PHN Technical Note 85-8 Public Disclosure Authorized

DEVZLOPI%E-T CONSEQUENCES OF RAPID POPULATION GROWJT: Public Disclosure Authorized A REVIEW FROM TEE PERSPECTIVE OF SMB-SAHARAN AP:RICA

by

Susan H. Cochraae Public Disclosure Authorized

July 1985

Population, Health and Nutrition DepartLment World Bank

IThe World Bank does not accept responsibility for the views expressed herein which are those of the author(s) and should not be attributed to the World Bank or to i ts affiliated crganizations. The findings, interpretations, and coclusiolns are the restults of research supported by the Bank; they do not

Public Disclosure Authorized necessarily repr:esent offi cial policy of -he Bank. The designations employed,t the preseatation of material, and any maps used in this document are solely ror the convenience of the reader and do not imply the expression of any opinion whlatsoever on the part of the World Bank or its af f iliates concerning the legal status of any country, territory, city, area, or of its authorities, or concernaing the delimitations of its boundaries, or national affiliation, PHN Technical Note 85-8

DEVELOPMENT CONSEQUENCES OF RAPID POPULATION GROWTH: A REVIEW FROM THE PERSPECTIVE OF SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA

A B S T R A C T

The purpose of this paper is to review Africans' perceptions of the relationship between population growth and economic development in sub-Saharan Africa. Even in the late 1960s there existed some concern for the negative consequences of population growth, but there also existed anger and frustration with simplistic visions of the role of population in economic development. In this paper, an attempt is made to discuss the conceptual issues involved in evaluating the effect of rapid population growth on the achievement of development objectives, document perceptions of these efforts in sub-Saharan Africa and review the attempt to quantify the effects of population growth in sub-Saharan Africa.

There is a considerable difference of opinion in sub-Saharan Africa about the positive and negative consequences of population growth. These differences arise from many sources. In part, they reflect actual differences within sub-Saharan Africa in the degree of population pressure. There has also existed the view that while sub-Saharan Africa could absorb large increases in -population in the long run, the problem of providing for population growth in the short run might be quite formidable. Finally, perceptions differ because of the different intellectual traditions or political orientation in the many countries of Africa.

Given the diversity of actual economic circumstances, the differences in government's commitment to basic needs and differences in the world view of African thinkers, there can be no simple summation of the African perspective of the development conse'quences of rapid population growth. There is, however, considerable recognition of the complexity of the issues involved and there is growing awareness if not acceptance of the limited ability of most African governments to cope with rapid population growth given recent poor economic performance. What can be done about the problem, given that individuals seem to want very large families, is a question which plagues many of those who recognize the riegative effects of population growth.

* * *- * * * * * * * *

Prepared by: Susan H. Cochrane Population, Health and Nutrition Department

July 1985 Development Consequences of Rapid Population Growth:

A Review from the Perspective of SSA

Susan Hill Cochrane

Introduction

There are two things that are necessary to bring about a commitment to reducing fertility in any country. The negative consequences of rapid population growth or specifically high fertility must be perceived by the government leaders. Such perceptions are not sufficient, however.

It is also necessary for those leaders to perceive that it is possible to do something to reddce fertility and that such policies and programs to reduce fertility must be perceived as being feasible in terms of both economic and political cost.

In this paper, the development consequences of population growth in Sub-Saharan Africa will be reviewed. Giveni the diversity of work that has been done on this topic, this review cannot hope to be comprehensive.

Nevertheless, an attempt will be made (1) to examine the perception of

African leaders as to the aggregate consequences of population growth from

policy statements and development plans, (2) to review the conceptual

problems that arise in trying to assess the probable demographic

consequences of rapid population growth, and (3) to review the work on

probable specific effects of population growth on development objectives of

expanding education, eliminating unemployment, providing sufficient food and accelerating general economic development. -2-

Although this review is far from comprehensive, it is hoped that more materials will be forthcoming to expand the evidence in later editions. Despite the limitations of this draft, however, it is exDected

that the evidence reviewed here will be suff1icient to identify the general

problems of coping with population growth that have been and are being

experienced in Africa and the potential amelioration of those problems if

fertility could be reduced.*

The feasibility of reducing fertility in Africa must also be

addressed if governments are to consider not only the need to cope with

population growth but the possibility to control that growth. These issues

of feasibility will be addressed in other papers.

*This draft was prepared prior to the second African Population Conference. Suggestions on specific changes or additions necessitated by the conference would be welcomed gladly. i 3-

The discussion of the consequences of rapid population growth has generated considerable anger and frustration in SSA, as evidenced by the statement of Eraj (Nairobi, 1969) and Samir Amin (Accra, 1971). In recent years, however, there has also been widespread recognition of the serious problems arising from coping with rapid poptulation growth. It is extremely important to reconcile these two positions if one is correctly to interpret the position of SSA governments on population and help them to achieve accelerated development.

The evolution of increased recognition of the problems associated with rapid population growth in Sub-Saharan Africa arises from many sources: (1) improved availability of data documenting population size and growth rates, (2) increased analysis of population consequences, and (3) changes in the economic circumstances in SSA which have eroded the surpluses with which to cope with rapid growth. Before preceeding to examining the conceptual and empirical issues involved in estabfishing the consequences of rapid growth it is necessary to determine the attitudes towards that growth in SSA prior to the 1974 Bucharest Conference on

Populati6n.

Perceptions of the Consequences of Population Growth in SSA

There is a variety of possible ways in which population growth, size and density might affect economic growth and development. To understand the stance of SSA governments on population policies, it is necessary to determine how these consequences are perceived within SSA and how these perceptions have evolved. While no easy way exists to determine -4-

the perceptions of governments or individuals of the relationship between population and well-being, there are bits and pieces of information that lend insight. It is useful to examine these perceptions up to the time of the 1974 World Population Conference as well as more recent perceptions.

The earliest consistent cross-national data set on attitudes towards population comes from a series of sample surveys conducted around

1965. These surveys covered the urban and generally literate population in selected countries of Latin America, Asia and Africa, as well as selected developed countries. -- (Stycos, 1971, Appendix Table C). The majority of those interviewed in the three African countries - Nigeria, Kenya and

Senegal -- felt that a larger pQpulation would be good for the country,

(Nigeria - 53%; Kenya - 59%; Senegal - 83%; see Table 1). It should be noted that a majority also agreed with this position in M'anila, Athens,

Santiago, iexico City, Bangkok, Buenos Aires, Teheran and .Caracas. In addition, regional summary data shows that in Africa and Latin America only

33 and 24 percent, respectively, of those intervierwed felt that population growth would be bad for the nation, while in the Near and Far East, 53 percent perceived this to be the case.

Thus, the majority of literate urban dwellers interviewed in these three African countries considered population growth to be good for their country. Their perceptions were shared by those interviewed in urban

Latin American and in some cities in Asia. The survey shows that African perceptions about the consequences of population increase were not more optimistic than those in Latin America at that time. There was, however, a substantial difference between these regions on approval of national family planning programs. Despite the fact that Latin America is predominantly - 4a

.Table I: Percenrtale Distribution of *Answers to uestLion, "Ait Lh1..s considr!red, do vot.t .ihi.nk luiving, a -Lrg,-tr popitti il- be a good thing or a bad thing Cor this country?" country/Ci ty Bad Thing Good Thing No Opinion 73tal

India 87 8 5 100 Great BriLain 73 12 15 0oo Seoul 68 16 16 iOO Italy 59 21 20 100 Turkey 63 33 4 100 West Ger;many 51 24 25 1 00 Japan 51 27 22 LOO Singapore 38 26 36 100 Nigeria 47 53 - .00 France 32 46 22 100 Manila 3? 54 7 i00 Athens 40 56 4 1C00

Rio de Janeiro 29 47 24 100 Kuala Lumpur 29 49 22 00 Kanya 36 59 5 100 Sanitiago 30 64 6 00 Mexico City 31 65 4 1'00 Bangckok. 20 69 11 100 Buenos Aires 21 71 8 '00 Teheran 21 76 3 GC0 Caracas 18 75 7 100 Da kar 13 83 4 1'00 -5-

Roman Catholic, 74 percent of those interviewed approved of such programs. 1 ] While 54% of the zomposite African sample approved -- a majority- there were strong differences within Africa. In Dakar, Senegal

52 perc ,-t strongly disapproved, ;while in Nigeria and Kenya, only 16 and 19 percent respectively disapproved. In Nigeria, 53 percent strongly approved of such- programs but only 28 percent approved in Kenya.

Thus, Africa was not apparently more ambivalent about population growth than Latin America, but Africans vre less approving of national family planning programs and strong diffferences appeared across these countries regarding that issue.

Other, perhaps more relevant infor:mation on perceptions of the consequences of population increase has been obtained from exa-mining SSA development plans for the period prior to the 1974 Conferaftce.

In Jue 1969, a seminar on the "Application of Demogr-aphic Data and Analysis to Development Planning" was organized by the Econamic

Ccmmission for Africa. Published proceedings of this seminar provide considerable insight into the subject perceptions, but need to be suppleimented by plan documnts draw up after 1969 and prior to 1974. Table

2 summarized the pe:-ceptions of population consequences in these plans.

While plans for Chad, Dahomy, Mali, Niger and Togo in West Africa and

Ethiopia, Malawi and Zaire in East Africa made no mention of negative

consequences of population growth, the other identified countries

demonstrated some recognition of negative consequences, from simple

recognition that income must grow faster than population to raise per

capita income to recognition of problems of employment, education and

nutrition and more indirect problems of urbanization.

1/ In the Nlear East, 74 percent approved; in the Far East, 82 percent. - 5a -

Table 2: Perception of Population Consequence in African DevelopTnt Plas up to 1974 Pare l o 2

Couny Year Growth Rate of Perceived Consequenes Ebpulation FbsiLive NegaLive Given in Plan

West Africa eLixcadon, Caneroxn 1971-76 2.1 Stiimlnated dcndar ard supply arrd Strain an employment .ad developnent of w areas np1o¢ -.- C.A.R. 1967-70 2.0 dtion 0-,sts, u-''--'m,

Qiad 1965-70

h:may 1961-81

Chaa 1963/64-69/70 Labor Force Growth oa Ivory Coast 1971-75 Probln of iradgratozion e::ic

;iberia 1967-70 mpaer objectives f-wl-zd with poplationi gro'th c. t ons MAia 1961-65 - rce growt-c. aturita 19634' "N cesms Rapid urbamization, t-ix to date Niger 1961-74

N.geria 1962-68 Lagos rapid growth

Senegal 1965-69 1969-73 Recognizes reed t create jobs arsd nationaliz jobs to a= 'm--.7te growing laor force. Togo 1966-70 and Upper Volta 1972-76 Probl; for feding, rg providing rnplQo!ent. - 5b

Plans up to 1974 Page 2 of 2 Table 2: Perception of Population ConscEruence in African -Dcvelornnrt

PercivdedqCons CUt37y Year Growth Rate of Population Positive Pgative GLven in Plana

East Africa gcneral. disveloopt.jatt, envicyLa Botswana 1973-73 2.6 Edurativn, by implication

Nitriticn problens B=uni 1968-72 2-2.5

Ethiopia 1963-67 tb census Popaticn grwth will provide to date srfficient labor force, ecrension of market Eduxatiori cost, reed for hig-2r inccr'e Keira '1966-70 gro'^. wI-!elivirg c ,-,&r-iis lo constituta a seriouz 7Cw;.,Lan alzWi 1971-e0 2.5 IC,cac io. Mauritius 1966-7O

S=calia L953-(7 ~b cetsus Large area & cntvral c:sources to date available !Iust L'm.cict groWL'. ffi po7d2atior. Slan 16 .62-%L/72 growt.h to increase Fer .. p. inccme gyrow

ient Tanzania 1964-69 enpioy U:banization costs; ni-xl foc higrar inc, gara 1966-71 growth

Zaire 1965-69

.Fpet ;ttt1 SX17ctŽ: ECA, 19'33, L u-1 i.ev1rolL tli -6-

Thus, substantial recognition of negative consequences of population growth for development existed even prior to the 1974 Bucharest

Conference. This does not mean that most African countries considered these consequences serious enough to justify family planning programs.

Table 3 shows that in SSA at the time of the conference only Botswana,

Kenya and Ghana had explicit government-supported family planning programs

(King et al. , 1974).

The position of various African countries on population issues at the Conference in 1974 is well summarized in the country statements

(Appendix A). The range of attitudes on conseqtences and programs is substantial. Some countries do not mention consequences but mention family planning programs and even growth targets (Mauritius and Kenya), while others believe strongly in positive consequences of larger populations

(Niger, Tanzania, Guinea). Other important theme! included (i) the importance of national sovereignty in population policy and individual sovereignty in determining family size; (ii) the multiple fa;,tors affecting development and the lack thereof; therefore, the rejection of population as the development problem (Zambia, Nigeria, Rwanda); and (iii) concern for reducing mortality aind improving maternal and child health.

The perceived seriousness of the population problem in any country depends on the experience of the country in the past, the interpretation of that experience by politicians and schlars, and the projection of the potential consequences of population. Therefore, to understand how population policy has evolved in Africa, it is necessary to review the conceptual issues and the analysis that has been done in the consequences of population size and growth, actual and perceived, in SSA. - 6a - Table 3

Distribution of Selected Developing Countries in Africa by Gaverment Polcifes on Population and Fa=ily Planning Activities *

Laizsaez-falrd

Pronatalist NJeutral Neutral AntinataList

Cameroon Angola Mozambique Burundi Central Af. Rep. Cape Verde Is. Niger Liberia Gabon Chad Portuguese Guinea (FPA 1956) Guinea Congo, Senegal Sierra Leone Libya People's Rep. (FPA 1970; (FMA 1960) Malagasy Rep. Dahomey closed 1971) (FPA 1967) * (FPA 1972) Seychelles Malawi 7quatorial Guinea Somali Republic Rwanda Ethiopia Namibia (F?A 1966) Spanish Sahara Ivory Coast Swaziland Lesotho Tanzania (FPA 1968; (FPA. 1959) closed; Togo reopened 1971 Upper Volta ;Mali Zambia (FPA 1972) (FPA 1971) Mauritania

Antinatalist

Government Support Official Official Family Offic-al Family of Private Fa=.Liy ,Planning Program Planning Programs Family Planning Planning Includring Motiva- and Sotrnger Program -Program tion Campaign Measures

Gambia Algeria Botswana (FPA 1969) (1967) (1970) Nigeria South Africa Egypt (FPA 1964) (FPA 1.932; (FPA 1958; 1965) Reunion 1966) Ghana (FPA 1966) . Zaire (FPA 1965; 1969) Rhodesia (1973) KCenya (FPA 1957) (FPA 1961; 1966) Sudan Mauritius (FPA 1965) (FPA 1957; 1965) Uganda Morocco (FPA 1957) (FPA 1971; 1965) Tunisia (FPA 1968; 1964)

* Dates are given for both the founding of the private family planning association (FPA) and the year in which gover-=ents began ofefaring family planning services in their health programs, where applicable.

Sources: International Planned Parenthood Federation. 1973. Family Planning in Five Continents. London: IPPF U. S. Agency for International Development, Office of PoDu- lation. PoDulation Program Assistance. 1972. 'Washington, D. C.: U. S. Government Princing Of-ice. interLational Planned Parenthood Federation. 1969-1974. Situation Renorts. London: IPPF. U. N. Economic and Social Council. 1969. 'World Ponulation Situation. Geneva: U. N. -7-

The Conceptual Issues

At the national level, there is justice in the statement that

"the argument that the control of population growth is essential for economic development can be substantiated neither by facts and figures nor fromm the history of the developed nations." -- (Eraj, Nairobi, 1969).

The fundamental flaw in the argument that population growth is the bete noir of development is that it assumes a single causation model of development and focuses on very partial analyses. During the 1974

Bucharest Population Conference, Zambia summarized this position succinctly: ". . . It would be highly erroneous to jump to the conclusion that Zambia's economic failures were due to rapid population increase.".

In fact, anyone can envision and document cases where rapid devlopment has occurred with rapid population growth, and it was only 50 years ago that John Maynard Keynes was suggesting that increased population growth would increase income levels by stimulating demand.

Therefore, to address the legitimate frustrations of thcse

African think4rs who hotly reject the link between population growth. and development put forward by the unicausal populationist, one needs to understand the richness of the growth process and the diversions, pervesions, and deviations from that process. From this brief outline, we can identify the points on which evidence can be brought to bear.

The growth of per capita income and :ts relationship to population growth is uncertain, because we lack knowledge of:

(1) The complex relationship between inputs and outputs in the

productive process and in particular lack of unders tanding

of economies of scale; (2) The growth of capital and the effect of population growth on

- the accumulation of capital;

(3) How input/output relationships change over time through

technological change and in particular how population growth

stimulates or retards technological change.

The specific gaps in our knowledge of the process of growth and development can briefly be discussed and various alternatives can be

examined. However, there are seven serious reasons why the standard discussions of developmental consequences of population growth and its implications are widely rejected or viewed with hostility.

