68th International Astronautical Congress (IAC), Bremen, Germany, 1-5 October 2018

FAA LICENSING AND THE NASA COMMERCIAL CREW PROGRAM

Kelvin Coleman Federal Aviation Administration Office of Commercial Space Transportation (FAA/AST) Washington, DC, United States, [email protected]

Mike Machula Federal Aviation Administration Office of Commercial Space Transportation (FAA/AST) Washington, DC, United States, [email protected]

John Sloan Federal Aviation Administration Office of Commercial Space Transportation (FAA/AST) Washington, DC, United States, [email protected]

Abstract NASA's Commercial Crew Program (CCP) will develop two new human space flight vehicles that will be commercially operated and carry people to and from low Earth orbit. This innovative government and commercial partnership is a first for human space flight and builds on the success of NASA's Commercial Resupply Services (CRS) program that provides cargo and return services on commercially operated vehicles to support the International Space Station. Throughout NASA's history, human space flight has been overseen by NASA. In CCP, regulatory oversight for public safety will be done by the Federal Aviation Administration's Office of Commercial Space Transportation after NASA certification. The FAA currently licenses the launch and reentry of U.S. commercial providers under the CRS program and has licensed over 300 commercial launches since 1989.

The transition from a historically government-run activity to a government-commercial partnership has generated several safety challenges. NASA's focus is on crew safety and mission success for NASA missions while FAA's focus is on ensuring public safety on licensed launches or reentries. A Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) between NASA and FAA was signed in 2012 to avoid conflicting requirements and multiple sets of standards. One key consideration from industry’s perspective is to be able to design a single vehicle that meets the needs of both NASA and future commercial customers, including affordable cost of operations.

This paper will describe the challenges and successes to date of the FAA's role in the Commercial Crew Program as a regulator of public safety in commercial space transportation. The paper will cover: changes in NASA oversight that led to NASA and FAA cooperation on Commercial Crew missions; interagency collaboration to resolve any barriers to licensing and ensure a smooth transition; the regulatory issues that needed to be addressed when flying government astronauts on FAA-licensed flights; and identify future challenges and milestones as the public safety oversight role transitions from NASA to the FAA. The purpose of the paper is to provide an understanding of new and innovative approaches to commercially operated space flight safety from a regulatory perspective while maintaining safety and reliability in commercial orbital human space fight.

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1. Introduction DOT authority, the Commercial Space Launch Act of The prospect of commercial human space flight to 1984, as amended, is 51 U.S.C. Chapter 509. The orbit and back is rapidly approaching. Historically, primary mission of FAA/AST is to “protect public the high cost, risk, national importance, and expertise health and safety, safety of property, and national needed to carry out human space flight has been security and foreign policy interests of the United solely in the realm of governments. With the States.”1 The office also has a promotion role to emergence of increased commercial capabilities, “encourage private sector launches, reentries, and potential for new markets and willingness to partner associated services and, only to the extent necessary, in risk, NASA’s Commercial Crew Program (CCP) regulate those launches, reentries, and services to will soon produce commercially operated vehicles ensure compliance with international obligations of capable of carrying humans to low Earth orbit and the United States…”2 back. The innovative program builds on the success of NASA’s commercial cargo resupply to the It is important to note that the FAA does not International Space Station (ISS), which has certify commercial launch or reentry vehicles. strengthened U.S. commercial operators and resulted Instead, the FAA licenses the launch or reentry in significant cost savings to the U.S. Government. operation for public safety.3

