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2021 Click on Event to See More Information events 2021 Click on event to see more Information Top Events 3rd briq Summer School in Behavioral Economics June 28 – July 2 briq Beliefs Workshop May 6 – 7 BGSE/briq Applied Micro Workshop Isabel Trevino (UC San Diego): Uncovering biases in information choice and its use: the role of coordination and information acquisition July 13 Andrew J. Oswald (University of Warwick): Feelings and Actions June 22 Magne Mogstad (University of Chicago): Inference for Ranks with Applications to Mobility across Neighborhoods and Academic Achievement across Countries June 15 Bettina Rockenbach (University of Cologne): Gender Differences Across Economic Games: Norms, Expectations, and Behavior June 8 Anya Samek (UC San Diego): Detecting Drivers of Behavior at an Early Age: Evidence from a Longitudinal Field Experiment June 1 Johannes Spinnewijn (LSE): Retirement Consumption and Pension Design May 18 Heather Sarsons (Harvard University): Across-Country Wage Compression in Multinationals May 11 www.briq-institute.org Updated July 2021 events 2021 Click on event to see more Information BGSE/briq Applied Micro Workshop Nagore Iriberri (University of the Basque Country): Naivete and Sophistication in Initial and Repeated Play in Games May 4 Raymond Fisman (Boston University): Expected Discrimination and the Transparency Gap April 27 Ernst Fehr (University of Zurich): Attentional Foundations of Framing Effects April 20 Benjamin Moll (LSE): Present Bias Amplifies the Household Balance-Sheet Channels of Macroeconomic Policy April 13 Cavit Görkem Destan (BGSE): An Experimental Analysis of Misattribution Models Laurenz Günther (BGSE): The (Economic-)Refugee Crisis: Explaining Disapproval of Immigration Radost Holler (BGSE): Working hours and household income dynamics during the different stages of the CoViD-19 pandemic February 5 Matthias Heinz (University of Cologne): Trustworthiness in the Financial Industry February 2 Elif Bodur (BGSE): The Role of Parental Beliefs in Schooling Decisions Paul Ivo Schäfer (BGSE): Heterogeneity, Relationships, and Norms in German-Speaking Villages in the 1930s Valentin Stumpe (BGSE): The Effects of Increased Job Search Autonomy January 29 Nicola Gennaioli (Bocconi University): Identity, Beliefs, and Political Conflict January 26 www.briq-institute.org Updated July 2021 events 2021 Click on event to see more Information BGSE/briq Applied Micro Workshop Moritz Mendel (BGSE): The Dynamics of Macroeconomic Expectations during COVID-19 Fabian Schmitz (BGSE): Consumer Protection or Efficiency? The Case of Partitioned Pricing January 22 Ghazala Azmat (Sciences Po): Gender Promotion Gaps: Career Aspirations and Workplace Discrimination January 19 www.briq-institute.org Updated July 2021 3rd briq Summer School in Behavioral Economics June 28 – July 2, 2021 | CEST (GMT +2) Faculty: Armin Falk briq and University of Bonn Uri Gneezy UC San Diego Botond Kőszegi Central European University Andrei Shleifer Harvard University Lise Vesterlund University of Pittsburgh Florian Zimmermann briq and University of Bonn Monday, June 28 15:00 – 15:30 Welcome + Instructions Lise Vesterlund University of Pittsburgh 15:30 – 16:15 Lecture 1: Charitable Giving: Motivated Fundraising Lecture 16:15 – 16:30 Break 16:30 – 17:15 Lecture 2: Gender Differences: Competition and Task Allocation