First, there is considerable skepticism among mamr about who will benefit from improvements in productivity brought about by reduced population growth or by any other mechanism. This is the well-known concern of developing countries -- particularly primary produ:ers -- about adverse movements in terms of trade.

Second, there is rejection of the legitimacy of the wrld-wide distribution of capital and the contention that redistribution should in some way be proportional -to population size.

Third, the quality of resources is as important as th.eir quantity, but the discussions of population's effect on development rarely focus on the quality/quantity trade-off. While reduced quantity can increase quality in some ways, for example, through improved education, improved quality through improved health will actually increase quantity.

Ignoringr this relationship tends to be interpreted by many Africans as meaning that the populationists are indifferent or hostile to reductions in mortality -- a major concern of all conscientious African govern=nts. -9-

Fourth, it has been argued in SSA, as it was argued in Europe in the 1930's, that a young population is dynamic. (See Guinea country

statement at the World Population Conference of 1974 as well as statements by Togo at the ILO Regional Conference in Nairobi, 1977.)

Fifth, even if there were ccmplete accord that reduction in that rate of population growth would increase the per capita incomes of those

countries who bring them about, there is recognition that there may be very

little possibility of reducing fertility in many Africaa countries. "The assumption that if fantastic 'population projections' are played up and

very gruesome pictures of the future of the human race, because of

overcrowding, are painted, more couples will practice family plannirg is the wrong." -- (Eraj.) The extension of this argument is the idea that for

present time develapment is the best contraceptive in SSA. "Africa must

choose development today and perhaps the 'pill tomorrow'." -- (Senegal

country statement, First World Population Conference, 1974.)

Sixth, while most discussions focus on overall population size

and growth rates, the population problem seen by most Africans is one of

maldistrribution. This is manifested by rapid urban growth, overpopulation

in some rural areas and underpopulation in others.

Seventh, the previous arguments are intellectual. There are also

a large number of emotional and political issues which have confounded the

discussion.

While it is beyo-,d the scope of this paper to deal with these

emotional/political issues or the issues of the redistribution of capital

or the distribution of the benefits of improved productivity through

changes in terms of trade, it is essential to address the. other points that

explain the rejection of population growth as the focal point of

developnent policy in SSA. - 10 -

Economies of Scale

In SSA as in Latin America in earlier periods, there is a perception that there are substantial ecoanies of scale to be reaped fron population growth. "For example, Abcoulaye Wade supports 'Adam Smith's optimism about the existence of a positive correlation between population and economic activity' and concludes that a large population will permit further division of labor resulting in higher productivity. Wade also states that -quantitative demographic insufficiency has been reconized as one of the obstacles in the industrial development of Black Africa.' --

(Wade, 1964, in Van de Walle, 1975).

There are several kinds of econanies of scale envisioned. First, the availability of unused land is oftea considered a prima facie case that population growth can at least be accanodated without reduced incane -- that 'unused land ensures at least constant if not increasing return to scale.

Second, increased size of market allows economies of scale through the divisioa of labor.

Third, increases in population size or market size allow the spreading of overhead and thus the reduction of cost per unit.

These three sources of benefits from population growth are extremely difficult if not impossible to document or to refute, but some discussion might be illuminating.

The availability of unused land or natural resources does not guarantee constant or increasing returns to scale unless the quality of the unused resources and the costs of bringing them into production are sufficiently high and low respectively. Indeed the reverse can easily be

imagined. Evidence needs to be accumulated on the costs of brirning ne7 resources, particularly land, in SSA into production. In no case have these costs been negligible, and in many cases they may have exceeded the costs of improving productivity and/or labor absorption on existing land.

This is an empirical issue that needs careful research in various regions of SSA if development strategy is to be appropriately designed.

The economies of scale to be reaped from increased division of if labor depend not on population size, but on market size. Only per capita income remains constant or increases will market size expand. This raises the question of the sources of income growth in the first place and of unemploymint one is faced with a problem of simultaneity4 The problem and underemployment is relevant here. A critical question is whether such

unemployment is due to a lack of aggregte demand or >

factors.

There are ways other than population growth to increase market to size -- improved transportation, reduction of tariff and other barriers

trade, etc. These issues have, of course, received considerable attention

by African economists and politicians.

The economies of scale to be reaped from shared overhead can

arise from unused capacity in manufacturing and can thus arise frcm market

expansion or from unused capacity in public utilities, including, perhaps

especially, transportation. For example, Nyorko's statement at the 1968

'University of Ghana Symposium is relevant: "The existence of these vast

empty spaces poses a problem fox the economic development of the country.

It renders unviable projects of road construction, water and electricity

supply to rural areas and thus retards development of these areas." --

(Nyorko, 1968, p. 162.) In the case of some kinds of social overhead

capital, it is not population size so much as population density. that 12 -

in reduces overhead per capita. This is one other major consideration the in "villagization" program in Tanzania and is clearly an important concern many of the low-density areas of SSA and elsewhere, e.g., out-back

Australia. Considerable work needs to be done on the strategies for

reducing overhead costs in such enviroments and for attainirg optimal

density in rural areas, considering both the cost of social overhead and

the optimal density for agricultural and other rural econcmic activities.

The optimum clearly differs by ecological region, and many marginal areas

such as the Sahel have far exceeded the optimum even at very low

densities. Discussions of critical population densities are relevant here.

Growth of Capital

Although substantial literature exists on the subject there is

considerable uncertainty concerning the effect of population growth on.

capital accumulation. In the 1930's, the Keynsians saw population growth

as a major stimulant to motivating investient. Most developing countries,

however, do not see the lack of investmnt opporttrities as the major

constraint on capital accumulation. It is the lack of supply of savings

that is the major concern of developing countries.

The various sources of savings -- households, businesses

(domestic), national governnmnts, foreign private investmant and foreign

assistance -- have different and uncertain relationships to population

growth.

Of these, household savings will be discussed in another report,

but there is little general belief that larger families save m:re. The

effect of population growth on savings made available by dcmestic

businesses and private foreign investors is uncertain. It is pcssible that

more rapid population growth or a larger market size stimulates - 13 -

investment. This is, of course, related to both the Keynsian argument

mentioned above and to the question of whether increases in population

creates a market if income does not increase. Another way in which more rapid growth may stimulate investment, particularly foreign invest Mnt, is by lowering wages. Cheap labor has often been an attraction to foreign investment, but today it is more likely to be cheap skilled labor than cheap raw labor that attracts irnvestment, and the ability to train labor is, of course, more difficult as population grows more rapidly. In addition, investments that are attracted by cheap labor are perhaps the very ones that will result in having larger portions of the benefits of improved productivity transferred outside the country. Therefore, with respect to private investment, there must be concern for who benefits to what degree.

The relationship between international assistance and population growth is a political topic of enormous concern to both developed and developing countries. Eraj's statement capsules the view of the.LDC's:

"The belief . . that help in developing their [econcaies] should be withheld pending a reduction iri the birth rate is not only incorrect but also very high-handed." Such linkage of aid is so offensive as to be. counter-productive in many cases.

The opposite relationship may also exist. As population grows more rapidly, a greater degree of assistance may be made available, either because aid is, in some cases, allocated on a per capita basis, or because increased immiseration accompanyilng rapid population growth results in greater aid for humanitarian reasons. This applies particularly with respect to food aid. The possibility is related to the wk:ole question of redistribution raised above, but it is unlikely that increases in aid - 14

accompanied by increases in population are fully caupensatory for the burden of such growth.

If aid were allocated on the basis of population size, however, and if it were not closely tied to goods going directly to the impoverished, covernments might well find it in their interest to increase command of foreign resources by allowing population growth to proceed apace. If there were little negative consequence of that growth for the population's welfare, or if the population were sufficiently docile wdth respect to decreasing welfare, motivation could exist for goverments to take passive positions with respect to population.

This possibility may also exist for goovernmental units within countries where central government resources or power are allocated on a per capita basis. Nigeria is, of course, a classic case of this phenomenon, but the degree to which this results in mre rapid growth of the people or only their reported numbers is unclear.

These links between external resources and population growth are far more political than econamic, and one can probably dismiss the link between external assistance and population growth as an important determinant of the effect of population size on growth of capital and thus on per capita income.

The final source of savings and a ma.jor one in developing countries is government, where the most analysis has been done on the effect of population growth on savings and where there is the greatest consensus among Africans about the problems of population growth.

Government savings depend on revenues and expenditures on current account. Revenues can be expected to rise with increases in per capita. income, but not generally population growth perse, few governments are - 15 -

sufficiently-confident of the positive effects of population growth on per

capita income to expect revenues to rise with population growth in the

short run.

As will be documented later, these governments see quite clearly

that the costs of reaching social goals, such as expanded education and

improved availability of health facilities, increase in direct proportion

to the rate of population growth. They also see that urban growth compounds rapidly escalating costs for social programs through costs of water, sanitation, housing and transportation. The problems of food and employment are seen as linked to population growth as well, but the concern

for these consequences varies depending on the responsibility governnents choose or need to assume in this area.

Thus; the problems of achieving national goals of improved welfare or basic needs in the face of rapid population growth presents a direct conflict with the goal of increasing government savings available for directly productive investment. The more strongly the government commits itself to achieving "basic needs" for its population, the more it is likely to worry about the "costs" of population growth.

It was the prospect of this conflict that caused Ghana and kenya to adopt policies early to reduce fertility, and the experience of this conflict has caused many other nations subsequently to change their policies on population growth. This concern is well expressed in the opening remarks of the Vice Chancellor of the University of Ghana at the

1968 Symposium on Population and Socio-Economid Development in Ghana.

"Ghana is fortunate not to be overcrowded on its land surface. Indeed ,

Africa is general in in this respect mnre fortunate than the coutries of

Asia, where population pressures are explosive. Our problem here, however, .16 -

is not really.one of.absolute numbers; it is more a question of an adequate

means of feeding the people, of improving the quality and standard of

living of the people." -- (A.A. Kwapong, 1968, p.v.)

Before reviewing the evidence on these well-recognized effects of

population growth, it is necessary to address the question of technological

change.

Technological Change

The effect of population size, growth and density cn

technological change has received considerable attention from pronatalists

such as Julian Simons on The Ultimate Resource. The arguments that more

people generate improved technology range -from those who maintain that more

people increase the probability of producing a genius (presumably each

genius mere than compensates for all the extra people); to those that simply believe that the increased hardship of more people stimulates

individuals to be more creative, in order to prevent reduction in the standard of living. (This is an old belief linkdng motherhood, necessity and invention.)

While the effect of population size, growth anrd density on technological change is mentioned in SSA literature, a much more specific concern is expressed by those writing on SSA: Choice of technology in

Af,rica, rather than invention or innovation, is the dominant concern.

Some believe that labor scarcity, particularly in SSA, prevents the adoption of agricultural technologies which would increase per capita productivity. This argument stems from Esther Boserup's The Conditions of

Agricultural Growth (1965) and her elaboration on the subject in Population and Technological Change (1981). The basic arguxent is that the shift from

'slash and burn" to ultimately intensive agriculture, represented by multiple year-round cropping, depends upon the availability of labor. - 17 -

There are a number of questions that need to be addressed -with respect to this argument. One is the question of whether productivity per unit of labor input increases with intensification of agriculture. This would clearly depend on the particular ecology and the availability of cooperating factors; thus, it would vary among SSA regions.

The second question concerns the possible sources of increased labor. A possible source, of course, is more work per existing member of the local population, either through increased labor participation or through increased hours per worker. Etienne Van de Walle reviewed evidence from West Africa on this point and concluded: "Thus, it would seem wrong to assume that higher population densities lead necessarily to more intensive forms of cultivation." -- (Van de Walle, 1975, p. 142.) An alternative way to increase labor availability is to relocate existing populations, either through natural migration or resettlement schemes.

Considerable review of African agricultural experience is needed to determine the extent to which productivity per worker or unit of labor is kept abnormally low by (1) lack of sufficient labor, (2) lack of capital,

(3) lack of technologies appropriate to the particular ecologies, (4) poor practices by farmers, and (5) deficient or lacking goverrimental policies.

Only in this context of population growth on agricultural technologies be assessed.

Balancing the Consequences

Given those various channels through which population growth might affect the growth of per capita income (or other measures of welfare), it is difficult to make a prima facie case for the net positive or negative effect of population growth in the abstract. Clearly, the balance of positive and negative effects at the aggregate level will differ from one circumstance to another. Certain poiats must be kept in mind, however, in trying to assess whether slower or more rapid growth would be desirable on economic grounds in any context.

First, certain conseqtwnces are short-run and fairly certain, such as those on expenditures to achieve educational goals, while others are mre likely to be long-run and less certain, such as increasing tnit costs of developing resources, capturing economies of scale from the division of labor or inducing technological change.

Second, the less obvious point is the fact that even though there may exist substantial economies of scale, it may be desirable for populations to grow at less than maximum possible rates, if the increases in capital will also increase per capita income and if population growth, at its maximum rate, slows the rate of capital accumulation. A theoretical rndel is given in Cochrane, 1973. The statemrnt of the Vice Chancellor of the University of Ghana at its 1968 Symposium also reflects this balancing of scale versus growth, as dctes a country statement at one ILO subregional conference in Nairobi in 1977.

The sittuation in much of Africa was aicely summarized by N'Diaye at the 1965 World Population Conference: "Frcm a dynamic point of view. the transition from under-population to a nationally nmre advantageous population requires large investment. This paradox is at the heart of the problem, which is comoon to many African countries." -- (N'Dliaye, 1967.)

Third, the appropriate population policy depends not only on the rate of population growth, which will maximize the rate of increase in pr capita income, but on the economic, political and human costs of shifting the rate of population growth from its "natural' rate. It is this cost that is frequently neglected in simplistic views of population and it is - 19 -

this negligence regarding what is feasible that has frustrated and arngered

(in some cases even frightened) those thinkers who do not trust the antinatalist. This is a particular problem in areas with very high mortality, since a focus on reducing population growth implies that mortality reductions should be foregone -- a very high cost indeed!

The only acceptable ways of reducing population growth rates for most countries are emigration and voluntary reductions in fertility. The costs of achieving voluntary reductions in fertility depend on the motivation of individual couples to control their fertility.

"It may well be that under given specific conditions, an authentic development strategy will incorporate a population policy, either

to slow it down or to accelerate it, according to circumstance. But this policy has no chance of yielding results unless the micro-motivations of families are consistent with the macro-objectives of the nation.." -- (Amin and Okedije in Cantrelle, 1971, p. 419.)

Thus, to move from theoretical considerations of the consequences of population growth to the design of population policies, it is necessary

to identify the evidence of consequences of rapid population growth and large families among the governments and individuals of various SSA countries. - 20 -

Evidence on the Consequences of Rapid Population Growth for Countries in Sub-Saharan Africa

Types of Information

There is a considerable body of work on the consequences of population growth for countries in SSA. The quality of this work varies substantially as does most of the work on consequences. Mich of this workl by individual researchers inside and outside of the region has been presented in a series of seminars and conferences sponsered locally with the support in many cases from the Population Council, IPPF, and UNFPA.

Later, there developed a series of national and regional conferences on population issues sponsored by ILO in collaboration in many cases with OAV and ftuded by UNFPA. These conferences have had mixed objectives and mixed success in reaching those objectiires. (See Weekis-Vagliani and Handrison,

1974, for a review of those held prior to the Bucharest Population

Conference in 1974.)

Despite their limitations, these conferences have provided an

outlet for research being done on population and a forum for discussion.

In most instances they were sponsored by African governments and insti-

tutions and had a hlgh degree of African participation. These confer-

ences have not, however,, provided a body of literature that is readily

accessible, since publication has not always been feasible. This point

is important to keep in minld, since it may explain why the work on con-

sequences in che region is so little known and why the perceptions exist

by those outside the reaion that little thought has been given to these

problems. - 21 -

There also exist other bodies of work specifically on the con- sequences of population growth which have been produced for the most part outside the region. The two most systematic efforts to deal with these problems have been those by UNFPA and the work of the Futures

Group on Rapid. The UNFPA Needs Assessments papers have frequently con- tained a section on the problems generated in the country by population size, growth, distribution or other related problems. These sections have not in general included new analysis, but have pulled together the existing material. The Rapid work has focused more exclusively on the consequences of alternative rates of population growth, generally focus- ing on the two-child versus the three-child family, rather than popula- tion projections seen as probable for the country. These two bodies of work are very important in creating an awareness of population problems in the countries, but the extent to which they reflect or have had im- pact on the thinking of Africans is difficult to assess, without a care- ful review on a case-by-case basis. Therefore, since neither effort attempts to create new country-specific.knowledge, no effort is made to review this body of work in the present paper.

Rather, this paper initially presents the evolution of the

treatment of population consequences in the Af*r can conferences and sem-

inars prior to Bucharest. This will be followed by a discussion of the

analysis of specific consequences that was presented at these confer- ences and in other work specific to SSA.

