Central Asia-Caucasus Analyst

BI-WEEKLY BRIEFING VOL. 15 NO. 18 18 SEPTEMBER 2013 Contents

Analytical Articles

ARMENIA CHOOSES CUSTOMS UNION OVER EU ASSOCIATION AGREEMENT 3 Armen Grigoryan

KAZAKHSTAN STEPPE EAGLE EXERCISE HELPS SUSTAIN NATO TIES 6 Richard Weitz

MOSCOW SIGNALS INTENTION TO ESTABLISH GREATER CONTROL OVER 10 Valeriy Dzutsev

YEVKUROV REELECTED PRESIDENT OF 14 Tomáš Šmíd

Field Reports

AZERBAIJAN GEARS UP FOR PRESIDENTIAL ELECTIONS 17 Mina Muradova

WILL GEORGIA FOLLOW ARMENIA’S PATH TOWARDS EURASIAN UNION? 19 Archil Zhorzholiani

TAJIK OPPOSITION PARTIES NOMINATE FEMALE CANDIDATE PRESIDENT 21 Alexander Sodiqov

BISHKEK HOSTS THE 2013 SCO SUMMIT 23 Arslan Sabyrbekov

THE CENTRAL ASIA-CAUCASUS ANALYST

Editor: Svante E. Cornell

Associate Editor: Niklas Nilsson

Assistant Editor, News Digest: Alima Bissenova

Chairman, Editorial Board: S. Frederick Starr

The Central Asia-Caucasus Analyst is an English-language journal devoted to analysis of the current issues facing Central Asia and the Caucasus. It serves to link the business, governmental, journalistic and scholarly communities and is the global voice of the Central Asia-Caucasus Institute & Silk Road Studies Program Joint Center. The Editor of the Analyst solicits most articles and field reports, however authors are encouraged to suggest topics for future issues or submit articles and field reports for consideration. Such articles and field reports cannot have been previously published in any form, must be written in English, and must correspond precisely to the format and style of articles and field reports published in The Analyst, described below. The Analyst aims to provide our industrious and engaged audience with a singular and reliable assessment of events and trends in the region written in an analytical tone rather than a polemical one. Analyst articles reflect the fact that we have a diverse international audience. While this should not affect what authors write about or their conclusions, this does affect the tone of articles. Analyst articles focus on a newsworthy topic, engage central issues of the latest breaking news from the region and are backed by solid evidence. Articles should normally be based on local language news sources. Each 1,100-1,500 word analytical article must provide relevant, precise and authoritative background information. It also must offer a sober and analytical judgment of the issue as well as a clinical evaluation of the importance of the event. Authors must cite facts of controversial nature to the Editor who may contact other experts to confirm claims. Since Analyst articles are based on solid evidence, rather than rumors or conjecture, they prove to be reliable sources of information on the region. By offering balanced and objective analysis while keeping clear of inflammatory rhetoric, The Analyst does more to inform our international readership on all sides of the issues. The Editor reserves the right to edit the article to conform to the editorial policy and specifications of The Analyst and to reject the article should it not be acceptable to our editorial committee for publication. On acceptance and publication of the edited version of the article, The Central Asia-Caucasus Institute of The Johns Hopkins University-The Nitze School of Advanced International Studies will issue an honorarium to the author. It is up to the individual author to provide the correct paperwork to the Institute that makes the issuing of an honorarium possible. The copyright for the article or field report will reside with the Central Asia-Caucasus Analyst. However, the author may use all or part of the contracted article in any book or article in any media subsequently written by the author, provided that a copyright notice appears giving reference to the contracted article’s first publication by the "Central Asia-Caucasus Analyst, Central Asia-Caucasus Institute, The Johns Hopkins University, Nitze School of Advanced International Studies."

Submission Guidelines: Analytical Articles require a three to four sentence Key Issue introduction to the article based on a news hook. Rather than a general, overarching analysis, the article must offer considered and careful judgment supported with concrete examples. The ideal length of analytical articles is between 1,100 and 1,500 words. The articles are structured as follows: KEY ISSUE: A short 75-word statement of your conclusions about the issue or news event on which the article focuses. BACKGROUND: 300-450 words of analysis about what has led up to the event or issue and why this issue is critical to the region. Include background information about the views and experiences of the local population. IMPLICATIONS: 300-450 words of analysis of the ramifications of this event or issue, including where applicable, implications for the local people’s future. CONCLUSIONS: 100-200 words that strongly state your conclusions about the impact of the event or issue.

Field Reports focus on a particular news event and what local people think about the event. Field Reports address the implications the event or activity analyzed for peoples’ lives and their communities. Field Reports do not have the rigid structure of Analytical Articles, and are shorter in length, averaging ca. 700-800 words.

Those interested in joining The Analyst’s pool of authors to contribute articles, field reports, or contacts of potential writers, please send your CV to: and suggest some topics on which you would like to write.

Svante E. Cornell Research Director; Editor, Central Asia-Caucasus Analyst Central Asia-Caucasus Institute & Silk Road Studies Program Paul H. Nitze School of Advanced International Studies, The Johns Hopkins University 1619 Massachusetts Ave. N.W., Washington, D.C. 20036, USA. Tel. +1-202-663-5922; 1-202-663-7723; Fax. +1-202-663-7785 Central Asia-Caucasus Analyst, 18 September 2013 3

ARMENIA CHOOSES CUSTOMS UNION OVER EU ASSOCIATION AGREEMENT Armen Grigoryan

After nearly four years of negotiating the Association Agreement with the EU, Armenian president Serzh Sargsyan made an abrupt turn, announcing his intention to instead join the Customs Union with , Belarus, and Kazakhstan. It is not possible to combine the two frameworks because of contradicting tariff regulations. Sargsyan’s statement was made after increased political and economic pressure from Russia in recent months. Armenia’s participation in Russia-led integration projects will imply very limited possibilities for cooperation with the EU. It will also result in Armenia’s deeper isolation and cause additional complications for the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict resolution process.

