169
DISASTER AT ABOUKIR: BRUEYS' OR NAPOLEON'S FAULT?
Virgil Medlin Department of History, Oklahoma City University, Oklahoma City, Oklahoma
E\·idence is presented and discussed concerning the disposition of the French fleet in Egyptian waters, prior to its destmction in one of the major naval victories in the Wars of the French RC\·olution. An attempt is made to assess the responsibility for the disposition and, hence. destruction of the French fleet by analyzing the roles played by Napoleon Bonaparte. commander of the Egyptian campaign, and Francois Paul Broeys, admiral of the destroyed fleet. This study. the first attempt by an "unofficial" historian to search the archives for the answer to this long debated question, is also the first corrobative investigation of the "official" history which appeared nearly 70 years ago.
On I August 1798, Rear Admiral Horatio were to be unloaded at Aboukir. The ad Nelson with a 1,012 gun force, destroyed miral was ordered to report to Napoleon at Aboukir Bay, Egypt, a 1,182 gun fleet whether he I) had entered the Old Port, under the command of the French admiral or finding this impossible, 2) had found it Francois Paul Brueys. Crane Brinton (I) possible to defend himself in Aboukir Bay has written of the event, "Disaster struck against a superior force, or finding neither upon the sea. The French admiral Brueys, of these possible of execution, 3) had de unable to get his biggest ships over the bar cided to depart for Corfu in the French into Alexandria, and prevented by Bona held Ionian Islands (4). Brueys· wrote to parte from following the Directors' order Napoleon at this time that thus far he had to seek safety in the Ionian Islands, drew been unable to find a channel into the Old up his fleet along the curving shore of Port through which his heavier ships could Aboukir Bay, in a position he seems to pass without danger of running aground. have regarded as safe. Here on August 1, Brueys also states in the dispatch that he 1798, Nelson ... at last found his enemy." could sce no other place at present for the The isolation of Napoleon Bonaparte and fleet to anchor than Aboukir Bay (5). his army in the Near East, the deliverance Napoleon certainly wanted the fleet in of control of the Mediterrancan Sca to the the Old Port, for the day before he left British, the formation of the Second Coali Alexandria he wrote to the Executive Di tion against France, the psychological effect rectory, "The fleet will be at Aboukir today of the victory on the English, the French, finishing landing our artillery. The Old and the decrepit monarchies of Italy, and Port of Alexandria can contain a fleet of any the military importance of Aboukir as a great size. But there is one point in the passage naval battle are reasons enough to question with only five fathoms of water, which how the French fleet came to be at Aboukir makes the sailors think it impossible for and who made the decision to station the the 715 to enter. This fact seriously inter fleet there. The answers to these two ques fers with my plans "I (6). tions are not as clcaHut as Brinton writes On 6 July, Brueys wrote to Napoleon that of them (2). he was going to set sail from Alexandria in On 3 July, 1798, Brueys received orders order to anchor at Aboukir. He stated that from Ceneral Berthier that Napoleon wished he was trying his best to find an entrance the fleet anchored in the Old Port of Alex into the Old Port, but, as the loss of a ship andria (3). Bonaparte signed an order that was too considerable, that the work would same date for Brueys to station the fleet require time and care (7). Broeys again in the Old Port if he had time and if the wrote Napoleon the following day and in depth of the passage into the port was suf this letter argued against stationing the ficient to allow ships to enter. If no passage fleet in the Old Port, stating that even if it were found, artillery and other materials were possible to get the fleet in the port, Proc. Okla. Acad. Sci. SO: 169·17, (1970) 170