While this review of conferences will focus on the substantive

content of the papers, it is important to understand that there were

strong ideological conflicts at some meetings, particularly the First - 22 -

African Population Conference in Aczra in 1971. To quote the introduc- tion to the volume of published proceedings: "The present conference placed strong emphasis on ideologies and theories and was marked by emo- tionally charged statements on population policy in several of its ses- sions, This was in marked contrast to the technical nature of the dis- cussions which prevailed at the earlier regional conferences." -(Can- trelle, 1971.)

Treatment of Population Consequences in African Population Conferences Prior to Bucharest

The First African Population Conference was held at the Uni- versity of Ibadan in 1966. The proceedings were published in a volume edited by Caldwell and Okonjo. The published proceedings are devoted primarily to the problems of data collection (censuses and vital regis- tration) and the estimatioa of mortality, fertility and natural in- crease. There are only two brief papers explicitly related to conse- quences: (1) an overview of the relationship between population change and economic development in tropical Africa, by Etienne Van de Walle, and (2) a more specific paper on the nutritional problems associated with high density in parts of Nigeria. The focus on measurement at this conference reflects the seriousness of the data scarcity in SSA at that time and to a somewhat lesser extent today. Without data on population size, distribution and growth, it is impossible to do more than specu- late about consequences. The availability of. demographic data differs greatly between countries in the region. Both Ghana and Kenya had early and very good censuses prior to the mid-1960's. This may well explain why population consequences received attention in these countries very early and perhaps why they were the first countries to adopt national family planning programs. - 23 -.

The first seminar which explicitly attempted to address the

relationship between population and development was sponsored by the

University of Ghana in 1968. Both the effect of socio-economic develop- ment on population growth and the consequences of population growth were

reviewed. The material on consequences, however, was fairly slim.

Another seminar on West Africa sponsored by the University of Ghana two

years later had re emphasis on consequence, both for the country and the household. The major focus of concern was on agricultural development and nutritional needs -- problems that have continued to plague SSA in general and Ghana in particular.

In 1969, the University College of the University of Nairobi

sponsored a very large conference on population and economic growth.

The greatest attention to consequences at this conference was given to

educational consequences of rapid growth. Three papers were given on

this topic -- one general paper with an example based on Ghana, a paper

on Fenya, and one on Sierra Leone. A pap-r on population growth and em- and de- ployment (Sierra Leone) and a general paper on population growth

velopment (Kenya) were also presented. Another paper was given on pop- demo- ulation and-food supply. Finally, Bill Brass presented a paper on

graphic data needed for development.

Both papers on demographic data for development planning and

the need for demographic considerations in educational planning were on followed up by later conferences. The first was a 1969 conference second, Demographic Data for Development Planning sponsored by ECA, and the

sponsored by UNESCO in 1971, focused on population dynamics and educational -24-

development. Employment consequences were later explored in more detail at a 1973 expert group meeting entitled "Some Demographic Aspects of Human Resources in Africa", sponsored by OECD in Dakar. The proceed- ings of these meetings include case studies of Ivory Coast, Nigeria, and

Tanzania.

AMother OECD expert group meeting on Demographic Transition in

Tropical Africa (1970) provided a number of case studies on the effect of population growth on employment (Dahomey, Ghana, and Les6oho), educa- tion (Kenya, Nigeria and Zambia), and industrialization (Cameroons and

Nligeria).

The following year proved to be the busiest for population conferences in SSA. Early in the year, a large conference on population problems and policies was held at the University of Ife in Nigeria. In the Fall, tl;e first of the ILO conferences was held in Nairobi, and the

UNESCO meeting mentioned earlier was held in Dakar. The year ended with the joint IUSSP/ECA/1PPF conference in Accra.

The proceedings of the Ife conference were never published, but the program lists at least eleven papers that are devoted to the effect.of demographic factors on general development (4 papers); agri- culture (2 papers); food supply (3 papers); and education (2 papers).

Selected papers from the Accra conference were published in two volumes, edited by Pierre Cantrelle. In the published volumes, there is a vari- ety of papers on topics ranging from data collection to policy. Five

(5) papers rather explicitly address consequences: An overview paper on over-population by Amin and Okediji cited earlier; a paper on agrarian structure; two papers on education; and one on the provision of social - 25 -

services in Kenya. There were apparently other papers on the household consequences of high fertility which were not included in the published proceedings.

As meationed above, the ILO-sponsored seminars on population began in 1971 with a sub-regional seminar on "Trade Unions, Workers'

Education and the Population Question." These conferences. take several forms -- national workers' education seminars, population, employment and development seminars, and seminars on population and family welfare. Not all of them contain work on consequences, however, and the treatment ot consequences varies substantially from country to country. An assessment of the content and impact of-these conferences is needed, similar to that done by Weekes-Vagliani and Hankenson, in order to understand the best strategy for disseminating information and exchanging ideas.

There also exist papers on consequences from conferences, sem- inars and ad hoc research efforts unrelated to the series described above. These will be included where possible in the discussion of spe- cific consequences below. - 26 -

Educational Implications of Rapid Population Growth in SSA

Population growth through natural increase tends to expand the

youngest age groups relative to older ages. Therefore, once a country

has made a comaitment to educating its population, the consequences of

rapid population growth or changes in the rate bf growth become quickly

noticeable to governments. This is paricularly true with respect to

primary schooling, where the impact is felt within six years after a

change in the birth rate and where the political commitment to universal

primary education makes it difficult to shift much of the burden to par-

ents.

The impact of rapid population growth on the cost and feasi-

bility of attaining educational goalswas one of the first topics to be

analyzed in SSA. Perhaps the earliest extensive analysis is contained

in th- 1966-70 Kenya Development Plan, which was based on the work of

the Kenya Education Commission of 1964-65. The analysis estimated the

costs of reaching educational goals under alternative population pro- jections and concluded: "Thus, with constant fertility and at current

construction costs of £ 20 per student, it would cost over £ 100 million

to build the additional facilities needed to educate everyone of primary

school age at the end of the century. With diminished fertility, the

cost would be less than £ 45 million. Therefore, £ 55 million is saved on primary school construction alone, or £ 1.6 million per year, which could be used for additional economic development.' - (UN, 1973 p. 75.) Additional work on the attainment of educational goals and population growth has been done for Kenya by Komora (Nairobi Seminar, - 27 -

1969), S. R. Ominde (OECD, 1970), M. Meck (APC, Accra, 1971), Herrin and

Mott (t4imco, 1979), and Faruqee et. al. (World Bank, 1980).

This early work on Kenya is a simple example of the potential

impact of population growth on attainment of educational goals. There

are, however, a number of complexities that exist in attempting to spec-

ify the impact of population growth on education which are not evident

from this example.

First, the analysis of-the savings from fertility decline pre-

sented in the 1966-70 Keynan Development Plan is an excellent start in

analyzing the impact of high fertility on educational costs, but it sub-

stantially underestimates those savings to the extent that it focuses on

capital alone rather than on capital and recurrent costs. A study of

the projected costs of education in four developing countries (Ceylon,

Columbia, Tunisia and Tanzania) presented at the 1971 Population Confer-

ence in Accra found that on average over a range of alterntive projec-

tions, recurrent costs accounted for 90 percent of projected costs. -

(Tu Ngoc Chau, 197i.) In Sub-Saharan Africa, recurrent costs are

particularly high because of (i)_the scarcity of trained personnel, (ii)

the consequent higher salaries they receive, and (iii) the tendency to

depend, especially in the early periods in Africa, on expatriate

teachers. The recent World Bank report Accelerated Development in

Sub-Saharan Africa confirms this pattern for 1980. The cost of a

student year of primary education was 20 percent of GNP per capita in

Eastern Africa, 24 percent in Western Africa, 11 percent in Asia and

Latin America, and 15% for Europe, Mliddle East and North Africa. -

(World Bank, 1981, p. 82.) - 28 -

Thus, low enrollment rates in SSA countries imply a two-sided

problem the necessity Lor steep increases in earollments and the high

cost of such increases because of the scarcity of educated personnel.

Some portion of the costs can be deferred by fees paid by the students'

families, and these fees have been significant in SSA; but political

commi.tment to universal primary education makes retention of fees polit-

ically difficult.

Second, the burden of education depends in part on population growth and in part on the expansion of enrollment rates. If universal primary enrollment has been obtained, for example, all future expansion in enrollment is due to population gro-dLh. Identifying what part of ed- ucational expansion is a consequence of population growth and what part is due to broadening of the system requires sensitivity analysis.

Treatment of the consequences of population growth for educa- tional expansion has taken two basic forms. In several cases, demo- graphic projections have been used to check the feasibility of attaining educational goals, given planned expansion of the system. Other work

%>as been more general, attempting to project school places, educational costs, etc. under alternative assumptions of population growth and increases in the primary enrollment rate. This first category of work has more immediate policy relevance for coping with population growth, while the second type of work is useful for illustrating the benefits from changing that growth.

Several studies have attempted to reconcile governmeLltal tar- gets for various enrollment rates, given feasible rates of expansion of the school system and realistic rates of growth of the school age popu- - 29 -

lation. A paper given at the 1969 Conference in Nairobi on Sierra Leone concluded that "instead of 100 percent enrollment by 1990, as projected in the Development Program, only two out of every five eligible children would be enrolled in school by that date." - (Dow, 1969, p.11.) A la- ter paper detailing the various constraints to expansion of education in

Sierra Leone concluded that instead of obtaining the 1974/75-1978/79 plan objectives of universal enrollment of all six year olds by 1980 and universal primary education by the end of the century, an estimated in- crease from 33 percent in 1965 to 64 percent by the year 2000 was all that was feasible. - (Samai, ILO, Freetown, 1980.)

For Kenya, Herrin and Mott concluded that educational goals were not attainable given planned expansion of enrollments, because fer- tility would probably rise rather than remain constant, as assumed in the plan - (Herrin and UIott, 1979.) Writing earlier on Kenya plans,

Ominde concluded: "Educational planning on a long-term basis must be supported by a programme f or the moderatioa of the country's high rate of population increase. An accelerated growth rate would result in greater difficulties in providing free primary education. In fact, it may lead to abandonment of this important political and social goal." --

(Ormindi, OECD, 1970, p. 191.)

At an earlier period, Nigeria's experience with trying to achieve universal primary education illustrates the set-backs that unex- pectedly large numbers of children can cause. Following 1952 elections in the western reaion, the Action Group announced plans to introduce

free universal primary education. Plans for educating 150,000 six and - 30 -

seven year olds to be implemented in January, 1955, proved unrealistic when the census of 1952-55 showed 170,000 children of that age. But both the census and the plan were underestimates, and 394,000 children registered in Grade I in 1955. "In the face of these numbers, the gov- ernment abandoned the 'compulsory' nature of its scheme and addressed itself to the urgenc task of providing physical accommodation and teach- ers for numbers over 21 times what it had originally planned." -

(Okanjo, OECD, 1970, p. 196.) A similar problem arose in eastern

Nigeria in 1957. These experiences created considerable skepticism among some concerning the advisability of announcing in 1973 that uni- versal free primary education would take effect beginning in April,

1975. - (See Fapahundu, ILm Ibadon, 1977.) His main objection was less one of costs, (although those would be substantial even given expected oil revenues), as it was the need for finding employment for primary school leavers.

Attempts to illustrate the impact of alternative rates of pop- ulation growth on school enrollments differ in their sophistication and their conclusions. The simplest technique is to examine the difference in the number of primary age under various fertility assumptions. (This is nearly equivalent to assuming universal primary education, although in reality school repetition would inflate enrollments in primary school above those of primary age.) Faruqee and Gulhalti calculate different rates of growth of school age populations for nine SSA countries. --

(Faruqee and Gulhalci, 1983.) These are shown in Table 4. While the differences in growth rate of school age populations are not great for the next 20 years, they are very substantial for the early part of the - 31 -

Table 4: Growth of School Age Population (6-13) Under Three Assumptions

U. N. Low Fertility U. N. High Fertilitv Contant TFR's

1980-2000 2000-2020 1980-2000 2000-2020 1980-2000 2000-2020

Ethiopia 2.8 1.4 3.0 2.6 3.0 3.8

Ghana 3.4 0.6 3.6 3.0 3.7 4.1

Ivory Coast 3.2 1.5 3.4 3.0 3.4 4.0

Kenya 4.1 1.6 4.6 3.8 4.4 4.8

Nigeria 3.5 1.3 3.7 3.1 3.7 4.1

Sudan 2.6 1.5 3.0 1.9 3.1 3.6

Tanzania 3.4 1.3 3.6 3.0 3.6 4.0

Zaire 2.9 1.4 3.1 2.7 3.1 3.7

Zimbabwe 3.6 1.4 3.7 3.1 3.8 4.1

Source: Annex Tables 14, 15 and 16 of Faruqee and Gulhati, 1983. - 32 -

next century. The effects would appear to be much more dramatic if it were feasible to assume more rapid fertility declines. Thus, work such as the Rapid model may show much more dramatic impacts under alternative fertility assumptions, because no ittempt is made to use projectionas which are feasible.

The actual eftort needed to achieve universal primary educa- tion, however, depends not only on the rate of growth of the school age population but the proportion currently enrolled in school. Some coun- tries such as Togo have much less to be concerned about, because they have achieved near universal primary education, while others such as

Ethiopia have much more serious problems. This is illustrated in Table

5, which shows both the rate of vrowth of primary age groups and the growth needed in primary education under asqumptions of constant fertil- ity to obtain universal primary enrollmeant by the year 2000. For Togo, these two rates are identical, while for Ethiopia, enrollments must grow at more than 2± times the r'ate of growth of the school age population.

With constant enrollment rates, the difference in costs be- tween two population projections, assuming no economies of scale is sim- ply the difference in growth rates of the school age populatioa. If enrollment rates increase, however, the effect of population growc.h is compounded by an interaction effect equal to the rate of growth of the school age population times the rate of increase in the enrollment rate.

The effect of alternative population growth rates and expan- sion of enrollment rates was analyzed for the different regions of Afri- ca in a paper prepared for the 1971 Conference in Accra. -- (E/CN 14/Pop p. 141.) Table 6 illustrates the relative impact of population - 33 -

Table 5: Growth in Primary Places to Achieve Various Educational Goals with Constant Fertility

- Annual Rate of Growth, 1980.-2000

Primary Of Enrollment for Enrollment Rate Universal Primary 1978 Of Primary Cohort in 2000

Ethiopia 38 3.07 7.91

Kenya 99 4.43 4.48

Zaire 90 3.17 3.70

Tanzania 70 3.64 5.42

Malawi 59 3.77 6.40

Mali 28 3.40 9.77

Senegal 41 3.22 7.98

Upper Volta 17 3.25 12.10

Togo 102 3.41 3.41

Ivory Coast 71 3.39 5.10

Liberia 64 3.98 6.22

Nigeria 62 3.76 6.15

Cameroon 101 2.97 2.97

Sudan 50 3.11 5.60

Average of Above 3.49 5.84

Sub-Sahara 63

Asia 87

Latin America 102

Source: World Bank calculations for Meerman and Cochrane (1982) based on population projections for WDR, 1982. Table 6. (ONIlurrION m TOM PLOO AM IWR-EAS IN ER1UM[S 19651985 OF

'oputlatlon growtlh Inrease in Interaction of pa-pulatIon Regions only fertiliLty enrollrent groith and increase in Taal enrollmnt increase ratio only enrollment ratla only in 19651985

Lai ltditin High Constant Law ditm lhighi Constant Low dilum IHigh Constant

East Africi2a .18 6 .5 95.3 86.9 134.9 92.7 102.7 114.3 102.3 307.7 324.1 322.5 324.1

Uhest Afria 75.4 83.9 94.4 83.7 138.6 107.8 121.6 135.9 121.4 321.8 344.1 368.9 343.7

Mlddle Africa 63.3 74.3 83.6 73.1 30.5 18.6 24.5 27.6 24.1 112.4 129.3 141.7 127.7

North Africa 84.1 96.4 105.3 98.0 57./4 53.1 59.0 64.2 59.5 194.6 212.8 226.9 214.9

SothLleni Afrlca 71.9 75.2 81.1 73.0 11.1 11.0 8.5 9.2 8.2 94.0 94.8 101.4 92.3

Africa 76.8 85.6 94.5 85.7 84.0 64.5 72.1 80.0 72.0 225.3 241.7 258.5 241.7

Source: E/(NlJ14/PCJ?

I I 1 - 35 -

growth and expansion to universal primary education as well as the interaction of these two factors.

Figure I illustrates the impact of population growth in various regions of Africa under the assumption of medium population growtih. Line A represents the growth of enrollment if universal primary earollmeat rates were achieved by 1985. Line C shows total enrollment expansiona Therefore, the difference between A and C represents the proportion attributable to population growth under the medium assumption. Curve B represents all effects except the interaction effect. Therefore, the difference between B and C represents the interaction effect,

In addition to regional totals, the paper also presented country-specific break-dowtis of the potential growth of population. The impact of these estimates on educational planning in Africa might have been greater if this paper had been included in the Conference proceed- ings rather than kept as an ECA paper with "limited distribution".

