Harvey Klehr, John E. Haynes, Fridrikh I. Firsov, eds.. The Secret World of American Communism. New Haven, Conn. and London: Yale University Press, 1995. xxxii + 348 pp. $25.00, cloth, ISBN 978-0-300-06183-3.

Reviewed by Michael J. Carley

Published on H- (June, 1995)

The American editors and their Russian col‐ is to show that the revisionist school is wrong in laborator set out in this book to describe the histo‐ all its main lines, and that American "communists' ry of the 's relationship duplicity poisoned normal political relationships with the of the and contributed to the harshness of the (CPUSA), based on a selection of documents anti)communist reaction of the late 1940s and drawn from the large holdings of the Comintern 1950s" (p. 106). archives in . The editors contend that the The editors appear determined to deal a mor‐ CPUSA was subservient to the Comintern; re‐ tal blow to the revisionist school, so determined ceived large subsidies from the Soviet govern‐ in fact that they do not address what it seems to ment; and closely cooperated through its secret this reviewer are important questions concerning apparatus with Soviet government intelligence the Comintern and its relations not only with oth‐ services. The editors also place their fndings er national communist parties, but with the Com‐ within the orthodox and revisionist historiogra‐ munist party of the (CPSU) and the phy of the CPUSA. The former school (including Soviet government. In the 1920s British, French, and editors Klehr and Haynes) and American diplomats assumed that national believes "that the CPUSA was never an indepen‐ communist parties were mere creatures of the dent American political party but a creature given Comintern, which was an instrument of the Soviet life and meaning by its umbilical ties to the Soviet government controlled by the CPSU. Was it all so Union" (p. 17). The revisionist school (including simple? What control did the CPSU Politburo exer‐ , Mark Naison, Ellen W. cise over the Comintern at various points during Schrecker), "holds that the American Communist the interwar years? Narkomindel ofcials (from movement was a normal, albeit radical, political the commissariat for foreign afairs) often told participant in American democracy... with its western diplomats that the Soviet government roots in America's democratic, populist, and revo‐ could not always control the Comintern, and that lutionary past" (pp. 17-18). The editors' objective H-Net Reviews

Narkomindel certainly could not. Was this true? rubles did have during the civil war period, was G. V. Chicherin, M. M. Litvinov, and L. B. Krasin caused by Allied representatives buying them to were incensed by Comintern activities which in‐ subsidize anti-Bolshevik activities--incidentally, to terfered with their objectives of establishing busi‐ the great annoyance of the French government, ness-like relations with the West and of obtaining which wanted to destroy the ruble's value without long, cheap credit to rebuild and develop the Sovi‐ delay. Rubles, especially Soviet rubles, had no for‐ et economy. How important were the conficts eign exchange value in January 1920, for exam‐ which developed within the CPSU and within the ple, when the ledger sheet shows that American Soviet government about the Comintern's impact journalist, , received 1,008,000 rubles. A on Soviet foreign relations? What consequences seemingly large sum, one might think, but which did these "bureaucratic politics" have on the Com‐ would have bought very little in Soviet Russia and intern and its relations with foreign communist nothing at all abroad. When Reed tried unsuccess‐ parties? fully to leave Soviet Russia in February 1920, The editors' apparent determination to down Finnish authorities stopped him with "$1,500 in the revisionists leads them to push their evidence various currencies and 102 diamonds estimated rather further than would seem warranted by the to be worth $14,000, a small fortune in 1920," say documents they have published. This may sur‐ the editors--and a great deal more than a million prise, since one might have expected the vast worthless rubles. The editors calculate, neverthe‐ Comintern archives to have given up more in‐ less, that the Comintern gave American commu‐ criminating evidence. Yale University Press, in its nists several million dollars in valuables, based on sensational press release of 10 April 1995, claims a future theoretical exchange rate projected back nevertheless that the editors have bagged the Bol‐ to 1920 where it had no meaning (p. 24). But even shie bear. But have they? if the editors' calculations are correct, Reed tried to leave Soviet Russia with only $15,500. What Consider a few examples. In order to show happened to the rest of the money and how was it the extent of Comintern subsidies to foreign com‐ sent to the United States since Reed died later in munist parties, the editors reproduce a ledger the year without returning to the United States? sheet showing payments in 1919-20 to various in‐ dividuals, denominated in Russian rubles or in The editors stress the importance of Com‐ foreign currencies. Those amounts listed in intern subsidies to the CPUSA, for example, rubles, say the editors, are given in "...'value,' indi‐ $75,000 in 1923 (p. 25). Not a huge sum even by cating jewels, gold, or other valuables rather than the standards of the 1920s for a country as large currency" (p. 22), though in the document there is and prosperous as the United States. But most no proof of this supposition. The editors do not in‐ Comintern subsidies and CPUSA expenditures dicate what the Russian word is, which they have mentioned in the editors' documents are three or translated as "value," if "valiuta," the English four fgure sums. The fnancial statement of the translation is foreign currency or medium of ex‐ "Brother-Son" clandestine network for 1942 shows change. But whatever the Russian word, "value" total expenditures of $11,311, a beginning balance does not mean or suggest valuable in the sense of $30,145, and no income. More than half the ex‐ meant by the editors. penditures are in three fgures (pp. 211-12). In 1932 a CPUSA ofcial complained "... it is annoy‐ During the intervention period the Allied ing to expect funds and not get them, because al‐ powers blockaded Soviet Russia and sought to de‐ tho (sic) we are stretching out what we had, lack stroy the value of the many types of circulating of assurance of any more prevents us progressing paper rubles. What foreign exchange value these