BACKGROUND: After meeting Azerbaijan. Russian officials, including Russian President in former Ambassador to Armenia Moscow on September 3, Armenia’s Vyacheslav Kovalenko, made President Sargsyan announced his numerous threatening or contemptuous country’s intention to join the Russia- statements. A few days before led Customs Union. Sargsyan stated Sargsyan’s visit to Moscow, the first that such a decision serves Armenia’s secretary of the Russian Embassy in interests, primarily from a security Armenia Alexander Vasilyev point of view. After Sargsyan’s demanded that the agreements reached statement, European officials declared during the EU-Armenia negotiations that the EU-Armenia Association should be disclosed, and threatened a Agreement, the initialing of which had “hot autumn” in Armenia. been planned for November, was now A large part of Armenia’s population “off the table.” Although the EU- views Sargsyan’s stance as a Armenia negotiations on the preparation to surrender state Association Agreement and a Deep and sovereignty. Since membership in the Comprehensive Free Trade Area Customs Union must be followed by (DCFTA) have been ongoing for over joining the Eurasian Economic Union three years and were finalized just six in 2015, the general perception is that weeks before Sargsyan’s visit to Armenia will no longer make foreign Moscow, the different regulations and policy decisions on its own. The tariffs applied by the EU and the prevalent opinion is that Sargsyan’s Customs Union make it impossible to yielding to Russian demands came as a conclude agreements with both free result of threats to provoke a war with trade zones at the same time. Azerbaijan. In recent months, Russian pressure on Opposition to Putin’s and Sargsyan’s Armenia included a rise in gas prices plans may grow in the next few months and a shipment of heavy weapons and the coming anniversary of worth nearly US$ 1 billion to Armenia’s Independence Day on Central Asia-Caucasus Analyst, 18 September 2013 4

recently imposed an import ban on Moldovan wine. Russia’s possible further actions in the South Caucasus should be examined carefully, and it should also be considered that the Russian economy is in recession. A decision to cut budgetary expenses by 5 percent has just been made, while internal September 21 could be a critical point dissatisfaction with Putin’s regime is for mobilizing protests. Activists growing. Furthermore, Russia faces a perceive a need to act fast, expecting significant decline in revenues in the that the situation may soon deteriorate mid and long term as the U.S. will start and that the authorities may exporting liquefied natural gas while increasingly adopt Russian-style reducing oil imports, and several oppression, including bans on European countries are exploring shale demonstrations, Internet censorship gas. under the pretext of protecting children Desperation caused by the inability to from dangerous information, mock persuade Ukraine to participate in the trials, and so forth. Eurasian project together with a need to IMPLICATIONS: After Sargsyan’s boost oil prices may induce Putin to use statement, the leaders of Georgia, Russia’s influence in Armenia and the Moldova, and Ukraine reaffirmed their region’s unresolved conflicts for determination to continue integration gaining an even stronger domination in with the EU, which in turn is now the South Caucasus. Russia may considering the possibility of assigning increase its military presence in more financial assistance for those Armenia, and perhaps also deploy some three countries. Russia’s ongoing “trade troops in Nagorno-Karabakh under the war” on Ukraine has not convinced the disguise of peacekeepers as tensions Ukrainian government to consider mount on the line of contact. Russia joining the Customs Union but has to may also target Georgia, aiming at the contrary consolidated the support Finlandization of the country at for association with the EU. Russia is gunpoint but also not excluding the currently most interested in getting possibility of full-scale aggression. Ukraine – one of the largest European Controlling Georgia would be crucial as countries with significant natural it would allow Russia to control the resources and industrial capabilities – pipelines supplying Azerbaijani oil and into its projects. Moldova’s government gas to Europe. Ultimately, Russia also remains determined despite might seek to increase its oil revenues growing Russian pressure; during a while restoring domination of the recent visit to Chisinau Russian entire Caucasus region. Deputy Prime Minister Dmitry A stronger Russian domination, Rogozin threatened to cut gas supply to including manipulation of the unsolved Moldova during winter, and Russia Central Asia-Caucasus Analyst, 18 September 2013 5 conflicts, would not only undermine of the Customs Union agreement. regional security and prevent the Otherwise, the ongoing economic region’s democratization; it could also decline and infringements of civil easily result in a drastic increase of liberties will continue to stimulate energy prices with immediate negative emigration and depriving the country consequences for the U.S. and EU. of human capital. So far, European decision makers have So far, Sargsyan’s statement about the reacted to Sargsyan’s intention to join intention to join the Customs Union the Customs Union by stating that has induced European decision-makers none of the planned agreements with to indicate that agreements with Armenia will be signed, and the Georgia and Moldova, after being implementation of a Twinning project initialed in November, may be signed providing support for legal and and enter the ratification phase earlier institutional reforms has been than previously planned. As further suspended. This means that the option policy options are considered, it is of offering more economic assistance reasonable to assume that Russian and some security guarantees to help pressure in the region, particularly resisting Russian blackmail is not being against Georgia, may intensify within a considered. It is also quite obvious that few months, coming to a peak soon the National Assembly of Armenia will after the Sochi Olympics. rubber stamp any law and ratify any AUTHOR’S BIO: Armen Grigoryan is treaty signed by Sargsyan, so Customs an Armenian political scientist. His Union membership will be formally research interests include post- approved unless a strong protest communist transition, EU relations movement comes to the fore. with Eastern Partnership countries, In the U.S. and EU, there is seemingly transatlantic relations, energy security, a tendency to consider Sargsyan a and conflict transformation. He is the victim of Putin’s pressure. In addition, author of several book chapters, U.S. and European politicians have conference reports and analytical invested a high degree of trust in articles. Sargsyan’s administration and seem careful not to offer overt criticism that may undermine the Armenian regime. CONCLUSIONS: Recent statements by European politicians exclude the possibility to initial the Association Agreement with Armenia in November, as there is a general understanding that further engagement of Sargsyan’s administration in the EU association process is useless. It is now up to Armenia’s civil society to try preventing the signing and ratification Central Asia-Caucasus Analyst, 18 September 2013 6

KAZAKHSTAN STEPPE EAGLE EXERCISE HELPS SUSTAIN NATO TIES Richard Weitz

The latest Steppe Eagle annual multilateral military exercise in Kazakhstan occurred from August 10-23, at the Illisky Training Center near Almaty. The exercise, held under NATO auspices, confirms that the Kazakhstani national security community wants to retain defense ties with Western countries despite their country’s deep military relations with Russia. This goal should grow in coming years as NATO winds down its combat operations in Afghanistan. In this context, sustaining Kazakhstan’s Airmobile Forces Brigade (KAZBRIG) is important for promoting interoperability between NATO and the rest of Kazakhstan’s military.

