal author of Certain whelming force and show that its applica- precedented use of force, the difficulties Victory: The U.S. Army in the Gulf War tion nonplused the Somalis into docility which the players encountered along the (reviewed in JFQ, Summer 1995). for a time and helped stamp out the way, and some programmatic suggestions Limited wars range from acts of ter- famine. This result, they say, was a “good for improvement. For understanding the rorism to conflicts that fall below the start.” But they do not offer a systematic sequence of considerations that drove threshold of full-scale war. They are typi- assessment of the suitability of over- American involvement in Somalia, this cally characterized by no front lines and whelming force in peacekeeping, instead book is a valuable tool. JFQ harsh environs, and occur in less devel- merely noting that administrative diffi- oped areas of the world and often pit a culties in the U.S.-to-U.N. handover never modern force against insurgents who are allowed for the case to be proven one way not as well armed. In the preface, Scales or the other. Suppose these problems can defines two types of limited war—attri- be overcome, whether by a standing U.N. tion and intervention—which unneces- army or some more modest device such sarily confuses the subject. This distinc- as “subcontracting,” both of which tion is subtle, but it luckily does not Hirsch and Oakley say should be consid- significantly affect the ensuing analysis. ered. Is humanitarian military interven- The case studies are clear accounts tion of the variety pioneered by Restore that use battlefield vignettes to illustrate Hope the preferred option? If so, what cri- problems faced by tactical commanders, teria should govern its application? their solutions, and their lessons for cur- These are issues that American poli- rent leaders. The stories describe the situ- cymakers must address with greater de- ation on both the sending and receiving termination and focus, so as to avoid the ends of firepower from artillery, naval ad hoc mistakes which the authors gunfire, and close air support by fixed- demonstrate were made in Somalia and wing aircraft and helicopters. The cases proclaim to be “inexcusable.” They agree include the first Indochina War, second that the military peculiarities of peace Indochina War, Soviet invasion of operations require far more study and

Shawn C. Whetstone is on the research staff of the Institute for Defense Analyses.

