Towards Gendered Rational Choice Theory
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Towards gendered rational choice theory Martina Belmonte 09/2012 Contents 1 Introduction 3 2 Revealed Preferences 7 2.1 Formal tools . .7 2.1.1 From preferences to choice . .9 2.1.2 From choice to preferences . 11 2.2 Rational choice . 12 2.2.1 The representation theorem . 12 2.2.2 Rationality as maximization . 14 2.3 Principles . 15 2.4 A comment on preference and models . 17 2.5 A debate on consistency . 19 2.5.1 Sen's critique . 19 2.5.2 Binmore's reply . 22 3 Gender issues 24 3.1 Framework . 24 3.1.1 Up to the third wave . 24 3.1.2 Gender, among others . 26 3.1.3 Gendered groups . 30 3.1.4 Drawing some premises . 36 3.2 The advancement of women . 37 3.2.1 A collective phenomenon: statistics . 38 3.2.2 A suffered and acted phenomenon . 39 3.2.3 An individual phenomenon: experiments . 42 3.3 A debate on choice . 47 4 Gendered choices 51 4.1 Something external to the choice . 51 1 4.2 Reasonable Inconsistency . 52 4.2.1 A new example . 52 4.2.2 Old examples . 54 4.3 Gendered epistemic value of the menu . 57 4.3.1 Inappropriateness of redescription . 57 4.3.2 Psychological explanation . 59 4.4 Revealed preference theory and gendered choices . 60 4.4.1 Back to Sen . 60 4.4.2 Different kinds of problems and different kinds of ques- tions . 62 4.5 Other accounts . 64 4.5.1 Bossert and Suzumura on external norms . 64 4.5.2 Dietrich and List on reason-based choices . 65 5 Conclusion 68 References 75 2 Chapter 1 Introduction The original intuition that motivates this dissertation is that rational choice theory might be useful to deal with some gender issues, and that gen- der studies might be useful to deal with some issues about rationality. I try to develop this intuition analysing what happens when agents choose an al- ternative recognizing themselves as woman or man. I argue that choices out of agents' identification with gendered groups are not always rational. In- deed, if the gendered choice is disadvantageous for the group and the agent has concerns about gender equality the choice turns out to be irrational. Specifically, in my thesis I develop this intuition till the identification of a class of problems which are particularly interesting for rationality and gen- der issues. I call it the gendered epistemic value of the menu, because it exhibits a seemingly inconsistent choice when the menu is specifically rela- tive to gender. The arrival point is that choices that violate the requirement of consistency because of gender constitute a specific class of problems and I argue that is worth to inquiry the normative conditions of rationality for it. When this idea was just a vague intuition in my mind, I started to look for feminist scholars who discussed rational choice theory. I found some papers, like England (1993), Friedman and Diem (1993), Folbre (1993, 1994), An- derson (2001), Peter (2003), Thalos (2005), Driscoll and Krook (2008), but it was difficult for me to pinpoint what all of them had in common. Indeed, some of them had economical concerns, others political, others philosoph- ical, etc. In addition, some of them considered rational choice theory as a procedure to formulate collective decisions, others to analyse economical facts, others to justify democratic decisions, etc. Anyway, what surprised me was that none of them treated rational choice theory under a philosoph- 3 ical perspective and for individual choices in normative conditions - that is what I was looking for. An interesting consideration I found is Anderson's distinction between the rhetorical and the formal aspect of rational choice theory. She writes \The formal theory of rational choice says that people tend to maximize their utility; that is, that they adopt as their end the maximal satisfaction of their overall scheme of preferences. The theory is formal in that it concerns only the relative rankings of a person's preferences, disregarding the contents of these prefer- ences or the individual's reasons for having them. It says that an individual's preferences fit into a single, complete, transitive ordering, and that individuals choose to satisfy the top ranked preference in that ordering."1 Furthermore, she argues that formal rational choice theory is \either tau- tology or universal truth" and so that there aren't relevant objections to it. On the contrary, her criticism is addressed to the rational agent of economic rhetoric: \he is self-transparent: he knows what he wants, and suffers from no unconscious drives that thwart his conscious desires. He is opportunistic: he takes the initiative in pursuing his goals, and actively seeks and promptly takes advantage of every opportu- nity to advance his goals. [...] He is self-reliant, and expects others to likewise look after themselves. He is cooly-calculating [...], autonomous and self-confident."2 According to her, the agent sketched above is not only far from actual agents, but also undesirable, as normative models. Indeed, actions out of a sense of obligation, from some external force, altruistic, social norms etc. are not considered in that picture. Although she argues that the only aspect of rational choice theory that can be criticized is the rhetorical one, however she claims that the main task of the theory, that she identifies in explaining human actions, is carried out by rhetoric rational choice. The results that come up applying the theory are considered as carring a normative force, only thanks to rhetorical reasons: \if the concept of \preference" [...] were understood purely for- mally, as \whatever people, in fact, choose" [...] then the prin- ciple would have little normative force. Why should we think 1Anderson (2001). 