2 H-Net Reviews with the work in any way that will involve ex‐ chives. Note also that when American security pense" (p. 51). agencies obtain documents or ciphers, by clandes‐ The editors also stress the importance of tine means, from the Soviet government during CPUSA secrecy and clandestine work. Once again the second world war, the editors ofer no nega‐ the documents in the collection suggest that the tive comments (p. 237). Undoubtedly it is a case of secrecy was as amateurish as the sums expended "deux poids, deux mesures". to support it were modest. Not the three stooges The editors characterize CPUSA head Earl by any means, but not the nefarious, pervasive Browder as an "NKVD Talent Spotter", on the ba‐ operations either, which the editors seek to por‐ sis of a single document in which Browder report‐ tray. In 1925 a CPUSA document complains of a ed to the Comintern in 1940 that French Third Re‐ "careless method of sending mail" (p. 33); in 1932, public politician Pierre Cot wanted to work for a of mail being sent to the wrong comrade (p. 51); in Franco)Soviet alliance. A Soviet defector has al‐ 1939, of poor safeguarding of documents (p. 101). leged that Cot was a Soviet "agent"; his family has And contact with the Comintern was so clandes‐ asked for a formal inquiry to prove Cot's inno‐ tine that CPUSA ofcials complained (e.g., in 1932 cence. The editors, however, appear to assume & 1942) about not hearing from it (pp. 51, 209). In that Cot was a Soviet agent, though other French 1939 a top CPUSA ofcial could not recall all the cabinet ministers, for example, Georges Mandel names of the members of Central Control Com‐ and , were strong advocates of a mission (p. 100). Another document dated 1939 re‐ Franco-Soviet alliance, and sometimes went to see ports that "Party work at Ford companies is badly the Soviet ambassador in Paris in the late 1930s organized" (p. 102). with information or to complain about the poli‐ The documents present a problem in that cies of their government. re‐ they often do not permit defnite conclusions, so bufed Cot in 1940, when he ofered his services to that the editors are compelled to use such quali‐ the Free French; he was "an embarrassment" be‐ fers as the evidence "suggests" (pp. 109, 231, 247, cause, the editors imply he was tainted by over- 294, 295), "most likely" (pp. 59, 103), "probably" enthusiasm for the USSR. To support this point, (pp. 60, 64, 104, 109, 231), "possibly" (p. 104), " may the editors cite Jean Lacouture's biography of de be" (pp. 126, 132, 294). At one point the editors Gaulle (pp. 233-7). But Lacouture notes that de speak of the "evidentiary weight" of their docu‐ Gaulle rejected Cot because of his ties with the ments (p. 105), but the editors' use of language rotten Third Republic, not the USSR, and that a suggests the weight of the evidence is rather light. year later de Gaulle wrote to Cot to praise his con‐ duct as a "bon Francais" (Lacouture, De Gaulle: Le Even so, some of the editors' most defnite Rebelle_, 1890-1944, [Paris, 1984], p. 409). conclusions concerning the "integral links" and treasonable activities of the CPUSA with the CPSU The editors also say that Browder "was suf‐ and Soviet intelligence agencies (p. 205) are not ciently intimate with the NKVD to ask that his well supported by their evidence. For example, wife's birth certifcate (she was born in Russia) be seventeen CPUSA members were also members of sent to him through Soviet intelligence chan‐ the CPSU, these seventeen become "many" mem‐ nels..." (p. 233). From this bit of evidence and the bers, by the editors' reckoning (p. 202). The edi‐ fact that his wife and his wife's sister worked or tors publish two documents "pilfered", say the ed‐ had worked for Soviet agencies, the editors con‐ itors, from the State Department by a communist clude (guilt by association one supposes) that "thief" (pp. 110, 218). Pilfered Soviet documents Browder "had direct ties with the NKVD" (p. 249), are a penny a piece in British and French ar‐ though later they note that the NKVD provided a

3 H-Net Reviews channel of communications for the Comintern 1949 destroyed the monopoly which the United during world war II because of war)time disrup‐ States government hoped to retain for 10 to 20 tions (p. 293). years and destroyed the American "sense of physi‐ Finally, there is the case of Soviet intelligence cal security". The United States would henceforth operations to obtain American nuclear secrets have to face the danger of "serious civilian deaths during the second world war, in which the CPUSA or destruction" (p. 225) ) just like Europe & the clandestine network was directly involved, assert USSR, the editors might have added. Once again it the editors. The editors focus their attention on appears a case of "deux poids, deux mesures". one , code-name Louis, who worked However, the editors do not stop there, they go in the CPUSA clandestine network. They produce on: "Had the American nuclear monopoly lasted an undated document, apparently written in early longer, Stalin might have refused to allow North 1943 since it was a summary of 1942 activities, Korean Communists to launch the , or which referred to Louis' clandestine work. The the Chinese Communists might have hesitated to document strongly implies that Louis was not in intervene in the war... (p. 226)." The editors do not the United States in 1942 and that in any event produce a scrap of evidence to support such as‐ communications with him were "extremely dif‐ sertions. cult" and that the network did not know what he The gap between the editors' evidence and was doing (pp. 209-10). However, in 1991 a Soviet the editors' conclusions is wide. Nor are the above intelligence ofcer claimed that in 1942 Louis, examples mere exceptions, numerous but not sys‐ Morris Cohen, recruited for Soviet intelligence a tematic, in the editors' work. On the contrary, in physicist who was working on the development of virtually every section of this book the attentive the atomic bomb. Were there thus two agents reader will fnd such gaps. These technical faws named Louis or Morris Cohen; if there was one are serious, the result perhaps of the editors' de‐ agent, could he have been in two places at the sire to down the revisionists, once and for all. If same time; or did he recruit the American physi‐ the editors' main objective was to bag the bear, cist for Soviet intelligence and then go abroad? the reader may want to wonder about the reliabil‐ Further, did the Soviet intelligence ofcer make a ity of their research methodology. mistake about the date, or did Soviet intelligence "Mind the gap," warns the piped recording in ofcers contact Louis, as an individual, outside the London Underground to exiting passengers. the CPUSA network since he had difcult commu‐ Readers! Mind the gap also! The evidence ad‐ nications with it? The editors observe that Soviet duced in this book suggests, contrary to the edi‐ intelligence organizations wanted their agents to tors' view, that the CPUSA was a relatively small sever communist party ties (p. 293). organization, largely made up of amateurs, work‐ Unfortunately, the editors do not address ing with small fnancial and other resources and these questions, though they claim "that the having at times inadequate or sporadic communi‐ CPUSA's own covert arm was an integral part of cations with the Comintern and indeed between Soviet atomic " (p. 226). The editors' evi‐ its various elements. While the CPUSA may well dence fails to support such a sweeping statement. have had close working ties with Soviet intelli‐ This "evidentiary" problem does not prevent the gence agencies, the evidence produced by the edi‐ editors' from asserting that CPUSA involvement in tors fail to show it. This is not to say, by the way, Soviet atomic espionage "undermine[d] the Amer‐ that the CPUSA did not have an important infu‐ ican political process" (p. 218). They say further ence on the American labour and black civil that the Soviet explosion of an atomic bomb in rights movements. On the contrary, this infuence