128 JFQ / Winter 1995–96 JFQOTS 9/19/96 1:34 PM Page 129

OFF THE SHELF ■

Afghanistan, Falklands/Malvinas War, by NDU Press in 1990, is out of print). and Persian Gulf War. Media coverage of Desert Storm and the SETTING THE A recurring theme is the difficulty spectacular coverage of coalition aircraft that the side with the advantage of fire- in action could easily tempt one to be- RECORD STRAIGHT power encounters in finding an enemy come enamored of aerial firepower. But with accuracy and speed to effectively by examining firepower in support of A Book Review by employ fires. The problem of locating an tactical ground actions, Scales provides JAMES J. TRITTEN elusive enemy, often insurgents, in insights not normally contained in popu- densely covered terrain is a common fea- lar accounts of the war. For example, the ture of limited wars. Scales reviews the account of the attack by VII Corps on Revolt of the Admirals: The Fight for approaches to solving this dilemma Iraq’s Republican Guard demonstrates Naval Aviation, 1945–1950 which include forward observers, in- the integration of indirect—artillery— by Jeffrey G. Barlow fantry patrols, and sensors. Coordinating and direct—tank—firepower in a com- Washington: Department of the Navy, firepower to support a relatively small bined arms battle. Naval Historical Center, 1994. area of close battle while avoiding fratri- The precision of coalition weaponry 420 pp. $30.00. cide is also covered. The methods used to exacted an overwhelming physical and [ISBN 0–945274–24–6] coordinate artillery, armed helicopter, psychological toll on Iraqi forces, and the and tactical air reveal the problems of a precision of the weapons dramatically re- combined arms commander. Although duced the amount of ordnance required he preface to Revolt of the Admirals the author offers no one solution to to achieve the desired effect. One Iraqi Tmakes a sobering assumption: “. . . as these problems, he assesses the effective- lieutenant underscored the accuracy and long as there are differing strategic per- ness of historical arrangements. quickness of U.S. counter-battery fire that spectives and doctrines, there will be ser- Scales vividly establishes that the illustrates the lethality of these weapons vice competition over roles and mis- primary effect of firepower is frequently systems. Within minutes of its first and sions.” In that vein, the book recounts psychological. For example, it can aid only volley, his battery was destroyed by events in 1948–51 when interservice ri- friendly troops in difficult situations American rocket artillery. valry over roles and missions led to the such as the siege at Khe Sanh. There an But firepower is not presented as a dismissal of the Chief of Naval Opera- experimental use of close support heavy guarantee for achieving bloodless victo- tions. A familiar tale, it is told from the bombing brought cheers from the belea- ries. Although it paves the way, ground perspective of newly declassified material guered marines. The psychological im- forces still must occupy the battlefield to as well as interviews by Jeffrey Barlow, a pact of firepower on enemy forces often secure victory. The key features of Desert member of the Naval Historical Center, far outweighs its destructive effects. Storm, namely, an open battlefield and a with participants who have remained The increased role of helicopters as a static enemy, played to the strengths of silent for almost fifty years. significant component in supplying fire- the U.S. arsenal. Such features should not The so-called revolt of the admirals power is also chronicled in the case stud- be anticipated in future conflicts and occurred in the wake of the approval of a ies. During the Afghanistan conflict, So- must color the lessons that one draws new strategic bomber (B–36) during viet armor and artillery were not greatly from this conflict. World War II and an aircraft carrier (USS feared because they could not attack the Firepower in Limited War closes by it- United States) in 1949, and the fallout Mujahideen where they were vulnerable. erating the major observations from the from hearings held by the House Armed But Hind helicopters combined firepower case studies. One predominant theme is Services Committee on the FY51 defense with mobility and responsiveness that en- that the effects of firepower in limited budget. The book begins by comparing abled the Soviets to take the battle to war should not be overestimated. Civil- the doctrine and experience of the Army rugged mountain sanctuaries used by Mu- ian as well as military leaders must un- Air Corps in World War II with that of jahideen fighters. Helicopters not only derstand what firepower can and cannot the Navy. It also contrasts the actual have their own firepower but increase the do. Its primary effect is psychological record of strategic bombardment and its mobility of other capabilities such as light rather than physical destruction. Thus, promise of victory. With this opening artillery. During the Falklands War, the firepower should be employed in a man- salvo Barlow exposes himself to a charge British attack on Port Stanley was accom- ner that induces maximum psychological of bias which could have been avoided. It panied by moments of crisis because of damage to attain victory at minimum would have sufficed to review the prefer- inadequate helicopter transport for cost. However, as in all aspects of war, ef- ence of airpower enthusiasts for strategic troops, artillery, and ammunition. fective use of firepower requires an ex- bombardment and note that the B–36 Scales addresses the argument on the tensive knowledge of friendly and enemy had the capability for such a mission. balance of firepower and maneuver by capabilities. It cannot compensate for an On the other hand, the attitude of looking at the different approaches of U.S. inadequate strategy. the Navy toward strategic bombing cam- forces in combating an elusive enemy in Scales successfully utilizes historical paigns in Europe and the Pacific is cen- Vietnam. He asserts that the tactical situa- case studies to offer a wealth of insights tral to the revolt of the admirals. Strate- tion in limited war should determine on the evolution and application of fire- gic bombardment as the sole means of whether combat becomes maneuver or power. Moreover, the inclusion of lessons attaining victory in warfare was a theory firepower intensive. A commander must from the Gulf War in this edition, make that, according to the Navy, could not be assess character, weapons, and disposi- the book a worthwhile addition to the tions of friendly and enemy forces to de- professional military library. JFQ termine which side will prevail. The case study on the Persian Gulf James J. Tritten is a member of the Joint War is new to this edition of Firepower in Training, Analysis, and Simulation Center Limited War (an earlier edition, published at U.S. Atlantic Command.