a single enemy ship of the line could bottle would be in the port or would have set sail it up there (8). for Corfu (13). The report of Ensign Lachadenede, who The order to Broeys must have been was attached to Broeys' staff on the L'Ori written just before Napoleon left Alexandria, ent, confirms both the Old Port and Abou as he mentions Poitevin's findings of 7 July. kir Bay as places considered for anchoring He left on 7 July thinking the fleet would the French fleet. According to Lachadenooe, soon be in·the port or on its way to Corfu_ the admiral and Napoleon met and discussed Why Broeys did not "obey" these orders is the problem, prior to the removal of the discussed later. fleet to Aboukir, and decided that if the Broeys seemed earnest in trying to com fleet was unable to enter at Alexandria, it ply with the orders of Bonaparte to enter should anchor at Aboukir. Napoleon, how the Old Port. He wrote the Minister of ever, not satisfied with having the fleet Marine and Colonies 12 July, "To gratify exposed while waiting to see if the sound the wishes of the Commander in Chief, I ings of the Old Port would allow the fleet have offered a reward of ten thousand livres to enter there, sent engineer and artillery to any pilot of the country who will under officers to see if the fleet could be protected take to carry the squadron in: but none of from the land at Aboukir Bay (10). On 7 them will venture to take charge of a July, while undersail to Aboukir, Broeys, in single vessel that draws more than twenty a letter to Napoleon, expressed the hope that feet." ( 14) During this time soundings for the engineers would be able to find land for a channel into the Old Port continued, tifications that would "protect the two heads and on 13 July, Captain Barreof the frigate of my line" which would make the fleet's Alceste reported, ". .. and my judgement, position, in Broeys' words, impregnable is that ships of the line can enter" the port (11 ). On that same date Casimir Poitevin, provided the necessary precautions are taken chief of the corps of engineers, reported (I 5). That same date Broeys wrote to Na that land fortifications would be of little poleon that he was strengthening his posi help in protecting the fleet (12). tion at Aboukir and that a passage had been Supposedly on receiving Poitevin's find found into the Old Port through which the ings, Napoleon ordered Broeys to enter the fleet could enter "with a favorable wind and Old Port in twenty-four hours, or, failing a calm sea," though the entrance would be that, to set sail for Corfu. The only indica difficult and dangerous (16). Broeys was tion as to the contents of that dispatch not satisfied that the fleet could enter and are contained in a report Bonaparte made continued soundings until 20 July and on to the Executive Directory 19 August: 26 July wrote Napoleon that the findings would be sent to him so that the command I wrote to the admiral to enter the port er in chief could decide which ships should within twenty-four hours, or, if his fleet could not enter, to unload all the am1lery and stores enter the Old Port (17). of the land army at once and go to Corfu. Ensign Lachadenooe in his report claimed The admiral did not think he could com it was not so much a question of whether plete unloading where he was, since he was the fleet could enter the Old Port, but of moored among the rocks before the port of Alexandria and several ships had already lost the time it would take to get it inside. Even their anchors. He DlOVtd to Aboukir which the 12O-gun L'Orient could enter, but, at offered a good anchomge. I sent engineer and most, only two of the heavier ships could artillery officers who agreed with the admiral be moved into the port each day and, with that he could be given no protection from the land and that, if the English appeared during part of the fleet in the port and part out. the two or tIuee days he would Lave to remain the French would be exposed if the Englisl, there ill order to land our arb1lery and to sound suddenly appeared (18). As it would hav. and made the pIISSIge at Alexandria, he could taken 26 days to place the 13 ships of 74 (do) nothing but cut his cables and that it was important to stay at Aboukir as short a SO, and 120 guns in the Old Port, the cor time as possible. I thus left Alexandria ill the tinued consideration of entering the 01, finD beJieE that witlUo tIuee ell" the fleet Port seems stnmge for Nelson was know'· 171