Three other country-specific case studies have been done illustrating the combined effects of increased enrollments and population growth.

The first case is Gavin Jones' 1969 Nairobi paper. The savings he esti- mates from reduced fertility would be 22 percent in the year 2000 with constant enrollment rates and 25 percent with increasing enrollment rates. The overall increase in spending as a percent of GNP, however, is much larger in the case of rising enrollment rates. The overall in- crease in spending as a percent of GNP, however, is much larger in the case of rising enrollment rates. With constant enrollment rates, this percent increases from 3.03 to 3.53 in the year 2000 given reduced fer- EAST AFRIC A WEST AFRICA

Pes.d* s-4Bi

300

UIODLE AFRICA SOUTHERN AFRICA

,"..

-too

I000

,. ItIt ,5* - t4

Filre 1. Percentage increase in enrollments in SSA. total (C); dtUe to enrollilient rate increases alone (A); due to population increases and enrollnient rate increases (bI); due to population growtih alone (C-A); dute to interactioll of popullation alid enrollment Increases (B-C). 37 -

tility and to 4.30 percent in the year 2000 given constant fertility.

With increasing enrollment rates, primary education absorbs 8.65 and

10.81 percent of GNP given reduced and constant fertility respectively.

(Jones, 1969.)

The second case for Nigeria comes from a 1981 book entitled

The Prospects of Economic Development in Nigeria Under the Conditions

of Rapid Population Growth by Olusanya and Pursell. In this case, an

overall budget constraint of 5 percent was imposed, and the number of

children who must be left outside the school system was calculated under

various assumptions. With reduced fertility, the potential number of

illiterate children can be reduced to zero by the year 2003. With

constant fertility, the proportion of illiterate children would be between 60 and 65 percent of the potential school age cohort.

Tu Ngoc Chau's paper given at the Accra Conference in 1971 and

expanded as a UNESCO book published in 1972 assumes that fertility will

not decline in Tanzania for 15 years following 1970, so that all the '

projected differences observed in his work for Tanzania arise from dif-

ferences in mortality assumptions. Such differences are relatively mi-

nor. This is the logical extension of the point made above about what

is feasible with respect to population growth. In this instance, the

analysis is useful only to help cope with population growth, since no

control was perceived as feasible in the relevant time period. - 38 -

As-the above review illustrates, a considerable amount of work

has been done on the possible impact of population growth on attaining

universal primary educati.on in SSA. The most convincing lessons have

been learned by the actual experience of countries of SSA in the last 20

years. Enormous progress has been achieved in expanding educational

participation as shown in Table 7.

Despite this progress and tremendous expansion in educational

budgets (see Okunatitu, 1974), SSA has a primary enrollment rate in 1983

of 63 percent -- far from the goal of universal primary education by

1980, established at the 1961 Addis Ababa Educational Conference. There can be no question that rapid populatioa growth contribuced to

ono-attainment of this objective. It should be noted. however, that simple

or mu-ltiple correlation between enrollment rates a,nd population growth does

not show more rapid growth necessarily associated with poorer perfor=nce.

Specific Issues of Measuring Consequences or Impact of Population Growth

Despite the complexities of projecting educational enrollments

and costs and the potential effect of alternative rates of population

growth on them, this type of consequence analysis is conceptually quite

simple. First, population (children in this case) are simply consumers

of education and not producers. In addition, it is general'ly assumed

that the government will bear the majority if not all of the cost of

primary schooling. (Thus the benefits to education accrue primarily to

individuals while the cost accrues to the state). Therefore,

the elasticity of demand for schooling ac zero price is assumed to be

determined by the number of school age cllldren, Finally, the - 39 -

Table 7. PRIMARY EDUCATIONAL ADVANCE IN T1H PERIOD 1960-1980

Enrollment 'Percent of GNP Growth of Country Primary Rate on Education Population5-9 1960 1980 1980 1970-1980

East Africa Botswana - 94* 7.0 4.9 Burundi 18 29 2.8 2.0 Comoros 99* 6.5 2.8 Ethiopia 7 43 2.2 2.1 Kenya 47 108 5.9 5.3 Lesotho 83 104 4.1 3.0 Madagascar 52 100 4.0 3.1 Malawi - 62 2.2 3.6 Mauritius - 94* 4.7 -0.8 Rwanda 49 70 3.2 3.3 Somalia 9 41 2t0 1.8 Sudan 25 51 4.5 3.6 Swaziland 92* 6.1 4.8 Tanzania 25 104 6.8 4.4 Uganda 49 50 3.4 2.3 Zaire 60 90 6.0 3.6 Zambia 42 95 5.6 3.9 Zimbabwe 96 115 - 4 . O Benin 27 62 7.2 3.3 Cameroon 85 104 3.7 2.8 C.A.R. 32 70 3.0 2.8 Chad 17 35 3.0 2.5 Congo 78 156 6.0 4.3 Gabon 100* 5.0 1.8 Gambia 27* 3.3 3.2 Ghana 38 69 - 3.7 Guinea 30 33 4.3 4.0 Ivory Coast 46 76 6.8 7.8 Liberia 31 66 3.1- 2.4 Mali 10 27 4.2 3.2 Mauritania 8 33 4.1 2-4 Niger 5 23 2.8 3.5 Nigeria 36 98 4.1 3.2 Senegal 27 44 5.0 3.2 Sierra Leone 23 39 3.4 3.2 Togo 44 116 5.5 3.1 Upper VolLa 8 19 3.4 3.2

*UNESCO. - 40 -

possibiity of economies of scale in provision of education is rarely

considered.

The effects of population growth on any commodity or service

that could meet these criteria can and generally has been analyzed in a

similar way. Target.s with respect to nurses and doctors or health fa-

cilities per capita can be treated quite analogously.

There is also a tendency to treat food, employment, housing,

health services (see Kocher) water supply and waste disposal in

analogous ways. While this may make good p.ropaganda, there are good

reasons why each of these "basic needs" should be treated somewhat

differently. It is only if some consideration is given to

sector-specific issues that a convincing case can be made for

consequences of population growth. If not, it is perhaps bettar to discuss the general relationship between population growth and basic

needs requirements than to derive specific quantifiable estimates of

population's effect, which are poorly based.

1. Water supply and waste disposal systems have large economies of scale per population in a given area. Thus, population growth will not create proportional increases in costs. Depletion of water re- sources however, is a serious problem which has not received sufficient attention and economies of scale do not exist and substantial diseconipes through ecological damage of deforestation and dessert±fication may arise at very low densities.

2. Housing is extremely expensive and while a government may wish to improve the living condition of its citizens, it will not generally be able to bear the full cost of housing. Thus, the elasticity of - 41 -

demand for a particular type of. housing in a particular location must be considered. Similarly, the extent to which people produce as well as consume houses needs to be considered in realistic analysis of the relationship to population growth and housing needse Finally, to the extent that population increase occurs by the addition of babies as opposed to migration', increases in housing need not be proportional to the size of population, but are more likely to be proportional to the size of the cohorts who are estabiishing first homes. Thus, changes in rates of population increase need not have an immediate effect on housing requirements. To the extent it is growth of urban populations which is of greatest concern to governments and to the extent this results from migration, the needs are immediate. These considerations qualify the trelationship between population growth.and housing.

3. The link of population growth with employment and unemploy- ment, like that with food as mentioned below, is compounded by supply and demand issues. The relationship between population growth and the growth of the population of working age is trivially easy to establish.

Labor force growth, however, depends on the participation rates of the population which are dilfficult to predict depending as they do on alter- natives to market work (schooling, household work, leisure) and the remuneration in market work which depends in part on the growth of de- mand for labor relative to supply in various kinds of work. Population growth might affect not only working age population but also labor par- ticipation rates by (a) altering the labor participation rates of men, women and children as a response to househ.old population pressures, and

(b) altering labor participation rates by affecting the wage rates - 42 -

through increased supply of labor or less likely through altering the demand for labor0 The household pressure effects may be to increase labor participation while the effect of increased supply relative to de- mand on wages may cause a decrease in participation rates.

Governmental concerns, however, are to a large degree focused not on the level of employment per se, but on the level of unemployment, since it is more visible and politically dangerous. Underemployment and low earning capacity are of concern from the poiat of general develop- ment and improvements in welfare, but this concern is a second order of magnitude. This explains in part the intense concern with urban growth, because underemployment or disguised unemployment in the rural areas is translated through migration to more open and politically dangerous un- employment id urban areas. This may well explain the lack af concern about population growth among many of the most rural (and poorest) SSA countries.

A country statement by the Mali representative at the 1977 ILO sub-regional semninar in Nairobi is relevant here: "In an economy where the traditional sector is predominant (more than 87% of the population devote themselves to agriculture), the problem of employment does not arise in the same terms as in a developed economy".

Thus, the link between populacion growth and unemployment de- pends very heavily on the movement of population between urban and rural areas as well as on overall growth. It also depends, of course, on the balance of demand and supply of particular skills and educational levels and market equilibration. - 43 -

4. The- effect of population growth on food requirements iq,of major importance to many developing countries, especially in SSA. Per capita estimates of food.requirements appropriately adjusted for age structure can be easily developed for any specific food commodity.

Problems arise, however in (a) determining the elasticity of demand for the food commodities both with respect to income and price, (b) combin- ing all food commodities into oae measure of food requirements, and

(c) determining what domestic production of food commodities will be and how population growth will affect production. It is the latter problem which compounds the food/population link to the greatest extent, parti- cularly where there is perceived to be labor scarcity. It is true that if one focuses on urban growth, this third problem becomes fairly insig- nificant, and it is quite often urban population growth that is of greatest concern to governments in SSA.

Of the various perceived consequences of rapid populationa growth as evidenced in the various development plans, employment prob- lems are the most frequently mentioned. Therefore, before addressing the extremely important issue of food, it is necessary to proceed with an exploration of the analysis done to-date in SSA on the employment consequences of rapid population growth. *

* A separate paper will address the broa--Xr issues of employment and population growth as well as new analysis of the relationship. - 44

Emploa2ut Consequences of Rapid Population Growth ia SSA

There were two papers at the Nairobi Conference in 1969 which dealt with the population/employment relationship. The first by Angwen- yi addressed the issue within the general context of overall Kenyan de- velopment. Citing existing evidence on the numbers currently unemployed and underemployed, the existence of diminishing returns in agriculture, and the IPPF projected populatioa, he concludes "the implications of the future population of Kenya with respect to employment look bleak and ominous." - (Angwenyi, Nairobi, 1969, p. 7.) Later papers by Ominde,

Paris, 1970, and Okidyi, Ac*cra, 1971, repeat the concern that current high rates of unemployment and underemployment bode poorly for the abil- ity to absorb further increases in population in Kenya.

At the same conference, Forde's paper gives a much more de- tailed report on the current employment situation in Sierra Leone and a look at prospects. He concludes that unemployment will remain a serious problem as population grows, because of (1) limited ability to absorb labor productively in agriculture and the consequent high rates of underemployment, (2) the limited expansion capacity of industry, (3) the possibility of declining quality of labor as population pressure reduces the ability to increase or keep up with expansion of health and educa- tion, and (4) the rising expectations of workers which stimulates polit- ical pressures to improve wages and working conditions despite high ex- isting levels of unemployment. Forde does make positive suggestions for alleviating the problem in the short-run and emphasizes that reduced fertility can only alleviate the problem after a generation. - 45 -

The 1970 OECD expert group meeting on the demographic transi- tion in tropical Africa presented three case studies on population growth and employment: Dahomey, Ghana and Lesotho. The Dahomey case is in fact a brief discussion of the general problems of population growth based on admittedly weak data. Like the Dahomey paper, the paper for

Lesotho is based on very little data but cites an anticipated problem of labor absorption given population growth. The Ghana case study is based on much better data from censuses, labor force surveys and national ac- counts. Current levels of unemployment (10%) and underemployment by oc- cujpation are combined with projecticns of working age population based on the 1960 census. The prospects for increased employment sufficient to meet the needs of 'population growth are not considered bright because of (1) existing un- and underemployment, (2) lack of increased agricul-

tural employment in the recent past and a belief that improved producti- vity might push even more labor from agriculture, and (3) inability of industrial growth to absorb drop-outs and increments to the agricultural labor force. The final table in the paper charts the decline of per capita product in Ghana from 1960 to 1969. This is cited as "a clear indication that the growth of the economy has not kept pace with the growth of the population." - (K. T. de Graft-Johnson, Paris, 1971, p.

147.) The author does not, however, go on to attribute the decline to

population growth and probably quite wisely does not discuss the prob-

lems and policies other than to umention that popul:ation contributed to

the depressing situation.

The 1971 Accra Conference had a session on labor force, but

only two of the four papers presented at the session are iacluded in the - 46 -

proceedings and neither of these addresses the effect of population growth on employment or labor absorption. A contributed paper aot pub- lished in the proceedings by Conde and Herzog is a precursor to the

Ivory Coast case study in a later conference. There was also a paper by

Okediji on socio-demographic aspects of Nigeriat s second national devel- opment plan 1970-74. Although this paper does not contain analyses of the impact of population growth on unemployment, it does flag the prob- lem 2/. It is particularly useful in that it cites evidence indicat- ing that the unemployment rate increased from 1.7 percent of the labor force in 1966 to 7.8 percent in 1970. It also documents that this is primar- ily a problem of the youngest members of the labor force. While those aged 15-23 constitute only 10 percent of the labor force, they represent

70 percent of the unemployed. Okediji also emphasizes that a large part of the problem arises from the rapid expansion of education and that the more educated tend to leave the rural agricultural sector, leading to both a shortage of agricultural labor and a surplus of urban labor. This is a recurring theme throughout the work on employment problems in SSA.

The 1973 OECD expert group on demographic aspects of human re- sources in Africa prepared four case studies on human resources plan- ning: Nigeria, Algeria, Tanzania and Ivory Coast. In each case, the potentially active labor Eorce was projected; then che actual active population was projected under various hypotheses about economic growth; next, the number unemployed was obtained by implication. The final step in the procedure was to determine the rate of economic growth corres-

2/ A later paper by Olusanya and Pursell does contain such an analysis for Nigeria. - 47 -

ponding to full employment in 1980.

The definitioa of unemployment here is not that of the econo- mist who identifies the unemployed as those able to work and looking for work but unable to find it. In these papers, unemployment is the number who are of the appropriate age and (i) not infirm, (ii) not pregnant or lactating, (iii) not in school or (iv) not in the active labor force given various projections of active population. The voluntary changes in the proportion who wish to work (not represented in the above cate- gories) are not reflected in the above calculations. Therefore, if such changes result ia greater labor participation, for example, if more of those in school or who are pregnant or lactating choose to work, these unemployment estimates are too low. If for various reasons, the number of those who wish to work in any category decreases due to either lower wages or higher incomes, these figures over-estimate unemployment.

Unfortunately, although there is a considerable amount of

"empiricAl" information in these studies, the results are not easy to interpret. In the Nigerian case, it appears that if employment grows at the rate specified under the plan (3.2 percent) unemployment in 1980 rill be at 21.8 percent. To attain full employment, it would be neces- sary to have employment growing at 7.5 percent anmually if 90 percent aged 10-14 are in school, and at 9.4 percent if 50 percent of them are in school. If historic trends in employment growth prevail, it appears

(although ift is not explicitly stated) that unemployment would be be- tween 39-49 percent of the labor force in 1980, depending on the assump- tion about school enrollment. A much less clear piece of analysis im- plies that to increase living standards as well as maintain full employ- ment, employment would have to grow at an annual rate of 14 percent. - 48 -

ln the case of Ivory Coast, the discussion is much more abbre- viated. To attain full employment in 1980 with 90 percent earollment of those aged 10-14 would require expansions of employment at an annual rate of 6.4 percent. With 50 percent enrollment, the rate would have to be 7.3 percent 3/. Comparisons between labor force growth and etaployment growth indicates in the report: "The disparity between tle supply and the demand is negligible, being approximately 2 parcent." -

(Conde, 1973, p. 216.) Detailed examination of the tables in the report, however, indicates that the potential increiaents in the labor force between 1965 and 1980 were 1,376,000 while estimates based on the plan indicate 1,246,076 new jobs over the period. This gives aa implicit rate of unemployment according to my calculations of over 9 percent.

The case of Tanzania is even less well described than that of

Ivory Coast. The conclusion of this section states: 'As shown in Table

IV-6 [95 percent] school enrollment of the 10-14 age group results in a shortage of labor in 1985. The hypothesis of partial school enrollment

(60 percent of boys and 50 percent of girls aged 10-14 attending school in 1985) yields relatively low unemployment rates, less than those pro- jected for the other three countries under study." - (Conde, 1973, p. 232.)

While the analysis in this report is interesti g, its results are too poorly explained to give a good feeling of the difficulties the governments may face in maintaining high rates of employment under as-

3/ A brief concluding sentence indicates that if the standard of living is to be increased, these rates will have to be doubled. - 49 -

sumptions of rapid growth of the potential labor force, most of whom had

already been born at the beginning of the period.