Winter 1995–96 / JFQ 129 JFQOTS 9/19/96 1:35 PM Page 130

■ OFF THE SHELF

that naval campaigns should require car- infringement on its responsibilities. Bar- rier-based aircraft capable of conducting low argues that the Navy shunned a car- limited offensive strikes against land tar- rier-based strategic offensive capability gets. Thus the USS United States reflected on moral grounds because it did not a new design that fully accorded with think bombing civilian populations was doctrine and combat experience. a bonus for attacks on urban-industrial With the advent of nuclear weap- targets. Moreover, the Navy doubted the ons, the Atlantic and Pacific Oceans were ability of these bombers, specifically the no longer seen as a defensive bulwark for B–36, to penetrate air defenses. the continental United States. War plan- The Navy was frustrated by the in- ning centered around strategic air cam- sistence of the Air Force that naval and paigns against Soviet urban-industrial military targets be assigned a lower prior- sites as well as naval blockades and ity. Destruction of some targets would strikes from the sea against maritime aid Air Force bombers in penetrating air forces. The Army Air Force viewed nu- defenses. Hence, the Navy planned to de- clear weapons as an additional tool for stroy them from the sea. This joint ap- use in strategic bombardment. The Navy proach was not appreciated by the Air perceived a near-term need for nuclear Force, who looked upon the carrier nu- strikes by either short-range high speed clear strike mission as a major threat. bombers operating from outlying bases While much of the anecdotal evi- Admiral close to the territory of a potential dence on the aircraft being designed for Louis E. Denfeld. enemy or supersonic missiles. Neither the carrier-based bomber focused on the the Air Force nor the Navy could take ad- 45,000 lb. gross weight AJ–1 Savage,

Naval Historical Center vantage of the technology afforded by which had a combat radius of 1,000 nau- nuclear weaponry. Both services required tical miles, internal memoranda revealed delivery systems which led to a competi- that another aircraft was envisaged by tion for scarce resources with the result- the Navy. This was the ADR–42, a substantiated by actual combat. Rather ing revolt by the Navy’s leadership. 100,000 lb. gross weight plane which had than question this theory, the Air Force The heart of the interservice debate a 2,000 nautical mile combat radius and blamed “inadequate resources and the was the design of a flush-deck aircraft needed a launch platform with a flush high proportion of its effort foolishly di- carrier that could launch long-range at- deck, the CVB–X. Both carrier aircraft verted to assist land and naval cam- tack aircraft. The Air Force regarded the being considered for nuclear strike mis- paigns,” according to Barlow. Experience Navy’s efforts to develop long-range nu- sions would be capable of bomb loads be- by the Navy in World War II suggested clear-capable aircraft as an unwarranted tween 8,000 and 12,000 lbs. The largest bomb regularly carried by carrier-based aircraft during World War II was 2,000 lbs. and the normal maximum combat Don’t Forget... radius was 400 nautical miles. Unfortu- nately, Revolt of the Admirals does not fully explain how increases in bomb load THE SECOND ANNUAL and combat radius were necessitated by new technologies and doctrine and why Joint Force Quarterly the Navy felt that it required such capabilities for missions that would not over- ESSAY CONTEST ON THE lap those of the Air Force. The CVB–X was a single-mission carrier intended solely to conduct nuclear strikes with the ADR–42. Fighter aircraft would have been carried on board Revolution multipurpose carriers as escorts to the CVB–X. Follow-on schemes replaced the CVB–X and ADR–42 with a mix of long- in Military Affairs and shorter-range strike aircraft with options for self-defense fighters. At the Key West conference in 1948 the Joint Chiefs agreed that a flush-deck carrier might not be justified based on naval warfare alone All entries must be postmarked no later than and used this fact to illustrate the concept of strategic air warfare as a collateral August 31, 1996. mission. Compounded by a decision by Secretary of the Navy John Sullivan to not pre-brief other defense officials on See page 19 for details. the flush-deck carrier, it is obvious why