BACKGROUND: Like the other Kazakhstani armed forces with former newly independent states that emerged Soviet weapons. But since the late from the wrecked Soviet military- 1990s, the Kazakhstani government has industrial complex, Kazakhstan had to used some of its surging energy revenue construct novel military institutions to modernize and expand its based initially on the few suitable conventional armed forces. The defense resources the country managed country’s military reformers, backed by to inherit from the former Soviet NATO experts, have been focusing on armed forces. In developing their qualitative rather than quantitative armed forces, the Kazakhstani improvements. They have been authorities pursued an eclectic focusing on developing a more approach. Since independence, they professional, flexible, and effective have readily sought subsidized military force with better quality equipment and training, donated weapons, and other training. NATO-backed programs have defense assistance from Russia, China, focused on strengthening Kazakhstan’s NATO and other foreign sources. capabilities for peacekeeping, Caspian More recently, the Kazakhstani armed Sea maritime defenses, and forces have become more closely interoperability with the alliance. For integrated with the Russian military, example, NATO has been promoting but Kazakhstan strives to maintain Western-language training of defense ties with Western and other Kazakhstani officers and helping to countries as well. develop a professional Kazakhstan struggled to sustain noncommissioned officer class based on adequate defense spending during the Western NCO standards. first years after independence. The The revival of Kazakhstan’s economy authorities had to grant Russian forces since the late 1990s, combined with the access to test ranges on Kazakhstani post-9/11 influx of foreign militaries territory in exchange for Russia’s into Central Asia and the Caspian providing the underequipped region, has enabled the government to Central Asia-Caucasus Analyst, 18 September 2013 7

Moscow-led Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO), through which Russia provides its members extended security guarantees against external threats. After Russia, Kazakhstan provides the most military personnel to the CSTO’s elite collective units. As a CSTO member, Kazakhstan is eligible

to purchase some Russian military pursue its objective of developing a equipment at wholesale prices. Russia dual-purpose military, one capable of and Kazakhstan have joint air defense both self-defense and promoting and other partnered units and missions. international peace and security. The IMPLICATIONS: In accordance with country’s growing military capabilities, its multi-vector foreign policy, combined with the government’s Kazakhstan has sought to develop fundamental foreign policy principle military ties with Western countries. that Kazakhstan requires a secure From 2003 to 2008, Kazakhstan environment to develop politically and deployed its elite Airmobile Forces economically, has induced Kazakhstan Battalion (KAZBAT) to Iraq to assist to pursue capabilities that that can be in finding and neutralizing unexploded used outside the country’s national ordinance, constructing fresh water borders in support of broader regional facilities, and providing medical security objectives, including treatment for the local population. peacekeeping and post-conflict In December 2006, the battalion was reconstruction missions. Kazakhstani formally expanded to brigade size and leaders see multilateral military renamed the KAZBRIG, though the cooperation as making an important first KAZBAT still remains the core contribution to securing regional unit since the other two battalions have stability as well as their own country’s taken time to build into capable security. Although Kazakhstan does formations. The KAZBRIG has not currently face a conventional received substantial training, military threat from another nation equipment, and other assistance from state, the country is challenged by NATO and its member governments transnational security threats such as to increase its effectiveness and narcotics trafficking, ethnic unrest and interoperability with the alliance. The terrorism. brigade’s one fully operational battalion Kazakhstan’s armed forces have is widely considered the Kazakhstani developed extensive ties with Russia unit most likely to be capable of and the two defense establishments participating in Western-led share doctrine, weapons, and training. multinational operations, which has yet Almost all of Kazakhstan’s military to occur. KAZBRIG regularly units have greater interoperability with participates in the annual Steppe Eagle Russian forces than with NATO. exercise series designed to prepare the Astana’s only military alliance is the Central Asia-Caucasus Analyst, 18 September 2013 8

Kazakhstani armed forces to join evaluating the KAZBRIG’s ability to international peacekeeping exercises led achieve NATO Evaluation Level 1 on by NATO or the United Nations. interoperability according to the The first Steppe Eagle exercise alliance’s Operational Capabilities occurred in 2003 as a trilateral drill Concept Program, which allows non- involving troops only from NATO militaries to practice alliance Kazakhstan, the UK, and the U.S. The procedures and standards and enhance number of participating countries has their interoperability with NATO since doubled to include several more through training and evaluation. European and Central Asian states, Certification that the KAZBRIG is though the number of Kazakhs interoperable with NATO’s standards considerably exceeds those of other would allow elements of the unit to countries. Steppe Eagle has been a operate with NATO forces on NATO Partnership for Peace (PfP) international Peace Keeping and Peace exercise since 2006. On January 31 of Support Operations (PKO/PSO). If that year, Kazakhstan signed an the KAZBRIG achieves Level 1 Individual Partnership Action Plan interoperability, the alliance will work (IPAP) with NATO. with Kazakhstan to raise the unit’s Steppe Eagle 2013 occurred at the capabilities to NATO Evaluation Level KAZBRIG’s main training area in 2, which would allow the unit to join Almaty province. The participants the NATO Pool of Forces. included soldiers from Italy, Lithuania, The KAZBRIG”s growing capabilities , Tajikistan, as well as result from years of hard effort. The Kazakhstan, the UK, and the U.S. In preparatory efforts included the addition to KAZBRIG, units from establishment of the PfP training Kazakhstan’s Army and Air Force also center of the Military Institute of Land participated. In total, 1,680 Forces (KATZSENT) to train multinational military personnel were Kazakhstani military personnel to involved in the exercise. By contrast, NATO standards and procedures. In the previous Steppe Eagle, which 2008, KATZSENT was designated the occurred from September 6-18, 2012, 19th Partnership Training and involved fewer personnel from fewer Educations Centre with NATO. Since countries. Observers from Belarus, then, several dozen courses and Germany, Spain, and Ukraine also workshops have been held there, were present at Steppe Eagle 2013. covering such topics as NATO military Colonel General Zhasuzakov, staff procedures and English military Kazakhstan’s First Deputy Minister terminology. To improve their English and Chief of the General Staff, opened language skills, senior Kazakhstani this year’s exercise. officers participate in an English This year’s Steppe Eagle 2013 was Language Training Program at the especially important because a team of Royal College of Defence Studies and experts from NATO’s SHAPE Royal Military Academy at Sandhurst Military Partnership Directorate is in the UK. More junior military Central Asia-Caucasus Analyst, 18 September 2013 9 personnel learn English at York St present a more plausible danger to John University in Britain and in Kazakhstan. classes organized by the British AUTHOR’S BIO: Dr. Richard Weitz Military and Advisory Training Team is a Senior Fellow and Director of the (BMATT) at Vyskov in the Czech Center for Political-Military Analysis Republic. Other KAZBRIG personnel at the Hudson Institute. attend different courses at BMATT, which is the UK Ministry of Defence’s Training Establishment for Peace Support Operations for the militaries of Eastern Europe, Central Asia and North Africa. NATO certification would also confirm the KAZBRIG’s ability to operate in a multinational peacekeeping environment under a UN mandate. In line with the country’s current defense doctrine, the Kazakhstani government has announced its intention to provide approximately 200 personnel from the KAZBRIG to one or more UN peacekeeping missions. It would still be difficult to send the entire unit since Kazakhstan’s constitution prohibits the deployment of conscript soldiers on foreign missions; only long-term professional soldiers can be sent. And KAZBRIG, like other Kazakhstani military units, still contains some conscripts. CONCLUSIONS: Sustaining KAZBRIG is important for promoting interoperability between NATO and the rest of Kazakhstan’s military, which have less compatible equipment, training, and command and control arrangements. Most of the Kazakhstani armed forces also rely heavily on traditional Soviet military doctrine, which prioritizes defeating an adversary’s conventional forces. Such a posture is not optimal for the type of foreign terrorist threats that currently Central Asia-Caucasus Analyst, 18 September 2013 10