4 H-Net Reviews seems the more impressive in view of the CPUSA's that the term on the accounting sheet indicates relatively small membership and limited re‐ valuables: gold and jewels, and refect hard cur‐ sources. rency values. They have all seen the document in RESPONSE BY John E. Haynes original. Professor Carley says they are all wrong. It is Carley who is wrong. In reviewing our book, The Secret World of Professor Carley does not seem to know the American Communism, M. J. Carley makes so value of money. He dismisses a 1923 Soviet pay‐ many misstatements of fact and omits so many ment of $75,000 to the CPUSA as insignifcant. In details that contradict his assertions that it would 1923 $1,000 was a annual salary that would have take a small book to respond to every silly asser‐ been welcomed by many American workers. Thus tion but here are a few rejoinders to some of his this single payment would have taken care of the more egregious errors and distortions. full-time annual salaries of roughly seventy -fve CPUSA organizers and ofcials, hardly insignif‐ Carley states that we have mistranslated a cant. Carley claims that we suggest that Soviet Comintern accounting sheet showing subsidies to trade revenue fnanced Comintern activities and the American Communist Party through John even gives page numbers for where we did this. Reed and other of several million rubles of "val‐ We never wrote anything even resembling this ue" in gold and jewels. According to him the sheet and on checking the pages on which he claimed shows only a payment of worthless paper rubles. we made this suggestion we can fnd nothing sup‐ The frst thing to note is that we have seen the porting his bizarre assertion. Carley also seems original document in Russian and know what we unaware of already published documents about are talking about. Carley has not seen it and, liter‐ the size of Soviet subsidies to the CPUSA. We refer ally, does not know what he is talking about. To be him to our "'," Confrmed at Last?" fair, we may be capable of making mistakes in (Labor History 33,2 and 33,4, Spring and Fall translating from the Russian, but our co-author, 1992) which reproduced documents showing se‐ Fridrikh Igorevich Firsov, is not. We suspect Pro‐ cret Soviet subsides to the CPUSA continuing into fessor Firsov's knowledge of Russian is a match the 1980s with payments in that decade averaging for that Professor Carley's. Firsov's knowledge of $2 million a year until 1989. the language used in Comintern documents, honed by his decades of research as a Russian his‐ Carley says we make too much of a document torian of the Comintern and scholarly supervisor showing that 's "wife's sister" of the Comintern's archives, gives us confdence worked for what Carley calls "the Soviet govern‐ that our translation is accurate. Further, as we ment." Browder did have a sister-in-law but we noted in the book, Rudolf Pikhoia, chairman of don't discuss her. We presume that Carley has the Committee on Archival Afairs of the Russian confused the sister-in-law with Margaret Brow‐ Federation and the overall supervisor of all Rus‐ der, the person discussed in two documents, who sian archives, put the value the subsidy delivered is clearly and repeatedly identifed as Earl Brow‐ to Reed at $1.5 million. The senior Russian histori‐ der's own sister (Earl actually recruited her to the an Dmitri Volkogonov, who cites this document, Communist movement). And what she worked estimated the value of the subsidy given to Reed for, what Carley euphemistically calls "the Rus‐ at more than $1 million U.S. in his own book on sian government," was the foreign intelligence Lenin. Translators at the Yale University Press branch of the NKVD. We reproduce documents and translators at the Russian archive all agreed demonstrating that Browder asked that she be re‐

5 H-Net Reviews moved from that position -- not because he Browder, for Soviet instructions about the use of thought here was anything objectionable about CPUSA contacts in the OSS and OWI. Nor does he such activity -- but lest it embarrass him if it be‐ mention the documents demonstrating the con‐ came known. Its an embarrassment for Carley as tact between Soviet military intelligence and a well, thus his hiding the agency Margaret Brow‐ CPUSA network in Washington, DC, NKVD docu‐ der worked for behind a bland euphemism. ments checking for Comintern fles on Americans Carley equates the evidence we published of who are later identifed by defectors or by FBI the theft of State Department documents by a surveillance as Soviet spies, documents reporting CPUSA source with American intelligence decod‐ CPUSA manipulation of a U.S. government agen‐ ing Soviet cable trafc. Carley seems unable to un‐ cies in 1938, or the stolen OSS document we re‐ derstand that the point is not what Soviet or produce. Carley's efort to minimize or ignore co‐ American intelligence was doing; what those doc‐ operation between the CPUSA and Soviet intelli‐ uments show is the assistance provided by AMER‐ gence agencies will not work. We reproduce the ICAN Communists to Soviet intelligence. If there documents in our book. Readers who doubt our was some equivalent of the CPUSA --moles of the claims can read them for themselves. Democratic or Republican parties inside the Sovi‐ Carley's claim in his original post that Stalin et government -- aiding American intelligence we did not control the Comintern or his equally are not aware of it. bizarre theory that the Comintern was somehow Carley says the only evidence of Pierre Cot independent of CPSU and Soviet government con‐ having a covert relationship with the Soviets was trol, a loose cannon undermining Soviet foreign an allegation by a Soviet defector. As we stated in policy, are breathtaking assertions that can be ac‐ the book, in addition to the statement by a defect‐ cepted as plausible only by the truly naive or will‐ ing Soviet intelligence ofcer, Cot was identifed fully blind. by American and British decoding of wartime So‐ There are in the Comintern archive literally viet cable trafc as having been recruited by the thousands of pages of exchanges between the Soviets. In the book we reproduce Browder's mes‐ CPUSA and the Comintern: letters, cables, memo‐ sage informing the Soviets that Cot, then a newly randa, and reports. For most of the Comintern's arrived exile in the U.S., had met with Browder existence the CPUSA stationed a permanent repre‐ and "wants the leaders of the Soviet Union to sentative in Moscow whose sole duty was to act as know of his willingness to perform whatever mis‐ CPUSA liaison to the Comintern. And, there were sion we might choose." Carley, in the face of the Comintern representatives in the U.S. who regu‐ other evidence, wants readers to believe that the larly communicated directives and reports. As we Soviets rejected Cot's ofer. The evidence is other‐ noted in the book, the Comintern archive has wise. many thousands of pages of transcripts of the ver‐ Carley misunderstands the Louis/Morris Co‐ bal reports by American Communist leaders and hen matter but most egregious is his failing to their detailed cross -examination by ofcials of note that the report from the CPUSA's Brother-Son the Comintern's "Anglo-American Secretariat." network records the network's cooperation with There are innumerable instructions going to the Vasily Zubilin, the NKVD agent who supervised USA and numerous requests for instructions com‐ Soviet penetration of the . Car‐ ing to Moscow. In the face of all of this Carley's as‐ ley is equally silent about the cable we reproduce sertion that the CPUSA had "inadequate or spo‐ in which , then number two in the radic communications" with the Comintern is CPUSA hierarchy, asked on his behalf and that of ridiculous.

