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Indonesia at a Glance: 2001-02

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Indonesia at a Glance: 2001-02 COUNTRY REPORT Indonesia At a glance: 2001-02 OVERVIEW President Abdurrachman Wahid’s gamble of replacing his “rainbow” cabinet with a new cabinet of party loyalists in the aftermath of the August session of the People’s Consultative Assembly has paid off in the short term by allowing him to consolidate his position. Over the longer term, however, his decision to leave out representatives of other major political parties runs the risk of antagonising important players. Another, more determined attempt at impeachment within the forecast period cannot be ruled out. Strong export growth and a hesitant recovery in the domestic economy will push GDP growth close to 4% this year, and the rate of expansion will further accelerate in 2001-02. Strong export growth will push up the merchandise trade surplus over 2001-02, but a more rapid increase in the income deficit will erode the current-account surplus. The decision to raise fuel prices and civil service salaries in October will push up consumer price inflation in 2000-01, but this will moderate in 2002. Key changes from last month Political outlook • President Wahid sacked chiefs of both the army and navy on October 9th, replacing them with their deputies. But this decisive act should not be taken as evidence that the political accommodation between the president, his vice-president and the MPR will be effective in the long term. Economic policy outlook • The government annoyed the IMF in early October by postponing the sell-off of stakes in two major banks. The IMF has also questioned a debt restructuring deal, but relations will recover. The draft 2001 budget was released at the start of October. This includes plans for a further cut in fuel subsidies, and for raising excise duties, notably on cigarettes. Economic forecast • Evidence of sustained export growth has led us to edge up our 2000 GDP growth forecast to 3.8%. September consumer price inflation data was consistent with our existing forecast of a year-end inflation rate of 8.5% this year. October 2000 The Economist Intelligence Unit 15 Regent St, London SW1Y 4LR United Kingdom The Economist Intelligence Unit The Economist Intelligence Unit is a specialist publisher serving companies establishing and managing operations across national borders. For over 50 years it has been a source of information on business developments, economic and political trends, government regulations and corporate practice worldwide. The EIU delivers its information in four ways: through our digital portfolio, where our latest analysis is updated daily; through printed subscription products ranging from newsletters to annual reference works; through research reports; and by organising conferences and roundtables. The firm is a member of The Economist Group. 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ISSN 0269-5413 Symbols for tables “n/a” means not available; “–” means not applicable Printed and distributed by Redhouse Press Ltd, Unit 151, Dartford Trade Park, Dartford, Kent DA1 1QB, UK Indonesia 1 Outlook for 2001-02 Political outlook Domestic politics The new system of executive government introduced after the two-week annual session of the People’s Consultative Assembly (Majelis Permusyarawatan Rakyat, MPR) that began on August 7th appears to be working better than expected. Early fears that President Abdurrachman’s decision to appoint only his own party loyalists to his new cabinet and exclude representatives from other parties would prompt an escalation of political opposition have not been borne out—so far. The decision to cede the day-to-day running of government to vice-president Megawati Sukarnoputri with the support of the two new co-ordinating ministers, the economics minister, Rizal Ramli, and the security minister, Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono, also appears to be bearing fruit. Although Mr Abdurrachman is continuing to test the limits of the restraints placed on him by this agreement, inter alia by taking unilateral decisions on the appointment of senior police and military officers (he dismissed both army and navy chiefs on October 10th), the embryonic system of checks and balances imposed on him by this new system has reduced policy-making volatility. Numerous problems nevertheless remain. The new cabinet is not free of the taint of corruption or cronyism. The powerful speakers of the two houses of parliament, Amien Rais and Akbar Tanjung, have begun to transform their parties, the National Mandate Party (PAN) and Golkar respectively, into opposition vehicles after they too were excluded from the cabinet. Mr Abdurrahman could easily clash with the military on such fundamental issues as tackling separatism and bringing soldiers accused of human rights abuses to account. Meanwhile, the economy is still seriously ailing, separatist sentiment in Papua and separatist violence in Aceh are, if anything, on the rise, and the sectarian conflict in Maluku is raging out of control. Even at the centre, public discontent with the slow pace of legal action on the allegations of corruption and abuse of power against the former president Suharto are provoking continued street protests. At the same time, a spate of bombings, most recently in the Jakarta Stock Exchange Building on September 13th, are being ascribed to supporters of the former president. To differing degrees, the economy, the regions and the security situation have slipped out of government control. To stand a chance of regaining control of the economy, the president will have to take a firm hand with key state institutions such as Bank Indonesia (the central bank), the Indonesian Bank Restructuring Agency (IBRA), the staples procurement agency, BULOG, and the courts. His team will have to handle the bumpy transition to greater regional autonomy over the next year. But more difficult still will be defusing separatism and sectarianism in the “outer islands”, where if any arm of government holds sway, it is the military. Partly because of its convincing EIU Country Report October 2000 © The Economist Intelligence Unit Limited 2000 2 Indonesia claim to indispensability in these “security situations”, the military reform process appears to have stalled for now International relations Mr Abdurrahman has seemed to be putting a higher priority on Indonesia’s relations with the US, the EU and Japan. The president’s frenetic travels since coming to power have tried to establish international confidence in his government, particularly in the influential capitals of the West and Japan. His efforts have paid off, and he is still generally perceived as Indonesia’s best hope for a successful democratic transition. At the same time, however, anti-Western sentiment exists at all political levels in Indonesia, tapping into resentments over the handling of the 1997-98 regoional financial crisis and the “loss” of East Timor. As well as Australia, the US has also been increasingly criticised. Economic policy outlook Policy trends Over the next two years, monetary policy will remain mildly accommodating, as the desire not to undermine the recovery and add to the government's already heavy debt-servicing burden outweigh other considerations. Despite higher than previously expected oil prices, the government's room for fiscal manoeuvre will remain limited. The economy’s prospects will therefore depend heavily on the success of the bank and corporate restructuring programmes, something which the draft 2001 budget released in October, recognises. Corporate restructuring is expected to benefit from the more flexible approach to debt settlement now being encouraged by the IMF and the World Bank. But bank lending is expected to continue to be severely constrained by relatively high interest rates and caution about lending to the still-weak corporate sector. Fiscal policy The assumptions underlying the budget for 2000 (which covers only the nine months from April to December 2000 in order to allow a change to a calendar year period in 2001) will clearly not be met. The government budget was in fact in surplus in the first six months of fiscal year 2000, but his was due to severe underspending; a deficit is forecast for the full fiscal year, but this will narrow in 2001. The budget has for some time also looked overoptimistic in some of its revenue projections, particularly those from asset disposals by the Indonesian Bank Restructuring Agency (IBRA), privatisation and state enterprises’ dividend payments.
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