CERTIFICATE OF ORIGINALITY

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...... (Signed). UNIVERSITY OF NEW SOUTH WALES Thesis/Project Report Sheet

Surname or Family name: ROBBINS First name: WILLIAM Other name/s: MURRAY Abbreviation for degree as given in the University calendar: PhD School: Industrial Relations and Organisational Behaviour Faculty: Commerce Title: The Management of Convict Labour Employed by New South Wales Government 1788·1830

Abstract: This thesis examines how the labour of convicts employed in the public sector was organised, coordinated, supervised, rewarded and punished. In addition the thesis also examines how convict workers responded to management controls: resistance or consent. In doing this the thesis explicitly applies labour process theory and feminist theory to the management of convict labour In three empirical case studies: the convict work gangs, the skilled Lumber Yards and the Female Factory in Parramatta. The convict gangs were an enduring form of work organisation for mainly (but not exclusively) unskilled male convicts. The Lumber Yards were government enterprises established in Sydney and at Parramatta in order to manufacture metal and timber products needed by government projects. The Female Factory at Parramatta was asylum, hospital, prison as well as a place of work for female convicts but the productive employment of the women has often been neglected. The thesis establishes that the management of convict labour in these three areas did not conform to a major theoretical perspective offered by labour process theory, namely that the employment of the convicts would be regulated by a simple model of labour process controls. On the contrary the thesis argues that the management of male convict workers relied on an elaborate and sophisticated system of regulations that were more akin to a bureaucratic model of control. In addition, the thesis argues that between 1788· 1 821 the management of convict males was not as brutal as is commonly characterised by popular opinion. Nevertheless from 1822 harsher controls became a reality for male convicts in public employment although these remained firmly bureaucratic rather than simple or direct. On the other hand the more extensive employment of the female convicts was only apparent at the end of the period under review. Much early feminist theory argued this neglect reflected the values of a patriarchal society but this view can ignore the intensity of resistance by the women. It is argued that the resistance displayed by the women was a critical factor in the government's reluctance to employ more convict women.

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THIS SHEET IS TO BE GLUED TO THE INSIDE FRONT COVER OF THE THESIS THE MANAGEMENT OF CONVICT LABOUR EMPLOYED BY NEW SOUTH WALES GOVERNMENT 1788-1830

WILLIAM MURRAY ROBBINS

Submitted for the award

PhD.

2001 CONTENTS

Page

Acknowledgments v

List of Tables, Charts and Graph VI

CHAPTER ONE THE MANAGEMENT OF CONVICT LABOUR

1.1 Introduction 1 1.2 The convict labour process 3 1.3 The hypotheses and methodology 5 1.4 Conclusion 8

CHAPTER TWO CONVICT LITERATURE REVIEW

2.1 Introduction 11 2.2 The early debate: the radical and conservative discourse 11 2.3 A new orthodoxy 14 2.4 The new challenge to orthodoxy 17 2.5 The feminist challenge 20 2.6 The current debate 28 2. 7 Conclusion 32

CHAPTER THREE LABOUR PROCESS THEORY: REVIEW AND DISCUSSION

3.1 Introduction 34 3.2 Marx's theory of the labour process 36 3.3 Friedman and worker resistance to the labour process 44 3.4 Edwards and forms of labour process control 46 3.5 Burawoy and the manufacture of consent 52 3.6 Feminism, gender and patriarchy 56 3.7 Conclusion 65

11 Page

CHAPTER FOUR THE SYSTEM OF TRANSPORTATION: AN OVERVIEW

4.1 Introduction 68 4.2 Convict numbers and demographics 68 4.3 The policy oftransportation 70 4.4 Role of Governor 71 4.5 The Bigge Inquiry 74 4.6 The problem of coercion 76 4.7 Conclusion 79

CHAPTER FIVE CONTROL AND RESISTANCE: A CASE STUDY OF THE GANG SYSTEM 1788-1830

5.1 Introduction 80 5.2 Size of the gang system 81 5.3 The work of the convict gangs 89 5.3 .1 Gang work 1790 and 1800 90 5.3.2 Gang work in 1820 92 5.3.3 Gang work 1825 and 1829 96 5.4 Organisational structure ofthe gang system 99 5.4 .1 Organisational structure of gang system circa 1814 100 5.4.2 Organisational structure of gang system circa 1820 102 5.4.3 Organisational structure of gang system circa late 1820s 110 5.5 Nature and quality of gang supervision 124 5.6 Convict resistance to management control 132 5. 7 Conclusion 144

CHAPTER SIX THE MANAGEMENT OF SKILLED LABOUR AT THE LUMBERYARDS

6.1 Introduction 147 6.2 The rise and fall of the Lumber Yards 149 6.3 The workforce of the Lumber Yards 156 6.4 Work organisation 160 lll Page

6.5 Work control 165 6.6 Supervision 172 6. 7 Productivity of Lumber Yard labour 180 6.8 Conclusion 184

CHAPTER SEVEN FEMALE CONVICTS AND THE FEMALE FACTORY, PARRAMATTA, 1803-1830

7.1 Introduction 187 7.2 The first female factory-an overview 1788-1820 189 7.3 The new female factory-an overview 1820-1830 195 7.4 The workforce of the female factories 201 7.5 The work performed at the female factories 207 7.6 Industrial output at the female factories 212 7. 7 Control, administration and supervision of factory work 217 7.8 Punishment and resistance 228 7.9 Conclusion 236

CHAPTER EIGHT CONCLUSION

8.1 Introduction 240 8.2 Distinguishing labour power and labour use 241 8.3 Evaluation ofhypotheses 243 8.4 Conclusion 259

BIBLIOGRAPHY

Primary Sources: Archival Material 265 Primary Sources: Published Material 267 Secondary Sources: Books 269 Secondary Sources: Articles 281

lV ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

There are many people who have helped make the completion of this thesis possible. I would like to thank my supervisors Dr John Shields and Dr Chris Wright. While each contributed enthusiasm for and support of my topic, John helped start the project and Chris helped resolve it. I would also like to publicly acknowledge the support of my colleagues in the School of Business but in particular Mr John Saw and Mr Gerry Voll who did so much more than encourage my efforts. I also take this opportunity to acknowledge the financial and time release assistance given to me by my Faculty and by Charles Sturt University. Finally, I want to thank my family, Karen, Zoe, Odette and Madeline, without whose support I could not have even been dreamed of finishing this thesis.

v LIST OF TABLES, CHARTS AND GRAPH

Tables Page

5.1 Male Workforce ofGangs and Total Number ofConvicts Maintained by Government for New South Wales, Various Dates 85

5.2 Gang System by Industry Sector 1790 and 1800 91

5.3 Gang System by Industry Sector 1820 93

5.4 Gang System by Industry Sector 1825 and 1829 97

5.5 Numbers of Superintendents and Overseers in Gang System, Sydney, 1796-1820 128

5.6 Numbers of Gang Supervisors 1825 and 1829 130

5. 7 Span of Supervisors Control for Gang System 1796-1829 131

6.1 Size of the Workforce at Sydney and Parramatta Lumber Yards, Various Years 1790-1832 157

6.2 Convict Worker and Supervisory Staff at Parramatta Lumber Yard, Various Years 1811-1821 179

7.1 Female Convicts Victualled and Employed at Public Labour 1803-1807 204

7.2 Female Convicts Employed in the Female Factory, Parramatta 1821,1826-1829 205

7.3 Yards of Coarse Woollen Cloth Various Dates 1800-1824 214

7.4 Quantity and Yards of Blankets Manufactured at the Female Factory 1814-1819 215

7.5 Total Numbers and Value ofltems Produced at the Female Factory 1822, 1823-1824, 1828-1829 216

7.6 Ratio of Supervised to Supervisors at Female Factory Various Years 1800-1829 227

7.7 Incidence ofPunishment at Female Factory Various Months 1826, 1829 234

7. 8 Percentage of Punishment Imposed on First, Second and Third Class Women 1826-1828 234

VI Charts Page

5.1 Sectoral Characteristics ofthe Gang System 1820 95

5.2 Organisational Chart Showing Hierarchy of Administration and Supervisory Positions 1820 103

5.3 Chief Engineer's Organisational Chart Showing Hierarchy of Administration and Supervisory Positions 1820 105

5.4 Principal Superintendent of Convicts, Hutchinson, Organisational Chart Showing Hierarchy of Administration and Supervisory Positions 1820 107

5.5 Principal Superintendent of Convicts, Fitzgerald, Organisational Chart Showing Hierarchy of Administration and Supervisory Positions 1820 109

5.6 Organisational Structure of Clearing Gangs 1825 113

5.7 Organisational Structure of the Convict Department 1829 121

5.8 Organisational Structure ofDepartment ofRoads and Bridges Circa 1830 123

7.1 Organisational Structure ofPositions at Female Factory 1826 221

7.2 Organisational Structure ofPositions at Female Factory 1827 223

7.3 Organisational Structure of Positions at Female Factory 1830 225

Graph

6.1 Organisational Structure of Positions at Female Factory 1830 158

Vll CHAPTER ONE

THE MANAGEMENT OF CONVICT LABOUR

1.1 Introduction

The importance of the convicts as Australia's first settlers has long been recognised. 1 Less well appreciated is their importance as Australia's first working class.2 It is fair to say that there has been little systematic analysis of convict work relations or modes of control beyond recognition of the brutality of the system. Little attention has been directed to understanding how convict labour was organised, what mechanisms of control were used at different times and what the convict reactions or responses were to their work and its control. In short, the convict labour process has been neglected or misrepresented. This thesis addresses these shortcomings by analysing how convict labour was organised, administered, controlled and modified over time. The neglect of convict labour process has arisen because most historical inquiry into the convicts sent to New South Wales has concentrated on them as criminals and has viewed them as poor unfortunates brutalised and exploited/ as shameful degenerates of bad stock4 or as a lumpen proletariat.5 In the brief passages where Manning Clark actually viewed them as workers, he described the convicts as "an alienated working class ... with no spiritual or material interest in the products of its work."6 They had to be "driven or terrorised into labour" and "physical terror was the one effective restraint" that management had to control the labour process.7 In addition, the unique origins, purpose and penal nature of colonial New South Wales have also distorted the examination of the convict labour process. The problems of the convicts as bad, lazy workers and the challenges of penal settlement have been viewed as unique and wholly exceptional. However, accounts of the problems of

1 Robson, L (1965) The Convict Settlers ofAustralia: and inquiry into the origin and character ofthe convicts transported to New South Wales and Van Dieman 's Land, 1788-1852. Melbourne University Press. Melbourne. 2 The exception is Nicholas, S. ( ed) (1989) Convict Workers: reinterpreting Australia's past. Cambridge University Press. Melbourne. 3 Buckley, K. and Wheelwright, T. (1988) No Paradise for Workers: capitalism and the common people in Australia 1788-1914. Oxford University Press. Melbourne. 4 Hancock, W.K. (1966) Australia. Jacaranda Press. Brisbane. 5 McQueen, H. (1971) A New Britannia. Penguin. Ringwood. 6 Clark, M. (1971) A History ofAustralia. Vol. 1. Melbourne University Press. Melbourne. p. 244. 7 Ibid. 1 recruiting and motivating an industrial workforce in British factories from the 1750s to the 1830s are very similar to the complaints levelled at the convict workers.8 Like convict managers, British industrialists also complained of a lazy, unmotivated workforce that was unreliable, unco-operative and at times defiant of management authority .9 A variation of this view is David Neal's argument that the convicts were a slave workforce and so had to be coerced and brutalised in ways quite different to those required for the management of a free workforce. 10 However, Neal's argument also simplifies the convict experience by ignoring a range of important factors. Firstly, while the convicts were a coerced workforce they were not legally slaves but possessed more significant rights than workers in any slave society.U Secondly, the convicts were not treated, in practice, as slaves because until 1822 they had considerable bargaining power as a workforce and, just as importantly, were successful in their interactions with convict administrations. Thirdly Neal extrapolates broad conclusions from a highly specific range of timeframes. Although he refers to mobility restrictions, coercive management controls and, in particular, physical punishmene 2 his examples are drawn from the controls and punishments imposed in the decades after 1822. 13 In other words he treats the convict experience as constant and unchanging throughout the period of transportation. However, the analysis of convict labour management needs to recognise the watershed represented by the end of the Macquarie era ( 1810-1821) in 1821 and to view the systems of management before and after this date as distinctly separate. The analysis of convicts as workers cannot be placed within the simplistic contexts of criminality or slavery. It needs to be analysed within the context of the creation of the modem worker generally.

8 See Fox, A. (1985) History and Heritage: the social origins of the British industrial relations system. George Allen and Unwin. London. pp. 42-43. 9 See Thompson, E.P. (1972) The Making of the English Working Class. Penguin. Harmmonsworth. pp. 247,292, 397-398 and 473; and Pollard, S. (1968) The Genesis ofModern Management. Penguin. Harmondsworth. Chapter 5. 10 Neal, D. (1991) The Rule ofLaw in a Penal Colony. Cambridge University Press. Melbourne. 11 See Report from the Select Committee on Transportation, 10 July 1812. Facsimile edition 1969. British Parliamentary Papers. Crime and Punishment. Transportation. Vol. 1. Irish University Press. Shannon. pp. 11-12; and compare this to Genovese, E.D. (1967) The Political Economy ofSlavery. Vintage Books. New York. Chapter 2. 12 Neal. op. cit. pp. 27-59.

2 1.2 The convict labour process

The labour process, according to Marx, occurred naturally whenever human "activity, with the help of the instruments of labour, effects an alteration, designed from the commencement, in the material worked upon."14 In other words, human labour reshapes the natural world to produce the necessities of life. However, just "As the taste of porridge does not tell you who grew the oats" this simple model does not reveal "the social conditions under which it is taking place". 15 In Marx's view the private ownership of the means of production which distinguished capitalist society created the basis for a new and distinctive labour process. One of the key dimensions of capitalist labour process was the dichotomy between labour power and labour use. Marx argued that when capitalists engaged labour this transaction only purchased the worker's labour power: his/her potential. 16 Owners of the means of production (or their managers) were consequently confronted with the task of extracting actual use from the potential of the labour they bought. That is, labour power needed to be turned into labour effort. This challenge meant that under the capitalist labour process work had to be organised, labour controlled and motivated in ways that made labour productive. One of the simplest ways this was done in early capitalism was to increase the hours ofwork.17 It is argued here that colonial New South Wales from 1788 was the product of British industrial capitalism and so the fundamental features of the capitalist labour process were also to be found here. Firstly, although the state did not purchase convict labour power but seized it through criminal conviction, 18 this was nevertheless a transaction critical to the labour process. Like private capitalists, the state in New South Wales possessed control of convict labour power. Secondly, this transaction created by transportation was also a complex arrangement of reciprocal rights and responsibilities. Although· the state was given convict labour power and the authority to utilise it as it

13 Ibid. chapter 2 wherein almost every reference to the incidence of flogging or its severity relates to the 1830s or at least post 1820. 14 Marx, K. (1974) Capital. Vol. 1. Progress Publishers. Moscow. p. 176. 15 Ibid. p. 179. 16 Ibid. p. 313. 17 Ibid. pp. 477-479; and see also Littler, C. (1982) The Development ofthe Labour Process in Capitalist Societies: a comparative study ofthe transformation ofwork organisation in Britain, Japan and the USA. Gower. Aldershot. p. 22. 18 Under the Transportation Act the Governor was given the labour power of each convict to utilise as he saw fit. See Report from the Select Committee ofthe House of Commons on Transportation. Sir W. Molesworth. 1838. Facsimile edition 1967. State Library of South Australia. Adelaide. p. 8; and Byrne. P.

3 saw fit, it had to do so within a range of responsibilities. The state was legally bound to ensure that convict workers were sustained by adequate rations and clothing and in this way can, arguably, be seen as determining at least a living wage in exchange for its seizure of convict labour power. 19 Free labour in Britain, in contrast, was not protected by any minimum standards. 20 The state in New South Wales also regulated the wages that convicts could earn when employed by a private employer during their free time. 21 Thirdly, and most importantly, the state like all employers of labour faced the basic problem of extracting labour use from labour power. It is also evident that colonial administrations, until 1822, were highly concerned with labour effort. The surplus value of labour was important because there was an economic imperative to make convict labour productive. As a consequence, the state constructed a range of policies that stimulated the convicts to provide a minimum level of effort.22 Further, the convicts were able to influence the nature and effectiveness of the state's strategies by a range of counter measures or strategies. In other words, up to 1822 there was an interaction between convict labour and state capital, employee and employer, over labour effort. It needs also to be appreciated that the ability of free labour in Britain to influence the labour process was also highly circumscribed during the period under review.23 Free labour was not legally free to bargain with employers and so the restrictions on convict workers in this respect were less exceptional than is often thought. The extraction of labour effort is the major focus of this thesis and it is argued this demanded a more concerted, complex and varied range of strategies than has b~en commonly recognised. Indeed it can be argued that the need to extract labour effort, in the light of the pioneer nature of the settlement, was greater in New South Wales than in Britain. Furthermore, the hostility of the convict workers to this labour process

J. (1993) Criminal Law and Colonial Subject NSW 1810-1830. Cambridge University Press. Melbourne. p. 20. 19 See Australians 1838. (1988) Fairfax. Sydney. p. 149. 20 See Ricardo, D. (1972) Principles ofPolitical Economy and Taxation. Everyman's Library. London; for a discussion of his Iron Law ofWages; Rule, J. (1981) The Experience ofLabour in Eighteenth Century Industry. Croom Helm. London. Chapter 2; Deane, P. (1967) The First Industrial Revolution. Cambridge University Press. London. Chapter 15; and Hammond, J.L. and B. (1947) The Bleak Age. Penguin. West Drayton. 21 Historical Records ofAustralia. Series 1. (hereafter referred to as HRA I) Vol. II, Government Order 1 October 1800. pp. 622-624. Free time was working outside official working hours and was called working "on their own hands", see Hirst. J. (1983) Convict Society and its Enemies. Allen and Unwin. Melbourne. p. 40. 22 A notable one was the creation of Task Work, see Robbins, B. "Contested Terrain: the Convict Task Work System, 1788-1830." In Markey, R. (2001) Community and Labour. Wollongong University Press. W ollongong. pp. 33-50. 23 See Fox. op. cit. pp. 31-67. 4 transaction was also probably greater, at least initially, than amongst British workers. In addition, the ability of the convict labour force to with hold effort was even more significant than that of many individual workers in Britain. Convicts in New South Wales could not be starved by market forces. 24 Indeed, while the state was highly powerful in the labour process it was denied the most fundamental weapon at the disposal of even the smallest of business entrepreneurs; dismissal. The state could not dismiss its workers like a British employer and so did not possess the inherent control mechanism that unemployment and the threat of unemployment entailed.

1.3 The hypotheses and methodology

This thesis will explore the dynamic nature ofthe.convict labour process experienced by convicts in public employment in New South Wales between 1788 and 1830.Z5 The hypotheses that this thesis will test are:

1) That state (employer) control of the convict labour process was simple but extensive. 26 2) That convict resistance to management control was largely covert, individual and unorganised but was significant. 3) That there were isolated examples of overt, individual and collective resistance to state control of the labour process. 4) That on occasions convict resistance yielded positive results in that labour controls were modified, relaxed or rewards increased.

24 Convict rations were regulated by government decree and were generally only varied during the early years of hardship. During the severest years of food shortages, from 1788 until 1792, rations to all colonists were regularly reduced. In doing this the reductions suffered by the male convicts were less than for the females because the labour of the males was regarded as more essential. Indeed this economic productivity argument was powerful enough to cross class boundaries because the rations of officers and marines were also reduced to the same levels as the male convicts. See Moore, J. (1987) The First Fleet Marines. University of Queensland Press. St Lucia. p. 154. 25 The starting point for this thesis is obvious enough to require no comment but the date 1830 has been chosen because it is argued that the dynamic pressures on the convict labour process had stabilised by this time. After 1830 while some details change, the labour process for convicts does not. From this date until 1840 when transportation was abolished the approach to organising convict work remained largely unchanged. Indeed, after 1830 the growth in the free labour market begins to reduce the significance of convict labour to the colonial economy. 26 The term Simple refers to Richard Edwards' Simple Model of Control, in his view the first discernible structure of management control to emerge under capitalism. In this stage management control is direct, personal and unsystematic. See Edwards, R. (1979) Contested Terrain: the transformation ofthe workplace in the Twentieth Century. Basic Books. New York. pp. 17-21. 5 In testing these hypotheses a number of methodological strategies have been adopted. Firstly the management of convict labour has been placed within the wider social history context by briefly examining past and current literature on convict history. This discussion is provided in Chapter 2. Secondly, this thesis relies on and explicitly utilises the analytical framework offered by labour process theory. Chapter 3, therefore examines the original construction of labour process theory by Marx and the modifications and elaborations of it that have been generated by participants in the labour process debates since the 1970s. Specifically this involves a detailed examination of the contributions by Richard Edwards, Andrew Friedman and Michael Burowoy although reference is also made to others?7 Labour process analysis focuses discussion on the dynamics of employment relations. It does this by providing a theoretical framework for identifying how work was organised in the public sector of colonial New South Wales, how its administration was structured, by whom work was performed, where it was performed, how labour effort was extracted, how labour was supervised, disciplined and controlled, what incentives were used to motivate it and what the reactions of workers were to work and its organisation. In examining these issues the analysis here also borrows much from the concerns and focus of industrial relations and human resource management; two disciplines concerned with the construction of a labour process and the interaction of its participants. Feminist theory and historical analyses of the female convict experience are also discussed in Chapter 3. Feminism has not only confronted social history's neglect or dismissal of women's contributions28 but labour process theory has also been enriched by the consideration of gender. 29 As a consequence the contribution by feminist writers to the labour process debates and to Australian social history will be examined and discussed. In the study of convict work and convict labour management the dimension of gender is critical. The official views held of the women were consistently more hostile than those held of the men, while the women's role in and experience of the

27 Ibid; Friedman, A. ( 1978) Industry and Labour: class struggle at work and monopoly capitalism. Macmillan. London.; and Burawoy, M. (1979) Manufacturing Consent: games in the labour process under monopoly capitalism. University of Chicago Press. Chicago.; and see also Braverman, H. (1974) Labor and Monopoly Capital: the degradation ofwork in the twentieth century. Monthly Review Press. New York; and Littler. op. cit. 28 See Summers, A. ( 1977) Damned Whores and God's Police. Penguin. Ringwood; and Dixson, M. (1978) The Real Matilda: Women and Identity in Australia, 1788-1975. Penguin. Ringwood 29 See Thompson, P. (1983) The Nature of Work: an introduction to debates on the labour process. Macmillan. London. Chapter 7. 6 labour process differed significantly and needs to be better understood?° Finally, New South Wales colonial society was constructed by both male and female convicts and the contributions of each still needs to be better acknowledged. The final but major strategy adopted in this thesis is the detailed construction of case studies of three distinct parts of the government's convict labour force although as an introduction Chapter 4 provides the background to the convict system. The construction of the three case studies involves qualitative and quantitative research sources. The first examines the labour process of male convicts employed in the government gang system between 1788 and 1830 and it is presented in Chapter 5. The gang system was an important and ultimately enduring method of organising the work of large numbers of male convicts. Although not all of these males were unskilled the great bulk of them were and the scarcity of skilled labour was a prima facie reason for organising male convicts into gangs. 31 This case study will outline the type of work performed by the gangs, the number of males employed in them, how their work was organised and how the workers were controlled and motivated. The second case study, presented in Chapter 6, examines the convicts employed in the Sydney and Parramatta Lumber Yards. These Yards were the sites of a wide range of work activities that supported many government public works projects and responsibilities. Although the work in each was organised on both an individual, gang and team basis the work performed in them was more specialist and generally more skilled than in the gang system. 32 In this sense the case study. on the Lumber Yards can be seen as a study of skilled male labour and it presents a contrast with the gang system as well as providing a sharp focus on the fortunes of government enterprise. The third case study examines the work experience of the female convicts employed in the Female Factory at Parramatta and it is presented in Chapter 7. Although this institution played a variety of roles in colonial New South Wales between 1803 and 1830 the analysis here concentrates on it as a place of employment.33 Not only

30 See Byrne. op. cit. p. 7; Robbins, Bill "Mothers of Militancy: some reflections on the female convicts 1788-1830" in Kelly, D. (ed) (2001) Crossing Borders: employment, work, markets and social justice across time, discipline and place. Vol. 1. Conference Papers 151h Annual Conference. Association·of Industrial Relations Academics of Australia and New Zealand. Wollongong. pp. 284-291; Damousi, J. ( 1997) Depraved and Disorderly: female convicts, sexuality and gender in colonial Australia. Cambridge University Press. Melbourne. 31 See Nicolas, S. "The Organisation of Public Work" in Nicholas. op. cit. pp. 154-157. 32 Although labour was also collective in the Lumber Yards the gangs that operated in or from the Yards have, as far as is possible, been kept out of the calculations for the gang system as a whole. 33 Contrast with Daniels, K. (1998) Convict Women. Allen and Unwin. Melbourne. 7 does this study allow the development of the labour process as experienced by the females to be better appreciated, it also highlights many important gender issues such as the economic contribution of women, the nature of sexual relations and the contrasting attitudes of the women and the male administrative bureaucracy. The incidence and nature of the reaction of the women convicts was also so distinctive, consistent and colourful that it needs to be better highlighted and analysed.

1.4 Conclusion

The analysis presented in this thesis will detail the labour process in colonial New South Wales for convicts employed in the public sector. It will identify the type of work performed by convicts employed by government, the way that work was organised and administered, the nature of supervision and span of control of the supervisors as well as the range of incentives, both positive and negative, that were offered to convict workers. An additional and critical dimension to understanding the nature of the colonial labour process is the level of convict resistance, acquiescence or, in the words of Michael Burawoy, consent to management control.34 In other words in order to understand the nature of the colonial convict labour process it is necessary to establish not only management strategies but also the nature of the reactions and responses of the convict workers. Although Marx tended to neglect the modifying influence of worker resistance to managerial control of the labour process35 other labour process theorists have given this much greater attention. Richard Edwards and Andrew Friedman have in particular argued the critical role that worker resistance has had on the modification of a society's labour process.36 In examining the responses of convict workers considerable reliance must be placed on official and often formal accounts and this raises the problem of bias. Although critical sources, official records of convict behaviour and reactions are essentially the opinions of managers and employers and as such represent a specific and partisan perspective?7 Unfortunately there are very few accounts by convicts themselves that detail their resistance or otherwise. However, one way in which this

34 Burawoy, op. cit. p. 27. 35 Thompson, P. op. cit. p. 59. 36 See Edwards. op. cit. pp. 17-18; and Friedman. op. cit. pp. 6-7. 37 See Oxley, D. (1996) Convict maids: the forced migration ofwomen to Australia. Cambridge University Press. Melbourne. pp. 200-201. 8 response can be more clearly recognised is by analysing the types of controls that are introduced by the state. It is argued that management was not always the designer or instigator of labour process controls or strategies but that some controls were introduced in direct response to convict resistance. No workforce, ultimately, is powerless but plays some role in the design of a society's labour process. This thesis focuses exclusively on public employment of male and female convicts for a number of reasons. The management of convict labour was more standard within public employment than private, it was more systematic and deliberate, was at various times strategically altered and modified, and it was more elaborately and discernibly recorded and documented by government officials. Although assignment to private settlers usually involved greater numbers of convicts, employment in this sector was not uniform and nor was it systematic or even significantly recorded. It has often been referred to as a "Lottery" in that a convict could "win" either a good or a bad master.38 Analysis of the labour process within the private sector would also rely much more significantly on anecdotal accounts than the public sector. Finally, employment in the public sector represented an extremely important benchmark for private employment. Before 1822 public sector employment established many basic conditions of employment which were applicable to the private sector; wages, hours of work, type of work, rations, clothing and other conditions were often set more consistently and even more generously by the public sector. This appears to have been particularly evident during the Macquarie years (1810-182). After 1822 the purpose of public employment became less concerned with productivity and more with punishment and deterrence. In this way public employment became more punitive and less attractive and so encouraged assigned convicts to remain with their masters and to be more diligent and acquiescent. Public sector employment therefore represents a measurably important feature of the colonial labour process. This study will examine a neglected area of early colonial history: the management of convict labour. Colonial New South Wales was created by a capitalist mode of labour utilisation but its own objective conditions simultaneously required the adaptation of that mode. The objective conditions that demanded modification included climate and technology but more significant were those forces that arose from the interaction between manager and managed. The argument presented in this thesis is

38 See Molesworth. op. cit. p. 11. 9 important because it will make an original contribution to the study of the evolution of work control and organisation in early Australia. 39 By approaching the subject from an explicitly industrial relations focus new questions and new issues are explored or raised. Without pre-empting the conclusions of the thesis it is fair to say the view argued here is that the convicts were not "an alienated working class"40 but were active, in a variety of ways, in the construction of the labour process in New South Wales.

39 The analysis here will provide more detail to the colonial history of management in Australia, see Wright, C. (1995) The Management ofLabour: a History ofAustralian Employers. Oxford University Press. Melbourne. 4°Clark. op. cit. p. 244. 10 CHAPTER TWO

CONVICT LITERATURE REVIEW

2.1 Introduction

Although this thesis relies on labour process theory1 to understand the nature of the employment relations between convict workers and government managers of convict labour it is essential that this analysis be placed within the broader literature on convicts and the penal system. As a consequence this chapter reviews the key historical studies made of the convict and the convict experience. This is not a review of Australian history per se but only those major works that have dealt significantly or substantially with the convicts. Nevertheless this review identifies not only significant contributors to the understanding of convict history but also the broad development of historical perspectives. In this way the complexity of the debate about the convicts and the ideological influences on that debate can be traced. A notable and relatively recent ideological perspective that has had an important impact on the historiography of convicts is feminism but other influences such as economic history are also important. The discussion offered in this chapter also highlights the contribution made by this thesis with its reliance on labour process theory.

2.2 The early debate: the radical and conservative discourse

Despite the obvious importance of the convicts and the transportation system to the European settlement ofNew South Wales it was not until 1922 that the convicts began to receive serious academic attention. In this year Professor Arnold Wood wrote a seminal article on the character of the convicts in which he articulated what was to become the radical interpretation of convict history. 2 He argued the convicts were the victims of "criminal laws, atrocious in letter and atrocious in execution"3 and that their standard of morality was no worse than that prevailing generally in England. The

1 A Marxist analytical framework designed to reveal the character of the organisation and performance of work in capitalist society and the forces or interactions that shape and modify it. This theoretical model will be discussed in greater detail in the following chapter. 2 Wood, G.A. "Convicts" Journal of the Royal Australian Historical Society, Vol. 8, No. 4, 1922. For brief biographical sketch of Wood and his contribution to Australian history see Pascoe, R. (1979) The Manufacture ofAustralian History. Oxford University Press. Melbourne. pp. 15, 19,36 and 38. 11 reasons for this were not only the relatively minor crimes committed by the convicts but also that, in Wood's opinion, "The greatest English criminals remained in England."4 These were those "men who plundered their country in habitual political robbery, who stole the common lands from the people in millions of acres, who spent their ill-gained riches in pagan luxury and vices".5 From this polemic although weakly researched argument began the Radical Nationalist tradition of Australian history.6 Proponents of Wood's view (or who shared a similar view of the function of history) included historians such as Brian Fitzpatrick, Vance Palmer, Marjorie Barnard and ultimately Russell Ward, although in their works each offered far more detailed and considered scholarship.7 The passion of the radical nationalists for Australia, its history and culture, demanded a nobler perspective on the character and crimes of the convict settlers and a harsher, democratically inspired antipathy toward the English authorities in charge of transportation. Nowhere is this more apparent than in the work of Russell ·ward. In his seminal work The Australian Legend, Ward attempted to explain the origins as well as trace the development of such Australian (male) national character traits as mateship, egalitarianism, antipathy to authority and the ability to innovate and make do. In Ward's view and that of the other radical nationals, the convicts suffered terrible exile and hardships but laid the physical and cultural foundations of Australian society and national character. 8 In other words, modem Australian society owed a debt to the very people it shunned and ignored in shame. As Mary Gilmore wrote of the convict "I split the rock/ I felled the tree/ The nation was -/because of me". 9

3 Ibid. p. 179. 4 Ibid. p. 178. 5 Ibid. p. 178. 6 For a more specific discussion of the objectives and impact of the radical nationalists on Australian History see Ibid. pp. 42-69. For an analysis of the political views and affiliations of Fitzpatrick see 0 'Brien, P. ( 1977) The Saviours: an intellectual history of the left in Australia. Drummond. Richmond. pp. 15, 73-74. In contrast to Pascoe see McQueen, H. (1971) A New Britannia. Penguin. Ringwood. Strongly identified with the New Left, McQueen disparagingly described the radical nationalists as the "Old Left" and was savagely critical of the romantic quality of much of their work. It is interesting that in a much later edition (1986) McQueen added an Afterword in which he admits significant weaknesses in his own analysis but only modestly softens his views on those who could now be described as the Older Left. See also Patmore, G. (1991) Australian Labour History. Longman Cheshire. Melbourne. Chapter 1. 7 See Fitzpatrick, B. (1946) The Australian People 1788-1945. Melbourne University Press. Melbourne. pp. 16-31; Palmer, V. (1968) National Portraits: 25 Australian Lives. Melbourne University Press. Melbourne; Barnard, M. (1961) Macquarie's World. Melbourne University Press. Melbourne; Ward, R. (1974) The Australian Legend. Oxford University Press. Melbourne. 8 Ward. op. cit. p. 41. 9 Mary Gilmore, "Old Botany Bay" contained in Thompson, J., Slessor, K. and Howarth, R.G. (eds) (1958) Selected Works, Angus and Robertson. Sydney. This poem was quoted by Ward. op. cit. p. xi; and by O'Shaughnessy, P., lnson, G. and Ward, R. (1969) The Restless Years. The Jacaranda Press. Milton. p. iv- v. 12 The Wood thesis was by no means universally or even widely accepted. Indeed it was confronted and challenged by more conservative historians such as Keith Hancock, G.V. Portus, R.M. Crawford and Eris O'Brien. 10 These historians were much more firmly convinced of the criminality of the convicts and rejected any sense of their innocence. Hancock, for example wrote

"The tendency of a folk to idealise its origins is universal among mankind, and may be observed even in Australia where the popular imagination has created a legend of a typical convict 'sent out for snaring a rabbit' .... But an examination of the records of transportation at any period between 1790 and 1840 would show that spirited poachers and political prisoners and even picturesque intelligent villains were but a small leaven in the lump, which was wretched and listless and forlom." 11

According to Hancock the convicts were "poor quality" stock12 and the typical convict was "not the countryman who snared rabbits, but the Londoner who stole spoons" .13 In many respects these historians saw the development of Australia as a triumph over something unsavoury, almost a genetic defect. The nation had developed successfully in spite of its shameful origins. A consequence of this was also that this generation of historians did not analyse the convict experience in much detail but were anxious to move onto other, more palatable and noble topics such as exploration, pastoral development and the gold rushes. 14 The view of the convicts presented by these historians had considerable impact on both popular conceptions of Australian history and the work of later generations of historians including A. G .L. Shaw and Manning Clark. 15 In particular, the degree and quality of their scholarship and the disapproval of a political or ideological perspective in history writing were powerful influences.

10 Hancock, W K (1966) Australia. Jacaranda Press. Brisbane; Portus, G V (1951) Australia since 1606. Oxford University Press. Melbourne; Crawford, R M (1952) Australia. Hutchinson; London. O'Brien, E. (1950) The Foundation ofAustralia. Angus and Robertson. Sydney. 2nd Edition. 11 Hancock, op. cit. pp. 24-25. 12 Ibid. p. 24. 13 Ibid. p. 25. 14 O'Brien, op. cit. is an exception to this with his highly circumscribed and still competent history of the first decade of white settlement. 15 Pascoe. op.cit. p. 19-20. 13 2.3 A new orthodoxy

However, in terms of convict historiography it was probably the simplistic treatment of the convicts that encouraged a new and more complex examination from the 1950s onwards. Both the conservative historians and the radical nationalists, in equal measure stimulated a closer and more objective examination of the convict history of Australia. On the one hand, the discomfort felt by the conservative historians about Australia's convict founders led to their neglect of the convicts while on the other hand the simple romantic notions held by the radical nationalists distorted or exaggerated aspects of the convict character or experience. The writing produced in reaCtion to these perspectives still remains powerful and highly influential. 16 Manning Clar~ despite, one imagines, a willingness to rehabilitate the convicts if he could, was unable to do so. In a powerful article17 and subsequently in the first volume of his history of Australia, Clarke concluded that the convicts were not transported for political crimes but for theft. 18 He could not rehabilitate them in any romantic construct, on the contrary his condemnation, well researched and written, seems the harshest. He wrote that the convicts;

"seemed to be liars, drunkards and cheats, flash and vulgar in dress, cheeky in addressing their gaolers when on top, but quick to cringe and whine when retribution struck. With hearts and minds unsustained by any of the great hopes of mankind, driven on by the terror of detection, strangers to loyalty, parasites preying on society, fit objectives for that eye of pity with which the historian contemplates those on whom the hand of the potter blundered, they were men and women who roused their contemporaries to disgust and to apprehension, but rarely to compassion, and never to hope." 19

16 See for example the international bestseller written by Hughes, R. (1988) The Fatal Shore. Pan. Hughes produced a highly evocative and colourful account of the convict experience that was, nevertheless, a direct extension of Clark, Shaw and Robson. 17 Clark, M. "The Origins of the Convicts Transported to Eastern Australia, 1787-1852" in Historical Studies. Vol. 7. Nos. 26-27, May-June 1965. 18 Clark, M (1985) A History ofAustralia. Vol. 1. Melbourne University Press. Melbourne. p. 94. 19 Ibid. p. 95. 14 Perhaps no historian before him had so eloquently condemned the character of the convicts and so it comes as no surprise to note that in Clark's view work was regarded by the convicts "as the most severe and least tolerable of evils" .zo In many respects this view was also accepted by A G L Shaw although in much more sober terms. In writing what was probably the first comprehensive analysis of the convict experience, Shaw accepted the guilt of the convicts as unquestionable. He wrote, more dispassionately than Clark, that the convicts "were professional and habitual criminals" who "All in all ... were a disreputable lot".21 However, Shaw was not so much concerned with their criminality as with the history of transportation, with the treatment of the convicts by the system and with the social impact they had on the development of Australian society. Seemingly, !he last word on the criminality of the convicts was provided by Lloyd Robson in what still remains one of the most detailed statistical analyses of convict convictions.22 This study confirmed that the ·convicts were not political prisoners punished by an unjust regime but were criminals guilty of petty and violent crimes and, more importantly, were generally hardened criminals who had a record of offences.23 Robson also argued that the majority of female convicts were far from innocent, being convicted for theft.24 The Robson study still has much to recommend it. It is still a work of highly impressive methodology. Few other works provide such comprehensive factual detail on who the convicts were in terms if their nationality, urban and rural origins and the nature of their crimes. However, this study, and those of Clarke and Shaw, have been justifiably criticised in terms of quantification and interpretation.Z5 However a more fundamental problem with the orthodox perspective arises largely from the fact it views the criminality of the convicts as the key social characteristic. This orthodox view explains many of the features of colonial society; the socio-economic divisions within society, the nature of colonial administration and the methods of social control and regulation. A harsh administration, public floggings, the

20 Ibid. pp. 91-92. 21 Shaw, A. G. L. (1966) Convicts and the Colonies. Faber and Faber. London. p. 165. 22 Robson, L. L. (1965) The Convict Settlers ofAustralia: an enquiry into the origin and character of the convicts transported to New South Wales and Van Dieman's Land, 1787-1852. Melbourne University Press. Melbourne. 23 Ibid. pp. 143- 145. 24 Ibid. pp. 74-76. 25 See Nicholas, S. and Shergold, P. "Unshackling the Past" in Nicholas, S. (ed) (1989) Convict Workers: reinterpreting Australia's past. Cambridge University Press. Melbourne. pp. 4-5; and Oxley, D. (1996)

15 political battle between the "Exclusives" and the "Emancipists"26 are all made more comprehensible by the fact that the convicts were hardened criminals. Their criminality designated them as outside the norms of social relationships, even as anti-authoritarian, and this demanded regulation in order to control them. In terms of the management of a workforce, particularly a convict one, the inertia of this argument draws analysis to a simple and fundamental conclusion. Clark wrote that the convicts "possessed neither the ability nor the incentive to work for a living. For this was an alienated working class, a class with no spiritual or material interest in the products of its labour" and who had to be "driven or terrorized into labour".27 Similarly, Shaw referred to the convicts as the "dregs of society" who had been "commonly trained from the cradle" in their trades of crime. 28 He also notes that

by the early 1800s convicts employed by the government were working compar~tively short hours "and usually finished their task soon after midday" although even those assigned to private settlers also worked relatively short hours. 29 However, in his view this is because the convicts were lazy and unused to regular work and their cunning and irascibility allowed them to take advantage of high demand for labour. 30 The convicts and sections of the free or military population were, in short, often able to out­ manoeuvre and resist an unimaginative colonial bureaucracy.31 In terms of a simplistic profile of criminality this behaviour by the convicts is not surprising. Criminals, by their very act of unlawfulness, rejected the socially defined discipline imposed by the regularity of work in honest paid employment. As criminals they needed to, be driven to labour and needed a tough, hierarchical structure to keep them at work. The structure and character of the organisation and management of convict labour is therefore simply and logically explained. The ineffectualness of the system until the 1820s and its brutal harshness after this date are explained by the fact that a criminal class was reluctant to work and therefore had to be forced to do so. However, the commitment to the

Convict Maids: theforced migration of women to Australia. Cambridge University Press. Melbourne. Chapter 7. 26 Exclusives was a name given to free settlers, military officers and administrators who, between 1788 and 1840, treated or regarded ex-convicts as their social inferiors. They endevoured to exclude ex­ convicts from public office. Emancipist was a term applied to pardoned convicts or those whose sentence had expired. The Exclusives and Emancipists were socially, if not also politically, opposed to one another. For a fuller account of both terms see Barnes, A.R. and Homer, J.C. (1970) A Dictionary of Australian History. Cassell Australia. Melbourne. pp. 56-57 and p. 52. 27 Clark. (1985) op. cit. p. 244. 28 Shaw. op. cit. p. 165. 29 Ibid. p. 71 and alsop. 72. 30 Ibid. chapter 3. 16 criminality thesis by Clark, Shaw, Robson and, more recently by Hughes,32 denies insight into the nature of the employment relationship within workplaces either historically or ideologically.33 Criminality, rather than any reaction to or interaction with the prevailing nature of employment relations, has been offered as the simple but orthodox explanation.

2.4 The new challenges to orthodoxy

Disquiet with this orthodoxy is not entirely new. John Hirst, in his study of the system of transportation, began the more complex analysis of the nature of the management of convict workers.34 While Hirst largely focused on explaining the character of transportation as a penal response to crii_Tie in Britain he nevertheless recognised that the character of transportation and the controls required to establish and administer it could not be explained only by penal concerns. There was, he found, a range of disparate influences shaping the nature of administration and control. The major one was that championed by Jeremy Bentham, that there were alternative penal policies to transportation35 but another influence was the ability of convicts to shape the nature of their regulation.36 Virtually for the first time, Hirst puzzled over the lack of control over the convicts and the many freedoms they enjoyed.37 In his view the harshness of transportation varied over time and was, in any event, the consequence of interaction between the controlled and the co~trollers, 38 as well as broader policies on punishment. Earlier Alan Atkinson had added greater complexity to the analysis of convicts by examining the incidence and nature of their resistance to the controls that were imposed on them. 39 In this article Atkinson recognised that the convicts did resist their seemingly irresistible masters. Although his analysis remained firmly within the constructs of social history, Atkinson's identification of convict resistance has enormous significance for the examination of convicts as a workforce. Much of the

31 Ibid. p. 78. 32 Hughes, op. cit. p. 203. 33 In fact neither of these writers gave any attention to the occupational backgrounds of the convicts. See Nicholas and Shergold. op. cit. p. 5. 34 Hirst, J. (1983) Convict Society and its Enemies. George Allen and Unwin. Sydney. 35 Ibid. pp. 9-27. 36 Ibid. pp. 28-29; 33-57. 37 Ibid. pp. 78-79. 38 Ibid. See for example his discussion of the convict workers employed on Busby's water tunnel on pp. 66-69.

17 protest nature of convict actions were reactions to the way they were being managed or were expressly designed to influence the nature of their employment, rewards or general treatment at work. In other words, the protests and resistance of convicts were articulated attempts to confront authority and to modify its behaviour,40 and were not simply motivated by a sullen and hostile attitude to work or transportation. In addition, at least some of the reactions of authority and the punishment imposed in the face of these protests must be viewed as a response to convict militancy rather than simply the mechanisms for terrorising a lazy workforce. Echoes of convict protest are also to be found in the class analysis offered by Connell and Irving. 41 As their analysis is explicitly concerned with the formation of class relations in Australian society Connell and Irving saw the nature, incidence and the forms of convict protest as arising largely from the nature of "labour relations" in the convict system.42 They noted that while government officials and private settlers complained consistently of the poor quality of the convict workers these complaints were largely a reflection of convict resistance to employers rather than their criminal status.43 The convicts resisted their employers with a variety of tactics although the most common and effective was "the slow-down" whereby the convicts restricted their work efforts.44 Repression, flogging and other brutalities were typical employer responses although making concessions to the convicts was also commonplace.45 Other convict tactics were theft, defiance, absconding, bushranging and even open revolt. 46 However, despite a clear work-related struggle between employers and convicts and the fact that, according to Connell and Irving, the convicts did demonstrate "a widespread solidarity" they were unable to form a more cohesive working class consciousness.47 Indeed, despite their refreshing insights into the nature of the management of convict labour, Connell and Irving ultimately view the convicts as disappointing. In their view, the convicts contribute more than "a rural counter-culture" but they do not construct

39 Atkinson, A. 'Four Patterns of Convict Protest' in Labour History No. 37, November 1979, pp. 28-51. 40 Ibid. p. 30. 41 Connell, R.W. and Irving, T.H. (1980) Class Structure in Australian History: Document, Narrative and Argument. Longman Cheshire. Melbourne. 42 Ibid. p. 44. 43 Ibid. pp. 46-47. 44 Ibid. p. 47. 45 Ibid. 46 Ibid. p. 48. 47 Ibid. pp. 48-49. 18 class.48 The convicts influence "the conditions in which classes began to form" but they do not seem to contribute anything more directly.49 In contrast to Connell and Irving, another left historian, Humphrey McQueen, provides an alternative interpretation of convict labour.50 In his exciting re­ interpretation of aspects of Australian history McQueen was particularly concerned with dismantling the romantic notions of the Old Left historians. Ironically, in doing this he moved much closer to aspects of the orthodoxy of Clark and Shaw et al on the question of the convicts. In a major article on the convicts, McQueen concluded firmly that the convicts were indeed criminals. They were members of a criminal lumpenproletariat who were "vomited up by the maelstrom which was delineating class in Britain".51 McQueen rejected the radical nationalist view of the convicts as political criminals or as noble founders of an egalitarian Australian working class.52 In his view, the convicts displayed little sense or expression of class-consciousness or solidarity. They were highly individualistic, self-interested and concerned largely with personal social and economic advancement and consumption.53 These, in fact were features that, in McQueen's view, characterised a modem Australian working class that was decidedly unrevolutionary. The convicts were the founders of petite bourgeois ambition rather than mateship. While McQueen's A New Britannia was provocative and exciting and demanded that Australian history be approached with a greater appreciation of its complexity, 54 his treatment of the convicts is an exception.55 Indeed, his anger at the convicts seems partly motivated by disappointment. His depiction of the convicts as lumpen proletariat offers a simplistic but ideologically based explanation of why a convict workforce apparently did not display more noble proletarian qualities. They did not organise and collectively resist management because they were criminals and not real workers. In this McQueen ignored Marx's labour process theory or the reality of management's labour controls and the diversity of the convicts in terms of class, nationality and occupation.

48 Ibid. p. 50. 49 Ibid. 50 See McQueen, H. ''Convicts and Rebels" in Labour History No. 15. November 1968. pp. 3- 30. 51 Ibid. p. 25. 52 Ibid. p.3. 53 Ibid. p. 25. 54 Patmore. op. cit. p. 11. 55 McQueen. (1972) op. cit. 19 Ken Buckley and Ted Wheelwright provided a similar analysis although they were more concerned with tracing the economic development of capitalism in Australia rather than with the convict workers.56 Consequently their analysis of the labour process is brief, even bordering on the sensational. They emphasise the more brutal and physical aspects of the convict work experience without placing this oppression within the context of work relations or the labour process. 57 Nevertheless, they do recognise that there was convict resistance to work58 although it was "rare" and, in their opinion, more in response to broad social and legal conditions rather than to the terms and conditions of work. 59

2.5 The Feminist challenge

However complex the broad ideological distinction between left and right historians is, a feature common largely to both perspectives has been the absence of a concern with gender. For example, in their popular histories neither Fitzpatrick nor Hancock offered any index reference to women generally,60 while Fitzpatrick used such masculine or implicitly masculine terms as "the Big Man's Frontier", "the Squatters and the Diggers" as headings for a number of chapters.61 However this neglect has continued into more recent accounts. A.G.L. Shaw makes only minor reference to females and implicitly writes of the convicts as males62 while Manning Clark also makes only a few explicit references to the female convict or to the Female Factory at Parramatta.63 In contrast, Robson devoted considerably greater attention to the female convicts but in doing so he was concerned exclusively with their background, nationality and criminality rather than with their experiences in New South Wales. As a consequence, although he recognises the female convicts he too relegates them to the margins of history. In confirming that the "convict wom~n were not of the highest quality ... [and] ... were an

56 Buckley, K. and Wheelwright, T. (1988) No Paradise for Workers: capitalism and the common people in Australia 1788-1914. Oxford University Press. Melbourne. 57 Ibid. pp. 57-58. 58 Ibid. p. 59. 59 Ibid. p. 54 and pp. 57-62. 60 Hancock. op. cit. and Fitzpatrick. op. cit. 61 Fitzpatrick. op. cit. p. vii. 62 See Shaw, op. cit. see Index. 63 Clark. (1985) op. cit. see Index p. 290. 20 indifferent batch of settlers" Robson helped to over simplify the view of the female convicts as bad workers and difficult citizens.64 The invisibility of the roles and contributions of women generally and not just historically was finally confronted by feminism in the 1960s and 1970s. In responding to contemporary issues of discrimination in employment, broader social experiences and the inequity in domestic roles, feminism provided a new political and social focus. As a consequence feminists also re-interpreted the past or at least demanded a more complex and sophisticated view of the role of women and men in the settlement of colonial Australia. In this way feminist historians came to offer a more encompassing evaluation of the contribution of women in the past and of the obstacles they faced. Feminist literature, therefore, has offered the objective, if not the means, of placing women more centrally into an understanding of the past. In terms of the convict women of NSW this demanded confrontation with their seeming invisibility in social histories and with the negativity of official attitudes and evaluations by contemporary accounts. One of the first and most confronting analyses was that provided by Anne Summers in her book Damned Whores and God's Police.65 Essentially she argues that the female convicts were not transported to contribute their labour but their bodies. Female convicts were required to service the sexual needs of the male population, both convict and free. In other words, productive employment in the labour market was not the critical role envisaged for female convicts. Instead they were intended to perform an explicitly reproductive role: "enforced whoredom". 66 The state was the "Imperial Whore master"67 imposing a patriarchal control over the structure of colonial society and its economy. While this was a powerful and provocative analysis a number of problems can be identified. Firstly, Summers sees the fate of colonial women as particularly grim but this, as Aveling points out, is an isolationist perspective.68 The idea that colonial women "have-it-worst" ignores the reality of the sexually exploitative and reproductive roles in other societies, such as Britain.69 In Britain a reproductive and

64 Robson. op. cit. p. 85. 65 Summers, A. (1977) Damned Whores and God's Police: the colonization of women in Australia. Penguin. Ringwood. 66 Ibid. p. 270. 67 Ibid. 68 Aveling, M. "Gender in Early New South Wales Society" in The Push From the Bush. No. 24. April 1987. p. 33. 69 Ibid. and see Robson. op. cit. p. 78; Mayhew, H. (1968) London Labour and the London Poor. Dover Publications. New York; Schedvin, M.B. and C.B. Schedvin. "The Nomadic tribes of urban Britain: a 21 sexually exploitative role was the common fate of many women but the ability of working class women to resist this was probably even more limited than in New South Wales where at least scarcity of numbers offered some choice and bargaining power. The situation of colonial women was, by the standards of the twentieth century, unattractive but it may, in reality have been less unattractive than the situation then emerging in other societies. A second problem with Summers' argument is that it is not always logical. This is particularly evident where she argues the sexual exploitation of the female convicts and the state's role in this. For example, if sexual relations in convict society were constructed solely or largely by an exploitative patriarchy why would every Governor complain of the wanton and sexually explicit behaviour of female convicts? In other words, why would the Whore-Master complain that the whores were behaving like whores? If it had been official or even unofficial policy for them to contribute a sexual service to the colony there would be little justification for the sustained hostility of the state to the sexuality of the female convicts. It seems the issue of sexuality was much more complex than Summers claims. A third problem with the Summers' thesis is that she positions the influence of patriarchy as all-powerful. Although Summers challenges the invisibility of the female convicts in social history her uncritical acceptance of official attitudes and the power of patriarchy leaves the women passive and opinionless. In addition, under Summer's logic the female convicts are made visible only in terms of the concerns of late twentieth century feminism. While Summers highlights some aspects of social and gender relations that have been consistently ignored, she also ignores aspects of reality. For example, the female convicts were not invisible between 1788 and 1830 because they caused officialdom so much trouble. They were trouble because they were difficult to manage, were uncooperative, militant and often engaged in collective resistance to the State. They were hostile to colonial authorities and often to their private employers and were unresponsive to religious appeals to their mortality or morality. Summers ignores these complex but consistent displays of defiance and resistance and instead overly emphasises the passivity of the women. Where Summers examines official hostility to the females she views it as arising from the women's rejection of the exploitative sexual role given them by the state. However it seems

prelude to Botany Bay." in Carroll, J. (1982) Intruders in the Bush. Oxford University Press. Melbourne. pp. 82-108. 22 curious that some did so in such an explicitly sexual manner while many others adopted methods of protest more akin to the struggle over the labour process or to patriarchy generally. The difficulty female convicts presented the colonial administrators needs to be seen not only as resistance to gender but also to class and management's control of the labour process. Finally, it is important to note that while there seems little doubt that the women were expected to perform a reproductive role, why the penal system was so ineffectual in this objective is not satisfactorily addressed by Summers. Female convicts and later free female immigrants were always vastly outnumbered by males and so, logically, if reproduction was a paramount patriarchal objective of the State surely there would have been a concerted effort to transport more females in order simply to improve the breeding process. Governor Phillip was given permission to recruit or ki~nap women from the Pacific islands but he quite sensibly rejected this notion on the grounds of impracticability if not moral sensibility.70 Interestingly, no other Governor was ever given this encouragement again while some, like Hunter and Macquarie, were openly hostile to the transportation of any female convicts. 71 If the breeding of a new population of free currency lads and lasses was a conscious colonial objective it was surely a minor or ineffectual one. Another limitation to the reproductive role of women convicts is also the fact that their assignment to free settlers was significantly regulated. Even by 1819 William Hutchinson, the Principal Superintendent of Convicts in the Macquarie administration, made the point to Commissioner Bigge that getting female convicts "off-the-stores" was very difficult.72 Private settlers were reluctant to take female convicts as servants, particularly those with children "and they are generally sent to the factory". 73 In addition, the penal system did not in principal, if not in practice, sanction the assignment of female convicts to single males - logically the most efficient sector of the population if breeding were the major objective.74 In fact no male was allowed near transport ships carrying females while only widowed males with children were eligible to secure an assigned female convict.75 Clearly, while a reproductive role

70 Historical Records of Australia Series I (hereafter referred to as HRA I) Vol. I. Governor Phillips's Instructions. p. 14. 71 HRA I. Vol. I. Hunter to Portland, 18 November 1796. p. 707; and HRA I. Vol. VII. Macquarie to Liverpool, 17 November 1812. p. 614. 72 Transcript of evidence given by William Hutchinson to Commissioner Bigge. Bonwick Transcript (hereafter referred to as BT). Vol. 1. p. 39742. 73 Ibid. p. 39757-8. 74 Ibid. p. 39743; and see also HRA I Vol. XL Brisbane to Horton 24 March 1825. p. 76. 75 See Hutchinson evidence. BT. Vol. 1. p. 39742. 23 was the major one that emerged for female convicts it may be an exaggeration to say this was an over-riding objective of the State. In contrast to Summers is the analysis of Portia Robinson. While she too confronts an indifference to the female convicts she takes the view that by and large the female convicts survived their ordeal of transportation well, and indeed in an essentially conservative way; through marriage and/or motherhood.76 The female convicts, despite their demonisation by contemporary officialdom, became good mothers, wives and companions as is evidenced by their devotion to their children and to the stability of their relationships. In her view, the female convicts made a go of their new life in the colony and that their reputation was undeserved. 77 Other writers such as Annette Sales and Monica Perrote9 also argue this point. Perrott in particular concludes that the female convicts not only carved

76 Robinson. P. (1993) The Women ofBotany Bay. Penguin. Ringwood. p. 118. 77 1bid. p. 112 and 114. 78 Salt, A. (1984) These Outcast Women: the Parramattafemalefactory 1821-1848. Hale and Iremonger. Sydney. 79 Perrott, M, (1983) A Tolerable Good Success: economic opportunities for women in New South Wales 1788-1830. Hale and lremonger. Sydney. 80 Ibid. pp. 102-103. 81 For a brief analysis of the optimism of Robinson and the pessimism of Summers see Ave ling. op. cit. p. 33. 82 See in contrast Alford, K. (1984) Production or Reproduction?: an economic history of women in Australia. 1788-185 0. Oxford University Press. Melbourne. 83 Aveling, op. cit. p. 33. 24 however, are often anecdotal while they offer little to explain why women were successful or, just as importantly, why they were perceived by contemporary male administrators as difficult. 84 One explanation as to why the female convicts were so vilified by contemporary officialdom is offered by Michael Sturma. 85 In attempting to explain the hostility to the female convicts by the colonial authorities Sturma challenged both the traditional social history view of the female convicts as degenerate and Summers' view that they were mere sexual commodities. He argues, "Within the context of working-class culture, the behaviour of female convicts in Australia appears less aberrant than is commonly supposed."86 And, that official condemnation of them largely reflected middle class hostility or fear of working class behaviour more generally. Cohabitation, for example, rather than marriage was a common form of relationship amongst the British working class but was regarded legally and morally by the middle class as prostitution. 87 This widely held middle class view of even stable common law relationships helps, for example, to explain the official designation of many convict women as prostitutes. Working class attitudes to female chastity were likewise very different to those held by the middle class. Sturma also suggests "Often what appeared to witnesses as the most shocking testimony of the women's depravity did not involve sexual intercourse, but was of sexual implication."88 Working class women were less inhibited by their sexuality and were more suggestive than middle class mores defined as acceptable, although neither implied an indiscriminate promiscuity, merely explicitness that the middle class found threatening.89 More significantly, Sturma argued during this period the genteel and submissive role given to middle class females was in hegemonic battle with that of the working class and so lead to misunderstanding and hostility.90 Just as British workers were cajoled, starved and sermonised into the disciplines of the nineteenth century factory system so too was there a struggle to suppress and replace traditional working class mores, particularly sexual.

84 See Ibid. p. 34. 85 Sturma, M. 'Eye of the Beholder: The Stereotype of Women Convicts', in Labour History no. 34, 1978. ftP· 3-10. 6 Ibid. p. 3. 87 Ibid. p. 6. Although divorce was legally available it was prohibitively expensive for working class couples and so common law marriage was the more common arrangement. See also Mayhew, op.cit. 88 Sturma, op.cit. p. 5. 89 Ibid. 90 Ibid. p. 4. 25 Although Sturma's argument is highly important it essentially remains within the confines of a sociological study of class attitudes to sexuality. Sexuality, however, must also be seen within the dimensions of gender; between men and women. Lisa Adkins attempts to highlight the importance of sexuality in determining the relationship and interactions between men and women at the workplace.91 In her contemporary analysis she focuses on the issue of sexual harassment at work and how the act of harassment is representative of the power relations between men and women living and working in a patriarchal society.92 Feminist historians have also recognised that sexuality, "lust and love", must be brought into any analysis of the female convicts.93 Joy Damousi argues that male judgement of the female convicts expressed "a fear of female sexuality, of its assertiveness, power and danger."94 While the sexuality of the male convicts and the Exclusives95 would have made the danger of sexual harassment not only real but probably extensive, this is only one view of sexuality. While the small numbers of females in the colony would have, on one hand, clearly increased the danger of sexual exploitation, on the other hand this numeric disparity would have also empowered some females. In fact colonial New South Wales offered all female convicts a greater choice of sexual if not relationship partners than British society and this may have been to the advantage of at least some women. The scarcity of females may have encouraged them to be sexually assertive and more discerning. This empowerment may have also encouraged them to be more discerning in the roles, partners and the work they performed and so less willing to accept employment allocated by the State. On the other hand they demonstrated a greater degree of solidarity with one another because they were so outnumbered by men and had in common the very real task of withstanding sexual harassment. However the female convicts may have dealt with their sexuality, females revelling in their power of sexual discretion could only have been seen by a patriarchal model of sexual relations as negative and threatening.96 The

91 Adkins, L. (1995) Gendered Work: sexuality, family and the labour market. Open University Press. Buckingham. 92 Ibid. pp. 54-67. 93 Aveling, M. "She Only Married to be Free: or, Cleopatra Vindicated" in Grieve, N. and Grimshaw, P. (eds) (1983) Australian Women: feminist perspective. Oxford University Press. Melbourne. p. 123. 94 Damousi, J. '"Depravity and Disorder': the sexuality of convict women" in Labour History. No. 68. May 1995. p. 31. 95 See footnote 26 above. 96 See Damousi. op. cit. pp. 30-45; and also Heney, H. (1978) Australia's Founding Mothers. Nelson. Melbourne. p. 57. 26 militancy and solidarity of the female convicts generally may be seen partly as an outcome of their sexuality. Another dimension to sexuality and its impact on the economic and social role of women is offered by Katrina Alford in her economic history of the contribution of females to colonial society.97 In this she argues that the reproductive role, which was often explicitly sexually exploitative, was the main contribution made by the female convicts.98 However, she does not see this as entirely due to a patriarchal conspiracy but to the more fundamental nature of colonial society. She writes:

"The numerical male dominance of the penal society helped to consign women to an economically peripheral role, as did the vast amount of

ma~mal labour and physical strength needed to physically found and build the colony. This favoured the greater physical and economic contribution of male convict labour. Colonial economic needs explained why women were never really brought at all into the mainstream of production. They also provide a clue to convict women's status remaining such a debased and inferior one."99

In other words, the economic demands of a pioneer society placed a greater premium on male rather than female labour and this limited the productive role offered women. However, while Alford's analysis certainly has some validity, it is, ultimately, too simple. Why would a pioneer society not more effectively utilise its female population, particularly when it was so often in economic crisis? This is all the more puzzling given that hard physical labour was a feature of most work, especially agricultural work, in Britain and Ireland. In traditional agriculture females were engaged along side males in the performance of many gruelling and physical work tasks. 100 Why the female convicts were not allocated to essential but hard physical labour is a central issue in the gender division of work in New South Wales. Alford, like Summers, argues it was because the patriarchal state determined the limits of female work. However, not all males can be considered part of this. patriarchal power structure that determined the division of

97 Alford. op. cit. 98 Ibid. p. 91. 99 Ibid. p. 92.

27 labour. The male convicts were not consulted and may in fact have been resentful of the lighter work role given their female counterparts. If there was a state inspired gender division of labour it was entirely an administrative decision and, by implication, reflected the priorities, mores and attitudes of a middle class elite rather than males generally. Convict males, closer to the realities of working class life, even agricultural life, probably had a higher expectation of the physical capabilities of women and, indeed also children. On the other hand, it is interesting to speculate on how the male administrators ofNew South Wales may have perceived the physical capabilities of men and women given that most came from a military and naval background where there would have been few, if any, female role models. But more than this, like Summers, Alford views the female convicts as a passive group upon whom the weight of patriarchy fell unfairly but without resistance or murmur. In reality, the female convicts were a troublesome class of workers or citizens who individually and collectively, asserted themselves. It is less clear as to what ends they were asserting themselves but it is suggested here that some would have been demanding a more productive role while others may have been demanding a pleasanter reproductive role. Female relegation to a reproductive role rather than productive employment may not have been a patriarchal decision. As A veling points out, the nature of fieldwork required in the early years was extremely hard and was unlikely to be viewed as attractive employment. 101 In other words some females may not have viewed their exclusion from ''working for the government like horses" as a disadvantage or as discriminatory. 102 Modem feminist concern with employment opportunities may not have the same resonance when viewed in historical contexts. The motives and objectives of the female convicts are just as important in the shaping of the gender division of labour as are the dictates of patriarchy and a pioneer economy.