MOSCOW SIGNALS INTENTION TO ESTABLISH GREATER CONTROL OVER CHECHNYA Valeriy Dzutsev

An increasing number of conflicts between Chechnya’s strongman Ramzan Kadyrov and Moscow may signify that the Russian government is gearing up to change the status quo in Chechnya. Regional authorities and Kadyrov himself have long been exempt from Russian law, which Russian leaders have motivated as a necessity for keeping Chechnya stable. Kadyrov’s success in keeping Moscow at bay has to a large extent depended on his personal relationship with President Putin. Growing resentment among ethnic Russians against North Caucasians and Putin’s weakening position make a tougher position on Moscow’s part against Chechnya’s pro-Moscow government more likely, a development that may have numerous unintended consequences.

BACKGROUND: On August 29, the investigated by the Chechen side, Russian Prosecutor General’s office according to the Russian prosecution. surprisingly confronted abuses by the The Russian official said that overall, Chechen law enforcement agencies, nearly 3,000 people in the North issuing a special penalty ruling for their Caucasus are listed as missing, over colleagues in Chechnya. Sergei half of which went missing during the Vasilkov, the deputy head of the war in Chechnya. On August 31, the Prosecutor General’s office in the Chechen side retaliated by sending a North Caucasus Federal District, letter to the president of Russia and the explained to the public that Chechen leader of Chechnya, asking them to investigators failed to launch find people who had been kidnapped by investigations into 60 cases of the Russian forces and to punish the disappearances and kidnappings that perpetrators. The letter was signed by took place in the republic during the 300 relatives of those kidnapped. period 1990-2000. Vasilkov cited the Russian officials extremely rarely go kidnapping of the Russian President’s public about present or past adverse Plenipotentiary Representative developments in Chechnya. The Valentin Vlasov, who was kidnapped Russian government arguably in 1998 and released within several committed more crimes in Chechnya months after the payment of a ransom. than did Kadyrov, however notorious Three reporters of Russian news he may be. Hence, prosecutor Vasilkov agencies, 20 police officers, one was selective about which cases to prosecutor-general, two FSB officers, highlight and exclusively focused on seven foreign citizens and over 50 other those taking place during Chechnya’s Russian citizens were also on the list of period of quasi-independence in 1996- kidnapping cases that were not Central Asia-Caucasus Analyst, 18 September 2013 11

the Chechen government simply ignored them. “Kadyrov’s ‘guardsmen’ are absolutely immune to Russian laws,” Kalyapin told Bigcaucasus.com in an interview in March 2013. In March-April 2013, Russian liberal paper Novaya Gazeta unveiled a story about Kadyrov’s men engaging in kidnappings, torture and extortions in Moscow. Yet, soon after those accused 1999, when Aslan Maskhadov ruled the were detained, they were promptly Chechen Republic of Ichkeria. released and Russian security officers Kadyrov and his entourage are still involved in the investigation reportedly vulnerable to the accusations since staged a walkout in Moscow. Since many, including Kadyrov himself, then, negative news about Kadyrov and participated in Chechnya’s struggle Chechnya has prevailed in the Russian against Russian forces during the first media and pressure on Kadyrov’s Chechen war in 1994-1996 and government has mounted. In late May, afterwards. Having defected to the Kadyrov promised to remove all his Russian side at the start of the second portraits from the streets in Chechnya Russian-Chechen war in 1999, Kadyrov during a confrontational press along with his father, Ahmad Kadyrov conference with Russian journalists and used brutal tactics to suppress made good on his promise. resistance in Chechnya. Russia attained Many observers believe that the relative peace and stability in Chechnya precarious peace in Chechnya is by delegating much power to Kadyrov's founded on personal agreements family, having implemented a policy of between Putin and Kadyrov. While the so-called Chechenization. However, the latter received enormous powers within central government also lost much Chechnya, he also provided a control over the republic. semblance of stability and loyalty to IMPLICATIONS: Many Russian Russia that had been unknown to commentators lamented the fact that Chechnya for many years. Changing Chechnya under Kadyrov became more this balance would seem unwise on independent than was the case under its Moscow’s part. However, there are at previous separatist leaders, while at the least two interlinked factors that same time securing generous funding undermine Chechnya’s special status from Moscow. within Russia: the rising resent among According to Alexander Kalyapin, head ethnic Russians toward North of the Russian Committee Against Caucasians and the gradual decline of Torture, even such seemingly Putin’s popularity. Changes in Russia’s omnipotent Russian agencies as the policy toward Chechnya are also FSB could not properly carry out consistent with the general trend of investigations on Chechen territory as establishing greater direct rule by Central Asia-Caucasus Analyst, 18 September 2013 12

Russian authorities in the North Russian citizens, most prominently Caucasus. North Caucasians. Russian nationalism is on the rise and What appears to be a “race to the slogans such as “Stop Feeding the bottom” is taking place in Russia, as [North] Caucasus!” have become both Putin’s regime and leading common in the country. Ethnic opposition figures, such as Alexei Russians feel that too much of the Navalny, strive to outperform each country’s resources are consumed by other in harshness on the North the predominantly non-Russian North Caucasus. Chechnya is naturally the Caucasus. At the same time, ethnic first target because Kadyrov evidently Russians have become less tolerant enjoys the greatest degree of autonomy toward the non-Russian culture of the from Moscow among all regional North Caucasians and frustrated with leaders and has the closest relationship the situation in the region. A poll with Vladimir Putin. The stakes in conducted by the Levada Center, a Chechnya are quite high, because respected polling organization, in July unsettling the situation in the republic 2013 revealed that 75 percent of Russians for the third time since the breakup of thought that the situation in the North the USSR will take place in very Caucasus was “critical,” “explosive” different circumstances. During the and “tense.” This percentage has first two wars with Russia, Chechnya remained almost exactly the same was an island of instability in the every year since 2007. North Caucasus. In contrast, most As ethnic Russians become increasingly parts of the North Caucasus are now critical of Moscow’s policies toward the unstable and Chechnya is not currently North Caucasus, Russian politicians, the most violent republic. If the including Putin, must react to the situation in Chechnya would spiral out changing attitudes. The popular of control, the area of instability in the opposition figure Alexei Navalny made North Caucasus would expand more good use of the Russian government’s than ever before in recent history. mistakes in the North Caucasus, CONCLUSIONS: As the Russian pressing the Kremlin to adopt a harder government indicates that it wants to line in order to keep up with public establish greater control over opinion. The election campaign for the Chechnya, tensions in the republic and position of Moscow’s mayor, which the wider North Caucasus region risk culminated in the victory of the intensifying. Russian nationalism incumbent Kremlin candidate Sergei appears to be the main driver behind Sobyanin on September 8, also led to a the changes as both the Kremlin and sweeping crackdown on illegal popular opposition figures are headed in migrants in the city. Due to the long the same direction of establishing held Russian tradition of restricting the greater direct rule over Chechnya and movement of its own citizens, illegal in the North Caucasus in general. migrants in the Russian capital Breaking the status quo in Chechnya included not only foreigners but also would likely result in a ripple effect Central Asia-Caucasus Analyst, 18 September 2013 13 throughout the already volatile North Caucasus. These processes appear to be closely linked with the trajectory of Putin’s regime. As the regime is becoming weaker, the pressure on Kadyrov’s government is likely to increase. Changes in Chechnya and in the North Caucasus in general appear to be imminent. AUTHOR’S BIO: Valeriy Dzutsev is a Senior Non-Resident Fellow at Jamestown Foundation and Doctoral Student in Political Science at Arizona State University. Central Asia-Caucasus Analyst, 18 September 2013 14