During U.S. commercial launches and reentries, The U.S. Congress has incrementally granted public safety and regulatory oversight is done by the DOT/FAA oversight authority. Launch and launch Department of Transportation’s Federal Aviation site authority was granted in 1984. Reentry authority Administration (DOT/FAA). Since 1989, the FAA’s was added in 1998. Limited human space flight and Office of Commercial Space Transportation (AST) experimental permits for suborbital vehicle testing has licensed over 300 commercial launches and were added in 2004. reentries. One of the continual challenges for the FAA is to The transition to a commercially operated be able to write regulations that cover all different business model in orbital human space flight while types of vehicle capabilities and missions to keep enabling the U.S. Government to meet its objectives pace with industry while ensuring public safety.4 for ISS operations means changes in how the government thinks and operates. As commercial capabilities expand in low Earth orbit and beyond, the U.S. Congress is evaluating This paper will describe challenges and successes commercial “on-orbit authority” that is not already to date of the FAA's involvement in CCP. Important covered by other agencies such as the Federal to understanding the current FAA and NASA Communications Commission or the Department of relationship is a discussion of the FAA’s Office Commerce. Because the FAA only has launch and Commercial Space Transportation role and reentry authority, NASA retains oversight of background, as well as NASA’s partnership with operations that are near the ISS such as U.S. commercial providers. The paper will discuss key commercial cargo rendezvous and proximity changes that led to CCP establishing a relationship operations for berthing/docking to the ISS. with the FAA, interagency collaboration to achieve national goals, inclusion of government astronauts on 3. Human Space Flight Authority at the FAA FAA-licensed flights, and how future challenges will In order to allow both the suborbital and orbital be identified and overcome. The paper will provide commercial human space flight industry to grow and an understanding of applying new approaches in CCP develop, in keeping with incremental practice to date, from a regulatory perspective while maintaining the U.S. Congress has limited the amount of safety and reliability in commercial orbital human regulations that can be enacted. space flight. With the passage of the 2004 Commercial Space 2. Background on FAA Office of Commercial Launch Amendments Act, the Congress granted the Space Transportation FAA limited human space flight regulatory authority The FAA Office of Commercial Space but did not give the FAA authority to protect people Transportation (FAA/AST) licenses U.S. commercial onboard spacecraft. Industry would be responsible for launch and reentry activities and the operation of occupant protection and the Congress established an launch and reentry sites by U.S. citizens or activities industry “Learning Period” of eight years before the otherwise in the United States. The law establishing FAA could initiate additional human space flight 2

regulations. Since 2004, the Congress has extended Until the FAA has full oversight over human the Learning Period or “moratorium” deadline three space flight safety and regulations in place, industry times and could again. Currently, the sunset date is and NASA will need to fill the gap. October 2023.5 4. Traditional Model Meets the Commercial The 2004 law established a new term, “Space Model Flight Participant,” (SFP) to differentiate between Under a traditional government approach for traditional “passengers.” A passenger in aviation has human spacecraft from the Mercury capsule to the no training requirements and has a reasonable Space Shuttle: expectation of minimal risk because the airplane they  NASA devised the requirements; are flying on has been certified as safe by a regulator.  NASA engineers and specialists oversaw every In contrast, under FAA space regulations, an SFP is development aspect of the spacecraft, its support not a crewmember and the operator must be inform systems and operations plans; them of risks they are taking, told that the US  A contractor was hired to build to NASA design Government has not certified the vehicle they are criteria and the standards; riding on, and sign a document that recognizes there  NASA personnel were heavily involved in the are risks, both known and unknown. These processing, testing, launching and operation to requirements form the basis of what is called an ensure safety and reliability; and 6 “informed consent regime.” In addition, CFR 460.51  NASA owned the spacecraft and its operating states that “[a]n operator must train each space flight infrastructure.9 participant before flight on how to respond to emergency situations, including smoke, fire, loss of Under the new commercial approach: cabin pressure, and emergency exit.”  Companies are free to design the transportation system they think is best; Other FAA human space flight regulations for the  The companies are encouraged to apply their operator include environmental control and life most efficient and effective manufacturing and support systems, human factors, verification, crew business operating techniques; and space flight participant waiver of claims, and  NASA’s technical expertise and resources are security.7 accessible to a company;

 The companies own and operate the spacecraft Although the FAA cannot yet establish regulations and infrastructure.10 to protect people on board, the FAA does have a responsibility to promote the continuous  For the contracts phase of development and improvement of the safety of launch vehicles certification: designed to carry humans. Working closely with o Each company must meet NASA’s pre- NASA and industry, in 2014, after a three-year effort, determined set of requirements; the FAA published “Recommended Practices for o NASA will have oversight of a limited Human Space Flight Occupant Safety.”8 The set of critical milestones; recommendations are voluntary for industry. While o The companies accept development risk the 90 mostly performance-based practices could in a fixed priced contract (not the serve as starting point for future rulemaking, they standard cost-plus contract); and were also meant to capture important safety practices o Companies must demonstrate their and identify subject areas that could benefit from investment in the contract. industry consensus standards. Under this new commercial approach, the CCP launches (or reentries) are no longer conducted by The FAA, in developing the recommend practices, 11 used requirements from NASA’s CCP were used as a and for the U.S. Government. As a result, CCP concept baseline. Specifically, the FAA used: missions are considered commercial by the FAA because the company has significant responsibility  CCT-PLN-1120 – Crew Transportation for the vehicle. Technical Management Processes;