2.6 The current debate

While feminism raised new questions and issues that demanded a more complex analysis of the convict experience, other writers, armed with new disciplinary

100 See Ryan, E. and Colon, A. (1989) Gentle Invaders: Australian Women at work. Penguin. Ringwood. p. 3; and Pinchbeck, I. (1981) Women Workers and the Industrial Revolution, I750-1850. Virago. London. Chapters 1 and 2. 101 Ave1ing (1987) op. cit. p. 35. 102 Ibid. 28 perspectives or analytical tools, have also offered new perspectives. Certainly the most significant recent analysis of convicts and the convict work experience has been in Convict Workers edited by Stephen Nicholas. 103 Although this volume explored the criminality of the convicts in great statistical detail the general approach gave emphasis to the convicts, both male and female, as a workforce possessing skills, experience and motivations and whose work was organised and structured as a consequence of interaction between management and workers. Convict Workers analysed the official Indent information on 19, 711 convicts transported to New South Wales between 1817 and 1840, a sample that Nicholas and Shergold argue represented "about one-third of the post-1817 convict inflow in New South Wales and nearly one-quarter of the total convict arrivals."104 The database constructed included "a wealth of personal information on [the convicts'] occupation, age, sex, education, height, birthplace and crimes."105 With the underpinning provided by this data each of the contributors to Convict Workers seemed determined to challenge "the traditional interpretations of social and labour history" and to place the convict work experience within the broader contexts of British political and economic history as well as other experiences of coerced labour. 106 Nicholas and Shergold posed a set of hypotheses that in different ways all the contributors to the book addressed. These can be briefly summarised as being; the convicts were workers not professional criminals, that they brought useful skills, were often literate and were a productive workforce whose organisation was not random or inefficient while their work performance was extracted in more sophisticated and complex ways than reliance merely on physical punishment. Convict Workers was a bold and exciting contribution to convict history. However, it was also controversial and incited much criticism. 107 Indeed, much of the

103 Nicholas. op. cit. 104 Nicholas and Shergold. op. cit. p.3. 105 Ibid; and see also Butlin, N.G. (1994) Forming a Colonial Economy: Australia 1810-1850. Cambridge University Press. Melbourne pp. 46-50. 106 Nicholas and Shergold. op.cit. pp. 3-4. 107 See For example, Davidson, A. "Reviews - Convict Workers: reinterpreting Australia's past" Australian Historical Studies. 93. October 1989; Macintyre, S. '"'Histories of Australia" London Review ofBooks. 28 Sept. 1989; Hirst, J. "Convicts and Crime" Overland, 113, 1988; Sholomowitz, R. "Convict Transportees: casual or professional criminals?" Australian Economic History Review, XXXI, September 1991, 2. Shaw, A.G.L. "Reviews: Convict Workers: reinterpreting Australia's past" Victorian Historical Journal. 61, March 1990. 1; Whitefield, K. "Review- Convict Workers- reinterpreting Australia's past" The Economic Record. 67, March 1990; Smith, F. B. "Beyond the Uninviting Shore" The Times Literary Supplement, 9 March 1990; Gollan, R. "Book Reviews - Convict Workers: reinterpreting Australia's 29 latter concentrated on the statistical analysis offered by Nicholas et al and criticised its methodology and reliance on the modelling frameworks of economic history. 108 Other criticisms were in a sense a defence of major orthodox social historians such as Clark, Shaw and Robson. 109 Convict Workers not only challenged the interpretations of the convicts by social historians but did so by using an approach either unfamiliar or anathema to many of them. Where the contributors such as Meredith,uo Oxley111 and Dyster112 relied less on quantitative analysis there were still criticisms about their ideological frameworks. 113 Of course there is some validity in expressions of concern about reliance on quantitative methodologies. The very act of measurement adds to bias, but the dangers of this methodology are hardly greater than the reliance on written documents or even recollections. More people, however, understand the nature of the written and spoken source better than the calculated one. It also seems strange that the Robson analysis, performed admittedly without the aid of computers, has been so widely accepted by social historians although it is no less reliant on a quantitative methodology than Convict Workers. In the light of the methodological astuteness of historians and others today, it is valid to speculate on the reception that Robson would now receive. However, no one has argued that the statistics generated by Nicholas et al are actually wrong, more that the type of measurements were invalid, the questions posed of the data inappropriate or that the conclusions drawn were wrong. However, many of the contributions in Convict Workers rely on more than simple (or even complex) statistical analysis. By the very act of viewing the convicts as workers the range of questions that are important to explore and resolve were transformed. In the end, whether the convicts were London pick-pockets or prostitutes, their criminality is only one of the issues that propelled the evolution of the forms of labour management that are discernible in early colonial history. The focus on criminality by most social historians, however, has obscured attention to the organic dynamics of workforce regulation and management.

past" Prometheus, 9, December 1991, 2; Evans, R. and Thorpe, W. "Power Punishment and Penal Labour: Convict Workers and Moreton Bay" Australian Historical Studies. 25, Aprill992, 108 Hirst (1988) op. cit. p. 113; Macintyre, (1989) op. cit.; Smith, op. cit.; and Davidson, (1989) op. cit. 109 See Macintyre, (1989) op. cit.; Gollan, op. cit.; and Robinson, P. "Getting a Nation's Record Straight?" The Age: Saturday Extra. 21 January, 1989. 110 Meredith, D. "Full Circle? Contemporary Views on Transportation" in Nicholas. op. cit. 111 Oxley, D. "Female Convicts" in Ibid. 112 Oyster, B. "Public Employment and Assignment to Private Masters" in Ibid. 113 Davidson, (1989). op. cit. 30 Almost immediately after the publication of Convict Workers one of its contributors, Barry Dyster, published a study of the building and running of the large and grand households of Sydney in which he also analysed the role of the working convicts. 114 Here again the convicts were examined explicitly as a workforce. 115 In doing this Dyster also offered insight into the nature of convict building and domestic work, the incidence and character of their skills, the way convicts were organised into gangs and teams or employed as individuals as well as an evaluation of productivity, performance and the general character of work management. 116 With this study Dyster was able to expand upon his analysis of public employment and assignment of convicts presented in Convict Workersn 7 and he shows how sustainable is convict research that focuses on work and its management. Dyster recognises, unromantically, the validity of Gilmore's "Old Botany Bay" and argues, like this thesis, that work and its management offers a rich and critical insight into the nature of broader social and political relations in a society. In a more recent feminist analysis, Kay Daniels complains "historians writing about convict resistance have tended to see female convict rebelliousness as individualist rather than collective" and have ignored the fact that individual acts of manipulation of regulations and restrictions were also based on collective knowledge "passed on in the factories." 118 In her history of the Female Factories at Parramatta and in Tasmania, Daniels found that a culture of resistance based on collective knowledge and information existed between the women in the Factories. While not explicitly focusing on employment relations in the Factories, Daniels nevertheless interpreted personal acts of rebellion by large or significant numbers of individual workers as symptomatic of conflict and resistance. In Convict Maids Deborah Oxley confronts the notion that the female convicts contributed little to colonial development by arguing that the convict women transported to New South Wales after 1826 "packed a range of occupational and literary skills in the economic baggage they brought with them to Australia."119 More importantly, she too sees the vilification of the female convicts

114 Dyster, B. (1989) Servant and Master: building and running the Grand Houses of Sydney 1788-1850. University New South Wales Press. Kensington. 115 Ibid. pp. 8-9. 116 Ibid. Chapters 5, 7, 8 and 9. 117 Dyster in Nicholas. op. cit. pp. 127-151. 118 Daniels, K. (1998) Convict Women. Allen and Unwin. Sydney. p. 144. 119 Oxley, D. (1996) Convict Maids: the forced migration ofwomen to Australia. Cambridge University Press. Melbourne. p. 171. 31 within the context of employment relations "where employer and employee battled to establish work relations". 120 To Oxley and the other recent analysts of the male and female convict experience the issue of critical importance has not been criminality but the way in which they were utilised as workers. Within this focus the role the convicts performed was much more the consequence of their interaction with the system of employment relations rather than simply as passive pawns. Explaining the nature of the convict work experience, therefore, requires an understanding of gender, class and employment relations.

2. 7 Conclusion

The historiography of the convicts, .both male and female, has evolved into a complex. and critical body of work. The tentative first forays, which attempted to either ennoble or ignore the convicts, has well and truly been overcome. The contributions of historians such as Clark, Shaw and Robson, although now seen as orthodox and even conservative, sobered the radical nationalist view and supplanted the old orthodoxy of Portus, Scott and Hancock. They did this with authoritative and exhaustive research and with a firm and uncluttered focus; to resolve the criminality of the first white settlers of Australia. This concern, while important to an earlier debate, proved to be less enduring when the questions and methodology of historical enquiry began to broaden. Hirst's concern with how the system of transportation was perceived and modified politically, lead him to recognise that the convicts were important for many more reasons than simply their criminality. The nature of colonial New South Wales was the result of interaction between the free and coerced rather than simply the innocent and guilty. However, the emergence of feminist theory and its concerns was perhaps the single most powerful ideological innovation to shape the history of convicts in the last two or so decades by raising the question of gender. But, new explorations of the role and experiences ofthe female convicts have also shed light on those of the males. Recently, the more explicit recognition of the convicts as a workforce by Nicholas et al has also transformed, although not uncritically, the broader view of the convict system. Armed with new economic concepts and concerns as well as new quantitative methodologies not only were new questions asked but new data compiled and analysed. It is argued

120 Ibid. p. 200. 32 that the explicit utilisation of labour process theory in this thesis will add further to this new complexity of the understanding of how convict worker, both male and female, were employed in building the foundations of a nation.

33 CHAPTER THREE LABOUR PROCESS THEORY: REVIEW AND

DISCUSSION 3.1 Introduction

What distinguishes the analysis of the management of convict labour in this thesis is that it examines the "problem" of convict labour within the context of labour process theory. It is argued that the state and its convict workforce created a labour process that was fundamentally capitalist in nature. New South Wales did not create a slave labour process. 1 Until the early 1820s convict labour was performed under "the anxious eye" of government administrators who were as motivated by the need for efficiency and productivity as any capitalist.2 During this time convict workers were also able to modify the colonial labour process in ways that were to their advantage. Even after this time, when punishment became greater and more systematic, the convicts did not labour under a "slave-owner's brutallash".3 They were part of a coerced labour force, but one that had significant rights and still some ability to resist. The complexity and interactive nature of the convict labour process that emerged and evolved in New South Wales was due to a number of unique factors. Firstly the pioneer nature of white settlement meant that much more of the social and economic infrastructure required by the colony needed to be created by the state4 while climate and differences in the physical environment also created unique features and concerns. The "instruments oflabour", for instance, the technology and tools brought with the First Fleet were not always adequate.5 These factors, at least until the withdrawal of Governor Macquarie (181 0-1821 ), demanded a greater public concern with the productiveness of convict labour. In this way the capitalist anxiety about the labour process was evident from a very early time. The second reason for the emergence of a capitalist labour process arose from the nature of the convict workforce. They were the products of an industrial society; they were largely of urban origin, had occupational skills and experience and generally understood industrial employment even if they were hostile to aspects of it. The

1 See For example Genovese, E. D. (1967) The Political Economy of Slavery. Vintage. New York. Chapter 2. 2 Marx, K. (1974) Capital. Vol. I. Progress Publishers. Moscow. p. 179. 3 Ibid. 4 Kumar, K. (1983) Prophecy and Progress: the sociology of industrial and post-industrial society. Penguin. Harmondsworth. pp. 123-133.

34 employment of convicted criminals may have created some unique labour-management issues but these are not now so apparent. Governor Phillip (1788-1792) did complain, "Experience, Sir, has taught me how difficult it is to make men industrious who have passed their lives in habits of vice and indolence."6 However, most British employers of free labour in the new factories also complained of the quality of their employees and their deplorable work habits and lack ofindustry.7 As Sidney Pollard stresses, one of the first labour-management issues that early industrialists had to confront was the reshaping of the attitudes and values of their workforce so that its behaviour could be predicted and motivation better manipulated. 8 The convicts needed to be reshaped as workers not because they were criminals but because they were pre-industrial in attitude and less motivated by the acquisitive and consumer values that industry demanded.9 Similarly while the convicts were coerced workers who did not have freedom of mobility, the right to change jobs or to withdraw their labour the significance of these restrictions can be greatly exaggerated. For instance, few convicts in New South Wales were actually imprisoned but were left very much to their own resources to find accommodation10 while they were also encouraged to hire themselves out in the private labour market. 11 On the other hand, free labour in Britain did not have an unfettered freedom of association in 1788 and what rights they did have were further restricted by Anti-Combination Acts in 1799 and 1800. 12 Not until 1825 was the strike made vaguely legal or trade unionists and their leaders freed from persecution for illegal oaths, conspiracy and even treason. 13 The hours of work required of free workers were also considerably greater than the convicts 14 while the wages paid to free workers did not

5 Historical Records of Australia. Series I. (hereafter HRA I) Vol. I. Phillip to Nepean. 9 July 1788, pp. 56-57 for an account of the inadequacy of the axes; and see Ibid. Hunter to Portland, 12 November 1795 pp. 675-676 on the problem oflack oflime for the manufacture of mortar. 6 Ibid. Phillip to Grenville, 17 July 1790. p. 195. 7 See Rule, J. (1986) The Labouring Classes in Early Industrial England 1750-1850. Longman. London. pp. 107-152; Pollard, S. (1968) The Genesis of Modern Management. Pelican. Harmondsworth. Chapter 5. 8 Pollard. p. 190. 9 Rule. pp. 134-150; and Thompson, E.P. (1972) The Making of the English Working Class. Penguin. Harmondsworth. pp. 397-398. 10 Evidence of Major Druitt to Commissioner Bigge in Ritchie, J. ( ed) (1971) The Evidence to the Bigge Reports: NSW under Governor Macquarie. Voll. The Oral Evidence. Heinemann. Melbourne. p. 9. 11 See Ibid. p. 21; and Evidence of William Hutchinson to Bigge, in Bonwick Transcript Vol. 1. p. 39774; HRA I. Vol. III. Government Order dated 10 March 1801. p. 37. 12 See Rule. op. cit. pp. 255-266. 13 See Thompson, E.P. op. cit. pp. 543-557; and Simon, D. "Master and Servant" in Saville, J. (ed) (1954) Democracy and the Labour Movement. Lawrence and Wishart. London. pp. 160-200. 14 See Marx, op. cit. pp. 222-280; Rule, op. cit. pp. 130-138; Shaw, A.G.L. (1966) The Convict Settlers of Australia. Faber and Faber. London. pp. 71-72. 35 reflect any minimum standard of living and could therefore have allowed them to starve. In contrast, the convict had, by law, to be given the proscribed ration, which was both adequate and nutritious. 15 In addition, convict labour was not umque m being subject to physical punishment. Some free labour in the eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries were commonly subjected to corporal punishment16 while all free workers lived with the uncertainty of a fickle labour market. Although convicts lived with the threat of flogging this required the due process of an appearance before a Magistrate. That some of these Magistrates were also employers of convict labour and so were likely to have shared an empathy with the employer17 is not, however, a distinguishing feature of the convict experience in New South Wales. 18

Finally, scarci~y of labour demanded that the state be concerned with productivity, with skill formation and the rational allocation of convicts to specific work tasks. There were also conflicting demands for labour from the public and private sectors of the economy and so a degree of competition existed which was to the advantage of convicts. Indeed, the entire situation emboldened convict workers and gave them significant bargaining power, which they used with a surprising measure of success. The repressive administrations after Macquarie should also be seen not as regimes of psychopathic brutality, but as the state's desperate attempt to wrest greater control of the labour process from its convict workforce. It is argued here that the colonial labour process was capitalist in nature but that its character was the product of the unique interaction between convicts and their managers.

3.2 Marx's theory of the capitalist labour process

While Marx was not the first to be concerned with the capitalist labour process and the organisation of work19 his account has been the more comprehensive and enduring.

15 See Frost, A. (1994) Botany Bay Mirages: illusions of Australia's convict beginning, Melbourne University Press. Melbourne. 16 See Rule, op. cit. pp. 147-150. 17 See Macintyre, S. (1985) Winners and Losers: the pursuit ofsocial justice in Australian history. Allen and Unwin. Sydney. p. 3 for an example of this view. 18 Rule. op. cit. p. 285. This point was made by Francis Place, the main architect of the Repeal of the Anti-Combination Laws in 1825, when he described the anti-trade union laws as being unjustly enforced by magistrates who "belong to the order of the masters". See also Thompson, E.P. op. cit. pp. 563-569. 19 See Ure, A. (1835) The Philosophy of Manufactures: or an Exposition of the Scientific, Moral and Commercial Economy of the factory System of Great Britain. London; Babbage, C. (1835) On the 36 From his analysis of the organisation of work, its changing character and its purpose, the basis of labour process theory was established. Marx's analysis of capitalist work relations began with the theory of the surplus value oflabour. 20 Like Smith21 and more particularly David Ricardo,22 Marx saw labour as the source of value in a capitalist economy. According to Marx workers sold their labour power, their potential to work, to a capitalist for a wage that was lower than the value of what their labour produced. The difference between paid wages and value of labour-output Marx called the "Surplus Value of Labour" and was, in his view, the source of capitalist profit and exploitation. 23 The ability of capitalists to sustain a consistent degree or level of surplus value was highly dependent on the nature of the organisation of work, the labour process. While Marx saw the cost of labour as important it was the exploitation (productivity) of labour that he considered much more fundamental. 24 In other words to improve productivity by increasing the length of the working day or by improving the "instruments of labour" through technology or the management of labour and the labour process. In this way labour effort, the utilisation of labour power into actual labour, required capitalists to devise methods of management, supervision, division of labour, specialisation of labour and control in order to ensure the worker actually performed productive work: that is, provided labour effort.25 With this distinction between labour's potential and actual performance, Marx was able to identify in sharper focus than many before (or after him) the imperative and importance of management of the labour process. Purchasing labour did not guarantee any specific degree of productivity. Labour had to be cajoled and encouraged. It had to be motivated with reward and punishment, it had to be organised, trained and supervised. In short, capitalism demanded a greater level of management of the labour process than any society before it.

Economy of Machinery and Manufacturers. Augustus Kelly. New York. 1963 edition; Owen, R. (1813) Report to the County of Lanark: a New View of Society. 1969 edition. Penguin. Harmondsworth; McKendrick, N. "Josiah Wedgewood and Factory Discipline" in Historical Journal IV, 1961; On James Watt see Ward, J.T. and Fraser, W.H. (eds) (1980) Workers and Employers: Documents on Trade Unions and Industrial Relations in Britain since the Eighteenth Century. Macmillan. London. 20 Marx. op. cit. p. 181. 21 Smith, A. (1970) The Wealth ofNations. Everyman's Library. London. p. 1. 22 Ricardo, D. (1972) Principles of Political Economy and Taxation. Everyman's Library. London. p. 6; and see Roll, E. (1973) A History ofEconomic Thought. Faber and Faber. London. Chapter 4. 23 Marx. op. cit. pp. 181-192. 24 Ibid. p. 313. 25 Ibid. p. 173. 37 Labour effort represents the amount of work that a worker performs. It measures, in practical terms how much work a worker produces, how hard he or she works and for how long. This has always concerned both workers and their employers. Traditional feudal work arrangements often quite explicitly determined the quantity of labour each worker had to provide to a social superior in specified periods of time. However, these were stable arrangements that could not easily be changed by either side in the social and employment relationship. But under capitalism these traditional arrangements, obligations and rights were swept away. A much more dynamic and variable relationship emerged that was both potentially more productive and more exploitative. The rewards, the risks and the level of competitive pressures unleashed by capitalism demanded much more flexible and fluid employment arrangements. As a consequence not only did the price of labour become an issue . in the capitalist employment relationship but so too did the amount of work each worker had to perform. In doing this, the capitalist labour process not only changed management's approach to the organisation of work but also changed the interests and role of workers. However, the ability of labour to assert its right to participate in the determination of the cost of labour power (wages) and labour effort (actual amount of work performed) was slow in corning. Throughout the eighteenth century labour's collective (and even individual) right to bargain was fiercely prohibited in Britain and this was only slowly overturned in the first half of the nineteenth century. But overt and collective participation in the determination of "a fair day's wage" was by no means the only response that labour could make. Indeed, the scope for action by workers over labour effort issues, the pace of work and the effort of individual workers, was considerably greater and less illegal than for wage related issues. There was more scope for workers to withhold effort, to impose a control over labour effort than in any bargaining process over the terms and conditions of work. Controlling or covertly influencing the amount of labour effort also offered infinitely more variable ways in which an individual or a group of workers might resist their subordination to capitalists. One of the most common ways was simply the insistence on the maintenance of traditional labour process arrangements. 26 This worker strategy of course confronted the interests of capitalists and the evolution of modem industry was, in a sense, partly the outcome of this fundamental struggle.

26 See Rule, op.cit. pp. 134-143. 38 Having identified what he saw as the fundamental nature of employment relations in capitalist society, Marx analysed the historical evolution of the labour process, the ways that work and workers were managed over time. In doing this Marx identified three stages of capitalist labour process management: simple co-operation; manufacture; and modem industry. In the co-operation stage capitalists essentially brought labour together into the same place of work. Although the technology used and the nature of the work remained the same as pre-industrial stages of industry the key change introduced by co-operation, typically in a workshop, was the new more direct and visible role it gave to the management of labour. In the co-operation stage of capitalism "The work of directing, superintending, and adjusting, becomes one of the functions of capital".Z7 While all co-operative labour processes required a form of management, the control wielded by the capitalist was essentially despotic a~d was distinguished in a number of ways. First, the purpose of capitalist co-operation was not a common social aim but "to extract the greatest possible surplus-value."28 Second, as the control of the capitalist increases "so too does [worker] resistance to the domination of capital, and with it, the necessity for capital to overcome this resistance by counterpressure."29 Consequently, the nature of the capitalist labour process is "rooted in the unavoidable antagonism between exploiter and the living and labouring raw material he exploits."30 The third distinguishing feature of capitalist co-operation is the creation of new levels of authority and power within the labour process.

Just as at first the capitalist is relieved from actual labour so soon as his capital has reached that minimum amount with which capitalist production, as such, begins, so now he hands over the work of direct and constant supervision of the individual workmen, and groups of workmen, to a special kind of wage­ labourer. An industrial army of workmen, under the command of a capitalist, requires, like a real army, officers (managers), and sergeants (foremen, overlookers), who, while the work is being done, command in the name of the capitalist. The work of supervision becomes their established and exclusive function. 31

27 Marx, op. cit. p. 313. 28 Ibid. 29 Ibid. 30 Ibid. 31 Ibid. p. 314. 39 Locating contracted workers in the one place meant that for the first time management had a serious and direct supervisory role to play in terms of worker management.32 Direct scrutiny allowed management to begin to control the labour process, most obviously by better controlling the processes and flow of work and by increasing the intensity and duration of work. Marx called this despotic/direct control in that it depended more on the physical presence and scrutiny of management (or its delegates) than on the re-organisation of work or the implementation of systematic strategies of control. 33 However, while it did increase management control and expanded output it left intact, at least initially, worker job discretion, independence of movement and lifestyle as well as expectations of rewards. The result was the creation of a new intensity of conflict and indeed also the _interdependence of capitalist and worker. To Marx, the next stage of development was Manufacturing. Essentially this involved the principle of the "systematic division of labour."34 That is, the dissection of complex jobs into smaller and specialised segments of work activity that were, therefore, inherently less challenging in terms of skill or experience. 35 The division of labour marked by the manufacturing stage of development had a number of critical impacts. Firstly, it increased output. Adam Smith offered a clear example in his enthusiastic account of the division of labour required to produce pins. 36 Secondly, the systematic design of the division of labour reduced the cost of labour.37 Individual workers became "detail labourers" and so more interchangeable with one another. 38 Although division of labour also created some new areas of specialisation/9 the systematic division of labour reduced, abolished or redefined skill in ways that confronted worker discretion, autonomy or independence.40 With the manufacturing stage, management began to systematically and deliberately design the division of labour in order to reduce the cost of labour and to increase its productivity.41 In addition

32 See Ashton, T.S. (1972) The Industrial Revolution 1760-1830. Oxford University Press. London. p. 109; and Mantoux, P. (1968) The Industrial revolution in the Eighteenth Century. Harper and Row. New York. p. 246. 33 Marx, op. cit. p. 314. 34 Ibid. p. 319. 35 Ibid. p. 320. 36 Smith. op. cit. pp. 4-5. 37 Marx. op. cit. pp. 330-331. 38 Ibid. pp. 321-323. 39 Ibid. pp. 334 and 340. 40 Ure, A. op. cit. quoted by Marx. Ibid. pp. 346-347. 41 Marx. Ibid. pp. 339-347. 40 to the division of labour this stage also involved more obvious forms of labour process control. While management used the division of labour to reduce the independence of workers it also began to develop more elaborate mechanisms for the discipline and control of the workforce. These were direct controls and involved rules of behaviour and the use of such coercive mechanisms as dismissal or the fining of individual workers.42 These were transparent strategies designed to increase management's control of the labour process. The final stage of industrial development identified by Marx was "Machinery and Modern Industry". In this the organisation of work reflected technological change. In modern industry, machinery was developed in response not only to technical and scientific advances but also to managements' need to better and more comprehensively control work.43 Powered machinery determined the pace and to some extent the intensity of work.44 With the wide spread introduction of machinery the physical capabilities of individual or groups of human workers no longer dominated the production process. The speed at which work flowed was now the product of independent power and technological sources. In this way the machinery of Modem Industry offered a new level of worker supervision and scrutiny to management.45 From this perspective it is evident that Marx saw machinery and technology as partisan instruments in the transformation of the labour· process. They were not mere accidents of science and technology and were not neutral factors of production. Machinery, in his view was a product of the intentions, the objectives and interests of management.46 As a consequence machinery contributed to the control objectives of management in a number of ways. Machinery was often labour-saving, de-skilling of traditional labour expertise and thereby allowed the replacement of sections of the workforce by other less traditional or less hostile workers. An example of this was the recruitment of women and children in many new factory jobs. Not only were women and children often much cheaper to employ but also they had fewer traditional work habits and were more willing to submit to the rigours of factory discipline and regularity. They were considered to be less militant and to be less mobile and therefore

42 See Marglin, S. "What Do Bosses Do?; the origins and functions of hierarchy in capitalist production" in Gorz, A. (ed) (1978) The Division of Labour: the labour process and class struggle in modern capitalism. Harvester Press. London. p. 35. 43 Marx. op. cit. pp. 394-402. 44 See Ibid. pp. 353-365. 45 Ibid. p.396. 46 Ibid. pp. 566-567. 41 more dependent on their employer.47 However, machinery offered other, more sophisticated and, ultimately, more durable benefits to management. Machinery generally reduced worker discretion and judgement in the production process, reduced the independence of workers, increased the pace and intensity of work by adding new dimensions of scrutiny of worker performance. 48 This greater degree of control allowed management to more systematically address the objective of maximising surplus value. Marx called this new level of management of control, the real subordination of labour, whereby labour power was maximised not only through such crude strategies as increasing hours of work but also through the organisational and technological restructuring of the work experience.49 Although Marx was aware of working class resistance to modem industry50 he largely accepted that the struggle for control was resolved _in favour of management. For the working class, release from this domination would only come from revolutionary action when the level of exploitation became intolerable. For this reason, while his theory of the labour process under capitalism was insightful many later Marxists neglected it. 51 However, another reason for this neglect was, as Paul Thompson concedes, a problem of chronology. While Marx's analysis "closely approximated ... features of modem industry" his "distinction between the phases of the labour process were not entirely accurate".52 According to Thompson, "The changes in technology and work organisation, which Marx linked to specific periods of 'manufacture' and 'modem industry', were not in pr,actice so clearly separable."53 Thompson goes on to explain that Marx ignored or did not appreciate the complexity and diversity of British industrial development. As Kumar points out, the pace of industrialisation even in Britain was very patchy and much British industry even early in the second half of the ninetieth century was still far from modem. 54 Examples of all three stages coexisted at the same time. 55 In addition, division of labour and mechanisation did not deskill all workers but also created new skills or even left old

47 Ibid. pp. 372-379. 48 Ibid. pp. 380-393. 49 Ibid. pp. 477-479; and see also Littler, C. (1982) The Development of the Labour Process in Capitalist Societies. Gower. Aldershot. p. 22. · 50 Marx. op. cit. pp. 402-432. 51 See Thompson, P. (1984) The Nature of Work: An Introduction to Debates on the Labour Process. Macmillan. London. p. 58. 52 Ibid. p. 47. 53 Ibid. pp. 52-53. 54 Kumar. op. cit. pp. 131-133.

42 ones intact. Significant elements of traditional work organisation survived the industrial revolution in the form of artisans, craft workers and in outworking and even the domestic industry. 56 As Littler also points out a distinguishing feature of many British industrial factories was the elaborate system of sub-contracting. 57 This meant that the owners or managers of a factory did not necessarily directly or even significantly control the labour process but sub-contracted the responsibility out.58 Thompson argues that Marx also exaggerated the control yielded by management even in modern industry, given that it was not until the early twentieth century that a systematic theory and practice of management emerged.59 Some of the shortcomings associated with Marx's labour process theory were addressed by contemporary Marxists from the mid-1970s. This revitalisation ofMarxist labour process . theory was initially stimulated by the seminal analysis of Harry Braverman in Labor and Monopoly Capitalism. 60 His analysis attempted to up date and even complete Marx's analysis and, as a consequence,.Braverman clarified and resolved a number of key issues. Although he did not resolve all or even most of the threads of labour process theory Braverman, nevertheless, provoked a strong and spirited labour process debate. However, while there is no doubting the vital role played by Harry Braverman in the resurgence of interest in labour process theory and indeed in its growing sophistication, this analysis is not greatly concerned with him. The reason for this is simply that Braverman saw himself as contributing to the understanding of the nature of work in the late twentieth century.61 The only significant historical component of his analysis was that dealing with scientific management62 wherein Braverman found a base for his concern with deskilling and technological change. 63 As a consequence this thesis is indebted to Braverman only in so far as his work generated a revival of Marxist labour process theory.

55 Thompson. P. op. cit. p. 53. 56 Rule. op. cit. pp. 134-138. 57 Littler. (1982) op. cit. pp. 65-67. · 58 See/bid. 59 Thompson, P. op. cit. pp. 55-56. 60 Braverman, H. (1974) Labor and Monopoly Capital: the degradation of work in the twentieth century. Monthly Review Press. New York. 61 This is apparent as much from the title of his book as from the contents. 62 Ibid. Chapters 4 and 5. 63 Ibid. Part II. 43 3.3 Friedman and worker resistance in the labour process

One of the first significant contributors to the labour process debate following Braverman was Andrew Friedman, whose contribution arose from a socio-economic analysis of regional deprivation in Britain.64 While broadly accepting the Marxist model of capitalist industrial development from cooperation to manufacture to machine-based modem industry, Friedman emphasised the role of worker resistance. While he admits that Marx recognised worker resistance Friedman argues this was underplayed. Marx classified worker resistance as either reformist in terms of trade unionism or as revolutionary class-consciousness.65 However, Friedman argued that worker resistance was more significant than this simple dichotomy allowed. Worker resistance was a factor of the social relations of capitalist production that modified the evolution of capitalist industrial development. 66 Friedman identified three characteristics of worker resistance; the form it can take will vary; it "is unevenly developed among different groups of workers"; and organisational strength of worker resistance can have a variety of impacts. 67 The form in which worker resistance can be expressed will vary between the individual and collective. Historically individual resistance is the first form that resistance takes and is essentially over the loss of an individual's labour power.68 The way resistance is expressed includes arriving late or leaving early, quitting work, absenteeism, refusing work commands, sabotage and various forms of deception.69 Collective forms of resistance can be divided into the highly organised and the spontaneous. The highly organised actions are those that commonly involve a trade union, which publicly articulate the objectives of the collective and develop a strategy of action. This form is, historically, relatively recent because for much of the first half of the nineteenth century worker organisations and even collective action were illegal or highly circumscribed. Spontaneity is more commonly associated with unstructured collective action although it may not always be. In the early history of industrial

64 See Friedman, A. (1978) Industry and Labour. Macmillan. London; and also Kitay, J. "The Labour Process: Still stuck? Still a Perspective? Still Useful?" Electronic Journal of Radical Organisational Theory, Vol. 3. Issue No. 1. 1997. p. 1. 65 Friedman. (1978) op. cit. p. 50. 66 Ibid. p. 49. 67 Ibid. p. 50. 68 Ibid. p. 51. 69 Ibid. 44 capitalism the more common forms of collective action were those that were informally organised.70 Indeed, some forms of collective resistance may involve nothing more formal than individuals acting in ways that are collectively supported or have collective outcomes. These include workers covering for each other, warning one another of the approach of authority figures and developing a custom and practice. The strike is the most visible form of worker resistance but was often illega1. 71 The strength of worker resistance will also vary according to the homogeneity of a workforce. This homogeneity is formed by the similarity of work, work experiences and social and community lifestyles.72 A heterogeneous workforce on the other hand will be more divided and differentiated and so will have difficulty dev~loping a "resonance" of grievances and objectives.73 The emphasis Friedman places on worker resistance is critical to his analysis of control of the labour process. Worker resistance is one of the constraints on management authority and control. To Friedman management must not only forge a path of enterprise survival in a competitive economic climate but it must also assert control over a workforce that is inclined to resist in a variety of ways. In doing this, Friedman argues, management will adopt one of two broad strategies: responsible autonomy or direct control. According to Friedman;

The Responsible Autonomy strategy attempts to harness the adaptability of labour power by giving workers leeway and by encouraging them to adapt to changing situations in a manner beneficial to the firm. To do this, top management gives them status, autonomy and responsibility, and try to wintheir loyalty to the firm's ideals (the competitive struggle) ideologically. The Direct Control strategy tries to limit the scope for labour power to vary by close supervision and by minimising individual worker responsibility using Taylorist techniques. The first strategy attempts to capture the benefits of variable capital [labour use]; the second tries to limit its harmful effects and to treat workers as machines.74

70 See Rude, G. (1966) The Crowd in History. John Wiley & Sons. London. pp. 334-34 and 68-70; and Hobsbawn, E. and Rude, G. (1973) Captain Swing. Penguin. Harmondsworth. Part II. 71 Friedman (1978) op. cit. pp. 51-52. 72 Ibid. pp. 52-53. 73 Ibid. pp. 53-54. 74 Ibid. pp. 6-7. 45 In Friedman's view, Marx and Braverman recognised only direct control of the labour process because they failed to appreciate the impact and significance of worker resistance.75 Friedman also argues that shifting from one strategy to the other is difficult and so this inflexibility will create tensions and contradictions that management must deal with. One of the ways this inflexibility is accommodated is by differentiating between workers, firms within an industry and between regions. In this way management will try to differentiate between workers who are central and others who are peripheral to the production process.76 In this way management is able to control both types of workers but by using different types of control strategies.

In arguing this position Friedman saw himself as "amending Marx's framework" rather than rejecting it. 77 However, the strategic choices of management and the classification of workers as central or peripheral, reflects features of the dual labour market theory and underlies the labour market purpose of his study. His work was also criticised for the simplicity of his dual model. 78 Although Friedman offers historical case studies his analysis is not really historical "in that a schema of stages of development in forms of control is absent"?9 In other words whilst Friedman has articulated a plausible dichotomy of management strategies or approaches and has effectively emphasised the dynamic nature of the struggle for control of the labour process, he does not fully explain how the two strategies have been shaped historically.

3.4 Edwards and forms of labour process control

Richard Edwards offered another milestone in the development of labour process theory. He too relied on the Marxist theory of labour process but he was explicitly interested in explaining the form control of the labour process took under capitalism. In doing this Edwards, unlike Friedman, took a very specifically historical view. By analysing the economic and labour history of the United States, Edwards charted in great detail the stages of development of capitalism's systems of control. As a

75 Ibid. pp. 48-50. 76 Ibid. p. 109. 77 Ibid. p. 5. 78 Littler. (1982) op. cit. p. 3; and see Friedman, A. "Managerial Strategies, Activities, Techniques and Technology: Towards a Complex Theory of the Labour Process" in Knights, D. and Willmott, H. (eds) (1990) Labour Process Theory. Macmillan. London. p. 185. 79 Thompson, P. op. cit. p. 134. 46 consequence Edwards argues that in the United States there were three distinct systems of control. These were simple control, technical control and bureaucratic control. These were evolutionary in that one succeeded the other in response to economic, organisational, product and worker pressure. However, Edwards concedes that while each "corresponds to a definite stage in the development" of capitalism this process of development has been uneven "with some sectors pushing far in advance of other sectors".80 As a consequence these systems of control will, to some degree, co-exist within a capitalist economy. He cites the example of simple control still dominating the system of control within the small business sector while large-scale manufacturing is firmly bureaucratic. However, simple control was the dominant form of labour process control in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries because during most of this period firms were small scale, were frequently owned and managed by an entrepreneur, the market was highly competitive and volatile, there were no complex management structures while employers were required to motivate and supervise a workforce that was obstinate if not down-right hostile. Edwards typifies the nineteenth century capitalist firm in the United States as one in which;

A single entrepreneur, usually flanked by a small coterie of foremen and managers, ruled the firm. These bosses exercised power personally, intervening in the labor process often to exhort workers, bully and threaten them, reward good performance, hire and fire on the spot, favor loyal workers, and generally act as despots, benevolent or otherwise. They had a direct stake in translating labor power into labor, and they combined both incentives and sanctions in an idiosyncratic and unsystematic mix. There was little structure to the way power was exercised, and workers were often treated arbitrarily. 81

Simple control was an appropriate and successful model of control until capitalism and the surviving individual firms in an industry began to grow. As the scale and complexity of production grew, as firms established new operations in other locations and as the size of enterprise workforces grew and their militancy increased the ability of simple

80 Edwards, R. ( 1979) Contested Terrain: the transformation of the workplace in the twentieth century. Basic Books. New York. p. 21. 81 Ibid. p. 18. 47 control systems failed. 82 As a consequence capitalist management turned to more sophisticated forms of labour process control. In Edwards' view the second system of control developed by capitalism (at least m the United States) was what he calls technical control. This had two distinct components to it that raised it well above the erratic and idiosyncratic simple control model. Technical control as its name implies relied heavily on the actual physical and capital intensification of the production process itself. In other words it drew considerable control from the way work was organised and from the technologies developed to improve output. Edwards argued that "Technical control involves designing machinery and planning the flow of work to minimize the problem of transforming labour power into labour as well as to maximize the purely physically based possibilities for achieving efficiencies."83 A clear example of this was the assembly line. Although not new, by the late nineteenth century the scale and complexity of automated production line techniques were such that they represented a new form of work organisation. 84 But, more importantly, this form of organising production gave power and therefore greater control to management. The technical demands of production imposed a speed, intensity and a character on work that controlled the behaviour ofworkers.85 However, technical control was more than simply the physical redesign of work and its technology. Coupled with these changes was a growing sophistication and complexity of the structure of management and labour. As capitalist enterprises grew larger they were required to develop more elaborate structures and hierarchies of control. By the end of the nineteenth century large, successful firms could no longer rely on the personal control of an entrepreneur. The scale of activity was too big. The new structures of control were, therefore, also designed to control (or at least monitor and moderate) the behaviour of those to whom the entrepreneur had delegated power. The most visible link in this longer and more sophisticated chain was the supervisor, who was also one of the most vulnerable. 86 The delegation of simple, despotic power to the supervisor did not meet the control needs of the capitalist firm. The controllers of

82 Ibid. p. 19. 83 Ibid. p. 112. 84 Ibid. p. 113. 85 Ibid. p. 114. 86 Ibid. pp. 54-55. 48 labour had also to be controlled and brought within the reach of systematic and consistent structures. 87 According to Edwards, technical control increased the dominance enjoyed by management over the labour process and it continued to display influence until the Second World War. 88 However, despite its longevity technical control also produced problems. The most notable of which was labour resistance. The newly integrated nature of work organised under the principles of technical control simultaneously increased management control and exposed it more fully to the effects of labour militancy. By integrating work processes, reducing hierarchical distinctions between workers and by discouraging workers from identifying with their increasingly distant boss the impact of labour militancy was made greater and its likelihood stronger. While

. production lines offered greater output and controll~d individual worker behaviour more fully, they were also more vulnerable to disruption by mass strikes or even by key . workers. The impact of resistance, in other words, was more apparent than under simple · control. 89 To Edwards the third system of control developed under capitalism was bureaucratic control. He explains this system as emerging from the "formal structure of the firm" rather than from personal relationships or roles.9°Further,

... while technical control is embedded in the physical and technological aspects of production and is built into the design of machines and the industrial architecture of the plant, bureaucratic control is embedded in the social and organisational structure of the firm and is built into job categories, work rules, promotion procedures, discipline, wage scales, definitions of responsibilities, and the like. Bureaucratic control establishes the impersonal force of 'company rules' or 'company policy' as the basis for control.91

Bureaucratic control addressed equally all three elements of control; namely the direction and coordination of work, the supervision and evaluation of the labour effort

87 See Littler, C. (1981) Power and Ideology in Work Organisations: Britain and Japan. The Open University. Milton Keynes. p. 17 for a brief discussion of the opposition of supervisory staff to some attempts to introduce Scientific Management. 88 Edwards, op. cit. p. 130. 89 Ibid. pp. 57-58. 90 Ibid. p. 131. 91 Ibid. 49 of individual workers, and the reward and discipline of workers in order to "elicit" acceptable work behaviour. 92 Bureaucratic control developed extensive and elaborate policies and rules to perform all three coordination roles. And, these were now impersonal (like the ownership of the modem large corporation), were consistent and ostensibly rational. These policies and rules addressed the issue of worker loyalty, forced consistency and accountability on supervisors, divided workers into much more clearly delineated groups in which their degree of job autonomy, status, promotional prospects, security and earnings were more easily differentiated. In directing and coordinating work tasks bureaucratic control developed a network of interrelated job descriptions and specifications in which duties, functions, tasks and qualifications could be set down. These detailed duty statements explicitly conveyed. to workers what they were meant to do and so they themselves became part of the discipline regime of the firm. 93 This approach also promised a structured and more transparent hierarchy of jobs and therefore career prospects. 94 The supervision and evaluation of workers and their performance was also based on the job description.95 Similarly the role of the supervisor and his or her behaviour was made more consistent, more impersonal and therefore more objective. The way supervisors promoted, punished, rewarded and allocated workers to specific tasks etc. "all came under top management scrutiny".96 Bureaucratic control also relied on more elaborate incentive systems to discipline and control worker behaviour. Formal sanctions for unacceptable behaviour were developed and these were applied in a so-called impersonal and certainly more consistent manner.97 However, of even more significance was that positive incentives were also institutionalised and formalised. Edwards explains,

Bureaucratic control impinges on the behaviour of individual workers in part by developing strong and systematic incentives to obey company rules, to develop work habits of predicability, and to internalize the enterprise's goals and

92 Ibid. p. 18. 93 Ibid. p. 150. 94 Ibid. pp. 136-139. 95 Ibid. p. 139-142. 96 Ibid. 97 Ibid. p. 142. 50 values ... Hard work and deference are no longer enough; now the 'soulful' corporation demands the worker's soul, or at least the worker's identity.98

The result, Edwards argues, is that opposition to management control is minimised. The ability to resist management in a collective and overt manner was severely weakened. For example, trade unions were openly and often successfully resisted by management or they were controlled by incorporating them into the fabric of the enterprise. 99 This was achieved by encouraging the formation of company unions or through consultation and by giving the union a role in preserving and enforcing rules and procedures. 100 As a consequence the ability of workers to openly resist is damaged and where conflict does occur it may not only be in opposition to management but also to trade union leadership. In this way conflict is de-legitimised while the semblaqce of harmony is created.

While the Edwards' thesis was "the most comprehensive attempt" to analyse the history of the systems of management control developed under capitalism101 it is not without its critics. The key criticism levelled at Edwards is his understanding of control and the dynamic of how control varies. For example, although Thompson admits that simple control "is a persuasive image of the transition from control to management" he goes on to describe it as "inaccurate and misleading" because the actual operation of firms does not confirm that management was able to impos,e direct and unfettered personal control over the labour process. 102 Management control "was still relative to the skills and job control exercised by many workers ... [and]. .. the idea that employers knew and decided everything belies the real struggle over control that raged as the factory system matured". 103 Similarly, others such as Burawoy have viewed the all­ pervading control offered by the Edwards' version of the bureaucratic system as not simply the result of management's desire to maximise control but also as a consequence

98 Ibid. p. 152. 99 Ibid. p. 137. 100 Ibid. p. 138. 101 Thompson, P. op. cit. p. 144. 102 Ibid. p. 125. 103 Ibid. p. 125. 51 of the struggles of workers. 104 The same point is made by Jill Rubery, who argues that in any case Edwards

overstressed the control offered by the bureaucratic division of the labour force, and at the same time underestimated or ignored the benefits for the working class of a sheltered, secure, albeit stratified, labour market. 105

In many respects Edwards' main contribution has been to flesh out in much greater detail the nature of the forms of control employed by management in the struggle to control the labour process. The labour process is and always has been a contested terrain under capitalism and the strategies developed by management have varied over time in response to the nee~ to control the labour process within a changing business and industrial relations environment. However, while most of Edward's critics positively note his elevation of struggle between worker and · manager to a more prominent theoretical position, they remain highly critical of his inability to concede worker success. In other words, workers struggle but they do not win, or if they do it is short lived because management is driven to reverse its loss with more elaborate and sophisticated control systems. The labour process debate up to Edwards therefore can be seen as attempting to define control.

3.5 Burawoy and the.manufacture of consent

Another important perspective in the analysis of the control of the labour process is offered by Michael Burawoy. The basic view ofBurawoy is that although workers resist management objectives and strategies they do not do so all of the time. The workplace is not continuously beset by industrial conflict between workers and managers. 106 On the contrary, workplaces are more commonly characterised by cooperation. Workers agree to accept management .authority for more of the time than they do in openly resisting it. Workers acquiesce to management power; they consent to the right of

104 Burawoy, M. (1979) Manufacturing Consent: changes in the labour process under monopoly capitalism. University of Chicago Press. Chicago. pp. 106-108. 105 Rubery, J. "Structured Labour Markets, Worker Organisation and Low Pay" in Amsden, A. (ed) (1980) The Economics of Women and Work. Penguin. Harmondsworth. p. 226. 106 For an over view of the Burawoy thesis see Marchington, M. "Managing Labour Relations in a Competitive Environment" in Sturdy, A., Knights, D. and Willmott, H. (eds) (1992) Skill and Consent: contemporary studies in the labour process. Routledge. London. p. 150. 52 management to manage the labour process for much of the time. This consent, Burawoy argues, is just as significant as worker resistance but has been overlooked by labour process theorists. 107 Burawoy, like the other Marxist labour process writers discussed above, also starts his analysis with the explicit understanding that employment in a capitalist society is designed to extract surplus value from the labour employed. The pursuit of profit demands the organisation of work and the control of workers in the labour process but the form this organisation of control takes will be shaped both by worker resistance and by worker acquiescence. Coercion and consent are both players in the historical development of management control over the labour process although in the early nineteenth century there was more coercion than consent. 108 This issue is important to the Marxist analysis of capitalism and its overthrow. 109 Burawoy, while recognising broad state hegemony, llO argued that what needed even more attention was why the workplace, where the fundamental relationships of capitalism most openly existed, was not more extensively racked by conflict and agitation but was often essentially cooperative. 111 In his view the legitimation of management control or at least the maintenance of this control comes about for a variety of reasons. The most critical one is that the extraction of surplus value from labour is concealed under capitalism by capital investment in new technology and techniques, by separating ownership and control but mostly by the working of market forces. 112 In these ways the fundamentally exploitative nature of capitalist work organisation is not widely understood or recognised. Burawoy calls this "Obscuring and Securing Surplus Labour". 113 In addition, during the nineteenth and twentieth centuries workers struggled industrially against the most blatant coercive instruments of management and imposed some limitations on it in terms of health and safety, wages and conditions. Accordingly management needed to become increasingly concerned with the "manufacture of consent". 114 In this way he too sees the evolution of management control in terms

107 Burawoy (1979) op. cit. p. 27. 108 Ibid. p. 27. 109 See Marx, K. and Engels, F. (1969) The Communist Manifesto. Penguin. Harmondsworth. pp. 89-90; Lenin. V.I. (1969) What is to be done? Progress Publishers. Moscow. p. 35; and Gramsci, A. (1976) Selections from the Prison Notebooks. Lawrence and Wishart. London. 110 Thompson, P. op. cit. p. 157. 111 See Burawoy. (1979) op. cit. p. xi. 112 Ibid. p. 28. I 13 Ibid. p. 81. 114 Ibid. p. 27. 53 similar to Edwards. That it has moved "towards methods of bureaucratic control dependent more on rules and procedure than coercion". 115 The formulation of work rules and the modification of them in practice by workers (within acceptable limits) created hegemony of consensus in modern industry. In arguing the deliberate manufacture of consent by management, Burawoy does not dismiss or discount worker resistance but simply that much working class resistance is, by its nature, accommodated and confined within the limits of the capitalist labour process. In other words, workers may not often openly resist management authority but they may quite consciously circumvent, limit or modify it by using a range of strategies. Burawoy calls this the "Game". 116 Game playing may be designed to specifically address or confront a management agenda and may be a subtle part of a bargaining process. On the other hand, playing the game may also be a strategy for redressing the alienation caused by work. In order to add meaning to the work experience workers will inject life into it through the invention of interactions, social cohesiveness, rule bending and other individual or group actions. Burawoy saw evidence of this in his own experiences on a machine shopfloor and also through the studies of many other organisational behaviourists such as Elton Mayo and George Homans. 117 More importantly, management will accept some resistance or rule bending if on the whole production is increased or even maintained, not perhaps at a maximum level, but at a consistent and acceptable level. The game can be seen, therefore, as a subtle process of bargaining between management and workers. 118 In a sense the bureaucratic control of the labour process, characterised by rules and regulations which can be broken or modified, is a shift to consensual management. Management's toleration of playing the game is about creating hegemonic control. The alienation of labour, its collective bargaining interests and even hostility to management can therefore be institutionalised and controlled. In addition, workers as groups begin to police not so much management's rules but the collective modification of them. Conflict can also be generated between workers or groups of workers thereby reducing class solidarity. 119

115 Thompson, P. op.cit. p. 164; and also Sturdy, Knight and Willmott. op. cit. p. 5. 116 Burawoy. (1979) op. cit. p. 85. 117 Ibid. pp. 78-79. liS Ibid. p. 79. 119 Ibid. p. 66. 54 While Burawoy's argument has been influential there are some criticisms that have been made of it. A major concern discussed by Thompson is that Burawoy's thesis seems to discount "the collectivising potential of the large socialised workplace" to circumvent or resist management. 120 If workers' resistance could be so easily accommodated by management then why would modem managers pursue "more flexible forms of control to deal with 'labour problems"'. 121 In other words why are there different management strategies? Other studies contest the pacification of the workforce by arguing that workers "act - and to a degree informally organise - against work, and the management which directs it". 122 Workers may sometimes follow rules so strictly that their compliance is an act of irritating defiance. 123 Thompson argues that while the game may often perform the legitimising role given it by Burawoy, at another level it does also "reflect some level of attempted imposition of an alternative rationality over the production process". 124 It may be consent in practice but resistance in intent. Consequently others have suggested, "compliance might be a more appropriate concept". 125 Consent implies agreement but the decision of workers to agree to management rules or even the modification of those rules may not always reflect their active and considered acquiescence. It may also reflect the reality of bargaining power between management and its workforce. In difficult economic conditions workers may have to 'consent' to strictly adhere to management rules because they have neither the formal, collective industrial strength to resist nor the luxury of informally modifying management rules. 126 Alternatively, there may be situations in which worker bargaining power is so significant that management may determine rules on the basis of what it thinks will be attractive to workers. 127

120 Thompson, P. op. cit. p. 166. 121 Ibid. 122 Nichols, T. and Beynon, H. (1977) Living with Capitalism: Class relations in the modern factory. Routledge & Kegan Paul. London. p. 107; and see also Nichols, T. and Armstrong, P. (1976) Workers Divided: a study in shopfloor politics. Fontana. Glasgow. 123 See Marchington, op. cit. p. 155. 124 Thompson, P. op. cit. p. 167. 125 Sturdy, Knights and Willmott. op. cit. p. 3. 126 See Thompson, P. op. cit. pp 176-177. 127 Ibid. p. 155. 55 3.6 Feminism, gender and patriarchy

The role played by men and women in the labour process of any society is of critical importance in understanding the nature and organisation of work. The work experiences of men and women have also often been significantly different and yet at the same time highly integrated. It is essential then that the gender divisions within the labour process of a specific society be analysed and understood. However many feminists have expressed some discontent with Marxist labour process analysis. 128 Heidi Hartmann for example questions whether the class foundation of labour process analysis can accommodate the equally important patriarchal foundations of capitalist societies. 129 As a consequence the following discussion will explore feminist perspectives on the gender division of labour within the capitalist labour process in order to construct a framework for the analysis of the role of female convicts within New South Wales between 1788- 1830. Marx did not ignore gender but his accommodation of it within his analysis was ultimately superficial. Marx argued that all societies produce a division of labour and that this division can be characterised in both a social and technical sense. 130 The social division denotes the allocation of workers to different branches of production and the technical division relates to the allocation of different tasks to "workers producing the same commodity". 131 Marx argued that both the social and technical division of labour in all societies reflected a gender division but that under capitalism the most powerful determinant of social and technical divisions of labour would be class. 132 In this way the issue of gender remained under-developed in Marx's work because he believed the technological and organisational development of capitalism "would erode the basis for differential rates of participation in the labour force by women and men". 133 Marx assumed, incorrectly as it turned out, that the logic and rationality of capitalism would

128 See Hartmann, H. "Capitalism, Patriarchy, and Job Segregation by Sex" in Eisenstein, Z. R. ( ed) (1979) Capitalist Patriarchy and the Case for Socialist Feminism. Monthly Review Press. New York. pp. 208-209; Bland, L. et. al. "Women 'inside and outside' the Relations of Production" in Women's Study Group, Centre for Cultural Studies University ofBirmingham. (1978) Women Take Issue: aspects of women's subordination. Hutchinson. London. p. 35; Burton, C. "Engels, The Origin ofthe family and feminist theory" in Grieve, N. and Grimshaw, P. (eds) (1983) Australian Women,feminist perspectives. Oxford University Press. Melbourne; and Eisenstein, Z.R. "Developing a Theory of Capitalist Patriarchy and Socialist Feminism" in Eisenstein. op. cit. pp. 5-9. 129 Hartmann. op.cit. p. 208. 130 Marx (Capital) op. cit. pp. 331-339; and Marglin. op. cit. p. 16. 131 Thompson. P. op. cit. p. 180. 132 Marx (Capital) op. cit. pp 49-50 and pp. 331-339. 56 dispense with any notions of gender inequality when it came to maximising the surplus value of labour. 134 In addition, while Engels recognised that the social division of work between productive and reproductive remained in early capitalism he, like Marx, thought this public and domestic divide would decline with the homogenisation of labour. Indeed he argued that capitalism was the destroyer ofthe family. 135 However, as Paul Thompson writes, Marx and Engels "simply failed to grasp the significance and staying power of the wider sexual division of labour". 136 This omission was to some extent addressed by Braverman. He analysed the transformation of employment and noted the rise in the participation rate of women in Western economies in the twentieth century and their increasing segmentation in some new and traditional occupations. 137 However, although Braverman gave considerably more attention to the position of women, he did so by sticking "closely to the central. tents of Marx" and so left many of the gender problems unresolved. 138 For example, the segmentation of work in modern capitalist economies is so significant it would seem that women are not part of a general reserve army of labour, ready to enter paid work in replacement of male workers. Women are essentially mostly competing with other female workers. 139 Similarly, the concept of the reserve army of labour does not easily accommodate the fact that the role of women, as a whole, is more often divided between domestic, family centred work and paid, industrial work. That is, the issue for women is not so much one of employment and unemployment but of paid and non-paid employment, public and private spheres of work. For many feminists gender as well as class needs to be explicitly discussed when analysing the labour process and this requires the explicit recognition of patriarchy; a socially determined hierarchical structuring of society. Bland et. al. argue that it is necessary to begin with patriarchy in its widest sense before its impact on the labour process, for both men and women, labour and capital, can be appreciated. 140 Patriarchy is defined by Eisenstein as "the male hierarchical ordering of society" and that it "is

133 Thompson. P. op. cit. p. 188. 134 Ibid. pp. 188-189; and see Bland. Et. al. (1978) op. cit. p. 65. 135 Engels, F. (1970) "The Origin of the Family, Private Property and the State." in Marx, K. and Engels, F. Selected Works. Vol. 3. Progress Publishers. Moscow. p. 35; and see Bland, et. al. op. cit. pp. 38-39; and Burton. op.cit. pp. 3- 14. 136 Thompson. P. op. cit. p. 189. 137 Braverman. op. cit. Chapters 16 and 17. 138 Thompson. P. op. cit. p. 190. 139 Ibid. p. 193. 140 Bland, et. al. (1978) op. cit. p. 35. 57 preserved, via marriage and the family, through the sexual division of labour and society". 141 Hartmann defines patriarchy "as a set of social relations which has a material base and in which there are hierarchical relations between men, and solidarity among them, which enable them to control women". 142 Anne Witz understands it as male control over women's labour and that this control has a number of dimensions. Men, rather than women, socially define what labour women may perform, where it is located -industry or domestic- and are able to appropriate women's labour power. 143 Although these definitions make the nature of patriarchy clear, they are essentially ahistorical. Patriarchy simply exists and establishes male dominance and female subservience. In a sense there is no discussion of how patriarchy may have evolved and asserted itself in changing social and economic circumstances. Some feminists, -like Judy Lown have, nevertheless recognised this. shortcoming. She argues that inherent in many of the patriarchal arguments is the "assumption that the location ofthe 'original causes' of male dominance is of prime importance: that once established the link between a pre-defined system of class relations and the persistence of unequal gender relations can be traced". 144 In taking a similar view Rubin suggests the term patriarchy should be reserved for the social relations where men exert authority over women, children and younger men. 145 In the industrial context she uses the concept of sex-gender relations. 146 Cynthia Cockburn uses the term "andrarchy", which she claims is more work specific, while she also argues that patriarchal relations are only one of a variety of reasons for the gender division of labour under capitalism. 147 One of these other reasons, for example, is the difference in the physical capabilities of men and women. 148 Another reason is that historically work has been divided into two broad categories; reproductive and productive work. The reproductive role is located domestically in the family and home and includes the labour required to raise and

141 Eisenstein. op. cit. p. 17. 142 Hartmann. op. cit. p. 232. 143 Witz, A. "Patriarchy and the Labour Market: Occupational Control Strategies and the Medical Division of Labour" in Knights, D. and Willmott, H. (eds) (1985) Gender and the Labour Process. Gower. Aldershot. pp. 14-15. 144 Lown, J. ''Not so much a Factory, More a Form of Patriarchy: Gender and Class during Industrialisation." in Garmarnikow, E., Morgan, D.H.J., Purvis, J. and Taylorson, D.E: (eds) (1985) Gender, Class and Work. Gower. Aldershot. p. 28. 145 Quoted in Ibid. 146 Ibid. 147 See West, J. "Gender and the Labour Process: A Reassessment" in Knights and Willmott. op. cit. pp 244-245; and Cockburn, C. "The Material of Male Power" in Feminist Review (ed) (1986) Waged Work: A Reader. Virago. London. pp. 93-96. 148 Cockburn. Ibid. pp. 96-104. 58 nurture children as well as provide for the sustenance in food and other material ways of family members and the male productive worker in particular. Although historically women have performed productive work in many societies there is considerable anthropological evidence to indicate that women consistently performed reproductive work more than men did because it "was seen to follow naturally from [their] role in biological reproduction". 149 This biological determinism has remained a powerful component of the justification of patriarchy. However, from an historical perspective the nature of reproductive and productive work can be viewed more complexly. In pre­ capitalist societies the implications of this gender division may have been less distinctive and the implications less far-reaching given that much economic activity was family and domestic centred. When productive work was located in the horne it was performed alongside. reproductive work and offered women at least some wider work opportunities while the domestic or horne economy involved more elaborate manufacture and processing of food and clothing. In other words households in pre­ capitalist societies produced more of their needs and relied less on the market for manufactured food and clothing. In this way, while there was a gender division of labour it "was not always a hierarchical one". 150 The issue then, is how capitalism created a hierarchical form of patriarchy. Bland et al argue that the patriarchal character of capitalism is an inherited one. They write,

The sexual division of labour ... does not anse as a sexual division from capital's own structure. Rather capital has built its own divisions on to already existing sexual divisions. The implications of that however are that, in the sexual division of labour which is our starting point, capitalist and patriarchal structures are inseparable. The sexual division of labour structured in masculine dominance is 'colonized', 'taken over' by the structures of capital. 151

149 See Bland et al op. cit. p. 40; Hartmann. op. cit. pp 209-211; and also Rogers, L. "Biology: gender differentiation and sexual variation" in Grieve .. and Grimshaw. op. cit. 150 Hartmann. op. cit. p. 206. 151 Bland. et. al. op. cit. p. 61. (emphasis in text) 59 Hartmann also accepts that capitalism was "a relative latecomer" to patriarchy. 152 She argues that patriarchal relations were initially threatened, like all pre-industrial institutions, by the "free" market forces of early capitalism but that it survived for a variety of reasons. The two most important reasons, according to Hartmann, were first, that the hierarchical structures of traditional patriarchal society were compatible with the structures of capitalism. Segmentation of the labour force by sex, race or skill etc allowed capitalists to play "workers off against one another". 153 The second reason for the survival of patriarchy was the actions of male workers. In her analysis male workers combined to restrict or prevent female participation in the paid labour force in order to maintain their control over "the labor of women and children in the family". 154 As an example of this she cites the social, industrial and political campaigns to control or remove women and children from the new factories by restricting the hours they could work and the types of work they could perform. 155 While Hartmann is correct in identifying a male working class role in the restriction of women in productive work her explanation seems curiously unsophisticated. In the first instance the restrictive role of males is more likely to have been in response to simple economic self-interest, a need to restrict the level of competition and so exploitation, rather than exclusively an assertion of traditional patriarchal authority. Secondly the role of women in the march of patriarchy is missing from Hartmann's analysis. The voices of female workers and those of mothers, sisters and daughters are silent. What productive jobs did women perform or want to perform? What were the processes of exclusion or even removal? Did women express preferences for some work and not others? Could it also be possible that some productive roles were so onerous that dependency within patriarchy might have seemed preferable? Working half-naked in coalmines might have struck many women as an occupation to be avoided. Finally, it also needs to be noted that whatever their motives, male opposition to female employment in the factory system was hardly startlingly successful. The early Factory Acts in Britain156 attempted to limit the hours of employment for children but were widely regarded at the time as resoundingly unsuccessful. 157 Indeed it was not until the

152 Hartmann. op. cit. p. 207 and see also Eisenstein. op. cit. p. 25. 153 Hartmann. op. cit. p. 207. 154 Ibid. 155 Ibid. pp. 217-221. 156 For the Factory Acts passed in 1802, 1819, 1825 see Hammond, J.L. and B. (1947) The Bleak Age. Penguin. London. pp. 194-195. 157 See Ashton. op. cit. p.140. 60 1833 Act, which appointed inspectors, that the battle over long hours of work for young workers was significantly advanced. Critically, the hours of women workers, other than in the mines, was not addressed until the Factory Act of 1844. 158 In addition it took Acts in the early 1850s and 1860s to finally reduce hours of work for all adult women workers while these Acts also began to regulate male working hours as well. 159 The political and industrial campaign required to challenge hours of female labour may very well have been tainted with the motives of patriarchy, but it was in the self-interest of both male and female workers. More importantly, it was also a moral response to the horrors ofunfettered capitalism. 160 Hartmann's lack of an historical perspective is not unique. There are few explicit historical studies that explore how the traditional constructions of patriarchal divisions of labour were modified and extended by the factory system. However some light, nevertheless, can be thrown on this question. In Frances Collier's study of the cotton industry considerable information on the family economy can be established. She wrote;

In the period before the introduction of machinery the cotton manufacture was carried on in the houses of the workpeople. It provided employment for all members of the family: spinning and its preparatory processes were performed by the women and children and weaving by the men. 161

However these divisions of labour were damaged by the development of the factory system and later with the introduction of new machinery and technology. Collier claimed the male weavers had a "prejudice against entering the factories" 162 despite their increasing difficulty to compete with factory weaving. 163 As a consequence "the men lost their monopoly of weaving" and "From the 1790s onwards women, boys and girls were employed in ever increasing numbers in weaving calicoes, coarse muslins and cambrics". 164 Later, with the introduction of steam power to the cotton industry the situation changed yet again. "Machinery reversed the occupations of the sexes - women

158 See Evans, E. J. (1986) The Forging of the Modern State; early industrial Britain: 1783-1870. Longman. London. p. 179 and pp. 228-231. 159 Ibid. p. 231 and 275. 160 Ibid. pp. 228-229. 161 Collier, F. (1968) The Family Economy of the Working Classes in the Cotton Industry, 1784-1833. Manchester University Press. Manchester. p. 2 162 Ibid. p. 3. 163 Ibid. pp. 6-7. 164 Ibid. p. 3. 61 had attained the pre-dominance they still have in weaving, and the men in the spinning branch of the industry". 165 In contrast, even the traditional character of the family­ centred handloom weaving industry was dramatically transformed by the competitive pressures unleashed by industrialisation. Although many male handloom weavers resisted the factories they were forced to relinquish their traditional exclusivity to weaving. Collier claims, "by the beginning of the nineteenth century the ranks of the [hand-loom] weavers contained all sorts and conditions of men, women and children". 166 When men began to enter the factories they did bring with them traditions of patriarchy. This may not have been as much at the insistence of the males, as Hartmann asserts, but due to entrepreneurial expediency or inexperience. Craig Littler argues that a feature of employment in early factories was the extensive reliance on an ell:lborate and at times seemingly chaotic system of labour contracting and sub-contracting.167 Managers or owners of factories often relinquished or avoided the need to control their workforce by employing gangs or teams of workers under the control of an individual contractor. 168 According to Littler skilled male spinners were "put in charge of machines on the understanding that they paid and recruited their own child assistants". 169 In other words the owner of a factory sometimes did not actually employ workers but merely contracted parts of the factory's activities to independent contractors. The case of the male spinners illustrates this approach but also suggests a way in which traditional patriarchy was introduced into the factory system. The employment of women and children under the direct control of the male head of the household continued the hierarchical relations of traditional patriarchy and allowed these relationships to be grafted into the capitalist enterprise. There is, however, no evidence that this transportation of domestic patriarchy was not approved of by the whole family. The ability to continue working together as a family unit may even have helped overcome "the sordid surroundings and the evils associated" with factory work. 170 This familial construct on the employment experience also needs to be seen within the

165 Ibid. 166 Ibid. p. 6. 167 Littler. (1982) op. cit. p. 65. 168 Hobsbawn, E. (1974) Labouring Men: Studies in the History of Labour. Weidenfeld and Nicolson. London. p. 297. 169 Littler. (1982) op. cit. p. 66. 17°Collier. op. cit. p. 16. 62 context of the growth of management's direct control over the labour process. Initially capitalists relied on "existing forms of subordination and dependency" such as traditional patterns of patriarchal control but these may have come into conflict with managerial authority quicker than other forms of the contract system. 171 Familial relations, even hierarchical ones, may have come to compete with and even challenge the authority and power of managers, particularly at the supervisory level. Although the contract system was still a significant method of labour control in the 1870s it was no longer as firmly based on familial relations. 172 In her analysis of the de-feminisation of the medical profession in Britain Anne Witz made an explicit contribution to explaining the dynamics of patriarchy within a workplace, industry or profession. In outlining how male doctors masculinized the medical profession she argues that patriarchal power structures have developed three strategies to redefine the sexual division of work. These are firstly, the Patriarchal Strategies of Closure, where male power is institutionalised in organisational structures whereby they have the power to influence rule and decision-making. 173 Secondly, Patriarchal Strategies of Exclusion, where "exclusionary practices are directed against actual and potential women practitioners or employees .. [in order] .. to create women as a class of ineligibles". 174 And thirdly, Patriarchal Strategies of Demarcation, where men are able to subordinate surrounding or related jobs to lesser skill, pay or into sex-type jobs which are defined as female. 175 It is probably the first strategy that has most relevance to the sexual division of labour in New South Wales. The other two are useful for understanding the sexual division of labour in professions or in skilled occupations like medicine or printing176 but they are not so obviously helpful in explaining the processes of male domination in New South Wales in the years 1788-1830. During this period skill was too fluid thing to be seized upon by male workers in terms of exclusion or demarcation. Also, the pioneer nature of white settlement in New South Wales during the first decades limited the

171 The contract system lasted in many parts of British industry until the 1870s. See Littler. (1982) op. cit. p. 72. 172 Ibid. pp. 66-69. 173 Witz. op. cit. pp. 16-17. 174 Ibid. p. 17. 175 Ibid. 176 See Cockburn, C. (1983) Brothers: Male Dominance and Technological Change. Pluto Press. London. 63 productive role available to all convict workers, both and male and female. 177 Many traditional or complex industrial skills possessed by male as well as female convicts were not relevant or at least not fully utilised. The nature of most work in New South Wales was very physical and demanded brawn and stamina rather than more subtle or complex skills. Many male convicts were not physically equipped to handle the work demands placed on them as Governor Phillip recognised. 178 On the other hand, the critical needs of the settlement outweighed these limitations and when not actually sick or too weak to move, all male convicts were forced to labour. 179 The same cannot be said for the female convicts for there is little doubt that their labour power was significantly under utilised or even ignored. 180 The reluctance to more fully employ women in New South Wales is apparent from the beginning of settlement and. this is all the more surprising given that hard physical work was a feature of most work, especially agricultural work. In Britain and Ireland and female workers were often engaged along side males in the performance of many gruelling and physical agricultural tasks. 181 Why the female convicts were not allocated to essential but hard physical labour is a central issue in the gender division of work in New South Wales but most feminist historians have seen this as evidence of the forces of patriarchy. 182 However, the situation appears much more complex. The male convicts, for instance, did not exclude the women from their work. The allocation of convicts to work was entirely an administrative decision and, by implication, reflected the priorities, mores and attitudes of a middle class elite. Convict males, closer to the realities of working class life, even agricultural life, probably had a higher expectation of the physical capabilities of women and, indeed also children. On the other hand, it is

177 Noel Butlin argued that until the 1840s the colonial economy of New South Wales demanded a multi or semi-skilled workforce rather than a highly skilled one. Butlin, N. (1994) Forming a Colonial Colony. Cambridge University Press. Melbourne. 178 HRA l Vol. I. Phillip to Grenville, 17 July 1790. p. 195. 179 See/bid. In contrast, by Macquarie's administration, when the dangers of starvation had well and truly passed, the physical and class background of the male convicts were much more explicitly recognised as criteria in their allocation to different work tasks. By 1819 those considered less capable of hard physical work because they were too old, young, infirm, handicapped or simply unused to work were allocated to lighter duties. See Oral Evidence of William Hutchinson, Superintendent of Convicts, to Commissioner Bigge, 1819 in Bonwick Transcript, Box 1. pp. 39770 and 39795. 180 See Oxley, D. (1996) Convict Maids. Cambridge University Press. Melbourne; and Aveling, M. "Gender in Early New South wales Society" in The Push From the Bush. No. 24. April1987. p. 35. 181 See Pinchbeck, I. (1981) Women Workers and the Industrial Revolution 1750-1850. Virago. London. Part 1; and also Ryan, E, and Colon, A. (1989) Gentle Invaders: Australian Women at Work. Penguin. Ringwood. p. 3. 182 Ryan and Conlon. op. cit; Summers, A. (1977) Damned Whores and God's Police. Penguin. Ringwood. Chapters 8 and 9. 64 interesting to speculate on how the male administrators of New South Wales may have perceived the physical capabilities of men and women given that most carne from a military and naval background where there would have been few, if any, female role models. Clearly, conservative, middle class male administrators in New South Wales were more wedded to the notion of "biological determinism" than the working class male convicts. 183 Another factor in the way patriarchal relations operate and are modified is the role and attitudes of women themselves. Angered by inequalities and inspired with a contemporary reform agenda many feminist writers overlook the part played by women in the construct of patriarchy. It is argued here that women, like all workers, are not wholly and utterly powerless in the construction of a gender division of labour but are active, if unequal, partners in its construction. Recognising that women convicts were concentrated in reproductive rather than productive roles, Marian A veling observes that this "saved them from 'working for the government like horses' as men were forced to' do in the hungry years and their survival rate was much higher than the rnen's". 184 Regardless of how active patriarchal values and power structures were in the construction of a gender division of labour the exclusion from hard physical work can hardly be viewed as a disadvantage. The adoption of a reproductive role in colonial New South Wales may, therefore, not have been simply the product of patriarchal attitudes but also the result of a rational preference of the female convicts.

