Green Learning: The Role of Scientists and the Environmental Movement

Anita Krajnc

A thesis submitted in conforrnity with the requirements of the degree of Doctor of Philosophy Graduate Department of Political Science University of Toronto

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This thesis compares and contrasts the role of scientists and the envîronmentai movement in international environmental affairs . The influence of these two critical agents of change is, in large part, due to their role in advancing learning. The role of scientists is highlighted in the epistemic communities approach and the environmental movement in the growing non- governmental organization (NGO) literature. But the two approaches offer very different propositions with respect to who has to tearn to effect policy change. In the first approach, convergence in scientific knowledge as well as the placement of scientists in positions of power facilitates govemment leamïng and the prospects for policy change. In the second approach, the environrnental movement promotes public education which results in (1) public pressure on governrnents and intergovernmental bodies to adopt new or better policies, and (2) the transmittal of an ecological sensibility in globd civil society, which further enhances environrnental protection. In short, the impetus to regime development provided by scientific convergence is emphasized by the former, and broad-based, public education, by the latter.

A Merobjective of the research is to describe the process of broad based societal learning. While many political scientists acknowledge the importance of public education, the question of how broad based societal learning takes place is less well understood. Much cm be learned from the public education strategies adopted by relatively successful social movements, such as the early American labour and civil rights movements. A Progressive Societal Learning and Social Change Model is offered which highlights the roIe of NGO activities, protest rncsic, films, formal and informal education, the media, and so forth. The Model asserts that a range of learning sources need to be employed for vibrant and effective social movements. The two case studies examined (climate change and BC forests) differ with respect to role of scientists and the environmental movement. In the case of climate change, scientists, rather than environmental groups are responsible for climate change getting on the

international agenda. But environmental (and other) groups are beginning to play a crucial role in transforming climate change fiom an agenda item to a political pro- - a task for which scientists are less adept. 1argue that the clirnate regime is stalled at a declaratory and promotional stage due to weak societal leaming. The development of a strong

irnplementation and enforcement regime is dependent upon a rnuc h stronger environmental movement and more effective public information campaigns.

In contrast, in the Clayoquot Sound and Great Bear Rainforest campaigns in British Columbia, the environmentai movement took the lead in promoting societal learning and social change whereas conservation biologists are only beginning to organize and to have an impact. The environmental movement relied on a different rnix of 'green learning7 sources in the two campaigns, and consequently the type and scope of public education differed in each. In the early phases of the protests, public pressure models, which highlight the influence of public opinion and concern on policy-makers, are useful. However, the global civics politics mode1 (as developed by Paul Wapner) is especially useful in describing and explaining later stages of the forest campaigns. Having achieved insignificant policy changes, environmental groups attempted to build alternative global noms and procedures by turning to public education and market campaigns aimed at actors in the global civil society. Conservation biologists, corning from a relatively new field, have moved from the role of marginal players to occasional advisors to senior policy makers. Recentiy, conservation biologists have also taken the lead in developing a pnvate, transnational regime - the Yellowstone to Yukon Conservation Initiative. 1 dedicate this thesis to Susan and other activists working to make this world more livable and just for dl life. It was so evidently a wicked thing to spend one's pennies for drink, when the working class was wandering in darkness, and waiting to be delivered; the price of a glas of beer would buy fifty copies of a leaflet, and one could hand these out to the unregenerate, and then get drunk upon the thought of the good that was king accomplished. That was the way the movement had been made, and it was the only way it would progress; it availed nothing to know of it, without fighting for it - it was a thing for dl, not for a few! -Upton Sinclair, The Jungle AcknowIedgments 1 have been fortunate to have on my thesis committee three people who have profoundly influenced my academic path. 1 fmt encountered Janice Gross Stein in an introductory course in international relations when I was a fmt year, undergraduate student in astrophysics taking an elective. Her clear thinking and passion for understanding and responding to the threat of a global nuclear war inspired me to switch programs at once and to take Peace and Conflict Studies. For me, it's come full circle having her as my supervisor. 1also took a Third World politics course with Robert O. Matthews in the last year of my undergraduate studies, and remember being pertubed and unsure about which area in international relations to specialize in. Professor Matthews, in his typicdly eloquent way, made an irrefutable case for protecting the Earth's naturd environment and flora and fauna for present and future generations. Ever since, 1 have felt absolutely certain of my Iife purpose inside and outside academia. 1 thank him for being a guiding presence for me throughout. Evert Lindquist has contributed to my understanding of the crucial relationship between international relations theory and public poiicy, especially important in the case of transboundary issues like environmental politics. For his help in giving me the opportunity to do research on environmental restructuring in Canada, 1 am permanently grateful. Over the years, 1 have benefited enormously from working as a teaching assistant and co- organizer with Russ Houldin, Doug MacDonald, Robert Paehlke, Beth Savan, and Ruth Grier at the Innis Environmental Studies Program - a home away from rny home discipline of Political Science. 1 am gratefül to Russ Houldin who went through the entire thesis, and to Paul Wapner, David Welch, and Franklyn Griffith for providing very helpful comrnents on parts of my thesis. My thanks go also to a host of social activists and fiends who have assisted me in my research on the environmental, animal rights, labour, and civil rights movements. My great interest is to make linkages between different progressive causes, and three individuals have stood out in helping me see the connections: Shelly Lipsey whom 1 met at the blockades in Clayoquot Sound; Larry Wartel from the Great Bear Rainforest campaign; and Tony Weis from the Ontario battles against the neo-conservative Harris government. 1 am grateful to Tzeporah Berman of Greenpeace International for showing me how effective nonviolent direct action can be in her role as blockade coordinator in Clayoquot in the sumrner of 1993, and later for giving me the opportunity to volunteer at the Greenpeace office in Vancouver; Valerie Langer of the Friends of Clayoquot Sound for always being happy to answer questions about the history of the Clayoquot protests; and Wmen Magnusson for inviting me to the Politics of Clayoquot Workshop in Tofino in May 1997. 1am thanldül to David Sztybel for his long standing friendship and support. Thanks to Tita Zierer for giving me a copy of Upton Sinclair's book, The Jude, and to Alicia da Conceiçao for patiently and generously offering me her expert computer assistance.

1owe a deep sense of gratitude to Susan Krajnc, my sister, for her constant encouragement of my efforts. 1 am grateful to my parents for their support and for providing me with space to work on my studies. 1 dedicate this thesis to Susan and other activists working to make this world more livable and just for ail life. Table of Contents Abstract Acknowledgments List of Tables and Figures Glossary Chapter One. Introduction Theoretical and Policy Goals Epistemological and Methodological Approaches (i) Drawing Lessons from Older, Progressive Social Movements (ii) Normative and Positivist Approaches (iii) State-centered and Non-s tate-centered Approac hes (iv) Participatory Research Outline of the Study

Chapter Two. Public Pressure, Civic Politics and Government Learning: Eco-Forecasting Versus Backcasting Eco-forecasting: A Typology of Positivist Learning Models Public Pressure Models Civic Politics Models Government Leaming Models

Government Education Models Eco-backcasting: Back From A Possible Future Defining Green Learning Type 1: Basic Information on the State of the Environment Type 2: Changes in Worldview Type 3: Action Learning and Citizen Engagement The Advocacy Coalition Framework Conclusions Chapter Three. The Art of Green Learning: From Protest Songs to Media Mind Bambs Mapping Societal Learning Channels Learning and Culture Protest Music Environmenta1 Li terature Environmental Art Environmental Film Leaming and the Media Leaming and Formal and Informal Schools A Progressive Societal Learning and Social Change Mode1 The Importance of the Arts in Education Promo ting Various Types of Learning Targeting Audiences Bottom-up and Top-down Education Linkages Across Learning Channels The Effects of Public Education on Social Change The Potential for Large-ScaIe Green Learning and Social Change Conclusions Chapter Four. Agents of Change: Scientists and the Environmental Movement The Epistemic Communities Approach The Social Change Movements Approach Public Relations and the Environment Research Questions Methodology: Case Studies Testability and Sources of Evidence Chapter Five. Scientific Convergence, PubIic Education and Climate Change: Moving From Agenda to Action? Scientific Knowledge as a Climate Regime-Driver The History of Climate Change Science Phase 1. The Long Road to Environmental Concem (1827-1957) Phase 2. The Global Warming Consensus (mid-1970s) Phase 3. The Growing Intemational Scientific Consensus (late 1970s to late 1980s) Phase 4: Consensus and Bargaining Power in the PCC (1988-present) The Role of Public Education in Climate Regime-Building The Environmental Movement Phase 1: The Primacy of NGO Lobbying (late 1980s to 1997) Phase 2: Direct Action and Public Information Campaigns: Stopping fossii fuel development and advocating for a Solar Century (1997-present) Media Protest Art Formal and Informal Schools The Weak, But Improving, State of Green Leaniing The Power of Scientific Knowledge Versus Public Education Scientists as Public Educators The Role of Crises in Raising Public Awareness and Concem Outside the PCC: The Fossil Fuel Industry Targets International Scientific Consensus Intergovernmental Learning and Responses: Principies and Targets Conclusions Chapter Six. Learning in the Clayoquot and Great Bear Rainforest Campaigns: From Public Pressure to Global Civic Politics The Public Pressure Approach Clayoquot's Cascading Campaign The Clayoquot Scientific Pane1 Other Policy Changes The Global Civic Politics Approach Acting and Thinking Globally: The Case of the Great Bear Rainforest Transnational NGO Involvement The Strategy of Global Civic Politics Transnational Public Education Global Norms and Green Markets: Governance Without Government? The Y2Y Conservation Initiative: Scientists and Private International Regirne-Building: Comparing the Roles of Scientists and the Environmental Movernent Conclusions

Chapter Seven. Conclusions: Agents of Green Learning - Scientists and the Environmental Movement Scientists as Regime-Drivers The Environrnental Movement and Societal Learning Choosing a Learning Mode1 Scientists and Environmentalists: Are They Aligned? Backcasting Our Way into the Future

Appendix A: State of the Environment Reports and Sustainability Indicators Appendix B: The US Climate Change Program Bibliography List of Tables and Figures

Figure 2.1 A Typology of Learning Models Table 2.1 Environment Reporting by Governments and NGOs Figure 3.1 Sources of Learning in Social Change Movements Figure 3.2 Sources of Learning and Their Influence on Social Change Table 4.1 Number of Multilateral Environment Agreements: 1911-1993 Figure 4.1 The Time Lags in the Learning and Decision-making Process Table 5.1 International Conferences on the Global CIimate Table 5.2 The US 2000 Federal Budget for Global Change Research Table 6.1 Sources of Green Learning in the Clayoquot Struggle Table 6.2 Sources of Green Learning in the Great Bear Rainforest Campaign Table 7.1 Comparing Regime Development in the Climate and Forest Cases Glossary AGGG Advisory Group on Greenhouse Gases CCHW Citizen's Clearinghouse on Hazardous Waste CEC Commission for Environmental Cooperation CEQ Council on Environmental Quality CO2 Carbon Dioxide CRC Coastal Rainforest Coalition ENGO Environmental Non-Govemental Organization FCCC Frarnework Convention on Climate Change FOCS Friends of Clayoquot Sound GCRP Global Change Research Program EPA the US Environmental Protection Agency FSC Forest Stewardship Council HDGC Human Dimensions of Global Change ICLEI International Council for Coca1 Environmental Initiatives ICSU International Council of Scientific Unions IISD International Institute for Sustainable Development PCC Intergovemrnental Panel on Climate Change n'O International Trade Organization MTPE Mission to Planet Earth NAFrA North American Free Trade Agreement NASA National Aeronautics and Space Administration NCAR National Center for Atrnospheric Research NGO nongovernmentd organization NRDC Natural Resource Defense Council OECD Organization for Econornic Cooperation and Development PETA People for the Ethicai Treaûnent of Animais RAN Rainforest Action Network UN United Nations UNDP United Nations Development Program UNEP United Nations Environrnent Program WCED World Commission on Environrnent and Developrnent WCP World Climate Program wcwc Western Canada Wilderness Cornmittee WI Worldwatch Institute WMO World Meteorological Organization WRI World Resources Institute WTO WorId Trade Organization Chapter One

Introduction

Scientists and the environmental rnovement are two critical agents of change in international environmental affairs. The influence of these two actors is due mainly to their role in advancing learning, whether it be by acquiring knowledge about the nahird world and the impacts of human activities, promoting environmental awareness, challenging anthropocentric worldviews, or rnobilizing the public, government, and others to act on their knowledge. The role of scientists is highlighted in the international relations literature on epistemic cornmunities, and that of the environmental movement in the growing literature on non-govermnental organizations (NGOs), sociai movements, and global civil society. But the two approaches offer very different explanations as to who has to learn to effect change. In the first approach, convergence in scientific knowledge as well as the placement of scientists in positions of power facilitate governrnent Iearning, and enhance the prospects for policy change. In the second approach, social movements pIay a central role in achieving social and political changes by promoting broad based public education. By involving the public in the learning process, the environmental movement can apply pubIic pressure on govemments and intergovernmental bodies to introduce policies to promote environmental protection and sustainable development, and, at the same time, foster an ecological sensibility in the global civil society itself which further preserves the environment. In short, the former emphasizes scientific consensus as a key impetus to the development of environmental regimes; the latter, public education, people power, and citizen engagement. The art and science of green learning places human agency on centre stage by assuming that the future does not necessarily unfold in a deterministic fashion-a slave to prior trends and matenal forces-beyond the grasp of the hurnan species. Multiple pathways are possible and feasible depending on a host of individual and collective choices rooted in different ideas and paradigrns about what consritutes a desirable future, new information and understandings of human-nature relations, lessons learned, and political will. Karl Marx was well aware of the power of human agency when he pointed out that "People make history, but not in conditions of their owr? choosing."l The purpose of this thesis is to explore the possibilities and limits of the first half of Marx's aphorism. But are scientists and the environmental movement the most important agents of learning and change in international environmental afYairs? Why focus on these two actors? A broader approach is suggested by the World Commission on Environment and Development (Brundtland Commission) in its 1987 report entitled Our Common Future, which examines sustainable development in the context of major groups in al1 sectors, and at al1 levels. Agenda 21, a detailed plan of action produced at the 1992 Earth Surnrnit, Lists the following key actors: nongovernmental organizations (NGOs), local authorities, trade unions. business, scientists, women, youth, indigenous peoples, and farmers. Beyond those Iisted in Agenda 21,1 would argue that additional actors in civil society are environmental educators and cultural actors like environmental writers, artists, and musicians. Clearly, the question of who has to learn must ultimately be inclusive for a truly effective response to the global environmental crisis. But this begs the question: Which actors are at the forefront of progressive social change? The Brundtland Commission identifies scientists and NGOs as playing a catalytic role. Scientific groups and NGOs have played-with the help of young people-a major part in the environmental movement from its earliest beginnings. Scientists were the first to point out evidence of sipificant risks and changes resulting from the growing intensity of human activi~es.Other non-govemrnental organizations and citizens' groups pioneered in the creation of public awareness and political pressures that stimulated govemments to act.2

Cited in David Dessler, "What'sat Stake in the Agent-Structure Debate?'International Oreanization. VoI. 43, No. 3, Summer 1989, p. 443. WCED, Our Comrnon Future (Oxford: Oxford University Press, L987), p. 326. Independent scientists and the environmental movements are well positioned to discover and report on the impact of human activities on the state of the environment and to advocate on behalf of the planet's Iife support systems since they possess a distinct sort of legitirnacy and credibility related to their work in the public interest, clarity of purpose, and genuine motives (for the most part).3 EImer Schattschneider, in his 1960 book Serni-Sovereim People, notes that the fundamental differences between public interest groups and special interest groups, such as business, include the varying composition of the two type of organizations and "the exclusive or nonexclusive nature of benefits sought." Schattschneider writes: 'The distinction between public and special interests is an indispensable tool for the study of politics. To abolish the distinction is to make a shamble of political science by treating things that are different as if they were alike."4 Interestingly, public opinion polls generally confirm the notion that NGOs and, subsequently, independent scientists are the most tnisted actors and sources of information on environmental problems. For exarnple, in 1992 citizens from twelve countries in the former European Cornrnunity were asked about their confidence in information about radioactivity coming from nine different institutions and groups.5 They consistently placed environmental associations in either first place (in eight countries) or second place (four countries). Independent scientists afso fared well

(first in four countries, second in five cases, and third, fourth and sixth in the others); their ranking tended to be more favorable than that of doctors, journalists, consumer associations, the nuclear industry, government, EC authorities, and local representatives.

Environmental groups can become cormpt, particularly if they receive controversial corporate and government donations. The World WiIdIife Fund Canada, for example, was influenced in its Ontario forest policy by corporate donations from mining companies among other players . See Tony Weis and Anita Krajnc. "Greenwashing Ontario's Lands for Life: Why Some Environrnental Groups are Complicit in the Tories' Disastrous Plan," Canadian Dimension, Vol. 33, No. 6, December 1999, pp. 34-38. In conuast, Greenpeace takes a principled stand on funding sources, refusing any corporate or governrnent contributions. Schattschneider, p. 27. Eurobarometer 37 (June 1992). Theoretical and Policy Goals This research is motivated by a number of explanatory and policy concerns. In the exphnatory domain, my proposed research has five major objectives aimed at improving explmations of international environmental policy change and regime building: 1) to assess the relative utility of the transnational level of analysis, 2) to assess the importance of ideational factors, 3) to further develop the social change movement approach in international relations theory, 4) to analyze and compare the epistemic cornmunity and the social change movement approaches, and 5) to develop a multivariate mode1 that incorporates both the environrnental movement and epistemic coimunity approaches. Kenneth Waltz, a chief architect of neo-realism, would argue that international anarchy, material forces and the political interactions between state units, not an international society of many actors and rnany identities and interests, characterize world politics.6 If it could be shown that a transnational, cognitive frarnework (objectives 1 and 2) is best at understanding and explaining eco-regime building, this would provide support for Robert Keohane and Joseph Nye's "world politics paradigrn" as a more appropriate mode1 for the study of 'international' relations: it provides a broader focus on the interactions between governrnents, intergovemmentd organizations, nongovernmental organizations and their subunits, and the movements of ideas as well as material goods, and people and other living beingse7 Redists may nonetheless dismiss the environrnental issue-area as 'low politics' compared to the 'high politics' of security affairs. This argument does not stand up within their own frame of reference for three reasons. First, many of the multilateral environmental agreements iisted in UNEP's Registry directly concern security issues as well, such as the ban of nuclear weapons tests in the atrnosphere (1963), the prohibition of nuclear weapons on the seabed (1971), the regulation of maritime transport of nuclear

Ci Kenneth Waltz. Theory of International Politics (Reading, Mass.: Addison Wesley. 1979). material (1971), the prohibition of biological and toxin weapons (1972),and the prohibition of hostile use of environmental modeling techniques (L976).* Second, neo- Malthusians argue that there is a relationship between environmental degradation and acute conflict, such that environmental degradation and resource depletion often lead to "high politics."g Third, neo-Malthusians also argue that the environrnental consequences themselves pose a grave threat to the quality of Iife for human and nonhuman animals, and plants aiike. 10 In sum, business-as-usual in human attitudes and activities could result in a vicious cycle of environrnental destruction and gradually produce a conflict-ridden, dead planet with little species diversity, acute resource scarcity, and ubiquitous pollution. With respect to objective 3, in international relations theory the role of socid change rnovements is not well developed. There is an extensive literature on the influence of scientific knowledge and consensus on the policy process. By contrast, there is little by way of specific theorizing on just how social movements promote broad-based, public education. While rnany politicai scientists acknowledge the importance of public education, the question of how such societal learning takes place is less well understood. Princen and Finger note that the theory is "only a loose set of propositions and concepts with preliminary ernpirical grounding and testing," and argue that there is as yet no theory of global environmental poli tic^.^^ A key objective of this thesis is to specify the multiple

Robert Keohane and Joseph Nye (eds), Transnational Relations and World Politics (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1971). 8~lso,there is an important and growing literature on the environmental impacts of war and other rnilitary activities. See, for exarnple, Stockholm International f eace Research Institute, Warfare in a Fragile World: Milita- Impact on the Human Environment (London: Taylor and Francis, 1980). gWhat is becoming clearer and clearer is that the environment is high politics. There is a growing literature on redefining security including Robert HeiIbroner, An Tnaui- into the Human Prospect (New York: W.W. Norton, 1974) and William Ophuls, EcoIogv and the PoIitics of Scarcity (San Francisco: W. H. Freeman and Co., 1977) who provide a political interpretation of the international implications of the Iimits to growth debate of the 1970s. See also the work of Thomas Homer-Dixon, and Robert Kaplan. The work of Herman Daiy is best representative of this view. Daly focuses. in particular, on population growth and overconsumption. Other eady works that explore the international political costs associated with environmental degradation include those by Faifield Osborn (writing in the late 1940s and 1950s), Margaret and Harold Sprout, and Richard Falk. l~he~write: "We fully believe that a tight. logical theory of world environmental politics is still a long pathways to such popular environmental education. I develop a Progressive Societal Learning and Socid Change Mode1 designed to assist in both operationalizing the concept of green societal leaming and to offer a framework for analysis of broad-based societal learning and its effects on policy and civil society. Man y scholars argue that both episternic cornmunities and environmental organizations are indispensable actors in the making of international eco-regimes, though their distinctive roles have not been sufficiently disentanbled (objectives 4 and 5). The two case studies in this work will help identiS, the conditions under which the epistemic community is the dnving force, the circumstances under which the environmental movement is the primary agent of change, and those in which regime building occurs as a result of both actors' initiatives. This may Vary by issue-type (eg., the preservation of wildemess as contrasted to air pollution issues, like global climate change; the technical nature or economic importance of the issue; etc.) and by stages of regime development (i.e., from declaratory through promotional to implementation and enforcement).I2

The deveIopment of a good explanatory theory gives rise to the possibility of a prescriptive theory on how best to effect change. As Oran Young and Gail Osherenko wnte:

Those seeking to foster international cooperation on behalf of States, intergovernrnentd organizations, and even NGOs stand to benefit from improvernents in Our understanding of the process of regirne formation, and especially of the initiatives likely to increase the probability of success in the process.13

way off." Thomas Princen and Matthias Finger, Environmental NGOs in World Politics: Linkino the Local and the Global (London: Routledge, 1994)- p. 14. l2 Jack Donnelly advances these categories of regime development and strength in Universal Human Riehts in Theorv and Practice (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1989) and "International Human Rights: A Regime Analysis," International Or~anization,Vol. 40, No. 3, Summer 1986, pp. 599-642. I30ran R. Young and Gail Osherenko (eds), "The Formation of International Regimes: Hypotheses and Cases," in Polar Politics: Creating InternationaI Environmental Re~imes(Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1993), p. 2. At the practical level, the proposed research is aimed at helping policy makers and environmental activists answer a nurnber of policy-relevarit questions, including: What role does civic politics play in achieving environmental protection? Do governrnen ts learn and act as a result of the consensual knowledge and influence of epistemic cornrnunities, or is it a result of social learning? If the latter is an antecedent condition, how much social learning (and public pressure) are necessary for governments to be motivated to lem and to act? How can the episternic comrnunity and environmental movement most effectively prornote social learning and bargain for significant policy change-that is, to adequately address environmental concems and produce changes in civil society and build a strong eco- regime? How can the time lag between the emergence of an environmental problem and significant policy change be shortened? What lessons cm be leamed from older, relatively successful social movements in achieving significant progressive social change? In other words, what kind of learning is necessary to reverse the ecological cisis and how rnight we get there through human agency and choice, given the current context, and lessons we might draw from the past?

Epistemological and Methodological Approaches 1 depart from traditionai international relations theoretical approaches, such as neo- realist and neo-liberal, in four major ways. 1 attempt to understand and explain the international dimensions of environmental issues by: (i) drawing heavily from the historical expenences of a nurnber of domestic social movements; (ii) considering cntical and normative approaches as weIl as positivist ones; (iii) using non-state centric approaches as well as state-centered ones; and (iv) engaging in a participatory research method as well as traditional methodology based on detached observation.

(i) Draw ing Lessons fiom Older Progressive Social Movements Faced with a dearth of theorizing on how specifically learning takes place in social movements, it is worthwhile reviewing the historical learning pathways of oIder, relatively successful social movements for Iessons. What rnechanisms did socid change movements, Eke the early American labour and civil rights movements, use to promote societal leaming? Still, you may ask: why review the Arnerican labour, civil rights or any other rnovements of the Old and New Lefi, if what we want to do is to better understand the process of and potential for green societal learning? After dl, the environmental movement is confronting a much larger, global problem; it requires radical changes in attitude and behaviour from actors at al1 levels-individuals, societal groups, States, transnational actors and international organizations; and much of environmental impacts affect nonhuman nature and future generations, beings who are unable to organize and voice their own interests and concems. Despite differences across social movements, there are a number of good reasons to look at older, relatively successful social movements for lessons. Narnely, social movements commonly draw on the ideas, tactical experience, activists, and NGOs and other supportive organizations of earlier protest rnovements. Ideas about ends and means traverse progressive social movements over space and tirne offenng both inspiration and concrete points of reference. Generally, struggles against oppressive and exploitative systerns are rooted in shared moral values and goals at an abstract, universal level. Efforts to end discrimination based on such arbitrary factors as race, sex, sexual orientation, ability, age, and species (in the case of animal rights) are essentially moral struggles, and involve sirnila. ideals, namely, freedom, equality, and justice. Thus, the folk Song "Oh Freedom" was first used by emancipated slaves following the Civil War and during Reconstruction, then adapted for the labour movement in its effort to organize and establish unions in the 1930s, and rechirned by the civil rights movement in the 1950s and 1960s.14 This is true for a whole set of folk songs, including "We Shall l4 According to rhetorical theonst Kerran L. Sanger, "When the Spirit Says Sin?!" The Role of Freedorn Sones in the Civil Ri~htsMovement (New York: Garland Publishing, 1995), p. 107, the Language in "Oh Overcome," first Sung by women tobacco workers, most of whom were black, on strike at the American Tobacco Company in Charleston, South Carolina, in the early 1940s, and "We Shall not Be Moved," also originating in the South in the early 1930s out of the organizing drives of the Southern Tenant Farmers Union-important to the labour, civil rights, anti-nuclear, and, more recently, the environmental movement (though mainly in ancient forest carnpaigns in the latter movement, such as at the peace camp and blockades in Clayoquot Sound, British Columbia, in 1993). Appropriate strategies and tactics are necessary to achieve movement goals. Herein lies a tangible and pragmatic iinkage across progressive social change movements: knowledge of the tactical experfence of past movements in organizing educational activities in a variety of contexts is a useful resource for newer movements. Historian James Tracy, for example, argues that tactical experience in nonviolent direct action was the main contribution radical pacifists, working with such NGOs as Fellowship of Reconciliation (FOR), Congress on Racial Equality (CORE)and Cornmittee for Nonviolent Action (CNVA), made to the postwar, American Left, in particular, the civil rights movement and other movements of the New Left in the 1960s.15 Radical pacifists helped establish nonviolent direct action as the main protest method of the Left due, in part, to their tacticaI experience in organizing prison strikes against segregated facilities during WorId War II, sit-ins in segregated restaurants in Chicago and other Arnerican cities in the 1940s and 19SOs, and anti-nuclear protests when it was unpopular to do so at the onset of the Cold War. Similady, skilled activists in one movernent often move on to other movements, empowered and motivated to play increasingly important roles at the forefront of new social

-- Freedom" is 'general enough to express the feelings of any persecuted people, stressing the concerns and desires of the oppressed." The chorus, which remains much the same in the various movements, is as folIows: "Oh Freedom, Oh FreedodOh Freedom over me, over me/And before 1'11 be a sIaveJI'11 be buried in my graveJAnd go home to my Lord and be free." l5 See Tracy, Direct Action: Radical Pacifisrn from the Union Eight to the Chicano Seven (Chicago: Chicago University Press, 1996). movements, and there is evidence suggesting that activiïsts that participate in more than one progressive movement are more sophisticated in their Icnowledge and comprehension of

underlying socio-economic, and politicai forces and re Rationships. l6 Many organizers of the eady women's movement and other New Left movements had participated in and been radicalized by the student and civil rights movements, i-ncluding Freedom Sumrner's 1964 voter registration project in Mississippi, involving the Student Nonviolent Coordinating Cornmittee (SNCC) and other young black and white atctivistsJ7 Numerous social activists, such as A. J. Muste and Pete Seeger, possess a lifelong cornmitment to progressive social change, and have been influentiai in :numerous social movements

spanning several generations. 18 Many NGOs are supportive of severai social maovements, and progressive socid movernents often work together in coalitions in order toe advance their common interests and vision in building a better world. Aldon Moms refers to supportive organizations,

------l6 R. Feagan, 'Zxpanding Worldviews: Social movernents background bring deeper analysis to the environmental movement," Alternatives 20:2 (1994), pp. 27-3 1. l7 Doug McAdam, Freedom Summer (New York: Oxford University Press. 1988); MqA. Rothschild, A Case of BIack and White: Northern Volunteers and the Southern Freedom Summers. 1964-1965 (Westport, Conn.: Greenwood Press, 1982); Sara Evans, Persona1 Politics: The Roots of Women's Liberation in the Civil Rights Movement and the New Left (New York: Alfred A- Knopf, 1979). l8 A. J. Muste founded the American branch of the Fellowship off Reconciliation a year after it was fomed in Great Britain in 1914, then became the first director of Brookwood Labour College in New York state in 1921, left the coUege and founded the Arnerican Workers' Party in 1933, and becarne a key advocate of nonviolent direct action in the postwar civil rights and anti-war movements as head of FOR once again. Muste was able to effectiveIy bridge the Old and New Left by fournding Liberation magazine, organizing broad-based, coalition-building conferences for the Left, and adopiting the policy of nonexclusion for members who espoused radical Left views-which was particularlyv appealing to student activists concerned with civil liberties and irked by the reactionary McCarthyism of tftie 1950s (see Tracy, Direct Action). Similady, Pete Seeger, the protest singer, has written and adaptedl folk songs for a series of movements, from labour, civil rights, anti-apartheid, antiwar, and the environnent beginning in 1940 when he started to sing professionaily and continuing to the present. Seeger toured Amerka with Woody Guthrie, the Almanacs, and later Weavers in the 1940s and early 1950s. beforez king blacklisted by the forces of McCarthyism and dnven underground performing the coliege circniit where he "taught most of Amenca's younger folk performers." Later, he wrote songs and campaignedf to clean up the Hudson River, buying a sailboat, the Clearwater, which was used for public tours of the rf-ver. See David King Dunaway, How Can 1 Kee~From Sin~in~:Pete Seeger (New York: McGraw-Hill Boook Company, 1951), p. 195, and Josh Dunson, Freedom in the Air: Song Movements in the Sixties (New York: International Publishers, 1965), p. 33, 45, 51-52. such as Highlander Folk School, the American Friends Service Cornmittee, and the Fellowship of Reconciliation, as "haifway houses3'-institutions that do not have a mass base of suppoa, but which Iatch on to various movements and provide them with "a battery of social change resources such as skilled activists, tactical knowledge, media contacts, workshops, knowledge of past movements, and a vision of a future society."Lg For instance, the innovative and highly influentid Highlander Folk School was set up in Tennessee in 1932 by Myles Hoaon initially to help train local leaders in their drive to organize labour unions in the Southem States; by the mid-1950s it had turned its focus to supporting the civil rights movement through the developrnent of a citizenship school program aimed at registering black voters; and since the 1970s it has focused on environmental issues and the problems of resource exploitation by multinational corporations in the Appalachian regi0n.~0 Further, coalition-building is an essential strategy for any social movement that hopes to build a sufficient base of support for social change, and this is especially true for the environmental movement. Robert Paehlke posits that if the ideology of environmentalism is to replace more traditional ideologies, such as socialisrn, liberaiism and conservatism, it is necessary to forrn alliances with the women's movement, the anti- war movement, the labour movement, and other progressive movements.21 The labour movement has often worked on environmental issues related to occupational health and safety, and various progressive unions, such as the United Auto Workers (UAW) and United Farmworkers, have carnpaigned for pollution control and against pesticide use.22 l9 Aldon Moms, The Origins of the Civil Rights Movernent: Black Cornrnunities Oreanizinr for Chanee (New York: Free Press, 1984)- pp. 139-140. 20 Frank Adams, Unearthino Seeds of Fire: The Idea of Hiehlander (Winston-Salem. NC: John F. Blair, 1975), and John M. Glen, Hi~hlander:No Ordinary School 1932-1962 (Lexington: University Press of Kentucky, 1988). *l Robert Paehlke, Environrnentalisrn and the Future of Pro-ssive Politics (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1989). 22 Scott Dewey, "Working for the Environment: Organized Labor and the Origins of Environrnentalism in the United States, 1948-1970," Environmental Historv, Vol. 3, No. 1, Ianuary 1998, pp. 45-63. See aIso For example, the UAW sponsored the United States' first environmental teach-in in February 1970, and hosted a follow-up meeting after the first Earth Day in May 1970 at its Family Education Center at BIack Lake, Michigan. More recently, environmental and labour groups in both Canada and the United States cooperated in the battle against the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFïA) in 1993 and the proposed Multilateral Agreement on Investment in the late 1990s. The Labour Party in Britain has broadened its platform, incorporating some key components of the green political agenda? Similarly, grassroots civil rights and environmentd activists are coalescing in the environmen ta1 justice movement, a network of civil rights, social justice, and environmental groups. Following the Love Canal hazardous waste disaster near Niagara Falls in the late 1970s, and the 1991 First National People of Colour Environmental Leadership Summit held in Washington D.C., a number of new groups, such as the Citizen's Clearinghouse for Hazardous Waste (CCHW) in Arlington, Virgînia, and the Southwest Network for Environmental and Econornic Justice (SNEEJ), have assisted thousands of local groups in protecting everybody 's bacbard (the title of CCHW' s newsletter) regardless of class, income or race, and thus "working against the NIMBY mot-In-My-Backyard] mi~norner."~~ In sum, studying other progressive social movernents of the past (and present) can be a useful exercise: it widens the scope of our understanding of the many sources of progressive societal learning; highfights the many linkages across social movements; and improves our understanding of the techniques and aims of other movements thereby facilitating learning and coalition-building across progressive social movements.

Laurie E. Adkin, Politics of Sustainable Development: Citizens, Unions and the Comorations (Montreal: Black Rose, 1998). 23 Mike Robinson, The Greenine of British Party Politics (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1992) 24 David Schlosberg, "Networks and Mobile Arrangements: Organisational Innovation in the US Environmenta1 Justice Movement," Environmental poli tic^, Vol. 8, No. 1, Spring 1999, p. 13 1. See also Robert D. Bullard, Unequal Protection: Environmental Justice and Communities of Color (San Francisco : Sierra Club Books, 1994). (ii)Normative and Positivist Approaches A number of learning theories in the public poiicy and international relations literature relate specifically to environmental issues or social movements more generaiiy.

Theories explored include public pressure models (e.g., public choice theones w hich focus on the role of environmental salience in public opinion polls, and several post pluralist models like policy cornmunity and advocacy coalition approaches), govemment learning theories (e-g., epistemic community), govemrnent public information campaigns, and civic politics approaches. In the positivist tradition, these approaches not on1y seek to explain learning by specifying the conditions under which it takes place, but also provide a foundation for predicting or forecasting the potential for green learning. At the same time, 1 use a more explicitly normative, backcasting approach which begins with the question: "What kind of social, economic and ecological future do we want?" and then asks "How do we get there?" Why backcast? It impels us to put on a different lens and steers us towards a different set of questions; it requires us to imagine a utopia, and make it a "relevant utopia" by going a step Wher and considering the practicalities of getting there.z During the height of the Cold War when the threat of nuclear war hung over the planet, most people, most of the time, went about their usual business as though nothing absurd were occurring. In the post Cold War scheme of things, one could argue that a similar sense of apathy and ignorance prevails on global environmental issues. If you contrast the magninide of the environmental cnsis, and the very weak international environmental regimes that trail it, it Iooks as though our chosen future could very weIl threaten humanity and the many other species with whom we share this planet with a death of a thousand cuts, if not a big bang. Backcasting is an essential tool when such an enormous gap exists between what is and what ought to be. This

25 Mendlovitz cited in Iohan Galtung, The True Worlds: A Transnational Perspective (New York: The Free Press, 1980), p. xvii. approach to future studies is employed to highlight multiple scenarios, the existence of choice, and the critical importance of focusing on the question of feasibiiity. Positivist approaches, on the other hand, are helpful in assessing the current status and role of leaming. Both backcasting and forecasting approaches are employed to develop a definition of green learning and to better understand the way in which broad-based societal learning might occur.

(iii) State-centered and Non-state-centered Approaches Thirdly, a non-state centric approach is used alongside statetentric ones. The Advocacy Coalition Frarnework, highlighted in the literature review of the concept of leaniing in Chapter Two, integrates both state-centred and non-state centred approaches. In addition, chapter two looks at the role of governments, as highlighted in the extensive literature on govemrnent learning and govemment public information campaigns, as well as two sets of other literature focusing on the role of actors in civil society, including public pressure rnodels and global civic politics approaches. These distinctions become particularly important in the two case studies exarnined. State centnc approaches are important in the case of regime developrnent in the area of the global climate, while global civic politics and public pressure models are particularly useful in the case study on BC's ancient rainforests.

(N) Participatory Research

Finally, 1engage in participatory research as an environmental activist in two carnpaigns to Save the ancient rainforests of Canada's British Columbia. Beginning in the summer of 1993,I spent a couple of weeks at the Peace Camp and blockades in Clayoquot Sound. I attended civil disobedience and media workshops, went to the daily blockades (at 5 am.), participated in nonviolent civil disobedience, and was arrested and went to one of a series of mass trials the following year. Following that experience, I helped organize several Toronto demonstrations and speaking events involving leading environmental carnpaigners, politicians and academics. In the sumrner of 1997,I volunteered at the Greenpeace office in Vancouver for a few weeks and participated in what tumed out to be the more contentious Great Bear Rainforest campaign (given that the stakes were much bigger in a larger area of ancient rainforest than in the Clayoquot case), a better organized (anti-environmental) opposition, an unusually inflamrnatory Premier, and the fact that the economy was on a downtum. Again, 1was involved in nonviolent civil disobedience in 1997 on Ista Island (also known as King Island) in the midcoast of British Columbia. The following surnmer 1went to trial and again took the opportunity to volunteer at the Vancouver Greenpeace Office. These experiences were invaluable not only as a means of promoting the important goal of saving Canada's few remaining temperate rainforest ecosystems, but also in terms of the transformative effects the Clayoquot experience, in particular, had on me. Active participation in these campaigns also heIped me gain insight into two very different ~arnpaigns.~6In one, the 1993 Ctayoquot campaign, there was mass participation in which more than 900 people of al1 ages, occupations, and classes were arrested in nonviolent blockades of logging roads, making it the largest civil disobedience protest in Canada's history. In the subsequent 1997 Great Bear rainfoïest in the more remote mid part of the province of British Columbia, a well trained and cornrnitted elite goup of Greenpeace activists from around the world participated, in solidarity with the Nuxalk First Nations people, in a set of more danng protests which took place dongside the traditional blockade of a logging road. Greenpeace activists from the US, Russia, Gennany, Ireland, Britain, and Belgium occupied a barge carrying timber from ancient rainforests, locked ont0 a grapple yarder, and sat on top of a teepee contraption in the middle of a logging road.

26 The battle against the WTO in Seattle had a sirnilarly transformative effect on participants. See the very eloquent op ed in the Globe and Mail (Friday, December 3, 1999) by the 19 year old activist Pauline Hwang, entitled "The view from ground zero, a young Canadian in Seattle explains why she risked tear gas - or was it pepper spray?- to change the worid." Experiential data and one's identity should not be treated simply as bias-something to be eliminated. Rather, as Joseph Maxwell argues, "using this experience in your research cm provide you with a major source of insights, hypotheses, and validity checks." Such experiential knowledge cm be a valuable component of a research project provided it is not treated as "a Iicense to impose your assumptions and values uncritically on the research."27

Outline of the Study The first half of the thesis (chapters two to four) is theoretical in nature. Chapter Two provides an overview of learning theones in the public policy and international relations literature. 1 examine the concept of learning in terms of its definition, its significance, its subjects, and its sources. In other words, what is learning, why does learning matter, who is leaniing, and how do they learn? Next, 1 use the backcasting approach to highlight the importance of choice in the concept of green leaming. Green Iearning is defined as an amalgarn of three elements: basic, accurate information about the state of the environment; changes in worldview towards a more eco-centric perspective; and a relationship between action and learning, that is, public participation and citizen engagement in environmental politics. 1 find that both the eco-forecasting and backcasting methods helpful in "learning Our way out7'of the global ecologicai crisis. The chapter ends by presenting a conceptual framework which will guide the thesis based on Paul Sabatier's Advocacy Coalition Frarnework. Sabatier's frarnework is extended to incIude the role of the public in addition to policy elites in the environmental advocacy coalition, and the different roles of scientists are considered, in particular, whether they are aligned or non- aligned in relation to specific environmental advocacy coalitions.

-- - --

27 Joseph A. Maxwell, "Designhg a Qualitative Study," in Leonard Bickrnan and Debra J. Rog (eds). Handbook of A~wliedSocial Science Research Methods (London: Sage, 1998), p. 78. In Chapter Three, 1 argue that while many political scientists acknowledge the importance of public education, the question of how societal leaming takes place is less well understood. The purpose of this chapter is to examine the mechanisms social change movements use to prornote societal learning based on the experiences of the early Amencan labour and civil rights movernents. A Progressive Societal Learning and Social Change Mode1 is presented and the potential for large-scale green learning examined. 1 believe this chapter to be the most significant theoretical chapter in this study. It provides both a means of operationalizing the concept of societal Ieaming and a mode1 for understanding, explaining, and evaluating progressive societal leaming and social change. With a better understanding of the concept of leming and how it takes place, Chapter Four then contrasts the roles of two critical agents of change in the environmental learning process-scientists and the environmental movement. In one approach, the environrnental movement, particularly environmental NGOs, plays a critical role in promoting change in civil society and pressuring govemments to alter their policies through its promotion of broad-based public education and concem. In contrast, an older and more cohesive literature exists on the power of scientists and ecological experts in international environrnental policy-making. The episternic cornrnunity literature focuses on the role of an international convergence in scientific knowledge and the bargaining power of scientific experts in national and intergovernrnental bureaucratic positions on the environmentai regime-building process. In this chapter, 1dso examine the role of the growing "green" public relations firms hired by polluting industries or resource exploitation sectors to misinform the public through "greenwashing" or by distracting the public and governments from environmental issues. The last half of the thesis is empirical. Two case studies are undertaken to test the relative importance and power of scientists and the environmental movement in the learning process. Chapter Five explores the role that learning has played in the establishment of the global climate regime. 1 review the long history of scientific interest and concem over global climate change, and contrast that with the relatively new found concems of the environmental movement. International scientific convergence and bargaining power have been important forces in international agenda-setting and regime-building. But without significant international societal leaming and concomitant public pressure and change in civic politics, the climate regirne is likely to be stalled and doomed to remain a weak declaratory and promotion regime, not an implementation and enforcement regime. In Chapter Six, 1 examine several societal leaming strategies used in two efforts to protect Canada's west Coast rainforests-the Clayoquot Sound and Great Bear Rainforest carnpaigns. Here, the environmental movement rather than scientists took the lead in a set of local, national and international campaigns. Societal learning was promoted by a number of local and international environmental groups, such as the Friends of CIayoquot Sound, Western Canada WiIderness Cornmittee, Greenpeace, and the Rainforest Action Network. Sources of public education varied from the experiential learning derived from direct action on the site of rainforests and clearcuts, the building of wilderness trails, traveling siide show presentations, transnational media exposure, as well as other traditional social movement strategies to promote public education and action such as the use of cultural activities like protest mucic and art, and an international boycott of multinational forest companies. Conservation biologists, corning from a relatively new field, have moved from the role of marginal players to occasional advisors to senior policy makers. Chapter Seven, the conclusion, attempts to provide a more cornplex and integrated mode1 of the roles of scientists and the environmental movement in international environmental affairs. I also surnrnarize the conditions that are likely to produce high levels of societal learning and scientific consensus and power. Further, in keeping with the normative and forward-looking concerns of this thesis, 1 propose a long term vision of the kinds of green learning needed for an environmentally sustainable and compassionate gIobal society, and the types of learning sources and actions that are likely to assist us in getting there. Chapter Two Public Pressure, Civic Politics and Government Learning Models: Eco-Forecasting Versus Backcasting

There is a growing interest in the concept of leaming arnong political scientists. Historically, much of that interest has been in government learning, including organizational fearning at the domestic and international levels,2* and individual and collective learning arnong senior foreign policy-makers, especially in the area of international peace and security.29 More recently, rising concern with environmental issues has led to a renewed interest in government learning approaches, from frame- analysis, involving an examination of how changes in government actors' perceptions and interpretations of the world influence policy outcomes,30 to green learning in political parties.3' This emerging empirical interest in environmental politics has also led to the flourishing of a host of new theoreticai approaches. These include the advocacy coalition framework, highlighting the role of coalitions of various interest groups, govemment officiais, journalists, and other actors organized around common core beliefs who engage in an instrumental type of policy leaming as they vie for political influence;j2 the epistemic

28 Chris Argyris and Donald A. Schon, Organizational Leamin- A Theory of Action Perspective (Reading: Addison-Wesley, 1979); Ernst Haas, Bevond the Nation-State: Functionalism and International Or~anization(Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1964) 29 For exarnple, see George W. Breslauer and Philip E. Tetlock (eds), Leaming in US and Soviet Foreim Policy (Boulder: Westview Press, 199 1); Lloyd S. Etheredge, Can Governrnents Lem? American Forei-gn Policv and Central American Revolutions (New York: Pergamon Press, 1985); Jack S. Levy, "Learning and foreign policy: sweeping a conceptual minefield," International Or~anization,Vol. 48, No. 2, Spring 1994, pp. 279-312; Janice Gross Stein, "Political learning by doing: Gorbachev as uncomitted thinker and motivated leamer," International Oreanization, Vol. 48, No. 2, Spring 1994, pp. 155-83. 30 Markus Jachtenfuchs, International Policv-Makine as a Leamin- Process? The European Union and the Greenhouse Effect (Aldershot: Avebury Ashgate Publishing Ltd., 1996). Mike Robinson, The Greenin. of British Pem, Politicp (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1992). 32 Paul A. Sabatier and Hank C. Jenkins-Smith (eds), Policy Chan- and Learning: An Advocacy Coalition Au~roach(Boulder: Westview Press, 1993); Ken Lertzman et al., "Learning and Change in the British Columbia Forest Sector: A Consideration of Sabatier's Advocacy Coalition Framework," Canadian Journal of Politicaf Science, Vol. XXK, No. 1, March 1996, pp. 111-133. community approach, focusing on the role of expert (often scientific) consensual knowledge in the development of international regirnes;33 and the civic politics perspective, explorhg the role of non-governmental organizations (NGOs) in promoting broad-based, social leaming34 or ecological sensibilities,35 as a means to pressure govemments on their environmental stands and as an end in itself. There is, however, very little consensus arnong political scientists on such questions as the definition of leaming, the key subjects in the learning process, how leaming takes place, and why it matters. One aim of this chapter is to classi@ the various approaches based on the questions of who leams and why it matters, particularly those perspectives which are relevant to social movements and environmental politics. Leaming is a particularly si-pificant topic for long-term, "creeping" environmental problems if preventative, anticipatory and precautionary approaches are adopted. By default, the alternative approach is after-the-fact cnsis management, damage control or simply accepting in an ignorant, fatalistic or cynical way environmental destruction and losses that may be inevocable or irreplaceable like toxic pollution, resource depletion, global climate change, deforestation, habitat loss and species extinction. By specifying the conditions under which leaming takes place, the various traditional approaches employed by political scientists not only seek to explain, but also provide a foundation for predicting or forecasting the potential power of leaming in civil society, government or international organizations in addressing environmental concerns.

33 Peter Haas, Savinp: the Mediterranean: The Politics of International Environrnental Cooperation (New York: Columbia University Press, 1990); Mathew Paterson, Global Warming and Global Politics (London: Routledge, 1996). pp. 134- 156. 34 Thomas Princen, Matthias Finger and Jack P. Manno, 'Transnational Linkages," in Princen and Finger (eds), Environrnental NGOs in World Politics: Linkinp the Local and the Global (London: Routledge, 1994). 35 Pau1 Wapner. Environrnental Activism and World Civic Politics (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1996). Beyond positivist approaches, one can look at more explicitly normative procedures, the importance of choice, and long-term planning in any future scenarios. As Kari Marx noted, "People make history, but not in conditions of their own choosing."36 A second purpose of this chapter is to explore the possibilities of the first half of Mm's aphorism. B y contrasting positivist, "eco-forecasting" approaches with "backcasting" ones, an alternative and more radical approach to leaming is possible. To backcast, one begins with the question, 'what kind of future would we Iike?' and then asks, 'how do we achieve it?' Such future-oriented approaches impel us to put on a different lens and steer us

towards a different set of questions; they require us to imagine a utopia, and make it a "relevant utopia" by going a step further and considering the practicalities of getting there.37

The potential for "learning our way out" of the global ecological crisis is worthy of serious exploration, and both eco-forecasting and backcasting approaches provide insights into how this might occur.

Eco-Forecasting: A Typology Of Positivist Learning Models The concept of learning is understood in a variety of ways by public policy and international relations scholars in terms of its definition, its subjects, its sources, and its significance. In other words, there is no consensus or single focus among political scientists on questions such as what is learning, who is learning, how does it take place, and why does it matter. These four questions are treated in a variety of ways by theorists advancing pluralist, public choice, MWst, and other theoretical perspectives. One way to approach the vast literature is to group or classify approaches to leaming based on how they address two of the above questions: who is Iearning and why does it matter.

36 Cited in David Dessler. "What's at Stake in the Agent-Structure Debate?" International Orpnization. Vol. 43, No. 3, Summer 1989, p. 443. 37 Mendlovitz in Johan Galtung, The Tme Worlds: A Transnational Perspective (New York: The Free Press, 1980), p. xvii. Using this technique, learning models can be categorized into four broad sets in the public policy and internationd relations literature: (i) public pressure, (ii) civic politics, (iii) government learning, and (iv) govemment public education campaigns. These learning models focus either on changing state policy or the attitudes and behaviour of actors in civil society. In the former instance, the impetus for changes in state policy may come from within government or from societal actors. For example, public pressure models share the view that changes in a govemment's policy course are driven by an educated and concerned public, particularly in issue areas involving the public interest like the environment and social safety net? The general public's views, if expressed with sufficient intensity in public opinion polls, or from segments of the public, like the attentive public, NGOs, advocacy coalitions or social movements, matter to governments and intergovernmental bodies and conûibute to new or more progressive policies. Similady, civic politics rnodels share with public pressure rnodels an emphasis on public education, though not necessarily on its effects on public policies or what governments actually do. Rather societai learning is analyzed as a force in social change itself.39 Altematively, in govemment learning models, the learning processes of individual or group decision makers in govemment bureaucraties, politicai parties or governments may act as important determinants of change in govemment acti0n.~0 The fourth set of Ieaming models explore the efforts of government-initiated public information ~arnpaigns.~~ These four sets of rnodels can be further subdivided depending on whether the rnodels refer to the domestic scene or world politics (see Figure 2.1). Although the various learning

38 e-g., Kathryn Harrison, pas sin^ the Buck: Federalisrn and Canadian Environrnental Policy (Vancouver: UBC Press, 1996); Robinson, The Greenin of British Partv Politics, pp. 84-123. 39 Wapner, Environrnental Activisrn and World Civic Politics. eg., Robinson, The green in^ of Bntish Party Politics.; Haas, sa vin^ the Mediterranean; Lchtenfuchs, International Policv-Making as a Leamine Process?. 41 Janet A. Weiss and Mary Tschirhart, ?Public Information Carnpaigns as Policy Insmiments." Journal of Poiicv Analvsis and Mananement Vol. 13, No. 1. 1994, pp. 82-119; George Hoberg and Kathryn Harrison, "It's Not Easy Being Green: The Politics of Canada's Green Plan," Canadian Public Policv, Vol. XX, NO. 2, 1994, pp. 119-137. Simcance of learning

changes in changes in state policy Sources of 1 upward public L learning public pressure or domestic up ward pressure domestic mode1 diffusion civic politics mod civil society diffusion I I civic politirs-1 global downw ard i ntemational downward global civil society i ntemational public mode1 ci vic pubiic pressure diffusion politics pressure (INGW 5 4 government governmen t ep i stemic public1 bilateral state learning CO mmunity information training (bot tom-up) campaigns aid

.a -*overnment learning -= government education }

intergovern- international 1 international international mental epistemic community leaming training regime (top-down) 1 projects norms models are categonzed in terms of who learns and why it rnatters with respect to the public sphere or civil society, the questions of definition and how learning takes place will also be explored under each heading.

(i) Public Pressure Models Public pressure models are based on the idea that governments respond to concerned and mobilized publics. Governrnents introduce new and more progressive environmentai policies if sufficient public pressures are applied and "force" them to do so. In these models, governrnent learning is not necessary to achieve policy change, though such learning would facilitate stronger policy reforrns. Public pressure models vary with respect to the type of publics that need to be aroused and mobilized. Some scholars look at the role of the public as a whole while others concentrate on the roles of se,ments, iike the working class, organized pressure groups, advocacy coalitions, and social rnovements. Pressure pupsrepresenting the public interest transmit public demands to the government in order to persuade the latter to pursue the policies the public advocates. Scholars looking at the influence of pressure groups focus on the institutionalization of groups and their access to senior decision-makers, whereas those exploring the role of the general public tend to rely on public opinion polls to define and measure societal learning and public pressure.

A good illustration of a public pressure mode1 based on public opinion is Kathryn Harrison's employment of the concept of environmental salience in public opinion polls to account for govenunent action on environmental pr~tection.~~Rather than simply looking at public opinion poIls that measure levels of concern about the environment (often called latent public concem), Harrison argues that govemments act on environmental issues mainly when the environment is a salient or top of mind concern in public opinion polls.