130 JFQ / Winter 1995–96 JFQOTS 9/19/96 1:35 PM Page 131

OFF THE SHELF ■

the Air Force concluded that the Navy States, the resignation in protest of Secre- force and new first line of defense. A sim- was trying to usurp its mission of strate- tary Sullivan, and the firing of the Chief ilar tale is told about the response of the gic bombardment. The Navy had demon- of Naval Operations, Admiral Louis Den- Navy to unification. Senior naval officers strated this capability by launching land- feld. Regardless of the actual sequence of objected, but some only as they retired. based P2V–2 patrol planes from carrier events and capabilities of programmed At stake was an attempt to make the decks in 1948, which did little to allay forces, the inadequacy of the Navy to Navy into an escort and transportation that conclusion. deal with the issues becomes obvious. service. The Navy comes off as fighting The argument is made by Barlow One important underlying theme in defensive battles against well-armed foes that the capabilities of the B–36 were Revolt of the Admirals is that the Navy and encumbered by a bureaucratic doc- vastly oversold by the Air Force, that Sec- lacked suitable preparation to stave off trine that espouses harmony while the retary of Defense Louis Johnson was bi- bureaucratic assaults on its roles and mis- Air Force is portrayed as a well-oiled pub- ased against a flush-deck carrier, and that sions. The bias of naval officers to stay at lic relations firm that was able to get its the Navy had suffered unjustly from bud- sea and away from shore assignments did message out. get cuts. The author also recounts the not serve it well in the immediate post- Another interesting aspect is the vir- creation of the Organizational Research war era. Barlow contrasts Navy expertise tual lack of input from unified com- and Policy Division (OP–23) under Cap- in the policy arena with the success of mands. The role of CINCs would change, tain Arleigh Burke and the events which the Army Air Force, and later the Air led to the cancellation of USS United Force, in making its case to the public that airpower was the Nation’s dominant

. . . new from

INSTITUTE FOR NATIONAL STRATEGIC STUDIES NATIONAL DEFENSE UNIVERSITY Strategic Assessment 1996: Instruments of U.S. Power

This 230-page illustrated volume offers thorough summaries of the instruments of national power and influence available to the United States in the post-Cold War era. In addition to assessing the full range of military capabilities—classical, unconventional, limited, and emerging, it examines the instruments of diplomacy, international communications, international and voluntary organizations, intelligence, technology, arms control, peacetime engagement, overseas presence, and much more.

To order a copy from the Government Printing Office [stock number 008–020–01387–1], send a check for $20.00 or provide a VISA/ MasterCard number (with expiration date) to the Superintendent of Documents, P.O. Box 371954, Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania 15250–7954. Telephone orders can be placed at (202) 512-1800.

Strategic Assessment 1996 is also available to Internet users via the National Defense University World Wide Web. Access the home page “what’s new” symbol by addressing http://www.ndu.edu.