3.7 Conclusion

Given the specific historical context of this study into the management of convict labour not all aspects of these labour process theories discussed above will be relevant. However, each contributes something to the theoretical framework needed to identify the nature of the labour process in New South Wales between 1788 and 1830. In the first instance labour process theory clarifies the nature of the employment relationship. Although convict workers did not sell their labour power, conviction by the British legal system, nevertheless, provided the colonial authorities with it. Having secured convict labour power, managers of convict workers were still faced with the fundamental

183 Ibid. 184 Aveling. M. "Gender in Early New South Wales Society" in The Push from the Bush. No. 24. April 1987. p. 35. 65 problem of how to extract labour use or effort. This was particularly pronounced between 1788 and the early 1820s. In these years colonial managers of government convicts had to utilise the labour of these workers in ways that were productive and efficient. The necessity therefore to extract labour use was very apparent and stimulated the conscious construction of management mechanisms and strategies for doing so. For this reason the models of control offered by Edwards are useful for identifying the nature of the control exerted by colonial management. However, there is little evidence to suggest that management's control was simple. On the contrary it appears to have been a form of bureaucratic control. Although the system of management relied extensively on coercion this was by no means the only mechanism of control. Other structures and incentives, some of considerable complexity and sophistication, were developed. It is evident that many male convicts offered consent in a variety of forms in return for a ticket of leave or other benefits. During the administrations of Governor Macquarie and of Governor Darling the concessions made to some convict workers for their acquiescence to management authority and control, while very different, were quite sophisticated. In this way the Burawoy argument that management control is in part legitimated by the creation of worker consent is a relevant consideration. It also further strengthens the argument that colonial management constructed a complex bureaucratic system to control the labour process. Clearly, labour process theory highlights key issues in the effort to control convict workers. Labour process theory asserts the dynamic nature of the relationship between employer and employee even in a system of coercion. It provides an analytical framework by which the mechanisms of control can be identified over time and explained. In short, labour process theory provides the framework for understanding what the nature of the employment relationship between government and convict workers was, how control of the labour process was organised and why some approaches were adopted or modified over time. Although labour process theory highlights basic characteristics of the way a society organises employment and work it is clear that the role of gender is not so easily accommodated within its framework. As a consequence the concerns of feminist writers with labour process theory has validity. However, the emphasis given to patriarchy as a determinant of the gender division of labour has been exaggerated by some feminists, or at least not satisfactorily explained. Patriarchy is a powerful set of hierarchically orientated attitudes and beliefs that shape the nature of gender relations within a society in favour of males. But, patriarchy needs 66 to be understood as an ideology with a real historical context. That is, the character and structure of patriarchal relations will change over time and be shaped by differing economic and social circumstances. It can be said, therefore, that capitalism did not invent patriarchy but it did create a new species of it, just as it did of class. In addition, the relations between men and women are also important m determining the nature of patriarchy in a society. In this sense patriarchy is not the construct of all males or, more importantly, only males. The role of females in this process is also critical, if inequitably proportioned. Curiously feminism has tended to view women as passive victims of patriarchy rather than as contributors to its character. In contrast, labour process analysis post-Braverman has highlighted the role of worker resistance to capitalist management of work and so given it a more explicit role in the determination Qf the labour process. The emphasis on consent as well as resistance by Burawoy, for example, is relevant to understanding the dynamics of patriarchy. Women resist and accommodate patriarchal relations and in doing so shape its character. The experience of the female convicts in New South Wales during the years under review is not explained by a simple model of patriarchy. They, like their male counterparts, may be viewed as victims of their historical circumstances but they were not passive or powerless victims. They struggled, accommodated and negotiated as well as consented or acquiesced.

67 CHAPTER FOUR

THE SYSTEM OF TRANSPORTATION- AN OVERVIEW

4.1 Introduction

The analysis of the management of the convict worker offered in this thesis will rely not only on historical interpretation but also on the explicit application of the theory of the capitalist labour process. Having said this, it is still necessary to understand key aspects of the convict system as a whole. The following discussion is not, however, a history of the system of transportation. What is needed is simply a sense of the political chronology of the system, the broad policy directives of individual governors and of the British government as well as key events or incidents. Knowledge of these details will assist readers to appreciate the changing context of convict labour management in New South Wales and the forces that propelled those changes.

4.2 Convict numbers and demographics

A pnme dimension of the convict expenence 1s simply the number of convicts transported to New South Wales. Transportation to this colony lasted from 1788 to 1840 during which time 80,440 convicts were sent. 1 On the other hand, over half of the total number of convicts transported to New South Wales arrived between 1788 and 1830, the period examined by this thesis. A.G.L. Shaw estimates that 47,697 convicts were sent from the United Kingdom during these years.2 The vast majority of these convicts were males, 40,497, while only 7,201 were females? However it is also apparent that the number sent per year was not constant but varied considerably. Of the total number transported during these years 14% arrived between 1788 and 1800; 9% between 1801- 1810; 32% between 1811-1820; and, 45% between 1821-1830. Essentially the growth in transportation occurred after the Napoleonic wars. Although the growth in transportation continued until 1840 the patterns and character of convict labour

1 Robson, L. L. (1965) The Convict Settlers ofAustralia: the inquiry into the origin and character ofthe convicts transported to New South Wales and Van Dieman 's Land, 1788-1852. Melbourne University Press. Melbourne. p. 4. 2 Shaw, A. G. L. (1966) Convicts and the Colonies Faber and Faber. London. Appendix: Convicts Transported to Australia. pp. 363-366. 3 Ibid. 68 management that were apparent by 1830 remained essentially unchanged. In this way the period 1788-1830 not only covers the bulk of the history transportation to New South Wales and a large proportion of the convicts, it also details the development and final consolidation of the management of the labour process into a sophisticated and complex system. It is also useful to recognise the importance of convicts to the general population growth of the colony and to its workforce. Noel Budin estimates that convicts or ex­ convicts represented nearly 90% of the total population in 1790; 77% in 1820 and 71% in 1830.4 However the overwhelming masculinity of the convict population meant that the convicts were even more predominant in the workforce. Butlin estimates that the male convicts and ex-convicts comprised around 94% of the colonial workforce in 1800, 90% in 1820 and 88% in 1830. 5 Clearly the male convicts and ex-convicts were extremely central to the character of colonial society and its workforce. Another aspect of transportation that has relevance to the convict labour process is the demographics of the convict population. According to Lloyd Robson about two thirds of the convicts were English or at least tried in England and about one third were Irish. The Scots and the Welsh were not numerous although the latter were often considered the more difficult. Robson quotes a contemporary view as being "A man is banished from Scotland for a great crime, from England for a small one, and from Ireland, morally speaking, for no crime at all."6 Not surprisingly two thirds of all convicts were Protestants and a third were Catholics. In addition, the single most frequent source of the English convicts was London, indicating that a significant number of the convicts were from an urban background. 7 In contrast, most of the Irish convicts were from rural backgrounds or were newly arrived in urban centres. Almost all convicts were working class although there were some "gentlemen convicts".8 Robson offered little on the occupations of the convicts but more recent analysis

4 Butlin, N. (1994) Forming a Colonial Economy: Australia 1810-1850. University of Cambridge Press. Melbourne. pp. 36-37. Note his figures also include Tasmania but the proportions are not likely to be significantly different for the colony ofNew South Wales. See Clark, M. (1985) A History ofAustralia. Vol. 1. Melbourne University Press. Melbourne. p. 151 and Appendix 1; and Hartwell, R. M. "The Pastoral Ascendancy 1820-1850" in Greenwood. G. ( 1968) Australia: a social and political history. Angus and Robertson. Sydney. p. 85. 5 Butlin. op. cit. pp. 39-40. 6 Robson. op. cit. p. 10. 7 Ibid. 17% of all convicts transported between 1788-1853 were from London but about 27% of all those transported before 181 0 came from London. 8 Evidence of William Hutchinson, Principal Superintendent of Convicts, to Commissioner Bigge, 1819, and contained in the Bonwick Transcripts. Box 1. 69 conducted by Stephen Nicholas and Peter Shergold and by Deborah Oxley suggest a greater incidence and mix of skill amongst the convicts than has been recognised in the past.9 All of these demographic issues are important because they highlight the significant differences between the convicts. Robson argues for example that the gulf between the rural and urban convicts was as great as that between the Irish and the English. 10 The convicts were not a homogeneous working class but were disparate parts of differing working classes thrown together by social and legal circumstances. These divisions also partly explain their apparent lack of working class solidarity11 but make even more remarkable the attempts they did make. 12

4.3 The policy of transportation

British policy toward transportation and ultimately New South Wales was also important. Although New South Wales had been claimed by the British Crown in 1770, its settlement and use as a penal colony was stimulated largely (and slowly) by the loss of the American colonies in 1776. 13 The colonies of America had long been used as a destination for convicted British felons but with independence a new colony had to be found. 14 The failure of the Hulk system of incarceration in which convicts were accommodated in old moored ships and sent to work on shore and the high cost of constructing more effective prisons also encouraged transportation as a penal policy. 15 While there were certainly strategic and economic reasons for settlement in New South Wales there can be no doubt that transportation of convicts was a primary motive. 16 In response to what was perceived as a rising crime wave17 caused by social unrest and

9 Njcholas, S. and Shergold, P. "Convicts as Workers" in Nicholas, S. (ed) (1989) Convict Workers: reinterpreting Australia's past. Cambridge University Press. Melbourne. pp. 62-84; and Oxley, D. (1996) Convict Maids: the forced migration ofwomen to Australia. Cambridge University Press. Melbourne. 10 Robson. op. cit. pp. 10-11. II See The Oral Evidence of Major Druitt, Chief Engineer, to Commissioner Bigge in Ritchie, J. (ed) (1971) The Evidence to the Bigge Reports. Vol. 1. Heinemann. Melbourne. p. 28; and also McQueen. H. "Convicts and Rebels" in Labour History. Vol. 15, November 1968. pp. 3-30. I2 See for example Druitt. op. cit. p. 34; and Chapter 5 below. IJ Evans, L. and Thorpe, P. (eds) (1976) Convicts and Colonial Society 1788-1853. Cassell Australia. p. 6 andp. 17. I4 Robson. op.cit. pp. 5-6. IS Evans and Thorpe. op. cit. p. 6. I6 Frost, A. (1980) Convicts and Empire: a naval question 1788-1811. Oxford University Press. Melbourne; and also Meredith, D. "Full Circle? Contemporary Views on Transportation" in Nicholas. op. cit. pp. 14- 27. I? Tobias, J. (1972) Crime and Industrial Society in the Nineteenth Century. Penguin. Harmondsworth; Sturma, M. (1983) Vice in a Vicious Society. Queensland University Press. St. Lucia; and Grabosky, P. N. 70 dislocation, the British criminal code had been made more and more ferocious in its response. 18 By 1788 there were around 200 capital offences while many seemingly minor or property related crimes were punished with the severity of exile or banishment. 19 Interestingly the crime of prostitution was not punishable by transportation and so while many middle class administrators and settlers commonly described the female convicts as prostitutes, legally this was not accurate. While harsh laws were a widely accepted response to crime m eighteenth century Britain the effectiveness of transportation was less accepted.20 The decision to transport criminals to New South Wales in the first and subsequent fleets was taken in the face of growing intellectual opposition. One of the most notable opponents of transportation was Jeremy Bentham who proposed the construction of modem reformatory prisons.21 In these Panopticon prisons intensive and seemingly constant supervision, rigid routines, education, training and labour would all be utilised in ways that would reform prisoners and save rrioney. 22 Bentham's arguments, however, fell on deaf ears in 1788 for British government policy remained firmly in favour of banishment with labour. But, as will be seen, reformist zeal and cost sensitivity emerged more powerfully by the end of the Macquarie era ( 1810-1821) and complicated and even curtailed his administration?3

4.4 Role of the Governor

The political and administrative role of the position of governor in New South Wales was critical in the development of convict labour management. The position of governor was extremely powerful. For instance, Ralph Clark and Arthur Bowes Smyth were shocked at the autocratic powers given to Governor Phillip?4 These powers were only

(1977) Sydney in Ferment: crime, dissent and official reaction 1788-1973. Australian National University Press. Canberra. 18 Evans and Thorpe. op. cit. p. 6. ., 19 Hughes, R. (1987) The Fatal Shore. Pan Books. London. pp. 28-29. 20 Evans and Thorpe. op. cit. pp. 17-19. 21 Foucault, M. (1995) Discipline and Punish: the birth ofthe Prison. Vintage Books. New York. 22 See Bentham, J. -submission to Report from the Committee on the Laws Relating to Penitentiary Houses. Facsimile edition 1969. British Parliamentary Papers. Crime and Punishment. Transportation. Vol. 1, 1810-1832. Irish University Press. Shannon. Appendix 3. pp. 98-99; and also Daniels, K. (1998) Convict Women. Allen and Unwin. Melbourne. pp. 103-105. 23 See Hirst, J. (l983)Convict Society and its Enemies. Allen and Unwin. Melbourne. Chapter 1. 24 See Hughes. op. cit. p. 89. Footnote 14; and also Australian Dictionary ofBiography. Vols. 1 & 2, Shaw, A. G. L. and Clark, C. M. H. (eds) Melbourne University Press. Melbourne. Ralph Clark was a 1st Fleet Marine Officer while Smyth was the Surgeon on the 1st Fleet ship Lady Penrhyn. 71 slowly reduced over time.25 However, by the latter period of this thesis Governor Darling (1825-1831) increasingly shared power with a quasi-colonial cabinet,26 while in practice nearly all governors delegated and consulted with leading bureaucrats and citizens. Of the governor's powers the one of particular significance to this thesis is the fact the labour power of convicts was explicitly given to the governor to dispose of or utilise as he saw fit. 27 This provision provided an important contrast to the labour process that was apparent during transportation to the American colonies. In the latter case the labour power of convicts was transferred to private agents who "sold" convict labour power to free settlers or anyone who could purchase it. 28 In New South Wales convict labour power was always held by the crown through the governor even when a convict was assigned to a free settler. 29 This feature alone ensured that the transportation system was distinct from slavery30 while it probably helped empower convict workers more significantly than they had been in the American colonies. Although the power of the position of governor was extensive the personal impact each governor had on colonial development or the convict labour process varied considerably. Between 1788-1830 there were seven governors ofNew South Wales and two periods of interregnum administrations.31 Understanding the chronology of the governors is useful in understanding the contribution of each and in establishing the evolution of the convict labour process generally. The first governor was Arthur Phillip (1788-1792) whose prime responsibility was the construction of a basic settlement. In doing this the primacy of convict labour was immediately established as were a range of management strategies such as Task Work (a quota ofwork).32 Phillip was followed by the caretaker administrations of Lieutenant-Governor Francis Grose (1792-1794) and Lieutenant-Governor William Paterson (1794-1795). The second governor was John Hunter (1795-1800) and the third was Phillip Gidley King (1800-1806) both of whom

25 See Byrne, P. J. (1993) Criminal Law and Colonial Subject, NSW 1810-1830. Cambridge University Press. Melbourne. p. 21; and see Neal, D. (1991) The Rule ofLaw in a Penal Colony. Cambridge University Press. Melbourne. p. 21. 26 Fletcher, B. (1984) Ralph Darling: a Governor maligned. Oxford University Press. Melbourne. pp. 86- 102. 27 Byrne. op. cit. p. 20. 28 Ibid. 29 Coghlan, T. A. (1969) Labour and Industry in Australia. Macmillan. Melbourne. p. 34; and Evans and Thorpe. op. cit. p. 7. 30 See Hirst. op. cit. pp. 78-95 and contrast his views with Neal. op. cit. pp. 44-49. 31 See Fitzpatrick, B. (1946) The Australian people, 1788-1945. Melbourne University Press. Melbourne. Appendix 1. 32 See Robbins, B. "Contested Terrain: the Convict Task Work System, 1788-1830" in Markey, R. (ed) (2001) Community and Labour: historical essays. Wollongong University Press. Wollongong. pp. 30-45. 72 increased the public employment of convicts and began to formalise the system of gang labour. The fourth was William Bligh (1806-1810) although his administration was interrupted by the rebellion of some senior officers of the NSW Corp in 1808.33 Bligh opposed and attempted to regulate the highly profitable trade in rum by members of the NSW Corp and as a consequence was arrested by a group of rebel officers. Colonial administration was taken over by George Johnston (January 1808-July 1808), Joseph Foveaux (July 1808- September 1809) and finally William Paterson (September 1809- December 1809). The fifth and arguably the most influential of all governors was Lachlan Macquarie (1810-1821); followed by the sixth, Thomas Brisbane (1821-1825) and the seventh governor, Ralph Darling ( 1825-1831 ). While the impact of each governor on the development of the convict labour process was important the most significant roles were those played by Macquarie and Darling. During their administrations the transportation system grew rapidly,34 creating critical labour management issues. As will be argued later in this thesis, both governors constructed elaborate systems of labour management and each were also deeply concerned with convict motivation. Macquarie saw the need to stimulate productivity and offered a wide range of rewards, most notably pardons, conditional pardons and tickets-of-leave. The latter allowed convicts limited but significant freedom. 35 Darling on the other hand was much more concerned with controlling the behaviour of the convict population than its productivity as a workforce and he did this most obviously by creating a greater and more severe range of negative motivators. Indeed under Darling the public gang system was explicitly designed to punish and discourage crime. 36 In contrast Macquarie had been personally committed to infrastructure construction and this also gave his administration a distinct interest in and concern with convict labour productivity and management.

33 This incident is commonly referred to as the Rum Rebellion. See Evatt, H. V. (1965) Rum Rebellion. Angus and Robertson. Sydney. 34 See Shaw. op. cit. pp. 363-368. 35 See Evans and Thorpe. op. cit. p. 17. 36 See Chapter 5 below. 73 4.5 The Bigge Inquiry

The Macquarie administration was also distinguished by the fact that it stimulated one of the most important contemporary analyses of the convict system.37 While Macquarie's system of convict labour management grew increasingly complex and sophisticated his allocation and utilisation of skilled convicts also began to conflict with the interests of some free settlers such as John Macarthur and the Reverend Samuel Marsden. 38 Referred to as "Exclusives" because of their attitude of social superiority toward convicts and ex-convicts (the "Emancipists"/9 these powerful settlers increasingly opposed Macquarie's social reforms and his management of the convict workforce. More importantly, their criticisms were conveyed to a receptive British govel11Il;lent that was, by 1818, also alarmed at the cost of the settlement and the apparent failure of transportation to deter crime in Britain.40 As a consequence the British government sent John Thomas Bigge to the colony in 1819 to conduct an inquiry into the state of the colony and the administration of the convict system.41 Bigge spent two years in the colony and wrote three reports which were published in 1822 and 1823.42 These looked at the general convict system, the judicial system and the state of agriculture. The first volume is of most importance to analysis of the convict labour process and will be commonly referred to as the Bigge Report. Although this Report was not an impartial document, for his brief predisposed him to take a critical view of Macquarie's administration,43 it is nevertheless, a vital source of insight into the convict labour process in 1820. Bigge recorded and evaluated the quality of convict administration, the effectiveness of work organisation, the quality and effectiveness of convict supervision, the productivity of convict workers and the intensity of their labour. With insights like these the Bigge Report should be seen not

37 The two other notable inquiries were the Report from the Select Committee on Transportation 1812. op. cit.; and Report from the Select Committee ofthe House of Commons on Transportation. Sir W. Molesworth. 1838. Facsimile edition 1967. State Library of South Australia. Adelaide. Neither of these reports were as astute as Bigge's but rather transparently pushed a contemporary political agenda; see also Meredith. op.cit. 38 John Macarthur was an Officer of the NSW Corp and became a prominent free settler and land holder while Rev Marsden was the principal religious minister from the mid 1790s until the early 1830s. See Barnes, A. R. and Homer. J. C. (1970) A Dictionary ofAustralian History. Cassell. Melbourne. 39 The Emancipists were ex-convicts. See Neal. op. cit. pp. 18-20. 40 See Historical Records of Australia. (hereafter HRA) Series 1. Vol. XII. Bathurst to Darling. 24 September 1826. pp. 584. 41 See Ritchie, J. (1970) Punishment and Profit. Heinemann. Melbourne. 42 Barnes and Horner. op. cit. pp. 17-18.

74 only as a social, political and economic analysis of New South Wales but as the first management analysis of work in Australian history. Essentially Bigge reached the conclusions demanded by the British government and he made recommendations, implemented by Brisbane and later Darling, that significantly re-organised the convict labour process.44 These changes involved the dismantling of the public system of convict employment, the wholesale assignment of convicts to free settlers and a general increase in the severity of convict punishment.45 Assignment of convicts was the practice of allocating convicts as workers to individual free or emancipist settlers. The private settler was obliged to feed, clothe and accommodate the assigned convict in ways consistent with government regulations in return for government regulation hours of work or Task Work quantities. The private employer of assigned convicts possessed extensive powers over their convicts but this power may have, until the early 1820s, been slightly less than that enjoyed by employers of free labour. 46 Convicts had a number of inalienable rights such as hours of work, wages and rations while they could not be flogged by an employer without a formal hearing before a Magistrate and could not be easily returned to the government. Labour, even hostile convict labour, was in relatively short supply until about 1820 while return to public employment was rarely considered a punishment by the convicts. Returning convicts to the government or mistreating them also reduced the likelihood of getting other convicts assigned. Assignment was always used by colonial Governors, partly as a reward and partly to reduce cost but after the Bigge Report assignment was greatly increased.47 According to Coghlan, for every ten convict employed by the government in 1820 six convicts were assigned while by 1827 for every ten in government employment 26 were assigned to private settlers.48 However not only did the Bigge report dramatically increase assignment of convict labourers to free settlers it also reduced the cost of transportation to the British government. It transferred public sector cost to the private sector. Of course for this transference to be acceptable and successful the reputation of

43 See Bigge, J. T. (1823) Report ofthe·Commissioner ofInquiry into the state ofthe Colony ofNew South Wales. Vol. 1, Facsimile edition 1966. Libraries Board of South Australia. Adelaide. pp. 1-6. 44 Evans and Thorpe. op. cit. p. 8. 45 These issues will discussed in greater detail in Chapter 5 below. 46 Quinlan, M. "Industrial Relations Before Unions: New South Wales Seamen 1810-1852" in Journal of Industrial Relations. Vol. 38, No.2, June 1996. pp. 264-265. 47 Coghlan. op. cit. p. 25. 48 Ibid. p. 180. 75 public employment, particularly in the gangs, needed to be transformed. Under Macquarie's productivity emphasis much gang work was organised and performed in ways that were relatively benign. For this reason Darling needed to brutalise the public employment of convicts. He needed to make it a measurably more terrifying experience in order to deter crime in Britain and in New South Wales and to strengthen the managerial prerogative of private settlers. Clearly the reasoning was that if employment in a government gang was unpleasant then assigned convicts would be more inclined to co-operate with their private employer. In this way, after the Bigge inquiry the importance of the management of the convict labour process by the colonial government was reduced and responsibility for it was increasingly transferred to individual free settlers.

4.6 The problem of coercion

The state did possess greater coercive powers than free employers but the reliance on physical punishment can be easily distorted if not exaggerated. Firstly, there are very few surviving records of the incidence of flogging before the mid 1820s49 and so the significance of flogging cannot now be accurately quantified. Although there appears to be more evidence on flogging in the late 1820s and particularly the 1830s these figures cannot be transposed to the pre-1822 period. There are accounts of considerable savagery in the first decade of white settlement, severe sentences of flogging or even hanging, but most of these incidences seem to have related to the control of pilfering during the period of near-starvation or were punishment for rebellion. 5° Flogging was not greatly used by Governor Phillip for example, to control the convicts as workers, to induce them to their labours, but it was obviously used to dissuade them from theft of food. In this respect it would also seem that the weight of coercion also fell as heavily on marines caught stealing food as it did on convicts.51 Secondly, while there are no reliable or extensive records of flogging for any labour control purpose in the first decades of the 1800s, Governor Macquarie certainly curtailed its savagery. He limited the number of lashes a single magistrate could order (for any reason) to either 25 or 50

49 See Byrne. op. cit. p. 25. 5° Clark. op. cit. pp. 114-115, 119 and 121; and also Hunter, Cpt. John. (1793) An Historical Journal 1787-1792. Facsimile edition 1968. Angus and Robertson and Royal Australian Historical Society. pp. 243-244, 246 and 265-266.

76 lashes and this was seen as a mitigation of corporal punishment. 52 Thirdly, that flogging became more systematic and savage after Macquarie should be no surprise. Governors Brisbane and Darling were explicitly concerned with transforming the convict experience. Darling in particular was determined to make transportation and public labour a punitive exercise. During his administration the re-organisation of the penal system of public labour was designed to inflict punishment on all convicts and to deter crime in Britain.53 In other words the function of flogging was no longer explicitly concerned with the motivation and control of a workforce but was part of an indiscriminate campaign to terrorise the convict experience generally. Finally, the question of flogging and other forms of physical punishment also need to be understood within the broader context of British society throughout these years. British society, despite signs of an emerging enlightened humanitarianism, 54 was fundamentally brutal. In 1788 public flogging was still commonplace in British civil society while it was utterly endemic to the military and naval services.55 Irideed there is strong evidence to indicate that flogging was a more systematic and enduring feature of service by ordinary seamen in the British navy than it was for convicts transported to New South Wales before 1822.56 But more than this, the brutality of life for ordinary

British workers can be found in many other forms. 57 For instance, hours of work for free labour in the British factory system were higher and generally increased faster than those worked by convicts58 while factory work was, until the Factory Acts59, reliant on

51 See Moore, J. (1987) The First Fleet Marines. University of Queensland Press. St Lucia. pp 207 and 211. 52 See HRA I. Vol. VII. Macquarie to Liverpool, 18 October 1811, Enclosure No. 9: Police Regulations, Section 6. p. 410; Druitt. op. cit. pp. 36-37; and see also Barnard, M. (1961) Macquarie's World. Melbourne University Press. Melbourne. pp. 116-117. 53 Successful as he was in generating a new terror, Darling initially intended to impose an even more vigorous regime. See HRA 1. Vol. XIII. Darling to Bathurst, 1 March 1827. p. 139, where he explained that originally he had planned to work "all Convicts in Irons on the public works for a certain period after their arrival". The convicts were then to be assigned to free settlers on the understanding that they would be sent back to work in irons if they misbehaved. It was simply the shortage of labour that forced him to assign the convicts without first tasting his public work gangs. 54 Perkin, H. (1971) The Origins ofModern English Society 1780-1880. Routledge & Kegan Paul. London. Chapters 6 and 7; Evans, E. J. (1986) The Forging ofthe Modern State: early industrial Britain. Longman. London. pp. 122-124; and see also Robertson, G. (2000) Crimes Against Humanity: the struggle for global justice. Penguin. Ringwood. pp. 11-16. 55 See Scott, G.F. (1996) The History of Corporal Punishment. Senate. London. Part 2. 56 Ibid. pp. 70-79; Bigge. op. cit. p. 35; and see also Dening, G. (1994) Mr Bligh's Bad Language. Canto. Melbourne. 57 See Engels, F. (1969) The Condition of the Working Class in England. Panther. London; and see also Hobsbawn, E. (1974) Labouring Men: Studies in the History ofLabour. Weidenfeld and Nicolson. London. 58 Nicholas, S. "Care and Feeding of Convicts" in Nicholas. op. cit. pp. 187-189; and also Rule, J. (1986) The Labouring Classes in Early Industrial England 1750-1850. Longman. London. pp. 132-135. 77 the exploitation of child labour in ways that would horrify modem sensibilities. 60 A society that felt no difficulty with employing children to crawl up chimneys 61 was not one that created a uniquely brutal convict system. Brutality, as modem sensibilities might now define it, was an institutionalised feature of the society that settled and maintained the penal colony in New South Wales. Having said this, of course there is no doubt that flogging or the threat of flogging was part of the armoury of labour control in New South Wales. It was a way that managers of convict labour endeavoured to control and coerce convicts to their labours. But, restrictions on its use by all employers of convict labour (both public and private) as well as variations in its use, particularly during Macquarie's administration, indicates inherent limitations in it as a motivating mechanism. Unlike slave societies no employer of convicts in New South Wales was able to flog a convict without recourse to the legal system. 62 Only Magistrates or the Governor could legally order convicts to be flogged. This complicated the use of corporal punishment and even allowed, however muted, convicts to defend themselves. 63 It has been suggested that the magisterial system was biased against the convicts because most were employers of labour but this was not a feature unique to New South Wales. 64 The entire British legal system would have reflected a similar class bias. 65 The notion that flogging was a wholly terrorising control mechanism can also be substantially challenged. For example, there is evidence that up to 1822 assigned convicts who did not like working for a private settler or who wanted to be re-employed in the public sector were at times prepared to suffer flogging to facilitate a change in employer. 66 This inclination surely complicates the perception of flogging as an all­ encompassing brutality. For some convicts flogging was accepted as the cost of changing their employer. There is also evidence that during Macquarie's administration senior managers understood the limitations associated with flogging or other forms of

59 For a discussion of the Factory Acts see Ashton, T. (1972) The Industrial Revolution 1760-1830. Oxford University Press. London. p. 140; and Evans. op. cit. p.385. 60 See Evans. op. cit. pp. 122-124 and pp. 228-231. 61 Hammond, J.L. and B. (1947) The Town Labourer, 1760-1832. Guild Books. London. pp. 11-25. 62 See Report from the Select Committee on Transportation, 1812. op. cit. pp. 11-12. 63 See Ibid. and Macintyre, S. (1999) A Concise History ofAustralia. Cambridge University Press. Melbourne. pp. 44-45. 64 Macintyre, S. ( 1985) Winners and Losers: the pursuit ofsocial justice in Australian history. Allen and Unwin. Sydney. p. 3 for an example of this view. Interestingly Neal. op. cit. does not significantly pursue this perspective, see his chapter 5. 65 See Rule. (1986) op. cit. p. 285; Fox. op. cit. p. 40; and Thompson, E.P. op. cit. pp. 563-569. 66 See Bigge. op. cit. pp. 32 and 56. 78 coercive controls. Flogging damaged scarce labour while at times it merely entrenched convict hostility.67 Before 1822 flogging and other forms of corporal punishment must be seen not as a dominant labour control mechanism but one of many.

4. 7 Conclusion

As Nicholas and Shergold emphasise, the transportation of convicts to New South Wales was a highly significant part of the nineteenth century global system of labour migration.68 But more than this, the convicts transported during the years examined in this thesis were absolutely critical to the formation of the first modem work force in Australia. Convicts and ex-convicts consistently represented around 90% of the whole workforce. The dependence of colonial society on the labour power of the convicts, at least until the early 1820s, demanded administrative efforts from colonial governor$ to make convict labour productive. For this reason the economic objectives of each governor and the effectiveness of their administrative structures and procedures were critical. In addition, the general scarcity of labour also offered convict workers significant influence over the struggle to extract labour effort. The labour process was therefore constructed by economic need, administrative efficiency and by the interaction between convict labourers and their managers. However, in addition to other considerations it was the very real influence the convicts had over the labour process that encouraged the British government to review transportation and colonial administration in 1819. The consequential inquiry by Commissioner Bigge therefore produced a detailed analysis of significant aspects of the colonial labour process and recommended a new blue print for penal, economic and social development. The publication of the Bigge Report and the recall of Governor Macquarie represent a clear watershed in the development of the colonial labour process. The objectives and administrative mechanisms adopted after 1822 changed and, most importantly, confronted the ability of convict workers to shape and modify the labour process.

67 Evidence of William Hutchinson. op. cit. p. 39773 and p. 39795. 68 Nicholas, S. and Shergold, P. "Unshackling the Past" in Nicholas. op. cit. p. 7. 79 CHAPTER FIVE

CONTROL AND RESISTANCE: A CASE STUDY OF THE GANG SYSTEM 1788-1830

5.1 Introduction

The system of organising convicts into labour gangs is extremely important in the study of the employment of convicts by colonial authorities in NSW and in understanding the nature of the management of convict labour generally. The gang was an early and enduring method of organising male convict workers. Large numbers of male convicts were allocated to gangs. In 1820 around 20% of the total convict workforce was allocated to a gang and some 95% of all male convicts in government employment performed work in a gang. 1 Understanding the nature of the gang system will therefore shed light on the way many male convicts were employed. But more than this, the gang system also offers insight into the nature of colonial economic activity and its labour process. The purpose of the gang system varied between 1788-1830, reflecting changing economic circumstances and management strategies as well as British government policy objectives. However, the early 1820s are the watershed. Prior to this date the gang system was rationally organised in terms of task and skill, while it explicitly addressed the perennial problems of insufficient numbers and quality of overseers. After 1822 the purpose of the gangs became more explicitly driven by the rationale of punishment and control. This reflected the changed policy directives of a British government increasingly concerned with the cost of transportation, with deterrence of crime in Britain and with the reformation of convicts in Australia? As a consequence the gang system became (with the exception of the Clearing Gangs) much less an instrument of raising or maintaining labour productivity and became a mechanism in the deliberate terrorisation of the convict experience. This chapter will endeavour to redress the perception of the gangs as inherently cruel by detailing and analysing their evolution in NSW from 1788 to 1830. In doing this the following analysis will focus on the size of the gang system, the nature of gang work and the structure of administration, control and supervision. Over time these

1 See Coghlan, T .A. ( 1969) Labour and Industry in Australia: from the first settlement in 1788 to the establishment ofthe Commonwealth in 1901. Volume I. Macmillan. Melbourne. p. 47. 2 Ibid. pp. 178-179. 80 features of the gang system varied considerably and in order to trace these changes a time-line analysis is also necessary. This chapter will contribute not only to a better understanding of the convict work experience but also to a more complex appreciation of the changing nature of the control and management of the labour process for a highly significant number of convicts.

5.2 Size of the gang system

The formation of work gangs seems apparent from the outset of white settlement at Sydney Cove and this collective organisation of work was necessitated by the circumstances of settlement. Governor Phillip (1788- 1792) faced massive labour force problems from the moment settlement began. He had insufficient numbers of convicts experienced in or familiar with farming3, no experienced supervisors4 and a military unwilling to perform this duty. 5 To make things worse the colony faced a severe and persistent shortage of food that affected labour productivity because hours of labour had to be significantly reduced. 6 Lack of food supplies also had another effect. In order to supplement Government rations convicts were encouraged to cultivate a small vegetable plot for themselves and to hire themselves out to cultivate food and fodder for the Officers and others.7 This requirement meant it was "necessary to permit. .. the convicts to work for the officers" and themselves for a part of each day. 8In addition, the basic technology brought by the First Fleet was found to be deficient and unsuited to local conditions. Phillip described "most of the axes, spades, and shovels the worst ever were seen."9 This certainly hampered work and labour productivity. But, in terms of his basic control of the colonial bureaucracy Phillip was also at a disadvantage. He had little official documentation on the convicts under his control and so was unsure of their occupations and skills or even when their sentences expired. 10

3 Historical Records ofAustralia Series I. (hereafter referred to as HRA I) Vol I. Phillip to Grenville, 17 July 1790. p. 195 4 Ibid. p. 196. 5 See Moore, J. (1987) The First Fleet Marines. University of Queensland Press. St. Lucia. p. 134. 6 HRA I. Vol. I. Phillip to Nepean, 29 March 1792. p. 345 7 Ibid. Phillip to Sydney, 15 May 1788. pp. 22-23. 8 Ibid. p. 22. 9 Ibid. Phillip to Nepean. 9 July 1788. pp. 56-57. 10 Ibid. p. 57. 81 However, in Phillip's perception his worst labour force difficulty was the general quality of the convict workers. Writing in mid 1790 to Lord Grenville, Secretary of State, Phillip complained:

Experience, sir, has taught me how difficult it is to make men industrious who have passed their lives in habits of vice and indolence. In some cases it has been found impossible; neither kindness nor severity have any effect; and tho' I can say that the convicts in general behave well, there are many who dread punishment less than they fear labour; and those who have not been brought up to hard work, which are by far the greatest part, bear it badly. They shrink from it the moment the eye of the overseer is turned from them. 11

This perception that the convicts as a whole were not "industrious" and lacked the habits of regular labour was a widely held and persistent view. 12 However, neither Phillip's complaints nor those which persist in later decades should be seen simply as a reflection of the quality and motivation of Australia's convict labour force. Similar complaints were commonplace amongst the employers of free labour in Britain well into the nineteenth centuryY The acquisition of habits of regular labour, time­ consciousness, diligence and acquisitive consumer behaviour by free workers in British industrial society was a key social, political and economic struggle. 14 In other words, convict workers in New South Wales must be seen in the context of widespread worker indifference or resistance to the demands made by employers in industrialising capitalist societies. Phillip built no "dark satanic mills" but he wanted a level or type of motivation from his convict workers that was alien to them or to which they harboured covert if not open hostility. It is argued here that the nature of the work demanded by a new settlement to accommodate and feed itself as well as the character of its workforce encouraged work to be organised into gangs or collective parties of labourers. Although Phillip does not use the term "gang" it is clear from his General Muster of Convicts in mid 1790 that

II Ibid. p. 195. 12 See for example Blainey, G. (1980) A Land Half Won. Macmillan. South Melbourne. p. 37. 13 See Thompson, E.P. (1972) The Making of the English Working Class. Penguin. Harmondsworth. pp. 247, 292, 397-398 and 473.

82 much of the work performed in the early years at Sydney was organised into collective groups. Brick and tile making, transporting bricks, unloading ships, road making, timber fetching and gardening were clearly all organised into large or small work

groups and engaged 57% of the fit male convict workforce 15 • Other jobs, such as bricklaying, some carpentry, the sawing of timber and stone masonry also probably involved the co-operative organisation of small groups of workers for at least some of the time. Bricklayers, for instance, worked in a team of skilled and unskilled, as did many of the carpenters16• Similarly most of the male convicts working at Rose Hill (Parramatta) at this time were also organised into collective work groups. Over 60% of them were employed together in clearing and cultivating land. 17 The first official reference to the term "gang" was made in 1796 by Governor Hunter (1795-1800) when he wrote, "We have now a gang of .people employed collecting sea-shells."18 The Shell Gang, as will be seen, became an enduring fixture in the gang system and generally seems to have employed around 40 men. It was clearly very necessary work but often very unpleasant and as such became associated with punishment. 19 Women were also initially employed in this work during Phillip's administration. 20 By the end of the 1790s the term, "gang" was commonly used in reference to the permanent organisation of convicts into work groups. For example, the Agriculture Gang at Parramatta, the Town Gang, the Goal Gang and the Shell Gang were officially identified from 1800 through to 1825.21 Other trades or occupationally distinct activities were also clearly organised into gangs although sometimes not officially designated as such until about 1813 .Z2 These included most building trades, metalworking trades, road making, boat crews, carting and mining. Essentially these were activities where, by the nature of the work, there was scope or a necessity to

14 See Ibid; and also Pollard, S. (1968) The Genesis of Modern Management. Penguin. Harmondsworth. pp. 189-244. 15 HRA I. Vol. I. Enclosure, Phillip to Grenville. 23 July 1790. pp. 199-200. 16 Ibid. p. 199. 17 Ibid. pp. 199-200. 18 Ibid. Hunter to Portland. 12 November 1796. pp. 675-676. The shells were burnt into lime in order to produce cement. Gibbons, G. S. "Sources of Lime Mortar for Colonial Sydney" in Industria! and Historical Archaeology. (1981) National Trust of Australia (NSW) Sydney. pp. 60-61. 19 See oral evidence of Major Druitt to Bigge Inquiry contained in Ritchie, J. (ed) (1971) The Evidence to the Bigge Reports. Vol. 1. Heinemann. Melbourne. p. 28. (Hereafter referred to as Druitt). 20 Tench, W. (1789) Sydney's First Four Years, Facsimile edition 1961, Annotated by Fitzhardinge, L.F. Angus and Robertson, Sydney, p. 72; and Heney, H. (1978) Australia's Founding Mothers. Nelson. Melbourne. p. 45. 21 For example see HRA I Vols II to XI.

83 orgamse groups of workers to perform the work. It may also have been due to traditional work practices or to a lack of technology. Most manual work was organised into gangs and even most skilled trades required, if not gangs, then at least teams of workers, usually a skilled convict worker supported by one or more unskilled convicts. From the 1800 General Muster it is clear that approximately 63% of all male convicts employed in Sydney by the government in a non-servant capacity were employed in groups, teams or gangs of convict workers. 23 As Table 5.1 indicates, by 1800 the size and organisation of the gang system was significant. Vitally concerned with labour productivity, the gangs were improved by a more formal and permanent organisation?4 This re-organisation was, to some extent, stimulated by the disarray of public employment that ensued after Phillip's departure. Under the interregnum administrations of Grose (1792-1794) and Paterson (1794-1795) public sector gang employment probably declined in favour of assignment to the private sector. At the end of 1796 Governor Hunter complained to the Duke of Portland, British Secretary of State, that the growth in assignment to free settlers prior to his appointment "had reduced our numbers to work for the public so very low that when I arrived we could scarcely call together twenty [convicts] for any public purpose at Sydney".25 Hunter clawed back a number of assigned convicts but, more significantly, reduced the assignment of newly arrived convicts. He achieved the latter by making assignment more expensive and more strictly regulated. 26

22 HRA I Vol. VII. Enclosure No.7, 28 June 1813. pp. 748-749. 23 HRA I Vol. II. Hunter to Portland, 28 September 1800. pp. 615-616. 24 Ibid. p. 616. 25 HRA I Vol. I. Hunter to Portland, 12 November 1796. p. 667. Hunter also recounted that when discovering there were insufficient convicts in Sydney to actually unload the storeship Ceres he ordered "that three men from each farm having ten, be immediately sent in for this purpose". See Ibid. p. 686. 26 See HRA I. Vol. II. General Orders 1, 2 & 3 Oct 1800. pp. 622-624. 84 Table 5.1 Male Workforce of Gangs and Total Number of Convicts Maintained by Government For New South Wales Various dates

Date No. Gang Total No. Convicts Govt. Cons 1790 360 908 1800 772 1276 1820 2297 2631 1821 2843 4031 1825 2525 5000 1827 2777 4313 1828 2784 5004 1829 2692 4879

Source: HRA I Vols. 1, 2, 3, 7, 8, 11 and CO 201/119 Reel106-107

Governor King (1800-1806), Hunter's successor, continued to refine the employment of the convict gangs as well as the assignment of convicts to free settlers.27 The gangs continued to be forni.alised and increased in size28 although the diligence of the convicts and the quality of the overseers continued to be a problem. The convicts still required "constant and unremitted attention to make their labour the least beneficial"29 while the overseers were considered "not much better".30 The poor quality of the supervision was due, according to King, in large measure to the inadequacy of the rewards he could offer them.31 Maintaining if not improving the productivity of the gangs continued to be exacerbated by some free settlers "attempting to obtain the labour of some of the servants of Government employed at the harvest, by offering them very high rewards".32 While King had some limited impact on the regulation of the labour market he had even less success in controlling other aspects of colonial life, most notably the economic power and influence of a number of prominent free settlers and military

21 See HRA I. III. Enclosure Number 3, King to Portland, 30 June 1801 pp. 155-156 and Government Order 6 February 1802 pp. 472-473. 28 HRA I Vol. III. Hunter to Portland, 10 March 1801. Enclosure No. 6. p. 27, 30 June 1801, Enclosure No.3. pp 155-156 and King to Portland, 1 March 1802. p 423. 29 Ibid. p. 424. 30 Ibid. 31 Ibid.

85 officers. It was their influence which was to dominate and ultimately defeat the governorship of William Bligh (1806-181 0). Evidence that the gang system despite some reform by King was not functioning effectively when Bligh arrived is apparent from the state of the public buildings and enterprises in Sydney. In a dispatch Bligh enclosed a detailed analysis of the state of repair of all government buildings in 1806, which made clear the extent of decay and neglect. 33 Bligh's mixed success in redressing these problems was probably not a reflection of the abilities of the gang system as a whole. There was a severe shortage oflabour.34 This shortage is not surprising given the consistently low number of convicts transported to New South Wales after 1803 (and until 1813).35 Lack of labour rather than the quality of its organisation or supervision was the most obvious constraint on labour productivity although a contributing factor was the poor quality of the convict workers themselves. They did not "readily leave off the evil ways"36 they were accustomed to but retained "their vicious habits" of crime and lack of industry. 37 After Bligh's overthrow, the rebel administrations of Johnstone, Foveaux and Paterson ( 1808-1809), advanced the interests of the larger free settlers. This involved the distribution of large tracts of land to the co-conspirators and to an increase in the assignment of convicts to private employers. 38 As the number of convicts arriving in New South Wales did not significantly increase during this time it can be assumed the gang system probably declined in size.39 With the arrival of Governor Macquarie (1810-1821) a new approach to the administration of convict labour was introduced, although, certainly slowly at first. In 1813, according to a Return of the government's convict gangs, there were only 342

32 Ibid. Government Order. 9 December 1801. p. 467. 33 HRA I. Vol. VI. Bligh to Windham, 9 January 1807. pp 97-100. Virtually every building seemed to need "doors and windows and window shutters" or wanted "new plaistering [sic], whitewashing and repairing wood work". A year later Bligh was able to report that a considerable amount of work had been done. Some buildings had been repaired and others rebuilt (see Ibid. Bligh to Windham, 31 October 1807. p. 169). However that so much was left umepaired or only modestly fixed would suggest lack of money, labour or that some buildings were too far gone to be attended to. 34 Ibid. Bligh to Castlereagh, 21 October 1808. p. 671. 35 See A.G.L. Shaw (1966) Convicts and the Colonies. Faber and Faber. London. pp. 364-365. 36 HRA I. Vol. VI. Bligh to Windham, 30 September 1807. p. 138. 37 Ibid. Bligh to Windham, 31 October 1807. p. 148. 38 Ward. (1992) Concise History ofAustralia University of Queensland Press. St Lucia. op. cit. p. 66; and Crowley, K.F. "The Foundation Years, 1788-1821" in Greenwood, G. (1968) Australia: a social and political history. Angus and Robertson. Sydney. p. 17. 39 This conclusion is supported by the figures in Table 5.2 below for the Sydney gang system. 86 men employed in gangs in Sydney.40 The small size of the gang workforce reflected the shortage of convict workers due to the continuing low numbers transported to New South Wales41 and to the political shift from public to private sector activities that had prevailed before Macquarie's arrival. While the growth in the size of the gang system was reasonably slow it nevertheless did grow. In June 1813 Macquarie was assuring the Secretary of State that:

As soon, however, as the Necessary Public Works now in progress are Completed, it will not be necessary to retain so many Superintendents in the Service of Government, and the Strength of the Gangs of Artificers and Labourers will then also admit of being greatly reduced, which will Considerably lessen the Expenses ofGovemment.42

The expansion in the gang system may have been partly driven by Macquarie's public works agenda but the more persuasive explanation for the growing scale of the public gang system after circa 1813 was simply the expansion in the numbers of convicts transported to New South Wales.43 In 1820 Macquarie wrote to Bathurst that:

The Settlers not being able to take any considerable number of these Convicts at present off the Store, I have experienced no small difficulty in disposing of them to advantage, so as to render their Services as useful to Government as possible, and in some Degree to indemnify the great expence [sic] incurred by the Crown in Victualling and Clothing them. With this view I have been obliged to reinforce the several Gangs at present employed in constructing the different Public Buildings and the other Public Works in the Towns of Sydney, Parramatta and Windsor, and also the several Gangs employed in constructing Public Roads and Bridges in different parts of the Interior, as well as the Gangs employed at the Agricultural establishment under Mr Fitzgerald in "Emu Plains" ... But in case thyre should be many more arrivals of Male Convicts this Season, I

40 HRA I Vol. VII. Macquarie to Bathurst, 28 June 1813, Enclosure No.7. pp. 748-749. There were also another 233 men employed in public work at the lumber yard and the dock yard or as storemen and constables. 41 See Shaw. op. cit. pp. 364-365. 42 HRA I. Vol. VII. Macquarie to Bathurst, 28 June 1813. p. 719.

87 shall certainly be greatly at a loss how to employ them, as the present Government Gangs, all over the Colony, are already sufficiently numerous, and cannot with a due regard to their care and Superintendence be much more increased.44

In other words, Macquarie's expansion of the gang system was largely by necessity. While for most of his Governorship he deliberately expanded the gang system he did so within the broad proportions established by virtually all other governors before him. However in the latter years of his rule he was forced to expand it to a much greater extent. For a time this necessity may have been convenient to his building ambitions but there is no doubting the genuineness ofhis complaint to Bathurst at the end of 1820. It is commonly accepted that after 1822 Governor Brisbane ( 1821-1825) scaled back the gang system.45 This contraction was certainly the impression that Brisbane w~nted to convey in an 1825 Enclosure to Lord Bathurst, Secretary of State in Britain.46 In this Brisbane claimed he had reduced the number of gangs (although this cannot be quantified) and the number of convicts employed within thern.47 He claimed, for instance, that the number of convicts employed in the gangs had declined by 1,613 between 1821 and 1825.48 However, this contraction is not apparent from Table 5.1. The discrepancy between what Brisbane claimed and what was happening to the gangs in reality, came about because Brisbane created a new form of gang, which he did not include in his 1825 Return to the Secretary of State. In response to a suggestion by Commissioner Bigge49 Brisbane established the Clearing Gangs in 1822.50 These were small gangs of convict workers contracted out by the government to free settlers to clear land for a fee per acre. 51 By 1823 these Clearing Gangs employed 700 convicts and by 1825 employed 1160.52 In other words, by 1825 the Clearing Gangs had absorbed most of the labour 'savings' claimed by Brisbane. In

43 See Shaw. op. cit. pp. 364-365. 44 HRA I. Vol. X. Macquarie to Bathurst, 1 September 1820. p. 366. 45 See Coghlan. op. cit. p. 176. 46 HRA I. Vol. XI. Brisbane to Bathurst, 18 March 1825. p. 549. 47 See Ibid. in which it is clear that he abolished many of the road, stone and quarry gangs. 48 Ibid. 49 See J.T. Bigge. (1822) Report of the Commissioner ofInquiry into the state of the Colony ofNew South Wales. Vol. 1. Facsimile edition 1966. Libraries Board of South Australia. Adelaide. p. 159. 50 HRA I Vol. X. Brisbane to Buchan, 30 August 1822. pp. 723-724. 51 HRA I Vol. XL Brisbane to Bathurst, 3 June 1825. pp. 623-624. 52 Ibid. Brisbane to Bathurst, 28 April 1823. p. 79; and see also Ibid. Report by Major Ovens, p. 660. 88 addition, it needs to be recognised that Brisbane's attack on the road gangs was short­ lived.53 According to Coghlan, by 1826 "not a road in the colony was in a decent state of repair".54 As a consequence, Governor Darling (1825-1831), Brisbane's successor, was forced to revitalise and expand the road gangs although he did so in ways that made them quite different from the large gangs which operated under Macquarie. Each gang was smaller, their activities were more closely coordinated and they were more systematically regulated through closer supervision and more elaborate management controls. The new road gangs also became deliberately and indelibly associated with punishment and harshness. 55 But it is clear that both Brisbane and Darling were forced to preserve the gangs as an essential method of organising convict labour. They also, in different ways, continued and even accelerated Macquarie's system of bureaucratic control. However the purpose of the gangs altered fundamentally after 1825.. Thereafter, the administration of the gangs was, to all intents and purpose, no longer concerned with the productivity of convict workers but with punishment. While their work remained important in terms of economic infrastructure and was even sometimes well performed56 this was not their sole or even primary function. The Road Gangs existed in order to punish or subdue convict workers and they cheapened the cost of punishing the convicts. 57

5.3 The work of the convict gangs

The nature of the work performed by convict gangs varied over time and these changes reflect both the reformation of the gang system itself as well as the evolving nature of the colonial economy. As will be seen, it is not possible to trace the work performed by

53 From 685 convicts in 1821 to 433 in 1825, see Ibid. Brisbane to Bathurst, 18 March 1825. p. 549. 54 Coghlan. op. cit. p. 176. 55 See AO/Reel590. Assignment and Employment of Convicts 1828-1830. 56 See HRA I. Vol.XIV. Darling to Huskisson 28 March 1828. p.70; and Karskens, G. 'Defiance, Deference and Diligence: Three Views of Convicts in New South Wales Road Gangs' Australian Historical Archaeology. 4, 1986. pp. 17-28. 57 This need was, in a sense anticipated by Commissioner Bigge when he observed that working for the government was "a species of labour less fatiguing and less irksome than the labour of convicts in the service of settlers, and therefore it operates with them as a temptation to quit that service and repair to Sydney." see Bigge. op. cit. p. 32. The horror of public employment as created by Darling was somewhat softer than he originally planned. In a dispatch to Lord Bathurst in 1827, he explained that he initially wanted to work every convict "in Irons" when they arrived and that, with chilling logic, "Their employment on the Roads in Irons, in the first instance, would have rendered their assignment to the Settlers a desirable release from a painful and degraded situation; and in proportion to their dread of being so employed, they would have behaved to their Masters so as to avoid at least being returned to Government." See HRA I Vol. XIII. p. 140. It was only the shortage of labour that prevented this policy being put into effect and forced Darling to assign convicts to settlers without a sobering taste of his brand of public employment. 89 the gangs for every year within 1788-1830, however, information on a range of years can be examined and this allows an historical trend to be established. Due to variations in official documentation it has also been necessary to examine the nature of the work performed by the gangs m general sectoral terms; pnmary, secondary (building/construction and manufacturing) and tertiary. Arguably this allows a more meaningful analysis than simply listing the work performed by individual gangs. It should also be noted that while the Lumber Yard convicts often worked in gangs these have been, as far as possible, quarantined from this discussion of the gang system. 58

5.3.1 Gang work 1790 and 1800

Few details of the organisation of individual gangs for the year~ prior to the Macquarie administration now exist. However Table 5.2 shows the total number of convicts working collectively in a Primary sector activity, in Building/Construction, in Manufacturing activities or in the Service Sector for the years 1790 and 1800.59 From this Table it is evident that in 1790 most of the work performed by the gangs was concerned with Primary sector activities such as clearing and cultivation, stock keeping and timber fetching. 60 Approximately 40% of all convicts employed in a gang were engaged in work of this nature. This is not surprising given the still very basic pioneer needs of white settlement at this time. The next most common work activity can be described as Service and included work such as land and water transport and loading and unloading. Of the total of gang convicts in this year 29% were engaged in this type of employment. Clerical work was also significant but is not included here because it was seldom performed in any collective sense. Most clerks were distributed throughout the gang system and even where a number worked together they tended to complete distinct and individual tasks. 61 Surprisingly, the Building/Construction and the Manufacturing sectors only employed 15% and 16% of gang convicts respectively. This would presumably have reflected the very basic nature of both activities at this time. Interestingly, the gang system was not used in any formal way as a form of punishment.

58 See Chapter 6 for a full discussion of the Lumber Yards and their convict workforce. 59 For 1790 see HRA I. Vol. I. Phillip to Grenville, 23 July 1790 pp. 199-200; and for 1800 see HRA I. Vol. II. Hunter to Portland, 28 September 1800.pp. 615-617. 60 HRA I. Vol. I. Phillip to Grenville, 23 July 1790 pp. 199-200. 61 Ibid. 90 Table 5.2 Gang System by Industry Sector 1790 and 1800

Sector 1790 1800

Primary 138 121 Build/Con 52 78 Manufacturing 54 200 Service 100 122 Punishment Nil 19 Total 344 540

Source: HRA I Vols 1 and 2.

In contrast, the situation had changed by 1800. In this year, Manufacturing activities were the largest employer of gang convict labour with 3 7% of the total. This is all the more impressive given the fact that a significant amount of additional manufacturing was also conducted at the Lumber Yards. Service and Primary activities employed about 22% respectively while Building/Construction fell to 14% of the total. Contrasting the relative importance of each sector for these two years offers some insight into the shift in colonial economic activity. The decline in the number of convicts employed in Primary sector activities, for instance, probably reflected the growth in private sector agriculture. As free settlers began to successfully grow food crops and to raise livestock the agricultural activities of government farms became less important. The relative importance of the Building/Construction gangs fell slightly as activity shifted to Parramatta or as public building programs were curtailed. Indeed the essentially wattle and daub nature of Sydney was only modestly or slowly confronted by Governors King and Bligh. It was not until Governor Macquarie that government building was significantly expanded. 62 In both 1790 and 1800 it is also fair to say that work in this sector was largely concerned with the building of dwellings and public buildings rather than roads. Presumably local roads evolved from use rather than design

62 See Connah, G. (1988) Of the Hut I Builded: the archaeology of Australia's history. Cambridge University Press. Melbourne. p. 21. 91 and it was probably not until Macquarie that systematic road construction became more important.63 Service activities, in contrast, fell slightly in relative importance but the real shift was in the growth in Manufacturing activities. By 1800 brickmaking, shingle splitting, lime and charcoal burning, tanning and boat building were the main manufacturing tasks performed by gang convicts outside the Lumber Yards. Another modest change was the creation of a Goal Gang, which was designed specifically to punish convicts. However, clearly this gang performed the functionally necessary role of handling the relatively few recalcitrant convicts rather than as an aggressive deterrent or as a systematic mechanism of terror.