to be in the vicinity. Napoleon, when he alarm. "It appears to me that Admiral left Alexandria on 7 July, was certainly not Brueys did not wish to go to Corfu until he immediately aware of Broeys' position, es was certain he could not enter the port of pecially since Broeys' letter of 13 July, ac Alexandria and that the army, of which cording to Napoleon ( 19), did not reach he for long had no news, was in a position him at Cairo until 30 July. to have no need for a retreat. If' in the Napoleon, on 27 July, in his first dispatch course of these disastrous events he had made to Broeys since leaving Alexandria wrote that mistakes he expiated them by a glorious he had received intelligence from Alexandria death "(22). that an adequate passage into the Old Port The story of the events leading up to had been found, and that he did not doubt 1 August, as constructed from the original that the fleet was presently in the port. Two source materials, tends to have some in sentences later, in the same dispatch, Bona consistencies. From Napoleon's dispatches parte wrote that, as soon as he received a it appears that the fleet could at one time letter from Brueys telling him what had have anchored in one of three places, the becn done and where he was, further orders Old Port, Aboukir Bay, or Corfu. From would be issued to the admiral (20). The these same dispatches it appears that Napo two sentences arc not contradictory, as Na leon dismissed Aboukir Bay as a possible poleon had apparently not heard from choice after receiving the report of Poitevin Bmeys since leaving Alexandria, and had that land batteries would not give the fleet only "received intelligence" that a passage protection at Aboukir Bay. From the dis had been found and not that the fleet was patches of Brueys, only Aboukir Bay and the actually removed to the Old Port. As Na Old Port are mentioned and never Corfu. polcon now thought that Brueys was either It can only be assumed, if all the dispatches in the Old Port or soon to be, it is under are taken at face value, that Bmeys either standablc that he would not write in tIle ignored Bonaparte's orders of 7 July to be dispatch of his objection to the fleet re in the Old Port in twenty-four hours or sail maining at Aboukir, nor of the fleet not for Corfu, or that Brueys was dilatory. If being on its way to Corfu. What is ques the dispatches are not accepted at face value, tionable is why Napoleon was still enter then considerable speculation is possible taining the idea as late as 27 July that Brueys (23) . would move his fleet into the Old Port Why Brueys did not want to enter the when he had ordered Brueys as early as 7 Old Port has already been explained. Why July to move the fleet into the Old Port in Brueys, however, continued until 20 July twenty-four hOllrs or be on its way to Corfu. to search for an entrance and then waitcd On 30 July, Napoleon wrote to Broeys six days more to ask Napoleon to decide that he had received the admiral's letters which ships should enter the Old Port is from 13 July to 26 July [probably 21 July surely being dilatory, as Nelson was known (3 thennidor) not 26 July (8 thermidor) to be searching for the French fleet. Brueys the 3 becoming an 8 in copying] and "What did not want to be bottled up in the Old I hcar from Alexandria on the success of Port but wished to be in a fighting position. the soundings leads me to hope by now you On 7 July, he wrote Napoleon, "My firm have entered the port." Bonaparte adds, desire is to be useful to you in every possible "Howevcr, vou must either at once enter way: and, as I have already said, every port the port of Alexandria or else provision your will suit me well, provided that you place self quickly with rice and com I am sending me there in an active way (Italics mine) " you and proceed to Corfu .. .o' This dispatch (24). Further, Damas mentions in his Jour d~d not reach Bmeys before the I August nal the report of Chef de Brigade Laugier disaster. In his report to the Executive Di that although Brueys had been ordered to rectory, 19 August, Napoleon