Winter 1995–96 / JFQ 131 JFQOTS 9/19/96 1:35 PM Page 132

■ OFF THE SHELF A Note to Readers and Contributors

but not until the passage of the Goldwa- DISTRIBUTION: JFQ is distributed to the field and fleet through service channels. Military ter-Nichols Act in 1986. The major play- personnel and organizations interested in receiving the journal on a regular basis should make ers at the time were the Chairman and their requirements known through command channels. Corrections in shipping instructions for service chiefs who were said to always act service distribution should be directed to the appropriate activity listed below. in concert, although this was not always true. Moreover, the House Armed Ser- ■ ARMY—Contact the installation publications control officer or write to the U.S. Army vices Committee failed to live up to its Publications Distribution Center, 2800 Eastern Boulevard, Baltimore, Maryland 21220–2896 promise to protect everyone who gave (reference Misc. Publication 71–1). free and frank testimony. ■ NAVY—Contact the Navy Inventory Control Point, Customer Service List Maintenance The book’s 69 pages of notes are (Code 3343.09), 700 Robbins Avenue, Philadelphia, Pennsylvania 19111–5098; requests may be valuable because they reveal different in- sent by FAX to (215) 697–5914 (include SNDL, UIC, and full address). terpretations by scholars of the same evidence and the removal of source materials ■ MARINE CORPS—For one-time distribution write to Marine Corps Logistics Base (Code from the special interest files belonging to 876), 814 Radford Boulevard, Albany, Georgia 31704–1178; request by FAX at (921) 439–5839 / the Secretary of the Air Force before they DSN 567–5839. To be placed on standard distribution contact Headquarters, U.S. Marine Corps were transferred to the National Archives. (Code ARDE), Federal Building No. 2 (Room 1302), Navy Annex, Washington, D.C. 20380; request One must review this information to learn by FAX at (703) 614–2951 / DSN 224–1463. who did what to whom—such as the ad- ■ AIR FORCE—Submit AF Form 764A with short title “JFQN (with issue number)” to the base mission by the Secretary of Defense that publications distribution office to establish unit requirement through the Air Force Distribution he had decided to cancel USS United States Center, 2800 Eastern Boulevard, Baltimore, Maryland 21220–2896. even before receiving memos on the sub- ■ COAST GUARD—Contact U.S. Coast Guard Headquarters, ATTN: Defense Operations ject from the chiefs. Barlow also recon- Division, 2100 2d Street, S.W., Washington, D.C. 20593–0001. ciled conflicting testimony from key participants who apparently played greater In addition, bulk distribution is made to defense agencies, the Joint Staff, unified commands, roles in these events than they disclosed service colleges, and other activities. Changes in these shipments should be communicated to the in the past. Thus the notes provide ample Editor at the address below. evidence that existing secondary sources on the revolt of the admirals are incom- SUBSCRIPTIONS: JFQ is available by subscription from the Government Printing Office (see plete and biased due to inaccuracies in the order blank in this issue). To order for one year, cite: Joint Force Quarterly (JFQ) on the order earlier works. The traditional view of the congres- and mail with a check for $21.00 ($26.25 foreign) or provide a VISA or MasterCard account sional hearings is that they were a defeat number with expiration date to the Superintendent of Documents, P.O. Box 371954, Pittsburgh, for the Navy. While that was true in an Pennsylvania 15250–7954, or FAX the order to: (202) 512–2233. Individual copies may be immediate sense, Barlow argues that the purchased at GPO bookstores for $7.50 each. tactical defeat was accompanied by the strategic recognition on the part of Con- CONTRIBUTIONS: JFQ welcomes submissions from members of the Armed Forces as well as gress about the value of the carrier. The from defense analysts and academic specialists from both this country and abroad, including subsequent revitalization of carrier pro- foreign military officers and civilians. There is no required length for articles, but contributions of grams would not have occurred without 3,000 to 5,000 words are appropriate. Other submissions, however, to include letters to the the revolt. Congress had come to realize editor, items of commentary, and brief essays are invited. Reproductions of supporting material that the Strategic Air Command was not the totality of the Nation’s offensive air- (such as maps and photos) should be submitted with manuscripts; do not send originals. power. Manuscripts are reviewed by the Editorial Board, a process which takes two to three months. Whether Revolt of the Admirals indeed To facilitate review, provide three copies of the manuscript together with a 150-word summary. presents a “more balanced perspective” or Place personal or biographical data on a separate sheet of paper and do not identify the author (or merely a pro-Navy view of these events is a authors) in the body of the text. Follow any accepted style guide in preparing the manuscript, but point that must be resolved by the reader. endnotes rather than footnotes should be used. Bibliographies should not be included. Both the But there appear to be some missing pieces manuscript and endnotes should be typed in double-space with one-inch margins. that have not been addressed. As Barlow JFQ reserves the right to edit contributions to meet space limitations and conform to the himself admonishes us, “after the passage journal’s style and format. Proofs of articles accepted for publication are not normally sent to of more than forty years, it is certainly authors for review. time to correct the record.” JFQ Unless evidence of prior clearance is provided, all manuscripts selected for publication which are contributed by members of the U.S. Armed Forces or employees of the Federal government are forwarded to the Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Public Affairs to undergo security review. No honorarium or other form of payment is authorized for the publication of articles submitted by servicemembers or U.S. Government employees. If possible submit the manuscript on a disk together with the typescript version. While 3.5- and 5.25-inch disks in various formats can be processed, WordPerfect is preferred (disks will be returned if requested). Further information on the submission of contributions is available by calling (202) 685–4220 / DSN 325–4220, FAX: (202) 685–4219 / DSN 325–4219, or writing to the Editor, Joint Force Quarterly, ATTN: NDU–NSS–JFQ, Washington, D.C. 20319–6000 JFQ

132 JFQ / Winter 1995–96 JFQOTS 9/19/96 1:35 PM Page 133

Cover 3 JFQC1 9/19/96 11:10 AM Page 1

JOI JFQ JFQ JOINT FORCE QUARTERLY

coming next... the security of the Americas plus Unified Endeav joint warfighting and the Army-Air Force team, evolution of naval theater air defense, Strategic leadership virtues and values, Performance and more in the Spring 96 issue of JFQ

Forces for Engagement JFQ 10 1995–96 / NUMBER WINTER JOINT FORCE QUARTERLY

Published for the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff by the Institute for National Strategic Studies National Defense University Washington, D.C.

Cov 4 Score covers 1 & 4 no greater than 3/16” from the bi