5.3.2 Gang work 1820

By 1820 the gang system was a highly complex and elaborate system of organising convict labour. For this reason much more detailed evidence relating to its structure, administration and work is available and so a more complete analysis of the gangs can be established. At the end of November 1820 there were at least 47 clearly defined working parties or gangs then in existence. 64 They were distinguished most often by the name of their Principal Overseer or Overseer and by the nature of their work or sometimes by work location. An example of a gang was Bryan 's Stone Quarrymen Gang, which was overseen by Dennis Bryan at the Government Domain. To avoid confusion with this gang and the one overseen by Ambrose Bryan, the latter was officially designated A. Bryan's Stone Gang. Using the industry sector categories already discussed the 47 individual gangs or occupationally specific groups of workers in existence at this time have been allocated to their most appropriate industry sector and the results are presented in Table 5.3. While the gang system was involved in all categories of work, clearly the bulk of the gangs and the bulk of their workforce were in Primary industry activities and in

63 See Deans, D. "Transport and Communication" in Birmingham, J., Jack, I. and Jeans, D. (1983) Industrial Archaeology: rural industry. Heinemann Publishers. Richmond. pp. 120-122; and Newell, H. H. "Road Engineering and its Development in Australia, 1788-1938" Journal of the Institution of Engineers, Australia, Vol. X, (1938), pp. 46-106. 64 By correlating the information contained in the Monthly Returns of Government Working Parties for 1820 (CO 201/119 Reel 106-107), the Bigge Report. op. cit; and the Bonwick Transcripts of Evidence from the Bigge Inquiry, Various Vols; and the Return of Superintendents and Overseers (Co 2011118 Reel 106) it is possible to identify most of the gangs operating in New South Wales at the end of 1820. These sources also allow reliable estimates to be made of the size of each gang, the number and identity of most of their supervisors, where they operated and, most importantly, what type of work they performed. 92 Building/Construction. In this latter category, 13 of the 18 gangs were involved with road or bridge construction. This is not surprising given that by 1820 most building work performed by convicts was carried out through the activities of the Lumber Yards and not through the gang system as a whole. Similarly, the Lumber Yards also performed most of the government's manufacturing work leaving the gang system to perform those manufacturing activities that were site specific as in the case of the brick making, shingle splitting, stone masonry and stone cutting gangs. The work of these gangs could only be performed in situ at Pennant Hills (near Parramatta) in the case of shingle splitting and at quarry and clay sites.

Table 5.3 Gang System by Industry Sector 1820

Industry No. of %of No. of %of No. of No. of %of Span Sector Gangs Gangs Convicts Convicts Skilled Overseer ·Overseers Of Convicts s Control Primary 11 24 939 37 11 23 26 1:41 Manuf. 8 17 632 25 57 19 22 1:.33 Build/ 18 39 653 25 50 19 22 1:34 Construct Service 7 15 221 9 14 24 28 1:09 Punish't 2 5 101 4 2 2 1:50

Totals 47 100 2546 100 87 100 1:29

Source: CO 201/119 Reel106-107; CO 201/118 Reel106; and, Bigge Report Vol. 1.

The large number of convicts employed in Primary sector activities, 37% of the gang system's workforce, is also consistent with the nature of the colonial economy at this time although this was also the result of government policy. In 1811 Macquarie essentially abandoned government farming activities but was encouraged in 1819 by the increasing numbers of convicts arriving in New South Wales and by Commissioner Bigge to reactivate this type of public sector enterprise. It is also interesting that two of the three government farms, the Emu Plains and Grose Farm gangs, were primarily

93 concerned with training convict farm labourers rather than with producing food stuffs65 . The other farm gang, at Longbottom (near Sydney), was mainly concerned with producing timber and feed for government horses, an important activity that helped maintain the Town Carters Gang. 66 On the other hand, Table 5.3 underestimates size of the Service sector activities of the government convict system. This is because the significant numbers of stationary servants (clerks), storemen and constables did not perform their work as designated gangs but were distributed throughout the gang system as need demanded. As literate workers the Clerks, for example, were very important in administrative and organisational terms but they were not a group whose work or responsibilities were coordinated or made interdependent in a specific gang. In contrast, the seven Service related gangs listed in Table 5.3 did perform tertiary activities such as transport, street cleaning and loading and unloading materials within Sydney. It should also be noted that the large number of supervisory staff to these gang workers (24 for 221 convict workers) is exaggerated by the nature of water transportation.67 The two Punishment gangs in existence at this time could have logically been included within this Service category but they have been omitted, in large part, to emphasise the essentially non­ penal function ofthe gang system as it operated by (if not before) 1820. Using the information contained in Table 5.3, the sectoral make-up of the gang system in 1820 can be more clearly seen from Chart 5.1 below. Not only does this display the relative size of each sector but it also highlights the interrelatedness of the gang system. For example, while the road gangs operated as separate work groups, they were frequently performing similar work on the same project but in different physical locations. There were, for instance, three separate road gangs working on the Parramatta road, five gangs working on the Liverpool road and at least three working on separate sections of the Windsor road. Other gangs, like the Shell Gang operated as a separate work organisation or entity but its product was the critical input into the activity of the Lime Burners Gang. Similarly, the Wood Cutters Gang collected firewood for the brick making kilns and so directly affected the productivity of the Brick Makers Gang. The gang system, therefore, should be seen as an interlocking set

65 See Bigge op. cit. pp. 24-26. 66 Ibid. 67 Although Barnard Williams was appointed the Coxswain for Government Boats in practice each of the individual boats had a supervisory coxswain. The nature of marine transportation demanded more formal

94 of individual work gangs whose activities were often highly integrated with those of other gangs. Indeed, this interconnection is the essence of the structure of any economy and the gang system provides an additional way in which to glimpse the structure of the colonial economy ofNew South Wales in 1820.

Chart 5.1 Sectoral Characteristics of the Gang System 1820

~------Primary Sector ------,I I 24% of all Gangs I INPUTS I I 37% of Gang System Workers I l I 26% of all Gang Overseers I I Building/Construction I I I INPUTS 39% of all Gangs rc------lI I ~ .. I 25% of Gang System Workers I I _ ... 22% of all Gang Overseers I Manufacturing I INPUTS.,. I 17% of all Gangs I I I 25% of Gang System Workers ~~ I I 22% of all Gang Overseers I I INPUTS t Se rvice ,r •------INPUTS 15 % of all Gangs Lumber Yards I 9o/co of Gang System Workers 28 % of All Gang Overseers

Clearly the activities of the individual gangs within the gang system were highly interdependent. For instance, in order for most building to occur, particularly within the settlements, the building gangs were dependent on other gangs to produce essential inputs such as bricks, cement and stone. Similarly, while many of the road construction gangs would have produced at least some of the fill, rubble or stone they needed on site, there were gangs whose function was to produce these inputs in greater quantity and quality.68 In addition, there were also long, heavy haul transport gangs, such as the bullock drives, as well as the Town Carters Gang using horse drawn vehicles to deliver and distribute the produce of the gangs within settlements. This integrated structure demanded the development of a system of supervision and administration within each levels of authority than land based activities would have required, while the naval model of command and responsibility would have been very dominant. See Ibid. p. 28.

95 gang as well as an overarching administration for the entire system. Both of these levels of administration were designed to keep track of inputs, outputs and productivity. As a consequence, the evolution of an interdependent system of gang labour must be seen, at least in part, as driven by design and logical intention. What can also be concluded, and with even more confidence, is that the gang system as it had evolved by 1820 was not principally penal in its construction.

It should also be noted that the amount of work performed by many of the gangs in and before 1820 was established by a quota system called Task Work. 69 That is, a minimum quantity of work, or quota, for each gang was set as the required output on either a per day or per week basis. As Commissioner Bigge observed, Task Work was "adopted more for the purpose of securing and ascertaining that a certain quantity of labour [was] performed, than of stimulating the quicker performance of it". 70 In other words, it was not designed or could not be enforced in ways that maximised convict work effort. The penal system of New South Wales, despite drastic powers of coercion, recognised the inherent and covert bargaining power of convict workers in the labour process and calculated a minimum rather than a maximum level of labour productivity. More importantly, there is considerable evidence that convict gangs resisted changes to their Task Work, deliberately minimised it, or manipulated it to their advantage. 71

5.3.3 Gang work 1825 and 1829

In the period after Macquarie and until 1830 the work of the gang system changed considerably. The range of work performed declined very significantly while the entire purpose of the gang system itself was fundamentally reformed. From 1822 the gangs began to display an increasing concern with convict punishment although until 1826 labour productivity did remain important. From this date until the 1830s (if not beyond)

68 Dmitt. op. cit. p. 5. 69 The history of the Task Work system is discussed in greater length by Robbins, B. "Contested terrain: The Convict Task Work System 1788-1830"in Markey, R. (ed) (2001) Community and Labour: historical essays. University ofWollongong Press. Wollongong. pp. 33-50. 70 B'tgge. op. czt.. p. 29 . . 71 For example the Hawkesbury sawyers outraged Governor Hunter by refusing to meet their government Task Work if it rained and yet hired themselves out for private paid work regardless of the weather, see HRA I. Vol. II, Government Order dated 30 October 1798, p. 359; the Pennant Hills sawyers resisted attempts by Major Dmitt to increase their Task Work in 1817-1818 by actually withdrawing their labour for nearly three weeks. See Dmitt. op. cit. p. 37; and also Hawkins, R. (1994) The Convict Timbergetters of Pennant Hills. Hornsby Shire Historical Society. Sydney. The Grass-cutters Gang also used their low Task Work to pursue private work interests see Bigge. op. cit. p. 28. 96 the gangs became almost exclusively concerned with crime and punishment. The work performed by the gangs in the years 1825 and 1829 is presented in Table 5.4 below.

Table 5.4 Gang System by Industry Sector 1825 and 1829

Sector Number of Gang Convicts 1825 1829 Primary 1723 430 Build/Construction 619 1802 Manufacturing 72 167 Service 3 362 Other 181 36 Punishment 0 1313 Totals 2598 4110

Source: HRA 1 Vols. 11 and 15

By 1825 Governor Brisbane had significantly modified the work performed by the convict gangs. Although he claimed he had reduced the number of gang convicts, in reality he had merely shifted most of them into a new form of gang; the Clearing Gang. 72 As a consequence, the bulk of the convicts in the gangs ( 66%) worked in Primary sector activities at the government farms, raising stock or, in most cases in clearing new and existing farmland. Building/Construction sector activities remained the next most common for gang convicts, with 24% of the total gang workforce employed in this sector, despite a significant reduction in the number of road gangs. Manufacturing activities only represented employment for 3% of the gang convicts reflecting his reduction of stone masonry and his consolidation of most timber and metal fabrication activities into his smaller Lumber Yards. Unfortunately Brisbane's return of convict employment in 1825 is marred by the very vague term "Various Employments"73 for some convict workers and so the Other category in Table 5.4 is unexpectedly large. This category perhaps explains the extremely low number of convicts employed in Service sector gangs. Certainly Brisbane does not mention transportation other than in the case of Boat Crews and this omission would have substantially reduced the number of convicts in the Service sector. However, it is

72 HRA I Vol. XI. Brisbane to Bathurst, 18 March 1825.p. 549. 73 Ibid.

97 apparent that he did reduce some traditional service activities with his abolition of the Town and Light Worker Gangs. These had been commonly involved with loading and unloading goods within Sydney and with street cleaning and maintenance. Also, under Brisbane the gang system remained productive in its orientation. Although the Clearing Gangs recruited convicts "whose character is the worst"74 Brisbane intended these gangs to operate as a means of"rendering [convict] Labor [sic] productive".75 By the end of this decade the situation of the gangs was, however, in stark contrast. By 1829 the gangs were no longer engaged largely in Primary sector activities. The number of gang convicts employed in this sector had fallen to only 10% of the total gang system's workforce. This was caused to a great extent by the abolition of the Clearing Gangs but the government agricultural establishments were also very seriously downsized. Only a relatively small number of convict gangs performed gardening and stockkeeping while a small but growing number of convicts were engaged in mining or mineral surveying.76 Manufacturing likewise remained an insignificant employer of convict gangs with only 4% of the total gang workforce. By this time even the Public Works activities carried on in the Lumber Yards were also being seriously curtailed. 77 The major work activities of the gangs by 1829 were in the Building/Construction sector where 44% of the total were employed. Apart from some building in Liverpool and in rural settlements like Bathurst and Newcastle, the vast majority of convicts were engaged on road and bridge construction. Under Governor Darling these gangs were revitalised. They and the more infamous Iron Gangs have been included in this category, despite the ferocity of their role as punishment gangs, because they were more concerned with productive work performance than the Penal Establishments.78 In addition, the Road and Iron Gangs were integrated, to a great extent, into the community and economy. 79 With 9% of gang labour, the Service sector activities were more important under Darling than Brisbane although this growth may

74 Ibid. Brisbane to Bathurst, 28 Aprill823. p. 79. 75 /bid.Brisbane to Bathurst, 23 July 1824. p. 323. 76 HRA I. Vol. XV.Darling to Twiss, 2 April1830. pp. 386-387. 77 See Chapter 6 below. 78 See Karskens. op. cit. and compare with Maxwell-Stewart, H. "'Convict Workers, "Penal Labour" and Sarah Island at Macquarie Harbour, 1822-1834"' in Duffield, I. and Bradley, J. (eds) (1997) Representing Convicts. Leicester University Press. London. p. 14 7. 79 See AO/Reel590 Assignment and Employment of Convicts 1827-1830 for Weekly and Monthly Work Reports of Road and Iron Gangs. 98 reflect the somewhat dubious nature of Brisbane's returns. Nevertheless under Governor Darling most Service sector gangs were involved in transport. 80 The category of Punishment Gangs in Table 5.4 includes those convicts sent to places of secondary punishment such as Norfolk Island and those "On the Tread Mil1". 81 Of course not all convicts condemned to these activities worked as a gang but this whole category of convicts operated as such an important sub-set to the gang system that it is difficult to exclude them from this analysis. Indeed the very existence of these places and forms of punishment were designed to maintain discipline within the gangs as well as support private employers. If the Road and Iron Gangs are added to the Punishment category in Table 5.4, 76% of all convicts in the gang system were suffering some form of work related punishment under Governor Darling in 1829. Without doubt, punishment was by this time the raison d' etre of the ga!lgs and of the public employment of the convicts in general.

5.4 Organisational structure of the gang system

A simple measurement of the number of gangs and the size of their workforce throws only so much light on the sophistication of the work they performed or on the complexity of their organisation, supervision or administration. An additional way of understanding this growth in complexity is to examine and contrast the hierarchical structure of the gang system as it stood in about 1814, in 1820 and in the mid to late 1820s. 82 An examination of the hierarchical structure reveals the increasing bureaucratisation of the convict gang system, highlighting the cat that it was an example of a bureaucratic model of labour process control rather than Edwards' simple model of control.

80 HRA I. Vol. XV. Darling to Twiss, 2 Aprill830. p. 386. 81 Ibid. 82 Macquarie was largely to blame for this lack of documentation because he was notoriously tardy in sending detailed Returns. See HRA I. Vol. VII. Bathurst to Macquarie, 23 November 1812. pp. 669-669 andHRA I. Vol. VIII Bathurst to Macquarie, 2 March 1815, pp. 436-437. 99 5.4.1 Organisational structure of gang system circa 1814

In 1814, the control of convict labour was shared between the Chief Engineer and a Principal Superintendent of Convicts although the Governor also maintained input. 83 The position of Principal Superintendent of Convicts existed before this time but with the appointment of William Hutchinson in April 1814 the status of this position was enhanced with a higher salary and probably an expansion of duties.84 Below the two senior management positions the gangs were under the direct responsibility of Superintendents of Convicts. In 1814 there were 10 individual Superintendents of Convicts who were responsible for trade specific gangs such as Carpenters, Bricklayers, Masons and Smiths or for the more generic gangs of Public Works, Mills and Government Stock. 85 Intere~tingly, in 1813 almost all of the trade specific Superintendents were called 'Masters' so their designation as Superintendents in 1814 can be seen, if not as a promotion, then as evidence of the system was being modified in ways that clarified and standardised hierarchal distinctions. Subordinate to these Superintendents of Convicts there were Clerks (stationary servants), Principal Overseer(s) and/or Overseer(s). There is no evidence of further distinctions between classes of overseer at this time. This structure is particularly well illustrated by the Government Stock gang as it was in June 1813. In appointing George Thomas Palmer, Superintendent of Government Stock, Governor Macquarie outlined not only the duty statements for this position (including clear objectives and performance criteria) but also the structure of this gang of convict stockmen. Under the Superintendent of Government Stock all the stock86 were "divided into Two Separate Divisions, under the immediate Charge of the two Principal Overseers".87 Division One was under the control of Thomas Arkell and Division Two under James Blackman. Each of these Divisions were further divided into 15 herds of homed cattle with 2 men per herd. As most of the convicts were employed as stockmen to the herds of cattle the

83The following outline of gang administrative structure is based on Macquarie's "A List of Persons holding Civil and Military Employment" in New South Wales for 1814 and again for 1815, see HRA I. Vol. VIII, Macquarie to Bathurst 28 April 1814 and 24 June 1815, pp. 190-191 and 597-598; the similar lists for 1820, see CO 201/118 Reel 106 Return of Superintendents, Clerks and Overseers of the Crown with the Salaries and Number of Government Men allowed them as Remuneration for their Services, 1819 and 1820; and the much more detailed Monthly Returns of Government Working Parties for the same year, CO 2011119 Reel106-107 Monthly Returns of Government Working Parties, November 1820. 84 HRA I Vol. VIII. Macquarie to Bathurst 28 April1814. pp. 190-191; and Bigge. op. cit. pp. 52-53. 85 HRA I. Vol. VIII. Macquarie to Bathurst 28 April 1814. pp. 190-191 and pp. 597-598. 86 All homed cattle, sheep and horses. 87 HRA I Vol. VII. Macquarie to Bathurst 28 June 1813, p. 746. 100 Principal Overseers were largely involved in their supervision but they also shared the responsibility for men allocated to the flock of sheep, the care of the horses and the driving of the provisions carts. They were assisted, however, in their management of the shepherds by the appointment of an Overseer from amongst the shepherds. In total, the Government Stock gang employed 44 men including the two Principal Overseers and the Overseer of the shepherds.88 While the increasingly complex structure of the Government Stock Gang was probably representative of many gangs at this time it was unique in one respect. In the case of this gang the Governor had a more direct involvement. In his instructions to the new Superintendent of this gang Macquarie requested that he "must make a [monthly] report thereof to Me in Writing".89 In addition to this Monthly Report the Superintendent was also required to "Send in Weekly Returns of Government Stock on the Monday of each week, to [the Governor] and to the Commissary, agreeably to the form you will receive therewith".90 But Macquarie's design did not end here. A book was especially provided for these reports while the Superintendent was also required to involve the Principal Overseers in this web of accountability.

The two Principal Overseers must make their reports to you, every Saturday of each Week, of the State and Condition of their respective Divisions of Government Stock, So as to Enable you to make up the required weekly return thereof on the following Monday.91

Not only is the Government Stock Gang evidence of an increasingly complex structure of authority, duty and responsibility but also of growing bureaucratic control. A form of bureaucratic control, moreover, that was comprehensive, highly specified and in an increasingly standardised format. Weekly Work Reports were also required at the Lumber Yard and other places of work such as the Road Gangs although little of this material is now available.

88 Ibid. pp. 742-745. 89 Ibid. p. 746. 90 Ibid. p. 747. 91 Ibid. 101 5.4.2 Organisational structure of gang system circa 1820

The broad hierarchical structure of authority and subordination for the gang system as it existed in 1820 is set out in Chart 5.2 below. By this year, there were two Principal Superintendents, both free, although Hutchinson was an emancipist, 92 ten Superintendents, all of whom were free and a free Deputy Superintendent.93 There were nine Principal Overseers, six of whom were free and the rest serving convicts. There were 46 Overseers, of whom 3 7 were convicts and nine free men. There were 18 Deputy Overseers of whom all but three were convicts.94 The Clerical staff are a little more problematic in that they were functionally only designated to assist Superintendents and sometimes Principal Overseers in gangs or areas that generated sufficient administrative paperwork to warrant _it. In all there were 66 clerks or Stationary Servants in public employment in 1820 but most of these were allocated to the Lumber Yards, the Dock Yard and to the Barracks.95 The degree of authority held by each grade of overseer obviously would have varied but it is safe to assume from the Government Stock Gang that Principal Overseers were expected to contribute to the administration of the gang as well as supervise or co-ordinate the actual performance of work tasks. They were also probably required to co-ordinate the activities of more than one gang performing the same or similar work. Overseers, on the other hand were more likely to have been directly associated with supervision of work performance and effort. Deputy Overseers would also have been appointed when the size of a gang or the complexity of its work was beyond the control of one individual. There is evidence that Deputy Overseers were trainee Overseers. Thomas Shaw was a Deputy Overseer of the South Head Road Party in 1819 but was promoted to his own gang as Overseer of a Liverpool Road Party the following year.96

92 Bigge. op. cit. pp. 52-53. 93 CO 2011118 Reel 106 Return of Superintendents, Clerks and Overseers of the Crown with the Salaries and Number of Government Men allowed them as Remuneration for their Services, 1819 and 1820. 94 Ibid. 95 Ibid. 96 Ibid. 102 Chart 5.2 Organisational Chart showing Hierarchy Of Administration and Supervisory Positions 1820

GOVERNOR

CHIEF ENGINEER (Major Druitt) t f PRINCIPAL PRINCIPAL SUPERINTENDENT SUPERINTENDENT OF CONVICTS OF CONVICTS Sydney Emu Plains William Hutchinson Richard Fitzgerald

Superintendents Principal Clerks Deputy Superintendents

Principal Overseers

Overseers

Assistant/Deputy Overseers

Gaolers, Scourgers

Skilled Convict

Unskilled convict

The status and authority of the vanous supervisory staff also tended to be reflected in the remuneration they received. Principal Overseers all got one man on-the­ stores and one man off-the-stores allocated to them. Overseers, on the other hand most commonly only got one man on-the-stores.97 •

97 Ibid. 103 The detailed Returns of the Gang system in 1820 provide evidence of how much more elaborate and complex its structure had become by this time. Organisational charts showing the duties and responsibilities of the Chief Engineer and the two Principal Superintendents of Convicts have been constructed and are presented below. Chart 5.3 shows the extensive range of responsibilities and functions of the Chief Engineer, Major Druitt. Clearly, by 1820 the Chief Engineer was responsible for "all the public works carried on in the settlements of New South Wales"98 and that the bulk of his duties were civil engineering by nature, as his extensive supervision of building and maintenance, road construction and street and cityscapes indicate. But he also had responsibility for the purely penal duties of the Goal Gangs as well as the agricultural establishments. The manner in which he performed his supervisory responsibilities varied between these different areas of activity. He seems to have remained much more directly associated with the supervision of most building gangs, the road gangs and the street and town gangs whose duties can be regarded more as civil engineering in nature. These gangs operated only with Overseers indicating Druitt continued to exert a direct influence over their activities. In contrast, while Druitt was particularly interested in the agricultural establishments, the day to day supervision of these were delegated to Principal Overseers.

98 Bigge. op. cit. p. 28. 104 Chart 5.3 ChiefEngineer's Organisational Chart Of Administration and Supervisory Positions 1820

CHIEF ENGINEER Major Druitt

+ .L Constables I Principal Superintendents of Convi~ts + (Hutchinson and Fitzgerald) Harbour• Superintendent Master I I Dock Yard 56 men ~------, ------~ Architect Greenway 1 And 114 men in 3 I I I associated !lan!ls I ------,-----~ I I I I I ,, ,, ,, .,, iI Road I Street &Town 3 Goal Gangs I I Farms Building I Gan!ls I GanQs 101 men Gan!ls

Street Principal Overseer ~ Overseers of 6 Gang Overseer ._ Plaisterers Liverpool Grose Gang 22 men • Road Parties Town Farm 181 men Gang 4 Deputy Os • /Clerks 150 men Principal Overseers of 3 Overseer Parramatta Bricklayers • Road Parties Principal Overseer Gang 113 men ._ Longbottom 2 Deputy 0/s Farm 59 men I Overseer Overseer 107 men • New Botany Overseer Bay Road Principal Painters Party Overseer Gang 53 men Pennant ._ 15 men Hills 1 Deputy 0/s Overseer of a 6 0/s ~ Windsor 105 men Road Party 58 men

105 The key subordinate in Druitt's hirearchy of control was William Hutchinson, a Principal Superintendent of Convicts for Sydney and Parramatta. According to Bigge the division of their roles was somewhat haphazard if not mutually agreeable to the two men.

This circumstance has arisen in great measure from the extension of the duties of [Druitt], during the last two years, as well as from the perfect cordiality that has always existed between them; Major Druitt never having felt any repugnance to intercourse with the class of persons to whom the principal superintendent belongs. 99

William Hutchinson was an emancipist but, Druitt was untroubled by this. Bigge distinguished the broad and dominant range of functions these two men performed by describing the Principal Superintendent of Convicts' role as being to distribute and manage the convicts and detect their offences, while the Chief Engineer was more concerned with convict "employment, labour and punishrnent". 100 From Chart 5.4 the enormous breadth of Hutchinson's duties are immediately apparent. He was involved in organising and supervising the employment of over 1,200 convicts working at a wide variety of tasks, activities and locations. In doing this he showed no great reluctance to delegate. A wide range of activities in specific areas like barrack administration, stock management and windmill maintenance was delegated to Superintendents. These sub-divisions were mostly discrete activities delineated by function, role or by their geographic location. Some Superintendents directed their convicts personally others delegated this role to overseers. All Superintendents were required to produce weekly and monthly Work Reports of their activities, which were sent to Hutchinson and the Governor.

99 Ibid. p. 53. 100 Ibid. p. 54. 106 Chart 5.4 Principal Superintendent of Convicts, Hutchinson Organisational Chart Of Administration and Supervisory Positions 1820

PRINCIPAL SUPERINTENDENT OF CONVICTS, Sydney William Hutchinson I

Superintendent of , , ,, ,, ,, Macquarie Towers r-- LumberYard Carters Principal Various Govt. Sydney, Barrack Overseer Gangs Millers Superintendent of .___ 367 men Stone Gangs 3 men Hyde Park Barracks

Overseer Superintendent of Shell Gang Parramatta Barracks Overseers of 2 r----+ 44men StoneMason r- ~ Gangs 185 men Principal 0/s Superintendent of ..,..___ Brickmakers Parramatta Lumber ..... Gang Yard Overseers of 2 2 Deputy 0/s ... 1">7m~n Superintendent of ....__ Stone Quarry Parramatta Factory Gangs ,------, 148 men Overseer I I Lime I Governor I .. Superintendent of I1.-----r------..I ... Burners Government Stock ....__ I Gang I Overseer of _, 44men ______I Stone Cutters •---"" Gang "" Oversees of Superintendent of 30men ..... 2 Govt. Slaughter ....__ Garden n~no<;:, House Overseer Bennilong Point Stone Masons ... ~ Overseer Superintendent of Gang .... Wood Govt. Wind Mills 51 men Cutters r- n~na

~ Overseers of 2 Town Cart Gangs fiQm~n -,.. Overseer Light Work Gang 13 men

107 Hutchinson also delegated the direct control of the 6 stone gangs to his Principal Overseer, Edward Cureton. Below Cureton were Overseers who reported directly to him. The daily control of the large Brickmaking Gang (157 men) was also delegated to a Principal Overseer, Rueben Hannan who exercised his_authority through two Deputy Overseers, Absoleum West and John Lacey. 101 The other Principal Superintendent of Convicts was Richard Fitzgerald who was located at Windsor and was responsible for the Emu Plains agricultural establishment as well as the convicts attached to the settlement of Windsor and some road gangs in the near vicinity. His range of responsibilities are set out in Chart 5.5 although his main duty involved the management of the Emu Plains farm which was established "for the purpose of giving employment to the numerous convicts that arrived in 1819, and that were not taken up by the settlers". 102 However, not only was this farm a by­ product of the expansion in convict numbers, it also represented a concerted effort by Macquarie

to afford the means of instruction in agriculture to the convicts ... who were ... with very few exceptions unacquainted with agricultural employment, and they generally consisted of the most useless and least robust; but the experience of this establishment has shown that in the simple operation of felling timber, burning it, and clearing the land of roots, all descriptions of convicts may be beneficially employed. 103

Although Bigge felt Emu Plains Farm was a beneficial experiment and well suited to its aims he concluded, "there was nothing remarkable in point of arrangement, and certainly nothing that denoted activity". 104 For this lack of success he noted a lack of resources but on balance firmly blamed Fitzgerald. Apparently his supervision was minimal, - "he has never visited that establishment more than twice a week" - while he seems to have had a range of personal business enterprises that raised concerns over a conflict of interest. 105 Bigge's evaluation of Emu Plains, while insightful,

101 See CO 2011118 Reel 106 Return of Superintendents, Clerks and Overseers of the Crown with the Salaries and Number of Government Men allowed them as Remuneration for their Services, 1819 and 1820;and CO 201/119 Reell06-107 Monthly Returns of Government Working Parties, November 1820. 102 Bigge. op. cit. p. 25. 103 Ibid. pp. 39-40. 104 Ibid. p. 41. 105 Ibid. pp. 41 and 26. 108 nevertheless also reveals the partisan nature of his analysis of New South Wales under Macquarie. Although his criticisms of Fitzgerald may have had substance, in colonial New South Wales personal conflicts of interest were widespread and certainly not confined to supporters of Macquarie. 106

Chart 5.5 Principal Superintendent of Convicts, Fitzgerald Organisational Chart Of Administration and Supervisory Positions 1820 ,------., : Governor : I I I I ,_------~------_, PRINCIPAL SUPERINTENDENT I I I OF CONVICTS, Emu Plains I I Richard Fitzgerald I I I I I I r------~ I I I ,, I I I

Superintendent of Great Deputy Principal • Overseers of2 Western Road Gang Superintendent of Emu Windsor Road Parties 60men Plains agricultural 77men Establishment John Greenhatch. A Principal Overseer and 4 overseers. 269 men

A further explanation for Fitzgerald's lack of attendance at the Farm was the fact that he had a Deputy Superintendent, John Greenhatch to assist him in its daily superintendence. 107 Fitzgerald was not alone in constructing a mesh of interlocking personal and public interests and nor was he alone in having to perform a wide range of geographically dispersed responsibilities.

106 See Barry Dyster (1989) Master and Servant: building and running the grand houses of Sydney 1788- 1850. University of New South Wales Press. Kensington. pp. 77-78, and the case of the Blaxland Brothers. 107 CO 2011118 Reel 106 Return of Superintendents, Clerks and Overseers of the Crown with the Salaries and Number of Government Men allowed them as Remuneration for their Services, 1819 and 1820; and Bigge. op. cit. p. 39. 109 5.4.3 Organisational structure of gang system circa late 1820s

After Macquarie the administration of the gang system changed very substantially, indeed its very existence was threatened by British government policy and colonial government strategies. Governor Brisbane began his administration with an enthusiastic implementation of the recommendations of Commissioner Bigge. In doing this he tightened the quarantine of convict ships108 increased the assignment of convicts,109 expanded the powers of the Chief Engineer110 and developed a temporary assignment system for skilled mechanics. Brisbane allowed private employers in Sydney to employ convict mechanics for the duration of specific work projects. The cost, to be paid to the government, was 3/6d per week per mechanic plus food and clothes. In other words, th~ government sold skilled convicts cheaply to employers on short-term contracts. 111 Of more significance to the quality and nature of gang administration was Brisbane's greater control of the rations for working parties. Bigge was convinced that there was widespread embezzlement of government rations with overseer connivance112 and presumably felt the more careful administration of this activity would save money. As a consequence Brisbane implemented a more stringent process of administering convict rations. In tme bureaucratic style his new Regulations for the Issue of Rations more carefully accounted for the rations distributed to gang workers113 and more stringently controlled the movements of the gang convicts generally. This new system relied on more Musters and better records of gang membership. In addition, the responsibility for these controls was not simply delegated to the overseer but was now shared by the Superintendent. In this way the bureaucracy focused greater scrutiny on all supervisors.

108 See HRA I. Vol. XI. Brisbane to Bathurst 14 may 1825. p. 572; and Bigge. op. cit. pp. 156-157 109 HRA I. Vol. XIII. Bathurst to Darling 2 Aprill827. pp. 220-221. Brisbane went so far as to design an incentive scheme for free· settlers to increase their employment of convicts. He linked land grants of 100 acres for each convict employed and offered a cash "bonus" of a share of the government's savings. 110 HRA I. Vol. XIV. Hely to Darling, 30 October 1828. p. 412. 111 HRA I. Vol. XI. Brisbane to Bathurst, 17 January 1825. p. 472. Brisbane claimed to "have thrown the whole Mechanics open to a fair competition amongst the Settlers" although it was the free mechanics and those convicts seeking employment 'on their own hands' who surely bore the real brunt of this competition. Wheri Brisbane assured Bathurst that this scheme was "very generally approved of' he could only have meant amongst employers. No mechanic, free or bond, who hired himself out in Sydney would have approved of 3/6d per week. In 1824 the wages for skilled mechanics ranged from 4/6d per day for tailors, 7/- per day for painters and stone cutters and 10/- per day for brass founders and pump borers. See Ibid. p. 388. Not even labourers worked for the government's bargain price. 112 Bigge. op. cit. p. 38 for an account of Principal Overseer, Ebenezer Knox and his weakness for drink and fraud. 113 See HRA I. Vol. XI. Brisbane to Bathurst, 8 February 1825. p. 509. 110 But perhaps the most significant of the changes to the gang system introduced by Governor Brisbane was the organisation of the gangs themselves. He, like Bigge, was alarmed by the concentration of convicts in Sydney. He wrote to Lord Bathurst "The Convict-barracks of New South Wales remind me of the Monasteries of Spain. They contain a population of consumers who reproduce nothing". 114 Concentrating large numbers of convicts in gangs anywhere in the colony was thought to encourage resistance and idleness and to lay "the foundation of a Second Sydney" with all its pernicious and corrupting influences. 1 Is This attitude encouraged Brisbane to abolish some gangs, reduce others in size and disperse not only more convicts to private settlers but to government work 'up country'. As he reported in 1823:

... the road gangs are abolished almost entiryly, and the stations at Parramatta, Windsor and Liverpool reduced next to nothing. I am perfectly convinced of the difficulty of task work and its danger, unless under strictest superintendence. To ensure that my constant endevours [sic] shall be strained to subtract from the persons employed about buildings, and direct them to agricultural operations. The badness of the present overseers, and the impossibility of engaging others, is another great inducement for diminishing the Government works. Into a proper compass should these ever be reduced; the Colonial Architect will then be enabled to measure all the tasks that are performed; then the overseers will be obliged to render

without excuse an accurate account. I I6

In this statement there are many tenets of Brisbane's approach. The abolition of some gangs and the dispersal of their convicts, the reduction of the more essential gangs to minimum numbers of convicts and the stricter use of task work as a mechanism not only of increasing work effort but also control. Senior management gained greater control by making the lower ranks in the hierarchy more accountable.

An early gang initiative suggested by Bigge and adopted by Bris~ane was the creation of the Clearing Gangs in 1822. I I 7 Brisbane wanted to expand agriculture by

114 Ibid. Brisbane to Bathurst 29 November 1823. p. 181. 115 Ibid. 116 Ibid. Brisbane to Bathurst, 28 April1823. p. 79. m See Bigge. op. cit. p. 159; and HRA I. Vol. X. Brisbane to Buchan, 30 August 1822. pp. 723-724. 111 opemng up new country and by improving land already settled. To do this he established the Clearing Gangs in which convicts were:

... employed in clearing the Country of the excess of its Forest Timber and Brushwood. These men fell at least an acre a week each, and therefore your Lordship will perceive a vast extent of Country will be laid open; and this clearing system is carried on by the Government in behalf of the Settlers by means of the Convict labourers, on the settler paying for each acre, so cleared and stumped, five bushels of wheat out of his first crop into his Majesty's Stores; by which means the advantage to all these parties are so nicely combined as to render them mutually beneficial to all concerned. 118

The benefits derived by the convict labourers, however, are not now apparent. The work was hard, the conditions primitive119 and the supervision of a more stringent and direct nature. The Clearing Gangs grew steadily in terms of the number of men employed from 700 in their first year of operation in 1822 to 1,160 in 1825 120. They were also productive; from March 1822 to the end of April 1825 the gangs cleared over 20, 000 acres ofland. 121 While much of Brisbane's approach to the reform of the gang system had been essentially one of re-allocation and dispersal of labour from government to settler and from Sydney' to the country, the Clearing Gangs do reflect a model of bureaucratic control. The Clearing Gangs were created with a very specific and quite new organisational structure, which is presented in Chart 5.6 below. Like all gangs the Clearing ones were directly under the authority of the Chief Engineer but he then delegated authority to Sub-Inspectors whose position was a hybrid of Superintendent and Constable. Unlike Superintendents, Sub-Inspectors were appointed from amongst "the best conducted Prisoners" in the gang system or Police force but they were paid an annual salary of £40 and were given a horse and lodgings. 122 In keeping with a

118 HRA I. Vol. X. Brisbane to Buchan, 30 August 1822. pp. 723-724. 119 See Kerr, J.S. (1984) Design for Convicts: an account of design for convict establishments in the Australian colonies during the transportation era. Library of Australian History. Sydney. 120 HRA I. Vol. XI. Brisbane to Bathurst, 28 April 1823. p. 79 and Report by Major Ovens in same Volume, p. 660. 121 Ibid. Brisbane to Bathurst 3 June 1825, pp. 623-624. 122 Ibid. Brisbane to Bathurst, July 1824. p.324. 112 bureaucratic style, highly detailed regulations were designed for the Clearing Gangs. 123 These were particularly specific in delineating the duties of the Sub-Inspectors. They were required to inspect each gang "at least once a week"124 in order to muster them and to report weekly on their work both in terms of quantity and quality. 125

Chart 5.6 Organisational Structure of the Clearing Gangs 1825

Sub-Inspector Sub-Inspector of of 1st Sub-Division 2nd Sub-Division South of Sydney and North and West at Parramatta Rooty Hill I Clerk I .,, 25 Clearing Gangs 25 Clearing Gangs consisting of: consisting of:

Overseer Overseer 22 convicts 22 convicts

A Memorandum of Clearing Parties in 1824 added further bureaucratic detail to the operation of these gangs. 126 In specifying that there were to be only 50 gangs and that each would consist of 22 convicts and one overseer, Brisbane made plain his intent to limit the scale of the Clearing Gangs. More innovatively Brisbane addressed the use

123 See Ibid. p. 323-326. 124 Ibid. p. 325. 125 Ibid. 126 Ibid. pp. 326-327. 113 of positive motivational rewards in the form of additional rations. These were explicitly regarded as luxuries and indulgences and as such were intended to motivate. He wrote:

... the luxuries they are to receive in addition are to depend entirely on themselves. At the end of every week, before they send for their Rations, their Overseer is to receive from the Proprietor of the Estate a Certificate of the number of Acres that have been properly cleared in the Course of that Week, and, on presenting such Certificate to the nearest Storekeeper he will get for each acre cleared three shillings and six pence in money for himself, and as Remuneration to be divided equally amongst himself and his party

6lbs Sugar, 1~lb Tea, 1~lb Soap and Two Thirds of a pound of Tobacco. 127

While the gangs were filled with men "whose character is the worst"128 and the work designed or intended to be "irksome and more fatiguing" 129 than most other labour, the emphasis was still on productivity. From the detailed regulation of the gangs and voluminous reports he wrote to Britain about them it is clear that Brisbane wanted them to be successful and, more importantly, for his success to be measurable. After Brisbane, Governor Darling fundamentally altered the administration and the organisation of both colonial government and the gang system. The reforms associated with these changes were implemented within the context of two insistent and sometimes conflicting pressures; the needs of British government and those of an expanding colonial economy and society. Of course, the cost consciousness of British governments had always existed and been a powerful influence over colonial reform and administration. However, by 1826 the pressure to curtail colonial expenses through the abolition of the public employment of convicts and their increased assignment to free settlers was almost irresistible. So too was the old conviction that transportation was an insufficient deterrence to crime in Britain. Secretary of State, Bathurst wrote to Darling that:

127 Ibid. Brisbane to Bathurst. 28 April 1823. p.79. 128 Ibid. 129 Ibid. 114 His Majesty's Government having occasion to believe that very erroneous notions are entertained in the Country [Britain] respecting the condition of those persons, who have been banished for their crimes to New South Wales and Van Diemens Land, and that, from this cause, the dread of transportation is very much diminished amongst the lower classes in this

Country. 130 .

As a consequence Darling set about brutalising the convict experience. He was also able to do this because convict labour was no longer the critical component of the colonial labour market that it once had been. The other powerful force that propelled the reformatory efficiency and zeal of Darling was the increasingly complex demands associated with colonial government. The administrative needs of New South Wales by the time of Darling's arrival had well and truly outgrown the despotic model of colonial governorship of his predecessors. The precursors of many of the features of modem government can be found in his formation and reformation of various government departments and in the systematic construction of efficient administrative procedures and methods. As will be seen, by adopting clearer departmental objectives, more defined duty statements for a wide variety of colonial managers, by imposing greater public accountability and by adopting better salary structures and the principle of merit-based promotion, Darling anticipated some of the core features of Fayol's and Weber's models of administration. 131 According to Brian Fletcher the Darling model drew directly on his military experiences of administration. 132 This fact further underlines the unique imperative toward bureaucracy implicit in virtually all governorships of New South Wales and particularly with regard to the management of convict labour. While neither Darling's appreciation of administrative efficiency nor even the less systematic administrations of his predecessors were unique, the application of basic principles of administrative

130 HRA I. Vol. XII. Bathurst to Darling., 24 September 1826. p. 584. 131 See Ibid. p. 99; and compare with R.J. Aldag and T.M. Stearns (1987) Management. South-West Publishing Company. Cincinnati. pp. 35-39; and Littler, C. (1982) The Development of the Labour Process in Capitalist Societies. Gower. Aldershot. pp. 37-42. 132 Fletcher, B. (1984) Ralph Darling: a Governor maligned. Oxford University Press. Melbourne. p. 91. 115 efficiency to the management of labour by a central government bureaucracy certainly was. 133 Achieving the objectives of his administration, however, demanded an improved administration of the convict system. It had to be made leaner, more professional and more systematic. Brian Fletcher explains that during Darling's governorship he:

... substituted a centralised administrative system for the loose organisation that had existed under Brisbane. He placed his own office on an efficient basis and instituted a system of minutes and memoranda to convey official instructions to the Colonial Secretary, whose office was also streamlined. In the interests of efficiency he relocated the buildings that housed the

public offices, subdivided departments, redistributed duties, and improv~d the arrangement of colonial finances. He ordered convicts to be replaced by free clerks and, to attract suitable recruits ... urged the government to provide passages for 'well-educated young men', recommended an attractive salary scale and proposed that they be offered land grants, instead of pensions, as a means of saving money . . . He offered salaries commensurate with those paid by private employers and established the principle ofpromotion by ability, not seniority. 134

Under Darling the Convict Department, whose responsibilities he described as "very extensive and detailed", 135 became only one of many government departments and was not the dominant focus of government as it had been under Macquarie or even Brisbane. A number of Darling's reforms were specifically concerned with the convict gangs and their work. Broadly, these reforms addressed either the allocation of convicts or the administration of those remaining in public employment. In performing the first, he zealously increased assignment of convicts, directly allocating them from the transport ships and marching them immediately off to their respective districts "so that

133 Compare with Edwards, R. (1979) Contested Terrain. Basic Books Inc. New York. and Wright C. (1995) The Management of Labour: a history of Australian employers. Oxford University Press. Melbourne. 134 Fletcher. op. cit. p. 99. 135 HRA. I. Vol. XIII. Darling to Goderich, 5 October 1827. Enclosure No. 1. p. 534. 116 they do not remain in Sydney for a day, or have any Communication with the Town". 136 Darling explained in 1827:

When I took charge of the Government 14 months ago, there was no Order or Rule for the disposal of the Convicts. They were given at the caprice of the Civil Engineer, to whomsoever and in such numbers as he pleased. A Board has since been established, and Individuals now apply according to a certain Form, so that the wants of each may be seen; and they are supplied according to circumstances without partiality or favour. 137

This simple but more formal process of allocation directly attacked the convict propensity to disguise or exaggerate their skills. The convicts were less able to manipulate their allocation to preferred employment. Darling's "Fonn" also helped control the tendency of some settlers to submit ambit claims for convict workers 138 whilst it was able to identify harsh and unreasonable employers and deny them assigned convicts. 139 Brisbane's incentives to free settlers to take more assigned convicts were also abolished because it was considered as being "no longer necessary to hold out any Premium" to the settlers. 140 Although the government was still required to maintain many of the female convicts and those males considered too young, old or infirm141 most able-bodied male convicts were no longer engaged in productive public employment. Darling assigned about two thirds of all the convicts, maintaining between 4,500 to 5,500 convicts at government work. 142 Darling abolished the Clearing Gangs and revitalised the road gangs. 143 These however, were much more punishment orientated than in Macquarie's time when, according to Druitt, care had been taken to allocate well behaved convicts to

136 Ibid. Darling to Bathurst, 1 March 1827. p. 136. 137 Ibid. p. Darling to Hay, 23 March 1827. 181; and see Darling to Bathurst, 1 March 1827. pp. 140-141 for the form referred to in the quote. 138 Ibid Darling to Goderich, 31 December 1827.pp. 673 and 677. 139 Ibid. Darling to Hay 23 March 1827.p. 181. 140 Ibid. Bathurst to Darling 2 April1827. p. 221. 141 HRA I. Vol. XV. Darling to Murray, 22 December 1830. p. 853. 142 For the numbers for 1826 & 27 see Ibid. Darling to Goderich, 31 December 1827. p. 676; for 1828 see HRA I. Vol. XIV. Darling to Murray, 10 February 1829. pp. 636-637; and for 1829 see HRA I. Vol. XV. Darling to Murray, 2 April 1830. p. 386. 143 HRA I. Vol. XIII. Darling to Hay, 23 March 1827, p. 181; and see also Ibid. Darling to Bathurst, 1 March 1827. p. 136. 117 isolated road gangs. 144 The Road Gangs under Darling were explicitly designed to punish convicts in either public or private employment. Most of the convicts comprising the workforce of the Road Gangs in 1827 were considered by Darling to be "of the very worst description, being Men who have in general been returned by the Settlers as incorrigible". 145 The Road Gangs were designed to inflict punishment by the nature of their hard, physical, isolated, and closely supervised work. 146 The number of men attached or sentenced to the Road Gangs increased from 545 in 1827 to 1, 165 in 1829. 147 But, as if this were not enough an even more extreme road gang was created; the Iron Gang. These gangs were designed for even more refractory convicts and, as their name implies, the men allocated to them worked on the roads in leg and sometimes neck

irons. 148 In 1828 there were 464 men in the Iron Gangs. and 452 in 1829149• Darling also turned his talent for re-organisation and formalisation to convict overseers. Although Brisbane had begun this process it was his successor who streamlined the status and remuneration of convicts employed as overseers, clerks or storekeepers. In 1826 Darling issued a Government Order that established four classes of overseer and a salary scale that reflected differing levels of responsibility. The Order stipulated that:

144 See evidence ofDruitt. op. cit. p. 30. 145 HRA I. Vol. XIII. Darling to Goderich, 31 December 1827. p. 674. 146 AO 590 Assignment and Employment of Convicts 1828-30, NSW Road Gang Reports 1827-30. 147 HRA I. Vol. XVI. Darling to Goderich, 11 June 1831. p. 270 and HRA I. Vol. XV. Darling to Murray, 2 April1830. p. 386. 148 The gruesome report and evidence of an inquiry into the death of a soldier sentenced to an Iron Gang in 1829 revealed that experiments in weight, size and protruding spikes were also conducted in order to add yet further degrees of punishment. See HRA I. Vol. XIV. Enclosure, 28 May 1829. pp. 850-893. 149 Ibid. Darling to Murray, 10 February 1829. pp. 636-637; and HRA I. Vol. XV Darling to Murray, 2 April 1829. p. 386. The system of punishment and deterrence created or refined by Darling had yet more shades of horror. According to Governor Darling, bad as they were, the Iron Gangs were preferred to the Penal Settlements at Moreton Bay and Norfolk Island, see Ibid. pp. 850-851. Darling claimed Norfolk Island represented "the last penal infliction short of death" , see Colonial Secretary, Copies of Letters to Norfolk Island 1825-31, AONSW 4/3821, p. 94. In 1827 there were just over 1,000 men incarcerated at the penal settlements (HRA I. Vol. XIII. Darling to Bathurst, 15 May 1827. p. 305), over 1,100 men in 1828 (HRA I. Vol. XIV. Darling to Murray, 10 February 1829. p. 637) and over' 1,200 in 1829 (HRA I. Vol. XV. Darling to Murray, 2 April 1830. p. 386). This growth in numbers represents the fruits of a more efficient system of convict administration and the fact that some convict resistance and protest still existed. However, no longer was the government prepared to make concessions but seemed more determined to meet convict resistance with greater and fiercer punishment (see Fletcher, op. cit. p. 103). An additional display of efficiency was Darling's more effective use of the Hulk established by Governor Brisbane in 1825. Darling better defined its administration and formalised a detailed set of instructions for its use (Ibid. p. 111). 118 1st Class 1/3d per diem £22/16/3 per a. 2nd Class 10d per diem £15/4/2 per a. 3rd Class 6d per diem £9/2/6 per a. 4th Class or Probationary Class to be allowed, as a Means of Distinction, Clothing the same as Overseers. 150

Although the Order did not specify the distinctive uniform of the overseer, this clothing allowance was part of their remuneration package, as were rations. These classes were also clearly intended as a scale of promotion, for the Order specified that vacancies in higher grades were normally to be filled from the class of overseers below. Demotion to a lower grade was also a mechanism for controlling and punishing overseers as was dismissal from the position of overseer entirely. Presumably demotion was a first warning and. dismissal a second and final one. In 1831 Darling revisited this issue in order "to simplify the arrangement, as well as reduce the Expense". 151 Essentially the four grades were reduced to two. 152 In his rationalisation of government Governor Darling attempted to delineate the functions of each Department more clearly and to better clarify the focus of the activities and concerns of each. 153 This reorganisation had considerable impact on a number of key positions within the bureaucracy, most notably on the duties and responsibilities of the Chief Engineer, the Principal Superintendent of Convicts and the Surveyor General. In this reshuffle the most notable casualty was the Chief Engineer. Darling's administrative curtailment of this position occurred largely because the civic responsibilities of the Chief Engineer were being systematically reduced as part of the push to phase out, as far as possible, public employment. By 1829, although the Chief Engineer was Director of the Public Works Department, he was now only one of an increasing number of Department Heads and the responsibilities contained within this portfolio were considerably reduced. More in keeping with his modem namesakes, the Chief Engineer was, by 1829, exclusively concerned with civil building and maintenance programs in Sydney and Parramatta.

150 HRA I. Vol. XII. Government Order, 31 May 1826. p. 366. 151 HRA I. Vol. XVI. Darling to Howick, 6 June 1831. p. 264. 152 Ibid. 153 HRA I. Vol. XIV. Darling to Huskisson, 25 March 1828. p. 65. 119 In contrast Darling's shift in bureaucratic policy dramatically increased the role of the Principal Superintendent of Convicts. Darling explained:

When I arrived, this Office was like all the others totally unorganised, and the Principal Superintendent merely a Clerk in the 'Lumber Yard' who received his orders from the Civil Engineer. 154

As a consequence, the duties and responsibilities of the Principal Superintendent were "very considerably extended"155 and his importance and authority was greatly increased as evidenced by the promotion of this position to Head of the Convict Department with an increased salary. 156 An Organisational Chart for the Convict Department is displayed in Chart 5.7. In response to the more complex administrative functions performed by the Principal· Superintendent his office was also expanded with the appointment of additional Clerks. Interestingly these new appointees were all free because Darling had great concerns about the employment of convicts as clerks although three convict clerks did remain with this office. 157 The role of Clerk had traditionally been a source of employment for 'educated' convicts and those of a higher class but Darling was determined to phase this out and indeed to disperse the better educated convicts to country regions because he viewed them with distrust. Not withstanding the continued employment of some convict clerks the Clerical division shown on the left of Chart 5.7 represented a fundamentally new scale of administrative activity for the office of the Principal Superintendent of Convicts. Under Darling this position was "required to keep exact Returns" of all convicts maintained by government, assigned to free settlers and those issued with a Ticket of Leave. 158 Obviously this detailed record keeping had both a penal and an economic purpose but in either case was very much concerned with increasing control over the movement and activity of convicts.

154 Ibid. Darling to Murray I November 1828. Enclosure of letter by Rely. p. 412. 155 Ibid. p. 411. 156 This salary was raised from £352/9/2 to £500 per annum plus a £100 allowance for the incumbent, Mr. Frederick A. Rely, who had been appointed in 1823 by Brisbane. See Ibid. pp. 412-413. 157 Ibid. Rely to Macleay, Enclosure, 28 March 1828. pp 68-69. 158 Ibid. pp. 65-66. 120 Chart 5.7

Organisational Structure of The Convict Department 1829

Principal Superintendent of Convicts

Superint. Govt. Stock Wellington Valley

Superint. Matron Superint. Hyde Park Female Grose/Longbottom Barracks Factory Farms Parramatta

Assistant Clerks (2) Superint Carters Barracks

,_. N Under the expanded bureaucracy of Governor Darling the administrative/clerical roles within the convict system also gained in status and complexity while the status of functional supervisory roles declined. The growing importance of clerical administrators was reflected most clearly in salary. By this time almost every clerical position was paid at a higher salary than the Superintendents. 159 This is the complete reversal of the situation in 1820 when no free clerical worker was paid more than a Superintendent. 160 Although the salaries for Superintendents increased between 1820 and 1829 this rise was not as dramatic nor as consistent as that experienced by the clerks. Another part of the growing bureaucracy of Darling's system of government was the Surveyor General's Department. In a colony in which land and urban settlement was occurring there was obviously a need for surveying. The work of this Department did not involve the significant employment of convicts or convict gangs although a few were employed as assistants to the surveyors. 161 However, as Chart 5.8 shows, the Surveyor General, Major Mitchell, was not only the Head of Surveyor General's Department but also the Department of Roads and Bridges. 162 The latter department was responsible for the Road, Iron and Bridge Gangs but its seemingly untidy inclusion under the umbrella of the Surveyor General was more logical than may at first appear. The Road and other gangs, while clearly places of punishment, were required to expand the system of rural roads and these had to be practicable; that is they needed to be correctly surveyed for legal, technological and construction reasons. Once surveyed the actual performance of road construction seems to have rested firmly in the hands of the Chief Surveyor of Roads and Bridges, Captain William Dumaresq in 1826 followed by the organisationally energetic Edmund Lockyer in 1827. 163 Both these Chief Surveyors seem to have been active in refining the structure of the gangs. Dumaresq for instance dismissed the soldiers from the Royal Staff Corp who had been employed as overseers and replaced them with convict overseers in 1827. This change was justified by Darling on the basis that the soldiers' "Misconduct ... obliged me to withdraw them, and Convicts now do the duty of Overseers". 164

159 HRA I. Vol. XVI. Darling to Goderich, 26 July 1831. pp. 312-313. 160 See CO 2011118 Reel 106. Return of Superintendents, Clerks and Overseers of the Crown with the Salaries and Number of Government Men allowed them as Remuneration for their Services, 1819 and 1820. 161 See HRA I. Vol. XIV. Darling to Murray, 10 February 1829. p. 636 and 647; and HRA I. Vol. XV. Darling to Murray, 2 April 1830. p. 386. 162 HRA I. Vol. XV. Darling to Hay, 30 September 1830. p. 742. 163 See Karskens. op. cit. p. 19. 164 HRA I. Vol. XIV. Darling to Huskisson, 28 March 1828. p. 70. 122 Chart 5.8 Organisational Structure of the Department ofRoads and Bridges Circa 1830

I Surveyor General

f l Department of Surveyor General Roads and Bridges Department ~ Chief Surveyor of Roads and Bridl!es l

Assistant• 2 Assistant• Assistant• Assistant• Surveyor Surveyors Surveyor Surveyor Parramatta Southern Road Western Road Northern Road 530 men Argyle 253 men Bathurst 320 men Hunter 700 men + r ,,. ,, ------.., ------.., ------.., I I I I I I GANGS 1 Ditto I : Ditto I 1 Ditto I I I I I I I __ --_- __ I ·------1 ·------J I l Road Gang Iron Gang Bridge Gang I I Overseer I Overseer Overseer I + 2 Assist' 3 Assist'• Overseers I Overseers ~ ~ SO Convicts 60 Convicts 25 Convicts per Gang per Gang I per Gang I

When Lockyer became the Chief Surveyor of Roads and Bridges he persuaded Darling to appoint more Assistant Surveyors, to standardise the size and hierarchical structure of the Road, Iron and Bridge gangs and to specify more precisely, the duties

123 and responsibilities of the various supervisory staff within the Department. 165 As a consequence the role of the Assistant Surveyors became more fundamental to daily operations as well as to the administration of the road gangs generally. These men were required to produce detailed weekly and monthly work reports, to personally direct the gangs under their responsibility and to ensure not only the good behaviour of the convict workers but also the effectiveness of the overseers. 166 After 1828 the Weekly and Monthly Reports produced by the Assistant Surveyors were also more detailed, more carefully filled out and offered much greater work related observations and measurements. It is also apparent that they visited their various gangs more often than in the past and so were able to increase their degree of control over the working gangs.

5.4 Nature and quality of gang supervision

A key element in control of the labour process and in the management of any workforce is the degree and quality of work supervision. The management of convict labour was no exception. To understand the significance of the role of supervision in the management of convict labour a number of broad points need to be appreciated. Firstly, from the beginning of white settlement overseers were recruited from among the ranks of the convicts and this raised problems of quality and effectiveness. Indeed, this was of such concern that complaints about the convict overseers can be viewed almost as endemic to senior officials in New South Wales. Phillip explained that some of the convicts he had appointed overseers were quickly dismissed for "wanting either industry or probity". 167 Governor King felt his convict overseers were "not much better" than the convict workers. 168 Brisbane felt convict overseers were possessed of a "badness"169 while Darling described them as "little interested in the progress of the Work" for which they had charge. 17° Commissioner Bigge probably provided the most detailed analysis of the failings of the convict overseers citing their poor character, the

165 See Karskens.op.cit. p. 19; HRA I. Vol. XIV. pp. 69-72; and HRA I. Vol. XV. pp. 742-743. 166 See AO 590 Monthly Report of Road Parties and Iron Gangs under direction of Assistant Surveyor 1827 and 1830. 167 HRA I. Vol. I. Phillip to Grenville, 17 July 1790. p.195. 168 HRA I. Vol. III. King to Portland, 1 March 1802. p.424. 169 HRA I. Vol. XL Brisbane to Bathurst, 28 Aprill823. p. 79. 170 HRA I. Vol. XV. Darling to Hay, 30 September 1830. p. 743. 124 conflict of interest many operated under, their low motivation and the government's lack of effective management controls over them. 171 These complaints, while obviously reflecting problems with the quality and reliability of convict overseers, also highlight the second general point about the nature of convict supervision that should be noted; namely that the problems of supervisory control and effectiveness were not unique to convict New South Wales. Between 1788 and 1830 the role of supervision in British industry also under went major transformation. The number and quality of supervisors in all areas of British industry were critical problems that sometimes hindered the development and growth of enterprises. 172 One solution to poor supervision was for British factories simply to contract out labour supervision along with parts of their operations. Each contractor supervised their own gangs of workers quite i~dependently of the firm's management structures. 173 At the same time the division of labour also reshaped and rendered irrelevant traditional supervisory structures and practices. 174 Between 1788-1830 there was no theory of British management to guide the construction of rationally and functionally based management practices, little planning, no clear hierarchical structures into which overseers could be fitted, there was a shortage of experienced personnel who could be appointed to overseer and there was probably an over-reliance on job skill as a recruitment criteria. 175 The chaos of British industry in the grip of an industrial revolution, the shortage of quality supervisors and the predominance of the military model are relevant for analysing the evolution ofthe role of supervision in the New South Wales gang system. In Britain this evolution took place on a piece-meal, ad hoc and trial basis within many thousands of individual private enterprises. It did not occur within an over-arching theoretical or ideological structure of management nor within the central control of government policy. As a consequence the development of consistent models of management and the clarification of the role and function of supervisory staff took a long time. Indeed Scientific Management, as late as the 1890s and early 1900s, was

171 Bigge. op. cit. pp. 54-55 and 58-59. 172 See Pollard. op. cit. p. 197. 173 See Littler. op. cit. pp. 64-69. 174 See Littler, C. and Salaman, G. (1984) Class at Work: the design, allocation and control of jobs. Batsford Academic and Educational. London. pp. 49-52. 175 Littler. op. cit. p. 64. 125 still concerned to clarify, define and control the role of supervisors. 176 On the other hand, in New South Wales the role of the gang supervisor or overseer was systematically addressed as early as 1813 and was by 1826 clearly defined by a centralised government bureaucracy. Colonial government in New South Wales not only possessed the capacity to impose systematic structures of management across much of the colonial economy but displayed a strong willingness to do so in ways that were innovative. This arose from the need to make convict labour productive and also from the military backgrounds of the governors ofNew South Wales. 177 A third feature that needs to be noted is that there were essentially two levels of supervisory management in the New South Wales gang system between 1788 and 1830. These were firstly, the clearly managerial supervisors like Superintendents along with their assistants and secondly the gang overseers and their assistants. Both levels of supervisor were highly functional although the managerial supervisors did not always have close contact with actual work performance and often also had broader administrative roles as well. The overseer supervisors on the other hand were almost exclusively concerned with the supervision of the physical performance of work although by the latter half of the 1820s they too were involved in some elements of its administration. Nevertheless, the effectiveness of the supervision of the work of convicts offered by either of these two levels of supervisor depended essentially on their number and their quality. However in terms of their numbers it was not simply how many supervisors of either class were appointed. The effectiveness of supervision was also affected by the number of men who were to be supervised. In other words, the span of control, the proportion of supervisors to supervised, affected the quality of the performance of the role of supervision. 178 In this the attitude of the supervised was also relevant, as was the type or nature of the work being performed. In addition the shortage of skilled labour also affected the quality of supervision. In New South Wales the scarcity of some skilled workers sometimes required closer and more direct supervisory control, a narrower span of control, than was the case in contemporary

176 See Taylor, F. (1911) Principles of Scientific Management. Harper and Brothers. New York. For his discussion of Functional Foremanship. 177 See Frost. A. (1987) Arthur Phillip, 1738-1814. Oxford University Press. Melbourne; Kennedy, G. (1989) Captain Bligh: the man and his mutinies. Duckworth. London; Auchmuty, J. J. (1968) John Hunter Oxford University Press. Melbourne; Ellis, M. H. (1958) Lachlan Macquarie. Angus and Robertson. Sydney; Teale, R. (1971) Thomas Brisbane. Oxford University Press. Melbourne; and Fletcher, op. cit. 178 See Saville, J. and Higgins, M. (1990) Supervision in Australia. Macmillan. Melbourne. 126 British manufacturing enterprises. 179 In other words there were a range of factors that affected the quality and nature of supervision not just the convict status of the overseers. Finally, an examination of supervision is also critical in the appreciation of the level of convict resistance to management generally. In the absence of freedom to strike and bargain, the resistance of convicts to the system was most visible at the supervisor/subordinate level. It was here that convicts first displayed their defiance to work commands or where their inclination to avoid work was more likely to be noticed. However, not only was conflict between the supervisor and the supervised evident but, and more importantly, there could also be a measure of collusion. As Michael Burawoy's work emphasises while conflict is fundamental to the employment relationship between management and workers so too is consent, a degree of co­ operation or acquiescence. It is evident that the work of the c<;mvict gangs was not always extracted by brutality or fear but was also offered freely in return for reward. Up to 1820 there is evidence that overseers and convict gang members commonly colluded to control the amount of work they performed as a gang. Even after this date some collusion continued. 180 As a consequence the New South Wales gang system must be seen as a fertile case study for understanding the evolution of the modem role of supervisory staff. It is difficult to comprehensively measure the number of supervisory staff appointed to the gang system at different times due to either a shortage of reliable figures or to changes in the way the figures were recorded .. However, estimates of the numbers of supervisors or at least the trend in their numbers can be established by examining the Returns of the Civil Establishment and detailed Work Reports for large sections of the gang system in the second half of the 1820s. The fragmentary nature of this information necessitates its presentation in different tables rather than in one. The figures in Table 5.5 relate only to Sydney, which for most of these years was the main focus of the gang system in any case. From this Table it is clear that the organisation of gang supervision became much more sophisticated over these years. The number of supervisory staff clearly increased as did the layers or grades of the different types of supervisors. The .position of Superintendent of Convicts in the early years was clearly a much more hands-on supervisory role. These men would have been involved in the daily supervision or

179 See Pollard. op. cit. pp. 161-162. 180 See for instance Hirst. op. cit. pp. 66-69. 127 monitoring of the work performed by the various gangs within their control. However, apart from 1813 the number of Superintendents remained very stable. This stability was due to the fact that increasingly the role of Superintendents became more occupationally or geographically defined and their role became less hands-on. By the middle of Governor Macquarie's administration Superintendents had become specialist managers responsible for the administration of an increasing number of gangs rather than for the actual work performance of the convicts in them. The Superintendents, probably by 1813 but certainly by 1819, were essentially responsible for the allocation of gangs to various work tasks or sites within their control, with the generation of vital statistical information required by senior management and with maintaining discipline in ways which supported the authority of the Governor and the overseers.