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At one point Carley berates us for being cau‐ Professor Carley does not seem to realize tious in our claims. We plead guilty to using what is happening with the opening of this ar‐ words like "probably," "suggest," "most likely," etc. chive. He can continue to insist that the earth is We do not lightly or quickly accuse people of be‐ fat and that if it were round we would all be fall‐ ing espionage agents; when the evidence requires ing of. But scholars no longer pay attention to the qualifcation, we qualify it -- nor do we, by the fat-earth people. We will be publishing two more way, accuse anyone of "treason" as Carley charges. volumes of documents. Even with that, we will There is no single smoking gun document in this have only picked a few of the interesting and in‐ book. It is the weight of all the documents and structive items of the mountain of material open their relationship with other known evidence that for research in Moscow. Others researchers are led us to our conclusions. Carley reminds us of the busy fnding more and in the years ahead these Holocaust deniers who confdently assert that be‐ will be published. These documents are devastat‐ cause there is no signed order from Hitler order‐ ing; they detail a mountain of criminality. Our ing the extermination of the the Holocaust it‐ book deals with one small part of the Communist self didn't happen or, like Carley's fantasy of the movement and demonstrates that the leadership Comintern as an autonomous agency independent of the American Communist party willingly coop‐ of Stalin, that the SS did it behind Hitler's back. erated with Soviet intelligence agencies. It de‐ Carley claims that in this book we have set scribes, in their own words, the creation by the out "to describe the history of the Communist In‐ CPUSA leadership of a "secret apparatus" that ternational's relationship with the Communist penetrated U.S. government agencies, worked Party of the United States." That badly misstates hand-in-glove with the KGB and GRU, helped fn‐ what the book is about. The Secret World of Amer‐ ger Soviet dissidents, and cooperated in Trotsky's ican Communism is about documents dealing assassination. Mr. Carley admires this outft when with the CPUSA's underground. That's why it has he's not making excuses for its behavior or insist‐ the title it has. The CPUSA-Comintern relationship ing on the moral equivalence of the U.S. and the will be developed in documents in the next vol‐ USSR. That's his privilege, but we urge readers of ume, and we make this clear in our book. Carley this list not to believe that his review bears any did not read our book with any care and missed resemblance to the contents of our book. this just as he missed much else. We note that he RESPONSE BY Mike Haynes, University of even has misidentifed the three authors as edi‐ Wolverhampton, tors. One of the reasons we and the Yale University May I be permitted a comment on the prob‐ Press choose to reproduce the entire texts of most lem of Moscow Gold? of the documents we used is so that readers could I have not yet had a chance to look at the con‐ make their own judgments. Professor Carley has tested discussion on American Communism but tried mightily to give a benign spin to several of we have had a similar debate in Britain over Mos‐ those we used. The human mind is a wondrous cow Gold and the British Communist Party so I thing, and some readers may be able to join him suspect that I am familiar with the outlines of the in this, but we think most readers will not be able debate. In this context the following thoughts oc‐ to perform such mental gymnastics for more than cur to me: a few documents. We confdently urge people to 1. Puzzlement? why is there so much obses‐ read the documents. sion in the US with using the collapse of the USSR to settle scores? So far as I can see most of the pro

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Soviet left certainly got it wrong but so too did the gold. And they were quite open about this. By right. Some certainly predicted the collapse of the chance I have just come across some notes from Soviet Union but then they did so continuously so the Second Comintern Congress of 1920 that when it did collapse their analysis was only 'Proletarian internationalism ... demands 1. proved correct in the way that the famous the subordination of the intertests of the proletar‐ stopped clock is right every once in a while. By far ian struggle in one country to the interests of the the biggest section of the right, however, was of struggle on a world scale; 2. that the nation which the view that the dictatorial character of the Sovi‐ achieves victory over the frst shall et system was so powerful that it could not col‐ display the capacity and readiness to make the lapse. So they were wrong too. greatest national sacrifces in order to overthrow 2. Who is occupying the moral high ground? If international capitalism'. we argue that the old system was the embodiment 5. The key issue therefore is the politics of the of all evil and that there was no moral equiva‐ connection. Here the degeneration of the revolu‐ lence between the US and the SU then how do we tion from the ideas of 1917 is crucial and particu‐ cope with the fact that we are still dealing with larly the development of the idea of socialism in people who ran the old system - that so many of one country because that meant that the whole the old centres of power including the control of relationship was stood on its head and the west‐ the archives lie in the hands of the old appa‐ ern Cps were used to further not international ratchiks. No less than politicians can historians revolution but the foreign policy interests of the avoid this issue. I do not necessarily dispute the Soviet state. One aspect of this was the encourage‐ correctness of the information of funding re‐ ment - especially during the period vealed by the Russian historians concerned but its - of Western Communist parties to portray them‐ a bit rich to claim extra credit because of where it selves as being as much the inheritors of specifc comes from see since these fgures efectively national traditions of radicalism (rather than tra‐ presided over the old Ministry of Disinformation ditions that developed within individual societies for Historians. but on the basis of social and economic forms that 3. The Russian Revolution was in part a re‐ were international in character).in the belief that sponse to the collapse of the idea of international a compromise with nationalism would give them socialism in its Second International form and it greater legitimacy. If you wish to cast the debate refected a renewed determination to create a in terms of infuence 'from abroad' 'foreign pres‐ genuine internationalism. This can be seen in the sure' this is essentially to adopt a nationalist per‐ writings of the early leaders and it was refected spective - some undoubtedly do this consciously at a much deeper level in the wider debates and but it behoves us all to make our assumptions even on the banners of the demonstrations where clear. international socialism had much more than a 6. Elements of that frst tradition address a rhetorical character. It was often the case that human need that we all feel to connect with one many ordinary Russians had a hazy understand‐ another. It was good that people from all over the ing of international afairs in this early period but world contributed time, efort and money to bring we should be careful about eliminating often gen‐ down the South African regime. The pity was that uine feelings of solidarity from history. for so long governments did so little. For my part I 4. Because of this internationalism in their am happy to have given money and signed a peti‐ own terms the would have been de‐ tion to try to save someone on death row in the US serving of criticism had their been no Moscow this weekend for however unpalatable it may be

