Volume 3 May 2015 http://journals.gmu.edu/NandC How to Start a War: Eight Cases of Strategic Provocation J.D. Maddox, Department of Information Science & Technology, GMU Abstract Strategic provocation has been a consistent prelude to war. A leader intent on starting a war must develop a compelling narrative for their domestic constituency and the international community. For some, strategic provocation – defined here as the use of deceptive tactics to instigate violence against one's own state – has been a reliable means of initiating war under the guise of self-defense. Eight cases of strategic provocation reveal a basic pattern of its use, and some possibly unwelcome truths about state leaders' methods. As international institutions increasingly scrutinize states' interventionist agendas, the use of deceptive narratives is likely to continue. Despite known indicators of strategic provocation operations, warning of such operations has not typically prevented warfare. Key Words media; narrative; strategic narrative, propaganda; messaging; war; provocation; strategic communication; media Recommended Citation Maddox, J.D. (2016). How to Start a War: Eight Cases of Strategic Provocation. Narrative and Conflict: Explorations in Theory and Practice, 3(1), p. 66-109. Retrieved from http://journals.gmu.edu/NandC/issue/view/195 This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivs 3.0 Unported License. Please contact Sara Cobb at [email protected] for usage rights. Maddox How to Start a War: Eight Cases of Strategic Provocation Page 67 Introduction: The tragedy of strategic provocation Americans have long been witness to, and participant in, strategic provocation. One case in particular took place close to George Mason University’s campus in the Northern Neck of Virginia and illustrates many principles of the concept: In the late 1690s, the planters of Colonial Maryland and Virginia along the Potomac River had established a treaty with the friendly Piscataway Native Americans that enabled the Colonists to conduct steady trade along the coast. The profitable peace, though, threatened the livelihood of the Iroquois Native Americans to the north – a nation that had long fought their neighboring Piscataway enemies for territory and goods (Charles County Bicentennial Commission, 2013). A contentious history between colonists and Native Americans had fostered a climate of mutual distrust and apprehension. Colonists based their fears on previous clashes, including massacres of Colonists by Native Americans in 1620 and 1640 (Charles County Bicentennial Commission, 2013) and by the 1690s they had little faith in their neighbors (Maryland Colonial Court Proceedings, 1697). The Native Americans also had cause for concern as they saw their land access contract with the western expansion of the Colonies. In official testimony to Colonial sheriffs, old men described new incidents of Indian aggression, such as Native Americans’ unexplained renewed use of warpaint, the theft of weapons and alcohol, and increasing numbers of hunting parties, which they feared were a sign of imminent violence (Maryland Colonial Court Proceedings, 1697, p. 188-191). It was amid this narrative of distrust – on 8 July 1697 – that a Native American named Esquire Tom and his companion Choptico Robin, along with some other men, attacked an Englishwoman and her three children in the town of Acquia, Virginia, while the woman and children were doing chores at a spring. Esquire Tom and his accomplices knocked the woman unconscious, scalped her completely, drove a knife deep into her breast (“the wind puft out like a pair of Bellowes,” wrote a witness after the fact), and beat her children nearly to death (Maryland Colonial Court Proceedings, 1697, p. 182). Initial reports by a shocked Maryland court indicated a murder had taken place. The attackers were assumed to be Piscataway “assassins” (Maryland Colonial Court Proceedings, 1697, p. 182). Governor Nicholson demanded quick justice: an investigation and prosecution of those responsible, and counsel with the Piscataway Emperor. The Stafford County sheriff, Captain George Mason II, within days arrested a group of eight Piscataway who, under threat of immediate death by hanging, admitted their collaboration with Esquire Tom and Choptico Robin. In an examination at the Stafford County Courthouse, attended by the Piscataway Narrative and Conflict: Explorations in Theory and Practice http://journals.gmu.edu/NandC Maddox How to Start a War: Eight Cases of Strategic Provocation Page 68 Emperor, the court learned that something much more profound than a simple killing had been attempted. (Maryland Colonial Court Proceedings, 1697). The presence of the Piscataway Emperor elicited tears from the defendants. They