Table 5.5 Numbers of Superintendents and Overseers in Gang System Sydney, 1796-1820

Date Super- Total Intendants Overseers Principal Overseers Deputy Overseers Overseers

1796 6 7 1802 6 8 1813 11 12 1819 7 53 6 29 18 1820 8 52 6 31 15

Source: HRA I Vols. 1, 3 and 7; CO 201/118 Reel106

On the other hand, the role of the overseers also changed during this period although the figures contained in Table 5.5 do not identify exactly when this expansion occurred. Certainly the number of overseers increased after 1802 in response to the growth in the number of gangs 181 but, as the number of overseer staff in 1813 indicates, this expansion was slow. Somewhere between 1813 and 1819 the number and role of overseer staff was more dramatically changed. 182 Unfortunately, the only detailed

181 See Table 5.2. 182 HRA I. Vol. VIII. Macquarie to Bathurst, 28 April 1814. pp. 190-191; and Macquarie to Bathurst, 24 June 1815. pp. 597-598. 128 figures for the different types of overseers are for the years 1819 and 1820 by which time the sophistication of supervision was very apparent. Not only was there a tremendous increase in the number of overseers but different types or levels of overseers, with quite different roles and degrees of status, had emerged. By 1819 there were Principal Overseers, Overseers and Deputy Overseers. The role ofthese levels of supervisory staffvaried quite distinctly. Principal Overseers were much more involved in the administrative function of the gang system as they were required to directly generate detailed, weekly work reports on the various gangs under them. They also performed a greater coordinating role in that frequently they were responsible for a number of gangs or a number of distinctive but smaller units of convict workers. That is, gangs within gangs. The Overseers were also partly involved in the administration of the gang system in that they too were sometimes required to provide input into the weekly or monthly work reports as they related to the work of their particular gang. However, they were still vitally if not sometimes exclusively involved in managing the performance of work by gang convicts. In this they were sometimes assisted by Deputy Overseers who seem to have been appointed where the number of convicts was extensive, the work difficult, skilled or geographically dispersed. 183 Figures for the number of supervisors in the gang system become more problematic for the years after 1820. In Brisbane's re-formation of the gang system he only provided information on the supervision of his new Clearing Gangs. Similarly, under Darling the gang system shifted to the Road, Bridge and Iron gangs and so most of the detailed information on supervision for his administration relates to the number of supervisors of these gangs. As a consequence, after Macquarie it becomes increasingly difficult to calculate the number of supervisors for all gangs but extremely detailed information does exist for large sections of the gang system. This is presented in Table 5.6 below.

183 See Druitt. op. cit. pp. 2-3. 129 Table 5.6 Numbers of Gang Supervisors 1825 and 1829

Year Gan2s Convict Men Overseers Assistant O's 1825 50 Clearing 1,160 50 Gangs 1829 35 (est) Road 1,165 35 (est) 60 (est) Gangs 8 (est) Iron 452 8 (est) 24 (est) Gangs

Source: AO 590 Assignment and Employment of Convicts 1828-1830 and HRA I. Vol.15. Return of Average Number of Convicts Maintained by the Government during the Year of 1829. p. 386.

The total of convict males for 1829 is reliable but Table 5.6 underestimates the number of overseers and assistants because, while there were 43 road, bridge and iron gangs, the exact number of each is not now known. 184 This is relevant because the Road Gangs all had one overseer and two assistant overseers, the Bridge Gangs had one overseer and the Iron Gangs had one overseer and three assistant overseers. 185 There were probably not many more or less than 8 Iron Gangs but some of the 35 Road Gangs included in Table 5.6 were actually Bridge Gangs which employed fewer convicts (around 25) and only one overseer. 186 Nevertheless, despite these problems Table 5.6 very strongly suggests that all convict gang workers became more closely supervised after Macquarie and were certainly so from 1825 onwards. Further evidence of this can be found by calculating the span of control enjoyed by gang overseers and their assistants from 1796 to 1829. The span of control for these years can be calculated from the information contained in Tables 4.5and 4.6 and is present in Table 5.7 below.

184 See AO 590. Assignment and Employment of Convicts 1828-1830. 185 Ibid. 186 See Ibid; and also Karskens, op. cit. 130 Table 5.7 Span of Supervisor Control for Gang System 1796-1829

Year Gangs Convict Total Span of Men Overseers Control 1796 All 360 7 1:51 1800 All 772 8 1:96 1820 All 2,297 52 1:44 1825 Clearing Gangs 1,160 50 1:23 1829 Road Gangs 1,165 95 1:12 Iron Gangs 452 32 1:14

Source: Tables 6 and 7.

The Span of Control describes the ratio of supervisor to workers and in doing so indicates something of the degree and nature of supervision. Where the ratio is high the nature of supervision is indirect and control is limited. Where it is low supervision is close, direct and personal. 187 From Table 5. 7 it is evident that the span of control for all convict gangs, or for highly significant parts of the gang system fell after 1820. From an enclosure on the number of male convicts .in public employment in 1828, provided by Governor Darling to the Secretary of State, Sir George Murray, it is also possible to calculate that the span of control was as low as 1:13 in this year. 188 It is clear that by the end of the 1820s convict workers had became more closely and directly supervised and therefore controlled. 189

187 See Saville and Higgins. op. cit. Chapter 2 and pp. 72-73. 188 HRA I. Vol. XIV. Darling to Murray, 16 February 1829, Enclosure No. l.p. 647. The figure of 1:13 confirms the general accuracy of the figures in Table 5. 7 and indicates the increase in overseer control was consistent throughout the system of public employment for male convicts and not confined only to the big road gangs. 189 As an interesting contrast Pollard, op. cit. pp. 161-162, in his analysis of management in the British industrial revolution, identifies the ratio between overseers and workers in the cotton industry. By the 1830s, he estimated, the average ratio was 1:28 although in the larger firms it had fallen from a ratio of 1:69 in 1813 to 1:45 in 1830. More relevantly, the ratio amongst the gangs working on the Grand Junction Canal in 1810 was 1:50 while in 1848 the ratio among the railway construction gangs was 1:71. While comparisons of this nature are difficult it is nevertheless clear that during the period under review the span of control of both British industrial workers and New South Wales convict gang workers were both falling. However, that the span fell faster and more consistently in the convict system indicates both a greater need for control by management in New South Wales and a greater ability to deliver it by a centralised government bureaucracy; 131 5.6 Convict resistance to management control

It is argued here that while official concern with productivity before 1822 and with punishment after this date encouraged greater control over convict workers, these were not the only rationale. Changes to the control of the labour process were also a consequence of worker resistance. Colonial managers of convicts endeavoured to increase their control not only to increase labour effort but also to reduce or subdue worker discretion and control over work performance. That this was a concern is not hard to identify, at least at certain times, however measuring the incidence of worker resistance is now extremely difficult. Alan Atkinson examined part of this problem in his study of convict resistance as discerned from an analysis of Magistrate Bench Books. 190 In this article he certainly established a richer and more concerted pattern of convict resistance to the convict system than many previous writers had acknowledged. 191 In his analysis Atkinson identified four categories of protest. These were Attack where convicts rejected official controls both physically and verbally, Appeal to Authority in which convicts asserted their legal rights, Withdrawal of Labour by striking or non-cooperation and Compensatory Retribution in which they devised their own forms of revenge. 192 While these categories are extremely useful in analysing convict reaction to the system under which they lived it is the withdrawal of labour or its variation that is of most interest here. In this part of his discussion Atkinson argued that withdrawal of labour was often a means of protesting over conditions of treatment such as quality of rations, clothing or accommodation. 193 On the other hand this form of protest was sometimes designed "only to bargain". 194 That is, to influence the employment experience by modifying treatment, hours of work, quantity of work etc. As a function of industrial relations this activity forms a less critical part of his analysis while the Bench Book records do not always allow a simple distinction between protest labour actions and bargaining actions. However, in terms of industrial relations the

190 Atkinson, A. "Four Patterns of Convict Protest" in Labour History No 37. November 1979. pp. 28-31. 191 Ibid. p. 28 192 Ibid. p. 30. 193 Ibid. pp. 38-39. 194 Ibid. p. 37. 132 incidence of overt and articulated industrial conflict is not considered the only or even most significant measure of conflict. 195 As will be discussed below there are examples of convict gangs engaging in both bargaining and protest actions that involved the withdrawal of their labour. However, labour will not always use the strike as a means of influencing its work experiences and treatment. Indeed where the strike is illegal (as it was until after

1830196) workers will often find other mechanisms to exert some influence. But, even more significantly, where workers can influence their employment relations without the strike or other overt action it is in their interest to do so. 197 Workers will not normally strike if their objectives can be advanced by other less strenuous means. Convict gang workers were not permitted to withdraw their labour (although some did) while others did not always need to resort to this illegal and. overt action in order to modify their work experience. 198 They used other mechanisms. Examples of these can be difficult to measure. They are also not likely to often find their way before a Magistrate as an industrial action and so the Bench Book records will not present the full picture. However, it is argued here that one way of establishing the general prevalence of a form of resistance is by examining the nature of management controls. In other words evidence of worker resistance to management prerogatives can sometimes found in the ways management changes its labour process controls. It is argued that management will not only modify its policies and practices in line with its own objectives but also in response to worker action, discretion or resistance. In the following analysis of convict gang resistance it is apparent that management designed parts of its labour control bureaucracy as a means of counter attacking worker "abuses" of the system.

195 See Deery, S. Plowman, D. Walsh, J. and Brown, M. (2001) Industria/Relations: a contemporary analysis. McGraw-Hill, Sydney. Chapter 9; and Kennoy, T. and Kelly, D. (1998) The Employment Relationship in Australia. Harcourt Brace. Sydney. Chapter 2. 196 See Quinlan, M. "Pre-Arbitral Labour Legislation in Australia and its Implications for the Introduction of Compulsory Arbitration" in Macintyre, S. and Mitchell, R. (eds) (1989) Foundations of Arbitration: the origins ofstate compulsory arbitration. Oxford University Press. Melbourne. pp. 25-49; and Turner, I. (1978) In Union is Strength. Nelson. Melbourne. pp. 9-19. 197 See Quinlan, M. and Gardner, M. "Strikes, Worker Protest and Union Growth in Canada and Australia, 1815-1900: a comparative analysis of available data" in Labour/Le Travail No. 36, Autumn 1995. 198 See Nichol, W. "'Malingering' and Convict Protest" in Labour History. No. 47, November 1984. p.18. 133 In industrial relations terms it is understood that employers and labour interact over two fundamental issues; firstly, the terms ofthe recruitment of labour (wages) and secondly the utilisation of labour ( effort). 199 In the case of either problem there is ample scope for worker resistance or interaction although, until free labour organised durable trade unions, workers were most often at the mercy of the vagaries of supply and demand and the Master and Servant Acts. 200 On the other hand the contest over labour utilisation offered workers their greatest range of discretion and influence. These problems are rarely explicitly considered by either social or early labour historians although often implicit is the assumption that colonial authorities faced few complexities.201 In reality this view is unsustainable and in any event unduly simplifies the interaction between convict worker and convict manager. Although the problem of convict labour recruitment was seemingly resolved by criminal conviction even in this, as will be seen below, management of convict labour faced many difficulties. However, it is in the problem of labour utilisation that the complexity of managing convict workers is most apparent. Getting convicts to work was a significant problem up to the early 1820s because the convicts were able to influence how hard they laboured. One of the earliest and most important strategies developed by colonial managers of convict labour was the Task Work system. 202 As already discussed above it was an official designation of a minimum quantity of work, or quota for individual convicts and, more commonly, a gang of convict workers, which had to be achieved on either a per day or per week basis. In the early years Task Work was often set through negotiation and consultation?03 In practice Task Work was an effort to balance public and private work interests and reflected the inherent but covert bargaining power of convict workers in the labour process. Where the Task Work was set too high the convicts would have had insufficient time to provide for their own lodging and other needs. Set too low and the convicts would have been able to meet their private needs

199 Quinlan, M. "Industrial Relations Before Unions: New South Wales Seamen 181 0-1852" in Journal of Industrial Relations. Vol. 38, No.2, June 1996. pp. 264-293. 200 See Ibid. pp. 264-265; and Byrne, P. J. (1993) Criminal Law and Colonial Subject, NSW 1810-1830. Cambridge University Press. Melbourne. pp. 41-71. . 201 See Hughes, R. (1988) The Fatal Shore. Pan. London. pp. 282-322; and Sutcliffe, J. T. (1921) A History of Trade Unionism in Australia. Facsimile Edition 1967. Macmillan. Melbourne. pp.23-34. Compare these views with the account offered by Patmore, G. (1991) Australian Labour History. Longman Cheshire. Melbourne. 202 See Robbins (200 1) op. cit. 203 See Tench. op. cit. pp. 249-250; Hunter, J. (1793)An Historical Journal1787-1792. Facsimile edition 1968. Edited by Bach, J. Angus and Roberston and Royal Australian Historical Society. Sydney. pp. 231- 232. 134 with time to "loiter about the streets ... "204 Certainly some convicts manipulated Task Work in order to decrease the intensity of their government labour. Governor Hunter discovered that the Hawkesbury sawyers had set their own Task Work too low205 and this allowed them to sell their free labour hours. But, as if this were not sin enough, Hunter also confronted another custom and practice developed by these convict sawyers. He wrote:

It appears to have been the custom to do government work in the fore part of the day, but if the weather happened to be bad during that time, altho' fair in the afternoon, no work [was] done for Government, but that time [the afternoon] employed for themselves, and for which they have claimed payment as if they had done so much beyond their Government task. 206

In order to stamp out "this shameful practice"207 . Hunter increased the hours of government work and more stringently enforced Task Work with the observation "that if no work can be done for Government on account of bad weather, none can be done for private persons".208 Hunter eventually set a comprehensive policy on Task Work which specified the minimum amount of labour effort required of most gang convicts.Z09 Management was forced to increase its regulation of the labour process in order to reduce worker discretion and control. Interestingly it did so by making a concession to the convicts. Any work the convicts performed in addition to the Task Work was to be paid for.Z 10 Although the brazenness of the Hawkesbury sawyers was exceptional, it is clear that all convict workers were active in resisting the intensification of work. In June 1799 Hunter proclaimed:

From the shortness of the days and the late hours at which the people assemble at their work in the morning, it is not possible that a fair day's task can be finished by 1 0' clock. It is therefore to be understood by

204 Bigge. op. cit. p. 30. 205 HRA I Vol. II, Government Order dated 30 October 1798, p. 359. 206/bid. Government Order, 15 May 1798. p. 214. 207 Ibid. 208 Ibid. 209 HRA I Vol. III, Government Order, 10 March 1801. p. 37. 210 Ibid. 135 superintendents and overseers that the working gangs are to be continued at their work until2 O'clock.211

This extension of hours was a straightforward assertion of control by management and represented the simplest way management had of increasing labour effort although, in practice it was by no means an unequivocal success.Z 12 For example, working hours remained an issue for Governor King, Hunter's successor. Despite the coercive power of the government as an employer, starting times ofwork were inconsistently enforced. A General Order in mid 1801 on working hours instituted (or reiterated) formalised procedures for starting work:

The Bell will ·ring at gun-fire in the morning, and it is expected every person will be at work at daylight. The breakfast bell will ring at eight, and at a quarter before nine, at which time every person is to return to their respective labour.213

This attention to detail was obviously required in order to challenge a casual approach to the starting time of government work. In addition to hours of work King also tightened Task Work. However, despite his efforts, it seems fair to say that King was not able to greatly extend the state's regulation of work much beyond the controls developed by his predecessor. Hours of work were modestly extended although of more significance was the insistence on more regular starting and finishing times. Although Governor Macquarie significantly reorganised and structured the gang system in order to increase labour productivitl14 there were a number of reforms or controls that were explicitly designed to constrain the bargaining power of convict workers. The convicts were able, both individually and collectively, to influence their allocation to specific work or gangs as well as to moderate the amount of work they performed. The power of the convicts to influence their work allocation arose from the fact that there was often an imbalance in the supply and demand for labour, particularly

211 Ibid. Government Order 11 June 1799. p. 585. 212 See Crowley. op. cit. pp. 7-8. 213 HRA I. Vol. II. Government Order, 23 August 1801. p. 462. 214 See Druitt. op. cit. pp. 4-8. 136 skilled labour.215 The state solved this to some extent during the Macquarie administration simply by taking first choice of skilled mechanics before allocating any to the free settlers. But the power of the state was less effective in identifying the skilled convicts from those recently arrived because of the inadequacy of official records on each convict transported216 and because convicts actively manipulated the information they provided. With the assistance of 'old lags' and even of free employers the convicts quickly learned what skills to claim and what to conceal. By claiming skills that they did not possess some convicts improved the type of gang or work to which they were allocated. On the other hand, "if they are successful in the Concealment of their trade and are sent off to a Settler they can exercise their trade at spare hours and gain a great deal ofmoney."217 Exaggeration or concealment .of skill was a deliberate convict strategy to extract better treatment from the penal system and must be viewed as a form of covert convict bargaining. More significantly, this strategy was so widespread that Hutchinson's duties were modified to combat it. He was given the authority to board newly arrived transport ships in order to interview the convicts and to prevent unauthorised people from conveying information about the colonial labour market.218 Convicts have not left many personal accounts of their interaction with the gang system but the extensiveness of this particular strategy is well proved by the reaction that it forced from the colonial administration. In addition, while Macquarie's senior administrators were obviously aware of this convict strategy they were not, in Commissioner Bigge's opinion, successful in thwarting it. His Report urged more stringent quarantine of convict transports219 and Governor Brisbane complied by instructing all convict ships to anchor well away from Sydney "between Dawes' Battery and the New Fort".220 Again the inference is clear. This was an important and widespread convict strategy that continued to interfere with the state's allocation of convicts. Task Work continued to define minimum and not maximum work effort in the Macquarie period.221 Most of the Task Work set by Governor King in 1801 222 remained

215 Robbins, W .M. "The LumberYards: a Case Study in the Management of Convict Labour 1788-1832" in Labour History No. 79. November 2000. p. 149. 216 Evidence by William Hutchinson, Principle Superintendent of Convicts, to Bigge Inquiry and contained in the Bonwick Transcript (hereafter referred to as BT) Box 1, November 1819. 217 Druitt. op. cit. p. 26. 218 Hutchinson BT op. cit. Box 1, November 1819. 219 See Bigge. op. cit. pp. 156-157. 220 HRA I. Vol. XI. p. 572. 221 See Bigge. op. cit. p. 29. 137 in force despite Macquarie's avowed discomfort with Task Work generally.223 Indeed, Macquarie seems to have been unable to abolish it outright although the construction of the Prisoner Barracks in Sydney was an elaborate strategy in the struggle to remove, if not Task Work, then at least its most transparent justification; the need of convicts to earn sufficient income to support themselves. Where Macquarie did increase it he faced significant convict resistance or had to make attractive concessions. A notable example of the former was the case of the sawyers. Druitt confessed to Bigge, I have had more trouble with the Sawyers than any other Description of convicts, & I attribute it to my obliging them to do a greater Portion of work than ever they Did before."224 Druitt not only increased their Task Work from "450 feet per week each pair" to 700 feet but he required them to cut more demanding types of timber such as Iron Bark, Stringy Bark and Blue Gum as well as the customary cedar, a very soft wood. 225 In raising this Task Work Druitt also increased the rations given the sawyers by half, but those at Pennant Hills:

in a body refused to do it; This continued for two or three weeks when H.E. The Govr. Requested me to visit the Settlement & and to speak to the people to represent to them that they were only asked to perform the same work as their fellow prisoners did in the Lumber Yard. I did so & there was a general murmur throughout the whole body; & two men stepped forward close to me; & said if all the men were of their way of thinking, that nothing more than the old task should be done, as they considered the ration of a pound & a half of beef & a pound 8i a half of flour not near Sufficient for a man to work hard upon. They were extremely insolent & I have no doubt wd. Have made an attack upon me had not a resolute Overseer been near me & ready to offer assistance.Z26

Escaping from these 'striking' sawyers Druitt reported the situation to Governor Macquarie who ordered that the two spokesmen be flogged the following morning. Each was given 100 lashes "The Greatest Punishment" Druitt remembered ever being

222 HRA I Vol. III, Government Order dated 10 March 1801, p 37. 223 See Bigge. op. cit. pp 29-32. 224 Druitt. op. cit. p. 37. 225 See Ibid. pp. 4 and 37.

138 inflicted. 227 This swift and punishing response broke the strike " & from that day the usual task required at the Lumber yard was performed by the Sawyers at Pennant Hills."228 In other words the Task Work norm of 700 feet per week per pair of sawyers was imposed upon them although the conditions of work, or more pertinently, lifestyle differed so markedly.

This example highlights not only the immense power of the state over employment relations within the penal system but also the fact that, in spite of this, convicts did quite openly resist. The actions of the Pennant Hills sawyers, it should also be remembered, would have probably been illegal for free workers.229 The hostile response by the government to worker militancy was not simply a reaction to the temerity of convict labour but may have been just as swift in the face of free worker resistance. However, a postscript to this dispute offers yet more evidence of convict bargaining power. Defeated in their overt actions the sawyers resorted to more covert resistance. By 1820 it was widely known that the sawyers were still completing their larger Task Work with time to spare. The Task Work for "the Government was done on Thursday Evenings of every week".230 In other words the sawyers still withheld productive capacity from the government and retained Friday and half of Saturday to be used in paid employment for themselves.231 They performed more work but could have worked even harder. However, the government did not further raise the Task Work despite a shortage ofbuilding timber.232 On the other hand, the Grass Cutters gang is an example of where the administration deemed it prudent to offer concessions in exchange for an increase in task work. Bigge explained that:

Those of the grass-cutters that are well conducted, are allowed to lodge in the town (Sydney), and after they have procured the quantity that is given as a task to each man, they are allowed to dispose of the surplus for themselves; those likewise who have been able to furnish on the Fridays the quantity required for that day and the Saturday, are allowed the use of the

226 Ibid. p. 34. 227 Ibid. p. 36 228 Ibid. p. 34 229 Quinlan. ( 1996) op. cit. pp. 271-281. 230 Ibid. 231 See Bigge. op. cit. p.29. 232 See Druitt. op. cit. p.34. 139 government boats to procure it for themselves on the Saturday, and to sell it in the town. The daily task to the grass-cutters has been raised lately from 40 to 60 bundles of grass for each man ... 233

There is no evidence that the grass-cutters resisted this increase in their Task Work. However, it is clear that, to encourage an acceptable minimum level of labour productivity from the convicts employed in this gang, a number of very significant concessions were given to them. If well behaved they were able to enjoy independent, private (non-work) life-styles outside the Barracks and in this way minimised the penal system's regulation of their lives. This example also highlights the fact that Task Work divided a convict's work effort into publicly and privately owned spheres. As long as the convict grass-cutter produced the required Task Work during his public employment he was then allowed to work in a private capacity for part of the day or week. And it was in this latter capacity that the system allowed reward for greater personal effort. When working for themselves the convict grass-cutters could increase their personal rewards by increasing their work effort. But more than this, the personal or private work effort of these convicts was subsidised by the public sector. Government property, in the form of the boats, tools and even the vacant land upon which they harvested the grass, was freely made available to them. In other words, the State sanctioned private enterprise amongst those convicts who conformed to acceptable habits and patterns of behaviour. However, in terms of the gang system under Macquarie there was evidence of even more fundamental convict influence over the labour process; this influence was collective and it also involved the collusion between overseer and gang workers. According to Bigge some overseers colluded with their gangs because they were engaged in running a private enterprise and needed flexibility in their duties or because they were simply incapable of effectively imposing greater control over their gangs.234 As a consequence, Bigge wrote:

I can add my own testimony during a period of six months residence in the Town of Sydney, to the inactivity of the gangs of workmen, whenever they

233 Bigge op. cit. p. 28. 234 Ibid. p. 58. 140 thought that they were unobserved, and the little dependence that is to be placed in the overseers for correcting it. 235

The discerning behaviour of the convict workers in this respect can be seen as a symptom of a covert militancy. Although engaged in coerced labour they were not a passive workforce but were clearly prepared to vary their work effort when circumstances permitted. Evidence that this "inactivity" was endemic and widespread is found in statements by both Druitt and Bigge that identified the strategy the convicts called the "Hawk". The Hawk was a convict selected by a gang to keep watch at a discrete distance and vantage point in order to give "a private signal" warning the gang of the approach of any figure of authority.236 Protected by their Hawk a gang could idle away part of their working day undetected. Like their 'flash' language237 the gang convicts developed a secret code of signals that only they could read or understand. More than this, according to Druitt, the convicts were "always successful in concealing" their private signals.238 Despite the penal system's explicit reliance on the propensity of convicts to inform on one another,239 none in the gangs ever revealed the secrets of their Hawk's warning signals. This is not surprising given the egalitarian nature of the Hawk arrangement. It benefited all convicts in a gang, not just a few. But, the most subversive and alarming aspect of this scam was the fact that it could not operate without the collusion of the overseer. "The overseers" Druitt explained " are interested in the concealment for if I caught them idle I shd. [sic] hold them responsible."240 Task work was in a sense designed to address collusive work restrictions. Task work meant that, however idle a gang might have wished to be, a minimum level of output within a set period of time had to be achieved. Task work, in other words, also placed a cap on gang idleness. It is also likely that an overseer of a gang, which consistently met its task work, would have used idleness as an indulgence to good behaviour and consistent work effort. Idleness or extended rest periods may therefore have been an unofficial, even illegal, incentive offered by an overseer. As a consequence, the overseer, even more than the convicts, needed to use and preserve the

235 Ibid. p.32. 236 Druitt. op. cit. p. 29. 237 See Ward, R. (1974) The Australian Legend. Oxford University Press. pp. 9, 23-30. 238 Druitt. op. cit. p. 29. 239 Ibid. p. 28.

141 Hawk in order to protect his use of this secret incentive or reward. Although neither Druitt nor Bigge quantified the prevalence of the Hawk arrangement (indeed, how could they have) that they knew of its existence and were alarmed by it indicates it was common. In the long run only the implementation of Bigge's recommendations to extend working hours overwhelmed this covert convict strategy to control the labour process. Governors Brisbane and Darling both addressed the problem of controlling convicts by restructuring the gang system and by improving the character and nature of supervision. Released from the demands of productivity they both concentrated on designing gang work to be as punitive as possible. They improved overseer motivation and accountability by enmeshing convict overseers in a structure of promotion, reward and status designed to shift their allegiances away from the convicts and into the arms of the system of penal administration. Accountability was improved by imposing greater scrutiny of work measurement through the positions of middle management. The role of the Superintendents, Assistant Superintendents, Assistant Surveyors of Roads or the short-lived position of Sub-Inspectors of the Clearing Gangs, were changed to be more explicitly and directly involved in maintaining control of the overseers. These middle management positions were all required to more strictly monitor the allocation of rations and clothing, muster the gangs more frequently, to more closely set and evaluate the quantity and quality of work performed by the gangs and to generate weekly and monthly reports of work perforn1ance. These reports became particularly comprehensive documents. They generated detailed statistical measurement of work achieved including estimates, for example, of the amount of dirt removed from a road to the quantity of rock and gravel spread, how many men were employed at what tasks on what days and where they worked. 241 However, while these reports did not often identify individual convict workers they certainly minutely measured the effectiveness of the overseers of each gang. Overseers had to contribute to this statistical analysis and offer explanations where output fell short of expectations. Under Darling the functions of colonial government were more rationally departmentalised with clearer distinctions between the role of each department while within them a more professional and effective administrative bureaucracy was created. Under the stricter controls of Darling the ability of convicts to utilise the Hawk

240 Ibid. 241 AO 590. Assignment and Employment of Convicts, 1828-1830. 142 arrangement was greatly reduced. There was far less scope for negotiating informally with their overseers because Task Work was no longer relied upon to set an acceptable quantity of work output. In fact it was replaced by unremitting and seemingly never­ ending toil, for Darling also increased hours of work. 242 By 1830 the convict had to work from sunrise to sunset and the overseer was required and forced to impose a regime of regular and constant toil. The distinction between the supervised and the supervisor was widened and for the convict the only way out was to successfully serve his sentence or to abscond. Nevertheless, it would be wrong to conclude that the changes implemented by Brisbane and Darling stopped all convict resistance or attempts to influence the labour process. The growth in the number of convicts sent to the Road and Iron Gangs and the penal settlements are testimony to the fact that convicts resisted their government and private employers. Many were sentenced to these gangs or prisons for work related conflicts such as neglect of work or disobeying lawful commands.243 While Governor Darling liked to describe the Road and Iron Gang convicts as "double distilled villains" at least some of them were convicted of 'crimes' that can now be seen as attempts to influence employment relations rather than merely acts of dishonesty.244 Convict resistance to management control of the labour process did not disappear even within the gangs for Road Gang convicts were also convicted of work related crimes and punished by sentencing to an Iron Gang, to being lumbered, flogged or incarcerated in a penal settlement.245 John Hirst also describes the difficulty overseers faced in trying to assert control over convict work attendance and performance on the Busby Tunnel, the underground water supply engineered by John Busby between 1827 and 1837. 246 Convicts employed in this semi-public work gang continued to display an ability to negotiate greater leniency from their overseers. Convict resistance to management control and their attempts to moderate the employment experience were not eradicated

242 HRA I. Vol. XIII. Darling to Bathurst, 1 March 1827. p. 136. 243 AO 590. Assignment and Employment of Convicts, 1828-1830. See for examples, Monthly Reports from Numbers 28, 9 and 10 Iron Gangs, Monthly Reports of Numbers 11, 18, and 25 Road Gangs for various years between 1827 and 1830 244 HRA I. Vol. XIV. Darling to Huskisson, 28 March 1828. p. 70; and see also AO 590. Assignment and Employment of Convicts, 1828-1830, the Monthly Report of Road parties and Iron gangs under direction of Assistant Surveyor, March 1830. 245 See AO 590. Weekly Report of Road Parties and Iron Gangs under Direction of the Surveyor of Roads and Bridges, 16 January 1830; the Monthly Report of Road parties and Iron gangs under direction of Assistant Surveyor, March 1830; and Report of Assistant Surveyor of the Road Branch for the District of LowerNorthhead, Newcastle Road, 30 September 1830. 246 Hirst. op. cit. pp. 66-69. 143 although it is fair to say resistance became more difficult to express and was more swiftly and brutally dealt with. Perhaps as a consequence of the curtailment of convict resistance others in colonial society began to champion their cause. By 1827 The Monitor, a Sydney based newspaper "written expressly for the convict population"/47 began to campaign against the treatment of convict workers by the government of Governor Darling. As the ability of convicts to influence their employment relations declined other avenues of protest were utilised, reflecting the increasing complexity of the political divisions in colonial New South Wales.

5.7 Conclusion

The gang system was one of the most visible and enduring methods of organising the public employment of convic_t labour. The gang system grew steadily in size from the first years of settlement until in 1820 it employed approximately 20% of all male convicts and around 95% of all male convicts employed by the government. In 1822 the gangs were re-organised although it was not until after 1825 that the size of the gang system was significantly reduced. The type of work that the gangs performed also expanded until the early 1820s where upon they were reorganised, mostly into road construction. The early 1820s must be seen a watershed in the history of convictism and this is reflected in the scale, character and purpose of the gang system of public convict labour. The development of the gang system reflects the policies and objectives of British and colonial governments as well as the changing economic importance of the convicts as a workforce. Economic survival in the first decades made the organisation of convicts into gangs a necessity. It was an efficient way in which to organise a physically weakened, hostile and poorly skilled workforce although the administration of the gangs also reflected a lack of systematic management practice as well as convict power or discretion in the employment relationship. Early Governors like Phillip or Hunter were required to make significant concessions to the convicts in order to extract an acceptable level of labour effort. This situation was changed and made more complex with the arrival of Governor Macquarie because. his ambitious infrastructure and general development policies created the need to make convict workers more productive than they had been. However, contrary to popular belief he did not, as a consequence, adopt

247 See HRA I. Vol XIII. Darling to Bathurst, 1 March 1827. p. 140. 144 brutal labour management policies and practices. His approach was not the maintenance or construction of a simple model of control, as Marx or Edwards have suggested, but the adoption of a complex and sophisticated bureaucratic system of control. In terms of the gang system Macquarie made its organisation as well as its activities more elaborate. The allocation of convicts to gangs became more systematic, the number of gangs was expanded, the range of work performed by the gang system was broadened, the motivation of the gang workers was made more elaborate and the hierarchy of command within and over the gangs was made more sophisticated. Macquarie created new supervisory positions within the gang system and delineated more clearly and formally the differing levels of authority, power and function of supervisory managers. In other words he began to formalise the hierarchy of control within the gang system. Although the chain of command remained relatively flat and direct it is very apparent that Macquarie was elongating it. On the other hand the convicts remained able to influence many of the employment relations issues that arose from their employment within the gang system through covert and even overt actions. Senior management were concerned with this situation and accommodated or, where possible, confronted convict bargaining power. In this way the organisation of the gangs and the management of the convict workers within each gang reflected convict resistance and bargaining as well as government ambition. The elaborate and transparent nature of many of Macquarie's labour management reforms made him an obvious target for critics. He increased government construction at a time when the British government was highly cost sensitive and was increasing the volume of transportation. His productivity orientated labour management policies were also perceived by the British government as making public employment too attractive and lenient and in this way reduced the deterrent effect of transportation. Finally, some free settlers saw Macquarie's public works programs as competing with their own workforce needs and their complaints found an increasingly sympathetic reception in Britain. As a consequence of these factors the British government appointed in 1819 a Commission of Inquiry headed by Commissioner John Thomas Bigge. Although his report examined a wide range of social, economic and political issues he gave considerable emphasis to the structure and organisation of workforce management. In this way, although Bigge was clearly predisposed to oppose Macquarie, his analysis offers many details on how the employment of convicts in gangs was organised and managed. Bigge was critical of the quality and effectiveness of

145 management but his recommendations, while changing the nature of the gang system, tended to increase and bureaucratise management control rather than make it more simplistic.

Governor Brisbane, Macquarie's successor, energetically implemented many of Bigge's recommendation, most notably the assignment of more convicts to free settlers, the curtailment of some public gangs and the construction of the new Clearing Gangs. More importantly, Brisbane organised this new type of gang in a ways that increased management control. He created new hierarchical distinctions in the chain of command by delineating responsibility, status and reward between the different levels of supervisors. In this way Brisbane, while hostile to Macquarie's gang system, in fact refined and increased the formalisation of management's bureaucratic control. However, Governor Darling, Brisbane's successor introduced the most obvious changes, after 1825. Darling dramatically reduced the scale of the gang system by increasing assignment to the private sector and by abolishing many of the public works construction and maintenance gangs. However he did not abolish the gang system per se but continued to employ over 4000 male convicts in an expanded network of road and bridge construction gangs. More than this, Darling also changed the purpose of this form of public employment. Although the road and bridge gangs continued to perform critical work the fundamental purpose of these gangs was to impose punishment. The road gangs were designed to be punitive first then productive. Although Darling simplified the purpose of the remaining convict gangs he did not simplify their management. On the contrary he introduce even more controls. He increased the levels of supervisory managers, increased and highly formalised the distinctions between supervisory function, scope of authority, status and reward. New and more distinctive levels of supervisors were created while greater energy and method was developed to make each supervisor more accountable for gang performance and behaviour. The covert and overt strategies of resistance previously used by convict workers in the gangs were confronted and brutally resolved in management's favour. The gang system was managed within the context of a government bureaucracy which was more rationally structured, more focused on the need to control and better equipped with the means to do so. Governor Darling finalised the creation of the tall hierarchal and unitarist structure of command that is distinctively and recognisably bureaucratic.

146 CHAPTER SIX

THE MANAGEMENT OF SKILLED LABOUR AT THE LUMBER YARDS

6.1 Introduction

The simplicity of the name, Lumber Yard, belies the complexity and importance of these two government enterprises. Situated in the centres of the Sydney and Parramatta settlements, the government Lumber Yards were, for a period of time, the largest and most important manufacturing factories in the colony of New South Wales. From modest maintenance activities in the first years of white settlement the Lumber Yards, during Macquarie's governorship, came to produce hundreds of different types of manufactured goods, employ hundreds of convicts, both skilled and unskilled, and provided metal as well as timber products for a diverse range of projects. As employers of large numbers of convict workers they also have unique significance in the study of the management of convict labour. The management structures, controls and decision making processes used in the Lumber Yards shed light on the broader question of how convict labour was utilised and managed. The history of the Lumber Yards mirrors Noel Butlin' s account of the evolution of the colonial economy ofNew South Wales. Before 1810 the colony was a pioneer economy with limited and highly basic production demands but between 1810 and 1820 "the public sector expanded relatively rapidly ... " while after 1821 "its rate of expansion slackened drastically ... " 1 During the period of expansion the government created a public sector which "carried out a wide array of functions". 2 The Lumber Yards were critical public enterprises in this period of economic expansion. According to Butlin a number of factors reversed this trend by the early 1820s. The physical restrictions on the colony were removed with the construction of roads across the Blue Mountains while the influx of convicts and free settlers created a larger and more diverse population. This expansion in population also included the return of many members of the active entrepreneurial class who had been recalled to Britain to answer

1 Butlin, N. (1994) Forming a Colonial Economy. Cambridge University Press. Melbourne. p. 142. 2 Ibid. 147 charges arising from the Rum Rebellion. Their return "brought back into contention potential large employers of convict labour" and challenged the continuation of "large­ scale public infrastructure provision".3 The Bigge Inquiry was an administrative response to the growing conflict between public and private sector interests and to the fiscal concerns of the British government. As a consequence, Butlin argues, 1821 can be seen as "a major dividing point" in colonial economic development. After this date the British government recognised the pastoral and agricultural potential of the colony while to reduce government expenditure it assigned convicts "to private and away from public employment."4 The role of colonial government changed and nowhere was this more apparent than in the Lumber Yards. Although the Lumber Yards were clearly important in the history of Australian industry they have attracted little research. 5 One explanation may be the nature of the surviving archival records relating to these enterprises. There are more general references to and explanations of activity at the Sydney Lumber Yard than for the Parramatta one. Indeed the Sydney Yard was the first established while the Parramatta Yard was clearly regarded as a 'branch office' for many years. Even the beginning and closing of the Parramatta Yard is less clear than for the Sydney Yard. However, in critical ways the records of the Parramatta Yard are the more important. Much more detail relating to the nature of work performed, the output produced, and the size of the workforce employed, exists for the Parramatta establishment than for the Sydney one. Also, and just as critically, more information relating to the nature and character of convict supervision is now available for Parramatta. As a consequence the analysis of the Lumber Yards will shift between Sydney and Parramatta and will often refer to them as interchangeable. This is not a problem for they were extremely similar organisations. They produced the same products, employed a similar mix of skilled to unskilled convict worker and came under the direct controls of the Chief Engineer and the Principal Superintendent of Convicts. While they were physically separate organisations they were administratively integrated.

3 Ibid. p. 147. 4 Ibid. p. 118.

148 6.2 The rise and fall of the Lumber Yards

Although many Lumber Yard activities, such as blacksmithing, were of immediate importance to the new settlement, their consolidation into the permanent sites in Sydney and Parramatta was evolutionary. Watkin Tench indicated that crude blacksmiths' workshops were built upon the arrival of the First Fleet.6 These seem to have been located near what became known as Bennalong Point.7 However, according to White "The blacksmith's shop, which was built of common brush wood was burnt down" on 23 third of July 1788.8 Presumably a similar pioneer structure was quickly rebuilt for it is later improved. David Collins recounted that between June and September 1789 "a large and convenient shop, capable of working six or seven forges" was built.9 The Parramatta Lumber Yard seems to have been established the following year. 10 At the end of 1791 Tench wrote,

All the sawyers, carpenters, and blacksmiths will soon be concentrated under the direction of a very adequate person of the governor's household: this plan is already so far advanced as to contain nine covered sawpits, which change of weather cannot disturb the operations of, an excellent work-shed for the carpenters, and a large new shop for the blacksmiths; it certainly promises to be of great public benefit: 11

Clearly the productivity of the Sydney Lumber Yard convicts had been improved with investment in physical layout and infrastructure and by the recruitment of a better

5 See Linge, G. J. R. (1979) Industrial Awakening: a geography ofAustralian manufacturing 1788-1890. Australian National University Press. Canberra; and Walsh, G. P. "Factories and Factory Workers in New South Wales 1788-1900" in Labour History. No. 21, November 1971. 6 Tench, W. (1789) Sydney's First Four Years. 1961 Facsimile Edition annotated by L.F. Fitzhardinge, Angus and Roberston. Sydney. p. 38 and p. 92. 7Kelly, M. and Crocker, R. (1978) Sydney Takes Shape: a collection ofcontemporary maps from Foundation to Federation, Doak Press. Sydney. p. 2. 8 White, J. (1790) Journal ofa Voyage to New South Wales. Facsimile edition 1962. Edited by A.H. Chisholm. Angus and Robertson. Sydney. p. 151. 9 Collins, D. (1798) An Account ofthe English Colony in New South Wales. Facsimile edition 1975 edited by B. H. Fletcher. Reed Books; Sydney. Vol. 1. p. 56 and Vol. 2. pp. 35 and 57. 10 Ibid. p. 56. 11 Tench. op. cit. p. 246. 149 supervisor. Tench's account also highlights the lasting correlation between government building and the importance or expansion of the LumberYard activities. Between September 1800 and December 1801 Governor King (1800-1806) further improved and enlarged the physical structure of the Sydney Lumber Yard. He wrote to the Duke of Portland, Secretary of State for the Home Department, that he had "built a large blacksmiths' shop and carpenters' work shop etc. of brick and enclosed a lumber yard at Sydney for the carpenters at public labour." 12 Using a map of Sydney dated 1807 G.P.Walsh locates King's large brick factory on "the south side of Bridge Street between George Street and the Tank Stream." 13 By all accounts the Lumber Yard remained on this site until it was closed in 1832. 14 King's refurbishment and consolidation of the yard into more substantial buildings reflected the growing importance of its manufacturing activities. The need for blacksmithing, wheelwrights and the manufacture of timber building materials was too great to be accommodated in anything but permanent buildings. Similarly, an enclosure must surely reflect the need to protect the growing value of government property. Government enterprise probably stagnated after King for his modifications lasted about 15 years. This is perhaps not surprising given the turmoil of Bligh's governorship (1806-1810) and the Rum Rebellion that overthrew him. 15 However, although the arrival of Macquarie (181 0-1821) marked renewed public activity, expansion of the Sydney Lumber Yard was slow to follow. This probably also reflects greater investment in the Parramatta Yard in the early years of his administration. Macquarie did not refurbish the Sydney site until sometime between 1817 and 1819. Recounting this refurbishment Macquarie described it as:

A large Commodious Brick-Built Lumber Yard, situated nearly in the centre of the Town, containing all the requisite Workshops and covered in Saw Pitts for the Mechanics and Artificers in the immediate Service of Government, with an Arsenal for Arms and Rooms for various Stores and also Offices for the Acting

12 Historical Records of Australia Series 1 (hereafter referred to as HRA I) Vol. III Statement of PUblic Works done from Sept. 23 1800 to Dec. 31 1801. p. 439. 13 Walsh, G. P. "The Geography of Manufacturing in Sydney 1788-1851" in Business Archive and History. No.3. 1963. pp. 29 and 33. 14Linge. op. cit. pp. 23-29. 15 Evatt, H.V. (1965) Rum Rebellion. Angus and Robertson. Sydney. 150 Chief Engineer and Principal Superintendent of Convicts, having an extensive Area of Ground for Timber, and the whole Premises enclosed with a Stone Wall 12 feet high. 16

Major Druitt also claims credit for some refurbishment of the Sydney Lumber Yard. When he took up his position in 1817, he told Commissioner Bigge,

I found the Lumber Yard very inefficient there was no covering for the sawyers except on one side of the Yard. The Smiths and carpenters shops were much too confined, in consequence I caused to be built a Smith's Shop at the lower end of the Yard, sufficient for Eight additional fires for heavy work; and six for nailers. I also caused to be erected a furnace for both iron and brass founding a large Shop for painters and glaziers, and a shed sufficient to accommodate Eight pair of Sawyers, as well as a Shop for the harness and collar makers. 17

He raised the wall enclosing the yard by four feet (1.2 metres) and replaced the gates with more substantial ones. He also provided "the protection that I considered indispensably necessary to all the workman from the Sun and rain but more especially for the Sawyers ... "18 While his motives for this action can be seen in terms of Atkinson's "age of humanitarianism" 19 it also, just as vividly but more practically, reveals a concern for productivity. Saw-pits were dreadful places of labour in good weather but in the wet would have been dangerous and muddy if they could have been used at all.2° Covering the pits would have been a welcome improvement to working conditions but, according to Druitt's calculations, it nearly doubled sawing productivity.Z1 Infrastructure investment helped raise Task Work.

16 HRA. 1 Vol. X. Macquarie to Bathurst, 27 July 1822. p 685. 17 Evidence of Major Druitt, Chief Engineer, to Commissioner Bigge in Ritchie, J. (ed) (1971) The Evidence to the Bigge Reports: New South Wales under Macquarie. Vol. I. Heinemann. Melbourne. p. 4. 18 Ibid. 19 Atkinson, A. (1997) The Europeans in Australia: A History. Vol. I. Oxford University Press. Melbourne. p. 99. 20 Birmingham, J. Jack, I and Jeans, D. (1979) Australian Pioneer Technology. Heinemann Educational Australia. Richmond. p .. 180; and Berg, M. (1979) Technology and Toil in Nineteenth Century Britain. CSE Books. London. p. 129. 21 Druitt. op. cit. p. 4. 151 While simple metal work, sawing and timber splitting remained core Lumber Yard activities, over the years others were gradually added. This evolutionary expansion reflected the increasing sophistication of construction and maintenance carried out by the Colonial government particularly during Governor Macquarie's reign. As public buildings became larger and more permanent and utilised more durable materials, such as brick and stone, the Lumber Yards' manufacturing became more sophisticated and the range of activities was expanded. In 1819 the convict workers engaged at the Lumber Yards included:

Carpenters, Joiners, Cabinet makers, Wood Turners, Sawyers, Wheelwrights, Cartmakers, Barrow makers, Blacksmiths, Whitesmiths, Shoeing Smiths, Smiths for all sorts of country work, Tool makers, Nailors [sic], Bell founders, Iron and brass Founders, Brass finishers, Turners and platers, Iron and brass wire Drawers, Tool Sharpeners and Steelers [sic], Tinmen, Painters and Glaziers, Farriers and horse shoers, Saddlers and Harness makers, Bridle bits and Stirrup makers, Bellows makers, Pump borers, Taylors [sic] and Shoemakers, Gunsmiths, File makers and cutters, Comb makers, Block makers, Coopers and Millwrights, Machinemakers, Anchor smiths.22

By this time the Sydney Lumber Yard and probably the Parramatta Yard were also manufacturing a range of Slops (clothing) for convict use.23 However, it was not simply the range of work performed that expanded at the Lumber Yards. By their nature, much of the new work activities reflected greater skill levels and higher quality and sophistication. For example, the timber supplied to the Sydney Yard varied in quality and type because different timber was used for different jobs. By 1819 sawyers were manufacturing weatherboards, bearers, joists, scantling boards, laths, doors and wood suitable for cabinets and furniture. Similarly, metalworking involved making nails of differing sizes, door and gate hinges, pails, brackets and spikes and bolts for bridges.24

22 Ibid. p. 21. 23 CO 2011118 Reel106 Return of Cloth and Blankets Manufactured at the Government Factory, Parramatta. 24 See ML A2086-A2088 CY Reel11 16 New South Wales Superintendent of Carpenters, Parramatta; and Druitt. op. cit. pp. 6 and 16. 152 Governor Brisbane (1821-1825) reduced much of the government's public works, particularly in Sydney and increased assignment. However he seems not to have significantly reduced the activities of the Lumber Yards. These contained more of the government's skilled convict workforce than any other part of the convict system and their work remained essential not only to government projects but also simple maintenance of public infrastructure. However, Brisbane was determined to address the 'problem' of skilled mechanics,25 particularly in Sydney and part of his attention was directed at the Lumber Yards. Around 1824 the Yards were placed under Major Ovens and the Engineer Department and this change consolidated a range of activities that were once part of the general Gang system. Under Ovens brick making, quarrying, stone cutting and setting were brought within the management of the Lumber Yards.26 Ironically the activities of the Lumber Yards increased at the time when ways were being explored to reduce if not close them. As acting Chief Engineer, Ovens was instructed to examine the operations of the Lumber Yards 27 and to report on the possibility of contracting out "for the making, erection and repair of all Government Works and Buildings ... "28 Ovens' report was a spirited defence of public works generally and the Lumber Yards specifically. He argued that privatisation of Lumber Yard activities would be wasteful, raise the cost of skilled labour, damage discipline and lower labour productivity. He argued that the Lumber Yards were productive, efficient and essential organisations.Z9 There is no indication now as to what Governor Brisbane made of this defence but he had no time in which to act upon it for responsibility passed to Governor Darling (1825-1831 ). Ovens also played no further part in the defence of the Lumber Yards for he died after a long illness on 7 December 1825.30 Like Brisbane, Governor Darling was also determined to transform government employment of convicts but his impact on the Lumber Yards was slower than anticipated.

25 See HRA I. Vol. XI. Brisbane to Bathurst. 17 June 1825. pp. 472-473. 26 HRA I Vol. XI Ovens to Goulbum, 16 June 1825. pp. 650-658. · 27 Ibid. Goulbum to ChiefEngineer. 10 July 1824. p. 650. 28 Ibid. Ovens to Goulbum. p. 650. 29 Ibid. pp. 652-654. 30 See Australian Dictionary ofBiography. Vol. 2. 1788-1850. Shaw, A. G. L. and Clark, C. M. H. (eds). Melbourne University Press. Melbourne. p. 305. 153 He did reduce the range of activities performed by the Yards31 but he did not dramatically reduce the workforce of the Sydney Lumber Yard. In 1825 it employed 182 convicts while in early 1832 it employed 183. 32 Nevertheless, the days of the Sydney Lumber Yard were numbered. For several months during 1830 and 1831 Governor Darling and the Surveyor General, Major Mitchell, argued about re-locating the Lumber Yard. Mitchell favoured a Darling Harbour site33 while the Governor favoured a site adjoining the Hyde Park Barracks.34 This dispute was part of a larger and acrimonious conflict between the Governor and the Survey General over their respective powers and qualities. The Governor, for example wrote to the Colonial Secretary that,

Major Mitchell is a 'good practical Surveyor and an excellent draughtsman'. Beyond this, he possesses no merit. He is a Man of no arrangement, and is totally unequal to the management and proper Conduct of an extensive Department. But, if he were more capable, his ill temper would render his talents abortive?5

Darling and the Executive Council examined the two sites and decided that the Hyde Park Barracks one "held out many advantages over the" other. The Minutes of this Council meeting recorded that with the Barracks site,

The workmen and labourers would be saved the fatigue and the Government the loss of time of their walking a considerable distance four times a day, proceeding to their work and returning to their meals and their Barracks, when the work is finished for the day, a distance taken altogether perhaps a

31 He did this by giving some of its traditional activities to specific government departments such as the Surveyor General, Commissariat and Public Works. See HRA I XIV. Enclosure, Darling to Murray, 1 February I829. pp.' 628-631. 32 See HRA I. Vol. XI. Major Ovens to Goulbum, I6 June I825. pp. 654-659 for I825 figure and AO Reel 2652 2/8I66, Return of Mechanics Discharged from Lumber Yard for I832 figure. 33 HRA I XVI. Surveyor General to Colonial Secretary. 30 November I830. p. 204 and p. 208. 34 Ibid. Darling to Murray. January 1831. pp. I 56-I 57. 35 Ibid. 154 little short of eight miles. The inconvenience besides of such a number of Prisoners passing to and fro through the town would be avoided.36

At the beginning of 1832 the Lumber Yard site on Bridge Street was closed down and relocated to land adjoining the Barracks.37 However, this change involved more than mere relocation because the workforce was dramatically reduced, through release, assignment or re-allocation, from 183 convicts at the start of 1832 to 24 by the end of that year.38 A year later Governor Bourke voiced concern about how future public building maintenance requirements would be organised.39 Although the curtailment of government activity was well under way the nature of continuing government responsibility was not yet clearly worked out. For example, repairs to some public buildings were made the responsibility of· . the Colonial Architect and paid from Colonial revenues, while others were put under the charge of a Deputy Commissioner General, assisted by a Board and paid for by the Military Chest.40 The modem division between civic and military functions was not yet fully in place and indeed the closure of the Lumber Yard also highlighted the need to distinguish which government authority was responsible for roads, surveying, water supply etc. Finally, in 1833 Governor Bourke also proposed to sell the old site of the Lumber Yard but this suggestion raised concerns as to which branch of government actually owned it. He proposed that the proceeds of the sale of the buildings should go "into the Military Chest" while the sale of the land would be paid to the Crown. The buildings by this stage were only expected to fetch $250 "but the ground being in the heart of Sydney is of very considerable value."41 However, nothing seems to have come of this proposal for in February, 1835, the old Lumber Yard site and buildings were once again pressed into public use when they were required to accommodate a ship load of 'respectable' female immigrants.42 In May it was again used for female accommodation but apparently these women were not only respectable but were of greater sensibilities, for they complained of

36 Ibid. 37 See HRA 1 Vol. XVII. Bourke to Goderich. 5 February 1833. p. 26; and Linge. op. cit. p. 88. 38 AO Reel2652 2/8166 Return ofMechanics Discharged from Lumber Yard. 39 HRA 1 XVII Bourke to Goderich 5 Feb 1833. pp 26-27. 40 Ibid. 41 See. p. 29. 42 Ibid. Bourke to Rice, 13 February 1835. pp. 660-661. 155 the conditions of the buildings.43 The Sydney Lumber Yards' demise was complete when it was reduced to basic accommodation on very expensive real estate.

6.3 The workforce of the Lumber Yards

The size of the workforce at the Lumber Yards is a critical measure of activity and management. While there are, unfortunately, gaps in the estimates of the workforce at each Lumber Yards, those figures that are available are presented in Table 6.1 while the trend in employment is displayed in Graph 6.1. From these it is apparent that the Lumber Yards' workforce expanded slowly from 1788 until 1800. This growth reflects the slow increase in the number of convicts transported to NSW generally and the gradual expansion of government infrastructure activity. Over this time public work slowly expanded from basic pioneer activity to include a growing but still narrow range of more sophisticated . 44 manu f:actunng. However, the growth of the Lumber Yards was not uniform or continuous. Between 1800 and 1806 the workforce of the Lumber Yards declined. This fall reflected firstly, a slowing in the number of convicts transported to the colony and secondly, the stagnation of public sector employment generally.45 During these years, powerful free settlers and NSW Corps Officers like John Macarthur were able to shift convict employment from public to private sector activity.46 It is interesting to note that the Parramatta Lumber Yard was slower to decline, probably reflecting a greater need for state subsidised public works on the margin of white settlement. A slight recovery in the numbers of Lumber Yard convicts occurred after 1806 perhaps in response to the Rum Rebellion.47

43 Ibid. Bourke to Glenelg, 8 May 1835. p. 725. 44 Budin. op. cit. pp. 142-144 and p. 162. 45 Shaw, A. G. L. (1966) Convicts and the Colonies. Faber and Faber. London. pp. 363-364. 46 O'Brien, E. (1950) The Foundation ofAustralia. Macmillan. Melbourne. p. 208; and Butlin. op. cit. p. 119. 47 Evatt. op. cit. 156 Table 6.1 Size of Workforce at Sydney and Parramatta Lumber Yards Various Years 1790-1832

Date Sydney Parramatta 1790 44 1800 92 1801 89 98 1802 89 102 1803 90 94 1804 78 110 1805 73 74 1806 52 58 1807 83 68 1808 1809 1810 1811 39 1812 21 1813 158 41 1814 40 1815 71 1816 1817 146 1818 157 1819 340 211 1820 367 208 1821 316 354 1822 1823 1824 1825 182 179 1826 1827 1828 1829 1830 1831 183 1832 24

Source: 1790-1807, HRA I Vols. I-VI; 1813 Sydney, HRA I Vol. VII;1819-20, CO 201/118; 1821-25. HRA I Vol. XI; 1831-32, AO Reel2652 4/5675; P'tta 1811-20, AO 2086 CY Reel116; 1821, CO 201/119 Reel106/107.

Data on Lumber Yard employment during the early years of Macquarie's governorship is not available. But, by 1813 the Sydney Lumber Yard's workforce was almost double the 1807 figure although this growth is unlikely to have been sudden. On the other hand, the number of convicts at the Parramatta Lumber Yard continued to decline in

157 the first years of Macquarie for they do not increase until 1814. This would have reflected Macquarie's priorities, for he found Sydney in a lamentable state when he arrived.48 After 1814 the number of convicts at both Lumber Yards increased dramatically. By June 1817 the number of convicts working at the Lumber Yards had more than tripled. Given Macquarie's expansionary public sector programs the growth in Lumber Yard employment is hardly surprising. However, this workforce expansion also coincided with an increase in the number of convicts transported to New South Wales, almost certainly reflecting the dislocation caused by the end of the Napoleonic War and the on-going crisis due to continuing industrialisation in Britain.49

Graph 6.1 Employment at the Lumber Yards

400450 ...t·~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ 350 ~ 300 ·~ 250 -+-sydney 8 200 -B-Parra'tta z0 150 100 50 J,.,~''r;':;)lli'N:. 0~~¢1 ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ Date

A.G.L. Shaw points out that the number of convicts transported to New South Wales increased dramatically in 1814 and continued to do so until1821.50 Noel Butlin puts the increase as beginning earlier, in 1812, and suggests it plateaued "in the mid 1820s then accelerated again into the mid-1830s".51 Nevertheless, by 1818 the problem caused by such an increase was acute. Macquarie complained to Bathurst, the Colonial Secretary, that "within the space of One Calender Month and five days" over 1000 convicts had arrived in

48 See Hughes, R. (1988) The Fatal Shore. Pan. London. p. 296. 49 See Tobias, J. J. (1972) Crime and Industrial Society in the Nineteenth Century. Pelican. Harmondsworth. 50 Shaw. op. cit. pp 365-366. 51 Butlin. op. cit. p 98. 158 the colony. 52 In his view, this necessitated the maintenance of the large Lumber Yards. He wrote:

I am greatly grieved to say that I am as yet unable to make any Considerable Reduction in the Public Expenditure of this Colony, owning principally to the Vast Numbers of Convicts, which have been sent out to it within the last two Years ... 53

In 1819 Macquarie was still making the same complaint when he wrote; "If however, many more Ships arrive here with Male Convicts in the course of the present Season, I shall have great difficulty in finding suitable Employment for them."54 The Lumber Yards did not simply increase in size during this period but also in the range of work performed. More skilled convicts, possessing a greater range of skills, were allocated to and retained in the Lumber Yards. This created a new imperative in the allocation and retention of skilled convict labour within the colony that reflected deliberate planning by senior managers of the convicts. Both William Hutchinson, Principal Superintendent of Convicts, and Major Druitt, Chief Engineer, admitted to Commissioner Bigge that the government took first choice on all skilled convicts and that only once its needs were met were mechanics released to free settlers.55 This caused tension between some free settlers and the Governor.56 Commissioner Bigge took the side of the free settlers in his Report and urged the reduction in government public works and the release of greater numbers of convicts into the management of private sector settlers.57 The effect of these recommendations was, in the longer term, to signal the end of the Lumber Yards.

52 HRA 1 Vol. IX. Macquarie to Bathurst, 16 May 1818. p 794. 53 Ibid. p. 796. 54 HRA 1 Vol. X. Macquarie to Bathurst, 20 July 1819. p. 192. 55 Evidence of William Hutchinson in Bonwick Transcripts (BT) of Evidence of the Bigge Inquiry, Box 1. 9 November 1819; and Druitt. op. cit. p. 8. 56 Hughes. op. cit. p. 299.

159 6.4 Work Organisation

It is argued that the management of convict labour at the Lumber Yards was not simplistic nor is there evidence to suggest that it was a place of brutality or harshness. In fact, the evidence shows that management was aware of a range of complex labour management issues or problems and developed reasonably sophisticated policies and strategies to address them. If, in some respects, the actual mechanisms for organising and controlling work were still reasonably basic, a complex appreciation of the task and challenge of managing convict labour, was, nevertheless, certainly apparent amongst senior managers. Like many convict workers engaged in public works, those employed in the Lumber Yards were organised into teams, gangs or worked individually. However, as will be seen, the Lumber Yard gangs were often smaller and more varied in type of personnel allocated to them than were, for example, the Road Gangs. By the late 1820s the latter seem to have been consistently composed of between 30 and 40 convicts allocated largely on the basis of behaviour rather than skill and were supervised by an overseer relying almost exclusively on coercive methods of labour discipline. In contrast the Organisation of the Lumber Yard gangs was not haphazard but reflected conscious management strategies and the demands of different work tasks. Some work in the building trades, for example, was organised on an individual basis either because of the specialist nature of the skills required, because the work was performed in dispersed locations and for limited periods of time, or because the tasks were highly varied.58 Other trades were organised in gangs or teams. For example Sawyers cutting timber in sawpits invariably worked in teams of at least two workers because that was an efficient way of organising such work. The Weekly Returns of Work from the Parramatta Lumber Yard in 1819 for instance, also make it clear that the Carpenters were organised into work groups of varying sizes for different jobs. For example, between 24 and 31 July "7 [carpenters] were employed at the Men's barracks; 2 men were employed at the Dam; 1 man was employed at Sundry Work for Government House."59

57 Bigge op. cit. pp. 163-164. 58 Druitt. op. cit. p. 26. 59 ML A2086-A2088 CY Reel1116. Report Superintendent of Carpenters at Lumber Yard, Parrmatta. 1811- 1821. 160 From the Parramatta Work reports it is evident that much of the way work was organised in the Lumber Yards was determined by the need to make the best possible use of skilled workers. Often skilled workers such as wheelwrights and carpenters were allocated to gangs consisting of specialist tradesmen, semi-skilled workers called "Learners" as well as unskilled "labourers" and young native born apprentices. In 1820, for example, there were 31 Lumber Yard carpenters at Parramatta to 7 5 learners and 11 apprentices. 60 Learners were more than labourers, they were adult trainees as opposed to apprentices, and were taught specific or routine aspects of a trade. In contrast, specialist trades like Cabinet Makers would have generally made whole items while the Turners may have produced components for a wide range of projects. 61 The Common or House Carpenters were organised into gangs and allocated to specific projects.62 These skill distinctions also encouraged the organisation of the carpenters into pre-fabrication Work. In 1825 Ovens reported that:

In this shop are made roofs, floorings, doors, door frames, windows, window frames, in short most of the wood work of the required house; parts of the work are then taken to pieces, carried to the building they are intended for, and ultimately fixed. 63

It can also be inferred from Ovens' account that some blacksmithing jobs went through a production process, moving from one specialist group to another while others were highly specialised whole jobs like Saw-making. The Wheelwrights seem to have been organised into specialist component manufacture with separate workers 'classed as Wheel, Body, Spoke makers and other subdivisions of the same Trade'.64 The organisation of convict workers into different configurations of groups meant that an efficient allocation of labour could be made for each job or task. The number of convicts required for each specialist task in different projects could be varied in accordance with the complexity, scale or nature of each project.