 CCT-REQ-1130 – ISS Crew Transportation The U.S. Government has used the option of Services Requirements Document; and commercially operated launches several times. Of the  CCT-STD-1150 – Crew Transportation 319 FAA-licensed and permitted launches during Operations Standards. 1989-2017, 58 of those launches flew primary

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payloads owned by the U.S. Government. These include NASA cargo missions to the ISS and During the first phase, a competition under a launches of Air Force, Navy, and NOAA satellites. NASA Space Act Agreement, test launches or For these missions, the U.S. Government chose not to reentries would be carried out by commercial be substantially involved in the launch and as such, providers (such as SpaceX’s pad abort test) and they are commercially operated and therefore therefore licensed by the FAA. licensed by the FAA. In other words, responsibility for launch mission success is by the commercial In phase 2, completion of vehicle development launch operator. and certification for NASA missions would occur. In September 2014, NASA announced contracts for 5. Getting to a Commercial Service Commercial Crew Transportation Capability Reducing risk for humans on vehicles during (CCtCAP). Multibillion-dollar contracts were space flight is of supreme importance to NASA. At awarded to two companies: Boeing to continue stake is not only the safety of NASA astronauts but development of the CST-100 capsule and to SpaceX also ISS partner astronauts and cosmonauts. Could to continue with the Dragon crew capsule. The that be achieved at a commercial level when FAA did contracts cover two certification test flights and two not have vehicle certification authority nor authority operational missions per company with options for to protect people onboard? Just like the trend-setting additional operational missions. Since the initial Commercial Resupply Services program, going the contract, additional options were awarded for a total commercial route meant changes in how NASA of six operational missions per provider. approached human space flight. Certification flights would be fully overseen and Unlike the Space Shuttle which NASA owned, directed by NASA to verify compliance with NASA NASA does not own the commercial vehicles. This requirements and standards. During test flights, key difference gives industry the opportunity to use NASA would have oversight of astronaut safety, their design to not only meet NASA’s needs but also mission assurance, and public safety. As a result, commercial needs. This has the potential to reduce these government certification missions would not be NASA costs and enable a company to expand into licensed by the FAA. new markets. To further reduce costs and encourage industry innovation, NASA gave the commercial The providers will have completed certification partners decision-making freedom. NASA did this by when NASA is satisfied they meet the NASA removing some prescriptive requirements and requirements. The intent thus far is to have one replacing them with high-level requirements uncrewed flight and one crewed flight before performance requirements and allowing industry to completing certification and moving on to FAA- decide how best to meet them. licensing. A flight schedule was announced in August 2018 (see Table 1). 6. Background on NASA Commercial Crew Program Table 1. Commercial Crew Program Flight Schedule After the Space Shuttle was retired, NASA relied SpaceX Boeing CST- on Russian Soyuz spacecraft to get astronauts to and Dragon on 100 Starliner from the International Space Station. Although Falcon 9 on Atlas V workable, it was not an ideal situation. The success of (ULA) the U.S. Commercial Orbital Transportation Services Uncrewed November Late 2018 or Demonstration 2018 early 2019 program and resulting ISS cargo resupply First Crew April 2019 Mid-2019 partnerships brought forth a question: could the same Flight commercial model work for a new crew vehicle? For phase 3, post-certification, NASA, once Missions in CCP would be structured in three satisfied their requirements are met, would hand phases that played to the strengths and authorities of oversight of public safety over to the FAA. NASA and FAA while incentivizing and moving Accordingly, the launch and reentry of post- industry partners on a competitive path to certification missions are licensed by the FAA. commercial operations: NASA retains responsibility for astronaut safety and  Concept development and testing; mission assurance during FAA licensed missions.  Design certification and test missions; and  Post-Certification Missions (PCMs). 4