8 H-Net Reviews to people in the United States to have criticism the communist parties in the west had roots albeit from abroad I reject the idea that we live in na‐ uneven ones. Nowhere was the argument suf‐ tional boxes and I believe that capital punishment cient that 'Moscow says we have to do this in the United States is a disgrace to a civilized so‐ RESPONSE BY M.J. Carley . this position and recognize the right of people in May I reply please to the rebuttal of my re‐ the United States to give money and support to view by Messrs. Klehr and Haynes. I think it criticizing and afecting the policies of the British would be appropriate to ofer point by point com‐ government as in Ireland. Uncomfortable though ments, but I would like to start by responding to this sometimes is I have to accept it because the the unsuitable and ofensive analogy between my real question is not the abstract one of whether views and the denial of the Holocaust. I can un‐ aid should be given but the specifc political ques‐ derstand that the editors do not like my review of tion of whether a thing is right or wrong. That their book, but there is no justifcation for such question is not solved by running up the Stars and comment; and frankly I am surprised that the Stripes, the Union Jack or the Soviet Flag over po‐ moderator let it pass. litical issues. Not being a denier of the Holocaust nor a 7. Moscow gold however is misleading in an‐ member of any fat earth society, let me say that I other sense - it cannot explain the development of am a scholar of western-Soviet relations and in communist parties. The Russian revolution had particular those relations between the two world such an appeal immediately after 1917 because it wars. I am not a specialist in the CPUSA, but I am seemed to ofer a way out of a dead end that in western-Soviet relations and in particular An‐ many radical traditions across the advanced glo-Franco-Soviet relations between 1917 and world had got into. As a labour historian who has 1939. I have published a book and a large number worked on both the British and Russian experi‐ of articles (four of which forthcoming or submit‐ ence I would argue that this is evident in the prac‐ ted for publication) on various aspects of these re‐ tice of the labour movement as well as its ideolo‐ lations. I am working with R. K. Debo on a book gy. In particular the stress on the centrality of the concerning western-Soviet relations in the 1920s industrial working class, the need to build a so‐ based on French, British, German, American, and, cialist politics around workplace issues and yes, soon, Soviet archives, though of course we strikes, the need to fght for rank and fle move‐ have already made good use of the series of pub‐ ments to capture the trade unions from increas‐ lished Soviet papers. ing bureaucratisation - these were concepts that were embryonically present before 1917 and the Contrary to the assertions of the editors, I do direction of things to come. have some passing knowledge of Comintern activ‐ ities and of western attitudes toward them during 8. The fact that everywhere the early commu‐ the inter-war years. With this in mind, I dare still nist parties drew on complex traditions that were to difer with the editors about the ledger sheet developing organically is important because it which they reproduced in their book. They say helps us to understand the mechanism by which that I have not seen the document frst hand; this control was established in the interests of Soviet of course is true. I did however see the reproduc‐ policy in the 1920s. This was a process of leaning tion of it in their book, and I assumed (I assume frst in favour of one faction and then in favour of still) that it was/is a faithful reproduction of the another. Russian infuence was crucial but it was actual ledger sheet, from which any critical mind crucial because it linked in to the way in which could draw conclusions. I am sure that Messrs.

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Firsov, Pikhoia, and Volkogonov are honourable nual salary of 75 CPUSA organizers and ofcials, and honest men, but no critical reader should be presumably 25 of them in clandestine activities, prepared to take their word on Comintern subsi‐ since the editors say that $25,000 "... was to sup‐ dies to the CPUSA. Incidentally, Dimitri Volko‐ port illegal operations of various sorts" (p. 25). So gonov is a special assistant to Russian president let us say that the money paid for 50 organizers ; I would not be the frst commenta‐ for a year. That would be one approximately for tor to note that his views, however interesting, each state, and one for every two to three million should not be accepted uncritically, since Yeltsin Americans (depending on the census) - for one wishes to discredit Soviet history in order to de‐ year. I rest my case. feat his present political enemies. The editors, of course, refer to their articles in In my initial comments I asked what is the LABOR HISTORY, and they talk about Soviet subsi‐ Russian word which the editors translated as "val‐ dies continuing until the 1980s. Their book and ue", and I ask again: What is the Russian word for my comments pertain mostly to the interwar "value"? When readers know what it is, they will years, and it is from their documents that I drew not have to take anyone's word, they can decide the conclusion that the subsidies were not sub‐ for ourselves. I note that in their very long reply stantial. Even Volkogonov in his book on Lenin on this point, the authors did not answer my notes that Comintern subsidies fell of in the query on the Russian word, or concerning John 1930s (pp. 403, 406). Incidentally, I could fnd no Reed's 1,008,000 rubles. The editors state that reference in Volkogonov's LENIN about Com‐ Reed tried to leave Soviet Russia in February 1920 intern monies paid over to John Reed. with $15,500 in foreign currency and diamonds. With regard to E. Browder's sister's connec‐ Very well, but as the editors note Reed was jailed tion with Soviet government agencies, whether it in Finland and then went back to Soviet Russia, was his sister or sister-in-law (mea culpa), my where he died without returning to the United point still stands. If the editors want to demon‐ States. I asked what happened to the rest of the strate Browder's close connections with the large sum of money given to Reed, assuming the NKVD, they need only to produce documents or editors' calculations to be correct, and how it was other evidence demonstrating these connections sent to American communists? Indeed, if Reed with respect to policy formulation and implemen‐ was to act as courier of this money, why was he tation. Browder's request for his wife's birth cer‐ carrying only $15,500 and not a million or two tifcate through an NKVD channel does not million dollars of valuables? The question is a rea‐ achieve this object, any more than Browder's re‐ sonable one, and remains to be answered. The ed‐ quest that his sister stop working for the NKVD. itors appear to be using what I would call the "ex‐ The latter request does, however, demonstrate his pert's argument": trust us, trust Messrs. Volko‐ good & prudent political sense. The editors indict gonov et al., and accept without question our as‐ me & attempt to discredit me for confusing Brow‐ sertions. der's sister with his sister-in-law; fair enough, As for the $75,000 Comintern subsidy paid to though my error is similar to theirs in dating the the CPUSA, I did not dispute that it was paid, nor Polish repulse of the Soviet invasion to 1921 (p. 6), in fact would I dispute that the Comintern paid when it actually took place in 1920, after a Polish subsidies to various foreign communist parties. I ofensive in April 1920 undertaken with tacit said that I did not think the sum was large, and French government support (see my articles on the editors have only confrmed my supposition. the subject in Historical Journal [1976] & Interna‐ They say that the $75,000 would have paid the an‐