YEVKUROV REELECTED PRESIDENT OF INGUSHETIA Tomáš Šmíd

On September 8, the president of Ingushetia was for the first time in history elected by the Ingushetian parliament. The People's Assembly elected the highest representative of this North Caucasian republic, and could choose from three candidates, all of whom were nominated by the President of Russia, Vladimir Putin. The candidates were Urushan Yevloyev, Magomed Tatriev and the incumbent President of Ingushetia, Yunus-bek Yevkurov. As many observers predicted, Yevkurov won the elections having received 25 out of 27 votes. The remaining two deputies voted for Yevloyev. Yevkurov was inaugurated soon after his election.

BACKGROUND: In the past, it has As many observers predicted, been up to the Ingush voters to elect Yevkurov won the elections by their presidents, of which Ruslan receiving 25 out of 27 votes. He was Aushev(1993-2001) and Murat Zyazikov subsequently inaugurated and made a (2002-2008) were legitimized this way. mandatory oath of affirmation. Along In later years, only those appointed by with tremendously multiethnic the President of Russia were allowed to Dagestan, virtually mono-ethnic run, which applied to Zyazikov as well Ingushetia remains the only republic of as Yevkurov. However, in April 2008 the Russian Federation to have a the Kremlin ruled that Ingushetia’s president elected by parliament. president should again be elected IMPLICATIONS: Yevkurov has among several nominated candidates. never been in a secure position since the Consequently, the People’s Assembly very beginning of his political career, concluded that the head of Ingushetia and the Kremlin has been highly shall be elected by the Parliament. mistrustful of him. When he started his The main argument against allowing first term in office, violent rebel actions direct presidential elections though a inside Ingushetia’s territory rose popular vote is that the high level of significantly, and Yevkurov survived tension in the North Caucasus makes one assassination attempt. campaigning too risky. Russia’s Prime Additionally, Yevkurov has been forced Minister stated that to face Ramzan Kadyrov, the ambitious the culture of the Ingushetian people leader of the neighboring Chechen makes them distinctive in a way that Republic. Yevkurov has long been prevents them from holding a regular aware of the fact that the Kremlin presidential election. Yevkurov, the favored Kadyrov. candidate favored by Kremlin, had the However, things have changed as the same opinion, possibly due to concerns Kremlin has stated that Yevkurov is over the potential results of a popular the Kremlin’s favorite and will be the vote. sovereign ruler of Ingushetia, at least Central Asia-Caucasus Analyst, 18 September 2013 15

the Kremlin is much stronger. By supporting Yevkurov, Putin has most likely signaled to Kadyrov that he should stay away from the internal affairs of Ingushetia, at least until the end of the Olympics. The prospect of Yevkurov assuming a leadership role in the North Caucasus region is almost inconceivable. for this year. Although Kadyrov is Ingushetia is the smallest North viewed as Putin’s principal ally in the Caucasian republic, while Chechnya region, Putin indirectly supported constitutes the most populous nation of Yevkurov on several occasions. Some the region. In short, unlike Yevkurov, observers believe that the Kremlin aims Kadyrov controls a pivotal territory in to change its overall strategy in the the region. In addition, despite region. Since Yevkurov prefers soft Kadyrov's heavy handed and violent power over violence to tackle Islamism exercise of political power, he still and rebellions, making him the new enjoys a significant degree of popular North Caucasian leader might ensure a support. The author's own experience long-term benefit for the Kremlin. during several visits to the North Kadyrov’s ruthless approach to the Caucasus supports this claim. Indeed, insurgency no longer seems effective many Ingush would prefer a Kadyrov- and the Kremlin’s support for him risks like ruler to a soft leader. Most people becoming counterproductive. believe that exercising hard power has Nevertheless, the Kremlin’s potential proven to be more effective in the short decision to support Yevkurov over term. Yevkurov's determination to Kadyrov remains hypothetical. Earlier instead use soft power has, however, this year, observers anticipated that the gradually lowered the number of Kremlin might get rid of Yevkurov victims to violence in Ingushetia. with the help of Kadyrov. In the end Even though Yevkurov's strategy however, the Kremlin decided to keep might be successful in tackling the issue the North Caucasian representatives in of armed Islamic violence, he has not their places. Observers believe that the managed to eradicate or even diminish Kremlin will back Yevkurov, at least the level of corruption and nepotism. until the Winter Olympics are The public, and in particular those who launched in Sochi. Nevertheless, the are not part of Yevkurov’s clan, are Kremlin’s support for Yevkurov is aware of the fact that Yevkurov has restricted to the inner territory of accomplished little in this regard. Ingushetia. On the one hand, Putin Although electing the president via the backed Yevkurov as a presidential parliament was intended to prevent candidate. On the other hand, taking radicals from resorting to violence, the whole North Caucasus region into Security Chief Ahmed Kotiev was account, the link between Kadyrov and killed on August 27. Besides being a Central Asia-Caucasus Analyst, 18 September 2013 16 high ranking official, Kotiev was an scenario. Yevkurov can now count on essential component in Yevkurov’s the Kremlin's backing, at least in the plan for tackling extremism and short term. As far as Kadyrov's radicalism. Ingushetian “Boyeviks” interventions into Ingushetia’s internal (bandits in the Russian parlance) have affairs are concerned, it is likely that claimed responsibility for the murder. Yevkurov will have the Kremlin's Despite the fact that this was not the support in this regard as well. first attempt on Kotiev's life, the Nevertheless, things might change security chief refused to have drastically once the Winter Olympics bodyguards protecting him. Kotiev's in Sochi are over. Ingushetia, like other predecessor Bashir Aushev, cousin of North Caucasian republics, has to bear the former president , this in mind. Yevkurov will have to was also killed in 2009. Unlike Aushev, stay alert to the risk that North who employed ruthless tactics against Caucasian Islamists led by Doku Boyeviks while also prosecuting Umarov could act to disrupt the Winter innocent people, Kotiev promoted a Olympics. If Umarov strikes, the policy of prevention and reintegration. Kremlin might retaliate in a brutal Nevertheless, blood revenge might manner. From Adygea to Dagestan, all have been the motivation for Kotiev’s North Caucasian politicians and murder and he had worked as security observers worry that such events will chief long enough to make some take place. The assassination of Kotiev enemies. However, the fact that the is a reminder that even the highest assassination took place before the ranking officials are vulnerable to elections is unlikely to be a coincidence. insurgent attacks. Having been elected president, AUTHOR'S BIO: Tomah Šmíd is Yevkurov continues to pursue his main assistant professor at Masaryk objectives of dealing with radical University. He was a Fulbright Fellow Islamists while simultaneously at the Central Asia-Caucasus Institute retaining the Kremlin’s confidence and in 2010-2011. support. In addition to the struggle for influence in his own republic, Yevkurov also has to face Kadyrov in a clash over the means for conducting counterinsurgency in the North Caucasus. CONCLUSIONS: Yevkurov won the elections, meeting the expectations of most observers. The Kremlin gave the deputies of the People’s Assembly a clear sense of direction by backing Yevkurov before the elections took place. By voting for Yevkurov, the deputies fulfilled the only possible Central Asia-Caucasus Analyst, 18 September 2013 17

