NATIONS UNIES UNITED NATIONS HAUT COMMISSARIAT IGH COMMISSIONER POUR LES REFUGIES FOR REFUGEES
Case Posiale 25OO CH-1211 Geneve 2 Depot ULU W fl FEB20 FACSIMILE MESSAGE GENERAL To: Destination fax number: Mr. S. Iqbat Riza 001.212.963.3826 Chef de Cabinet Executive Office of the Secretary-General From: Return fax number: 739.7346 Ruud Lubbers 7e// (022) 739.8254 Email: saunderm@unhcr,ch Date: 2O February 2OO1 No. of pages including this page: 7O
File code: hem
Subject: Letter to the Secretary-General
I would be grateful if you could share the attached with the Secretary-General:
1. Letter to the Secretary-General 2. Draft letter to the President of the Security Council 3. Letter to the former President of the Security Council (Ambassador Mahbubani of Singapore) 4. Relation between UNHCR's plan on Safe Access etc, and ECOWAS 5. Action Plan on RUF.
I look forward to receiving the Secretary-General's comments. Best regards.
HSIH-HDHNII Ci 6CZ ZZ If XVd CT>:?T ffill TO, ZQ/OZ NATIONS UNIES UNITED NATIONS LEHAUT COMM1SSA1RE THE HIGH COMMISSIONER POUR LE5 FOR REFUGEES
Case Ftestato 2500 CH-1211 Genovo 2 Dcpfil Suisse
19 February 2001
EXECUTIVE OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY-GENERAL Pear Mr. Secretary-General,
_Ypu win find herewith enclosed a draft of my letter to the President of the Security Council. I could, of course, also communicate this information to the Security Council in a different form such as a report should you prefer. The President of the Security Council asked me to come and brief the Security Council and answer questions. The draft letter is also meant for this purpose.
Before leaving the area, I formalized my proposal to RUF (see enclosed Action Plan of RUF). I also presented to President Konare of Mali, in his capacity as Chair of ECOWAS a document entitled "Relation between UNHCR's plan on Safe Access, etc. and ECOWAS" (enclosed as] Annex). I seek your guidance as to whether to share this information only with vo» nr tn annex it| as well as to the letter to the President of the Security Council.
Finally, I would like to inform you that since my understanding with the authorities of Guinea, the f refugees in the Languette are not any longer totally isolated. In a prudent and cautious manner, limited quantities of food were brought in (although it is still very difficult) and there is a modest flow of refugees (approximately 500 today) who, no longer hampered by the Guinean army, take the risk to flee from Laaguette to Nvaedou. As Iqbal Riza was informed, I am available to speak about all of this by telephone and I seek your guidance before finalizing the letter to the President of the Security Council. Yours sincerely,
Ruud Lubbers
Mr. Kofi A. Annan Secretary-General United Nations Headquarters New York
COOg) H3NOISSIKHOO H9IH-HOHNT1 cz eci zz anx TO, zo/oz NATIONS UN1ES WH-W61imV& UNITED NATIONS LE HAUT COMM1SSAIRE Sfi^^^ir T^ HIGH COMMISSIONER POUR LES REFUGlfc ^g Caea Poelale 2500 ™na-*»2 20 February 2001 Sir, Upon my return from Guinea, Sierra Leone, Liberia. Ivory Coast and Mali (10-18 February 2001X I would like to share with you the findings and results of my mission. My focus was naturally on the current refugee crisis in West Africa. In this regard, I should like to refer to my briefing to the Security Council on 9 January 2001 and my letter of 17 January to His Excellency Ambassador Kishore Mahbubani of Singapore, then President of the Security Council, regarding the situation in Guinea. (A copy is attached herewith for ease of reference.) Subsequently, the situation of refugees and internally displaced people in the region deteriorated substantially. A series of rebel attacks in southeastern Guinea, particularly in the UNHCR received reports on a number of occasions that thq Guinean Army did not allow refugees to leave the Languette region. Similarly, nearly 35,000 refugees were blocked in Nyaedou situated between Gueckddou and Kissidougou. UNHCR vehicles and other humanitarian provisions were also requisitioned by the military. In addition, the large number of refugees coupled with the deteriorating security environment in Guinea led to increase in tensions with the local population. I Cases of harassment were repotted and the free movement of refugees toward Conakry and other safer places became more difficult. In view of these developments, upon my arrival in Guinea on 11 February, I placed a high priority / on restoring good and effective relations with the Government of the Republic of Guinea and its I military. In a war-like situation in southeastern Guinea, I noted that two senior military officers had replaced the civilian prfefets of Kissidougou. We agreed with the authorities on establishing a focal point to facilitate our contacts and communication on security matters. The main responsibility of the