10 H-Net Reviews tional History Review [1980]). If the editors care USSR, and indeed from enterprising document to nit-pick; so can the reviewer. counterfeiters. These gentlemen did a good busi‐ I consider that the editors have demonstrated ness with the American, British, French, and Ger‐ a lack of fair play in quoting from the frst draft of man governments, which later proved rather an my review which the H-Russia moderator clearly embarrassment to them all. Readers should de‐ stated he had mistakenly circulated and was not cide if the analogy fails. intended for posting. Even the second draft on H- On the case of Pierre Cot, the verdict is still Russia contained a few mistakes. The version out. It is quite true that I did not mention British which was cross- posted to H-Labour and H-Diplo and American decrypts of Soviet cable trafc sug‐ is the review for which I will stand to account. gesting Cot's culpability, but it is unclear how the There are several examples of references to the cables implicate Cot and the authors do not say it - early draft: one is the editors' on the use of Soviet they simply assume that Cot was a "Soviet agent". trade revenue for Comintern purposes. The Maybe he was, but the case is not proved. French and British governments thought this was The editors say that I "misunderstand" the in fact the case, by the way, and it is a good lead to Louis/Morris Cohen matter (i.e., atomic espi‐ follow up. The editors deny making any such sug‐ onage); I do not think so. I ask a number of perti‐ gestion. But here is what they say & to which I re‐ nent questions concerning this issue which the ferred in my frst draft: The editors explain that editors do not answer, and the afair requires the U. S. State Department was concerned that some further elucidation before the drawing of "Soviet authorities" had furnished funds to Ameri‐ any dramatic conclusions. cans Julius and Armand Hammer for the pur‐ I am glad incidentally that the editors raise chase of a bank through which funds could be the matter of CPUSA involvement with British and transferred surreptitiously objectives. "The con‐ American intelligence agencies. Initially, I was cern was justifed," state the editors: "In 1927 puzzled by the editors' indignation because the British police raided the London ofces of Arcos - CPUSA was cooperating with these agencies the All-Russian Co-Operative Society - an agency against Nazi and fascist Italy. Readers ostensibly engaged in promoting Soviet-British may remember that the USA and the USSR were trade" (p. 27). "Ostensibly" suggests that Arcos had allies during the second world war. What appears other surreptitious activities. Maybe it did, but the to bother the editors is that American communists British Foreign Ofce did not think the police had lied about being communists or continued their turned up enough incriminating evidence to justi‐ loyalties to the communist party while assisting fy the rupture of diplomatic relations. Tory "die- British and American intelligence services (e.g., hards" did not need much of an excuse; Arcos pp. 267, 279-80). I do not remember that the USSR, would do, and they got rupture. or European communist resistance movements The editors do not like my comparison of the (which dominated the resistance in Europe "pilfering" of State Department documents with against ), agreed to give up being commu‐ the acquisition, shall I say, of Soviet documents. It nist for the sake of the alliance anymore than the is not the same thing, claim the editors, because USA agreed to give up being capitalist. Alliance "AMERICAN communists" provided the docu‐ partners agreed to "caler la voile", trim their ideo‐ ments to Soviet intelligence agencies. Well, sorry, logical sails, but no more than that. but the British and French governments got their Incidentally, the editors appear to make a documents, inter alia, from Soviet communists, good deal out of the Nazi-Soviet non-aggression anti-Bolsheviks both in and out of Soviet Russia/ pact. It was a badge of shame for the Soviet gov‐

11 H-Net Reviews ernment, without a doubt, but before the editors full and proper quotation is "... having at times in‐ wax too indignant on that issue, I would suggest adequate or sporadic communications with the that they examine a little the conduct of the Comintern and indeed between its [i.e., CPUSA] French and British governments over the previ‐ various elements." This is a conclusion, by the ous fve years during which they repeatedly re‐ way, which I drew from reading the editors' docu‐ jected Soviet initiatives for an anti-Nazi alliance ments. (see, inter alia, my recent or forthcoming articles The editors further say they have produced in Cahiers du Mode Russe et Sovietique [1992], Eu‐ "no single smoking gun" in their book. Who could rope-Asia Studies [1993], Canadian Journal of His‐ disagree? They might then wish to instruct Yale U. tory [1994 & forthcoming 1995], Historical Refec‐ P. to exercise a little more restraint in any subse‐ tions [1996]). The editors might also like to read a quent press releases. And the editors dislike being little A.J.P. Taylor. referred to as "editors" even though they have The editors again refer back to the early draft critically edited a collection of 92 Comintern docu‐ of the review, more fair play, to say that it is posi‐ ments, more proof they suggest of my careless re‐ tively ridiculous to suppose that the Comintern view of their work. I do not wish to ofer personal could act without CPSU/Soviet government ap‐ ofence, and so henceforth I will refer to the edi‐ proval. And it is here that the editors reach the tors as authors - as they wish. And fnally the au‐ paroxysm of their incredulous indignation that I thors accuse me of insisting on the "moral equiva‐ should even suggest that the Soviet government/ lence" of the United States and the USSR. I never CPSU could not always control the Comintern or spoke of moral equivalence and I do not think foreign communist parties. A curious position for morality should normally be mixed up in the ex‐ the editors, since even Volkogonov - within whose ercise of foreign policy. Morality and foreign poli‐ robes the editors like to warm themselves - indi‐ cy like religion and politics is poisonous and usu‐ cates that the Soviet government did not exercise ally false and self-interested. What I would say, full control until after 1924 (LENIN, p. 405); For‐ however, is that historians should try to under‐ eign Ofcials did not think there was full control stand what the Soviet government considered to even in 1936 as they watched the Popular Front be its legitimate security interests. take power in . There is considerable evi‐ The authors quite rightly condemn Stalin's as‐ dence in French, British, and German archives of sassination of Trotskii, and they would rightly the Soviet government's inability to control fully condemn the purges and all the other murderous Comintern activities. Whether it was a communist acts of . But this book is about other mat‐ ruse, I cannot say, but the hypothesis is worth fur‐ ters, and here the authors would do well to con‐ ther investigation, not the editors' dogmatic, dis‐ sider whether they want to continue to sledge‐ missive indignation. hammer documents into a rigid, dogmatic cold Continuing their fair play, the editors refer to war framework. In case the authors have not no‐ my use of the word "treason" [my characteriza‐ ticed, the is over. The USSR lies defeated tion of the editors' view of CPUSA activities] in the and dismembered; Russia is thrown back to fron‐ early draft [not in the fnished review], but then tiers roughly equivalent to those of the 17th cen‐ they themselves take about "a mountain of crimi‐ tury. The United States and the capitalist west are nality" which they will expose in future. The edi‐ triumphant! Why do the authors not get on with tors also ridicule my position by misquoting me in writing good, sophisticated history, instead of con‐ referring to "inadequate or sporadic communica‐ tinuing their necrophilic grapple with the corpse tions" between the CPUSA and the Comintern. The of a dead adversary.