AZERBAIJAN GEARS UP FOR PRESIDENTIAL ELECTIONS Mina Muradova

On October 9, ten candidates for executive secretary Natig Jafarli wrote president will struggle for the votes of on his Facebook page and recognized almost five million Azerbaijani voters. there was little hope that Mammadov’s Observers have expressed doubts over candidacy would be registered, the transparency and fairness of the “…because Azerbaijani authorities are upcoming elections and increasing in favor of decreasing interest in the pressure on journalists has induced elections and do everything to calm youth and political activists to organize down any political activity related to protest actions against the government the elections. If Mammadov was in recent months. registered, he would be released and The president of Azerbaijan is directly give extensive public statements, which elected for a five-year term by absolute would lead to increased interest in the majority. Constitutional amendments elections by creating a political intrigue in 2009 removed the limitation for a within the campaign. The authorities, president to serve no more than two taking all these aspects into account, consecutive terms. Thus, the preferred not to register his candidacy,” incumbent president can run for a third Jafarli noted. On September 16, Jafarli term in the upcoming elections. informed via his Facebook page that the Ten candidates are nominated for board of REAL called on its followers elections, eight of which are largely to give their votes to a second loyal to the authorities and not opposition candidate, Jamil Hasanli. considered serious challengers to Election officials have allowed Hasanli, incumbent President Aliyev. On 61, a historian and former opposition September 13, the Central Election MP who currently teaches Modern Commission (CEC) barred opposition History at Baku State University, to candidate Ilgar Mammadov, a leader of run in the October presidential the Republican Alternative (REAL) elections. Hasanli is nominated by the opposition movement, from running National Council of Democratic against President Aliyev, who is Forces, established by around 20 nominated by the ruling New opposition parties and groups, and Azerbaijan Party for a third term. represents the joint opposition as a Mammadov was registered as a single candidate. He replaced Rustam candidate on August 27, though he has Ibrahimbeyov, a famous screenwriter been in detention since his arrest in whose works include the Oscar- February on charges of inciting a riot. winning Russian film Burnt by the “This is a pure political decision and Sun. The CEC blocked his candidacy, not a decision made by the Central referring to his double citizenship in Election Commission,” REAL’s Azerbaijan and Russia. Ibrahimbeyov Central Asia-Caucasus Analyst, 18 September 2013 18 requested the cancellation of his of expression, assembly and Russian citizenship and later accused association, and the functioning of the Kremlin of deliberately delaying the pluralist democracy, have not been process as a favor to President Aliyev. implemented. In addition, the Venice In an address to fellow opposition Commission recommendation related members in late August, Hasanli stated to the composition of electoral that, “Today, I believe that the criminal commissions at all levels has not been government of Azerbaijan is not only properly addressed. “The President’s facing the opposition forces, but the decision not to conduct a campaign of whole nation … the authorities finally his own on the grounds that he is well- must feel the strength of the people. known by his deeds is disappointing. The government finally must respect Furthermore, his frequent presence in our nation’s voice and return the most the media, while totally legitimate fundamental constitutional right back given his functions as the incumbent, to the people – that the people are the puts other competitors at a source of the power.” disadvantage,” according to the PACE Incumbent President Aliyev, who came statement. to power in 2003 after the death of his The Election Monitoring and father Heydar, is widely expected to be Democracy Studies Center (EMDS), a re-elected in the October 9 polls. local nonpartisan, nongovernmental Observers from various international organization promoting elections, and local organizations noted a lack of issued an interim report saying that debates and a low level of pre-election signatures in favor of Aliyev were activity. A pre-electoral delegation of collected behind the closed doors of the Parliamentary Assembly of the schools, hospitals, and other state- Council of Europe (PACE) issued a funded entities. “We registered a statement on September 13 statement, massive collection of personal IDs from saying that the forthcoming election employees of schools and their further will be held in “an apparently submission to local governor’s competitive” environment. “At the administrations in some districts. We same time, the lack of credible believe that signatures were collected challengers to the incumbent President not only in favor of Ilham Aliyev, but has led to the absence of a substantive also for some pseudo-opposition nationwide debate. Distinctions candidates,” said Anar Mammadli, between the political platforms of head of EMDS, and noted that the would-be opposition candidates are center also registered that people were rather vague, the struggle boiling down induced to give their signatures “in to a clash of personalities.” A full 32- exchange for solutions to their member delegation from PACE will problems by local officials or arrive in Azerbaijan on October 7 to municipalities.” observe the voting. Human Rights Watch said in its PACE stressed that its many September report that the Azerbaijani recommendations, concerning freedom authorities are engaged in a “deliberate” Central Asia-Caucasus Analyst, 18 September 2013 19 and “abusive” strategy to limit dissent The group also reported a “dramatic” before the elections. “The strategy is deterioration in the government’s designed to curtail opposition political record on freedom of expression, activity, limit public criticism of the assembly, and association in the last 18 government, and exercise greater months. control over nongovernmental organizations. The clampdown on freedom of expression, assembly, and association has accelerated in the months preceding the October presidential elections,” the report noted.