7. Trending Toward Performance Requirements NASA would buy transportation and rescue services NASA was faced with a major challenge on how to the ISS after NASA certified the commercial to allow for industry innovation while maintaining providers.13 safety. NASA had a large number of vehicle requirements that had been proven over time in “This MOU is intended to support the transition to human space flight. These detailed and strict commercial transport of Government and non- requirements had the potential to hamstring industry Government passengers to low-Earth orbit in a innovation. The space agency found the middle manner that avoids conflicting requirements and ground in CCP. NASA established its high-level multiple sets of standards. In developing these needs and then delegated to industry derivation of the standards, the parties will exchange knowledge and lower level vehicle and operation requirements that best practices in the disciplines of space flight health, would support the macro requirements. While medical, engineering, and safety and mission detailed requirements remained where appropriate, assurance requirements for space systems and NASA wrote many high-level, performance-based vehicles and operations.”14 requirements that gave industry flexibility. For example, NASA required four ISS crewmembers to As part of implementation, the FAA co-located be safely returned after a six-month stay. personnel at the Johnson Space Center and the Kennedy Space Center. NASA also assigned a few Furthermore, as a result of a reduced set of employees to work a temporary detail at FAA requirements and NASA delegating responsibility to Headquarters in Washington. Working together, both the provider, after certification, vehicle operation agencies identified tasks, goals, objects, documents, transitions to the commercial realm. Accordingly, the and schedules needed to enable successful licensing FAA has oversight responsibility for public safety of commercial crew missions. and NASA range safety requirements are not in effect. 9. Collaboration to Enable Licensing and Minimize Burden to Government and Industry In this new commercial environment, to determine When the FAA and NASA first started working if there would be overlaps in each agency’s current together on CCP missions, little was known about the authority or requirements, NASA and the FAA vehicle design and operations. Hypothetical vehicles agreed to work together to flush out any issues early combined with different agency methods, cultures and resolve them. To formalize this review, NASA and requirements resulted in relationship growing and FAA signed an agreement. pains. NASA had concerns the regulations, being law and difficult to change, would prevent them from 8. MOU between NASA and FAA carrying out their mission. While the forward path In June 2012, the FAA and NASA signed a was not clear at the time, both sides remained Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) to committed to success. coordinate standards together for operational commercial crew missions to and from Low Earth Government collaboration made significant Orbit, including the International Space Station. progress when teams from both agencies met face-to- face in 2012 to compare and contrast each other’s The most important policy established in the requirements line-by-line. At those meetings, the MOU is that during commercial crew missions: teams identified approximately 100 issues needing  FAA is responsible for public safety investigation. Simple clarifications and consolidation  NASA is responsible for crew safety and mission of similar items allowed the team to quickly reduce assurance.12 the number of issues to less than 50. The topics generally fell into the following groups: payload, The MOU committed NASA and FAA to avoid definition questions, range safety, crew issues and duplication and conflicts in their respective liability. Working together, both agencies discovered authorities while advancing both public safety and the differences were not insurmountable, but crew safety. The benefit to industry would be acknowledged work was needed to address the establishment of a “stable framework” that was issues. understood in advance by commercial providers. To aid in resolving the potential barriers to FAA The MOU also established the government’s licensing and avoid agency duplication of effort, intent to have FAA license ISS services missions. 5