The last of the pre-Bucharest conferences to deal explicitly

with employment was that held in Lesotho in June, 1974. At that confer-

ence, the analysis, while apparently less empirical than that of the

OECD meeting, was more convincing, because it looked at the record of

recent achievements in employment growth as well as projected needs. It

concludes: "The magnitude of Lesotho's local employment creation prob-

lem to satisfy these demands is therefore immense, and even assuming

that the most optimistic forecasted developments are [achieved rapidly],

(i. e., some 2-3 thousand jobs are created each year), the Plan provides

for only 20-30 percent of this annual increase in the labor force. But

so far, even this rather modest target has not been met. From 1970 to

mid-1973, only about 4,000 jobs were created in Lesotho, yet about seven

times as many people became new entrants into an already over-saturated

labor market. This implies increased dependency on South Africa or much

higher unemployment and under-employment in Lesotho." --. (Ward in

Lesotho, 1974, p. 73.)

Several of the ILO conferences on population, development and

employment have provided interesting treatment to the population/employ-

ment issue 4/. In a paper at the 1977 Nigerian Conference; Igharha 4- addressed the question of the meaning of surplus population in an oil-

4/ Several of these conferences have failed to address the question ex- plicitly. The 1980 conference in Tanzania has a manpower chapter which mentions age, education, sex, mobility as imDortant factors in manpower planning, but not population growth. The 1980 conference from Sierra Leone illustrates problems arising from inadequate data. The most recent survey data was from 1963 and the results of the 1974 census had not yet been published. 50 -

re- rich economy by stating that v e tthe problem is not whether the sources are there but how fast they can be harnessed to provide employ- ment and satisfactory standards of living for the fast-growing popula- tion." - (Igharha, 1977, pp. 82-83.) The problem with harnessing em- ployment resources arises from the capital intensive nature of such in- vestment, the disillusionment with educatioa as a sound basis for pre- paring to work and the neglect of agriculture and other rural industries in the development process.

Perhaps the most passionate treatment of the employment/ popu- lation growth issue is contained in a paper presented at the 1978 semi- nar and prepared collaboratively by the ILO and the Military Government of Socialist Ethiopia. This paper presents a clear and clean analysis of a socialist position on the population question. The author states that the fundamental problem of unemployment is not population growth but under-development. The author, however, does recognize that "while it is true that population growth by itself does not cause under-employ- ment, it is nonetheless also true that,.in the face of low rates of em- plopyent creation, rapid population and labor force growth exacerbates unemployment problems . . . The fundamental solution lies not in slowiag population growth but in increasing the rate of employment creation." --

(Gebru, 1978.)

Gebru?s analysis treacs the fundamencal problem of African un- employment -- job creation (especially increased productivity in the rural sector) and the high cost of urban job c,eation. In this case, however, the responsibility for the neglect of rural development is laid on the previously feudal structure of agriculture and the capitalist urban sector. - 51 -

He cites a 1972 ILO paper forecasting a massively deteriorat- ing employment situation between 1970-1990: "Overt unemployment is estimated to rise from 3.8 percent in 1970 to 7.3 percent in 1980 and to

8 percent in 1990, implying an overall urban unemployment rate of 20 percent with 40 percent for those aged 15-24." -- (Gebru, 1978, p. 146.)

In addition, if the output projections for service and industry were to fall by only 1 percent, the unemployment rate would triple by 1990.

Despite Gebru's optimism about what can be accomplished as a consequence of the 1974 revolution, he nonetheless concludes:, "The broad conclusions of the paper, leaving aside its estimates of magni- tudes, growth rates, etc., (might still be] valid and.can serve as a crude indicator of the seriousness of the employment problem." -

(Gebru, 1978, p. 147.)

In the numerous short- and long-term strategies for alleviat- ing these problems, he does not mention slowing population growth and concludes:

"The problem of unemployment in many developing countries like

Ethiopia is the problem of under-development itself. The root cause of unemployment lies in the fundamental causes of under-development. The structural disequilibrium and the very slow transformatioa of the econo- my, under-utilization of the countries' abundant resou:ces, especially agricultural land as evidenced by the existence of a substantial amount of idle arable land, the factor-price distortion and resulting use of inappropriate techniques of production, the unbalanced development be- tween the urban and rural areas, constitute the fundamental cause of the unemployment problem in Ethiopia." (Gebru, 1978, p. 166.) 52 -.

This discussion has been cited in detail, because it repre-

sents one of the clearest statements of the argument against population

as "the cause of under-development". Nonetheless, like the population-

ist, it does not provide the balanced attempt to apportion the degree of

difficulty that arises from job creation (demand-side) and that which

is, in fact, attributable to rapid expansion of labor supply. Such a

balanced analysis does not, in fact, exist to-date and represents a

major gap in the analysis of the consequences of population growth.

Such an analysis would have to analyze separately the, urban and rural

labor markets and the growth of labor supply through natural increase

and migration.

The papers reviewed previously in this section identify (or

deny) the problems associated with population growth in African labor

markets. They do not estimate the possible impact of varying rates of

population growth on employment. Two fairly recent studies, one for

Kenya and one for Nigeria, do attempt such an analysis. In addition, a

recent World Bank work'ing paper estimates the impact of alternative fer-

tility projections for eight (8) countries in SSA.

The study of Kenya, carried out as part of a World Bank popu- lation report, projected population under three assumptions:

A - constant fertility

C = rapid fertility decline (TFR declined from 8 to 4 by the year 2000

B = moderate fertility decline

Labor force growth was estimated for each population projection assiming constant age/sex-specific activity rates. These projections are shown in Table 8. By the year 1990, the difference between the constant Table 8: TROJECTION OF WORKING AGE POPULATIOI 1/ AD LABOR FORCE 2/ (in 000's)

Rate Annual Rate Rate Annual Rate Annual Rate Annual Annual Rate Annual of Growth Growth of Growth Popu- of Crowth Popu- of Grovth of Growth Popu- of Labor In Preceding lation In Preceding Labor In Preceding lation in Preceding Labor in Preceding lation in Preceding Force 5 Years 15-64 5 Years Forco 5 Years 15-64 5 Years Force 5 Yeare 15-64 5 Years - 6193.8 8045.1 6205.3 1980 8038.4 6189.0 8038.4 2.68 3.19 7123.3 2.79 9442.1 3.20 7094.2 1985 9429.5 3.19 7219.6 3.8 9428.3 2.38 3.48 8137.6 2.64 11255.4 3.51 7988.8 1990 11222.7 3.48 8468.7 3.19 11223.4 2.27 4.03 9301.0 2.67 1381}.8 4.09 8950.3 1995 13737.2 4.04 10053.1 3.43 13735.0 1.87 3.63 10602.6 2.62 16428.9 3.47 9827.3 2000 1676b.9 3.98 12054.5 3.63 L6469.3 1.93 3.34 12204.4 2.81 19083.3 2.99 10825.1 2005 20480.2 3.99 14817.5 4.12 19464.6 11464.2 I.1S 3.17 13876.0 2.56 21741.9 2.61 2010 25145.0 4.10 18299.7 4.22 22812.1

Projections 8 and C are bosed on ProjecLion A assumes a coontant TFR of 8.0 for 1975-2000. Source; (1) I8RD projections by the Mission. 1.30, (assuming TFR declines to 4.0 In 2000) respectively of Table Projectiona 2 (asstuling TIR declines to 5.5 In 2000) and 4 Chapter 1. is the uoritiag 1I.0s Iabor Force Projections, Vol. 11, p. 91. (Also lncluded'here (2) Calculated using Age-Specific Activlty Rates in population 10-14 and over 64 years.)

Source: Kenya, 1980, Table 3.3. - 54 -

fertility and rapid fertility decline scenarios is 6 percent and reaches

18 percent by 2000 and 37 percent in 2010. This paper also attempts to analyze the demand for Labor, but without a fairly detailed model of the economy, only limited work could

be conducted on this subject. The best that could be done was to pro- ject modern wage employment and to estimate the proportion of the labor

force in this sector under various assumptions. With constant fertili- ty, this proportion increases from 16.2 percent in 1977 to 19 percent in

the year 2000, if GDP grows at 4.5 percent (actual rate 1972-77) and

33.8 percent if it grows at 7.0 percent (the rate assumed in the five- year plan). With rapid fertility decline, the proportions are 23.3 per-

cent and 41.5 percent respectively. Thus, the proportion is highly sen-

sitive to the rate of economic growth.

The Nigerian case study done by Olusanya and Pursell is quite

similar to that carried for Kenya at about che same time. There are two

fertility assumptions, i. e., constant fertility and a reduced fertility

assumption. The labor force participation rates are projected usirg

age/sex-specific activity rates for developing countries The projections

show that by 1988, the difference in labor force between the two

projections is 1 percent, widening to 8 percent in 2003 and 12.5 percent in 2008.

As for Kenya, the Nigerian case study calculates the propor-

tion of the labor force absorbed in the modern wage sector under various

assumptions. The proportion ranges from 5 to 5.8 percent in 2008 for

the constant and reduced fertility models respectively, assuming growth

rates of 2.5 percent in the modern sector (a decline from 6.4 percent ia - 55 -

1973). With rapid expansion of modern sector employment (8 percent),

the respective figures are 31.3 and 35.8 percent.

The authors of the Nigerian study also attempted to project

the ratio of experienced to inexperienced workers under the two fertil-

ity assumptions. If fertility remains constant, the number of experi- enced workers relative to inexperienced ones actually declines, while with reduced fertility, it increases from 84/100 in 1973 to 100/100 in

the year 2008.

The World Bank paper on rapid population growth in 2000 pro- jected labor force growth for eight (8) SSA countries, assuming both constant fertility and low fertility This paper used ILO estimates of

labor participation rates. The growth rates of the labor force under these

various assumptions are shown in Table 9. The growth rates of labor force

do not differ between the two assumptions between 1980-2000, but do differ

markedly in the 2000-2020 period.

The only comprehensive demographic modeling of demand and sup-

ply of labor in Africa is the Bachue model of Kenya. This model is too

complex to present in detail here, but a major conclusioa of the study

is: "Over the next 30 years, foreseeable declines in fertility (even

declines considerably greater than those expect&L by even the most opti-

mistic -- or pessiaistic -- observor) are unlikely to have a very signi-

ficant impact on the size and intensity of Kenya's fucure employment

problem." - (Anker and Knowles, 1983, p. 697.)

To assess why these results arise, it would be necessary to

carefully explain the assumptions of labor demand and supply in the - 56 -

Table 9: Growth Rate of the Labor Force

Low Fertility Constant Fertility

Country 1980-2000 2000-2020 1980-2000 2000-2020

Ethiopia 2.74 2.70 2.74 3.28

Ghana 3.28 3.11 3.28 3.81

Ivory Coast 2.92 2.86 2.92 3.55

Nigeria 3.38 3.28 3.38 3.89

Sudan 2.96 2.64 2.96 3.32

Tanzania 3.27 3.08 S.27 3.80

Zaire 2.94 2.85 2.94 3.37

Zimbabwe 3.55 3.35 3.55 3.97

Kenya 4.15 3.79 4.15 4.70

Source: Faruqee and Gulhati, 1980. - 57

Bachue model. One point that is emphasized in this model and clearly must be emphasized in analyzing the employment consequences of popula-

tion growth is the very different characteristics of the urban and rural

labor markets and the crucial role played by differential rates of

growth of demand for labor in these sectors and consequent urban-rural migration.

There is very little evidence on employment in SSA. Few

countries have had one much less two labor force surveys or censuses with

employment questions that will allow us to determine whether unemployment

has been increasing or decreasing and whether trends in anemployment are

associated with trends in population growth.

J - 58

Population Growth and Agriculture

Africa is highly dependent on agriculture. In 1962, the agri- cultural sector made up 40 percent of the GDP and 82 percent of the em- ployment in SSA. While there was considerable variation in the degree of agricultural dependency, for the 24 countries reviewed by FAO in 1968

the minimum proportion of the population engaged in agriculture was 62 percent in Ghana. (The maximum was 95 percent in Chad.) - (FAO, 1968, p. 4.) By 1979, the percent of GDP from agriculture for the region had declined to 32 percent and the percent of the labor force in agriculture had decined to 71 percent. - (World Bank, 1981.)

Given the predominantly agrarian character of SSA, the rela- tionship between populatioa growth and agriculture -is of primary impor- tance to understanding the consequences 'f population growth. This top- ic is also of crucial importance; Because it is a topic about which least is known. The effects of rapid urbanization are generally agreed to h- nagative in SSA, because of the needs to provide social services, jobs and food to the urban population. It is in the rural areas that the possible positive effects of population growth are sought by those who be?.teve population growth may have positive effects in SSA.

There are three major issues relating population growth and agriculture: (1) the effect of population growth on the increase in food requirements, (2) the effect of population growth on agricultural production and productivity (the economies of scale issue), and (3) the ability of agriculture to absorb labor. These three issues have been of concern in SSA for a considerable period of time, but the treatment has aot been systemuatic with respect to any of them. - 59 -

Food

In the late 1960's, thie FAO judged calorie intake in SSA to be about 95 percent of the required level, but this general picture of nutritional adequacy was marred by the fact that there was substantial

protein deficiency in the region and by the fact that household budget

surveys revealed that 50-70 percent of family expenditures were on

food. -- (FAO, 1968.) By 1979, the estimated adequacy had decreased to

8 percent. The situation has been prevented from more rapid deteriora-

tion by large increases in food imports. These aggreaates conceal large differences between countries of the region, which will be discussed

later.

Concern for the nutrition consequences of population growth was expressed in'the development plans for Upper Volta (1972-76),

Burundi (1968-72), and Rwanda (1977-81). The nutritional problem in

Nigeria was addressed at the First African Population Conference in 1966

by I. S. Dema. He identified indicators of poor health in various re-

gions of Nigeria (low birt' weight, poor lactation performance, retarded

physical and psychological development in early childhood, protein-cal-

orie deficiency diseases. in children and emaciation anad loss of strength

in working adults) and concluded that " . . . these health problems tes-

tify that food supplies are not keeping pace with rapid growth in human

numbers." - (Dema, 1968).

He also identifies ways in which traditional rotation patterns

are breaking down in the face of rapid population growth. In terms of

hard data, he presents information on 13 farming communities in Nigeria

in the early 1960's, showing that as food crop acreage per capita de-

creases so does the consumption of calories and proteins as a percent of 60 -

requirement. He also identified a paradox to be confronted by a number of

African countries (and those in other parts of the world) -- incame frcm

land in cash crops is not used to provide food adequacy but to satisfy

other aeeds.

The problem of meeting food needs with rapid Population growth and rapid expansion of areas under cash crops in Ghana was addressed by

B. Benneh at the 1968 Symposium on Population and Socio-Economic Devel- opment in Ghana. As production of cocoa for export expanded in Ghana, the level of food imports began to increase and these food imports were considered to be a major contributor to the worsening balance of pay- ments. The expansion of cocoa at the expense of food productioa has been of major concern because of the reluctance to use exchange earnings

-o purchase food and because of the rislk of dependence on one cash crop.

Benneh seems to identify the main problem as beiag the low productivity of land and labor used in production of food crops. This problem is worsened as population pressure on food land reduces fallow periods and lowers soil fertility. The solution appears to be to in- crease productivity in food production. The low level of education of the farmers makes it difficult to teach them new technologies for appli- cation of artificial fertilizers. The use of artificial fertilizers also involves foreign exchange costs. Instead, a bush fallow system has been suggested, whereby plants which would restore soil fertility would be used for fallow. This would provide fuel as well as restore the soil in short fallow periods. The major drawback to such a scheme appears to be the labor cost of clearing the bush fallow before cultivation.

Benneh does not identify the solution to the. problem, but his analysis clearly lays out the constraints on expanded food production, - 61 -

given conditions of water, soil type technology, and socio-ecoaomic con- ditions. He identifies the food problem as being one of low agricultur- al productivity which is exacerbated by population growth and reduced fallow periods. Technological change is implicitly the proposed solu- tion to the dilemna.

At the Nairobi Population Seminar the following year, the main paper on population and food is much more rambling in its presentation of the problem, and the main conclusion of the paper seems to be that

*the solution to the food problem and indeed poverty and population growth is industrialization. This paper presented no data and little sys9tematic analysis.