wrote that put into the Old Port, the admiral opposed it Brucys' position at Aboukir was of "strange desiring to be in a fighting position (25). resolve" which caused him the greatest Yct, Broeys also knew that land batteries 172 at Abollkir were of little value to his fleet poorly provisioned, as was the entire ex and reported to Napoleon that, as Abollkir pedition, (and remained at Aboukir eating Bay was too open, the French fleet could up his stores), he nevertheless makes no not be protected from a superior fleet while mention of Corfu in any of his dispatches. anchored there (26). Knowing these things, If Brucys was dilatory, so was Napoleon. it is worth questioning: Why did not Brocys As late as 27 and 30 July, in dispatches of query about Corfu? Why did he have to wait those dates, Napolcon was still desirous of in silence for Napoleon to issue him a spe seeing the fleet in the Old Port! TIlis is dif cific order to sail for Corfu, especially since ficult to accept if Napoleon's order of 7 Napoleon had left it open as a third option July is to be belicved and his 19 August which circumstances certainly allowed him statement to the Directorv, both of which to take? (Even if Napoleon had never men stress the urgency of stati~ning the fleet in tioned Corfu, Brucy's action is strange) the Old Port or at Corfu. At no time did (27). Rear-Admiral Vencc's letter to thc Brueys attempt to impress on Napoleon the French Minister of Marine has been quoted extreme amount of time, 26 days, needed to to mean that Bruevs wanted to sail for place the fleet in the Old Port. It would Corfu: "After the co~versations we had with appear from Napoleon's dispatches of late Admiral Brueys, I would have thought that July that he thought, once an adequate chan he would not have remained twenty-four nel was found, Brueys simply had to sail hours after the landing was compl~ted." the fleet in in a matter of hOUTS and was, (28) As Jonquiere points out, this only re therefore, even at that late date, insistent flects Brocys' thinking before leaving for on it if Brueys had found such a passage. Egypt and, in fact, makes it even more a Continuing to question Napoleon's anxiety question as to why Brucys did not bring up to remove the fleet from Aboukir, Herold Corfu in his dispatches (29). Also of in has written, "TIle letter in which Brueys terest is a letter from Commisary to the did announce his intention to make a stand Fleet, Jaubert, to the Minister of Marine, at Abukir, if attacked, is dated July 13 and Bruix, 9 July: "TIle English arc in our neigh must have reached Bonaparte no more than borhood ... We arc in expectation of them. ten days later, thus giving him time to order The general opinion (but this might be in the fleet to leave for Corfu before August I fluenced in some degree by personal con if he so chose" (35). Napoleon, in other siderations) was, that as soon as the de words, should have sent on 23 July his in barkation was effected, we should have sailed structions of 30 July to enter thc Old Port for Corfu ... The General has decided it or sail for Corfu and therebv have saved the otherwise" (30). Of interest in this letter fleet. Bonaparte, howcvcr: claims not to is that Jaubert was in expectation of the have received any dispatches from Brocys English 9 July and he says "we." The "we" until 30 July, nor did he receive any from certainly cannot refer to Brueys who wrote General Kleber who was at Alexandria until the Minister of Marine 12 July, "I have 27 July (36). In any event, Napoleon had heard nothing from the English ... and do issued such an order supposedly on 7 July. not think it quite so prudent (that they On the basis of the available material, want) to try their strength with us" (31 ). both Napoleon and Brucys appear negli. As for Napoleon deeiding it otherwise, no gent in their handling of the positioning of order exists from Bonaparte saying that the· fleet. Why did the Old Port remain a Broeys should not sail for Corfu (32). Jon possible place of anchoring onee Broeys quiere, in discussing this letter, notes that understood it would require too much time it appears only in the 1798 publication of to enter and would