6°CO 2011119 Ree1106-107. Monthly Returns of Government Working Parties, Lumber Yard, Parramatta. 61 Ibid. 62 See HRA I. Vol. XI. Major Ovens to Goulbum, 16 June 1825. pp. 654-659. 63 Ibid.

161 Another issue critical to the management of convict labour was the physical allocation of individual convicts to trades, occupations or jobs. The matching of appropriate skills, physique and experience required by a job with an individual was a critical issue for the management of convict labour. Butlin argued that in the early years of settlement a 'multi-functional' workforce was the most valued and useful but, by 1817 the Lumber Yards were organised on specialised lines with workers performing complex and highly focused work.65 Multi-functional skills were not as useful in the Lumber Yards as they would have been elsewhere in Sydney or 'up country'. As a consequence, the need to identifY and utilise individual convicts with appropriate skills and experience was much more important at the Lumber Yards. The first labour allocation problem faced by the state was an imbalance in supply and demand for labour. The supply of skilled convicts (mechanics) was low and erratic . while the demand for them was invariably great. The power of the state solved this to some degree, particularly during the years of Governor Macquarie. The government took first choice of all skilled mechanics and only once its needs had been met were any allocated to needy settlers. More difficult to solve was the problem of how to identifY convicts who were skilled. In detailing his duties, William Hutchinson explained the necessity for him to board convict ships upon their arrival at Sydney Cove in order 'to enquire about their trades and prevent boats coming on board. 66 This personal contact was deemed necessary because, "The descriptions of the convicts conduct and callings which are sent out are not adequate. The indents merely detail crime, conviction and sentence. The Hulk lists are not official but give a tolerable account."67 Although the Hulk lists were generated by an inefficient system they did contain some useful occupational information because convicts held on Hulks in Britain were often pressed into employment before their transportation.68 However, the newly transported convicts had an incentive to be circumspect with the colonial authorities. When they arrived at Sydney Cove they were entering a new and uncertain labour market and would, quite

64 Ibid. pp. 655 and 657. 65 Butlin. op. cit. pp. 50-52. 66 Hutchinson. BTBox 1. November 1819. 67 Ibid. 68 Byrnes, D. "Emptying the Hulks: Duncan Campbell and the first three fleets to Australia." in The Push from the Bush. No.4. Aprill987. 162 naturally, have been unsure as how best to manipulate it. But, as Bigge recognised, with the help of "old lags" and even free employers the new convicts did try.69 Hutchinson's desire to prevent 'boats coming aboard' was to stop Sydney convicts from communicating local labour market details to those newly arrived. The convicts already in New South Wales were obviously aware of the lack of official information on the occupation of new convicts and in a spirit of solidarity or self interest were quick to offer advice on what the newly arrived should and should not reveal about themselves. New convicts could simply lay claim to scarce skills and so secure better treatment. New convicts, armed with knowledge of the colonial labour market, could also conceal their skills and profit privately.70 Either subterfuge must be seen as a deliberate convict strategy to extract better treatment from the penal system. It was, if not a form of resistance, then at least as form of convict bargaining designed to alter an individual's place within thepenal labour market. It was interactive, covert and deliberate in its intention. The management of the convicts also used a range of other characteristics as selection criteria. Both Druitt and Hutchinson explained that the health, physical build, class background and strength as well as skill, crime and conduct were also used to allocate individual convicts to specific work.71 However this selection method relied very much on "observation" and so was of most relevance to the allocation of convicts already in the colony. Newly arrived convicts were more of problem. Greater reliance had to be placed on the observations of ship Captains and Surgeon Superintendents (Doctors), the Hulk records, personal interviews, crime and physical appearance. While the selection process for newly arrived convicts was probably imperfect in practice, the two senior managers of convict labour clearly understood its limitations. In response they instigated procedures and strategies that reduced the worst abuses and prevented labour allocation from being entirely indiscriminate. It should also be noted that the government was expected to support "the aged and crippled" convicts transported to the colony.72 Although never likely to be very productive there was no suggestion, under Macquarie at least, that these individuals should be assigned

69 Bigge. op. cit. p. 157. 70 See Druitt. op. cit. p. 26. 71 See Ibid. pp. 22 and 28; and also Hutchinson. BTBox 1. p. 39792-3. 72 Druitt. op. cit. p. 7. 163 to free settlers.73 Convicts disabled "through the loss of an arm" became shepherds and the legless became watchmen. 74 The Lumber Yards were one of the places in which the less efficient convict workers were regularly employed. Druitt explained, "The weakly and unhealthy men are kept under a shed in the Lumber and Dock Yards picking oakum."75 Where appropriately qualified labour is unavailable management must develop strategies to lessen the impact of those shortages through technological and organisational changes or by increasing the supply of skilled labour. The use of gangs, teams and pre­ fabrication have already been identified in Chapter 4 as some of the strategies developed by colonial management but training must also be seen as another response to shortages of skill. In this respect a commitment to training must be seen as a measure, to some degree, of the sophistication of the management function. Within the Lumber Yards it is apparent that training was a recognised priority. As already noted trade training was on-the-job but was not limited only to young convicts. Training of adults was extensive and created semi­ skilled "learners" in a variety of skilled trades while the Lumber Yards were important in the employment of young apprentices both free and convict.76 The hours of work for Lumber Yard convicts were set by government regulation and although these were set at 5.00am to sunset in summer and from 8.00am to sunset in winter, in practice convicts worked far fewer hours. Many convicts, Druitt explained, 'only work till3 o'clock and tilllO on Saturdays'.77 The shortness ofthis working day, compared with free British labourers also highlights a striking contrast between the management of labour by Australian colonial and British manufacturing organisations. Faced with the need or desire to increase labour use and thus productivity, the simple control model strategy adopted by British employers was to increase hours of work; to extend the length of the working day?8 In this way greater work effort from employees was extracted even though

73 Interestingly the Board of Management of the Female Factory in Parramatta did just this in 1829. See AO 2801 4/2094 Report of the Board of Management of the Female Factory and Hospital, July 1829. 74 Druitt. op. cit. p. 29. 75 Ibid. 76 See Ibid. p. 7; and also CO 2011119 Reel106-107. Monthly Returns of Government Working Parties, Lumber Yard, Parramatta. 77 Druitt. op. cit. p. 21; see also Davison, G. (1993) The Unforgiving Minute. Oxford University Press. Melbourne. pp. 17-18. 78 See Littler, C. (1982) The Development ofthe Labour Process in Capitalist Societies. Gower. Aldershot. pp. 22-23 and Marglin, S. "What do Bosses Do? the origins and functions of hierarchy in capitalist production" in Gorz, A. ( 1978) The Division ofLabour: the labour process and class struggle in modern capitalism. Harvester Press. London. p. 15. 164 the marginal labour productivity may have been low. However, for a variety of reasons this 'Simple Control' strategy was not adopted by the management of the Lumber Yards. Indeed, hours of work were not significantly increased any where within the convict system until the 1820s. Instead managers of convict labour were required to set Task Work, a clear definition of an acceptable amount of work to be achieved within a specific period of time. It was well established in government employment in the Colony and had been in use since at least 1793. Druitt claimed he instituted this system at every opportunity because he found "it the best mode of securing the performance of a fair Days work."79 Task Work was not designed to maximise work effort, but merely ensure an acceptable minimum amount was actually performed A limitation of the Task Work System was that it was best suited for work output that was measurable or quantifiable. On the other hand, Task Work was not set indiscriminately. Druitt claimed he regulated Task Work so that it would occupy convict 4\ workers until about 3.00 pm. 80 In order to define a "fair days work" managers like Druitt and Hutchinson had to have a good understanding of the nature of the jobs or tasks involved and what convict workers were capable of performing. The skill of management in these matters is the more apparent because setting the Task Work amounts did not openly or often involve negotiations with convict workers although there were exceptions.81 Nevertheless, the setting of the Task Work by convict managers needed to be reasonable to the extent that it was an amount that was readily achievable. To do otherwise would simply have increased discontent, encouraged worker resistance, strained the power of supervision and, most likely, reduced the quality of work performed.

6.5 Work Control

The way work was controlled at the Lumber Yard reflected the unique demands of its work and functions as well as the more fundamental concerns that the management of all labour faces in a capitalist economy or society. That is, to extract labour use from labour power. The degree to which this is possible depends on a variety of factors including bargaining

79 Druitt. op. cit. p. 26; and see also Robbins, B. "Contested Terrain: the convict task work system 1788- 1830" in Markey, R. (ed) (2001) Community and Labour: historical essays. University ofWollongong Press. Wollongong. pp. 33-50. 80 Druitt. op. cit. p. 26.

165 power and management and worker strategies. In the Lumber Yards the convicts perhaps possessed a greater degree of bargaining power than most other convicts. This was because many of the Lumber Yard convicts were skilled or essential and their work was determined by technical and organisational needs that empowered some of the convicts for some of the time. For example, much of the metal work was batch rather than mass production and did not always involve a division of labour. In addition, most building sites were so diverse in location and complexity that individual convicts or groups of convicts could more easily reduce the degree of management's direct control over their work performance. Management was not unaware of these control issues so it established a range of complex labour process controls. Certainly methods of labour control such as the lash, incarceration and even hanging were used, even institutionalised. However, the use of these is likely to have been exaggerated by modem sensibilities and perhaps also by contemporary sources. The control of convict workers at the Lumber Yards was considerably more complex and sophisticated than the cat-o-nine-tails and involved elaborate systems of punishment and reward, supervision and mechanisms for measuring work performance and productivity.82 Convict workers at the Lumber Yard were subject to two broad types of control; firstly those that applied to them all; and, secondly those that were applied to specific groups or classes of labour or in particular circumstances. An example of the first type of control was the starting time of work. Whether convicts lodged in town or at the barracks, were skilled or unskilled workers, they all started at the same time.

The Bell rings for a quarter of an hour as a notice and when it ceases to ring the gates are shut. Anyone entering after this period, the constable and watchmen at the gates Stop him and give his name to the Clerk of the Superintendents Office and his punishment is at my discretion. 83

81 Robbins. op. cit. 82 See Nicholas, S. "The Care and Feeding of Convicts" in Nicholas, S. (ed) (1988) Convict Workers. Cambridge University Press. Melbourne. pp. 180-183; and also Wright, C. (1995) The Management of Labour: a history ofAustralian Employers. Oxford University Press. Melbourne. pp. 6-11. 83 Druitt. op. cit. p. 21. 166 The second type of control mechanisms were those which befall individual convicts. While they existed to be used on all convicts, in practice they were discretionary controls that were imposed when the circumstances or behaviour of an individual convict warranted it. These types of control include the rewards and punishments, which were developed and applied to convict labour. It would seem that these rewards and punishments were publicly determined and reasonably even-handedly applied to male convicts. Exceptions to this consistency were class and skill. Social class did offer some convicts better treatment and work but this was certainly a very small minority. Of more significance was scarcity of skilled labour. Skilled workers were differentiated from the rest and rewards and punishments were, as will be seen, less consistently applied. The evidence of the experience of reward and punishment is, unfortunately, slim in detail but what exists suggests that the range of rewards and punishments used at the Lumber Yards were designed to encourage acceptable behaviour. Acceptable behaviour was productive labour. The use of rewards and punishments as a means of controlling convict labour at the Lumber Yards was not random or unstructured. As is well documented, no convict employer, private or public, had the right to directly inflict corporal punishment on convict workers and this restraint existed at the Lumber Yard as well.84 In contrast, the Principal Superintendent of Convicts and the Chief Engineer had more discretion in offering or allowing rewards to be given. Only their right to reward a Ticket of Leave or a Pardon was limited. Whilst it is difficult to establish just how often certain punishments or rewards were used, it is clear what types of reward and punishment were used in the Lumber Yard around the early 1820s. Interestingly, it seems certain that there were many more forms of punishment than there were rewards and that, over time, the range of rewards was reduced. For example, some time before 1819, "a reasonable money consideration was given them (the convicts at the Lumber Yard) whenever they worked in their own hours upon any emergency. Their work now all goes to Govemment."85 This reduction in what amounted to an overtime payment seems to have come about because management increased its control over the labour process and confronted convict manipulation of Task Work.

84 See Bryne, P. J. (1993) Criminal Law and Colonial Subject: New South Wales, 1810-1830. Cambridge University Press. Melbourne. 85 Druitt. op. cit. p. 22. 167 However, one of the more significant and consistent rewards involved 'free time' and therefore personal independence. Hutchinson claimed that in the early years of the settlement the custom and practice was, as soon as Task Work was completed the convicts had "the remainder of the day for their own purposes".86 However, free time was also a deliberate management reward strategy. In 1819, Druitt explained that "I sometimes give a well behaved man, a Day to himself."87 In 1825 Major Ovens maintained that "the Liberty to work for themselves after I 0 o'clock on each Friday" was an "indulgence" that was "only granted as a reward for the most scrupulous good conduct and regularity."88 Free time clearly had always been a reward and was still so regarded in 1825. However Ovens added an interesting proviso to this indulgence. Free time would only be given to a good convict worker who "can earn money Sufficient to pay for his lodging, etc." 89 In other words, free time was still being used to enable convicts to support themselves but the moral tone is dear enough; free time was not for self-indulgence or pleasure. A similar reward was the right to live out of the government Barracks. In Sydney this was no small matter. Although the government tried to make living at the Hyde Park Barracks attractive, confinement to it was widely regarded as a punishment.90 Hutchinson claimed "There was a great deal of dissatisfaction expressed by the convicts about going into the Barracks" and, because it restricted their lifestyle and movement, most of its inhabitants were the "newly arrived" convict.91 Good conduct and diligent work habits were the way to maintain the independence of living out. This was a highly sophisticated motivator and more akin to the social control over individual workers under Edwards' bureaucratic model.92 Other rewards offered at the Lumber Yards included "extra slops" (clothing), the chance of promotion to overseer, allocation to lighter or pleasanter duties and the grant of a Ticket of Leave. Government clothing (Slops), whatever its shortcomings, had some

86 Hutchinson. BT. Box 1. pp. 39773-4. 87 Druitt. op. cit. pp. 25-26 88 HRA I Vol. XI. Ovens to Goulburn. 16 June 1825. p. 659. 89 Ibid. 90 Hutchinson. BT. Box 1. p. 39784. 91 Ibid. pp. 39775-6. 92 Edwards, R. (1979) Contested terrain: the transformation ofthe workplace in the twentieth century. Basic Books. New York. p. 21. 168 personal utility at least in winter. It could also be sold.93 The rewards or incentives offered overseers will be discussed in more detail below but it is unlikely they would have overcome everyone's reluctance to join the ranks of management. In reality the rewards of becoming an overseer probably had most appeal to the skilled mechanic who could, concurrently with his supervisory duties, run a private business with significant government support. A highly prized reward was the granting of a Ticket of Leave, a Conditional or a Full Pardon. Under Macquarie the incidence of these rewards increased dramatically and caused some disquiet.94 However, they were also issued more systematically, if unfairly. For example, under an 1813 Government Order convicts became officially eligible to a Ticket of Leave after 3 years of good conduct and service.95 Unfortunately for skilled mechanics employed at the Lumber Yards, however, this regulation was deliberately not applied to them. Commissioner Bigge found that well behaved, skilled mechanics in the Lumber Yards were not automatically given a Ticket of Leave after their 3 years good service.96 Druitt explained they were kept at their "indispensable [sic]" labours in the Lumber Yards because they were often so critical to the effective operation of many trades or activities.97 This inconsistency, however, was not the result of whimsy on Macquarie's part. In fact it highlights the complex dilemma face by him. On the one hand he used Tickets of Leave as a powerful incentive and motivator to convict behaviour and as a means to reduce government costs. On the other hand, he had to balance these interests with the need to maintain the productivity of government enterprises like the Lumber Yards. That the normal policy of granting of Tickets of Leave to key convict personnel at the Yards was perceived by Macquarie and other senior managers as having a negative impact on work performance, highlights the fact that these enterprises were primarily places of productivity rather than punishment. The result was a policy of discrimination although, as Druitt claimed, compensatory incentives, like "Grants of Land & cattle" were used to extend the

93 See Maynard, M. (1994) Fashioned from Penury. Cambridge University Press. Melbourne. 94 See Bigge. op. cit. pp. 148-151; and Clark, C. M. H. (1985) A History ofAustralia. Vol. 1. Melbourne University Press. Melbourne. p. 247. 95 HRA I Vol. VII. Government Order, 9 July 1813. pp. 782-785. 96 See Bigge. op. cit. p. 34 97 Druitt. op. cit. p. 25. 169 service of Lumber Yard convicts.98 However, in the face of Bigge's view that this practice was "prejudicial to the reai objects of discipline" Macquarie was forced in 1819 to relent and guarantee Lumber Yard mechanics a Ticket of Leave after 4 years.99 It needs to be stressed that the Governor was central in the granting of Tickets of Leave or Full or Conditional Pardons. Senior managers could grant all the rewards above with the exception of a Tick of Leave or a Pardon. Nevertheless, managers like Druitt and Hutchinson did play a role by taking "care to recommend them to His Excellencys [sic] consideration."100 In contrast, there was a greater range of punishments that could be imposed on convict workers at the Lumber Yards. This range varied from the relatively lenient punishment ofbeing made to live-in the Barracks to the much more severe punishment of a

flogging. This range of punishments gives further strength to the argu~ent that the Lumber Yards were primarily places of enterprise rather than reform because most of the punishments seem designed to keep the convict worker productive. After 1819, with the construction of the Hyde Park Barrack, convict workers who transgressed rules of behaviour or discipline could be made to live- in and this was widely regarded as a punishment. Convicts sent to the Barrack lost the opportunity to work for themselves and lost much personal independence and freedom of movement. Further degrees of this type of punishment included making convicts work for the whole of Saturdays, being confined to the Barrack watch house and reducing convict rations for a specified period.101 Ovens indicated that in 1825 the reduction of rations to a "courser ki:t;1d of food" was still being used. 102 In the case of overseers, they could be punished by demotion while Ticket of Leave convicts could still be controlled by the penal system through the withdrawal of the Ticket. 103 However, other forms of punishment were used in the cases of more serious offences. For example, offences like "mutiny or extreme insolence" could be dealt with by "dispersing" the convict to other work locations, which were presumably less attractive. 104 Similarly, convicts were punished by being allocated to harsher and more "severe

98 Ibid. 99 Bigge. op. cit. p. 34. 100 Druitt. op. cit. p. 25. 101 Ibid. pp. 26 and 35. 102 HRA I Vol. XI. Ovens to Goulbum. 16 June 1825. p. 659. 103 Hutchinson. BTBox 1. p. 39763.

170 employments" such as collecting shells or by being placed in the Goal Gang. 105 This was reserved for convicts who had escaped, committed robbery or for "repeated neglect of work". 106 Convicts sent to this gang were worked in chains. However, as a means of reforming individuals Hutchinson felt it unsuccessful. He explained, "It is sufficient punishment; but as they [the convicts] are aware when sentenced to this, that the overseer cannot punish them beyond it, there is the greatest difficulty and trouble to make them work."107 Druitt held similar views he said to Bigge;

I cannot approve of the Jail gang as a punishment as I find it gives rise to a great deal of depravity by the accumulation of a great number of very bad men

together. Neithe~ is the labour so severe as that obtained from men who work without chains. To some the Coal River is a very great punishment & others more hardened think nothing of it. 108

In serious cases convicts were of course flogged but this was a highly regulated form of punishment. No overseer could directly or instantly punish convict workers with the lash. Even the Chief Engineer and the Principal Superintendent of Convicts could only directly impose very limited forms of punishment. Serious punishment required the ruling of a Magistrate or the Governor. In addition, it is apparent that this form of punishment was used in graduations. For example, 25 to 50 lashes with a less severe form of the Cat punished less significant offences. In contrast, serious crimes could be punished with 100 lashes from a Cat designed with much more evil intent. 109 The variations in flogging and the other forms of punishment were not randomly imposed. Moreover, their variation suggests a system of punishment that attempted to keep the convict located at the Lumber Yards and, ultimately, productive. This makes sense given the highly skilled nature of the work of many of the convicts at the Lumber Yards. Incapacitating skilled workers did not

104 Druitt. op. cit. p. 22; and see also HRA I Vol. VII. Macquarie to Bathurst, 28 June 1813. p. 781. 105 Ibid. p. 28. 106 Hutchinson. BTBox 1. p. 39795. 107 Ibid. 108 Druitt. op. cit. p. 36. 109 Ibid. 171 make economic sense. 110 In this way, even the milder form of Cat can be seen as preserving more of the convict worker's productive capacity. It should also be noted that because of their scarcity and usefulness, there was a reluctance to severely punish skilled workers. They were given more chances at reformation than the unskilled. 111 However, even severe forms of punishment were not entirely successful in controlling the convicts. Some resisted the negative incentives that regulated their working lives, others responded to the rewards and took promotion and responsibility while still others valued the personal freedom of life outside the Barracks in the Rocks and so minimised their conflict with the system. 112 These reactions reflect Marchington's categorisation of contemporary workers as "getting back, getting on or getting by". 113 Asked whether the Lumber Yard convicts worked "cheerfully" Druitt replied to Commissioner Bigge, "Some work very well, & I have hardly any occasion to interfere with them in the Slightest Degree others are very refractory & idle."

6.6 Supervision

Supervision was obviously a pivotal means of controlling convict labour. However, the nature of supervision at the Lumber Yards changed over time. The evolution of this arm of management control reflected the growth and complexity of Lumber Yard activities as well as management's seemingly constant concern with supervisor quality. As early as 1791 Watkin Tench rejoiced in the appointment "of a very adequate" supervisor at the Sydney Lumber Yard. 114 This is not surprising given the Colony's immediate and critical shortage of supervisors. To organise the important management function of supervision, Governor Phillip recruited from the ranks of the convicts themselves and this practice remained the norm. 115 However, attracting convicts with the right qualities and experience remained a problem and as late as 1819 Major Druitt was still maintaining "it is very Difficult to find

110 See Butlin. op. cit. pp. 125-126. 111 Hutchinson. BTBox 1. p. 39773. 112 See Karskens, G. (1997) The Rocks: life in early Sydney. Melbourne University Press. Melbourne. 1 B Marchington, M. "Managing Labour Relations in a Competitive Environment" in Sturdy, A., Knights, D. and Willmott, H. (eds) (1992) Skill and Consent: contemporary studies in the labour process. Routledge. London.pp. 155-157. 114 Tench. op. cit. p. 246.

172 Proper Persons". 116 Lumber Yard supervisors were recruited, "from the best conducted and most skilful in their several Trades and callings. This knowledge I obtain from being constantly amongst them and observing their behaviour, sobriety and capability."117 In other words, skill at the job to be supervised was the prime criteria for appointment to the position of overseer. This emphasis on task-skill probably meant the overseer was closely involved in much of the work performed by his subordinates. Where the span of control became too great or dispersed for a single overseer, assistant overseers were often recruited. These individuals were given to understand the possibility of their promotion to "permanent Overseer in the case of good conduct."118 As will be seen below, Darling refined the distinction between classes of overseers. It is tempting to attribute the perceived .low level of overseer quality to a shortage of the necessary skill, experience and capacity amongst the male convict population for recruitment to overseer. However, there may also have been reluctance among some convicts to assume a position of authority within the penal system. William Cox, Justice of the Peace, told Bigge in 1820 that many ex-convicts and serving convicts "declared they would never appear against a prisoner if they could possibly avoid it."119 He suggested that this was not motivated by any indifference to crime but to genuine feelings of sympathy. The free settler, Alexander Harris, in his colourful account of the colony in the early 1840s, also highlighted these feelings of sympathy amongst convicts and ex-convicts.12° Further evidence of this reluctance to join the r~nks of the administration can also be drawn from the very significant inducements that Druitt offered to convicts and others to become overseers. Free men recruited to the position of overseer were paid a yearly salary of between £20 and £30 and were given a "Man on stores" and sometimes even a skilled man "off the stores". 121 Convict overseers were not paid (except on some road construction works) but they too were given a man on the stores and, in some cases, a man off the stores as well.

115 Ibid; and see also Moore, J. (1987) The First Fleet Marines. University of Queensland Press. St. Lucia. pp. 96, 134 and 185. 116 Druitt. op. cit. p. 26. 117 Ibid. pp. 2-3. 118 Ibid. pp. 3-4. 119 Evidence of William Cox to Commissioner Bigge in BT Box 1. p. 39810. 120 Harris, A. (1847) Settlers and Convicts. Facsimile edition 1996. Melbourne University Press. Melbourne. p. 68.

173 The provision of labour in this way was particularly attractive to skilled overseers living and working in Sydney and to some extent Parramatta. In addition to employees, they were also sanctioned to do private work in their own time. Convict overseers were permitted "to carry on their respective trades in the Town"122 and it was commonly accepted that they would use their time before starting work, at lunchtime or after work to direct the management of their private business. 123 This arrangement and the provision of an employee or two were significant enough incentives for some convicts to accept or seek promotion to overseer. There is also some suggestion that most of the convict overseers were permitted to live out of the barracks but those who chose to live-in were given separate quarters from the men. 124 Interestingly, both Druitt and Hutchinson believed payi:p.g convict overseers an annual salary would have been a more attractive incentive for many but was considered to have been too costly for the government. 125 In addition, insolence to an overseer was a punishable offence and this helped raise the status and authority of the overseer. 126 Good convict workers needed to be rewarded for taking on the responsibility of becoming an overseer. These rewards were important in terms of establishing higher status, generating greater income and in overcoming the convict aversion to becoming part of the administration of the penal system. Governors Brisbane and Darling both continued to rely on convicts as overseers and promoted the best behaved and most skilful to these positions. However they changed the remuneration offered to overseers. Brisbane abolished assignment of convicts as payment to overseers and introduced direct money payments. 127 However, in 1826 Darling streamlined this approach and made it more elaborate and sophisticated. He created 4 classes or grades of overseers and differentiated their reward with an incremental pay scale. 128 These grades were hierarchical and were intended to formalise the training of lower grade overseers. In this way Darling created a career structure for convict overseers. In addition he also designed an overseer uniform, which was intended to mark the overseer

121 Druitt. op. cit. p. 26. 122 B'tgge. op. c1t.. p. 32 . 123 Druitt. op. cit. p. 3. 124 Ibid. p. 11. ' 125 See Hutchinson. BTBox 1. p. 9 November 1819; and Bigge. op. cit. p. 166. Commissioner Bigge also felt that salaries for overseers would have been more effective motivators and recommended this in his Report. 126 Druitt. op. cit. pp. 28-29. 127 HRA I Vol. XI. Brisbane to Bathurst, 17 January 1825. pp. 471-472.

174 with distinctive status. 129 Although the number of overseers at the Lumber Yards is not known after 1821 it is extremely likely that both Brisbane and Darling increased their number. This would be consistent with their reforms of the Government Gangs and the Female Factory at Parramatta. The formal duties of the Lumber Yard overseers were concerned with extracting an acceptable level of labour use from the convicts. To do this overseers were required to allocate work tasks to individuals, to coordinate work effort and to inspect the work processes and outcome. However, in analysing the contemporary accounts of Lumber Yard overseers and their duties, it is clear that while they were responsible for a great deal they had very little discretionary power. The following is a list of the broad and specific supervisory function of Lumber Yard overseers that were consistently identified in accounts between 1819 and 1825:

• Enforce start and finish times • Ensure convicts work during regulation hours • Extract acceptable levels of work output • Prevent theft • Prevent waste • Allocate tools and equipment • Maintain discipline • Assist in distribution o weekly rations • Keep and submit weekly work reports

Interestingly, almost none of these activities offered the overseer any input into the setting of standards or even gave him any discretion in their enforcement. The hours of work, including starting, breaks and finishing times were set by government Regulation not the overseer. 130 The extraction of an acceptable amount of work from a convict or gang, or the achievement of a measurable Task Work quantity was the responsibility of the overseer but

128 HRA I Vol. XII. Government Order, 31 May 1826. pp. 366. 129 Ibid. 130 See Druitt. op. cit. p. 21; and also Ovens. op. cit. pp. 654-659. 175 he was not involved in setting this amount. 131 Although not consulted failure to meet work quantities subjected the overseer to the same punishment as the work gang; namely extra work during private or free time. Overseers were expected to prevent theft and waste by keeping track of all raw materials used in trades or occupations under their control. 132 However, they did this essentially within the larger framework of the government's resource controls. In practice the Sydney overseers were held responsible to William Noah, the convict clerk in charge of the Lumber Yard's stores. 133 Lumber Yard overseers were also charged with maintaining convict discipline but, in this, they were very restricted. No overseer could directly or physically punish convicts. The imposition of punishment directly involved the Governor, Magistrates and in some cases, other senior administrators. Furthermore, overseers were given few other methods of maintaining discipline. They could not withhold rations, clothing or any other stipulated convict right. Presumably, they could use the allocation of unpleasant work as a direct punishment but, ultimately, even unpleasant work had to be performed. Officially overseers were only given the right to report breaches of discipline to immediate superiors and in this, Druitt explained, they were diligent in "giving me Information". 134 Threatening to do so would have been a practical variation of this right. Only in the allocation of tools and equipment does the overseer appear to have had any significant discretionary control. Ovens reported that in terms of the carpenters at the Lumber Yards, "The tools are kept apart and in charge of the Overseer, who furnishes the workmen with such as they require for the time." 135 The overseer would use his experience to judge when and what tools convict workers required and would evaluate the requests even of the skilled workers. This power was not entirely insignificant. Allocating tools would affect the length of time a job took, its degree of difficulty or pleasantness. It was the overseer though who was held personally responsible for these tools and the system to control their use would have

131 HRA I Vol. XI. Ovens to Goulbum. 16 June 1825. pp. 654-655. 132 See ML A2086-A2088 CY Reellll6, New South Wales Superintendent of Carpenters, Parramatta Lumber Yard. 133 See Noah, W. (1978) Voyage to Sydney in the Ship Hillsborough 1798-1799 and Description ofthe Colony. Facsimile edition. Library of Australian History. Sydney. 134 Druitt. op. cit. p. 3. 135 HRA I Vol. XI. Ovens to Goulbum. 16 June 1825. pp. 654-655. 176 operated to protect him as much as the government's property. This was all the more so, given that tools had a history of disappearing since the first days of settlement. 136 The Lumber Yard overseers were also required to produce and submit Weekly Work Reports to Hutchinson, the Principal Superintendent of Convicts. These Reports recorded the number of convicts in each gang, trade or work team and the quantity of work produced. For relevant trades the Weekly Reports also detailed the quantity of raw materials used, the weight of finished products and the amount of waste. These records were designed to record convict employment, measure labour productivity, circumvent theft and to assist with setting Task Work quotas. The role of the overseer in the production of these Reports, however, was essentially documentation. That is, the overseer did not generate information by his own discretion such as differentiati.ng between convict workers (other than by trade etc.) and nor did he, as a consequence of the Reports, redesign or re-set work or work quotas. The strategic decisions seem to have been made entirely by senior administrators at the Lumber Yards. 137 The Weekly Work Reports at the Lumber Yards were explicitly about organising work, materials, labour and the monitoring of work performance. Their function was entirely concerned with work organisation and control unlike most other parts of the state bureaucracy in New South Wales. In the Macquarie period no individuals (other than overseers) were identified in the Work Reports and so they did not contribute to the general

administration of crime and punishment. Although d~tailed Reports continued to be generated at the Lumber Yards no details of these are now available but in the light of Government Gang Work Reports it is almost certain that individual identification and evaluation occurred to at least some extent. In either period, the Weekly Work Reports from the Lumber Yards were an explicitly manifestation of a bureaucratic control of the labour process. In summary, the duties of the overseer at the Lumber Yard were heavily prescribed. They had a limited span of discretion/control. Overseers did not have any significant powers of discretion in their supervision of convicts or gangs. They were essentially required to enforce government regulations and were held personally responsible for the

136 Moore. op. cit. p. 134. 137 See ML A2086-A2088 CYReel New South Wales Superintendent of Carpenters, Parramatta Lumber Yard. 177 productive use of convict labour and government property. In fact, the restrictions under which overseers operated not only highlight their lowly status in the structure of convict labour management but also the distrust with which they were held. Without controls overseers could make life for the convict more pleasant than moral reformists wanted or less productive than the economically ambitious desired. But the government's approach to the management of the function of supervision appears to have been successful. A minimum level of overseer competence was ensured by reasonably careful selection, the offer of attractive rewards including some higher status but most particularly, by the design of effective controls and punishments. However, the skill of individual overseers was not the only determinant of the efficacy of convict supervision. Another was simply the number of overseers. In very basic terms, the success of supervisory management will also depend on the span of control. Although there is no ideal span of control there are two broad types or extremes of ratio. A narrow span of control occurs where a supervisor is directly and personally in charge of a small number of workers. At the other extreme, a wide span of control is said to exist when a supervisor controls a large number of workers and is therefore less immediately involved with their work performance. 138 The span of control that existed at the Parramatta Lumber Yard has been calculated for those years in which the number of convict workers and supervisory staff are known and these are presented in Table 6.2. Although there are no reliable figures for the Sydney Yard's span of control, it is very likely to have been the same or similar to given the identical work performed at each as well as their centralised management structure. The span of control for the Parramatta Yard is shown in column 6 of Table 6.2 and what this shows is that the span of control varied from 1 overseer to 19 workers ( 1: 19) in 1811 to a ratio of 1:40 in 1814. By this latter date the control exercised by the Lumber Yard overseer could not have been particularly close or direct. This is not inconsistent with what is known of the work performed at the Lumber Yard during these years. There was little division of labour and many of the skilled convicts would have performed their work in an independent and discretionary manner. In a sense, their specialist skills would have kept the overseer at bay and thereby given them some range of work freedom. On the other hand, the overseer

138 Saville, J. and Higgins, M. (1990) Supervision in Australia. Macmillan. Melbourne. pp. 22 and 72-73. 178 would probably have more closely supervised less skilled convicts although much less directly than in the later time series.

Table 6.2 Convict Worker and Supervisory Staff at Parramatta Lumber Yard Various Years 1811-1821

1 2 3 4 5 6 Year at No. of No. of No. Ass't Total of Ratio June Convicts Overseers Overseers Supervisor 1811 39 2 0 2 1:19 1812 21 1 0 1 1:21 1813 41 1 0 1 1:41 1814 40 1 0 1 1:40

1817 146 7 6 13 1:11 1818 157 10 10 20 1:08 1819 211 11 11 22 1:09 1820 208 10 11 21 1:10 1821 344 20 23 43 1:08

Sources: ML A2086-A2088 CY Reel1116 New South Wales Superintendent of Carpenters, Parramatta, Weekly Work Reports

On the other hand the situation is quite different after 1815. From this period the range of trades and skills utilised within the Lumber Yards, the number and variety of products they produced, the number of convicts, overseers and assistants employed in them all substantially and consistently increased between 1815 and 1821. But Table 6.2 also shows that concurrent with these changes was a change in the span of control enjoyed by management. It narrowed during these years to a ratio of around 1:9. As Saville and Higgins point out, the narrower the span of control the greater and more direct is management's control over the work process. 139 Despite an expanding labour force management increased its control by deliberately changing the nature of supervision. It appointed more overseers and created a new grade of supervisor, the assistant overseer. This was a rational bureaucratic response to the need to improve labour productivity,

139 Ibid. pp. 72-73. 179 absorb an expanding workforce and to produce a more complex range of products. The adoption of prefabrication manufacturing processes, higher building and construction standards, the use of more semi-skilled adult "Learners" and increasing division of labour also demanded greater management control of the labour process. After 1817 even skilled workers began to be more closely and directly supervised. There can be no doubt that this narrow span of control was maintained by the administrations of both Brisbane and Darling.

6.7 Productivity of Lumber Yard labour

Another distinguishing feature of the Lumber Yards was management's consistent concern with levels of labour productivity in these enterprises. Although there was a general concern with the productivity with convict labour before 1822, concern with the productivity of Lumber Yard convicts was even apparent in the Brisbane and Darling years. It would seem that this was the only area of convict employment in which these Governors expressed concern about productivity. Elsewhere in the convict system productivity was eclipsed by a concern with punishment. Although labour productivity is a complex concept with a number of measurement problems associated with it, the simple view of productivity is "Output of goods or services per worker" .140 This output per worker measure is usually over a specific period of time; that is, output per labour hour, per day or even week. 141 Many factors affect the productivity of labour but will include such things as working conditions, worker motivation, product design, technology quality of management and supervision and the layout of the work process. 142 In terms of convict labour in New South Wales another dimension can be added to this list, which significantly affected labour productivity and that was the moral purpose of transportation. Transportation was intended to punish as well as reform or rehabilitate convicted British criminals and in this sense, British government policy was not necessarily

140 Umstot, D. D. (1984) Understanding Organisational Behaviour. West Publishing Co. St Paul. p .9. 141 Ballot, M. (1992) Labor-Management Relations in a Changing Environment. John Wiley and Sons. New York. p. 4; Mosley, D. C., Megginson, L. C. and Pietri, P. H. (1989) Supervisory management; the art of working with and through people. South-Western Publishing Co. Cincinnati. pp. 395-396. 142 Scanlan, B. and Keys, B. (1983) Management and Organisational Behaviour. John Wiley and Sons. New York. pp. 32-33 and 457-466. 180 concerned with labour efficiency. Of course in the colony, the moral imperative of the penal system was often less important than the productive utilisation of convict labour. Until 1822 the productivity of convict workers was of considerable concern to Colonial administrators. As early as 1790 Collins suggested that convicts on government employment were much less productive than free labour. 143 This view was also held by Captain Hunter in the first attempt to settle Norfolk Island. 144 However, while these accounts reinforce the idea that labour productivity was of as great a concern as punishment or rehabilitation, they do not reflect anything more sophisticated than mere personal observation and comparison. On the other hand, the Lumber Yards do provide some evidence of a much more deliberate and complex attempt to quantifY work output and labour input over an extended period of time. The work records of the Lumber Yards, senior management observations, the organisation of work processes and variations to Task Work standards all provide insight into the changing and improving nature of convict labour employment. A good example of the improvement in the productivity of Lumber Yard convicts is to be found amongst the sawyers. Their productivity increased, between 1817 and 1825, by over 66%. When Druitt took up his position as Chief Engineer in 1817 each pair of sawyers were required to cut 450 feet of timber per week. With the improvement in physical working conditions and the construction of better saw pits Druitt was able to report to Bigge in 1820 that "now they cut with ease 700 feet." 145 This was no idle boast, for 700 feet became part of their Task Work quota. Although improvement in work organisation assisted this productivity growth much of it was achieved by simply making the sawyers work harder. Closer and more effective supervision was one method more work output was extracted. In addition to greater output, Druitt also required the sawyers to cut a wider variety of timbers. Before his reorganisation of sawing work they mostly cut local cedar, a soft wood, but after it they were cutting hardwood varieties such as Iron Bark, Stingy Bark and Blue Gum, all essential for flooring, joists and roofs. 146 Management, clearly, was successful in demanding and extracting an increase in sawyer productivity but,

143 See Collins. op. cit. Vol. 1. pp. 28, 35, 37, 38, and 42 and Vol. 2. p. 145. 144 See Hunter, Captain J. (1793) An Historical Journall787-1792.Facsimile edition 1968. Angus and Robertson with Royal Australian Historical Society. pp. 231-232. 145 Druitt. op. cit. p. 4.

181 by Druitt's own admission this victory was not total. While the Lumber Yard sawyers did not openly resist the increase in their workload they were still able to with hold extra capacity. They were able to consistently meet their 700 feet Task Work quota by "Thursday Evenings every week". 147 But, there were also productivity gains in other trades and occupations as well. In 1821 the brick making gang of 29 convicts produced 25,000 bricks per week148 while by 1825 the brick maker gang consisted of only 15 men and produced 24,000 bricks per week. 149 Output per worker, and thus productivity, had clearly increased. By 1825 it seems that the control over convict labour was considerably greater than in the past. In more general terms, Druitt and Hutchinson were both of the opinion that convict labour was only about 2/3rds as productive as free labour in 1819. 150 However, Druitt also claimed that in his opinion "the mechanics employed in the Lumber yard, execute their work as well as Mechanics in England". 151 Commissioner Bigge was also interested in the productivity of convict labour for he inquired about the use of incentives "to induce them to augment their Tasks". 152 In reply Druitt said,

I do not with the Mechanics, for I have by degrees been able to raise them to as great a Portion of work as I think they can perform in their present condition of convicts. Perhaps the common Labourers might be encouraged to encrease [sic] their Tasks, but in the present Dispersed state of works & their variety it wd. [sic] Be very Difficult. 153

The common labourers clearly restrained their output (long suspected by government officials) but more than this, Druitt admitted that there were organisational obstacles which prevented productivity from being easily increased. The nature of many manufacturing and

146 D rmtt. . op. ell. . p. 34 . 147 Ibid. 148 AO 2086 CY Reel 1116 Report of Superintendent of Carpenters at Lumber Yard, Parramatta. 149 HRA I Vol. XI. Ovens to Goulbum. 16 June 1825. pp. 656. 150 Druitt. op. cit. p. 25; and Hutchinson. BTBox 1. 10 November 1819. 151 Druitt. op. cit. pp. 25-26. 152 Bigge. op. cit. p 26. 153 Druitt op. cit. p. 26. 182 building jobs and dispersed location of many construction sites made supervision and quantification of work effort difficult. On the other hand, Major Ovens approached the problem of productivity much more seriously. His attempts to calculate labour productivity used a more complex methodology than in earlier periods. 154 Where output could be quantified, such as in brick making, and sawing, Ovens indicated quantities in terms of number of bricks and superficial feet. In more complex tasks, where work could be less meaningfully quantified, he relied on a calculation of labour value. For example, according the Ovens, free blacksmiths earned approximately 6/- per day while a convict blacksmith's labour was worth about 4/6d per day. 155 In his terms, this difference in value translated into the assessment that. a convict blacksmith was approximately 75% as productive as a free blacksmith. Similarly, he calculated that convict brass founders were between 60 and 70 per cent as productive as similar free workers. 156 On the other hand, while Ovens estimated that convict labour, both skilled and unskilled, was less productive than free labour he argued that this gap could not be bridged. He wrote,

In detailing the particulars of each trade, I have .. [calculated] .. the average rate of work that should be done by each mechanic or labourer daily or weekly. Should this quantity fall short of that which an individual could perform, worked for himself on his own behoof, it must be remembered that the quantity and quality of food given in the one case to that of the other. On the supposition that each Prisoner does not get more than half the food requisite, or rather what is usually consumed by a free man in his circumstances, it would not be reasonable to expect the like amount of work to be done; the difference in the one case to that of the other may fairly be estimated at from one half to two thirds of what a free man could perform under ordinary circumstances. 157

1s4 HRA I Vol. XI. Ovens to Goulbum. 16 June 1825. p 655. ISS Ibid. !S6 Ibid. p 659. 157 Ibid. p. 654. 183 In Ovens' view the productivity of convict labour was lower than free labour but this was a natural and inevitable difference produced by the nature of the penal system. He also suggested that the public employment of convict labour offered other benefits such as in training, rehabilitation and discipline. Clearly, up to at least 1825 the Lumber Yard managers were highly concerned about the level of labour productivity. Much of the technological innovations and organisational changes made to the work environment of the Lumber Yard during these years were designed to raise productivity; to increase output from a given level of labour input or, alternatively, to maintain output while reducing labour input. Management at the Lumber Yard generated work records which were intended to maintain, if not improve, labour productivity. Improvements in supervision, as a means of increasing labour control, were also concerned with productivity. While the reliability of management's measures of productivity (particularly Ovens') might rightly be questioned, to dwell on these short comings and inadequacies is to miss the point. The significance of management's attempts to keep track of labour productivity is that they were deliberate and complex and that they highlight the fact, the management of labour at the Lumber Yard was not simply an exercise in reform or punishment. It was just as concerned (if not moreso) with improving the effective and economic utilisation of convict labour power.

6.8 Conclusion

The Lumber Yards are important because they closely reflect government economic activity and highlight the pro-active nature of management's control of the labour process. The demands on management to create a sophisticated and rational system of labour control were immense. Over time the number of convict workers engaged in the Lumber Yards increased, the range of skills possessed by them expanded and the variety of products and activities produced by the Lumber Yards dramatically increased. Significantly, this development occurred within the context of skilled labour shortages, increasingly competitive labour demands from the private sector and growing fiscal alarm by British governments. And yet, the output of the Lumber Yards increased while the cost of convict labour per head declined throughout the 181 Os. The success of the Lumber Yards was

184 based firmly on the ability of management to extract labour use from a convict workforce. Remarkably it did this without brutalisation. Management of convict labour at the Lumber Yards was sophisticated, elaborate and ultimately successful. Some technical imperatives encouraged innovation in the Organisation of work but of more importance were the strategies designed to control the work processes. Management developed effective, or at least informed and rationally motivated policies of labour allocation and training. A regulated system of supervision providing a variety of supervisory controls was created, as was an elaborate and sustained system of work administration. Centrally designed Weekly Work Reports, administered by overseers in all workplaces or divisions within the Yards, generated accurate information upon which labour allocation, work performance and productivity could be monitored and measured. Similarly, an elaborate system of worker rewards and punishments were consistently and centrally applied which addressed worker motivation and productivity. There is also evidence that some management strategies were designed in response to convict resistance or bargaining power and that these were only partly successful. Lumber Yard convicts had some bargaining power. It seems clear that the system of convict labour management developed at the Lumber Yards was not simplistic, idiosyncratic, random or ad hoc in the way the Edward's model of simple control would suggest. While supervision was in some circumstances close, it was not personal or variable in the way early factory supervision in Britain often was through the elaborate system of internal subcontracting.158 Nor did work performance go unmeasured. Discipline was not direct or personally determined but was systematic and centrally regulated. It is also argued that the Lumber Yards, while innovative, were not driven by new technological developments and so little of Edwards' technical control model explains its management structures. On the other hand, the bureaucratic model is much more persuasive. This is not entirely surprising given the immensity of the state bureaucracy that dominated and regulated virtually all aspects of colonial life. The senior colonial managers were almost invariably of a military or naval background while the imperative of penal punishment demanded much more elaborate state control than was apparent in contemporary Britain.

158 Littler. op. cit. P• 65. 185 However, the Lumber Yards were not driven by punishment or even reformation. As state enterprises they were dominated by concern about labour productivity. In pursuit of this productivity management did not rely on the terror that Clark or Hughes suggest characterised the management of convict labour in the penal colony of New South Wales. 159 The management of the convict labour process at the Lumber Yards, even after 1822 under the administrations of Brisbane and Darling, was an elaborate bureaucratic system, which utilised sophisticated management strategies and pursued the rational objective of improving labour productivity.

159 Clark. op. cit. p. 244; and Hughes. op. cit. p. 203. 186 CHAPTER SEVEN

FEMALE CONVICTS AND THE FEMALE FACTORY AT

PARRAMATTA 1803-1830

7.1 Introduction

The Female Factory at Parramatta was an ambiguous enterprise for much of the period 1803 to 1830. During these years it operated simultaneously as an industrial factory, a prison, a refuge for women who were pregnant, destitute or otherwise in need of asylum, as a holding depot for female assignees and as a hospital and medical centre for women and their children. However, providing work, extracting a sustained and viable economic contribution from the women at the Factory, was a consistent but often overlooked objective. 1 The penal function of the factory was given greater emphasis after 1822 but this can be exaggerated. The whole system of transportation became increasingly concerned with deterrence of crime after this date while the Pentonville model of penal reform had finally gained greater political influence.2 In addition, given the relative newness of both factory and goal in the first half of the nineteenth century there may, in practice, have seemed little difference between these two modern innovations. There is ample evidence that working class people in Britain sometimes saw little distinction between a prison and the dark satanic mi11. 3 Indeed, early factories were by necessity as often concerned with the objectives of prison reformers as they were with production. The modern factory needed to reconstruct pre-industrial values, attitudes and work habits; to reform the worker and recreate him or her into a person of diligence, habit, regularity and honesty. 4 These objectives were also apparent in the emerging prison reform agenda. New prisons were no longer simply places of pain and punishment but were also concerned with reformation of character.5

1 See for example Daniels, K. (1998) Convict Women. Allen and Unwin. Sydney; Salt, A. (1984) These Outcast Women: the Parramattafemalefactory 1821-1848. Hale and Iremonger. Sydney. 2 See Hirst, J.B. (1983) Convict Society and its Enemies. Allen and Unwin. Sydney. 3 See Thompson, E.P. (1972) The Making ofthe English Working Class. Pelican. Harmondsworth; and Marglin, S. (1978) "What do Bosses Do?: the origins and functions of Hierarchy in Capitalist Production" in Gorz, A. (Ed) (1978) The Division ofLabour: the labour process and class-struggle in modern capitalism. The Harvester Press. London. 4 See Pollard, S. (1968) The Genesis ofModern Management. Pelican. Harmondsworth. 5 Foucault, M. (1991) Discipline and Punish: the birth ofthe prison. Penguin. London; and also Report from the Committee on the Laws relating to Penitentiary Houses, May 1811, Appendix 3 pp. 98-99 by Bentham, J. 187 There were a number of consistent problems in developing the economic functions of the Female Factory. First, the supply of raw materials for the production of yam, cloth and clothing or textile goods was an early, and to some extent enduring, restraint on Factory output. Second, the Factory operated in a section of the Parramatta Goal until 1822 when a purpose built complex was completed. The old arrangement hindered the development of effective labour process controls. A third, and more significant, problem was that of supervision. However, this was not simply a problem of recruiting persons qualified in the supervision of textile or clothing manufacturing, although that was significant enough. Ultimately, the solution to effective supervision depended on the organisational and administrative structure of the Factory. Reform of the Factory's administration was neglected until 1826, when Governor Darling (1825- 1831) started a wholesale restructure that clarified the hierarchical chain of command, increased differentiation between the individual women, professionalised supervision and improved worker motivation by the development of more consistent punishment and reward systems. The result of these reforms was a dramatic increase in production but not the complete submission of the women. The final and most critical problem faced by both the old and new Factories were their workforces. At their best the convicts were subdued workers who displayed little initiative and had to be closely directed in the performance of their work. At worst, the convict workers openly or elaborately resisted their colonial managers. The female convicts were no exception, indeed, they may have been worse than the males. This was certainly the view of Governor King (1800-1806), when he complained in 1802 "As most of [the female convicts] are of the worst description, and totally irreclaimable, being generally the refuse of London, very few of them are useful, except those employed in spinning, who are mostly from the country". 6 Other Governors also held strong negative views of the female convicts. In the evolution of the Factory as a place of industry there is also embedded the struggle of the convict women themselves. While they have left few personal accounts they do speak; sometimes to official inquiries, but mostly in action. The women at the Factory were not passive and were perhaps more militant and overt in their resistance to authority than many males. Riot, that periodic working class expression of collective

6 Historical Records of Australia. Series I. (hereafter referred to as HRA I) Vol. III. King to Portland, 1 March 1802. p. 424. 188 action7, was more common at Female Factories than any other convict workplace. This was a difficult workforce and, until Governor Darling, the State had little mechanism for forcing their compliance with the demands of industry. Punitive powers were one method but they were not particularly effective motivators and certainly of even less effect in the case of the female convicts.8 It is argued, consequently, that the nature of the labour process experienced by the women at the Female Factories was not simply the result of patriarchal values and attitudes. Neither were the women forced to work or denied it by the design of an all powerful or even neglectful management. The power of management in the Factories was circumscribed by the actions and attitudes of the female convicts while neglect of the Factories was as much the consequence of female resistance as it was of male indifference.

This chapter will analyse the changing ~haracter of the labour process in the Factory. In doing this it will provide a general overview of the administration and functions of both the old and new Factories. More importantly it will estimate the size of the workforce of the Factory and will identify the range of jobs performed by the female convicts, particularly their work in textile and clothing manufacture. While few records of the operation of the Factory have survived estimates can be made of the volume and even value of the output produced for some years between 1803-1830. In addition, the administrative structure of the Factory, the way work was organised and managed and the incidence of punishment and convict resistance will also be discussed in detail. An analysis of this nature will throw light on the labour process within the Female Factory and allow the work experience of female convicts to be contrasted with the more fully documented employment experiences of the male convicts.

7.2 The first Female Factory- an overview 1788-1820

The employment of female convicts by the penal system varied considerably over time. Initially Governor Phillip (1788-1792) allocated female convicts to a fairly broad range of activities but this began to contract toward the end of his administration and more obviously after it. In the first years of white settlement women were employed in weeding and tending crops and in more strenuous activities such as collecting shells for

7 See Rude, G. (1966) The Crowd in History: a study of popular disturbances in France and England, 1730-1848. John Wiley and Sons. London. Introduction and Chapter Two. 8 See Daniels. op. cit. p. 105. 189 the manufacture of lime, as well as the more domestic activities of cooking, and clothes washing and repair. A more pressing problem from Governor Phillip's perspective was the imbalance in the number of males and females. In the First Fleet the gender ratio was 347 males to 100 females. 9 As a consequence, Phillip wrote to Lord Sydney, Colonial Secretary that "The very small proportion of females makes the sending out of an additional number absolutely necessary". 10 Phillip declined to collect women from the Pacific Islands as his instructions allowed suggesting that to do so "would answer no other purpose than that of bringing them to pine away in misery."11 Indeed, unlike many of his successors, Phillip did not view the female convicts in a negative light. They did not resist his efforts to employ them and he did not regard them as a burden on the stores as he did the "disordered and helpless" convicts that he was sometimes sent. 12

Perhap~ because the colony was beset with much more fundamental problems Phillip did not seem to view the females as more difficult to manage than the males. Despite there being no evidence that Governor Phillip regarded the female convicts in a negative light, it does seem clear that over time he increasingly ignored them. For instance, their allocation to work was not recorded in his General Report on the work of convicts in July 1790. 13 This invisibility, however, was probably the consequence of economic crisis rather than official hostility. The scarcity of food and other supplies throughout Phillip's administration caused him to reduce the hours of work for the male convicts 14 and to cut the rations of the females, the old and the young. 15 In other words, Phillip concentrated the colony's dwindling supplies on the most productive labour, the male convicts. This economising also included the Officers and the Marines although not to the same extent as the women. As in so many other ways this policy had longer term implications by establishing, as custom and practice,

9 HRA I. Vol. I. Footnote 16 p. 717. 10 Ibid. Phillip to Sydney, 15 May 1788. p. 23. II Ibid. Il Ibid. p. 197. 13 See Ibid. p. 199. I4 See Tench, W. (1798) Sydney's First Four Years. Facsimile edition 1961. Annotated by Fitzhardinge, L.F. Angus and Robertson. Sydney. p.165. IS See Frost, Alan (1994) Botany Bay Mirages: illusions of Australia's convict beginning. Melbourne University Press. Melbourne. p. 212; and also Frost, A. "The conditions of early settlement: New South Wales, 1788-1840. in Carroll, J. (1982) Intruders in the Bush. Oxford University Press. Melbourne. pp. 69-81. 190 the exclusion of female convicts from many of the colony's most manual work activities. 16 After Phillip, official attitudes towards the female convicts hardened although some efforts were made to more effectively employ them at public labour. In a dispatch at the end of 1796 Governor Hunter expressed a hostility toward the female convicts that was to be echoed by most of his successors in the decades to come. Having been informed of the imminent arrival of more transports he wrote:

I must express my hope that the three hundred are all men, and not part men and part women, for of the latter we have already enough. We have scarcely any way of employing them, and they are generally found to be worse characters than the men; if we had more work for them it wou'd (sic) often be difficult to employ them, for we generally find those of a certain age taken up in the indispensable duties of nursing an infant. 17

This is a curious statement given that the gender disparity was still very marked with more than 2 males to every female; a ratio that belies the idea the colony had enough women. 18 Hunter's statement is also notable for the fact that it is the first official articulation of the idea that the women presented problems: there was little productive work for them, they were worse characters than the men and were impossible to motivate as workers. By implication their sexuality also complicated their productive role; because they were sexually active they were likely to become pregnant or to have children and so be unable to work. Hunter's catalogue of faults was made more contradictory by his report the following year:

The vast number of women for whom we have very little work are a heavy weight upon the store of Government. If we estimate their merits by the charming children with which they have filled the colony they will deserve our care; 19

16 See Aveling, M. "Gender in Early New South Wales Society" in The Push From the Bush. No. 24. April1987. p. 35. 17 HRA I. Vol. I. Hunter to Portland, 18 November 1796. p. 707. 18 Ibid. p. 598. 19 HRA I. Vol. II. Hunter to Portland, 20 June 1797. p. 24. 191 On the one hand Hunter condemned the convict women as poor workers despite the fact it was the colonial government which did not design or invent work for them while on the other hand he was clearly moved by their reproductive successes. While these views may reflect the confused mores of middle class British patriarchy of this time, they are hardly evidence of a patriarchal conspiracy to limit the opportunities of the female convicts or even to exploit their sexuality. Nevertheless by 1800 the female convicts, whether by State design or convict preference, were concentrated in a reproductive rather than productive role. This gender division and Hunter's difficulty or hesitancy in employing women more widely and extensively is confirmed by the 1800 Muster of the colony?0 Of the 666 free and convict women supported by the government at this time 15% were employed at "Flax, Picking Oakum, Spinning and Picking Weeds", 12% were in "Service to the New South Wales Corps", 10% in "Service to Officers", 5% employed as Nurses and Midwives, in Goal or Sick. The remaining 58% of the females in the colony were classified as "Who do not Labour" although, in the light of the fact that they had 884 "charming children", this classification belies the extensive domestic roles performed by women. From the 1800 Muster it is clear that there was a fundamental gender division of labour in the colony. The prime role offered (or accepted by) the female convicts was raising and nurturing children while most of their productive, economic roles were also firmly located within caring or service activities. Only 15% of the colony's publicly supported female population were employed in agriculture and in the manufacturing activity of spinning. However, this pattern of employment began to change after the Muster. Sometime in late 1800 but more likely in 1801 "The Manufacturing of Linen and woolen [sic] is begun with some success" by Governor King.Z 1 The Governor also reported that by March of 1801 "There are 119 Convict women Victualled from the Stores who are employed in the Woollen and Linen Manufactories, Nurses at the Hospital and Living with Overseers etc."22 While it is not possible to establish exactly

20 Ibid. p. 617. It should also be noted that these figures relate almost exclusively to female convicts for there were only 41 free women identified as being "victualled" by the government in 1800. See Ibid. p. 680. 21 HRA I. Vol. III. King to Portland 10 March 1801 p. 13. Although King took the credit for the establishment of this manufacturing industry there is evidence suggesting that it was at least planned by Hunter as early as late 1799. It may have been Hunter who recruited Edward Wise, a free man from England, as a superintendent of woollen and linen manufacture but he drowned on the voyage out to New South Wales on the 14 March 1800 (see Ibid. p. 433). Nevertheless, it was King who was the more energetic for barely a month after taking control of the colony "Every woman that can spin has been employed since October 1800" (Ibid. p. 433). 22 Ibid. p. 28. 192 how many were employed in the Woollen and Linen trades in 1801 it is very likely that it involved around 30 women.23 King's motives for establishing or sustaining the fledgling textile manufacturing industry were more in response to cost cutting objectives and recognition of an economic opportunity rather than a desire to more extensively provide employment for female convicts. The increasing availability of wool and flax and the need for coarse woollen cloth suitable for blankets were the paramount motives.24 King also had an eye to eventually contributing to the provision of 'common apparel" for the convict population, which is not surprising given the growing shortage of Slop Clothing held in the Government Stores.25 The least of King's motives was providing employment for women convicts whom he saw as one of the industry's most pressing problems. In his view the women were morally corrupt and utterly unmotivated as workers?6 Other problems such as supply of wool and flax and the lack of experienced supervisory control also restrained ·his industry but as it turned out these were more easily overcome than the problem of the women as workers. 27 Over time King managed to significantly increase production at the Parramatta Goal. 28 This success was achieved by employing more male and female workers, expanding the supply and quality of wool and flax, relocating the manufactory to an "extensive room over the new Jail at Parramatta"29 and by appointing a Master Weaver in September 1803.30 Having despaired of a free man being sent from England King appointed George Mealmaker "an Emancipist Woolen (sic) and Linen Manufacturer now resident at Parramatta" as Master Weaver? 1 After Governor King there seems to have been a decline in the regard with which the manufacturing factory was held by colonial administrations. Bligh reported in May 1809, with perhaps a better and more up to date appreciation of industrial activity in Britain than King, that "Manufactures are extremely trifling. A small quantity of coarse Linen and Sail-Cloth, with coarse Blanketting (sic), a poor pottery and tanning

23 Ibid. p. 439. 24 See Ibid. p. 433. 25 Ibid. 26 Ibid. p. 13 and p. 424. 27 See Ibid. p. 125 and p. 433. 28 HRA I. Vol. IV. King to Hobart, 9 May 1803. p. 108. 29 Ibid. p. 312. 30 Ibid. p. 393. 31 Ibid. p. 396 and also seep. 393. 193 of leather are all we have at present..".32 Nevertheless he claimed commitment to these enterprises writing that manufacturing received "all the support that Government can give". 33 Although there are no figures for the output or employment levels in the public textile manufacturing industry at this time it is possible that both fell. George Mealmaker seems to have died in some mishap during 180834 and his loss created once more a vacuum of technical and organisational expertise that was to last until1813.35 Although Governor Macquarie ( 1810-1821) was strenuously committed to the public employment and utilisation of convict labour this did not significantly include the female convicts. He seems to have given little attention to the employment of the female convicts and when he did address their needs and built the new Factory in 1819-1822 this was largely in response to the criticisms of Bigge, Lord Bathurst and others. However, Macquarie's neglect of the Female enterprise at Parramatta is hard to quantify because no returns of employment were made until 1821 when it was reported that 110 female convicts were employed. 36 Macquarie did concede that the Factory had the potential to contribute to the clothing of the convicts generally but this view was neither original nor seriously implemented.37 In practice Macquarie still saw the role of the Factory in 1814 as being a place from which to assign "the Young and Healthy Women" and its work "was only Meant to apply to the Case of the old and infirm women."38 In his defence, Macquarie also faced difficulty in recruiting a skilled and experienced supervisor of the work of the Factory until 1813.39 The physical layout of the workrooms and indeed the location of female employment at the Parramatta Goal were restraints on the organization and performance of work. Macquarie was aware of this inadequacl0 but he was very slow to

32 HRAI. Vol. VI. Bligh to Windham, 15 May 1809. p. 152. 33 Ibid. 34 How and exactly when Mealmaker died is not now clear (see HRA I. Vol. VII. Peel to Macquarie, 4 July. p. 340). He seems to have given evidence at the trial of D' Arcy Wentworth in April of that year (see HRA I. Vol. VI. Bligh to Windham, 30 April 1808. p. 452) but Macquarie later reported that he had died in March of 1808 (HRA I. Vol. VII. Macquarie to Liverpool, 18 October 1811. p. 391). 35 SeeHRA I. Vol. VIII.pp.190-191. 36 See CO 201/118 Reel106. pp. 303-304. 37 See HRA I. Vol. VII. Macquarie to Liverpool, 17 November 1812. p. 614. 38 HRA I. Vol. Vlll. Macquarie to Bathurst, 7 October 1814. p. 312. 39 Ibid. pp. 597-598. 40 Ibid. p. 614. 194 commence construction of the Female Factory.41

7.3 The new Female Factory- an overview 1820-1830

Bigge's view of the purpose of the Female Factory highlights the ambiguous and sometimes conflicting functions ascribed to the Factory. On the one hand Bigge approved of the New Factory and thought it to be "dry, healthy and cheerful" and to be free of "unnecessary decoration".42 On the other hand, it is clear he believed it should function primarily as a place of punishment rather than a place of employment. As a consequence, he urged modification of the building in order to provide "more extensive and better means of separation and punishment".43 In contrast, he was disturbed that Greenway and even Marsden saw its employment purpose to be paramount.44 The purpose of the factory is important. Kay Daniels in her otherwise impressive history of the Factory overly emphasises its role as a place of punishment and much of her analysis follows the impact of the evolution of penal reform.45 As a consequence she understates the complexity and character of it as a factory. But, in Daniels defence, Bigge's Report may be seen as signalling the triumph of a more punitive perspective of and role for the Factory. This is consistent with the broader impact of his Report in subsequent years. Without doubt it ushered the beginning of a much more punitive approach to transportation and the management of convicts generally in New South Wales and the Female Factory was not exempted from this new regime. The importance of the Factory as a place of employment is also evident from its physical design. Situated close, too close Bigge thought46, to the Parramatta River on the bank opposite to the town and the Governor's residence, the New Factory was a substantial complex. The main accommodation block separated the outer and inner yards around which other rooms were built. The outer yard contained the main entrance and a variety of accommodation for the porter, superintendent and family and the deputy superintendent. There was also a room designated as a Library "but without apparent or

41 See Clark, C. M. H. (1985) A History of Australia. Vol I. Melbourne University Press. Melbourne. p. 313; HRA I. Vol. IX. Macquarie to Bathurst, 24 January 1817. p. 199 and Ibid. Bathurst to Macquarie, 24 August 1818. pp. 382-382. 42 Bigge, J.T. (1822) Report of the Commission ofInquiry on the state of the Colony of New South Wales. Australiana Facsimile.Edition. 1971. Libraries Board of South Australia. Adelaide. Vol. 1. pp. 72-73. 43 Ibid. 44 Ibid. 45 Daniels. op. cit. p. 103. 46 Bigge op. cit. Vol 1. p. 72. 195 probable application of it to such an use".47 The outer yard also contained the Hospital and the weaving workrooms in which the male convict weavers were employed during the day. The workrooms of the female convicts, on the other hand, were located within the inner yard, thereby separating the sexes. Surrounding the whole complex was a wall nine and a half feet high. Surprisingly in a penal colony, this wall was an after-thought. Only once the main building had been completed was it apparent that there was easy access to the sleeping rooms of the women while a wall also helped strengthen the foundations from the encroachment of the River.48 Clearly, much of the building's design was firmly focused on providing workrooms and even the wall was concerned with separating the women from the males in the Factory or the wider community rather than as the walls of a penitentiary.