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RESPONSE BY Harvey Klehr John E. Haynes ments to foreign Communists. Some of these pay‐ ments were made in marks, pounds, or other for‐ Professor Carley's latest post confrms that he eign currencies and some in more tsennosti. What did not read our book very carefully. Let us start would be the purpose of paying Reed and the oth‐ with a trivial issue; whether we are authors or, as ers in paper rubles that had no exchange value he insists on calling us, editors. In the heading of and would have been useless for the intended his initial review, where the title of the book and purpose of jump- starting the international Com‐ other publishing information is placed, Professor munist movement? Carley writes "Edited by..." Whether or not he And, one fnal example of Professor Carley's thinks we deserve to be called authors, he was un‐ carelessness on this issue. We noted that Dmitri der an obligation to readers to accurately describe Volkogonov in his LENIN stated that Reed re‐ the publishing data in the book he was reviewing. ceived more than one million in U.S. dollars for On to move substantive matters. In document #1 the American Communist movement. Mr. Carley regarding the subsidies to the American Commu‐ in his reply said "I could fnd no reference in nist movement, we translated a word describing Volkogonov's LENIN about Comintern monies the form in which the subsidy was transmitted as paid over to John Reed." Mr. Carley should look "value" and explained that in that context it harder. On page 364 of LENIN: A NEW BIOGRA‐ meant something of value or valuables such as PHY (New York: The Free Press, 1994) is the fol‐ jewels. As we noted, Russian historians and Rus‐ lowing exact quote regarding Comintern subsi‐ sian translators who examined the document dies: "A typical monthly statement begins with agreed with the accuracy of this characterization. Hungary and continues with Czechoslovakia, Ger‐ Carley speculates that the word we translated was many, Italy, America (including US$1.008m for "valiuta" or "stoimost'" and goes on to weave an John Reed), England, the Balkans, Sweden and intricate web about worthless paper rubles. Switzerland." The statement is footnoted and the Wrong guesses. The Russian word is "tsennosti;" footnote on page 503 references the same docu‐ and its meanings include things of value, valu‐ ment that is reproduced in our book as document ables, and jewels. #1. Carley asks what happened to that large sum Just how much did the Comintern give to the and why John Reed only had about $15,000 in cur‐ American Communist movement? Thirty-fve rency and jewels when he was arrested in Fin‐ years ago Theodore Draper estimated that in its land. We do not know. There were a number of frst ffteen years of existence, the CPUSA received other Americans in Russian and other Comintern anywhere from half a million to fve million dol‐ emissaries available to carry funds back to Ameri‐ lars. It now appears that the latter fgure is closer ca. It would have been the height of folly for Reed to the truth. Professor Carley keeps repeating that or any other single individual to have attempted $75,000 in one year was a trivial amount. We re‐ to smuggle the entire sum into the U.S; Reed's ar‐ produced only a few of the documents we found rest amply demonstrated the wisdom of dividing that discussed the transfer of money from the up the fund into smaller amounts for transmittal. USSR to the U.S. In addition to the regular yearly We also call attention to the fact that the same subsidies there were frequent additions for all documents list three other persons who received sorts of special projects, ranging from starting up 1.72 million rubles worth of valuables for the the to separate subsidies for American movement. Moreover, these sums are trade union work. Even leaving aside these spe‐

13 H-Net Reviews cial payments, the yearly subsidy enabled a small to the difculty of contacting Louis refer to dif‐ and struggling political organization -- which the culties in changing his assignment at that time, CPUSA was in the 1920s -- to deploy far more re‐ early 1943, and do not refer to all of 1942. sources than any of its rivals on the Chikov's account places Louis/Cohen's recruit‐ and to support a party structure and full-time ment of an American physicist in mid-1942 and staf whose numbers were the envy of rival that is not inconsistent with what is in the Broth‐ groups whose actual American membership was er-Son document. But, as we noted in the book, many times that of the CPUSA. Adjusted for infa‐ Chikov's account is one that was released with the tion that $75,000 fgure would be the equivalent cooperation of the Russian successor agency to to $670,000 today. Small change? the KGB and the information he gives must be Professor Carley raises a series of questions evaluated with that in mind. Because the Russian about Morris Cohen's role in Soviet atomic espi‐ Foreign Intelligence Service still has institutional onage and the links between the CPUSA's secret reasons to maintain the secrecy of Soviet-era apparatus and that espionage. Morris Cohen, who spies, Chikov gives a pseudonym for the scientist just died in Moscow, was an American Communist Louis/Cohen recruited. Out of a desire to obscure who was recruited as a Soviet spy while in Spain exactly who was recruited, we regard it as possi‐ fghting with the . We ble that the date Chikov gives is not exact. Chikov present evidence suggesting that other American is publishing a longer version of his story of the members of the Brigades may have been recruit‐ Cohens' life as Soviet spies and this may provide ed as well. He was trained as a radio operator and additional information on this matter. given the code name Louis. The KGB has proudly None of this, however, does Carley's enter‐ claimed credit for Cohen's role in atomic espi‐ prise of separating American Communists from onage. The KGB has also credited Vasily Zubilin as Soviet espionage much good. Even if we are being the KGB ofcer in the U.S. who supervised wrong that the Brother-Son document's Louis is penetration of the Manhattan project. One docu‐ Louis/Cohen, Morris Cohen remains an American ment reproduced in our book is a report of the Communist recruited along with his wife, also a Brother-Son network headed by , the CPUSA member, for a life-long career as Soviet man in charge of the CPUSA secret apparatus. spies. Nor does that even afect the incontestable Baker notes that Louis is a radio operator in the fact that the document we reproduced shows that network in 1942 and that his network is working the Brother-Son network, a CPUSA instrument, in close cooperation with Vasily Zubilin. Thus, our was supporting the activities of Vasily Zubilin, the conclusion that Louis/Cohen and Louis of the NKVD supervisor of the penetration of the Man‐ Brother-Son document were the same is based on hattan project. both having the same codename, both being radio But the connection between the CPUSA and operators, and both being associated with atomic atomic espionage goes deeper. Just this week the espionage. CIA and NSA released 49 documents that are part Carley says the Brother-Son document implies of the VENONA decrypts. These were coded cables that Louis was abroad in 1942 and could not be sent to Moscow in the 1940s by Soviet ofces in the Louis who Chikov, the retired KGB ofcer, said the U.S. They are the frst batch of 2,200 decrypted recruited a key Soviet source. The Brother- Son NKVD cables that will be released in the next document used pseudonyms for locations and year. In addition to proving beyond a shadow of a Louis may or may not have been abroad. Further, doubt that the Rosenbergs were Soviet spies, the the report is from early 1943, and the references released documents make it clear that Bernard