be too dangerous to try dispatches intercepted by Nelson's squad to enter? Brocys clearly failed to impress ron and has qualified merit (33). Herold the former on Bonaparte. As for Aboukir has written that Brocys did not have the Bay, why, once Poitevin's report was re provisions necessary to make the consider ceived, did Broeys remain at Aboulcir Bay able trip to Corfu (34). While Broeys was any longer than necessary to ascertain whe- 173 ther it would be possible to cnter thc Old the Original Let.ters from the Army of Gen· Port? Napoleon had ordcred BruC\'s not to end Bonaparte in Egypt Intercepted by the stay at Aboukir unless hc found it possible Fleet under the command of Admir.d Lord Nelson (2 \'Ols; London: J. Wright, 1798. to defend against a superior foree. '''hcther J;99) is an additional source, but of quali Napoleon wrotc this to Bmcys or not, fied merit (hereafter cited, Original Letters). Bmeys reports the position untenable Another source, but to be used with cau against a superior force and thcn was lax tiou, is Louis Antoine Fauvelet de Bour in his defense preparations. Bmcys ap rienne. Memoirs (5 vols; Paris, n.d.). Re prodncing most of Napoleon's correspond pears even to have been ovcrconfident ence on the subject is Correspondance de Na with regard to the English: "My opinion po/eon ler (32 \'ols: Paris, 1858-1870). Bet· is that thev have not so manv as fourteen ter is Traffanel de Ia Jonquiere, L'Expedition sail of the "Iinc, and, not bein'g superior in d'Egypt, 1798·1801 (5 vols; Paris, 1899-1907) which comments on and evaluates the rna· number, have not thought fit to try conclu teri.'1l in Correspondance and reproduces, sions with us" (37). No matter how confi with considerable accuracy and but slight dent Brue\"s was, once a decision was made editing, most of the archival material avail· concerning thc Old Port, the flcet should able on the battle and the expedition. An ('';lrly article on the subjcct is A. T. Mahan, hm'c removed from Aboukir Bay, 1 'hc prob Nelson in the Rattle of the Nile, Century lem was that no
that aD but a small amount of the material H. Original Letters, I, ..3. A r~rt of LeOnce can be safely regarded as Napoleon's work." Trullet, captain of the TimolOOn, to Vence, (Letters and Documents of Napoleon (Lon shortly after the disaster of I August (Arch. don, 1960) I, xxii). Finally, though Na Nat: BB. l\farine 125, 289) states that Bona poleon III ordered the publication of the parte offered the reward. not Brueys. Trullet Correspondance, the material concerning the reports that Brueys found Aboukir "more questions at hand was edited and published convenient to place thc fleet, conciliating by by the first commission (though not without this means his intention with that of the error), not by the far less reliable Prince gencral-in-<:hief". Brueys, according to Jerome Napoleon Commission. Trullet. feared being in the Old Port. The l Berthier. I 5 messidor an VI ( 3 July 1798). captain also points out in his report that a l'amiral Brueys, Ie registre de Berthier, Brueys "dared publicly to state in my pres Service Historique de l'Arrnee. The Corre enee that perhaps the fleet would not return sponcbnce, IV, No. 2727, 19'1-95, rather to France" and that Brucys maintained snch than showing the dispatch signed by "Ber· a loose contact with his captains it was as thier" gives "par ordre du general en chef," if the thirteen ships of the French fll:et which is typical of the handling of such were commanded by captains from thirteen letters. different nations. [The copy in the archiv<.'S is withont date and carries the notation that 'I. Nape;>Icon, 15 messidor an VI (3 July 1798) the copy was made 16 July 1866, the date a l'amiral Brueys, Les Collections du Prince in Napolcon III's reign making the docu Napolifm; Correspondance, IV, No. 2728. ment perhaps of qualified merit. Jonquie....e. 195-96. II, 90. only reproduces a portion of the 5. Arch. Nat: BB. Marine 124. 