focal point arrangement will be to alert humanitarian agencies on issues pertaining to security in the region and also on other incidents such as the requisitioning of UNHCR vehicles. His Excellency Mr, Said Ben Mustapha Ambassador and Permanent Representative of Tunisia President of the United Nations Security Council H3NOISSIHKOD HSIH-HOHKU1 9fr CZ, 6Ci ZZ Tfc TVd W-Vl 301-10, ZO/OZ DRAFT T found that improvements to safeguard the physical protection of refugees were much needed. I / addressed this point with the Guinean civilian and military authorities by agreeing upon the I necessity of ensuring "safe access to" and the "safe passage oP refugees, along with any measures required to implement these principles. While we agreed upon these principles for the entire '// country, implementation is to begin with the establishment: of safe passage along the mam road " between Gueckedou and Kissidougou and the route leading to Conakry. The agreement also secures passage to refugee camps near the mam road, such as the new Albadaria site. The next step will be to gain access the Languette region. With the rainy season about to begin, Argent action is needed to remedy the situation. My consultations with the Guinean authorities made clear that they would be prepared to cooperate in ensuring access to the Languette and'tbe safe passage Of refugees northward. They shared their concern that bringing food and Other humanitarian assistance into that area risked attracting the attention of rebel groups and, thus, undermining the prospects for. safe passage out. The ability of the RUF to reach the area obviously was a consideration in their thinking. The Government also emphasized that, given the sizable f] number of refugees, not only relocation inside Guinea but also return to Sierra Leone needed to be|| considered and pursued. • These two points were high on my agenda when I arrived in Freetown on 13 February. Following my meetings with UNAMSIL. the President of Sierra Leone and government authorities, I had assurances that an agreement on basic principles of safe access and passage was possible—for Sierra Leone, the option of safe passage - or opening a humanitarian corridor - was more relevant. President Kabbah agreed that TJNAMSIL and the UN Contact Group could initiate discussions with the RUF leading to the establishment of conditions for the safe passage of refugees returning to Sierra Leone. The initiative to open a corridor for refugees and to reach an agreement on the basic principles matched perfectly with the need to improve relations with the RUF and bring greater stability, as mentioned by SRSG Adeniji in his briefing to tie Security Council on 14 February. I should add that the efforts of the Contact Group to establish conditions for safe passage must nor I only involve Sierra Leone, but Guinea as well. The ongoing consultations regarding the hand-over' of control over the Forecarlah-Kambia road from RUF to UNAMSIL - and, consequently, the establishment of a safe passage - can only become a reality if Guinea also cooperates with thelj initiative. During my mission, I received reports of the Guinean Army shelling the area. At the| same time, a request that the Government of Guinea cooperate in these efforts will be more realistic} and productive if the RUF commits itself to refraining from military actions on the Gt territory and condemns all actions that violate the agreed principles. For this reason, during my stay in Sierra Leone, I decided to seek the active support not only of President Kabbah, but also of the RUF through the intermediary of the Contact Group. During our meeting, President Kabbah pointed out the possibility of opening a road from the .Languette to Kenema. The President had already requested that UNAMSIL explore this possibility, and he later confirmed this position during our joint press conference. While agreeing that his suggestion could be another potentially valuable step, I stressed that the first priority should be to reach a formal agreement between the Governments of Guinea and Sierra Leone and the RUF (and UNAMSIL for that mauer) on the basic principles of safe access and safe passage. Following my talks and fact-finding visit in Sierra Leone, I was convinced that the success of refugee returns will depend fundamentally upon guaranteeing safety in the country, most particularly by ensuring the cease-fire agreement holds. This will allow us to explore the possibility of expanding the safe areas for return into RUF-controlled areas. The promotion of safe passage and increased returns to Sierra Leone are thus intertwined with the peace and political S00[?l H3NOISSIHKOD HSIH-HDHNfl 91> ZL 6Ci ZZ Ttf XVd SV-ft 3111 TO, ZO/OZ processes in that country^ The agreement of the RUF to restrict its operations to Sierra Leonean territory