Redalyc.Sacred Places and "Folk" Islam in Central Asia

UNISCI Discussion Papers ISSN: 1696-2206 [email protected] Universidad Complutense de Madrid España Kalanov, Komil; Alonso, Antonio Sacred Places and "Folk" Islam in Central Asia UNISCI Discussion Papers, núm. 17, mayo, 2008, pp. 173-185 Universidad Complutense de Madrid Madrid, España Available in: http://www.redalyc.org/articulo.oa?id=76701710 How to cite Complete issue Scientific Information System More information about this article Network of Scientific Journals from Latin America, the Caribbean, Spain and Portugal Journal's homepage in redalyc.org Non-profit academic project, developed under the open access initiative UNISCI Discussion Papers, Nº 17 (Mayo / May 2008) ISSN 1696-2206 SACRED PLACES AND “FOLK ” ISLAM IN CENTRAL ASIA Komil Kalanov 1 Institute of Culture of Tashkent Antonio Alonso 2 Universidad CEU-San Pablo Abstract: Islam is not a uniform religion but is expressed differently around the world. In Central Asia this corresponds to the experience of a moderate Islam that allows people to move away from the extremists who, nevertheless, are taking root in the area. This is partly due to to the incorrect management of the issue of Islamism undertaken by each Government, some failing in terms of laxity and others in terms of hard repression. Keywords: Islam; Islamism; Central Asia; sacred places. Resumen: El Islam no es una religión uniforme sino que tiene diversas expresiones a lo largo y ancho del planeta. En Asia Central esas expresiones se corresponden con la vivencia de un Islam moderado que permite que la gente se aleje de los extremistas que, sin embargo, se van arraigando en la zona. Eso se debe, en parte a la mala gestión del islamismo que hace cada Gobierno, cayendo unos en la laxitud y otros en la represión descarnada. Palabras clave: Islam; islamismo; Asia Central; lugares sagrados. Copyright © UNISCI, 2008. The views expressed in these articles are those of the authors, and do not necessarily reflect the views of UNISCI. Las opiniones expresadas en estos artículos son propias de sus autores, y no reflejan necesariamente la opinión de UNISCI. 1 Komil Kalanov is Senior Teacher at the Chair of Sociology, Uzbek National University of World Languages, Tashkent. Address: Chair of Sociology, Uzbek National University of World Languages, 21 a, block G-9a, S. Yusupov Street, Tashkent, Uzbekistan. E-mail: [email protected] . 2 Antonio Alonso is Assistant Profesor at the “Angel Ayala” Institute for Humanities, CEU-San Pablo University, Madrid. Address: Instituto de Humanidades “Ángel Ayala”, Universidad CEU-San Pablo, Paseo Juan XXIII, 8, 28040 Madrid, Spain. E-mail: [email protected] . 173 UNISCI Discussion Papers, Nº 17 (Mayo / May 2008) ISSN 1696-2206 Introduction The attacks committed in the last decade by people claiming to be acting in Allah’s name and trying to give a religious glaze to their actions against the West lead us to think that the best way of anticipating these assaults, in the long term, is to foment the development of moderate Muslim groups and to asphyxiate the most radical fundamentalist groups. The main battlefield, therefore, is that of ideas, for the hearts and the minds, which we can translate in Central Asia as the necessity of rediscovering “folk” Islam. Islam is not a unified religion, but it possesses a multitude of divisions, sects, and Schools of Jurisprudence, besides lacking a common spiritual leader with universal authority. The principal division is based on the dispute for the succession of the fourth Caliph 3 (Omar) in the 7 th century, producing, on the one hand, Sunnites (supporters of the Sunna , “path” or custom planned by Mohammed) and, on the other one, S hi’ites (supporters of Alí, nephew of the Prophet). Sunnites , in turn, recognize four principal Schools ( madhahabi ) of Islamic Jurisprudence: the Hanafi 4 (present traditionally in Central Asia and known for its tolerance and adaptability), the Malaki , the Shafi and the Hanbali . In addition, Sunnites recognize other lines ( fiqh ) of jurisprudence, such as the Deobandi, the Safi or the Wahhabi 5. The role of Islam in politics in Central Asia has changed through time, from being the main regulator of ordinary life to disappearing from the political scene, and then arising again controlled by the State. By the end of the 70’s, when some movements claiming a key role for Islam in politics proliferated there, imitating Iran and Afghanistan 6, Islam had started to be a threat to the USSR, due to two factors: first, because it was an ideology that was undermining the foundations of Marxism-Leninism, and second, because it could be used to channel dissatisfaction with bad Soviet management of other matters (social, economic or cultural). But the “Islamist threat” was manipulated and exaggerated by Andropov, Gorbachev and their comrades, and, likewise, before the ‘80s the enemies were called Sufis , and soon they were replaced by the Wahhabis 7. Right after the fall of the atheistic Soviet regime other schools, which were more radical than the Hanafi, carried out massive proselytism campaigns. The branches of Islam traditionally present in Central Asia are not the most controversial, but they try to live through their faith in a moderate way. Therefore, in B. Raman’s opinion, the challenge to regional 3 For the Islamic terminology, see Galindo Aguilar, Emilio (dir.) (2004): Enciclopedia del Islam , 1ª ed., Madrid, Darek-Nyumba. See also Maillo Salgado, F. (1987): Vocabulario básico de la historia del Islam , Madrid, Akal. 4 Cf. Arístegui, Gustavo de (2004): El Islamismo contra el Islam. Las claves para entender el terrorismo yihadista . Barcelona, Ediciones B, pp. 26-29. See also Roy, Oliver (1997): La nueva Asia Central: o la fabricación de naciones , 1st. ed., Madrid, Sequitur, pp. 231-254. 