79-80; Jonquiere, entirc letter to Veneel. II, 84-86. As Jonquiere points out the copy 15. Arch. Nat: BB' Marine 124; Jonquicre. II. 246. of this letter is incorrectly dated 2 July and 16. Arch. Nat: BBI Marine 124, 85; Jonquicre, II. should be at least 3 July in order to respond 248. to orders of 3 July. 17. Arch. Nat: BBI Marine 124,92; Jonquicre. II, 6. Napoleon, 18 messidor an VI (6 July 1798) 25)·56. Jonquicre incorrel:tly notes this as au Directoire Executif, Service Historique de the last disp;lteh of Brneys to Napoleon. l'Armee; Correspondance, IV, No. 2765. Arch. Nat: BB' Marine 124. 95. gi\'<."S a letter 215-18; Howard, I, No. 320,251. II thcnnidor an VI (29 Jllly 17(8) alh'ising 7. Arch. Nat: Bm Marine 124, 81·82; Jonquicre, Napoleon that the fleet had rcecil'ed from II, 93. Rosetta tcn djemlcs (lateen S 20. Napt; and next to combine with the fleet Ju)Jien ). As for the letter to Brueys, the alrthe forces that could be supplies ... for Correspondance cites incorrectly Archives the purpose of attacking England." In a de la marine as the source of deposit. A copy report 16 April Napoleon laid such a plan in the hand of Bourrienne or de Duroc and before the Directorv (Arch. Nat: A. F. Ill. signed by Napoleon existed at the Archives 206; Jonquieie, II, 88-89). If this is accepted, de Ia guerre, but Jonquiere states that it was Napoleon had JtOOd reason to want the fleet withdrawn without doubt in order to be in a place of salety; if possible the Old Port, destroyed by Napoleon. On the copy that and if not, Corfu, but not Aboukir (espe served the COne5pOndance is found: "Cer cially after Poitevin's findings of 7 July). tifie' conforme ala copie £aite sur l'original If this is not accepted, no known reason au depot de la guerre, par M. Ie colonel exists for Napoleon not wanting the fleet to Pr~tet," signed, "Chasseriau." leave for Corfu. 22. CorreSpondance, IV, 3045, 357-61. 28. Arch. Nat: BBt Marine 124, 240, de Toulon, 23. Such speculation can become bitter as in 25 fructidor an VI (11 September 1798); Herold's Bonaparte in Egypt, 102-09. Jonquiere, II, 86. Written entirely in the H. Arch. Nat: BB. Marine 12." 83-84; Jonquiere, hand of Vence. 11,95. 25. Jonquiere, II, 425 n.l. 29. Jonquie..e, II, 86 n.2. 26. Arch. Nat: BBJ Marine 123, 85; ]onquiere, II, 30. Original Letters, n. 248. 31. Original Letters, 44. 27. According to a letter from admiral Ganteaume 32. Jaubert may have been writing about Brueys to the French Minister of Marine and Col as admirals were commonly addressed as gen. onies, Broeys did not think himself justified eral. in quitting the Egyptian coast without a formal order from Napoleon. Jonquiere, II, 33. Jonquiere, II, 87n. 255 n. I, indicates a phrase in Broeys letter 34. Herold, 106-07. of 26 July to Napoleon which, according to 35. Herold, 105. Jonquie'ie, shows Broeys did not feel au thorized to quit the coast without a formal 36. Correspondence, IV, No. 2853, 263-64. Re order from Bonaparte. The phrase, however, printed from Original Letters. is not so exact and simply refers to the time 37. Herold 105, notes correctly that Napoleon in when the fleet will eventually leave Aboukir. his i9 August report to the Directory mis The point bas been raised that Napoleon takenly reports that Brueys letter of 20 July never really wanted the fleet to sail for informed him that the admiral was strength Corfu. Loir in "Broeys a Aboukir," Revue ening his defenses at Aboukir and was ready 'mmtirne (avril 1900) reasons that unbl for an enemy. As already seen, Brueys in Napoleon captured Cairo, he had to have formed Napoleon of this in his 13 July dis· a retreat open for his army; therefore the patch, not 20 July. Rather than being a de· presence of the fleet was oecessaary. Bona bberate misrepresentation by Napoleon, more parte mentions this in his report of 19 b1tely it was an error, for in that same August to the Executive Directory, stating dispatch Napoleon states that he left Alex that this could have been Brueys' reasoning anaria 6 July, when he actually left 7 July. for keeping the fleet at Aboukir. Admiral Thus it awean more likely ~ was su!fer Ganteawne in a letter to the Minister of ing from tlie lack of • professional military Marine and Colonies 23 August 1798 writes sUff or could Dot keep his dates might that Napoleon's "anny DItuD11y derived a (or for that matter perhaps his secretary gmat degree of confidcoce from the pres- could not).