In contrast, two (2) papers on population growth and nutrition were presented at the 1970 Symposiun in Ghana on the "Implications of

Population Trends for Policy Measures in West Africa." The first by

Orraca-Tetteh (1970) cited data on the extent of population growth in

Ghana, the decrease in production of major food crops over the 1963-68 period, and the increase of food imports since 1955 and 1963,'Qup 96 and

38 percent respectively by 1968), In addition, a nutritional survey was cited, showing that 0.3 percent of children aged 0-4 suffered from kwa- shiokor and 40-50 percent of the children were underweight. The author then presented household data on family size and adequacy of nutritional intake. This paper thus gives very serious evidence that nutritional problems existed in Ghana and that they were related, at least in one sample, to family size. The author concluded: "The influences of demo- gaphic trends in affecting the economic development of a nation, and

therefore the bearing of this on the health and nutritional well-being of the populaticn, necessitate the coordinated efforts of all in en- couraging family planning." - (Orraca-Tetteh, 1970, p. 68.) - 62

The secoad paper at the Accra conference on Southern Nigeria by Ajacghu gives evidence of small farm size and poor nutrition status in the area. There is little systematic but considerable inferential data on increasing land scarcity. The problem of food inadequacy is also attributed to increasing production of non-food crops for export and the sale of food crops for high urban prices) despite very low lev- els of consumption in rural households -- a point which is raised in other papers on Africa.

A large number of other papers on population and agriculture have been done for Africa. Four such papers were presenced at the 1971

Seminar on Population Problems and Policy in Nigeria held at Ife. These papers ranged from a general discussion of potential source of protein not specifically related to. Africa to a paper -by Antonio- dismissing..the.. population problem. His dismissal is based on (1) optimism about the green revolution, (2) lack of a persuasive theory about how to alter population growth rates through ferti.lity control, and (3) suspicion about the motives of those advocating the population solation to the problems of development. - (Antonio, 1971.) While this paper contains rather severe rejections of the populatioa issue, it does have some thoughtful discussions, and it is clear that none of the earlier papers attempt to assess the relative importance of population growth versus other factors in creating or solving the food problem.

A much more careful and balanced analysis of the food and pop- ulation question in Nigeria is contained in a 1974 paper from the Cairo

Demographic Center Seminar on Demographic Aspects of Socio-Economic De- velopment in Some Arab and African Countries. This paper addresses, to the extent possible given data limitations, (1) trends in population and - .63 -

food production and supply, (2) the relationship between population and

agricultural output, and (3) the relationship between population and the

productivity of agricultural labor.

The authors contend that the food problem in terms of caloric

intake is not severe according to the standards of most developing coun-

tries (2,175 calories per day), but since these are derived muostly from

root crops, there does tend to be a deficiency in protein. Evidence was given, however, showing that the food situation deteriorated somewhat

during the 1960's.

The food problem is linked to the general problem of agricul-

tural productivity. During the period 1950-1970, the population of Ni-

geria increased by 60 percent and that engaged in agriculture by 34 per-

cent. The value of output per capita of population in agriculture in-

creased by only 16 percent. The expansion of agricultural output re-

sulted from increased area under cultivation (23 %) and reduced produc-

tivity per acre (-15%) ia the 1950-1961 period and by slower excpansion

of area (6%) and constant yield in the 1960-1970 period.

Concommitantly, agricultural labor productivity increased between 1950

and 1960 and decreased in the period 1960-1970.

The aucthors conclude that "* . if there is population pres-

sure upon land in any part of Nigeria it comes fromi:

(1) poor soil conditions and soil erosion

(2) unequal distribution of land

(3) technological backwardness

(4) system of land tenure (such as communal ownership of land) and,

(5) high rate of-population growth. - 64

If'-conditioas (1) to (4) above could be overcme, the rate of population growth would not be a problem. At present, there is no indication that these drawbacks are being surmounted. Consequently, the high rate of population growth idds to the difficulties." -- (Vaid3enathan and Omiatu, 1974, p. 218.)

The food problem in Nigeria was also dealt with iadirectly in a chapter in the book by Olusanya and Pursell. The main thrust of their chapter on populatioa growth and economic development of the agricultur- al sector was to question the wisdom of the recommendatioa of the Con- sortium for the Study of Nigerian Rural Development and the FAO to con- centrate agricultural efforts in export crops. This recommendation was based on tire belief that export grow.th provides a better engine for growth and that by increasing iacomes of faraers producing export crops, the effective demand for food would increase. The authors conclude: "The export policy involves risks which must be carefully analyzed and appraised before the policy is given a complete endorsemenc. One point is evident; reduced population growth would alleviate some of the pres- sure on the agricultural sector, thereby enabling it to produce a sur- plus which could be used as the basis for economic development." -- (olusanya and Pursell, 1981, p. 4163.)

A careful analysis of the situation in Lathoso rwas prerented at the 1974 National Population Symposium held in 'Maserive, Lethoso. The author of this study documents crends in farm size, proportion landless, yields and grain production per capita and concludes: "On the basis of available infor7ation and current perform- ance, the carrying capacity of the land seems to have been stretched to 656-

the limit by the sheer weight of the population it has to carry. It is essential to arrest . . . (Resolution] requires an alternative basis for

dependency and a new set of national policies aimed at establishing a

healthy equilibrium between resources and the population as beneficiar-

ies." - (.Monyake, 1974, p. 69.)

This paper and the paper by Vaidyanathan and Omiata on Nigeria

contain thorough analyses given the data on both the potential for sup-

plying food needs as well as evidence of deteriorating nutritional con-

ditions. As such, they cover indirectly the questions of the effect of

population growth on agricultural productivity arid the ability of agri-

culture to absorb labor. Before covering these other issues, it is

necessary to look at t7wo papers which attempt to examine the issue of

population growth and food/nutrition across Africa.

Idusogie's 1979 paper reviews the history of agriculture and

periodic hunger is SSA, documents declining trends in food production

per capita in the 1970's, and reviews the evidence from several house-

hold surveys in Ghana and Nigeria documenting decreases in food adequacy with increases in household size. In his list of strategies to address

the problem, population policy is only one of six items identified. The need for other policies is stressed, given the ltmited success to-date of population policies. "An important factor retarding the progress of population policy in Africa is that the program is very new and is hand- led mainly by foreign.ers. So that the policy is associated with Colon- ial policies. Secondly, many developing countries seem to hold the view

that population policy has other political motives which are not com-

pletely spelt out Lsicj . . 2 - (Idusogie, 1979, pp. 147-48.) Thus,

the need to cope with the effect of population growth on food - 66 - requirements is identif ied, and the author is skeptical about the ability to control that growth. A 1983 ECA/FAO document presented at the International

Conference on Population of the 1984 Expert Group on Population,

Resources, Environment and Development records the worsening food situation in Africa in the 1970's and projects possible deterioration to

1990 unless major changes are brought about. (Population and Division,

ECA, 1983).

The report points out the fact that the deteriorating food situation in Africa was identified by the 12th meeting of the FAO

Regional Conference for Africa held in 1982 as "one of the biggest de- velopment problems in the world." The evolution of this problem and of concern for this problem can be understood by looking at Table 10 figures on growth of population, food output and output per capita in the two periods 1961/65/70 and 1970/76. While food growth per capita tended to be positive in 20 of 43 SSA countries in 1961/65/70, it was positive in only 14 of those countries in the 1970/76 period. The evi- dence on actual nutritional status and its deteriora.tion is not avail- able, so that it is difficult to tell the extent to which deteriorating domestic production has been offset by increased food imports.

The FAO identified various causes for the deteriorating sit- uation, among which have been (i) agricultural policies that have sup- ported growth of export crops at the expenses of food crops, (ii) poor infrastructure, (iii) a series of disasters, both natural and man-made, and finally, (iv) rapid population growth and increasing rates of urban-- ization. - 67 -

Recommendations of the paper cover a wide range of topics, in- cluding demographic measures. As stated in the 1974 World Food Confer- ence record, an attempt should be made to achieve a desirable balance between.population and food supply. The paper also recommends policies to monitor rural to urbaa migration in an effort to boost food produc- tion.

This paper therefore documents a situation in the 1980's where the food issue has come to be much more serious in Africa than it was in the 1960's, when work on population, consequences was begun. What has emerged is a situation which shifted from the perception that the abun- dant land of Africa was a "cushion" against population growth to the realization that agriculture has failed to supply basic food needs, thereby creating iacreasing alarm.

/ The cause of food deficits is one of both supply and demand.

The idea that population growth stimaulates demand is not novel. The key question that must be addressed in SSA is whether population growth can increase, at least proportionally, the production of lood or agricultur- al production in general. While some of the preceding papers have touched on this issue, there is a wider body of work that exists on this topic.

Effect of Population Growth on Agricultural Output

This is the key question for Sub-Saharan Africa. A wide vari- ety of work has been executed which attempts to address the issue, but the answer to the question remains unclear. Etieane Van de Walle, writing in the early 1970's, reviewed a number of issues related to population and developtuent. His section on density and population size - 68 -

presents a clear summary of much of the work to date. He clearly identifies that the issues of economies of scale in agriculture must be addressed within the specific context. The effects of populatioa growth within zmallholder agriculture aight be quite different froa that in large plantations, and population growth itself will not bring about reorganization of large-scale production units. The question of whether small-scale holdings or large plantations are more productive is an emptrical question that needs careful consideration. Van de Walle cites

Eicher's work which concludes "that under West African ecological, political and social conditions, smallholders can produce almost any crop as efficiently as large-scale produccion units such as plantations or state farms." - (Eicher, 1970, p. 15, and Van de Walle, 1975, p.

139.) More recent work on Kenya indicates that small settlement farms

(under 10 acres) had output per acre that was 2j times greater than farms of 10-20 acres anid about 6 times greater than farms over 40 acres. - (Livingstone, 1981, p. 12.12.)

A separate question concerns the effect of population growth on small or large farms. For export crops, problems might arise from decreasing availability of land suitable to export crops as a conse- quence of populatioa growth. la addition, for those export crops that can be consumed domestically, increased population growth might decrease exports by increasing domestic demand. But core serious problems for the export sector appear to be the slow increase in world demand and ad- verse terms of trade.

In the early l970's, Vat de Walle could stace that in West

Africa . . In general, and within limits discussed later, such as the availability of cultivable land, food production tends to increase abreast with population." - (Van de 'Walle, 1975, p. 141.) - 69 -

The limits are set by the extent of man's ability to change agricultural techniques to keep up with increasing density as well as

the carrying capacity of the land under existing conditions. Van de

Walle dismisses the possibility of population growth improving the po-

tential for opening new lands, since new areas w;ould require substantial new investment.

He also makes a convincing argument that higher population densities would not necessarily lead to more intensive forms of cultiva-

tion a la Boserup. Van de Walle's argument is that underemployment of labor in African agriculture provides potential for more labor-intensive production at the current time in Africa, and these methods are not be- irng used because they do not pay. Evidence on hlours worked in .A.Erican agriculture relative to agriculture in other parts of the world tend to confirm this. While land and labor may be available, the missing factor might be capital in the form of irrigation systems or it may be lack of markets which would not come into existence by the simple growth of population.

The question of land scarcity or land abundance cannot be ad- dressed for Africa as a whole or even for West Africa. There are clear- ly areas of land shortage evidenced by decreasing fallow, consequent re- ductions in soil productivity, fragmentation of holdings, etc. In the late 1960's, Hance attempted to map the areas of population pressure in

Africa. (See Figure 2.) The coexistence of areas of population pressure and areas of unused land 5 / suggest thaV- the fundamental problem in SSA

51 A paper by Elie at the 1971 African Population Conference attempts to identify the areas of over- and underpopulation in Cameroon and identifies one area as underpopulated, one as overpopulated and one as severely overpopulated. -- (Elie, 1971.) 70

......

AFRICA: A Tentative ...... Depiction of Population Prewure, Mid-1966

PaouiatiW Preu=w at Law 0Usity i (r4 la10 iWsts ;w sq. km. (25 w Z4. mil)w) Pegidatian Pret~u= at M*di,n 0.rity 91 p--- "p.r sq. km. (7 - p."q, mile)) Fi-ur****.. 2 ~e

Source: Hance (1968). 71 -

might be considered to be one of distribution. However, since

redistribution is not without cost, it cannot be said given current

resources, that economies of scale exist, unless population growth will stimulate capital growth.

While Van de Walle's paper provides an excellent review of the issues and evidence up to the early 1970's, the deteriorating perform- ance of African agriculture since that time requires a careful reassess- ment of (i) the general question of agricultural development in the per- iod since 1970, and (ii) the changiag capacity of African agriculture to provide food and jobs for a growing populacion. Such a review has high priority and should attempt to identify differences within Africa re- garding the extent to which agricultural performance has been handicap- ped by poor agricultural policies and the extent to which population pressure has been responsible. More specifically, research is needed to determine appropriate policies for coping with expanded populati on and the potential for slowing population growth through fertility reduction or population redistribution. The costs of absorbing expanding popula- tion in various areas, both urban and rural, need to be carefully assessed in SSA as well. - 72 -

The Effect of Populatiou Growth on Econoiic Development

An enormous amount has beea w-ritten about the general effect of population growth on economic development in SSA. Both positive and negative effects have been catalogued in numerous papers. It is much rarer, however, to find work that attempts to quantify the effects ei- ther retrospectively or prospectively. The papers cited earlier on ed- ucation, employment, food and agriculture represent some of the work on quantification.' Several other papers have attempted to quantify other consequences of population growth. These will be briefly reviewed in this section. There also exist a large number of papers which hypothe- size various relationships without quantifying them. 'While these may be persuasive as postulates, they do not provide even hypothetical evi- dence.

Several papers and development plans have attempted to esti- mate the effect of population by considering how much faster income or capital must grow if per capita income is to rise under various assump- tions of population growth. Such calculations are the simplest possible estimaates of population impact and implicitly or explicitly assume that population growth will affect only the denominator in per capita income and aot the numerator.- At least they assume that the impact on the num- erator will not be as large as the effect on the denominator -- an im- plicit assumption of diminishing returns.

One of the earliest published papers using this approach in

SSA is that given on Senegal by N'Daiye at the 1965 World Population

Conference. "In order simply to maintain the level of living, the rate - 73 -

of annual increase of national income wrould have to be more than 2.5 percent. If the level of living is to rise as rapidly as in developing countries, production would have to increase by 8 percent annually.

-- (N'Diaye, 1965, pp. 84-85.)

At the 1969 seminar in Nairobi, Angwenyi presented a paper on

Kenya using a similar argument. He assumed that if GDP grew at 6 per- cent and population at 3 percent, per capita GDP in the year 2000 would be £ 117.5, whereas if population grew at 1.5 percent, per capita income

would be £ 193.6. -- (Angwenyi, 1969.)

The papers presented at the Seminar on the Application of Dem- ographic Data and Analysis to Development Planning, organized by ECA in

1969, show that similar concepts were explicit or implicit in the devel- opment plan of Sudan (1961/62 - 1971/72) and Kenya (1966-70).

In addition, a paper on the Rungure District of Tanzania, giv- en at the Seminar on Populatioa and Economic Growth in Africa at Lieden in 1972, calculates alternative per capita money.income for 1948, 1957 and 1967 under alternative assumptions of population growth and alterna- tive economic conditions. In each case, however, the performance or growth of total income is assumed to be independent of the grbwth of population. - (Sterkenburg and Luning, 1972.)

In a 1979 paper on population growth and development in Kenya,

Herrin and Mtott do similar calculations based on alternative rates of net investment and population growth. Doubling time for per capita in- come is 106 years with 4 percent population growth and 15 percent in- vestment, whereas it is 55 years if population grows at 3 percent. If net investment is raised to 20 percent, the comparable figures are 41 -74-

and 26 years respectively. In additiot, if populatioa growth negatively affected the ability to invest, the pernicious effect of population would be greater than estimated above.

In a number of exercises aimed at judging the realism of var- ious planning programs in developing countries, target investment ratios and assumed capital output ratios have been used to calculate target rates of GDP growth and have been compared with estimates of pezformance on,total income growth. Per capita income growth rates can thea be cal- culated, and some assessmeat can be given of the negative impact of pop- ulation growth. This approach was used in the ECA paper on "The Appli- cacion of Demographic Data and Analysis to Development Plannin;g" and in a more recent paper by Faroog (1979). In neither paper are the conclu- sions about the effect of population growth and planned performance ex-

A.ained well. But the twom papers do show hot well or poorly plans have been realized, and both planned and actual rates of growth can be com- pared with income growth. - 75

The Current Situation in Sub-Saharan Africa

Sub-Saharan Africa has more of the very poor countries than any other contilnent. This statement reflects both the poverty of SSA and the small size of most countries. It is more realistic to look at the diversity within Africa. Eleven countries of over one million pop- ulation had per capita incomes in 1981 below that of China. These are the unequivocally poor. They are located in the Sahel (Chad, Mali and

Upper Volta); the Horn of Africa (Ethiopia and Somalia); and in Central and Eastern Africa (Uganda, Burundi, Rwanda, Malawi, Mozambique,Tanzania and Zaire). (See Figure 3 and Table 10.)

Ten other countries are listed as low income by the World

Bank. These have incomes above that of China. There are only 13 coun- tries in the world in this income range listed by WDR, 10 of these are in SSA. The others'-are-a- very- mixed--group . Sri Lanka, 'Haiti -and-Paki--- stan. These African countries are found primarily on the West Coast of

Africa (Guinea, Benin, Sierra Leone, Togo and Ghana), but also include

Sudan, the Ceatral African Republic and Niger and Madagascar and Mozam- bique.