2Anderson (2001). 4 that people choose well, or that what causes them to choose has any normative authority? [...] Economists have only one plausi- ble reply: because, in general, people are autonomous choosers [...], and individuals are the ultimate normative authorities for themselves"3. In conclusion, she criticizes formal rational choice theory for failing to dis- tinguish many kinds of preferences4 that an agent can hold, and for lacking normative authority without rhetoric rational choice theory. So, although her distinction between rhetoric and formal rational choice is worthy in or- der to reject feminist theorists that accuse rational choice theory to endorse a selfish agent and a \separative self"5, nevertheless it is not enough to sup- port the use of rational choice theory for some gender issues. In response to this, I distinguish specific applications of rational choice the- ory in economic analysis and rational choice theory in itself. More, I specify that normative authority, as it will be shown in the first chapter, is not given by rhetoric features, but it is given by axioms that aim at grasping that behaviour that is a patently irrational behaviour. So, normative force is given by the adeguacy of the axioms in ruling out irrational behaviour. Axioms, however, can be criticized through the exhibition of cases in which agents fail to satisfy at least one axiom, but their behaviour is still consid- ered reasonable. Indeed, I present in my third chapter the case of gendered epistemic value of the menu, that reveals that the axiom of independence of irrelevant alternative is inadequate to deal with some gendered choices. Rhetoric considerations, such as that the choice to stay at home made by many women is autonomous, opportunistic and self-reliant, can only justify some specific interpretations in applying the theory to concrete phenomena - but I am not interested in such applications here6. Therefore, from noting that formal rational choice theory can't account for different kinds of pref- erences or that it has been employed in objectionable analysis, it doesn't follow that it should be rejected. My aim here is to show that additional structures can be sought to enrich the theory and to treat some gender is- sues, still maintaining its formal aspect. A difficulty in looking at rational choice theory and gender studies simul- taneously has been that they have different starting points: rational choice 3Anderson (2001). 4See also Folbre (1994). 5England (1993). 6For example, it is often quoted Gary Becker's A Treatise on the Family, see for example Folbre (1994); Anderson (2001) criticizes Kristin Luker's \Taking Chances:' Abortion and the Decision not to Contracept" 5 theory, especially in the part of individual choice I consider, starts from individual's preferences, taken as already given. Gender studies, on the contrary, often starts from the social dimension that affects individual pref- erences. Between individual actions and social outcomes, it seems that there is a gap. Folbre (1993), another feminist scholar, while she notes that the concept of preference used by rational choice theory is too thin for support- ing feminist purposes, also encourages to go beyond the dichotomy between individual choices and structural constraints. In the following, I have tried to develop this suggestion. Briefly, in the first chapter I define rationality as consistency, presenting a debate about consis- tency; in the second chapter, I present the problem of the slow advancement of women; in the third chapter I presented the gender epistemic value of the menu, which is an inconsistent choice made out of gender group member- ship. Finally, I argued that this case offers the possibility to inquiry into the normative conditions for rationality for a specific class of problems. 6 Chapter 2 Revealed Preferences In the following chapter, I will fix the framework of revealed preference, to define a rational choice. Particularly, I will outline the route that leads to the definition of rationality, inquiring firstly into the conditions for pref- erences to build a maximizing choice function (ordering), secondly into the conditions for choice to represent an ordering (independence of irrelevant alternatives) (2.1).