and to refrain from action in Guinea would tie conducive to greater peace, stability and repatriation. During my mission, I attempted to clarify our future course of action with regard to the RUF. I developed a plan of action in the following days, which was presented to the RUF on Monday, - through the Contact Group - and also shared informally with the Government of Guinea. I will jl inform you of the results of the initiative, if any,'as soon as these consultations conclude and I confidentiality is no longer requited. '' Before leaving for Liberia, I also looked into the possibilities of organizing an airlift from Guinea to I Sierra Leone for the most vulnerable refugees. We also need to examine closely the potential need I for assistance to the Guinean Army, especially in the area of logistics, in order to achieve safe passage for refugees. I will need to evaluate these two points further before taking a position. On the other hand, I have concluded that action in the following two areas is urgently needed: • Increased assistance to internally displaced people in both Guinea and Sierra Leone, given the/] mixed nature of displacement, as well as the funding to make this possible; and t • Increased support to local communities that are heavily burdened by large numbers of refugees jj and displaced people, to be implemented together with NGOs. On February 15.1 headed to Monrovia to meet President Charles Taylor of Liberia. I explained to President Taylor that I was seeking his commitment to placing absolute priority upon the principles of safe access and safe passage for refugees. I also urged him to condemn publicly all violations committed against these principles. I mentioned to the President that making such commitment represented the only way forward for his country and people, as this might lead to regaining support from the international communiry. Liberia's effective adherence to these basic principles would give Liberia credibility, while railing to do so would lead to further isolation and degradation. President Taylor agreed to make this commitment and, on this basis, I invited him to become a partner in the sub-regional "safe access" and "safe passage** framework. I should also like to bring to your attention to the following three points that President Taylor made during our meeting. First, the President again categorically declined to be an intermediary with the RUF. I clarified that this would not be the case. On the contrary, I agreed that - from now on - the least possible contact between him and the RUF would be best. I also shared my view that it would be preferable" to engage RUF through the Contact Group in Sierra Leone and to respect the RUF as a Sierra Leonean movement Second, President Taylor offered to open the border between It the Langueite region in Guinea and Liberia, so refugees could be transferred to safer locations via |j Liberia. While expressing appreciation for the offer, I declined to pursue such a possibility at this juncture, at least for the non-Liberian refugees. Third. President Taylor offered his hope that the jf deployment of ECOMQG forces and, in particular., the monitoring mission would diminish tensions jl and the false accusations regarding military actions in and around the borders of Guinea and ' Liberia. 1 responded that I would explore positive synergy between the ECOWAS initiative and the principles of the safe access and passage during my meeting with President Konare of Mali. As you will appreciate, I have obtained the agreement of the Presidents of Guinea. Sierra Leone and Liberia to respect the principles of safe access and passage, and we are working engaging the RUF in this process. Nevertheless.. I.realize that this initiative remains fragile and vulnerable. Military '""''3. 900P H3NOISSIHHOD H3IH-H3HNI1 9t Ci 6Ci ZZ If XVd Sfr'-fT HOI TO, ZO/OZ DRAFT discipline is a critical issue, with..different armed -factions active in the Languette region, along the border between Guinea and Liberia and even in Sierra Leone, with the RUF, the Sierra Leonean Army, Sierra Leonean civil defense units and, vigilante groups in UTiinea remaining sources"of concern. Although my visit to C6te d'lvoire was useful, I did not see a reason to involve President Laurent Gbagbo in the sub-regional safe access and safe passage scheme. The final stop of my mission was Mali. I held discussions with President Konard on the status of the ECOWAS 'initiative to deploy forces to the conflict zone. The President shared his frank view that the original idea of an interposition force along the borders of Guinea. Sierra Leone and Liberia was becoming increasingly difficult to implement. He welcomes my views on viable alternatives. At his suggestion, I met subsequently with two ECOWAS military advisors and exchanged views on bur approach 