The poorest of the middle income countries found in SSA with incomes below those of Thailand and the Philippines contain the rest of coastal West Africa, Mauritania, Senegal and Liberia, the East African country of Kenya, the Souchern African countries of Angola and Lesotho and the Central dAfrican country of Zambia.

The richest countries of SSA still fall within the category of lower middle income countries and include Nigeria, Zimbabwe, Cameroon,

Congo and Ivory Coast. The per capita income of this group corres7nds with that of the relatively poor countries of Latin American and the

Caribbean, Peru, Ecuador and the Dominican Republic. -76-

Table 10. Economic Situatior- in Sub-Saharan. frica Average Food 2roducc':oa 1969-71 100 1981 GN? Percant of GDP GDP Groawh Food per capita 197-9-81 per caoita tn .kzricullure 1960-70 1970-81 Adeuatcv

- 74 96 Chad 110 - 0.5 2.2 76 83 Ethiopia 140 50 4.4 4.3 85 88 M'Iali 190 42 3.3 5.6 94 96 !4alawi 200 43 4,9 0.2 94 87 Zaire 210 32 3.4 -1.6 83 86 Uganda Z20 75 5.6 3.2 96 100 Burundi 230 54 4,4 3.6 95 94 Upper Volta 240 41 3.0 88 . 104 ?.wanda 250 46 2.7 5.3 3.9 100 65 Somalia 280 - 1.0 5.1 83 91 Tanzania 280 52 6.0 3.0 77 37 Guinea 300 37 3.5 3.3 103 96 Senia 320 44 2.6 1.6 94 102 Central African R.epublic 320 37 1.9. 1.9 89 81 Siefrra Leone 320 31 4.3 2.9 0.3 *94

3.1 109 93 M.adagascar 330 35 2.9 - 92 73 Higer 330 30 - 4.1 70 102 Mozambique - - 1.3 3.2 101 90 Sudan 380 38 8.5 95 74 Togo 380 24 2.1 -0.2 5.8 88 85 Ghaaa 400 60 5.9 2.0 88 76 KCenya 420 32 2.5 1.7 100 77 Senegal 430 22 6.7 * 1,3 97 95 .(auritania 460 28 5.1 8.4 114 86 Liberia 520 36 5.2 0.4 107 92 Leeocho 540 31 5.0 93 8L Zambla 600 18 - - 83 Angola ^ - - 4.5 9L 91 Nligeria 870 23 3.1 1.9 86' 92 Zimbabwe 870 18 4.3 6.3 l06 lO0 Cameroon 880 27 3.7 9 2.3 5.1 94 32 Congo 1,L10 110 Ivor7 Coast L,200 27 8.0 6.2 112

Tocal Z70 37 4.6 4.5 97 China and India 280 33 45 4.8 99 92 Oe.er 240 45 4.7 3.6

,iiddle tncome 106 Lower mLddle 850 22 5.0 5.6 115 Upper middle 2.490 10 6.4 5.6 - 77 -

GNP PER CAPITlA

0 - 300

Note Urnsnoded Areas Not Under St.ay

Figure 3

Source: Mapped from WDR, 1983 data - 78 -

The second most obvious feature of African economies is their predominantly agrarian charac ter. The 1981 World Bank teport reported that in 1979, 32 percent of GDP in SSA came from agricultu;+^. This is approximately equal to the average of all low income countries (34 per- cent) and far above that for all middle income countries (14 per- cent).' This 32 percent of the GDP is produced by 71 percent of the labor force, revealing the very low productivity of labor in agricul- ture.

The dependency on agriculture varies substantially, however, with over 75 percent of GDP from this source in Uganda in 1981 and 9 percent in Congo. The normal range, however, is between 25 and 60 per- cent# (See Table 10.) But only four of 33 have more than 50 percent from this source and only six have less than a quarter. Despite this high dependence on agriculture, there is considerable inadequacy in food consumption to the extent it can be measured. As shown in the 1981

World Bank report the average calorie intake was only 89 percent of what would be required while the average low income country achieved 98 per- cent of what was required. As shown in column 3 of Table 10 and Figure 4 only aine countries achieve 100 percent of requirement while eight have

85 percent or less and only two of the five richest countfrie- achieve 95 percent or better.

The third feature of the economies of Sub-Saharan Aftica is that the rate of economic growth slowed substantially ia the 1970s.

While the overall growth rate was 3.9 percent in the period 1960-1970, it slowed to 2.9 percent in the 1970-79 period. This compares with 4.5 and 4.7 percent respectively for all low income countries and 6.'. and

5.5 percent for all middle income countries.

As shown in columns 4 and 5 of Table 10, 18 of 30 countries for which information was available in both periods showed slower growth in - 79 -

DAILY PER CAPITA CALORIE SUPPLY % of Requirement, 1980

O:ver 1l0 \ 100 - 110 90 - 100 80 - 90

70 - 80

Note: Unshaded Areas Not Under Study F.e 4

Source: -Mapped from WDR, 1983 data - 80 -

1970-80 than in 1960-70. The pattern of income growth varied substanti- ally across :ountries, however. The causes of slow growth were undoubt- edly political in many cases, Ethiopia and Uganda being the clearest examples. Adverse movements in the terms of trade explaia some of the poor performance. There were massive deterioracion of terms of trade in

Zaire, Zambia and less severe but significant deteriorations in Liberia and Mauritania while Somalia, B-ain and Niger had deterioration of be- tween 2 and 3 percent a year.

The poor performance of the agricultural sector was an impor- tant factor explaining the slow down in economic growth. Yields per hectare in millet, and. maize deteriorated between 1969-71 and 1977-79, while for sorghum, roots and tubers yields per hectare were stagnant.

Only in rice was there a growth of 5 percent or slightly better. For the developing world as a whole 7.ields in sorghum, maize and rice in- creased b-r 31 percent, 10 percent and 14 percent respectively. (See

World BankAfricanReport, 1981, p. 169.) This poor performance in agri- culture is manifest in reduced food production per capita and substan- tial increases in food imports.

The general poor performance in the growth of agriculture, food and total income must be set agaiast a situaction in which popula- tion growth wani accelerating and for the period 1970-81, population growth exceeded GDP growth in 12 of the 30 couancries in SSA. This sug- gests that even if we put aside the question .)f the effect of population growth in SSA, it is clearly necessary to iuderstand the magnitude o-f that growth and its potential for chaaLge if we are to understand the potential for coping with population growth. - 81 -

The Demographic Situation in SSA

For the 1969 seminar on Application of Demographic Data and

Analysis to Development Planning the ECA prepared a paper summarizing the demographic situation in Sub-Saharan Africa as follows.

"(a) Relatively low densitities in many countries; except only

in a few areas, there is no pressure on land. This mea-

sure of density constitutes, however, only one aspect of

the pressure of population in relation to resources and

potentialities for development.

(b) A great unevenness in distribution of population among the

different countries, with a multiplicity of small hamlets

and villages, few medium--sized towns, and few big cities,

which are in most cases getting over-crowded.

(c) Low degree of u.banization, but very high rates of growLh

of urban populations.

(d) High and constant fertility (with a possibility of sl'gaht increase in certain population groups with iffproved health

f acili ties).

(e) High mortality with signs of declining which may be sharp

in many countries.

(f) High rates of population growth, which are likely to ac-

celerate in the near future as fertility remains constant

and the present high mortality continues to decline.

(g) High proportion of children in the population resulting

from high fertility, and therefore heavy dependency

ratios, with implications for heavy eicpenditures required -82-

for education and provision of jobs for the growing popu-

lation.' - (Economic Commission for Africa, 1974, pp.

69-70.)

This statement remains accurate 15 years later, and the rate of popula-

tion growth in SSA has increased from 2.8 in 1960-70 to 2.9 percent per

year in the period 1970-79. In the meantime, the population of SSA has

increased from approximately 278 million in 1970 to 406 milllion in 1983.

By contrast, in almost all the rest of the developing world

growth rates had slowed. la Asia growth rates of population have de-

clined from 2.2 to 2.0 percent, while in Latin America the comparable

figures are 2.7 and 2.5 percent. Only in the Middle East and North

kfrica have growth rates continued to increase, from 2.4 to 2.7 percent

in Nlorth Africa and 2.8 to 2.9 percent in the Middle E-ast.

tWhile the demographic data in SSA are both scarce and of low

quality (see Hill and Isiugo-Abanihe, 1983), by using best guesses we

can identify the main characceristics of the demographic situation

in SSA. As shown in Table 11 ard Figure 3 there are substantial

variations in the growth rates of SSA countries in the period 1970-81.

'o country with more than a million population had a growth rate less

than 2 percent while Kenya and Mozambique had rates of 4 percent or more

and Ivory Coast experienced a rate of 5 percent due to very high rates

of immigration. Eight other countries hLad rates of 3 percent or great-

er. The very high growth areas are clustered in central and eastern

coastal Africa and thie contiguous areas of Zaire, Zambia, Zimbabwe,

Mozambique, TanRania Rwanda, and tMialawi. had rates of 3 percent or more. In this geographic cluster only Uganda and Burundi had somewhat slower growth rates. The only ocher countries with growth rates of 3

percent or greater were Niger, Sudan and, as mentioned, Ivory Coast. - 83 -

Table 11. Demographic Situiatiou in SSA Total Infant Child Population Fertility Mortality Death Life Growth Rates Rate Rate Expectancy 1960-70 1970-81 1981 1981 1981 1981

Chad 1.9 2.0 5.5 146 32 43 Ethiopia 2.4 2.0 6.5 145 31 46 45 Mali 2.5 2.6 6.5 152 33 Malawi 2a8 3.0 7e8 169 38 44 Zaire 2.0 3.0 6.3 110 21 50

Uganda 3.0 2.6 7.0 96 17 48 Burundi 1.6 2.2 6.5 120 24 45 44 Upper Volta 2.0 2.0 6.5 208 50 Rwanda 2.6 3.4 8.3 137 29 46 Somalia 2.8 2.8 6.5 145 31 39

Tanzania 2.7 3.4 6.5 101 19 52 43 Guinea 2.9 2.9 6-3 1.63 36 Benin 2.6 2.7 6.5 152 33 50 Centr4l African Republic 1.9 2.3 5.5 146 32 43 Sierra Leone 243 2.6 6.1 205 49 47

Madagascar 2.2 2.6 6.5 69 11 48 Niger 3.4 343 7.0 .143 31 45 Hozambique 2.1 4.2 6.5 113 22 47 Sudan 2.1 3.1 6.7 122 21 / 48 Togo 3.0 2.5 6.5 107 20 54 Ghana 2.3 3.0 7AO 101 19 56 Kenya 3.2 4.0 8.0 85 15 44 Senegal 2.3 2.7 6.5 145 31 Mauritania 2.3 2.3 6.0 141 30 44 54 Liberia 3.2 3.5 ' 6.9 152 33

2.0 2.4 5.8 113 22 52 Lesotho 51 Zambia 2.6 3.1 6.9 104 20 42 Angola 2.1 2.5 6.5 152 33 49 Nigeria 2.5 2.5 6.9 133 28 55 Zimbabwe 3.4 3.2 8.0 72 11 50 Camer ron 1.8 2.2 5.8 106 20 60 Congo 2.4 2.9 6.0 127 26 Ivory Coast 3.8 5.0 6.8 125 25 47

Low Income 2.3w 1.9w 4.3w 99w 14w 58w 61w China and India 2.3w 142w 3.7w 92w 1w Other Low 2.5w 2.6w 6.2w 124w 21w 50w

Lower Hiddle 2.6w 2.6w 5.2w 95w 14w 57w Upper Middle 2.5w 2.2w 4.2w 62w 6w 65w

Source: World Development Report, 1983. The World Bank, Tables 19, 20 and 23.

w - weighted. -84-

The high growth rates of the central/east African area result

from the fact that fertility rates tend to be higher here than else-

where while mortality rates tend to be lower as shown in columns 3, 4, 5 I i and 6 of Table 3z. The total fertility rates which represent the number

of children a woman would have during the course of her reproductive

life if age specific fertility rates were to be maintained was seven or

more in seven countries in SSA and was eight or more in Zimbabwe, Kenya

and Rwanda. Rates under six children per woman were only observed for

Chad, Central African Republic, Cameroon and Lesotho. In the first

three, the low rates are due to sub-fecundity from disease-induced re-

productive impairments. This is a problem throughout large areas of

Central Africa, including Gabon. In these areas as health has improved

fertility has risen and can be expected to continue to rise. -For

example, in Cameroon it appears that TFR.'s increased ,froa about 5 in

1960-64 to about 6.5 in 1975-79.

The higb fertility of SSA exceeds that of Asia and Latin Amer- ica substantially where TFR's rarely exceed 6.5 and where TFR's around

5 are quite common. Outside SSA, only in the Middle East does. one ob- serve TFR's of 7 or more (Yemen PDR, Iraq, Algeria, Libya, Saudi Arabia, Jordan, Syria).

The very high fertility in SSA and the fact that it has been in-cf.:asing or constant raises serious questioans about the prospects for fertility decline in the near future. This issue #ll be addressed later in the paper.

Not only is fertility quite high in SSA; so is mortality. The

1981 WUrld Bank Report estimated life expectancy in SSA as 47 years com- pared with 57 in the -average low income country and 61 years in the mid- dle income countries. This high mortality arises from high infant mor- - 85 - tality and an abnormally high child mortality rates which are over twice as high in SSA than in other low income countrles.

The mortality varies substantially across countries in SSA.

"'Mortality has been generally considerably more severe in western than in eastern Africa with a rather consistent gradient across the continent

from northwest to southeast; the highest levels are recorded in West and

Sahel Africa1 the next highest in Central Africa, lower still in East

Africa and lowest of all in Southern Africa." - (Hill and Isiugo-Aban-

ihe, 1983, p, 44). The high mortality of West Africa and the pattern of abnormally high child mortality relative to infant mortality needs con- siderable research if programs are to be designed which can address the serious concerns of SSA countries for high mortality.

While there has been considerable mortality decline in SSA in the last 20 years, the rate of increase in life expectancy and percent- age decline in child death rates does not appear to be as great as in other low income countries. The 1981 'World Bank report on SSA estimates life expectancy increase from 39 years to 47 years from 1960 to 1979 or by 8 years while in the average low income country it increased by 15 years from 42 to 57 years.

These characteristics of accelerating population growth have important implications for economic growth which will be addressed in the next section. - 86 -

The Economic Demography of Sub-Saharan Africa

As mentioned earlier in this paper, the slowing economic

growth of GDP and the accelerating growth of population in Sub-Saharan

Africa resulted in very disappointing increases in GDP per- capita in the

period 1970-81. While GDP growth was less than population growth in

only 5 of 30 SSA countries in the 1960-70 period it fell short in 12 of

those countries in the 1970-81 period. While it is difficult to esti- mate the net impact of population growth on per capita income through both its effects on output or the numerator as well as on the denomina- tor, the effect of accelerating growth on economic development appears to have been a mixed blessing at best. It is possible to identify some of the ways that population growth has slowed the. rate of increase in per capita income.

First, rapid population growth lowers the proportion of work- ing age, increases the costs of meeting primary education and other basic needs objectives, thereby probably reducing the rate of growth of investment. Increased rates of investment would be required, however, to cover rapid increases in the labor force. Therefore, capital/labor. ratios would tend to increase more slowly than otherwise, slowinig the rate of growth of output per worker, reducing the rate of growth of in- come per capita.