WILL GEORGIA FOLLOW ARMENIA’S PATH TOWARDS EURASIAN UNION? Archil Zhorzholiani

On September 4, Georgian Prime September 8 that the government Minister Bidzina Ivanishvili stated that aimed to accelerate the signing of an Georgia could join the Russia- Association Agreement with the EU, sponsored Eurasian Union if this would including provisions on a Deep and benefit the country’s interests. Comprehensive Free Trade Area “I am looking at it with attention and (DCFTA), in spring 2014. we are studying it. At this stage we Government officials have sought to have no position at all. If in perspective diminish the implications of we see that it is interesting for the Ivanishvili’s remarks, insisting that strategy of our country, then why not; Ivanishvili only suggested that but at this stage we have no position,” developments surrounding the Eurasian Bidzina Ivanishvili said. Union should be observed, not that The statement drew much attention Georgia should join it. Some Georgian especially in light of Armenia's analysts have translated the PM’s decision, announced a day earlier, to remarks as a diplomatic effort intended join the Customs Union with Russia, to contribute to Georgian-Russian which will come at the expense of an rapprochement. Advocates of such an Association Agreement with the EU. approach assert that by not excluding The Georgian PM later explained that participation in the Kremlin’s Eurasian his remarks did not imply a revision of initiative, Ivanishvili attempted to Georgia’s foreign policy, of which moderate Georgia’s official stance integration with the EU and NATO towards Moscow. remains a cornerstone. To buttress his By contrast, the opposition United words, Ivanishvili announced on National Movement (UNM) party Central Asia-Caucasus Analyst, 18 September 2013 20 sharply criticized Ivanishvili’s remarks, been well-grounded. In fact, it is arguing that they constituted a threat to impossible to reconcile participation in Georgia’s sovereignty and security. the EU’s free trade zone with President Mikheil Saakashvili asserted membership of Russia’s Custom and that over the past ten years Georgia’s Eurasian Unions, as each provide pro-western foreign policy course had different custom regimes. never been questioned by any major What exactly Ivanishvili's government political force, whereas Ivanishvili’s intends to explore is unclear since on recent statement risked reversing this July 22 the EU and Georgia successfully record. “The government explores a ended negotiations on a DCFTA, the Eurasian Union membership efficiency of which was detailed in a perspective… but there is no need for Trade Sustainability Impact studying and analyzing the possibility Assessment between the EU and of returning back into the fold of the Georgia, forecasting that occupying power,” he said. the DCFTA has the potential to Giga Bokeria, Secretary of the National increase Georgia’s exports to the EU by Security Council, termed the Eurasian 12 percent and imports by 7.5 percent. Union Putin’s tool for halting the Moreover, Ivanishvili’s statement came European integration of Russia’s immediately after Yerevan’s decision to neighboring states and denounced the reverse its European course, PM for failing to offer a clear position underlining its potential implications. on the issue. Since Armenia does not share a The UNM’s presidential candidate physical border with Russia and its David Bakradze claimed that the frontier with Azerbaijan is closed due upcoming presidential elections would to the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict, not be only about voting for a Georgia remains the only potential candidate, but the manifestation of a state to serve as a transit country. In Georgian choice before the world and this context, Ivanishvili’s previous talk whether the country’s struggle for about reopening rail traffic between freedom and European values will Russia and Armenia through Georgia continue. and its breakaway region of Abkhazia, Bakradze said that Georgian Dream’s obtains increased significance (see the candidate Giorgi Margvelashvili would 02/03/2013 issue of the CACI Analyst). incrementally bring the country under Armenia’s membership in the Customs Russia’s influence while the former Union risks strengthening the rationale speaker of parliament Nino Burjanadze for such projects to the detriment of the would do it immediately, implying that interests of Azerbaijan, which will seek the UNM remains the only political to discourage Tbilisi from taking part. force truly following the European Thus, Moscow’s pressure on both Baku path. and Tbilisi is likely to increase. Although the UNM has deftly used Since no other country engaged in the Ivanishvili's statement to boost its EU’s Eastern Partnership is as strongly election campaign, its criticism has dependent economically and politically Central Asia-Caucasus Analyst, 18 September 2013 21 on Russia as Armenia, it might be EU’s support for the rights of sexual harder for the Kremlin to force Tbilisi and religious minorities (see the to replicate Yerevan’s move. However, 05/30/2013 issue of the CACI Analyst). Moscow possesses many other Thus, apart from ethnic tensions, instruments to exercise influence on Moscow could seek to stimulate Georgia. provocations along these lines, which The Orthodox Church, which has would discredit Georgia in Brussels and tremendous clout in Georgian society, undermine the prospects of signing an does not welcome the process of Association Agreement between the European integration and condemns the EU and Georgia.