quickly admitted that Esquire Tom – a Pomunkey tribesman from Charles County, Maryland – was in league with the Iroquois leadership. He had met with the Iroquois months before at Great Falls, Virginia. There, an Iroquois agent provocateur baited Esquire Tom with stories of English transgressions. He offered Tom a reward to avenge the Native American nations. By having Esquire Tom kill a Colonist and then blame it on the Piscataway, the Iroquois aimed to ignite a war between the English and the Piscataway, thus weakening both parties. The Iroquois would then seize on their weakness to eventually drive the English out and retake formerly held Piscataway territory (Maryland Colonial Court Proceedings, 1697). Captain Mason would curse the baffling situation in a letter to the Governor: “…our County is so Dam’d full of lyes that I know not how allmost to Act but God direct for the Best that I may Act both for Good of King & Countrey” (Maryland Colonial Court Proceedings, 1697, p. 183). The Governor opted against the knee-jerk violent reaction that might have triggered just the kind of violence that Esquire Tom’s puppeteer intended. Governor Nicholson chose to investigate further and deal with the individuals involved rather than proudly punish his Native American neighbors as a whole, despite his colony’s reputation for strong control. He ordered increased patrols by his Rangers, inquired into the more general nature of Native American relations, and communicated with his nervous Virginia counterparts on the issue. Eventually, Esquire Tom was brought to justice. The incident would disappear into the inky camouflage of a hundred other tales in Maryland’s court records, seemingly never to reemerge until this examination. (Maryland Colonial Court Proceedings, 1697) Over three hundred years later, the basic principles of the “Iroquois Deception” are unchanged in international application, as we will discover in eight case studies, below. As recently as 2008, the Russians were able to provoke an attack by the Georgians using similar tactics, but on a broader scale, and before that in Czechoslovakia in 1968 and in Afghanistan in 1979 (Sonne and Cullison, 2014; Herbig and Daniel, 1981). The same has been documented in Poland, Finland and elsewhere, as we will see below. And strategic provocation perhaps was the rule, rather than the exception, in early US wars. This under- appreciated narrative technique deserves a closer look in the context of conflict resolution, especially as stakes escalate. Narrative and Conflict: Explorations in Theory and Practice http://journals.gmu.edu/NandC Maddox How to Start a War: Eight Cases of Strategic Provocation Page 69 The Iroquois Deception – besides being a curious interlude in American Colonial history – illustrates some of the fundamentals of this concept. At their most basic, these narrative operations are premised upon enduring brinkmanship between two opposing forces that are usually intent on securing sovereignty or land, often despite popular distaste for violence. Provocation occurs because an aggressor sees the need to develop a narrative justifying his own unpalatable, violent intentions. And while a zeitgeist of animosity may haunt both parties of an argument, provocation operations are deliberately planned to trigger a climax of violence that would not occur without some devilry. And – in the most devilish cases – a leader sacrifices some of his own people, as in the examples of Germany and Finland, below. The conflict resolution implications of strategic provocation operations beg our close attention: these operations are classic tragedies whose results are deadly and often resonate beyond control. Their secrecy during planning ensures that citizens are unaware of the reality behind leaders’ fiery narratives leading up to violence, and their leaders’ narratives compel hapless citizens toward violence that may otherwise be avoided. The voices of those who might restrain themselves or caution against violence are muffled by their leaders’ dominant narrative. As nations attain global influence through increasingly centralized media and through increasingly important international organizations, the implications grow. Similarly, as the normative influence of international organizations increases, so (ironically) grows the use of strategic provocation. I. Attack Me… Please! Provocation is one of the most basic, but confounding, aspects of warfare. Despite its sometimes obvious use, it has succeeded consistently against audiences around the world, for millennia, to compel war. A well-constructed provocation narrative mutes even the most vocal opposition. It seems we are ever welcoming of a just reason to fight. Proponents of the jus ad bellum (just war) discipline