42 Harrison, Passina the Buck. Using a public choice theoretical frarnework, she starts with the assumption that governments are rational actors who assess the costs and benefits of introducing environmental Iegislation, regulations, and enforcement measures. Govemments hesitate to introduce environmental legislation since these produce diffuse benefits for the public, but impose concentrated costs on industry. At the same time, business interests are generalIy better organized and financed than environmental groups. Thus the Olsonian problem of colIective action emerges. However, environmental policy does emerge "when public opinion occasionally overcomes the obstacle to collective action, thus transforming politicians' incentives."43 Only when environmental issues are "top of rnind" or a priority concem in public opinion polls, as during the "green waves" in the late 1960s and early 1970s and the rnid to late 1980s, were govemments motivated to introduce si,pificant environmental legislation and regulations, improve enforcement, and give more weight to environmental concerns during constitutional disc~ssions.~~Hanison argues that "It is not sufficient for members of the public merely to prefer a cleaner environment: they must also be familiar with government policies and be willing to weigh the government's performance on environmental issues heavily at election time."45 During periods of low salience or when there is only latent public concern, governments rarely act since "environmental protection offers politicians more blarne [fkom brown industries] than credit" from the public.46 Harrison says liale of the origins of green waves or how societal learning occurs, other than mentioning the possible role of enk~ronmentalcrises and media coverage, as well as the skills of policy entrepreneur^.^^ In sum, Harrison's mode1 finds a

43 Ibid., p. 16. 44 See also Anthony Down's classic work on issue-attention cycles "Up and Down with Ecology-The Issue-Attention Cycle," The Public Interest, Vol. 28, 1972, pp. 38-50, and for a detailed discussion of green waves, Harrison, Passim the Buck, and Robert PaehIke, "Eco-History: Two Waves in the Evolution of Environmentalism," Alternatives, Vol. 19, No. 1, 1992: 18-23. 45 Hanison, Passin- the Buck, p. 17. 46 Ibid., p. 25. 47 Ibid., p. 16. strong correlation between salience in public opinion polls and environmental protection-a stringent requirement for progressive environmental policy. Further, by focusing on the influence of an informed and aiarmed public in generating environmental policies, she places "greater emphasis on societal rather than institutional forces" and argues that there is Iess need to "bring the state back in" than to "bring society back in" in the study of public policy determinants.48 At the international level, fewer theorists focus on the role of public pressure in the international policy-making process, though the significance of world opinion is ofien alluded to. This is particularly true in the issue area of human rights where world opinion is deemed, at times, to influence violator states, and to provide critical support for the development of global human rights regimes. In the environmental field, Thomas Princen, et ai., identify social learning and bargaining as key roles played by nongovernrnental organizations (NGOs).49 Although social learning is "probably the most characteristic feature" of the environmental movement, their work is short on specifics, though a good starting point.50 Societal leaming is not clearly defined nor the public clearly specified, that is, whether it is necessary to look at world opinion or social learning in a few key states or what type and how rnuch social learning are needed to pressure governrnents to cooperate on international environmental policy. They note that a major problem is that social movement theories applied at the national level are simply extrapolated to the internationai level without considering the compIexities of transnational relations or the absence of a corresponding international governent for environmental movements to lobby. Other approaches in international relations that incorporate the role of public opinion include Robert Putnarn's two-level garne analysis of international bargaining. This conceptual framework involves simultaneous international and domestic level negotiations confronting

48 ibid., pp. 9 and 169. 49 Princen et al., 'Transnational Linkages," p. 217. 50 Ibid., p. 65. diplomats. A state's negotiating position may be influenced by foreign domestic opinion as well as by public opinion in its own co~ntry.~I An alternative to looking at the public as a whole is to examine the relationships among the attentive public, pressure groups, and state politics. Public interest group theonsts define the environrnentd movement as consisting of environmental groups and the 'attentive publicy1-members of the public who regularly read newspapers, magazines and journals, who rnay or may not belong to formal environmental groups, and who participate irreplarly in the movement.52 Similady, social movernent theorists define the segments of the public in terms of their orientation towards a particular social movement: adherents hold favorable views of movement goals, constituents supply the movement with resources, bystanders are unaware of a rnovement's content or direction, and opponents oppose the movernent.53 The attentive public category is likely to encompass adherents, constituents and opponents, while bystanders tend to consist of the "inattentive public". Altematively, neo-Mancists look at the working class and the labour movement as a driver of social change. Neo-Mamist variants of this approach are based on public pressure rnodels, though the unit of analysis is "class" rather than the public. WhiIe instrumental and structural Marxist analyses tend to focus on the contradictions of capitalism in producing change, neo-Marxists such as E. P. Thompson reco,gnize the importance of ideas and social movements in building the social safety net, improving working conditions, and generally defending the interests of labor.54

Peter Evans et al. (eds), Double-Edeed Diplornacy: International Bargainine and Dornestic Politics (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1993). 52 P. Lowe and J. Goyder, Environmental Grouos in Politics (London: Allen and Unwin. 1983); Paul A. Pross, Group Politics and Public Polic . Second Edition (Toronto: Oxford University Press, 1992). 53 Mayer Zald and John McCarthy, "Resource Mobilization and Sociai Movernents: A Partial Theory." in Zald and McCarthy (eds), Social Movements in an Organizational Societv (Oxford: Transaction Books, 1987), p. 23. 54 E. P. Thornpson, The Poverty of Theory and Other Essays (London: Merlin Press, 1978); David Montgomery, "History as Human Agency," Monthlv Review, Vol. 33, No. 5, October 198 1, pp. 42-48. The role of the working class parties operating through normal political channels and trade unions is especially emphasized as a key factor shaping public policies. The rise of the welfare state, for example, is explained not as a direct response to the needs of capital, but as the result of political pressures exerted by the working ciass. The structural imperatives of capitalism are not ignored, however, because they are said to impose limits on what the state can do in response to working-class demands- The welfare state that was established by capitalist States in response to working- class demands was designed in a manner that did not undermine fundamental property rights or profits.55

The work of cultural neo-Marxists is particularly important in highlighting the various cultural activities in the realm of the superstructure (e-g., worker education, alternative media, and labour films, theater, literature, and music) that play a pivotal rok in raising worker class consciousness and in organizing drives, and in providing potentid lessons for the environmental movement to draw from.56 In the study of interest groups, two approaches in the post-pluralist Stream have been widely applied to environrnental case studies: the advocacy coalition and polic y cornrnunities approaches. Both these approaches are state-societal models which explore the complex interconnections among various public and private actors, but will be dealt with here as "public pressure models" since they focus on the role of interest groups in the political process.57 The advocacy coalition approach, developed by Paul Sabatier and Hank

55 Michael Howlett and M. Rarnesh, Studying Public Policy: Policy Cycles and Policy Subs"sterns (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1995), p. 24. 56 On worker education schools, such as Highlander Folk School and Brookingwood Labour College, see for example, Richard Altenbaugh, Work for Struwle: the Arnerïcan Labour Colleges of the 1920s and 1930s (Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 1990); John M. Glen, Hi~hlander:No Ordinary School l93Z 1962 (Lexington: University Press of Kentucky, 1988); and Frank Adams, Unearthino Seeds of Fire: The Idea of Highlander (Winston-Salem, NC: John F. Blair, 1975); and, on labour films, see Tom Zaniello, Working Stiffs. Union Maids. Reds. and RifiafE An Or~anizedGuide to Films About Labor (Ithaca: ILR Press, 1996). 57 For example, Paul Ross's [Sroup Politics afiJ Public Policy) study of poliey cornrnunities is by no means onIy a public pressure approach, but also straddles between government learning and education approaches, since Pross' goal is to study state-societal interactions. Pross also touches on how learning takes place in civil Society, noting that the media are the main means pressure groups use to reach the mass public. Different media foms provide different types of information and analyses: television tends to cover "short, pungent, and pointed" material as in Question period while print media produces better coverage of public hearings and the routine business of Parliament (budget debates, throne speech, second reading of Jenkins-Smith, is particularly relevant to environmentai studies and learning since it is based on hierarchical belief systems of two or more advocacy coalitions. Advocacy coalitions are defined as "(i) people from a variety of positions (elected and agency officiais, interest groups leaders, researchers, etc.) who share a particular belief system, Le., a set of basic values, causal assumptions, and problem perceptions, and (ii) show a nontrivial degree of coordinated activity." The one or more advocacy coalitions in a policy arena are organized around hierarchical belief systems, the most important being the deep core beliefs. Core beliefs are very abstract and normative worldviews (such as views about humans and their relationship to the environment), and are "stable, in large part because they are largely normative issue inculturated in childhood and largely impervious to empirical evidence" ! 58 The learning in this model, by and large, leaves out the public at large and core beliefs, but rather tends to involve only subordinate aspects of beliefs, like near core beliefs, defined as policy beliefs, and secondary beliefs, related to implementation strategies. Such "polic y oriented learning" within coalitions takes years and decades. However, changes in core beliefs are possible, and take place principally as a result of external perturbations, such as the oil crisis of 1973. Another approach to interest groups, the attentive public, and public policy is the policy cornmunity approach. Paul Pross defines a policy community as consisting of an "attentive public" and a "subgovernment" portion.59 The attentive public is composed of those interested in policies in a particular issue area, but not involved in the daily workings of policy development, including the media, academics, pressure groups, consultants, other govemment agencies, etc. The subgovemment segment is "the policy-making body of each cornmunity," and encompasses the lead government agencies and institutionalized

government biIls, parliamentary cornmittee proceedings) by providing more in-depth reporting, including analyses of underIying causes (Ibid., 165- 194). 58 Sabatier and Jenkins-Smith, Policy Change and Learning, p. 36. 59 Paul Pross, Group Politics and Public Policy, 1992. interest groups.60 The subgovernment tends to be consensus-seeking as those with vested interests prefer established policy, and often exclude groups that are oriented towards socid change, or that use high profile media tactics, and public demonstrations.61 Pross cites Tom d'Aquino, president of the Canadian Business Council on National Issues, to illustrate the point: 'Most businessmen (sic) avoid confrontation and are uncornfortable promoting causes on public platfoms ... and there is the further underlying concem that high visibiiity cm attract reprisais from either government or labor."62 In contrast, the attentive public constitutes the bulk of the environmental movement and often challenges the status quo. As Mike Robinson argues: 'The important point is that environmentalism possesses the necessary spread of support from which it cm potentially draw when required."63 Significant policy change often depends on mobilizing the public in order to push cabinet and others in governrnent to take control of the issue, ovemde status quo- oriented policy communities, and resmcture or create new policy comrnunities. PoIicy debate broadens as levels of conflict rise, so that eventually central issues may be taken out of the hands of the sub-governent and the policy community and resolved at the highest political levek When this occurs, both the policy community and policy are often vastly altered, perhaps totally restructured-as in the early 1970s when several older communities were reorganized and combined to serve the newly defined field of environrnental policy. Thus, the attentive public is a force for policy ~hange.6~

Akin to the advocacy coalition approach, Pross allows for the possibility of two or more policy communities in conflict with one another, as is often the case with environrnental

60 Ibid., p. 120 61 Access to government by environrnental groups depends not only on their level of institutionalization. but also on whether policy communities are structurally opened or closed (Pross, gr ou^ Politics and Public Policv). See, for example, Jeremy Wilson's case study of BC forests in which the policy community shifts from being closed to somewhat open "Wilderness Politics in BC: The Business Dorninated State and the Containment of Environmentalism," in Wiliiam CoIernan and Grace Skogstad, eds, Policv Cornmunities and Public PoIicv in Canada: A Structural Ari~roach(Mississauga: Copp Clark Pitman, 1990). pp. 141- 69. 62 Pross, Gmup Politics and Public Polit". 63 Robinson, The green in^ of British Politics, p. 46. 64 Pross, Group Politics and Public Policv, p. 126. iss~es.6~A clear advantage of policy community and advocacy coalition approaches is that they focus on the cross-sectorai alliances that emerge among NGOs, government actors, and industries-an amalgamation of grassroots and top-down elite alliances that often exist in various environmental rnovements.66 Social movements often consist of an assortrnent of interest groups, some groups developing expert knowledge while othen are mobilizing public supporters and generating media-atîracting publicity. Pross' approach helps illuminate a difficult stratepic choice facing pressure groups that are pressed for resources: should resources be devoted tu submitting bnefs or educating the public? On the one hand, public interest groups exercise influence through consultation and lobbying, both of which depend on access to various levels of govemment. Highly institutionalized interest groups possess a policy capacity to participate in sub-governments by providing govenunents with specialized knowledge through briefing notes, working papers, and professional consultations. Such NGO activities are rnuch appreciated by govemment agencies as "the bureaucratie machine Lives on inf~rmation".~~Pressure groups, in tum, benefit from a two-way flow of information, receiving valuable information regarding government intentions and plans that may prove useful to their constituents and in their lobbying efforts. On the other hand, interest groups may focus on educating the public. The attentive public is a key force for policy change. NGOs use extra-parliamentary means to educate and mobilize the public, and these include direct action like mass rallies and marches, boycotts, blockades, and civil disobedience, media attention, newsletters, leafleting, dectarations and demands, and information tables at community events, arnong many other creative devices. However, the two approaches are

65 Ibid., p. 155. 66~orexample, see Russell J. Dalton, "Alliance Patterns of the European Environmental Movernent," in Wolfgang Rüdig (ed), Green Politics Two (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 1992), pp. 59-85. 67 Pross, Group Politics and Public Poliq, p. 150. not necessarily mutually exclusive, though Pross makes a subtle distinction between confrontation and the use of publicity as a bargaining technique.68 The sanctions against confrontation present many groups with a fundamentd question: should we try to embarrass policy-makers and expand our public support by criticism in the media, or is it better to work quietly behind the scenes and forsake a public image? Many groups forrnulate [a different] course to action: avoid confrontation, but remember that sometimes it is necessary to embarrass politicians and off~cials.~~

In the Iast few decades, power has become more diffuse and the political process more open, with the increased importance of Parliament in Canada, for example, as well as the use of "extensive consultation that is the hallmark of politics in modem policy comrnunities."70 In tfiis context, Pross argues that institutionalized interest groups have become increasingly important, and the role of grassroots movements less so. Kowever, this is not entirely the case. Another factor accounting for pressure group types and roles is the social movement stage at which NGOs a~pear.'~NGOs and social activists clearly perforrn various roles: "rebel" groups attempt to politicize issues and place them on society's politicai and social agenda through protest; "socid change agents" aim at long term, mass public education through gassroots organizing and various activities in civil society; and "reformer" groups work with governments to convert popular opinion into Iaws and new governrnent policies, by employing lobbying, political campaigns, lawsuits, petitions, and participation in parliarnentary cornmittees, task forces, and public hearings. The prominence of group types varies according to the stage in which a social movement fin& itself: at early stages and at triggering or crisis events, "rebel" groups use direct action and media in order to place the issue on the political and social

68 Ibid., pp. 153 and 158. 69 Ibid., p. 153. 70 Ibid.. p. 149. 71 Bill Moyer, The Movernent Action Plan: A Stmteeic Frarnework Describin~the Ei~htStages of Successful Social Movements (Social Movement Empowerment Project, Spring 1987) and The PracticaI Strate~ist:Movement Action Plan MAP) Strategic Theories for Evaluatino. Planning and Conducting Social Movements (Social Movement Empowerment Project, July 1990). agenda; gradualiy social change agents become more important in their work to win over a majority of public opinion; and only at the last stages, once public opinion overwhelmingly supports social change, do "reformer" groups emerge as central actors when the need arises to bargain with governments and other powerholders to develop alternative policies.72 The central argument Moyer advances is that the powerholders will be the last to change their mimis and policies. Thus, the chef challenge facing social movernents is promoting public education, and gaining widespread public mobilization in favor of alternative policies, before it is likely, or even possible, for lobbying efforts to bear fruit. Bill Moyer writes: The primary target constituency of social movements is ordinary citizens, not the powerholders. Social change happens only when the majority of citizens are alerted, educated, and motivated to be concerned about a problem. Social movements are only as powerful as the power of their grassroots support. The chief task of activists, therefore, is to focus on and to win over the public, not to change the mincis and policies of ofticid powerh0lders.~3

At the same time, protest is only one aspect of social movements. "...Protest must be balanced with hope, plans, and programs for achieving goals and positive altematives."74 Moreover, the ideal social activist should strive to contribute to the various roles (rebel, social change agentleducator, refomer/lobbyist as well as being a "good citizen") in order to reach his/her full potential, and appreciate the si,gnificance of each of the roles in social movement success. How does Moyer's mode1 compare with those of Harrison's public choice/environmental salience model, and the various pressure groups approaches? Moyer, like Hanison, is interested in the pressure exerted by public opinion overall, but rather than looking at salience in opinion polls, Moyer's focus is on citizens'

72 For example. consider the early stage of the animal rights rnovernent where direct action and media attention is the main emphasis of animal rights organizations, and rarely do representative of these group work with government and others in developing alternative policies. In fact, policy communities related to the protection of animal rights are rare compared to ones that invoIve animal exploitation. In contrast, an issue such as acid rain involved extensive cooperation between government and environmentaiists in the 1980s and early 1990s. 73 Bill Moyer, The Practical Strateest, 1990, p. 6. 74 Ibid., p. 2. activism as well as the various roles of NGOs. And while Pross and Sabatier and Jenkins- Smith are mainly interested in the "position" of pressure groups relative to governing coalitions, Moyer's mode1 focuses on the amount of public education as the key variable. Moyer explicitly relates the arnount of public education with the relative importance of either further educating the public or lobbying the government. Public education is cntical at the outset and development of a social movement, while lobbying only becomes important in the latter stages of a social movement. Moyer and Harrison's societal models are more uni-directional than the state-societal, pressure group models, since they highlight the influence of the general public and NGOs on govemment policy, rather than considering the role of elite rnembers in the movement, as is the case with the latter. OveralI, public pressure models make a number of claims relating to the significance of public concem and pressure. First, theorists in this school of thought tend to share the view that a movement requires active participation from the public, and that the public is al1 too often miles ahead of the politicians and private interests in pressing for progressive social change. Political and business "leaders" tend to be followers on environmental policy and in other areas of public interest more generally. Govemments drag their feet for a number of reasons, incIuding close ties to special, private interests who have a vested interest in the status quo, although this point is made more strongly by societd models than state-societal ones. Altematively, there exists a subculture of hard bal1 politics in many senior decision-making arenas, which results in the neglect of ethical considerations and long term vie~s.~s At the same time, a strong democratic government is important in protecting the public interest, and countering and controlling special private interests, or discriminatory governrnents in other jünsdictions (for example, the US federal govemment's roIe in the South during the civil rights struggle). Elmer Schattschneider, in his classic book The

75 Lloyd S. Etheredge, Can Governments Learn? Amencan Foreim Poliçy and Central Amencan Revolutions (New York: Pergamon Press, 1985). Serni-Sovereim Peo~le,argues that every conflict includes individuals at the center of the scene and an audience, and that the outcome of all conflict is detennined by the scope of the conflict and its contagion.76 There is an enduring struggle between tendencies toward the privatization of conflict (particularly by powerful special interests in the business community) and the socidization of conflict (by weaker, diffuse interests such as public interest groups). The main way to achieve the public interest is by "expanding the scope of the conflict," particularly through the invocation of universal ideas such as equality, justice, and freedom of speech and association, and the involvement of govemment.

Schattschneider argues that "...the very words 'union,' 'collective bargaining,' 'union recognition,' imply tremendous socialization of a conflict which was once regarded as a purely private matter conceming only the employer and the individual worker" and "democratic govemment is the greatest single instrument of socialization of confiict."77 In response to the increasing concentration of business interests, big business must be matched by "big governmentyyin order to maintain an equilibrium between economic and political interests. "Every change in the organization, technology and scope of the economy has had to be matched by parallel changes in the organization of political p~wer."~~However, recent world trends point to reduced govemment, on the one hand, and increasing economic globalization and the concomitant rise of multinational corporations, on the other, thus weakening the underpinnings of the public pressure models. Public pressure models are based on the assumption that state governments have the capacity to introduce and implement legislation and regulation. Essentially, this leaves the environmental movement, along with other progressive social movements, with an additional task-that is, to challenge neo-conservative policies, to secure adequate funding

76 E. E. Schattschneider, The Sernisovereign People: A Reaiist's View of Dernocracy in Arnerica (New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1960), pp. 2 and 7. 77 Ibid., pp. 10 and 13 78 Ibid., p. 123. for govemment bureaucracies and progams, and to support state intervention in the economy. Second, public pressure is essential at all stages of the policy process ranging from agenda setting, through attaining a favourable decision once the NGOs pass the agenda hurdle, to implementation and enforcement. There exists the risk of "non-decisions" throughout the policy cycle as a result of the mobilization of bias by elites who have a vested interest in the status quo. "A non-decision is a decision that results in the suppression or thwarting of a latent or manifest challenge to the values of the decision- maker."79 In Peter Bachrach and Morton Baratz's classic study of anti-poverty group stniggles in Baltimore in the 1960s, they found that a series of barriers in the policy process made it dificult for groups that challenge the status quo: While advocates of change must win at al1 stages of the political process- issue-recognition, decision, and implementation of policy-the defenders of existing policy must win at only one stage of the process. It is diff~cultto avoid the conclusion that al1 political systems have an inherent 'mobilization of bias' and that this bias strongly favors those currently defending the status quo.80

Third, and related to the point above, the greater the proportion of the public that is concemed, the more likely the policy change is to move dong to more advanced stages in the policy cycle. Moyer argues that although significant public concem is needed for agenda setting, more extensive concem and pressure are needed to ensure the policy cycle moves to discussion and formulation of alternatives and irnplementation and enforcement. Similady, in Kathryn Harrison's environmental salience model, siagnificant govemment initiatives in the areas of environmental legislation, regulation and enforcement occur only when the environment is a "top of mind" issue for the public over an extended period, such as the green waves of the lare 1960s and early 1970s, and the mid to late 1980s.

79 Peter Bachrach and Morton S. Baratz. Power and Poverty: Theory and Practice (New York: Oxford University Press, 1970)-p. 44. See aiso Moyer, The Practical Stratezist. Ibid., 58 In sum, there exist a variety of public pressure models which posit that public education and concern are the main drivers of progressive policy change. Critics of public pressure models argue that such models are too simplistic and "crude". Green leaming by various actors in civil society may be an end in itself, as any solution to the environmental crisis necessarily involves a paradigm shift and a reonentation of al1 political and socio- economic institutions and people, that is, al1 three sectors of society-government, civil society and business. Furthemore, there is the possibility of genuine government learning due, in part, to intemal sources, such as environment bureaucraties, government scientists, and the work of various parliamentary cornrnittee~.~~Finally, govemments and intergovernmental organizations also undertake public education campaigns.

(ii) Civic Politics Models Paul Wapner's ground-breakinp work on the role of global civic politics in protecting the global environment, points to the promotion of an "ecological sensibility" by transnational environmental groups, such as Greenpeace. Not only are States and inter- governrnental organizations relevant environmental actors, but so are the various collectivities in civil society. Civil society is defined as "that arena of social engagement existing above the individual yet below the state," and global civil society as "that slice of associational life that exists above the inàividual and below the state, but also across national boundaries."8' In short, "world civic politics works underneath, above, and around the state to bring about widespread change. It rests on the view that the state system alone cannot solve our environmental woes nor will substituting it with some other institution do the üick."*3 Thus green learning in civil society and the use of civic politics

g1 See, for example. Robinson, The green in^ of British Party Politics, p. 84-123. 82 Wapner, fi,p. 4. 83 Ibid., p. 9. in order to influence other actors in civil society are ends in themselves rather than simply means of presswing governrnents to adopt environmentai policies. Wapner examines the role of three international environmental organizations invoIved in global civic politics-Greenpeace, the WorId WildLife Fmd, and Friends of the

Earth. Greenpeace's strategy, for exarnple, has been to try to change formal, state behavior, but failing that, "to work through transnational econornic, social, and cultural networks to achieve their ends." Greenpeace's current international boycott campaign against a number of multinational forest companies operating in British Columbia's ancient temperate rainforests illustrates the point. The market, rather than the federal or provincial govemments, is the primary target in its campai@ to end loggïng in those areas. More broadl y, Greenpeace has played a key role in enhancing an "environmental sensibility" arnong publics around the world through its use of media "mind bombs." These allow the public to bear witness to environmental1 y des tmctive be havior by governments or industry (e-g., whaling, toxic waste dumping in the oceans, nuclear testing in the South Pacific by the French), as well as "persuading al1 types of people to care about environmental conditions and to take action to protect the earth."84

At the dornestic Ievel, new social movement theorists have long explored the changes in civil society introduced by social movernents. The objectives of social movements are not simply policy-oriented, but also involve shaping public values and changing the behaviour of individuals and groups, opening new political spaces, and raising collective consciousness and identities. Members of new social movements are ideologically driven in pursuit of collective goods and fundamental social change. Contemporary movements are defined as agents of meaning since they "cultivate and poiiticize collective identities."85 They deconstruct cultural conventions and assumptions, g4 Ibid.. p. 14. 85 Melodic cited in Russell Dalton, Manhrd Kuechler. and Wilhelm Bürklin, 'The Challenge of New Movements," in R. Dalton and M. Kuechler (eds), mginethe Political Order: New Social and Political Movements in Western Democracies (Oxford: Polity Press, 1990), pp. 12-13. create new symbols, and build alternative meaning systems. For example, the gay and lesbian movement works for politicai and cultural change outside the institutional structure when it employs direct action and confrontational tactics, such as kiss-ins in shopping malls and straight bars, marrying sarne sex couples on the steps of a Roman Catholic cathedral, etc? Further, social movements open new political spaces by creating their own set of institutions and counter-culture, for example, when radical feminists establish their own shelters, magazines, and discussion groups. There does not exîst a sharp boundary between civic poIitics approaches and public pressure models, since a collective consciousness needs to develop before social movements can develop and influence policy change. Yet legislative action is clearly not the only type of social change that is important to social movernents. Social movements can also work outside the political system and still be effective, as when they attempt to change the way in which society views issues and the way in which it acts.

(iii) Government LRaming Models Govemment leamïng models suggest that government greening is the result of more than external pressure groups. In other words, governments and political parties care about the environment and act to protect it independently of pressure by the environmental movement. The creation and development of environment bureaucracies have contributed significantly to the emergence of ecological epistemic cornmunities, while environmental parliarnentary cornmittees provide a forum for politicians to focus on environmental issues and consider deeper analyses of environmental problems. A host of different units of analysis has been applied in the study of govemment learning in the environmentai field, including transnational expert Iearning and organizationai leaming in govenunent

86 Barry Adam, The Rise of a Gay and Lesbian Movernent (New York: Twayne Publishen, 1995). p. 163.

39 bureaucracies,*7 and Ieaming as it takes place in political parties.88 The conditions for learning are explored as well as the reasons for misleaming or nonlearning. Mike Robinson, in his study of the greening of British party politics, develops a mode1 of government learning that incorporates both extemal public pressure and internal processes of learning. The greening of political parties occurs at three levels-the rhetorical, policy, and ideological levels. The 1970s saw the emergence of environment ministries across the globe, while during the green wave of the 1980s the environment moved from "the margins of party politics to mainstream party thinking," meaning not only that parties have a well developed environmental rhetoric, but also that the number and sophistication of party positions on the environment have grown.89 To some degree, party ideology has also shifted green-wards and this has implications for future policy. The reason for party greening is due to both the environmental movement and internal forces. Govemment learning rnay be "strategic," in response to societal pressures andor "genuine," due to internal sources of change, such as consensus among members of the ecological episternic community, the daily workings of parliamentary cornmittees, and the efforts of key personalities acting as 'green crusaders' within the particular political party. The "genuine" leaming of the green crusaders in political parties is based on a self- motivated interest in environmental issues whereas politicians or parties who engage in "strategic" government leaming tend to respond to various pressures (constituent concems, interest groups, disaster events, etc.). The concept of "genuine learning" is convincing in that government representatives are a part of larger society, thus also reflecting changes and ideological developments in society, such as growing concern about the environment.

87 Haas, Savine the Mediterranean, and Haas, "Introduction: Episternic Communities and International Policy Coordination," International Oreanization, Vol. 46, No. 1, Winter 1992, pp. 1-35; Jachtenfuchs, International PoIicv-Making as a Learnin~Procas?. 88 Robinson, The green in^ of British Party Politics, 1992. 89 Ibid., p. 39. Peter Haas has advanced an epistemic community approach which explores the development of expert learning and consensus in a particular issue area and its influence on govemment leaming adorpolicy change. Learning within an epistemic community or scientific convergence is necessary for govenunents to Iearn and to effect change in international regimes. The term episternic cornmunity is defined by Haas as a network of professionals, for example ecological scientists, with recognized expertise in a particular issue area who share sirnilar principled and causal beliefs, notions of validity and a common policy enterpnse.90 Episternic communities are, however, distinct from the broader scientific communities, professions and disciplines, and bureaucrats, since the latter do not necessarily hold a consensual understanding of the problem and so1ution.g~ Moreover, once consensus breaks down in an episternic community, "smaller, discreet epistemic communities" ernergeSg2Members of the epistemic comrnunity denve their power, domestically and intemationally, from their authoritative claim to knowledge. They increase their effectiveness by exhibiting a strong consensus or "speaking with one voice" on the nature of the problem and policy conclusions. Leaders or governments tum to the episternic community to help them identiîy their own interests and policies in areas where they are poorly informed and uncertain or following a crisis. The epistemic cornmunity helps limit the range of policy options govemments consider by identifying the parameters of the problem and solution based on their own causal and value framework. Although scientific convergence is a necessary condition, it is not suffkient for regime building. As Haas points out in his empirical study of the Mediterranean Action Plan, "...no learning occurred in countries in which the episternic community was unable to appropriate control," (e-g., the epistemic comrnunity was weak in Libya, Morocco, and

Tunisia and, as a resuIt, there was little action) and consensual knowledge "...clid not serve

Haas, "Introduction," p. 3. 9LIbid., pp. 18-19. 92 Ernanuei Adler and Peter Haas, "Condusion: Epistemic Communities, World Order, and the Creation of a Reflective Research Program," International Or~anization,Vol. 46, No. 1.. Winter 1992, pp. 367-390. as a process of regime change. Instead it served largely as a power resource for rnembers of the epistemic community."93 Thus a second necessary condition for regirne building and the development of convergent state poiicies is that members of the epistemic community attain bargaining power in goveniment bureaucracies and international secretariats, including high level access to decision-makers. Thus, Haas proposes: "The strength of cooperative arrangements will be deterrnined by the dornestic [and international] power amassed by members of the epistemic community within their respective governments [and

intergovemmental bodies]."94 Haas' work points to the importance of strong environmental bureaucracies in ensuring a state capacity for green learning. Evert Lindquist's work on institutional structures (the strength of govemment and organized interest groups) tells us something about a state's capacity to both learn and generate its own information and analyses. For exarnple, in "clientele pluralist networks" (Le., weak govemment and high organization of interests) the govenunent tends to be dependent on interest associations for informati0n.9~

The current trend of cutting government @y about a third over the course of three years in the case of Environment Canada's program review behveen 1994 and 1997, and almost one half in Ontario since 1990), and a tum to c'voluntarism'' represents a real danger and threat to government's capacity to generate environmental data, to contribute to scientific convergence on emerging environmental issues, and to provide epistemic community bargaining leverage from within-conditions that facilitate environmental regime-building.

93 Peter Haas, "Do Regirnes Matter? Epistemic Communities and Mediterranean Pollution Control," International Organization, Vol. 43, No. 3, Summer 1989, p. 398. g4 Haas, Savin? the Mediterranean, p. 57. 95 Evert A. Lindquist, "Public Managers and Policy Communities: Leaming to Meet New Challenges," Canadian Public Administration, Vol. 35, No. 2, Summer 1992, p. 137. (iv) Govemment Public Education Models

Moreover, governments often undertake public education as a government project. Drawing on social marketing research, the effectiveness of public information campaigns (PICS) depends on a host of factors, such as targeting the audience, selecting appropnate channels of communication, providing understandable and clear information, directing attention, triggering existing norms, changing values and preferences, as well as creating a new social context. For example, the mass media is seen as a particularly good way of directing attention to issues or agenda-setting, since media campaigns influence what people think about and, thus, judge as being more important. Moreover, multiple channels are needed to ensure broad exposure to the message. First, different collectivities are

exposed to different media (e.g., television is a good way of reaching youth). Second, the message needs to be reinforced and repeated to rernind one of and refocus attention on an issue? Taylor and Muller argue that the message must "monopolize" the media: Not just one, but every, medium needs to be utilized in a concerted reinforcing effort. Only by saturating al1 media (libraries, brochures, mass media advertising, billboards, speakers' bureaus, public presentations, transit posters, audiovisual materials, telephone hotlines, cornrnunity events, news conferences, news releases) with a simple message will that message be heard and understood to the point of invoking consumrnation of motivation by the consumer-motivation to change behavior.97

In general, public information campaigns attempt to build on existing norms and values. At times, the set task is to change underlying values and principles which is much more difficult-something public information campaigns alone are unlikely to accomplish; a change in social contexts is also necessary, including government policies and changes in other social institutions.98

96 Weiss and Tschirhart, "Public Information Carnpaigns as Policy Instruments," p. 9 1. 97 Wayne D. Taylor and Thomas E. Muller, "Eco-literacy and Environmental Citizenship: a social marketing challenge for public sector management," O~timum:The Journal of Public Sector Manacement, Vol. 23, No. 3.. Winter, 1992, p. 10. 98 Weiss and Tschirhart, "Public Information Campaigns as Policy Instruments," pp. 90-92. Environmental public information carnpaigns are one tool available to govemments in achieving sustainable development, as was heavily emphasized in the Governrnent of Canada's Green Plan initiatives. However, PICs are often seen as symbolic gestures- giving the appearance of government action and an easy way of difisirtg public concem about the environment, while letting industry off the hook. Weiss and Tschirhart note that policy-makers often "blame the victim" by stressing the role of the individual in environmental and other social problems, rather than "more systemic social or organization dynamics," and thus choose public information tools rather than regulatory and market instruments directed at corporations.99 'The rnindset that amibutes policy problems to individu&, rather than to institutions, makes it more likely that policy designers will consider PICs as a viable in~trument."~00Similarly, George Hoberg and Kathryn Harrison are cntical of the Green Plan's heavy emphasis on the use of indirect measures, like information development and dissemination, and the minirnization of more coercive and direct measures, such as regulation, taxation, and clean-up which would impose concentrated costs on polluting industries.101 Clearly, the use of public information carnpaigns in green strategies should be seen as only one component of an overall set of instrument choices. At the international IeveI, Jack Donnelly's work on global human rights regïmes suggests that new and weak international regimes-called declaratory and promotional regimes+ften focus on public education. lo2 Stronger regimes-that is, implementation and enforcement regimes-use more direct means of ensuring the achievement of international standards and noms. Governrnents and international organizations often provide bilateral

99 Ibid., p. 93. lûû Ibid. lol Hoberg and Harrison, "It's Not Easy Being Green.'' lo2 Jack Donnelly, Universal Hurnan Ri~htsin Theory and Practicg (Ithaca: Corne11 University Press, 1989), and "International Hurnan Rights: A Regime Analysis," International Or~anization,Vol. 40, No. 3, Summer 1986, pp. 599-642. and international training, respectively, in the issue areas of human rights and environment. For exarnple, the Intergovemmental Panel on Climate Change and the US government have provided extensive training aid to the Chinese climate change research program.103

In sum, political scientists employ a wide range of models in exploring the meaning, process and significance of learning in response to environmental problems. The target of green learning may be actors in civil society or govemment. The focus of the first part of this paper has been on changing state poticy since, as Mike Robinson points out, "Emphasis quite nghtly has been placed upon govemment and its role as the forma1 respondent to the environrnentalist challenge."lM Public pressure models highlight the role of NGOs and the attentive public in promoting government action on the environment, while government learning models highlight the role of scientists and various institutional mechanisms in the greening of government policy. However, while state poIicy may be the key part of any response to the environmental cnsis, this does not take away from civic politics as an additional force in environmental politics. Increasingly, with the growth of economic globalization and the nsing importance of multi-national corporations and the concomitant decline of state power, the only recourse for international environmental NGOs is to apply direct pressure on corporate polluters and to launch appeals to their transnational consumers. More important, implementing sustainable development requires the full participation of societal actors at aLl levels, from local to transnational. In contrast to the other learning approaches, govemment education prograrns tend to be used by governments as an easy and weak alternative to more forceful command and control or fiscal instruments and other state interventions.

lo3 Elizabeth Econorny. 'Thinese Policy-making and Global Climate Change: Two-front Diplornacy and International Community," in Miranda A. Schreurs and Elizabeth C. Economy (eds), The InternationaIization of Environmental Protection (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997). lo4 Robinson, The Greenine of British Partv Politics, 1992, p. 20. Eco-Backcasting: Back From a Possible Future The main tasks of positivist models are to make descriptive and causal inferences as well as prescriptions based on these. These models are relevant in future-oriented studies, particularly when addressing the question of what is likely to occur in the future given a specific set of conditions.lO5 B y specifying the conditions under which leaming takes place, these approaches provide a basis for predicting or forecasting the potential for societal and governrnent learning in addressing environmental concems. However, prediction may not be the proper aim of forecasting, as the future is unknowable and past predictions have failed rniserably. John Robinson argues that it is actually counterproductive to search for the most likely future, since it may not be a better worid To the degree that the future is not already determined but remains to be lcreated, then the search for the most likely future (i.e., the best prediction) is not only often misguided (since we are usually wrong) but actually Icounterproductive. This is so because the most likely future may not be the most desirable, and thus what are needed are not techniques that converge on likelihood but techniques that reveal the possibility, and test the feasibility and impacts, of alternative futures. The focus thus shifts from prediction and Likelihood to feasibility and choice.106

A backcasting approach is one tool of moving on a better pathway. One first has to imagine a preferred future and then determine how such a desirable future can be reached.

One starts with the question, 'What kind of worId would you Iike to see in 2020, 2050 or at some other date in the long tenn future?' and then asks 'How do you attain that desired fUture?'m7 In the case of the global ecological crisis, solutions are explored based on a

105 e-g., Gary King et al.. Desiminp Social Inqui?: Scientific Inference in Oualitative Research (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1994). lo6 John Robinson, "Unlearning and Backcasting: Rethinking Sorne of the Questions We Ask about the Future," Journal of Technolo~icalForecasting and Social Chanae, Vol. 33, 1988, p. 326. lo7 John Robinson et. al.. "Defining a Sustainable Society: Values. Principles and Definitions," Alternatives, Vol. 17, No. 2, 1990, pp. 36-42, and Robinson, Life in 2030: Ex~Iorin~a Sustainable Future for Canada (Vancouver: UBC Press, 1996). long term vision of a preferred future. Rather than assuming business-as-usual and simply extrapolating current trends into the future, a backcasting approach requires one to imagine what kind of global ecological, economic and social system one wouid like future inhabitants-human and nonhuman-to live in. One cmconsider the planet's ecological, economic and social system as a whole, or a particular issue, such as farm animals, rainforests, or the global climate. For example, imagine a more environrnentally-friendly world where energy production was organized around end-use needs and relied on a sustainable soft energy path, where human-induced species extinction ended and natural habitats were cherished and protected, where factory farming, animal experimentation or other forms of animal exploitation no longer existed, where reforestation was a priority, and where social and environmental justice within and between societies was a fact of life. Robinson and Slocombe write: "It is thus explicitly normative, involving working backward from a desired future endpoint or set of goals to the present, in order to determine the physical feasibility of that future and the policy measures that would be required to reach that point."*08 In this way, the backcasting approach represents a significant methodological departure from traditional, positivist approaches to international relations theory where the positivist legacy reigns supreme. Such alternative approaches to future studies have ken employed by various scientists, energy analysts, and political scientists. Vincent Geoghegan has reviewed Marxist utopian visions and strategies to achieve these over the course of the 1st two centuries, from Fourier, Saint-Simon and Robert Owen to Mmand Engels to the Second International and to more contemporary work of Ernst Bloch, Rudolf Bahro and André Gorz. Geoghegan argues that a 'utopian impulse' lies behind al1 politicai ideologies (and even fashion, art and architecture), and the not infrequent failure of the Ieft to daydream and to self-consciously develop detailed

logJohn Robinson and Slocornbe in Robinson (ed), Life in 2030, p. 8.

47 future-oriented visions is positively dangerous, leaving the nght to fil1 the In the 1970s, the New York Institute for World Order sponsored a book series on "Preferred Worlds for the 1990s," including works by Richard A. Falk and Johan Galtung-110 Science and technology analysts have also used various backcasting approaches to examine the kinds of shifts necessary to produce a preferred future in technology, end-use energy systems, and global climate change policy.lll Recent studies have explored environmentally sustainable governance in various sectors and green Lifestyle~.~~~This chapter's focus is on the role of learning in the making of a sustainable society.113 If learning is to play a role, key questions that arise, include:

What kind of learning is necessary in a sustainable society? How can this be achieved? More specifically: Who ought to learn about the crisis in order to effect change? 1s scientific learning andor public education key to global regime-building? What lessons can we learn from older social movements about usefulness and effectiveness of different sources of leaming, such as media, popular and counterculture, formal and informal schook, and direct action? How does the necessary leaming compare with the current status of learning?

log For exarnple, in the early part of the twentieth century, many revisionist and orthodox Marxisü of the Second International were, in Geoghegan's views, 'anti-utopian' utopianists, fearing future speculation and condemning others on the left with such visions as 'utopian.' In contrast, "the rights had no such qualms and rapidly filled the vacuum with cheap novels portraying the hell of future sociaiist society and, even more sinisterly, developing utopian visions of strong leaders, international power and racial purity. The left thus abandoned this great reservoir of utopianism to be poisoned by the right." Vincent Geoghegan, Utopianism and Marxism (London: Methuen, 1987), p. 39. Richard A. Falk, A Study of Future Worlds (New York: The Free Press, 1975). and Galtung, The True Worlds. Science Council of Canada, Çanada as a Conserver Society: Resource Uncertainties and the Need for New Technolo&s, Report No. 27 (Ottawa, 1977); Amery Lovins, "Energy Strategy: The Road Not Taken?' Foreim Affairs, October, 1976, pp. 55-96; Pier Vellinga and Rob Swart, "The Greenhouse Marathon: A Proposal for a Global Strategy," Cllimatic Chanoe, Vol. 18, Ianuary 1991, pp. vii-xii; Florintin Krause et al., Enerw- - Policv in the Greenhouse: From Warrnina Fate to Warming Limits: Benchmarks for a Global Wannina- Climate Convention (El Cerrito, CA: International Praject for Sustainable Energy Paths, 1989). l2 Robinson, Life in 203Q. l3 See also Lester Milbrath, Envisioning a Sustainable Society: Learning Our Way Out (Albany, NY: SUNY Press, 1989). In short, the kinds of questions it focuses on are deeper ones-ones that involve grappling with the root causes of the global ecological crisis, and devising learning and action strategies necessary to address these. The backcasting approach suggests that environmental thought literature and social movement history cm help us answer these questions, and develop a more radical concept of green learning. In planning ways to achieve an alternative future, various methodological tools are available. First, one could explore some of the classic works on the environment and learning-such leading ecological thinkers as Karl Polanyi, Rachel Carson, Barry Commoner for example-and sift out their ideas about the role scientific learning and public education should and do play. It is also usehl to explore philosophical works to examine the knd of learning various philosophers see as necessary to reverse the ecological crisis. There is a growing body of environmental thought literature, much of which involves radical ecoIogical perspectives, such as deep ecology, social ecology,

ecoferninism, animal rights, and steady-state economics. A number of authors have taken a holistic, global approach and offer a vision of an alternative ecological future and ways of getting there, including the work of Arne Naess, and Murray Bookchin, and Daly and Cobb7ssteady-state vision and proposed set of institutions. Second, when addressing the question of feasibility or "how do we get there?", one could look at how broad-based societal learning has taken place in the past, that is, what the various sources of learning were. A practical and descriptive approach would involve examining older, relatively successful, social change movements that were able to achieve fundamental shifts in societal knowledge, values, worldview and power relations. The multiple sources of learning in the labor and civil rights movements could be reviewed, including the use of labor schools, protest songs, theater, and fiterature, action learning (e.g. direct action such as strikes), the media, etc. Third, representatives of environmental NGOs could be interviewed regarding the overd1 type of learning they see as necessary. In sum, the backcasting approach departs from positivist approaches, which, to varying degrees, tend to postulate the continuation of curent or past trends into the future, and is useful in developing a more explicitly normative conceptual frarnework which highlights choice and feasibility in "learning Our way out." Such an approach, if adopted at al1 levels of society, may be critical in decelerating and reversing the drift towards global ecological and social calamity. Below, 1 will examine only the definition of green learning, in light of the backcasting approach's focus on desirability. The questions of how this Iearning might take place and of who the key subjects of the leaniing are will be examined in Chapters three and four respectiveiy .

DeJining Green Leaming

The previous section gave us some idea of the extent of change required. This section will develop the concept of green learning by using both insights from positivist models as well as adherïng to the backcasting approach's focus on choice and feasibility. Directing our attention to issues such as envisioning a preferred future and detennining ways of getting there (backcasting), while, at the sarne time, inquiring about the conditions necessary for such leamhg (forecasting), highlights the importance of the literature in the fields of environmental policy, environmental thought, and social change movements. The term learning is too large a category to begin with to be useful in the study of popular environmental education. For example, a dictionary definîtion of leaming appears value-free and neutral: "to get knowledge of (a subject) or ski11 in (an art, trade, etc.) by study, experience, instruction, etc." n4 Attaching such adjectives as "progressive" or "green" to learning is a way of narrowing the focus and is justifiable since there exists a

l4 Webster's New World Dictionq. Second College Edition.

50 strong relationship between progressive politics and "learning our way Though the tem progressive may change over time, there are some constants: expanding the circle of compassion and elirninating arbitrary foms of discrimination based on race, sexysexual orientation, ability, age, species, etc.; concern for social justice, environmental protection, and the public good in general; and the important role played by progressive social change movements in these struggles. A review of the environmentai and social movement Iiterature suggests three distinct components comprise "green learning." First, the environmental policy literature points to the need to generate and distribute basic, accurate information and analyses related to the state of the environment. There exists a relationship between democracy and progress in environmental protection insofar as significant public education and policy change have taken place in the past alongside greater access to information, public accountability, and public participation.116 Second, an examination of the environrnental thought literature suggests the need for a shift towards an ecological worldview. Environmental ethicists provide deep philosophical critiques of the global ecological crisis and point to root causes of the global environmental crisis, such as anthropocentrism, the growth paradigm, the Cartesiadmechanistic worldview, social injustice, and patriarchy.117 Finally, the social movement literature emphasizes the importance of relating learning to action (e.g., Freire, 1970).l18 h the experiences of the labor, civil rights and environrnental movernents, direct

Milbrath, Envisionine a Sustainable Society; Robert Paehlke, EnvironmentaIism and the Future of Promessive Politics (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1989) For exarnple, Robert Paehlke, "Dernocracy and Environrnentalisrn: Opening a Door to the Administrative State," in Paehlke and Douglas Torgerson, eds., Manazin~Leviathon: Environmental Politics and the administrative state (Peterborough: Broadview Press, 1990), pp. 35-55; Harrison, Passing the Buck. Il7 For example, Michael E. Zirnrnerman et al. (eds), Environmental Philoso~hy:Frorn Animal Riehts to Radical Ecologv (New Jersey: Prentice Hall, 1993); Morris Berman, The Reenchantment of the World (Ithaca: Corne11 University Press, 1981); Stephen R. Sterling, "'ïowards an ecological worldview," in J. Ronald EngeI and Joan Gibb Engel (eds), Ethics of Environment and Deveiooment: Global Challen~e, International Remonse (Tucson: The University of Arizona Press, 1990), pp. 77-86. Political scientists also point to the need for citizen engagement [Janice G. Stein ct al., "Citizen Engagement in Conflict Resolution: Lessons for Canada in International Experience," Commentarv, No. Tabie 2.1 Environmental Assessments by Governments and Nongovernmental Organizations in Canada and the United States

International and Reeional Or~anizations: the United Nations Environment Program (UNEP)publishes a biennial Environmental Data Report, an annual State of the World Environments report, and has introduced an irnpressive biennial Global Environmental Outlook (GEO) starting in 1997. The GE0 series moves beyond the traditionai state of the environment reports by assession policies and emerging issues region by region from a sustainable development perspective. Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) publishes an Environmental Data Compendium every two years (beginning in 1985), State of Environment Reports every five years (starting in 1979), occasional OECD Performance Reviews for their member countnes, and released, in 1991, an 80-page volume, Environmental Indicators-A Prelirninarv Set, containing indicators suitable for the integration of environmental and economic decision making at the national and international levels. The Commission for Environmental Cooperation, part of the North American Free Trade Agreement, compiles annual reports on cornpliance with environmental regulations in the Canada, the U.S. and Mexico Select National Governments US. Govemment: U.S. Council on Environmental Quality publishes an annual Environmental Oualitv Report, an occasional digest entitled Environmental Trends and the Global 2000 report

Canadian Govemment:

the Canadian Ministry of Supply and Service publishes the State of the Environment Report for Canada about every five years (starting in 1986) Statistics Canada occasionally publishes, Human Activitv and the Environment: A Statistical Com~endium(beginning in 1978) on a provincial level, Quebec's Ministry of the Environment published L'Environnement au Ouebec Nonpovernrnental Or~anizations the International Institute for Sustainable Development, based in Winnipeg, Manitoba, is working on a comprehensive set of sustainability indicators the World Resources Institute publishes a biennial World Resources Report. The publication is coproduced with UNEP and the International Institute for Environment and Development The World Watch Institute publishes an annual State of the World report action plays a critical role in raising awareness, creating a comrnunity and changing state policies. In sum, progressive learning may entai1 anything from the generation and distribution of information, to the adoption of progressive core values and beliefs or worldviews, and, finally, learning through action. Taken together, these three ty-pes of learning are essential in responding to the ecological crisis, and moving towards a sustainable and progressive society.

Type I Learning: Acquiring Basic Information on the State of the Environment There cm be no social protest without awareness of an issue. The generation of basic, relevant and accurate information about the state of the environment is essential to informing the public, and promoting good decision-making by policy-makers and the myriad of actors in civil society. Daly and Cobb point to "wild facts", such as global warrning, species extinction, deforestation, etc., that we al1 have a responsibility fo be aware of? Such awareness depends, first, on the generation of basic, accurate environmental information, and second, on its distribution. State of the Environment (SOE) reports are documents that gather and present information on environmental conditions and trends in particular jurisdictions (see Table

2. I and Appendix 1 for more details). Some environmental reports are sirnply statistical compendia, offerhg raw data and some description of environmental conditions. SOEs often include sets of environmental indicators. Increasingly, more holistic and integrated analyses are being provided in SOE reports, including sets of sustainability indicators- measures that incorporate important environmental and social and economic feahues.

94. C. D. Howe Institute's The Canadian Union Papers, June 1997)], strong democracy Penjaniin Barber. Strong Democracv (Berkeley: University of California, 1984)], participatory citizenship [Carole Pateman, Participation and Democratic Theory (Cambridge : Cambridge University Press, 1970)], and plrblic participation (PaehIke, "Democracy and Environmentalism"). l9 Herman Daly and John B. Cobb Jr., For the Cornmon Good: Redirectinp the Econorny Toward Communitv. the Environment. and a Sustainable Future (Boston: Beacon Press, 1989 and 1994). Environment and sustainability indicators are intended for use in starting and improving assessrnent activities of governments, international institutions, corporations, non-government organizations, and comrnunity groups. Moreover, sustainability indicators inforrn decision-makers, the media and the general public on the status of a country's progress toward, or away from, environmental protection and sustainable development. Indicators help translate public expectations to measurable parts, iike targets or benchmarks. Their purpose is to increase awareness and understanding of environmental issues, problems and trends. They provide a tool for evaluating the effectiveness of policy. They also provide information to improve environrnental and socio-economic performance and help generate new policies. The provision of information is needed to fulfill the public's "right to know" in democratic societies. In the United States, legislation is in place which requires annual reports on the environment and allows public access to information about the environment. The generation of environmental information requires a societal, national and international capacity to do so, including strong and adequateiy funded environment ministries, university research, and citizen group activities. Govemrnents play a crucial role in undertaking basic research, as many of them have strong research orientations, though this is being eroded rapidly by cutbacks in a neo-conservative age.120 Daly and Cobb argue that al1 univenities should have Global Issues Departments and required courses which would tackle some of the most important ecological and socio-econornic issues facing life on the planet. Iz1 Environmental NGOs are also key generators of basic information and analysis-and increasingly so, as governments downsize their environment ministries. NGOs undertake investigative work, scientific research, and monitoring of the

120 See Anita Krajnc, "Wither Ontario's Environment? Neoconservatisrn and the decline of the Environment Ministry," Canadian Public Policy, Vol. XXVI, No. 1, March 2000, pp. 1-17, and M. Waterstone ,"Environmental Policy and Governrnent Restructuring," Urban Affairs Annual Review, Vol. 48, 1997, pp. 233-51. 121 Daiy and Cobb, For the Cornmon Good. environrnent and environmental p~licies.'~~Research and investigations are particularly important to socid movements in their eady stages, since placing an issue on the agenda ofien requires unraveling disturbing stories. For example, Alex Pachenko, a CO-founderof the People for the Ethicai Treaûnent of Anirnals (PETA), the world's largest animal rights group, argues that the group's Investigations and Reporting Division is its most important department. However, while "good information" often exists, the major stumbling block often proves to be the adequate distribution of such material to the mass public. With regard to access to information, Robert Paehlke argues that "more dernocracy is better," since govemrnent leaders and expert administrations are not necessarily the protectors of the public interest. Goverment agencies are often "captureci" by private corporate interests, and the lathers7power is maximized in "closed or low visibility arenas." As a result, environmentalists cal1 for more democracy: increased transparency, more information, and the public's right to know; more grassroots mobilization, and full public participation in the decision-making process; and greater public accountability. However, it often takes a lot of effort to get basic information distributed in order to expand the scope of the confiict, and get an item on the agenda.124 AS noted earlier, Bill Moyer points to a series of stages social movements go through: initially "rebels" within social movements often have to take ciramatic mesures to draw attention to an issue or politicize an issue; "social change agents7'engage in long term, Lfe-long process of promoting social leaming; and finally, once a majority of the public demands progressive policy change, "reformers" negotiate alternative visions and programs with powerholders.125 Clearly, if green learning is to gain the prominence it deserves, an important priority should be piaced in generating and

122 Noam Chomsky argues that mainstream sources provide only a srnall fraction of relevant information, and says he gets most of his information fiom NGOs about what's going on in the world. 123 Paehlke, "Dernocracy and Environrnentalism," pp. 35 and 38. 124 Bachrach and Baratz, Power and Poverty; Schattschneider, The Serni-sovereim People. 125 Bill Moyer, The Practical Strategist. distributing information related to the state of nature, though such awareness-raising activities are insufficient in adequately addressing the global ecological crisis.

Learning Type 11: Changes in Worldview Environmentai ethicists would argue that the root causes of the ecological cnsis are not being addressed by simply providing basic, accurate facts and figures about the state of the environment. Rather, and much more ambitious, new epistemologies and worldviews are essential. Historically, progressive movements have often portrayed their ideas as a "new religion." A character in Upton Sinclair's The Jungle describes Sociaiism as "the

new religion of h~rnanity."~~~Morris Berman, in the Re-enchantment of the World, argues that switching frorn a Cartesian, mechanistic worldview to an ecological worldview is akin

to a religious conversion.127 The new scientific epistemology should be holistic and ecological instead of reductionist.128 Matis a green worldview? Natural and social scientists and philosophers have played a key role in the development of a number of perspectives on what an ecological worldview would entail. Environmental ethics is a branch of applied philosophy which deals with the relationship between humans and nature. In 1979 Eugene Hargrowve founded the journal Environmental Ethics. The airn of environmental ethics is to extend ethical concem beyond human beings, to include other species and ecosystems as deserving moral consideration. Lester Milbrath and Robert Paehlke point to a cornrnon set of fundamental values upon which the green movement is based such as the long term

126 Upton Sinclair, The Iunrle (New York: Penguin Books, 1985/originally published in 1906). p. 375. 127 Berman, Re-enchanmient of the World. 128 For exarnple, Steding, 'Towards an Ecological Worldview,"; Berman, The Reenchantrnent of the WorId; Carolyn Merchant, The Death of Nature (San Francisco: Harper and Row, 1980). future, hoiistic perspectives, the intrinsic value of nature and dl living beings, social justice, among other values.129 In radical ecological approaches, such as deep ecology, social ecology, ecofeminism, animal rights and steady-state economics, the seriousness of the ecological crisis is recognized and a fundamental change in values is advocated.130 A radical ecological worldview is based on the recognition that al1 living beings have intrinsic value and also emphasizes the fundamental importance of social justice. For example, the human-centered paradigm needs to be replaced since it rests on such faulty assumptions as: humans are separate fiom nature humans are superior to nature humans have the right to dominate and ultirnately destroy nature other species, often including human beings, should be treated as means or as instruments, rather than ends in themselves

An ecological worldview rests on the principle of tremendous humility, and gants future generations of humans and other species greater consideration. For Neil Evemden the environmental crisis is related to our predorninant belief system, culture and way of thinking.131 Although new kinds of societal learning aimed at worldviews are essential, these are not always the basis by which the environmental movement is formed. Evemden notes that while the environmental movement has obviously had some success, its accomplishments can easily be swept away if the root causes of the ecological crisis are not addressed. In particular, if, as in our culture, the environment tends to be valued only as a

129 Milbrath, J3wisionin~a Sustainable Society; Paehlke. Environmentalisrn and the Future of Prooressive Politics. Within the green movernent, however, there are many different approaches, including reform and radical ecological perspectives. Reform perspectives, such as the Brundùand Commission's sustainable development approach, are hurnan centered (it tends to refer to the ecosystem and other species as resources or genetic pools rather than as ends in themseIves with their own interests and rights), and cal1 for continued, though cleaner, economic growth. The World Commission on Environment and Development (Our Comrnon Future) rnakes a number of important recommendations related to greater North-South equity and the incorporation of environment in al1 political and economic decision making, but in the end it does not cdfor the needed far-reaching changes in values and behaviors. 130 Zimmerman et al., (eds), Environmental Philosophy- 131 Neil Evemden, The Natural Alien: Hurnankind and the Environment (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1991). resource, nature is always sacrificed in the end. As a result, the environrnental movement must constantly repeat itself in underlying the intrinsic value of nature. Livingston also looks at anthropocentrisrn: Conternporary Western Furnan beings] in the ovenvhelming majority considers [themselves] fundamentally different and distinct from the Iiving world that gives [themf both substance and sustenance. This imagined separation between [humans] and 'nature' has provided the conceptual framework for a further doctrine, that of absolute power and authonty over the nonhuman. These ludicrous but temfying notions have become soiidified in our collective thought in a ridiculously bnef period of human and Earth history.132

Livingston proposes environrnental humility as a way out.'33 Other perspectives such as social ecology and steady state economics emphasize the linkages between the environment and social justice issues. Social ecology is based on the anarchist writings of Murray Bookchin. A number of independent schools have been set up to undertake research, education and outreach in the field of social ecology, including the Institute for Social Ecology in Plainfield, Vermont, in the United States. The International Society for Ecological Economics focuses more on the interface between econornics (a subsystem) and the planet's environment (the overall systern). Ecolooical Econornics, the Society's journal founded in 1989, addresses the relationships between ecosystems and economic systems in a broad sense. It hofds an intefisciplinary, holistic, biocentnc perspective. Its research agenda includes five parts: (1) sustainability: maintaining our life support systems; (2)valuation of natural resources and natural capital; (3) ecological economic system accounting; (4) ecological-econornic modeling at local, regional, and global scales; and (5) innovative instruments for environrnental management.

Learning Type III: Action Learning and Citrzen Engagement

13* John Livingston. One Cosrnic Instant: A Naniral History of Hurnan Arroeance (Toronto: McClelland and Stewart Ltd., 1973). 133~physicist friend of mine includes as her mailing address 'Toronto. Ontario. Canada, Earth, Sol, Cygnus Arm, MiIky Way, Local Group, Coma Super-duster, Universe." However, a third type of learning is needed, one that links knowledge and action. Paulo Freire also criticizes the fmt approach to learning-sirnply gaining knowledge of facts and undertaking analyses-what he calls the "banking method" of education. Rather Freire calls for "action learning," that is, praxis: "reflection and action upon the world in order to transform it."134 The tme Iearning experience is dialogical, and the indicators of public education inchde both knowledge and the act of transforrning the concrete reality of oppression.l35 The "means are the ends in the making," as Moyer notesP Nonviolent direct action is a central part of the collective action of new social movements. Direct action is done by a social movement to protest, bear witness, draw attention, and/or stop certain actions the group opposes. It cm take many forms. For example, Gene Sharp, in The Politics of Nonviolent Action, lists dozens of different methods, including protest and persuasion (fodstatements, symbolic public acts, drama and music, marches, parades, pickets, vigils, leafleting), political, social and econornic non-cooperation (strike, consurners' boycott), and intervention (sit-in, hunger strike, guemlla theater, speak-in, nonviolent intejection and obstniction).l37 Action Iearning is critical to social movernents, yet it is often underplayed or even ignored in the political science literature on interest groups. Sociologists, in contrast, have focused on the significance of social activism, for example, in theories such as resource mobilization theory and new social movement theory.

The Advocacy Coalition Framework

In examining al1 of the iiterature on learning, the epistemic cornmunities approach and advocacy coalition (AC) frarnework provide the most useful and encompassing

134Paulo Freire. The Peda~owof the Oppressed (New York: Herder and Herder, 1970). 135 Ibid.. pp. 179 and 34-35. 136 Moyer, The Pracrical Strateeist, p. 5. 137 Gene Sharp, The Politics of Nonviolent Action (Boston: Porter Sargent, 1973). See also Martin Oppenheimer and George Lakey, A Manual for Direct Action (Chicago: QuadrangIe Books, 1964 and 1965). conceptual frameworks for the role of the scientists and the environmental movement, respectively, in the learning process. The focus of this thesis is on how scientific learning dong with societal learning inside and outside the environmental movement influences the environmental policy process, and thus the episternic cornmunities approach developed by Peter Haas and the advocacy coalition (AC) approach advanced by Paul Sabatier and others are particularly appropnate conceptual framework~.~3aThis section will elaborate on the AC approach and explore some of the interconnections between scientists and the environmental movement, and will incorporate elements of the epistemic cornmunities approach reviewed earlier. See Figure 2.2.