The proportion of the population of working age (1960 and

1981), the rate of growth of t:he labor force (1960-70 and 1970-81) are given in Table 12. The proportion of working age in SSA was reported to be 52 percent in 1981 (World Bank, 1981) while that of the average low income country was 58 percent. The rates of labor force growth for

1960-70 and 1970-81 were 2.0 and 2.1 percent, respectively, in SSA com- - 87 -

Table 12: Population of Working Age Labor Force Growth and-Investment 1960 to 1981

Proportion of the Population Gross Domestic Working Age Labor Force Growth Investment 1960 1981 1960-70 1970-81 1980-2000 1960 1981

Chad 57 54 1.5 1.8 2.5 11 Ethiopia 53 53 2.0 1.6 3.0 12 10* Mali 54 51 2.1 2.0 3,0 14 16 Malawi 52 50 2.4 2.5 3.2 10 22 Zaire 53 52 1.4* 2.3 3.1 12 33

Uganda 54 52 2.6* 2.1* 3.6 11 3* Burundi 55 53 1.2* 1.5 2.8 6 19 Upper Volta 54 52 1.6* 1.5 2.8 10 16 Rwanda 53 52 2.2* 3.2 3.4 6 23 Somalia 54 54 2a1* 3.0 2.0 10 -

Tanzania 54 51 2.1 2.7 3.4 14 22 Guinea 55 53 2.5 2.2* 2.6 11 Benin 53 51 2.1 2.1 2.9 15 35 Central African Republic 58 55 1.4 1.7* 2.1 20 9* Sierra Leone 55 53 1.5 1.9 2.8 - 13

Madagascar 55 53 1.7 2.1 3.0 11 15 Niger 53 51 3.0* 3.0 3.4 13 27 Mozambique 56 53 1.8 3.3 3.1 - - Sudan 53 53 2.0E 2.7* 3.1 12 13 Togo 53 51 - 2.5* 1.7 3.1 11 31

Ghauia 53., 51 1.6 2.3* 3.9 24 6* Kenya 50 47 2.7 3.2 4.2 20 25 Senegal ... 54 52 17 2.0 2.6 16 17 Mauritania 53 51 1.9 2.0 2.5 38 38 Liberia 52 51 2.4 3.1* 3.5 Z8 18*

Lesotho 57 55 1.6* 1.9 2.8 2 21 Zambia 53 50 2.1 2.3 3.2 25 23* Angola 55 53 1.6 2.0 2.9 -

Nigeria 52 50 - 1.8 1.7 3.5 13 29 Zimbabwe 52 50 2.7 2.5 4.5 23 22*

Cameroon 57 54 1.3 1.5 2.8 - 21 Congo 56 53 1.8 2.1 3.7 45 32* Ivory Coast 54 53 3.6 4.3 2.9 15 27

Low Income 55w 59w 1.7w 1.9w 2.Ow 19w 24w China and India 56w 60w 1.7w 1.9w 1.8w 21w 26w Other Low 54w 54w 1.8w 2.3w 3.0w 12w 14w

Lower Middle 54w 55w 1.9w 2.5w 2.8w 15w 25w Upper Mtiddle 55w 57w 2.3w 2.Ow 2.6w 22w 25w

Source: World Development Report, 1983. The World Bsnk. Tables 5 and 21.

w - weighted. - 88 -

pared with 1.6 and 1.9 percent for the average low income country. The

1981 SSA report cites average rates of domestic investment of 15 and 23 percent for 1960 and 1981 respectively compared with 18 and 26 percent for the average low income country.

This somewhat fas ter labor force growth and lower levels of domestic investment in SSA relative to other low iacome countries may explain at least in part the slower economic growth. Correlation anal- ysis shows that the rate of growth of per capita income was not signifi- cantly associated with the level of investment relative to the rate of growth of labor force in the 1960 to 1970 period. This lack of rela- tionship persists when one controls for movements in the terms of trade over the period..

In the later period, however, the lower the level of invest- ment relative to the growth of the labor force the' slower the growth of income per capita and this effect persists when the movement in terms of trade is controlled. The effect of rapid labor force growth during the period 1970-81 in reducing the rate of development was somewhat mtore important than the deterioration in the terms of trade. 1/ Other fac- tors are clearly important as well but these two alone explain 30 per- cent of the variation in growth of per capita income.

While this analysis is fairly simple it does help address those in SSA who tend to blame the worsening economic performance on ex- ternal terms of trade rather than internal population growth. Both ap- pear to have been significant in recent years and not in earlier per- iods * This reality may explain why governments in SSA. are begirnning to

1/ The regression equation estimated for 26 countries over 1 million in S.S.A. GDP growth per capita - 0.41 + .06 (2.21) Investment/Labor Force Growth + .05 (2.05) Growth of Terms of Trade (t values in parenthesis). - 89 -

concerned with "the population problem" in recent years. In the next

section the most recent prceptioas of governments and researchers on the effect of rapid population growth in SSA will be brief reviewed to summarize how the situation has changed since the early 1970's.

Current Perceptions of Developmental Consequences of Population Growth

in Sub-Saharan Africa

The vision of the potential for absorbing large population increases combined with concern for the short-term negative effects of

.rapid population growth has been well summarized by a major African

leader.

"President Julius Nyerere gave his views on population problems in his address outlining Tanzania's Five-Year Plan. Speaking of the cardinal role of education in the process of economic and social development in Tanzania, he said:

'I should like to say this to you: It is excellent that our population is growing, for our country is large and vast areas of it are uncultiva- ted. But we must remember tha't these additional 350,000 persons each year will be babies, not workers. They wili have to be fed, clothed, given medical care, sent to school and provided with many other serv.ces before they are able to contribute to the country's development t2hfgh their work. This is right and proper and in accordance with the pre- cepts of the Arusha Statement. But it is obvious that the more the num- ber of our children increases . . ., the greater is the burden on the adults, on the workers. Giving birth is something common to man and animal, but bringing up children and in particular educating them over many years is a unique gift of man, and a great re3ponsibility. That is why it is important for human beings to focus- more on the education of their children and how to take care of them, than on their number and on the capacity to give birth. For it is often the case that the capacity to procreate is greater than the ability to bring the children up prop- erly . . .' -- (Cited in Cond&,, 1973, p. 235.)

This perspective of balancing the short versus the long-term consequences implies that a slowing of population growth might be desirable. The slow-down in economic growth, poor agricultural performance and increasing food imports, along with analysis of population consequences for education and empoyment have undoubtedly s contributed to a shift in policy perspectives. Since 1974, a number of - 90 -

Sub-Saharan countries have adopted positions recognizing that fertility and population growth are too high. Specifically, Cameroon, Liberia and

Senegal in West Africa have adopted this position, as have Lesotho,

Rwanda and Swaziland. (See Table 13.)

Concern for the importance of population growth in development planning has become so widely accepted that the 1980 Lagos Plan of

Action of the OAU adopted the following resolution:

-348. Appropriate machinery should be established where necessary to ensure greater integration of population variable in development plan- ning, bearing in mind the expected doubling of African population be- tween 1975 and 2000 and the impact of this on economic planning and development.

349. Member States should attach more importance to analysis of rele- vant demographic data from both the 1970 and 1980 rounds of censuses and other demographic surveys.

350. Nationals must be trained to undertake the collection and analysis of demographic data. In this regard support should be given to the existing training centres.' -- (OAU, 1980, 147.)

A much more comprehensive set of -onclusions and recommenda- tions was included in the report of the Inter-Parliamentary Union'-s Con- ference on Population and Development in Africa. - (Nairobi, July,

1981.) This statement recognized that:

(a) the right of couples and individuals to obtain information and have access to ways and means of responsible parenthood. -

(b) "Africa is a continent of vast potentials which are still untapped. Natural resources are plentiful and the real obstacles to their exploitation for a development strategy are economic, technological, socio-political, demographic and institutional. Governments should therefore pay more attention to plans and programs aimed at removing these obstacles.'

(c) 'It is imperative that everything be done to reduce the high rate of urbanization in view of the intractable problems cre- ated by the influx of people into the larger cities;" Table 13. SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA POLICY PROFILE

Global Polil Profile Sub-Saharan Latin America Went Africa East Africa Africa Caribbean Asia/Pacific Hiddlo East Governsent Policy (24 countrieo) (21 countrieaS (45 eountriea) (25 countrPic) (25 countries) (2 dountrieas Oovornerent Perception of the Population Growth Rate - too low 5 (21%) 0 - satisfactory 15 (63%) 11 (521) 5 (IIX) 5 (20Z) 2( 82) 8 (40%) - too high 4 (17%) 10 (48%) 26 (58X) 9 (36%) 7 (282) 7 (35%) Government Perception of the 14 (31%) 11(4%) 16 (64%) 5 (25X) Fertility Level - too low 6 (25%) 0 - acceptable j2.(50%) 9 (431) 6 (13%) 4 (16%) 3 (12%) 4 (20%) - too high (25%) 12 (57X) 20 (44Z) 11 (44%) 5 (20z) 9 (45%) - not kno - -9 (42Z) 10(40%) 15 (60%) 7 (35%) - ~ 25 (60Z) 7- 5Z Government Policy to Influence Fertility 7 1% (8)3 2)5 2% - to maintain 6 (25%) 2 (10%) ? (16%) 7 (28Z) t4 (512) 4 (205) - to reduce 2 ( 82) 7 (33%) 4 ( 9Z) 4 (16%) 3 (12%) 3 415%) - to ruia 4 (17%) 0 24 (53%) 12 (481) 4 (16%) B (40g) - no intervention 12 (50%) 12 (57%) - - 1 (4%) - not known - -

Government Position on Contraceptive Services 7(16%) - interest 5 (21%) 2 (10%) 7 (162) 8 (32%) 1 42) - aome aupport 5 (212) 2 (102) 21 (47Z)- 14 (56%) 18 (722) 4 -active euppot 6 (252,2) 5(11%) 9 no support 5 (21%) 0 4 ( 91) 0 1 (I4%) (251) - restrictions 3 (122) 1 (5%) 1 ° (12%) :. (10%) -not known 0 1 (52) 8%)

Government Reason for Permitting Family Planning 29 (64%) 25 (60%) 4 (16%) 12 (60%) - maternal/child hcalth 17 (71%) 12 (57%) 2 (11Z) 3 (12) 14 (56%) 4 (20%) - deLmographic 0 5 (24%) 5 (11%) 6 (242) 2 ( 8%) 0 - combination 2 (08%) 3 (14%) 6 (13) 1( 42) 5 (20%) 4 (201) - no policy or unknown 5 f21%) i ( 5%)

Source: International Planned Parenthood Federation "People" Vallchmrt published with Vol. 9, Ho. 3, July 1982. - 92 -

(d) family health is dependent on a whole range of programs and actions of which health activ-ities should form a part, Comphrehensive people-oriented development programmes; in the planning and execution of which the population concerned should play a full part as partners, are necessary for laying the foundations for a family health program . . . Family health which is basically concerned with human fertility, reproduction and growth and development addresses a variety of problems, the most important of which are high fertility, maternal age, the number 6f children at each stage of maternity and birth spacing, as well as high infant and young child mortality related to the above mentioned causes and to malnutrition, to poor environmental sanitation and communicable diseases."

Thus, while positions differ between countries in.Sub-Saharan Africa, there

is now fairly wide recogition of the need to include population growth in

the development planning process and recognition of the problems to be

faced by African countries in coping with the very high rates of population

growth and particularly urbanization.

There also exists considerable acceptance of the provision of

family planning for reasons of maternal and child health. There is less

certainty of the wisdom or potential for policies to reduce fertili ty

through family planning programs. Therefore, to help the leaders of SSA, it is necessary to better understand the problems of coping with population growth in SSA and beyond coping, of raising incaes under conditions of

rapid, inevitable rates -of population growth in the near.future-. To slow population growth, it is necessary to Lmderstand the factors which keep

fertility high in SSA. and the potential demand among houseiolds for limiting their fertility or spacing their children. Finally, it is

:necessary to learn how to design policies and programs in SSA to accelerate the transition from high mortality and fertility to low mortality ard fertility. - 93 -

Conclusion

While the above analysis is very sketchy it does indicate the

thinking to-date on coping with population growth in the provision of education and employment and food in Sub-Saharan Africa and the sustain-

ed increase in per capita income. While the early focus of the work was on the provision of education and jobs, there has come to be increasing

recognition of the seriousness of rural development for coping with pop- ulation growth in SSA. The optimism concerning land surptus and vast

potential for labor absorption in agriculture has dwindled, and the

stark reality of growing food imports has given rise to increasing concern in SSA.

The recent report on "ECA and Africa s Development, 1983 to

2008" has stated that "Africa's food situation is by now the single most

critical area of concern in the region." - (ECA, 1983, p. 8.) It goes on to state: "The disappointing performance in agriculture and food production must be judged against the fact that Africa's potential

arable land is estimated at about 1.7 hectares for each African person,

while only about 0.55 hectares per person is being utilized at present.

Thus, the causes of the food crisis, besides the exogenous problems of drought and desertification, are to be found in the fact that Africa's

agriculture has suffered from low productivity rates, especially per unit of land, inadequate investment outlays in ag7iculture, poor incen-

tives to farmers, fragmentation and subdivision of holdings, inadequate land tenure systems, limited agricultural research, rural-urban migra-

tion and institutional constraints." -- (ECA, 1983, p. 9.) - 94 -

While the increasing food crisis has not been attributed to population growth in a fundamental sense, it should be increasingly recognized in SSA that the capacity to cope with that growth is much more limited than anticipated. Another factor creating pess4.mism is the poor performance of the AIfrican economies in general in the 1970's. To an extent, this has arisen from poor performaace of primary exports due to the world depres- sion. Again, the implications of such poor performance is that the vast reserves of natural resources in the form of minerals does not necessarily provide the hoped for cushion for population growth.

Therefore, while the evidence reviewed above oa the consequences of population growth in SSA is not definitive, coping with population growth is much more difficult in light of the reality of deterioratirg economic prospectd and particularly poor agricultural performnce and this is being recognized by leaders throughout Sub-Saharan Africa. 95 - Bibliography

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Highlights of the Statements of Policy Made by Government Delegations to the World Population Conference

AFRICA REGION

Rwanda. The Secretary General of Public Health and Social Affairs, Mr. Michel Mtwetende Placide, argued that population problems were not the cause of underdevelopment. Some countries were developed although they had a large population while others were poor and had few people. Under- development could be explained by the fact that the poor countries provided raw material to the industrialized states, the result of a deterioration of the terms of exchange and of ill-conceived assistance. But family planning could be justified within the context of socio-economic development.

Guinea. Mr. Damantang Camara argued that Africa needed mre people. The continent remained under-populated, technically ill-equiped to raise production. A lowering of the birth rate would lead to disaster. Sustained action was needed to lower mortality rates and to raise birth rates to give Africa a youthful and lively population ready to develop the continent, which was so rich and had for so long been in subj ugation.

Ghana. The Commissioner for Economic Planning, Lieutenant Colonel R.J.A. Felli, said the implications for high growth rates in Africa were very serious and some countries were witnessing deleterious effects with regard to food, health, education, housing and em,ployment. Thie population of Ghana had tripled in the last 40 years and setbacks in development efforts were due in part to this rapid growth rate. Ghana had adopted a population policy in 1969 and the family planning programme had had a tremendous impact, with substantial annual increases in the numbers of acceptors.

Zambia. The Minister of Labour and Social Services, Mr. H.D. Banda, said that while his government had allowed a voluntary family planning association to develop, it would be highly erroneous to jump to.the conclusion that Zambia-s ecbnomic failures were due to rapid population increase.

Chad. The delegate, Guelina Amane, said family traditions and polygamy had made birth control difficult in Chad. With a population density of two to three persons per square kilometre and virgin islands to be developed, Chad was not at present contemplating a reduction in its population. Situated in the Sahelian zone and threatened with famine, Chad wished rather to benefit from international assistance in order to modernise its means of production and to solve its water problem.

Nigeria. The Federal Commissioner for Economic Development and Reconstruction, Mr. Adebayo Adedeji, said undue emphasis had been put on population control. It was lack of economic growth which created to so-called population problem. There should be a new world economic order. Nigeria's economy had picked up a strong upward path, and with an assumed rate of population growth of 2.5 per cent, it was clear for the foreseeable future that Nigeria could sustain a satisfactory way of life for its citizens. Appendix A Page 2 of 2

Mauritania. The delegate, Mohammed Elmokatar Zamel, said Mauritania had not yet taken a complete census. He believed population policies were exclusively a matter of national sovereigaty and decisions about family size were the responsibility of the individual.

Congo. The Minister of State and Social Affairs, Dr. Alphonse Empana, said there had been a rural exodus to the cities at an alarming rate. It was necessary to accelerate economic and social development in the rural areas. He said the Congo had a population of 1,310,500 and a density of 3.8 persons per square kilometre.

Mauritius. As a result of the family planning programre., the population growth rate of Mauritius had been reduced from 3 per cent in 1960 to 1.5 per cent in 1973. Mr. Keharsingh Jagatsingh said that among the factors .for success had been the full support of the government, a high literacy rate, effective use of communications and the widespread provision of family planning services. Mauritius was grateful for the support it had received from the IPPF, from UNFPA and other international agencies.

Mali. Mr. Faran Samake said Mali rejected any Malthusian approach to population. For the moment it preferred to keep its rate of population growth and concentrate first on reducing maternal and child mortality. It must also fight malnutrition.

Tanzania. Mr. D.N.M. Mloka said any population policy must be based on a concrete realization of the present world socio-economic situation. People were a development asset, By decreasing population countries might succeed only in distribuiting their poverty among less and less people.

Botswana. Mr. Phineas P. Makepe said family planning belonged in the maternal and child health services and must not impose an undue burden on those services. His government believed that social, economic, political and cultural conditions were far more important in determining family size than availability of free contraceptives.

Kenya. Describing earlier family planning efforts as 'ad hoc', Mr. James Mbogo Gekonyo said there was now a national programme with a target to reduce population- growth from 3.3 per cent this year to 3.05 per cent in. 1978. From next year Kenya would be a regular contributor to the UNFPA.

Niger. Mir. Jean Poisson said special efforts were being directed to improving health facilities, but Niger was not concerned with problems of family planning because it needed strong hands to build the nation. The country's economic future depended o-n manpower. He complained that it was easier to get international aid for family planning than to get help for well-digging in periods of drought.

Senegal. The government could not take up a birth control policy at present. Africa muist choose development today and perhaps -the pill' tomorrow.