In some respects the New Factory ~ad a similar impact on the lives of the female convicts as the Convict Barracks in Sydney had on the male convicts. It regulated and controlled their lives and movement. Most women at the old factory had lived:-out. That is, they worked in the factory until about one o'clock then were free to return to their lodgings in the town.49 In a sense this was in part a Task Work arrangement in that the first half of the working day was government-time, the afternoon private or free time during which the women sought paid employment to support themselves. It was this necessity that Bigge and others such as Bayly saw as creating crime and immorality of "every kind of wickedness".50 Bigge took a very dim view of "the disordered, unruly and licentious appearance of the wo~en" in the old factory where the degree of control over them was only sufficient to extract "the mere performance of a certain portion of labour" and no more. 51 Like the Barracks in Sydney the New Factory was the physical manifestation of a new order of control and regulation. This was certainly the way some of the convict women saw it.

The apprehension of confinement and greater discipline, that the sight of [the New factory] had created amongst [the female convicts] had not been without its effects; and during the three months, anterior to the day of their removal, several marriages had taken place at Parramatta. church, the motives for which

47 Ibid; in other words without books. 48 Ibid. 49 Ibid. p. 69. 50 HRA I. Vol. IX. Bathurst to Macquarie, 24 January 1817. p. 198. 51 Bigge. op. cit. p. 70. 196 were clearly attributable to the fear of greater restraint ... and not from any respect for the new obligation they had incurred; for several of them separated

from their husbands in a few days after their marriage. 52

Bigge conveniently ignores the fact that the State had long encouraged and rewarded marriages of convenience at the Parrarnatta Factory.53 With the construction a new complex also carne new principles of administration. Macquarie divided the convict women at the New Factory into two classes; the Crime Class and the Other Class. This was an attempt to distinguish between the characters of the women at the Factory and so differentiate their treatment and experiences. The Crime Class consisted of those women who had committed a crime within the colony or "Yithin the Factory. As Annette Salt explains, the Other Class actually consisted of two divisions; those on six months probation dependent of their good behaviour and those in the Merit Class who had proved their good behaviour.54 The distinction between the Crime Class and the Other Class of convict women imposed by Macquarie are most often seen by historians in terms of emerging principles of penal reform.55 While the theories of segregation and classification developed by new approaches to prison management in Britain are highly relevant to the Female Factory, they are by no means the only perspectives that should be considered. The classification and segregation of workers, distinctions between their skills, tasks and other motivational qualities were as much a product of the growing sophistication of industry. Indeed, it could be argued that prison reform might have been driven by the reforms and experiments of the workshop and factory floor. In these, the development of a division of labour and the need to discipline and control a workforce all demanded the creation of distinctions and grades between workers as motivational rewards and threats. In fact Bigge recommended that the Female Factory be run by someone "familiar with the details of management either in a factory or a goal".56 Similarly, the need for management to

52 Ibid. p. 73. 53 The process of selecting women as brides was in no respect romantic or even sensitive while many of the State sanctioned bonds of matrimony would surely have also been as transparently self-serving and even as short lived. The only difference was that on the eve of departure to the New Factory some of the women took the initiative rather than the State or a lonely male. While Bigge's moralising tone should be dismissed, his observation that some convict women opted out of the Factory system via marriage because the new establishment was a harbinger of unacceptable change, nevertheless remains valid. 54 See Salt. op. cit. p. 70. 55 Ibid. pp. 69-70 and Daniels. op. cit. pp. 103-104. 56 See Bigge. op. cit. p. 167. 197 create administrative bureaucracies also demanded the ability to systematically distinguish between workers. 57 Consequently, the classification of female convicts at the New Factory must be seen within the context of Macquarie's increasing bureaucratisation of the convict system generally. Just as important was the refinement of the classification of the convict women begun by Governor Brisbane. Mrs Fulloon, the Factory Matron, explained to the 1826 Board of Inquiry into the Factory that the convict women were classified into three classes:

1st Class consists of the best behaved among the women, and such any as are assignable to Service. The 2nd Class of women who are well conducted .though not assignable from other causes and others who have been advanced from the 3rd Class. The 3rd Class or Penitentary (sic) is composed of the worst characters such as those who have been sentenced there by the Magistrates. 58

This classification of the women was based on recommendations made by Bigge and illustrates once more, Brisbane's desire to implement the Commissioner's Report. Although Bigge did not specify the three different classes he was concerned to "separate at all times, and in all duties, the women who are placed in the factory for punishment, and those who are placed there on arrival". 59 When Governor Darling (1825-1831) turned his attention to the Factory he introduced substantial change. These changes, as with so many of his efforts, were firmly based in administrative and organisational reform but they had a clear impact on the scale of the factory, its purpose and the work that was conducted at it. However, unlike the imperative of professional civil administration so evident in his approach to the gangs of male convicts, his motive for reformation of the Factory appears to have been forced upon him by circumstance. With immaculate timing and in a manner that suggests self-preservation, William Tuckwell, Secretary of the Factory, wrote a memorandum to Alexander McLeay, the Colonial Secretary voicing concern about the administration of the Factory on 301h January 1826. Writing in his capacity as Secretary of the Factory and with responsibility for the stores, he complained that the 600lb meat

57 See Littler, C. R. (1982) The Development of the Labour Process in Capitalist Societies. Gower. Aldershot. pp. 6-25; and also Marglin. op. cit. 58 AO 702 Vol. 411791. Report of Board of Inquiry, 1826.

198 ration for the Factory was "25lb deficient".60 Without making an outright accusation Tuckwell claimed the meat had been delivered in his absence and cut up by John Fulloon, the Matron's son. 61 Although Tuckwell's allegations were not acted upon they had a bearing on subsequent events. On the 24 February 1826 Mary Ann Hamilton, an older female convict at the Factory, died. Curiously the Parramatta coronia! inquest met twice and handed down two different findings. The first coronia! finding concluded "Death by Visitation of God" but this was overturned with the finding of death by "Hunger and Harsh Treatment" on 26 February.62 It was this finding which precipitated the formation of an official Inquiry, which included the Lieutenant Governor and Rev. Samuel Marsden.63 Meeting in early March this Inquiry interviewed a wide range of persons connected to the F~ctory, free and convict, as to the health and state of Hamilton and to the treatment and rations of the females generally. The Inquiry concluded "the deceased appeared to have been for some weeks in a feeble state and from the evidence produced before us, we are of the opinion that she died of gradual decline."64 The Inquiry never explained what a gradual decline was or what might have caused it but the vagueness of this term appears to have been deliberate. It allowed the government to avoid blaming any individual such as the Matron or her son, or the suggestion of wider corruption or administrative malpractice. While this approach has the appearance of a whitewash, the Inquiry did recommend comprehensive reforms, particularly regarding food and rations.65 Apart from re-examining and overturning the Coroner's finding the Inquiry also went on to conduct a more thorough examination of the operations of the Factory between 22 March and 12 April 1826. The first issue addressed by this Inquiry was the question of male staff. Perhaps in response to the allegations made by Tuckwell concerning John Fulloon's liaison with Lucy Payne, the Inquiry recommended the

59 Bigge op. cit. p. 167. 60 AO 702. Vol. 4/1791. Report Board oflnquiry, 1826. 61 Tuckwell also went on to claim that Fulloon was having an affair with Lucy Payne a female convict overseer. He wrote: "Lucy Payne [was seen to] pass down from her apartment into that ofMr Fulloon's at a late hour last night (Mrs Fulloon being at Sydney) and she did not return hence till this morning, remaining there all night. .. it is well known to the Women that he is frequently up in her room till twelve and one o'clock at night." See Ibid. 62 Ibid. 63 This Board of Inquiry later became the Factory's Board of Management and it met at six monthly intervals until1829. 64 AO 702 Vol. 411791. Report ofBoard oflnquiry, 1826 65 Ibid. 199 removal of as many of the male employees of the factory as possible. The presence of significant numbers of males was considered to be a problem and a danger to both efficiency and morality. It was established that of the 21 men, free and convict, employed in the factory 14 could be removed. It was recommended that some male­ occupied jobs such as the Overseer and the Gatekeeper should be replaced with females while other jobs could be ••none away with altogether".66 It was felt that essential jobs like Constable no longer needed the permanent employment of male constables at the Factory. It was obviously felt by this Board of Inquiry that Constables were too easily corruptible67 and it was recommended that they be attached to the Parramatta Police Magistrate and sent into the Factory only for each shift of duty. 68 Another key objective of this Inquiry was to ••Render Classification more perfect".69 To this end the Inquiry recommended that the First and Second class women should be kept separate from the Third class women at all times except morning and evening prayers. Alterations to the building were recommended so that separate Workrooms, Wash Houses, Kitchens, Wards and Yards could be made available for the Third class. Both First and Second class women were regarded as assignable although the Second class women also included those who were not assignable (but well behaved) and who were essential to the running of the Factory such as Monitresses and Domestic Servants. The Third class of women was '"considered wholly penal; and confined to Persons, who are sentenced by a Court of Law or Bench of Magistrates".7° Clearer distinctions were also made between the work, the earnings, the rations and the luxuries enjoyed by the women in each class. These represented a detailed and graduated scale of distinctions which clarified the hierarchical position of each convict and made clear to the woman in the Third class .. what Punishment she must suffer ... and that she has nothing to hope for, but from her own good conduct".71 Classification meant control, discipline and reform of behaviour if not character. In addressing the question of punishment the Inquiry also made the observation that .. Under the present arrangement the Matron, judges the offence, awards the Punishment, and mitigates it at pleasure, and with the best of intentions, from the nature

66 Ibid. 67 See Daniels. op. cit. pp. 134-142 for a brief discussion of the incidence of corruption in the Female Factories. 68 AO Reel 702. Vol. 411791. Report of Board of Inquiry, 1826. 69 Ibid. 70 Ibid. 71 Ibid. 200 of her situation, she must be very liable to err". 72 As a consequence, it was recommended that punishment be reduced from 4 days in the cells to a standardised 24 hours and that the Matron be given the power to deprive women of tea and sugar as a milder form of punishment. The Inquiry also recommended that the Factory keep better records of the assignment and return of the women and control visitors to the Factory. The Inquiry also felt no children over the age of four years should remain in the Factory and that they should be sent to the Orphan School. This must surely have been a cost cutting exercise for the Factory (although not the government) for it would have been unpopular with the women. The establishment of an Adult School within the Factory was also recommended in order to teach the women to read and write. In addition, it was recommended that a Board of Management be established to assist and oversee the Matron's administration. All of these recommendations were adopted by Darling, indeed they anticipated the tenor of much of his administration; professionalism, efficiency, reward based on merit as well as economy of operation and staffing. The Board of Management met every 6 months until 1829 when annual meetings and reports were considered acceptable. In producing their subsequent Annual Reports for the Governor, the Board examined the operation ofthe Factory in great detail·and much ofwhat is known about it after 1826 is based on those reports that have survived. Each half-yearly and later annual review was taken as an opportunity to analyse the Factory and to recommend administrative or other changes. While the Factory remained a complex and multi­ purpose organisation the Board of Management and its reports represent an ongoing act of administrative review, evaluation and public accountability - a practical implementation of a Utilitarian government bureaucracy.73

7.4 The workforce of the Female Factories

As can be reasonably expected the number of women employed at the Female Factories increased over time, reflecting in large measure the increase in the transportation of female convicts. However, this increase was not steady but also varied according to the emphasis and commitment of colonial administrations to the public employment of

72 Ibid. 73 See Perkin, H. (1974) The Origins of Modern English Society, 1780-1880. Routledge & Kegan Paul. London. p. 322. 201 females and to the wider colonial demand for female assignees. The assignment of female convicts was problematic for both the government and settlers. Anxious to remove as many convict women from the stores, governments were at times only too willing to assign the female convicts, but demand was variable and there was some resistance from potential employers. As late as 1819 William Hutchinson, Principal Superintendent of Convicts under Macquarie, had to resort to advertising the arrival of female convicts in the Sydney Gazette and to the use of the town cryer.74 Women with children were always difficult to assign and, despite government incentives or even penalties for returning women assignees, settlers did not consistently demand or keep the females. 75 Although little official statistical information on the public employment of female convicts has survived the most detailed and comprehensive series rel~tes to the period 1803 to 1807 and is presented in Table 7 .1. In addition, these figures also identify the whole range of occupations in which female convicts were employed allowing a comparative and sectoral analysis of female employment at Parramatta and not just employment within the Factory. The detailed figures presented in Table 7.1 were collected as official returns of the Quarterly Employment of Female Convicts Victualled and at Public Labour and were dispatched regularly to the Colonial Secretary in Britain.76 It also needs to be noted that the official figures of employment in the textile industry at the factory presented in Table 7.1 probably under estimate total employment in textile and related activities. For example, although, spinning was a critical part of textile preparation, it was included within the range of agricultural activities. Underestimation is also apparent from dispatches from King for the years 1803 and 1804 in which he claimed 80 and 96 women were employed in textile trades respectively.77 However, these minor reservations aside, it is clear the number of women convicts employed at the Parramatta Factory varied considerably over this time period. As already suggested this would have been more a reflection of the assignment of females to settlers and others rather than a genuine fluctuation in the fortunes of the Factory itself. There is no evidence to suggest that at this time women particularly skilled at textile work were kept in the Factory in preference to assignment as was

74 Oral Evidence of William Hutchinson to Bigge Inquiry. Bonwick Transcript. (hereafter referred to as BT) Box 1. pp. 39742-39743. 75 Ibid. 76 These Returns mostly relate to Governor King's administration ( 1800-1806). He, unlike Governors before or after him, diligently kept the Colonial Office informed of convict employment.

202 sometimes the case with skilled male convicts in other fields of employment.78 Nevertheless the factory did offer female convicts significant employment and, more importantly, work that was varied and initially non-traditional. As will be discussed below, in the early years of the Factory female convicts were sometimes employed as weavers, traditionally more often a male than a female occupation.79 There are also a number of broader issues raised by Table 7.1 that throw light on female employment generally and which need to be noted. Firstly, the much more limited range of work tasks to which the females were allocated when compared with the male convicts for the same period. The males were allocated to 48 different work tasks or categories of tasks compared to only 15 categories for the women. Secondly, from these official work categories it seems difficult to maintain Anne Summers' perception that women were blatantly employed in sexually exploitative work roles. 80 There is no clear evidence of the women's work being dominated by sexual services. This is not to say that although there was no official sanctioning of prostitution, cohabitation or sexual exploitation that these pressures were not real or extensive. However, the nature of the public work to which the female convicts were allocated suggests that sexual pressures on women were more endemic to colonial life than institutionalised in public employment. Of the work to which the women were allocated during these years only that described as "In Charge of Government Huts"; "Allowed to Overseers"; "Servants to Officers etc"; and "Women Allowed to the NSW Corp" would offer any implicit danger of sexual exploitation. Between 1803 and 1807 the proportion of female convicts publicly employed in these sexually dangerous activities ranged from 31% of the total to 11%. Of course, it would also be an exaggeration to suggest that all women allocated as servants to officers, overseers or the NSW Corp were forced to prostitute themselves. Hutkeepers and servants ran greater risks than most female workers but the nature of their duties were also largely domestic.

77 See HRA I. VoL IV. King to Hobart, 9 May 1803. p. 108 and King to Hobart, 1 March 1804. p. 483. 78 See Chapter 6: The Management of Skilled Labour at the Lumber Yards, above. 79 See Collier, F. (1968) The Family Economy of the Working Classes in the Cotton Industry, 1784-1833. Manchester University Press. Manchester. p. 2; Pinchbeck, I. (1985) Women Workers and the Industrial Revolution 1750-1850. Virago. London. p. 158 and p. 132; Thompson. E. P. op. cit. pp. 454-455 and chapter 9. 80 Summers, A. (1977) Damned Whores and God's Police. Penguin. Ringwood. Chapter 8. 203 Table 7.1 Female Convicts Victualled and Employed at Public Labour 1803-1807

Work Category 1803 1804 1805 1806 1807 June June June Aue: June Woollen and Linen 78 60 96 58 87 Manufacturing Spinning & Picking Oakum 5 20 9 5 6 Husking Com & Picking Weeds 18 3 7 8 4 In care of Govt. Huts 3 3 1 0 2 Sail Makers 1 1 1 0 1 Orphan House & Care of 4 10 10 3 3 Orphans Hospital Nurses 17 13 12 12 14 Midwives 2 2 1 1 1 Sick & Convalescent 5 14 15 4 12 Blind, Insane & Invalids 6 6 6 6 5 Government Dairy 2 1 3 6 0 Settlers Wives 53 12 20 20 0 Allowed to Overseers 26 9 18 11 6 Servants to Officers etc. 17 9 5 0 8 Women Allowed to the 40 39 43 45 0 NSWCorp General Totals 277 202 247 179 149

Source: HRA I. Vol. 4: 318; Vol. 5: 45,502, 782; Vol. 6: 181.

On the other hand, "Working in Woollen and Linen Manufactory", for instance, would have involved no entrenched sexual dangers beyond the harassment encountered as part of a convict woman's daily life. Without denigrating the danger of unwelcome sexual advances or demands placed on all convict women, it is clear that the nature of most of the employment to which the women were allocated did not explicitly increase this danger. The only other period for which there are reliable figures indicating the number of women working in the Factory are for the years 1821, and 1826 to 1829. By the latter time period the women were living and working in the new Factory and during this time the building was also very much a holding depot for newly arrived women awaiting

204 assignment. The figures in Table 7.2 relate to those who were actually employed rather than those who were passing through, were convalescing in the hospital or sentenced to the House of Correction.

Table 7.2 Female Convicts Employed in the Female Factory at Parramatta 1821, 1826 to 1829

Date Female In or Estimated Factory Assigned from Total Workforce Factory 1821 110 288 1826 Oct 256 300 556 1827 Dec 366 378 668 1828 June 451 419 870 1829 June 513 611 1124

Source: AO 201/118 Reel106 pp. 303-304 (for 1821); Board of Management Reports, AO Reel 702 Roll No. 96 Vol. 4/1791 (for 1826); AO Reel2081 Vol. 4/2011 (for 1827 and 1828); AO Reel2081 Vol. 4/2094 (for 1829).

Table 7.2 indicates that not only did the number of women working at the Factory increase over this time series but the number of women attached to it for punishment, medical treatment or who were released through assignment or marriage also dramatically increased. Clearly, the scale of the Female Factory increased but this did not undermine its continuing importance as a place of employment and industry. The proportion of total females in the Factory during each reporting period who worked remained consistently over 40%. The growth in the numbers of females sent to the Factory was caused by the arrival of new female convicts, the return of assigned females, the unsuitability of some women for assignment due to age, infirmity, pregnancy or child rearing responsibilities and, by 1827, by the need to retain some key personnel who worked as domestic servants or as overseers.81 In June 1828 of the 149 women in the First Class and whose behaviour therefore allowed them to be assigned, only 62 were in fact eligible, 55 were unfit for a variety of reasons while 32 were employed in key positions.82 However, the growth in numbers but particularly the increasing retention of women at the Factory was

81 See AO Reel2081 Vol. 4/2011 Report of Board of Management, December 1827. 82 Ibid. Report of Board of Management, June 1828. 205 a cause of concern for the Board of Management. A number of explanations were offered by the Board and included the return of assignees because they must "have for the most part committed an offence"83 or "that there has not been any material increased demand for Females in the Colony".84 It was even suggested that the number of bad, old and infirm being sent to the Colony had increased. 85 But growing numbers had implications for the employment of the women. The difficulty was essentially one of "furnishing profitable labour for such a large proportion of females collected in one place".86 Nevertheless, in 1828 the Board was still confident:

of carrying into effect the original proposition ... of making the Slop clothing for .the prisoners of the Crown in the service of Government. There will be no difficulty in furnishing a sufficient quantity, as 50 suits a day can readily be supplied. 87

There is no way now of knowing whether or not the factory was successful in meeting this target but it seems very unlikely. In 1828 the women were only producing approximately 10 suits of male Slops Clothing per day and considerably fewer female suits. 88 Further evidence of failure is the comment in the 1829 Report, which explained, "The women are kept as much as possible employed, but a constant and regular supply of labour is not always obtained owing sometimes to the neglect in the supply of wool". 89 Despite a production shortfall, or perhaps because of it, investment in "a Weaving shop" was commenced in 1829 with the expectation that "when finished it is hoped the additional employment of weaving will afford the means of constant work".90 From the figures in Tables 7.1 and 7.2 the growth in employment levels at the Female Factory at Parramatta is clear. Although the various industry and manufacturing activities conducted at the Factory may not always have been as successful as was planned or expected to be, it is very evident that the provision of work for female

83 Ibid. Report of Board of Management, December 1827. 84 Ibid. Report of Board of Management, June 1828. 85 Ibid. 86 Ibid. 87 Ibid. 88 Ibid. 89 AO 2081 Vol. 4/2094. Report of the Board ofManagement, June 1829. 90 Ibid. 206 convicts was an important and enduring function of the enterprise. It was a place with many roles but its purpose as a place of industry cannot be ignored or discounted.

7.5 The work performed at the Female Factories

Essentially there were two broad types of employment for female convicts at the Factory throughout the period 1803-1830. The first type was the employment generated by the institution itself. That is, the work of cleaning, cooking, laundering, childcare, nursing, midwifery and administration. The collection of such a large body of women at one institution would have created a demand for these types of jobs regardless of the institution's over all purpose. The second type of employment was that which was created by colonial governments when designating it as a place of industry. This began with Governor King's founding of a woollen and linen textile industry at the Parramatta Gaol in 1803. Although both types of employment are important the first type of work is only significant in so far as some of its tasks and activities had an impact on the way the Factory's textile work was organised and performed. As a consequence most of the attention in this discussion will concentrate on the second type of employment; the females in the textile and related activities. Initially Governor King's textile industry was as concerned with flax and linen as it was with wool. But not surprisingly, wool very quickly took over as the prime product. It was easier to produce than flax and New South Wales relatively quickly developed world-class quality. British manufactured cotton products later also would have begun to replace flax linen at least in the uses it was being put in colonial New South Wales. Nevertheless, either fibre required a series of preparatory processes before it could be spun and so these were the first jobs created by a textile industry. The preparation of wool seems to have been easier or at least a rudimentary knowledge of it seems to have been more commonly held by convicts than of the preparation of flax. It was the technical difficulties associated with the latter that so complicated and made essential the recruitment of a skilled superintendent by King and later Macquarie. Preparation of flax was complicated and involved some highly specialised skills.91 This may also explain why before 1802 the women employed in the flax part of textiles seem to have been

91 For example some of the activities included "rippling, retting, grassing, breaking and scrutching". Chambers Twentieth Century Dictionary. ( 1977) Thomas C. Lothian. Melbourne. 207 concentrated in spinning it rather than in preparing it. 92 Another problem raised by flax was its cultivation. Women were involved in sowing the flax93 but the cultivation of flax plants was not common agricultural knowledge and this increased the need for a skilled Superintendent. When George Mealmaker was appointed in 1803 he was explicitly employed to cultivate flax as well as manufacture linen and wool material.94 While flax and linen seems to have involved the convict women mostly in its spinning their involvement in woollen manufacture seems to have been more extensive. The women were much more involved in preparing wool than flax, probably because it was a traditional activity and so more widely understood, at least by those women from rural Britain.95 In a General Summary of Public Work performed by the female convicts in 1802, King claimed they were involved "in sorting picking washing carding and spinning and weaving".96 At t~is time these activities employed twelve women and five men97 while in the following year the numbers employed had increased to "15 weak men and 80 women".98 With the employment ofMealmaker as Superintendent the volume of production increased and by 1804 six looms were in operation.99 However, given that these looms probably employed two weavers and an assistant100 it is probable that most weaving was now done by the 15 men while the women were concentrated in wool preparation, spinning or as assistants to the male weavers. This gender division of labour is also consistent with the increasing efforts of the colonial authorities to separate the male and female convicts working at the Parramatta Goal. Bigge provided an insight into not only the dreadful conditions under which the women lived and worked at the Factory in 1819 but also evidence that the female work areas on the second floor ofthe Gaol were filled with wool in various stages of preparation.101 By 1806 the range of products produced by the textile manufactory at Parramatta was much more extensive. By this time drugget (a woollen felt), canvas, sacking, girthing material, blanketting, collar cloth as well as coarse woollen cloth and linen both fine and coarse were produced. 102 Later, sailcloth was also produced, as was the

92 HRA I. Vol. III. King to Portland, 1 March 1802. p. 424. 93 Ibid. p. 439. 94 See HRA I. Vol. IV. King to Hobart, 7 August 1803. p. 393. 95 See HRA I. Vol. III. King to Portland, 1 March 1802. p. 424. 96 Ibid. p. 439. 97 See Ibid. p. 433. 98 HRA I. Vol. IV. King to Hobart, 9 May 1803. p. 108. 99 Ibid. King to Hobart, 16 April1804. p. 629. 100 See AO Reel 702 Vol. 4/1791. Board oflnquiry Report, 1826. 101 B.tgge. op. czt.. p. 69 . 102 HRA I. Vol. V. King to Camden, 15 March 1806. p. 665. 208 weaving of hemp into material suitable for shoe and boot making. 103 The woollen cloth made at the Factory was generally very coarse and suitable only for basic products like blankets and capes although King obviously saw the potential of making material suitable for Slop clothing as early as 1804. 104 This objective was not easily realised. In 1812 Macquarie was still speculating that the efforts at the Factory "Might be turned to good Account in providing Slop Clothing for the Convicts". 105 That this objective remained illusive seems, in Macquarie's view, to have been due to the physical restraints imposed by the Parramatta Goal, technological limitations and the lack of a skilled and experienced Superintendent.106 The only other indication of the extent of work performed at the factory during Bigge's visit to New South Wales are Returns of the cloth and blankets manufactured there between 1814 and 1819. 107 An Account of Work performed at the new Factory in 1822 and 1823, produced for Governor Brisbane, indicates that slop clothing for males, females and boys was manufactured, as well as the mending of old slop clothing, the making of curtains, bed linen, shoemakers hemp, night caps and gowns and ropes and lines. 108 Although weaving was the most productive activity, the range of work performed by the female convicts was by this time extensive and varied. By 1826 the women in the Female Factory were classified into three classes but the separation of these classes was not thorough while the distinctions between them were considered insufficient. As a consequence the Board of Inquiry into the Factory in 1826 recommended renovations be made to the building to keep the Third Class women separate from the First and Second Class women and that changes to the work regimes of all three classes be made. The Inquiry recommended that from the First Class;

the Monitresses [overseer positions] and all Domestic Servants for the Institution be selected; [and those] not wanted for Domestic purposes, should be employed at their needles, in making Slop clothing for themselves, and the male convicts, from the cloth manufactured by Government - the number of articles a Woman should make for her Government Work per week, should be

103 See HRA I. Vol. VI. Bligh to Windham, 15 May 1809. p. 152. 104 See HRA I. Vol. IV. King to Hobart, 16 April1804. p. 629. 105 HRA I. Vol. VII. Macquarie to Liverpool, 17 November 1812. p. 614. 106 See Ibid. 107 CO 201/118 Reel 106. Return of the whole of the Cloth and Blankets Manufactured at the Government Factory at Parramatta. 108 AO Reel2081 Vol2/855. Reports ofWork Performed at Female Factory Parramatta. 209 specified, nine shirts, or frocks, or Trousers; ... as a fair Task for one Woman each Week - for every article a woman makes over and above her stated task, she should receive a specific sum sufficient to excite her industry but not more. 109

The women employed in a domestic role were also to be given time to do needlework and be eligible for payment at the same rates, although these were not specified. As an added incentive the women in the First Class were to be permitted to spend all their money on luxuries such as tea, sugar, butter, cheese, extra bread and clothing. It was also argued by Marsden's Inquiry that if these incentives worked and produced good behaviour the added bonus of attendance at Divine Service at the Parish Church (outside the Factory) could be offered to them.Jl 0 The second Class women, it was recommended;

should all be employed in preparing (from flax and Wool) yarn for the weavers. A regular Task should be assigned them in proportion to their strength, when they are newly arrived in the Factory a reasonable time should be allowed them to acquire the art of spinning before they are put to a full Task. A fair Task appears to be nine Cuts per day, as an encouragement to the women in this Class ... 111

Accordingly, the Board of Inquiry recommended a scale of remuneration of Yz pence for 7 cuts, 1d for 9 cuts 1Yz pence for 10 cuts, 2d for 11 cuts and 3d for 12 cuts. 112 Second Class women however were not permitted to have and spend all of their earnings but were restricted to "two thirds of their earnings". 113 The Third Class women were to be employed at the same work as the Second Class women but "without remuneration". 114 With the adoption of this Board's recommendations the distinctions between the classes of women were made stricter and, in terms of work, more extensive.

109 AO Reel 702 Vol. 4/1791. Report of Board oflnquiry, 1826. 110 Ibid. Ill Ibid. 112 Ibid. A Cut was a traditional but now unspecified length of yam, which was worth I pence and a pound of yam was worth -/9d. 113 Ibid. 114 Ibid. 210 In 1829 the work of the female convicts at the Factory was expanded to once more include the function of weaving. This occurred partly because the male convicts were by this time being concentrated in a very limited range of public employment but also because of continuing problems associated with finding employment for the women. The supply of wool, presumably both raw and woven, made it difficult to keep the female workforce fully occupied. As a consequence the Governor had authorised the construction of"a Weaving Shop" which, although not completed in 1829, was expected to "afford the means of constant Work" .115 The other employment offered women by the Factory was in its administration and domestic operations. In 1826 when the Factory provided employment to 21 men it also employed 42 convict women. Of this number there was one Principal Overseer, two Overseers, 10 Housemaids, three Cooks, three Delegates (who were later to be called Monitresses), seven Nurses, six Washerwomen, four Needlewomen, two Fortresses, one Servant to the Matron and three others whose tasks are now unclear. 116 Few of these women seem to have been paid at this time. 117 However, after the 1826 review of male staffing a rationalisation of the female domestic staff also seems to have begun. In 1828 there were only 26 women in the general domestic roles classified as "House maids Cooks etc" and six Monitresses. 118 In addition, more free women were employed in professional roles such as Assistant Matrons (there were two) and as "Porteress" (sic ). 119 However, the 26 domestic servants and the six Monitresses were all convict women although the Monitresses and three of the other women, who worked as overseers, were paid according to Governor Darling's schedule ofremuneration for overseers. 120 While there is evidence that the staffing arrangements within the Factory were rationalised, systematically rewarded and even professionalised, there remained some fundamental problems. For instance the appointment of washerwomen and nurses was not achieved without difficulty. According to the Rules and Regulations of the Factory the domestic staff were to be recruited from the First Class convict women but this source created problems of continuity. In the 1828 Board of Management Report it was explained that the Matron, Mrs Gordon, had allowed the recruitment of washerwomen from the Second Class females because:

115 AO 2081 Vol. 4/2094 Report of Board of Management June 1829. 116 Ibid. 117 Ibid. The Matron was paid £150 per annum. 118 AO 2081. Vol. 4/2094 Report of Board ofManagement June 1828. A Monitress was an overseer. 119 AO 702, Roll No. 99 Vol. 4/7327. Report of Board of Management, December 1834.

211 from the constant change taking place in the first class by their assignment from it, the laundry was never well attended to, the same cause operating with respect to the Hospital nurses ... 121

As a consequence, domestic staff in the Factory were henceforth recruited from both the First and Second Classes. The Regulations determining the appointment of First Class women to the role of Monitress and the incidence of assignment may also have created similar problems. In 1829 the Board of Management lamented the "difficulty in finding suitable Persons for these situations, the first class is now without a Monitress". 122 Of course there may also have been a reluctance among some female convicts to take on the role of Monitress, even though they were paid P.ositions, because of an unwillingness to be more closely associated with the penal system. The work of the female convicts at the Factory, both old and new, was a central part of the operation of this institution. While there was a core of domestic work to which some women were recruited this was not the major source of employment. The largest and most significant means by which the women were put to work was in textile and clothing manufacturing. This was an important reason for the creation of the Factory in 1803 and remained central to its function in 1830. Women were employed in various occupations within this industrial activity during this period although there is clear evidence that a gender division excluded them from such traditionally male activities as weaving for much of the time. 123 Only initially and at the end of this time period was this gender division ignored.

7.6 Industrial output at the Female Factories

An examination of the output of the Female factories is made difficult by a lack of data but the fragments of detail that now exist provide some indication of the intensity of the Factories' activity. Even allowing for inconsistencies created by incomplete statistics it is clear that by the latter part of the 1820s production at the Factory had dramatically increased. This may not, however, have been due entirely to increased labour

120 See Darling's schedule of remuneration, HRA I. Vol. XII. p. 366. 121 AO 2081 Vol. 4/2094 Report Board of Management June 1828. 122 AO 2081 Vol. 4/2094 Report of Board of Management June 1829.

212 productivity. The growth in production quantity coincides with the growth in the number of women employed at the Factory. However, the new and increasingly wide range of products as well as much higher levels of production would also suggest at least some gains in labour productivity. There is no evidence that dramatic changes occurred in the technology used by the women, indeed much of their needlework was performed by hand. There are a number of possible explanations for the productivity increase in the late 1820s. Firstly, productivity gains may have been derived by increasing skills amongst the newly arrived female convicts or by the better utilisation of their existing skills. Secondly, productivity growth may also have been the result of changes in the way work was organised and thirdly, new incentive schemes may ahave been more appealing and therefore successful. The indicators of production at the old and new Factories are fragmented in terms of time and type of output. There is no one consistent measure of output but instead a variety of indicators ranging from length of woollen and linen cloth woven, length of yam spun, value of production of a variety of forms and quantities of clothing or other textile goods. Taken together, these give some idea of the trend of production that was achieved at the Factories and further add to the understanding of the economic and work-related importance of the Factory. Although the female convicts were not always or even substantially involved in weaving at the Factory the trend in the output of coarse woollen cloth woven by the males does throw light on the work of the women. Weaving was obviously dependent on the quantity of spun yarn, which the women produced, while the women's efforts at making blankets, capes and slop clothing was clearly dependent on the volume of woollen cloth available. The female convicts worked on either side of weaving; as producers of its input and as users of its output. In this way the volume of weaving will give some idea of the intensity of the work efforts of the female convicts. The quantity of coarse woven wool cloth is presented in Table 7.3.

123 AO 702 Vol. 411791 Report Board ofinquiry 1826. 213 Table 7.3 Yards of Coarse Woollen Cloth Various Dates: 1800-1824

Date Yards of Woollen Cloth 1800 306 1801 676 1802-3 1000 1805 2210

1814-15 6655 1815-16 7391 1816-17 9686 1817-18 10388 1818-19 11545

1822 (est) 16000 1823 18225 1824 16184

Source: 1800-1805, HRA I. Vols. 3, 4 & 5; 1814-1819, CO 201/118 Reel 106 Return of Cloth/Blankets Manufactured at Parramatta Factory 1814-1819; 1822-24, AO Ree12081 reports of Work Performed at Female Factory Parramatta.

Clearly, the female convicts had to have expanded their output in terms of preparation of the wool and the spinning of it for this sustained increase in the production of coarse woollen cloth by the men (and initially also by women weavers). However, very few figures for the spinning of yam are now available and only for extra spinning output for some months at the beginning and at the end of the 1820s. Between November 1823 and May 1824 the women spun 4,066 Cuts of yam over and above their task work. In the months May to October 1824 the female convicts spun an extra 3,588 Cuts of yam. 124 It needs to be noted that these figures significantly under estimate the spinning output of the women for these months. They only relate to the extra work perform~d by the

124 AO Reel208l. Reports of Work Performed at Female Factory Parramatta. 214 female convicts125 but, nevertheless, indicate that spinning was of an extensive and probably consistent output. 126 What the women did with the woven cloth is also a measure of the extent of their work effort but once again only fragments of statistical detail are now available. However, presenting these pieces of information again throws some light on the female convicts' work. One of the most basic products the women produced from the coarse woollen cloth was the manufacture of blankets. This information, collected for or at least given on request to Commissioner Bigge, relates to the production of blankets between 1814 and 1819 and is presented in Table 7.4.

Table 7.4 Quantity and Yards ofBlankets Manufactured at the Female Factory, 1814-1819

Date Pairs of Yards of Blankets Blankets 1814-15 270 2700 1815-16 355 3550 1816-17 240 2400 1817-18 160 1600 1818-19 85 850

Source: CO 2011118 Reel106 Return of Cloth/Blankets Manufactured at Parramatta Factory 1814-1819.

Clearly in the first two time periods the women were productively involved in the manufacture of this basic commodity. However the curious decline in the quantity of blankets produced by the women towards the latter years needs comment. Although production of cloth suitable for making blankets increased throughout this period the blanket making efforts of the women declined. The reason for this was firstly, over time more blanket material was sent to other government institutions such as the Lumber Yard or various District Police forces where it was made into capes, coats or slop suits by male convicts. 127 Secondly, instead of making blankets the female convicts were increasingly employed in manufacturing other products, particularly slop clothing. By

125 HRA I. Vol. XIV. Darling to Huskisson, 7 March 1828, p. 211; and see also AO Reel 2081. Vol. 4/2094. Report of Board of Management June 1829. 126 Even fewer figures relate to the quantity of wool prepared by the females but it is known that in the second half of 1822 they washed 5,984lbs of wool and in the first half of 1823 they washed 2,551lbs. See AO Reel 2081, An Account of Work done in the Government Factory, Parramatta, July 1822 to December 1823. This variation in quantity washed may reflect the differing time periods and the general problem of the supply of wool.

215 the early 1820s the female convicts began to produce suits of slop clothing for males, females and boys, shirts, frocks, trousers, aprons, hats, nightcaps, capes, petticoats, shifts, socks and stockings. Some linen clothing was still being made while other types of material such as Linsey Woolsey, cheese cloth and Gurrah (a form of muslin) were used for some types of clothing. In addition, the women were also manufacturing wool packs, flour sacks and window blinds. 128 More importantly, this greater range of products demanded and utilised more traditional female skills.

Table 7.5 Total Number and Value ofltems Produced at the Female Factory 1822, 1823-24, 1828 and 1829

Date Items Value of Items Produced Produced£ 2nd Q. 1822 502 36/15/8 1st Q 1823 544 39/15/9 2nd Q 1823 198 16/9/11 1st Q 1824 88 2/3/8 2no Q 1824 228 10/12/8 1st Q 1828 3546 267110/3 1st Q 1829 8680 Unavailable

Source: AO Reel2081 Reports of Work Performed at Female Factory, Parramatta 1822-1824; AO 2081 Reports of Board for the Management of the Female Factory and Hospital1828 and 1829.

There are some figures detailing Factory output, both in quantity and value, for the years 1822 to 1824 and then for 1828 and 1829 and these are presented in Table 7.5. From these figures it is clear that there was a decline in the quantity and value of goods made at the Factory in the midl820s but that production increased dramatically in the late 1820s. This may highlight the reason why the Factory was in crisis by 1826 and that the attention given to it by the Board of Inquiry and the later Boards of Management lead to productive work reforms. Before 1826 the most profitable activity from the point of view of the Master Manufacturer and the Secretary of the Factory was the weaving output of the men. Weaving produced the great bulk of their salaries up till the reviews of 1826. 129

127 See CO 2011118 Reell06 Return of Cloth/Blankets at Parramatta Factory 1814-19. 128AO Reel 2081. Returns of Work Done at Female Factory, Parramatta. Vols. 2/855,8; 2/855,83; 2/857,19; 2/585,17. 129 See Ibid. 216 Thereafter male weaving probably declined while the wages of the Master Manufacturer and the Secretary were fixed annually and so there was less incentive for them to favour the work of the males over the females. Indeed, with the public inquiries in 1826 into the death of the convict, Mary Ann Hamilton, the attention of the State was re-focused on the Factory and thereafter production began to rise. By 1828 it is also apparent that the value of the goods produced by the female convicts had increased. An increase in the value of production of this magnitude suggests an increase in quantity, quality and utility. By the latter part of the 1820s the work of the female convicts at the Factory must surely have become more demanding and skilled. It was certainly more rewarding for the State. 130

7.7 Control, administration and supervision of Factory work

The main administrative mechanism for controlling workers that was relied upon the by the State at this time was the supervisor, the convict overseer. The effectiveness of the overseer was dependent upon a number of factors; firstly, the technical and job knowledge of the individual overseer, secondly, his/her motivation and thirdly the number of overseers compared with the number of subordinate workers. All of these factors impacted on the effectiveness of the function of supervision and the degree of control that the State could impose in a direct and immediate way upon its convict workforce. In simple work tasks such as felling trees and clearing land technical job knowledge and skill were not so critical. However, in the case oftextile manufacturing, in the preparing, spinning, weaving and clothing or product manufacture, skill was of paramount importance. Finding a qualified and trustworthy supervisor was a lingering problem at the Female Factories. An attempt was made to recruit a qualified free man in Britain but this proved tragically unsuccessful. 131 Despairing of a free man being sent from England King appointed George Mealmaker "an Emancipist Woolen (sic)' and Linen Manufacturer now resident at

130 Salt. op. cit. p. 106. 131 Initial efforts made in 1800 were successful for an Edward Wise was engaged in Britain but he drowned on the journey out to the colony. HRA I. Vol. III. King to Portland, 1 March 1802. p. 433. This forced Governor King to recruit two convict supervisors but their engagement was relatively short-lived. After 12 months both were eligible for emancipation. Ibid. King to Portland, 10 March 1801. p. 13. It is possible, however, that one of them agreed to carry on but in 1802 King complained that his Irish convict overseer had "turned out a worthless character". HRA I. Vol. III. p. 433. See also HRA I. Vol. IV. King to Hobart, 9 May 1803. p. 81 and p. 246. 217 Parramatta" as Master Weaver in September 1803. 132 King was immediately impressed with his appointee for "he has put four looms to work and goes on very well". 133 So well in fact that King negotiated a surprisingly comprehensive contract with Mealmaker to "act as Superintending Grower manufacturer and Weaver" in order to expand the cultivation of flax and its production into linen as well as the manufacture of woollen materials. 134 However, George Mealmaker died in some mishap during 1808 135 and his loss created once more a vacuum of technical and organisational expertise that was to last until 1813.136 It is not now clear just who took over supervision of the Factory's manufacturing activities after the death of George Mealmaker but it was evidently someone "in every respect unqualified for his Situation". 137 Macquarie wrote that he needed:

a Superintendent of the Factory to be sent out from England by the earliest Conveyence (sic). This Person ought to be a Married Man of good ·Moral Character and thoroughly well acquainted with the different Branches of the Manufg (sic) etc., of Linen and Woollen Cloths. He should be made to understand that it is his indispensible Duty to be present With the Working People during the Hours of Labour. 138

In 1813 Macquarie appointed William Alcock the Superintendent of the Factory at Parramatta on a salary of £50 per annum 139 but this was a temporary solution. Macquarie was still requesting a superintendent "of sober Correct Manners" from the Colonial Secretary in 1814. 140 Alcock was replaced by Francis Oakes in 1815 but he was also the Superintendent for Parramatta and so had considerably greater responsibilities than simply supervision. 141 There is also doubt as to whether Oakes was particularly

132 HRA I. Vol. IV. King to Hobart, 7 August 1803. p. 396. 133 Ibid. p.393. 134 See Ibid. p. 396. 135 See HRA I. Vol. VII. Under Secretary Peel to Macquarie, 4 July 1810. p. 340; Macquarie replied in October 1811. p. 391. 136 See HRA I. Vol. VIII. Macquarie to Bathurst, 28 April1814. pp. 190-191. 137 HRA I. Vol. IX. Macquarie to Bathurst, 24 January 1817. p. 615. 138 Ibid. pp. 614-615. 139 SeeHRA I. Vol. VIII. Macquarie to Bathurst, 28 April1814. pp. 190-191. 140 Ibid. Macquarie to Bathurst, 7 October 1814. p. 312. 141 Bigge. op. cit. p. 70. 218 qualified, for Macquarie was still requesting the recruitment of a supervisor in Britain in April and May of 1817. 142 Commissioner Bigge found the physical conditions of the old factory appalling but he regarded its administration to have been even worse. 143 Francis Oakes was still the Superintendent at the Factory in 1822 but he no longer lived on the premises and had additional public and private duties that further minimised his impact on the control of the women. 144 Nevertheless Oakes did directly supervise the performance of the work of the women "during the hours of labour"145 but in this "his task was a hopeless one". 146 Although his honesty was not questioned Bigge found:

the disordered, unruly and licentious appearance of the women; manifested the little degree of control in which the female convicts were kept, and the little attention that was paid to any thing beyond the mere performance of a certain portion oflabour.147

Clearly, the women still worked under task work but it extracted only minimal output and demanded little in the way of direct or constant supervision. The general control of the women was likewise chaotic and ineffectual. When Oakes was not working the direct control of the women was left in the dubious hands of a resident Constable "who was still a convict, [and] who had continued in that office for 15 years" for which role he was rewarded only with "a ration and a half' .148 In Bigge 's not unreasonable view, control of the women was given to a man who could not be trusted and who was not rewarded in ways designed to extract greater diligence to duty. 149 In Bigge's list of criticisms it is impossible to escape the view that under Macquarie the old Factory was poorly administered by overworked and inadequate staff, the organisation of work was minimal and that the character of the behaviour of the women was hostile and disobedient. 150 However the characterisation of the women as wanton and abandoned by

142 See HRA I. Vol. IX. Macquarie to Bathurst, 4 April1817. p. 356 and Macquarie to Bathurst, 17 May 1817.p.411. 143 Bigge. op. cit. pp. 69-70. 144 Ibid. p. 70. Oakes was also Superintendent of the Convicts at Parramatta while he also ran a bakery. 145 Ibid. p. 69. 146 Ibid. p. 70. 147 Ibid. 148 Ibid. p. 69. 149 For a more detailed account of the problem of male corruption see Daniels. op. cit. pp.137-140 150 Bigge. op.cit. p. 70. 219 Governor, Commissioner and Reverend should also be seen as the moralising condemnation of a workforce unresponsive to managerial control. Workers in industrialising Britain were also often demeaned, in the most explicit moral terms, as debauched, lazy and dishonest. 151 As a first step toward the rational control of female work and behaviour Governor Macquarie constructed the new Factory between 1819 and 1821. This was explicitly designed to improve the physical organisation of the employment of the female convicts and should seen as an unequivocal attempt to make work a more systematic and central focus of the Female Factory. However, other practicalities, such as improvement in the formal administration and hierarchy of control, were not addressed by Macquarie (as he had for the male convicts). In the reform of the Factory's administrative structures Brisbane followed the recommendations of Commissioner Bigge closely, if ineffectually. He appointed a Matron, Mrs Fulloon, as the principal administrator along with a Master of Manufacturers, William Smith, to directly oversee the work of the females. In doing this the Master was assisted by a deputy and by the Secretary of the Factory, William Tuckwell. 152 Further detail on the growing bureaucracy of the Factory is provided by the Board of Inquiry conducted by Marsden and others in 1826. The organisational structure of the chain of command and role of the various functionaries appointed to the Factory prior to 1826 is presented in Chart 7.1. However, due to a lack of detailed information on the role of all the positions represented in this Chart the relationship between some of them is based, to some degree, on speculation. But, the fact that the interrelatedness of these positions is unclear and that the hierarchy of command was confused can be taken as evidence of the immaturity of the administration at the Female Factory. Nevertheless sufficiently clear relationships are confirmed by evidence that make this Chart provide valuable insights into how the administration of the new Factory was structured in the early 1820s post-Macquarie.

151 See Marglin. op. cit. pp. 34-37. 152 See AO Ree12081, Returns ofWork Done at the Female Factory, Parramatta, 1822-1824. 220 Chart 7.1 Organisational Structure ofPositions at Female Factory, 1826

Governor

Magistrates r-~~--~~

'---..---__.J IIC I Doctor I

Master Secretary Manufacturer

Constables 4 males Ass't Master Manufacturer

The first point made by Chart 7.1 is that the Matron of the Factory was a senior and key manager with a broad range of responsibilities. However, the management of work, which until 1826 still included the male weavers, was not unequivocally within her sphere of responsibility. Indeed, while the Master of Manufacturers ostensibly had clear authority for the superintendence of work, in reality this was shared with the vaguely titled job of Secretary. Both these men were paid on the basis of 5% of the value of production. 153 Clearly the State regarded the level of production achieved at the factory to have been a joint effort on the part of these two positions. The Matron did not share in the value ofproduction and in practice, while her salary of£150 per annum was relatively high, it was less than that earned by the Master and the Secretary. This certainly would have blurred the hierarchy of command.

221 The second issue, which needs to be noted is the predominance of convicts in the structure of administration. The shaded boxes in Chart 7.1 show that, except for the Assistant Manufacturer, almost all of the positions at the Factory were occupied by convicts and most of them were males. Even some of the Constables may have been convicts. Although female convicts held a variety of formal positions within the Factory they were out numbered and often subordinate to males both free and convict. After the Inquiry of 1826 Factory staffing was significantly changed as Chart 7.2 indicates. The Matron's role was strengthened and broadened within the Factory154 but she was subjected to the scrutiny of a permanent Board of Management. On the other hand, the gender mix of staff was changed. Many of the males, most of whom were convicts, were relocated and an Assistant Matron and Portress were appointed at annual salaries of £50 per year. It is not now clear exactly what the Assistant Matron and the Portress did at this time but the former may have .been more concerned with the domestic operations of the institution while the latter probably handled the arrival and departure of convict women. In this way she would perhaps have had some role in supervising the Gatekeeper. Perhaps with these two paid positions there was less need for Constables because their number was reduced from four to two. In addition, the two remaining Constables were now rostered to work in the Factory from the constabulary of the Parramatta Police force although in daily duties they would have been responsible to the Matron either directly or by delegation. In contrast the four convict woodsmen were left attached to the Factory because the nature of their work, supplying firewood, meant they did not normally come into contact with the women. William Tuckwell remained the Secretary to the Factory on a salary of just over £100 per annum but was now assisted by a male Clerk on an annual salary of £91. 155

153 See AO Reel2081 Returns ofWork Done at the Female Factory, Parramatta, 1822-1824. 154 See AO Ree12081 Vol. 4/2011 Report of Board of Management, December 1827. 155 Ibid. 222 Chart 7.2 Organisational Structure of Positions at Female Factory, 1827

Board of

Parramatta Chaplain Police Force Rev. Marsden

Secretary

Constables 2

Assistant Portress Matron

The six Monitors were convict women and although their role was not clearly defined they were paid at the rates for overseers and seem to have been responsible for the performance of different work and tasks. This differentiation however was made clearer in 1830 as will be explained below. Rationalisation of staff numbers was not confined only to the males. The number of convict women employed as domestic staff was reduced from over 40 in the early 1820s to 26 after the review of 1826. In short, by 1827 staffing at the Factory had become leaner, displayed signs of task specialisation and differentiation and was increasingly being professionalised with free, career staff. The administration of the Factory was also being integrated into the wider government

223 bureaucracy through increasingly standardised salaries, the appointment of Constables from the broader police pool and was subject to continual review by its Board of Management. Although these changes were stimulated by governmental review in response to a crisis the form that they took was consistent to many of the broader administrative changes being made by Governor Darling. The reform of the Factory, however, did not end here but continued into the early 1830s. The situation in 1830-31 was significantly different and not only reflected administrative reform and accountability but an added emphasis on the organisation of work. The reforms were not simply bureaucratic nor even largely penal. By 1830 changes to the Factory's administration also highlight the objective of improving the organisation of the performance of work by the female convicts. The new structure is shown in Chart 7.3. The administration of the Factory by 1830 reflected completely the classification system of the female convicts. Not only were the women divided intothdr three classes but so too was the structure of the Factory's administration. Mrs Gordon, now the Principal Matron, still retained overall authority although she was assisted with the appointment of three Assistant Matrons who were paid £50 per year. Each of these assistants was responsible for a Class of women and for the supervision of their distinct employment. The Classification system of the female convicts created differences in their work and the rewards they received for it. 156 The Portress was paid the same salary as the Assistant Matrons alt~ough her role was now more clearly defined. The Portress was responsible for the domestic operations of the Factory and in this capacity she supervised the daily duties of the Constables and Gatekeeper as well as the women employed in the laundry, hospital and at needle work (clothes repair). The Secretary remained William Tuckwell although he was now also described as the Storekeeper. In practice the work of Tuckwell and his clerk seem increasingly to have been clerical and administrative in character. Under Darling the clerical part of the colonial bureaucracy flourished and, like many other clerical administrators, the salary levels of Tuckwell and his Clerk were higher than the more functionary supervisors like the Assistant Matrons and the Portress. 157

156 AO Reel 2081. Vol. 4/2094. Report of Board of Management June 1829; and AO 702 Roll No. 99. Vol. 4/7327. Return of the Establishment of the Female Factory, Parramatta. 1831. 157 AO 702 Roll No. 99. Vol. 4/7327. Return of the Establishment of the Female Factory, Parramatta. 1831. 224 Chart 7.3 Organisational Structure ofPositions at Female Factory, 1830

Governor

Board of

Secretary and Storekeeper I I Clerk

Assistant Assistant Assistant Portress Matron Matron Matron } 81 Class 2"d Class 3rd Class

By 1830 the organisational structure of the Factory also reflected the creation of a professional or careerist level of administration. All the positions left white in Chart 7.3 were filled by paid employees all of who were free men and women. The only exceptions to this may have been the Gatekeeper and Constable but they were not in any event serving convicts at this time. This permanent staffing division was also complemented by an exclusively convict level of administration which is diagonally shaded in Chart 7.3. Convict women were appointed to the positions of Monitor, one for each Class and one for the three domestic divisions. In practice the Monitors performed 225 the role of overseers and were paid according to Governor Darling's schedule of remuneration for convict overseers. The appointment to Monitor was made by the Matron and was an internal decision without reference to the Board of Management or to the Governor. Organisationally, the structure of the Female Factory by 1830 was very clearly delineated by function, work, salary and status. This reflects the administrative zeal and vision of Governor Darling rather than simply the implementation of Pentonville penal theories. Darling transformed the administration of colonial government by the adoption of new principles of merit, professionalism and bureaucratic efficiency. 158 The Matron remained the senior manager at the Factory and by 1830 her authority was actually increasing. The input from the Board of Management declined after 1829 when it reported, "That it appears no longer necessary that the Board should hold their Meetings so often as half yearly, and they would, therefore, suggest ... annual meetings". 159 The other administrative positions held by free persons at the factory not only reflected penal classification but also the differing work tasks and functions of the female convicts. In addition, some convicts were also included in the administration or supervision of the Factory creating yet further distinctions of status between free staff, convict staff and convict workers. It is also interesting to note that of the eight permanent staff at this time five were female, including the Principal Matron and only three were male. When the six convict women employed as Monitors are included in the personnel numbers the female predominance is striking. The administrative dominance ofwomen at the Factory in 1830 was all the more remarkable given that the colony was still a male dominated pioneer society Although Chart 7.3 shows clearly that the Factory's administration was transformed and that the result of this change was an increase in management control the new administrative structures do not, in themselves, quantify this control. To attempt this requires more information, specifically the degree of supervision of the female convict workers and the nature and intensity of punishment imposed at the Factory. The number of supervisors and the size of the workforce being supervised are critical in determining the nature or degree of control of the labour process enjoyed by management. Specifically, the ratio of supervisors to supervised will establish the Span

158 Richie, J. (1986) Lachlan Macquarie: a biography. Melbourne University Press. Melbourne. 159 AO 2801 Vol. 4/2094, Report of the Board of Management, June 1829. 226 of Control and this sheds light on the nature of that control. 160 In the case of the female convicts engaged in textile and clothes manufacturing the Span of Control can be calculated for a number of years and this information is presented in Table 7.6.

Table 7.6 Ratio of Supervised to Supervisors at Female Factory Various Years 1800-1829

Date No. No. of Span of Female Supervisors Control Convicts 1800 12 1 1: 12 1801 42 2 1: 21 1802 30 1 1:30 1821 110. 2 1: 55 1826 256 11 1: 23 1827 366 10 1: 36 1829 513 10 1: 51

Source: HRA I. Vol. 3 p. 433; Bigge Report Vol. 1.73; AO Reel702 Roll99 Vol. 417327

From this Table it is clear female labour was not closely or directly supervised at either the old or the new Factories. Apart from 1800 the Span of Control for female convicts employed in the textile and clothing industry was relatively wide throughout the years detailed in this Table. 161 This may be accounted for by the fact that much of the work they performed was traditional handicraft in nature and so can be expected to have been widely familiar. However, other conclusions can also be drawn from Table 7.6. Firstly, that Macquarie did not increase the level of supervision at the factory but allowed it to deteriorate again seems to confirm Macquarie's general neglect of the female convicts. Secondly, it would seem that Governor Brisbane attempted to increase controls at the Factory by narrowing the span of control and he did so by appointing more staff with supervisory functions. However, as the crisis of 1826 indicates, more staff and personnel will not necessarily improve management control or production.

160 A wide Span of Control is said to exist when a small number of supervisors are responsible for a large number of workers. The nature of supervision in such a situation would be described as indirect and distant. This would allow individual workers a degree of discretion in terms of what they did or how hard they worked. Where the Span of Control is narrow the nature of supervisory control would be described as direct and close. See Saville, J. and Higgins, M. (1990) Supervision in Australia. Macmillan. Melbourne. Chapter 6. 161 See Summers. op. cit. pp. 274-282; and Alford, K. (1984) Production or Reproduction?: an economic history ofwomen in Australia, 1788-1850. Oxford University Press. Melbourne. 227 Thirdly, it is now very evident that Governor Darling approached supervision and control more seriously than his predecessors. Although he reduced staff numbers at the Factory and widened the Span of Control he better selected staff and designed their roles with greater precision. That the Span of Control continued to widen thereafter was also due to increasing numbers of women being sent to the Factory rather than a fall in the number of supervisory staff. Finally, it is interesting to compare the changing Span of Control at the Factory with Production levels. Although there are few clear indicators of Factory output during these years Table 7.5 indicates that during the early 1820s the quantity and value of the clothing goods produced at the factory declined. Strangely, this decline occurred at a time when the number of supervisory roles probably increased. In contrast, after 1826 when the Span of Control began to widen production increased at the Factory. Of course, the increase in output may be partly explained by the simple fact that the workforce increased. A more satisfactory explanation is to be found in the operation of Task Work. Although this management strategy was disappearing from use with male convict workers at this time, it remained important at the Factory. The significance of Task Work to labour control is that it actually reduced the need for direct supervision of workers because it extracted a minimum level of output. Task Work was also of most relevance to work in which the output could be most easily quantified and textile work lends itself to measurement. But, more importantly, task work at the factory could be individualised. Unlike most male convict workers in skilled trades or in gangs, the work effort of most individual women could be calculated at the Factory. Armed with this type of detailed and individualised statistical information there would have been less need for close and direct supervision. In addition, there is some evidence to suggest that task work amounts were raised in these years but that the new levels were accompanied by more generous remuneration for any extra work. 162

7.8 Punishment and resistance

Another dimension in the degree of labour control constructed by management that must be considered is the use of punishment. Negative incentives have long held a prominent position in the analysis of convict motivation and by the second half of the 1820s were

162 See AO 2081 Vol. 4/2094 Report Board of Management, June 1828. 228 the most widely used stratagems for controlling male convicts. It is essential, therefore, to establish the role of punishment in the construction of the labour process at the Female Factory. Unfortunately, like much to do with the Factory, very little information relating to the punishment of female convicts is now available. However, from the reports of the 1826 Inquiries and the subsequent reports of the Board of Management after 1826 some very clear indications of the incidence and character of punishment can be established. The basic impression to emerge from these sources is that before 1826 punishment at the Factory was haphazard and ad hoc while after 1826 punishment became more systematically organised and enforced. Of course, the punishment of a workforce is not only a management strategy for controlling a workforce. It is not exclusively an expression of management initiative. Management's need to punish is also an outcome of the behaviour of workers, it is also worker initiated. The incidence of punishment of a workforce can therefore also be seen as a symptom of worker resistance to management control, as a measure of the cooperativeness of a workforce. However, it is not only the incidence of punishable offences that needs to be identified but also the type of offences and the degree of collective action. That is, whether the offences are part of group action or individual. As Kay Daniels complains "historians writing about convict resistance have tended to see female convict rebelliousness as individualist rather than collective" and have ignored the many instances of collective action. 163 An example of collective action can be found in 1827 riot at the Parramatta Factory. Described as "Amazonian Banditti" the Third Class female convicts and many of the others swept aside the Constables, broke out of the Factory and ran amok in the town stealing food from shops. 164 Indeed the objective of their actions was very specific; to secure more and better food, as very few seemed intent on escape. 165 This action, which required the intervention of an armed body of the Sih Regiment of troops to suppress, was characterised by a highly visible demonstration of collective solidarity on the part of the women. They worked together in groups and as a whole they resisted the identification and arrest of their ringleaders. 166 It is significant that the Report of the Board of Management for this period makes almost no mention of this action. Instead it described it cryptically as "the disturbance of some time ago in the Penitentiary and of

163 Daniels. op. cit. p. 144. 164 Sydney Gazette 31 October 1827. 165 Summers. op. cit. p. 284; See also Rude. op. cit. Introduction.

229 which number only three are now at large". 167 More importantly, the records of punishment for this period do not reflect widespread retribution by the authorities, which can be taken as further evidence of the success of this collective action. The fact that the Board of Management was so coy in actually mentioning the riot also suggests there could have been other actions of protest that went unrecorded. On the other hand, group actions at Parramatta continued even after the Darling reforms. In 1833 the "women rioted over having their hair cut" and again in 1836 when the Matron, Mrs Gordon, was dismissed. 168 The female convicts were not passive as a group or as individuals but endeavoured through a variety of actions to improve their position within the Factory or to influence the decisions of management. Kay Daniels also points out, some individual acts of resistance can have a strong collective dimension. In her view the manipulation of regulations ~y individuals was often based on collective knowledge and "passed on in the factories". 169 That is, a culture of collective knowledge and information existed between the women at the Factory. But, in any case, individual acts of rebellion by large or significant numbers of individual workers may still be interpreted as symptomatic of conflict and resistance. Individual acts of resistance or actions designed to thwart or mitigate management control may also be the only course open to a workforce. Collective action is not always possible and this inability was, for a number of reasons, particularly apparent in the case of the female convicts at the Factory. They were administratively divided into rigid classifications, turnover in the 1st Class was very considerable, new arrivals diluted collective resolve while in the physical layout of the factory management made strenuous efforts to isolate and quarantine the women from each other and the wider society. The work performed at the Factory may also be considered an obstacle to collective action. While many male convicts worked in gangs or teams, much of the work performed by the females was organised as an individual activity as evidenced by the fact they were paid personal bonuses. This study is concerned with punishment for crimes or offences committed within the Factory but the ability to quantify internal punishment is problematic There are no statistical returns detailing the incidence of punishment at the Factory before .1826 However, there was probably no sudden emergence of militancy on the part of the

166 See Sydney Gazette. op. cit. and Daniels. op. cit. pp. 148-149. 167 AO Reel2081. Vol. 4/2094 Report Board ofManagement, June 1828. 168 Daniels. op. cit. p. 146.