10 safe passage and access. • During the meeting, I offered a phased plan for developing a revised ECOWAS initiative in tandem with UNHCR's safe access and passage plan. The parties concerned are now discussing the issue, and I hope that a concrete and feasible mechanism might be defined as soon as possible. The ongoing crisis hi West Africa needs urgent attention and support from the international / community! I plan to travel to New York during the second week of March, and I would look forward to having the opportunity to brief you and the Members of the Security Council at that time. Yours sincerely. Ruud Lubbers 4 AnnISi HHMOISSIWHOD H3IH-HDHNT1 Sir Ci 6Ci ZZ It XVd W-tl 3OI TO, ZO/OZ NATIONS UNIES UNITED NATIONS LE HAUT COMMISSAIRE THE H|GH COMMISSIONER- POUR LES REFUGIES FOR REFUGEES Case Postale 2£0d CH - 1217 Geneve 2 Oeaa: Suisse 17 January 2001 Sir, I would like 10 thank you for providing me the opportunity to btief the Security Council on the situation in Guinea. 1 was encouraged by the show of concern with regard to the humanitarian crises in the region and by the supporc voiced for UNHCR's protection and assistance activities in Guinea and Sierra Leone. A number of questions were raised to which I promised to provide information in addition to the comments I made. I would appreciate your help in communicating this information to the Security Council. On the issue of UNHCR's presence, my Office has dispatched 45 experienced emergency staff to Guinea and Sierra Leone to support the country teams already in place, Tn Guinea, the emergency assistance and relocation team is based in Kissidougou, from where they undertake missions to refugee hosting areas along the border. The cross-border team is based in Conakry. In Sierra Leone, staff are based in Freetown and undertake daily missions to Luigi and Kenema, where sites are being prepared for returnees. The security of our staff is, of course, a crucial issue. UNHCR, together with the United Nations Security Management Team, which reports directly to the United Nations Security Coordinator in New York, are constantly reassessing conditions on the ground. In Guinea, the Government has identified three new sites, each with a capacity for 20,000 persons, which are being prepared for refugees currently in border camps. These sites are located at least 120 km from the border. The local authorities, with UNHCR, are conducting sensitization campaigns in an effort to ensure that the local communities accept the refugees. Whilst UNHCR has not started moving refugees, many already moved away from their original camps in December 2000. Efforts are underway to ensure that these displaced refugees are accommodated in new or existing safer camps. Violence in the border areas, most recently around Gueckedou, and the reported spontaneous movements of refugees towards Kissidougou, however, are causes for continued concern. His Excellency Mr. Kishore Mahbubari President United Nations Security Council H3NOISSIHKOD H9IH-H3HND.1 Ci 6EL ZZ If J.V3. 3OL TO, ZO/OZ -2- UNHCR maintains close working relations with the Government of Guinea both at the central and local level. Close coordination with local authorities as well as with WFP and international and national implementing partners is also on-going and regular meetings are held with all concerned actors. The delivery of humanitarian assistance to both refugees and internally displaced persons, where they are mixed with refugees, is discussed in these meetings. With regard to the voluntary return of Sierra Leonean refugees from Guinea to their home country, UNHCR's cross-border operation is making progress. In cooperation with IOM, our implementing partner, a second boat is being provided in order to increase transportation capacity. Since the RUF control the whole area bordering Guinea, my Office is not in a position to facilitate return overland. Whilst it is recognized that the situation in Guinea is extremely precarious, the absorption capacity of Sierra Leone must be taken into account when planning for repatriation from Guinea. UNHCR currently maintains two transit centres in Freetown: Waterloo with a capacity of 20,000 persons, and Jui, with a capacity of approximately 3,000. Although efforts are underway to try to improve the transit capacity, UNHCR's strategy is primarily to ensure that sufficient settlement sites are identified and prepared to minimize the time returnees spend in transit centres. So far, some 16,500 returnees have been accommodated in 28 local villages in what is considered a very successful programme in the Lungi peninsula. In addition, two sites, with a capacity of 5,000 and 12,000 respectively, are being prepared between Bo and Kenema in the East and Southeastern provinces. I was particularly encouraged by positive comments about the ECOWAS