Lecture 17:15 – 17:30 Break 17:30 – 18:15 Lecture 3: Gender Differences: Negotiation and Discrimination 18:15 – 19:00 Big Break #SSBE2021 www.briq-institute.org 3rd briq Summer School in Behavioral Economics June 28 – July 2, 2021 | CEST (GMT +2) 19:00 – 20:30 Office Hours Lise Vesterlund University of Pittsburgh Botond Kőszegi Central European University 20:30 – 22:00 Group Meetings I Tuesday, June 29 Botond Kőszegi Central European University 15:00 – 15:45 Lecture 1: The Economics of Hidden Prices I 15:45 – 16:00 Break 16:00 – 16:45 Lecture 2: The Economics of Hidden Prices II 16:45 – 17:00 Break 17:00 – 17:45 Lecture 3: The Economics of Hidden Prices III 17:45 – 18:45 Big Break 18:45 – 20:15 Office Hours Armin Falk briq and University of Bonn 20:15 – 21:45 Group Meetings II #SSBE2021 www.briq-institute.org 3rd briq Summer School in Behavioral Economics June 28 – July 2, 2021 | CEST (GMT +2) Wednesday, June 30 Uri Gneezy UC San Diego 15:00 – 15:45 Lecture 1: Incentives and Mixed Signals 15:45 – 16:00 Break 16:00 – 16:45 Lecture 2: Predicting Behavior from Communication 16:45 – 17:00 Break 17:00 – 17:45 Lecture 3: Stakes & Mistakes 17:45 – 18:45 Big Break 18:45 – 20:15 Office Hours Uri Gneezy UC San Diego Florian Zimmermann briq and University of Bonn 20:15 – 21:30 Roundtable Armin Falk briq and University of Bonn Uri Gneezy UC San Diego Botond Kőszegi Central European University Lise Vesterlund University of Pittsburgh #SSBE2021 www.briq-institute.org 3rd briq Summer School in Behavioral Economics June 28 – July 2, 2021 | CEST (GMT +2) Thursday, July 1 Andrei Shleifer Harvard University 15:00 – 15:45 Lecture 1: Memory in Economics I 15:45 – 16:00 Break 16:00 – 16:45 Lecture 2: Memory in Economics II 16:45 – 17:00 Break 17:00 – 17:45 Lecture 3: Memory in Economics III 17:45 – 18:45 Big Break 18:45 – 20:15 Office Hours Andrei Shleifer Harvard University 20:15 – 21:45 Group Meetings III #SSBE2021 www.briq-institute.org 3rd briq Summer School in Behavioral Economics June 28 – July 2, 2021 | CEST (GMT +2) Friday, July 2 Armin Falk briq and University of Bonn 15:00 – 15:45 Lecture 1: Global Evidence on Preferences 15:45 – 16:00 Break 16:00 – 16:45 Lecture 2: Formation of Preferences 16:45 – 17:00 Break 17:00 – 17:45 Lecture 3: What‘s Worth Knowing? 17:45 – 18:45 Big Break 18:45 – 20:00 Group Meetings IV 20:00 – 21:20 Group Presentation Presentation: 10 min + Discussion: 10 min 21:20 Farewell #SSBE2021 www.briq-institute.org 3rd briq Summer School in Behavioral Economics June 28 – July 2, 2021 | CEST (GMT +2) List of Participants Chiara Aina University of Zurich [email protected] Andrea Amelio University of Bonn [email protected] Cuimin Ba University of Pennsylvania [email protected] Katharina Brütt University of Amsterdam [email protected] Sandy Campbell UC Berkeley [email protected] Luisa Cefala UC Berkeley [email protected] Carvajal Daniel NHH Norwegian School of Economics [email protected] Jana Gieselmann Heinrich-Heine-University Düsseldorf [email protected] Neeraja Gupta University of Pittsburgh [email protected] Maria Johanna Kogelnik UC Santa Barbara [email protected] Marissa Lepper University of Pittsburgh [email protected] John Macke Harvard University [email protected] Robin Jakob Musolff University of Bonn [email protected] Charlie Rafkin MIT [email protected] Friederike Johanna Reichel LMU Munich [email protected] Matthew White Ridley MIT [email protected] Anna