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Schuster, a CPUSA ofcial in New York who intelligence against ." We're puzzled worked in Baker's apparatus, was providing logis‐ as well because we said nothing of the sort. Our tical assistance to the NKVD's atomic espionage. point was and is that American Communists The NSA-CIA announcement about what to expect STOPPED cooperating with American and British in the documents to be released in the next year intelligence on Soviet orders. What we wrote was notes: "Information derived from the VENONA exactly the reverse of what Mr. Carley thinks we translations shows the KGB's [NKVD's] extensive wrote. contacts with the American Communist Party. Some of Professor Carley's other remarks Many of the espionage activities by members of seem to us irrelevant. What has the conduct of the the American Communist Party are refected in British and French governments in the 1930s to the VENONA translations." do with our book on the American Communist Mr. Carley's assertions about Earl Browder party underground operations? Carley brings up are puzzling. To demonstrate Browder's ties to the what some anti-Bolsheviks may or may not have NKVD, he insists, we "need only to produce docu‐ done in the USSR. Again, we are writing about ments or other evidence demonstrating these con‐ what American Communists were doing in Ameri‐ nections with respect to policy formulation and ca. On the other hand, he says we should not have implementation." We are at a loss to understand talked about the assassination of Trotsky because what Carley is getting at. That the NKVD deter‐ he says our book "is about other matters." We did mined CPUSA policy? That wasn't its function. The not gratuitously bring up Trotsky's assassination. Comintern took care of that task. But our point We brought it up in connection with the CPUSA's were really quite simple. Through the NKVD secret apparatus's role in infltrating the Ameri‐ Browder informed the Soviets that Cot, then a can Trotskyist organization and its direct role in newly arrived exile in the U.S., had met with the successful insertion of the assassin into Trot‐ Browder and "wants the leaders of the Soviet sky's Mexican residence. Union to know of his willingness to perform what‐ We realize this is tedious, but a few fnal ex‐ ever mission we might choose." As we note, de‐ amples of Mr. Carley not being aware of what he crypted Soviet radio cables, VENONA again, has said. He now claims that we have unfairly tak‐ showed that the NKVD took Cot up on his ofer. en him to task for using the work "treason" in the But that was not Browder's only connection to the frst of the two versions of his review that were NKVD. He was fully cognizant of the activities of posted-- a word that "was not in the fnished re‐ the Brother-Son network and its links to Zubilin. view." But in the fnished review here is Professor If Professor Carley had carefully read our Carley talking about "the editors' [sic] most def‐ book he would have found documents where the nite conclusions concerning the 'integral links' CPUSA and Browder quite clearly took orders and treasonable activities of the CPUSA." And, he from the NKVD. We reproduce documents demon‐ now says that because we talk of a "mountain of strating that Browder and Gene Dennis accepted criminality," he is somehow justifed in using the orders from the Comintern and the NKVD to close word treason. But not all criminal activities are down an operation against Nazi Germany in treasonable. Treason has a precise and limited which American Communists cooperated with the meaning and we do not use it. Professor Carley is OSS during World War II. In his latest post Carley more free with his words. Also, Mr. Carley states hopelessly confused this episode. Mr. Carley re‐ that a passing reference we made to the Polish- ports that he was "puzzled by our indignation that Bolshevik war was wrong by our dating its end to the CPUSA cooperated with American and British 1921 rather than 1920. The battle of the Vistula

15 H-Net Reviews was in 1920, to be sure, but the war did not end ment "at that time, early 1943, and do[es] not re‐ until the Treaty of Riga of March 18, 1921. fer to all of 1942". Is this also legerdemain? Here RESPONSE BY M.J. Carley "GENERALLY [my emphasis] communications with Louis are extremely difcult" (p. 210). In‐ Messrs. Klehr & Haynes! Shall we go around deed, as the authors note, the brother-son docu‐ one more time? ment "... is a year-end report on the 1942 activities Thank you for the reference to Volkogonov and fnancing of an espionage network" (p. 206). [by the way readers, if you search for it, the au‐ It begins: "Brother: Year 1942 has been character‐ thors transposed the page number; look on p. ized by difculties arising from the war, difcul‐ 346]. Volkogonov says US$1.008m; the authors say ties we were not equipped to cope with and on 1.008m rubles in valuables. And the authors do the whole have not solved up to this time..." (p. not know how the money got to the United States. 208). The authors concede the date given by a So‐ It is a incongruous admission among the accusato‐ viet intelligence ofcer may not be exact, but if ry, ad hominem allegations and statements made the date is not exact, other elements of the au‐ by the authors. thors' theory may not be exact either. As for the Readers! Would you not agree? The authors' Venona decrypts, we shall have to wait to see if words "We do not know" mark the beginning of they explain the conundrums of this afair. the path to scholarly wisdom and humility. But I am not a specialist in such matters, but I be‐ authors! If you do not know how the money was lieve that Maurice Isserman is. A colleague passed sent to the United States, how can you be sure that me the other day a copy of his review of Klehr et it was sent in full or at all, as you state unequivo‐ al. (The Nation, 12.6.95); coincidentally, Isserman cally (p. 24)? Even the Comintern could not keep raises, inter alia, the same point about the where track of all its money. abouts of Louis in 1942 (p. 855). He speculates that Since the authors excuse themselves for delv‐ the brother-son network may have been "nothing ing into trivial issues; I shall do the same. The au‐ more than a Comintern postal service" (p. 856). thors reply triumphantly to my comment about Messrs. Klehr & Haynes, will you write to The Na‐ the dates of the Soviet-Polish war that the treaty tion? of Riga was signed in March 1921 and that there‐ There is another interesting point in the fore their reference is after all correct. But here is brother-son document. The authors' make much what the authors actually write: "When re‐ of the Comintern advisory (May 1942) to cease pulsed a Soviet invasion in 1921..." A trivial mat‐ CPUSA cooperation with American and British in‐ ter which illustrates the authors' skill in legerde‐ telligence services, but it does not seem to have main, but not in historical accuracy. been entirely obeyed as the brother-son docu‐ On the matter of CPUSA involvement in Soviet ment reports that "ever since Dec. 7. 1941" com‐ atomic espionage: Readers, you may remember rades had worked for or cooperated with the Of‐ that I asked, inter alia, how agent Louis could be fce of War Information "with our direct approval in the United States in 1942 helping Soviet intelli‐ and under our steady guidence (sic)" (cf., pp. gence services to penetrate the Manhattan 210-11 & 271). In any event, there was certainly project, and at the same time be abroad. The au‐ no halting of communist resistance cooperation thors say that the brother-son document points to with the Allied powers in Europe - whatever its difculties in contacting Louis in early 1943 and difculties and limitations. that the report is about changing Louis' assign‐

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Readers! In my review, I said "Mind the gap", between the authors' evidence and the authors' conclusions. I say it still!

If there is additional discussion of this review, you may access it through the network, at https://networks.h-net.org/h-russia

Citation: Michael J. Carley. Review of Klehr, Harvey; Haynes, John E.; Firsov, Fridrikh I., eds. The Secret World of American Communism. H-Russia, H-Net Reviews. June, 1995.

URL: https://www.h-net.org/reviews/showrev.php?id=91

This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution-Noncommercial-No Derivative Works 3.0 United States License.

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