three main teams eventually formed to close out the 100 issues:  Launch & Entry Steering Group (LESG) – a joint NASA, FAA, and Air Force chaired meeting formed to resolve range safety policy issues  Legal Harmony Working Group – NASA and FAA team formed to address liability and legal questions  Technical issue team – joint NASA and FAA team formed to resolve technical, analysis and operational issues Figure 1: Partner Relationships The FAA and NASA also formed specific teams to address challenging specialized topics such as Within the PMP, many of the 100 initial issues reentry risk. have been addressed or resolved. Items addressed include Maximum Probable Loss (MPL), Payload As a method to document roles and Review, Emergency response, and Government responsibilities and address some of the open issues, astronauts. the agencies developed a joint Program Management Plan (PMP). The PMP expands upon the Joint The FAA determines the MPL value as part of its FAA/NASA MOU and has the following primary standard licensing process, 14 CFR Part 440. This goals: analysis established the licensee’s financial  Identify efficient technical data exchanges to responsibility they must cover (e.g. insurance) for reduce duplicative requests of the Commercial possible third party bodily injury or property damage Providers; as a result of their launch or reentry activities. To  Share information and resources to the greatest remain consistent with the FAA MPL requirements extent practicable to preclude any unnecessary that will be imposed on the contractors during overlap or duplication of effort; licensed activities, NASA mimics licensing on the  Ensure each agency has the appropriate level of CCP certification flights by requiring liability information and insight to execute its responsibility in the contract. Given the FAA already responsibilities under their respective authorities; has the tools and expertise to calculate MPL, and and NASA does not, the FAA agreed to perform an MPL  Define the roles and responsibilities that each analysis and provide it to NASA for the CCP agency plays throughout the program and certification flights. This way the government avoids mission life cycle. unnecessary duplication because NASA will not have to stand up its own MPL analysis team. The To achieve these goals, NASA and the FAA work commercial providers benefit because in using the together to ensure a mutual understanding of each FAA-provided analysis they can purchase the agency’s goals and requirements while seeking appropriate amount of liability insurance just as they efficiencies in the process. Figure 1 depicts this would for a licensed launch or reentry. interdependent relationship. The Commercial Providers must distribute to both NASA and the FAA The FAA must perform a payload review as part their deliverables in satisfaction of their respective of the licensing process; however, NASA already NASA contract and FAA license requirements. conducts a thorough review of payloads going to the NASA and the FAA will each execute their ISS. Each agency identified this as an area where the respective roles consistent with their government government could avoid duplicative and oversight responsibilities. However, NASA and the unnecessarily burdensome process. In the PMP, the FAA agree collaboration between the agencies on FAA agreed that for the payload review on licensed common technical information and insight data, as flights, the Commercial Provider could provide the well as sharing of resources, will help to achieve safe NASA payload safety data package (including commercial space transportation while minimizing ground and flight hazards) to the FAA for review and the burden on the Commercial Providers. consideration as part of the payload review process. The FAA in the past has accepted NASA’s

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characterizations and hazard assessment of the Government civil servant, military and International contents (such as food and equipment). Partner astronauts to the International Space Station. To address this, the FAA and NASA formed a joint To address NASA concerns about emergency team of lawyers and engineers to assess the impacts responses conflicting with regulatory requirements, of the CSLAA on CCP missions. The team identified in the PMP, the FAA agreed normal coordination three key hurdles to overcome: crew being employees may not be possible during an unexpected event that of licensee, waiver of claims against the U.S. requires immediate action necessary for astronaut Government and informed consent. survival or to prevent serious injury from occurring during launch or reentry. The FAA pointed out it has The CSLAA defines crew as “any employee of a the ability to allow real-time deviations and has licensee or transferee, or of a contractor or allowed them in the past. For example, in an in-flight subcontractor of a licensee or transferee, who emergency requiring immediate action, the pilot in performs activities in the course of that employment command may deviate from the license to the extent directly relating to the launch, reentry, or other required to meet the emergency. The FAA operation of or in a launch vehicle or reentry vehicle documented in the PMP that grants authority for this that carries human beings.” This becomes type of deviation in its aviation regulations, and has problematic because only crewmembers are also previously allowed for this type of deviation permitted to pilot or operate a launch or reentry through the terms and conditions section of the vehicle. Since U.S. Government and International launch or reentry license. Partner astronauts are not employees of a licensee, they can only fly as Space Flight Participants (SFPs). The most recent agreement reached in the PMP dealt with the government astronaut category. NASA For public safety reasons, SFPs have an extremely and the FAA worked to provide an approach to limited role and are not allowed to pilot a launch or implement complementary reviews to preclude any reentry vehicle. Placing U.S. Government or unnecessary overlap for FAA applicants carrying International Partner astronauts in this category government astronauts on CCP vehicles. The FAA potentially conflicted with their expected duties. The assessed CCP requirements and found they team spent months reviewing anticipated duties sufficiently addressed FAA concerns regarding required during a launch or reentry looking for training, human factors, smoke detection and life potential solution paths. support system capability. The PMP documents FAA agreement that license applicants performing CCP NASA felt they might accept the SFP missions may cite the relevant NASA documents classification, and associated piloting limitations, on along with accepted evidence of compliance as CCP missions as long as the astronauts could conduct evidence of regulatory compliance. This approach operational duties related to emergencies such as helps the FAA in an evaluation because these parts system monitoring and abort activation. In order to have already been evaluated for compliance that formally document this understanding, NASA reduces duplicative documentation and reviews for requested a legal interpretation from the FAA. The the FAA and commercial provider. Before these FAA responded favorably to NASA that NASA government astronaut agreements could be even be astronauts classified as SFPs on CCP missions, based contemplated, the category first had to be created in on a number of facts, most notably that as a result of order to solve some significant problems that could automation during nominal flight, could perform have hampered licensing of CCP missions. emergency related duties because during nominal flight “any persons on board would not likely affect 10. Government Astronauts the flight path of the launch vehicle.” Beyond the One of the most challenging issues the FAA and issue of being able to pilot the vehicle, the joint legal NASA overcame was the government astronaut team addressed other obstacles. predicament. The Commercial Space Launch Amendments Act (CSLAA) of 2004 anticipated For commercial space travel, the CSLA requires flying humans on commercial space vehicles, but not crew and SFPs to execute reciprocal waivers of NASA astronauts because at that time, NASA had its claims releasing the United States Government own human space flight vehicle, the Space Shuttle. (USG), its contractors and subcontractors from The CLSAA did not foresee the retirement of the claims for personal injury, death, or property damage Space Shuttle and current events where NASA would sustained by the SFP during licensed activities, utilize commercial space vehicles to fly U. S. regardless of fault. This becomes problematic for 7