TAJIK OPPOSITION PARTIES NOMINATE FEMALE CANDIDATE PRESIDENT Alexander Sodiqov

On September 9, the Alliance of social and ideological roots as well as a Reformist Forces of Tajikistan (ARFT) complex organizational structure. The announced that its members will group served as a leading force in the support a unified candidate during the United Tajik Opposition (UTO) which presidential elections set for November fought against the government of 6, 2013. The Alliance includes the incumbent President Emomali Rahmon country’s two leading opposition during the 1992-1997 civil war. The parties, the Islamic Revival Party IRPT’s main support bases are the (IRPT) and Social-Democratic Party traditionally more religious (SDPT), as well as a number of non- communities in the eastern Rasht governmental organizations and Valley (Gharm) and the southwestern prominent individuals. During the region of Qurghonteppa (Kurgan- upcoming elections, these diverse Tube), although it has supporters political forces will rally behind throughout the country. The SDPT, in Oynihol Bobonazarova, a 65-year old contrast, draws its support from among woman lawyer and human rights a much narrower group of urban-based activist, not currently associated with intelligentsia united around the party’s any political party. leader, prominent lawyer and activist The announcement followed uneasy Rahmatillo Zoyirov. negotiations between the members of The IRPT is by far the strongest the ARFT over a candidate who would political force in the Alliance, and the be acceptable to their very different party’s leader, Muhiddin Kabiri, faced constituencies. The IRPT is the largest strong pressure from members and opposition group in the country and supporters to run for president. By perhaps the one closest resembling a agreeing to throw his support behind a genuine political party with strong female presidential candidate, who is Central Asia-Caucasus Analyst, 18 September 2013 22 neither a member of the IRPT nor announced whether he would seek re- known as a very pious person, Kabiri election, few people in the country risked alienating many of his doubt that he will join the contest. constituencies. In order to prevent this Rahmon will almost certainly run for from happening and to legitimate the office which he has held since 1993. Bobonazarova in the eyes of the party’s The Democratic Party (DPT) and conservative and patriarchal Agrarian Party (APT) have also membership, Hoji Akbar Turajonzoda, nominated their candidates, while the a prominent Islamic leader who had Communist Party (CPT) and Socialist served as part of the IRPT’s senior Party (SPT) have announced their leadership in the past, was made intention to run for the presidency. Bobonazarova’s proxy Rahmon will almost certainly win the (doverennoyelitso). upcoming elections and thus ensure Kabiri has also stressed that the party’s another seven years in office for late founder and leader, Said Abdullo himself (the current constitution does Nuri, had a high regard for not allow him to hold the office beyond Bobonazarova and even nominated her 2020). During the contest, as Deputy Prosecutor General as part of Bobonazarova is expected to be the a government quota awarded to the second most popular candidate. UTO after the civil war. She refused However, she is not likely to pose any the nomination in 1997. On September serious challenge to Rahmon. The 17, the IRPT’s congress endorsed country’s first ever female presidential Bobonazarova as a presidential candidate is virtually unknown to candidate. Barzu Abdurazzokov, a voters outside of major urban centers. prominent Tajik theater and film During the seven weeks remaining director, also accepted an offer to before the elections, she is unlikely to become Bobonazarova’s proxy during win many votes without access to state- the congress. controlled television or to other The SDPT, whose leadership had advantages afforded to the incumbent worked closely with Bobonazarova in president, such as the full control of the the past, will find it much less difficult election administration, legions of to identify with her personality and loyal, state-employed voters, religious political views. Zoyirov has urged the authorities, army conscripts, and the country’s civil society, social media ability to blend official duties and activists, and members of the Tajik campaign activity. opposition in exile to support Besides, even if Bobonazarova had Bobonazarova. many voters to support her on election In order to formally enter the day, there would be no guarantee that presidential contest, Bobonazarova still these votes would count. Tajikistan has needs to gather 210,000 signatures from never held an election judged free of her supporters before October 7. fair by western observers, and it is very Although the country’s veteran leader difficult to gauge to what extent the President Rahmon has not yet Central Asia-Caucasus Analyst, 18 September 2013 23 election results reported by the Organization for Security and authorities reflect the voters’ will. Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) Office A lawyer by education, Bobonazarova in Tajikistan. From 1996 to 2007, was among the founders of the Bobonazarova headed Tajikistan’s Democratic Party of Tajikistan (DPT) branch of the Soros Foundation (now in the late 1980s. After the DPT joined called Open Society Foundations), a the IRPT in fighting against the philanthropic organization supporting “constitutional” government (headed democracy and human rights. After by Rahmon after November 1992), 2007, she led a Western-funded human Bobonazarova was arrested in 1993 and rights NGO involved in monitoring charged with treason and a coup prisons, fighting against torture, and attempt. She was later pardoned by defending the rights of women and Rahmon and, from 1996-2004, she labor migrants. served as an adviser with the

BISHKEK HOSTS THE 2013 SCO SUMMIT Arslan Sabyrbekov

On September 13, 2013, a summit of the The Kyrgyz President stated that the Shanghai Cooperation Organization activities of terrorist and extremist (SCO) took place in Bishkek, the groups are still on the rise in capital of the Kyrgyzstan. The leaders Afghanistan and called on the SCO of Russia, China, Tajikistan, member states to continuously support Uzbekistan, Kazakhstan, Afghanistan, Kabul in its effort and determination to Iran and Mongolia, as well as revive the country. Atambayev stated delegations from India and Pakistan, that Bishkek will host an international both of which have observer status in conference on the situation in the SCO, attended the summit and Afghanistan on October 10, 2013. The outlined their positions on a number of conference will be attended by geopolitical issues. The joint positions prominent experts and will serve as yet of the participants were reflected in the another opportunity to jointly search so-called "Bishkek Declaration." for solutions, exchange ideas and The security situation in Afghanistan concerns. following the withdrawal of the NATO This year’s Summit in Bishkek was troops by the end of 2014 was one of the also highlighted by the participation of major topics of international concern the newly elected Iranian President discussed at the 13th SCO Summit in Hassan Rouhani, his first foreign trip Bishkek. Kyrgyzstan's President since taking office on August 4, 2013. Almazbek Atambayev, whose country The Iranian President used the SCO has been chairing the SCO for the last Summit to hold a number of bilateral year, expressed his deep concern over talks with other foreign leaders, among the situation in Afghanistan after 2014. them Russian President Vladimir Central Asia-Caucasus Analyst, 18 September 2013 24

Putin, who stated that Iran, just like these agreements demonstrate that the any other member of the international Central Asian countries of the former community, has a right to develop and are no longer locked in use nuclear power for peaceful Moscow’s embrace when it comes to purposes. In his turn, President economic investments. At the Bishkek Rouhani supported Moscow’s position SCO summit, China reiterated its on the situation in Syria, saying that support for Moscow’s position on the any external military involvement situation in Syria and additionally should be possible only with the suggested to launch a special SCO consent of the UN Security Council account to provide financial support for and only after the exhaustion of all members in urgent need. diplomatic tools. The Chinese, Kazakh, The Bishkek Summit concluded with Kyrgyz, Uzbek and Tajik leaders also the adoption of the respective expressed their support for Russia’s declaration, which stresses the need to position and jointly welcomed the take joint actions in the fight against decision of Damascus to join a global terrorism, extremism, separatism, ban on chemical weapons. Kyrgyz illegal drug trafficking and other Political Scientist Sheradil Baktygulov transnational threats. The Bishkek believes that the formulation of these Declaration also included a joint joint positions on the matters of position of the member states on the international and regional issues is an situation in Syria, namely respect for important step forward for turning the country’s sovereignty and the need SCO into a regionally united platform to put Syrian chemical weapons under and force. international control. The declaration The participation of the Chinese also focused on the further President Xi Jinping at the Bishkek modernization of national economies, summit was also under close scrutiny the establishment of an even closer from the international community. It investment partnership, cooperation in must be recalled that prior to the start the field of innovative technologies and of the Summit, the Chinese leader paid the agricultural sector, development of official visits to almost all the Central transport and communications, and the Asian capitals and managed to conclude need to carry out further works on energy deals worth billions of dollars. launching a special SCO Development During his visit to Ashgabat, the sides Bank. reached an agreement over the potential In accordance with the Charter of the tripling of gas imports to China by institution, the chairmanship for the 2020. Furthermore, Beijing signed deals coming period was handed over to with Tashkent worth US$ 15 billion and Tajikistan, which will host next year’s expressed its readiness to invest summit in its capital Dushanbe. another 3 billion into strategically important neighboring Kyrgyzstan. Foreign policy experts believe that