O LLIGENCE PREPARATION F the BATTLEFIELD MAY 1989 HEADQ
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. o LLIGENCE PREPARATION F THE BATTLEFIELD MAY 1989 HEADQ ARTERS, DEPARTMENT THE ARMY Pentagor: ATTN: Wiiii^ry Documents Sectiof Room 1A518, Pentagon Washington, DC 20310-6050 DISTRIBUTION RESTRICTION: Approved for public release: distribution is unlimited. # FIELD MANUAL FM 3*1-130 NO 34-130 HEADQUARTERS DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY Washington, DC, 23 May 1989 INTELLIGENCE PREPARATION OF THE BATTLEFIELD Tabla of Contanta Paga Preface i i i CHAPTER 1 - Why Intelligence Preparation of the Battlefield? 1-1 CHAPTER 2 - Development and Use of Intelligence Preparation of the Battlefield Products 2-1 Graphics 2-1 Templates 2-1 CHAPTER 3 - Intelligence Preparation of the Battlefield Effort 3-1 CHAPTER 4 - Intelligence Preparation of the Battlefield Process 4-1 Battlefield Area Evaluation 4-1 Terrain Analysis 4-6 Weather Analysis 4-32 Threat Evaluation and Doctrinal Templating 4-42 Threat Integration 4-53 CHAPTER 5 - Intelligence Preparation of the Battlefield Support 5-1 Combined Arms Team 5-1 Staff Planning 5-2 Situation Development 5-3 Electronic Warfare 5-5 Battlefield Deception 5-6 CHAPTER 6 - Intelligence Preparation of the Battlefield—The Systematic Approach 6-1 APPENDIX A - Tactical Intelligence Preparation of the Battlefield A-1 APPENDIX B - Intelligence Preparation of the Battlefield in the B-1 Urban Battle APPENDIX C - Intelligence Preparation of the Battlefield In Air C-1 Defense, Counterair, and Air Operations Pag« APPENDIX D - Operational Level of War D-1 APPENDIX E - Intelllganca Preparation of the Battlefield In E-1 Counter Insurgency Operations APPENDIX F - Electronic Preparation of the Battlefield F-1 APPENDIX Q - Intelllganca Preparation of the Battlafleld In G-1 Rear Operations and Rear Area Operations GLOSSARY Glossary-1 REFERENCES References-1 INDEX I ndex-1 Preface The purpose of this publication is to emphasize the vital role that intelligence preparation of the battlefield (IPB) plays in preparing for the next battle. It focuses on specific IPB requirements that have developed as a result of the AirLand Battle Doctrine and previous detailed instructions on how to apply IPB in previously unconsidered areas. The concepts presented in this publication are not radically new. However, as doctrine has shifted, these concepts have moved to the forefront of our concern and must be given in-depth consideration. The primary function of this publication is to provide the commander with the latest IPB doctrine. It also provides guidelines on how the commander may apply IPB in specific situations. These situations include offensive and defensive operations; support to rear operations; urban operations; air defense artillery (ADA), counterair, and air operations; counter insurgency operations (COIN); the operational level of war; and electronic warfare (EW). While this publication is not intended to be all-inclusive, the material presented is in accordance with current US Army doctrine in the areas concerned. It is intended to be as complete as poss i bIe. This publication describes the IPB process and how to use IPB as a basis for counter inteI I igence (CI), situation development, target development, battlefield deception, and EW operations. It concentrates on building IPB data before hostilities, and outlines its applicability to tactical operations. This publication is intended to serve as a guide. No part of this document should be construed as limiting commanders' freedom of action or committing them to a fixed or particular course of action. Nor should any part of this document be construed to imply that all graphics depicted must be prepared by all corrmands in all situations. Bather, commanders may apply the information presented in any manner appropriate to the particular mission and situation. Although this publication applies to all members of the active Army, Army Reserve, and Army National Guard, it is primarily intended for use by unit commanders and staffs at all echelons. Specific portions and sections are also intended to be of use, or interest to, commanders and staffs of joint and combined commands; units of the US Air Force and Allied air forces; Marine and Naval forces of the US; and Allied countries and other intelligence agencies. Information in this publication which expands upon IPB doctrine will be incorporated into FM 34-1 and FM 34-3 upon normal review. i i i The proponent of this publication is HQ TRADOC. Submit changes f improving this publication on DA Form 2028 (Recormended Changes to Rubi i cat ions and Blank Forms) and forward it to Commander, US Army Intelligence Center and School, ATTN: ATSI-TD-PAL, Fort Huachuca, AZ 85613-7000. CHAPTER 1 WHY INTELLIGENCE PREPARATION OF THE BATTLEFIELD? I PB is the key for preparing for the next battle. During peacetime, I PB builds an extensive data base for each potential area in which a unit may be required to operate. It analyzes this intelligence data base in detail to determine the impact of the enemy, weather, and terrain on operations and presents this information graphically. I PB is initiated any time the commander