ACs are defined as "peopIe from a variety of positions (elected and agency officiais, interest group leaders, researchers, etc.) who share a particular belief system, Le., a set of basic values, causal assurnptions, and problem perceptions, and show a nontrivial degree of coordinated activity over time."l39 The environmental movement consists of many advocacy coalitions, including the forest protection AC and climate protection AC, examined later in the thesis. However, within different policy cornrnunities different policy networks will form around particular issues. Some environmental organizations and scientists wiil only mobilize or engage around a particular issue due to their specialization, while others will have broader interests and work across issues. The environmental movement mobilizes around a great variety of issues so that ACs have many components - appearing as clusters of organizations and policy entrepreneurs - which will work in comrnon cause on some issues, but work more effectively or concertedly on different issues.140 A distinguishing charactenstic of ACs is their stability and comprehensive scope:

38 Paul A. Sabatier, "Knowledge, policy-oriented learning, and policy change: An advocacy coalition framework," Knowledee: Crearion. Diffusion. Utilization, Vol. 8, No. 4, June 1987, pp. 649-692; Sabatier and Jenkins, Policy Chan~eand Learninq; Lindquist, "Public Managers and PoIicy Communities"; and Keck and Sikkink, Activists Beyond Borders, for a sirnilar approach extended to the transnational level-- instead of ACs, they refer to transnational advocacy networks or TANS. 139 Sabatier and Jenkins, Policv Chan-e and Learning, p. 25 140 Personal communication, Evert Lindquist, Director, School of Public Administration, University of Victoria, February 8,2001. Figure 2.2. Extending the Advocacy Coalition Framework: Capturing the Roles of the Public and Scientists on Environmental Issues

REIATNELl' ST-ABLE P,GMWZERS ie-p.. basic artribute of the problem area. fundamental socio- Constrainr POLICY cultural values. and basic consritutional and Scienrists--Civic uplstemic cornmuniry Resourccs epistemic community (non-aIigned! (aligned with of environmenta1 AC) Policy Brokers ExTJxX.4.L (SYSTEii) EVESTS Subsysrcrn Environmental Pro-Econornic Gro~vth (e-g.. major Advocacy Coalition environmental Actors Advocacy CoaIirion a) beliefs crisis. dramatic ;II belicfs b) resources Orher .\Cs increases in energy b) resources costs. elecrion of (e-g.. Firs go\lemments with Nations) strong Srrategies environmental credenrials- uptums and doumturns in the economy l/ Decisions by sovereigns+ Agency resources and geneml policy orientation

. Policy outputs

PoIicy impacts they exist for a decade or more and are concerned with advancing a range of policy issues in order to better secure their core beliefs. They are different from issue networks or what Sabatier cascoalitions of convenience, which are temporary clusters of individuals and groups interested in fighting immediate battles (hke the 2000 campaign to prevent Toronto's garbage from king shipped to the Adams Mine in northern Ontario), and that disintegrate once a particular issue has been resolved. The advocacy coalition approach categorizes and clusters actors according to their belief systems rather than interests or power, but observes that at least one coalition tends to be in a dominant position for extended periods of time. Its point of departure is that ideas matter, and that groups of individuals and organizations that share core beliefs (e.g., that humans are part of nature, and are not superior to it) are highly Iikely to share near core beliefs (similar policy positions, such as views on the role of government in area of environrnental protection) as well as secondary beliefs (ideas on what specific regulatory or other instruments to use to achieve core beliefs). The focus of Sabatier's work is on policy-oriented learning or learning that leads to adjustments in secondary beliefs, largely because core and near core beliefs are much more resistant to change, with changes in core beliefs being akin to a "religious conversion," and because the distribution of power is unlikely to be altered as result of policy debates. Sabatier argues that changes in power relations between two or more ACs are rnost likely to occur as a result of extemal perturbations, such as a change in a goveming coalition, econornic changes (an oil crisis), and environmental crises rather than changes in the internal structure of ACs. The role of environrnental crises will be addressed in this thesis, but the role of other socio-econornic perturbations are beyond its scope. In a similar way, John Kingdon notes that a variety of factors cm lead to the placement of an issue on the public agenda, ranging from regular political events, Like conferences, to extemal events, like accidents and crises.'41 In the case of the latter, crises and important discoveries, Like the ozone hole, often act as focusing or triggering events. The presence of policy entrepreneurs or initiators can also help define and frame an environmental problem following a crisis and link it to possible actions or policy alternatives. Policy entrepreneurs are "individuals or smail groups that facilitate and coordinate the strategic growth of political coalitions around a particular policy p~oblern."'~~Green policy entrepreneurs can consist of a range of actors, such as scientists and members of environmental movement, including NGO activists, international diplomats, political leaders, journalists, and celebrities. 143

The key focus of this thesis is on the role of changes in internai dynamics of ACs on specific environmental issues, or what Sabatier terms subsystems. Sabatier notes that changes intemal to an AC, like increased resources, including "such things as money, expertise, number of supporters, and legal authority," can also irnprove the prospects of an AC achieving its g0als.14~ However, Sabatier postdates that extemal changes are ultimately more important: ",... while rninority coalitions can seek to improve their relative position through augrnenting their resources and 'outlearning' their adversaries, their basic hope of gaining power within the subsystem resides in waiting for some extemal event to increase significantly their political reso~rces."1~5

However, given the stakes involved, the environmental movement cannot wait for extemal perturbations like a devastating environmental crisis to advance its policy agenda. Social movements must be engaged in an ongoing process of social learning, both inside and outside the advocacy coalition. To embrace this important dynamic the AC approach

14' John W. Kingdon, Agendas. Alternatives. and Public Policies (Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1984). 142 Lamont Hempei, Environmental Governance: The GIobal Challen~e(Washington D.C.: Island Press, 1996), p. 128. 143 Ibid., pp. 129-131. Sabatier, "Knowledge, policy-oriented Iearning, and policy change," p. 664 145 Ibid., p. 671. needs to be expanded to better account for the role of social movements and how they intersect with the leaming and other activities of policy elites. Paul Pross, in his work on policy communities, observes that for groups not in the sub-government, or what Sabatier would cal1 the dominant advocacy coalition, the advantage of not wielding power is the

ability to innovate and come up with alternative policy solutions or, in other words, to engage in social learning.'46 Sabatier states that c6subsystemsare composed of policy elites rather than the generai public."147 The central question guiding this thesis is: Who has to Iearn for the environmental movement to achieve social and political change? To put it more sirnply: whose learning counts most? For progressive social change movements whose purpose is to promote the public good, it is the public. The desirability of public participation in pubüc interest issues like environmental protection stems from their reliance on "people powery7or the expansion of the audience to a fight, in Schattschneider's terminology. While it may be more useful to use elite membsrs of an AC as the basic unit of analysis for other issue subsystems, issues of public interest require a more inclusive unit of analysis, one that includes both members of the broad-based public as well as elite participants like leaders of various interest gruups, key journalists, and comrnunity leaders. The focus of Sabatier's work is on policy-oriented learning because he models the notion that core or near core values are not likely to change. Sabatier and Jenkins claim that deep core values are "stable in large part because they are largely normative issues inculturated in childhood and largely impervious to empirical evidence."l48 However, this is a starting assumption which 1 do not share with Sabatier and Jenkins. In chapter three, 1 focus on how three types of green learning take place: (i) the acquisition of basic facts about the state of the environment, (ii) changes in worldview, and (iii) action iearning. This requires, fust, that 1 extend Sabatier's frarnework to embrace

146 Personal communication, Evert Lindquist, Director, School of Public Administration, University of Victoria, February 8,2001. 14' Sabatier, "Knowledge, policy-oriented learning, and policy change," p. 665. 148 Sabatier and Jenkins, PoIicv Chan~eand Leaming, p. 36. progressive social Learning (e-g., NGO activities, media reports, protest music, film, environmental literature, and other channels of learning can prornote al1 three types of learning). Second, Sabatier's framework also has to be modified to account for the possibility that individuals can experience changes in one's worldview, or deep core values in Sabatier's terminology. Other authors, like Moms Berman, Arne Naess, and Neil Evernden take 'religious conversion' seriously. (It cm happen to people at various stages of their lives, from childhood to adulthood if they encounter dramatic experiences of nature or witness gross injustice via various media, including films. For example, 1 watched The

Animals Film on animai exploitation in factory farms narrated by Julie Christie when 1 was

an undergraduate; it had a transfomative effect on my view of animals and their moral standing in society.) See Figure 2.3. Deep core values can be adopted or adjusted both within an environmental AC (Le., an expansion of deep ecological views and values, such as extending one's circle of compassion from humans and ecosystems to individual animals, moving from a deep ecology to an animal rights' perspective as well) and outside the environmental AC (recruiting new mernbers who adopt environmental values, ranging from 'shallow' green or human-centered perspectives like sustainable development to more radical ecological worldviews, such as deep ecology, social ecology, eco-ferninism, steady-state econornics, and animal rights). This is not to suggest that what 1 am proposing departs from Sabatier's articulation of various types of beliefs (deep core, near core, and secondary), but simply that core beliefs within and outside an environmental AC are more amenable to progressive change then he believes. Lloyd Etheredge's concept of learning is relevant to the fmt and third components of green learning which involve increasing the accuracy in one's understanding and knowledge of the state of the world, rather than simply viewing leaming "as any change produced by experience", however me or false, as well as increasing the effectiveness of Figure 2.3. Linkages Between Policy Elite and Public Learning and Belief Systems

SABATIER'S MODEL OF BELIEFSYSTE:MS OF POLICY ELITES: Ei\?rlROiWrnTX ADVOCACY COAUTIOX Deep (Nomacivej Core Sear (Policy) Core Second- Aspects e.g.. belief chat humans e.~.. policy position on cg.. insuiimencd are part of nature proper roIe of government decisions on replations & noc superïor to ic

=%GO activities GREEY LEARYKG (PUBLICAh'D ELiTEl +mass Br alrernacive media Type2 Içming: Type 1 learning: Type 3 ieming:

*cultural activities changes in \vorldvie\c grotvrh in intelligence action learning or ( procesc music- wich increasing citizen engagernenr environmencal li knowledge of state of the environrnenc one's strategies for achieving change.149 Etheredge defines leaming as a growth in intelligence including "(i) increased realisrn, recognizing the different elements and processes actually operating in the world; (ii) growth of intellectual integration in which these different elements and processes are integrated with one another; and (iii) growth of a reflective perspective about the conditions of the first two processes, the conception of the problem, and the resul t which the decision-maker desires to achieve."15* Etheredge's andysis is very consistent with Sabatier's framework. It is closely related to leaming with respect to learning and change with respect near core, secondary, and policy program parts of belief systems. Action learning or citizen engagement, the third component of green learning, overlaps with Sabatier's primary concern, policy-oriented learning, though again it includes both elite and public participation. In sum, the focus of this thesis is on green learning, and how scientists and environmentalists attempt to shape public policy through their respective activities, some of which involves cornmunicating the results of science and some which involves social learning via education and sharing of information, or both. This focus is consistent with Sabatier's AC framework, though 1 am exploring only particular parts of it, such as how the interna1 resources of the environmental ACs (the number of its supporters) expands with the adoption and adjustment of individual belief systems. Using Sabatier's framework as a point of departure, this thesis explores the emergence of green learning in transnational society, and its effects on social and political change at both the domestic and international levels. Finally, the relationship between scientists and the environmental movement can be modeled as king either aligned or not aligned within Sabatier's advocacy coalition framework. Scientists may play a role within a particular environmental AC, particularly if

149 Etheredge, Can Governments Learn?, p. 87. lSo Ibid., p. 66. they act as green policy entrepreneurs and are seen as part of the environmental movernent (an aggregated approach). Alternatively, scientists and scientific organizations rnay be seen as separate from any particular AC and instead, act as mediators or regulators of ideological and substantive conflicts between different ACs.151 The epistemic community approach tends to assume the latter. Scientists or scientific groups are iikely to be particularly effective policy brokers, possessing a significant degree of political and scientific legitimacy, if they are seen as independent and providing "a 'relatively apolitical forum' for professionals represented in each advocacy coalition to discuss policy issues."Is2

Conciusions The chapter began by reviewing a number of positivist models of learning, and, then took a step back, and considered the concept of green learning by using the backcasting approach. The central argument advanced in this chapter is that the backcasting approach is a useful and illuminating complement to positivist approaches to leaming, such as public pressure, civic politics, and government learning and education models. The use of both positivist models and the backcasting approach cm help provide a better understanding of the meaning and potential of green learning.

Some of the positivist green models emphasize the role of the public in the green learning process (public pressure and civic politics models), others the role of government (governrnent leaming and education models). The survey of the literature served to illustrate the processes and significance of learning by various actors at different levels. Though various actors are important, social change movements and scientists are clearly at the leading edge of green learning. The public pressure, government leaming (e.g., epistemic community approach), and civic society models are particulariy useful in lS1 Sabatier, "Knowledge, policy-oriented learning, and policy change"; Lindquist, "Public Managers and Policy Communities." lS2 Lindquist, "Public Managers and Policy Communities," p. 155. explaining and understanding the emergence and development of environmental policy and the greening of society. The positivist models used provide various insights into the nature of leamïng, its subjects and ~i~pificance.In many of the models, however, the concept of societal learning is under-specified. In other words, the mechanisms for green learning in broader society are not specified in great detail, Yet the question of how green leaming occurs is a central question, paaicularly if there is a gap between the present state of green learning and what is needed. The use of the backcasting approach focuses attention on a preferred future, and then address the diffxcult question of the necessary steps entailed in achieving the desired vision. The backcasting approach, when applied to learning, proved useh1 in highlighting a number of different literatures that are relevant in developing the concept of green leaming-beyond the environmental policy Iiterature-including the environmental thought literature and the study of past social movements. The various literatures were then used to develop a multi-dimensional concept of learning. Green learning is defined as encompassing three components: basic, accurate information and analyses about the state of the environment, an ecological worldview, and action leaming or citizen engagement. Though this chapter did not address in detail the question of how Iearning may aid in the achievement of a preferred sustainable future, it did suggest looking at how past, reIatively successful social movements have used a variety of sources of learning, lïke various media, schools, protest music, literature, theater, and film. Chapter Three

The Art of Green Learning: From Protest Songs to Media Mind Bombs

Public education is one of the chief strategies employed by the transnational environmental movement in its attempts to effect changes in global civil society and international environmental policy. Many public policy and international relations theorists and analysts underline the importance of public education in promoting environmental protection. For exarnple, Thomas F'rincen and his colleagues write that, in the transnational environmental movement, "... NGOs perfonn key roles as independent bargainers and as agents of social learning."l53 This is supported by Paul Hohnen, Greenpeace International's political director, who summarizes Greenpeace's key functions: "One hand tries to focus public attention on the issue, while the other hand - working with the poiiticians and sometimes with corporations - tries to translate that into real national and international legislative outcornes." lS4 However, the international relations literature is undeveloped when it comes to understanding how societal learning takes place.'55 Moreover, social movement theorics, such as the new social movement and resource mobilization approaches, do not have a well developed concept of leaming, though there is a large body of related work on communication channels, with particular emphasis on media, advertising, and community

L53Thomas Princen, Matthias Finger and Jack P. Manno. "Transnational Linkages," in Princen and Finger (eds), Environmental NGOs in World Politics: Linkinp the Local and the Global (London: Routledge, 1994), p. 217. L54Hohnen cited in Stephen Dale, McLuhan's Children: The Greenpeace Message and the Media (Toronto: Between the Lines, 1996), p. 2 17. 155 Princen and Finger, (eds), in "Introduction," Environmental NGOs in World Politics, p. 14, identify social leaming and bargaining as the key roles played by NGOs, though they note that international relations theory on the role of social change movements is not well developed. They describe their work as "only a loose set of propositions and concepts with preliminary empüical grounding and testing," and argue that there is as yet no theory of global environmental politics. They write: "We fully beIieve that a tight, logical theory of world environmental politics is still a long way off." and personal networks.156 While learning channels iike mass media are a key focus, other cultural activities, such as protest music, drama, and literature are under-appreciated.'s7 In the absence of a well developed body of literature on how public education as a whofe occurs, we need to look at more specific or narrowly based literatures.

In this chapter, 1examine the potential for large scale public education at the local and transnational levels. 1 focus on protest music, alternative and mass media, and informal schools, which were particularly effective tools in the successfd social movements of the pst, iike the early American labour and civil rights movements. A Mode1 of Progressive Societal Leaming and Social Change is offered to illustrate the influence of specific learning channels and their interactions on public education, and, in turn, the consequences of societal learning for social change in the areas of both environrnental polic y and civil society. Finally, some clarifications of terms is in order. A review of the environrnental and social movement literatures suggests that "green learning" has three significant elements. First, the environmental policy iiterature points out that green Ieming is dependent on the generation and wide scale distribution of basic, accurate information and analyses related to the state of the environment. Second, the environrnentd thought literature emphasizes the critical importance of shifting to an ecological or eco-centric worldview (deep ecology, animal rights, steady state econornics) combined with a concem for social justice (global lS6 For an overview of communication channeIs see Mayer Zald and John McCarthy, "Resource Mobilization and Social Movements: A Partial Theory," in Zald and McCarthy (eds), Social Movements in an Organizational Society (Oxford: Transaction Books, 1987), pp. 15-39. On the role of personal networks in the recruitment of civil rights activists see Doug McAdam, "Micromobilization Contexts and Recruitment to Activism," in Bert Klandermans et al,, (eds), International Social Movement Research. From Structure to Action Cornvaring Social Movement Research Across Cultures, Vol. 1 (Greenwich, Conn.: JAI Press, 1988), pp. 125-151, and on transnational networks see Margaret Keck and Kathryn Sikkink, Activists Bevond Borders: Advocacv Networks in International Politics (Ithaca: Corne11 University Press, 1998). lS7 See, for exarnple, Aldon Morris. The Origins of the Civil Riphts Movement: Black Cornrnunities Or~anizingfor Change (New York: Free Press, 1984), pp. 28 1-283,and Reebee Garofalo, "Understanding Mega-Events: If We Are the World, Then How Do We Change It?" in R-Garofalo (ed), Rockin' the Boat: Mass Music and Mass Movernents (Boston: South End Press, 1992), pp. 15-36. sustainable development, social ecology, and ecofeminism). Third, the social movement literature suggests the importance of relating action to learning.158 Al1 three of these elements will be used here to connote "green leaming." Finally, the '"environmental movement" is defined as "'broad networks of people and organizations engaged in collective action in pursuit of environmental benefits."fig

Mapping Societal Learning Channels The public lems about environmental and other social issues from many sources. Activities of non-governrnental organizations (NGOs) and other social movement organizations are central in achieving social change. Nonviolent direct action and NGO public information campaigns are key features of the strategy and tactics of many social movements of the New Left. The purpose of this chapter is to explore, beyond specific NGO campaigns, the role and implications of a broad set of education channels such as media, popular and counter-cultural influences, arnong other areas of civic politics. Although NGOs are the major component of social change movements, a movement, if successful, consists of more than NGOs; it includes supportive organizations, sympathetic media, artistic contributions, and so forth. Moreover, NGOs rely on a rich array of Iearning channels to get their message out and to promote citizen engagement. In short,

158 See, for example, Robert Paehlke, "Dernocracy and Environmentdisrn: Opening a Door to the Administrative State," in Managinn Leviathan: Environmental PoIitics and the Administrative State, ed. R. PaehIke and D. Torgerson (Peterborough: Broadview Press, 1990). pp. 35-55; Morris Berman, Tht Reenchantrnent of the World (Ithaca: Corne11 University Press, 1981), MichaeI Zimrnerrnan (ed), Environrnental Philosouhv: From Animal Ri~htsto Radical EcoIopy (New Jersey: Prentice Hall, 1993), and Herman Daiy, Steadv State Economics, 2nd edition (Washington D.C.: Island Press, 199 1); and Paulo Freire, The Peda~orrvof the Oppresseci (New York: Herder and Herder, 1970), on the three components respectively. lS9 Christopher Rootes, "Environrnental Movernents: From the Local to the Global," Environrnental Politics, Vol. 8, No. 1, Spring 1999, p. 2. A rnultiplicity of groups fit into this Iarger environmental activist category, including groups that hold a deep ecological perspective (Earth First!, Greenpeace), combine social and ecological justice (e.g., Friends of the Earth, Women's Environment and Developrnent Organizations), and advocate for animal rights (e-g., People for the Ethical Treatment of Animais). social change movements ernploy an array of media, music, other cultural activities, schools, etc. as educational tools or leaniing channeIs (see Figure 3.1). Public education efforts can be targeted at multiple audiences. The primary targets for many NGOs and environmental activists begins with either a group's membership or the local or national publics. Audiences at the transnational or global Ievels tend to be secondary targets of the environmental movement as a whole. This is largely due to the dearth of instruments with an effective and economical global reach. This paper examines both the traditional channels of Iearning employed by earlier social movements at the community level as well as a number of top-down teaching efforts of social activists, such as mega-musical events, mass media, and tramnationai networks of schools.

Leaming and Culture In Antonio Gramsci's influential work on the role of ideas, culture is part of a superstructure which reflects the biases of the ruling class - the group that dominates the economic base - and major changes in society result from actions based on class contradictions in the economic base, not the superstructure. However, Gramsci also recognized the possibility of a "counter-hegemony" emerging in the superstructure which could surround the hegemonic, bourgeois values and institutions with revolutionary, worker ones.l60 Sirnilarly, cultural neo-Mdsts, such as E. P. Thompson and Raymond Williams, emphasize the relatively autonomous force of culture.l61 Irt a yet further departure, New Social Movement theorists argue that many of the struggles in the New Left involve participation across class lines, and take place outside the workplace, in the areas of leisure and community, and, moreover, concern quality of life issues - not only

160 See discussion in Richard Altenbaugh, -le: the Arnerican Labour Collepes of the 1920s and 1930s (PhiIadelphia: Temple University Press, 1990). l6I Raymond Williams, Manisrn and Literature (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1977); E. P. Tornpson, The Poverty of Theory and Other Essav~(London: MerIin Press, 1978); and David Montgomery, "Historyas Human Agency," Monthl~Review, Vol. 33, No. 5, October 1981, pp. 42-48. Fimire 3.1. Sources of Leamine in Social Change Movements

Societal Learning; Protes t

Pro me ssive Films YTheater. questions related to the distaïbution of wealth.162 Reebee Garofalo writes: "In al1 these

struggles, the locus of organizing as well as the major political victones were in the reaIrn of the superstructure."~63 For New Social Movement theorïsts, the cultural realm is becoming relatively more important, or even dominant in achieving social change.

Protes Music Assuming cultural archvities are at times determining and not only reflective, which of their many forms are most persuasive and effective at facilitating widespread and significant societal leaming? For Ernst Bloch, a neo-Mancist, who in the postwar period published The Princi~leof EHoD~,"no art has so much surplus over the respective time and ideology in which it exists'" as rnusic.164 Music's special qualities include its ability to survive difîerent eras, its uEopian content, and expression of some of the "most sublime longings of humanity."I6s Sirnilarly, Reebee Garofalo notes that popular music is an under-appreciated cultural fomin the academic world, yet it is an arena where "progressive forces seem to have real power."l66 Music and musical events cm further education and social change through consciousness-raising, artist involvement, fundraising, and agitation/mobilization. According to Garofalo, musicians possess a relatively greater ability to raise social consciousnes-sthan other artists: It is laudable that a Cennis star iike John MacE~oehas refused million-dollar deals to play in Souah Africa on more than one occasion. But there is no way that tennis as a cultural form can portray the horrors of apartheid. While any cultural event can be dedicated to a particular cause, popular music is further distinguished in its ability to reflect the issue at hand in its very content. Of CO-urse,other cultural forms such as film or theater have

16* Russell Dalton, Manfred Kuechler, and Wilhelrn Bürklin, 'The Challenge of New Movernents," in R. Dalton and M. Kuechler (eds), Cniallenging: the Political Order: New Social and Political Movements in Western Dernocraci~(Oxford: Polity Press, 1990), pp. 3- 16. 163 R. Garofalo, 'Understanding Mega-Events:' p. 18. Bloch cited in Vincent Geoghegan, Utopianisrn and Marxisrn (London: Methuen. 1987). p. 95. 165 Ibid. 166 Garofalo, "Understanding Mega-Events," p. 16. this capability, but they seldom combine the versatility, responsiveness, and impact of popuiar music.167

The progressive potential of both popular and counter-cultural forms of music in mass movements is readily identifiable in three distinct historical phases, though, at times, they appear concurrently. First, folk music has played a major role in the anti-slavery, labour, civil rights and other grassroots movements. Second, topical songs of the 1960s entered mass culture and were generally reflective and supportive of New Left md counter- culture movements. And, third, an international phase of global mega-musical events

started with Live Aid in the mid-1980s, and was followed by a whole seties of protest events like Sun City, the Amnesty International Human Rights Tours, the Nelson Mandela Tributes, and the Greenpeace Project. In the first phase, folk music arose from the grassroots to express the stmggles and desires of the dispossessed, and tended to involve participatory singing. Labour songs and singers were used extensively at rallies, meetings, and on picket Lines in the early labour movement, providing simultaneously entertainment and a leaming experience as well as building emotional links to the movement and its members. In the United States, labour songs were an essential part of the eight hour day movement in the 1880~~the International Workers of the World or WobbIies between 1905 and the early 1920s, and, finally, during the wave of organizing drives throughout the country in the 1920s and 1930s. John Greenway, in his seminal American Folksongs of Protest, notes that the rniners, followed by the textile workers, migratory workers, sharecroppers and tenant farmers, produced more songs of social protest than any other organized labour groups, especially when contrasted to the craft-dorninated Amencan Federation of Labour. Unions most prolific in songs and ballads of protest are those which are fighting for existence; tranquiility in the organization bnngs a corresponding Id1 in songs of discontent. The American Federation of Labor, a traditionally peaceful union, is virtually barren in songs which mark its path in the progress of unionism; on the other hand, the Industrial Workers of the World-the Wobblies-whose active life was comparatively short but turbulent, have contributed many songs to the history of militant labor organization. 168

The Wobblies were, in Pete Seeger's words, "the singingest union America ever had."l69 Songs written by Joe Hill, Ralph Chaplin and Hamy McClintock, including "Solidarity Forever" and "Hallelujah, I'm A Bum," appeared in the Wobblies' The Little Red Song; Book, and were distributed to al1 new members of the "One Big Union." Labour songs and singing witnessed a reemergence in the unionizing efforts of the 1930s, made farnous by the folk songs and labour ballads of Woody Guthrie, Aunt MoIly Jackson and Jim Garland of HarIan County, and ElIa Mae Wiggins of Gastonia. "We Shall Overcome" was first Sung by women tobacco workers, most of whom were black, on sû-ike at the American Tobacco Company in Charleston, South Carolina, in the early 1940s, and "We Shall not Be Moved" also originated in the South in the early 1930s out of the organizing drives of the Southern Tenant Farmers' Union. Songs played an even greater role in the Arnerican civil rights movement in the 1950s and 1960s. Freedorn songs such as "We Shall Overcome" (the movement's unoficial anthem), "Keep Your Eyes on the Prize," "Ain't Gonna Let Nobody Tuni Me Round," and 'This Little Light of Mine" were Sung at mass meetings, demonstrations, in jail and elsewhere with such vigor that the civil rights rnovement has corne to be known as the greatest singing movement in the world. Keman Sanger argues that the central learning contribution of the freedom songs was not the transmission of information, as in the story-telling tradition of ballads, but the transfomative effect the songs had on the singers, and the group participation they encouraged.170 The freedom songs did not provide specific information like how many

168 John Greenway. Arnerican Folksones of Protest (New York: Octagon Books, 1970). p. 11. 169 Pete Seeger, "Whatever Happened to Singing in the Unions?'Sing Out! Vol. 15, No. 2. May 1965, pp. 28-3 1. 170 Kerran L. Sanger, "When the Spirit Say Si=!" The Role of Freedorn Sones in the Civil Ri~hts Movement (New York: Garland Publishing, 1995). people went to jail and other details - but, rather, set forth a worldview based on the concept of freedom. This worldview depicted Afrïcan Americans as capable of changing the situation in the South, and invited others to join in making the changes.171 At the same tirne, the freedom songs provided one way of acting and contributing to the movement, while also advocating other kinds of action. The voicing of their support for the movement in Song bolstered the participants' cornmitment to the movernent's goals. The spirituality and emotionalism of the songs also contributed to a "total involvement" in the cause and group unity beyond a simple intellectual cornmitment. In Sanger's words: Activists spoke of spirituality in much the same way they taiked about the emotion generated by the songs. They described their rnovement away from a detached, intellectual attitude regarding their stniggle and advocated a more emotional, spiritual, and complete involvement. When they sang they claimed they gave themselves fully, gave al1 they had, to the cause.172

In the second phase, coinciding with the freedom Song movement in the South, there emerged a topical protest Song movement in the North. Folk artists such as Bob Dylan, Joan Baez, Phi1 Ochs, and Tom Paxton - though not closely identified with any particular social movement as was the case for the folk artists of the first phase - helped spread progressive ideas into the mass culture.173 Bob Dylan, with songs such as "Oxford Town," "The Lonesome Death of Hattie Carroll," and "Only a Pawn in Their Game" (a Song about the rnurder of civil nghts leader Medger Evers), arnong others, helped introduce songs about civil rights into the mass culture. These and other sixties' music popularized the ideas of the student, women's, anti-nuclear and anti-Vietnam war movements. In the third phase, a series of international mega-musical events was launched in the wake of Live Aid for Ethiopia on July 13, 1985. Live Aid was broadcast simultmeousIy in London, Philadelphia and Sydney, Australia to a phenomenal audience of 1.5 billion l7l Ibid., p. 53. 172 Ibid., p. 38. See also Morris, The Origins of the Civil Riehts Movement, p. 148. 173 Iosh Dunson, Freedom in the Air: Sone Movemenu in the Sixties (New York: International Publisbers, 1965). people worldwide. In addition to raising $67 million for Ethiopian famine relief, and vastly increasing worldwide awareness of the problem of absolute poverty in Afnca, the ideas of caring, compassion and social responsibility were placed on the world's centre stage. ... Live Aid resisted and challenged ideas that the world is best served by greedy self-interest and the side-stepping of social responsibilities, as put forward by Reagan, Bush, and Thatcher ....Live Aid was a media event that structurally emphasized charity and philanthropy ..., as well as global cooperation at a time when the narrow dominant views have atomized and deadened the majonty of the pop audience and locked us in our loneIy rooms. Live Aid opened windows from our rooms to the world and made it 'legitimate' to cure, and called upon us to a~r.17~

Although Live Aid did nct address the root causes of the Afncan famine, with its focus on emergency food relief, it did "open the door" for a series of other progressive mega-events by offering a mode&ope~ng new cultural spaces for radical politics, and "validating cultural intervention in the global politicai arena."'75 A series of more radical musical mega-events followed, such as Sun City (October 1985), the Amnesty International Conspiracy of Hope/Human Rights Now Tours (sumrner of 1988), and Mandela Tributes (Mandela's 75th birthday, June 15, 1988, and his release from prison, April 16, 1990). By far, the main contribution of mega-musical events is their ability to reach large audiences through access to mass communications (as noted, 1-5 billion watched Live Aid, and 600 million the first Mandela Tribute). But mega-events cmalso affect deeper learning and action among participants. The educational experiences of mega-events derive from more than the live performances, albums or worldwide broadcasts; they dso involve the creation and distribution of a variety of musical products ranging from videos, T-shirts,

174 Neal Ullestad, "Diverse Rock Rebellions Subvert Mus Media Hegemony," in Garofalo (ed), Rockin' fie Boat, p. 46. 175 bid., 41; Garofalo, "Understanding Mega-Events," p. 16; and Simon Frith and John Street, "Rock Against Racism and Red Wedge: From Music to Politics, from Politics to Music," in Garofalo (ed), Rockin' the Boat, p. 75. posters, educationd campaign materïals, books, and documentaries - al1 of whïch "affect Our understanding of the music and its rnessage."l76

For example, the (IAin't Gonna Play) Sun City concert and album "broke new political ground in its attempt to encourage an activist audience response."l77 it involved the most fa.reaching political and educationai effort: the Sun City album jacket was filled with facts about apartheid, and the Sun City project worked with schools, issuing "a 'Teacher's Guide7which showed how to use the record and the video as educational tools in the classroom.... Here an attempt was made to build on the farniliarity of the mass culturai product to create exercises which could be tailored to local use."178 The Amnesty International Human Rights tour also elicited action in its 26-city worldwide concert tour; human rights activists spoke to audiences during the concerts, and new and younger members were recruited. Amnesty International's US branch, for instance, added 200,000 new "freedom writer" volunteers to the organization.

Environmental protest music has been Iess prominent to date, but there are a few notable exceptions. A survey of Sinp; Out! magazine, the bible of the folk music scene, reveals an almost compIete absence of environmental folk songs, though Pete Seeger has written songs about the Hudson River, whales ("Song of the World's Last Whale"), and other environmental issues since the early 1970s, and a great number of folk artists have contributed to forest campaigns mainly. Greenpeace organized a major rock concert in the former Soviet Union and released Rainbow Warriors, a double album in 1989, with tracks by U2, the Pretenders, Sting, John Cougar MeIIencamp, Sade, Peter Gabriel, Bryan Ferry, and REM, among others, in order to prornote improved East-West relations and to set up a Greenpeace office in Russia. Further, the proceeds of the annual Glastonbury Perfoming Arts Festival in Somerset,

176 Garofalo, "Understanding Mega-Events," p. 26; Ullestad, "Diverse Rock Rebellions Subvert Mass Media Hegemony," p. 40. 17' 17' Ullestad, "Diverse Rock Rebellions Subvert Mas Media Hegernony," p. 34. 178 Ibid, p. 34. south-west England, are divided arnong Greenpeace, Oxfarn, Water Aid, and local groups. Major rock stars and groups have also been supportive of forest campaigns: Paul McCartney performed in the Tasmanian temperate rainforests to thousands in the early 1980s; Sting founded the Rainforest Foundation in 1989 to help Save the Arnazon rainforest in Brazil; Midnight Oil performed in British Columbia's Clayoquot Sound temperate rainforest in the surnrner of 1993. Also, the animal rights movement has received widespread musical support, such as The Srniths' bestseller Meat is Murder, PETA's Tarne Yourself cassette including the Indigo Girls, k d lang, the Pretenders, and Erasure. Overail, though, the environmental movement cannot be viewed as a singing movement at the grassroots, counter-cultural, or popular leveis, particularly if one considers other environmental issues like global wamiing, ozone depletion, toxic waste, and biodiversity which are not promoted through Song.

Environmental Literature Environmental literature consists of literary forms such as oral, poetry, fiction, nonfiction, and drama that examine the relationship between humans and nature.179Scott Slovic provides an excellent history of environmental writing in the United States, and an annotated bibliography of more than 30 classics and recent favorites in American environrnental literature. Amencan classics include Henry David Thoreau's Walden (1854), about the author's experirnent with meditative and simple living by the shore of a New England pond; John Muir, the founder of the Sierra Club, offered a sublime vision of the High Sierras in The Mountains of California (1894); and Aldo Leopold puts ethical concerns on center stage in his book, A Sand Countv Alrnanac (1949) with essays on 'Thinking Like a Mountain" and 'The Land Ethic." More contemporary, prominent Amencan environrnental authors include Edward Abbey (Desert Solitaire, 1968), and Gary

179 Scott Slovic, ''Giving Expression to Nature: Voices of Environmental Literature." Environment, Vol. 41, No. 2, March 1999, pp. 1-1 l & 25-32. Snyder's Pulitzer Prize-winning Turtle Island, a collection of poetry on issues of cornmunity and environment. One of Canada's most widely read authors is Farley Mowat, a "naturai" storyteller. In hîs first book, People of the Deer (1952), he expressed his outrage of the problems of the Innuit in Canada's North, which he attributed to white misunderstanding and exploitation.

Environmental Art Artists and photographers have played an important role in increasing public appreciation of wildemess and wildlife. In the US, the Hudson River School, a group of Arnerican landscape painters, including Thomas Cole, Asher B. Durand and Albert

Bierstadt, were active from 1825 to the 1870s. They painted the scenery of the east coast, the Catskills, and the Hudson River. Cole and others were interested in the Romanticist concept of the 'csublime," which conveyed the insignificance of humans before the awesome power of nature. The artists were particularly concemed with the human encroachment of settlement into America's hinterlands. lsO In Canada, the Group of Seven and Ernily Carr did much to advance the environmental cause through their depictions of stunning Canadian landscapes.181 The Group of Seven (1920-193 1) are Canada's best-known painting group. The group's subjects included Ontario's Algonquin Park, Algoma Highlands and Lake Superior, and the Arctic. Carr (1871-1945) painted the West coast forests and the symbols of the aboriginal peoples. More recently, the Western Canada Wilderness Society invited a number of Canadian artists to Carmanah Valley on Vancouver Island and published a book-Camanah: Artistic Visions of an Ancient Rainforest in 1989 containing aaistic

18* Jesse Paehlke, "Hudson River School," in Robert Paehlke, (ed), The Encyclopedia of Conservation and Environmentalism (New York: Garland Publishing, 1995), p. 354, and Roderick Nash, Wilderness and the American Mind (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1967). 181 Joan Murray, "Gmup of Seven," and Jesse Paehike, "Ernily Cam" in Paehlke (ed), The Encyclowdia of Conservation and Environmentalism, pp. 333-334 and pp. 109-1 10 respectively. renderings of the vaUeyYsancient temperate rainforest by Robert Bateman, Jack Shadbolt, arnong others.182

Ansel Adams (1902-1984), one of the world's best known photographers, was bom in San Francisco and spent his life in California in Yosemite and the coast at Carmel. His favorite subjects include Yosemite Valley, Lune Pine peak of the eastem Sierras, and the deserts of the Southwest. He is famous for his black-and white images, so rich in texture and detail that one remembers them as if they were color photographs. In addition to making others aware of the imrneasurable nchness and beauty in nature through his stunning photography, Adams also was a director of the Sierra Club from 1934 to 197 1.

Environmental FiLm

Since Walt Disney's 1942 animated film Bambi, popular film has influenced public attitudes towards wildli fe and wild spaces. The first annual International Environmental

Film Festival was held in Boulder Colorado in March 1991.183 Participants included Discovery Channel, National Geographic, the Public Broadcasting Corporation (PBS), Churchill Films and Bullfrog Films. In the US, there exist a number of regular envuonmental film festivals, including the International Wildlife Film Festival 0, based in Missoula, Montana, which is holding its 23rd festival in April2000, and the Jackson Hole Wildlife Film Festival in Wyoming, established in 1991. The latter organization sponsors a film festival in odd-numbered years, and a symposium on film- making and marketing in even-numbered years. Zn Great Britain, the biennial WildScreen Film Festival, established in 1982, is the world's largest such festival. With the help of a £41 million gant from Great Bntain's Millennium Commission, a permanent base for the festival was established in Bristol. The impressive cornplex includes leisure and learning lg2Carmanah: Artistic Visions of an Ancient Rainforest (Vancouver : The Western Canada Wiiderness Cornmittee, 1989). lg3For example, see Joyce G. Gellhorn, 'The Fust Annual International Film Festival: A Viewer's Perspective," Journal of Environmental Education, Vol. 22, No. 3, Spring 1991, pp. 12-15. facilities, including a visitor centre, a large botanical house, an IMAX cinema, an education centre, and the headquarters of ARKive - a digital library of images and recordings of endangered species. Chris Parsons, a founder of the festival, notes that the aims of the

festival are to "encourage a deeper public awareness of the natural world on which we al1

depend and celebrate the skills and kno wledge of wildli fe film-makers w orldwide." 184 Similar airns animate Australia's Wild Spaces Environmental Film Festival: Wild Spaces is a vehicle for environmental education which aims to: Entertain InfoIm Reflect the environmental and social justice concerns of the local, national and global cornmuniîy. Show film makers' varied expressions of the planet's wild spaces. Stimulate discussion on Australia's socid values in relation to the environment. 85

The first such Canadian festival, entitled "Planet in Focus: Toronto Environmental Film & Video Festival" will take place from September 28 to October 1,2000.

In addition, environmentai and animal protection groups rely heavily on film and videos in their undercover, investigative work as well as in popularizing their carnpaigns. The People for the Ethical Treatrnent of Animals (PETA) have been especially effective in enlisting film stars to popularize their campaigns.

Leaming and the Media In contrast to the arts, the media are the traditionally recognized avenue for broad based awareness raising, value formation, and social change. Mass communication, agenda semng, prirning, and "media mind bombs" attest to the media's potential (and Limits) to provide a high quaiity and quantity of information on social issues. The media

lg4 See the web site of "WildScreen" at ht~://wildscren.org.ukl. l85 See the web site of "Wild Spaces Environmental Film Festival" at http://www.pnc.com.au/-wIdspcs/index.html. clearly have the ability to change worldviews, as well as stimulate action and changes in behaviour. First, the media are the main source of information for the mass public. A key feature of the mass media is their agenda setting power. For instance, the news media exert political influence by promoting causes in their editorials, and by "their access to mass audiences, their capacity to act as a channel for other political actors, and their ability to ignore, select, and interpret policy-relevant events."l86Media influence the political agenda and public opinion not necessarily in terms of what to think but rather what to think about. That is, they have the capacity to "prime" audiences. The main source of public affairs information is print media; newspapers and magazines are generally seen as supenor to television for in depth background information and analyses. Second, the mass media are capable of playing a significant role in changing worldviews. According to Allan Mazur and Jinling Lee, content is not of key importance. The image is what counts: images are what the audience remernbers and is influenced by.187 Greenpeace has been effective in raising the profile of environmental issues from a "political snowball" into "an avalanche" by using television, its main medium, to convey saiking visual images.188 Beginning in 1971, Greenpeace has used the strategy of sailing into danger and defying polluters to bear witness via "media rnind bombs." A media mind bomb consists of a shocking media image, such as that of an infiatable dinghy being maneuvered in front of a whaler's harpoon or an activist climbing a tail smokestack and hanging an anti-poilution banner. Fred Pearce wntes, "Greenpeace was the first citizens' group to realize the potential of the moving image. 'We saw it as a media war,' said

Robert Hackett, News and Dissent: The Press and the Politics of Peace in Canada (Norwood NJ: Ablex Pub., 1991), pp. 12-13. 187 Allan Mazur and Jinling Lee, "Sounding the Global Alami: Environmental Issues in the US National News, " Social Studies of Science, Vol. 23 (1993), pp. 681-720. lg8 Fred Pearce, Green Warriors (London, The Bodley Head, 1991). Hunter [a founder of Greenpeace]. 'We had studied Marshall M~Luhan."'~*9 Greenpeace's tactics have their basis in McLuhan's ideas of reaching the "global village" with striking images that allow the mass public to bear witness to the madness of ecological destruction while at the same time promoting an alternative worldview based on an "ecological sensibility."'90 Greenpeace International's sophisticated Communications Department in London is a product of the advances in communications technology that enable it to reach more international and transnational audiences in shorter time spans.

Third, media cm function as an impetus for social change, although there is contention among media scholars and social activists as to what aspects of social protest receive media attention. On the one hand, the mass media direct NGOs to focus on short term, discrete events like demonstrations and single issues, rather than the complex

interconnection arnong issues. '91 Yet the increased rnilitancy needed to capture media interest, as in the student anti-Vietnam war protests in 1968 and 1969, can have "backlash consequences for the cause and the larger movement. On the other hand, socid movement demonstrations rarely receive prepublicity of their events. The mass media are generally not helpful in making social protest movement announcements.'92 The mass medis seldom inform their readers or viewers of the time and place or map of future demonstrations. For instance, Robert Hackett, in his study of news coverage of the Canadian peace movement, found that some newspapers provided details of the Vancouver Peace March in 1982 only afier it was considered an ovenvhelmingly popular and mainstream event in the city,

lB9 Ibid., p. 19. The concept of sailing a ship to bear witness of ecological destruction has a long history. In 1958, the Cornmittee for Nonviolent Action (CNVA) Iaunched the Golden RuIe, which was unsuccessful in its attempt to sail for the Marshall Islands to bear witness and protest US nuclear testing, though the Phoenix soon after did accomplish its mission. See James Tracy, Direct Action: Radical Pacifism from the Union Eight to the Chicapo Seven (Chicago: Chicago University Press, 1996), pp. 102-4. Ig0 Robert Hunter, Warrion of the Rainbow: A Chronicie of the Greenpeace Movernent (New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1979); Dale, op. cit.; and Paul Wapner, Environmental Activism and WorId Civic Politics (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1996), pp. 41-71. l9 Hackett, News and Dissent, pp. 32-33. lg2 Ibid., pp. 229-268, and Todd Gitlin, The Whole WorId 1s Watchin~:Mass Media and the Makinu and 1Tnmakin~ of the New Left (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1980). whereas, in sharp contrast, the press provided full pre-event coverage of charity runs for cancer research. Alternative media are the main sources of movement announcements of upcorning events and "what you can do" suggestions. As a result, social rnovements often rely on a whole set of alternative means of reac hing their members, including independent and alternative press, periodicals, NGO newsletters, telephone trees, e-mail-lists, word-of-mouth, and so forth.193 For example,

the Socialist press in the United States had a peak circulation size of more than two million between 1912 and 19 13, with its leading pubIications privately owned.'94 These included the popular Aooeai to Reason (with a weekly circulation of about 760,000),the National Rip Saw (42,000), focusing on farmers' concerns, and the International Socialist Review (42,000), a more scholarly publication. While the mainstream press raised public awareness of labour issues when it covered major strikes, it was generally hostile to the labour movement and did not provide detailed accounts of worker grievances, the work of the labour rnovement, and its vision of an alternative sociaiist socizy. ADD~~to Reason and other socialist publications filled the void by providing detailed accounts of worker demands, Marxist analyses and critiques, and practical guidance on strategies and tactics, dius perforrning "a vital function for the young socialist movement, as they were its major means of cornmuni~ation."~~~ In the case of the civil rights movement, the activities of the mas based movement were supported by a network of local movement centres, which emerged in a number of Southem cities like Nashville, Montgomery, Birmingham, and Tallahassee, and were comprised of coalitions of black churches, NGOs, and other supportive institutions. The local movement centres created a region wide movement with strong communication links

lg3 For example, Noam Chomsky notes that he derives rnost of his information from NGOs. lg4 James Weinstein, The Decline of Socialism in America 1912-1925 (New York: Monthly Review Press, 1967), pp. 84-85. 195 Elliot Shore, Talkin* Socialism: J. A. Wavland and the Role of the Press in American Radicalism, 1890- 19 12 (Kansas: University Press of Kansas, 1988), p. 1 1 1. capable of spreading protests in a short period as was evident in the student sit-in movement which began with four black college students in February 1960 in South Carolina and spread within a few months across the South.'g6 In the case of the environmental movernent, both the mass media and alternative

media play important roles. The mass media is the primary focus of most environmental NGOs, since it is crucial to getting the message out to the mass public and helping make the environment a "top of minci" issue. For exarnple, two transnational green waves occurred in the early 1970s and the mid to late 1980s in large part due to increased media coverage of

environmental issues and crises. lg7 But there are a number of limitations. Media critics highlight the problem of disinformation, the imperative of "keeping up with the Jones" advanced by commercial

media and advertising agencies - and the attendant "false consciousness - and the political apathy and disempowerment of television, in particular.198 Many of these problems are exacerbated by the increasing concentration of media ownership. An additional problem related to reporting environmental and cultural issues involves the lirnits of television as a medium with its technological imperatives calling for short, snappy, sound bitedg9 The environmental movernent also relies heavily on alternative media, such as newsletters, intemet web sites, email, and various popular magazines, to provide more detailed analysis, action oriented material, and access to undiIuted opinion from

lg6See Morris, The Ori~insof the Civil Ri-hts Movernent, on the role of the churches and NGOs as communication channels. At the sarne time, mass media coverage of the civil rights movement was ensured by both the mass-based character of the protests and the charismatic black leadership epitomized in Rev. Martin Luther King. lg7Kathryn Harrison, Passine the Buck: Federalisrn and Canadian Environmental Policy (Vancouver: UBC Press, 1996), p. 16, and Robert Paehlke, "Eco-History: Two Waves in the Evolution of Environmentalism," Alternatives, Vol. 19, No. 1, 1993, pp. 18-23. lg8See, for example, Sharon Beder, Global S~in:The Corporate Assault on Environmentalism (Foxhole: Green Books, 1997), Ben H. Bagdikian, The Media Mono olv. 5th edition (Boston: Beacon Press, 19971, and James Winter, Bernocracv's Oxvgen: How Corriorations Control the News (Montreal: Black Rose Books, 1997). lg9Jeny Mander, Four Arguments for the Elirnination of Television (New York: Morrow, 1978). environmentalists. In the 1970s and 1980s, a number of environmental journals emerged such as Alternatives, Ecologist, Environment, E Magazine, Earth First! Journal, and Animals Agenda. In the 1990s, the internet is becoming a key means of communication, public outreach, and networking. The relatively inexpensive and decentralized nature of the medium enhances its democratic potential to reach large nurnbers of people at a transnational level. The intemet is becoming an increasingly effective tool to relay messages, documents and action derts, reach out to the public, gather information and conduct research, and set up electronic conferences to link activists.2*

Learning and Formal and Znfomzal Schaols Environmental education (EE) is important to adult education, K-12 schools, industrial training, outdoor education, park interpretation, universities or colleges, and the public at large. The US National Environrnental Education Act of 1990 requires the Environmental Protection Agency @PA) to provide national leadership to improve environrnental literacy. The Ofice of Environmental Education, established by the EPA, provides funding for the EE Training and Assistance Program, a multi-year, multi-million dollar program that has trained more than 55,000 educators, and sponsored numerous "leadership clinics." The regional oftices of the EPA support summer institutes for formai and non-formal educators. In Canada, there has been much less government invohement in EE. A number of networks link environmental educators in Canada and the US including the North Amencan Association for Environmental Education, and the Environrnental Studies Association of Canada. It is important to distinguish behveen fomal, public education and independent and informal schools set up specifically to wain social activists.20l Informal, adult education

200 Jim Motavalli. 'The Virtual Environment," E Magazine. Vol W, No. 3, May-June 1996. pp. 28-35. 201 For a cornprehensive overview of critical thought of forma1 education systerns see Henry Giroux. Theorv and Resistance in Education: A Pedago~vfor the O~~osition(Massachusetts: Bergin and Garvey Publishers, 1983). and folk schools, also lcnown as "halfway houses," were partîcularly important in the early American labour movement and the civil nghts movement. Aldon Morris refers to supportive organizations, such as the Highlander Folk School, the Amencan Friends Service Cornmittee, and the Fellowship of Reconciliation, as halfway houses - institutions that do not have a mass base of support, but which Iatch on to various movements and provide them with "a battery of social change resources such as skilled activists, tacticd knowledge, media contacts, workshops, knowledge of past movements, and a vision of a fuhire society."202 Highlander Folk School was set up in Tennessee in 1932 by Myles Hoaon initidly to help train local leaders in their drive to organize labour unions in the Southem States; by the mid-1950s it had turned its focus to supporting the civil nghts movement through the development of a citizenship school program aimed at registering black voters; and since the 1970s it has focused on environmental issues and the problems of resource exploitation by multinational corporations in the Appaiachian regi0n.~03 In the early part of America's labour movement, labour activists focused on educational activities at mass meetings, lyceums, worker education schools, and Socialist Sunday schools for children.204 Workers' education was so popular that by the 1920s, an estirnated 10,000 workers were participating in about 300 workers' educational propams offered by an array of institutions, and the Worker Education Bureau, set up in New York in 1921, had about 40 labour schools affiliated with it. Workers' education as a concept emerged in Europe and quickly spread to the United States and elsewhere in response to the need to provide workers with a history and background of the labour movement from a workers' perspective, and to train organizers - objectives to which formai education, with

202 Morris. The Oririns of the Civil Rirhts Movernent, pp. 139-140. 203 Frank Adams, Unearthins Seeds of Fire: The Idea of Hiphlander (Winston-Salem, NC: John F. Blair, 1975), and John M. Glen, Highlander: No Ordinary School 1932-1962 (Lexington: University Press of Kentucky, 1988). 204 On socialist Sunday schools, see Kenneth Teitelbaurn and William J. Reese. "American Socialist Pedagogy and Experimentation in the Progressive Era: The SociaIist Sunday School," History of Education Ouarterlv, Vol. 23, No. 4, Winter 1983, pp. 429-454. its emphasis on producing a pliant labour force, was generally hostile. In Great Britain, Ruskin College was started at Oxford in 1899, and later spiintered into the more radical Central Labour College - which eventually encompassed a network of such colleges organized nationally in 1921 as the National Council of Labour Colleges - and a Workers' Education Association (WEA), forrned in 1903, emphasizing worker training for the workplace. Richard Altenbaugh writes: "Both the class-conscious approach of the labour colleges and the self-improvement ernphasis of the WEA had American counterparts."'05 An overview of the kinds of activities performed by the labour schools provides some idea of the kind of education being promoted. Altenbaugh reviews the curriculum and activities of a number of labour schools set up in the 1920 and 1930s, such as Brookwood Labour ColIege near Katonah in New York, Commonwealth Labour College in Arkansas, and Work Peoples College in Duluth, Minnesota. These labour colleges offered full time residential educational progarns, with an emphasis on theoretical and informational (or background) courses, and tool (or instrumental) courses. Worker/students studied labour history and economics, while being trained to participate in social change through collective action. Formal social science courses provided "rudimentary learning skills for workers with lirnited educational backgrounds," and "enabled students to analyze their society and determine the roots of working class problems."206 Labour drama and fieldwork also acted as leaming experiences for the students, while at the sarne time serving to raise class consciousness off campus and providing assistance to organizing and strike carnpaigns.207 Southern schools, such as Commonwealth and Highlander Folk School, assisted miners, s harecroppers, and millhands in their struggles to unionize, while the Northern schools assisted rnining,

205 Altenbaugh, -for, p. 25. 206 Ibid, p. 93. 207 See, for example. Altenbaugh, -for, pp. 103-1 16 on the role of theatre in the early American labour movement, and Tom Zaniello, Workiw Stiffs. Union Maids. Reds. and RifTrafF An Ornanized Guide to Films About Labor (Ithaca: ILR Press, 1996) on labour films. textiles, steel, and automobile workers, including the autoworkers in Flint, Michigan, in their sit-down strike against General Motors in 1937. Sirnilarly, in the civil rights movement, informal schools played a crucial role. Hundreds of citizenship schools emerged throughout the South in an attempt to register black voters. A voter registration project was initiated by Highlander Folk School in the mid-1950s, one of its most important contributions. In the 1950s, the ovenvhelrning majority of Southern blacks were not registered to vote. Highlander organized citizenship programs in South Carolina in order to raise literacy skills so that blacks couId pass test requirements to register to vote. The scope of the prograrn evennially spread to Southern Georgia and then elsewhere within three years; it grew beyond the school's resources so that the prograrn was transferred to the Southern Christian Leadership Conference (SCLC). The SCLC launched a Crusade for Citizenship in the late 1950s which was to confront black apathy and fear in the face of white intimidation tactics to the point that voting was seen as "white folks' business." 'Thus the movement was to be 'educational in the sense that it would have to establish means through which Negro masses could be aroused and made aware of the importance of the vote.' This 'consciousness raising' was to be accomplished through workshops, mass rallies, and politically relevant sermons presented to church congregations."*08 Later, the Student Nonviolent Coordination Cornmittee (SNCC) organized a voter registration program in the Deep South, and in 1964, launched a project calIed Freedom Sumrner, aimed at enlarging the campaign in Mississippi by bringing in volunteers fiom northem universities, thus helping focus national attention on the state throughout the surnrner. A new group called the Council of Federated Organization was set up which would organize freedom schools and comrnunity centres, in addition to registerïng voters.

208 Morris and SCLC document cited in Morris, The Orioins of the Civil Ri~htsMovernent, p. 108.

88 The Freedom Schools were designed to deveIop leadership, raise critical thinking, and teach black history.209 In contrast to the early phase of Arnerica's labour and civil rights movements, the environmental movement has not developed an extensive network of informal schools. There are a few notable exceptions. In the United States, for exarnple, the Ruckus Society each year trains hundreds of environrnentalists in direct action. The Rainforest Action Network organizes annual chataquas for their member rainforest action groups. The Earth Island Institute promotes education and activism through its extensive project network, including professional wilderness training for Bay Area youth services organizations. The Center for Compassionate Living conducts humane education programs for pnmary, secondary and college students, and workshops on animal rights, the environment and human rights at its center in Surry, Maine or any host comrnunity worldwide. EarthSave's 22 chapters in the US and Canada promote a plant-based diet. And, the Northwest Earth Institute faciIitates lunch-time discussions on deep ecology, voluntary simplicity, and bioregionalism at workplaces and other organizations.210 By contrast, formal environmental education has proliferated in elementary, secondary and post-secondary educational institutions. Europe has the most extensive set of national and supranational environmental programs and policies in placeS2l1In 1993, the European Research and Training Center on Environmental Education was set up - the first of its kind - to undertake training progarns, and basic and applied research projects on environmentai education in Europe and el~ewhere.~12Also, a host of independent

209 Doug McAdam. Freedorn Surnrner (New York: Oxford University Press, 1988). 210 Gregory A. Smith. "Creating a Public of Environmentalists: The Role of Nonformal Education," in Gregory A. Smith and Diafruz R. Williams (eds), EcoIogical Education in Action (Albany: Srate University of New York Press, 1999), pp. 207-228. 21 l Walter Leal Filho, "An Overview of Current Trends in European Environmental Education." Journal of Environmental Education, Vol. 28, No. 1, 1996, pp. 5-10. 212Walter Leal Filho et ai., (eds), Ractices in Environrnental Education in Eurooe (Bradford: European Research and Training Centre on Environmentai Education, 1995). institutions and groups have been set up to undertake research, education and outreach in the field of social ecology, including the Institute for Social Ecology in Plainfield, Vermont, in the United States, and the hstitute for Social-Ecological Research in Frankfurt, Germany.