USG employees because they have the right to seek of space occupant on FAA-licensed launches and compensation for injury to them during the course of reentries: 1) crew, 2) SFPs and, 3) government their employment. Signing a waiver, that the astronauts. U.S. civil servant and military astronauts, astronaut would hold the USG harmless, is contrary and the ISS International Partner astronauts will not to the rights of USG employees. To address this, the have to fly as SFPs. They will be able to perform FAA provided another legal interpretation, stating their duties under FAA’s licensed flights, as USG civil servants or military personnel are not appropriate, while preserving their rights as either required to sign waivers, as SFPs must. The FAA government employees or ISS International Partner consulted with the Department of Labor on this issue astronauts performing official duties. and came reached this conclusion based on the fact the CSLA could not repeal the rights afforded to 11. Future Challenges and Conclusion government personnel in the Federal Employees In May 2018, the President issued Space Policy Compensation Act. Directive-2, “Streamlining Regulations on Commercial Use of Space” after discussions within Informed consent created another difficult the National Space Council. The Secretary of situation for USG and International Partner Transportation was directed to review regulations for astronauts. The FAA requires SFPs to sign informed licensing of commercial space flight launch and re- consent stating they have been informed of the risks entry. The directive asked the Secretary of of space flight and their participation is voluntary. Transportation to consider 1) “requiring a single This caused problems because: 1) NASA as an license for all types of commercial space flight agency assesses and accepts the risk of space flight launch and re-entry operations” and 2) “replacing for their astronauts; and 2) US government astronauts prescriptive requirements in the commercial space performing official business, likely could not be flight launch and reentry licensing process with considered voluntary. Complicating the matter even performance-based criteria.”16 more is the fact that informed consent must be accomplished before any compensation or The impact of this regulatory reform has yet to be agreements to fly occur. NASA’s contractual determined. The FAA plans to release a Notice of payments and agreements might not align to the Proposed Rulemaking by February 1, 2019 that will timing required by informed consent. address the policy directive.

While the FAA and NASA continued to work The FAA, NASA, and industry, in the spirit of through these issues, a legislative change was goodwill and partnership, have done their best to deemed the simplest and best option for resolution. uncover any barriers or issues to FAA licensing of The team drafted a joint legislative proposal and in CCP missions. With the majority of issues and February 2015, the FAA and NASA administrators challenges resolved, those remaining tend to be sent a letter to Congress proposing the legislative operational in nature. change. The proposal recommended adding a definition for “government astronauts” to the two To identify and address any operational issues existing definitions for “Crew” and “Space Flight early, the FAA, in consultation with NASA and its Participants.” Since the current definitions and contractors, has agreed to participate in the upcoming licensing requirements were intended for space NASA certification missions as an observer. tourism, they did not consider the unique aspects and Following along in the timeline, procedures and requirements of transporting government employees observing the mission and interactions will allow the and international partner astronauts to the FAA to identify any barriers to licensing or conflicts International Space Station (ISS) on commercial in authority early, allowing time for the FAA and vehicles. The letter also emphasized legislation was NASA to resolve them without impact to the mission. needed to resolve and clarify the application of the CSLAA in order to keep the program on schedule.