Schulze Tilling University of Bonn [email protected] Christoph Semken Universitat Pompeu Fabra [email protected] Frauke Stehr Maastricht University [email protected] Nicholas Swanson UC Berkeley [email protected] Martin Väth Princeton University [email protected] Ao Wang UC Berkeley [email protected] Keyu Wu University of Zurich [email protected] Jeffrey Yang Harvard University [email protected] #SSBE2021 www.briq-institute.org briq Workshop Beliefs May 6-7, 2021 Organizers: Armin Falk Florian Zimmermann briq and University of Bonn briq and University of Bonn All $mes stated in CEST (Central European Summer Time, GMT+2) Presenta:ons are 20 minutes (only clarifying ques:ons), followed by 10 minutes discussion Thursday, May 6 15:20 – 15:30 Welcome 15:30 – 16:00 Underinfer but Overextrapolate Yucheng Liang briq 16:00 – 16:30 Associative Memory and Belief Formation Frederik Schwerter University of Cologne 16:30 – 16:45 Break 16:45 – 17:15 Irrational Statistical Discrimination Friederike Mengel University of Essex 17:15 – 17:45 Perceived Costs and Benefits of Maternal Labor Supply Decisions Teodora Boneva University of Zurich 17:45 – 18:30 Lunch in Breakout Rooms www.briq-institute.org briq Workshop Beliefs May 6-7, 2021 18:30 – 19:00 Cognitive Uncertainty in Intertemporal Choice Thomas Graeber Harvard Business School 19:00 – 19:30 Bounded Rationality and Elicited Preferences for Risk Ryan Oprea UC Santa Barbara 19:30 – 19:45 Break 19:45 – 20:15 Mental Models and Learning: The Case of Base-Rate Neglect Sevgi Yuksel UC Santa Barbara 20:15 – 20:45 An Experiment on Social Learning with Information Sequencing Pellumb Reshidi Princeton University Friday, May 7 15:30 – 16:00 A (Dynamic) Investigation of Stereotypes, Belief-Updating, and Behavior Katherine Coffman Harvard Business School 16:00 – 16:30 Mimetic Dominance and the Economics of Exclusion: Private Goods in Public Context Alex Imas Booth School of Business 16:30 – 16:45 Break www.briq-institute.org briq Workshop Beliefs May 6-7, 2021 16:45 – 17:15 Investor Memory Katrin Gödker Maastricht University 17:15 – 17:45 Correlation Neglect in Student-to-School Matching Chloe Tergiman Pennsylvania State University 17:45 – 18:30 Lunch in Breakout Rooms 18:30 – 19:00 The Object of Uncertainty: Probabilities versus Values Kathleen Ngangoe New York University 19:00 – 19:30 The Distribution of Ambiguity Attitudes Hans-Martin v. Gaudecker University of Bonn 19:30 – 19:45 Break 19:45 – 20:15 What’s Worth Knowing Armin Falk briq and University of Bonn Roland Benabou Princeton University www.briq-institute.org briq Workshop Beliefs May 6-7, 2021 Kai Barron WZB Berlin Roland Benabou Princeton University Teodora Boneva University of Zurich Katherine Coffman Harvard Business School Flavio Cunha Rice University Benjamin Enke Harvard University Ignacio Esponda UC Santa Barbara Katrin Gödker Maastricht University Thomas Graeber Harvard Business School Paul Heidhues DICE, Dusseldorf Alex Imas Booth School of Business Botond Kőszegi CEU Budapest Yucheng Liang briq Friederike Mengel University of Essex Kathleen Ngangoe New York University Ryan Oprea UC Santa Barbara Franz Ostrizek briq Pellumb Reshidi Princeton University Chris Roth University of Warwick Frederik Schwerter University of Cologne Paul Smeets Maastricht University Chloe Tergiman Pennsylvania State University Hans-Martin v.
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