A Progressive Societal Learning and Social Change Model Based largely on the experiences of the early American labour and civil rights movements, it is possible to further develop the simple model of societal learning outlined in Figure 3.1. This section introduces a Progressive Societal Leaming and Social Change Model which takes into account the importance of the arts, media and educational systems arnong other inputs in achieving various types of progressive societal education; the interactions arnong learning channels; and the effects of public education on social change, in particular, changes in civil society and govemment policy (see Figure 3.2). The model is simple in that it does not consider opposition forces, negative feedbacks, and various other exogenous factors, such as political, socio-econornic, and environmental crises, and

the extant and emerging political opportunity smictures over time and space. Rather, the model emphasizes the process of progressive societal learning, highlighting the diverse learning pathw ays, their interactions, and their influence on social change.

The Importance of the Arts in Education

Cultural activities are a central component of vibrant social movements, as was evident in both the early American labour and civil rights movements - two movements that consciously placed a high value on the use of the arts in societal leaming. Significant, broad based public education in these two movements rested upon a variety of similar leaming sources, thus challenging some traditional notions of the role of cultural activities and differences between the Old and New Left. In underlining the importance of cultural activities in progressive struggles, these earlier movements point to important cornmonalties Fimire 3.2. Sources of Learnirw and Their Influence on Social Chanee

Media

Schools Societal Learnin~: -awareness -changes in Changes in worldview civil societv -action -fry'-/Proese ssive learnin~ 4-yTheater. in public education strategies. This is not surprising, given the vibrancy of these earlier movements; the emotive and spintual elements of cuitural activities proved crucial in changing core values and increasing cornmitment, and, in tu,enhancing public participation in movement activities.

Promoting Various Types of Leaming At the same tirne, different Iearning channels or mechanisms contribute to different kinds of leaming, with deeper leaming more likely to occur when educational activities originate from independent institutions, cultural sources, and mass citizen parti~ipation.~'3 Of the three types of learning, the mass media generally perform the task of raising broad public awareness of partïcular issues. But the deeper learning changes-changes in worldview and action learning-involve extensive organization by social movements and other supportive institutions. In the case of the civil rights movement, societal learning arnong the black comrnunity in the South involved extensive organization by NGOs and black churches through mass meetings, the distribution of nonvioIence literature, freedom songs, and the supportive work of "half-way houses," such as Highlander Folk School. Freedom songs provided both a redefinition of black people and their undertaking (a worldview), and psychological and spirituai support for the dangers inherent in confrontations involving direct action. In the case of labour, the mainstream press basically informed the public of the existence of labour disputes, whereas the socialist press aimed at a deeper educative role by providing deeper analyses, informing workers of the root causes of their rnisery and the possibility of a socialist alternative, as well as listing supportive actions that might be taken.

213 Whereas participation does lead to learning, some initial leaming is a precondition for participation. A positive feedback cycle operates where one type of Ieaming (for example, being informed or having a certain set of core values) Ieads to another type of learning (action-learning), which in tum, promotes more leaming of the first type (being better informed and solidifying core values). Independent labour schools offered students labour history and Marxist critiques and alternative visions, and, at the same time, involved worker/students in active and militant labour disputes. Labour drama was, in the words of Brookwood Labour College's first director A. J. Muste, able to "interpret the Labour Movement for the pubk in more sympathetic and appealing tems than abstract reasoning cm do?4 Radical theater mirrored the struggle of workers whiIe encouraging worker responses. Thus the last Iine in Clifford Odet's 1935 play "Waiting for Leftie7' about the organizing efforts of taxi drivers in New York city in the 1930s is "STRIKE! STRIKE! STRIKE!" shouted by the entire cast with their clenched fists up high in the air. Labour ballads, such as Woody Guthrie's ccBalladof Tom Joad," tell stories of Iabour struggles (in this case the story based on John Steinbeck's Gra~esof Wrath), while folk songs involved worker participation on the picket line and at meetings.

Targeting Audiences In using the Progressive Societal Learning and Social Change model, it is important to note that different Iearning channels are likely to mect different segments within the social movement (be they differences in geography, age, occupation, or educational Ievels) in diverse ways. Both sociologists and political scientists offer useful categories of publics. Social movements theorists define segments of the public in terms of their orientation towards a parbcular social movement: adherents hold favourable views of movement goals, constituents supply the movement with resources, bystanders are unaware of a movement's content or direction, and opponents oppose the rno~ernent.~~~ Alternatively, in the policy community approach to interest groups, political scientists refer to the "attentive public" - i.e., members of the public who regularly read newspapers, magazines and journals, for example - leaving a presumably "inattentive public" which is

214 Muste cited in Altenbough, Work for Stru&, p. 105. 215 Zald and McCarthy, "Resource Mobilization and Social Movements." neither interested in nor aware of developments in a particula. issue area.216 The attentive public category may encompass, in part, adherents, constituents and opponents, while the inattentive public is more likely to comprise bystanders. Pnnt media (the quality press) is a useful means of informing the "attentive public," whereas television, with its more powemil reach, is an effective way of spreading a visual message to a larger, sometimes global, cross-section of the population. Though reaching much smaller audiences, the alternative press-NGO newsletters, web sites, publications- generally provide far more detailed accounts of issues, incisive critiques, alternative visions, and action ideas for movement supporters (i.e., constituents and adherents). Sirnilarly, in the case of music, specific audiences or alternatively diverse and amorphous groupings may be targeted. The freedom songs of the civil rïghts movement brought together students and illiterate African Americans in the rural South, rich and poor,

and young and old, thereby bridging the gaps between different peoples. Sanger writes:

The inclusion of music as a rhetoncal strategy enabled blacks of al1 walks of life and al1 levels of learning to participate in the movement by taking part in an activity with which they already were familiar and cornfortable. Al1 participants, whether illiterate rural blacks or young college students could sing the songs of the movement drawing on lifetimes of experience in expressing thernselves through song217 Mega-music events, on the other hand, often have a global reach, in which masses of people worldwide are able to share a similar cultural experience. Musical events are usually a reliable means of ~achingyouth, as, for exarnple, the British Labour Party helped launch Red Wedge in 1986, following Live Aid, to garner the youth votem2I8At the same time, even mega-musical events, such as Live Aid, not only politicize artists, but also spur audiences to become more active in social movements.

216 On policy communities see, for example, Paul Pross. Group Politics and Public Policy. Second Edition (Toronto: Oxford University Press, 1992). 217 Sanger, "When the Spirit Say Sine!", pp. 41-42. 218 Frith and Street, "Rock Against Racism and Red Wedge." Bottom-up and Top-down Education Further, mechanisms of different leaming channels cm operate in a "bottom-up" and "top-down" fashion, with varying consequences for the types of societal leaming likely to occur. Some learning channels promote "bottom-up" leaming, that is, participatory learning at a grassroots level, face-to-face learning and "leaming by doing" approaches. These offer a direct leaming experience as compared to the indirect approach of public information campaigns. The emotional and spintual aspects of citizen engagement are more likely to affect worldviews and provide a Merstimulus to action learning, thus helping to build and strengthen civil society, as did the early protest Song movements, the labour and citizenship schools, and the independent press and community and personal networks. Top-down teaching efforts by environmental groups and others often serve different purposes. The use of the global mass media by social movements is an effective way of reaching large, transnational audiences, providing a means for the world to "bear witness" to harniful activities undertaken by transnational and global players, as Greenpeace regularly does, as in its campaign against French nuclear testing in the South Pacific. Sirnilarly, mega-musical events are a useful conduit for reaching a global mass public on issues of global concem, such as international peace, human rights and environmental problems. However, there tends to be a tradeoff between audience size and the quality of education taking place: folk songs, rooted in a community and often involving participatory singing, provide a more far reaching learning experience in terms of emotional involvement and linkages to action than do mega-musical events, though the gap may be bridged as was illustrated in the case of Sun City and the Amnesty International Tours.

Linkages Across Learning Channels Leaming channels not only promote different types of societal learning but may also facilitate and activate the use of additional learning channels. A central feature of the Progressive Societal Learning Model is the connectedness between the different leaming channels (illustrated by the two-way arrows linking each of the Ieaming channels in Figure 3.2). The fuzziness of the boundaries between the leaming channels is due to the positive feedbacks and synergistic effects that occur as learning channels overlap with and reinforce one another. The most obvious link is between NGOs and the other learning channels, particularly as NGOs consciously set out to utilize the media, the arts, schools, among other channels in order to advance movement goals and objectives. At the same time, supportive rnovement organizations are linked to NGOs and other learning channels so that several, diverse leaming channels are used together with cornplex multiplier and cascading effe~ts.~l9For exarnple, mass participation in direct action in the civil rights movement, such as bus boycotts, demonstrations, sit-ins and marches, provided mass media coverage, thus fuaher increasing participation in the southem movement as weli as informing and mobilizing participants from the northem parts of the country to assist in raising funds, participate in rnovernent activities such as Freedom Summer, and introduce topical songs about the civil rights movement into the mass culture. More recently, the worldwide, mega-musical events raised awareness of tens of thousands of concert goers, as well as hundreds of millions through rnass communications. These events also facilitate Ieaming in other channels by rnaking it easier for local movement centres and NGOs to further their aims in their campaigns, and by improving media coverage of issues as they become further legitimized. For exarnple, the two Nelson Mandela Tributes acted as flagships for local activists. According to Tony Hollingsworth, the producer of the Mandela Tributes, "the local anti-apartheid rnovements could pick up from the enormous coverage that we had and run a far more detailed political argument than you could have on stage."220 Fuaher, the media coverage of Mandela and the Afncan

219 On the concept of cascading interdependence, see James Rosenau, "A pre-theory revisited: worid politics in an era of cascading interdependence," International Studies Ouarterlv, Vol. 28, No. 3, 1984, pp. 245-306. 220 Cited in Ullstad, "Diverse Rock Rebellions Subvert Mass Media Hegemony," p. 26. National Congress (ANC) improved markedly after the 1988 Tribute, which reached a worldwide audience of about 600 million people. Before the event, the BBC news service regulady referred to the ANC as a "temonst" organization, but afier the event the coverage was far more sympathetic and balanced.

The Efects of Public Education on Social Change Once the various types of learning channels are activated and used to raise public awareness, change core values and promote action leanning, the question remains as to their effects on social change. Various types of social change cm occur, including changes in civil society, changes in government policy due to public pressure, and govemment Iearning, as govenunent members are part of the larger society. First, the purpose of broad based and participatory public education campaigns was often aimed at sirnply changing civil society itself. Civil society is defined as "that arena of social engagement existing above the individual yet below the state," and global civil society as "that slice of associational Iife that exists above the individual and below the state, but also across national boundaries."221 Social movements often employ various Iearning channels in order to change behaviour within the various coIlectivities in civil society, rather than to simply inform and pressure governments. In short, the world civic politics mode1 rests on the view that the state system alone cannot solve ouenvironmental problems; an active global civil society is also an essential element. Sirnilarly, the sustainable development approach of the Brundtland Commission advocates the incorporation of environaental concems in the decision making of actors at al1 levels, frorn individuals and societal goups to government institutions and international and transnational organizations.

221 Wapner, Environmental Activisrn and World Civic Politics, p. 4.

96 At the same tirne, an educated and active public also serves as a stimulus for policy change, pressuring both governments and intergovernmental organizations to introduce regulations, fiscal incentive, research, development and demonstration projects, as well as public information campaigns. Public pressure models are based on the idea that govemments respond to concerned and mobilized publics Govemments introduce new and more progressive policies if sufficient public pressure is applied and forces them to do so. The freedom songs of the civil rights movement, for example, were specifically directed at the grassroots community level, but had important repercussions for both civil society and government policy. Corde11 Reagon, a member of the Freedom Singers, notes: "The music doesn't change governments. Some bureaucrat or some politician isn't going to be changed by some music he/she hears. But we cmchange people-individual people.

The people cmchange governments."223 Moreover, government officiais are dso a part of larger society, and, to varying degrees, reflect changes in society, such as growing concern about the environment. Thus government learning is also a component of social change. It may occur at the rhetorical, policy and ideologicd Ievels due to a host of societal pressures and intemal sources of change. Mike Robinson, in his study of the greening of British party politics, distinguishes between "strategic" and "genuine" government learning. "Green crusaders" in politicai parties exhibit a self-motivated interest in environmental issues or are influenced by expert consensus or the daily workings of parliamentary cornmittees. Strategic government learning, in contrast, is a response to public pressure and various other pressures (constituent concerns, interest groups, disaster events, etc.). Social change in civil society and government policy, in turn, have feedback effects on the various learning channels (as illustrated in Figure 3.2).

222 On public pressure rnodels, see Mike Robinson, The Greenin? of British Party Politics (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1992). and Harrison, op. cit. 223 Cited in Sanger, "When the Spirit Savs Sin?!", p. 48. The Potential For Large-ScaIe Green Learning And Social Change The Progressive Societal Leaming Mode1 contains several advantages when applied to the study of public learning in the environmental movement. First, the mode1 cm serve to operationalize the concept of "green leaming." The strength of green learning in a transnational or local campaign or subrnovement of the environmental movement can be measured by exarnining and assessing mechanisms, such as the role of the arts, various media, schools, etc. in the movement, that lead to greater awareness, an eco-centric worldview and citizen engagement. Though cultural activities tend to be arnorphous and not well suited to quantification, an interpretive qualitative approach to the study of the arts in social change movements may provide a good indication of the vibrancy and levels of cornmitment in sociai movements. The strength of the various learning channels cm then be tested for their effects on social change - changes in civil society and providing public pressure airned at international organizations, governments or corporations. Further, the mode1 functions as a normative and evaluative tool by highlighting the use, underutilization or neglect of key learning mechanisms by a social movement. Lessons from older sociai movements can be applied in the design of effective leaming channels in social movements. The study of previous movements leads us to suggest the following are li kely to enhance environmental education: a major emphasis on cultural activities (e.g., music, literature, theater, films, and so forth); independent media, including newsIetters, newspapers, magazines, and books (as in the case of the independent socialist press like the popular weekly socidist Appeal to Reason); an extensive network of independent green schooIs for social activists; and Green Sunday Schools for children (&in to the Socialist Sunday Schools at the twn of the century), and other equivalent vehicles in the Jewish, Muslim, Hindu, Buddhist, Taoist, and other religions in the eco-theology movement. But in order for the environmental movement to effectively promote public education, it is important to first note the conditions which would facilitate the expanded use of various learning channels. Take, for example, protest music which has played a minimal role in the environmental movement, especially when contrasted to the early labour and civil rights movements, and to the various mega-musical events of the 1980s. A nurnber of conditions facilitated the emergence of folk music in eadier social movements which are often lacking in environmental campaigns. John Greenway's thesis is simple: "the best songs, as always, are bom of conflict." Music, in this instance, is particularly important in the early stages of the American labour movement, for example, when singing played a role in organizing drives and on the picket line.224 However, labour songs and the freedom songs of the civil rights movement were rnostly self-directed, aimed at the dominated themselves, who were at the forefiont of social change. The environmental movement, in contrast, depends on the participation of people, and not oppressed, nonhuman nature, or future generations; it thus faces a potentially much greater challenge, through the emergence of various environmental crises, issues of environmental justice, as well as humanity's longer term interest depends on a healthy planet. A further way out is through a redefinition of one's identity ar "self." For exarnple, Arne Naess, in his deep ecological perspective, proposes two selves: a self, with a lower case "s" to connote our individual being, and a larger "Self' that empathizes with nature and the entire community of life.23 Another condition facilitating an instrumental role for music in social change movements is a sense of community. Participatory singing emerged with relative ease in

224 In contrast. in the postwar period there was littie singing as unions becarne established and workers becme absorbed in consumer culture. David King Dunaway elaborates, "Unions had different needs then [in the 1930s and early 1940~1:to gainer publicity and to persuade members to jain a labour organization for the first time. This was what the Almanacs had done; but after the war, when unions had a good foothold in the plants, picket lines largely disappeared in favour of contract bargaining-and picket singers vanished as well. Industnal workers wanted refngerators and washers, not armed conflict." Dunaway, How Can 1 Keep From Sin inn:- Pete S- (New York: McGraw-Hi11 Book Company, 198 1). p. 51. 225 Anie Naess, Ecoloev. Community and Lifestyle (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 1989). the civil nghts movement and played a significant role in social change. Activists specifically chose Song as their major means of communication, since music was an important part of black history in Afiica, during the times of slavery, in the black churches, and among black labourers. Whether on a picket Line or blockades, or Iiving together perrnanently in a community or temporarily in a peace camp, songs need time to take root. In contrast, the environmental movement tends to rely on short and infrequent demonstrations, and has a fluid set of supporters rather than a specific social base Iike other movements. In the United States and Canada, forest protest campaigns are an exception, involving peace camps and long tenn blockades of logging roads, and thus have relied on both forest folk songs and folk classics like "We Shall Not Be Moved" and TeShall Overcome," as well as popular music concerts. Nonetheless, the transnational environmental movement has not tapped into the full leaming potential of popular and folk music even under present conditions. The 1989 Greenpeace Project did not play a radical educative role like the Sun City or the Amnesty

International Human Rights tours, and did not reach audiences anywhere near the size of those of Live Aid and the Mandela Tributes. Yet, a series of musical mega events for the environment, like Live Aid, could potentially draw world attention and help develop global responses to concems iike the forest crisis, the protection of endangered species, climate change, toxic chernical pollution, and global sustainable development. Other cultural forms may be just as significant, particularly for the environmental movement as a whoIe or in individual campaigns, where art, posters, film, literature, and other creative, cultural activities are important tools in public environmental education campaigns.

Conclusions Progressive social movements can and do draw upon mynad sources of leaming. Focusing on how broad-based, progressive societal learning takes place is essential in understanding the work of social change movements. As Bill Moyer suggests, the broad public should be the target of educational programs, since those with vested interests in the status quo (i.e., opponents) are the last to change and there is littie payoff in lobbying without a mass base of support; attaining majority support for social change is essential for the building of alternati~es.2~6Although NGOs are major components of social change

movements, a movement, if successful, consists of more than NGO activities; it must include supportive organizations, such as educational institutions, friendly and independent media, and various cultural activities. The lessons of the labour and civil rights movements point to the extensive use of different Iearning channels, each facilitating one or several types of leaming. The transnational environmental movement has not yet deveIoped an extensive network of such learning channels. This gap needs to be fiIIed if the environmental movement hopes to attain significant advances in green learning and social change.

The key to addressing the environmental crisis is the use of a varïety of leaming channels, including cultural mechanisms, and the promotion of many learning types, including rnass citizen engagement. This chapter presented a Progressive Societal Learning and Social Change Mode1 which highlights the importance of various learning channels and their interactions as well as their influence on governrnents and civil society. Many barriee to green leaming exist, and were not considered here in detail. Rather the focus was on determining the range of learning techniques used to help social movements develop, expand, and achieve their aims through infodng, inspiring, and activating the public, and through it, other social and political institutions.

226 Bill Moyer, The Movernent Action Plan: A Strategic Frarnework Describin- the Eieht Stapes of Successful Social Movements (Social Movement Ernpowerment Project, Spring 1987) and Bill Moyer, The Practical Strate&t: Movement Action Plan MAP) Strategic Theories for Evaluating. Plannin~.and Conducting: Social Movements (Social Movernent Empowerment Project, July 1990). Chapter Four Agents of Change: The Environmental Movement and Scientists - Traditional, realist international relations theory focuses on the systernic level of analysis and material forces to explain patterns of cooperation and confict in world politics. Stmctural realist theory, for example, relates patterns of international conflict and cooperation to the distribution of capabilities in the international ~~stern.'~'More specifically, the theory of hegemonic stability posits two main propositions with respect to the creation and maintenance of international regimes.228 First, it links regime creation to the existence of a hegemon (a state possessing a preponderance of material resources) which provides public goods or coerces others to, and second, it ties the weakening of a regirne to a hegemon's de~line.*~According to these propositions, the presence of US hegemony in the postwar period up to the early 1960s should have led to the creation of multilateral environmental regimes while the decline of US hegemony thereafter should have resulted in the absence of regime formation and the weakening of extant eco-regimes. Hegemony, in other words, is a necessary condition for both the formation and maintenance of international regimes. The empirïcal record presents a puzzle for neo-realist theory and hegemonic stability theory, in particular, on both counts. First, the number of international environmental agreements has grown rapidly this century, rnost dramatically in recent decades (see Table 4.1). The United Nations Environment Program's International Remsbv of Environmental

ennet ne th Waltz, Theory of International Politics (Reading, Mass.: Addison Wesley. 1979). 228~hetheory of hegemonic stability is reviewed in Robert Keohane, After Hegernony: Cooperation and Discord in the World Political Econom~(Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1984), pp. 3 1-46. 229Krasner defines an international regime as a set of international prïnciples, noms, rules and decision- making procedures that guide actor expectations in worid politics in "Structural Causes and Regime Consequences: Regimes as Intervening Variables," Krasner (ed), International Re~imes(Ithaca: Corne11 University Press, 1983), p. 2. It is weakened when the principles, norms mles and decision making procedures becorne las coherent or when there is a growing gap between regime requirements and actual practice (Ibid., p. 5) or when States revert to national norms and procedures from international ones. Jack Donnelly, "International human rights: a regime analysis," International Or~anization,Vol. 40, No. 3, Summer 1986, p. 602. Table 4.1 Number of Multilateral EnvironmentalAgreements: 1911-1993'

Decade Number of agreements 19 11-20 1921-30 1931-40 1941-50 1951-60 1961-70 1971-80 1981-90 1991-93

lhhn McCormick provides a table for 1911-1983 in Reclairnin~Paradire: The Global Environmental Movement (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1989), p. 175, based on the United Nations Environment Programme, Environment (UNEP/GC/INF0/11) Nairobi: UNEP, May 1984. The sources used for the decade 1981-90 and the years 1991-93 are UNEP, Remster of International Treaties and Other Ageements in the Field of the Enviroment. Revised Edition, 1989, and M. J. Bowman and D. J. Harris, Multilateral Treaties: Index and Current Status (Nottingham: University of Nottingham Treaty Centre, 1993). Treaties iists about 140 multilateral environmental treaties, more uian half of which were signed since the 1972 United Nations Conference on the Human Environment in Stockholm. Contrary to the first proposition, although many eco-regimes emerged during the period of US hegemony, most were created in its absence, thus producing a negative correlation behveen the emergence of eco-regimes and US hegemony. Clearly, hegemony is not helpful in accounting for the occurrence or frequency of ec~-re~ime-builciin~-~~~ In the case of the second proposition, the eco-regimes established during the penod

of US hegemony ciid not weaken with US decline, but rather were maintained and even strengthened. For example, the whale regime was created in 1946 in a very weak form - quotas were set at such high levels in the 1950s and 1960s that whaIing nations couId not meet their al lot ment^.^^' However, three major changes in policy took place which substantially strengthened the whale regime, and yet coincided with US hegemonic decline: the introduction of new management procedures in 1974 which resulted in lowering the quotas for whale capture; the adoption of a moratorium on commercial whaling in 1982 which took effect in 1986; and finally, the establishment in May 1994 of an Antarctic whale sanctuary which aims to protect whales from 40 degrees South in an area covering 50 million square kilometers around ~ntarctica."~Moreover, the United States pIayed a key

2300ne case of eco-regime formation in the absence of hegemony is sufficient to reject the hypothesis that hegemony is a necessary condition. The many cases, however, suggests that hegemony does not even facilitate regime-building. 231~uringthis tirne, the killing of whales actually doubled from 31,000 in 1951 to 66.000 in 1962- Gareth Porter and Janet Welsh Brown, Global Environmental Politics: Dilemmas in World Politics (Boulder: Westview Press, 1991) p. 79. 232~.J. Peterson, "Whalers. Cetologists, Environrnentalists, and the International Management of Whaling," Internaticma1 Or~anization,VoI. 46, No. 1, Winter 1992, p. 147, and Greenpeace, Greenlink. Vol. 3, No 1, 1995, p.4. The last of the three major changes, in particular, may constitute the beginnings of a regime change since there is a marked shift in emphasis in the whale regime's principles and noms. The establishment of the Antarctic whaie sanctuary gives substance to the preservationist ethic of protecting wildlife for its own sake, at least in the South Antarctic region, overshadowing the conservationist pnnciple of sustainable kill of whales. See Krasner on regime change in ''Structural Causes and Regime Consequences," p. 4. role in regirne building frorn the 1960s to the present - after it was in relative decline."' In short, there is a need to look beyond structural realist theory and its focus on the international distribution of capabilities to alternative approaches, ones that examine the transnational forces that increasingly shape international politics.

Muitilateral environmental regïmes were created at various times - most of these since the 1960s - coinciding not with US hegernony but rather with its decline and with increasing ecological interdependence and a growing environmental awareness and concern. Both the social change movement and epistemic community approaches offer plausible explanations for the development of eco-regimes. To begin with, there exists a positive correlation between the increase in the quantity and quality of eco-regirnes, on the one hand, and the rïse of both the environmental movernent and epistemic cornrnunities, on the other. The environmental movement has grown in size and significance in three waves of environmentalism that have swept much of North America and Western Europe, and to a lesser degree, the rest of the world. The fust mobilization occurred at the turn of the

twentieth century with much emphasis on the conservation or preservation of wildlife; the second wave, between the mid-1960s and mid-1970s, focused on pollution, resource depletion especially of oil, offshore oil drilling, tanker spills, nuclear energy, and population growth among others issues; and the third wave between the mid-1980s to the present added increasingly globalized concems such as global warming, stratospheric ozone depletion, deforestation, the loss of biological diversity, hazardous wastes, and so

233~obenMandel, 'Transnational Resource Conflict: The Politics of Whaling," in Robert O. Matthews, et al. (eds), International Conflict and Conflict Ma-ment: Readings in Wortd Politics (Scarborough, ON: Prentice-Hall of Canada, Inc., 1984) pp. 341-352; Porter and Brown, Global Environmental Politics, pp. 78-82; and Peterson, 'Whalers, Cetologists, Environrnentalists, and the International Management of Whaling." foahSu4 The number of environmental organizations has grown astronomically as have their membership, multinational affiliates, budgets and activities. Greenpeace, for example, was founded in Canada by a srnall group of environmental and peace activists in 1971; it has become increasingly transnational with 35 offices in 24 countries, more than 3,000,000 members worldwide (in the early 1990~)~a budget of about $140 million, and a variety of environmental ~arn~aigns.~~~About 10% of the US public belong to an environrnental group, and in Germany, more people belong to environrnental groups than to political parties.u6 At the sarne time, ecological epistemic communities have become more powerful with the consolidation of their position in intergovernmental and govenunent bureaucraties, such as the United Nations Environment Program (UNEP),created in 1972, and the newly formed environment deparûnents worldwide. Peter Haas notes that governments in 118 countries established environrnental agencies between 1972 and 1982, and that many of these were subsequently upgraded hmcoordinative to regulatory bodies.237

234 The origins of the fint wave of environmentalisrn is reviewed in John McCormick, Reclairning Paradise, pp. 1-24 and the Iatest two waves in Robert Paehlke, "Eco-History: Two Waves in the Evolution of Environmentalism," Alternatives, Vol. 19, No. 1, 1992, pp. 18-23. 235 Mireille Deriron and Leigh Bailey, A Directory of European Environmental Or~anizations(Blackwell Reference, 1991), pp. 112-115. See aIso Peter Brackley (ed), World Guide to Environmental Issues and Or~anizations(Harlow: Longrnan Current Affairs, 1990), Kirkpatnck Sale, The Green Revolution: The American Environmental Movement 1962-1992 (New York: Hill and Wang, 1993), and John McCormick, "International nongovernmental organizations: prospects for a global environmental movernent," in Sheldon Kamieniecki (ed),Environmental Politics in the International Arena: Movements, Parties. Orpanizations. and Policv (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1993), pp. 131-143. 236 Lester Milbrath, Envisionin? a Sustainable Society Leamin- Our Way Out (Albany, NY: SUNY Press, 1989), pp. 72-73. 237 Haas, "Introduction: epistemic cornmunities and international policy coordination." International Oryanization, Vol. 46, No. 1, Winter 1992, p. 9. See also Mostafa Tolba et al., (eds), The World Environment 1972-1992: Two Decades of Challengg (London: Chapman and Hall, 1992), pp. 702-3. On the upgrading of a number of environmental ministries, see Haas, "Do Regimes Matter? Epistemic Communities and Mediterranean Pollution Control," Tntemational Organization, Vol. 43, No. 3, Summer 1989, pp. 388-9. Kenneth Waltz points out, however, that theory emerges not from the mere existence of correlations (which he cails laws), but fi-om the exvlanation of a set of laws. A theory, writes Waltz, explains "why particular associations Petween variables] hold" and

'Lindicates that some factors are more important than others." U8 Thus 1 will explore the theoretical arguments presented by the epistemic cornmunity and the social change movement approaches and assess the relative force of their expianatory power in accounting for the emergence of international environmental regimes. 1 begin by highlighting the theoretical similarities between the two approaches before tunung to their differences.

The fmt feature the episternic community and social movement approaches share is their use of the transnational level of analysis. Unlike traditiond theories of international relations and international regimes, which are ~tate-cenaic,~~~the transnational level of analysis focuses on the role of non-state actors and the manner they interact with state and other nonstate actors. Robert Keohane and Joseph Nye define transnational relations as taking place when at least one actor in the relationship is a nongovernrnental a~tor.~~'The growing size and significance of transnational actors challenge the realist notion that States are the only significant players in worId politics. James Rosenau, for example, argues that a nurnber of systernic and individual forces have led, by the 1980s, to a "bifurcated world,"

238~ennethWaltz, Theot-y of International Politics, pp. 6 and 7. 239~tephanHaggard and Beth A. Simmons, 'Theories of International Regimes," International Qrganization, Vol. 41, No. 3, Surnmer 1987, p. 499. In the issue area of human nghts, a nurnber of authors have argued that nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) have made important contributions to the process of regirne building, yet the Iiterature on international regimes tends to be state-centric, not incorporating the role of NGOs. See Conway Henderson, "Human Rights and Regimes: A Bibliographic Essay," Human Ri~htsOuarterlv. Vol. 10, 1988, pp. 541-542, and Laurie Wiseberg and Hamy M. Scoble, "Monitoring Hwnan Rights Violations: The Role of Nongovemmentai Organizations," in D. P. Kommers and G. D. Jhescher (eds), Human Rights and Arnerican Foreim Policv (Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame, 1979). p. 183. 240~ongovemmentaIacton include transnational organizations, subunits of transnational organizations, and subunits of intergovermental organizations and governments. Robert O. Keohane and Joseph S. Nye, "Transnational relations and world politics: a conclusion," in their edited, Transnational Relations and WorId Politics (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1970). pp. 382-3. that is, <'theemergence of a multicentric world consisting of thousands of nonstate, non- sovereign global actors which CO-existin a nonhierarchical relationship with the state- centnc system.""' Transnational environmental actors not only influence govemment definitions of national interest, but are major actors in the international political arena in their own right. Karen Litfin writes: "Social movements and scientists have emerged as core participants in al1 phases of the process, from placing issues on the agenda to monitoring cornpliance with agreernent~,""~and, as Paul Wapner argues, key actors in the global civil society. Second, the two approaches highlight the power of ideas. Stephan Haggard and Beth Simmons associate the transnational level of analysis with cognitive theories which explain regime formation and development in terrns of the power of ideology, consensual knowledge, and ~earnin~.~~~Ideas Vary according to their comprehensiveness (world views or beiiefs about reality and the world), and whether they address mainly ends (principled beliefs) or means (causai be~iefs).~*For example, an ecological, holistic world view gradually emerged in the ecological episternic community and environmentai movement, paaicularly in the 1960s, following the publication of Rachel Carson's classic book, Silent S~ring;(1962). In this book Carson showed that in ecoiogy everything

241~amesRosenau cired in Thomas Princen and Matthias Finger, Environmental NGOs in World Politics: Linking the Local and the Global (London: Routledge, 1994) p. 48. See also James Rosenau, "Environmental Challenges in a Turbulent World," in Lipschutz and Conca (eds), The State and Social Power in Global Environmental Politics, pp. 71-93, and Turbulence in World Politics: A Theorv of Chanpe and Continuitv (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1990), and Seyom Brown, OId Forces, New Forces. and the Future of WorId Politics (Glenview, Illinois: Scott, Foresman and Co., 1988). 242~arenLitfin, "Eco-regirnes: Playing Tug of War with the Nation-State," in Ronnie Lipschutz and Ken Conca (eds), The State and Social Power in Global Environmental Politics (New York: Columbia University Press, 1993), p. 11 1. 243~aggardand Simmons, "Theorks of international regirnes," pp. 499 and 509-13. 244~udithGoldstein and Robert O. Keohane, "Ideas and foreign policy: an analytic hework,'' in their edited volume Ideas and Foreim Policy Beliefs. Institutions. and Political Change (Ithaca: Corne11 University Press, 1993). connects together and a threat to any one species is a threat to the whole web of life as a result of such processes as the bioaccumulation and bioamplification of toxic cher ni cal^.^^^ Further, the influence of ideas varies dong different pathways, from providing a road map to providing reasons for generalizing mles and linking issue area~.~~~Episternic cornmunities may provide the "transmission mechanisms that propel a particular set of ideas f~rward."~~'Alternatively, the transnational environmental movement may mobilize a change in societal values, and persuade governments to alter their course. As Emanuel Adler and Peter Haas write, the epistemic comrnunity and, I wouId add, the social change movernent approaches, "offer a research program with which students of world politics can empirically study the role of ideas in international re~ations.""~To the extent that ideas are key independent variables in the process of regime-building, the realist assumption that state interests are exogenously determined by material forces is further undermined. For example, in the issue area of human rights, ideational factors in the postwar penod proved to be critical to the creation and development of the global human rights regime. 249 A similar case can be made for environmental issues.

245~achelCarson, Silent Soring (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Co., 1962) However, environmental perspectives on the relationship between humans and nature, and on the appropriateness of the political and economic systems greatly diverge-some radicaI (deep ecology, ecoferninisrn, social ecology, steady-state econornics, and anima1 rights) and other reformist (sustainable deveIopment)-and therefore different world views, means and ends coexist within the environmental movement and epistemic community. For radical ecological perspectives, see Zimrnerman et al., (eds), Environmental Philoso~hv:From Animal Rights to Radical Ecolow (New Jersey: Prentice Hall, 1993), and for the reformist view, see the World Commission on Environment and Development, Our Common Future (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1987). 246 Goldstein and Keohane, ''Ideas and foreign policy," pp. 11-24. 247 Ibid., p. 14. 248 Emanuel Adler and Peter Haas, 'bConclusion: Episternic Cornrnunities, World Order, and the Creation of a Reflective Research Program," International Orpanization, Vol. 46, No. 1, Winter 1992, p.367. Adler and Haas are somewhat equivocal; they argues ideas shape definitions of national interest, especiaily under conditions of uncertainty, but ideas "supp1ement the structural approach." 249 Following the Nazi atrocities of the Second World War, in particular the Holocaust, governments rirnply gravitated to the idea of the universality of human rights. Jack Donnelly -tes: "power rnay coalesce around, rather than create, hegemonic ideas, such as human rights and the regimes that ernerge from them," in Universal Human Ri~htsin Theorv and Practice (Ithaca: CorneIl University Press, 1989), p. 227. Finally, in addition to providing a similar focus on the transnational level of analysis and the role of ideas, both approaches highlight the importance of (i) learning and (ii) bargaining in the process of regime building.250 However, the two approaches offer very different propositions with respect to who has to Iearn to effect policy change and who the key bargaining agent is.

The Epistemic Communities Approach Peter Haas, the main proponent of the epistemic comrnunity approach, argues that two conditions must be met for regime building to occur. As noted in Chapter Two, the first proposition is that scientific convergence within an episternic community is necessary for govemrnents to Iearn and to effect change. Members of the epistemic cornrnunity derive power, domesticaily and intemationally, from their authontative daim to knowledge. They increase their effectiveness by exhibiting a strong consensus or "speaking with one voice"

on the nature of the problem and policy concIusions. Leaders or govemments tum to the episternic community to help them identify their own interests and policies in areas where they are poorly inforrned and uncertain or following a crisis. The epistemic community helps limit the range of policy options govemments consider by identiQing the parameters of the problern and solutions based on their own causal and value framework. Although scientific convergence is a necessary condition, it is not sufficient for regime building. A second essentid condition for regime building and the deveiopment of convergent state policies is that members of the epistemic community attain bargaining power in govemrnent bureaucraties and international secretariats, including high level access to decision-makers. As Haas points out in his empirical study of the Mediterranean

250 Peter Haas points out that the process of cooperation depends on the epistemic community's leaming and bargaining power, sa vin^ the Mediterranean: The Politics of International Environmental Cooneration

(New York: Columbia University Press, 1990). pp. 64-65; alternatively, Prïncen and Finger write, "... we have atternpted to explain the NGO phenomenon by demonsbating how NGOs perform key roles as independent bargainers and as agents of socid leaniing," Environmenta1 NGOs in World Politic, p. 217. Action Plan, "...no learning occurred in countries in which the epistemic comrnunity was unable to appropnate control," (e-g., the epistemic community was weak in Libya,

Morocco, and Tunisia and, as a result, there was little action). Further, consensual knowledge "...ciid not serve as a process of regime change. Instead it served largely as a power resource for members of the epistemic ~ornmunit~."~~'Thus, Haas proposes: 'The strength of cooperative arrangements will be detemined by the domestic [and intemationdl power amassed by members of the epistemic comrnunity within their respective govemments [and intergovemmentd bodies] ."252 The term epistemic community is defined by Haas as a network of professionals, usually of scientists, who with recognized expertise in a particular issue area, share sirnilar principled and causal beliefs, notions of validity, and a common policy enterpi~e.~'~ Epistemic cornmunities are, however, distinct from the broader scientific cornmunities, professions and disciplines, and bureaucrats since the latter do not necessarily hold a consensual understanding of the problem and Moreover, once consensus breaks down in an epistemic conimunity, "smaller, discreet epistemic communities" emerge. 255 Overall, Haas' approach is extremely valuable because it highlights the power of key transnational actors and ideas. As such, it marks an immense improvement on traditional international relations theories. Yet the approach has a few deficiencies. Haas' definition does not clearly specify what is meant by shared values or shared ends. It is necessary to make a clear distinction between scientific consensus on poliq content, on the

251 Haas, "Do regimes rnaner?*. p. 398. 252 Haas. Savine the Mediterranean, p. 57. 253 Haas, Lïntroduction."p. 3. 254 Ibid., pp. 18-19. 255 Ernanuel Adler and Peter Haas, "Conclusion: Epistemic Communities. World Order, and the Creation of a Reflective Research Program," international Organization, Vol. 46, No. I Winter 1992, p. 384. one hanci, and specific implernentation metho&, on the other? For example, in the case of global warming, scientists agree on targets and schedules (e-g., the need to reduce greenhouse gas ernissions by 60% to stabilize atrnospheric concentrations), but it is the job of policy makers to agree on specific implementation methods to achieve those targets (e.g., energy efficiency standards, carbon tax, tradable pollution permits, research, development and demonstration, etc.). Further consensus is buiIt into the concept of epistemic community in Haas' definition. Yet the degree of scientific consensus may be an important variable in explaining cooperatian, especially considering that social and politicai forces shape the process of scientific convergence. Consequently, 1will treat scientific convergence as a variable which may take on more than two values (i.e., more than ail or n~thin~).~'~At a normative level, 1 also see the concept of episternic cornmunity learning as a function of belief change in the direction of greater accuracy and greater effecti~eness.~~ Also, there is a danger of the epistemic community approach becoming a tautological statement rather than an explanation if one measures bargaining power of the epistemic community in terms of the outcome (Le., regime building). Thus, we need to clearly separate bargaining power or access to policy makers from policy change. Bargaining power cm be measured by different indicators, such as the size of the epistemic

256 Arnold J. Heidenheimer, Hugh Heclo and Carolyn Teich Adams. Comparative Public Policy The Politics of Social Choice in America. Euroue. and Ja~an,Third Edition (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1990), p. 323. 257 For example, the degree of scientific convergence can be codified as follows: if only O to 25% members of the relevant discipline agree, there is no consensus; for 25-50%, there is an emerging agreement; for 50-7596, a majority agree and there is some consensus; and for 75-10096 an overwhelming majority concur and there exists a strong consensus. 258 Effectiveness is defined in tenus of greater understanding of the relationship between means and ends. and not effectiveness in terms of policy change. since in order to avoid a tautology leamhg (an independent variable) should be separated frorn policy change (the dependent variable). See discussion in Jack S. Levy, "Leaming and foreign policy: sweeping a conceptual minefield," International Or~anization. Vol. 48, No. 2, Spring 1994, pp. 289-300. community in governmental and intergovernmental bodies, and levels and amount of access to decision-makers. The main theoretical weakness in Haas' approach is that it is not sufficientIy political. The state is seen as a neutral, rational agent which makes necessary policy changes on a functionalist, almost apolitical basis. He writes: "... whether epistemic influence leads to policy coordination is a function of whether the causal beliefs of the epistemic communities demonstrate the need for ir. 9,259 This approach does not sufficiently examine how the political process works between and within States at various stages of the learning and decision-making process, from the emergence of the problem itself, to its identification, the development of a scientific convergence, the attainrnent of bargaining power by the epistemic community, and finally policy change (see Figure 4.1). In particular, political and social forces shape al1 points from "time O" to "~e4" (tO to t4), including the time lag between scientific discovery of the environmental problem (tl) and the emergence of a scientific convergence (t2);the time lag between scientific convergence

(t2) and the epistemic community gaining positions of power (t3); and the timing of the government's motivation to lem from the epistemic community and to act on its advice (t4). The epistemic community approach sirnply assumes the process of regime building will take place once there is scientific convergence and epistemic bargaining power, but it does not adequately address how and why such poiicy change is achieved. The problem is best illustrated in the case study Haas choose-the Mediternnean Action Plan. Haas notes that, in most cases, the Med Plan "... was not challenged by industrial groups or by commerce ministries. ri260 However, many urgent international environmental issues, such as global warrning, deforestation, hazardous wastes, and so foxth, do face significant opposition from well organized corporate interests. More likely, the obstructionist role of industry is a key variable in the regime building process, and the

259 Haas, ''Introduction," p. 30. Emphasis added. Haas, "Do Regimes Matter?", p. 392. Ficure 4.1. The time laes in the learning and decision-making process

ernergence of scienufic scienrific epis temic policy environmental discover y convergence bargaïning change problem power neutrality of government is an open question, particularly for governrnents with a neo- conservative ideological bent. Below, I will explore the role of public relations fums hired by polluting industries or the resource exploitation secton to misinfom or distract the public and governments from environmental issues.

Another issue is that Haas's "puzzle" is Algeria, which was initially strongly opposed to the Mediterranean Action Plan, and then radically changed its position as a

result of the epistemic community's influence. 261 Haas deals with the importance of the

epistemic community in Third World countries where there was initial antipathy to international environmental protection. Many of these countries are undemocratic, so social movernents and public pressure are less likely to change government policy whereas elite experts at least have a chance. In democratic countries, on the other hand, the environmental movement may be a critical agent of change. A number of empincal case studies on eco-regime building have shown that epistemic cornmunities are not always present during the process of regime formation. For example, Oran Young and Gail Osherenko failed to confirm the presence of an epistemic cornmunity in the polar bear and fur seal regimes, though there was "a nse in media attention and activity by nongovemmental organizations as facts promoting regime formation. 9,262 In sum, given the substantial time lags between the emergence of most environmental problems and policy responses, the role of industry, the si,pificance of social movements in democratic countries, and the possibility of eco-regime building without epistemic communities, it is necessary to look at alternative approaches to that of the epistemic cornmunity.

261 Ibid., p. 379. 262 Oran R. Young and Gail Osherenko, ''International regirne formation: findings, research priorïties, and applications," in their edited Polar Politics: Creatinp International Environmental Regimes (Ithaca: Comell University Press, 1993) p. 244. Note that these cases involved, in addition to conservation concerrns, concerns about animal rights or the preservation of wilderness for its own sake-issues where values play a heavy role and concomitantly science is less relevant. The Social Change Movement Approach The major alternative theoretical explanation looks at the role of social change movements, in this case, the transnational environmental movement. Instead of scientists playing the key role in the government learning process, social change movement approaches posit that social learning influences the creation, effectiveness and timing of regime building.263 Green societal learning is defined in ternis of directly raising public awareness about the state of the environment, changing worldviews in an eco-centric direction, and promoting citizen engagement through the involvement of large portions of the public in environmental campaigns and indirectly through the media, cultural activities, formal and inforrnal schools, and so forth. The environmental movement, particularly environmental NGOs, use broad-based public education both to pressure governmental bodies to alter their policies, and to promote change in global civil society. Public pressure motivates govemments to learn and to act. Unlike episternic cornmunities, environmental NGOs rarely have direct access to governments. For example, Russell Dalton's recent survey of environmental movements in Western Europe suggests that environrnentûl groups tend to have only indirect access to policy rnakew, and their ties to the plity are "weak and indire~t."~"Further, government agencies are often "captured" by private corporate interests, and the latter's power is maximized in "closed or low visibility arenas.,9265 As a result, environmentalists rely on public education campaigns

263 Princen and Finger, Environmenial NGOs in World Politics, pp. 60-65. 264 Russell J. Dalton, "Alliance Patterns of the European Environrnental Movement," in Wolfgang RUdig (ed), Green Politics Two (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 1992). p. 8 1. In the Canadian context, Jeremy Wilson argues that corporate interests and govemment agencies are in the subgovemment part of the policy community while environmental groups tend to lie in the peripheral attentive public part of poIicy communities, rarely entering the inner sub-government part, in "Wildemess Politics in BC: The Business Dorninated State and .the . Containment of Environmentalisrn," in William Coleman and Grace Skogstad, eds, Policv Cornmunit les and Public Policv in Canada: A Structural A~~roach(Mississauga: Copp Clark Pitman, 1990), pp. 141-69. 265 Robert Paehlke, "Democracy and Environmentalisrn: Opening a Door to the Administrative State," in Robert Paehlke and DougIas Torgerson, eds., Managing Leviathon: Environmental Politics and the and grassroots mobilization as a means to ensure that govenunents perform their roles as protectors of the public good. Increased public awareness and concern increase the bargaining power of environmental NGOs. The environmental movement's bargaining power is related to the success of its public education campaigns, the media attention it receives, and efforts at grassroots mobilization. The environmental movement also derives its bargaining leverage from the qualities it possesses, such as the legitimacy it gains from protecting the public interest and being a grassroots movement, and its transparent and transnational nature.266 A second proposition is that environmental NGOs influence the regime building process by changing values and activities in the global civil society. Paul Wapner examines the role of a number of transnational environmental groups, including Greenpeace, Friends of the Earth and the World Wildlife Fund in their efforts to engage civil society in environmental issues.267 Environmentai groups play a key role in developing an ecological sensibility and in engaging civil society in actions to protect the environment. Transnational environmental groups have enormous capabilities, through their work in developing an 'ecological sensibility,' by engaging civil society in actions to protect the environment such as implementing environmental projects in various states, and by utilizing the complex interdependencies between states and other actors to promote environmental protection. Wapner argues that transnational NGOs often take on global civic politics as an end in itself, that is, not necessarily directed at the state. Rather changes in civil society itself can make a significant contribution to environmental protection. Chapter Three presented a Rogressive Societal Learning and Social Change Model which mesures the degree of societal Iearning in terms of the use of multiple and

Administrative State (Peterborough: Broadview Press, 1990), p. 39 citing the work of Richard N. L. Andrews, "Class Politics or Dernomatic Reform: Environmentalism and Arnerican PoIitical Institutions," Natural Resources Journal, Vol. 20, 1980, p. 237. 266 Princen and Finger, Environmental NGOs in World Politics pp. 34-36. 267 Paul Wapner, Environmental Activisrn and World Civic Politics. interacting sources of green ieaming, such as attracting media attention, the use of formal and informal schools, and the role of music, art, film, and Iiterature. It argued in favour of a broad definition of the environmental movement, extending beyond a focus on environmental NGO actors to include environmental educators, musicians, artists, etc. The remaining part of this section wiii focus on the role of environmental NGOs within the environrnental movement, as they often play a leading part. 1 will define environmental NGOs and delineate some of the major transnational ENGO players based in Canada and the US as well as key national, regional, and local environmental organizations in these two countries. Environmental NGOs (ENGOs) are defined, by John McCormick, as pnvate, nonprofit, voluntary bodies "directly or indirectly influencing public policy on behalf of the broader public interest," while international NGOs (INGOs) are "voluntary organizations working in more than one country and directing their appeals either to more than one national govemment or to international bodies. ,7268 McCorrnick's definition of international NGOs includes both international environmental organizations and international coalitions of national NGOs. According to this definition, there are "probably no more than 100 INGOs cumently active mainly on issues of environmentai ~oncern."~~%owever,given that many local and national NGOs have international interests and work with international

NGOs, 1 will define ENGOs broadly as encompassing local, national and international organizations and coalitions. Environmental groups in the US and Canada consist of large national organizations, a number of regional networks, several major transnational, issue-onented networks, and a multitude of volunteer groups engaged in local activism. Many of the 'Big Ten' environmental groups in the US consist of wilderness and wildlife conservation groups that

268 McCorrnick, "Internationalnongovernrnental organizations: prospects for a global environrnental movement," p. 132. 269 Ibid. 132-3. were formed in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries: the Sierra Club in 1892, the Audubon Society in 1905, the Izaak Walton League in 1922, and the Wilderness Society in 1935. The Sierra Club, for example, had its origins in the successful campaign by John Muir and others to designate Yosemite a National Park. It has played a crucial role in defeating proposed dams for the Grand Canyon, and in establishing various parks in the US, including the North Cascades, Redwoods, and Alaska's national park, wildlife refuge, and wilderness preservation systems. During the second wave of environrnentalism, beginning in the 1960s, a new generation of environmental groups formed addressing a wider range of issues including air and water pollution, nuclear power, and solid waste. The Environmental Defense Fund, founded in 1967, worked with the United Fanns Workers and California Rural Legal Assistance on the issue of toxic substances like DDT in the late 1960s. The National

Resource Defense Council (NRDC) was founded with the help of a Ford Foundation gant in 1970 by a group of iawyers concemed with environmental issues. The NRDC has generated rnany landmark environmental cases to force the US Environmental Protection Agency @PA) to enforce environmental statutes like the Clean Air and Clean Water Acts. It Iater broadened its focus beyond litigation, to include carnpaigns against pesticides, unsustainable agriculture, and resource depletion. The Friends of the Earth (FOE) was founded in 1968 in the United States when David Brower led a secessionist group out of the Sierra Club. The group is known for its strong research and activist politics, especially in the area of energy policy. It has affiliates in more than 50 countries, including a

Canadian group founded in 1978. In 1990, FOE-US merged with the Environmental Policy Institute and the Oceanic Society. Prominent environmental groups in Canada inchde Greenpeace and the Sierra

Club, each having several offices across the country. Greenpeace was formed in Canada in 1971 bringing together the peace rnovement and environmental activists. Greenpeace began as the Don? Make a Wave Cornmittee of Vancouver, British Columbia, protesting US nuclear weapons tests on the Alaskan island of Amchitka. Tt has since become a global organization, with ofices in over twenty countries. Greenpeace embraces the Amencan Quaker tradition of "bearing witness" - that is, putting oneself in the path of an objectionable activity - together with the civil rights rnovement's comrnitrnent to nonviolent direct action. It emphasizes dramatic and highly public campaigns of direct action, such as sailing into nuclear test zones, unfurling banners from industrial smokestacks, plugging industrial waste outflow pipes, and interposing activists between whaling ships and the whales. Canada's West Coast environmental movement has been the country's most active and vibrant. As will be shown in Chapter Six, groups such as Greenpeace, Friends of Clayoquot Sound, Forest Action Network, Western Canada Wilderness Cornmittee, and Sierra Legal Defense Fund, have carnpaigned Iocally and intemationally to protect Canada's ancient temperate rainforest in British Columbia. Environmental NGOs play different roles in the public policy process and in civil society. Large professional organizations, Iike Greenpeace, have full-tirne carnpaigners, rountinized tasks, and a hierarchical decision-making process. Their staff often include scientists, lawyers, economists, and other professionals who work to promote change through educational and research-onented activities, Litigation, lobbying and expert testimony. Some large transnational environmental groups, Like Greenpeace and the Sierra Club, also focus on direct action. But a great proportion of the environmental movement consists of a host of local activist groups, many of them small, "kitchen table" groups. These are often compnsed of ad hoc cornmittees, informal networks, and loose coalitions who seek immediate action to pending problems. Critical events, like the Love Canal and Three Mile Island crises, play an important role in fostering community-based collective action. Local activists have acted as movement catalysts in their fight to clean up contaminated sites, to prevent polluting facilities from being built, to force corporations to improve production processes, create awareness of emerging environrnent and public health issues, and to enhance right to know Iegislation and citizen engagement. In the US, local activists confronting waste disposal have played a key role pressuring the federal government to enact the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act arnendments in 1984 and the Superfund Arnendrnents in 1986. A prime exarnple of grassroots activism is the environmental justice movement (EJM) - a loose network of civil rights, social justice, and environmental groups and individuals who oppose the elevated health risks faced by lower-income persons, working- class individuals, and people of color. The EJM has developed a different fom of organizing from the Big Ten groups: instead of relying on mailing lists to recruit people, solidarity originates in community relationships, such as pre-existing social and civic networks around where people live, work, play, and worship. A key defining characteristic of the EJM is its grassroots, bottom-up networking across issues and groups. Common ground is found in issues of the environment, and econornic and social justice concerns like homelessness, health advocacy, worker rights, immigrant rights, cornrnunity economic development, and gay and lesbian rights. It is essential for networking strategies to extend beyond the regional and local level to the transnational level given the growing mobility of capital that enables companies to take advantage of lower labour and environmental standards worldwide. The First National People of Color Environmental Leadership Surnmit of October 199 1 made progress in developing transnational linkages, galvanizing grassroots and national and international support for strategies to combat environmental racism. The Washington D.C. conference incIuded 650 delegates from al1 50 States, Puerto Rico, Mexico, Canada and other states. The frst key large-scale network to develop came directly out of the Love Canal toxic waste crisis, in northern New York State in 1978. Lois Gibbs and other volunteers from the Love Canal Homeowners Association began the Citizens Clearinghouse for Hazardous Waste (CCHW) in 1981 in Arlington, Virginia, with the idea of helping other cornmunities organize for environmental justice. By 1993, they assisted over 8,000 groups. The CCHW acts as a support mechanism. Its resource centre distributes a newsletter entitled Tveryone's Backyard" - which conveys the idea that al1 of us must work to resolve environmental problems, rather than imposing them on more vulnerable backyards and neighborhoods, and publishes information about specific problems and issues like fundraising, research leadership, running meetings, and problems faced by women as ?hey become active in political battles; sends organizers to train citizen groups and leaders in their area; sponsors regional Leadership Development Conferences; and organizes an annual national gathering.

The stren-g$hs of the social movement approach is its focus on the importance of public opinion and concern - not to be ignored in democracies in particular, and the role of public interest groups in advocating for the public interest. This approach is also useful because it calls into question the neutrality of the state, as well as challenging the corporate agenda. However, these approaches do not sufficiently address the role of the scientists in the environment policy process. There is a need to look at the interactive play between the environmental movement and the epistemic comrnunity, as well as the influence of the polluting and resource depletion industries which often act as significant barriers to green learning.

Public Relations and the Environment We must consider the roles played by other actors, such as govermnent, industry, and labour in the learning and rnislearning process. "Green7' public relations PR)is a growing industry, and is often nothing more than propaganda aimed at diffusing environmental awareness and public concem. "Environmental" PR should be distinguished from the traditional lobbying activities of industry. Direct Iobbying is defined as the use of elite access to personally comrnunicate with senior decision-makers. Indirect lobbying, also known as "public relations," is distinct from direct lobbying of politicians; it involves media and public lobbying in order to influence politicians.270 Direct lobbying and PR are not separate activities.27' PR is prernised on the assumption that traditional lobbying is most effective when the actor7sissues are popular. Corporate actors, for example, may act as agents of genuine green learning or, alternativeiy, as 'greenwashers' when they launch misinformation campaigns. Clearly, there is a difference between genuine concern for environmental protection and using public relations as part of a disinformation carnpaign. Public relations is often associated with the concept of propaganda or, in the case of environmental issues, as "greenwash"; both are based on deceptive communication. Some definitions of the term "propaganda" are neutral,

such as 'ccornmunicationsaimed at getting a target audience to adopt particular attitudes and belief~."~72Altematively, the concept of propaganda may be understood as forwarding half truths or shifting the focus away from the negative aspects of an issue.273 "Greenwashing" describes "the ways that polluters employ deceptive PR to falsely paint themselves an environmentally responsible public image, while covenng up their abuses of the biosphere and public healtl1."~7~ Sharon Beder notes the formula to define environmental risks: Risk = Hazard + Outrage.275

270 Hrebenar, p. 103. 271 Sharon Beder, Global Spin: The Corporate Assault on Environrnentalisrn (Foxhole: Green Books, 1997), p. 119. 272 Ibid., p. 121. 273 See discussion in Ka1 J. HoIsti, 'The Instruments of Policy: Propaganda," International Politics: A Framework for Analvsis, Seventh Edition (Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice Hall, 1995), pp. 15 1- 165. 274 John Stauber and Sheldon Rampton, Toxic Slud~eis Good For You! Lies. Damn Lies and the Public Relations Tndustrv (Monroe, Maine: Common Courage Press, 1995), p. 125. 275 Beder. Global Spin, p. 126 based on the formula developed by Peter M. Sandrnan, Environmental nsk and the press : an exploratory assessrnent (New Brunswick, N.J. :Transaction Books, 1987). Green corporate leaders tend to manage environmental risks by reducing environmental hazards. In stark contrast, corporate laggards use greenwash to manage public outrage rather than solving or mitigating the actual environmental problems. Corporate sustainabiLity entails phasing out the use of substances that are fundamentally at odds with a sustainable world; establishing boundary conditions limiting its ecological footpnnts; engaging the involvement of stakeholders; and promoting industrial ecology and ecoefficiency, that is, producing goods and services of greater value relative to the burden they impose on the environment. Sustainability relates to three dimensions of corporate behavior, namely the environmental, social, and economic aspects of a company's operations. Industrial ecology involves operating an industrial system like an natural ecosystem by focusing on closing the loop in the whole industrial process. Manufacturers retain responsibility for their products until those products are reused. While this concept is embodied in law in Germany, the United States and Canada are only beginning to discuss such measures. A number of companies have voluntarily adopted such processes at no net cost, and often at a profit. An exarnple of such product stewardship includes Xerox Corporation of Rochester, New York, which takes back its own products for reprocessing. It leases its copiers instead of selLing them, thus providing a service rather than a matenal good. As the producer remains responsible for a product throughout its life, it ensures that it will either remmufacture it or use the materials in a new product. Further, a nurnber of educationai and research-oriented organizations seek to create a sustainable society through positive examples and action, as well as pointing out "low hanging fruit," that is "no regret" first steps that are easiest to take at negative or low costs. The Natural Step (TNS) organizations exist in more than a dozen States worldwide, including Canada and the US, consisting of a network of groups and individuals that work with comrnunities, schools, organizations and businesses to promote cyclical processes, where wastes become new res0urces.2~6 TNS advocates fundamental social change involving four conditions: (1) comprehensive metal and mineral recycling programs, and decreased dependence on fossil fuels, (2) avoiding increased generation in persistent toxic substances, (3) avoiding systematically encroaching upon nature by destroying the habitat of other species, and (4) using fewer resources, especially in affluent areas. As an example, the Interface Company, a floor manufacturer using TNS, has reduced its resource use by 20% in two years. Another leading organization promoting a more sustainable pathway is the Rocky Mountain Institute 0.Founded in 1982 by resource analysts Hunter and Arnory Lovins, the RMI is a nonprofit research and educational foundation which fosters sustainable use of resources. It has worked to promote the adoption of a soft energy path, corporate sustainability, and sustainable transportation. Tens of thousands of visitors have toured its resource-efficient headquarters located in Old Snowrnass, Colorado.277 In Canada, the Pembina Institute, David Suzuki Foundation, National Round Table on Environment and Economy, and the International Institute for Sustainable Development have programs to promote eco-efficiency, full cost accounting, amd a closed loop in manufacturing. Sharon Beder argues that the rise of green PR took place dunng the second wave of corporate activism in a number of indusaialized countries in the 1990s in partïc~lar.~~~ The earlier historical roots of such efforts began with the green backlash in the late 1980s.