5 Islam is a legalistic religion, and the Quran a set of norms and prescriptions, so the people who know the Quran are expert in law and jurisprudence, and this is why the jurisprudence School or madhahabi is more important than the lines of interpretation or fiqh . See Khalil Samir, Samir (2003): Cien preguntas sobre el Islam , Madrid, Encuentro. 6 “The Soviet aggression in Afghanistan (1979) and the Islamic revolution in Iran (1979) posed a serious threat to the foreign political ties of Central Asian official Islam and to its prestige among the Muslims of their own country and of the entire Muslim world. The Muslims of Central Asia, and first and foremost of Tajikistan, largely sympathized with the Afghan mujahidin and Khomeini” . See Polonskaya, Ludmila and Malashenko, Alexei (1994): Islam in Central Asia , Reading, Ithaca Press, p. 99. 7 This term was used erroneously by the Soviet leaders since the wahhabism only existed in Dagestan, where the Saudi movement had penetrated and was rooted in a wide number of rural areas. See Ro’i, Yaacov (2001): Islam in the CIS. A threat to stability?, Central Asian and Caucasian Prospects, London, The Royal Institute of International Affairs, pp. 24-27. 174 UNISCI Discussion Papers, Nº 17 (Mayo / May 2008) ISSN 1696-2206 stability does not come from the religious field but comes from the IMU, the Hizb ut Tahrir and an immense quantity of people discontented with the dictatorships under which they live and which suppress with cruelty any observation of religiousness 8. But Central Asian people were interested on taking their religion on again through rediscovering their own traditions, which in many cases were not compatible with the new ideologies. This has meant the advance of Islamism being stopped in this region, at least for the moment. 1. The arrival of Islam to Central Asia. The territory known as Central Asia nowadays (Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan) has been a much disputed land in history. It has been coveted by Chinese, Mongol and Greek people, among others. In the seventh century after Christ, some years after the Prophet Mohammed’s death, Arab troops conquered the region, calling it the Ma Wara’ al-Nahr (which means: “What is beyond the river”, the Amu Darya, the old “Oxus”), and spread the new faith. By 875 Islam had become the official religion of the Samanid state, whose capital was the city of Bukhara, being independent of Bagdad, the capital of the Abbasid Caliphate. Islam was rooted in Central Asia as a form of continuity with old traditions: Baba Tükles was a “friend of God”. Islam does not have officially canonized saints, but early on, Muslims came to accept that certain individuals have an intimate relationship to God and may intercede with him on behalf of ordinary Muslims. This cult of sacred persons replicated patronage networks that existed in society. Friends of God could be recognized as such in their lifetimes, and after their deaths, their mausoleums became shrines, places of pilgrimage, and foci of communal identity; their disciples, connected to them through chains of initiation, provided a living link to sacred origins. 9 In this way, the peoples of central Asia could feel that Islam was not a strange religion but that they could incorporate the new faith into their traditions: This dual process of localizing Islam and Islamizing local traditions led communities to see themselves as innately Muslim. Local customs were sacralised, and Islam was made indigenous. For most people, there simply could not be a distinction, let alone a contradiction, between Islam and local customs. 10 The most Islamised former Soviet regions were the Ferghana Valley (in Central Asia), the Dagestan and Chechnya (in the Caucasus) and Tatarstan (in the Urals - Volga). Though the form of Islam that developed in Central Asia was mostly Sunní , specifically the Hanafi 8 “The main threats to the stability of the CARs in general and to Uzbekistan in particular arise from three sources: first, the remnants of the IMU; second, the growing following of the Hizb ut Tahrir in the entire region; and third, large sections of the people, angered by what they consider as the repressive policies of the local Governments and their exploitation of the fears of extremism and terrorism to continue their repressive rule”.

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