230 women and it is very unlikely that it was a crime wave at the Factory that terrified the authorities into action. On the other hand, there is considerable evidence that the State had viewed the women with alarm for a long time but had neither the means nor, more likely, the resolve to confront their militancy. They had always been seen as militant, uncooperative and even worse, corrupting. Governor King viewed the women as being "of the worst description, and totally irreclaimable". 170 Macquarie was even more forthright when he admitted to building the new Female Factory in order to quarantine "those depraved Females at Work within Walls". 171 Samuel Marsden had long held a negative view of the female convicts and wrote that th:

women are generally concerned in most of the crimes which are commited (sic) in the Colony; and if any means can be adopted to restrain their Immoralities, and counteract their Misconduct, much public good will result from it. 172

Commissioner Bigge also saw the women in terms of "profligacy and abandonment" but he was bold enough to lay blame for this at the administration of the Parramatta Factory. 173 In his view the administration had failed to confront and control the women when he observed that "the disordered, unruly and licentious appearance of the women; manifested the little degree of control in which the female convicts were kept". 174 According to him:

the factory at Parramatta acted merely as a temporary restraint from indiscriminate intercourse or unchecked dissipation. The labour of the females, confined for punishment, was not greater than those that were retained there for employment; and their diet was in nowise inferior. 175

In practice there was no administrative system for imposing effective control and punishment or even for making a distinction between women who had committed crimes

169 Ibid. p. 144. 170 HRA I. Vol. III. King to Portland, 1 March 1802. p. 424. 171 HRA I. Vol. IX. Macquarie to Bathurst, 4 April1817. p. 353. 172 AO Reel 702. Letter from Samuel Marsden to Governor Darling, 24 April1826. 173 Bigge. op. cit. p. 72. 174 Ibid. p. 70. 175 Ibid. pp. 69-70. 231 and those who had been simply allocated to the Factory. However, it is clear that he too was only reacting to the widely deplored behaviour of the women rather than an increase in its incidence. More importantly, it seems illogical to dismiss this sustained behaviour by the female convicts as mere individual rebelliousness, as though this were in some way less noble or significant than collective action. The effect, in any case, was the same; they were collectively condemned. It was not, however, until the Hamilton crisis at the Factory in 1826 and the zeal of Governor Darling, that the difficult female convict workforce was effectively confronted. The Inquiry into the death of Mary Ann Hamilton in early 1826 reveals a regime of punishment that was random and ill defined by regulation. Hamilton was subjected to a variety of punishments ranging from the hard labour of breaking up stones, being restrained by "a tight waistcoat" to being confined for four days in a cell during which time she received no food or water during the first 24 hours and bread and water for the remaining hours. 176 According to the evidence of Dr. Howard Allen, Surgeon to the Factory, these punishments were imposed for being "a very noisy and riotous person". 177 In reality her crime seems to have been consistently complaining that she was starving. Although her case is a very particular one, that the punishments inflicted on her were designed merely to silence her and were increasingly brutal, indicate the lack of regulation over internal punishment within the Factory at this time. The Matron had the power to inflict punishment although for serious crimes the Visiting Magistrate could also be involved. There is no evidence how often this occurred but one of the issues which brought down Francis Oakes, Superintendent of the Factory, 1815 to 1822, was his unease at the inconsistent way the Visiting Magistrate, Henry Douglass, imposed punishment. 178 What records or accounts that remain of punishment at the Factory before 1826 firmly suggest that this was a lax, unpredictable and sometimes severe mechanism of control. But that it was also a reaction to a defiant and militantly uncooperative workforce. After 1826 the situation became clearer, at least in terms of explicit regulation and standardisation of punishment. With the determination of three more strictly defined classifications of female convicts came the ability to differentiate not only the punishment of each Class but also a range of other issues such as food, clothing and

176 AO 702 4/1791 Report of Board oflnquiry, 1826. 177 Ibid. 178 See Salt. op. cit. pp. 56-67. 232 work. Of more significance was the standardisation of the regime of punishment generally. Interestingly, this standardisation may have made punishment less severe for the majority of women. Before the reforms, the Matron had the authority to impose as punishment "three days in the Cells on Bread and Water or Four days in Fetters, degrading [the convicts] in their Class or sending them to the Penitentiary" .179 Shaving the heads of the female convicts was probably also available. After 1826 the discretion as to who to punish was left in the hands of the Matron but the ability to inflict punishment was regulated. The Board of Inquiry noted:

Under the present arrangement the Matron, judges the offence, awards the Punishment, and mitigates it at pleasure, and with the best of intentions, from the nature of her situation, she must b~ very liable to err. 180

As a consequence of this gentle, but barely veiled criticism, the Inquiry recommended that the punishments the Matron could order without reference to the Police Magistrate be reduced from 4 days to 24 hours in the cells. In addition, she was given the authority to "deprive women of tea and sugar for a day as a punishment" .181 The Matron could now act quickly and without complication from the Magistrates but only in a very limited way. The punishment of 24 hours in the cells may in practice also have been more lenient than in the past or was Mary Ann Hamilton's experience. The shaving of heads was also restricted. Only women sentenced to the 3rd Class for the second time could have this indignity inflicted on them as a matter of course. 182 After 1826 the reports of the Board of Management of the Factory do provide some quantified records of punishment for part of the years 1827 to 1829 and these are presented in Table 7. 7. Leaving aside the figure for the few months in 1826 the incidence of punishment for the remaining years now seems very consistent. More interesting is that this consistency occurred in the face of rising numbers of women being sent to the Factory. In other words, the incidence of punishment per head of convict women attached to the Factory actually declined.

179 AO 702 4/1791 Report of Board oflnquiry, 1826. 180 Ibid. 181 Ibid. 182 Ibid.

233 Table 7.7 Incidence of Punishment at Female Factory, Parramatta Various months 1826-1829

Date Incidence

Aug-Oct 38 1826 June-Dec 312 1827 Jan-June 320 1828 Jan-June 315 1829

Source: AO Reel702 Vol. 4/1791 Report of Board of Management, Female Factory, October 1826; AO Reel2278 Returns of Punishment of Female Convicts at Female Factory, Parramatta, July 1827 to June 1828; AO Reel 2081 Vol. 4/2094, Return of Punishment of Female Prisoners at the Female Factory, Parramatta, January to June 1829.

A slightly more complex picture emerges when the question of who was punished is considered. This analysis is not concerned with individual women (although such detail for some months does exist) but with the Classes of female convicts. Table 7.8 indicates the proportion of punishment inflicted on the three classifications of women for the years 1826, 1827 and 1828. Unfortunately only the aggregate number of punishments inflicted on all women exists for the year 1829.

Table 7.8 Percentage of Punishment Imposed on 1st 2"d and 3rd Class Women ' 1826-1828

Date Percentage of Punishment by Class %

l st 2"d 3rd Total

1826 22% 29% 49% 100% 1827 27% 32% 41% 100%

1828 42% 23% 35% 100%

Source: 1826 AO 702 Report of Board of Management Oct 1826; 1827-28, AO 2278 Returns of Punishments at the Female Factory, Parramatta.

234 Table 7.8 indicates that over time relatively more of the punishment inflicted on the women at the Factory was imposed on the females in the 1st Class, who were, ostensibly, the better behaved women. In the first two years they were punished mainly for insolence and fighting but by 1828 their crimes tended to be work related; mainly refusing to work, neglect ofwork and disobedience. 183 On the 7 April alone, 12 ofthe 25 women punished were 1st Class women 184 and they were charged with Neglect of Work. Although this was a relatively small group they clearly withdrew their labour as a collective group. In fact work related 'crimes' seem to have been more common amongst the 1st than the other classes of female convicts during 1828, while there is also evidence of collective withdrawal of labour by this Class of worker in 1827. 185 The type of offences punished in the Factory varied considerably and although work related offences were prominent in 1826, 1827 and 1828 they were not always the most common. In 1826, of the 38 recorded offences committed and punished between August and October 16% were work related but virtually all the rest were for such crimes as drunkenness, theft and violence. 186 After this date the method of recording offences and punishment became much more elaborate although still not in a form that allows easy analysis. In 1827 "Fighting and Quarrelling" and "Insolence and Disrespect" were the two most common categories of offences punished. 187 Work related offences were the next most common followed by "Improper Conduct" (a wide category of offences that included riotous behaviour) then drunkenness. 188 This latter offence was largely committed outside the Factory because most of the women who were punished for it had "returned" drunk. Interestingly, theft was not a significant problem and was surpassed in frequency by escape and bad language. 189 The Return for Punishment inflicted in 1828, while more elaborate than in the past, does not allow the incidence of certain crimes to be individually calculated. However, work related crimes such as "Neglect of Work" and "Refusing to do Government Work" remained extremely prominent and common. 190 There is also no evidence that certain crimes attracted different types of punishment. It seems that all women in breach of Factory regulations were initially punished by confinement of "24

183 AO 2278 Returns of Punishments at the Female Factory, Parramatta from 1st Jan to 30 June 1828. 184/bid. 185 See AO Reel2081 Vol. 4/2011 Report of Board ofManagement, December 1827. 186 See AO 2081 4/1791 Report of Board oflnquiry, 1826. 187 AO 2278 Returns of Punishment of Female Convicts at Female Factory, Parramatta July-Dec 1827. 188 Ibid. 189 Ibid.

235 hours in a cell on Bread and Water". 191 Further periods of confinement were imposed for additional acts of infringement or continuing defiance. Of all the punishments inflicted 81% involved 24 hours in a cell, 8% involved 48 hours and 11% involved longer periods of confinement. 192 Most women were controlled by 24 hours confinement but, Board reports state, for those of greater indominability "Punishment on refusing to Work is usually continued until the opposing spirit is subdued". 193 In 1828 this involved one individual being confined on bread and water for a month. 194 Unfortunately little more can be concluded from the statistics on punishment at the Factory other than that after 1826 women continued to defy the rules and regulations of the Factory in the face of a more systematic and standardised regime of punishment. In addition, while the incidence of individual types of infringements cannot be quantified, it is very apparent that work related ones were very common and were a focus of management's concern.

7.9 Conclusion

It is no exaggeration to say that the female convicts in New South Wales were widely and consistently viewed as difficult and dangerous. Virtually every Governor after Phillip put on record his horror at the behaviour of the women and, almost as commonly, expressed exasperation as to what to do with them. While Sturma and Damousi convincingly argue a class and sexual bias in this stereotyping of the females 195 an additional dimension is simply their reluctance to cooperate with the labour process. This was certainly one of the dimensions of Governor King's attitude. While he enthusiastically invested in employment for the women he had no doubts about their unwillingness to work. Governor Macquarie, so energetic and innovative in his utilisation and management of the male convicts, appears to have hardly given the management of the females any thought until the last years of his administration. Similarly, while Macquarie was more inclined than any of the other Governors to forgive and rehabilitate

190 See AO 2278 Abstract of Punishments at the Female Factory, Parramatta, Jan to Jun 1828. 191 Ibid. 192 Ibid. 193 Ibid. 194 Ibid.

236 the male convicts, he was utterly unforgiving of the women. Consequently, he did not address the problems faced (or created) by the women until his critics had raised such a chorus he could no longer ignore them. However, although he built the new Factory he did not significantly change the nature of the way their work was organised or supervised. This oversight should not be seen as accidental but also as the consequence of the behaviour of the women. The female convicts so consistently resisted and defied all colonial management up to this time that Macquarie simply ignored them. The result was that the state minimised the labour effort it demanded of the women. Macquarie's neglect did not concern the female convicts but it did concern the Governor's many critics. The minimal efforts made to employ the female convicts and their lack of accommodation until 1822 were seen by some to encourage them into prostitution or idleness; twin evils in the minds of many mi~dle class male colonists. Governor Brisbane responded by increasing the degree of supervision but this almost certainly did not increase output. Brisbane addressed the problem of controlling the women but his interest in directing that control into greater labour productivity is not now evident. Imposing order and extracting greater labour effort from the female convicts at the Factory was left to Governor Darling. Although the span of control enjoyed by supervisors at the Factory declined during his administration, the effectiveness of their control increased. This was achieved in a number of ways. First by culling corrupt and surplus males from the administration of the Factory and replacing them with more professional careerist staff. Secorid, through the imposition of more effective mechanisms for recording details of the Factory's operations, Darling created a greater degree of administrative accountability. The third area of reform was the restructuring of the hierarchy of control within the Factory. While this new hierarchy did not exclude convicts, as they were elsewhere in the penal system, the role of the convicts was nevertheless highly circumscribed. Fourth, the Governor reorganised the Classification system of women in the Factory in ways that increased the differentiation of the classes of women. The differences between the three classes of convict women were made more apparent in terms of food, clothing, wages and the type of work they. performed. This increase in differentiation made managing the women more effective and should

195 Sturma, M. 'Eye of the Beholder: The Stereotype of Women Convicts', in Labour History no. 34, 1978. 3-10; and also Damousi, J. '"Depravity and Disorder": The Sexuality of Convict Women' Labour History. Vol. 68. May 1995. pp. 30-45. 237 have made collective resistance more difficult. That it did not is a testimony to the continuing hostility of all female convicts to the penal system. The fifth way in which the Governor imposed greater work control over the women was through the use of more elaborate reward systems. Under Darling the women were able to earn more money by working harder. More importantly, because the work performed by the women was organised as individual task work, the reward system related to individuals rather than a group. This reward system and the ability to accurately differentiate between the efforts of individual women meant that fewer supervisors were needed than in the past. Darling's approach to managing the labour process of the women was to impose a system of self-reward rather than one of terror, which was his approach with the male convicts. The records of the incidence of punishment imposed at the Factory do not show a dramatic increase. Punishment became more systematic and consistent but does not appear to have become a dark shadow stalking the women as it did on the male road gangs. The result of Darling's reforms was a dramatic increase in output at the Factory. The range of work performed by the women broadened, became value-adding and even enterprising in that some work was of a contract or jobbing nature. Despite the obvious increase in output there remained some official belief that the women were still not as fully occupied as they could have been. The supply of wool and woven cloth were still bottlenecks in the Factory's production regime that sometimes left the women idle. The solution suggested in 1829 was the construction of new weaving facilities for the women to operate and this marked the female's return to a traditional male occupation. Such a gender shift in occupation was possible because the continued public employment of males in any capacity was no longer an official objective by 1830 and because male convict weavers had no mechanism of resisting this feminisation of their work. Although management control of the labour process increased and production expanded, official attitudes towards the women did not greatly soften. Darling's administration still viewed them with horror and, more importantly, the women still broke the rules and even rioted. By 1830 they were certainly more restricted than in the past but they were by no means subdued or made passive. The so-called immorality of the females, their boldness, their uncooperative attitudes to work or to middle class conventions, their militancy, both individual and collective, remained characteristics of their behaviour and attitudes in 1830 and even beyond. In fact, the reciprocated and consistently hostile attitude between the female convicts and officialdom throughout the

238 period 1788-1830 make them not simply mothers of"charming children"196 but also the mothers of a durable working class militancy and disrespect of authority.

196 HRA I Vol. I. Hunter to Portland. 18 November 1796. p. 707. 239 CHAPTER EIGHT

CONCLUSION 8.1 Introduction

To Arnold Wood the convicts were victims of "criminal laws, atrocious in letter and atrocious in execution"1 but to W. K. Hancock the typical convict was "the Londoner who stole spoons".2 Although quality scholarship finally settled the scale on side of the "n'er-do-wells"3 convict historiography has been, until recently dominated by the thematic concern with criminality to the exclusion of other issues like employment relations.4 The criminality of the convicts simplified the analysis of their work experience: the convicts needed to be terrorised into labour because they were "liars, drunks and cheats".5 However, there are two broad issues that discolour this simple view. Firstly, an examination ofthe work experience ofthe convicts from 1788 until the early 1820s does not reveal conditions of work, management controls or an intensity of exploitation that reflects a simple, crude system of employment relations. The reality is that employment relations in convict society reflected a diversity of practices, sometimes a generosity of conditions and, above all, evidence of interaction and compromise. How could a coercive, simple employment relationship produce such ambiguous and varied outcomes? The British government, no less, had a clear answer to this question and needed no convincing that too much generosity was apparent. As a consequence the employment experience of the convicts changed from 1822 onwards. The second broad challenge to the simple, brutal view of convict employment is that the complaints levelled at the convicts as workers throughout the period 1788 to 1830 echo those raised against free British workers during the same period. British employers complained that their workers were lazy, insolent and irregular in their work habits. In other words they too were seen as "an alienated working class"6 which needed

1 Wood, G. A. "Convicts" Journal of the Royal Australian Historical Society. Vol 8 No 4. 1922. p. 179. 2 Hancock, W.K. (1966) Australia. Jacaranda Press. Brisbane. p. 25. 3 Robson, L. L. (1965) The Convict Settlers ofAustralia: an inquiry into the origin and character ofthe convicts transported to New South Wales and Van Dieman 's Land, 1788-1852. Melbourne University Press. Melbourne. pp. 143-145. 4 See Shaw, A.G. L. (1966) Convicts and the Colonies. Faber and Faber. London; Hughes, R. (1988) The Fatal Shore. Pan. London; and McQueen, H. (1970) A New Britannia: an argument concerning the social origins ofAustralian radicalism and nationalism. Penguin. Ringwood. 5 Clark, M "The Origins of the Convicts Transported to Eastern Australia, 1787 -1852" in Historical Studies. Vol. 7. Nos. 26-27, May-June 1965. p. 95. 6 Clark, M. (1985) A History ofAustralia. Vol. 1. Melbourne University Press. Melbourne. p. 244. 240 to be driven into the factories and forced into accepting the rules and discipline of industrial capitalism. According to Sidney Pollard, the "management of labour was the central management problem in the industrial revolution, requiring the fiercest wrench from the past."7 The convicts forced to labour in New South Wales were not, in other words, displaying some typical criminal-class aversion to work and the new regime of constancy and regularity. They were actually displaying the common hostility of a traditionally minded working class to modem labour. To make greater sense of the work experience of these convict workers, at least until the early 1820s, the utilisation of convict labour needs to be analysed within a theoretical framework of the labour process and within the context of the emergence of industrial capitalism in Britain.

~.2 Distinguishing labour power and labour use

The particular way work is arranged imd organised in a society reflects its unique social, economic and ideological values.8 In this way the labour process under feudal society differed in fundamental ways from the way it is organised under capitalism. Similarly, the labour process of indigenous Australians was utterly different to that which was transported with the First Fleet in 1788.9 Throughout the period examined in this thesis British society can be characterised as industrialising capitalism in which the essential ingredients of a capitalist labour process were being constructed. In other words the emerging capitalist labour process was characterised by a new distinction between labour power and labour use. Under capitalism labour became a commodity, a factor of production that needed to be purchased in ways that contracted workers to provide their labour power to capitalist employers. However, unlike other factors of production, the purchase of labour power did not translate directly into use or effort. The purchase of labour power was merely the transaction that determined the cost of gaining access to the productive capacity of a worker. 10 It did not determine the effectiveness or profitability of that labour. In this way capitalism unleashed a new imperative to the employment of labour. To make labour work productively or profitably, to extract

7 Pollard, S. (1968) The Genesis ofModern Management. Penguin. Harmondsworth. p. 189. 8 Marx, K. (1974) Capital. Vol. 1. Progress Publishers. Moscow. p. 179. 9 Rose, F. G. G. (1987) The Traditional Mode ofProduction ofthe Australian Aborigines. Angus and Robertson. Sydney. 10 See Edwards, R. (1979) Contested Terrain: the transformation of the workplace in the twentieth century. Basic Books. New York. pp. 11-16; and Wright, C. (1995) The Management ofLabour: a history ofAustralian employers. Oxford University Press. Melbourne. p. 14. 241 labour effort, it was required to address, more comprehensively than any society before it, the manner in which work was organised and managed. It is argued here that convict New South Wales, as a social and economic product of British industrialising capitalism, was also highly concerned with labour use. In New South Wales the question of labour power was settled by criminal conviction. However, it is important not to exaggerate the fact that the state seized rather than purchased the labour power of each convict. Indeed to dwell on this to the exclusion of the issue of labour effort is merely to argue about the cost of gaining access to labour power. Free British workers were not particularly free in their ability to negotiate the cost of their labour power11 while few wage rates at this time were generous. 12 The wage rates established for women and children, for example, are now widely regarded as being below subsistence levels. 13 To dismiss the labour process. issues apparent in New South Wales because the state seized convict labour power rather than by striking an unfair wage bargain to get it, is to misunderstand the importance of a labour process analysis. 14 How convict labour power is obtained only becomes significant when free workers were able to form trade unions that could successfully raise the cost of labour. 15 Arguably this stage was reached earlier in New South Wales than in Britain when free workers and settlers in the colony agitated for the abolition of transportation. 16 In any event, in the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries the issue of labour effort was the more important one. It is argued here that where workers perceive themselves unable to easily or safely alter the cost of their labour power, their efforts to resist management's extraction of labour effort will be greater. Exploitation is not simply determined by low wages but also by the intensity of the work experience. Resisting the latter form of exploitation can be infinitely more varied and less easily detected than striking over wages rates. Of course workers may not be more successful in their struggle to control the intensity of work but even workers who cannot bargain

II Biernacki, R. (1995) The Fabrication ofLabor: Germany and Britain, 1640-1914. University of California Press. Berkeley. pp. 229-230. I2 Hobsbawn, E. (1974) Labouring Men: Studies in the History ofLabour. Weidenfeld and Nicolson. London. pp. 346-350. IJ Ibid. p. 292. I4 See Fox, C. B., Howard, W. A. and Pittard, M. J. (1995) Industrial Relations in Australia: development, law and operation. Longman. Melbourne. p. 5. Is Hobsbawn. op. cit. pp. 35-51.

242 over wages can covertly influence the actual performance of their work. Sometimes, as in the case of the convicts, they may even use overt methods to influence their degree of exploitation. In New South Wales, the state, as the owner of convict labour power, was confronted with the problem of extracting labour use. In some respects this extraction was of greater importance in New South Wales than in Britain; it was a pioneer society dependent on a small, isolated and hostile workforce. In addition, while in some respects the state possessed greater power than private employers to demand labour effort, in others it was much less powerful. Labour could not be easily replaced or up­ graded while the state could not use dismissal and unemployment as a means of subduing its workforce.

8.3 Evaluation of hypotheses

In constructing and analysing the nature of the labour process in convict New South Wales this thesis has attempted to evaluate four specific hypotheses. The first hypothesis posed by this thesis was:

1) That the state (employer) control of the convict labour process was simple but extensive.

According to Richard Edwards the "Simple Model of Control" involved the direct and personal control of the labour process by individual employers. 17 The mechanisms of control they wielded were basic, "idiosyncratic and unsystematic". 18 These involved the employer or managers in personally directing the way work was performed; designing much of the work organisation and imposing discipline on an ad hoc and as needs basis. Characteristically labour effort was extracted more as an outcome of the personal control of the employer and by the basic mechanism of extending hours of work. 19 This simple control model was an elaboration of Marx's "Co-operation" stage

16 See Hartwell, R. M. "The Pastoral Ascendancy, 1820-1850" in Greenwood, G. (ed) (1968)Australia: a social and political history. Angus and Robertson. Sydney. pp. 57-58; and Turner, I. (1978) In Union is Strength. Thomas Nelson. Melbourne. pp. 16-19. 17 Edwards. op. cit. p. 17. 18 Ibid. pp 18-19 19 Ibid. p. 27. 243 of industrial development where the subordination of labour to capital was formal or basic rather than elaborate and "real".20 While the subordination of convict labour to the state would seem to be complete it was, in practice, formal or relative rather than comprehensive.21 In the labour process that can be discerned in the operation of government gangs, at the Lumber Yards and in the Female Factory at Parramatta the mode of control was not simple. In explaining this, an historical perspective is required because the labour process and its management varied over time. Before 1811 many concessions were made to the male convicts in the gangs and at the Lumber Yards which would indicate at least some greater complexity than that offered by the simple control model. On the other hand, there is no doubt that management's control of the labour process after 1811 was not simple. From 1811 until 1822 Governor Macquarie ( 1810-1821) constructed an elaborate administrative structure that endeavoured to make labour allocation rational and labour utilisation productive. These objectives required an increasingly sophisticated bureaucratic administration in order to rationalise and clarify hierarchical structures of authority and decision making. This bureaucracy also demanded greater measurement of work output and performance and demanded new levels of supervisory authority as well as greater numbers of supervisors. Macquarie also reshaped work organisation. He redesigned the convict gang system, creating new and larger gangs, while the activities of the Lumber Yards were considerably expanded. It is also evident that during Macquarie's administration new and more clearly delineated levels of managerial authority were established. In addition, new forms of motivational rewards were created to directly raise labour effort and productivity. In short, control of the labour process was not simple but was increasingly sophisticated and elaborate and that this system was consciously designed and constructed. Only in the area of the female convicts can this argument be challenged. In the case of the women at the Female Factory in Parramatta there is considerable evidence that Macquarie neglected or ignored control of the labour process. Whether this neglect is due to Macquarie's hostile and unforgiving opinion of the female convicts or was also because the women were too difficult to impose greater work control over is not easy to

20 See Marx. op. cit. p. 293 and pp. 305-317; and also Littler, C. (1982) The Development ofthe Labour Process in Capitalist Societies: a comparative study ofthe transformation ofwork organization in Britain, Japan and the USA. Gower. Aldershot.p. 23. 244 say. However the former reason is certainly well documented.Z2 On the other hand, while it is evident that Macquarie did not greatly alter the nature of the organisation of the work of the female convicts he did alter the nature of the female institution at Parramatta. After considerable criticism Macquarie built a new Factory in 1819 and this imposed greater control. The very design of the Factory, its layout and its functions addressed the question not only of female welfare but also control.23 Macquarie also imposed a more elaborate classification system on the women that offered the administration greater control in theory, if not in practice. In short, while Macquarie did not focus much of his attention upon the female convicts and so did not construct elaborate labour process controls, it is fair to say that his social control was probably greater than Edward's simple model. After 1822 the degree of control over the labour process of convicts employed by government dramatically increased although the motives for this were quite different to those of Macquarie. Both Governors Brisbane ( 1821-1825) and Darling ( 1825-1831) very significantly altered the organisation of convict work, created new levels of supervisory control, appointed more supervisors and imposed greater controls over them which increased accountability and the measurement of work performance. Darling was particularly innovative in this reform process. He very energetically restructured the whole administration of government through clearer departmentalisation, by designing more transparent levels of authority and responsibility and by professionalising the public service generally. However, he also confronted the fundamental and perennial problem of convict supervisors not only by increasing the degree of control and accountability under which they operated but also by addressing their motivational needs. By introducing a structured pay scale, career and promotional opportunities for the convict overseers within the bureaucracy of the convict system he created new and sophisticated incentives for them. For the gang workers an increase in Musters, in the greater measurement of work performance and an extension of the hours of work also reduced the capacity for these male convicts to vary their work effort. Although the intensification of punishment associated within gang labour is more than apparent these

21 Marx. op. cit. p. 313. 22 Historical Records ofAustralia Series I (hereafter referred to as HRA I) Vol. VII. Macquarie to Liverpool, 17 November 1812. p. 614; HRA I Vol. VIII. Macquarie to Bathurst, 7 October 1814. p. 312; HRA I Vol. IX, Macquarie to Bathurst, 4 April 1817. p. 353. 23 See Kerr, J.S. (1984) Design for Convicts: an account ofdesign for convict establishments in the Australian colonies during the transportation era. Library of Australian History. Sydney; and also Biernacki. op. cit. chapter 3. 245 other reforms belie the simplicity of Darling's control. Although his control became more brutal the subordination of the convict gang workers was not just formal but was also real. 24 The experience of the more skilled convict workers employed in the Lumber Yards contrasted with that of the gang convicts. Both Brisbane and Darling were given instructions from the British government to increase the assignment of convicts (including skilled ones) and to reduce the level of activity performed by these government enterprises. Both implemented this policy with the result that the Lumber Yard in Sydney was closed in 1832. In a sense control of the vast number of convicts (both skilled and unskilled) was transferred to private settlers via the increase in assignment. However, Brisbane held stronger views on the skilled convicts than did any other govemor.25 Thes.e views seem to have come from his awareness o~ the fact that skilled convicts (and also skilled free mechanics) had considerable bargaining power in the colonial economy. This power increased their wages and, just as importantly, increased their independence. As a consequence, Brisbane tried to use skilled convict workers in ways that were designed to reduce the advantages all skilled workers enjoyed in the labour market. He also urged the immigration of skilled free workers with the same motive: to impose greater control over the independence of skilled workers both convict and free. 26 The situation of the women at the Female Factory was essentially only addressed during the Darling years. Brisbane, like Macquarie before him, did little to regulate the lives of the female convicts. Indeed, Darling may also have had a similar intent but events at the Factory in 1826 prevented this and he became vigorous in his response. In 1826 Darling established a Board of Management for the Factory which met twice annually and produced a detailed written report. In addition to this on-going body of scrutiny other aspects of the organisation of its work were reformed in ways that increased management control. The administration of the Factory was dramatically reformed and restructured and was, along with the rest of the colonial bureaucracy, made more professional and career orientated. More obviously, the early classification system was made much more elaborate, the treatment of the females in each of the three . classes of prisoners was made more distinctive, investment in new work processes was

24 See Littler. op. cit. p. 23. 25 HRA I. Vol. XI. Brisbane to Bathurst, 17 January 1825. p. 472. 26 Ibid. 246 made and work and its supervision was re-organised. Most importantly, a new incentive system was introduced that offered the convict women a new and elaborate range of rewards. Control at the Factory increased but not in the ways defined by the simple model. The control constructed by Darling was complex and sophisticated and brought the management of the labour process at the Female Factory more into line with that evident in other areas of government employment of convict labour. Having established that management control of the convict labour process was not simple, the question remains as to what the nature of this control was. Ironically the theoretical paradigm which best explains the convict labour process is also found in the Edwards' argument. In his analysis of the historical development of capitalism in the United States of America he argues that the third stage is the Bureaucratic Model of

Control. He defines this as an e~aborate and impersonal system of controls which are "embedded in the social and organisational structure of the firm". 27 This system included rules of behaviour, hierarchies and categories of jobs and authority, job descriptions and duty statements and structures of discipline and reward that were consistently and impersonally implemented. By its nature bureaucratic control was more complex and far-reaching. It is argued in this thesis that the labour process controls over convict labour that are apparent from 1813 (if not earlier) until 1830 were bureaucratic rather than simple. The reason for the development of a bureaucratic model of control well in advance of Edwards' simple and technical models is explained by concern with labour effort until 1822 and with punishment after this time. For different reasons Governors Macquarie, Brisbane and Darling constructed elaborate and increasingly sophisticated mechanisms of labour process control. The simple model offered insufficient control over a labour force that had bargaining power and the ability to vary labour effort. On the other hand, there was no technical or technological imperative to make the second stage of capitalist development important.28 Finally, the military background of all the governors also added a bureaucratic imperative while the developmental role of the state was much more critical in New South Wales than in either Britain or ultimately the USA. In conclusion, the first hypothesis is not found. to be proved. While state control was extensive it was not by nature simple. On the contrary it was complex and sophisticated and can be better defined as a bureaucratic system of control.

27 Edwards. op. cit. p. 131.

247 3) That convict resistance to management control was largely covert, individual and unorganised but was significant:

There is evidence that convicts in the government gangs, in the Lumber Yards and at the Female Factory at Parramatta displayed covert, individual and unorganised acts of resistance. Although records of punishment in government employment are fragmented and incomplete for the period 1788-1830 there were numerous examples of convicts being punished for work related "offences".29 However while these sources indicate work offences were commonplace, there is little chance of now quantifying this other than for odd periods. Nevertheless it is probably true to say that the significance and type of convict resistance varied between the three types of labour. The gangs were clearly locations of individual and collective resistance and unrest.3° For example the theft of tools was a problem associated with the male convicts from the first days of white settlemene1 and remained so until around 1820.32 Theft of tools was largely an individual activity and in the early years of settlement was more likely to be an action of sabotage than it was in later years. Theft of tools was initially sabotage because it delayed and interfered with the performance ofwork.33 Further, in the early years there was little alternative use that could be made of the tools. In contrast, by the 1800s theft of tools would have had more to do with improving productivity in private work than it had with delaying government work. Although individual gang members resisted management's control of the labour process, the nature of gang work organisation also demanded a high degree of individual co-operation and interdependence. This collective characteristic of the gang work meant that covert action was as likely to be collective as individual. For example gangs had a reputation for minimising their work effort, despite and sometimes because

28 Ibid. p. 112. 29 AO Reel702 Vol. 4/1781 Report ofBoard ofManagement, Female Factory, October 1826; AO Reel 2278 Returns of Punishment of Female Convicts at Female Factory, Parramatta, July 1827 to June 1828; AO Reel2081 Vol. 4/2094. Return of Punishment of Female Prisoners at the Female Factory, Parramatta, January to June 1829; AO Reel2801 Bench of Magistrates, Parramatta. Proceedings, for some months 1820 and 1821; AO Reel593 Roll No. 6031 Returns of Gangs 1823, 1824 and 1825; and AO Reel590 Assignment and Employment of Convicts 1828-1830. 30 AO Reel593 Roll No. 6031 Returns of Gangs 1823, 1824 and 1825; and AO Reel590 Assignment and Employment of Convicts 1828-1830. 31 Moore, J. (1987) The First Fleet Marines. University of Queensland Press. St. Lucia. p. 134. 32 See Evidence by Major Druitt to Commissioner Bigge in Ritchie, J. (ed) (1971) The Evidence to the Bigge Reports. Vol1 Heinemann. Melbourne. p. 27. 248 of the overseers, but this covert action was not only individual in nature. The Hawk scam, whereby gangs appointed lookouts with secret signals, was a conscious and collective strategy for reducing work effort. Even in the construction of Busbys tunnel in the late 1820s and early 1830s, control over individual convicts was problematic. There is evidence to indicate that significant numbers of individual convicts came and went on this project although they probably did so with the knowledge or even connivance of their overseer and fellow workers. 34 In the Lumber Yards the actions associated with labour resistance seem to have been exclusively individual. Convicts concealed their skills or exaggerated them in order to reposition their individual allocation to work within the yards. This type of individual action was commonplace enough for the colonial administration to make

. strenuous efforts to quarantine newly arrived conv~cts from information about the local labour market.35 These efforts, although extensive, were not successful. The manipulation continued to such a degree that Commissioner Bigge was alarmed enough to recommend more stringent responses in 1822.36 Brisbane introduced these in the early years of his administration when he forced convict ships to anchor many kilometres from Sydney Cove.37 It is also likely that individual convict workers at the Lumber Yards minimised their work effort, for their productivity was calculated to be only two thirds of free mechanics.38 On the other hand the government's managers of the Yards generally seem to have found this level of performance acceptable.39 Some building gangs were an exception to this for Francis Greenway complained of the poor workmanship and low productivity of some engaged in his projects. He addressed this problem by taking a closer role in their supervision and offering more rewards.40 At the Female Factory in Parramatta the situation seems to have been considerably different. Work effort certainly seems to have been minimised and the administrative structure of the factory was unable to significantly affect this until its reform in 1826. Although Brisbane increased the number of supervisory staff at the

33 Moore. op. cit. p. 134. 34 Hirst, J. (1983) Convict Society and its Enemies. George Allen and Unwin. Sydney. pp. 66-69. 35 See Evidence of William Hutchinson to Commissioner Bigge in Bonwick Transcripts (BT) Box 1. 10 November 1819; and Druitt. op. cit. pp. 7 and 26. · 36 Bigge, J. T. (1822) Report ofthe Commissioner ofInquiry on the state ofthe Colony ofNew South Wales. Australiana Facsimile Edition 1971. Libraries Board of South Australia. Adelaide. pp. 156-157. 37 HRA I. Vol. XI. Brisbane to Bathurst, 14 May 1825. p. 572. 38 Druitt. op. cit. p. 25. 39 See Ibid; and Hutchinson. op. cit.; and also HRA I. Vol.XI. Brisbane to Horton, 16 June 1825. Enclosure No. 2. Major Ovens to Secretary Goulburn. pp. 650-660.

249 Factory between 1822 and 1825 and so narrowed the span of control, there is no evidence that this increased work effort.41 Only with the professionalisation of administration and supervision by Darling did management successfully increase work output.42 These controls were not, however, the only factors which encouraged greater individual effort. Part of Darling's reform agenda was the construction of more elaborate and generous rewards for the convict women as well as the investment in new and more diverse types ofwork. Lack of reliable data on punishment at the Factory also makes difficult any long-term measure of individual resistance to management controls. However, in the post 1826 period more detailed statistics are available and these indicate that individual women continued to resist. From 1826 to the early 1830s over 300 offences were punished annually at the Factory although these were not all for work related "~rimes". 43 All that can now be said is that despite the greater bureaucratic controls of the Darling administration, individual women continued to resist. In summary, the hypothesis is considered to have been proved. There certainly was covert, individual and unorganised action by convicts, both male and female. However, it does need to be pointed out that covert actions were not always individual but were also sometimes collective. In addition, while it seems more than evident that covert actions were widespread it is not possible now to meaningfully quantify their incidence. All government convicts had a reputation for minimising work effort but this seems to have been more visible amongst the unskilled males and the female convicts. The skilled males seem to have been more successful in disguising or obscuring their covert resistance or actions. Alternatively they may have simply worked harder. The difference between the skilled and unskilled convicts in these respects may also reflect the fact skilled workers were better able to work and act individually while the less skilled were required to operate more collectively. Certainly the skilled convict worker was viewed as special, more valuable and therefore given more concessions.44 Andrew Friedman argues that management will often distinguish between the value and importance of workers and design different strategies to manage them.

40 See Bigge. op. cit. pp.31-32. 41 See Tables 7.3, 7.4, 7.5 and 7.6 in Chapter 7 above; and CO 2011118 Reell06 and AO Reel2081 Vol 2/855. 42 See Ibid in Chapter 7 above. 43 See AO Reel 702 Vol. 411781 Report of Board ofManagement, Female Factory, October 1826; AO Reel 2278 Returns of Punishment of Female Convicts at Female Factory, Parramatta, July 1827 to June 1828; and AO Reel2081 Vol. 4/2094. Return of Punishment of Female Prisoners at the Female Factory, Parramatta, January to June 1829. 44 Hutchinson. BT. Box 1. p. 39773. 250 According to Friedman the two strategies used by management are "Responsible Autonomy" and "Direct Control".45 Skilled workers, for example, were more likely to operate under responsible autonomy. That is, management delegated a greater degree of discretion to skilled workers and so the pattern of their resistance is likely to have been different to unskilled workers who were more acutely controlled by direct controls and supervision. Michael Burawoy argues that another variable in the degree of conflict will be the level of consent given by workers to management.46 Management, in other words, can consciously create acceptance of its control through elaborate rewards and incentives. Again this perspective has some relevance because the skilled workers had a greater chance of distinguishing themselves as individuals than unskilled gang labourers. The only problem with this speculation is the incidence and variability of rewards offered by the convict system. In many respects there is little to indicate that skilled workers were given greater rewards than others. Certainly they did not receive greater rations or extra money. On the other hand they might have been able to maintain a more independent life-style,47 were more likely to be employed at interesting work and perhaps would have had greater mobility. An example of this was the sawyers at the Lumber Yard in Sydney who acquiesced with the increase in their Task Work in 1817 while the sawyers at Pennant Hills went on strike.48 Staying in Sydney would have been a strong inducement to conform to management controls.

3) That there were isolated examples of overt, individual and collective resistance to state control of the labour process:

It is evident that there were examples of acts of overt individual and collective resistance. Many of the convicts punished for neglect of work or refusing to work, were disciplined because they openly refused the commands of their overseers.49 However, amongst the gangs there is also evidence of some incidences of overt collective actions.

45 Friedman, A. (1978) Industry and Labour: class struggle at work and monopoly capitalism. Macmillan. London. pp. 6-7. 46 Burawoy, M. (1979) Manufacturing Consent: changes in the labour process under monopoly capitalism. University of Chicago Press. Chicago. p. 27. 47 For instance outside the Prisoner Barracks in Hyde Park, Sydney. See Hutchinson. BT 1. op. cit. pp. 39775-39778. 48 Druitt. op. cit. p. 34. 49 See AO Reel2801 Bench of Magistrates, Parramatta. Proceedings, for some months 1820 and 1821;AO Reel593 Roll No. 6031 Returns of Gangs 1823, 1824 and 1825; and AO Reel590 Assignment and Employment of Convicts 1828-1830. 251 For example, the sawyer gangs at Hawkesbury in the late 1790s were clearly able to assert themselves collectively in the setting and maintenance of their Task Work.50 Putting a stop to this practice required considerable effort from Governor Hunter. In about 1817 the Pennant Hills sawyers were also engaged in overt collective action when they withdrew their labour "for two or three weeks". 51 They did this in protest over the increase in their Task Work and a change in their rations. Three years later the sawyer gangs still had a negative reputation amongst senior management. Although Druitt does not detail the incidents that led to him claiming he had more trouble with the sawyers than any other gang labour, clearly they had continued to articulate a collective and even overt hostility. 52 On the other hand, there is no evidence to indicate that there was ever any overt collective resistance by convicts employed in the Lumber Yards. Individual acts of punishment were meted out but no collective activity was recorded against this workforce. This stood in sharp contrast to the women at the Female Factory at Parramatta. Although there is no evidence of concerted activity before the mid 1820s this may reflect either poor record keeping (which was certainly possible under Macquarie )53 or that the women did not need to engage in overt collective action. Workers will not display overt action if their collective or individual needs or demands can be met by simpler and more covert actions. However, after 1826 (admittedly when official record keeping had improved) the incidence of overt actions, both individual and collective, were highly visible. 54 Many of the punishments handed out to female convicts after 1826 were for individual, but open acts of resistance, and were both work and non-work related.55 More significantly, the willingness of the female convicts to engage in overt action seems to have been greater than amongst the males. There are more instances of collective riots, of acts of resistance, of demonstrations of hostility to official policy, of acts of solidarity with groups of women and even the withdrawal of labour at the Factory than among the male convicts. 56

50 HRA I. Vol. II Government Order, 15 May 1798. p. 214. 51 Druitt. op. cit. p. 34. 52 Ibid. p. 37. 53 HRA I Vol. VII. Bathurst to Macquarie, 23 November 1812. pp. 668-669. Bathurst included a pro­ forma for Macquarie, which had been designed by Robert Peel. 54 See AO 702, Report of Board of Management October 1826; and AO 2278 Returns of Punishment at the Female Factory, Parramatta, 1827-1828. 55 Ibid. 56 This higher incidence of resistance is also evident at the Female factories at Hobart and Launceston. See Daniels, K. (1998) Convict Women. Allen and Unwin. Sydney. pp. 134-156. 252 On the whole, acts of overt collective action were not numerous but, given the coercive nature of transportation, that there was any is highly significant. It would seem that unskilled male convicts and most skilled males did not or could not sustain open acts of resistance. The skilled sawyers were exceptional but their willingness or at least reputation for collective action was very consistent until the mid 1820s. In this way the third hypothesis is proved correct for the male convicts: there were isolated examples of overt individual and collective actions. On the other hand the militancy of the females at Parramatta (and elsewhere) was even more consistent. Although not all the actions of the women were work related but often merely displayed an overt hostility to the convict system, the frequency and visibility of the females' actions is highly significant. The direct controls developed by colonial administrations were sufficient to suppress most overt resistance amongst the males, but were insufficient in the case of the women. Indeed, the openness and incidence of female resistance, both collective and individual, seem to have increased even after the administrative reforms of Darling and his increasing bureaucratisation of the Factory. In this respect the third hypothesis understates the actions of the women after the Macquarie administration.

4) That on occasions convict resistance yielded positive results in that labour controls were modified, relaxed or rewards increased.

Having tried to quantify or assess the incidence of convict resistance in a number of ways the final hypothesis addresses the success or influence of convict resistance. In many respects this analysis makes greater sense of the previous two hypotheses as it begins to better link the tactics of resistance with their results. In doing this the analysis will focus on the issues of: labour allocation; work effort; supervision and collusion between overseers and convict workers; and labour mobility. In examining these issues it is also necessary to more clearly delineate the time periods within the years examined by this thesis. Although 1822 can be seen as the most critical watershed in the history of the convict system because of the shift in administrative initiative and policy that . occurred after this time, the period from 1788 to 1811 should also be noted. In this first period key issues were resolved in ways that were to influence the custom and practice of the convict system in later years. The shortage of food and of labour meant that convicts managed to extract significant concessions from colonial managers. The most notable of these concessions 253 was the restriction of hours of work and the sanctioning of private, non-government work time. Despite the efforts of Governors Hunter and King to extend hours of work or to improve the regularity of start and finish times, government gangs often finished their labours in the mid-afternoon. 57 Another concession arose from the setting of Task Work. 58 In the early years of settlement convicts were involved in direct negotiations with the Governor and other senior managers in order to set Task Work quantities.59 It even seems that in the case of the Hawkesbury sawyers they set their own Task Work and that senior administrators accepted this. 60 The allocation of labour during these years was also inefficient given that few occupational details were sent with convict fleets or transports and there is evidence that convicts took advantage of this situation.61 Finally, a shortage of overseers raised problems over the effectiveness of their control and the quality of their supervision. Convict overseers had a very wide span of control to contend with, their skill at work was sometimes suspect, while their motivation was distrusted. Although the mechanisms of control in this period were basic and can be viewed as "simple" they were not direct or powerful in the ways the Edwards' model defines them. Indeed, the character of the early labour process controls possessed by management reflects its lack of control rather than its simplicity. In contrast, many of the administrative reforms made by governors after Bligh were essentially in response to the paucity of management controls over the labour process. This lack of control also explains the lack of evidence of an endemic hostility to official control of work during these years. Convict workers had little reason to resist such weak managerial prerogatives in overt and collective ways. In the period 1811 to 1822 the administrative developments made by Macquarie dramatically transformed the control of the labour process. While many changes were introduced as a result of Macquarie's ambitions to develop the infrastructure of the colony, it is also apparent that other changes were in response to convict struggle with management over control issues. For example, the continued manipulation of labour

57 Shaw. op. cit. pp. 71-72. 58 Robbins, B. "Contested Terrain: The Convict Task Work System, 1788-1830" in Markey, R. ( ed) (2001) Labour and Community: historical essays. University ofWollongong Press. Wollongong. pp. 33- 50. 59 See Tench, W. (1789) Sydney's First Four Years. 1961 Facsimile Edition. Angus and Robertson. Sydney. pp.249-250; and Hunter, Cpt. John. (1793) An Historical Journa/1787-1792. Facsimile Edition 1968.Angus and Robertson and Royal Australian Historical Society. Sydney. pp. 231-232. 60 HRA I Vol. II. Government Order, 30 October 1798. p. 359. 61 See Druitt. op. cit. pp. 7 and 26. 254 allocation by convicts was such a problem during the Macquarie administration that management was forced to adopt a range of complex responses. These included demanding more official occupational information on each convict transported, interviewing convicts and ships' officers as well as attempting to quarantine transports. 62 Commissioner Bigge still found evidence of this abuse during his inquiry in 1819 and was sufficiently alarmed by them to recommend even more stringent measures. Attempts to increase labour effort also reflect the stridency of convict resistance to colonial management. As already stated, in the early years of settlement convicts were often consulted or negotiated with over the level of Task Work for some jobs. Ultimately Governor King set these in a Government Order in 1801.63 Although this can

be seen as a form of management. control of the labour process it is interesting that th~se amounts were not significantly increased during the Macquarie administration. The importance of the stability of Task Work is made more important by the fact that Macquarie did not like it as a system of work regulation. 64 In some of the instances where Macquarie increased Task Work convicts resisted or, more importantly, managed to continue to withhold labour effort. So, although the state quantified convict work effort this was a minimum rather than maximum level and could not in any case be easily increased. Before 1822 the state was unable to increase work effort by increasing hours of work or it was unwilling to confront the widespread resistance that might have resulted. Clearly custom and practice was important and the ability of convicts to resist management was considered real. Other strategies adopted by management to increase work effort included changes to supervision. Under Macquarie attempts were made to better select convict overseers using such criterion as good behaviour and work competence rather than simply willingness. However, the main initiative taken by Macquarie was to increase the number of supervisors. In doing this he also increased the type of supervisors so that a hierarchy of positions was created. The expansion in the number of supervisors began to decrease the span of control and in this way supervision became more intensive. However, Macquarie was limited in the range of rewards he could offer overseers and his reliance on the assignment of provisioned and unprovisioned convict workers was

62 See/bid. 63 HRA I. Vol. III. Government Order, 10 March 1801. p. 37. 64 Bigge. op. cit. pp. 29-32. 255 later seen by Bigge as creating a conflict of interest amongst the convict overseers. 65 In any respect, it was also clear that convict workers and their overseers, particularly in the gangs, commonly colluded either to pursue private business interests, to minimise work effort through elaborate schemes like the Hawk or to embezzle rations. Macquarie addressed these abuses by inspections and musters or by increasing the accountability of gang overseers through more elaborate work performance measures. However, collusion between supervisors and the supervised was not satisfactorily resolved by these initiatives, highlighting the effectiveness of convict resistance to management controls. Macquarie also addressed the question of manufacturing consent amongst his convict workers by increasing the range and attractiveness of his reward system. Under Macquarie Pardons, Conditional Pardons ap.d, in particular, the Ticket of Leave were used as rewards for increasing numbers of well behaved convict workers. Good behaviour was often explicitly related to work performance. During his administration Macquarie may also have reduced the impact of such negative incentives as flogging. The construction of the Prisoner Barracks in Sydney and the Female Factory at Parramatta were also elaborate attempts to address the problem of convict mobility . within the settled urban areas. Having failed to significantly increase Task Work, Macquarie tried to increase hours of public labour for gang convicts by placing them in the Barrack. This institution provided free lodging, cooked food and laundry facilities for inmates and so reduced their need to have free or private working time. However, even in this Macquarie's efforts were only partially successful, for his managers had great difficulty in attracting old convicts into the Barrack.66 Instead, it was filled with those under punishment and with new arrivals who had little experience of the freedoms and independence offered by private accommodation in such areas as the Rocks.67 The construction of a purpose built Female Factory at Parramatta can also be seen as an elaborate control mechanism.68 The Factory was intended to sweep Parramatta clear of convict women living independently, but like the males, many were reluctant to enter it. The introduction of a new classification system and aspects of the design of the building itself were also intended to increase control of the female convicts. However, the new Factory and its organization seem to have had less impact than the Barracks had on the

65 Ibid. pp. 54-55 and pp. 58-59. 66 Hutchinson. BT 1. op. cit. p. 399776. 67 See Ibid. p. 39790; and Karskens, G. (1997) The Rocks. Melbourne University Press. Melbourne. 256 men. Productivity did not increase while no greater degree of control or female acquiescence is now apparent. The reasons for this include the attitudes of the women themselves although the main reason was probably Macquarie's half-heartedness. There is no doubt that his administration neglected the female convicts although this may not have been to the disadvantage of the women. In 1822 Governor Brisbane began the first successful attack on convict bargaining power. He re-organised the gang system, made supervisory positions more attractive through the adoption of monetary rewards and incentives, increased supervisory accountability by the creation of new levels of supervisory staff and by the more careful measurement of work performance. His reform of supervision also reduced the span of control, particularly in his new Clearing Gangs. 69 The new forms of public wqrk created by Brisbane reduced the ability of convicts and supervisors to collude over work performance while stricter musters and better control of gang personnel reduced the opportunity for collusion over the embezzlement of rations. In this way stronger divisions between convict workers and their convict supervisors were created. The fine­ tuning of this division was completed by Governor Darling after 1826 when he dramatically increased the number of supervisory staff within the convict system. This expansion complemented his reorganisation of public work generally and very significantly decreased the span of control. But, more than mere expansion, Darling also re-organised the position of convict overseer into four distinct and formal levels of authority, accountability and status.70 By offering greater monetary and status incentives and by creating a career and promotional hierarchy for convict overseers, he shifted his concern from manufacturing consent amongst convicts generally to one that largely addressed the commitment of overseers. They became a more distinguished class of convict and were given greater reward for their acquiescence with the convict system. Of course, this is not to say they were more trusted.71 Darling also dramatically increased the level of scrutiny and accountability imposed on the convict overseer. New managerial positions were created for free and increasingly careerist public servants whose responsibility was focused on generating more elaborate work performance measures. Under Darling punishment of male convicts became fiercer and for female

68 See Kerr. op. cit.; and Biernacki. op. cit. chapter 3. 69 HRA I. Vol. XL Brisbane to Bathurst, July 1824. pp. 323-326; the span of control ratio of 1:23 was established for the Clearing Gangs. 70 HRA I Vol. XII. Government Order, 31 May 1826. p. 366. 71 For example Darling removed convicts ftom clerical positions. 257 convicts more systematic and consistent. These measures, however, were less concerned with maximising labour effort and were more concerned with imposing regularity and constancy on convict labour, particularly the labour of the gangs. This objective is also apparent from his contrasting attitude to the skilled convict enterprises of the Lumber Yards. Although he also decreased the span of control and increased the hours of work at these workplaces his real initiatives were firstly to curtail their activities and secondly to abolish them. Darling's motive in the abolition of the Lumber Yards was mostly at the instigation of the British government but it may also have reflected an appreciation of the inherent difficulties in controlling a skilled workforce. At the Female Factory Darling also dramatically increased his level of control by re-organising not only the work, supervision and worker reward systems but also by restructuring the administration of it so that its bureaucracy b~came more professional, accountable and effective. Not only did this improve the operation of the Factory in terms of work output but it also reduced the incidence of collusion between the supervised and their supervisors. However, the gains made by Darling in increasing managerial control were perhaps less obvious at the Female Factory than in any other government convict workplace. The new controls imposed at the Factory did not reduce the level of either covert or overt resistance by the women. Indeed, it may have increased. After 1826 the women at the Parramatta Factory continue to display vigorous collective hostility to the new system whereas, in contrast, the males in gang work were increasingly forced into taking covert individual action. Governor Darling endeavoured to confront the custom and practice of convict workers by the creation of new and more complex control mechanisms. He needed to do this because the convicts had been successful in modifying or circumventing government controls in the past. The mobility of convict labour was also a problem that Darling confronted. Under Macquarie employment in the public sector was seen as an attractive alternative to assignment. Male convicts felt little or no disincentive to engineer their return from private assignment to public employment. The incentives within public employment were usually more consistent, the opportunities to restrict work effort or to collude with overseers were more apparent, while most government work was located in the much more attractive urban settlements of Sydney and Parramatta. The existence of a public sector premised on the need for productivity and an acceptable minimum of labour effort offered convict workers an alternative to employment through assignment and so created a level of labour mobility that was 258 anathema to Commissioner Bigge.72 Darling's attack on public employment therefore, can be seen as an attack on labour mobility. It was also, as a consequence, a state endorsed mechanism for increasing the management control of private settlers. The existence, indeed the threat, of employment in an unattractive public sector meant that private settlers had greater authority over their convict assignees. The state made more resonant the commands of private employers. In contrast, however, the same cannot be said for the Female Factory. Despite Darling's reforms the threat of employment within it did not act as a disincentive to female convicts. Private settlers still continued to experience difficulty with controlling the labour of female assignees because, according to some, the Factory was not a place that was sufficiently feared. 73 To some women the Factory remained an asylum while the degree of collective solidarity that existed between its inmates offered a degree of protection against the new bureaucracy.74 Further, although Darling managed to increase output at the Factory, to increase labour effort, he achieved this by offering greater incentives to the women than they had ever been given in the past.75 Indeed, these incentives may have been more attractive than those offered by private assignment while the social cohesion of the convict women may have offered attractive non­ pecuniary benefits. In summary, it is argued that this hypothesis, with some significant qualifications, is proved.

8.4 Conclusion

According Edwards, and indeed even Marx, the model of control wielded by managers of convict labour in New South Wales should have been a cruder version of the simple control model. However, from the case studies examined in this thesis there is little evidence that a simple model of management control operated between 1788 and 1830. The methods by which work was organised and labour effort extracted were considerably more complex and sophisticated. Indeed even superficially there was little evidence that until 1822 work was overly intensive. Convicts did not work long hours, they were able to very effectively restrict their work output not just informally but

72 Bigge. op. cit. p. 56, 73 Damousi, J. ( 1997) Depraved and Disorderly: female convicts, sexuality and gender in colonial Australia. Cambridge University Press. Melbourne. 74 See Daniels. op. cit. Chapter 6. 75 AO Reel 702 Vol. 4/1791. Report of Board of Inquiry, 1826. 259 through the operation of Task Work, an official system of quantifying a minimum but acceptable level of work output. The gang convicts were not always under the constant or close scrutiny of their supervisors because they were often in a position to collude with them. Equally, they were not powerless in influencing their allocation to particular jobs and enjoyed some mobility between private and public employment. The convicts of New South Wales lost control of their labour power but they retained a considerable degree of control over their labour use. Convicts won or maintained these concessions in the period from 1788 to 1822 largely through covert and individual actions. They did sometimes use collective action but this was more often covert than overt. Like most free workers, the convicts took advantage of a shortage of labour during much of this time period. An analysis of Macquarie's administration of the government gangs and the Lumber Yards indicates very clearly many facets of a bureaucratic structure of control. He organised the gangs and the Yards in order to improve labour effort - a rational economic objective. He increased supervision and began the process of improving their co-ordination and accountability. For senior managers there is evidence that he wrote and constructed detailed job instructions that even now must be viewed as reasonably complex job descriptions. 76 The gangs and the Lumber Yard workers were all subjected to more impartial attempts to measure their output and performance. Indeed surviving Lumber Yard weekly and monthly work reports measure work performance, record tool and equipment usage as well as the quantity of raw and finished materials. Macquarie also addressed the problem of incentives with elaborate and innovative policies. For example, he reduced or at least standardised the amount of corporal punishment that could be inflicted on convicts and understood some of the limitations associated with a purely punitive approach. More importantly, he introduced one of the most elaborate incentive systems in the colony's convict history with the innovative use of Tickets of Leave and Pardons as rewards for work-related behaviour.77 He complemented this rational-generosity with a forgiving humanitarianism that promised convicts a society in which they, their sentences served or remitted for good behaviour, could make a new, untainted start. 78 Of course, his generosity in both these incentive schemes was loudly

76 HRA I. Vol. VII. Macquarie to Bathurst, 28 June 1813. Enclosure No. 6. pp. 745-748. 77 See HRA I. Vol.VIII. Macquarie to Bathurst, 7 October 1814. pp. 314-315; and Clark (1985) op. cit. p. 279 for an account of how Macquarie gave the gang of convict road makers under William Cox pardons for building the road across the Blue Mountains. 78 See Bigge. op. cit. p. 15 for an account ofMacquarie's ''New Men" speech to newly arrived convicts. 260 condemned by Exclusives, like Samuel Marsden, who held the view convicts could never be forgiven for their crimes.79 In more practical terms Macquarie also tried to make the rewards for supervisors and managers more attractive and standardised, although the obvious use of monetary rewards was considered but deemed unfordable.80 He attempted to rationally allocate convict labour to occupations best suited to their skills, background or social status and he tried, if crudely (by modem standards), to measure and monitor labour productivity. In terms of the female convicts Macquarie's energies are much less apparent. He clearly did neglect the development of their work, leaving most in the Female Factory largely under employed. However, even more revealing was the absence at the Factory of the elaborate labour process controls and policies so apparent in the management of the work of the male convicts. Although work was conducted at .the Factory it was carried out in much the same manner as Governor King had established in the early 1800s. Only toward the end of his administration, and even then under the shadow of his critics, did Macquarie begin to address the management of the female convicts. As a consequence, he built the new Factory and introduced a rudimentary scheme for the classification of the women. In a sense both these innovations really just reflected his poor attitude toward the women and his desire simply to hide them away behind stone walls. 81 It is useful, at this point, to highlight the contribution of Commissioner Bigge to the labour process development of colonial New South Wales. The Bigge report was written by an astute, if partial, analyst of the colony and, while he addressed many social and economic issues,82 the one of most interest here and which has been largely overlooked by historians, was that dealing with the management of work. This was no minor concern of Bigge. He was vitally interested in how the convicts were managed at work because the work experience was considered an integral component of transportation and punishment. As a consequence, it is argued here that the Bigge report needs to analysed as a management document as well as a social and judicial analysis of colonial society. Commissioner Bigge carefully examined the size of the government workforce, its distribution, its organisation, its composition in terms of skill, the degree

79 Evidence of Samuel Marsden to Commissioner Bigge in Ritchie, J. ( ed) ( 1971) The Written Evidence to the Bigge Reports. Vol2 Heinemann. Melbourne. pp. 92-94. 80 Druitt. op. cit. p. 3. 81 HRA I. Vol. IX. Macquarie to Bathurst. 4 April1817. p. 353. 82 See Ritchie. J. (1970) Punishment and Profit. Heinemann. Melbourne. 261 and effectiveness of supervision, the incentive system in place, and the level of productivity as well as its cost. To dismiss Bigge because he was so critical of all that he viewed is to miss much of the value ofhis analysis. However biased Bigge may have been by the objectives and brief he was given by the British government, he was nevertheless often accurate, if not always fair, in what he reported. The conflict between Bigge and Macquarie has been perceptively viewed as a clash between two development theories or blueprints83 but this does not make Bigge irrelevant or without insight. Bigge essentially argued that the work regime of public employment was too lenient, the government's workforce too big and costly and the control over the convict workers ineffective. It is hard to say now whether Macquarie's control of the labour process was ineffective but efficiency is not, in any case, a criteria in defining the bureaucratic model of control. 84 In addition, Bigge believed work to be ine(fectively managed because he saw convict workers with independence of mind and mobility, key concerns of contemporary managers of private industry in Britain. 85 He also railed against a punishment regime in which convicts earned significant amounts of money and cost the British government even more. On top of all this the convicts did not produce as much as free workers while their supervisors were corrupt and of bad character. Bigge was reacting to the paucity of management control and to the low level of work intensity. The importance of Bigge is twofold; firstly, he produced a detailed, if critical, account of many features of the colonial labour process and, secondly, his recommendations were closely used by subsequent governors as a blueprint for action. These have already been detailed in the account of the administrations of Brisbane and Darling but the point that needs stressing is that Bigge did not recommend the construction of a simple model of control. Consequently, analysis of the labour process controls developed by these two governors indicates a change in objective and methods but not in form. Indeed the controls imposed by Darling in particular, remained highly bureaucratic. Darling further stratified the colonial hierarchies of control with the

83 Dyster, B. "Public Employment and Assignment to Private Masters, 1788-1821" in Nicholas, S ( ed) (1989) Convict Workers: reinterpreting Australia's past. Cambridge University Press. Melboume.pp.128 and 134. 84 Efficiency is clearly a concern or motive in the development of the bureaucratic model but measurement of it remains problematic. 85 See Marglin, S. "What do Bosses Do?: the origins and functions of Hierarchy in Capitalist Production" in Gorz, A. (Ed) (1978) The Division ofLabour: the labour process and class-struggle in modern capitalism. The Harvester Press. London. 262 appointment ofnew levels ofprofessional managers and with the creation of new grades or classes of convict supervisors. The pay scales for these managers and supervisors were also more elaborate and generous. In addition to these new incentives also went new duties, or highly expanded versions of previous duties. All supervisory staff, both free and convict, were held more accountable by the design of new and more complex work reports. These provided even greater detail on work performance than those introduced by Macquarie. Similarly, however brutal the gangs became under Darling they were made so not on the basis of whim, idiosyncrasy or psychopathology. The organisation of the work gangs and the nature and location of their work was part of a wider and more elaborate strategy in the colonial labour process. The gangs were not required to be productive in a rational economic sense but to contribute a complex deterrent to all convicts at all times. 86 Although Governor Darling was no longer concerned with manufacturing consent in any humanitarian sense, he nevertheless needed a sophisticated bureaucracy to construct the desired level of fearful compliance. With Governor Darling the state's control of the labour process was dramatically increased through his construction of an elaborate bureaucracy. Although this bureaucratic control relied on more physical punishment than the Edwards' model, it nevertheless shared most of its other features. The only other difference was a minor one. According to Edwards the modern bureaucratic organisation "demands the worker's soul"87 where as Darling, unlike Macquarie, displayed no interest in souls. He sought physical rather than spiritual domination and in this terrestrial objective he was certainly successful with the males. The capacity of the male convicts to sustain resistance was severely restricted by the bureaucratic controls introduced by Darling. On the other hand the female convicts were not subdued. Although Darling radically altered the administrative structure and character of work organisation and performance at the Factory, these changes did not silence the female convicts. Indeed, it is amongst the women that the origins of key Australian working class attitudes and values are most obviously apparent. They were deeply disrespectful of authority; they were militant in both an individual and collective sense and often displayed a sense of solidarity with one another or with their leaders. They were also skilled in the craft of mocking officialdom. Although they were once described as the mothers of "charming

86 And indeed to deter free workers in Britain as well. 87 Edwards. op. cit. p. 23. 263 children"88 when viewed as workers the women can now also be regarded as the mothers ofmilitancy.89

88 HRA I Vol. II. Hunter to Portland, 20 June 1797. p. 24. 89 Robbins, Bill "Mothers ofMilitancy: some reflections on the female convicts 1788-1830" in Kelly, D. (ed) (2001) Crossing Borders: employment, work, markets and social justice across time, discipline and place. Vol. 1. Conference Papers from 15th. Annual Conference of the Association of Industrial Relations Academics of Australia and New Zealand. Wollongong. pp. 284-291. 264 BIBLIOGRAPHY

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