276 See Brian F. Nattrass, The Natural Stei, for Business: Wealth, Ecology and the Evolutionary Cornoration (Gabrïola Island, BC: New Society, 1999). and Car1 Frankel, In Earth's Comuanv: Business, Environment. and the Challenge of Sustainabilitv (Gabnola Island, BC: New Society Publishers, 1998). 277 See Ernst von Weizacker, Arnory Lovins, and Hunter Lovins, Factor Four: DoubIine Wealth. Halvino, Resource Use: The New Re~ortto the Club of Rome (London: Earthscan Publications, 1997), and Paul Hawken, Amory Lovins, and Hunter Lovins, Natural Ca~italism:Creatin~ the Next Industria1 Revolution (Boston: Little, Brown and Co., 1999). 278 Beder, Global Spin. Beder (p. 22) argues that during the fmt wave of corporate political activity in the 1970s. the focus was "on defending the free enterprise system and opposing labour unions," but in the 1990s. the attack shifted to environmentalist targets. For example, the American anti-environmental "wise use" movement was founded at a 1988 conference. This led to creation of "Share groups," largely in British Columbia, and the creation in the early 1990s of the BC Forest Miance and the Global Climate Coalition. A broad objective of greenwashing is to equate corporate interests with the greater public interest-ng A host of techniques are used by "green" PR firms. Below 1 brkfly examine five of these methods. The PR industry uses greenwashing techniques such as: (i) news releases, packaged news events, and videos to weaken the incentive for onginal investigative journalisrn; (ii) third party 'experts', such as industry scientists and front groups, to pIead a client's case and contest scientific evidence where the objective is to overcome the immediate, "natural credibility barrie? which vested interests have in public debate~;~gO(iii) "false" grassroots citizen campaigns, also known as astrotu@, that lobby govemments; (iv) grasstops communications which create an impression of "total cornrnunity support" by producing an artificial bubble around policy makers by surrounding hirnher with those favourable to the client's business position;2*1 and (v) the age-old strategy of trying to divide and conquer the environmental movement by separating moderate and more radical environmentalists.282 Responses from the environrnental movement include monitoring, exposing, and publicizing such PR greenwashing. For exmple, a public interest group called the Center for Media and Democracy was set up in Madison, Wisconsin; it distributes a newsletter

279 Ibid., p. 32. 280 Ibid., p. 27. 281 Ways of doing this include the creation of a set of dismct liaisons and roundtables consisting of "'farnily" (employees and shareholders), 'Yiiends" (customers, suppliers, trade associations), as well as strangers. Ibid., pp. 120 and p. 39 and Stauber and Rampton, Toxic Sludge is Good For You!, p. 80. 282 They tend to split off moderate environmental groups, such as the World Wildlife Fund. which are heavily reliant on corporate funding to take public positions favourable to their business interests. For an exarnple from Canada, see Tony Weis and Anita Krajnc, "Greenwashing Ontario's Lands for Life: Why Some Environmental Groups are Complicit in the Tories' Disastrous Plan," Canadian Dimension, Vol. 33, No. 6,December 1999, pp. 34-38. entitled PR Watch chronicling the activities of such PR groups. Their founders note that: 'When the public is educated about its techniques, [the PR industry] often loses its ability to mislead and manip~late."~83

Research Questions This thesis explores the roles that scientists, the environmental movement, and other actors play in the leaming process, and, in turn, the power that ideas exercise on the process of eco-regime-building. The term regime-building refers to the suen,& of the regime as it develops through its various stages, from its the weakest form as declaratory, on to promotionai, implementation, and enf~rcement.'~~Jack Donnelly differentiates types of regirnes based on a scheme of widening functions from standard-setting through monitoring to enforcement. At one end, an international regime is nonexistent when there are national standards and national decisions; at the other end, there is a strong enforcement regime compnsed of international norms and international decisions (Le., strong procedures). The strength of a regime is related to the extent to which states are willing to forego national standard-setting and national decision-making in favour of international norms and collective procedures for making decisions. But international regimes should not be seen as exclusively in the domain of states. Non-state-centered regimes are a real possibility. What kind of regime emerges will be determined by the empirical data. As Alexander George writes: "...investigators would do well to develop the categories for describing the variance in each of their variables not on an a ptiori bais but inductively, via detailed examination of how the value of a particular variable varies in many different cases .91285

283 Stauber and Rarnpton, Toxic Sludee is Good For You!, p. 15. 284 Donnelly, %ternational hurnan rights: a regirne analysis," pp. 603-5. 285 Alexander George. "Case studies and theory development: the rnethod of strucnired, focused cornparison," in Paul Gordon Lauren (ed), Diplomacv: New Approaches in History. Theory and PoIicv (London: Free Press, 1979), p. 47. In this section 1 identiQ six research questions that shape this dissertation. In the first place 1 am interested in exploring the strengths and limitations of the epistemic community approach. Peter Haas argues that the emergence of scientific consensus and the presence of scientists in important roles in the bureaucracies of key countries suffices in developing strong environrnental regimes. These two conditions are important for agenda- setting, however they are not sufficient for building a strong implementation and enforcement regime, particularly for complex environmental problems. Complex environmental issues are those which require major policy changes, involving Iarge socio- econornic ramifications. For exarnple, responses to cIirnate change require multi-sectord policy changes in the areas of energy, forest, and agriculture, and ~i~gnificantchanges in social behavior, such as reducing dependence on private automobiles in the transportation sector. It is argued here that a strong eco-regime will ultimately deveiop only if it is based on the foundations of significant societal leaming. Governments may seek advice and make rninor policy adjustments, but they are likely to lack the political will to undertake major and costly policy changes without significant public awareness and concern about a particular environrnental issue. Evidence to support this clah would undermine the assumption made in the epistemic community approach that bargaining power is strongly related to the authoritative knowledge of experts and their placement in government bureaucracies. Instead we expect to find that government actors will only be motivated to learn and to act fully on the advice of the epistemic cornrnunity as a result of public pressure and the emergence of apalitical crisis. In other words, an ecological crisis becomes a significant crisis once it enters the public domain and becomes a political crisis. Social leaming is an antecedent condition - an independent variable that precedes other independent variables in time - for the emergence of strong eco-regimes. This is not to dismiss the power of scientific consensus and bargaining power in the absence of public awareness and concern even for complex environmental issues. Scientists with bargaining power and a strong epistemic convergence on the existence of an ecological crisis cm achieve some results without significant societal learning. Gavernment decision-makers may experience genuine learning due to their concem about a paxticular environmental problem or due to other pressures motivating government officiais to Iearn and act, such as international pressure or pressure from one or more powerful States. A top-down regime building process would occur here, one advanced by policy- m.akers and scientists institutionalized in government bureaucraties rather than an aware amd concenied public. One would expect the issue to reach the international agenda and for governments to establish a declaratory and promotional regime, but not a strong irnplementation regime. At the same time, 1 propose that strong societal leaming in a parhcular emvironmental field is not sufficient for the development of a strong environmental regimes. In. the absence of a stmng epistemic cornrnunity, the result of little scientific convergence mdor scientific bargaining power, societal learning alone is uniikely to produce a strong inrtemational environmental regime. Scientific consensus and bargaining power play a cmcial role in facilitating government learning and thus eco-regime building. Without a stsong legitimating role played by scientists, one would expect Iimited success from public pr=essure tactics airned at changing state and international policies. The result may be that the environmental movement may by-pass the state and employ civic politics tactics aimed at building alternative, non-state-centered regimes, Such alternative, NGO-Ied regimes do not rely on the presence of an epistemic community installed in key positions of power in governmental or intergovernmental bodies, and have the further advantage of applying pr;-essure directly on transnational corporate actors. But the shortcorning of such regimes is that they are beyond the reach of most actors in civil society, except for the largest transnational environmental organizations and transnational advocacy networks. Even for these groups, NGO regimes are costly to maintain, particularly in the face of active gavernrnent and corporate opposition. Logically, it follows that the necessary and suficient conditions for the development of a strong eco-regime in a particular issue area are strong societal learning and scientific consensus and bargaining power. U'ithout si-gnificant social leaniing, on one han& and a strong epistemic community, on the other, international regimes will either not emerge or, if they do, will be weak, consisting of a set of principles rather than implementation procedures, or non-state-centred, NGO-led regimes. Bill Moyers, for example, argues that substantial public opinion in favour of social change is necessary before govemments are likely to take action. Powerholders, according to this model, are the last to change, and policy-makers tend to be followers, not leaders, when it comes to progressive social change.286 At the same time, scientists play a crucial role in setting the agenda, proposing policy alternatives, and promoting government learning Moreover, not al1 states must meet these conditions of societal learning and epistemic power; a group of key like-minded states, such as key members of the Group of Seven, can get the regime "off the ground" and provide public goods while offenng incentives for others to join the regime. 287 Further, I will examine the relative significance of scientists and the environmental movement in particular environrnental issues and seek to identify the kind of environmental issues in which scientists and environmental movernents are likely to be the main agents of change. At the methodological level, I will investigate the relationship between scientists and the environmental movement, and the conditions under which these two forces can be included in a single analytical frarnework. The literature tends to separate these two actors,

286 See Bill Moyers, The Movernent Action Plan: A Strateeic Frarnework Describine the Eieht Stage of Successfu! Social Movements (Social Movement Empowerment Project, Sprïng 1987) and The Practical Strate~ist:Movement Action Plan MAP) stratepic theories for EvaIuating. Planning. and Conducting Social Movements (Social Movement Empowerment Project, July 1990). 287 Fen Harnpson, "Clirnate Change: Building International Coalitions of the Like-minded," International Journal, Vol. XLV, No. 1, 1989-90, pp- 36-74. and to treat them as separate and distinct forces. However, increasingly ENGOs, particularly the 'Big Ten' environmental organizations in the United States, employ scientists and other professionals or work cirisely with these groups. At the sarne time, it is not uncornmon for individual scientists and groups of scientists to engage in issue advocacy and public education activities. The emergence of a strong scientific consensus on an issue may influence both goverment and societal learning. Alternatively, disaggregated approaches provide greater analytical leverage if the key purpose of the study is to compare the distinct contributions each of the actors play. Also, it may not be possible to subsume scientific groups within the environmental movement if their role is better seen as an objective source of information rather than that of an advocate. This is particularly true for prestigious intergovemental rnechanisms, such as the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change. Finally, the concluding chapter will address the question of what a backcasting approach to future studies rnight tell us about the ideal roles for these two critical agents of change. 1s an environmental utopia possible? What is required and expected of these two actors in order to reverse the growing ecological crisis invoiving increased species extinctions, air, water and land pollution, and resource depletion, as well as growing gaps in wedth within and between societies?

Methodology: Case Studies 1 will use two case studies to analyze and compare the influence of scientific knowledge and convergence with that of transnational public awareness and concern in the development of environmental regimes. Case studies are a useful tool to address "how" and "why" questions. The goal of case studies is to "expand and generalize theories (i.e., analytical generalizations)."288

288~obertK. Yin, Çase Sîudy Research: Desim and Methods (Beverley Hills: Sage, 1984). p. 2 1.

129 1 will trace the origins of environmental concem in the areas of climate change and BC ancient rainforests, and explore the learning and decision-making process leading to the development of international or global eco-regimes. The cases were chosen in order to facilitate c'stnictured, focused cornparison" - that is, systematicdly collecting data on the same variables.289 Both cases involve transboundary environrnental problems, and interstate and transnational relations, including interactions with govemments, intergovernmental organizations, the episternic community, the environmental movement, multinationd corporations, and their subunits. To facilitate the testing of critical variables, the cases also differ with respect to the strength of the regime, issue type, the constellation of interests involved, and variations in the degree of scientific convergence and social leaming. The forces combating climate change have given rise to a promotional regime, whereas there is a very weak and possibly non-existent deciaratory interstate regime in the case of rainforest protection as well as the emergence of non-state regime activity in the global civil society; the forest issue involves the protection of a particular area of land, while climate change involves atmospheric pollution; and corporate interests are significant in the cases of both global climate change and forests.

Testability and Sources of Evidence What evidence would count against the various theoretical approaches and falsify hem? One needs to examine both the kind of evidence that is required and the kind of evidence that exists. Peter Haas' proposed test for the epistemic comrnunities approach is first, "to compare the beliefs and behaviour of policy makers in one country over time," and second "to compare them to countries where the episternic comrnunity was active and not

289~eorge,"Case studies and theory developrnent: the rnethod of strucnued, fococuseci cornparison," pp. 43- 68. active."290 Although Haas calls this a "robust study," it does not rule out the possibility that socid change movements are the cause of policy change. For example, if both the epistemic community and environmental movement are active and inactive in the same countries then social change movements may be the driving force of any policy change. A proper test of the episternic cornrnunities approach would require a further step: to compare the beliefs and behaviour of policy rnakers over time in various countries while controlling for social learning and the bargaining power of environmental groups. A similar test could be done for the social change movements approach. The emergence of crises offer a possible test for the relative importance of the two transnationai actors. Haas notes that "it often takes a crisis or shock to overcome institutional inertia and habit and spur [decision makers] to seek help from an episternic comm~nit~."~~'The influence of the episternic community could be determined in cases where govements are informed by the epistemic cornrnunity of an ecological crisis and urged to respond, yet the crisis is hidden from public view due to a lack of full public àisclosure or, alternatively, little media coverage. Whether the knowledge of the episternic community and the policy makers is sufficient to lead to action would show that policy rnakers act on a functionalist bais "...when the epistemic community demonstrates the need for it." Altematively, if governrnents fail to act until there is public pressure, and pressure from the transnational environmental movernent, then this lends support for the propositions offered by the social movernent approach and multivariate model. The timing and content of policy change can help answer whether a political crisis, in addition to an ecologicaI crisis, are necessary and suficient conditions for governrnents to act.

However, as Gary King et al., write: "The process of trying to falsify theories in the social sciences is really one of searching their bounds of applicability. 9,292 In other

290~aas."Introduction," pp. 5 and 34-5. 2911bid., p. 14. 292~aryKing, Robert O. Keohane, and Sidney Verba, Desipninp Social Inqui?: Scientific Inference in words, the validity of a theory is not destroyed beyond repair as a result of finding evidence counter to a proposition, especially in the social sciences. Rather, "each test of a theory affects both the estimate of its validity and the uncertainty of that estimate; and it may also affect to what extent we wish the theory to apply."293 The goal in testing the various approaches is then to determine estimates of their relative explanatory power under varying conditions, and to establish a measure of uncertainty of this guess.

In preparing the case studies, 1will gather information through extensive interviews with representatives of epistemic comrnunity and environrnental organizations, review NGO, scientific and government documents and publications, and undertake a literature review of relevant secondary sources. Interviews with members of the epistemic community wiLl help establish the timing of the emergence of an environmental problem, the timing of its discovery, the degree of scientific consensus on the nature of the problem and its solution, and the quality and quantity of access to policy makers. Given the possibility of a reporting bias, 1will also look at final reports of international scientific meetings to see whether it registered a consensus or disagreement, and further review publications of intergovernmental organizations (e.g., the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change documents) and nongovernmental organizations. 1 will interview representatives of the environmental movement. These interviews will focus on activities of the environmental movement aimed at promoting social learning and its effects on government policy and the global civil society. In addition, I will examine their newsletters, poiicy papers, media reports and other information to chronicle the activities of the movement. 1will use the Progressive Societal Leaming and Social Change Mode1 (presented in Chapter Three) to measure social learning. A content analysis of media coverage will be used to determine the quality and quantity of reporting on

OuaIitative Research (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1994). p. 101. 2931bid., p. 103. environmental issues and the environmental movement itself. Public opinion polls are also important in detee~ngthe levels of awareness and concern in the general public. A number of cross-country opinion polls on the environment have been conducted for UNEP, the European Union, the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD), among others international, regional, and national ~r~anizations.~~~ Finally, 1will use the method of process tracing to determine the timing and motivation of govemment and corporate learning and action, and examine the relationship between the political and learning processes and their influence on policy change. Thus, although Jack Levy is right in noting that "a key question to ask of a decision maker is what did he/she lem and when did he/she lem it,"295 1 would adci, from whorn did he/she lem it (Le., the epistemic community, environmental movement or indirectly by them through the media) and why did he/she learn it (i.e., what is the motivation to lem?). This information may, however, be dificult to obtain for a number of reasons, including the difficulty of obtaining access to past and present policy makers. 1 will also rely on govemment publications, media reports, and relevant secondary sources to make inferences about the timing and motives behind policy change.

294~ee,for example, the chapter on "Perceptions and attitudes," in Tolba et al., (eds), The World Environment 1972-1992, pp. 659-692, and OECD, OECD Environmental Data Com~endium199 1 (Paris: OECD, 1991). 295~ackS. Levy, "Leaming and foreign policy: sweeping a conceptual minefield," p. 304. Levy argues (p. 302) that intellectual and political processes interact to shape policy, and these two processes are "usualiy reciprocal rather than unidirectional." Chapter Five Scientific Convergence, Public Education and Climate Change: Moving From Agenda to Action?

Epistemic cornmunity theonsts argue that convergence in scientific knowledge as well as the placement of scientists in positions of power facilitate government leaming and the prospects for policy change.296 Social movement theorists note that the environmental movement plays a central role in promoting public education which, in hm, results in public pressure on govemments and intergovemmental bodies to adopt new or better policies. Moreover, the environmental movement advances positive changes in civil society, which further enhance environmental protection.297 In short, one approach ernphasizes the impetus provided by scientific convergence and, the other, public education in shaping the development and effectiveness of environmental regimes. If leaming plays a key role in eco-regime-building, is scientific consensus around the existence and nature of the global climate change problem sufficient to develop a strong global warming regime? Or is public education also a necessary condition for significant international action? 298 In this chapter, 1 will argue that scientists, rather than environmental groups, are responsible for getting climate change on the international agenda, but that environmental (and other) groups are beginning to play a crucial role in transfoming climate change from an agenda item to a political program-a task for which scientists are less well-suited. Furtherrnore, a close look at the inter-relationships between

296 Peter Haas, "Do regimes matter? Epistemic communities and Mediterranean pollution control." International Oraanization, Vol. 43, 1989, pp. 377-404, and "Obtaining international environmental protection through epistemic consensus," Millennium: Journal of International Studies, Vol. 19, NO. 3, Winter 1990, pp. 347-364,and Peter H. Sand, "Lessons Iearned in global environmental govemance," Boston Colleze- Environmental Affairs Law Review, Vol. 18, No. 2, Winter 1991, pp. 265-6. 297 Paul Wapner, Environmental Activiçrn and World Civic Politics. Albany: State University of New York Press, 1996. 29s Obviously, a host of factors influence the developrnent of eco-regimes, including the negotiating process, the number of States involved, the power of the fossil fuel industry, the cornplexity of the issue, etc. My interest is to explore the power of ideas and transnational actors, and the influence of the different learning processes of NGOs and epistemic communities, in particular. these two actors is necessary to better explain the peculiarities of regime-development in the area of climate change, where these actors often cross paths to complement and shape one another. 1 will firçt look at the rise of a global climate science epistemic community, and then examine and account for its recent influence in building and shaping the global climate agenda and policy regime. Next, 1 will examine the role the environmental movement has played in promoting public education in this area. The final section will contrast the role of scientists with that of the environrnental movement.

Scientific Knowiedge as a Climate Regime-Driver According to Peter Haas, members of the epistemic comrnunity denve their power, domestically and intemationally, from their authoritative clairn to knowledge. They increase their effectiveness by exhibiting a strong consensus or "speaking with one voice" on the nature of the problem and policy conclusions.299 Leaders or govemments turn to the epistemic community to help them identi@ their own interests and policies in areas where they are poorly informed, uncertain or following a crisis. The epistemic community helps limit the range of policy options governments consider by identifying the parameters of the problem and solution based on their own causal and value frarnework. This approach has ken hitfuily employed in the area of clirnate change by Matthew Paterson, among others.300 In applying this approach, one must first establish the existence of an epistemic community. This involves considering whose views count when measuring or detennining the extent of the scientific consensus. The term epistemic community is defined by Haas as a nehvork of professionals, for exarnple ecological scientists, with recognized expertise in a particular issue area who share similar principled

299 Emanuel Adler and Peter Haas, 'Conclusion: Epistemic Communities, World Order, and the Creation of a Reflective Research Program," international Ormnization, Vol. 46, No. l., Winter 1992, pp. 367-390. 300 Matthew Paterson, Global Warminp and Global Politics (London: Routledge, 1996), pp. 134-156. and causal beliefs, notions of validity and a comrnon policy enterprise.301 Epistemic cornmunities are, however, distinct from the broader scientific cornrnunities, professions and disciplines, and bureaucrats since the latter do not necessarily hold a consensual understanding of the problem and solution.302 In the case of the climate "debates", two questions should be addressed: who pays the scientists and do they publish in peer reviewed journals? This is particularly relevant in the climate issue as many of the greenhouse skeptics are outside the field of climate science and do not publish in the relevant peer-reviewed journds.303 But from a political perspective they are relevant to the extent that they create doubts about the significance of globai ciimate change through their media profile as weIl as their use by govemments keen on slowing progress on any response strategies. Next, one must consider whether there is scientific consensus on key matters. Paterson points to a causal consensus among members of the climate science episternic cornmunity in the 1990 Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (PCC) report. This included a causal consensus that greenhouse gas emission are increasing due to human activities and this will result on average "in an additional warming of the Earth's surface," and a policy and normative consensus that international action should be taken to reduce emissions and that such action should take into account North-South equity con~erns.~~ Clearly there are a senés of issues, not just one, on which scientific debate and consensus may be important in the development of a climate regime. If one considers the PCC reports, then there are literally hundreds if not thousands of issues to consider; the chapters of the PCC reports are al1 based on key topics and within each area of study there are

301 Peter Haas, "Introduction: Epistemic Communities and International Policy Coordination," International Organization, Vol. 46, No. 1, Winter 1992, p. 3. 302 Ibid., pp. 18-19. 303 See Ross Gelbspan, The Heat is On: The High Stakes Battle Over Eanh's Threatened Climate (Reading, Mass.: Addison-Wesley Pub. Co., 1997) and Rep. George E. Brown Jr., "Environmental Science Under Siege in the US Congress," Environment, Vol. 39, No. 2, March 1997, pp. 12-20 and 29-3 1. 304 Paterson. Global Warminp and Global Politics, pp. 140-143. varying degrees of uncertainty or consensus on possible causes and effects. This begs the question, how many and whar kind of sciennfic issues are policy relevant? Arguably, scientific consensus became an increasingly potent force in regime- building when the basic mechanisms of climate change and what it rneans for environmental security were well understood. Even if we try to narrow the field to important issues, we are still left with a multitude of key issues, including: that human influence on climate is a senous environmental concem (scientists pointed this out in the 1950s); that global wa-ng, not global cooling, is the key concem (1970s); that greenhouse gases other than carbon dioxide have an equivdent radiative forcing and thus the problem is larger than previously thought (late 1970s-rnid 1980s); that human-induced climate change has begun (1990s); and future related research on regional impacts and the rate and degree of climate change. In assessing the power of expert opinion, the question is then, why has the developrnent of a global climate regime lagged behind these discoveries and the subsequent scientific convergence in each of these areas? Although scientific convergence is a necessary condition, it is not sufficient for regime-building. A second necessary condition for regime building and the development of convergent state policies, according to this approach, is that members of the epistemic cornmunity attain bargaining power in government bureaucracies and international secretariats, including high level access to decision-makers. As Haas points out in his empiricaI study of the Mediterranean Action Plan, "...no learning occurred in counûies in which the epistemic community was unable to appropriate control," (e.g., the epistemic cornmunity was weak in Libya, Morocco, and Tunisia and, as a result, there was little action) and consensuai knowledge "...ciid not serve as a process of regime change. Instead it served largely as a power resource for members of the episternic cornm~nity."~~~Thus, Haas proposes: 'The strength of cooperative arrangements will be determined by the

305 Haas, "Doregimes maner? ." p. 398. domestic [and international] power arnassed by members of the epistemic cornrnunity within their respective govemments [and intergovermnental bodiesl."306 But is the climate science epistemic community global, and, if so, in what way? It may be a IooseIy organized gIobaI network boased mainly on nationai epistemic communities or one based in international organizations. Matthew Paterson notes that although it is reasonable to define an episternic cornmunity without it being bureaucratically entrenched, its influence is clearly greater if it is. In other words, scientific consensus has a power of its own on the policy process, but the bureaumatic entrenchment of climate scientists cIeariy facilitates its decision-making power.

The History Of Cliznute Change Science When did an episternic climate science community emerge at the global level? Arguably it took more than a hundred and fif3y years to establish since the time the natural greenhouse effect was first discovered. Impaortant scientific discoveries were continually lost arnongst a sea of contending theories and, for the most part, a lack of interest among scientists, the pubiic and politicians. The ermergence of international concern about global climate change follows the process of paradGgm shifts suggested by Thomas Kuhn.307

Initially, a number of important nineteenth mdtwentieth century discoveries were neglected as they conflicted with the general consensus among atmoçpheric scientists. For exarnple, carbon dioxide was not considered an importtant greenhouse gas in the nineteenth century; a warmer planet was viewed as having a benefncial impact on the planet up until the 1950s; human interference was perceived as negligible when compared to natural processes, and certainly not an environmental concern until -the late 1950s; and there was a lack of scientific consensus on whether global wanrning or global cooling was the major threat up

306 Haas, Savine the Mediterranean, p. 57. 307 For a succinct review of paradigm shifts in the sciences and social sciences, see Michael Howlett and M. Ramesh, Stud~in~Public Policv: Policv Cvcles and Polic~Subsvstems (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1995), pp. 184-197. to the mid-1970s. Accumulating evidence then built up so that by the mid to late 1950s the climate change issue was considered an "environmental concem" for the fmt time.308 The paradigrn shift was beginning to congeal by the late 1970s and early 1980s, and a global ciimate epistemic community emerged when a majority of the world's climate scientists began to worry that human-induced climate change posed a significant threat to the planet's ecological and socio-economic systems. Shortly afienvards, the public and politicians also adopted this view. The Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) was

estabiished in 1988, representing a global consensus-seeking process and the largest collaborative research program in the world. It has consolidated the transnational clirnate science epistemic community and, through its ongoing efforts, is maintaining and extending poiitical concem into the future.

Phase 1. The Long and Winding Road ro Environmental Concern (1827-1957) In 1827, the French mathematician Jean Baptist-Joseph Fourier introduced the ccgreenhouseeffect" concept. Fourier discovered that greenhouse gases influence the

climate of the Earth, and was the first to recognize the role of the naturd greenhouse effect. Ln 1896, Dr. Svante Arrhenius, a Norwegian Nobel-winning chemist, posited that changes in greenhouse gases could affect the world's climate, and, further, that human activities were affecting the atrnospheric concentration of greenhouse gases. But he concluded that human influence on the climate was not significant and, if anything, would be beneficial for agriculture in Northern temperate zones. By the influence of the increasing percentage of carbonic acid in the atmosphere, we may hope to enjoy ages with more equable and better climates, especially as regards the colder regions of the earth; ages when the earth will bring forth much more abundant crops than at present, for the benefit of rapidly propagating rnad~ind.30~

308 Henry Hengeveld, "'Arrhenius'Greenhouse Effect Hypothesis: One Century Later," Atmospherïc Environment Service, Environment Canada, February 1996. 309 Arrhenius, 1908. p. 63 cited in Patterson, Global Wanninp and Global Politics, pp. 20-21. Arrhenius was interested in how changes in the atmosphenc concentration of carbon dioxide (C02) were related to climate change in glacial and interglacial periods. Although Arrhenius's theories were sirnplistic and incorrect in a number of areas (for example, he did not address the complex feedbacks of the climate system in the areas of clouds, oceans and ice cover), his 1886 estimates are strikingly similar to those of the IPCC's 1995 scientific assessment in a number of areas (for example, Ehat the climate response to CO2 doubling was 5-6 degrees Celsius versus the IPCC's 1.5-4.5 estimate and that the latitudinal response was greater as one moved poleward).310 However, Arrhenius' theories were quickly abandoned at the time and Iargely ignored for the next forty years. The dominant consensus among atmospheric scientists was that water vapor (a greenhouse gas) dominated absorption of heat radiation, rendering changes in CO2 concentration negligible.3' 1 In 1938, G. S. Callendar, a British engineer, effectively "reintroduced Arrhenius' work into the scientific debate" by showing that the infra-red absorption bands of CO2 gases lie outside those of water vapor, thus providing an additional wamiing effect and substantially innuencing the global ~lirnate.~'~Moreover, Callendar was the first to suggest that human influence on the climate could be ~i~pificant.However, he incorrectly believed that a doubling of CO2 atmospheric concentrations would take a few centuries, and that the resuiting climate changes would largely benefit the planet. It was not until 1957, one hundred and thirty years after Fourier's discovery of the greenhouse effect, that human impact on the globai climate, in the forrn of anthropogenic sources of greenhouse gas emissions, was finally recognized as an environmental

l0 Hengeveld, "Arrhenius' Greenhouse Effect Hypothesis." 311Ibid. Michael Oppenheimer and Robert H. Boyle argue that Arrhenius' work was forgotten for half a century in Dead Heat: The Race Qainst the Greenhouse Effect (New York: Basic Books, 1990), p. 35, and Paterson States that, with the exception of G. D. Ca!lendar's work, "the arguments of Arrhenius went unnoticed for rnuch of the next sixty years", Global Warming and Global Politics, p. 21. l2 Hcngeveld, "'Arrhenius'Greenhouse Effect Hypothesis." c~ncern.~~~Roger Revelle and Ham Suess published a pivotal paper in the scientific journal Tellus on the carbon dioxide exchanges between the atrnosphere and oceans arguing, in contrast to a pnor consensus, that increased emissions due to fossil fuel use were not predominantly absorbed by the oceans and thus were likely to have a major effect on the atmospheric concentration of greenhouse gases. They warned that: hurnan beings are now carrying out a large scale geophysical experiment of a kind that could not have happened in the past nor be reproduced in the hture. Within a few centuries we are returning to the atmosphere and oceans the concentrated organic carbon stored in the sedimentary rocks over hundreds of millions of years. This experiment, if adequately documented, may yield far-reaching insight into the processes determining weather and climate.3 14

Pnor to their paper, it was thought that most of the hurnan-induced carbon dioxide releases were absorbed by the ocean. Ironically, their discovery occurred as a result of their non- climate related research on carbon dating. They found that the atmospheric content of carbon isotope 14 (carbon-14) was decreasing which they surmised was due to increased carbon dioxide emissions from fossil fuel combustion-not containing carbon-14 but carbon-12, thus diluting the atmospheric concentration of the carbon 14 used in carbon dating? Their paper, as well as the onset of growing computing power, helped raise interest in the possibility of global climate change in the scientific cornmunity. Monitoring stations were set up to regularly measure the atmospheric concentration of carbon dioxide in the United States at Manau Loa Observatory in Hawaii beginning in 1958. In the 1960s, climate modeling research was taking root and the first experiments based on a doubling CO2 scenario took place. Sti11, Michael Oppenheimer and Robert Boyle argue that "Revelle and Suess's findings didn't stimulate a sustained response, even among scientists" and that politically, their influence was like "a minor ripple in Washington's policy circles" when

313 Ibid. 314 R. Revelle and H. E. Suess. "Carbon Dioxide Exchange Between Atmospheric CO2 During the Fast Decades," Tellus. Vol. 9, 1957, pp. 18-57, cited in Oppenheimer and Boyle, Dead Hat, p. 36. 315 Ibid., pp. 223-224. Revelle and his colleagues wamed against the development of synthetic fuels from domestic coal and oiI shale in light of the increased oiI pices in the 1970s.3'6

Phase 2. ïhe Global Waming Consensus (mid-1970s) In the early 1970s, climate disasters around the world, such as freezing and cold events, caused United Nations agencies to take interest. Although the seriousness of global climate change was beginning to provoke worldwide interest, the early 1970s were still marked by debates about whether the potential problem was global cooling or global warming. An epistemic community on the global warming issue emerged in the US by the mid-1970s. William Kellogg points to two conferences in the earIy to mid 1970s in which the issue of global warming moved from a contentious one, to a relatively resolved issue.3'7 At the 197 1 Study of Man's Impact on Clirnate conference at Wilk, near Stockhoim, there was a dispute between the atmospheric particle or aerosol camp (which advanced a global cooling thesis), and the CO2 and infrared-absorbing gases camp (which beiieved that global warming was the major concern). But, by the 1975 International Symposium on Long-Term Clirnate Fluctuations at Norwich, England, the idea of global warming "dominated the stage" as it was generally agreed that "smoke particles from slash- and-bum agricultural practices absorb sunlight quite strongly and do not cause a cooling of the lower aûnosphere when they are over land." Other important developments in climate science in the 1970s included the realization that the combined effects of other trace greenhouse gases, such as nitrous oxide, methane and CFCs could be as significant as carbon dioxide.318

316 Ibid., pp. 36 and 39. l7 William W.Kellogg, "Mankind's Impact on Clirnate: The Evolution of an Awareness," Clirnatic Chaqgg, Vol. 10, 1987, pp. 121-122. l8 Oppenheimer and Boyle, Dead Hat, p. 39. The work of W. C. Wang, James Hansen and others at the Goddard Institute of Space Studies (GISS) and Harvard University was instrumentai here. Phase 3. 7he Growing Inrernational ScientifSc Consensus (late 1970s tu late 1980s)

An epistemic climate science community developed in the 1970s and 1980s, as scientists from around the world assessed the state of climate science at a growing number of international conferences, These efforts at international scientific collaboration helped develop both a scientific consensus on the issue and an emerging global political interest (see Table 5.1). Matthew Paterson points to two organizations and three events as critical to the scientific establishment of growing political concem.319 The international efforts of the World Meteorological Organization (WMO) and the Intemationd Council of Scientific Unions (ICSU>-an NGO urnbrella of heads of scientific academies like the Arnerican National Academy of Science and academic representatives of individual disciplines-as well as leading research countries, such as the United States (see TabIe 5.2 and Appendix B), helped develop a global epistemic community. One of the key events was the first World Climate Conference, organized by the United Nations Environment Program (UNEF'), WMO and ICSU in 1979. This Conference helped to solidly entrench climate as an international research issue by creating the World Climate Program (WCP). The WCP helped establish the existence of an international scientific epistemic cornmunity by the mid- 1980s as well as national epistemic comrnunities. For example, Jeannine Cavender and Jill Jager argue that in Germany a climate science epistemic cornmunity was developed in the early 1980s largely in response to the WCP efforts.320 The second major event was a conference at Villach, Austria in 1985 on the Assessrnent of the Role of Carbon Dioxide and of Other Greenhouse Gases in Climate

Variations and Associated Impacts.321 It was not until Villach that scientists started to talk

319 Paterson, Global Warmin~and Global Politics. 320 Jeannine Cavender and Ji11 Jager, 'The History of Germany's Response to Climate Change." International Environmental Affairs. Vol. 5, No. 1, Winter 1993, pp. 3-18. 321 See Wendy Fr-, 'The Development of an International Agenda for Clirnate Change: Connecting Science to PoIicy," ENRP Discussion Paper E-97-07, Kennedy School of Governrnent, Harvard University, August 1997. Table 5.1. International Conferences on the Global Climate Tirne Conference Place Organizer(s) 12-23 Feb. 1979 First World Climate Conference Geneva wMo,uNEp 28 Sept.-2 Oct 1987 First Villach Climate Conference Villach, AustriaUNEP 9-13 Oct. 1987 First Workshop on the "Develop- VilIach UNEP ment of Strategies in Response to Climate Change 9-13 NOV. 1987 Second Workshop on the Bellagio, Italy UNEP "Development of Stragies..." 27-30 June 1988 World Conference on The Changing Toronto Government of Atmosphere: Implications for Canada Global Atrnosphere 20-22 Feb. 1989 Protection of the Atmosphere: Ottawa Government of International Meeting of Legal and Canada Policy Experts Feb. 1989 Conference on Global Wamiing New Delhi Tata Energy and Climate Change Research Inst., UNEP,World Resourceshst. 15 March 1989 International Environment The Hague France, the Protection Conference Netherlands and Norway Int'l Environment Conference on Noordwij k Netherlands Atmospheric Pollution & Climatic Change Nov. 14-18, 1989 Small States Conference on Malé AOSIS Sea Level Rise Dec. 17-21, 1989 The World Conference on Preparing Cairo Climate for Clirnate Change Institute May 2-7, 1989 International Conference on Global Nairobi Warming and Climate Change: Afncan Perspectives 16 May 1990 Follow-Up Conference on the Bergen, Norway UNEconornic Report of the World Commission Commission on Environment and Development for Europe ma and Norway Nov. 1990 Second World Climate Conference Geneva Sources: Gerrnan Bundestag (ed.) Protecting the Earth: A Status Report with Recornrnendations for a New Energy Policy. (Bonn: 3rd Report of the Enquete-Commission on Preventive Measures to Protect the Earth's Atrnosphere of the 1 1th German Bundestag, 1WO), 804-8 15. about the political implications of the problem of global climate change. Afler follow-up Villach and Bellagio workshops in 1987, ICSU set up a special panel on climate change called the Advisory Group on Greenhouse Gases (AGGG), headed by Kenneth Hare, a respected Canadian climatologist. ICSU7sprogram on climate was a predecessor to the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change. However, their recommendations "did not get to fmt base, since govemments were unwiliing to accept the advice of independent scientists."322 Still the AGGG was instrumental in organizing the highly influential Toronto conference on "the Changing Atrnosphere: Implications for Global Security" in

June 1988-the third key event Paterson highlights. The Toronto Conference occurred at a propitious moment-the exceedingly hot sumrner of 1988 (the hottest year on record up to that time). It was the fvst international meeting where policy makers sat down with scientists and talked about climate change, ozone depletion, and acid min. The final declaration of the Toronto conference noted that the planetary risks associated with climate change are potentially calamitous: Humanity is conducting an unintended, uncontrolled, globally pervasive expenment whose ultimate consequences could be second only to a global nuclear war.323

Participants developed the 'Toronto Target" which calls for a 20% reduction in global CO2 levels from 1988 levels by 2005 with the eventual aim of a 50% cut. They also called for an end to deforestation, and a global atmosphere fund to finance global reductions in greenhouse gases to be raised by a carbon tax on fossil fuel consumption in the industrialized counûies. As noted earlier, scientific consensus is not a sufficient condition for significant epistemic comrnunity influence; an epistemic comrnunity also needs bargaining power to be

322 Author's interview with Henry Hengeveld, CO2 Advisor, Environment Canada, Toronto, August Il, 1998. 323 ''Final Staternent" of "The Changing Atmosphere: Implications for Global Security" Conference. Toronto, 1988. Understanding the Earth's Climate 606.8 Composition and Chernistry of the Atmosphere 374.2 Global Water Cycle 29 1-7 Carbon Cycle Science 188.7 Biology and Biochernistry of Ecosystems 310.2 Paleoenvironrnent/PaleocLimate 23.3 Human Dimensions of Global Change 84.8 Total 1779.5 Source: US Global Change Reesearch Program, Our Changing Planet: The US FY 2000 (Washington: The Naitonal Science and Technology Council, 1999) effective. Interestingly, the United States was a driving force for setting up an intergovernmental mechanism to assess the state of chmate science. Oddly, conservatives in the Bush Administration hoped to slow down efforts at reaching a global accord, whereas Environment Protection Agency (EPA) officials hoped the process would achieve the opposite-greater support for building a climate regime.3*4 Arguably, the latter were correct overall. The Intergovemmentd Panel on Climate Change (PCC), established in 1988 by the WMO and UNEP, has facilitated the establishment of a consensus and has promoted learning in scientific cornmunities worldwide. Further, the PCC is playing an ongoing role in educating governmental officials, as well as the public indirectly, on the latest developments in climate science. At the same time, political interest in the intergovernmental process has facilitated the development of a scientific capaciw in the area of climate science, particularly in developing countries.

Phase 4: Consensus and Bargaining Power in the IPCC (1988-present) Once established, the PCC set up three working groups and a Special Committee on the Participation of Developing Countries. Working Group 1 (chaired by the United Kingdom) was charged with evaluating scientific findings on climate change; Working Group II (chaired by the USSR), with assessing the ecological and socio-econornic impacts of human-induced climate change; and Working Group III (chaired by the US), with developing and assessing response strategies. The Special Cornmittee on the Participation of Developing Countries was set up to encourage the full participation of developing countries in the IPCC and then the negotiations on the climate change convention. The IPCC produced a comprehensive fmt assessments of the science of climate change in l990, a supplementq assessment in 1992 for the Earth Summit, a second assessment in 1996, and will produce a third assessment by 2002. In the first IPCC report

324 Paterson, Global Warminp and Global Politics.

145 to the UN in 1990, 175 scientists from 25 countries agreed emissions korn human activities were substantially increasing the atmospheric concentrations of GHGs. The report predicted an increase in temperame of one degrees Celsius by 2025 and three degrees Celsius before the end of the twenty-first cenniry. Scientists noted that to rem the planet to a manageable state (stabiiize the curent concentrations of GHGs in the

atmosphere) would require a 60% cut in carbon dioxide ernissions. In the Second Assessrnent Report of the PCC, published in 1995, more than 1,000 scientists from around the world confirmed that "the balance of evidence suggests that there is a discernible hurnan influence on global climate."3= In preparing its reports, the IPCC has followed a three tier pr0cess.3~6 In the first tier, scientists are invited to corne to a workshop and act as advisors. The purpose of the workshop was to discuss the outline of the report, in particular, the possible chapters to be included (e.g., on sea level rise, the detection of the onset of human-induced climate change, etc.), and suggest several lead authors to wnte first drafts of each chapter. Chapters are then drafted which assess what is known based on the peer reviewed scientific literature (the PCC does not actually do any science). The draft chapters are then sent out for scientific peer review and government review for critique and input. Scientists who provide substantial comments then become contributing authors. For example, the preparation of the PCC's Second Assessrnent Report on climate science in 1995 involved about 250 lead and contributing authors who had a direct input in the contents of the report and 450 other scientists that publish in peer reviewed journals. Another 200 scientists

325 John T. Houghton, L. G. Meira Filho, B. A. Callander, et al., (eds). Clirnate Chan~e1995: The Science of Climate Chaw(Carnbridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996). 326 PCC, "PCC Procedures for Preparation, Review, Acceptance, Approval, and Publication of its Reports" (1993). Simon Shackley, "The Intergovemmental Panel on Clirnate Change: consensual knowledge and global politics," Global Environmental Chan~e,- Vol. 7, No. 1, pp. 77-79, and Interview with Henry Hengeveld, August 1 1, 1998. vetted the information and provided peer review. The end product is "the most peer reviewed document in the world."327 The chapters are submitted to the PCC for information, not for approval. In the second stage, the plenary of Working Group 1 works on a 20-page summary, providing "a bird's eye view", and thus, inevitably, "dropping a lot of the caveats on both sides of the debate."328 Some of the scientists working with the bureau are assigned to wnte the summary in collaboration with lead authors. The summary has to have the acceptance of the 40 to 50 lead authors (there were four or five lead authors for each of the 11 chapters in the Second Assessrnent Report). Also, the surnmaries have to be approved line-by-line by all the country representatives. Politicization starts to enter at this stage, though most of the representatives in Working Group 1 are scientists. Once the plenary of Working Group 1 approves the summary, it is submitted to the full plenary of the PCC. In stage three, the IPCC bureau drafts a synthesis report of al1 three Working Group reports. Here the potentid for politicization is greatest. For example, in the second

IPCC assessment of climate science, it was recognized by al1 that the detection and attribution chapter would receive the most media and political interest. Consequently, lobbyists for the fossil fuel industry mounted an effort to soften or weaken the overall document and to highlight uncertainties.329 The IPCC process is clearly a compromise bettveen political tarnpering with the state of scientific knowledge on the issue of global climate change and protecting scientific integrity. Given the balancing act between scientists and political representatives, a key question is whether the transfer of the research assessment function from non-

327 Interview with Henry Hcngeveld, August 1 1, 1998. 328 Ibid. 329 NGOs and industry representatives were invited to participate in the surnmarïzing exercise of the IPCC plenary meeting of the second assessment. However, indusû-y lobby groups engaged in a filibustering process, and bogged down the negotiating process. The chair then only accepted statements from country representatives, at what stage the lobbyists stood up and took their place behind the Saudi Arabian delegate (lawyer) and passed him notes. govemmental or quasi intergovemmental fora (such as the World Climate Prograrn) to a more heavily intergovemmental mechanism increased or decreased the bargaining power of climate scientists. Steve Rayner argues that the state overshadows the efforts of environmental NGOs, epistemic cornrnunities and international organizations: The Intergovernmental Panel on Clirnate Change (IPCC) is just that- intergovemrnentd. Although officially convened by UN agencies, national governments, not UNEP and WMO, are firmly at the helrn. Although admitted as observers to the IPCC, the role of NGOs seems to have been markedly curtailed.330

However, this conclusion is not self-evident, though it is true that the bargaining power of scientists decreased to the extent that there is greater political involvement in the PCC process. Overall, the power of climate science and climate scientists increased due to several factors. Firstly, the PCC fomhas been deemed an essential process that gives developed and developing countries a sense of ownership in the development and assessment of ctimate science. The PCC has promoted an international climate constituency. This is facilitated by the PCC Trust Fund, set up to encourage the participation of developing country representatives in the activities of the IPCC.331 Secondly, though a compromise was struck between ensuring that governments buy on to the process and its outputs, on the one hand, and the impartial input of the global scientific cornrnunity, on the other, overall the PCC process presents relatively effective, legitimate and credible outputs. The PCC is a panel made up of govemment representatives from different countries, most of whom are scientists.332 Working Group 1 is a mesh of govemmental and scientific influence: govemments review the PCC chapters

330 Steve Rayner, "A cultural perspective on the smcture and implernentation of global environmental agreements," Evaluation Review, Vol. 15, No. 1, February 199 1, p. 82. 331 Paterson. Global Warmine and Global Politics, and Simon Shackley, 'The Intergovemmentai Panel on Climate Change: consensuai knowledge and global politics," Global Environmentai Change, Vol. 7, No. 1, 1997, pp. 77-79. 332 For example, Gordon McBain, an oceanographer at the University of British Columbia, is Canada's representative. and play a more prominent role in the developrnent of PCC surnmaries. But there are built in safeguards against substantial political interference. For example, govenunent reviews of IPCC chapters must abide by the findings in peer-reviewed journals. And, as previously noted, the IPCC documents are peer reviewed by hundreds of scientists worldwide-several hundred tirnes more than is the case for acadernic articles published in scientific journals which typically undergo two or three peer reviews. J. D. Mahlman argues that the IPCC provides the foundation of any climate research: A good guideline for evduating contrary "expert" opinions is whether they use the IPCC science as a point of departure for their own analysis. In effect, if we disagree scientifically with PCC, we should explain why. Without such discipline, contrary arguments are not likely to be scientifically sound.333

Furthemore, with respect to the PCC sumrnarîes, scientists have an informal veto power over their approval. Basicdly, there is a "hg of war" between the acceptance of the sumrnary by the lead authors of the individual chapters, and the buy on of individual delegations.33" However, while some delegations (like Middle Eastern oil-producing countries, such as Saudi Arabia and Kuwait) typically call for weaker language, other countries more vulnerable to andor concemed about climate change, call for stronger language in the surnmaries (e.g., the Alliance of Small Island States or AOSIS335). For

333 J. D. Mahlrnan, "Uncertainties in Projections of Human-Caused Clirnate Wming," Science, Vol. 278, November 21, 1997, pp 1416. 334 Interview with Henry Hengeveld, CO2 advisor, Environment Canada, August 11, 1987. 335 AOSIS was formed in 1988 at a meeting of the South Pacific Forum. AOSIS consists of 36 counmes fiorn the southern Pacific, Indian Ocean and Caribbean. Many members are maIl island states based on coral atolls, the highest points of which are only a few feet above sea IeveI. Global climate change threatens their very existence and survival and face the danger of more violent storms washing over them which could make the islands uninhabitable. "The forum predicted that if global warming became a reality its members would produce 500,000 environmental refugees." See Paul Brown, Global Warmin~:Can Civilization Survive? (London: Blandford, 1996). p. 20. Insurance companies are already womed: property insurance is no longer available or rates have risen to prohibitive levels for smail island states (Ibid., p. 190) After the AOSIS proposal was not adopted at COPl in Berlin, Tuiloma Slade, of Western Samoa, a small island state threatened with extinction by sea level rise stated: "We will carnpaign relentlessly for cuts as soon as possible. The strongest human instinct is not greed, it is survival. AOSIS countries will not barter the survival of their culture and their homes for the short-texm economic gains of others." (Ibid., p. 169) example, Bruce Callander, Head of the Technical Support Unit of the IPCC Science Assessment Working Group (1991-96) notes that the overall changes to the original draft of the Summary for Policy-makers with regards to the criticai detection and attribution chapter were minimal: "..A is difftcult to avoid the conclusion that the essence of the statement had remained largely unchanged over the eight months of scrutiny, review, debate and revision."336 Thirdy, the PCC provides a mechanism for the continual assessment of the latest scientific information and a nurnber of mechanisms have been set up to provide a better mage between science and policy. The continual improvement in climate science is, in the epistemic community approach, critical to any ongoing climate negotiations given the convention/protocol approach adopted by the international community. The PCC provides clirnate scientists with an intergovernmental mechanism to promote inter-governmental learning. In addition, the Subsidiary Body for Scientific and Technological Advice (SBSTA), set up as part of the 1992 Framework Convention on Climate Change (FCCC) at the fnst meeting of the Conference of the Parties in the spring of 1995, provides a bridge between the PCC's climate science and the policy of climate change to be developed and implemented by the Conference of the Parties.

The Role of Public Education in Climate Regime-Building In contrat to almost the two century old history of ciimate science and the decades- long environmental concerns of climate scientists, the record of public concem is relatively short. In this section, I will explore the origins of public concem about global climate change; the factors leading to public awareness and concern; and the extent of public education. 1 will use the Rogressive Societal Learning and Social Change Mode1 to operationalize the extent of societal learning. As noted in Chapter Three, this mode1

336 Bruce A. Callander, "Global Clirnatic Change: the Latest Scientific Understanding," lecture to the 28th International Geographicai Congres, the Hague, the NetherIands, 4- 10 August, 1996. evaluates the strength of societal learning based on the strength of various inputs, such as ENGO campaigns, media coverage, educational activities, protest music, literature, art, and theatre, etc. It is based on the view that social movements need to use a variety of sources of learning and involve a wide range of actors in order to successfully promote public education and social change. Climate change is a parcicularly tough environmental issue to cornmunicate to the general public. Many have pointed to the puliar structure of climate change as an environmental issue: it is a long tenn, "creeping" environmental problem; climate science is highly abstract and cornplex: there are billions of sources of pollutants from the industrial, commercial, transportation and residential sectors; etc.? Still, the term "greenhouse effect" became a household word in the late 1980s, and environmental organizations, the media, government reports, and the insurance industry have frequently raised the question of the connection between human-induced climate change and the many extreme weather events, such as floods, ice storms, the intense El Nino in the 1990s, and drought in many parts of the ~orld.33~

The Environmerz~alMovement

The issue of global climate change was fmt taken up by the environmental movement in a systematic way starting only in the Iate 1980s. Evidence for this recent involvement is demonstrated by the late starting date of clirnate campaigns created by many of the leading transnational environmental groups. For example, in Germany, key environmental groups (Greenpeace Germany, German Nature Protection Ring, and the German Federation of Environment and Nature Protection) only began to organize around clirnate in the Iate 1980s. Cavender and Jager note that: "Oddly enough, these groups

337 See Anne R. Keamey, "Understanding Global Change: A Cognitive Perspective on Cornrnunicating Through Stocies," Climatic Chaw, Vol. 27, 1994, pp. 41 1-441. 338 David Francis and Henry Hengeveld Clirnate Change Dieest: Extrerne Weather and Climate Chanoe (Environmental Canada, 1998). were the last sector of society publicly to acknowledge the problem of global warming, and did so only after the establishment of the Enquete ~arliamentary]commissions."339 In Canada, Friends of the Earth began working on climate change in 1989, and Greenpeace

Canada fmt hired a climate carnpaigner in 1990. Internationally, environmental groups first organized into a loose network or urnbreiia organization called the Climate Action Network at a meeting in Germany in March 1989. The lateness of the ENGO campaigns is partly explained by the diff~cultyof organizing a campaign without the existence of some minimal public awareness of the issue. By the late 1980s this awareness had developed with the growing and visible scientific consensus on the nature and extent of the problem, the rise in concern for international environrnental issues in general, the exceedingly hot year of 1988, and the growing number of international meetings on climate change, such as the 1988 Toronto Conference on the Changing Atmosphere. Soon the climate issue emerged as a priority issue for an increasing number of environrnental international nongovernmentd organizations (INGOs), such as Greenpeace, Fnends of the Earth, the World Wildlife Fund, and the Climate Action Network. For example, in 1996, the Greenpeace International Council-part of Greenpeace's elaborate international decision-making structure-selected climate change and ancient forests as its top two priorities. Greenpeace has an estimated 70 international and national office staff working on clirnate change.340 There are also a network of national and local environmental NGOs working on the issue, such as the Environment Defense Fund, Natural Resources Defense Fund, and Union of Concerned Scientists in the United States, and the David Suzuki Foundation and Sierra Club in Canada.

339 Cavender and Jager. 'The History of Germany's Response to Climate Change," p. 13. 340 Author's interview with Steve Shallhorn, Director of Carnpaigns. and Kevin Jardine. Climate Carnpaigner. Greenpeace Canada, Toronto, September 18, 1998. At the international level, the Climate Action Network (CAN) has more than 260 transnational and local environment group members. CAN is comprised of seven regional networks which help coordinate its efforts in Africa, South Asia, South East Asia, Latin Amerka, Central and Eastern Europe, Western Europe, and the US; there are also national

contact points in Canada, Russia, the United Kingdom and France. In Canada, CAN- Canada was started by Friends of the Earth and other environmental groups in 1989, following the landmark Toronto Conference on the Changing Atmosphere. Canada's network has lacked adequate funding and does not have any staff (NGO activists volunteer their time in coordinating its efforts). However, the US and European Networks have full- time carnpaigners working for CAN. What have ENGO activities consisted of? Broadly speaking, ENGO strategies have changed from an early emphasis on lobbying to one concerned with promoting societal Iearning. In the first phase, most of the main environmental groups engaged primarily in lobbying activities at international negotiations in order to secure legally-binding global targets and schedules to reduce greenhouse gas ernissions. In the next phase, many ENGOs shifted the focus of their activities to direction action and pubIic education campaigns aimed at implementing international commitments made in Kyoto. This section also explores how NGO efforts relate to other sources of green learning such as media,

forrnal and informal education systems, and protest culture (music, film, literature, etc.).