Congress responded to the joint legislative request and in November 2015 passed, and the President then signed the U.S. Commercial Space Launch Competitiveness Act (CSLCA), thereby enacting the “government astronaut” provisions.15 The CSLCA added a definition to the law creating a third category 8

References

1 51 USC Chapter 509 is available at A working group from FAA’s industry advisory https://www.faa.gov/about/office_org/headquarters_o committee, COMSTAC, prepared a 2008 task force ffices/ast/legislation_policies/ report on “Commercial Human Space Operations 2 Ibid. Executive Order 12465 was signed by Training Standards. The report is available at: President Reagan in February 1984, before Congress https://www.faa.gov/about/office_org/headquarters_o passed the CSLA. The Executive Order designated ffices/ast/reports_studies/archives/ the Department of Transportation as the lead agency 7 Human Space Flight Requirements text from CFR within the Federal government for encouraging and 460 is available at facilitating commercial ELV activities by the United https://www.faa.gov/about/office_org/headquarters_o States private sector. ffices/ast/regulations/ 3 See “Certification Versus Licensing for Human 8 “Recommended Practices for Commercial Human Space Flight in Commercial Space Transportation,” Space Flight Occupant Safety, FAA, August 2014. Federal Aviation Administration, IAC-12-D6.1.3, The 56-page document is available at: (2012 International Astronautical Congress) https://www.faa.gov/about/office_org/headquarters_o Available at: ffices/ast/news_announcements/ https://www.faa.gov/about/office_org/headquarters_o 9 “Commercial Crew Program- The Essentials,” ffices/ast/programs/international_affairs/ NASA Commercial Crew website [undated] 4 FAA regulations can be found at: https://www.nasa.gov/content/commercial-crew- https://www.faa.gov/about/office_org/headquarters_o program-the-essentials/#.VjOJ3berRaT ffices/ast/regulations/ 10 Ibid. 5 See USC Chapter 509 § 50906. The third “Learning 11 According to 51 USC § 50919, “This chapter does Period” extension to 2023 was included in the 2015 not apply to— (1) a launch, reentry, operation of a U.S. Commercial Space Launch Competitiveness launch vehicle or reentry vehicle, operation of a Act, signed by the President in November 2015. The launch site or reentry site, or other space activity the first extension to the 2004 law was for three years in Government carries out for the Government.” February 2012. The second extension for only six 12 “Memorandum of Understanding between the months in September 2015 allowed more time for the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) and the 2015 CSLCA to pass. During the Learning Period, National Aeronautics and Space Administration the FAA is allowed by Congress to issue regulations (NASA) for Achievement of Mutual Goals in Human restricting or prohibiting design features or operating Space Transportation.” FAA, NASA, June 2012, practices that have either resulted in a serious or fatal https://www.faa.gov/about/office_org/headquart injury to crew or space flight participants during a ers_offices/ast/about/moa_mou/ licensed or permitted commercial human space flight, 13 Ibid. or contributed to a “close call.” 14 Ibid. 6 Text from the Human Space Flight Requirements in 15 U.S. Commercial Space Launch Competitiveness the U.S. Code of Federal Regulations (CFR) 460 is Act, Section 112 (Public Law 114-90), November 25, available at 2015. https://www.faa.gov/about/office_org/headquarters_o https://www.congress.gov/114/plaws/publ90/PLAW- ffices/ast/regulations/ 114publ90.pd See also “Informed Consent in Commercial Space 16 “Space Policy Directive-2, Streamlining Transportation Safety,” Federal Aviation Regulations on Commercial Use of Space,” The Administration, IAC-13-D5.1.4, (2013 International White House, May 24, 2018. Astronautical Congress). Available at: https://whitehouse.gov/presidential-actions/space- https://www.faa.gov/about/office_org/headquarters_o policy-directive-2-streamlining-regulations- ffices/ast/programs/international_affairs/ commercial-use-space/

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