mission. I fully support this crucial initiative and hope that the presence of ECOWAS troops will prevent a further deterioration of the situation in the sub-region. I would like to remind members of the Security Council that the conditions under which UNHCR operates in Guinea, in particular, are very precarious and thar any further instability might result in a major humanitarian crisis, and in the inability of humanitarian agencies to provide much needed protection and assistance to refugees and other victims of the conflict. In closing, I would like once again to thank you and assure you that I remain at your disposal for any further discussions. Accept, Sir, the assurances of my highest consideration. Action plan on RUF UNHCR, via the Contact Group, invites RUF to become a partner in the agreement that has been already endorsed by the Presidents of Guinea, Sierra Leone and Liberia on the following points: 1. the safe access to refugees 2. the safe passage for refugees 3. the condemnation of any act that would obstruct or hinder these principles. To do so, UNHCR also requests RUF to declare "retraining from taking any actions on the Guinean territory". As soon as UNHCR has received a written signed approval (or a written confirmation) from .RUF, it will use its good offices to invite the Government of Guinea to refrain from all military actions in the area of Kambia, so that the road from Forecariah could become a "safe passage". As soon as the consent of the Government of Guinea and Sierra Leone, and that of UNAMSIL is reconfirmed, this agreement starts to function, Further possibilities: UNHCR also invites RUF to look into the following possibilities, which are not a precondition to the agreement but a suggestion for further efforts: to support the work of ICRC; to examine the feasibility of materialising a free access into Kailahun and Kenema; - to settle together with the Government of Sierra Leone, UNAMSIL and UNHCR a system to safeguard and respect the freedom of movement and choice tor the place of settlement of all returnees, and to refrain from exercising any pressure to obstruct such choices. The High Commissioner intends to go on record with the above position, as soon as RUF and the Government of Guinea have responded. OTOlg] HHNOISSIJOTOD HDIH-'SDHm 8f C2, 6Ci ZZ If XVd LV'fl 3OL TO, ZO/OZ Relation between UNHCR's plan on Safe Access, etc, and ECOWAS At the request of President Konare of Mali, a discussion took place between UNHCR and the military advisors of ECOWAS. This conversation resulted in the following approach -in phases- to achieve a coherent and consistent system. Phase 1:. An agreement will be reached with RUF; and the Government of Guinea accepts the invitation as formulated in the Action Plan on RUF. The objective is to achieve this Phase by next Wednesday. Phase 2: ECOWAS countries reach an agreement on a revised initiative, which consists of the deployment of the available military capacity at the territory of Liberia, at the border with Guinea between the point where the boundaries of Sierra Leone, Guinea and. Liberia meet each other till the area of Zorzor, Liberia. This revised initiative respect the wish of Guinea for not having the ECOMOG force on its territory. It also builds on the willingness of President Taylor of Liberia to accept them on the Liberia territory to stabilize the situation in the most vulnerable region. The concentration of the force on this limited border area will produce - together with Phase 1-, a coherent approach for more safety and stability. Phase 3: As soon as the Phase 2 has become operational, the partners involved in the Phase 1 and ECOWAS will devise a system to communicate and to inform. Through this system, movements of fractions in the sensitive area of Gueckedou till Zorzor area will be monitored. This will make the protection and .monitoring action more effective. Phase 4: As soon as some experience under the Phases 1 - 3 is gained in practice, the possibility of joint assessment will be conducted to evaluate the mnctioning of the Phases 1-3, and to consider further possibilities, in order to make the best use of the available resources, including possible use of additional ECOWAS potential. A few additional remarks: 1. The possibility of using ECOWAS force to secure the safe passage on the Guinean territory will be excluded until an explicit consent of Guinea is given for this under Phase 4. 2. As soon as the Phases 1-3 become operational, one has to look into the possibility of strengthening the capacity of UNAMSIL. 3. Over 100,000 Liberian refugees are in Guinea wailing to return home. In this respect, it will also be necessary to open a safe passage from Macenta to Foya (Lofa County) for those refugees willing to return. H3NOISSIJWOD HDIH-HDHNil 9!> C2, 6Ci ZZ IV XVd SP^T 3OL TO, SO/OS