Phase 1: The Primacy of NGO Lobbying (late 1980s to 1997) For the most part, environmental groups gave priority to lobbying activities over direct action and public education campaigns from the Iate 1980s to the rnid 1990s, with a major shift towards the latter evident since 1997. For the most part, the transnational environmental movement has piggybacked on the success of the work of scientists in

setting thc international agenda on global climate change. The Climate Action Network7s main international activities have been directed at lobbying state officiais at the International Negotiating Cornmittee sessions (INCs) leading to the Frarnework Convention on Climate Change, and the annual Conference of the Party meetings, once the convention came into force in March 1994 when 50 ratifications were achieved. The Climate Action Network was formed largely in response to the flurry of international conferences and negotiations taking place in the late 1980s. 'The negotiating process has stimulated joint work arnong NGOs through the Climate Action Network," notes the CAN website.341 CAN's objectives are:

to coordinate information exchange on international, regiond and national climate policies and issues, both between CAN groups and other interested institutions to formulate policy options and position papers on climate-related issues to undertake further coilaborative action to promote effective NGO involvement in efforts to avert the threat of global warming, as well as providing a forum for activists to share information, ideas and concerns.342

A major success of environmentai groups was to increase the public accountability of governrnents taking part in the negotiations by placing a public spotlight on the negotiating positions of 'laggard' States, in particular. CAN effectively exposed the weaknesses in various state positions and put forth its own position by publishing a daily

ECO newsletter at internationd negotiating sessions. CAN accurately txumpets the newsletter as "the definitive source - it's what government negotiators and journalists aiike read to find out what's redly going on at the negotiations .... ECO'S contributors include Ieading independent scientists and political analysts, giving you u~valedaccess to the negotiations and what they really mean."343

341 The Climate Action Network website: htrp://www.climatenetwork.org./ 342~eeClimate Action Network, ÇAN International NWDirectory 1998 (Washington: Climate Action Network, 1998) 343 A short description of the CAN is provided in al1 issues of ECO Newsletter. At the same hme, international conferences offered ENGOs the opportunity to heighten public awareness of the issue through mass media coverage of these events. ENGOs, such as Greenpeace, undertook demonstrations and other creative actions at the conference sites which not only promoted public education, but also enhanced ENGO

bargaining power at the international negotiations. For exarnple, in an eloquent warning to delegates at the Kyoto meeting, Greenpeace offered them bottied rnelt water from the Antarctic Larson shelf (a 1300 square kilometre thick iceshelf which had collapsed in 1995) which it had collected on its earlier expedition to Antar~tica.3~~The bottles were labeled: "Al Gore, cut the hot air, or the penguin gets it," with a Little penguin printed next to the text.345 Greenpeace notes that "a lot of the delegations put the bottle on their tables in the ministerial session and were reminded about the need for urgent reductions of greenhouse gases throughout the day."3& Greenpeace also set up a 5 metre high "carbonosaurus" dinosaur at the Kyoto conference centre made of recycled metal with a scorecard reading,

"Dinosaur diplomacy 1: Climate 0.347 Moreover, Greenpeace organized a series of demonstrations around the world to put pressure on the weak negotiating stand of the US govemment prior to COP-3 in Kyoto, including protests in the US, Brazil, Israel, Cyprus, Austria, and Russia.348 In Vienna, for exarnple, Greenpeace set up a bed in front of the US embassy with a mock US Resident Clinton in bed with an oil barrel.

344 In early 1997, Greenpeace's four week tour of Antarctica documenteci the ernerging signs of clirnate change. The MV Arctic Sunrise expedition found Iarge cracks in the Larsen B Ice Shelf suggesting possible collapse in the near tenn. 345 Greenpeace, 'The Vice Resident of the US Cornes to Visit at the Climate Summit," News Release (December 8,1997). 346 Ibid. 347 Greenpeace, "Dinosaur diplomacy 1: Clirnnte O," News Release (December 8, 1997).

348 Greenpeace, "Greenpeace and Georgetown Snidents Send a Message

Century ."349 Greenpeace employed a strategy of direct action to highlight the need to phase out the causes of global climate change, in particular, the buniing of oil, coal and gas. Its press releases repeatedly note that "the world can't afford to bum even one quarter of the known

President Clinton In Bed with Oil Industry," News Release (Vienna: November 3, 1997); and Greenpeace, "Greenpeace Russia Picket the US Embassy in Moscow," News Release (Moscow: November 3, 1997). 349 Greenpeace Canada websia: http://www.grenpeace.~rg!-c~ms/~limate/p~Iart~~~/inde~.html fossil fuel reserves if it wants to avoid dangerous climate change." It is campaigning for an end to new oil exploration by pressuring oil companies to stop investing in oil exploration, and instead to redirect investnents towards renewable forms of energy. To this end, beginning in 1997, Greenpeace deployed two of its ships, the MV Arctic Sunrise and MV Greenpeace, in CO-ordinatedactions in the Alaskan Arctic and North Atlantic oceans respectively with the aim of directly confronting the fossil fuel industry's new oil developments. Greenpeace first carnpaigned against offshore oil in the Arctic in 1980 when oil companies constructed islands in the Endicott oil field. Its key concerns then were related to Arnerica's energy future and the impacts on the local environment. In 1997, the focus shifted to the threat of global wamiing posed by British Petroleum's (now BP Arnoco's) Northstar and Liberty projects which aim at an expansion of oil exploration off of the Alaskan Arctic Coast in the Beaufort Sea. The Arctic mission has two key goals: first, to document climate change impacts, and, secondly, to protest the deveIopment of the Arctic frontier. The Arctic is where climate models predict the most dramatic impacts of global warming; the Western Arctic is warming at a rate three to five times the global average. The Greenpeace expedition documented North American glaciers retreating and thinning following increases in regional temperatures.350 In August 1998, it released a report entitled, Answers from the Ice Edge, a two-year testimonies project which relies upon traditional knowledge of the First Nations living on the land and compares this record with Western science, such as the findings of the IPCC. Kalee Kreider, US Director of Greenpeace's Global Warming Campaign, interestingly notes that 'The result of this testimonies project is a starùing clear convergence between the Western, peer-reviewed science on climate change and the traditional knowledge of Alaskan Native peopies in the

350 Greenpeace, "Greenpeace Documents Glacial Retreat in Melt Zone as International Clirnate Treaty Negotiations Resume in Bonn," News Release (June 2, 1998). report."3S~ At the same time, in August 1998, the crew of the MV Arctic Sunrise protested against seismic testing in the Beaufort Sea, conducted by Western Geophysical for BP and Exxon, by launching four inflatables with activists canying banners that read: "Stop oil; go s0la.r.~~352 Further, in March 1999, a group of more than a hundred Greenpeace supporters set up a group cailed Shareholders Against New Oil Exploration (SANE BP). SANE BP7s aims are "to encourage responsible shareholders to challenge the oil company's present

investments in oil exploration and steer it, instead, towards ... renewable energy."353 SANE BP applies pressure on the oil Company by attempting to unmask its 'green' rhetoric. The group found that BP Amoco spent $7 billion in 1997 on oil explorations and deveiopment, but only about $20 million per year on renewable energy sources like wind and solar.3" Greenpeace calls into question the senousness of commiûnents made at Kyoto when spending on oil exploration is growing. In 1998, the world's oil industry was preàicted to spend $94 billion on oil and gas exploration and production, an 11% increase over 1997 levels.355

Greenpeace's global carnpaign aiso includes a European focus which, together with its North American campaign, places the spotlight on industrialized countries-the chief culprits in the global climate change problem. Greenpeace targeted the Atlantic frontier, which extends from the waters off Ireland's South Coast, passes the West Coast of Scotland and goes up North to Norwegian waters. In 1997, Greenpeace undertook offshore direct action in the UK sector of the Atlantic Frontier when it prevented ships from

351 Greenpeace, "Alaska Natives Provide Personal testirnony of the Impacts of Global Warming," News Relpse (August 1 1, 1998). 352 Greenpeace. "Greenpeace Protests Oil Exploration in Arctic and Atlantic Frontien in Carnpaign to Prevent Dangerous Climate Change," News Release (August 20, f 998) 353 Greenpeace. "Greenpeace Supporters Buy into BP Amoco," News Release (March 18, 1999). 354 Greenpeace, 'Greenpeace Occupies Oil Tanker in San Francisco Bay. Waming that Global Warming is the Next 0i1 Disaster," News Release (March 23, 1999). 355 Greenpeace, "Greenpeace Steps Up Global Carnpaign to Stop Oil Exploration and Prevent Dangerous CIimate Change," News Release (July 3, 1998). carrying out seismic testing, the first phase of oil exploration in the Foinaven oil development. Then, in June 1998, it became active in the Nordic sector of the Atlantic fiontier when it attempted to occupy the oil exploration and drilling platform "Ocean

Alliance" which was operating on behalf of Shell and the Norwegian state-owned Company

Statoil.356 On July 3, Greenpeace UK activists disrupted seismic exploration activities for 11 hours undertaken for oil companies Statoil, Mobil and Enterprise in the North Atlantic, 100 miles West of the Scottish coast, by placing themselves in the water in front of seisrnic testing vessel Geco Diamond. Their banner read "Wind Not Oi1."357 The following month, the ship MV Greenpeace targeted the North Atlantic-Nordic sector near the Deepsea Bergen off the coast of Norway (this occurred while the MV Arctic Sumise sirnultaneously mounted its protests in the Arctic in a set of CO-ordinated actions). For 12 hours activists stayed on the anchor chain of the Deepsea Bergen oil rig, operated by Statoil, preventing it from moving from its location off the coast of Norway.358 Other Greenpeace national organizations have undertaken carnpaigns as well. In July 1999, Greenpeace Australia temporarily stopped the operation of the Stuart Oil Shale plant near Gladstone, Queensland to pressure Australia to leave shale oil in the ground. Three activists occupied the top of a 60 meter emissions tower. The year before, coral bleaching occurred in virtually al1 the tropical reef systems in the world, the worst such episode over the last 20 years. In July 1999, Greenpeace released the report, Climate

356 Greenpeace, "Greenpeace Activists Arrested Attempting to Stop Oil Exploration as Clirnate Negotiations Start in Bonn," News Release (June 2, 1998). 357 Greenpeace, "Greenpeace Steps up Global Campaign to Stop Oil Exploration and Prevent Clirnate Change," News Release (July 3, 1998), and Greenpeace, "Greenpeace Ship in Ireland on Campaign to Stop New Oil Exploration," News Release (July 21, 1998). 358 Greenpeace, "Nonvegian State Owned Oil Cornpuiy Statoil Bills Greenpeace for Damages," News Release (January 14, 1999), Gnxnpeace, "Police Use Water Cannons to Remove Greenpeace Protesters on Oil Rig in the Atlantic While Protests Continue Against 0i1 Exploration in the Arctic," News Release (August 22, 1998), Greenpeace, "Greenpeace Activists Stay on Anchor Chain of Oil Rig for 12 Hours - Norwegian Government Owned Oil Company Considers Legal Action," News ReIease (August 22, f 9M), and Greenpeace, "Greenpeace Protests Oil Exploration in the Arctic and Atlantic Frontiers in Campaign to Prevent Dangerous Clirnate Change," News Release (August 20, 1998). Change.- Coral Bleaching and the Future of World's Coral Reefs, which presented the dire warning that "the vast majority of the world's largest coral reef, the 2100 km long Great Barrier Reef off Australia's north-west Coast will be dead in around 30 years unless.., projected levels of climate change are stopped."359 Greenpeace Canada has launched a campaign sirnilar to Australia's against Suncor's Stuart Oil Shale project in Edmonton, Atberta.360 It set up a 'Climate Rescue Camp' to bear witness and protest the expansion of Suncor's tar sands site as well as its plans to export its technology for oil exploration projects in Jordan and Estonia. Such Greenpeace actions are not only intended to educate the public, but also to enlighten "corporate and govemment actors by making what ofien arnounts to unconscious environmentally destructive behaviour a conscious process."361 In addition to highlighting the problem of fossil fuels, Greenpeace is working towards a solution by attempting to convert the global energy system to the efficient use of renewable energy, such as solar and wind power. It is calhg for an end to govenunent subsides for the fossil fuel and nuclear industries while encouraging utilities, corporations, governments and the public to invest in clean energy. In 1996 it sponsored a Greenpeace Business conference in London with more than 150 international corporate executives present. In November 1998, Greenpeace released a report in cooperation with the European Wind Energy Association and the Danish Forum for Energy and Development entitled 10 Per Cent of the World's Electriciv Consum~tionfrom Wind Ener~y,setting an international goal of 10% wind energy by 2017. Denmark already is approaching this target and has an official target for the country's electricity of 50% wind energy by 2030.3'j2

359 Greenpeace, "Climate Change Set to Devastate World's Coral Reefs in 30 Years," News Release (July 6, 1999). 360 Greenpeace, "Greenpeace Opens 'Clirnate Rescue Camp' at Coker Site." News Release (March 6, 2000). 36 Interview with Kevin Jardine, Clirnate carnpaigner, Greenpeace Canada, September 18, 1998. 362 European Wind Energy Association, the Danish Forum for Energy and Development, and Greenpeace International, 10 Per Cent of the World's Electricitv Consum~tionfrom Wind Energv: 1s that Tar~et Achievable? (November 6, 1998). In June 1998, the MV Greenpeace visited an offshore wind farm in Denrnark. In 1999, Greenpeace, working with a number of business groups and environmental organizations, carnpaigned for a European Union (EU) renewable energy directive.363 The European Wind Energy Association, Greenpeace, the World Wildlife Fund, Friends of the Earth, CNE, Business Council for a Sustainable Fnergy Future, COGEN Europe and several German wind energy groups called on the Energy Council to reach an agreement on an EU directive with binding targets for the phase-in of renewable energy (8% by 2005, 16% by

2010, with a 2% phase-in per year thereafter). Greenpeace also has a carnpaigner working on a solar Olympic Village for the 2000 Surnmer Olympic Games in Sydney, Austraiia. It constnicted "the world's largest sola.suburb" where more than 650 dwellings are equipped with the most advance solar power and solar water heating systems. Ever media conscious, Greenpeace Olympics campaigner Michael Bland notes that "In 2000, the Olympic Village will be a showcase for solar solutions in action both for those attending the Games from around the world and for one of the largest television audiences in history."3@

Media Ln their survey of American coverage of climate change, Allan Mazur and Jinling

Lee found that climate change was first covered in the media in the 1970s during the energy crisis when policy-makers were considenng a great expansion in the use of shale oil and coal, thus decreasing their reliance on OPEC oi1.365 A number of scientists advised policy- makers to avoid this energy path due to concems about climate change. Media coverage of climate change dissipated in the early and mid 1980s when oil pices fell drarnatically, and climate scientists and activists turned their attention to the nuclear anns race and the threat

363 Greenpeace. "Europe Risks Lead in Renewable Energy and Failure on Clirnate Policy Without Renewable Energy Directive Say Environment and Industry Groups," News Release (April28, 1999). 364 Greenpeace, "Greenpeace Congratulates Olympic Village Developments for hplernenting Solar Solutions," News ReIease (June 26, 1998). 365 ALlan Mazur and Jiniing Lee, "Sounding the Global Alarm: Environmental Issues in the US National News," Social Studies of Science, Vol. 23, 1993, pp. 681-720. of nuclear winter if a global nuclear war were to occur. However, in 1988, media coverage of global clirnate change skyrocketed to unprecedented levels. In the aftermath of the exceptionally hot summer of 1988, NASA scientist James Hansen appeared before US Congressional hearings and presented a global temperature graph showing increasing

temperatures since the nineteenth century. The graph was reproduced in the New York Times and other media outlets and became an important visuai image of the human impact on the world's climate system, just as the satellite images of the Antarctic hole were to become symbolic of the destruction of the stratospheric ozone layer or the dotted lights representing the buming of the Arnazonian rainforests. The quantity of media coverage of climate change remained high in the late 1980s and 1990s as a result of the international negotiations on the Frarnework Convention on Climate Change and the follow-up annual meetings of the Conference of the Parties. Interestingly, environmental groups have, for the most part, followed the agenda set by scientists (international negotiations) rather than setting the agenda themselves and generating their own media attention due to direct action activities, with the notable exception of Greenpeace after 1997.

Protest Art To what extent has global climate change entered popular culture? To date, very little in the form of films, music, literature, art work or theatre have directly or even tangentially addressed the topic of global climate change. There are a handful of exceptions in popular television, such as The Fire Next Time, or films, such the American President, Nakd Gun 2 1/2 and Watenvorld. The Fire Next Time is a The Dav After- like television show. In its exploration of some of the possible impacts of climate change, the show features a huge hurricane hitting Louisiana and then much of the rest of the United States. Cunously, most Arnericans try to 'escape' across the Canadian border to safer ground. The hero does make it to Nova Scotia, only to becorne a farmer with a huge Sun on the horizon. In a more policy-oriented film, Rob Reiner's American President (1995) features Michael Douglas starring as President Andrew Shepherd who falls in love with an environmental lobbyist (Annette Bening), and becomes a strong proponent of the 20% (Toronto) reduction target for greenhouse gas emissions. Clirnate change has featured more prominently in documentary films. Moreover, musicians and other celebrities have lent their name to climate carnpaigns. Greenpeace UK recruited musicians and other celebrities to sign its petition calling on the British Govemment to take action on climate change at the 1997 Kyoto conference and to end new oil exploration off Bntain's Coast.

Cornedians and members of over 60 bands signed the petition, including Darnon Albam from Blur, Jarvis Cocker from Pulp, Bryan Adams, Suede and Radiohead.366 At the annual Glastonbury Music Festival in Somerset, southwest England, the major theme in Greenpeace's 1998 field display was alternative energy; it inciuded solar-powered showers, a Greenpeace Solar Warrior on its internet site, and a solar trailer showing Greenpeace videos and videos by eco-acti~ists.~~~

Formal and Znfomal Schools Science-based public interest groups have pIayed a prominent role in educating the public about global climate change.368 Key arnong these is the Union of Concerned Scientists (UCS), founded in 1969 by a group of faculty and students at the Massachusetts

Institute of Technology (MIT.). UCS has a membership of about 100,000 scientists. A

Scientists' Action Network of about 8,000 scientists is made avaiIabIe to educate the public and media regarding the hazardous nature of the nuclear arms race, nuclear power, global

366 Greenpeace, 'Tountdown to Kyoto: Over Million People Want Action Taken to Save Our Clirnate." News Release (November 2 1, 1997). 367 Greenpeace, "Greenpeace @ glastonbury'98," News Release (June 1998). and interview with John Sauven, Greenpeace UK campaigner, July 2,1998, London, UK. 368 See Frederick W. Stoss. "Global Clirnate Change Education Resources," Global Clirnate Change Digest, Vol. Il, No. Il, November 1998, pp. 9-1 1. climate change and other environmental issues. In L992, UCS released the 'World Scientists' Warning to Humanity" - a document detailing the interrelated global environmental and resource problems threatening the planet and including recomrnendations for action to avert global catastrophe. The petition was signed by more than 1700 leading scientists from over 70 countries including the majority of the living Nobel Istureates in science.369 The Canadian counterpart to the UCS is the David Suzuki Foundation which has held extensive and well attended public meetings and film showings on climate change. Academic scientists have also played a leadership role. The National Center for Atmospheric Research (NCAR) in Boulder, Colorado, was founded in 1960 by the chairs of 10 leading US university meteorology departments.370 NCAR's goal was to attract more professionals into atrnosphenc research. More than one thousand core scientific staff and visiting university researchers conduct interdisciplinary research aimed at solving major atmospheric problems. Staff and visiting scientists present their findings to the public by writing papers and books explaining scientific issues, including works on global warrning by Stephen Schneider and Michael Glantz. Interestingly, govemments, particularly the US government, have begun to ailocate an increasing arnount of resources to global change and environmental education. The US government includes a "CIA's Home Page for Kids," the Department of Energy's "Energy Efficiency and Renewable Energy Network (EREN) Kids' S tuff ," the EPA' s Global Warming Web Site, and NASA's Global Change Master Directory Learning Center3?I Environrnent Canada's Kidzone includes facts and quizzes for children.

369 See Janet S. Wager. "Union of Concerned Scientists," Environrnent, Vol. 36, No- 4, May 1994, pp. 4- 5 & 45, and Union of Concerned Scientists, "Global Warning: Prominent Scientists WorIdwide Send an Urgent Message to Humanity," NucIeus, Vol. 14, No. 4, Winter 1992-93, pp. 1-3 &12. 370 Robert J. Serafin, "Institutions: National Center for Amiospheric Research," Envimnment, Vol. 32, No. 8, October 1990, pp. 2-3 & 45. 371 US Global Change Research Information Office. "Global Change and Environmental Education Resources," http://gc~o.org/edu/educ.html,December 6, 1999. The Weak, But Improving, State of Green Learning How does the environmental rnovement's activities relate to the three dimensions of learning, that is, infonning, changing worldviews, and engaging citizens in action

learning? International pressure on govermnents, not public education, was clearly the initial strategy of the environmental rnovement as major environmental groups placed almost exclusive emphasis on the international negotiating process before the Kyoto conference in 1997. Environmental organizations, like Greenpeace, have recently launched major public education campaigns on the threat posed by global clirnate change. First, Greenpeace is informing the public about climate change through its reports, videos, slide shows, fact sheets, media interviews and the Internet. Greenpeace produced a number of reports aimed at educating the public, media and policy-makers. It engaged in research to uncover data on their own or to highlight largely ignored studies by acadernics and others. It issued reports such as 10 Per Cent of the World's Electricitv Consumption from Wind Energy,- Climate Change. Coral Bleaching and the Future of World's Coral

-3 -3 Reefs and Answers from the Ice Ed~e.

Secondly, it attempted to change worldviews with its actions. Recall the bottle containing melt water from Antarctica's Larson Shelf which it distributed to delegates at Kyoto. Its direct actions against oil exploration aIso fundamentally challenged business as usual in how the world energy system operates with little or no regard for its implications for environmental "externalities." Prior to Kyoto, the United States governrnent became a target of Greenpeace protests worldwide. Thirdly, action leaming is certainly central to the work of its carnpaigners and volunteers. Greenpeace engaged in direct action in an attempt to increase public awareness and sensibility mainly via mass media. Greenpeace UK also directly engaged the public with its petition cirive in 1997. It collected over a million signatures for its petition calling for climate action with the help of local Greenpeace campaign groups throughout the country. In addition, the Greenpeace's touring mobile solar kitchen and a famous 'pod,' "the bright yellow swivd capsule used by Greenpeace in its occupation of Rockall and BP's Stena Dee oil rig," were used to collect signatures across the country.372 OveralI, though, the level of citizen involvement in the area of climate change has been minimal, espzcially when compared to other environmental problems like toxic chernical waste, deforestation, and nuclear power. Sources of green learning from other actors, Iike artists, film-makers, schools, etc. have generdy been weak. And given the recent emphasis on public education efforts by key transnational environrnental organizations, the state of green societd learning in the area of climate change is, not surprisingly, weak. Public opinion poll data cornoborates this conclusion. While various publics express concern about climate change, few know what climate change precisely is. A poll taken by the New York Times, prior to the 1997 Kyoto conference found that "Twenty-seven percent said they had heard or read a lot about global warrning and 38 percent said they had hear or read 'some' about it. About a third said they knew 'not much' or 'nothing' about it."373 Nonetheless, there are signs of growing interest and concern. The same poll found that a large majority of Arnericans showed a willingness to act on the issue: 65 percent of those surveyed said the US should take immediate steps to cuts its emissions "regardless of what other countries do" and 57 percent said that environmental improvements should be made regardless of costs - a view majorities have held for 15 years.

The Power of Scientific Consensus Versus Public Education

372 Greenpeace, "Countdown to Kyoto: Over Million People Want Action Taken to Save Our Climate." News Release (November 21, 1997). 373 John H. Cushman Ir.. "Public Backs Tough Steps for a Treaty on Warming." New York Times, November 28, 1997, p. A36. See also "Winds of Change: Public Views on Climate Change," Global Change Electronic Edition, December 1998, web site: http://www.globalchangeeorg/featalY98dec2.h~. There are several ways to evaluate the comparative influence of scientists and the environmental movement in the process of climate regime-building. A number of authors of ciimate politics have noted that scientists were clearly the main driving force in the agenda-setting process. However, their infiuence declined substantially in the negotiation pr0cess3~~and at the national implementation stages. Scientists have played a smaller roIe in the negotiations preceding the FCCC and at the meetings of the parties, such as Kyoto. For example, Paterson found most delegations at one INC consisted of policy experts, not scientists. But is it a fair test to evaluate the strength of climatologists based on their direct influence on specific irnplementation measures? Their influence on negotiations cm usudly, at best, be indirect, such as providing overalI pressure to adopt stringent targets.

Part of the problem is that the PCC has restricted the role of scientists in Working Group 1 by allocating the responsibility for defining "dangerous human interference with the climate" to Working Group 2, although Working Group 1 still has some role as it can help define the dangers to the ciimate and na& systems.375 Another reason for their declining influence is the changing importance of different epistemic comrnunities and other actors at different stages of regime developrnent, such as the implementation phase. For exarnple, a different group of scientists, not climatologists, are important in developing environmental standards and green technology. At the same time, climate scientists continue to play a role at international negotiations where there is a clear interplay between clirnate science and policy (such as what greenhouse gas sources and sinks to include, etc.).

Scientists as Public Educators As noted above in the section on formal and informa1 schools, scientists also play a critical role in public education, whether as part of the environmental movement like the

. . 374 Paterson, Global Wannine and Global Politics. 375 G. A. McBean, P. S. Liss and S. H. Schneider, "Advancing our Understanding." in J. T. Houghton, et al. (eds), Climate Chance 1995: The Science of Climate Chan~e(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996). Union of Concemed Scientists or as govemmental or academic epistemic community members who also see their role as science educators. Scientists promote public education direcùy by publishing books, through public speaking and providing expert testimony to legislative cornmittees. These as well as the numerous scientific conferences receive media coverage. Scientists are often contacted by the media and queried about the relationship of climate change to extreme weather events and other climate issues. Thus, another amendment to Haas's epistemic community approach should be the role of scientists in public education efforts. A source of strength or influence for the ciimate science epistemic

community resulted from their efforts at informing the public. Matthew Paterson notes that the influence of the epistemic community members of the IPCC was "primarily through their involvement in international organizations, and through direct access to publics, particularly in the industrialized countries."376 Further, many NGOs have scientists as key campaigners (e-g., Greenpeace and the Natural Resource Defense Fund) and many academic and government scientists consider themselves part of or work closely with the environmental movement (though many aIso work ciosely with industry).

The Role of Crises in Raising Public and Government Awareness and Concem An alternative exphnation for regime-building is the influence of crises, such as the hot summer of 1988. For exarnple, Sheldon Ungar argues that the claims-making of scientists were insignificant when compared to the results of real world events.3'7 But the dividing line between the two is fuzzy, and increasingly so now that the latest IPCC report has noted that the balance of evidence suggests that climate change has begun. The growing nurnber of extreme weather events may, in part, be attributed to climate change, and clearly facilitates the public and govemmental learning process. But at the same time

376 Paterson, Global Warmine and Global Politics, p. 147. 377 Sheldon Ungar, TheRise and (Relative) Decline of Global Warming as a Social Problem. " & SocioIo~icalOuarterl~, Vol. 33, No. 4, 1992, pp. 483-501. scientists and the environmental movement can point to extreme weather events as possible evidence of clirnate change and the worse that is yet to corne if no or too Little action is taken in response. In other words, real world events can enhance the claims-rnaking function of both the episternic community and environmental movement. Finaily, the epistemic community approach seems to assume that it is epistemic community members that effect change by either convincing governments or becoming decision-makers themselves. However, environmental groups aim not only at educating the public, but govemments too. Environmental groups spend much of their resources appearing before legislative cornmittees, informing politicians of issues as well as encouraging politicians to learn about environmental issues that their constituents are concerned about. In sum, there is not a simple and neat way to contrat the role of scientists and the environmental movement as the hivo interact in many important ways. In fact, the interaction contributes to improved learning processes, and deserve more attention as a topic of study. Nonetheless, several types of evidence suggest that the scientific contribution to the development of the global climate regime was greater than the efforts of the environmental movement in the governmental learning - and possibly public education - processes leading to the development of the global climate regime. First, those with vested interest in business as usual, such as the fossil fuel industry, used their public relations and lobbying resources to magnify any uncertainties in climate science and to undermine the credibility of the PCC, rather than focus on attempts at discrediting and dividing environmental organizations. Second, the timing of political responses seems to follow the demands put fonvard at important international scientific gatherings. The political responses, to some extent, follow the prescriptions of scientists, though there is an obvious gap between the two. Third, an overall evaluation of the strength of the various sources of green societal leaming points to weak inputs (as noted in the previous section). For example, the media coverage tended to report on scientific and political conferences, scientific assessments and extrerne weather events rather than NGO direct action and educational activities.

Outside the IPCC: me Fossil Fuel Industry Targets International Scientipc Consensus Anti-environmentalism has recently manifested itseif in such "astroturf' or artificial grass-roots movements as the "Wise Use" movement in the United States, and Share Groups in British CoIumbia.378 What is interesting in the case of cIimate change is that the backlash against environmentalism has manifested itself mainly against climate scientists and scientific consensus, not environrnental groups, as is usually the case. Business interests related to the fossil fuel industry primarily focus their attention and marshal their resources to challenge and undermine the PCC process and international scientific consensus on climate science, rather than target environmental groups and their climate campaigns. This is due to the fact that up to the mid 1990s, at least, scientists have been the driving force behind the process of climate regime-building. The fossil fuel industry has used a two-pronged strategy to undermine scientific consensus. First, a number of pressure groups were created by "brown" industries to lobby govemments and attend the clirnate talks. The Global Climate Coalition, the best hown international industry-funded lobbying group against action on climate change, represents major automobile, oil and coal companies.379 Interestingly, to date, Texaco, Daimler Chryster AG, Ford Motor Company, the Royal Dutch/ShelI Group, BP Amoco and others have left the WCclaiming they are not leaving because of any fundamental differences of opinion, but would like to speak for themselves and work with other broader-based organizations.380 The American Petroleum Institute was among the

378 Gelbspan, The Heat is On; Paul R. Ehrlich and Anne H. Ehrlich, Betryal of Science and Reason: How Anti-Environmental Rhetoric Threatens Our Future (Washington D. C.: Island Press, 1996). 379 See Greenpeace, Oilinp the Machine: Fossil Fuel Dollars Funneled Into the US Political Process (October 1997) 380 'Texaco qui& anti-Kyoto climate change group," Reuters News Service, March 2, 2000. sponsors of a "Global Climate Information Project," which ran a $13 million advertising campaign starting in rnid-1997 intended to cierail agreement at the Kyoto surnrnit. Their agenda is to promote a continuation of business as usual, and their message is that any action to combat climate change will darnage established industry, and cost millions of jobs. Secondly, a small group of vocal skeptics of climate change has emerged in the 1980s and 1990s, most of whom are industry-funded. They claim that there is a conspiracy fabricated by climate scientists to create the need for funding, that there is an artificial consensus at the PCC,and that the PCC does not represent true science, nor include the views of skeptics.381 Yet most of these clirnate skeptics do not publish in peer-

reviewed scientific journals-3g2 The Union of Concerned Scientists, in its "good science/ bad science campaign," compared the clirnate skeptics to tobacco industry scientists who for decades defended "the safety" of cigarettes.

Zntergovemmental Learning and Responses: Principle, Targets and Implementation? Based on his work on global human rights, Jack Donnelly evaluates the stren,oth of international regimes based on the extent to which they adhere to international noms and procedures. No internationd regime exists if there is merely a network of diverse national noms and procedures. Using Donnelly's definition, the global climate regime originatec! in the 1980s as a declaratory regime and then developed into a promotiond and a weak implementation regime. A declaratory regime emerged in the 1980s based on a set of agreed principles, such as the view that the global climate could be adversely affected by human actions. A system of unilaterd measures then emerged in the late 1980s.

381 While it is me that the PCC scientific consensus is not necessarily al1 true; averaging can elirninate part of the tnith (on either side of the debate). And while there are hazards with the process of consensus, but like democracy, there is no better aiternative. Scientific consensus provides a good indication of where the general foundation of science is at. Interview with Henry Hengeveld, CO2 Advisor, Environment Canada, August 28, 1998. 382 Richard Lindzen is one of the few skeptics to publish in peer-reviewed journals. The global climate regîme has largely been science driven. International action on principles and targets were the result of the work of scientists. Though when it cornes to commitment, scientific efforts fell short. The issue of climate change hardy received mention at the 1972 United Nations conference on the Human Environment in Stockholm since the science was not sufficiently developed and the subject was so enormous and complex. But by the late 1980s and early 1990s, numerous attempts were made at international and regional environmental

conferences and economic surnrnits to set greenhouse gas stabilization and reduction targets for industrialized countries before the 1992 Earth Summit in Brazil (see Table 5.1 for a Listing of events). As climate scientists became more vocal, there followed political and media interest, and ultirnately international negotiations on a climate convention. The two international workshops held in Villach and Bellagio, Italy, in 1987 marked, according to the German Parliamentary Enquete Commission, "the transition frorn the phase of scientific stock-taking to the beginnings of a discussion on political action designed to contain the greenhouse effect."383 In the same year, the Brundtland Commission released Our Comrnon Future, which noted that "about a quarter of the world's population consumes three-quarters of the world's primary energy."384 Although the Brundtland Commission did not specify targets and time frames for controiling emissions, it urged industnalized countries to "stabilize their primary energy consumption by the turn of the century" and allow developing counvies to increase their Ievels of growth.385 Specific greenhouse gas targets and schedules were first advanced at the

383 German Bundestag (ed.), Protectin~the Earth: A Status Report with Recomrnendations for a New Ener~vPolicv. (Bonn: 3rd Report of the Enquete-Commission on Preventive Measures to Protect the Earth's Atmosphere of the 11th German Bundestag, 1990). 807. On the evoIution of concem over global climatic change in the last 15 years, see also WiIliam E. Riebsame, "Social perspectives on global climate change," in Steve Rayner et. al (eds), Manmy the Global Commons: Decision makin~and Conflict Resolution in Resuonse to Climate Chan~e(Oak Ridge, Tennessee: Oak Ridge National Laboratory, July 1990), 11-26. 3841bid., 174. 385 Ibid., p. 174. landmark "Changing Atmosphere" conference, held in Toronto in June 1988 attended by scientists and policy-makers. The final statement included the following recommendation:

Reduce CO2 emissions by approximately 20% of 1988 levels by the year 2005 as an initial global goal. Clearly, the industrialized nations have a responsibility to lead the way, both through their national energy policies and their bilateral and multilateral assistance arrangements286

The Toronto target became, from the perspective of environmentalists, "the political bench mark for measuring a country's cornmitment to fighting global warming."3*7 The first major senior-level international meeting was at the Hague in March 1989 which called for irnproved decision making on international environmental issues. By February 1991, an Intergovernmental Negotiating Committee (INC) was set up. It began its first formal negotiations with the goal to complete a framework convention on climate change ready for signature at the Eaah Sumrnit in June 1992. At the Earth Surnmit, 154 countries dong with the European Union (then called the European Community) signed the Climate Change Convention. The convention adopted the precautionary principle, that is, a cornmitment to take action on potentially dangerous environmental problems without waiting for absolute scientific certainty on the nature of the problem. Article 2 provides the ultimate objective of the Framework Convention on Climate Change:

The ultimate objective of this Convention is .... stabilization of greenhouse gas concentrations in the atrnosphere at a level that would prevent dangerous anthropogenic interference with the climate system. Such a level should be achieved within a time-frame: to allow ecosystems to adapt naturally to climate change, to ensure that food production is not threatened, and to enable economic development to process in a sustainable manner.

US President Bush said he would not attend the Earth Surnmit if the proposed Climate Treaty contained specific obligations; the US opposed targets and tirnetables to reduce

386~nvironmentCanada, "The Changing Atmosphere: Implications for Global Security. Conference Statement." (Ottawa: 1988) 387~ndreaIrnada. "Canada's cool response to global wamiing," Probe Pos t (Spring 199 1). 24. greenhouse gas emissions. The Convention states that the industrialized countries of the North should take the lead in combating climate change and provides the legally nonbinding objective of stabilizing emissions at 1990 levels by 2000. In March 1994, less than two years after the signing of the treaty, 50 ratifications were achieved allowing for yearly meetings of the Conference of the Parties. The first Conference of the Parties (COPI) took place a year later in Berlin in 1995, three years after

the Rio conference. The INC which met 11 times to prepare for the Berlin meeting had nonetheless reached a stalemate. The task of the COPl was to agree to a protocol since the current comrnitments were not adequate to achieve the objectives of the Convention. One

proposal on the table at COPl in Berlin was from AOSIS calling for a 20% reduction in CO2 emissions by the year 2025-the Toronto target. Forty-two countries from the G77 endorsed the AOSIS green paper.388 Nthough no protocol was agreed to, the Berlin Mandate states that not enough was king done to address clirnate change and that a protocol containing legally binding targets and timetables should be agreed to by COP3 in Kyoto, Japan. However, a secretariat for the Convention was set up in Bonn, Germany with a budget of 12 million pounds and a staff of 43, as well as two subsidiary bodies-one on science and the other on implementation. At COP2 in Geneva in 1996, the rninisterial declaration accepted the idea of legally binding targets. No targets were set, that was left for COP3 in Kyoto, Japan. The Kyoto COP 3 was seen as the crunch meeting in which there would be negotiations about legally binding targets for the period beyond 2000 Industrialized countries agreed to an international protocol with 510% cuts by 2010. Govemments have not consistently faced a constituency in favour of strong response strategies. As a result they have either been slow to respond to the problem or have engaged in public education campaigns themselves to promote public awareness and

------388 Brown, Global Warming, p. 157. concern about the issue. Schreurs' comparative study of Japan and Germany, the fouah and fifth largest carbon dioxide emitters respectively, shows how the policies of these states have oscillated over a period of decades between leadership roles and reactive foot- dragging, prompted at times by 'bottom-up' politicai pressure from concerned publics,

Green Party members (in the case of Germany), scientists and environmental policy communities; at other times by a top-dom political process, with political elites initiating

s trong environmental performance goals.3sg

Conclusions The science of climate change has reached a high level of consensus on the basic mechanisrns of climate change, though there remains uncertainty as to how climate change will specifically affect different parts of the world. The important point is that there exists a great deal of consensus on the significance of the problem and a fairIy strong institutional capacity in clhate science irz a number of Western states, particularly the United States. In contrat to the role of scientists, the environmental movement has a short, relatively recent involvement in the issue of global climate change. Scientific convergence on the problem of global climate change has clearly driven much of the initial regirne development by aiding in the establishment of first a declaratory and then a promotional global climate regime. But scientific consensus alone is not sufficient for the development of a strong climate implementation and enforcement regime.

Implementation requires (1) scientific consensus and bargaining power, wd(2) significant public education and concem to ensure public pressure on national and international governments to act and the creation of a strong civil society acting in an environmental responsible way. Changes in civil society are a key component of a strong climate regime

389 Scheurs in Economy and Schews (eds), The Internationalization of Environmental Protection (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 1997). since there are literally billions of sources of greenhouse gases. A strong climate regime is likely to emerge once the state of green societal Iearning improves. Chapter 6 Learning in the Clayoquot and Great Bear Rainforest Campaigns: From Public Pressure to Global Civic Politics

Only one fifth of the world's original forest cover remains in large, relatively natural ecosystems.390 Almost half the world's states - 76 countries - have lost al1 their old growth forests, according to the World Resources Institute's pristine forest index. Three countries - Russia, Canada, and Brazil - house nearly 70% of the world's large intact pristine forests. In turn, habitat destruction has led to a phenomenal extinction of biodiversity, reaching 30,000 species per year in the 1970s, and jumping to 50,000 species

each year in the 1980s. At the 1992 Earth Surnmit in Rio de Jeneiro, conservation biologists wamed that if business-as-usual continues, an incredible 10 - 20% of the planet's estimated 10 million species could become extinct by 2020 - the Iargest mass extinction in 65 million ~ea.rs.3~' The Clayoquot Sound and Great Bear Rainforest carnpaigns represent two prominent efforts by the transnational environmental movement and conservation biologists to protect the last of the intact ancient temperate rainforests in Canada's westernmost province of British Columbia. The first, the Clayoquot Sound struggle, resonates in Canadian environmentai history given the unprecedented magnitude of protests. In the summer of 1993, more than 12,000 people participated in the Peace Camp and over 800

were arrested on logging roads in civil disobeciience protests following a decision by the Govenunent of British Columbia to open two thirds of the Sound on the western Coast of Vancouver Island to logging.392 Most of Vancouver Island's 170 forested valleys over 5,000 hectares have been partially or fully logged. Clayoquot Sound contains eight of the

390 Dirk Bryant et al.. The Last Frontier Forests: Ecosystems and Econornies on the Edee (Washington D.C.,World Resources Institute, March 1997). 391 Paul Brown, Global Warrning: Can Civilization Survive? (London: B!andford, 1996), p. 41. 11 large valleys with intact ancient temperate rainforests. The second campaign, an arnbitious effort launched in 1996 to stop the destruction of largely intact temperate rainforests on the mid-coastal mainland (dubbed the "Great Bear Rainforest" by environmentalists), is interesting for its mainly international thrust, and its increasingly successful, cascading market campaign in Europe and the United States. In this chapter, 1 assess and compare the influence of the environmental movement's public education campaigns with the role of conservation biologists in gaining additionai protection for Canada's ancient temperate rainforests. The environmental rnovement has played a leading role in promoting forest protection while conservation biologists are ody beginning to exert an influence on govemment poIicy and transnational civil society. In fact, an epistemic cornmunity of conservation biologists has not yet emerged in British Columbia. Conservation biologists are not well institutionalized in government bureaucraties and do not possess significant bargaining power, though the Clayoquot Scientific Panel represents an important exception. Conservation biologists are also just beginning to organize in the realrn of civil society, as in the case of the Yellowstone to Yukon Conservation Initiative - an effort that Largely consists of private regime-buiIding.393 Given the primacy of ENGO efforts, the buik of this chapter involves an exploration of the changing strategy and tactics of the environmental movernent in the two campaigns. The two key strategies employed by the environmental rnovement are public pressure tactics and global civic politics, with differing emphases in the two ~arnpaigns.~~~

392 Tzeporah Berman, 'Takin' it Back" in T. Berman et al. (eds), Clayoauot and Dissent (Vancouver: Ronsdale Cacanadadada Press, 1994), pp. 1-7; Governrnent of British Columbia, Clavoquot Sound Land Use Decision: Backmound Re~ort(Apnl 1993). 393 Charles Chester, "Civil Society, International Regimes, and the Protection of Transboundary Ecosysterns: Defining the International Sonoran Desert Alliance and the YelIowstone to Yukon Conservation Initiative," Journal of International WiIdlife Law and Policy, Vol. 2, Issue 2, 1999, pp. 159- 203. 394 Mike Robinson, The Greenine of British Party Politics (Manchester: Manchester University Ress, 1992); Kathryn Harrison, pas sin^ the Buck: Federalism and Canadian Environmental PoIicy (Vancouver: Public pressure models provide a good account of the initial aims and strategies of the forest environmentai movement in the Clayoquot Sound case. Groups involved in that campaign were predorninantly local and national, and their efforts were directed mainly at the provincial goverment, though they graduaily shifted their focus to the national and international menas as well. In the Great Bear Rainforest campaign, a global civic politics strategy was used from the outset as transnational ENGOs moved to centre stage and launched a global campaign to promote new global norms and reorient the market away from old growth wood and paper products to ones from independently certified and sustainably managed forests. Efforts to protect Clayoquot Sound and the Great Bear Rainforest became part of a larger transnational ENGO global strategy to build nonstate- centered, global norms and procedures to protect the world's dwindling old growth forests.

The Public Pressure Approach Public opinion and public concerns are the driving force in policy change in public pressure models. Basically, such approaches are based on the notion that dernocratic govemrnents are responsive to public demands.395 Paul Burstein writes, 'The struggle for representative democracy has ken predicated upon the belief that if people of a country win the right to vote and to freedom of speech and association, they can influence their government-the govemment will pay attention to their dernand~."3~~These models either look at the idluence of the public as a whole via public opinion polls or at the role of the intermediaries working to promote the public interest, alternatively called pressure groups, public interest groups, or environmental NGOs. A number of public policy theories have examined the role of public opinion and public interest groups in the policy process surrounding BC's forest environment. Jeremy Wilson has applied the policy community

UBC Press, 1996); Paul Wapner, Environmental Activism and World Civic Politics (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1996). . - 395 Robinson, The Gree nine of Brrtish Pa@ Politics, pp. 84-123. approach, and, more recently, Wilson, dong with Ken Lertzman and Jeremy Rayner, have effectively utiIized the advocacy coalition approach to highhght the clashing core beliefs of the environmental advocacy coalition with those of the industrial logging development advocacy coalition.397 In the policy comrnunity approach, policy change is the result of the lobbying activities of institutionalized groups, which are part of the sub-government or policy making body of the comrnunity. The attentive public, comprised of those interested in the issue area, but not involved in the daily workings of policy development, also influences policy, but less so. Paul Pross argues that the attentive public is a force for policy change on those rare occasions when the public is sufficiently mobilized to push government officiais to take control of the issue, override status quo-oriented policy communities, and restructure and create new policy comrnunities.39* Wilson found that the BC government and the forest industry were closely aligned in the forest sector and rernained largely unchallenged for much of BC's history. But the captured policy network opened up slightiy becoming a contested clientelist relationship with the rise of the environmental movement in the 1970s, and a nwnber of other facilitating factors, such as intermittent New Democratic Party government rule in 1972-75 and since 1991.'99 Wilson argues that the primary motivation of the BC govemment was to contain the environmental movement rather than to fundarnentally re-evaluate its forest policies. In the 1990s, the increasingly effective environmental campaign in BC and abroad led to a reappraisal of both the environmental movement's power, and led to an increasing

396 Paul Burstein, "Bringing the Public Back In: Should Sociologists Consider the Impact of Public Opinion on Public Policy?" Social Forces, Vol. 77, No. 1, September 1998, p. 29. 397 Iererny Wilson, "Wilderness Politics in BC: The Business Dominated State and the Containment of Environrnentalisrn," in William Coleman and Grace Skogstad, eds, Policv Communities and Public Policy in Canada: A Structural ADD~O~C~(Mississauga: Copp Clark Pitrnan, 1990), pp. 141-69, and Lertzrnan et al., "Leming and Change in the British Columbia Forest Sector." 398 Paul A. Pross, Group Politics and Public Policy. Second Edition (Toronto: Oxford University Press, 1992). p. 126. 399 Wilson, "Wilderness Politics in BC." role of ideas and learning in the policy-making pr~cess.~mThe forest environmental movement should not sirnply be seen as another actor in either the attentive public or, at best, a marginal player in the subgovernment part of the policy community, rather it is one of two competing advocacy coalitions trying to promote their own belief systems in the policy process while challenging the legitimacy of the opponent's stances. In the advocacy coalition analytical framework, actors are organized into coalitions based on comrnonly held belief systems.401 These belief systems consist of (1) core beliefs and values, altematively called paradigms or worldviews, (2) near core beliefs which outline policy preferences, and (3) secondary beliefs which encompass strategies and tactics to achieve policy goals. Seeing wildemess as sacred is a core belief of the environment advocacy coalition. Other core beliefs include the need to protect ancient rainforest ecosystems in order to preserve biodiversity and the rights of traditional forest d~ellers.~02In contrast, the development coalition advocates a liquidation conversion paradigm in which the belief system consists of "a deep core of anthropocentric, utilitarian conservationist beiiefs" and the concept of sustainable yield.403 The key question for Lertzman, et al., is to distinguish substantial shifts in belief systems from rninor, tactical ones, and to ascertain the causes of these shifts. Paradigms shifts occur when a group changes its core beliefs. Sabatier and others have proposed that paradiam shifts rarely occur, and when they do, noncognitive exogenous factors are the likeiy causal factors, like the appearance of a new systernic goveniing coalition or the emergence of socio-econornic crises. However, some scholars

400 cf. George Hoberg, "Putting Ideas in Their Place: A Response to 'Learning and Change in the British Columbia Forest Policy Sector,'" Canadian Journal of Political Science, Vol. XMX, No. 1, March 1996, pp. 135-144. 401 Paul A. Sabatier and Hank C. Jenkins-Smith (eds), Policy Change and Leamin?: An Advocacy CoaItion A~uroach(Boulder: Westview Press, 1993). 402 Gary Eastcope and Geoff Holloway, "Wilderness as the Sacred: the Franklin River Campaign," in Peter Hay et al. (eds), Environmental Politics in Australia and New Zealand (Occasional Paper 23, Centre for Environmentai Studies, University of Tasmania, Hobart, 1989). pp. 189-201; Lertzman et al., "Learning and Change in the British Columbia Forest Sector." have pointed to endogenous sources of change like the possibility that the process of intellectual debate rnay lead to the adoption of a new paradigm as the inconsistencies and anomalies of the old paradigm become apparent, though political factors, such as concern for prestige, interests, and power often block this type of learning process.404 In the BC forestry case, there is the problem of uncertainty about the impacts on biodiversity of clearcut logging and the Liquidation of vast areas of old growth forests.405 Uncertainty can play a role in fragmenting advocacy coalitions and weakening the power of entrenched interests to resist change. Interestingly, Lertzman found that the idea of legitimacy, another endogenous causal mechanism, operated in undermining the existing paradigrn of the industrial logging advocacy coalition. Legitimating ideas cm potentially provide a "non-crisis path to paradigm shift" by Luniting the freedom of action of the dominant development advocacy coalition. The environmentai advocacy coalition successfully called into question the forest industry's ability to live up to its paradigm's central idea of sustainable yield, and thus the legitimacy of its policies. The BC govemment granted authority to the developrnent advocacy coalition on the premise that the latter's performance "requires legitimation to be publicly acceptable ... In doing so, environmentalists weakened support for the development paradigm and opened space for the presentation of alternative^."^ While the advocacy coalition approach highlights leaming within coalitions - alternatively called policy learning, adaptation, or lesson-drawing - and, to a lesser degree, leaming across coalitions (i-e., paradigrn shifts), the role of public education has been insuffkiently developed in the model. For example, public opinion is seen as an exogenous socio-economic factor which rnay Iead a paradigrn shift, though Lertzrnan

403 Lertzrnan et al., "Learning and Change in the British Columbia Forest Sector," pp. 1 16-1 17. 404 Michael Howlett and M. Ramesh, Studyin- Public Policy: Policy Cycles and Policy Subsvstems (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1995). 405 Lertzrnan et al., "Leaming and Change in the British Columbia Forest Sector," pp. 132-3. 406 Ibid., p. 127. highlighted the idea of legitimacy as a way of bringing the public back in. Sirnilarly, the policy community model focuses on the interactions of players in the sub-govemment, and pays less attention to factors promoting public education and its effects, though Pross concedes that fundamental change often cornes at the prompting of pressure fiom the attentive public. Yet the literature on environmental NGOs highlights societal learning and lobbying as the two key roles played by the environmental rno~ement.~O~ Instead, 1 will apply the Progressive Societal Learning and Social Change Mode1 deveIoped in Chapter Three. 1 will examine the various sources of public education used by the environmental movement in the Clayoquot Sound and Great Bear Rainforest campaigns. These include direct action, the opening up of wilderness trails, transnational media, protest music and art, traveling slide show presentations, and an international boycott of a number of multinational forest companies. In the early phases of this protest movement, a public pressure model is particularly useful since the environmental movement's focus was on promoting government policy change through the mobilization of public opinion and concern.

Clayoquot 's Cmcading Campaign Environmental disputes began in Clayoquot Sound in 1979 when the Governrnent of British Columbia approved plans to log Meares Island-the irnmediate viewscape of the town of Tofino. The same year, Friends of Clayoquot Sound (FOCS), an environmental group, formed in Tofino. In 1984, with MacMillan Bloedel set to log Meares Island, the Tlaq-qui-aht and Ahousaht First Nations joined local environmentaiists in BCYsfirst blockade to stop logging. In response to mounting international attention focused on the area, a moratorium on logging was put in place (still in existence) while the uncertain status

407 Thomas Prince* and Matthias Finger (eds), Environmental NGOs in World Politics: Linkin~the LocaI and the Global (London: Routledge, 1994). of Meares Island, due to outstanding land daims, was the subject of Iitigation before the Supreme Court of British Columbia. In 1988, a blockade in Sulphur Passage in which 36 people were arrested, was followed by almost annual environmental blockades to protest the "talk and log" policies of the provincial governrnent. In addition to direct action, other groups like the Westem Canada Wilderness Cornmittee (WCWC) embarked on major public education carnpaigns. WCWC distributed tens of thousands of newsletters, and built wilderness trails for the public to bear witness to both clearcuts and the magnificence of intact ancient rainforest ecosystems. At this stage, the disputes were covered principally by the provincial media, with little national or international attention. By 1992, environmental groups began to shift tactics by extending the scope of the conflict beyond BCYsborders with a senes of national and international carnpaigns. The FOCS, WCWC and Greenpeace launched national and international slide show presentations in Canada, the United States and Europe, and an international boycott carnpaign against MacMillan Bloedel and International Forest Products. In early 1993, Valerie Langer and photographer Garth Lerz of the FOCS toured England, Germany, and Belgium, with the help of European groups such as BritainysWomen's Environmental

Network, in an attempt to convince European publishers, the public and governments to consider the relationship between their demand for BC forest products and rainforest destruction. Simultaneously, international and national environmental groups based in other countries launched supportive campaigns. Eco-Trust, an affiliate of Conservation International, invited reporters from Latin America to a journalists' conference in Clayoquot Sound in September 1992 to witness Canadian logging practices in the "Brazil of the North." Leading ENGOs in the US, such as Conservation International, Earth Island Institute, National Audubon Society, National Parks and Conservation Association, Rainforest Action Network, Sierra Club, The Wilderness Society, and Westem Ancient Forest Campaign, placed a critical Clayoquot advertisement in the New York Times on January 13, 1993. The conflict culminated in April 1993 when the Govement of British Columbia announced the Clayoquot Sound Land Use Decision after 14 years of "talk and log"

planning processes. It proposed logging in two thirds of the land base, while protecting one third The response of ENGOs was once again to center their campaign on local direct action. The Friends of Clayoquot Sound organized a blockade on a logging road in July 1993. That Sumer, about 12,000 people participated in the Peace Camp set up in a clearcut near Kennedy Lake, and 853 people were arrested in almost daily blockades in Clayoquot, making it the largest civil disobedience movement in Canadian history. The

mass participation and confrontation ensured locaI, national, and international media

coverage, and facilitated the strengthening of the local campaign and its expansion to the national and global levels. The involvement of a large and diverse set of actors in civil society ensured the development of multiple channels for societal leaming (see Table 6.1 on the role of the arts in the Clayoquot campaign). Valene Langer, a director of FOCS, estimates there were more than thiay benefit concerts in Tofino, Victoria, Vancouver, Toronto and elsewhere in 1993 alone.408 In one of the summer's highlights, the Australian rock band Midnight Oil performed at a 6 am. dawn concert at the blockade on Kennedy River bridge on July 18, 1993 before 5,000 fans, while CNN, MTV music network, and other media broadcast the event. Sarah McLachlan per formed on Clayoquot Island in August. In Toronto, a major benefit concert was organized in the Ml, with participation from such rock stars as Alannah Myles. FOCS support groups emerged in a number of Canadian cities in the sumrner of 1993, organizing their own direct actions, including a protest and civil disobedience action

408 Author's interview with Valerie Langer, director of the Friends of Clayoquot Sound (February 12, 1999). Music

Midnight Oil performs in Clayoquot Sound July 18, 1993 before 5,000 fans Sarah McLachlan performs a benefit at the Commodore Ballroom in Vancouver (July 1993) and on Clayoquot Island (August 1993). the tape "Land" was released in 1993 featuring performances by Crash Vegas, Hothouse Flowers, Daniel Lanois, Midnight 0i1, and The Tragically Hip (Lod= am Music, SOCAN) a Toronto Benefit Concert in the Fa11 of 1993 features environmental speakers and performances by Allanah Myles, HolIy Artzen and others the Song album and music video "Sulphur Passage" are released in 1994, written and performed by Bob Bossin with Stephen Fearing, Roy Forbes, Veda Elle, Ann Mortifee, Raffi, Rick Scott, Valdy and Jennifer West FiIm (documentaries)

Western Canada Wilderness Cornmittee, "Save Clayoquot Sound" (Vancouver: Davd Productions Inc.) "Clayoquot Sound," featuring the music of the Changelings (Artisan Recordings Production, 1993) Shelly Wine, Tury for the Sound: The Women at Clayoquot" (TellTale Productions, 1997)

The Global Forest was produced by the Multimedia Ethnographie Research Lab in the Faculty of Education at the University of British Columbia in cooperation with students at the Bayside Middle School. It contains movies, articles and maps dealing with the social, political and ecologicd issues involving the Clayoquot Sound rain forest. Literature, Poetry, and Popular Books

Tzeporah Berrnan et al., Clay uot and Dissent (Vancouver: Ronsdale Cacanadadada Press, 1994) Howard Breen-Needham et al., (eds), The Clavoauot Sound Antholow (Vancouver: Arsenal PuIp Press, 1994) Ron MacIsaac and Anne Champagne (eds), Clav uot Mass Trials: Defending the Rain =forest (Gabriola Id, B.C.: New Society Publishers, 1994) FOCS and WCWC, Meares Island: Protecting:- a Natural Pradise (1995) Adrian Dorst and Cameron Young, Cla~oauot:On the Wild Side (WCWC, 1990) Jean McLaren, S irit Rising (1993) Writcrs' Auction in Vancouver with Peirre Burton, Al Purdy, Bill Reid, Susan Musgrave, mong others (August 1993) at the Toronto Stock Exchange. The WCWC launched a giant stump tour across Canada and the United States, and a Clayoquot Train Caravan made its way from Canada's East Coast to the West in the fa11 of 1993. The Western Canada Wilderness Cornmittee collected about 100,000signatures on a petition calling for the Canadian Government to intervene in the conflict, FOCS and WCWC continued their national and international slide show tours. In 1994, Greenpeace UK in conjunction with Canadian NGOs, successfully pressured Kimberly Clark in the UK to cancel its MacMillan Bloedel contracts. Shortly aftenvards, MacMillan Bloedel lost $5 million worth of pulp contracts when Scott Ltd., a British-based tissue Company, canceled its contracts in response to public concern over the company's logging practices. In the United States, the Clayoquot Rainforest Coalition formed in 1994, consisting of Greenpeace, the Natural Resources Defense Council (NRDC), Coalition for Forests, Pacific Environment and Resource Centre, and the Fnends of Clayoquot Sound, and embarked on a campaign targeted at some of MacMillan Bloedel's biggest US customers, including Pacific Bell, GE,the Wall Street Journal, and the New York Times. In November 1995, the New York Times announced that it would not renew its contract with MacMillan Bloedel.