faces a new enemy or receives a new mission. It is initiated prior to hostilities and is adaptable to contingency situations. It is a continuous process which supports planning and execution for all operations. I PB is an analytical methodology employed to reduce uncertainties concerning the enemy, weather, and terrain for all types of operations. The development of AirLand Battle Doctrine has rejuvenated interest in offensive operations and created the need for offensive I PB. Offensive I PB is not a new concept, but a refinement of current I PB doctrine. AirLand Battle Doctrine also focuses on rear operations and the need for I PB in support of rear operations. While the focus of IPB for rear operations and rear operations support differs from that of offensive and defensive IPB, the concept is not new. Rear area logistics and security unit commanders have always had to analyze the area of operations (AO) to determine the potential effects of enemy capabilities, weather, and terrain on support and security operations. Another aspect of IPB that has not been doctrinally emphasized is what is called the "third dimension" of the battlefield—airspace. IPB has traditionally emphasized the first two dimensions—width and depth. However, modern and dynamic warfare requires that the commander be able to visualize the enemy air threat (both fixed and rotary wing) and understand the use of friendly aviation and air defense assets. IPB integrates enemy doctrine with the weather and terrain to determine and evaluate enemy capabilities, vulnerabilities, and feasibility of enemy courses of action. IPB products support commanders and their staffs in the dec i s ionmaking process. IPB provides a graphic intelligence estimate that portrays probable enemy courses of action, and a graphic operations order (OPORD) that allows the commander to dictate rather than to react to the battle. Once hostilities begin and updated information becomes available, the graphic intelligence estimate, or OPORD, becomes dynamic, changing with the battlefield situation. IPB helps the commander control the battle by telling the commander when the enemy can most easily enter the battle area and where and when follow-on forces should be moving. For battlefield deception, the IPB process assists in determining deception objectives; developing deception events, plans, and stories; and focusing the collection process to 1-1 determine if deception operations are being accepted, rejected, or deceptively countered by the enemy. The I PB process assists in situation and target development by showing the commander when and where the enemy can most effectively be engaged by fire, maneuver, and EW means, and when the initiative can be seized. Using I PB graphics, the commander and staff can identify high value targets (HVTs) and high payoff targets (HPTs) as they enter the battle area. HPTs that support the commander's concept of operation will be attacked, thus reducing the effectiveness of enemy forces; disrupting and delaying them; and creating further targets for maneuver, fire support, and EW elements. When applying I PB doctrine in counter insurgency (COIN) operations, the commander must adapt to a specific situation which will be unique to that environment. The nature of COIN makes it essential that the IPB effort is applied as early as possible against the insurgent movement. Prior to force commitment, during Phase I (logistics building) and Phase II (hit and run operations against host country) of the insurgency, commanders must effectively collect, process, and focus on intelligence to prevent Phase III from developing. The application of IPB to COIN operations is essential if Phase III (conventional conflict) is to be avoided. 1-2 CHAPTER 2 DEVELOPMENT AND USE OF INTELLIGENCE PREPARATION OF THE BATTLEFIELD PRODUCTS Graphics are basic to IPB analysis. Intelligence is often best communicated with pictures. GRAPH ICS IPB products include annotated military maps, multilayered overlays, gridded photographs, and microfilm and large-scale map substitutes which are all capable of computer-assisted display, manipulation, and compilation. Battlefield analysis and the intelligence estimate are not replaced but are converted to graphics whenever possible. These graphics become the basis for intelligence and operational planning. Information is kept current by replacing or updating the graphics. Currently, most IPB graphics are prepared manually through a slow, time-consuming process. Eventually, automated data processing (ADP) systems will assist the analyst in the IPB process. ADP system data storage and update capabilities will reduce the time required to prepare graphics. The obvious benefits of automated graphic analysis and intelligence displays will outweigh the high initial investment of time and resources in their development. The intelligence community is giving a high priority to developing these systems. Once these systems become available and are prepared properly, IPB graphics are inexpensive and simple to maintain. The products developed through IPB support many battlefield functions. They are most valuable to the corrmander's operations and intelligence staff.