The Man(ager) Who Knew Too Much Snehal Banerjee, Jesse Davis and Naveen Gondhi∗ July 14, 2020 Abstract Better-informed individuals are often unable to ignore their private information when forecasting others' beliefs. We study how this bias, known as \the curse of knowledge," affects communication and investment within a firm. A principal utilizes an informed manager's recommendations when investing. The curse of knowledge leads the manager to over-estimate his ability to convey information, which hampers com- munication and decreases firm value. However, this same misperception increases the manager's information acquisition and can increase value when endogenous informa- tion is indispensable (e.g., R&D). Finally, we characterize settings where the principal delegates the investment decision only if the manager is cursed. JEL Classification: D8, D9, G3, G4 Keywords: curse of knowledge, cheap talk, disclosure, delegation, belief formation. ∗Banerjee (
[email protected]) is at the University of California - San Diego; Davis (Jesse Davis@kenan- flagler.unc.edu) is at the University of North Carolina - Chapel Hill; and Gondhi (
[email protected]) is at INSEAD. We thank Judson Caskey, Archishman Chakraborty, Keri Hu, Navin Kartik, Nadya Malenko, Yuval Rottenstreich and seminar participants at UCSD for valuable feedback. All errors are our own. Corresponding author: Snehal Banerjee (
[email protected]), Rady School of Management, University of California - San Diego, Gilman Drive #0553, La Jolla, CA, 92093. \The single biggest problem in communication is the illusion that it has taken place." | George Bernard Shaw 1 Introduction Firms routinely make decisions under uncertainty. While managers and employees \on the ground" are likely to be better informed about product demand, operational constraints, and new technologies, \top level" managers are usually responsible for the actual decision of which projects to pursue and how much capital should be invested.