The Clayoquot ScientzIflc Panel In the face of increasing international scrutiny and pressure, the govemment of British Columbia created the Scientific Panel for Sustainable Forest Practices in CIayoquot Sound on October 22, 1993309 The 19-mernber panel consisted of independent native and non-native experts, and was chaired by Fred Bunnell, the chair of the Centre for Applied Conservation Biology at the University of British Columbia. The panel consisted of scientists from BC and Washington state with expertise in regional ecology and

409 Government of British Columbia, "New Scientific Panel Wi11 Ensure Forest Activities in Clayoquot Stand Up to World Scrutiny," News Release, October 22, 1993. See aiso George Hoberg and Edward Morawski, 'Tolicy Change Through Sector Intersection: Forest and Aboriginal Policy in Clayoquot Sound," Canadian Public Administration, Vol. 40, No. 3, Fa11 1997, pp. 387-414. biodiversity, earth science, fishenes and wildlife biology, landscape management planning, and ethnobotany, and four members designated by the Central Region of the Nuu-chah- nulth Tribal Council, inciuding one chief and three elders. The BC govemment ensured an impartial panel of recognized experts by exchding direct employees of govemment or industry as candidates for the Scientific Panel.410 The Panel's mandate was to develop sustainable forest management practices for Clayoquot Sound by combining traditional, indigenous knowledge, and scientific knowledge. This was the first time conservation biologists and First Nations people had been given a leading role in an important land use planning process. The representatives of the

First Nations' communities brought to the Panel perspectives and knowledge on ecosystem health and the value of forests to their way of life. Conservation biologists introduced a muItidisciplinary, ecological scope and mission-onented mandate. According to conservation biologists, such as Michael Soulé, Thomas Lovejoy and E. O. Wilson, nature reserves should be much larger than previously thought in order to protect the long-term viability of ecosystems, species, and genetic diversity. The main subdiscipiines represented in conservation biology are population genetics, population biology and Iandscape ecology; other subjects range from philosophy and ethics to law to development and to econornics. Conservation biologists' prescriptive mission is to preserve sustainable assemblages of as much of the earth's biodiversity as possible in the context of Iooming crises of global habitat alteration and rnass extinction. Michael Soulé has referred to conservation biologists as "physicians to nature." Just as medicine's goal is preserving human health, so conservation biology's goal is preserving the health of the bi~sphere.~' Conservation biology is a relatively new muIti-disciplinary field. The Society for

Conservation Biology was forrned at the Second Conference on Conservation Biology

410 Scientific Panel for Sustainable Forest Ractices in Clayoquot Sound, Sustainable Forest Ractices In Clavoauot Sound. Re~ortNo. 1, p. 25. which took place in Ann Arbor, Michigan in 1985. The next year, the Society published a new journal entitled Conservation Biolow. The Society and journal have expanded quickly; by 1993 there were 5,000 members and institutional subscribers, and conservation biology programs have dso proliferated at North Amencan universities. Still the field is nascent and research funding for biodiversity has faced severe cuts across Canada in recent years.412 mus, it is not surprising that an epistemic community of conservation biologists does not yet exist in BC. Forestry science is industry-dominated and continues to govem provincial bureaucracies.413 In stark contrast, conservation biologists are not well institutionalized in the environment and forestry departrnents and do not have significant bargaining power in BC. Nevertheless, the Scientific Panel is one of the few instances in which conservation biologists and native experts were institutionalized in an ad hoc way and given significant bargaining power. The Clayoquot Scientific Panels represents an important innovation which bas led to significant and unprecedented changes in the forest paradigm and forestry practices in the region. Conservation biologists and the First Nations representatives on the Panel were able to impart an ecosystem-based paradigm shift on a stubborn and well- entrenched view that BC forest lands should be managed mainly for sustained timber

SUPP~Y. During its tenure, which concluded May 29, 1995, the Panel produced five reports, containing over 170 recommendations for sustainable forest practices in Clayoquot Sound. On July 6, 1995, the BC government announced its intent to fulIy implement al1 of the Scientific Panel's recommendations. Since the Panel's mandate was to define how to log

411 Michael E. Sodé, "Wliat is Conservation Biology? New Synthetic discipline addresses the dynarnics and problems of perturbed species, communities, and ecosystems," BioScience, Vol. 35, No. 11, December 1985, pp. 727-734. 412 Ted Mosquin, ''Statu of and Trends in Canadian Biodiversity," in Stephen Bocking (ed). Biodiversity in Canada: EcoIow. Ideas. and Action (Peterborough: Broadview Fïess, 2000),p. 73. 413 See Wilson, "Wilderness Politics in BC," and Talk and Loe: Wilderness PoIitics in British Columbia, 1965-96 (Vancouver: UBC Press, 1998). Clayoquot Sound in an ecologically responsible way and not whether there should be any logging at all, many environmental activists have never fully embraced the recommendations of the Science Panel. The Friends of Clayoquot Sound, for example, did not accept the conclusions of the Panel since Clayoquot Sound was not considered in the larger ecological context of Vancouver Island - an already highly fragmented landscape. Still, the Science Panel's 1995 recornrnendations challenged the dominant paradip and improved the situation in Clayoquot; environmentaiists have advocated the application of these standards elsewhere in BC.414 In a FOCS evaluation report, Valerie Langer et al. note that the ecosystem-based paradigm shift contained within the Panel's reports is 'revolutionary' in nature:

... under current BC forestry policy, primariiy the Forest Act and tbe Forest Practices Code, forest lands are to be managed for sustained tirnber supply, but the Panel calls for forests to be managed for ecosystem integrity.... The Panel recommends shifting towards an ecosystem-based planned frarnework which puts the health of the ecosystem first. This stands in stark contrast to the voIume-based planning frarnework which governs forestry elsewhere in BC and which seeks first to provide a set flow of wood for the rni~ls.~~~

The panel gave priority to ecological integrity and was very critical of clearcutting as practiced in BC,noting that this harvesting method creates even-aged forests that are significantly different than ones disturbed through natural forces. The positive effects of the Science Panel include: decreasing the volume cut in the region from 323,000 cubic metres in 1995 to 106,000 in 1996; 84,000 in 1997; 17,000 in 1998; and 3 1,000 in 1999, (though the drop in the level of cut was also due to other factors); reducing the annual allowable cut from almost 600,000 cubic metres per year in 1995 to 200,000 cubic meaes per year; deferring logging in pristine valleys until Watershed Plans are drafted; requiring the completion of baseline data pnor to any logging, including a cultural, biological and hydrological study; introducing watershed reserves; and introducing rate-of-cut for

414 Sierra Legal Defeoce Fund, Sierra Club of BC,BC Environmental Network, Silva Forest Foundation. BC Forestrv Remrt Card (Vancouver: April 1998). watersheds, Limiting the area cut in any one watershed to an average of 1% of the watershed area per year.416

0th-Policy Changes In addition to the changes recommended by the Science Panel, four other major changes occurred in governrnent policy and in civil society that substantially increase the prospects for protection in Clayoquot Sound. First, the BC government irnproved the local decision making process by increasing the involvernent of First Nations and the local comrnunity. In March 1994, the provincial governrnent signed an Interirn Measures Agreement with the hereditary chiefs of the five First Nations bands in Clayoquot Sound. The agreement serves as a bridging mechanism to a treaty while treaty negotiations are under way. Under the agreement, a Central Region Board was created, comprised of a cornmittee of five First Nations and five provincially-appointed representatives to deliberate and approve logging plans and cutblock pennits, aquaculture pennits, and other resource extraction issues.

Second, MacMillan Bloedel closed its logging operations in Clayoquot Sound in 1997. The Company, committed to selling large volumes of minimally processed wood, was losing money in the new Clayoquot regime. In April it signed an agreement with the Nu Chah NuIth native comrnunity to form a Joint Venture Corporation called Iisaak Forest Resources. MacMillan Bloedel's logging operations in CIayoquot have been drastically reduced. It used to harvest 400,000 cubic meters a year from Clayoquot Sound, but under the new joint venture, Iisaak is planning to cut lower volumes (10,000 cubic metres in

2000), and tc access prerniurn niche markets. In a move that substantially increased corporate concentration, MacMillan Bloedel was bought out by Weyerhaeuser, the world's

415 Valerie Langer, Maryjka Mychajlowycz, Sergio Paone, Matîhew Pnce, and Ji11 Thornpson. Im~lementingthe Scientific Panel: Three Years and Counting (Tofino: The Friends of Clayoquot Sound, 1998). largest producer of softwood Iumber and pulp, in June 1999 (though it has prornised to honour MacMillan Bloedel's commitments in the Sound). Meanwhile, International F~rest Product (Interfor), which controls one third of the Sound (MacMillan Bloedel, now Weyersaeuser, controls the other two thirds), continues to log at high rates in Clayoquot unabated; it plans to log dunng most of its remaining tenure in the Sound (2005), with up to 70 cutblocks envisioned. The Fnends of Clayoquot Sound have set up intermittent blockades (in the fa11 of 1998 and in the summer of 1999) in Catface Mountain to oppose Interfor's road building in the area. Third, a Memorandurn of Understanding (MOU) was signed between four environmental groups and Iisaak Forest Resources in June 1999. The negotiations that led to the deal followed a short blockade of a logging camp by Greenpeace and FOCS in June 1996, protesting the failure of logging companies to uphold the principles of the Scientific

Panel. In a major ium of events, Iisaak agreed not to log in any pristine valleys within its tenure in Clayoquot Sound and to phase out logging of old growth - though no timeline was attached. Environmental groups, for their part, agreed to promote Iisaak's products. Greenpeace, Sierra Club of BC, Western Canada Wildemess Cornmittee, and the US based Natural Resources Defense Council signed the MOU, whereas FOCS did not sign - even though it participated in the negotiations - since Zisaak will continue to log old growth forests. Fourth, the United Nations designated Clayoquot Sound a Biosphere Resewe in January 2000. The UNESCO designation gives international recognition to the ecological importance of Clayoquot's ancient temperate rainforest ecosystem; however, the designation does not provide for new enforceable environmental rules. The federal governent has set up a $12 million Biosphere Trust Fund which is to be used by

416 Maryjka Mychajlowycz, "Effeces of Science Panel in Clayoquot Sound," Friends of Cla~oquotSound Newsletter, Spring 2000, p. 6. comrnunities and businesses in the region for research, education and training projects aimed at developing sustainable practices. These policy changes, dong with the Science Panel's recommendations, have presented an unprecedented challenge to industrial forestry. In the words of Valerie Langer, a FOCS director, "Clayoquot Sound has proven to be the creative ground for solutions to the artless practice of ecological destr~ction.~~~l~In addition, mapping the significance of the Clayoquot carnpaign goes kyûnd ~"icEst of pïûtectiue zxzsures related to the Sound itself. The mass mobilization in Clayoquot had spillover effects, aiding efforts to protect other areas like the Great Bear Rainforest. Following Clayoquot, conditions were ripe for the environmental movement to concentrate on European and Arnerican markets and to broaden the concern beyond Clayoquot Sound.

The Global Civic Politics Approach Pau1 Wapner defines global civic society as that layer of associational life that exists above the individual and below the state, but also across state boundaries.418 Transnational environmental groups are part of global civil society since they are stahoned in many countries and operate in the globai political arena. They attempt to influence global environmental politics through the use of global civic politics, that is, strategies that employ transnational econornic, social, and cultural networks to change the behaviour of larger collectivities within and across societies. As Wapner writes:

World civic politics works underneath, above, and around the state to bring about widespread change. Its approach to gIobal environmental governance rests on the view that the state system alone cannot solve Our environmental woes. .. The dynarnics of environmental harm exceed the workings of the state ~~stern...~~~

417 Valerie Langer, "1s there hope in the Biosphere Reserve?' The Friends of Clavoquot Sound Newsletter, Spring 2000, p. 2. 418 Paul Wapner. Environmental Activisrn and World Civic Politics, p. 4. 419 Ibid., p. 9. Although Wapner focuses on the political relevance of the civic dimension of NGO

activities, he begins with the assumption that states are the key actors in environmental protection, and argues that ENGOs are well aware of this political reality. In fact, "in each

case, actors do not ignore the state but rather make a strategic decision to explore the political potential of unofficial realms of collective action."420 Thus transnational and local ENGOs usually attempt to achieve their aims fmt through pressure group tactics aimed at state power, but when this route fails they use global civic politics. In the Clayoquot Sound campaign, ENGOs first targeted govemments, but when these efforts produced little payoff they worked to politicize the issue in global civil society. Matt Price of the Friends of Clayoquot Sound wntes, "In the face of utter intransigence on the part of the forest industry and government, the only thing that will ultimately Save BC's forests is market edu~ation."~2'

Wapner makes a number of clairns related to the functioning and poli tical ~i~~ficanceof global civic politics strategies. Transnational NGOs have enormous capabilities, through their work in promoting an ecological sensibility, implementing environmental projects, and utilizing the complex interdependencies between states and other actors to promote environmental protection. Wapner argues that transnational NGOs often engage in global civic politics as an end in itself, that is, not necessarily directed instrumentally at the state, since changes in civil society can make a significant contribution to environmental protection. Two types of global civic politics strategies will be explored in this section: fxst the development of global moral noms or an "ecological sensibility", and secondly, the use of international market forces to spur private regime development.

Acting and Thinking Globally: the Case of the Great Beur Rainforest

420 Ibid., p. 5. 421 Matt Ptice, "FOCS on the Road Again (Legally)," The FrÏends of Clayoquot Sound Newsletter, Surnmer 1997, p. 9. The Great Bear Rainforest carnpaign cm, in many ways, be seen as a continuation of the Clayoquot mas campaign. The latter aimed at protecting the ecologically significant and fairly intact Clayoquot Sound ecosystem which includes iarge pristine watersheds (e-g., the Moyeha, Megin, Sidney, Clayoquot and Ursus Rivers) covering 350,000 hectares. The Great Bear Rainforest stretches over an area of 2.5 million hectares of pristine wilderness - ten times the size of Clayoquot Sound - extending from north of Bute Inlet (across from the north end of Vancouver Island) up to Alaska. It contains 69 unlogged watershed~.~~~Many of the same NGO players were involved and sirnilar strategies and tactics were used. However, in the Great Bear Rainforest campaign, there

was a clear shift towards giving primacy to the global campaign: unlike the Clayoquot

campaign, the employrnent of global civic politics was central in defining the thmst of the Great Bear Rainforest campaign from the outset. A number of indicators attest to the shift from a public pressure to a global civic politics approach in the increasing globalization of the BC ancient rainforest issue. First, the transnational network of environmental groups involved expanded and broadened considerably; second, there was a clear shift in favour of global over local campaigning and a greater focus on industry rather than the state; and third, public education carnpaigns targeted audiences and participants in the transnational civil society in an effort to establish alternative, NGO-led global noms and institutions.

Transnational NGO ~nvolvernent An impressive array of local and international NGOs coalesced in the global campaign to protect BC's remaining ancient temperate rainforests. On the one hand, major, established environmental groups in other countries launched supportive carnpaigns to protect Canada's rainforests, and, on the other, new groups emerging from the mass

422 Greenpeace, The Great Rear Rainforest: A Report on the Ecolow and Global lrnmrtance of Canada's Temperate Rainforest ( 1997). mobilizations in the Clayoquot protests were ready to take on the Great Bear Rainforest campaign. The intemationalization was particularly evident in the new activism of Greenpeace International. Tzeporah Bernian, the Clayoquot blockade coordinator in the summer of 1993, moved from FOCS to Greenpeace International in 1994. In her new role as biodiversity campaigner, she coordinated a major, muki-faceted carnpaign involving various Greenpeace offices worldwide, including those in the US, Germany, Belgium, UK, Russia and Canada. In Novernber 1996, Greenpeace International adopted the BC temperate rainforest issue as one of its main focus areas for the coming year, alongside clirnate change and toxic chemical pollution. Greenpeace has off~cesin 41 countries, 2.5 million members worldwide, access to satellite media technol~~gy,and an eco-navy and a helicopter enabling it to reach the remote areas of BC's coastal rainforest.423 The Rainforest Action Network (RAN),a major transnational environmental group, with a history of success with corporate strategies and tactics, also adopted a BC rainforest campaign in 1994. RAN has a central office in San Francisco and about hundred and fifty afiliated rainforest action groups (RAGS) throughout the world. Chris Hatch, fomerly a

key environmentalist working with the Friends of CIayoquot Sound and Greenpeace Canada, becarne RAN's campaign coordinator in 1994, overseeing a series of grassroots direct action and market education activities. At the same time, the heightened interest and experience with activism in BC led to the formation of new groups and coalitions in support of the Great Bear Rainforest campaign. In 1994, Greenpeace USA, RAN, and the Natural Resources Defense Council transfomed the Clayoquot Rainforest Coalition into the Coastal Rainforest Coalition (CRC). The CRC's mandate was broadened to include "protecting the ancient rainforests of British Columbia by redirecting US markets toward ecologically sound alternatives." Also, the Forest Action Network (FAN), one of RAN's rainforest action groups in BC, becarne internationalized. FAN was founded in the summer of 1993 in Clayoquot Sound

423 Wapner, Envimnrnental Activisrn and World Civic Politics; Dale, McLuhan's Children. by activists who undertook more radical direct action, such as tree-sitting, in contrast to FOCS'S favoured strategy of blockading logging roads. FAN became a major player in the Great Bear Rainforest struggle, setting up an office in Bella Coola, near the Great Bear Rainforest, in 1995. The local Nuxalk Nation and FAN supporters initiated a joint tree-sit and blockade at Ista (Fog Creek) on Nuxlknalus (King Island) near Bella Coola in September 1995 in an attempt to stop Interfor from constructing a logging road into their unceded traditional temtory. Twenty-two people were arrested (sixteen Nuxalk, and six environmentalists). Soon several new FAN satellite groups fonned abroad in the UK, Switzerland, and the US to assist with international slide show tours in the United States and Europe, to track timber imports, and to organize international protests. In 1997, FAN organized high profile protests at Canadian embassies in Great Britain, Germany, and Switzerland.

The Strategy of Global Civic Politics Greenpeace International, in conjunction with local environmental groups and the Nuxalk people, took the lead in developing a two-pronged strategy to protect the Great Bear Rainforest. First, a series of nonviolent strategic direct actions were undertaken in the spnng of 1997 to draw attention to the problem, followed by a major international market carnpaign launched the following surnmer. Consistent with Wapner's expectations, the direct action campaign consisteà of two broad strategies designed to develop an "ecological sensibility." The direct action campaign began with "simply bringing instances of environmental abuse to the attention of people throughout the world" via the transnational mass media, and secondly, "to expose the gap between the rhetoric and the practices of

govenunents, corporations, and ordinary citizens...'"Q4

The first task of ENGOs was to establish name recognition for the remote, expansive area. The largely intact, ancient temperate rainforest in the rnid Coast of British Columbia lacked an alluring image and name. As a result, Greenpeace activists coined the phrase "Great Bear Rainforest" prior to the launch of their public campaign in 1997. With

narne in hand, the campaign began with the release of two major reports. The fmt highlighted the gap between the BC government's rhetoric and practices in implementing the Forest Practices Code and Protected Areas Strategy, and the second outlined the ecologicd significance of the area, provided detailed maps, and presented the threats posed to it in the next ten years by the allocative decisions of governrnent and industryS425 Having prepared the cognitive framework, environmental organizations undertook major direct actions in the Great Bear rainforest, occupied barges on the high seas and at ports, and various embassy and corporate protests abroad. On site, environmental groups and First Nations peoples organized two blockades of logging roads. On Roderick Island, in May 1997, Greenpeace activists stopped the logging operations of Western Forest Products (Doman Industries) by locking themselves onto logging equipment, and set up a floaring base camp near Green Inlet with the support of the Greenpeace vesse1 MV Moby Dick to monitor the clearcut logging activities. In June, four environmental groups (Greenpeace, Bear Watch, FAN,and People's Action for Threatened Habitat or PATH) joined the Nuxalk hereditary chiefs and people in blockading the logging operations of International Forest Products' (Interfor's) contractor on Ista (also known as King Island) - a rainforest valley considered sacred to the Nuxalk people because it is the site where,

according to their creation story, the first woman descended to the world. On June 24,

424 Wapner, Environmental Activisrn and World Civic Politics, pp. 54-57. 425 Greenpeace and the Sierra Legal Defense Fund, Broken Promises: The Tmth About What's Happening . . - 10 Rntish Columbia. s Forests (April 1997). and Greenpeace, The Great Bear Rainforest: A Re~orton the Ecolow and Global Tmwrtance of Canada's Temperate Rainforest (June 1997) twenty-four native and environmental activists were arrested after having stopped the Iogging operations for eighteen days. Meanwhiie, six Greenpeace activists from the Greenpeace vesse1 the MV Arctic Sunrise occupied the Seaspan Kgger, a large log barge carrying 400 truckloads (or 15,000 cubic meters) of timber from Interfor's Iogging operations in the Great Bear Rainforest destined for export after minimal processing. The activists occupied the barge for four days, unfurling a 50 by 30 foot banner reading "Don't Buy Rainforest Destmction-Greenpeace." The purpose of these actions was to bear witness to the fate of BC's forests, and to alert global audiences via the mass media. At the sarne hme, environrnental groups launched direct action and public information campaigns in Europe and the United States. FAN and Urgewald, a German environmental group, organized a European carnpaign tour of Nuxalk native leaders in April 1997. They visited 15 cities in five countries, presenting slide shows, appearing before parliamentary meetings, touring ecological forest operations, and setting up a network of activists and groups in preparation for the coming campaigns in Europe against Interfor, DomadWestern Forest Products, MacMillan Bloedel, AvenorIPacific Forest Products and Timber West. Further, on June 25, Greenpeace activists protested outside the Canadian High Commission in London with the syrnbol of their campaign - "an angry twenty foot grizzly bear."426 The event was timed one day after Canadian Prime Minister Jean Chretien spoke at the Five Year Assessrnent of the Eaah Surnmit in New York. Having raised awareness of clearcut logging in the Great Bear Rainforest, environrnental activists turned to a focused international market campaign in 1998 - the second prong of the campaign. The market strategy was in part a continuation of the international initiatives undertaken to protect Clayoquot Sound. However, it received a major boost in the Great Bear Rainforest campaign, as groups like Greenpeace International and its various national affiliate offices and the US Coastal Rainforest Coalition redoubled

426 Greenpeace, "Giant Bear Protests Outside Canadian High Commission in London," News Release, June 25, 1997. their efforts to redirect markets away from BC's old growth forest exports in Europe, the United States, and Japan. The groups did not launch a general boycott campaign against Canada, but a targeted one aimed at the customers of four BC Iogging companies (MacMillan Bloedel, Interfor, West Fraser, and Western Forest Products). For example, in March 1998, Greenpeace UK activists scaled the Crane of the Saga Wind cargo ship carrying wood and pulp from the Western Forest Product in the Scottish port of Greenock, near Glasgow, and unfiirled a 17-metre banner that read "Don't Buy Canada's Great Bear Rainforest Destruction." Four days later, German Greenpeace activists chained themselves to the gates of the Clariant plant, a giant international chemicd Company, to protest its pulp purchases from Western Forest Products. In June, the Coastal Rainforest Coalition sent out 5,000 letters to US corporations urging them to boycott BC wood and paper products from old growth forests. In October, groups launched a campaign against Home Depot. The Rainforest Action Network in coalition with hundreds of regional and national environmental and human rights groups staged 85 concurrent protests at Home Depot stores in 35 Amencan States.

Transnational Public Education The public education campaigns focused on a transnational rather than a local or national audience. Target audiences clearIy differed in the two campaigns: the Clayoquot Sound protests began by educating and mobilizing local BC communities, then Canadian, and, finally, international publics; the Great Bear rainforest campaign pnmarily targeted European and US opinion. Further, the level of public involvement in the two campaigns differed rnarkedly. For example, in the 1997 sumrner blockades in the Great Bear Rainforest, only 28 people were arrested in contrast to more than 900 people in the Clayoquot blockades. Even the direct actions at the Great Bear Rainforest had a strong global character. A solid international contingent participated in the blockades and barge action: two Germans, an Austnan and a Canadian were arrested in the Rodderick Island actions; several Gerrnan, Irish, Belgian and Dutch activists at the Ista Island blockade; and Russian and Australian activists in the barge action. WhiIe the Clayoquot protest involved a rich assortment of local and domestic civil society, the remoteness of the Great Bear rainforest, and the urgency of the issue required, from an environmentalist perspective, an immediate leap to transnational civil society, specifically those countries that buy BC's old gowth rainforest products (namely, Europe and the US). In sum, the global civic politics approach bat accounts for the nature and content of the Great Bear Rainforest campaign. Strong evidence supports Wapner's hypotheses that transnational ENGOs often engage in global civic politics as an end in itself, that is, they direct many of their activities at transnational societies and markets rather than state power. Wapner's second major argument - that global civic politics can have a significant effect on environmental politics - is assessed in the next section. The efforts of environmental groups to advance alternative global noms and promote market education resulted in a series of contract cancellations, the creation of an independent forest product certification system and buyers' groups, and, finally, changes in govemment and forest Company polic y.

Global Noms and Green Markets: Govemance Without Govemment The Great Bear Rainforest campaign largely bypassed the state. hstead, ENGOs worked directly to establish transnational, non-govemmental rules and procedures to govern the interaction between nonstate actors in an interdependent world. Market pressure coupled with awareness-raising direct action campaigns were designed to effect change in both global noms and consumer and corporate behaviour. Paul Wapner argues that spreading an "ecological sensibility" within and across societies is a key function of NGOs. Wapner points to a number of indicators of an ecological sensibility, such as "changes in discourse, the politicization of issues, mass acceptance of previously controversial perspectives, and the broadening of concem."42?

The Great Bear Rainforest carnpaign is less than three years old, though together with other rainforest campaigns, arguably has raised awareness arnong transnational publics and businesses of the ecological costs of clearcut logging in the last remaining pristine rainforest valleys, and the need to reduce wood consumption, use ecologically-sound non- wood fibers, and increase reliance on wood certified under the accreditation of the Forest Stewardship Council. Chris Hatch, the carnpaign director for RAN, argues a key to preservation is establishing new social noms like old growth forests are sacred.

Selling old growth wood products is like killing eIephants for ivory, or making ashtrays out of goda paws. With a new millennium dawning-and with plenty of alternatives already on the market - it's simply immoral to make consumer goods outs of the world's last ancient trees, some as old as 2,000 years.428 At the sarne the, greater corporate accountability can be obtained via direct market pressure and the shifting incentive structures towards eco-certified products. The market campaign was initiated in the latter stages of the Clayoquot carnpaign. With the launching of the Great Bear Rainforest campaign in 1996, environmental groups intensified efforts by demonstrating against and promoting a boycott of corporations that continued to use old-growth products. In November 1997, B&Q, Britain's largest home improvement chain, canceled their orders for Hemlock and Cedar from suppliers that sel1 products from BC's old growth forests. In March 1998, Do It Al1 announced that it would stop buying al1 Canadian hemlock because it was not certified by the Forest Stewardship Council. In Iate 1998, the Coastal Rainforest Coalition secured the agreement of more than 20 major US companies, including IBM, Nike, Hallmark, Bristol-Myers, Squibb, 3M, and

427 Wapner, Environmental Activism and World Civic Politics, p. 64. 428 Chris Hatch cited in Rainforest Action Network, ''Logging Giant's Groundbreaking Forest Plan Wins Kudos From Greens: Canada's Largest Logging Company Takes Important Step Towards Ending Old Growth Logging," Press Release, June 10, 1998.. Lockheed Martin, to halt the use of products made from old-growth trees logged out of BC's rainforests.429 Between 1997 and 1999, the boycott campaign has cost West Fraser, Western Forest Products, and International Forest Products (or Interfor) - the fourth, fifth and sixth largest BC timber companies by volume respectively - an estirnated $70 million in contract cancellations.430 Moreover, the more than 20 major US corporations which have pledged to find substitutes for wood and wood products from ancient forests represent nearly $2 billion of the US paper and package rnarkets.431 Since that cime, there have been a dizzying set of additional corporate commitrnents made from Forhme 500 corporations to the major lumber users in the home improvement, fumiture, and constmction sectors in the US and European markets. The Rainforest Action Network led a major campaign against Home Depot, starting in 1992, to persuade the largest building supply retailer in the world to phase out the sale of old growth forest products. RAN worked with a coalition of grassroots groups, including the American Lands Alliance, Student Environmental Action Coalition, Sierra Student

Coalition, Action Resource Centre, and FAN. In 1992, Home Depot announced that it would phase out its teak fumiture line, and, in 1997, it agreed to prahibit the sale of old- growth redwood products from the American West Coast forests. Finally, after enduring hundreds of demonstrations across the US and Canada, several shareholder's actions, and celebrity protests (see Table 6.2), Home Depot agreed, in August 1999, to phase out old growth wood products by 2002, and, further, to favour suppliers whose products are certified by the Forests Stewardship Counci1.432

429 Coastal Rainforest Coalition. Website: ht~://www.coalitionrbc.orgl. 430 Tzeporah Berman, Interview with Greenpeace International's biodivenity carnpaigner, lanuary 1999. 43 Jane Kay, "FirmsVow to Forgo Old-Growth Trees," San Francisco Examiner, Decernber 8. 1998. 432 Rainforest Action Network, "Old Growth Campaign Timeline," http://www.ran.org/ranancampaigns/old~1(April28,Zûûû) Table 6.2. The Role of the Arts in the Great Bear Rainforest Carnpaim

Film

"Green Dream$: The Forest Debate" (Corky Productions, 1997) Books

Ian McAIlister and Karen McAllister with Cameron Young, The Great Bear Rainforest: Canada's For~ottenCoast (Madeira Park, B.C.: Harbour Publishing, 1997)

Timber was produced by Greenpeace UK. Enlisting music and film stars Actors Ed Begley, Jr. and Barbara Williams participated in a protest at the Canadian Consulate in Los Angeles (May 13, 1997) Rock group R.E.M. wrote a public letter to Home Depot, urging the chain to end its purchase of B.C. old growth forest products (1998) Since Home Depot's announcement, five of the top ten do-it-yourself stores in the US have agreed to elirninate their most environmentally destructive wood supplies. Further, in November 1999, KEA, the international home furnishings retailer. agreed to phase out "al1 purchases of products made from unknown sources of wood to ensure that no wood originates from ancient forests," except ancient wood fiom FSC certified forestry operations .433 Next, US environmental groups set their sights on the US home construction industry. In January 2000, RAN launched its campaign by unfurling banners at the National Home Builders Convention in Dallas. It gave two of the top US companies two months to revise their policies before launching what promised to be a major public campaign, including protests at the companies' new-home developments and a major billboard and public information adveaising carnpaign. The campaign aimed to eliminate the use of wood from old growth forests from US home construchon, especially wood from endangered forest types from British Columbia, the US and Indonesia. In March 2000, Centrex Homes and Kaufman and Broad, two of the US largest homebuilders, agreed to endorse procurement policies which would end their use of wood from endangered old gowth forests in new home construction. These market education carnpaigns coincided with the development of NGO-led institutions like the Forest Stewardship Council (FSC). The FSC was founded in September 1993 in Toronto by a host of environmental, community forest and indigenous people's organizations, including the World Wildlife Fund, Greenpeace, Cultural SuMval, and the Hoopa Tribe, timber trade representatives, and forest certification organizations. The global FSC network consists of an International office and Secretariat located in Oaxaca in southem Mexico, and national contacts or working groups in 16 c0untries.~3~

433 Greenpeace, "Greenpeace Welcomes New Policy Cornmitment fiom KEA on Ancient Forests," News Release, November 24, 1999. 434 These are Belgium. Bolivia, Brazil, Canada, Columbia, Denmark, Finland, Gemany, Ireland, Mexico, The Netherlands, Papua New Guinea, Sweden, Switzerland, United Kingdom and United States. The aim of FSC is to provide a credible, independent, international certification standard which can assure customers worldwide that the wood and paper they are buying are derived from ecologically and socidy responsible Iogging practices. The process involves an independent third party confirrning that a product has been produced sustainably in accordance with ancient forest concems and Fùst Nations issues. By early 1999, more than 15 million hectares of forests were FSC-certified.435 Products derived from these forests cany the FSC-registered trademark, allowing consumers to reward good corporate behaviour, and thus providing a market incentive for improved forest management. Furthermore, environmental groups, such as the World Wildlife Fund-UK, have prornoted the development of a network of buyers' groups - independent, voluntary parinerships between NGOs and buyers of forest products whose members share a cornmitment to carry independently certified forest products. The "Group of 95 Plus" is the most prominent buyers' group, comprised of 85 members, including B&Q, Homebase, Do It All, Wickes, Boots the Chernist, Tarmac, Tetrapack and W. H. Smith, representing about 20% of al1 retail sales of wood and paper. Set up by the World Wildlife Fund and a group of British companies in 1991, the Group of 95 Plus has promised to buy only FSC- endorsed forest products b y the year 2000. Buyers groups have also emerged in Australia, Austria, Belgium, Denmark, France, Germany, Greece, Holland, Ireland, Japan, North America, Spain, and S~itzerland.~36In North America, the Certified Forest Products Council was set up in the fa11 of 1997, through the merger of the Forest Products Buyers Group and the Good Wood Alliance, to promote the specification and purchase of certified forest products via its quatterly newsletter, the Understory, and Intemet resources that provide links between buyers and sellers of certified forest products. The overall effect of

435 World Wildlife Fund, "Certification Hits More Than 15 Million Hectares WorIdwide," News Release. January 21, 1999 (se http://www.panda.org/forests4life/news/n). 436 See the World Wildlife Fund UK website for details on other buyers' groups and links to other relevant web sites. these initiatives is to increase demand for FSC wood and papa products, and apply pressure on BC logging companies to change strategies. MacMillan Bloedel (now owned by Weyerhauser), the largest logging Company in Canada and Clayoquot Sound, had been a pariah for the forest environment movement, agreed to alter fundamentally a number of its positions. In 1997, it substantially reduced logging in Clayoquot Sound and, in 1998, it announced that it would phase out clearcutting in the next five years. Moreover, it left the BC Forest Alliance, a public relations group promoting the big logging cornpanies set up by the consulting fm Burston Marstellar after environmental groups were gaining ground. MacMillan B loedel also hired Herb Harnmond, a renowned eco-forester, to critique their business plans in Clayoquot Sound, and deferred logging in pristine valleys of the Great Bear Rainforest, including Koeye region. This corporate policy change was, in part, prompted by a new Chief Executive

Officer, Tom Stephens. At the beginning of 1998, Stephens launched a major research project to consider alternative logging methods.437 In May 1999, Western Forest Products

also agreed to phase out clearcutting after facing a series of contract can~ellations.~3~Both companies were responding to the contract cancellations obtained by NGOs like Greenpeace, Wm3;-UK, and Rainforest Action Nehvork, and the new market opportunities for certified wood products.

The Y2Y Conservation Initiative: Scientists and Private Znternational Regime-Building Complementing the work of the transnational environmental movement's efforts at establishing an alternative regime based on new noms and the Forest Stewardship Council, conservation biologists have played a key role in setting up the Yellowstone to Yukon Conservation Initiative (Y2Y) - another private international regime. The Y2Y

437 Ruth Wnlker, "Seeing the Forest To Save the Trees," The Christian Science Monitor, July 3 1, 1998, p. 7. areas covers 1.2 million square kilometers and nins 3200 kilometers through the Rocky Mountains from the Wind River range of western Wyoming to the Mackenzie range in the Canadian noahem temtorïes.439 This emerging "transboundary conservation regirne" began following a meeting held in Kananaskis, Alberta, in 1993.440 Subsequently, a number of meetings were heid between 1995 and 1997 in which participants created a Y2Y Council consisting of al1 participating individuals and organizations, and a Coordinating Cornmittee comprised of active participants appointed by the Council. Their first off~cial conference took place in October 1997, entitled "Connections: The First Conference of the Yellowstone to Yukon Conservation Initiative." Y2Y is based on three central principles of conservation biology: connectivity, ecological processes, and umbrella species. Charles Chester writes:

First, in the context of large carnivores, the principle of connectivity holds that interconnecting wildlife corridors are necessary to maintain large carnivores in isolated protected areas. Second, the principle of "ecologicai processes" entails the maintenance of hydrological and nutrient cycles, biotic interactions such as predator-prey and mutualistic relations, genetic differentiation between populations, and other periodic events and cycles. Third, the umbrella species pnnciple holds that the protection of sufficient habitat for large carnivores should in turn protect the majority of other species .... The focus was on conservation of large carnivores, and the concept was to some degree inspired by a fernale wolf that, over an 18- month period, was tracked moving 840 km dong the Rocky Mountains over 30 different political juris~iiction.~~~

Conservation biologists and environmentalists are using civic politics in an attempt to protect more fully biodiversity in the area, replacing it with the current system of small

438 Greenpeace, 'Tirnber West Takes First Step on Road to Sustainable Forestry, Says Greenpeace," News Release, May 10, 1999, and "Greenpeace Condemns Logging of Pristine Valley by Western Forest Products," News Release, July 8, 1998. 439 Yellowstone to Yukon Conservation Initiative web site: http://www.r0ckies.ca/Y2Y/. 440 Charles Chester, "Civil Society, International Regimes, and the Protection of Transboundary Ecosysterns: Defining the International Sonoran Desert Alliance and the Yellowstone to Yukon Conservation Initiative," Journal of International Wildlife Law and Policv, Vol. 2, Issue 2, 1999. pp. 159- 203. Chester, "Civil Society, International Regirnes, and the Protection of Transboundary Ecosysterns." p. 179. and isolated protected areas. A Y2Y pamphlet notes: "Existing national, state and provincial parks and wildemess areas will anchor the system, while the creahon of new protected areas and the conservation and restoration of critical segments of ecosystems wiZl provide the cores, conidors and transition zones needed to complete it.''42 The goal of the Y2Y initiative is to merge scientific research with activism. Over 100 organizations participate in Y2Y and at least 20 individuals sit on the Coordinating Cornmittee. Activities include:

the production of a 138-page atlas on resources in the Y2Y ecoregion with sections on the Y2Y concept, the region's ecological and economic status, a sumrnary of threats to habitat and trends, a discussion of the implications of threats and trends, and First Nationmative American issues; the development of "Conservation Plans 2000" in which seven subregions in the Y2Y area are to develop conservation maps portraying the protected core areas, corridors, and transition zones for wildlife protection by the iate Mi of 20O0; the development of a Biosciences Program to educate US conservationists about the Y2Y initiative, encourage regular communication between scientists working in the region, and strengthen scientific research that supports the Y2Y prograrn; and public education through the production of pamphlets and reports, a website, a Y2Y listserver, and the work of the Y2Y Outreach Coordinator whose main tasks are working with Y2Y participants, conducting capacity-building workshops, developing a strategic communications plan, and generally "increasing public awareness and countering negative 'wise use' pres~P3

The response of the Forest Alliance of BC, an organization representing forest firms, was to commission a report arguing that the Y2Y initiative would cost BC 80,000 jobs, ignoring the fact that mechanization costs forest workers most of the job 10sses.~ The Y2Y functions as a transboundary advocacy network (TAN) in which, according to Margaret Keck and Kathryn Sikkink, "alternative channels of communication"

442 Yellowstone to Yukon Conservation Initiative, The Yellowstone to Yukon Conservation Initiative: To Restore and Protect the Wild Heart of North America (no date) dittp://www.rockies.ca/Y2Y/> 443 Chester, "Civil Society, International Regirnes, and the Protection of Transboundary Ecosysterns," p. 183. 444 ChancelIor Partners, The Potentil a Eco0 nm' on the Economv of British Columbia, 1998. are employed to produce, exchange and strategically use inf0rmation.~5 However, Chester prefers to categorize the Y2Y as a pnvate international regime, since the Y2Y represents more than "nodes of information transfer," though he acknowledges that Keck and Sikkink also look at the role NGOs play in setting up global principles, noms and practices. Chester analyses the Y2Y as a set of principles (the biological and cultural character of the region), noms (working with a diverse set of groups across a large set of political jurisdictions), and decision-making procedures (consensus-onented)_ Still Chester concludes that the Y2Y regime does not have rules since the participants in the Y2Y initiative cannot "impose any direct authority over what happens." The regime is embedded in civil society and "cm only attempt to influence the activities of those in power .... What States do within a state-centered regime is vested with sovereign authority and directly

affects societal behavior; what NGOs do within a private regime is accomplished by cajoling, lobbying, and educating, and only indirectly affects societal behavior.""6

Comparing the Roles of Scientists and the Environmental Movement A cornparison of the influence of the environmental movement and conservation biologists on changes in policy and civil society leads to the conclusion that the environmental movement has been driving change for some tirne whereas the latter are only beginning to enter the policy process and to use effectively transnational civic politics. The BC governrnent was forced to introduce a number of policy changes in response to public and market pressure generated by the 1993 blockades in Clayoquot Sound and the market transformation carnpaign. The 1995 Scientific Panel for Sustainable Forest Practices in Clayoquot Sound, and the BC-wide Forest Practices Code, also introduced in 1995, can be

Margaret E. Keck and Kathryn Sikkink, Activists Bevond Borders: Advocacv Networks in International Politics (Ithaca: Corne11 University Press, 1998). 446 Chester, "Civil Society, International Regimes, and the Protection of Transboundary Ecosystems," pp. 201 and 200. partly attributed to ENGO campaigns, as cm the closing of MacMillan Bloedel's logging division in the Sound in late 1997. Furthemore, the private forest regime created by the transnational environmental rnovement is clearly more advanced than the nascent Y2Y conservation regime set up by conservation biologists. Virginia Haufler defines regime effectiveness in terms of the ability of an NGO regime to withstand opposition from governrnent policy-makers when the interests of states and non-state actors come into direct conflict. Haufler writes, "the ultimate test of effectiveness would be the implementation of noms and rules in the face of opposition from states, since states cm press their claims through the use of legitimate force."M7 States generally have the upper hand given their resources, expert staff, and their

ability to mobilize public opinion. Still there is much evidence to suggest that the networks of transnational ENGOs have been successful in building an alternative regime. First, industry and govemment public relations campaigns were primarily concemed with opposing ENGO activities rather than scientists. The BC forestry industry and the logging unions set up a BC Forest Alhance and 'Share' groups in their attempts to preserve the Clayoquot Sound Land Use Decision. ENGO market campaigns in Europe and the US have ken countered by campaigns initiated by logging companies and their associations in cooperation with Canadian Embassies. For exarnple, Western Forest Products sent their chief forester to Great Britain to counter the claims of FAN UK, while the Canadian Embassy, concemed by the cornmitment of "Group of 95 Plus" companies to purchase only eco-certified forest products by the year 2000, lobbied the BBC to alter its coverage of BC forest issues.448 Cognizant of the role of the Canadian governrnent, FAN

Virginia Haufler, "Crossing the Boundary between Public and Private: International Regimes and Non- state Actors," in Volker Rittberger and Peter Mayer (eds), Regime Theory and International Relations (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1993), p. 98. 448 Forest Action Network, "'UK Market Carnpaign" http://www.fanweb.org/intlukmarketc~(April 28, 2000). and Greenpeace organized a series of protests in front of Canadian embassies, the most recent in Berlin in August 1999.349 Second, the forest industry's interest in wood certification is a direct result of the transnational ENGO market campaigns. The BC forest industry was forced to switch its preference for the weaker industry-led certification systems to the FSC standards, having initially spurned the FSC process, prefemng instead to work with wood certification systems in which it played a dominant role like the Canadian Standards Association (CSA), the International Standards Organization (ISO), and the Sustainable Forest Initiative (SFI). When it becarne clear by the late 1990s that industry-led eco-labels were not acceptable to an increasing number of wood and paper customers and Company executives in the European and US markets, the BC Iogging industry launched a concerted effort to influence the direction of the FSC regional standards in British Columbia. As a result, the FSC is in danger of becoming a greenwash tool for industry if the BC logging industry is successful in setting standards Iow enough not to require significant changes in their practices. At this point, the FSC would lose its credibility in the market place, and ENGOs would have to launch efforts to regain control of the certification process. Third, the BC forest industry has on several occasions entered into direct negotiations with ENGOs (and not scientists), bypassing the BC govemment altogether. In Clayoquot Sound, the 1999 landmark Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) between MacMillan Bloedel, the five Central Region Nuu-Chah-Nulth tribes, and four environmental groups added ~i~pificantprotection to the region by disallowing logging in major pristine watersheds that fall within MacMillan Bloedel's Tree Farm License. Further, in the Great Bear Rainforest campaign, three environmental groups (Sierra Club of BC, the Coastal Rainforest Coalition, and Greenpeace) were involved in discussions in 1999-2000 with the six major logging companies (Western Forest Froducts, Interfor, West

449 Greenpeace, "Greenpeace Banner Action Tackles Feds on Forest Desmiction," News Release. August 27, 1999. Fraser Timber, Canadian Forest Products, Fletcher-Challenge Canada, and Weyerhaeuser) over a proposed moratorium on logging in the area The logging companies decided to negotiate with environmentalists after a delegation of German pulp and paper, and magazine publisher representatives having witnessed BC logging practices, expressed profound concern over the fate of BCYstemperate rainforests. According to Greenpeace, the Geman delegation "indicated that several hundred million dollars of contracts could be canceled if industry and government failed to establish a moratorium on the remaining large intact valleys of the coast."450 Arguably, the slow Pace of government reform has led ENGOs and conservation biologists to focus on global civic politics, but this strategy is not without risks. As Ambrarnovitz writes, certification is "not a panacea" nor "a substitute for reducing wasteful consumption or sound legislation and policie~."~~*It is one of the rnany pieces in the solution puzzle. Other issues that need to be addressed include alternative fiber sources, post-consumer rec ycled fibers, and consumption reduc tion initiatives. Govemments are key players in environmental politics, and have vast authority, legitimacy, resources and coercive powers to carry out extensive environmental policy change. For example, while the approximately $70 million in contract cancellations obtained by Greenpeace over two years in the Great Bear Rainforest carnpaign is an impressive figure, the BC government's decision to weaken more than 500 provisions of its Forest Practices Code in 1998 and to divert some of the half billion dollar Forest Renewal Fund to increased logging rather than tree-planting could significantly undo ENGO efforts to redirect the market towards an eco-forestry direction. In part, the premier's leadership style dong with the slurnp in markets for wood and wood products have led to the reversal of many of the gains the environmentai movement had made over

450 Greenpeace Canada. "EnvironmentalGroups and logging indusû-y in discussion over fate of last rainforest valleys," News Release, March 15, 2000. 451 Ambrarnovitz, "Sustaining the World's Forests," p. 1998. the past decade.452 The Great Bear Rainforest carnpaign has prompted an unusudly hostile response from BC' s Premier Glen Clark, who branded Greenpeace "the enernies of

BC-"453

An overemphasis on global civic politics risks underplaying dornestic campaigns. In particular, domestic carnpaigns are geared at increasing government accountability and ensuring that govemments use theïr substantial resources and coercive powers to enhance ecologically sustainable development. For example, the environment has not been on Canada's national agenda for some time and there is still no Canadian, nor BC, biodiversity or endangered species legislation as Canadian governments have faced little concerted pressure to adopt such legislation. Ultimately, the politics of accountability also depend on democratically elected govemments in addition to the marketplace, where corporations tend to be accountable first and foremost to shareholders.

At the same time, it is important to note that the strategy of global civic politics interacts with the public pressure model. BC government initiatives occurred in response to the movement towards forest protection in the global civil society. Tzeporah Berrnan argues that the BC government only acted after contract ~ancellations.45~New policy initiatives, such as the Scientific Panel and the Forest Practices Code, were introduced shortly &er Kimberly Clark canceled i ts contract with MacMillan B loedel. Clearly, the civic politics and public pressure approaches are complementary, not mutually exclusive.

Conclusions ENGOs and conservation biologists have increasingly shifted tactics from local activism aimed at pressuring policy change in BC to transnational efforts aimed at raising global awareness and mobilizing transnational actors. When public pressure resulted in

452 As George Hoberg ("F'utting Ideas in Their Place," p. 143) argues, many variables influence forest policies in British CoIumbia including the goveming poIiticaI party, structural changes in the wood- products market, and changes in the relative power of ENGOs and the logging industry. 453 Hauka and Luke, 1997. lirnited success in achieving policy change, environmental groups used global civic politics

to transform international markets for BC wood and wood products, and, in turn, influence BC forest policy. Information sharing, direct action and market campaigns have helped

establish alternative, nongovenimental norms and institutions.

The increasingly global thrust of environmental campaigns have severai implications for international relations theory and the study of environmental politics. First, private international regimes are king developed by ENGOs and conservation biologists consisting of global norms and procedures set by non-state actors. Clearly, globai environmental regimes need not consist of only intergovernmental norms and conventions."5 Second, transnational environmental groups and, to a growing extent, concerned conservation biologists, have acted as key drivers in environmentai politics.

This is not to Say that States, IGOs, government scientists and other actors are not important players in the forest issue or even the main players in other environmental issues, such as climate change. Part of the problem, as previousiy noted, is that govemments at al1

Ievels have been slow to act. Internationally, vague, ambiguous and, at times, contradictory Ianguage in such documents as the Statement on Forest finciples is designed to appease diverse national interests. Third, there needs to be caution with respect to the use of voluntary, market-based approaches. A focus on global civic politics is possible only with large, transnational NGOs that have the resources to undertake such projects. In rnost cases, the environmental movement utilizes public pressure tactics aimed at governments based on the premise that it is the government's role to promote the public interest and protect the environment.

454 Tzeporah Berman. Interview with Greenpeace International's biodivenity campaigner, January 1999. 455 Wapner, Environmental Activisrn and World Civic Politics, p. 67. Chapter 7 Conclusion: Agents of Green Learning - Scientists and the Environmental Movement Scientists and the environmental movement are two critical agents of change in the environmental decision-making process. Their influence is due primarily to their role in advancing learning. The Brundtland Commission identified scientists and the environmental movement as playing a catalytic role: "Scientists were the first to point out evidence of significant risks and changes resulting from the growing intensity of human activities. Other non-governmental organizations and citizens' groups pioneered in the creation of public awareness and political pressures that stimulated governrnents to a~t.''~S~ Their roles differ: one acting as an authoritative source of information, the other distributing the information and politicizing the issue by enlarging the "audience to the fight," in Elmer Schattschneider's tenninology, moving an issue from the private to the public realm.457 The episternic community approach is the dominant approach for modeling the work of scientists in international relations. Explanatory power is related to the convergence of scientific laiowledge and the placement of scientists in govemrnentai and intergovemmental bureaucracies. In contrast, there exists a variety of approaches for modeling the role of the environmental movement, including pressure group approaches and models that focus on global civil society. Paul Sabatier's advocacy coalition framework was used to integrate the roles of the scientists and the environmental movement in one conceptual framework. A number of studies consider the work of only one of the critical agents of change9 Other scholars have looked at the roles played by both these actors, but there is

456 WCED, Our Cornmon Future (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1987)- p. 326. 457 E. E. Schattschneider. va(New York: HoIt, Rinehart and Winston, 1960). . . 458 Peter Haas, Savine the Med.itmnean: The Politics of International Environmental Coo~eration(New York: Columbia University Press, 1990), Thomas Princen and Matthias Finger (eds). Environmental little in the way of systematic evduation of the relative importance of the two actors. 459 Delineating the conditions under which each of these actors is the pnmary player for a given environmental issue would aid one in choosing a parficular learning model. 1 will argue that the nature of the environmental issue and the level of organization of the actors in a particular environmental area figure largely in expIaining the relative importance of scientists and the environmentai movement, particularly at the earlier stages of the development of an environmental problem.

1 begin by looking at the role each actor plays separately, how the empirical evidence from the climate and forest chapters relates to existing theory and what adjustrnents rnight be necessary in various theoretical approaches given the findings. 1 then address the question of choosing a learning model for a given environmental issue. When is one actor more significant than the other, and when are both likely to be key actors? Next, 1 examine the question of whether to consider scientific actors as aligned or non- aligned to the environmental movement. Finally, I return to the backcasting approach to andyze the types of learning needed to stem the global ecological crisis and the ideal roles to be played by scientists and the environmental movement.

Scientists as Regime Drivers The pressure-state-response model, developed by the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development, examines human activities (the pressures) that lead to particula. environmental conditions (the states) and ultirnately to remedial actions (the

NGOs in World Politics: Linkino the Local and the Global (London: Routledge, 1994), and Paul Wapner, Environmental Activism and World Civic Politics (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1996). 459 Oran R. Young and Gai1 Osherenko undertake sorne analysis of the relevant role of episternic communities in their edited volume Polar Politics: Creatin~International Environmental Regimes (Ithaca: Cornet1 University Press, 1993). See aiso Gareth Porter and Janet Welsh Brown, Global Environmental Politics: Dilemmas in World Politics, 2nd ed. (Boulder: Westview Press, 1996). respon~es).~6~In this model, scientists play a key role in detecting and diagnosing environmental problems, and governments and other actors respond in an effort to reverse environmental destruction. Peter Haas's epistemic community approach addresses the specific mechanisms by which scientific knowledge is translated into policy change. Fiist, scientists derive power fkom their authoritative daim to knowledge. Their power increases when there exists a strong scientific consensus on the nature of the problem and solutions, and they speak with one voice. Secondly, scientific influence is related to their bargainhg power. Govemment learning and action are promoted in States with a strong scientific capacity, including scientists in senior government positions or at least having access to key policy-makers. Haas's approach is essentially a goveniment learning model. Governments bureaucracies are comprised, in part, of scientists and if those scientists share a strong expert consensus on a particular environmental issue, then their governments are Likely to adopt a strong environmental stance. The prospects for international cooperation

improve when strong epistemic communities exist across countries and are institutionalized in intergovemmental organizations. The epistemic community model is useful in explaining the leading role played by scientists in the development of the climate change regime. Having reached a strong scientific consensus on the causes of the problem and necessary solutions, and with the emergence of extensive domestic and international scientific capacities in the area of global climate change, scientists were the driving force in the international agenda setting process beginning in the mid-1980s. In the 1990s, they played a pivotal role in the international negotiations leading to the 1992 Frarnework Convention on Climate Change and the 1997 Kyoto Protocol.

Adding to Haas's approach, 1 would argue that scientific consensus is not contingent on resolving a scientific debate on a single and unique issue. At least for

460 Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development, OECD Environmental Performance Review: United States (Paris: OECD,1996). and Organization for Economic Cooperation and complex environmental issues. like climate change, it is useful to unpack the concept of scientific consensus. Scientific debate and convergence emerged on a series of issues over time following a Stream of discovenes. For example, the greenhouse effect was discovered

more than a hundred years ago; hurnan greenhouse gas emissions were identified as an

environmental concern in the Iate 1950s; global wanning, rather than global cooling, was

deemed the threat in the early 1970s; carbon dioxide was identified as constituting only half of the problem in the late 1970s, the other half consisting of other greenhouse gases like methane and nitrous oxide; climate change was thought to have begun in the Iate 1980s. Today, major uncertainties still exist with respect to the role of aerosols, the impact of water vapour and clouds, and the danger of surprises, such as a flip in ocean circulation from one mode to another. A revised understanding of Haas's notion of scientific convergence, one that involves a set of issues, is significant since action may be justifiable at multiple points. For exarnple, one could argue that policy responses were justified in the 1950s, when climate became an environmental concern; in the mid-1980s, when there existed a strong international scientific consensus on the nature of the problem; or once scientists could safely argue that the balance of evidence suggested that global climate change had begun, as reported in the PCC's 1995 scientific a~sessrnent.~~ Given the decades-old environmental warning, a more interesting question is why scientific influence didn't take hold sooner. Roger Revelle and Hans Suess issued the first clear scientific wanllng in the 1950s that humanity was experimenting with the planet by significantly increasing the global atmospheric concentration of carbon d.io~ide.~*

Development, OECD Environmental Performance Review: Canada (Paris: OECD, 1995). 46L On the emergence of a strong international scientific consensus in the mid 1980s. see Shardul Agrawala, "Context and early origins of the Intergovermnental Panel on CIimate Change," Clirnatic Channe, Vol. 39, 1998, p. 612. For the detection of anthropogenic cIimate change, see J. T. Houghton. L. G. Meira Filho, B. A. Callander, et al., (eds), Climate Chan~e1995: The Science of Climate Change (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996). 462 Prim to that perïod, scientists though that human ernissions were insignificant. In the 1950s. it became apparent how rapidly human ernissions were increasing. R. Revelle and H. E. Suess, "Carbon Dioxide Exchange Between Atrnospheric CO2 During the Past Decades," Tellus, Vol. 9, 1957, pp. 18-57, cited in Oppenheimer and Boyle, Dead Heat, p. 36. However, there was very little understanding of the nature of the expriment at the time, or even global data on trends in atrnospheric concentrations of greenhouse gases. As a result, Revelle and others set up a global network to monitor the atmosphere, including stations in Hawaii and the South Pole. Further, it was just a theory in the 1950s; it took time before mathematical models and simulations made headway and for computing power to increase enough to improve the resolution of the models. In the late 1970s and early 1980s, the results of the first global circulation models (GCMs) arrived, but these were still highly uncertain, and only a small groups of scientists were debating the science intemally. It was not until the World Meteorologicd Organization -O), the United Nations Environment Program (UNEP), and International Council of Scientific Unions (ICSU) developed the World Climate Program in 1979 that the climate change issue was institutionalized internationally and that other countries, besides the US and Canada, began to develop national clirnate epistemic cornmunities. The development of international scientific bargaining power in the 1980s is another crucial variable in increasing the influence of the epistemic community in the regime building process, providing strong support for Haas's hypothesis. The influence of climate scientists increased several fold with the creation of the IPCC in 1988. Shardul Agrawala has compared options for developing scientific advice for govements using a counterfactual process of comparing the likely influence of nongovernmental versus intergovemmentai scientific rne~hshnisrns.~63Pzior to the establishment of the PCC, UNEP, WMO and ICSU set up an Advisory Group on Greenhouse Gases (AGGG) in 1986. The AGGG, chaired by Canadian climate expert Kenneth Hare, developed assessments and recornrnendations behind closed doors, and organized international

workshops attended by experts who did not officially represent governments. In the short

tem, the AGGG was effective, in that govements were somewhat responsive to the blue ribbon panel. However, Agrawala argues that in the long terrn such a process would probably have failed to get the backing of the scientific cornmunity as a whole and would have lirnited appeal to governments. In contrat, the fact that the IPCC is intergovemmental ensures that their assessments draw a much larger, captive audience. Scientific bargaining power is thus related to both scientific access to senior policy makers, and a sense of govemment ownership of the process and outputs -- the final IPCC reports are approved by governments and many of the scientists are employed by govemments, though roughly half are academic. The political legitimacy of the PCC is thus enhanced, without comprornising its scientific integrity, enabling it to play the role of a policy broker, mediating confiicting views of the ciimate protection and fossil fuel ACS.~~~Assessments authored by non-govemrnental actors like the Union of Concerned Scientists or a group of nongovemmental experts assembled by the AGGG would not have had the same influence. The PCC seems to be the right process at the right time: on one hand, IPCC assessments are scientifically robust, having undergone extensive international peer review and, on the other hand, they promote government learning and capacity-building in developed and developing countries. Beyond changing government policy, scientists can also have an influence on civil society by promoting public education and citizen engagement, and thus indirectly pressuring governments. This approach departs from the emphasis on government learning

463 Agrawala, "Context and early origins of the Intergovemmental Panel on Clirnate Change." in Haas's epistemic community approach by considering the efforts of scientists in promoting public education as a means of issue advocacy. From this view, scientists can be conceived of as a paxt of transnationai environmental movement Scientific influence is not limited to govemment-led scientific groups, like the PCC, which emphasize the power of consensus on causal beliefs; principled beliefs may motivate independent, academic or NGO-led scientists to use their lcnowledge in public and in politicd circles if the environmental issue is perceived to be of critical importance and if scientists cm fil1 a gap in public knowledge about the nature of the issue. Scientific advocates have made important gains in the case of climate change. Activist- oriented scientists in acadernia and nongovernmental scientific groups, like the Union of Concerned Scientists, have promoted public education by publishing reports and books, appearing in the mass media and films, and organizing speaking toursP6S Interestingly, the authoritative nature of the IPCC reports has resuited in substantial mass media coverage, and thus one of the PCC's greatest contributions was its communications of its findings to the general public.46

A more organized public education effort has taken place in the case of BC forests in response to the Iack of govemment initiatives in this area. Government departments dealing with forests in Canada at the federal and provincial levels tend to look at the issue from an industry perspective. The absence of the institutionaiization of conservation biologists and their consequent lack of bargaining power weaken their ability either to change forest policy at the local level or to create an international forest regime. As a result, conservation biologists concerned with the rapid fragmentation of ecosystems and the increasing Pace of species extinction have no near-term alternative but to press for private

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464 Sabatier, "Knowledge, policy-oriented learning, and policy change"; and Lindquist, 'Tublic Managers and Policy Communities." 465 For example, John T. Houghton, CO-editorof the IPCC assessrnent reports, published Global warming: &e complete briefing. 2nd ed. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997)- aimed at popular audiences, including a chapter on how his values enter into the process. 466 Matthew Paterson, The Politics of Global Warming. or NGO-led regimes. The Yellowstone to Yukon (Y2Y) Conservation Initiative was initiated by a civic epistemic community, following a meeting held in Kananaskis, Alberta, in 1993. A civic epistemic community is defined as a group of academic and NGO scientific experts who share common values and causal beliefs and act to promote their vision in civil society. The goal of the Y2Y initiative is to rnerge scientific research with activism. Conservation biologists are employing civic politics strategies, such as production of a atlas on resources in the Y2Y ecoregion, the development of a Biosciences Program to educate US and Canadian conservationists about the Y2Y initiative, and public education through the production of pamphlets, reports, a website, and the work of the Y2Y Outreach Cwrdinator.~7 In sum, the notion of scientific consensus needs to be adjusted at least for complex environmental problems in order to consider the multiple issues on which consensus may arise. Further, the climate case illustrated the importance of an intergovemental, scientific assessment process in enhancing the bargaining power of scientists in the regime-building process. An intergovemental process ensures a sense of govemrnent ownership in the scientific peer review process. By contrast, the absence of a strong, institutionalized epistemic comrnunity gives rise to the possibility of scientists employing civic politic and creating civic regimes, as was demonstrated in the case of BC forests.

The Environmental Movement and Societal Learning The other critical agent of change in environmental affairs is the environmental movement, whose power is derived mainly from its efforts at raising public awareness and public concem. Societd leaming models bring society back in by positing that social and political changes are driven by an educated and concemed public, particularly in issue areas

467 Charles Chester, ''Civil Society, International Regirnes, and the Protection of Transboundary Ecosystems: Defining the International Sonoran Desert Alliance and the Yellowstone to Yukon Conservation Initiative," Journal of International Wildlife Law and Policy, Vol. 2, Issue 2, 1999. pp. 159- 203. involving the public interest like the environment and social safety net. The environmental movement has been mapped into a variety of societal learning models. The advocacy coalition (AC) framework is paaicuiarly appropriate because it aggregates actors around shared belief systems. The approach used in this thesis is consistent with Sabatier's AC framework, since he does recognize a number of key rnechanisms used by ACs to enhance their interna1 resources, including increasing the membership of an AC, and thus their prospects for achieving policy change. Sabatier argues that it is unlikely that there will be dramatic change in the policy regirne governing a policy subsystem unless major extemal perturbations upset the balance of power in that subsystem. Changes in intemal resources may also lead to policy learning within and across systems, though these occur less fiequently. Rather, policy change tends to be incrernental over time because each advocacy coalition will be learning and developing new arguments and strategies. However, 1 find that the focus of Sabatier's approach needs to be adjusted and extended in a nurnber of ways for subsystems involving progressive social change

movements. First, with respect to the concept of learning, Sabatier's main interest is in policy learning among elites within an AC, and its effects on their secondary beliefs or on what are the best mechanisms available to achieve their goals. In contrast, this thesis has exarnined strategies the environmental rnovement uses to promote three types of learning within and outside the environrnental AC: acquiring basic, accurate information on the hurnan impact on the state of the environment; changes in worldview from a human- centered to an eco-centric perspective, including concem for other species, future generations, and intra-generationd equity; and action leaming or citizen engagement. This definition includes both substantive and instrumental components, incorporating thinking from the public policy, environrnental thought, and social movement iiteratures. The unit of anaiysis of the AC framework needs to be expanded beyond elite actors to bring the public in when analyzing issues involving public goods and public interest, like the environment. Second, this thesis supplements Sabatier's frarnework because, as Colin Bennett and Michael Howlett (1992, p. 287) have observed, it "does not shed much light on the circurnstances under which the crucial deep core beliefs, which ultimateiy bind advocacy coalitions together and channel their activities, emerge." The Progressive Societai Learning and Social Change Model, introduced in Chapter three and based on lessons from public education carnpaigns of the earIy American labour and civil rights movernenl, outlines a number of learning channels airned at enhancing broad-based public education. The concept of green societal learning is operationdized by assessing the learning contributions made by a host of sources, including NGO activities, mass and alternative media, forma1 and informal schools, cultural activities, like protest music, art, literature, and film, and so forth. The Societal Learning and Social Change Model is designed to gain a fuller understanding of how broad-based societd learning takes place, and to mode1 the relationship between various sources of learning, and their effects on changes in civil society and public pressure. These various sources of learning have positive feedback mechanisms in some cases and can result in both social and political change. The environmental movement attempts to achieve social and political change by expanding its membership base. First, the environmental movement can indirectly achieve policy change by applying public pressure on governments, as the latter respond to concerned and rnobilized publics. Public pressure models posit that the general pubiic's views, if organized or at least expressed with sufficient intensity in public opinion polls, matter to govermnents and contribute to new or more progressive policies. Second, societai learning is a force of social change in civil society itself. The influence of societal learning cmbe measured by examining the activities of advocacy coalitions or, dtematively, measuring environmental salience in public opinion polls or the views of the attentive public, to use Pross's terminology. The strength of societal Iearning in my two cases differed profoundly. There is a public sense of an ecological crisis in the case of disappearing ancient forests and the mass extinction of species. In contrast, public opinion on climate change shows that there is a sense of uneasiness and concern about the issue, but no sense of crisis. The difference is due, in part, to the relative strength of the environmental movement campaigns in the two cases. The forest environmental movement successfully engaged mass public participation in forest campaigns at the local level. BC's Clayoquot protests in the sumrner of 1993 led to the largest civil disobedience action in Canadian history. Mass participation and confrontation ensured national and international media coverage, and facilitated the use of multiple channels for societal Iearning. A rich assortment of groups in civil society becarne involved in the campaign, including musicians (e.g., Australian rock band Midnight 0i1 and Sarah McLachlan), artists, and educators. The BC government was forced to introduce a number of policy changes in response to public pressure, including the establishment of a Clayoquot Scientific Panel, a new Forest Accord, an Intenm Agreement with First Nations, and the creation of a UNESCO biosphere reserve in the region in January 2000. Dissatisfied with policy change overall in the province, and concerned about the fate of BCYsmid-coastal ancient rainforests, transnational environmental groups next turned to global civic politics. They effectively employed market education and direct action campaigns to raise transnational societal awareness and to build an alternative, NGO-ted forest regime. With the launching of the Great Bear Rainforest campaign in 1996, environmental groups intensified efforts to boycott corporations that continued to use old- growth products, targeting mainly European and US opinion. ENGOs worked to increase corporate accountability by direct market pressure and by shifting incentive structures towards eco-certified products. The strategy of global civic poIitics clearly interacts with public pressure tactics. BC govement initiatives occurred partly in response to the success of global civic politics. New policy initiatives, such as the Scientific Panel and the Forest Practices Code, can in part be attributed to contract cancellations in Europe and the US (e-g., after Kimberly Clark canceled its contract with MacMïllan Bloedei in the early 1990s). In contrast, environrnental organizations have oniy recently launched ciimate campaigns, beginning in the late 1980s and early 1990s, despite decades-long scientific interest and concern about the issue. In an unusual move, transnational environmental groups began by lobbying govemments at international climate negotiations instead of starting with direct action and public education strategies, as is normally the case at the early stages of social movement campaigns. The primary means used by environmental organizations to generate public interest and concern about global clirnate change has been the mass media. Their initial strategy was simply to make their presence known at international climate negotiations, assuring media coverage of their perspective. Thus, environmental groups have, for the most part, followed the agenda set by scientists (international negotiations) rather than set the agenda themselves by generating their own media attention through direct action activities. Since the Kyoto Protocol agreement in 1997, however, environrnental groups, such as Greenpeace, have launched major direct action and public education efforts. Overall, the environrnental movement has not yet successfully engaged such actors as artists, film-makers, and educators in its climate campaigns. Clearly, the successful forest campaigns suggest that a fuller set of leaming channeis need to be employed in the climate change arena for greater societal learning to take place.

Choosing a Learning Mode1 When is one approach more useful than the other? In other words, under what conditions do scientists play a leading role? Altematively, when is the environmental movement at the forefront of change? Or again, when are both scientific convergence and strong societal learning necessary for the emergence of strong environmental regimes? In the case of climate change, for example, scientists took the lead in placing the issue on the international agenda in the 1980s while environmental groups have only recently adopted climate carnpaigns. By contrast, environmental groups have developed significant forest campaigns since the 1980s utilizing public pressure and then global civic politics strategies, whereas conservation biologists are only beginning to organize their efforts. Why the difference? Does the existing academic literature help us determine the relative importance of these two cntical agents of change in different environmental cases? Peter Haas does not address which environmental issues will Iikely give rise to an epistemic cornmunity, but a number of empirical studies have found the existence of influentid epistemic communities. For example, a strong epistemic community was found in cases such as global wanning , ozone, whale protection, and the Mediterranean waters.46* Oran Young and Gail Orchenko found several environmenta1 regimes that did not have an epistemic community. The polar bear and fur seal regimes failed to confirm the

presence of an epistemic community, though there was "a rise in media attention and activity by nongovenunental organizations as facts promoting regime f0rmation."~69These cases involved conservation concerns, as well as the goal of preserving wildlife for its own sake. In the latter instance, values play a significant role and concomitantly science is less relevant and does not appear to be a necessary condition for the emergence of conservation regimes. In the case of the environmentai movement, Kathryn Harrison's work on greenwaves focuses on the identification and placement of the environment on the agenda, but does not examine specific campaigns (like forests and climate) or the relationship between the salience of the environment and individual carnpaigns. Paul Wapner does not look at which actor is most significant, but does delineate conditions under which transnational environmental organizations are iikely to adopt global civic politics strategies

468 Paterson, Global Warminp and Global Politics; special International Organization issue; Litfin, Ozone Biscourses; and Haas, Saviw the Mediterranean. as opposed to pressure group tactics. Action in the global civil Society may be necessary due to the ineffectiveness of public pressure on States, as evidenced by insufficient policy change. This may prove the case when governments are weak or resistant to change, and corporate actors are powerful and vulnerable to consumer power abroad. These conditions

were met in the case of the Great Bear Rainforest campais in BC where the BC government was intransigent, captured by the forest industry as well as itself a shareholder in MacMillan Bloedel - the largest logging Company in BC pnor in the early 1990s. Furthemore, the remote location of the Great Bear temperate rainforest made it difficult for Emsto mobilize mass participation. Also facilitating the adoption of a global civic politics approach, were large transnational ENGOs with substantial resources, Iike Greenpeace and the Rainforest Action Network, which were committed to saving Canada's temperate rainforest and to build an alternative NGO-led forest protection regime. In sum, the existing theoretical literahue does not speciQ the conditions under which the relative importance of scientists and the environmental movement could be decided. It does provide clues as to where epistemic communities may not be necessary, and when civic politics models are more useful than public pressure approaches. The results of the empiricai cases studies undertaken in this thesis suggest that the relative significance of these two actors is related to the nature of the environrnental issue, how well organized scientific groups and the environmental movement are in a particular environmental field, and the stage at which an environrnental issue appears on the international environrnental policy-making process. First, the nature of an environmental issue influences how and when the public, scientists and politicians respond. Long term, complex, abstract, and remote environmental issues favour a relatively stronger role for scientists in the environmental policy process. By contrast, the environmental movement, often arising out of grassroots

469 Oran R. Young and Gai1 Osherenko, "International regirne formation: findings, research priorities, and applications," in their edited Polar Politics: Creatine International Environmental Regirnes (Ithaca: stmggles, tends to focus on more proxirnate, tangible issues, ones that begin at the local and regional levels. Many of these issues tend to have immediate consequences for hurnan health, like the lead childrea breath, or involve not-in-my-backyard (NIMElY) issues, Iike the siting of garbage dumps. Only a few environmental groups get involved in broad, transnational issues. International environmental issues, like disappearing ancient forests and species extinction are visible (at least to date), and thus more emotionally-charged issues. Further, there is a clear connection in the public's mind between cause and effect, that is, clearcut logging and habitat destruction. By contrast, the complex and abstract nature of the climate change issue, for exarnple, is one reason why scientists have initially been more important than the environmental movement. CLimate change is a hard environmental issue. Not only is it a long terni, "creeping" environmental issue, it involves abstruse science, multiple causes from numerous sectors, billions of point sources of greenhouse gases, and a global solution. The climate change issue deals with far more compfex and non-iinear responses

than most environmental issues. It involves the interaction arnong the global oceans, the global atmosphere, polar ice sheets, and human activities, such as fossil fuel consumption, deforestation, and agricultural policies. The issue is highly abstract involving the use of complex computer simulations. The difficulty of understanding clirnate change is compounded by the significant lag time between the time greenhouse gases are ernitted into the atrnosphere and the climatic response. Only recently, has the IPCC concluded that the "balance of evidence suggests" a visible indication of climate change. The impacts of climate change are findly beginning to appear, even though there have ken substantial anthropogenic greenhouse gas emissions for more than a century. The reason for this delay is the lengthy period of time it takes before oceans corne to a stable, temperature equilibrium, as heat is drawn into the deep

Corne11 University Ress, 1993) p. 244.

228 oceans.470 Thus, the usud pattern in environmental policy making is reversed for climate change: the emergence of the environmental problem follows scientific discoveries and scientific convergence, rather than the other way around. The complex and long term nature of the climate issue poses temporal and spatial problems for stimulating widespread public awareness and concern, and this, in part, explains the relative weahess of the environmental movement in this area. The temporal

problem is that there is need for preventative action in the near term while the ecologicd, socio-economic, and health consequences are faced in the long term. This is exacerbated by a spatial problem: the highest GHG ernitting countries do not face the direct consequences of their actions, and thus global clirnate change may not appear to be a proximate issue. The highest emitters are developed countries, but the impacts are

primarily in developing countries. Even worse, similsir environmental impacts hmthe poor and most vulnerable disproportionately because they lack the resources to adapt to natural and human-made dis aster^.^^' Fuahermore, the complex nature of the climate change issue has resulted in pubIic misconceptions about the causes and impacts of climate change. The public employs inappropriate cultural models to view the problem, including equating clirnate change with

weather, particulates, air pollution Like sulfur dioxide, and the seatospheric ozone la~er.~~~ The challenge for scientists and the environmental movement is to cornmunicate more clearly to the public. Anne Kearney argues that an effective way of comrnunicating to the public on clirnate issues is to use a cognitive approach, including stories, use of analogies

470 Oceans circulate on a time scale of a thousand years. A warmer atmosphere results in pushïng heat into the surface ocean. Cold water sinks into the deep oceans in the North Atlantic around Labrador and Greenland, and the Antarctic. This causes surface water from low latitudes (equator) to flow poleward as in a huge conveyor belt. The ocean takes centuries to corne to a full stable system, but it begins to approach a stable state in a few decades (for a doubling of C02, much of the effect wilI be felt decades later, about 50- 60% of the effect). The principle is the same for a glas of water from the fridge. It will take a few hours for the glass of water to become room temperature [source, 2nd assessment]. 471 See Ribsarne's work on the social impacts of natual disasters. 472 Willett Kempton, "How the public views clirnate change," Environment. Vol. 39, No. 9, Novernber 1997, pp. 12-21. and parables rather than a logical approach (Le., numerical models), which scientists tend to use? Second, who leads on international environmental issues is also a question of how well organized the actors are in a particu1ar area at both the domestic and global levels. In the case of the forest issue, environmental groups in British Columbia became increasingly well organized since the late 1970s, and developed international carnpaigns beginning in the early 1990s. Conservation biologists, however, have only recently began to organize in a civic episternic cornmunity with the launch of the Y2Y Conservation Initiative in the late 1990s, and have had an ad hoc influence on domestic policy, particularly in the notabIe Clayoquot Scientific Panel set up by the provincial government in 1993 following massive protests in the summer. In cornparison, the introduction of climate change into the policy realm in the mid- 1980s followed the rapid development of domestic and international climate change episternic communities. For the past three decades, scientists have been more organized at the international level on the climate issue than the environmental movement. They held major conferences in the 1970s, and regular meeting in 1980s once the World Climate Program was set up by the WMO, UNEP and ICSU in 1979. In 1988, when the IPCC was established, the CIimate Action Network (CAN), a coalition of hundreds of environmental groups worldwide working on the climate issue, had not yet been created. CAN is more of a coalition of different organizations than an independent international actor: it has very Iittle staff and resources, and depends very much on the work of its member organizations. There were no international or even dornestic environmental campaigns for climate change until the late 1980s and early 1990s. For example, Jeannine Cavender and Ji11 Jager notes German NGOs were the last sector in society to mobilize on

473 Anne R. Keamey, "Understanding Global Change: A Cognitive Perspective on Cornmunicating Through Stones," Clirnatic Chanpe, Vol. 27. 1994. Pp. 41 1-441. climate.474 The main reasons for this belated response are the lirnited resources of social rnovements (many activists were focused on nuclear issues in 1980~)~and the difficult nature of the issue. Enviromencal groups adopted climate campaign in the late 1980s once scientists had placed it on political and public agenda. Also, the latest green wave in the rnid- to late-1980s placed global environrnental issues on top of the agenda. Environmental groups initially compensated for their lack of organization at the international level by following the Iead established by scientists. They attended international conferences and attempted to gain media attention by scmtinizing the negotiating positions of States and uncovering corporate lobbying activities. Only in the late 1990s, following the 1997 Kyoto agreement, did environmental groups, such as Greenpeace, switch their focus frorn lobbying to public education, launching major direct action and public information campaigns. Thirdly, there is a general shift in the importance of scientists, policy entrepreneurs, and advocacy coalitions in the international environrnental policy-making process.475 These critical agents of change play a particdarly important role in the early stages of the environmental policy-making process. Scientists are crucial in the problem identification and definition stage. Their discovenes Iead to the definition and framing of new environmental problems. In the agenda-setting stage, scientists, NGOs, and policy entrepreneurs al1 play key roles. John Kingdon notes that there are multiple avenues to agenda-setting, some related to the conscious efforts of various actors, such as rnobilizing the membership of an AC, while others are process-oriented, like the gradua1 build-up of problems and the role of focusing or tnggering e~ents.~~6For example, in the climate case, scientists and scientific organizations played the Iead role in the international agenda-setting process by making key discoveries on human impacts on the global climate, by

474 Cavender and Jager, 'The History of Gemany's Response to Climate Change," p. 13. 475 Hempel, &vitonmental Governance, p. 124 476 John W. Kingdon, A~endas.AIternatives. and Public Pol icies (Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1984). contributing to the general build-up of lmowledge on global climate change (e-g., the presence of eight of the warmest years on record in the 1980-1992 period), by holding regular scientific meetings, and b y releasing regular PCC assessrnent reports. B y contrast, conservation biologists have only recently begun to play an agenda setting role in the BC forest case with the emergent civic episternic community concerning the Y2Y Conservation Initiative. Rather the forest protection AC set the public agenda after years of organizing and protesting, culminating in the mass protests in Clayoquot Sound in the summer of 1993. The BC government responded by setting up a Clayoquot Scientific Panel and introducing a Forest Practices Code among other initiatives. Later, advocacy coalitions play various roles in the policy formation, decision- making, and implementation stages, depending on their resources, legitimacy, and institutional structure of the policy-making systems. In addition, Sabatier notes that the dominant advocacy coalition, often the development AC, is continually attempting to rebuff any policy changes advanced by the environmental AC. The dynamics between the environmental AC and its opponents is beyond the scope of this thesis, though it is important to note that in Sabatier's view, some think tanks, scientists, politicians, and governrnental agencies may not be connected to the dominant coalition. Scientists are dispersed throughout the policy communities and rnay play very different roles depending on their sub-disciplinary perspective and on their persona1 proclivities towards engagement.477 These scientists rnay play a role in the evaluation process by monitoring the state of the environment using a variety of environmental and sustainability indicators. Finally, environmental ACs use shame as a means of pressunng governrnents to adhere to their international cornrnitments. 1s either strong scientific consensus and bargaining power, on one hand, or significant societal leaming, on the other, sufficient for the emergence of a strong eco-

477 Persona1 communication, Evert Lindquist, Director, School of Public Administration, University of Victoria, February 8,2001. regirne? In other words, is sîrong learning brought about by one cntical agent of change enough? Table 7.1 summarizes the Ievels of societal Iearning and scientific consensus and power which were key factors in producing the climate and forest regimes, and clearly shows the inadequacy of one critical agent of change working in the absence of the other.

The forest case clearly revealed that the lack of government response was in large part due to the weak bargaining power of conservation biologists. Instead, a civic epistemic community has emerged, which is working in concert with the forest environmental movement in creating a set of private or NGO-led forest protection regirnes, which at present constitutes a weak regime in its formative stages. The overall influence of these NGO-led regimes rernains to be seen. In a sirnilar way, the ecological crisis prompted by the scientists in the climate change case study, was not sufficient to produce a strong regime. Alternatively, the relative importance between a non-public but real ecological crisis, on one hand, and a political crisis, on the other, offers a possible test for the necessity of the environmentai movement in prompting significant policy change. Episternic consensus and bargaining power should be suficient if governments respond to epistemic community knowledge and pressure on a particular environmental cnsis, even when the crisis is not a great public concern. However, the timing and content of policy change can help answer whether a political cnsis, in addition to an ecological crisis, is a necessary and sufficient condition for governments to act. Haas argues that "it often takes a crisis or shock to overcome institutional inertia and habit and spur [decision makers] to se& help fYom an epistemic comm~nity.~~~~

The global climate issue offers a good test case, particularly as scientific knowIedge and concern were rapidy growing in the 1980s and early 1990s. The global climate change issue was defined as an ecological crisis in the 1950s by individual scientists, when Roger Revelle and Hans Suess issued their farnous warning, and by a group of scientific and govemental experts in 1988 at the Toronto Conference on the Changing Atmosphere, when senior scientists and policy makers issued the following warning: "Humanity is conducting an unintended, uncontrolled, globdy pervasive expriment whose ultimate consequences could be second only to a nuclear war."479 Yet, as Chapter Five clearly showed, the power of the epistemic community did not push the international climate regime to implementation and enforcement stages though it clearly was vital in setting the international agenda and establishing a declaratory and promotional regime based on strong ecosystem and sustainable econornic and social principles. Despite scientific consensus on the problem of global climate change, governments have been slow to restrict fossil fuel consumption in the face of low levels of social learning.480 In the BC forest case, strong societal awareness, concern and engagement emerged, branching out from local and provincial levels to the national and international one. Why was broad-based societal leamïng not sufficient to produce significant poIicy change? Part of the problem is that one cannot divorce the power of ideas from other factors like interest and institutions, as George Hoberg n0tes.~S1 But another crucial variable is the absence of a strong episternic community working to preserve ancient rainforests in BC or

478~aas,"Introduction," p. 14. 479"~heChanging Atmosphere: Implications for Global Security. Conference Staternent," (Envimnment Canada, 1988). p. 1. 480 In contrast, the relatively high level of public awareness and concern about ozone depletion and relatively minor corporate opposition has facilitateci the emergence of a strong international implementation and enforcement regime on that particular environmental issue. 48 Hoberg. Tutting Ideas in Their Place." internationdly. Conservation biology is a relatively new multi-disciplinary field, and conservation biologists are not well institutionalized in govemment or intergovernmental bureaucracies. Until this changes, there is little prospect of ensuring that governments make the necessary changes needed to move ont0 a path of sustainable forests British Columbia or other key forested regions where there remains large intact, ancient forest cover. In response to government inaction, conservation biologists followed the transnational ENGO strategy of developing alternative private or non-governmental regimes, as in the Y2Y case. Clearly, both scientists and the environrnental movement are essentid players in the building of strong environmental regimes.

Scientists and Environmentalists: Are They Aligned? If both scientists and the environmental movement are cntical agents of change, how are these two actors related? 1s it useful to conceive of these two actors as parts of one advocacy coalition or transnational advocacy network or cm more analytical leverage be gained by treating these actors as separate entities, engaged in distinct learning processes and undertaking distinctive roles? Alternatively, do both distant and close relations exist simultaneously, as noted above? The Sabatier framework allows analysts to proceed with analysis at both levels; arguably, one has to do so in order to have a fuller picture for a complete analysis482 However, for certain environmental cases it may make sense to focus on a mainly aggregated or, alternatively, disaggregated approach, while always being aware that the relationship between scientists and ACs is dynamic and changes over time. The answer depends on the nature of the key actors in the particular environrnental field. Scientists cm be conceived of as aligned with the environmental movement when they clearly act as advocates and are part of the environmental movement. This occurs when scientists and scientific groups are driven as much by principled as causal beliefs,

482 Personal communication, Evert Lindquist, Director, School of Public Administration, University of Victoria, February 8,2001. play a major role in public education, and are not entrenched in govement bureaucracies. These conditions are met in the case of conservation biologists and their efforts to prctect large swaths of land and water in order to preserve the long term viability of ecosystems, species, and genetic diversity. Conservation biologists are part of a relatively new interdisciplinary field which is driven by pnncipled beliefs as much as causal beliefs. Conservation biologists are comprised of academic and NGO scientists mainly, and have not yet become entrenched in government bureaucracies. They thus operate chiefly in transnational civil society. Conservation biologist have a different philosophical underpinning from most environmental epi sternic communities. Man y conservation biologists enter ecosystern research because they are deeply concemed about ecological issues; they often hold a deep ecology perspective. Chase applies the transnational advocacy network UAN) framework to the Y2Y conservation initiative. But conservation biologists are more than TANS holding principled beliefs; they are also, in part, epistemic communities, generating and holding causai beliefs. Thus, they are a hybrid, part episternic cornmunity and part transnational advocacy network. In contrast, scientists may be non-aligned, in which case the two actors, scientists and the environmental movement, are discrete units and make very different contributions to the environmental policy-making process. Environmental scientists and scientific organizations may be distinct from any particular AC, and instead play the role of policy brokers, mediating conflict between two or more advocacy coalitions.43 Scientists are non-aligned when they provide objective forums for discussion, but do not act as a network of advocates. Keck and Sikkink note that scientists and social movements are generally driven by different types of beliefs: networks of scientists share mainly causal beliefs, while networks of activists are driven by shared principled beliefs. Their basis for action thus ciiffers. Activists are motivated by principled beliefs, viewpoints, and philosophies, such as deep ecology and global sustainable development. Their concern is with global ecosystems, and faimess to others, including intra-generational equity (North- South), intergenerational equity (future generations), and inter-species equity (other plant and animal species). Their sources of influence are different as well. The environmental movement advances social and political change by bringing public pressure on govemments and changing noms and behaviours in global civil society. The power of scientists is related to their authoritative claim to knowledge. Scientists rnay be motivated by the information extracted from their own research and their interpretation of scientific facts, not necessady a deep ecological worldview. Individual scientists may be activist-oriented, while intergovernmental organizations often attempt to provide objective forums for scientific and policy discussions. Expert scientists with significant stature can take on an advocacy role, even when most other scientists in their field do not, with little cost to their career paths. Consider the role that Albert Einstein and various nuclear physicists played in trying to contain the arrns race at the onset of the Cold War. And leading scientists have been quite active on important global issues. As the chapter on chnate change noted, the majority of the world's Nobel laureates signed a petition in the early 1990s issuing a warning to humanity on the grave impact of its environmentally destructive behaviour on the Earth's Life support systems. It could be argued that the credibility of scientists derives from their comrnitment to producing scientific knowledge, not taking policy positions. On the

483 Sabatier, "Knowledge, policy-oriented learning, and policy change," p. 652; and Lindquist, "Public

237 contrary ! Albert Einstein and the Nobel laureates are greater thinkers for their scientific contributions and their ability to connect their work to international politics. In the case of the climate change case, individual scientists, such as Stephen Schneidzr of the National Centre for Atmospheric Research, James Hanson, and David Suzuki, and NGOs, such as the Union of Concerned Scientists, acted as policy entrepreneurs by organizing petitions, press conferences, and public forums, and thus were part of the clirnate protection AC. Government and NGO scientists played a role in organizing international meetings of scientists in Villach, Bellagio, Toronto (1988) and elsewhere in which policy declarations and recornmendations were made such as the Toronto target (reducing GHG emissions by 20% by 2005) and the cal1 for international cooperation. The Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, in contrast, is best seen as an institution separate from any particular AC, even though it is a pivotal actor pushing the climate issue forward on the international agenda. The PCC does not advocate particular policies, but rather gives policy makers options based on its assessments of scientific developments. It carries a lot of political and scientific legitimacy because it consists of the world's leading climate researchers, and acts as a neutral advisory body. In short, the PCC is a source of information for govemments, NGOs, and the public; it does not move from information to advocacy. The environmental movernent seeks out the PCC not as Pamiers, but as a source of information. Decision-makers use the PCC via the International Framework on Climate Change's Subsidiary Body on Science and Technology, which turns to the IPCC as a source of information when it advises the Conference of Parties. Thus, scientists are positioned differently in relation to environmenta1 ACs in the two cases: key scientific institutions, such as the PCC, WMO and UNEP, are best seen as separate from the clirnate protection AC, acting as effective policy brokers due to their substantial political and scientific legitimacy; by contrast, conservation biologists,

-. Managers and Policy Communities," pp. 1%- 156.

238 consisting of a civic epistemic comrnunity, are very much part of the forest protection AC, playing the lead role in initiating pians for the creation of a Y2Y conservation initiative.

Backcasting Our Way Into The Future If, in the long term, both scientists and the environmental movement are indispensable in building strong environmental regmes, how can we best determine what roles these two actors might play in envisioning and building an ideal ecological future? One critical approach to future studies is backcasting. The backcasting approach is designed to think about preferred and possible futures by beginning with a vision of what the long term future would ideally be like, Say, the world as experienced by the next generation in 2050, and then addressing the question of how to arrive at this desired future. The advantages of backcasting are that targets and tirnetables can be set over a long term period, and it can be shown how early action makes future action much easier. Thinking about the long term future is important for environmental issues, particularly for issues like climate change, given the lag time between present pollution and future impacts. Futurïst approaches cm help transform these future crises into present-day political problems by focusing on the relationship between present behaviour and the long-term health of the planet's ecosystems. As Geoghegan argues, we al1 have long term utopic visions; those that argue against thinking about utopias are, at best, arguing for the continuation of the status quo, and, at worst, leaving futurist thinking to others with less benign intent. Scientists and the environmental movement have plaÿed key roles in defining preferred worlds in the two cases of preserving ancient forests and iirniting the amount of global climate change in the long terrn. Conservation biologists and ENGOs have presented the Y2Y Conservation Initiative as a desirable land use plan. The Y2Y is a vision of what land and water ecosystems need to be protected in order to ensure the long term viability of ecosystems, species, and genetic diversity. Conservation biologists are developing plans on "getting there" by producing an atlas, maps of proposed core areas, buffer zones, and wildlife corridors, and public education initiatives aimed at both other scientists, the public, and governrnents. In the case of climate, transnational environmentaI organizations, such as Greenpeace have envisioned the twenty fnst century as the solar century. The ultimate objective of the Frarnework Convention of Climate Change is also instructive in defining long tenn goals and an alternative future:

The ultimate objective of this Convention is .... stabilization of greenhouse gas concentrations in the atmosphere at a level that would prevent dangerous anthropogenic interference with the climate system. Such a level should be achieved within a time-ftame: to allow ecosysterns to adapt naturally to climate change, to ensure that food production is not threatened, and to enable economic development to process in a sustainable manner (Article 2, FCCC).

Environmental impact forrnulae and integrated assessment models are important tools that facilitate discussion between scientists, social scientists and decision-makers and ultimately improve the science-po2icy interface. PCC Working Group III, responsible for developing options for mitigating greenhouse bas ernissions, published a family of future scenarios based on the work of Japanese Professor Kaya.484 In the Kaya formula, fiiture CO2 emissions are a function of four key variables - population, wealth, energy efficiency, and energy type. The formula calculates impacts as follows:

CO2 emissions = population x GDP/population x energy/GDP x COdenergy

IPCC Working Group III has not yet provided a detailed blueprint on how to get to a low emissions future, however it does assume that population growth and weaIth are not likely to be adjusted through policy initiatives. These two environmental issues have been marginalized by govemments in developing and developed countries respectively, though the environmental movement plays an essential role in bringing these issues to the fore. Instead, the PCC and most other studies have focused on the last two variables. Energy efficiency is seen as a short term solution, for example, important in meeting the Kyoto Protocol requirements,485 while changes in technology, such as finding alternatives to fossil fuels (like the concept of a solar century), is viewed as a long term solution, one that wiII reduce greenhouse gas emissions substantially, taking the world beyond the requirements of the Kyoto Protoc01.~*~ Integrated assessrnent models (IAMs) are simplified models that take into account energy (how it affects GHG emissions), the carbon cycle (the atmospheric GHG concentration), and climate (how the climate responds to increases in the atmospheric concentration of GHGs), and impacts on humans and ecosystems. An example of an IAM

484 IPCC, Ernission Scenarios [2000), p. 105. 485 For example, in Canada, work is being done on the near term (2010), focusing on the implementation of the Kyoto Protocol. Ralph Torie and the Pembina Institute have developed blueprints on how Canada can achieve the Kyoto (though few have studied the question of how to move beyond Kyoto). 486 Wigley, Edrnonds and Michaels developed a blueprint which assumed that only the absolute levels of climate change were significant, but not the rate of climate change. They found that the important way of reducing greenhouse gas emissions and the easiest way to take precautionary measures was to focus on technology. Michael Gmbb, of the Royal Institute of International Affairs, criticized the work of Wigley, Edmonds and MichaeIs for ignoring the rate of climatic change, and, instead, believes that energy efficiency measures are also crucial in preventing dangerous climatic change in the future. is the Scenario Scanner, developed in the Netherlands by government and acadernic experts. The tool is designed to help decision-makers understand the issues by facilitating discussion between scientists and policy-makers. Decision-rnakers begin by setting a tolerable window in the long terrn fume, that is climate change that is below dangerous thresholds in terms of the absolute rises in temperature, rate of change in temperature, and sea Ievel rise. One cm then backcast to determine what the present and medium term policy implications are for avoiding catastrophic global climate change. This world future approach is an aggregate approach, since it looks at collective emissions, but not at how to specificaily achieve a low emission futures. Disagreggated approaches have been undertaken by the Pembina Institute in Canada, and the Rocky Mountain Institute in the US among others interested in looking at specific end use technologies, like energy efficient equipment. In considering the specific contributions scientists and the environmental movement might make in achieving the preferred futures sketched above, two types of learning need to be considered: long term socid learning that is planned, and adheres to a sornewhat linear pattern; and punctuated leaniing following unexpected as weil as anticipated environmental crises. Future environmental crises present opportunities for rapid societal and govemmental learning. It may seem fatdistic to factor in crises in a backcasting approach, but serious environmental crises are Iikely in the future given current trends in population growth and consumption levels, and the use of inappropriate technology. The priority, of course, is to avoid these. Moreover, one cannot plan crises (unless you are John Snobolen, Ontario's former Education Minister, who said if there wasn't already a crisis in Ontario's education system, one had to be created!). However, not dl crises are surprises. Anticipated crises are expected disasters which are bound to occur because theïr causes are already in the pipeline. For example, more extreme weather events are li kel y in the future as a result of our current buiId-up of greenhouse gases and the lag in the climatic response to these. On the other hand, there are possible, lurking, unknown crises, Like a potential disastrous flip in Atlantic current, fundamentally changing the temperate weather in coastal Europe. Still, it is important to recognize that rapid social learning and major policy change often occur after major disasters. For example, World War 1 gave rise to League of Nations, and the Second World War Ied to the development of the global hurnan rights regime. Similarly, environmental greenwaves tend to follow on the heels of a series of environmental disasters. The industrial accident in Bhopal in 1984, the Chernobyl catastrophe in 1985, the discovery of the ozone hole in the Antarctic in 1987, and the accelerated burning of Arnazon rainforests in the 1980s played a key role in the placement of environmental issues on the international agenda in the late-1980s and early 1990s. John Kingdon argues that crises such as these act as focusing or triggering events, serving as indicators or signals of a growing pr0blem.~8~At the same time, a strong scientific capacity and environmental movement are essential if crises are to be followed by a correct diagnosis of the problem, public and governrnental understanding of the issue, and the introduction of necessary policy changes. Governrnent agendas are also set by "a process of gradua1 accumulation of knowledge and perspectives among specialists in a given policy area", and so following a cnsis, governments turn to experts for authoritative knowledge and advice folIowing a ~risis.~88Further, policy entrepreneurs play a key role in "coupling solutions to problems and for coupling both problems and solutions to politi~s."~89For example, in Ontario's Walkerton disaster in May 2000, where at least six individuals died and two thousand became severely il1 due to e-coli contamination of the water, environmental activists were able successfully to attribute the crisis to the severe cuts to the Ministry of Environment's budget and staff introduced by the neo-conservative Harris government, as well as to the

487 Kingdom, Agendas. Alternatives. and Public Policies, p. 17. 488 Ibid., p. 18; see also Haas, "Do Regimes Matter?". rise of an unregulated factory fmindustry in the province. Environrnentalists had repeatedly brought these issues and evidence to the attention of the government and the

public, but it was not enough to shift public opinion or goverment policy. Post-crisis

leaming is Iess likely to occur without a strong knowledge base among scientists and the enviromentai movement. The crisis would have occurred with or without environrnental lobbying, but sustained learning ailowed environmentalist to better exploit the crisis when it occurred, and presumably to shift govemment policy off its moorings. But this moment of destablization in the existing policy regime is also allowing the neo-conservative Harris government to fight back with its own radical options of Merprivatization, based on its deep core beliefs regarding less governrnent and free markets (ignoring market failures!). For the most part, the learning process can be planned. Beyond crises, the Pace of environrnental regime-building can be quickened by developing more powerful epistemic comrnunities. A major challenge for the promotion of "public science" - that is, science which is undertaken to advance the public good - is the incompatibility of worldviews, ideas, vdues, and vested interests among different groups of scientists. The social basis of science was obvious in the two cases shidies undertaken. The positions varied considerably among government scientists, industry scientists, academic scientists, and ENGO scientists. Conflicting scientific findings often reflect differences in political, social, and economic privilege and positions.490 Industry-fimded science al1 too often amounts to a simple public relations exercise, otherwise known as greenwashing. A possible way of challenging industry pseudo-science is the acceptance of the precautionary principle, that is, the idea that serious environmental threats warrant action even when

- - 489 Kingdom, A~endas.Alternatives. and Public Policies, p. 21. 490 Donald Worster points to the influence of psychology, class, and culture on scientists. For example, Charles Darwin was psychologically predisposed to focusing on conflict in nature due to his class interests. He emphasized cornpetition in the origin of new species rather than the principle of cooperation. In response, the Russian anarchist Peter Kropotkin wrote Jbfutual Aid to show the importance of cooperation in nature and the pervasiveness of symbiotic relationships in the healthy functioning and evolution of species. See Worster, Nature's Econom~:A Historv of EcoIo~icalIdeas 2nd ed (Cambridge; New York, scientific consensus on the problem is absent (e-g., Theo Colburn's work on toxic chemicals). A Merway out is to lirnit who defines the existence or absence of scientific convergence. The peer review process, as employed by the IPCC, is exemplary in this regard w here academic, govemment, and ENGO scientists play Ieading roles. The preferment of public science involves building an adequate scientific capacity in governmental and intergovemmental bureaucracies through the investment of adequate resources in basic and applied environmentai scientific research. A major problem is the erosion of scientific capacity in a nurnber of environment-related ministries within and across countries. For exarnple, in Ontario, the neo-conservative govemment of Premier Mike Harris has cut the Environment Ministry's budget and staff by more than 40% since 1995; at the tum of the century the Ministry has the same level of resources (in real dollars) as it had in the early 1970~~shortly after it was fnst createds49' At the same time, the Canadian federal government cut Environment Canada's budget and staff by a third in the late 1990s, decimating the Canadian Wildlife Service in the process. There is a need to challenge the ideology of neo-conservatism which calls for deregdation, less government, tax cuts, and a shift of resources from the lower to the upper classes in society. As noted in Chapter Two, Schattschneider wrote in Serni-Sovereim Peo~iethat big business must be matched by "big government" in order to maintain an equilibrium between econornic and political interests. Ironically, there could be a silver iining in the cutbacks in environmental staff: govemments now have an opportunity to hire a new generation of ecologists and environmental policy analysts. In particular, there is an urgent need to hire conservation biologists in environment and natural resource departments in Canada's provincial and federal govenunents, and develop scientific capacity in government in the interdisciplinary field of conservation biology. At the same time, the international cornmunity should promptly set up an intergovemmentd assessment process, similar to the PCC's, in order

NY,USA: Cambridge University Press, 1994) and Peter Kropotkin, Mutual Aid: A Factor of Evolution 1st Canadian ed. (Montreal: Black Rose Books, 1989). to develop official assessrnents of the causes and consequences of the quickly disappearing habitats and mass extinction of species worldwide. What types of societal learning are necessary for a backcasting approach? Which have great potential? Which is most important? How are they related? Which is underpIayed? Planning for a more effective, long-tem role for the environmental movement would involve employing a hiller set of public education channels. The environmental movement needs to broaden its rnembership base. One way of doing this is to more fully incorporate groups like educators, jounalists, artists, musicians, and so forth into their movement.

Of the three types of learning, 1 would argue that a deep green worldview combined with a concern for social justice (Type 2 learning) is most important, since it is a foundation for the other types of learning. Solid eco-centric core values can provide the kind of motivation and drive necessary to engage in the other types of learning - leaming the basic facts and caring enough to engage in action learning - which together will ultimately help produce the major social changes needed on a grand scale, involving most of the world's citizenry. ~MorrisBerman, in The Reenchantment of the World, spends the fust half of the book examining how the enchanted world of the Middle Ages became disenchanted with the onset of the scientific revolution, capitalism and the predominance of organized religion, and then the next half of the book on ways to reenchant the world by fundamentally re-orienting our disenc hanted Western worldview . He argues in favour of a fundamental change in worldviews, akin to a religious conversion, one that underlines the intrinsic value of the natural world and sees humans as part of nature, not separate and superior to it. At the same tirne, as Berman notes, facts and values should not be considered separate. Developing and spreading information on the state of the environment (Type 1 learning), as do groups like the World Watch Institute, is essentid. A key question is how

491 Krajnc. "Wither Ontario's Environment?".

246 such information cmbe better distributed. One idea, offered by Herman DaIy and John Cobb Jr., is to create a Department of Global Issues which would have required course

offerings for al1 student~.~92 The Progressive Learning and Social Change Mode1 developed in Chapter Three also Iists a variety of Iearning channels that are essential for transmitting information to transnational publics as well as local communities.

Finally, mas-based direct action over long penods of time (Type 3 learning), as was the case in Clayoquot Sound and the early labour and civil rights movements, increases the commitrnent and skills of movement participants. Such sustained action learning over a period of weeks or months rnakes possible a life-long cornmitment to the

environmental and other progressive social movements.

492 Herman Daly and John B. Cobb Jr., For the Common Good: redirectin~the economy toward communitv. the environment. and a sustainable future (Boston: Beacon Press, 1989 and 1994). State of the Environment Re~ortsand Sustainabilitv Indicators

State of the Environment (SOE) Reports The Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) has produced an Environmental Performance Review for both the United States and Canada in which it outlines of environmental legislation and government departments and agencies involved in environmental policy making.493 The publications also review the integration of environmental concerns in a nurnber of sectoral cases studies. In the United States, the President's Council on Environmental Quality (CEQ) has published annual assessments of US environmental performance since 1970. Its reports entitled Environmental OualiQ, address issues like pollution, waste, and international cooperation. In the 1990s, the report has focused more on data publication, and less on planning for the future or evaluating the government's perfomance.494 In Canada, Statistics Canada and Environrnent produced the fmt national State of the Environment Report in 1986. The govenunent has continued to produce a State of the Environrnent Report every five years. A major report was produced in 1991, and another in 1996. Various provinces have also produced such reports including Quebec, Manitoba, Saskatchewan, and British Columbia.

Sustainability Indicators Assessing progress towards sustainable development requires an examination of the linkages between socioeconomic and environmental factors.495 In 1987, the World Commission on Environment and Development (Ehundtland Commission) called for new ways to measure the degree to which present societies and practices are sustainable. This cal1 was repeated in Agenda 21, the action plan developed at the 1992 Earth Summit. In response, international organizations, non-government organizations, academics, communities, businesses and governments are working on sustainability indicators sets and measurement techniques to supplant the transition from traditional State of the Environment Reporting to Sustainability Development Reporting. The US Govemment Within the US government, efforts to develop sustainability indicators have been undertaken by a number of groups. The President's short-lived Council on Sustainable Development (1993-99), a panel of govemment, business and envircnmental leaders, have

493 OECD, OECD Environmental Performance Review: United States (Paris: OECD, 1996) and OECD Environmental Performance Review: Canada (Paris: OECD, 1995). See aiso Eric Rodenburg, "OECD Reviews US Environmental Performance," Environment, Vol. 39, No. 4, May 1997, pp. 25-29. 494 Gordon J. MacDonald, "Assessing the US Environment-Envitanmental Quality: The Twenty-fourth Annuai Report of the Council on Environmental Quality," Environment, Vol. 38, No. 2, March 1996, pp. 25-26. 495 Alex Farrell and Maureen Hart, 'What Does Sustainability Really Mean? The Search for Useful Indicators," Environment, VoI. 40, No. 9, November 1998, pp, 4-9 & 26-3 1. produced a report which identifies what sustainability means for a broad range of issues.496 The President's Council for Sustainable Development created the opportunity for dialogue between the public and private sectors and civil Society. Its purpose was to advise the executive on implementation of Agenda 21. Their recommendations emphasize reducing costs, public participation, improving social and economic opportunities, and promoting intergenerational equity. An Interagency Working Group on Sustainable Development Indicators proposed a set that includes 32 indicators. Federal agencies, such as the US Forest Service and Environmental Protection Agency, have several national and regional programs related to sustainability indicators. EPA's Office of Sustainable Ecosystems and Communities has developed a training program for comrnunity leaders who would like to formulate sustainability indicator sets for their own purposes. Indicators are at the development stage and have not led to major changes in policy.

ï7ze Canadiun Govemment The Government of Canada appointed a Commissioner for Environment and Sustainable Development. The Commissioner reports annually to the public on how successfully federal programs and spending are supporting a shift to sustainable development. The report also evaluates implementation and enforcement of federal environrnental law S. The National Task Force on Environment and Economy was established by the Canadian and provincial governments in 1986 as a direct follow-up to the visit to Canada in May 1986 of the WorId Commission on Environment and Development (Brundtland Commission). In response to the Brundtland Report, the Task Force recommended the establishment of a permanent forum in which senior decision makers and opinion makers from diverse groups initiate a discussion on environrnent-economy integration. In an innovative move, the federal government and each province and temtory formed multisectoral Round Tables on Environment and Economy after the publication of the Brundtland Commission's Our Common Future. The Canadian govemment created the National Round Table on the Environment and Economy (NRTEE) in 1994, cornmitted to seeking consensus and providing decision makers with information on the state of the debate on the sustainable development. NRTEE members are distinguished Canadians appointed by the Canadian Government who represent a broad range of regions and sectors, including government, environmental groups, labor, business, academe, and First Nations. Its prograrns focus on climate change, economic instruments, measuring eco-efficiency, sustainable transportation, education, and aboriginal cornmunities. However, by the second half of the 1990s, many provincial round tables in Canada had disbanded as a result of the declining salience of environmental issues, and lack of political support for the environment by a nurnber of provincial governments. Environmental departments at the federal level and for a number of provinces experienced steep budget cuts in the 1990s, cuts which have compromised Canada's national capacity to monitor and diagnose existing and emerging environmental problems. Environmental Think Tanks A number of well-established environrnental think tanks or environmental research institutes emerged beginning in the 1970s. a) me Worldwatch Znstiîute (WZ)

496 MolIy Harriss Olson, 'The US President's Council on Sustainable Development," GIobal, Environmental Chan~e,Vol. 6, No. 1, 1996, pp. 63-65. The WI, based in Washington D.C., was founded in 1974 by agricultural economist Lester R. Brown with a startup gant from the Rockefeller Brothers' Fund. WI seeks to inform the general public, joumalists, policy makers, and students about the links between the world economy and its environmentai support system. WI research and publications are mainly concerned with overconsumption, transportation, international trade and aid, population yowth, water resources, urban planning, changing dietary habits away from meat, air pollution, soi1 erosion, biodiversity, rniiitary spending, unemployment, women in development, access to education and hedth services, grass-ruots movements, and poverty in the South. Every year, it publishes its famous State of the World: A Worldwatch Institute Report on Progress Toward a Sustainable Society, which is transiated in 27 different languages. More than a million copies are sold. In 1992 WI launched a second annual report cdled Vital Signs: The Trends that Shape Our Future to help readers identify future trends conceniing the environment. b) The World Resource Institute (WRI) The WRI was founded in 1982 in Washington, D.C., is an ecologically oriented think tank. WRI's focus is on global biodiversity, forest, climate change, population, technology, institutions, and world resource databases. The WRI generates information about global resource and environmental conditions, and assess current problems and forecasts possible new ones. For example, in its 1997 report, The Last Frontier Forests, it found that only one fifth of the world's original forest cover remains in large, relativeiy natural ecosystems. The 'WRI disseminates its findings through its broad array of publications, conferences and the mass media. c) International Znstitute for Sustainable Development (ZZSD) The IISD, based in Winnipeg, Manitoba, is a nonprofit corporation set up by the Governrnents of Canada and Manitoba. Its mandate is to promote sustainable development in decision-making-in government, business and the daily lives of individuals. IISD has set up a Consultative Group on Sustainable Development Indicators to facilitate the deveiopment of intemationally accepted sustainable development index. JISD contributes to Canada's effort to apply and refine the set of indicators recommended by the United Nations Commission for Sustainable Development (UNCSD). In 1995, IISD began work on a number of new indices to supplement indices like the Gross National Product (GNP) to measure progress. The IISD has developed a visudly attractive Dashboard Mode1 of Sustainability with three dials: environmental quality , econornic performance, and social health.497 Each dial is composed a set of three indicators measurïng current performance, changes in performance, and the amount remaining of critical stocks. For example the social Health Index measures: population growth, unemployment, poverty gap index, crime rate, housing affordability, nutritional status of children, and democratic participation (voting rate). Corporate Sustainability Reporting Allen L. White writes that, 'Two catastrophes in the 1980s-the accidental release of toxic fumes at Union Carbide's fertilizer [and pesticide] plant in Bhopal, India, and the Exxon Valdez oil spi11 in Alaska-laid the groundwork for higher standards of corporate

497 International Institute for Sustainable Development, "Consultative Group on Sustainable Development Indicators: Visual Models," web site, http://iisd.ca/cgsdi/dashboard.htm, November 30, 1999. disclosure."498 These human and environmental tragedies prompted reevaluation of chemical safety policies and on the problem of inadequate information flow and emergency preparedness around hazardous chemical facilities. Right -to-know policies in the US, home of Union Carbide, have been significantly strengthened as a result of public pressure for more openness and accountability. In 1986, the federal Superfund law was arnended to create a Toxics Release Inventory (TRI). Thousands of medium and large industrial facilities are obligated to annually report accidental releases of highly toxic substances listed by the EPA. The new law also requires the establishment of local emergency planning cornmittees, with representatives from locaI govemrnent, industries, and comrnunities, to draft emergency responses to possible chemical catastrophes. Providing information to the public has been a powerfûl incentive for encouraging action by indusîry to improve the management of toxic chernicals through reduced use and decreases in releases and transfers. The Toxics Release Inventory has inspired a similar initiative in Canada-the National Pollutants Release Inventory (NPRI). The next logical step would be to require reporting of information about chemical use and chernicals contained in products rather than simply chernical release. A number of groups are working on corporate environment reporting (CER), and more recently, sustainability reporting (CSR). The Canadian National Round Table on Environment and Economy are working on eco-efficiency measurement, CSRs would also include information on social and economic impacts of corporations, such as wage equity, child labor practices, gender equality, human rights, and community reinvestment policy. The Coalition for Environmentally Responsible Economies (CERES), formed in 1989, is a group of environmental organizations such as the World Resources Institute, and social investors that launched the Global Reporting Initiative in collaboration with a number of international organizations, including UNEP. A pilot phase began in March 1999 involving about 20 companies, including General Motors, interested in moving beyond reporting on the traditional environmental and health and safety concerns. Cntics have noted that the GRI's definition of sustainability is still too narrow (e-g., social and economic indicators simply consist of principles pertaining to bribery and corruption, freedom of association, and relations with the community, suppliers and customers). The USD socio-economic indicators are much broader and more comprehensive. Community SustainabiIity Indicators Community-based SOE reporting involves extensive public participation, and has obtained popular support in the US Public participation is criticai since the implementation of sustainability requires action by the public in political forums (as voters), in the marketplace and household (as consumers), and civil society (as citizens). Local indicator efforts provide an opportunity for education and outreach to the community on issues related to sustainability and thus are an important way to get on the path to sustainable development. For example, the residents of Seattle, Washington, have formulated an indicator set starting in 1990, following a conference sponsored b y the Global Tomorrow Coalition.499 Sustainable Seattle has produced a series of reports and indicators, including the number of salmon returning to spawn, the annual per capita number of vehicle miles traveled, per capita water consurnption, and the number of hours of work at the average wage needed to pay for basic needs. The process entailed extensive public meetings, involving hundreds of area residents. More than 240 worked on the 1998 report.

498 Allen L. White, "Sustainability and the Accountable Corporation,'' Envimnrnent, Vol. 41, No. 8, October 1999, pp. 30-43. 499 Farrell andHart, "What Does Sustainability Really Mean?'ppp. 27-28. The US Climate Chan- Program The world's Iargest and most significant global change program is in the United States. In 2000, the federal budget for the US Global Change Research Program (GCRP) was projected to be $1.8 billion (see table). The President's Office of Science and Technology Policy oversees federal global change research. The purpose of the multi- agency, interdisciplinary US GCRP is to understand the implications of global environmental change Erom scientific and social perspectives. The National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) supports the single largest component of the US GCRP data generation and information management in its Mission to Planet Earth. This long-term program studies the interactions among the Earth's atrnosphere, oceans, land processes, and human activities. The Earth Observing System (EOS) is a key component of the Mission to Planet Earth that generates a wide variety of aûnospheric, oceanic, and land use data. It consists of a space-based observing- system,- a data irîformation system, and a scientific research progr&. The overall US strategy to address global change issues focuses in three areas: (1) research to understand the Earth's environment, (2) research and development of new technologies to prevent and adapt to environmental changes, and (3) formulation of national and international policy response options. However, both the US and Canadian GCRPs (the prograrn was established in 1989, and operates through the Royal Society of Canada) are ovenvhelmingly physical sciences programs. Further, the problem of global change is seen as essentidy a subject for technological fixes and not as intirnately related to patterns of overconsumption, population growth and inappropriate technology. Yet global change is prïmarily the result of human interactions. In order to provide a better basis for policy decisions, more support for studies on the centrd role of lifestyles, human population growth and technology in effecting rapid global environmental change are needed. Policy makers should be provided with information on the consequences of the loss of ecosystems and biodiversity, and changes in land use. Further, a number of critics have argued that the US prograrn works largely through NASA's MTPE, but potentially cost-effective, but Iess glamorous programs outside of NASA have languished. More recently, the United States and Canada have placed a greater emphasis on the Human Dimensions of Global Change (EDGC). In 1990, the International Social Science Council launched the HDGC to parallel the World Climate Research Program. It works on the social dimensions of resource and energy use, attitudes conceming the environment, the role of institutions, industrial growth, and environmental securïty and sustainable development. At the same time, a greater emphasis is being placed on enhancing the provision of information to the public and other interested parties. The Carbon Dioxide Information Analysis Center (CDIAC) was established in the US Department of Energy in 1992 to support the GCRP by providing data for topics including atmospheric concentrations of trace gases, ernissions inventories of carbon dioxide, US and global historicai climate data, ocean chemistry and land use. With the growing interest in climate change, the center has received a growing volume of requests for information Erom policy makers, industry managers, students and environment reporters. The Global Change Research Information Office was established in 1993 to provide foreign governments, institutions, businesses, and citizens worldwide access to scientific research information available in the United States which would be useful to prevent, mitigate, and adapt to the effects of global change. Bibliography

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